Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question is whether the coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act includes injuries in the nature of occupational disease, here silicosis, or is confined exclusively to injuries inflicted by accident. After having béen twice before the, Supreme Court of Missouri, the case is here'on certiorari, 335 U. S. 809, for, review of its final decision on the second appeal that recovery may not be had for other than accidental injuries; A statement/of the course taken by the proceedings in the state courts, hs well as of the facts, becomes necessary for resolving the issues presented.
In 1941 petitioner Tom Urie filed suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act against respondent Thompson, trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. According to petitioner’s allegations', h§ had been eimplQyed as a fireman on steam locomotives of the’ interstate Missouri Pacific for roughly thirty years. In lt)40 he had been forced, to cease work by a pulmonary disease diagnosed as silicosis.. This permanently disabling affliction had been caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust blown or sucked into the cabs of the locomotives on which he had worked. The injurious concentration of silica dust in the air breathed by petitioner arose from the railroad’s use in its locomotives’ sanding boxes of sand materials containing 80 to 90 per cent of silica or silicon dioxide and the emission by the locomotives’ faultily adjusted “sanders” of such sand materials in excessive amounts beyond those needed to provide traction for locomotive wheels. Respondent Thompson, trustee of the railroad since 1933, “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” of the danger of silicosis arising from the conditions of petitioner’s employment.
The trial court sustained respondent’s demurrer to the complaint. On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court held that the action could not be maintained by virtue of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act alone, for the reason that respondent could not have “anticipated plaintiff’s injury-, and... therefore... the petition does not stat'e facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act.” 352 Mo.- 211, 219. The court felt, however, that the claimed malfunctioning of the locomotives’ sanders was in substance an allegation of breach of § 2 of the Boiler Inspection Act and that, since proof of breach of the latter Act would support a recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act without regard to respondent’s negligence, Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481, 485-486, petitioner had stated a cause of action. Furthermore, the court held that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 45 U. S. C. § 56, did not bar petitioner’s claim since his “cause of action accrued in May,.1940, when he became incapacitated....” 352 Mo. at 222. Accordingly the court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for trial.
On remand petitioner amended his complaint to charge specifically violations of the Boiler Inspection Act. Section 2 of that Act, as amended, makes it “unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be used on its line any locomotive unless said locomotive, its boiler, tender, and all parts and appurtenances thereof are in proper condition and safe to.operate in the service to which the same are put, that the same may be employed in the active •service of such carrier without unnecessary peril to life or limb....” 45 U. S. C. § 23. The violations alleged were (1) that the sanders were broken or faultily adjusted so as to release too much sand and (2) that the locomotive decks and cabs were in a bad state of repair, admitting dust through various cracks and openings in the cab’s iloor and elsewhere which ought to have been sealed off.
.The' case was tried to a jury, under instructions that negligence was not in iss.ue and that petitioner should prevail if he proved that he had contracted silicosis by reason of respondent’s breach of an “absolute and continuing duty to have such locomotive engines and all their parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition and safe, to operate... without unnecessary peril to the life of Tom Urie....” The jury found for petitioner in the amount of $30,000.
Upon respondent’s appeal the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered.on this verdict. 357 Mo. 738. Noting that on the former review it did not “treat with a contention that'silicosis’ is not an evil at.which the Act is aimed,” id. at 746, the court concluded that the Boiler Inspection Act “is aimed at promoting safety from accidental injury, as distinguished from injury due to.the gradual inhalation of harmful.dusts.” Id. at 749r It was to review the state supreme court’s successive constructions of the Federal Employers’ Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts that our writ was issued.
I.
Two preliminary contentions first engage our attention. We are met at the outset by the question whether, without regard to the legal sufficiency of petitioner’s claim under either Act, that claim is barred, as to both Acts by operation of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act’s statute of limitations.
