Task: sc_caseorigin

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Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether identifiable applicants who were denied employment because of race after the effective date and in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), may be awarded seniority status retroactive to the dates of their employment applications.
Petitioner Franks brought this class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against his former employer, respondent Bowman Transportation Co., and his unions, the International Union of District 50, Allied and Technical Workers of the United States and Canada, and its local, No. 13600, alleging various racially discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII. Petitioner Lee intervened on behalf of himself and others similarly situated alleging racially discriminatory hiring and discharge policies limited to Bowman’s employment of over-the-road (OTR) truck drivers. Following trial, the District Court found that Bowman had engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination in various company policies, including the hiring, transfer, and discharge of employees, and found further that the discriminatory practices were perpetrated in Bowman’s collective-bargaining agreement with the unions. The District Court certified the action as a proper class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (2) and, of import to the issues before this Court, found that petitioner Lee represented all black applicants who sought to be hired or to transfer to OTR driving positions prior to January 1, 1972.. In its final order and decree, the District Court subdivided the class represented by petitioner Lee into a class of black nonemployee applicants for OTR positions prior to January 1, 1972 (class 3), and a class of black employees who applied for transfer to OTR positions prior to the same date (class 4).
In its final judgment entered July 14, 1972, the District Court permanently enjoined the respondents from perpetuating the discriminatory practices found to exist, and, in regard to the black applicants for OTR positions, ordered Bowman to notify the members of both subclasses within 30 days of their right to priority consideration for such jobs. The District Court declined, however, to grant to the unnamed members of classes 3 and 4 any other specific relief sought, which included an award of backpay and seniority status retroactive to the date of individual application for an OTR. position.
On petitioners’ appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, raising for the most part claimed inadequacy of the relief ordered respecting unnamed members of the various subclasses involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. 495 F. 2d 398 (1974). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had exercised its discretion under an erroneous view of law insofar as it failed to award backpay to the unnamed class members of both classes 3 and 4, and vacated the judgment in that respect. The judgment was reversed insofar as it failed to award any seniority remedy to the members of class 4 who after the judgment of the District Court sought and obtained priority consideration for transfer to OTR positions. As respects unnamed members of class 3 — nonemployee black applicants who applied for and were denied OTR positions prior to January 1, 1972 — the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s denial of any form of seniority relief. Only this last aspect of the Court of Appeals’ judgment is before us for review under our grant of the petition for certiorari. 420 U. S. 989 (1975).
I
Respondent Bowman raises a threshold issue of mootness. The District Court found that Bowman had hired petitioner Lee, the sole-named representative of class 3, and had subsequently properly discharged him for cause, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Bowman argues that since Lee will not in any event be eligible for any hiring relief in favor of OTR nonemployee dis-criminatees, he has no personal stake in the outcome and therefore the question whether nonemployee discrimi-natees are entitled to an award of seniority when hired in compliance with the District Court order is moot. Bowman relies on Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), and Board of School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975). That reliance is misplaced.
Sosna involved a challenge to a one-year residency requirement in a. state divorce statute. The District Court properly certified the action as a class action. However, before the case reached this Court, the named representative satisfied the state residency requirement (and had in fact obtained a divorce in another State). 419 U. S., at 398, and n. 7. Although the named representative no longer had a personal stake in the outcome, we held that “[w]hen the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the named representative]," id., at 399, and, accordingly the “cases or controversies” requirement of Art. III of the Constitution was satisfied. Id., at 402.
It is true as Bowman emphasizes that Sosna was an instance of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” aspect of the law of mootness. Id., at 399-401. And that aspect of Sosna was remarked in Board of School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, supra, a case which was held to be moot. But nothing in our Sosna or Board of School Comm’rs opinions holds or even intimates that the fact that the named plaintiff no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of a certified class action renders the class action moot unless there remains an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Insofar as the concept of mootness defines constitutionally minimal conditions for the invocation of federal judicial power, its meaning and scope, as with all concepts of justiciability, must be derived from the fundamental policies informing the “cases or controversies” limitation imposed by Art. III.
“As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 9A-95 (1968).
There can be no question that this certified class action “clearly presented” the District Court and the Court of Appeals “with a case or controversy in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Constitution.” Sosna, supra, at 398. Those courts were presented with the seniority question “in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast, supra, at 95. The only constitutional mootness question is therefore whether, with regard to the seniority issues presented, “a live controversy [remains] at the time this Court reviews the case.” Sosna, supra, at 402.
The unnamed members of the class are entitled to the relief already afforded Lee, hiring and backpay, and thus to that extent have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [whether they are also entitled to seniority relief] as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult... questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Given a properly certified class action, Sosna contemplates that mootness turns on whether, in the specific circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary relationship sufficient to fulfill this function exists. In this case, that adversary-relationship obviously obtained as to unnamed class members with respect to the underlying cause of action and also continues to obtain as respects their assertion that the relief they have received in entitlement to consideration for hiring and backpay is inadequate without further award of entitlement to seniority benefits. This becomes crystal clear upon examination of the circumstances and the record of this case.
