Task: songer_respond2_7_2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.
This case requires us to add another chapter, still not the final one, to an already lengthy saga concerning the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s system of mandatory bar membership. In the decision on appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held that compelled membership in the bar association known as the Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico (“Colegio”) is unconstitutional in its present form. Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 682 F.Supp. 674 (D.P.R.1988). The district court also invalidated statutes requiring that lawyers affix official stamps, sold by the Colegio, to all court documents. We agree that the present system is constitutionally deficient, and therefore in large part affirm the conclusions of the district court. We modify the court’s judgment, however, to delay temporarily an injunction prohibiting mandatory dues so that the Colegio may remain integrated while it attempts to correct its constitutional defects. We also limit the court’s holding on the stamp statutes.
I. Legal and Factual Background
We detailed the origins and early history of this case at length when the dispute last came before us. See Romany v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.1984). The district court in its most recent decision also set forth a thorough review of the prior proceedings. See Colegio, 682 F.Supp. at 675-679. We see no need to repeat, once again, the full factual and procedural background of this case. This opinion therefore shall contain only that history necessary for a full understanding of the issues we decide today.
Accordingly, we begin this background section by stating briefly the constitutional claim raised by plaintiffs' and reviewing the federal law relevant to that claim. The next subsection describes the Colegio system as it presently exists. We then review the district court’s decision. In Section II of the opinion, we briefly discuss jurisdiction and appealability issues. Section III contains our analysis and conclusions. The remaining sections discuss the stamp issue and damages, and provide a brief summary of the opinion.
A. Constitutional Principles
Plaintiffs, five attorneys, claim that Puerto Rico’s mandatory system of bar membership violates their First Amendment freedom of association by depriving them of the right not to associate with the Colegio, which conducts activities they find objectionable. Their primary complaint is that the Colegio uses their compulsory dues and fees to publicly espouse views and support causes, with which they disagree, on controversial issues far removed from the immediate concerns of lawyers. These issues have in the past included supporting the Sandinista Front for National Liberation in Nicaragua, forcing the United States Navy to leave the island of Vieques, stopping the draft, and amending the electoral law in Puerto Rico. See Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F.Supp. 963, 966-971 (D.P.R.1983); 682 F.Supp. at 679-681.
In a decision reached after oral argument in this case, and for which we held up our opinion, the United States Supreme Court addressed a virtually identical claim made by 21 members of the California bar. In Keller v. State Bar of California, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), the Court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that compelled membership in a state bar association, and the exaction of compulsory dues, do not per se violate an individual’s First Amendment rights, see Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct. 1826, 6 L.Ed.2d 1191 (1961). The Court went on, however, to establish for the first time that the principles it previously had developed for the permissible use of compulsory union dues are equally applicable for the use of mandatory bar dues.
Abood [v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 [97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261] (1977)] held that a union could not expend a dissenting individual’s dues for ideological activities not “germane” to the purpose for which compelled association was justified: collective bargaining. Here the compelled association and integrated bar is justified by the State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity.
110 S.Ct. at 2236.
The Supreme Court recognized that its limitation on the use of mandatory bar dues was not self-executing and that a difficult problem remained in defining the class of activities germane to “regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.” Id. The Court again found the union context helpful in setting guiding principles, and quoted from its decision in Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984):
“[W]hen employees such as petitioners object to being burdened with particular union expenditures, the test must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues. Under this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.”
We think these principles are useful guidelines for determining permissible expenditures in the present context as well. Thus, the guiding standard must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or ‘improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State.’ Lathrop, 367 U.S., at 843 [81 S.Ct. at 1838] (plurality opinion).
110 S.Ct. at 2236. Even with this standard, however, the Court acknowledged that the line will be difficult to draw
between those State Bar activities in which the officials and members of the Bar are acting essentially as professional advisors to those ultimately charged with the regulation of the legal profession, on the one hand, and those activities having political or ideological coloration which are not reasonably related to the advancement of such goals____ But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at the other end of the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with disciplining members of the bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession.
Id. at 2237.
The Court in Keller also acknowledged that state bar associations may encounter added inconvenience or burden in ensuring that compulsory dues are used only for permissible purposes, but observed that “ ‘such additional burden or inconvenience is hardly sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional mandate,’ ” 110 S.Ct. at 2237 (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 47 Cal.3d 1152, 1192, 255 Cal.Rptr. 542, 568, 767 P.2d 1020, 1046 (1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting)).
