Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is taken to reverse the conviction and sentence of appellant upon counts 4 and 5 of an indictment duly returned against him. He was acquitted on counts 1, 2 and 3. Counts 4 and 5 charged perjury committed by the defendant in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 231, which reads as follows:
“Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify * * * truly * * * shall willfully and contrary to such oath state * * * any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury * * * The statute “takes the place of the similar provision of § 5392 of the Revised Statutes, which in turn was a substitute for a number of statutes in regard to perjury, and was phrased so as to embrace all cases of false swearing, whether in a court of justice or before administrative officers acting within their powers.” United States v. Smull, 236 U.S. 405, 35 S.Ct. 349, 59 L.Ed. 641.
The Fourth Count of the indictment charged: “that Union Electric Company of Missouri is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri and at one time was known as and called Union Electric Light and Power Company; that on or about the 29th day of May, 1937, the name of said corporation was duly changed from Union Electric Light and Power Company to Union Electric Company of Missouri, and hereinafter in the several counts of this indictment said corporation at all times will be referred to as Union Electric Company of Missouri; that heretofore and on or about the 7th day of June, A. D. 1939, an order was duly made at a regular session of the Securities and Exchange Commission held at its offices in the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, authorizing and instituting an investigation pursuant to sections 19(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77s(a), 77t(a)], Section 21(a) of the Securities 'Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S. C.A. § 78u(a)], and Sections 18(a) and (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [15 U.S.C.A. § 79r(a,b)], into certain acts and practices and the business and financial condition of the said Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiary companies, and the St. Louis County Gas Company, said Union Electric Company of Missouri at that time having securities registered under the Securities Act of 1933, having registered securities on a national securities exchange under the-Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and being a holding company within the meaning of the said Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and a subsidiary company of The North American Company, a registered holding company within the meaning of said Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; that during all of the period of time from January 1, 1930 until on or about May 15, 1939, said defendant, Frank J. Boehm, was Vice-President and a director of said Union Electric Company of Missouri; that in said order said investigation was directed to be for the purposes, among others,
“of determining whether said Union Electric Company had violated or was about to violate Section 24 of the Securities-Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C.A. § 77x],
“of determining whether said Union Electric Company of Missouri had violated or was about to violate Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S. C.A. § 78ff(a)],
“of aiding in prescribing rules and regulations pursuant to Sections 7, 10(b), and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U. S.C.A. §§ 77g, 77j(b), 77s(a)], Sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C.A. §§ 781, 78m], and Sections 3(b), 6(b), 7, 12, 13, 15, 17(c), and 20(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79c(b), 79f(b), 79g, 791, 79m, 79o, 79q(c), 79t(a)],
“of securing information' to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning any matters to which said Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 relates, and
“of determining whether said Union Electric Company of Missouri had'violated or was about to violate Sections 12(h) and 29 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79Z(h), 79z— 3];
“that said order of said Securities and Exchange Commission designated Paul J. Cotter and Harry C. Coles, Jr., among others, as officers of said Commission to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence in said investigation, and to perform all other duties in connection therewith authorized by law.
“That thereafter the said investigation duly authorized and instituted by the said Securities and Exchange Commission was conducted in the City of St. Louis, State and Eastern District of Missouri, in the Eastern Division of said District, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, by said Securities and Exchange Commission acting through competent officers thereof who were duly designated as aforesaid, and said Commission then and there had full and competent power and jurisdiction to conduct said investigation; that thereupon the facts and circumstances surrounding
“the padding of officers’ and employees’ expense accounts submitted to and paid by said Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies, and the inclusion of therein of sums not actually expended for or on behalf of said companies, or expended for purposes other than those-designated upon said expense accounts;
“the securing of sums of money in cash-by officers of said Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies-by means of secret rebates and kick backs-from persons, firms, and corporations with-whom said Union Electric Company of Missouri and its subsidiary companies-dealt.
“the creation and maintenance by officers of said Union Electric Company of its subsidiary companies of a sum of money in cash or of a slush fund,
“the making of political contributions by or on behalf of said Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies,
“the connection of said defendant, Frank J. Boehm, with said transactions and practices, and
“the accuracy of registration statements or financial statements filed by said Union Electric Company of Missouri and said The North American Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
“among other matters, became and were then and there material matters in said investigation.
