Task: sc_casesource

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We address in this case whether an Indian tribe may assert criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who is an Indian but not a tribal member. We hold that the retained sovereignty of the tribe as a political and social organization to govern its own affairs does not include the authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its own membership.
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The events giving rise to this jurisdictional dispute occurred on the Salt River Indian Reservation. The reservation was authorized by statute in 1859, and established by Executive Order of President Hayes in 1879. It occupies some 49,200 acres just east of Scottsdale, Arizona, below the McDowell Mountains. The reservation is the home of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, a recognized Tribe with an enrolled membership. Petitioner in this case, Albert Duro, is an enrolled member of another Indian Tribe, the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians. Petitioner is not eligible for membership in the Pima-Maricopa Tribe. As a nonmember, he is not entitled to vote in Pima-Maricopa elections, to hold tribal office, or to serve on tribal juries. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Code of Ordinances §§3-1, 3-2, 5-40, App. 55-59.
Petitioner has lived most of his life in his native State of California, outside any Indian reservation. Between March and June 1984, he resided on the Salt River Reservation with a Pima-Maricopa woman friend. He worked for the PiCopa Construction Company, which is owned by the Tribe.
On June 15, 1984, petitioner allegedly shot and killed a 14-year-old boy within the Salt River Reservation boundaries. The victim was a member of the Gila River Indian Tribe of Arizona, a separate Tribe that occupies a separate reservation. A complaint was filed in United States District Court charging petitioner with murder and aiding and abetting murder in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§2, 1111, and 1153. Federal agents arrested petitioner in California, but the federal indictment was later dismissed without prejudice on the motion of the United States Attorney.
Petitioner then was placed in the custody of Pima-Maricopa officers, and he was taken to stand trial in the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Court. The tribal court’s powers are regulated by a federal statute, which at that time limited tribal criminal penalties to six months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. 25 U. S. C. § 1302(7) (1982 ed.). The tribal criminal code is therefore confined to misdemeanors. Petitioner was charged with the illegal firing of a weapon on the reservation. After the tribal court denied petitioner’s motion to • dismiss the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, naming the tribal chief judge and police chief as respondents.
The District Court granted the writ, holding that assertion of jurisdiction by the Tribe over an Indian who was not a member would violate the equal protection guarantees of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U. S. C. §1301 et seq. Under this Court's holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The District Court reasoned that, in light of this limitation, to subject a nonmember Indian to tribal jurisdiction where non-Indians are exempt would constitute discrimination based on race. The court held that respondents failed to articulate a valid reason for the difference in treatment under either rational-basis or strict-scrutiny standards, noting that nonmember Indians have no greater right to participation in tribal government than non-Indians, and no lesser fear of discrimination in a court system that bars the participation of their peers.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 821 F. 2d 1358 (1987). Both the panel opinion and the dissent were later revised. 851 F. 2d 1136 (1988). The Court of Appeals examined our opinion in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978), decided 16 days after Oliphant, a case involving a member prosecuted by his Tribe in which we stated that tribes do not possess criminal jurisdiction over “nonmembers.” The Court of Appeals concluded that the distinction drawn between members and nonmembers of a tribe throughout our Wheeler opinion was “indiscriminate,” and that the court should give “little weight to these casual references.” 851 F. 2d, at 1140-1141. The court also found the historical record “equivocal” on the question of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.
The Court of Appeals then examined the federal criminal statutes applicable to Indian country. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1151-1153. Finding that references to “Indians” in those statutes and the cases construing them applied to all Indians, without respect to their particular tribal membership, the court concluded that “if Congress had intended to divest tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians they would have done so.” The tribes, it held, retain jurisdiction over minor crimes committed by Indians against other Indians “without regard to tribal membership.” 851 F. 2d, at 1143.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s equal protection argument under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. It found no racial classification in subjecting petitioner to tribal jurisdiction that could not be asserted over a non-Indian. Instead, it justified tribal jurisdiction over petitioner by his significant contacts with the Pima-Maricopa Community, such as residing with a member of the Tribe on the reservation and his employment with the Tribe’s construction company. The need for effective law enforcement on the reservation provided a rational basis for the classification. Id., at 1145.
