Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine whether a person released on his own recognizance is “in custody” within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 (c)(3), 2254 (a). See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 (1968); Carajas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963). Petitioner initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging a state court conviction on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The court denied relief, holding that since the petitioner was enlarged on his own recognizance pending execution of sentence, he was not yet “in custody” for purposes of the habeas corpus statute. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that release on one’s own recognizance is not sufficient custody to confer jurisdiction on the District Court, and affirmed the judgment. 453 F. 2d 1252 (1972). We granted certiorari, 409 U. S. 840 (1972), and we reverse.
Convicted of a misdemeanor in California Municipal Court for violation of § 29007 of the California Education Code, petitioner was sentenced to serve one year in jail and pay a fine of $625. He appealed his conviction unsuccessfully to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court, and his efforts to have the conviction set aside on state court collateral attack have proved equally unavailing. It appears that petitioner exhausted all available state court remedies prior to filing this petition for federal habeas corpus. See 28 U. S. C. §2254 (b).
At all times since his conviction petitioner has been enlarged on his own recognizance. While pursuing his state court remedies he remained at large under an order of the state trial court staying execution of his sentence. And the state trial court extended its stay, even after the Supreme Court of California declined to hear his application for postconviction relief, apparently to permit petitioner to remain at large while seeking habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Pending appeal from the District Court's denial of relief, an application for extension of the state court stay was granted by Mr. Justice Black, as Acting Circuit Justice, on August 12, 1970, and extended by Mr. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, on August 20, 1970, and again on September 9, 1970. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas corpus, but granted a 30-day stay of its mandate pending application for certiorari. That stay was extended by Mr. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, on March 20, 1972, and it is pursuant to his order that petitioner remains at large at the present time.
The California Penal Code provides that any court that may release a defendant upon his giving bail may release him on his own recognizance, provided he agrees in writing that:
“(a) He will appear at all times and places as ordered by the court or magistrate releasing him and as ordered by any court in which, or any magistrate before whom, the charge is subsequently pending.
“(b) If he fails to so appear and is apprehended outside of the State of California, he waives extradition.
“(c) Any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction may revoke the order of release and either return him to custody or require that he give bail or other assurance of his appearance . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 1318.4.
A defendant is subject to re-arrest if he fails to appear as agreed, id., § 1318.8 (a), and a willful failure to appear is itself a criminal offense. Id., § 1319.6. We assume that these statutory conditions have been imposed on petitioner at all times since the state trial court stayed execution of his sentence.
The question presented for our decision is a narrow one: namely, whether the conditions imposed on petitioner as the price of his release constitute “custody” as that term is used in the habeas corpus statute. Respondent contends that the conditions imposed on petitioner are significantly less restrictive than those imposed on the petitioner in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963), where we held that a person released on parole is “in custody” for purposes of the district courts’ habeas corpus jurisdiction. It is true, of course, that the parolee is generally subject to greater restrictions on his liberty of movement than a person released on bail or his own recognizance. And some lower courts have reasoned that this difference precludes an extension of the writ in cases such as the one before us. On the other hand, a substantial number of courts, perhaps a majority, have concluded that a person released on bail or on his own recognizance may be “in custody” within the meaning of the statute. In view of the analysis, which led to a finding of custody in Jones v. Cunningham, supra, we conclude that this latter line of cases reflects the sounder view.
While the “rhetoric celebrating habeas corpus has changed little over the centuries,” it is nevertheless true that the functions of the writ have undergone dramatic change. Our recent' decisions have reasoned from the premise that habeas corpus is not “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,” Jones v. Cunningham, supra, at 243, but one which must retain the “ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 291 (1969). See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). “The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.” Harris v. Nelson, supra, at 291.
Thus, we have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements. The demand for speed, flexibility, and simplicity is clearly evident in our decisions concerning the exhaustion doctrine, Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); the criteria for relitigation of factual questions, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963); the prematurity doctrine, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 (1968); the choice of forum, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973); Strait v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341 (1972); and the procedural requirements of a habeas corpus hearing, Harris v. Nelson, supra. That same theme has indelibly marked our construction of the statute’s custody requirement. See Strait v. Laird, supra; Peyton v. Rowe, supra; Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U. S. 335 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, supra.
The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty. Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate. Applying that principle, we can only conclude that petitioner is in custody for purposes of the habeas corpus statute. First, he is subject to restraints “not shared by the public generally,” Jones v. Cunningham, supra, at 240: that is, the obligation to appear “at all times and places as ordered” by “[a]ny court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction.” Cal. Penal Code §§ 1318.4 (a), 1318.4(c). He cannot come and go as he pleases. His freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers, who may demand his presence at any time and without a moment’s notice. Disobedience is itself a criminal offense. The restraint on his liberty is surely no less severe than the conditions imposed on the unattached reserve officer whom we held to be “in custody” in Strait v. Laird, supra.
Second, petitioner remains at large only by the grace of a stay entered first by the state trial court and then extended by two Justices of this Court. The State has emphatically indicated its determination to put him behind bars, and the State has taken every possible step to secure that result. His incarceration is not, in other words, a speculative possibility that depends on a number of contingencies over which he has no control. This is not a case where the unfolding of events may render the entire controversy academic. The petitioner has been forced to fend off the state authorities by means of a stay, and those authorities retain the determination and the power to seize him as soon as the obstacle of the stay is removed. The need to keep the stay in force is itself an unusual and substantial impairment of his liberty.
