Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM.
The Board petitions this Court to enforce its order requiring the respondent company to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the union which represents, inter alia, line operators who the company believes to be supervisors and, thereby, excluded from bargaining negotiations under the Act. For the reasons given below, we enforce the Board’s order.
Lauren manufactures extruded rubber products at its New Philadelphia, Ohio plant. Production is centered in the extrusion department which includes nine extrusion lines. Each extrusion line is supervised by a line operator who has working under his direction an assistant line operator and line assistants. Each line operator has two persons assigned permanently to his line and other line assistants are assigned on a daily basis depending on the job to be run. As many as six persons may work on the line.
Once the line is ready to run, the line operator gives the line assistants work assignments on the line. One person feeds rubber into the extruder, and the others work at the finished product end of the line coiling and doing whatever else needs to be done, including cleaning around the line. The line operator may also assign his assistant line operator to feed or coil, or he may assign his assistant line operator to do any of the several tasks required of the line operator. Periodically, the line operator alternates the positions of the employees on the line.
In 1979, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America (union) filed a petition for certification of representation seeking recognition as the representative of the production and maintenance employees at Lauren’s New Philadelphia, Ohio facility. A representation hearing was held in which one of the primary issues contested at this hearing was whether line operators were supervisors within the meaning of § 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. The regional director found that line operators were not supervisors and ordered that an election be held. Although the company requested reconsideration of the status of the line supervisors, it was denied. After the election results were tallied, the union lost.
The union again sought recognition as the representative of Lauren’s New Philadelphia production and maintenance employees in early 1981. Pursuant to a petition for certification of representation filed on February 20,1981, another representation hearing was held on March 3 and 6, 1981 and once more a primary issue was whether line operators were supervisors. The hearing officer received evidence on this issue and incorporated into the record the evidence introduced in the representation hearing held in the 1979 Board case. Relying on its 1979 decision, the regional director held that line operators were not supervisors and directed that an election be held.
An election was conducted by secret ballot on April 29 and 30, 1981. Of the 109 ballots cast, 46 voted for the union, 49 voted against the union and 14 were challenged. Lauren challenged the ballots of the 14 line operators who were allowed to vote on the ground that they were supervisors under § 2(11) of the Act. However, in a supplemental decision the regional director overruled the challenge to the ballots. The company’s request for reconsideration of the supplemental decision was denied. Consequently, the ballots of the line operators were counted, resulting in a revised tally of 56 ballots for and 53 against the union.
Based on the revised tally of ballots, on July 7,1981 the Board certified the union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following unit:
All production and maintenance employees, including regular part-time employees, line operators and quality control inspectors employed by the Employer at its facility located at 2228 Reiser Avenue, S.E., New Philadelphia, Ohio, but excluding the scheduler, all office clerical employees and professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
However, the company ignored the union’s repeated efforts to bargain collectively and refused to furnish it with information which it requested pertaining to the employees’ wages, hours, benefits and classifications. Therefore, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge which resulted in a complaint being issued charging the company with refusing to bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In its answer, the company contended that the union had not been properly certified because the bargaining unit contained the line operators, who allegedly are supervisors.
On April 13, 1982, the Board issued its decision and order. The Board concluded that all issues raised by the company in the unfair labor practice proceeding were or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding, that the company did not offer to adduce any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, and that the company had not alleged any circumstances which would warrant reconsideration of its decision in the representation proceeding. Accordingly, the Board found that the company had violated § 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the union and by refusing to furnish the union with requested information. Accordingly, the Board ordered the company to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the union and from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.
The question of whether individuals should be accorded supervisory status is a mixed question of fact and law. Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 1095, 1099 (6th Cir.1981). As such, the Board’s determination regarding the supervisory status of the line operators is not to be overturned as long as there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support its finding. NLRB v. Adam & Eve Cosmetics, Inc., 567 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir.1977). Accord, Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB, 661 F.2d at 1099.
Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). The kinds of supervisory characteristics enumerated in this section are listed in the disjunctive; therefore, “the exercise of anyone of [them] is enough to make one a supervisor.” NLRB v. Wilson-Crissman Cadillac, Inc., 659 F.2d 728, 729 (6th Cir.1981). Additionally, this Court has recognized that regardless of the specific kind of supervisory authority at issue, its exercise “must involve the use of true independent judgment in the employer’s interest before such exercise of authority becomes that of a supervisor.” Beverly Enterprises v. NLRB, 661 F.2d at 1098. Ac cord, NLRB v. City Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575, 580-82 (6th Cir.1965).
Congress defined supervisors separately from “employees” because although supervisors can become members of a labor organization, no employer can be compelled to deem supervisors as employees for collective bargaining purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a). This Circuit has emphasized that the mere performance of routine tasks or the giving of instructions to others is not sufficient to afford an individual supervisory status. The true test involves an inquiry into the significance of the individual’s judgment which is usually determined by observing whether the individual “identifies] with the interests of the employer rather than the employees.” NLRB v. Wilson-Crissman Cadillac, Inc., 659 F.2d at 729. Moreover, supervisory status is appropriately accorded those individuals who participate in formulating or determining policies for the employer with regard to labor relations. Id.
An individual does not become a supervisor merely because he possesses greater skills and job responsibilities than his fellow employees. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 631, 635 (6th Cir.1968). He must exercise independent judgment in performing his responsibilities. Thus, the appropriate inquiry for determining the status of the line operators is whether they possess any one of the characteristics enumerated in § 2(11) and whether they exercise independent judgment in performing this function.
Upon reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the line operators are merely leaders, rather than supervisors, because none of the functions they perform require them to exercise independent judgment. Moreover, they do not possess the power to hire, transfer, discharge, reward, promote, discipline or any of the other authorities enumerated in § 2(11) of the Act. We further conclude that although the line operators possess more responsibility than the line assistants, they do not participate in formulating or developing the company policy. Therefore, we find that the Board’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, the Board’s order shall be enforced.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1