, Urie filed suit qxi November 25, 1941. • Under the terms of the then prevailing thrq -year statute' of' limitations, the court could not entertain the. claim if Urie’s “jsause of action accrued” before November 25, 1938. Respondent contends that Urie, having been exposed to silica dust since approximately 1910, must unwittingly have contracted silicosis long before 1938, and hence that his “cause of action” must be deemed to have “accrued” longer than' three years before the institution of this action. Alier-C natively it may be argued that each inhalation of silica/ dust was a separate tort giving rise to a fresh “cause of action,” and that Urie is therefore limited to a claim forj inhalations between November 25, 1938, and the spring day in 1940 when he became incapacitated.
In our view, however, neither of the outlined constructions of the statute of limitations can be sustained. For, if we assume that Congress intended to include occupational diseases in thé category of injuries compensable under the Federal Employers’ Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts, süch mechanical analysis of 'the “accrual” of petitioner’s injury — whether- breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease — can only serve to thwart the' congressional purpose.
If Urie were held barréd from prosecuting this action because he must be said, as a matter of law, to have contracted silicosis prior to November 25, 1938, it would be clear that the federal legislation -afforded Urie only a delusive remedy. It would mean that at some past moment, in time, unknown and inherently unknowablé even in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs; under this view Urie’s failure to; diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery-and disability.
Nor can we accept the theory that each intake of dusty breath is a" fresh “cause of action.” In the present case, for example, application of such a rule would, arguably, limit petitioner’s damages to that aggravation of his progressive injury traceable to the last eighteen months of his employment. Moreóver petitioner would have been wholly barred from suit had he left the railroad, or merely been transferred to work involving no exposure to silica dust, more than three years before discovering the disease with which he was afflicted.
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights. The record before us is clear that Urie became too ill to work in May of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition was accomplished in the following weeks. There is no suggestion that. Urie should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date. “It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequéhtly the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves....” Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381. The quoted language, used in a state workmen’s compensation case, seems to us applicable in every relevant particular to the construction of the federal statute of limitations with which we are here, concerned. Accordingly we agree with the view expressed by the Missouri Supreme Court on the first appeal of this case, that Urie’s claim, if otherwise maintainable, is not barred by the statute of limitations.
We may readily dispose of another preliminary question concerning the issues which are now properly before us. Respondent argues, somewhat surprisingly, that the sufficiency of petitioner’s original claim for negligence involved in the first appeal is not properly here, since it. was neither raised nor considered on the second appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court. The short answer is that petitioner has brought the claim to this Court at' his first opportunity; and it was not necessary for him to relitigate that claim a second, time through the state courts in order to preserve it for our consideration on review of the final judgment rendered in the cause.
From the opinions of the state supreme court we know judicially that its judgment negating the general claim for negligence was coupled with its subsequently repudiated conclusion that petitioner had stated a cause of action under the Boiler Inspection Act and that, consequently, the court remanded the cause for trial, not for dismissal. The judgment therefore was not final; it was interlocutory and not reviewable here within the meaning of our jurisdictional statute. 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b) [now § 1257 (3)].
Although the Missouri Supreme Court’s disposition of the first appeal precluded review here at that time of the ruling adverse- to petitioner, Urie did not waive that question by amending his complaint, in conformity with the court’s mandate, to state his claim more specifically in terms of the Boiler Inspection Act or by proceeding with trial on that theory. As the case then stood, this was his only remaining chance for success unless he was to waive it; ask fof final judgment to be entered against him bn the general negligence issue, and.rely solely upon securing review of that judgment and reversal by this Court:
Whatever the effect of the state supreme court’s ruling for further proceedings in the state courts, it could not impose such an alternative upon petitioner. Local rules of practice cannot bar this Court’s-independent consideration of- all- substantial federal questions actually determined in earlier stages of the litigation by the court whose final adjudication is brought here for. review. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 225 U. S. 445, 454; Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444. Even so, We think sound practice would see to it that such questions were expressly. preserved in the later stages of review. But, as this -Court has had occasion heretofore to observe; its power to probe issues disposed of on appeals prior to the one under review is", in the last analysis, a “necessary correlative” of the rule which limits it to the examination of final judgments. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99, 102.