Moreover, our conclusion that the petitioner is presently in custody does not interfere with any significant interest of the State. Indeed, even if we were to accept respondent’s argument that petitioner is not in custody, that result would do no more than postpone this habeas corpus action until petitioner had begun service of his sentence. It would still remain open to the District Court to order petitioner’s release pending consideration of his habeas corpus claim. In re Shuttlesworth, 369 U. S. 35 (1962). Even if petitioner remained in jail only long enough to have his petition filed in the District Court, his release by order of the District Court would not jeopardize his “custody” for purposes of a habeas corpus action. Carafas v. LaVallee, supra. Plainly, we would badly serve the purposes and the history of the writ to hold that under these circumstances the petitioner’s failure to spend even 10 minutes in jail is enough to deprive the District Court of power to hear his constitutional claim.
Finally, we emphasize that our decision does not open the doors of the district courts to the habeas corpus petitions of all persons released on bail or on their own recognizance. We are concerned here with a petitioner who has been convicted in state court and who has apparently exhausted all available state court opportunities to have that conviction set aside. Where a state defendant is released on bail or on his own recognizance pending trial or pending appeal, he must still contend with the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine if he seeks habeas corpus relief in the federal courts. Nothing in today’s opinion alters the application of that doctrine to such a defendant.
Since the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that petitioner was not “in custody” at the time his petition was filed, its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court to consider his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Reversed and remanded.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the question was controlled by a prior decision of the same court, Matysek v. United States, 339 F. 2d 389 (1964).
Petitioner was convicted of awarding Doctor of Divinity degrees without obtaining the necessary accreditation. He defended the charge on the grounds that he is the chief presiding officer of a bona fide church, that his church has awarded honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates to persons who have completed a course of instruction in the church’s principles, and that state interference with this practice is an unconstitutional restraint on the free exercise of his religious beliefs.
There is a substantial question whether petitioner has forfeited the right to raise his First and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the state court conviction by deliberately bypassing an opportunity to raise the claim in the state courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963). Respondent maintains that petitioner deliberately absented himself from trial following the close of the prosecution’s case, with full knowledge that the trial would continue in his absence. He thereby relinquished, respondent contends, the right to defend himself and present evidence on his behalf. Petitioner argues in response that trial counsel failed to advise him of the reopening of trial and failed to warn him that absence from trial would lead to conviction. Accordingly, he asserts that he should not be held to have knowingly and intelligently bypassed an available state procedure. The record on-this point is more than a little obscure, and we express no opinion on the question beyond noting that the issue was not considered, much less resolved, by either of the courts below, and it is not in any sense presented for our decision.
In his Motion for Stay, filed in this Court on August 11, 1970, and addressed to the Circuit Justice of the Ninth Circuit, petitioner explained that the “Stay of Execution granted by the Trial Court is scheduled to expire on August 12, 1970, at which time petitioner has been ordered to surrender himself to the Sheriff of Santa Clara County for immediate incarceration.” Motion for Stay 2.
See, e. g., United States ex rel. Meyer v. Weil, 458 F. 2d 1068 (CA7 1972); Allen v. United States, 349 F. 2d 362 (CA1 1965); Application of Jackson, 338 F. Supp. 1225 (WD Term. 1971); United States ex rel. Granello v. Krueger, 306 F. Supp. 1046 (EDNY 1969) ; Moss v. Maryland, 272 F. Supp. 371 (Md. 1967).
See, e. g., Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F. 2d 299, 301 (CA5 1970); Marden v. Purdy, 409 F. 2d 784, 785 (CA5 1969); Beck v. Winters, 407 F. 2d 125, 126-127 (CA8 1969); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F. 2d 553, 555 (CA7 1968); United States ex rel. Smith v. DiBella, 314 F. Supp. 446 (Conn. 1970); Ouletta v. Sarver, 307 F. Supp. 1099, 1101 n. 1 (ED Ark. 1970), aff’d, 428 F. 2d 804 (CA8 1970); Cantillon v. Superior Court, 305 F. Supp. 304, 306-307 (CD Cal. 1969); Matzner v. Davenport, 288 F. Supp. 636, 638 n. 1 (NJ 1968), aff’d, 410 F. 2d 1376 (CA3 1969); Nash v. Purdy, 283 F. Supp. 837, 838-839 (SD Fla. 1968); Duncombe v. New York, 267 F. Supp. 103, 109 n. 9 (SDNY 1967); Foster v. Gilbert, 264 F. Supp. 209, 211-212 (SD Fla. 1967). In addition, the Supreme Court of California has concluded that release on one’s own recognizance under the laws of that State imposes “sufficient constructive custody” to permit an application for writ of habeas corpus. In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 613, 427 P. 2d 179, 183 (1967).
Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1040 (1970).
Insofar as former decisions, Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339 (1920); Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245 (1913); Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284 (1898); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564 (1885), may indicate a narrower reading of the custody requirement, they may no longer be deemed controlling. In none of the decisions on which we today rely, Strait v. Laird, supra; Peyton v. Rowe, supra; Carafas v. LaVallee, supra; Jones v. Cunningham, supra, are these earlier cases even cited in the opinions of the Court.
Similarly, in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973), where the Commonwealth of Kentucky had lodged a detainer against a prisoner in an Alabama jail, we held that the petitioner was in the custody of Kentucky officials for purposes of his habeas corpus action.
By contrast, a finding of no “custody” in Carafas v. LaVallee, supra, would not merely have postponed the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but would have barred it altogether. Similarly, if we had held in Jones v. Cunningham, supra, that a parolee is not in custody, then habeas corpus jurisdiction could not have been exercised until such time as release on parole was revoked. Cf. Peyton v. Rowe, supra.
See United, States ex rel. Pon v. Esperdy, 296 F. Supp. 726 (SDNY 1969); Goldberg v. Hendrick, 254 F. Supp. 286, 288-289 (ED Pa. 1966).

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 市