Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked in this case to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and create a damages remedy for a cross-border shooting. As we have made clear in many prior cases, however, the Constitution's separation of powers requires us to exercise caution before extending Bivens to a new "context," and a claim based on a cross-border shooting arises in a context that is markedly new. Unlike any previously recognized Bivens claim, a cross-border shooting claim has foreign relations and national security implications. In addition, Congress has been notably hesitant to create claims based on allegedly tortious conduct abroad. Because of the distinctive characteristics of cross-border shooting claims, we refuse to extend Bivens into this new field.
I
The facts of this tragic case are set forth in our earlier opinion in this matter, Hernández v. Mesa, 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2003, 198 L.Ed.2d 625 (2017) (per curiam ). Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was with a group of friends in a concrete culvert that separates El Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. The border runs through the center of the culvert, which was designed to hold the waters of the Rio Grande River but is now largely dry. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., detained one of Hernández's friends who had run onto the United States' side of the culvert. After Hernández, who was also on the United States' side, ran back across the culvert onto Mexican soil, Agent Mesa fired two shots at Hernández; one struck and killed him on the other side of the border.
Petitioners and Agent Mesa disagree about what Hernández and his friends were doing at the time of shooting. According to petitioners, they were simply playing a game, running across the culvert, touching the fence on the U.S. side, and then running back across the border. According to Agent Mesa, Hernández and his friends were involved in an illegal border crossing attempt, and they pelted him with rocks.
The shooting quickly became an international incident, with the United States and Mexico disagreeing about how the matter should be handled. On the United States' side, the Department of Justice conducted an investigation. When it finished, the Department, while expressing regret over Hernández's death, concluded that Agent Mesa had not violated Customs and Border Patrol policy or training, and it declined to bring charges or take other action against him. Mexico was not and is not satisfied with the U.S. investigation. It requested that Agent Mesa be extradited to face criminal charges in a Mexican court, a request that the United States has denied.
Petitioners, Hernández's parents, were also dissatisfied
and therefore brought suit for damages in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Among other claims, they sought recovery of damages under Bivens, alleging that Mesa violated Hernández's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court granted Mesa's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc has twice affirmed this dismissal.
On the first occasion, the court held that Hernández was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because he was "a Mexican citizen who had no'significant voluntary connection' to the United States" and "was on Mexican soil at the time he was shot." Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (C.A.5 2015) (per curiam ). It further concluded that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity on petitioners' Fifth Amendment claim. Id., at 120.
After granting review, we vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the case, instructing the court "to consider how the reasoning and analysis" of Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017), our most recent explication of Bivens, "[might] bear on this case." Hernández, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 2006. We found it "appropriate for the Court of Appeals, rather than this Court, to address the Bivens question in the first instance." Ibid. And with the Bivens issue unresolved, we thought it "imprudent" to resolve the "sensitive"
question whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a cross-border shooting. Ibid. In addition, while rejecting the ground on which the Court of Appeals had held that Agent Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity, we declined to decide whether he was entitled to qualified immunity on a different ground or whether petitioners' claim was cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. Id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 2006-2008
On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit evaluated petitioners' case in light of Abbasi and refused to recognize a Bivens claim for a cross-border shooting. 885 F.3d 811 (C.A.5 2018). The court reasoned that such an incident presents a " 'new context' " and that multiple factors-including the incident's relationship to foreign affairs and national security, the extraterritorial aspect of the case, and Congress's "repeated refusals" to create a damages remedy for injuries incurred on foreign soil-counseled against an extension of Bivens. 885 F.3d at 816-823.
We granted certiorari, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2636, 204 L.Ed.2d 282 (2019), and now affirm.
II
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, the Court broke new ground by holding that a person claiming to be the victim of an unlawful arrest and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim for damages against the responsible agents even though no federal statute authorized such a claim. The Court subsequently extended Bivens to cover two additional constitutional claims: in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), a former congressional staffer's Fifth Amendment claim of dismissal based on sex, and in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. After those decisions, however, the Court changed course.