“That thereafter during the course of said investigation, and on or about the 10th day of July, A. D. 1939, in the City of St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, Frank J. Boehm, the defendant herein, duly appeared as a witness in said, investigation before the said Harry C. Coles, Jr., a competent officer of said Securities and Exchange Commission, and then and there took an oath administered to him by said officer that all of the testimony which he would give in said investigation would be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; that said Harry C. Coles, Jr., the aforesaid officer, was then and there a competent person to administer said oath and that said investigation by said Securities and Exchange Commission was a case in which a law of the United States authorized an oath to be administered;
“That on or about the said 10th day of July, 1939, Frank J. Boehm, the defendant herein, being then and there under oath as aforesaid, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly, feloniously, and contrary to said oath did falsely testify to material matters in said investigation which he did not believe to be true, in substance and effect, as follows:
“(a) That he did not pad his own expense accounts and that the expense accounts submitted by him to the Union Electric Company of Missouri corresponded exactly with what his expenses were, as nearly as he could make them;
“(b) That he took all of the trips that were listed on his expense vouchers submitted to said Union Electric Company of Missouri for the period from 1933 to the end of 1938;
“(c) That a fund in cash of any sort had never been maintained by the said Union Electric Company of Missouri for political or other purposes; that any cash in his office, or on his person, or in his safe was his personal fund;
“(d) That no money was obtained by Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies, or officers or employees thereof, by means of kick backs or rebates from attorneys employed by said companies;
“That on the contrary it was the truth and fact, and said defendant, Frank J. Boehm, then and there well knew and believed :
“(a) and (b) That expense accounts submitted by him to said Union Electric Company of Missouri and paid by said company during the period from 1933 to the end of 1938 had been and were padded, and that trips listed on hiá expense vouchers as having been made by him during said period of time had not in fact been made by him;
“(c) That a large fund in cash was maintained by said Union Electric Company of Missouri for political and other purposes, said fund being maintained in the possession and under the control of said Frank J. Boehm in his office, on his person, and in his safe, which money was not his personal fund;
“(d) That for a long period of time, including the years from 1932 to 1939, the Union Electric Company of Missouri and its subsidiary companies and officers and employees thereof had received secret rebates and kick backs from attorneys with whom said Union Electric Company of Missouri and its subsidiary companies dealt, including Bradshaw, Schenk & Fowler, Rex H. Fowler, Benjamin P. Alschuler, Guy C. McMillan, and other persons to the Grand Jurors unknown.
“That the matters to which the said defendant, Frank J. Boehm, falsely testified as aforesaid were matters material to said investigation then pending before the said Securities and Exchange Commission as aforesaid.
“Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America.”
In the fifth count the false swearing was charged to have been done on the eleven day of July, 1939, under oath administered by the same person in the same proceedings, it being charged that the defendant had made false oath as follows:
“(a) That there was no practice of obtaining money by means of kick backs, rebates, or through any other mechanics, through purchases made by Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies of materials from supply companies, and that no money was derived by or on behalf of said Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies off the record or in any other manner for a slush fund;
“(b) That he had never made any political contributions or any loans or contributions to any candidate for public office for or on behalf of said Union Electric Company of Missouri or its subsidiary companies;”
After plea in abatement, demurrer and motion to quash had been overruled, the defendant plead not guilty.
It was shown on the trial that in October of 1938 the Securities and Exchange Commission had received information which indicated that the Union Electric Company of Missouri, a public utility company, had engaged for a long time in the practice of collecting a fund of money in cash, or a slush fund, by means of rebates from attorneys and supply companies and by means of padded expense accounts, and that the fund was used for various political purposes and the order made and entered by the Commission at its regular session on the 7th day of June 1939 referred to in the indictment was received in evidence. The order directed the investigation in. which the defendant was charged with having committed perjury, and as it contains the inducements leading to its issuance by the Commission and the findings and conclusion of necessity therefore, and contains specific reference to the particular sections of the statute upon which each direction of the order was based, we set it ■out in full as follows:
“It appearing to the Commission that Union Electric Company of Missouri is a holding company with twelve or more subsidiary companies doing business in the States of Missouri, Illinois and Iowa, and that these companies, as a holding company system, transmit electric energy across state lines in interstate commerce; and that the Union Electric Company of Missouri, as a holding company, has applied to the Commission for exemption under Section 3(a)' of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, [15 U.S.C. A. § 79c(a)] which application is now pending before the Commission; and
“It further appearing to the Commission that Union Electric Company of Missouri is a subsidiary of The North American Company, and was, until February 8, 1939, a subsidiary of the North American Edison Company, both registered holding companies within the meaning of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and
“It further appearing fo the Commission that Union Electric Company of Missouri, North American Edison Company and The North American Company, each has registered securities on one or more national securities exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
“It further appearing to the Commission that Union Electric Company of Missouri and The North American Company each has securities registered under the Securities Act of 1933; and
- “It further appearing to the Commission that Union Electric Company of Missouri, pursuant to the aforesaid registrations and in support of the aforesaid application for exemption, has filed financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts and other reports of operations with the Commission for the years 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938; and
“It further appearing to the Commission that the St. Louis County Gas Company is a subsidiary of The North American Company, is an associate company of Union Electric Company of Missouri, and has substantially the same executive officers as Union Electric Company of Missouri ; and
“It further appearing to the Commission that North American Edison Company and The North American Company, pursuant to the aforesaid registrations have filed with the Commission financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts and other reports of operations for the years 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938, which reports are based, in part, upon financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts and other reports of operations furnished to said companies by Union Electric Company of Missouri, and/ or the St. Louis County Gas Company, which information became and becomes a basis for, and was and is incorporated in applications, reports, documents, accounts and records filed and kept under the provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; and
