Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the merits this appeal presents substantial questions concerning the constitutional validity of ordinances of the City of Los Angeles governing the solicitation of contributions for charity. First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds are urged as nullifying them chiefly in the view that they impose prior restraints upon and unduly abridge appellants’ rights in the free exercise of their religion. Those rights, as claimed, are to engage in soliciting donations for charity as a part of their religion free from the ordinances’ restrictions.
Similar, but also distinct, questions were involved in Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, dismissed today for jurisdictional reasons. 331 U. S. 543. This case, however, arose procedurally in a different fashion, so that it is not subject to the same jurisdictional defect. And the procedural difference is important, not merely for our jurisdiction but also for determining the propriety of exercising it in the special circumstances presented by this appeal.
The California Supreme Court heard and determined the Gospel Army case several months in advance of this one. It sustained the regulations in both instances, filing separate opinions in each case. 27 Cal. 2d 232; 28 Cal. 2d 460. But the attack upon the city ordinances in the Gospel Army case covered a much wider range than here, and the court’s principal opinion was rendered in that cause. Hence in this case it disposed of overlapping issues merely by reference a fortiori to its “approval” of the challenged provisions in the Gospel Army opinion.
As will more fully appear, this mode of treatment, together with interlacing relationships between provisions involved here and others in the Gospel Army case, has combined with the necessitated dismissal of that appeal to create for us difficult problems in determining exactly how much of the regulatory scheme approved in the Gospel Army opinion, and hence also how much of that decision, must be taken as having been incorporated in the disposition of this cause. By virtue of the California court’s method of decision, we are largely without benefit of its judgment upon these matters, including possible questions of severability. Consequently, this fact, together with the different jurisdictional postures in which the cases reach this Court, would force us to determine those questions independently before undertaking any decision on the merits.
That necessity and the difficulties tendered by the extricating problem raise substantial questions concerning the disposition appropriate, in the unusual situation, to be made of this appeal. In order to present the problem with a fair degree of precision, it is necessary to state in some detail the nature of the two proceedings, their relationships to each other, and their procedural as well as jurisdictional differences.
I.
This suit is one for a writ of prohibition. The appeal is from the California Supreme Court’s judgment denying appellants’ application for such a writ. 28 Cal. 2d 460. They instituted the suit in the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, of California. Its object was to test the jurisdiction of the respondent Municipal Court of Los Angeles to proceed with a pending criminal prosecution against Murdock, who is an officer of the Rescue Army. In that court he had been charged with violating three provisions of the city ordinances, had been twice convicted, and twice the convictions had been reversed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
While the case was pending in. the Municipal Court after the second reversal, appellants filed their petition in this cause in the District Court of Appeal. Alleging that the Municipal Court was threatening to proceed with a third trial on the same charges, they set forth grounds held sufficient under the state procedure to present for adjudication the question of the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. 28 Cal. 2d at 462-467.
The District Court of Appeal denied the writ. Thereupon the state Supreme Court transferred the cause to its own docket and issued an alternative writ of prohibition pending determination there. As in the Gospel Army case, the Supreme Court, with three of the seven justices dissenting, decided the issues on the merits against the appellants. It therefore denied the writ, at the same time discharging the alternative writ. In short effect the ordinances, insofar as they were involved, were sustained as against the constitutional and other objections raised concerning them. Probable jurisdiction was duly noted here, and the cause was assigned for argument immediately following the Gospel Army case.
Apparently Murdock was charged in the Municipal Court with violating three sections of the Municipal Code. These were §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b), and 44.12 of Article 4, Chapter IV. Sections 44.09 (a) and (b) formed the basis for the first count against Murdock. Colloquially speaking, § 44.09 is a “tin-cup” ordinance. In summary, its two subdivisions, (a) and (b), prohibit solicitations in the specified public places or adjacent areas “by means of any box or receptacle” except, under (a), “by the express written permission of the Board [of Social Service Commissioners]”; under (b), “without first filing with the Department [of Social Service] a 'notice of intention’ as required by Sec. 44.05” and, literally, obeying the further command that “every person so soliciting must in all other respects comply with the provisions of this Article.” The full text of the section is set forth in the margin.