Accordingly, even if it should be held that petitioner has stated no claim under the Boilér Inspection Act, the judgment now in review cannot starid unless the Missouri ■Supreme 'Court rightly concluded, on the first appeal, that petitioner’s original complaint stated no cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Lia-, bility Act, considered apart from any effect of the Boiler Inspection Act. That question is properly presented and-to'it we now turn.
II.
Section 1 of the. Federal Employers’ Liability Act provides:'
“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging5 in commerce... shall be liable in damages to any' person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce...' for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from, the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any'defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.” 45 U. S. C. § 51. (Emphasis added.)
The section does not define negligence, leaving that question to be determined, as the Missouri Supreme Court said, “by the common law principles as established and applied in the federal courts.” 352 Mo. at 218. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, has no. application. What constitutes negligence for the statute’s purposes is á federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws fór other purposes. Federal decisional- law formuláting and applying the concept governs. Hence the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on the first appeal, that the complaint did not state a cause of action for negligence, is subject to our independent review and ^s not to be taken as governed conclusively by the state court decisions which alone were cited in support of the determination.
. Of course if silicosis caused by the employment is not an “injury” within the statute’s intended coverage, no cause of action could be stated for that injury under the statute, even though the allegations of fault and causation were wholly sufficient. The Missouri Supreme Court’s firs/ decision, however, assumed that silicosis fell within the statute’s broad term “injury,” and held that it would not “be reasonable to hold, under the facts- admitted by the demurrer, that defendant should have anticipated plaintiff’s injury....” 352 Mo. at 219. Accordingly, the court ruled that no cause of action for negligence under the Act had been stated.
Upon the assumption that silicosis when caused by the employment’is a compensable employee “injury,” the adequacy of petitioner’s claim turns solely on whether his original complaint alleged facts raising a triable issue of negligence. We think that under the standards heretofore set and followed by this Court the facts alleged in the complaint and taken as admitted by the demurrer clearly stated a cause of action for negligence.
Those facts have been briefly, though only partially, summarized above. They charged that respondent used in the locomotives’ sanders a sand material containing a very high percentage of silica or silicon dioxide; that often the material would come to the rails from the sanders in excessive and unnecessary quantities and would there be ground to dust; that the dust containing “such usual and unusual quantity of silican [sic] dioxide would come” into the engine cabs and, “frequently of.unusual quantity,” would be breathed by petitioner; and that, respondent “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” that the sand contained the high percentage of silicon dioxide; that “the dust would form and frequently of excessive quantity because of said sanders,” come into the cab and be breathed by petitioner; and that, over a period of time the breathing was “dangerous to the health and-life and would likely cause to the plaintiff the condition resulting to the plaintiff.” The complaint then stated the further allegations set forth in the margin, together with the following paragraph:
“Plaintiff further alleges that the sanding devices on said engines were all of the usual and customary type and used for the usual and customary purpose’ and if ordinary, care was exercised in keeping them adjusted such large quantities of such sandy silica material would not escape; that plaintiff does not know whether the same kind of sand containing such high quality of silica was used by other-railroads operating over or through such parts of the country of Missouri-; that such sanding devices operated in the same manner by the same means as devices on locomotives of other railroads, and if kept in normal and regular working condition, would not allow such large quantities of silica dust to form as above stated.”
• These and other allegations sufficiently charged.respondent with knowingly having used, in excessive quantitle's due in pait to faulty adjustment of the sanders and' respondent’s failure to use due'¿are in adjusting them, a dangerous sand material likely to cause silicosis ánd. in fact causing petitioner to contract it and become permanently disabled. This would seem to be clearly adequate for stating a cause of action for negligence resulting in injury within the nieaning of the statute and the applicable judicial standards to which we have referred. All the usual elements are comprehended, including want of due or ordinary care, proximate, causation of the injury, and injury within our assumption fqr present purposes of statutory coverage.'•,.