The unnamed members of the class involved are identifiable individuals, individually named in the record. Some have already availed themselves of the hiring relief ordered by the District Court and are presently employed as OTR drivers by Bowman. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. The conditions of that employment are now and so far as can be foreseen will continue to be partially a function of their status in the seniority system. The rights of other members of the class to employment under the District Court’s orders are currently the subject of further litigation in that court. Id., at 15. No questions are raised concerning the continuing desire of any of these class members for the seniority relief presently in issue. No questions are raised concerning the tenacity and competence of their counsel in pursuing that mode of legal relief before this Court. It follows that there is no meaningful sense in which a “live controversy” reflecting the issues "before the Court could be found to be absent. Accordingly, Bowman’s mootness argument has no merit.
II
In affirming the District Court’s denial of seniority relief to the class 3 group of discriminatees, the Court of Appeals held that the relief was barred by § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h). We disagree. Section 703 (h) provides in pertinent part:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system... provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....”
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a discriminatory refusal to hire “does not affect the bona fides of the seniority system. Thus, the differences in the benefits and conditions of employment which a seniority system accords to older and newer employees is protected [by § 703 (h)] as ‘not an unlawful employment practice.’” 495 F. 2d, at 417. Significantly, neither Bowman nor the unions undertake to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment on that ground. It is clearly erroneous.
The black applicants for OTR positions composing class 3 are limited to those whose applications were put in evidence at the trial. The underlying legal wrong affecting them is not the alleged operation of a racially discriminatory seniority system but of a racially discriminatory hiring system. Petitioners do not ask for modification or elimination of the existing seniority system, but only for an award of the seniority status they would have individually enjoyed under the present system but for the illegal discriminatory refusal to hire. It is this context that must shape our determination as to the meaning and effect of § 703 (h).
On its face, § 703 (h) appears to be only a definitional provision; as with the other provisions of § 703, subsection (h) delineates which employment practices are illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not. Section 703 (h) certainly does not expressly purport to qualify or proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, § 706 (g), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g), in circumstances where an illegal discriminatory act or practice is found. Further, the legislative history of § 703 (h) plainly negates its reading as limiting or qualifying the relief authorized under § 706 (g). The initial bill reported by the House Judiciary Committee as H. R. 7152 and passed by the full House on February 10, 1964, did not contain § 703 (h). Neither the House bill nor the majority Judiciary Committee Report even mentioned the problem of seniority. That subject thereafter surfaced during the debate of the bill in the Senate. This debate prompted Senators Clark and Case to respond to criticism that Title VII would destroy existing seniority systems by placing an interpretive memorandum in the Congressional Record. The memorandum stated: “Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). Senator Clark also placed in the Congressional Record a Justice Department statement concerning Title VII which stated: “[I]t has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on. seniority-rights existing at the time it takes effect.” Id., at 7207. Several weeks thereafter, following several informal conferences among the Senate leadership, the House leadership, the Attorney General and others, see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 445 (1966), a compromise substitute bill prepared by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen, Senate majority and minority leaders respectively, containing § 703 (h) was introduced on the Senate floor. Although the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute bill, and hence § 703 (h), was not the subject of a committee report, see generally Vaas, supra, Senator Humphrey, one of the informal conferees, later stated during debate on the substitute that § 703 (h) was not designed to alter the meaning of Title VII generally but rather “merely clarifies its present intent and effect.” 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). Accordingly, whatever the exact meaning and scope of § 703 (h) in light of its unusual legislative history and the absence of the usual legislative materials, see Vaas, supra, at 457-458, it is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act. There is no indication in the legislative materials that § 703 (h) was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved — as in the instant case, a discriminatory refusal to hire. This accords with the apparently unanimous view of commentators, see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1632 (1969); Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 487, 506 (1975). We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, § 703 (h) barred the award of seniority relief to the unnamed class 3 members.
Ill
There remains the question whether an award of seniority relief is appropriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, specifically, § 706 (g).
We begin by repeating the observation of earlier decisions that in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 429-430 (1971), and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the “highest priority,” Alexander, supra, at 47; Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968). Last Term’s Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975), consistently with the congressional plan, held that one of the central purposes of Title VII is “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.” Id., at 418. To effectuate this “make whole” objective, Congress in § 706 (g) vested broad equitable discretion in the federal courts to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” The legislative history supporting the 1972 amendments of § 706 (g) of Title VII affirms the breadth of this discretion. “The provisions of [§ 706 (g)] are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible.... [T]he Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole, and... the attainment of this objective... requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.” Seetion-by-Section Analysis of H. R. 1746, accompanying the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972—Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972). This is emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring. Adequate relief may well be denied in the absence of a seniority remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system that would have been his had he been hired at the time of his application. It can hardly be questioned that ordinarily such relief will be necessary to achieve the “make-whole” purposes of the Act.