Bivens, Davis, and Carlson were the products of an era when the Court routinely inferred "causes of action" that were "not explicit" in the text of the provision that was allegedly violated. Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1855. As Abbasi recounted:
"During this 'ancien regime,'... the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to 'provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective' a statute's purpose.... Thus, as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself." Ibid. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) ; J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) ).
Bivens extended this practice to claims based on the Constitution itself. 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1855 ; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (Court can infer availability of damages when, "in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate" the "policy underpinning the substantive provisio[n]").
In later years, we came to appreciate more fully the tension between this practice and the Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial power. The Constitution grants legislative power to Congress; this Court and the lower federal courts, by contrast, have only "judicial Power." Art. III, § 1. But when a court recognizes an implied claim for damages on the ground that doing so furthers the "purpose" of the law, the court risks arrogating legislative power. No law " 'pursues its purposes at all costs.' " American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 234, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (per curiam )). Instead, lawmaking involves balancing interests and often demands compromise. See Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-374, 106 S.Ct. 681, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986). Thus, a lawmaking body that enacts a provision that creates a right or prohibits specified conduct may not wish to pursue the provision's purpose to the extent of authorizing private suits for damages. For this reason, finding that a damages remedy is implied by a provision that makes no reference to that remedy may upset the careful balance of interests struck by the lawmakers. See ibid.
This problem does not exist when a common-law court, which exercises a degree of lawmaking authority, fleshes out the remedies available for a common-law tort. Analogizing Bivens to the work of a common-law court, petitioners and some of their amici make much of the fact that common-law claims against federal officers for intentional torts were once available. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners 10-20. But Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), held that "[t]here is no federal general common law," and therefore federal courts today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could before 1938. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (" 'Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals' ").
With the demise of federal general common law, a federal court's authority to recognize a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress, see id., at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511 ("private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress"), and no statute expressly creates a Bivens remedy. Justice Harlan's Bivens concurrence argued that this power is inherent in the grant of federal question jurisdiction, see 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (majority opinion); id., at 405, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion of Harlan, J.), but our later cases have demanded a clearer manifestation of congressional intent, see Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1856-1858.
In both statutory and constitutional cases, our watchword is caution. For example, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1391-1403, 200 L.Ed.2d 612 (2018) we expressed doubt about our authority to recognize any causes of action not expressly created by Congress. See also Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1856 ("If the statute does not itself so provide, a private cause of action will not be created through judicial mandate"). And we declined to recognize a claim against a foreign corporation under the Alien Tort Statute. Jesner, 584 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1408.
In constitutional cases, we have been at least equally reluctant to create new causes of action. We have recognized that Congress is best positioned to evaluate "whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government" based on constitutional torts. Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1856. We have stated that expansion of Bivens is "a 'disfavored' judicial activity," 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ), and have gone so far as to observe that if "the Court's three Bivens cases [had] been... decided today," it is doubtful that we would have reached the same result, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1856. And for almost 40 years, we have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens. See 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1863-1864 ; Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) ; Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) ; Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) ; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ; Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ; United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983).
When asked to extend Bivens, we engage in a two-step inquiry. We first inquire whether the request involves a claim that arises in a "new context" or involves a "new category of defendants." Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68, 122 S.Ct. 515. And our understanding of a "new context" is broad. We regard a context as "new" if it is "different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court." Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1859.
When we find that a claim arises in a new context, we proceed to the second step and ask whether there are any "'"special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation"'" about granting the extension. Id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1857 (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. 1468, in turn quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ). If there are-that is, if we have reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context or to a new class of defendants-we reject the request.
We have not attempted to "create an exhaustive list" of factors that may provide a reason not to extend Bivens, but we have explained that "central to [this] analysis" are "separation-of-powers principles." Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1857. We thus consider the risk of interfering with the authority of the other branches, and we ask whether "there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy," id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1858, and "whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed," id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1858
III
A
The Bivens claims in this case assuredly arise in a new context. Petitioners contend that their Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims do not involve a new context because Bivens and Davis involved claims under those same two amendments, but that argument rests on a basic misunderstanding of what our cases mean by a new context. A claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously recognized. Compare Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16-18, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (allowing Bivens remedy for an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical treatment), with Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-74, 122 S.Ct. 515 (declining to create a Bivens remedy in similar circumstances because the suit was against a private prison operator, not federal officials). And once we look beyond the constitutional provisions invoked in Bivens, Davis, and the present case, it is glaringly obvious that petitioners' claims involve a new context, i.e., one that is meaningfully different.