The Court therefore held that a permissible system of mandatory bar membership must include a mechanism for protecting the rights of dissenting members to withhold financial support of activities that fall outside the bar’s core purposes. On the limited record before it, the Court declined to speculate on the various methods a bar association might adopt to accomplish the required segregation of funds. The justices noted, however, that the procedure they deemed adequate for unions in Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986), also would suffice in the bar setting. 110 S.Ct. at 2237. In Hudson, the Court held that “the constitutional requirements for the collection of... fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.” 475 U.S. at 310, 106 S.Ct. at 1078.
Before turning to our analysis of whether the Colegio system, which is modeled after the Hudson procedure, fulfills these constitutional requirements, we complete our background summary by describing that system and why the district court found that it is inadequate to protect its members’ First Amendment rights.
B. The Colegio System
In 1982, in the course of state proceedings involving some of the attorneys who are plaintiffs in this federal case, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico upheld under state law compulsory membership in the Colegio and compulsory financial support of the bar. See Colegio de Abogados v. Schneider, 112 D.P.R. 540, 12 Official Translations of the Opinions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 676 (1982). Consistent with federal law, however, the court held that lawyers who dissented from ideological activities not related to the Colegio’s purposes must have the right to prevent the use of their funds for those activities. The court ordered that a remedy be designed to protect the dissenters’ right to object and, in a 1986 ruling, it adopted the rebate and escrow procedure that is challenged in this case (“the 1986 Rule”). Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados, 117 D.P.R. 504 (1986), Official Translation of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, slip op. (June 26, 1986) (hereinafter Schneider, Official Translation).
The elements of the Supreme Court procedure are as follows:
1. An interest-bearing escrow account must be set up, into which 15 percent of dissenting attorneys’ dues will be deposited.
2. Dissenting attorneys may, at the time they pay their dues, file a general objection to the use of their dues for ideological activities unrelated to the core purposes of the Colegio, and eventually receive a refund of the proportion of their dues based on the cost of all activities found to be “objectionable,” or
3. Attorneys may object on a case-by-case basis throughout the year, receiving a proportionate refund based on the cost of the specific activities to which they objected.
4. A three-member panel, composed of retired members of the Puerto Rico judiciary, will determine which activities are truly “objectionable” and whether the 15 percent escrow figure should be modified at some later date. This Review Board has promulgated regulations governing the objection procedure. See App. II at 323-344.
5. Dissenting members may not object to the use of their funds for activities related to any of 15 listed “functions and purposes” of the Colegio. Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 17-18.
C. The District Court Opinion
1. Defects. The district court found two significant defects in the Supreme Court’s remedy. First, it held that the 1986 Rule fails to limit adequately the types of activities that may be funded with compulsory fees. Second, the method used to accommodate dissenting members, including the 15% escrow, falls short of the procedures required by the Supreme Court for protecting dissenters’ rights. We now describe its findings with regard to each of these in some detail.
a. Activities Suitable for Compulsory Funding. The 1986 Rule provides for mandatory support for all “[activities comprised within the Bar Association’s purposes and ends which are germane thereto.” Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 17. In other words, if an activity promotes a purpose of the Colegio, dissenters may be compelled to subsidize it. The problem, in the district court’s view, is that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has defined too broadly the “purposes and ends” that justify mandatory financial support. The court in particular rejected two purposes articulated by the Puerto Rico court in support of the integrated bar: “ ‘the creation of a strongly pluralistic society,’ ” Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 13 (quoting Schneider, 112 D.P.R. at 549) and “contributing] to the betterment of the administration of justice,” id. at 18.
The district court’s concern was that almost any activity could be said to advance one or both of these interests, and that dissenting lawyers therefore would be compelled to accept the Colegio’s publicly expressed viewpoint as representing them on a vast number of sensitive issues. “Accepting these standards as the guides to determine permissible bar activity,” the court stated, “would be tantamount to a complete abdication of the court’s duty to protect dissenting attorneys’ First Amendment rights.” 682 F.Supp. at 683.