The second count charged violation of § 44.12 by soliciting without exhibiting or reading to the persons solicited an information card issued by the Los Angeles Board of Social Service Commissioners. Section 44.12 is more general than § 44.09 as to place and manner of solicitation. It is in the following words:
“No person shall solicit any contributions unless he exhibits an Information Card provided for in Sec. 44.03 of this Article and reads it to the person solicited or presents it to said person for his perusal, allowing him sufficient opportunity to read same, before accepting any contribution so solicited.”
Obviously neither § 44.09 (b) nor § 44.12 is self-contained. Each incorporates by reference other sections of the code. Thus, it is necessary to take into account, under § 44.09 (b), the provisions of § 44.05 requiring the filing of the “notice of intention” as well as the omnibus requirement of compliance “in all other respects... with the provisions of this Article”; under §44.12, the requirements of § 44.03 concerning issuance of the information card. Enforcement of § 44.09 (a), which does not refer specifically to other sections, necessarily involves consideration of whatever requirements may relate to securing the board’s written permission.
The issue of the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction therefore, insofar as it concerns us, turns upon the validity of §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12, together with the other provisions necessarily incorporated in them by reference; and, upon this appeal, their validity not only is relative solely to the effect of the federal constitutional prohibitions, but must be determined in light of the California Supreme Court’s interpretation, including the extent to which other provisions have been incorporated. Moreover the jurisdictional question arises substantially as upon demurrer to the charges, since trial has not been had and the issue concerns only the Municipal Court’s power to proceed with the criminal cause. Hence only the validity of the provisions on their face, not as applied to proven circumstances, is called in question.
The Gospel Army case, on the other hand, was an injunction suit, in which attack was projected on a broad front against the ordinances and the scheme of regulation they embody as a whole. For some reason § 44.09 (a) was not attacked in that suit. But § 44.09 (b) was involved indirectly through its relation to § 44.05 and § 44.12 directly, as well as numerous other provisions both of Article 4, Chapter IV, and outside it. That article, as we have noted above, consists of Code §§ 44.01-44.19, entitled “Charities and Relief,” and thus includes all of the sections involved here as well as many others which were in issue in the Gospel Army case.
It is this setting of dovetailed legislative enactments and judicial decisions which creates the primary problem for our disposition. Those interrelations, of the cases and of the ordinances they involve, will be better understood in the setting of a summary of the general scheme.
II.
The Municipal Code regulates both charitable and other solicitations, as well as pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers, junk dealers, etc. The regulations affecting those dealers lie outside Article 4 and became pertinent in the Gospel Army case because of that organization’s activities in collecting, repairing, selling and giving away used articles. None of those regulations, however, appears to be involved here. The Municipal Court charges, so far as we can now ascertain, relate exclusively to charitable solicitations and consequently are comprehended within Article 4. We therefore are relieved of the necessity for taking account of any of the code provisions outside that article.
Article 4, however, comprehends numerous interrelated sections and subdivisions. They provide a broad and general, though also highly detailed and integrated, plan for regulating solicitations in Los Angeles. The sections here in question are integral parts of that plan.
It is designed primarily, though not exclusively, to secure a maximum of information and publicity for the public. It seeks to make available to all persons solicited detailed information concerning the persons soliciting, the causes or organizations on behalf of which they act, and the uses to which the donations will be put. The plan also undertakes, in other ways, to assure responsibility, both moral and financial, on the part of soliciting individuals and agencies; and to see to it that the funds collected are applied to their appropriate purposes.
Machinery for executing the scheme is created through the establishment of a Department of Social Service and a Board of Social Service Commissioners, each with specified administrative powers. Comprehensive and detailed definitions of activities affected and correlative prohibitions are prescribed, together with various provisions for exemption. Violation of the prohibitions, which generally require compliance with one or more other regulations, is made punishable by criminal sanctions.
More narrowly, insofar as the plan is relevant here, any person or association desiring to solicit contributions for a charitable purpose must file with the department, at least ten days before beginning to solicit, a written “Notice of Intention.” § 44.05. This is, in substance, an application for the “Information Card” provided for in § 44.03 (d). It will be recalled that § 44.09’(b), in issue here, expressly requires the filing of this notice. And § 44.12, also directly in issue, requires exhibition of the card before solicitation may lawfully take place.