As a final basis for its result, the panel said that failure to recognize tribal jurisdiction over petitioner would create a “jurisdictional void.” To treat petitioner as a non-Indian for jurisdictional purposes would thwart the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over the misdemeanor because, as the court saw it, the relevant federal criminal statute would not apply to this case due to an exception for crimes committed “by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.” See 18 U. S. C. § 1152. This would leave the crime subject only to the state authorities, which had made no effort to prosecute petitioner, and might lack the power to do so. 851 F. 2d, at 1145-1146.
Judge Sneed dissented, arguing that this Court’s opinions limit the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian tribe to its members, and that Congress has given the Tribé no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. He reasoned that the federal criminal statutes need not be construed to create a jurisdictional void, and stressed that recognition of jurisdiction here would place the nonmember Indian, unlike any other citizen, in jeopardy of trial by an alien tribunal. Id., at 1146-1151. These views were reiterated by three other Ninth Circuit judges in a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. 860 F. 2d 1463 (1988). The dissenters accepted petitioner’s contention that tribal jurisdiction subjected him to an impermissible racial classification and to a tribunal with the potential for bias.
Between the first and second sets of opinions from the Ninth Circuit panel, the Eighth Circuit held that tribal courts do not possess inherent criminal jurisdiction over persons not members of the tribe. Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F. 2d 486 (1988). Due to the timing of the opinions, both the Eighth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit in this case had the benefit of the other’s analysis but rejected it. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 490 U. S. 1034 (1989), and now reverse.
1 — 1 1 — 1
Our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler provide the analytic framework for resolution of this dispute. Oliphant established that the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes does not extend to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation. Wheeler reaffirmed the longstanding recognition of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribe members. The case before us is at the intersection of these two precedents, for here the defendant is an Indian, but not a member of the Tribe that asserts jurisdiction. As in Oliphant, the tribal officials do not claim jurisdiction under an affirmative congressional authorization or treaty provision, and petitioner does not contend that Congress has legislated to remove jurisdiction from the tribes. The question we must answer is whether the sovereignty retained by the tribes in their dependent status within our scheme of government includes the power of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.
We think the rationale of our decisions in Oliphant and Wheeler, as well as subsequent cases, compels the conclusion that Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members. Our discussion of tribal sovereignty in Wheeler bears most directly on this case. We were consistent in describing retained tribal sovereignty over the defendant in terms of a tribe’s power over its members. Indeed, our opinion in Wheeler stated that the tribes “cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.” 435 U. S., at 326. Literal application of that statement to these facts would bring this case to an end. Yet respondents and amici, including the United States, argue forcefully that this statement in Wheeler cannot be taken as a statement of the law, for the party before the Court in Wheeler was a member of the Tribe.
It is true that Wheeler presented no occasion for a holding on the present facts. But the double jeopardy question in Wheeler demanded an examination of the nature of retained tribal power. We held that jurisdiction over a Navajo defendant by a Navajo court was part of retained tribal sovereignty, not a delegation of authority from the Federal Government. It followed that a federal prosecution of the same offense after a tribal conviction did not involve two prosecutions by the same sovereign, and therefore did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Our analysis of tribal power was directed to the tribes’ status as limited sovereigns, necessarily subject to the overriding authority of the United States, yet retaining necessary powers of internal self-governance. We recognized that the “sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.” Id., at 323.
A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or aliens. Oliphant recognized that the tribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense. Rather, as our discussion in Wheeler reveals, the retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and social order. The power of a tribe to prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for its own members “does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.” 435 U. S., at 326. As we further described the distinction:
“[T]he dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe.... [T]hey are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.” Ibid.
Our finding that the tribal prosecution of the defendant in Wheeler was by a sovereign other than the United States rested on the premise that the prosecution was a part of the tribe’s internal self-governance. Had the prosecution been a manifestation of external relations between the Tribe and outsiders, such power would have been inconsistent with the Tribe’s dependent status, and could only have come to the Tribe by delegation from Congress, subject to the constraints of the Constitution.
The distinction between members and nonmembers and its relation to self-governance is recognized in other areas of Indian law. Exemption from state taxation for residents of a reservation, for example, is determined by tribal membership, not by reference to Indians as a general class. We have held that States may not impose certain taxes on transactions of tribal members on the reservation because this would interfere with internal governance and self-determination. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973). But this rationale does not apply to taxation of nonmembers, even where they are Indians:
“Nor would the imposition of Washington’s tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on the reservation. There is no evidence that nonmembers have a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disbursements.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 161 (1980).
