Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM.
Appellant was tried and convicted on two indictments, each charging housebreaking and larceny. The trials were separate, but as the main ground of alleged error is the same, and as the evidence, except as to the house burglarized and the property stolen, is also the same, the appeals in both cases were consolidated for argument in this Court. The evidence against appellant consists of stolen property found in his house and of alleged verbal confessions of guilt. The seizure of the property, without search warrant, was said by the officers to have been made with appellant’s consent and as a part of his confession made immediately after his arrest freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort. Appellant denied he had given consent to have his house searched and denied that he had made any confession to the police. But the trial judge who heard the qu'estion — apart from the jury — admitted the evidence and it is this ruling which is attacked on this appeal. If this were all, the answer would be plain, but as it happens, there is another element in the case which, as we think, places a different aspect on the question. This grows out of the fact that after appellant was arrested and brought from his home to the Police Station and interrogated by the officers, the confession obtained and his consent to the search given, he was continued under arrest for more than a week by the police without being brought before a magistrate, commissioner or court, and this in the very teeth of the statute which commands arraignment “immediately, and without delay.” It was almost this identical situation which, the Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States said, makes a confession, voluntary or involuntary, inadmissible in evidence on the trial of the case.
In the McNabb case five uneducated mountain men were arrested for the murder of a revenue officer. They were taken into custody and more or less continuously questioned for two days in the Federal Building in Chattanooga, Tennessee, by members of the Alcohol Tax Unit before they were committed. Toward the end of the period of their detention they made confessions which the trial court decided were voluntary. After their conviction, on appeal to the Supreme Court, that Court held the confessions inadmissible and reversed the judgments. The principle of the decision was that since the Congressional requirement that police officers take an accused person before a judicial officer for commitment with reasonable promptness was designed to avoid “all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime," and to check “resort to those reprehensible practices known as the ‘third degree,’ ” the violation of the statute in “flagrant disregard- of the procedure which Congress has commanded,” was sufficient to require the exclusion of all evidence so obtained from the accused. As to this the Supreme Court said: “ * * * The record leaves no room for doubt that the questioning of petitioners took place while they were in the custody of the arresting officers and before any order of commitment was made. Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful disobedience of the law.” This unambiguous language leaves us no alternative but to apply the same rule with the same results to the facts in the present case. That this new rule, as Mr. Justice Reed calls it in his dissent, introduces a far-reaching innovation in the established rules of evidence in criminal cases will hardly be questioned, for heretofore the test of admissibility has been thought to be limited to the question — was the confession free and voluntary. Likewise, that its universal application in the Federal Courts will, in some cases — as it may in this — result in a miscarriage of justice is obvious. But doubtless this contingency was fully considered by the Supreme Court, and the conclusion deliberately reached that this — in the cases in which it occurs — will prove a lesser evil than the perpetuation by court approval of a violation by police of statutes designed to protect the personal rights of the individual and preserve his immunity from abuse and from imprisonment except upon a judgment of his peers and the law of the land. In this view it becomes our duty to reverse the judgments and remand the cases to the District Court for new trials in accordance with the views expressed herein.
No. 8533 reversed.
No. 8547 reversed.
R.S.D.C. § 397; Act July 16, 1862, Ch. 181, Sec. 10, V. 12, p. 581; D.C.Code, 1940, Title 4, Sec. 140.
318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 614, 87 L. Ed. —.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1