Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), involves a State’s attempt to require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State. In Bellas Hess we held that a similar Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In particular, we ruled that a “seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail” lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the State. Id., at 758.
In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to follow Bellas Hess because “the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations” of the past quarter-century have rendered its holding “obsolete].” 470 N. W. 2d 203, 208 (1991). Having granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 808, we must either reverse the State Supreme Court or overrule Bellas Hess. While we agree with much of the state court’s reasoning, we take the former course.
I
Quill is a Delaware corporation with offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia. None of its employees work or reside in North Dakota, and its ownership of tangible property in that State is either insignificant or nonexistent. Quill sells office equipment and supplies; it solicits business through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls. Its annual national sales exceed $200 million, of which almost $1 million are made to about 3,000 customers in North Dakota. It is the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in the State. It delivers all of its merchandise to its North Dakota customers by mail or common carrier from out-of-state locations.
As a corollary to its sales tax, North Dakota imposes a use tax upon property purchased for storage, use, or consumption within the State. North Dakota requires every “retailer maintaining a place of business in” the State to collect the tax from the consumer and remit it to the State. N. D. Cent. Code §57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991). In 1987, North Dakota amended the statutory definition of the term “retailer” to include “every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.” §57-40.2-01(6). State regulations in turn define “regular or systematic solicitation” to mean three or more advertisements within a 12-month period. N. D. Admin. Code § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988). Thus, since 1987, mail-order companies that engage in such solicitation have been subject to the tax even if they maintain no property or personnel in North Dakota.
Quill has taken the position that North Dakota does not have the power to compel it to collect a use tax from its North Dakota customers. Consequently, the State, through its Tax Commissioner, filed this action to require Quill to pay taxes (as well as interest and penalties) on all such sales made after July 1, 1987. The trial court ruled in Quill’s favor, finding the case indistinguishable from Bellas Hess; specifically, it found that because the State had not shown that it had spent tax revenues for the benefit of the mail-order business, there was no “nexus to allow the state to define retailer in the manner it chose.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A41.
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “wholesale changes” in both the economy and the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today. 470 N. W. 2d, at 213. The principal economic change noted by the court was the remarkable growth of the mail-order business “from a relatively inconsequential market niche” in 1967 to a “goliath” with annual sales that reached “the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989.” Id., at 208,209. Moreover, the court observed, advances in computer technology greatly eased the burden of compliance with a “‘welter of complicated obligations’ ” imposed by state and local taxing authorities. Id., at 215 (quoting Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 759-760).
Equally important, in the court’s view, were the changes in the “legal landscape.” With respect to the Commerce Clause, the court emphasized that Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), rejected the line of cases holding that the direct taxation of interstate commerce was impermissible and adopted instead a “consistent and rational method of inquiry [that focused on] the practical effect of [the] challenged tax.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 443 (1980). This and subsequent rulings, the court maintained, indicated that the Commerce Clause no longer mandated the sort of physical-presence nexus suggested in Bellas Hess.
Similarly, with respect to the Due Process Clause, the North Dakota court observed that cases following Bellas Hess had not construed “minimum contacts” to require physical presence within a State as a prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of state power. The state court then concluded that “the Due Process requirement of a ‘minimal connection’ to establish nexus is encompassed within the Complete Auto test” and that the relevant inquiry under the latter test was whether “the state has provided some protection, opportunities, or benefit for which it can expect a return.” 470 N. W. 2d, at 216.
Turning to the case at hand, the state court emphasized that North Dakota had created “an economic climate that fosters demand for” Quill’s products, maintained a legal infrastructure that protected that market, and disposed of 24 tons of catalogs and flyers mailed by Quill into the State every year. Id., at 218-219. Based on these facts, the court concluded that Quill’s “economic presence” in North Dakota depended on services and benefits provided by the State and therefore generated “a constitutionally sufficient nexus to justify imposition of the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax.” Id., at 219.
II
As in a number of other cases involving the application of state taxing statutes to out-of-state sellers, our holding in Bellas Hess relied on both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. Although the “two claims are closely related,” Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 756, the Clauses pose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the States. Accordingly, while a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987).
The two constitutional requirements differ fundamentally, in several ways. As discussed at greater length below, see Part IV, infra, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause reflect different constitutional concerns. Moreover, while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 315 (1945), it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due Process Clause.
Thus, although we have not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.
“ ‘Due process’ and ‘commerce clause’ conceptions are not always sharply separable in dealing with these problems.... To some extent they overlap. If there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among the states becomes ‘undue.’ But, though overlapping, the two conceptions are not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual connections, with economic and legal effects, between the transaction and the taxing state to sustain the tax as against due process objections. Yet it may fall because of its burdening effect upon the commerce. And, although the two notions cannot always be separated, clarity of consideration and of decision would be promoted if the two issues are approached, where they are presented, at least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not intermingled ones.” International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Heeding Justice Rutledge’s counsel, we consider each constitutional limit in turn.
Ill
The Due Process Clause “requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,” Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344-345 (1954), and that the “income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State,’” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978) (citation omitted). Here, we are concerned primarily with the first of these requirements. Prior to Bellas Hess, we had held that that requirement was satisfied in a variety of circumstances involving use taxes. For example, the presence of sales personnel in the State or the maintenance of local retail stores in the State justified the exercise of that power because the seller’s local activities were “plainly accorded the protection and services of the taxing State.” Bellas Hess, 386 U. S., at 757. The furthest extension of that power was recognized in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960), in which the Court upheld a use tax despite the fact that all of the seller’s in-state solicitation was performed by independent contractors. These cases all involved some sort of physical presence within the State, and in Bellas Hess the Court suggested that such presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, but also necessary. We expressly declined to obliterate the “sharp distinction... between mail-order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as a part of a general interstate business.” 386 U. S., at 758.