To. sustain the contrary view, however, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have ruled- as a matter of law that respondent had adhered to the customary standards of the tra,de, stressing the admission-in petitioner’s coin-plaint that the sanding devices alleged to have been faultily adjusted were of the kind ordinarily used throughout the railroad industry. Contrary to the court’s apparent conclusion, this obviously was not ap admission that respondent had complied with the usual standards of the trade. There was neither admission by petitioner nor evidence of anything more, than that respondent’s sanders were “all of the usual and customary type” which, if kept properly adjusted by ordinary care, would not have allowed such large and excessive quantities of silica dust to escape, concentrate in the cab, )and- be breathed by petitioner. There was no admission that other railroads generally or in the region customarily used suo'h high silica content materials for sanding purposes or that, if they did, they did not take steps to minimize potentially harmful effects. Moreover, assuming the premise that maintenance of trade standards negatives negligence, we cannot grasp its significance in this context, absent any indication that faultily adjusted sanding devices are the rule rather than the exception on American steam locomotives.
But wé-also reject’the premise, for-we think that negligence, within - the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, attached if respondent “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” that prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect. petitioner and similarly situated employees. Cf. Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U. S. 911, reversing 229 N. C. 236. See also Sadowski v. Long Island R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448, 456-457. Respondent’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the alleged inadequacies of the sanding equipment was a jury question. Whether petitioner was then or now would be able to shoulder the burden of proving respondent’s knowledge we need not surmise, though the evidence adduced by petitioner at trial under the Boiler Inspection Act — indicating that others besides petitioner had observed and reported defects in respondent’s locomotive equipment — underscores our insistence that issues of fact are matters for the jury.
Accordingly we think the state court’s ruling that the facts stated in the original complaint were insufficient to constitute a charge of negligence on respondent’s.part, within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act considered apart from the. effect of the Boiler Inspection Act, was wrong and must be overruled. What was said by the New York Court of Appeals in Sadowski v. Long Island R. Co., supra at 455-456, in sustaining a recovery for silicosis under the,Act, fits very closely the facts of this case and represents, in our opinion, the correct view:
“Ordinary care must be in proportion to the danger to be avoided and the consequences that might reasonably be anticipated from the neglect (Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., supra [319 U. S. 350]). It must be commensurate with known dangers. Defendant created the place in which the work was done and supervised the doing of the work by plaintiff and was aware for a period of at least sixteen years of the conditions under which plaintiff was required to work and of the means and methods by which its work was accomplished. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is injurious to the lungs and dangerous to health to work in silica dust, a fact which defendant was bound to know.”
The question remains whether silicosis is an “injury” within the meaning of that term as used in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. It is a novel one for this Court. But w.e think silicosis is within the statute’s coverage when it results from the employer’s negligence. Considerations arising from the breadth of the statutory language, the Act’s humanitarian purposes, its accepted standard of liberal construction in order to accomplish those objects, the absence of anything in the legislative history indicating a congressional intent to require a restricted interpretation or expressly to exclude such occupational disease, and the trend of existing authorities dealing with the question, combine to support this conclusion.'
We recognize of course that, when the statute was enacted, Congress’ attention was focused primarily upon injuries and death resulting from accidents on interstate railroads. Obviously these were the major causes of-injury and death resulting from railroad operations. But accidental' injuries were not the only ones likely to occur. And nothing in either the language or the legislative history discloses.expressly any intent to exclude from the Act’s coverage any injury resulting.“in whole or in part from the negligence” of the carrier. If such an intent can be found, it must be read into the Act by. sheer inference.
The language is as broad as could be framed: “any person suffering injury while he is employed”; “such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any. of the officers, agents,.or employees of such carrier”; “by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, áppliancés,” etc. On its face, every injury suffered by any employee while employed by reason of the carrier’s negligence was made compensable. The wording was not restrictive'as' to the employees covered; the cause of injury, except that it. must constitute negligence attributable to the carrier;, or the particular, kind of injury resulting.
To read into this all-inclusive wording a restriction as to the kinds of employees covered, the degree of negligence required, or the particular sorts of harms inflicted, would be contradictory to the wording, the remedial and humanitarian purpose, and the constant and established course of liberal construction of the Act followed by this Court.
We recognize, with respondent, that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is founded on common-law concepts of negligence and injury, •• subject to such qualifications as Congress has imported into those terms.' If respondent were right in suggesting that the common law does not

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 输