“The Commission having reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, and more particularly since January 1, 1933, Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company, directly or indirectly, have collected through their officers and others sums of money from employees, officers, directors, attorneys, contractors and other individuals and companies by means of padded expense accounts, kick-backs, rebates and otherwise, which collections are not properly contained in or reflected on the books, records or accounts of Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and said associate company, and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, ánd more particularly since January 1, 1933, the books, records and accounts of Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company, contain entries purporting to show various charges for goods, services and expenses, which were not incurred for the purposes set forth in said books, records and accounts, and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, and more particularly since January 1, 1933, Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and, the St. Louis County Gas Company, directly or indirectly, made contributions through their officers and others in connection with the candidacy, nomination, election or appointment of various persons for or to offices and positions in the Government of States, political sub-divisions of States, or agencies, authorities and instrumentalities of the foregoing; and made contributions to or in support of political parties, committees and agencies thereof; and that the amounts and designations of these contributions are not reflected on, entered, in or shown by the books, records and accounts of said companies, and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, and more particularly since January 1, 1933, Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company, through their officers and others, directly or indirectly expended money to influence the official conduct of public officials, which expenditures are not reflected on, entered in or shown by the books and records of said companies, and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, and more particularly since January 1, 1933, Union Electric Company of Missouri, through its officers and others, directly or indirectly expended money in entertaining public officials and the families of its officers, and for the personal purposes of its officers, and that these expenses have been in some instances made to appear as assets on the books of the company, and in other instances charged to subsidiaries, some of which received no benefit therefrom; and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that for a long period of time, and more particularly since January 1, 1933, Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company, through their officers and others, directly and indirectly, have received various sums of money, which receipts are not properly entered on the books, records and accounts of said companies, and have expended various sums of money, which expenditures are not entered in or otherwise properly reflected on the books, records and accounts of said companies, and
“The Commission having further grounds to believe that as a result of the aforesaid practices and activities the financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts and other reports of operations filed with the Commission by Union Electric Company of Missouri pursuant to the aforesaid registrations and the aforesaid application for exemption were false and misleading with respect to various items of receipts and expenditures ; and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that as a result of the aforesaid practices and activities of Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries, and the St. Louis County Gas Company, the financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts, and other reports filed with the Commission by the North American Company and/or North American Edison Company were false and misleading; and
“The Commission having further reasonable grounds to believe that Union Electric Company of Missouri has violated the provisions of Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933, of Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and of Sections 12(h) and 29 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and that the St. Louis County Gas Company has violated Sections 12(h) and 29 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; and
“It further appearing to the Commission to be necessary and appropriate to determine the extent to which receipts or expenditures of Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company have been improperly entered on or omitted from the books, records and accounts of said companies since January 1, 1933, and have been reported to The North American Company and/or North American Edison Company and the extent to which the acts and practices hereinbefore mentioned may have falsified, distorted or otherwise made incorrect financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, income accounts or other reports of operations filed with the Commission by The North American Company or North American Edison Company for the said period,
“It Is Ordered, pursuant to Sections 19 (a) and 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Sections 18(a) and 18(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, that an investigation be made of the Union Electric Company of Missouri, its subsidiaries and the St. Louis County Gas Company, to determine the facts, conditions, practices and matters above referred to, to aid (1) in the enforcement of each of said Acts; (2) in prescribing rules and regulations pursuant to provisions of Sections 7, 10(b) and 19 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act •of 1934, and Sections 3(a), 6(d), 7, 12, 13, 15, 17(c), 20(a) and 23 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and ■other pertinent provisions of each of said Acts; and (3) in securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning any matters to which.any of such Acts relate, as may appear to the Commission to be necessary and appropriate; and to determine whether or not there have been violations of the provisions of Section 24 of the Securities Act •of 1933, of Section 32(a) 'of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of Sections 12 (h), and 29 of the Public Utility Holding ■Company Act of 1935, and
“It Is Further Ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, ’Section 21(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Section 18(c) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, for the purposes of such investigation, that Paul J. Cotter, James R. Sharp, Harlan B. ■Collins, Harry C. Coles, Jr., George’ Jaffin ■and William V. Holohan, together with such other officer or officers as the Commission may hereafter appoint or substitute, and each of them be and they hereby are designated officers of this Commission, and are hereby empowered to administer •oaths, and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, take evidence, require the production of any books, papers, •correspondence, memoranda or other records deemed relevant or material to the inquiry, and to perform all other duties in connection therewith authorized by law; •and
“It Is Further Ordered that such investigation begin and continue at such times and places as such officers, or any ■of them, shall designate,
“By the Commission.