The notice must be filed on a form furnished by the department and must contain the “complete information” specified in the margin. § 44.05. The department is authorized, among other things, to investigate the statements contained in the notice and to issue information cards “to all solicitors.” § 44.03. Those cards must show the detailed matters specified below. Ibid. The board is empowered to publish the results of the investigations provided for in § 44.03 and to exercise other powers, such as endorsing a soliciting association, waiving specified requirements, and recalling the information cards for correction. §§44.02,44.03. A fee of four cents per card is charged, when issued, unless more than twenty-five are issued at one time for the same solicitation. In that event the fee becomes one cent per card.
The foregoing regulations apply, on the face of the ordinance, to charitable solicitations as requirements in the nature of conditions precedent, compliance with which is necessary before solicitation may be lawfully made. There are also other requirements which become applicable during and after the act of solicitation. One is that of § 44.15, which commands persons soliciting for charity to tender to each contributor a written receipt containing specified detailed information. And by § 44.14 every such solicitor must file with the department, within thirty days after “the close of any such solicitation” or demand, a report showing the contributions secured and “exactly for what uses and in what manner” they “were or are to be disbursed.”
Article 4, moreover, classifies persons soliciting into three groups, two of which are primary, namely, “promoters” and “solicitors.” “Solicitors,” as will appear, are subdivided into two classes. The regulations bearing upon promoters are more onerous than those touching solicitors and are contained in § 44.19, which itself includes numerous subdivisions.
The exact definitive distinction between solicitors and promoters, who may be either institutions or individuals, is not clear from the definitions given in the ordinance, or indeed from the opinions filed in the state court. But, so far as we can gather, the promoter differs from the solicitor, generally at any rate, as being one who engages in solicitation as a business or by exercising a managerial or supervisory capacity over other persons acting as paid solicitors under his direction or pursuant to a program in his charge.
Section 44.19 also regulates the relations between promoters and paid solicitors associated with them. A promoter is forbidden by § 44.19 (9) (a) to cause or permit any person for compensation “to solicit or receive on his behalf or at his instigation, under his direction or control or in his employment, any contribution unless such person shall be registered as a solicitor by the Board.” And the next subsection requires the registered solicitor to prove his good moral character and reputation for honesty, to file a $500 bond, and to pay a $1.00 registration fee. §44.19 (9) (b), (d).
Section 44.19 thus apparently is effective to create two classes of solicitors, namely, registered and unregistered, as well as the distinction between promoters and solicitors; and establishes special and more burdensome conditions for lawful solicitation by registered solicitors, as well as by promoters, than are created for solicitors not required to be registered.
Finally, without detailed elaboration, numerous regulations in addition to or interwoven with those relating to solicitors of both types and to promoters govern the organizations or charities on whose behalf the solicitations are made.
The foregoing summary is perhaps more than sufficient to show the comprehensive nature of the plan and the intricately interlacing relationships of the numerous provisions of Article 4 making up the general scheme in which §§ 44.09 (a), (b) and 44.12 find their context and setting. Some no doubt could be applied independently, perhaps for example § 44.09 (a). But others are interwoven with one or more distinct provisions to specify essential constituent elements. And in many instances the provisions so imported require or suggest still further reference to additional ones. The article is in fact a web of intricately dovetailing references and cross-references.
Thus, with respect to the sections involved here, § 44.12 requires exhibition of the information card provided for in § 44.03. This in turn forces reference to § 44.05, which specifies the conditions for securing the card. And fulfillment of those conditions may compel resort to still other provisions. The same process must be gone through with respect to § 44.09 (b). For while that section differs verbally from § 44.12 in that it specifically requires only the filing of the notice of intention, not issuance or exhibition of the information card, not only is the procedure for filing the notice highly detailed and largely set forth in other sections. It is also highly doubtful, in view of the California Supreme Court’s decision, whether persons so complying and filing the notice would be authorized by that act alone to proceed with lawful solicitation under § 44.09 (b), without waiting the specified ten-day period (§ 44.05) and undergoing the investigations prescribed by § 44.03 or perhaps actually procuring the card.
It is necessary, in order to complete the environment of the problem presented by the appeal, to set forth somewhat more fully the manner in which the California Supreme Court dealt with §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12, and related provisions. This, however, may best be deferred at this point, in order to state the legal principles which we think are controlling of our disposition.
III.
The Gospel Army case we have dismissed for the technical, nevertheless important, reason that under California law the state Supreme Court’s reversal, without more, contemplates further proceedings in the trial court. Consequently that judgment is not final for the purposes of our jurisdiction on appeal, within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). 331 U. S. 543.