The district court therefore articulated its own list of “permissible purposes” for which financial support may be compelled. These purposes, which the court acknowledged may not be exhaustive, all revolve around the role of the lawyer as lawyer, rather than relying on the lawyer’s more generic role as an informed and perhaps influential member of a complex society. The four areas are: monitoring attorney discipline, ensuring attorney competence, increasing the availability of legal services and improving court operations. Activities that promote one or more of these purposes, and which therefore may be funded by mandatory dues and fees, could include continuing legal education programs, legal aid services, public education on substantive areas of the law (e.g., landlord-tenant) that would help citizens recognize and enforce their legal rights, and public commentary on such matters as rules of evidence and attorney advertising.
b. Procedures. The district court found procedural problems with the 15% escrow amount and with the manner of filing objections.
The escrow system is inadequate, the district court held, because the 1986 Rule fails to require a detailed accounting showing how the Colegio spends its funds, and how it calculated the 15% setaside. The court relied on Hudson in holding that the Colegio each year must precisely calculate the escrow percentage based on its projected budget and its estimate of expenditures to be made for objectionable purposes. 682 F.Supp. at 687-688. It held that the Colegio not only must explain the basis for the escrow amount, but also must justify the entire amount to be collected. The court further held that the Colegio must include a “buffer” in the escrow percentage to ensure that, if the impermissible expenditures exceed the amounts budgeted for them, the funds required to be returned to dissenting members do not exceed the es-crowed amount.
The other procedural problem noted by the district court is the requirement that dissenters file objections to specific activities in order to receive a refund. The court held that, under Abood, a dissenter may not be required to object specifically to an activity because this “ 'would confront an individual... with the dilemma of relinquishing either his right to withhold his support of ideological causes to which he objects or his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure.’ ” 682 F.Supp. at 689 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 241, 97 S.Ct. at 1802).
2. State of the Record. The district court unquestionably was bothered by the state of the record before it. Despite repeated invitations, defendants failed to present evidence concerning the extent of the Colegio’s non-ideological activities. Instead, they urged the court to take judicial notice of the lengthy list of law-related activities conducted by the Colegio that was contained in the 1986 opinion of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. See Schneider, 682 F.Supp. at 692-94 (Appendix A). See also Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 25-43 (Appendix listing activities). That court had found that the Colegio’s ideological activities were de minimis. Id. at 13.
In contrast to the lack of evidence regarding non-ideological activities, the district court received substantial evidence of the partisan political activities undertaken by the Colegio. See 682 F.Supp. at 679-681. No party, however, provided the court with quantitative or comparative data showing what percentage of Colegio activities typically are devoted to each category. Accordingly, the court felt obliged to conclude “that the ideological activities of the Colegio constitute a large and inseparable proportion of the Colegio’s total activities.” 682 F.Supp. at 681.
Despite the problems it found, the district court stated its belief that the Colegio could devise a lawful procedure incorporating most of the features of the 1986 Rule. 682 F.Supp. at 691. In the absence of appropriate modifications, however, the court held that the Colegio either must cease all ideological activities not germane to its core purposes or it may not compel membership. So long as the status quo remained, defendants were enjoined from taking any action against any lawyer for failing to pay fees to the Colegio.
II. Jurisdiction and Appealability
Before delving into our own discussion of the Colegio mandatory membership system, we briefly address the parties’ various contentions that the case is not properly before us. The defendants claim that principles of federalism, res judicata and collateral estoppel bar our review. Plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to perfect their appeals because of untimely and incorrect filings. We reject all of these claims.
Jurisdiction and Preclusion. It is well-established that lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions, even if the state judgment is challenged as unconstitutional. Review of state decisions may be obtained only in the United States Supreme Court. See D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. In Feldman, the Supreme Court considered the so-called Rooker doctrine specifically in the context of attorney challenges to rules and regulations governing the bar, in that instance relating to bar admission. The Court carefully distinguished between “general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings” — for which there is jurisdiction in the lower federal courts — and “challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings,” 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1317 — for which there is not.
Defendants claim that the Rooker doctrine is triggered in this case because plaintiffs are, in effect, attempting to appeal the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decisions in the Schneider case. According to defendants, the 1986 Rule was the particular judicial remedy ordered in the original Commonwealth Schneider case, and the district court therefore had no jurisdiction to consider its validity.
