Task: songer_judgdisc

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the court's ruling on the abuse of discretion by the trial judge favor the appellant?" This includes the issue of whether the judge actually had the authority for the action taken, but does not include questions of discretion of administrative law judges. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

SWAN, Chief Judge.
On July 6, 1951, an order was signed by me temporarily enlarging the applicant on bail, pending decision and determination of the said application after submission of the record. A transcript of the proceedings before the District Court and memoranda by counsel having been submitted, the application is now ripe for decision. The three points argued do not appear to me to raise any substantial question which would justify the granting of bail pending the appeal. Rule 46, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A.
The appellant’s argument on the jurisdictional point rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature of bail in a criminal proceeding. The giving of security is not the full measure of the bail’s obligation; it is hornbook law that the accused is delivered into the custody of the bail and the bail is bound to redeliver him so far as he can. It does not discharge the bail from that duty merely to abandon the security. The bail must assist in arresting the convict so far as possible; security is not a substitute. This being true the bail can have no constitutional privilege to conceal from the court all that he knows of the whereabouts of the convict and that necessarily includes an inquiry into his relation with him at the time when the security was posted. Rule 46(g) made no change in the old law; as the reviser’s note says it is “a restatement of existing law and practice.”
If it be argued that there may nevertheless be a “substantial question” about any of this, at least no doubt can extend to defendant’s refusal to answer fully about the books of the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress and to help towards their production. The claim of privilege against self-incrimination has no application to the contemnor’s refusal to produce books held by him in a representative capacity.
The claim that there was a technical failure to comply with Rule 42, F.R.Cr.P., if sustained, would result merely in a remand of the appellant for resentence, so that this defect, if it be one, is not prejudicial to the appellant. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 296-301, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884. Accordingly the application for bail is denied and the temporary bail allowed by my order of July 6th is hereby revoked and the appellant is directed to surrender to the United States Marshal.
If the appellant desires to have the appeal heard before commencement of the October Term of the Court of Appeals, I will convene a court to hear it as soon as counsel can prepare briefs and be ready for argument.
. Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. 13, 21, 19 L.Ed. 541; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371, 21 L.Ed. 287; United States v. Simmons, C.C., 47 F. 575, 14 L.R.A. 78; United States v. Lee, D.C., 170 F. 613; Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 2 Cr., 69 F.2d 78, 81, 91 A.L.R. 885; United States v. Caligiuri, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 799, 801; State ex rel. Howell v. Schiele, 85 Ohio App. 362, 88 N.E. 215. Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, was a civil case and the language at page 575, 32 S.Ct. 599, at page 600, 56 L.Ed. 889, on which the defendant relies is not applicable.
. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542.

Question: Did the court's ruling on the abuse of discretion by the trial judge favor the appellant? This includes the issue of whether the judge actually had the authority for the action taken, but does not include questions of discretion of administrative law judges.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D