Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SETH Circuit Judge.
„ This suit was commenced by appellant, a turkey grower, to recover from appel-lee, Swift and Company, the price of a flock of turkeys it purchased from him. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, where it was tried without a jury. The judge found for the appellee and this appeal was taken.
The appellant had entered into a contract with Dannen Mills, Inc., which is not a party to this action, whereby that company was to furnish him with turkey poults, feed, and assistance in raising a flock of turkeys. Appellant executed and delivered to Dannen Mills, Inc. notes and mortgages covering the purchase price of the poults and of the feed. There is no , , .. ..... . dispute as to the validity or coverage of ,, * , ml . , these mortgages. There is also agree- ° . . , ment that there was a balance due by ,, , . ,, , . , the terms of the mortgages from appel- . , , ^ T . ,, , lant to Dannen Mills, Inc. m the amount , , ... ... .. ’ , °f abo,lt f,8d°“-00; fp?el howe™r does assert that the technical advisor pro- .... „ T . , ,1 , vided by Dannen Mills, Inc. introduced ,. .... . ’. . , a disease into the flock which caused considerable damage. At the end of the growing season, appellee, Swift and Cornpany, purchased the turkeys for an agreed price of $20,615.40 which was less than the balance due Dannen Mills, Inc. under the mortgages. This sale was agreed upon by appellant, by appellee, by representatives of Dannen Mills, Inc., and by representatives of Farmers’ Co°P- pother feed company which held a seconcl mortgage). Appellee was then instructed by appellant, by Dannen Mills, and by Farmers’ Co-op. that it should issue two checks for the turkeys, each one payable to appellant (mortgagor), to Dannen Mills, Inc. (the first mortgagee), and ^ Farmerg, c (second mort_ gagee) ginee ^ a]1 had an interegt ^ the turkeyg, Theg0 instructions as to the checks were given several weeks before the sale was consummated. These checks were so prepared and delivered to Farmers’Co-op. where they were held for several months and then delivered to Dannen Mills, Inc. The checks were voided by appellee nearly a year after issue and the purchase price was then id by llee gde] to Dannen Mm jnc
The appellant urges that the mortgagee in consenting to the sale of the turkeys waived its mortgage lien. It is certainly a general rule that the mortgagee’s consent to the sale of mortgaged property by the mortgagor is, in the absence of an understanding or of a condition as tío the application of the pro-eeeds, a waiver of the mortgage lien. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1379. However it is equally well recognized that there is an exception to this rule where it is a condition that the proceeds be applied to discharge the mortgage. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1379. Here there is no question but that the mortgagee and the mortgagor-appellant agreed with the appellee that the sale would be made. The record also shows that several weeks before the sale was consummated, these interested parties also agreed that each of the checks for the purchase price was to be made payable as above described. The record shows, and the court found, this agreement was not made at the time the sale was concluded as appellant contends, but before. The use of joint checks shows that the parties agreed to preserve their interests in the proceeds, and there is no evidence to the contrary. The trial court concluded that under the agreement for the sale of the turkeys and the agreement as to the payees of the checks, the mortgage lien attached to the proceeds of the sale. These proceeds were paid by appellee to the mortgagee. The court further observed that the agreement as to the payees of the checks would not be consistent with a relinquishment by Dannen Mills of its lien on the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged turkeys. The record clearly supports the findings upon which these conclusions were based. Muse, Spivey & Co. v. Lehman, 30 Kan. 514, 1 P. 804, was an early Kansas case where mortgaged grain was sold with the consent of the mortgagor and mortgagee, and with an agreement that the lien follow the proceeds. The court there held that the mortgage lien was effective as to the proceeds of sale as against other creditors of the mortgagor. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 1384. There are also authorities from other jurisdictions on this point, including Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389, and Clatworthy v. Ferguson, 72 Colo. 259, 210 P. 693. Appellant urges that Reese v. Kapp, 82 Kan. 304, 108 P. 96, holds to the contrary, but it appears instead that the court was there concerned only with whether or not the mortgagee’s consent to the sale had to be in writing. The finding's of the trial court in the ease at bar on this point are amply supported by the evidence.
Appellant urges also that it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit evidence to support appellant’s claim of damages against Dannen Mills, Inc., allegedly caused by its technical advisor. Appellant offered proof on this point. As mentioned above, Dannen Mills, Inc. was not a party to this suit at any time. The claim by appellant against it was unliquidated, and thei-e was no connection or relationship between appellee, which was the purchaser of the turkeys at the end of the season, and Dannen Mills as to what may have occurred during the growing season. This matter of damages between appellant and the third party mortgagee could not have been properly tried in this action in the absence of such mortgagee. Appellant cites Miller v. Thayer, 96 Kan. 278, 150 P. 537, and Commercial State Bank v. Baker, 99 Kan. 248, 161 P. 620, but these cases do not hold to the contrary.
The appellant asserts that there was a trust created during the transaction or by the check; however we do not find that the elements of such a relationship were present. The appellee paid the agreed price for the turkeys to Dannen Mills which had a lien on the proceeds and to whom the obligation was owed by appellant under the mortgages. Appellant urges he had a right of action against Dannen Mills, but the court correctly held he could not assert it here. The court also found he has never made a demand on it nor filed suit against Dannen Mills. As between the parties before the court, the appellant is not entitled to the proceeds of the sale.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0