We disagree, primarily for the reasons identified by the district court. 670 F.Supp. 1098, 1100-1103. The fate of attorneys Schneider and Ramos — the particular judicial decision made in the Commonwealth court — is not at issue here. Plaintiffs challenge not the outcome of that specific case, but the general Colegio system of mandatory bar membership, as defined by various statutory provisions and the 1986 Rule. Although the motivation for the 1986 Rule originated with the Schneider-Ramos case, we are persuaded that the Supreme Court invoked its inherent powers over the bar to go beyond their individual complaints to accomplish needed bar reform. See Romany, 742 F.2d at 34 n. 3, 40 & 42 (Puerto Rico Supreme Court has “unique latitude” to regulate the bar). That the court chose to combine its rule-making with its adjudication in the form of a single opinion does not detract from the nonjudicial nature of the Rule. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. at 1314 (“ ‘[T]he form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.’ ”) (quoting In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 567, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 1311, 89 L.Ed. 1795 (1945)). See also Zimmerman v. Grievance Com. of Fifth Jud. Dist., 726 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir.1984) (referring to the possibility of a combined adjudication and rulemaking in single opinion); Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir.1984) (finding jurisdiction after noting that “[t]he distinction is often difficult to draw” between “general challenges to state bar rules as promulgated and challenges to state court decisions in particular cases.”)
Moreover, a contrary conclusion on the nature of the 1986 Rule would have little impact on this litigation because only two of the plaintiffs were parties in the state court; thus, even if jurisdiction were improper as to them, the case would continue on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs. See In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 26 (1st Cir.1982).
As for defendants’ invocation of res judicata and collateral estoppel as bars to this action, we note that the district court first rejected these claims in 1982, and that that decision was not challenged in the subsequent appeal to this court. See Romany, 742 F.2d at 37 n. 6. Nothing that has occurred either in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court or the district court since that time convinces us that we should now open up that issue for full review. Moreover, unlike jurisdiction, preclusion is a matter subject to some flexibility in application. See Berrios Rivera v. British Ropes, Ltd., 575 F.2d 966, 970 (1st Cir.1978) (Puerto Rico courts have recognized that “in certain cases, the policies of res judicata are not well served by literal application of the procedural rules of the courts.”) Accordingly, without further analysis, we choose to treat the district court’s 1982 ruling on preclusion as establishing the law of the case. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 801 (1981) (if a “matter is omitted from one appeal... it may be held foreclosed on a later appeal to the same court as a matter of law of the ease”).
Appealability. Plaintiffs contend that both the Colegio and the Secretaries filed untimely appeals from the wrong judgments. Appeals must be filed “within 30 days of the judgment or order appealed from,” Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1), and courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over “[fjinal decisions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Before addressing the merits of plaintiffs’ argument, we review the procedural chronology.
The district court issued a full opinion on the merits on March 3, 1988, but delayed entering final judgment until after the defendants had an opportunity to modify the remedy to bring it into compliance with the court’s guidelines. The defendants made no changes, and the court issued an opinion on May 27 entering judgment in accordance with the March 3 decision. That May 27 decision was formally entered on the docket on either May 31 or June 1. On June 13, the Colegio filed a motion requesting additional findings of fact, which was denied by the district court on July 15. Both the Colegio and Secretaries filed their appeals on August 10.
The Colegio appealed from the court’s March 3 order and from the July 15 denial of its motion for additional findings of fact. The Secretaries’ notice of appeal sought review of a June 17 judgment.
It is worth noting at the outset of our discussion that if form alone were to govern, we would have to dismiss both appeals of the merits. The Secretaries appealed from a nonexistent judgment on June 17, while the Colegio appealed from a non-final judgment — the one on March 3. It would disserve the interests of justice, however, if we dismissed the appeals on these grounds. Indeed, the Secretaries apparently made no more than a clerical mistake in referring to a June 17 judgment, which should not bar appellate review. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 229, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The Colegio, while committing more than clerical error, undoubtedly appealed from the March 3 decision because it contained the district court’s full analysis. With regard to both appellants, there is no doubt as to the nature of their appeals, and avoiding decision on the merits would be contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
As for timing, we accept the district court’s conclusion that the Colegio’s motion for additional findings of fact was timely, extending the time for filing an appeal of the court’s judgment until 30 days following the court’s decision on that motion. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) (timely motion by any party extends time for appeal). Both the Colegio and the Secretaries met that extended deadline.
III. Discussion
We begin by stating that, in most significant respects, we agree with the district court’s legal conclusions and its disposition of this case. We nevertheless write at some length so that we may respond to arguments made by both plaintiffs and defendants, and so that, in some instances, we may elaborate on the district court’s discussion in ways that we hope will prove helpful to defendants in administering a constitutional procedure for protecting dissenters’ rights.