“Francis P. Brassor, “Secretary.”
The appellant contends in this court, as he did in the court below, that the oath he took and the testimony he gave before the above named Harry C. Coles, Jr., in the investigation conducted in obedience to the •above order, was not taken before a competent tribunal, officer or person in any •case in which a law of the United States •authorized an oath to be administered and that the testimony was not material, •and therefore he was not guilty under the statute. He contends that there was no power vested in the Commission to order the investigation and the proceedings were therefore void and his oath was a mere nullity, first because the Acts of Congress under which the Commission assumed to proceed did not in terms confer the power upon the Commission to make the investigation, and second because at least one of the Acts (1935) was unconstitutional.
But although the contentions have been greatly elaborated, we find no merit in them. Congress conferred broad powers upon the Securities and Exchange Commission in three comprehensive Acts, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq., the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq., and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq., and each of the Acts conferred upon the Commission the power to make investigations to aid in its enforcement. The findings of the Commission concerning the status of the Union Electric Company as a public utility company engaged with its subsidiaries as a holding company system in interstate commerce, and as a holding company' and as a subsidiary of a holding company, and that the company had registered securities and had invoked the exercise of the Commission’s powers by applying to it for exemption under Section 3(a) of the Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79c(a), and had filed financial statements with the Commission and had furnished financial statements constituting in part the basis of the reports of its parent company (the North American Company), establish that the Company was one whose conduct is of public interest and which is, and recognized itself to be, within the terms of the Acts.
The information which had come to the Commission and which it found it was necessary and appropriate to investigate is set out in the order and was manifestly a matter for investigation by the Commission within the sections of the Acts specified in the order. Section 12(h) of the Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 791(h), forbids any holding company or subsidiary thereof to make political contributions, and Section 29 of.the Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79z — 3, forbids the making of any false statement or entry in reports or documents required under the chapter. Section 24 of the Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x, forbids making false statements in a registration statement or “violating] any of the provisions of” the sub-chapter relating to domestic securities; Section 32(a) of the Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77ff(a), forbids the making of any false statement in any report or document required to be filed under the chapter relating to the regulation of Securities Exchanges. But more broadly, each of the Acts confers some regulatory powers upon the Commission in respect to such companies as the Union Electric Company, and in the numerous sections specified in the order the duty was imposed upon the Commission to find the true facts of the matter that had been brought to its attention as that matter manifestly affected the Company and its statements and reports of its conditions and operations filed with the Commission upon which the Commission was required to act.
Complaint is made that the Commission in making its order for investigation exercised powers conferred upon it by all three of the Acts of 1933, 1934 and 1935. It is true the Commission might have investigated the same question of whether or not the company had the alleged secret fund for political expenditures and whether its accounts were untrue in three investigations, one under each of the Acts, but there was no reason to proceed in such manner. It was proper for the Commission to recite its duties and powers specifically and to refer to the several Acts and the sections by which they were established. The investigation was not rendered invalid merely because the powers and duties of the Commission were established by three rather than by one Act of Congress, or by several rather than by one section. It is also argued that the disbursements from the secret funds of the Company were not in fact all made through the mails or for national, as distinguished from state, political purposes. But such arguments do not reach the validity of the order for investigation. The Commission found the necessity for the investigation in the information which it had received and was therefore required and empowered to proceed and investigate. A witness who has sworn falsely in the investigation may not defend on the ground that the information which gave rise to the investigation was not in all respects confirmed by the proof adduced upon the investigation. A further contention is that the Harry C. Coles, Jr., before whom the oath was taken, was not competent to administer the oath. But it was shown that Mr. Coles was an attorney on the staff of attorneys for the Commission who had taken an oath as such, and by the order under consideration the Commission designated him an officer of the Commission and empowered him to administer oaths and to take evidence for the purpose of the investigation. The sections of the Act invoked by the Commission are specified in the order and the provisions thereof clearly empowered the officer so designated by the Commission to administer oaths and to take evidence upon the investigation.