On the other hand, this appeal is not subject to that particular infirmity. The effect of the California Supreme Court’s judgment, of course, will be to permit further proceedings by the Municipal Court. But under the rule of Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8, this prohibition proceeding would be an independent suit, in relation to that criminal prosecution, “and the judgment finally disposing of it,” as did the state Supreme Court’s judgment, “is a final judgment within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code.” 284 U. S. at 14.
The Bandini case, like this one, was a prohibition proceeding brought in a California District Court of Appeal. Its object was to determine the jurisdiction of a state Superior Court in an equity cause. That suit had been brought by the state Director of Natural Resources to enjoin alleged unreasonable waste of natural gas, pursuant to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of California. A preliminary injunction issued in the Superior Court. Thereupon the writ of prohibition was sought to restrain the enforcement of the order, and of the Act, which was attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment on due process and equal protection grounds. The writ was denied, as was hearing by the California Supreme Court. Upon appeal here this Court sustained its jurisdiction and determined the constitutional issues presented upon the face of the statute, affecting the Superior Court’s jurisdiction, adversely to the appellants’ contentions.
The Bandini ruling is well settled. Apparently, however, it has been applied to a proceeding in prohibition relating to a criminal prosecution in but a single case, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, without discussion. On the other hand, a close, indeed it would seem a complete, analogy is to be found in Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63. In that case Bryant had been charged criminally in the courts of New York with violating that state's so-called anti-secret organization statute, and was held in custody for trial pursuant to that charge. He instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the state courts, on the ground that “the warrant under which he was arrested and detained was issued without any jurisdiction, in that the statute which he was charged with violating was unconstitutional.” 278 U. S. at 65. Upon appeal from the state court’s denial of the writ, this Court with one justice dissenting entertained the appeal and held the statute valid.
Although the jurisdictional inquiry, in the state courts and here, was conducted in the separate proceeding on habeas corpus, unlike the Bandini case it related to a criminal cause, as does this case. And for the purposes of our jurisdiction under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, a distinction would seem to be wholly verbal between such an inquiry and its disposition made under the state procedure of habeas corpus and a similar one made in a state proceeding for a writ of prohibition. Those procedures, of course, have their historic differences, both in availability and in specific function, at the common law. But when they are utilized, under state authorization, substantially for the identical purpose of questioning the validity of state statutes under the federal constitution, as determinative of the jurisdiction of state courts to proceed with criminal prosecutions based on those acts, it would seem difficult to find any substantial difference between them relative to this Court’s jurisdiction to review their determinations. This assumes, of course, that the judgment reviewed under one name or the other would be such as finally disposes of the proceeding.
While therefore we are unable to conclude that there is no jurisdiction in this cause, nevertheless compelling reasons exist for not exercising it.
From Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409, to Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case decided this term, this Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues. The earliest exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, arose in the Court’s refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy limitation. U. S. Const., Art. III. The same policy has been reflected continuously not only in decisions but also in rules of court and in statutes made applicable to jurisdictional matters, including the necessity for reasonable clarity and definiteness, as well as for timeliness, in raising and presenting constitutional questions. Indeed perhaps the most effective implement for making the policy effective has been the certiorari jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Congress. E. g., Judicial Code, §§ 237, 240.
The policy, however, has not been limited to jurisdictional determinations. For, in addition, “the Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” Thus, as those rules were listed in support of the statement quoted, constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of; at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute’s operation, or who has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Some, if not indeed all, of these rules have found “most varied applications.” And every application has been an instance of reluctance, indeed of refusal, to undertake the most important and the most delicate of the Court’s functions, notwithstanding conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compels it in the performance of constitutional duty.
Moreover the policy is neither merely procedural nor in its essence dependent for applicability upon the diversities of jurisdiction and procedure, whether of the state courts, the inferior federal courts, or this Court. Rather it is one of substance, grounded in considerations which transcend all such particular limitations. Like the case and controversy limitation itself and the policy against entertaining political questions, it is one of the rules basic to the federal system and this Court’s appropriate place within that structure.
Indeed in origin and in practical effects, though not in technical function, it is a corollary offshoot of the case and controversy rule. And often the line between applying the policy or the rule is very thin. They work, within their respective and technically distinct areas, to achieve the same practical purposes for the process of constitutional adjudication, and upon closely related considerations.
The policy’s ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 元