Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

DANAHER, Circuit Judge:
The appellee Deputy Commissioner entered his order awarding compensation to one Greenwell. The appellant sought to set aside that order contending that the record lacked substantial evidence to support the finding that Greenwell’s injury on September 14,1961 arose out of and in the course of his employment, and further, that such finding was erroneous as a matter of law. The District Court granted the Deputy Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
It is not denied that Greenwell was employed by the appellant. He was a shop steward and a member of the local union’s executive board. As an alternate delegate to the convention of the International Union in Toronto, he received from his union a salary, the cost of transportation and a daily expense allowance while attending the convention. Such arrangements had been authorized by vote of the membership of the local union at a regular membership meeting; indeed, the local union had made a hotel reservation for him. Greenwell had attended business sessions throughout each day of the convention. On the night of September 14, 1961, there was to be a banquet, described in the record as “one of the highlights of the convention.” In preparation for the convention banquet, Greenwell injured himself when he slipped in a bathtub in his room at the Toronto hotel where the convention was being held.
The appellant contends that at the time of injury, Greenwell, subserving only his own personal comfort and convenience, was performing an act in no way incidental to employment. “To extend an employer’s liability for workmen’s compensation to a case such as this would in effect make an employer a gxxarantor or insurer of his employee’s safety for every minute of the time that he is away.” Thus it is argued, to sustain the award would be tantamount to converting an employer’s compensation insurance policy into an accident and health policy.
The Supreme Court has told us that
“If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the Deputy Commissioner’s inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the Deputy Commissioner is factually questionable.”
Since the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the findings, if we conclude that the Deputy Commissioner’s determination is “not inconsistent with the law,” we are bound to affirm.
While the cases are sharply divided, particularly as to when an injury can be said to “arise out of” the employment, we are satisfied that the Deputy Commissioner might take as established that Greenwell was an employee of the appellant; sent by his employer upon a particular mission to represent that employer; injured while in furtherance of the purpose for which he had been sent; and at the time of injury engaged in an activity reasonably related to and properly to have been anticipated as an ordinary incident of the mission. His attendance at the annual banquet of the International was not only expected of him, the cost of his doing so was borne by the union. Readying himself for his appearance under such circumstances can not be said necessarily to have been for the exclusive benefit of the employee, as the appellant seems to contend. It is not “necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to his employer.” Nor is the test of recovery to be found in “a causal relation between the nature of [the] employment of the injured person and the accident.”
Rather, to paraphrase what this court long since has said, if in the course of employment an employee suffers an injury by reason of a risk incidental to the location where the employment requires him to be, that injury arises out of the employment. Otherwise stated,
“It is not the peculiar nature of the environment or of the risk, provided it is accidental, but the fact that the work brings the worker within the orbit of whatever dangers the environment affords that is important.”
The Deputy Commissioner here concluded that Greenwell’s work brought him within the range of a peril which as an incident of his employment caused his injury. That the particular act was not itself part of the work done for the employer by Greenwell does not detract from the force of the governing principle. We can not say that the Deputy Commissioner erred in his determination that Greenwell’s injury arose out of his employment as well as in the course of that employment.
On the record before us, the judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
. Appellant’s brief.
. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U. S. 469, 477-478, 67 S.Ct. 801, 806, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947).
. Ibid., and see Phoenix Assurance Company of New York v. Britton, 110 U.S. App.D.C. 118, 289 F.2d 784 (1961); Hurley v. Lowe, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 168 F.2d 553, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828, 68 S.Ct. 1338, 92 L.Ed. 1756 (1948).
. Cf. Larke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 90 Conn. 303, 309, 97 A. 320, 322, L.R.A.1916E, 584 (1916).
. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504. 507, 71 S.Ct. 470, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951).
. Ibid.
. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App.D.C. 52, 55, 112 F.2d 11, 14, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649, 60 S. Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1415 (1940).
. Id. at 55-56, 112 F.2d at 14-15.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0