It is also urged that the whole scheme of the Act of 1935 (excepting Sections 4 and 5, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79d, 79e) was unconstitutional and therefore the oath was a nullity. But the Act was duly enacted by legislative authority and very extensive governmental action has been and is being taken under it affecting vast public and private interests. Many witnesses have been and are being heard in the administration of the Act (some few of whom have been finally convicted for false swearing). Woolley v. United States, 9 Cir., 97 F.2d 258;. United States v. Mascuch, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 602. The appellant was not charged with violating the Act but with false swearing as a witness after he had taken an oath to tell the truth. There is no obvious or manifest unconstitutionality in the Act, and the tribunals set up under its provisions are functioning in fact as a recognized part of the government. We have not failed to observe the arguments made on the point of unconstitutionality, but find no sufficient merit to justify discussion of them at the instance of one convicted of false swearing in an investigation carried on pursuant to the Act’s provisions. Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 6, 58 S.Ct. 468, 82 L.Ed. 607; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S.Ct. 277, 66 L.Ed. 550.
As the Commission had full power to make the investigation of the Company in respect to the matters specified in the order, and the officer designated by it was competent, 18 U.S.C.A. § 231 was applicable to any false swearing as to any material matter by any witness sworn in the investigation.
The trial of the case before the court and jury commenced June 24, 1940, and ended July 26, 1940. Appellant has not undertaken to make a summary narration of the evidence, and we find the summary for the government (not contradicted in the reply brief) to be accurate. From the evidence produced by the government it appeared that in October of 1938, information was received by the Securities and Exchange Commission which, if true, would indicate that the Union Electric Company had engaged in certain acts and practices which might constitute violations of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq. On November 9, 1938, the Securities and Exchange Commission ordered an investigation, pursuant to that Act, to determine whether or not such violations had, in fact, occurred. During the course of this investigation, the appellant gave the allegedly false testimony which furnished the basis for the first three counts in the indictment, but as he was found not guilty thereon, there is no occasion to summarize the circumstances surrounding that testimony.
After the investigation had been pursued for a long time, the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 3, 1939, ordered that* a public investigation of the same charges be undertaken. However, this proceeding was never commenced. Thereafter, on June 7, 1939, the order for investigation -was promulgated by the Commission, pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq., the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S.C.A. § 78a et seq., and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. A. § 79 et seq., which is above set forth. This order specified in detail the nature of the information which had been received by the Commission and the sections of the various Acts which appeared to have been violated.
On July 10th and 11th, 1939, the appellant appeared before the officer of the Securities and Exchange Commission named in the order of June 7, 1939, and that he was duly sworn by the officer was established beyond doubt.
Appellant’s testimony was correctly stenographically recorded and transcribed and the transcript of it was received in evidence. It shows, that he gave the testimony which was specified in counts 4 and 5 of the indictment as false. Appellant did not testify in his own behalf and none of his witnesses gave any substantial evidence to establish the truth of the statements made by appellant under oath in the investigation.
As shown by that transcript of his testimony in the investigation, appellant there testified that no money was obtained by the Union Electric Company or its officers by means of rebates or kick-backs from attorneys employed by the Company. The evidence was that at least four attorneys employed by the Union Electric Company engaged in the practice of paying cash rebates or kick-backs to the appellant. In each instance this practice was of long standing and had been instituted either by him or at his direction. The funds so derived were delivered to him in cash.
In about 1933, the appellant arranged for the payment of an annual retainer in the amount of $38,000 to B. P. Alschuler, an attorney of Aurora, Illinois, by the Union Electric Company and its subsidiaries. Of this sum Alschuler returned to Boehm, or, in rare instances, to one of Boehm’s subordinates, about $19,000 per year for a period of about six years. This was accomplished in the following manner: Alschuler would submit bills to the Company purportedly for the retainer; after such bills had been approved by Boehm, the Company would pay them in due course by check. Alschuler would then either cash the check or deposit it in his account and later withdraw currency. Finally Alschuler would return the rebate to Boehm in cash.
The proof of rebates by E. Bentley Hamilton, an attorney of Peoria, Illinois, was substantially the same as in the case of Alschuler. Boehm arranged that an annual retainer of $40,000 should be paid to Hamilton by the companies out of which Hamilton was to, and did, return to Boehm in cash approximately $20,000 a year. This practice continued during the period from about 1930 through the early part of 1939, after the investigation had been started

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: I