Similarly, in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), we held that the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land held by the Tribe or held in trust for the Tribe by the United States. But this power could not extend to nonmembers’ activities on land they held in fee. Again we relied upon the view of tribal sovereignty set forth in Oliphant:
“Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” 450 U. S., at 565 (footnote omitted).
It is true that our decisions recognize broader retained tribal powers outside the criminal context. Tribal courts, for example, resolve civil disputes involving nonmembers, including non-Indians. See, e. g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 65-66 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223 (1959); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 253 (1982 ed.) (hereafter Cohen) (“The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian country has been markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal jurisdiction”). Civil authority may also be present in areas such as zoning where the exercise of tribal authority is vital to the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination. See, e. g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U. S. 408 (1989). As distinct from criminal prosecution, this civil authority typically involves situations arising from property ownership within the reservation or “consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Montana v. United States, supra, at 565. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction subjects a person not only to the adjudicatory power of the tribunal, but also to the prosecuting power of the tribe, and involves a far more direct intrusion on personal liberties.
The tribes are, to be sure, “a good deal more than ‘private voluntary organizations,’” and are aptly described as “unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory. ” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975). In the area of criminal enforcement, however, tribal power does not extend beyond internal relations among members. Petitioner is not a member of the Pima-Maricopa Tribe, and is not now eligible to become one. Neither he nor other members of his Tribe may vote, hold office, or serve on a jury under Pima-Maricopa authority. Cf. Oliphant, 435 U. S., at 194, and n. 4. For purposes of criminal jurisdiction, petitioner’s relations with this Tribe are the same as the non-Indian’s in Oliphant. We hold that the Tribe’s powers over him are subject to the same limitations.
f — i f — { I — i
Respondents and amici argue that a review of history requires the assertion of jurisdiction here. We disagree. The historical record in this case is somewhat less illuminating than in Oliphant, but tends to support the conclusion we reach. Early evidence concerning tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is lacking because “[u]ntil the middle of this century, few Indian tribes maintained any semblance of a formal court system. Offenses by one Indian against another were usually handled by social and religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on restitution rather than punishment.” Oliphant, supra, at 197. Cases challenging the jurisdiction of modern tribal courts are few, perhaps because “most parties acquiesce to tribal jurisdiction” where it is asserted. See National American Indian Court Judges Association, Indian Courts and the Future 48 (1978). We have no occasion in this case to address the effect of a formal acquiescence to tribal jurisdiction that might be made, for example, in return for a tribe’s agreement not to exercise its power to exclude an offender from tribal lands, see infra, at 696-697.
Respondents rely for their historical argument upon evidence that definitions of “Indian” in federal statutes and programs apply to all Indians without respect to membership in a particular tribe. For example, the federal jurisdictional statutes applicable to Indian country use the general term “Indian.” See 18 U. S. C. §§1152-1153. In construing such a term in the Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 733, this Court stated that it “does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, — of the family of Indians.” United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567, 573 (1846). Respondents also emphasize that courts of Indian offenses, which were established by regulation in 1883 by the Department of the Interior and continue to operate today on reservations without tribal courts, possess jurisdiction over all Indian offenders within the relevant reservation. See 25 CFR § 11.2(a) (1989).
This evidence does not stand for the proposition respondents advance. Congressional and administrative provisions such as those cited above reflect the Government’s treatment of Indians as a single large class with respect to federal jurisdiction and programs. Those references are not dispositive of a question of tribal power to treat Indians by the same broad classification. In Colville, we noted the fallacy of reliance upon the fact that member and nonmember Indians may both be “Indians” under a federal definition as proof of federal intent that inherent tribal power must affect them equally:
“[T]he mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation come within the definition of ‘Indian’ for purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C. § 479, does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt such Indians from State taxation.” 447 U. S., at 161.
Similarly, here, respondents’ review of the history of federal provisions does not sustain their claim of tribal power.
