Task: songer_immunity

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to some threshold issue at the trial court level. These issues are only considered to be present if the court of appeals is reviewing whether or not the litigants should properly have been allowed to get a trial court decision on the merits. That is, the issue is whether or not the issue crossed properly the threshhold to get on the district court agenda. The issue is: "Did the court refuse to reach the merits of the appeal because it concluded that the defendant had immunity (e.g., the governmental immunity doctrine)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the United States, as the stevedore employer of the federal civil service longshoreman, is subject to suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) for breach of its warranty of workmanlike performance to a private vessel. We hold that it is not.
In 1974, William Speller, a federally employed longshoreman, sustained injuries in a .fall aboard the S. S. AMERICAN CORSAIR due to the presence of slippery hydraulic fluid in the deck area where he was working. Speller sued the vessel’s owner, United States Lines (appellant herein), on the theory of unseaworthiness of the vessel, a strict liability theory. That suit was settled with the shipowner paying Speller $10,000. United States Lines then brought this indemnity action against the United States (appellee herein), alleging that the United States, as Speller’s employer, breached its warranty of workmanlike performance in failing to correct or warn of the slippery deck’s condition. The district court found that the United States had breached the warranty, but nevertheless was not subject to suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act. From an adverse decision, United States Lines appeals.
This case presents the classic circuity of action in the admiralty field which was abolished, at least in the private sector, by the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (hereinafter L.H.W.C.A.). Prior to 1972 an injured longshoreman, entitled to compensation under the L.H.W.C.A., was precluded from suing his employer, but could seek relief from the vessel’s owner if the vessel’s unseaworthy condition caused the accident. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki (1946) 328 U.S. 85, 95-97, 100, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099. When the unseaworthy condition was attributable to the employer’s unworkmanlike performance, the shipowner could recover indemnity from the stevedore (employer), Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp. (1956) 350 U.S. 124, 131-34, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133. Hence, the longshoreman, in effect, recovered indirectly from his employer that which he could not recover directly. This type of circular action occurred in cases involving federal employees, whose compensation is provided under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (F.E.C.A.), 5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq., as well as in cases involving private longshoremen. See Greene v. Vantage Steamship Corporation (4th Cir. 1972) 466 F.2d 159, 168, 18 ALR F 167.
Congress overruled the SierackiRyan form of action with the 1972 amendments to the L.H.W.C.A. It abolished the doctrine of unseaworthiness as a basis for liability against the shipowner in favor of the longshoreman, thereby restricting the longshoreman’s claim against the shipowner to one for negligence. It also outlawed the employer’s liability to the shipowner, whether claimed under warranty or otherwise. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
The amendments, relating only to workers covered under the Act, had no direct effect on longshoremen like Speller who are covered under the F.E.C.A. The indirect effect, however, was to cut off the indemnity action between the shipowner and the United States. Since a shipowner can no longer sue a private stevedore for indemnity, it cannot, under the terms of the Suits in Admiralty Act, recover from the United States, for the government is subject to suit only in those instances in which a private individual would be so subject. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970). The district court therefore properly found that suit may not be maintained against the United States. The judgment of the district court is, therefore, affirmed.
. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
“In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States . . . .”
. The policies and changes involved in the amendments, including a higher schedule of benefits, are detailed in the legislative history. See H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 4698, 4703-04. This court has had numerous occasions to discuss the effects of the amendments, and we need not do so again here. See, e. g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, (4th Cir. 1978) 577 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (en banc), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 348, 58 L.Ed.2d 343 (1978); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, (4th Cir. 1978) 576 F.2d 1072, 1076-78; Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., (4th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 1103, 1110, 1112; Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, (4th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 757, 758-59 (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098, 97 S.Ct. 1116, 51 L.Ed.2d 545 (1977); Bess v. Agromar Line, (4th Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 738, 740-41.
. Feeling precedent-bound under Sandoval v. Mitsui Sempaku K. K. Tokyo (5th Cir. 1972) 460 F.2d 1163, 17 ALR F 479, a pre-amendment case, a district court in the fifth circuit has allowed suit against an instrumentality of the United States. Guevara v. Cia Sud Americana de Vapores, (D.C.Z.1978) 1978 A.M.C. 2000, 2005. That court, however, overlooked the statutory bar to suit under the Suits in Admiralty Act, as affected by the amendments to the L.H.W.C.A. In passing, we note that at least one court has held the unseaworthiness doctrine no longer applicable to federally employed longshoremen. Quinn v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp. (D.Md.1977) 1977 A.M.C. 204.

Question: Did the court refuse to reach the merits of the appeal because it concluded that the defendant had immunity?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D