Seniority systems and the entitlements conferred by credits earned thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in the.economic employment system of this Nation. S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management 104-115 (1960). Seniority principles are increasingly used to allocate entitlements to scarce benefits among competing employees (“competitive status” seniority) and to compute noncompetitive benefits earned under the contract of employment (“benefit” seniority). Ibid. We have already said about “competitive status” seniority that it “has become of overriding importance, and one of its major functions is to determine who gets or who keeps an available job.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346-347 (1964). “More than any other provision of the collective [-bargaining] agreement... seniority affects the economic security of the individual employee covered by its terms.” Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1535 (1962). “Competitive status” seniority also often plays a broader role in modern employment systems, particularly systems operated under collective-bargaining agreements:
“Included among the benefits, options, and safeguards affected by competitive status seniority, are not only promotion and layoff, but also transfer, demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, order of layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, 'bumping’ possibilities in the face of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, working conditions, length of layoff endured without reducing seniority, length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and, in one plant, a preferred place in the punch-out line.” Stacy, 28 Vand. L. Rev., supra, at 490 (footnotes omitted).
Seniority standing in employment with respondent Bowman, computed from the departmental date of hire, determines the order of layoff and recall, of employees. Further, job assignments for OTR drivers are posted for competitive bidding and seniority is used to determine the highest bidder. As OTR drivers are paid on a per-mile basis, earnings are therefore to some extent a function of seniority. Additionally, seniority computed from the company date of hire determines the length of an employee’s vacation and pension benefits. Obviously merely to require Bowman to hire the class 3 victim of discrimination falls far short of a “make whole” remedy. A concomitant award of the seniority credit he presumptively would have earned but for the wrongful treatment would, also seem necessary in the absence of justification for denying that relief. Without an award of seniority dating from the time when he was discriminatorily refused employment, an individual who applies for and obtains employment as an OTR driver pursuant to the District Court’s order will never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy of seniority according to which these various employment benefits are distributed. He will perpetually remain subordinate to persons who, but for the illegal discrimination, would have been in respect to entitlement to these benefits his inferiors.
The Court of Appeals apparently followed this reasoning in holding that the District Court erred in not granting seniority relief to class 4 Bowman employees who were discriminatorily refused transfer to OTR positions. Yet the class 3 discriminatees in the absence of a comparable seniority award would also remain subordinated in the seniority system to the class 4 discrimi-natees. The distinction plainly finds no support anywhere in Title VII or its legislative history. Settled law dealing with the related “twin” areas of discriminatory hiring and discharges violative of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seg., provides a persuasive analogy. “[I]t would indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one which it denied for the other.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 187 (1941). For courts to differentiate without justification between the classes of discriminatees “would be a differentiation not only without substance but in defiance of that against which the prohibition of discrimination is directed.” Id., at 188.
Similarly, decisions construing the remedial section of the National Labor Relations Act, § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c)—the model for § 706 (g), Albemarle Paper, 422 U. S., at 419 — make clear that remedies constituting authorized “affirmative action” include an award of seniority status, for the thrust of “affirmative action” redressing the wrong incurred by an unfair labor practice is to make “the employees whole, and thus restor[e] the economic status quo that would have obtained but for the company’s wrongful [act].” NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258, 263 (1969). The task of the NLRB in applying § 10 (c) is “to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no unfair labor practice.” Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 651, 657 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). And the NLRB has often required that the hiring of employees who have been discriminatorily refused employment be accompanied by an award of seniority equivalent to that which they would have enjoyed but for the illegal conduct. See, e. g., In re Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 N. L. R. B. 547, 600, and n. 39, 603-604 (1940), modified on other grounds, 313 U. S. 177 (1941) (ordering persons discriminatorily refused employment hired “without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges”); In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 N. L. R. B. 1182, 1235 (1940), enforced, 316 U. S. 105 (1942) (ordering persons discriminatorily refused employment hired with “any seniority or other rights and privileges they would have acquired, had the respondent not unlawfully discriminated against them”). Plainly the “affirmative action” injunction of § 706 (g) has no lesser reach in the district courts. “Where racial discrimination is concerned, 'the [district] court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the' discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.’ ” Albemarle Paper, supra, at 418.
IV
We are not to be understood as holding that an award of seniority status is requisite in all circumstances. The fashioning of appropriate remedies invokes the sound equitable discretion of the district courts. Respondent Bowman attempts to justify the District Court’s denial of seniority relief for petitioners as an exercise of equitable discretion, but the record is its own refutation of the argument.
Albemarle Paper, supra, at 416, made clear that discretion imports not the court’s “ ‘inclination, but... its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.’ ” Discretion is vested not for purposes of “limit[ing] appellate review of trial courts, or... invit[ing] inconsistency and caprice,” but rather to allow the most complete achievement of the objectives of Title VII that is attainable under

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当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 息