Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
Kelvin Yearwood appeals the decision of the district court denying his motion for post conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm.
Yearwood, an alien, was indicted for narcotics violations under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. At his initial arraignment, Yearwood appeared with counsel and pleaded not guilty to the charges. Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement under which he would plead guilty to the first count of the indictment, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute the same under 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the government would enter nolle prosequi on the two remaining counts. The district court accepted the guilty plea and found defendant guilty on count 1. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years pursuant to the government’s recommendation. He is now subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(ll) based on his conviction.
With new counsel, Yearwood filed a § 2255 motion, alleging that his previous counsel failed to advise him of the collateral consequence of deportation mandated by his guilty plea. On appeal, defendant argues that the district court erroneously failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue raised in his § 2255 motion. A hearing is not required, however, on a § 2255 motion if the record of the case conclusively shows that petitioner is entitled to no relief. United States v. Baysden, 326 F.2d 629, 631 (4th Cir.1964); see Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 1462-63, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973). Although the defendant later mentioned, in a subsequent memorandum, the issue of affirmative misrepresentation by former counsel, that the conviction would not result in deportation, there is no such allegation nor support for such allegation in the initial § 2255 petition.
Turning to the issue raised in defendant’s § 2255 motion, we agree with the circuits which have decided the issue and found that an attorney’s failure to advise a client that deportation may result from a conviction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir.1975). To hold otherwise would place the unreasonable burden on defense counsel to ascertain and advise of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea which courts have uniformly held is not ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Campbell, 778 F.2d at 768-69; United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C.Cir.1971).
Defendant’s trial counsel had no spontaneous duty to inform defendant that his guilty plea would lead to his being deported. Indeed, the fact alone that defendant, an alien with an immigrant visa, violated the laws of the United States should have raised some question in his own mind as to his status in this country. Along the same line, we are of opinion that defendant’s argument that his guilty plea was made involuntary by the omission of advice as to deportation or that his conviction so was obtained without due process of law is also without merit. See Santelises, 509 F.2d at 704.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
. The § 2255 motion was filed December 22, 1987, and along with it was filed a memorandum in support thereof prepared by Yearwood’s attorney, as had been the § 2255 motion. Neither in the § 2255 motion nor in the memorandum was anything mentioned to the effect that Yearwood’s attorney at trial had been asked about the effect of a guilty plea or conviction on Yearwood’s status as an alien. Indeed the motion states that the attorney "did not advise ... [Yearwood] of the collateral consequence of his plea .. .and therefore his plea of guilty was .. .involuntary.” The memorandum, also filed December 22nd, described the defendant’s contentions as “the attorney retained to defend ...[Yearwood] was unaware of the collateral consequences” of the plea and that Yearwood was "not informed of the effects of his plea on his status as an alien.” The first time that anything was said about any inquiry on the part of Yearwood to his attorney was in a response to the government’s opposition to granting the § 2255 motion, which response was filed March 7, 1988, and which stated obliquely in connection with the discussion of another case that that court "...suggested that an evidentiary hearing would be required to determine whether, inter alia, that counsel had made affirmative misrepresentations to the defendant as to the possibility of deportation as was made in this case.”
On this state of the pleadings, the district court, in its order, found that the defendant was "not advancing an affirmative misrepresentation by his counsel but rather only a failure to disclose.” We think the district court was justified in its construction of the papers before it. The fact that such an important fact was not mentioned in the motion executed under pain of perjury, was not mentioned in the memorandum of December 22nd, and was mentioned only indirectly in the memorandum of March 7th, justifies the district court’s treatment of the matter.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: I