We did note in Wheeler that federal statutes showed Congress had recognized and declined to disturb the traditional and “undisputed” power of the tribes over members. 435 U. S., at 324-325. But for the novel and disputed issue in the case before us, the statutes reflect át most the tendency of past Indian policy to treat Indians as an undifferentiated class. The historical record prior to the creation of modern tribal courts shows little federal attention to the individual tribes’ powers as between themselves or over one another’s members. Scholars who do find treaties or other sources illuminating have only divided in their conclusions. Compare Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians on Reservations, 1980 Ariz. S. L. J. 727, 740 (treaties suggest lack of jurisdiction over nonmembers), with Note, Who is an Indian?: Duro v. Reina's Examination of Tribal Sovereignty and Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians, 1988 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 161, 170-171 (treaties suggest retention of jurisdiction over nonmembers).
The brief history of the tribal courts themselves provides somewhat clearer guidance. The tribal courts were established under the auspices of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, codified at 25 U. S. C. §§461-479. The 60 years preceding the Act had witnessed a calculated policy favoring elimination of tribal institutions, sale of tribal lands, and assimilation of Indians as individuals into the dominant culture. Many Indian leaders and others fought to preserve tribal integrity, however, and the 1930’s saw a move toward toleration of Indian self-determination. See generally Cohen 127-153; S. Tyler, A History of Indian Policy 70-150 (1973); A. Debo, A History of the Indians of the United States 201-300 (1970).
The Indian Reorganization Act allowed the expression of retained tribal sovereignty by authorizing creation of new tribal governments, constitutions, and courts. The new tribal courts supplanted the federal courts of Indian offenses operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Significantly, new law and order codes were required to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U. S. C. § 476. The opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior on the new tribal codes leave unquestioned the authority of the tribe over its members.
Evidence on criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers is less clear, but on balance supports the view that inherent tribal jurisdiction extends to tribe members only. One opinion flatly declares that “[ijnherent rights of self government may be invoked to justify punishment of members of the tribe but not of non members.” 1 Op. Solicitor of Dept. of Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974 (Op. Sol.), p. 699 (Nov. 17, 1936). But this opinion refers to an earlier opinion that speaks in broad terms of jurisdiction over Indians generally. 55 I. D. 14, 1 Op. Sol. 445 (Oct. 25, 1934). Another opinion disapproved a tribal ordinance covering all Indians on the ground that the tribal constitution embraced only members. The Solicitor suggested two alternative remedies, amendment of the tribal constitution and delegation of federal authority from the Secretary. 1 Op. Sol. 736 (Mar. 17, 1937). One of these options would reflect a belief that tribes possess inherent sovereignty over nonmembers, while the other would indicate its absence. Two later opinions, however, give a strong indication that the new tribal courts were not understood to possess power over nonmembers. One mentions only adoption of nonmembers into the tribe or receipt of delegated authority as means of acquiring jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 1 Op. Sol. 849 (Aug. 26, 1938). A final opinion states more forcefully that the only means by which a tribe could deal with interloping nonmember Indians were removal of the offenders from the reservation or acceptance of delegated authority. 1 Op. Sol. 872 (Feb. 17, 1939).
These opinions provide the most specific historical evidence on the question before us and, we think, support our conclusion. Taken together with the general history preceding the creation of modern tribal courts, they indicate that the tribal courts embody only the powers of internal self-governance we have described. We are not persuaded that external criminal jurisdiction is an accepted part of the courts’ function.
IV
Whatever might be said of the historical record, we must view it in light of petitioner’s status as a citizen of the United States. Many Indians became citizens during the era of allotment and tribal termination around the turn of the century, and all were made citizens in 1924. See Cohen 142-143 (tracing history of Indian citizenship). That Indians are citizens does not alter the Federal Government’s broad authority to legislate with respect to enrolled Indians as a class, whether to impose burdens or benefits. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974). In the absence of such legislation, however, Indians like other citizens are embraced within our Nation’s “great solicitude that its citizens be protected... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.” Oliphant, 435 U. S., at 210.
Criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the overriding sovereignty of the United States. Ibid. We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them. As full citizens, Indians share in the territorial and political sovereignty of the United States. The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members. Indians like all other citizens share allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States. A tribe’s additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes a focus on consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate. While modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial process, they are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often “subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments,” and their legal methods may depend on “unspoken practices and norms.” Cohen 334-335. It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribal governments. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376 (1896). The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts. There is, for example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer. See 25 U. S. C. § 1302(6).
Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional protections as a matter of right. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957). We have approved delegation to an Indian tribe of the authority to promulgate rules that may be enforced by criminal sanction in federal court

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常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
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