Task: songer_genresp1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

OPINION
Before CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and EAST, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Hayden, Stone, Inc. appeals from a denial of its motion for a stay of a damage action pending the arbitration of the dispute.
This court has jurisdiction of the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because Bear’s complaint “sounds in contract”, an action at law, and is confronted by an equitable defense, thereby meeting the Enelow-Ettelson test of appealability. Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1973).
Bear instituted his action for damages because Hayden Stone allegedly broke its promise to repurchase shares of preferred stock which Bear bought between 1962 and 1970 while employed as a Hayden Stone vice president. As a condition of his employment with the brokerage firm, Bear became an allied member of the New York Stock Exchange. Hayden Stone was already a member corporation. As members of the New York Stock Exchange, both parties had sworn to be bound by its constitution, a section of which requires:
“Any controversy between parties who are members, allied members, member firms or member corporations shall, at the instance of any such party, and any controversy between a non-member and a member or allied member or member firm or member corporation arising out of the business of such member, allied member, member firm or member corporation, or the dissolution of a member firm or member corporation, shall, at the instance of such non-member, be submitted for arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the rules of the Board of Governors.” Article VIII, Section 1, New York Stock Exchange Constitution.
After a corporate reorganization and the refusal by Hayden Stone’s successor corporation to repurchase the shares in question, Bear sued in the district court and Hayden Stone moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion stating that the dispute was not of the kind intended to be subsumed by the term, “any controversy” in the arbitration provision quoted above.
The question is complicated by the withdrawal of Hayden Stone from the NYSE. Bear’s present membership status is unclear. However, because the dispute involves a transaction entered into -by the parties when they were both members, and an alleged breach during the time of their membership, the parties agree that the arbitrability of the dispute is governed by the arbitration provision quoted above. See Isaacson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 319 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y.1970).
The district court held, as noted, that the arbitration provision was not designed to cover intracompany disputes. While some intracompany disputes might not be arbitrable, Bear has adduced and we have discerned no reason why disputes between NYSE members, in their capacities as shareholder and corporatism, should be read out of the meaning of “any controversy”. Arbitration is regarded with favor by the courts, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967); Riess v. Murchison, 384 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1967), except in situations involving protective legislation, an exception not germane to this case.
While we agree that the term “any controversy” extends only to the reasonable boundaries of that term, we believe that it does extend to the present case. First, there has been no showing in the record that Bear and Hayden Stone were not operating at arm’s length when they made their contract. Bear had a right to invest in the shares of brokerage companies, including his own. His election to invest in Hayden Stone should make no difference to a determination of arbitrability.
Second, the provision for arbitration between members and nonmembers is limited to transactions “arising out of the business of such member * * * or the dissolution of * * * [such] member * * while the same provision compels arbitration for “any controversy” between members; a transaction such as the instant one, which is arguably one within the limited category, would obviously be included in the broader category of “any controversy”.
Third, the Second Circuit, the court most experienced in the contextual nuances of the relationships involved in this type of case, has held disputes similar to the instant one arbitrable. Isaacson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., supra; Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 337 (1972). We also note that the Isaacson case involved almost the same fact situation which Bear presents here.
We also note that other circuits have enforced similar arbitration provisions, Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F.Supp. 766, 769, 776 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (involving a similar provision of the AMEX constitution), approved at the circuit level. In Re Revenue Properties Litigation, 451 F.2d 310, 312-13 (1st Cir. 1971); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, etc., Inc., 353 F.Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (E.D.Pa.1973) (arbitration provision governing registered representatives enforceable).
Bear seems most concerned that he will not be given a fair hearing before the arbiters because the NYSE is financially interested in the outcome of the case. Such a contention is premature. If it has any validity, it can be considered at the proper time. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 (1968).
The order appealed from is vacated and the cause is remanded.
. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 397, 55 S.Ct. 310, 79 L.Ed. 440 (1935); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S.Ct. 163, 87 L.Ed. 176 (1942). See also Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955).
. In situations where public policy dictates that an administrative or judicial body have primary jurisdiction, arbitration may not be ordered unless the waiver of the statutory right follows the controversy. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust); Coenen v. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 337 (1972) (Securities Act).
. The most obvious example of protective legislation that impinges on the arbitration provision of the NYSE constitution is embodied in the federal securities laws. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953) (1933 Act); but see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974); Coenen v. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 337 (1972) (1934 Act). Note that § 28(b) of the 1934 Act expressly empowers stock exchanges to make rules for settlement of disputes between members.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: G