Our due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years since Bellas Hess, particularly in the area of judicial jurisdiction. Building on the seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), we have framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940)). In that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s “presence” within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 212 (1977), the Court extended the flexible approach that International Shoe had prescribed for purposes of in personam jurisdiction to in rem jurisdiction, concluding that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”
Applying these principles, we have held that if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State’s in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State. As we explained in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 (1985):
“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physi cally enter the forum State. Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.” Id., at 476 (emphasis in original).
Comparable reasoning justifies the imposition of the collection duty on a mail-order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State. Such a corporation clearly has “fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S., at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In “modern commercial life” it matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers: The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation’s lack of physical presence in the taxing State. Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.
In this case, there is no question that Quill has purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits Quill receives from access to the State. We therefore agree with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not bar enforcement of that State’s use tax against Quill.
HH <J
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” It says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any action by Congress. Nevertheless, as Justice Johnson suggested in his concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 231-232, 239 (1824), the Commerce Clause is more than an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well. The Clause, in Justice Stone’s phrasing, “by its own force” prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate commerce. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 185 (1938).
Our interpretation of the “negative” or “dormant” Commerce Clause has evolved substantially over the years, particularly as that Clause concerns limitations on state taxation powers. See generally P. Hartman, Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation §§2:9-2:17 (1981). Our early cases, beginning with Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), swept broadly, and in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 648 (1888), we declared that “no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form.” We later narrowed that rule and distinguished between direct burdens on interstate commerce, which were prohibited, and indirect burdens, which generally were not. See, e. g., Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (CA6 1895), aff’d sub nom. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220 (1897). Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 256-258 (1938), and subsequent decisions rejected this formal, categorical analysis and adopted a “multiple-taxation doctrine” that focused not on whether a tax was “direct” or “indirect” but rather on whether a tax subjected interstate commerce to a risk of multiple taxation. However, in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946), we embraced again the formal distinction between direct and indirect taxation, invalidating Indiana’s imposition of a gross receipts tax on a particular transaction because that application would “im-poste] a direct tax on interstate sales.” Most recently, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S., at 285, we renounced the Freeman approach as “attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference.” We expressly overruled one of Freeman’s progeny, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), which held that a tax on “the privilege of doing interstate business” was unconstitutional, while recognizing that a differently denominated tax with the same economic effect would not be unconstitutional. Spector, as we observed in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434, 441 (1959), created a situation in which “magic words or labels” could “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.” Complete Auto emphasized the importance of looking past “the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect,” 430 U. S., at 279, and set forth a four-part test that continues to govern the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause.
Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in the middle of this latest rally between formalism and pragmatism. Contrary to the suggestion of the North Dakota Supreme Court, this timing does not mean that Complete Auto rendered Bellas Hess “obsolete.” Complete Auto rejected Freeman and Spector’s formal distinction between “direct” and “indirect” taxes on interstate commerce because that formalism allowed the validity of statutes to hinge on “legal terminology,” “draftsmanship and phraseology.” 430 U. S., at 281. Bellas Hess did not rely on any such labeling of taxes and therefore did not automatically fall with Freeman and its progeny.
While contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases. Under Complete Auto’s four-part test, we will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 430 U. S., at 279. Bellas Hess concerns the first of these tests and stands for the proposition that a vendor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common carrier lacks the “substantial nexus” required by the Commerce Clause.
Thus, three weeks after Complete Auto was handed down, we cited Bellas Hess for this proposition and discussed the case at some length. In National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 559 (1977), we affirmed the continuing vitality of Bellas Hess’ “sharp distinction... between mail-order sellers with [a physical presence in the taxing] State and those... who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.” We have continued to cite Bellas Hess with approval ever since. For example, in Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U. S. 252, 263 (1989), we expressed “doubt that termination of an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough nexus for a State to tax a call. See National Bellas Hess... (receipt of mail provides insufficient nexus).” See also D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 33 (1988); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 626 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S., at 437; National Geographic Society, 430 U. S., at 559. For these reasons, we disagree with the State Supreme Court’s conclusion that our decision in Complete Auto undercut the Bellas Hess rule.
The State of North Dakota relies less on Complete Auto and more on the evolution of our due process jurisprudence. The State contends that the nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are equivalent and that if, as we concluded above, a mail-order house that lacks a physical presence in the taxing State nonetheless satisfies the due process “minimum contacts” test, then that corporation also meets the Commerce Clause “substantial nexus” test. We disagree. Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two standards are animated by different constitutional concerns and policies.
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. Thus, at the most general level, the due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual’s connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State’s exercise of power over him. We have, therefore, often identified “notice” or “fair warning” as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis. In contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy. Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills. See generally The Federalist Nos. 7, 11 (A. Hamilton). It is in this light that we have interpreted the negative implication of the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, see, e. g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978), and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce, see, e. g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U. S. 662 (1981).
The Complete Auto analysis reflects these concerns about the national economy. The second and third parts of that analysis, which require fair apportionment and nondiscrimination, prohibit taxes that pass an unfair share of the tax burden onto interstate commerce. The first and fourth prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the tax and state-provided services, limit the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce. Thus, the “substantial nexus” requirement is not, like due process’ “minimum contacts” requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather' a means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce. Accordingly, contrary to the State’s suggestion, a corporation may have the “minimum contacts” with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the “substantial nexus” with that State as required by the Commerce Clause.
The State Supreme Court reviewed our recent Commerce Clause decisions and concluded that those rulings signaled a “retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach” and thus supported its decision not to apply Bellas Hess. 470 N. W. 2d, at 214 (citing Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue of Wash., 419 U

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 号