Bivens concerned an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and search carried out in New York City, 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ; Davis concerned alleged sex discrimination on Capitol Hill, 442 U.S. at 230, 99 S.Ct. 2264. There is a world of difference between those claims and petitioners' cross-border shooting claims, where "the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches" is significant. Abbasi, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1860 ; see Parts III-B and III-C, infra.
Because petitioners assert claims that arise in a new context, we must proceed to the next step and ask whether there are factors that counsel hesitation. As we will explain, there are multiple, related factors that raise warning flags.
B
The first is the potential effect on foreign relations. "The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns." Jesner, 584 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1403. Indeed, we have said that "matters relating 'to the conduct of foreign relations... are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.' " Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) ). "Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in [these matters]." Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). We must therefore be especially wary before allowing a Bivens remedy that impinges on this arena.
A cross-border shooting is by definition an international incident; it involves an event that occurs simultaneously in two countries and affects both countries' interests. Such an incident may lead to a disagreement between those countries, as happened in this case.
The United States, through the Executive Branch, which has " 'the lead role in foreign policy,' " Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008) (alteration omitted), has taken the position that this incident should be handled in a particular way-namely, that Agent Mesa should not face charges in the United States nor be extradited to stand trial in Mexico. As noted, the Executive decided not to take action against Agent Mesa because it found that he "did not act inconsistently with [Border Patrol] policy or training regarding use of force." DOJ Press Release. We presume that Border Patrol policy and training incorporate both the Executive's understanding of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures and the Executive's assessment of circumstances at the border. Thus, the Executive judged Agent Mesa's conduct by what it regards as reasonable conduct by an agent under the circumstances that Mesa faced at the time of the shooting, and based on the application of those standards, it declined to prosecute. The Executive does not want a Mexican criminal court to judge Agent Mesa's conduct by whatever standards would be applicable under Mexican law; nor does it want a jury in a Bivens action to apply its own understanding of what constituted reasonable conduct by a Border Patrol agent under the circumstances of this case. Such a jury determination, the Executive claims, would risk the "'"embarrassment of our government abroad" through "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."'" Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (C.A.D.C. 1985) (Scalia, J.)).
The Government of Mexico has taken a different view of what should be done. It has requested that Agent Mesa be extradited for criminal prosecution in a Mexican court under Mexican law, and it has supported petitioners' Bivens suit. In a brief filed in this Court, Mexico suggests that shootings by Border Patrol agents are a persistent problem and argues that the United States has an obligation under international law, specifically Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U. N. T. S. 174, to provide a remedy for the shooting in this case. Brief for Government of United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae 2, 20-22. Mexico states that it "has a responsibility to look after the well-being of its nationals" and that "it is a priority to Mexico to see that the United States provides adequate means to hold the agents accountable and to compensate the victims." Id., at 3.
Both the United States and Mexico have legitimate and important interests that may be affected by the way in which this matter is handled. The United States has an interest in ensuring that agents assigned the difficult and important task of policing the border are held to standards and judged by procedures that satisfy United States law and do not undermine the agents' effectiveness and morale. Mexico has an interest in exercising sovereignty over its territory and in protecting and obtaining justice for its nationals. It is not our task to arbitrate between them.
In the absence of judicial intervention, the United States and Mexico would attempt to reconcile their interests through diplomacy-and that has occurred. The broad issue of violence along the border, the occurrence of crossborder shootings, and this particular matter have been addressed through diplomatic channels. In 2014, Mexico and the United States established a joint Border Violence Prevention Council, and the two countries have addressed cross-border shootings through the United States-Mexico bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. Following the Justice Department investigation in the present case, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to "work with the Mexican government within existing mechanisms and agreements to prevent future incidents." DOJ Press Release.
For these reasons, petitioners' assertion that their claims have "nothing to do with the substance or conduct of U.S. foreign... policy," Brief for Petitioners 29, is plainly wrong.
C
Petitioners are similarly incorrect in deprecating the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the issue here implicates an element of national security.