Our review of the Colegio system requires us to answer three primary questions: what activities may be funded with compulsory dues? does the 1986 Rule adequately protect the right of dissenters not to contribute to other activities? and what steps must defendants take to fulfill their constitutional obligations to dissenters? We address each of them in turn.
A. What activities may be funded with compulsory dues?
The district court’s view that an integrated bar may use compulsory dues only for activities directly related to the lawyering profession and the operation of the judicial system accords with the Supreme Court’s subsequent pronouncements in Keller. See supra p. 624. To be sure, Puerto Rico’s legislature and Supreme Court evidently envision purposes for the Colegio extending far beyond a “professional advis- or” role. See Keller, 110 S.Ct. at 2235; Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 13. But even if it persuasively could be argued that lawyers in Puerto Rico play a distinctive role in creating a pluralistic society, and that collective political action by lawyers is therefore uniquely central to the mission of the Puerto Rico bar, compulsory funding of non-legal ideological activities would impose too great a burden on the First Amendment rights of individual members to be constitutionally acceptable. Lawyers who wish collectively to advocate certain political views can band together in a voluntary association, without coercing those with different views to join their ranks.
The Supreme Court cases upholding compelled membership rest on an implicit assumption that “ ‘the cause which justified bringing the group together,’ ” see Abood, 431 U.S. at 223, 97 S.Ct. at 1793 (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 778, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1805, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring)), would be sufficiently narrow that dissenting employees would be forced to associate against their will in only a limited way. As the district court recognized, if objecting members could be required to subsidize any activity that promoted the creation of a strongly pluralistic society, the limitation on compulsory support carved out in Abood would be meaningless.
Thus, the district court correctly set the boundaries for the Colegio’s use of compulsory dues. The court also described various activities that fall within those boundaries, see supra p. 626, and we endorse its list. The district court’s discussion of activities, however, dwelled primarily on bar programs that we think fall at an extreme end of the spectrum, and for which there would be little dispute that compulsory financing would be appropriate. We therefore think it worth adding to its catalog both some general principles and some specific examples to assist in categorizing activities as either appropriate or inappropriate for compulsory funding.
Before we begin that list, however, it is necessary to review the United States Supreme Court’s rather sketchy references to the propriety of using compulsory dues for “nongermane, nonideological expenditures,” Hudson, 475 U.S. at 304 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 1074 n. 13. These would include, for example, the costs of members’ life insurance or purely social activities. In Hudson, the most recent compulsory union dues case, the Court specifically refrained from deciding whether “the category of impermissible expenditures included all those that were not germane to collective bargaining, even if they might not be characterized as ‘political or ideological,’ ” id. at 299, 304 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 1072, 1074 n. 13.
In an earlier case, however, the Court had considered whether expenditures for union social activities could be financed with compulsory dues. See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 449-50, 456, 104 S.Ct. at 1893, 1896. After concluding that the Railway Labor Act permitted the union to charge all employees for such expenses, the Court only briefly addressed the First Amendment question:
Petitioners do not explicitly contend that union social activities implicate serious First Amendment interests. We need not determine whether contributing money to such affairs is an act triggering First Amendment protection. To the extent it is, the communicative content is not inherent in the act, but stems from the union’s involvement in it. The objection is that these are union social hours. Therefore, the fact that the employee is forced to contribute does not increase the infringement of his First Amendment rights already resulting from the compelled contribution to the union. Petitioners may feel that their money is not being well-spent, but that does not mean they have a First Amendment complaint.
466 U.S. at 456, 104 S.Ct. at 1896 (emphasis in original).
Despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance in Hudson to confront the “constitutional nongermaneness question,” we think the quoted discussion from Ellis provides the appropriate analysis for resolving the issue. Moreover, not only is the First Amendment not a factor, but “[t]he very nature of the free-rider problem and the governmental interest in overcoming it require that the union have a certain flexibility in its use of compelled funds.” Ellis, 466 U.S. at 456, 104 S.Ct. at 1896. We therefore conclude, as did the district court, that activities incidental to the operation of an association — such as social events and the provision of insurance to members— may be financed with mandatory fees.
We now offer several other examples of expenditures that may and may not be mandatorily funded:
1. Political activities, including lobbying, may be funded from compulsory dues so long as the target issues are narrowly limited to regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal service available to the residents of Puerto Rico. See Keller, 110 S.Ct. at 2236-37. Thus, for example, the Colegio could lobby in favor of budget appropriations for new judicial positions or increased salaries for government attorneys, or against statutory limitations on attorney advertising or requirements for the certification of legal specialists. Cf. Gibson v. The Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 & n. 4 (11th Cir.1986).
It would not be permissible, however, to use mandatory dues for such lobbying if the Colegio’s position rested upon partisan political views rather than on lawyerly concerns. For example, while it would be appropriate for the Colegio generally to lobby regarding attorney advertising, it may not use mandatory dues to advocate restrictions only on advertising for legal services in aid of (or opposed to) family planning agencies or abortion clinics. It likewise would be impermissible for the Colegio, to use mandatory dues to lobby on any issue pertaining to the political status of Puerto Rico, even if arguably related to the legal profession or the quality of legal services.
2. Among the activities that could not properly be funded with mandatory dues would be lobbying on controversial bills to change the law in ways not directly linked to the legal profession or the judicial system. For example, the bar could not use dissenting members’ funds to promote a system of no-fault automobile insurance, endorse a pro-life amendment to the Commonwealth constitution or generate support for a death penalty. See Keller, 110 S.Ct. at 2237.
We see no problem, however, in the Colegio’s participation in efforts to amend technical, non-ideological aspects of substantive law. For example, the Wisconsin state bar’s 1975 legislative program included advocacy on two bills that would appear to have engendered no controversy: one making it clear that land contracts enjoy the same exemption from the Wisconsin Consumer Act as do first lien mortgages, and the other simplifying condominium transactions by abolishing a requirement that floor plans be recorded. See T. Schneyer, “The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case,” 1983 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 1, 31 (1983) (hereinafter “Unified Bar Concept”). Another example falling into this category would be a bill to allow notaries to use either a stamp or a seal on documents. All of these measures appear politically noncontroversial and designed merely to “ ‘improv[e] the quality of the legal service available to the people of the [Commonwealth],’ ” Keller, 110 S.Ct. at 2236 (quoting Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843, 81 S.Ct. at 1838).
3. Among the Colegio’s activities that clearly fall outside the narrow categories for which financial support may be compelled are the following Colegio-sponsored committees: the Committee for the Study of the Constitutional Development of Puerto Rico from 1977 to 1984, which, among other business, has published a report on the “Procedural Requirements for Decolonization of the United Nations Organization” ; the Electoral Process Committee, which was created “to enhance the level of political debate in our country, to enforce compliance with the laws governing the voting process and to frame a code of ethics to regulate public debate among political candidates”; the Special Committee on Nuclear Armament and the Nuclear Arms Ban Treaty in Latin America, and the Committee for the Study of the Proposed Territorial Demarcation of the San Juan and Rio Piedras Delegations. See Schneider, Official Translation, slip op. at 48-49; 53; 54.
4. In many instances, it is likely that activities that may be subsidized with mandatory dues will be combined with those that may not. Consider, for example, a hypothetical annual meeting where business matters of direct concern to the regulation of the legal profession will be discussed, but where the chaplain opens with a long prayer for the health of Fidel Castro, and the featured speaker is a prominent Sandanista. Even if the business meeting takes two hours, and the prayer and speech together take only 35 minutes, we think it likely that the atmosphere would have become so partisan that the proportionate cost of the whole meeting should be deducted from a dissenter’s dues. In other words, where the permissible and impermissible are intertwined beyond separation, the objector should be entitled to a full rebate for the cost of the function.
The district court made a similar observation with respect to the Bar’s publications, holding that “[ejach publication stands or falls... as an indivisible entity, depending on its editorial policy.” 682 F.Supp. at 686. If a magazine is devoted to educational articles about the legal profession or the quality of the legal services available in the Commonwealth, it may be funded by compulsory dues. A magazine that publishes markedly political and ideological material may not rely on that source of funding (unless, perhaps, the magazine publishes a broad spectrum of counterbalancing views).
This list, obviously, is not intended to be exhaustive, but it hopefully will provide some context within which to evaluate other activities.
B. Does the 1986 rule adequately protect the right of dissenters NOT to contribute to other activities?
It is not disputed that the Colegio

Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer:

Answer: E