One of the ways in which the Executive protects this country is by attempting to control the movement of people and goods across the border, and that is a daunting task. The United States' border with Mexico extends for 1,900 miles, and every day thousands of persons and a large volume of goods enter this country at ports of entry on the southern border. The lawful passage of people and goods in both directions across the border is beneficial to both countries.
Unfortunately, there is also a large volume of illegal
cross-border traffic. During the last fiscal year, approximately 850,000 persons were apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally from Mexico, and large quantities of drugs were smuggled across the border. In addition, powerful criminal organizations operating on both sides of the border present a

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
数. U.S. Court of International Trade
日. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
的. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
月. U.S. Court of Military Review
用. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
成. U.S. Customs Court
名. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
时. U.S. Tax Court
件. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
一. U.S. Court for China
请. U.S. Consular Courts
中. U.S. Commerce Court
据. Territorial Supreme Court
码. Territorial Appellate Court
不. Territorial Trial Court
新. Emergency Court of Appeals
文. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
下. Bankruptcy Court
分. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
入. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
人. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
功. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
上. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
户. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
为. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
间. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
号. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
取. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
回. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
在. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
页. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
字. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
有. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
个. Alaska U.S. District Court
作. Arizona U.S. District Court
示. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
出. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
是. California Central U.S. District Court
失. California Eastern U.S. District Court
表. California Northern U.S. District Court
除. California Southern U.S. District Court
加. Colorado U.S. District Court
败. Connecticut U.S. District Court
生. Delaware U.S. District Court
信. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
类. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
置. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
理. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
本. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
息. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
行. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
定. Guam U.S. District Court
改. Hawaii U.S. District Court
市. Idaho U.S. District Court
期. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
以. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
修. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
元. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
方. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
录. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
区. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
单. Kansas U.S. District Court
位. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
型. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
法. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
县. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
存. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
品. Maine U.S. District Court
前. Maryland U.S. District Court
称. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
注. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
值. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
输. Minnesota U.S. District Court
建. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
能. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
大. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
例. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
度. Montana U.S. District Court
始. Nebraska U.S. District Court
到. Nevada U.S. District Court
面. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
载. New Jersey U.S. District Court
点. New Mexico U.S. District Court
密. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
动. New York Northern U.S. District Court
果. New York Southern U.S. District Court
图. New York Western U.S. District Court
提. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
发. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
式. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
国. North Dakota U.S. District Court
登. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
错. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
者. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
认. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
误. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
接. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
关. Oregon U.S. District Court
重. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
第. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
地. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
如. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
设. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
目. South Carolina U.S. District Court
开. South Dakota U.S. District Court
事. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
可. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
要. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
代. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
小. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
选. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
标. Texas Western U.S. District Court
明. Utah U.S. District Court
编. Vermont U.S. District Court
求. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
列. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
网. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
万. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
最. Washington Western U.S. District Court
器. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
所. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
内. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
体. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
通. Wyoming U.S. District Court
务. Louisiana U.S. District Court
此. Washington U.S. District Court
商. West Virginia U.S. District Court
序. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
化. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
消. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
否. Alabama U.S. District Court
保. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
使. Georgia U.S. District Court
次. Illinois U.S. District Court
机. Indiana U.S. District Court
对. Iowa U.S. District Court
量. Michigan U.S. District Court
查. Mississippi U.S. District Court
部. Missouri U.S. District Court
性. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
和. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
更. New York U.S. District Court
后. North Carolina U.S. District Court
证. Ohio U.S. District Court
题. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
确. Tennessee U.S. District Court
格. Texas U.S. District Court
了. Virginia U.S. District Court
于. Norfolk U.S. District Court
金. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
公. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
午. New Jersey U.S. District Court
円. California U.S. District Court
片. Florida U.S. District Court
空. Arkansas U.S. District Court
态. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
管. State Supreme Court
主. State Appellate Court
天. State Trial Court
自. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
我. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
全. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
今. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
来. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
正. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
说. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
意. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
送. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
容. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
已. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
结. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
会. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
段. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
计. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
源. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
色. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
時. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
交. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
系. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 标