Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The problem of irrigating the arid lands of the Colorado River Basin has been confronted by the peoples of that region for 2,000 years and by Congress and this Court for many decades. Today we conclude another chapter in this original action brought to determine rights to the waters of the Colorado River. In earlier proceedings in this case, the United States, an intervenor in the principal action, acquired water rights for five Indian reservations that are dependent upon the river for their water. The United States, and the Tribes which ask to intervene in the action, now seek to have those water rights increased.
I
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divided the waters of the Colorado River between the Upper- and Lower-Basin States, but fell short of apportioning the respective shares among the individual States. Nor did the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 617 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (Project Act), a vast federal effort to harness and put to use the waters of the lower Colorado River, expressly effect such an apportionment. The principal dispute that became increasingly pressing over the years concerned the respective shares of the Lower-Basin States, particularly the shares of California and Arizona.
This litigation began in 1952 when Arizona, to settle this dispute, invoked our original jurisdiction, U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2, cl. 2, by filing a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against California and seven public agencies of the State. Arizona sought to confirm its title to water in the Colorado River system and to limit California’s annual consumptive use of the river’s waters. Nevada intervened, praying for determination of its water rights; Utah and New Mexico were joined as defendants; and the United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of various federal establishments, including the reservations of five Indian Tribes — the Colorado River Indian Tribes, Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, Cocopah Indian Tribe, and Fort Yuma (Quechan) Indian Tribe.
After lengthy proceedings, Special Master Simon Rifkind filed a report recommending a certain division of the Colorado River waters among California, Arizona, and Nevada. The parties’ respective exceptions to the Master’s report were extensively briefed and the case was twice argued. The Court for the most part agreed with the Special Master, 373 U. S. 546 (1963), and our views were carried forward in the decree found at 376 U. S. 340 (1964).
The long and rich story of the efforts on behalf of the States involved to arrive at a mutually satisfactory plan of apportionment is set forth in the Special Master’s report and the Court’s opinion and need not be repeated here. We agreed with the Special Master that the allocation of Colorado River water was to be governed by the standards set forth in the Project Act rather than by the principles of equitable apportionment which in the absence of statutory directive this Court has applied to disputes between States over entitlement to water from interstate streams. Nor was the local law of prior appropriation necessarily controlling. The Project Act itself was held to have created a comprehensive scheme for the apportionment among California, Nevada, and Arizona of the Lower Basin’s share of the mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries. Congress had decided that a fair division of the first 7.5 million acre-feet of such mainstream waters would give 4.4 million acre-feet to California, 2.8 million acre-feet to Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet to Nevada. Arizona and California would share equally in any surplus. 373 U. S., at 565.
Over strong objection, we also agreed with the Special Master that the United States had reserved water rights for the Indian reservations, effective as of the time of their creation. Id., at 598-600. See Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908). These water rights, having vested before the Project Act became effective on June 25, 1929, were ranked with other “present perfected rights,” and as such were entitled to priority under the Act. 373 U. S., at 600. Rejecting more restrictive standards for measuring the water rights intended to be reserved for the reservations, we agreed with the Master and the United States, speaking on behalf of the Tribes, that the “only feasible and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage.” Id., at 601. We further sustained the Master’s findings, arrived at after full, adversary proceedings, as to the various acreages of practicably irrigable land on the different reservations. Ibid. These findings were subsequently incorporated in our decree of March 9, 1964. Article 11(D) of our decree specified each reservation’s entitlement to diversions from the mainstream.
Not all aspects of the case were finally resolved in the 1964 decree. First, in the course of determining irrigable acreage on the reservations, the Master resolved a dispute between the United States and the States with respect to the boundaries of the Colorado River and Fort Mojave Indian Reservations, generally finding that the reservations were smaller than the United States claimed them to be. Although we based the water rights decreed to these two reservations on the irrigable acreage within the boundaries determined by the Special Master, we found that it had been “unnecessary” for the Special Master finally to have determined these boundaries and provided in Article 11(D) that the quantities of water provided for the Fort Mojave Indian Reservation and the Colorado River Indian Reservation “shall be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” 376 U. S., at 345. See Part V, infra. Second, Article VI of the decree provided that the parties, within two years, should provide the Court with a list of the outstanding present perfected rights in the mainstream waters. Finally, in Article IX of the decree we retained jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of further modifications and orders that we deemed proper.
On January 9, 1979, we entered a supplemental decree identifying the present perfected rights to the use of the mainstream water in each State and their priority dates as agreed to by the parties. 439 U. S. 419. We also decreed that, in the event of shortage, the Secretary of the Interior shall, before providing for the satisfaction of these present perfected rights, first provide for the satisfaction in full of the Indian water rights set forth in the 1964 decree for the five reservations. We expressly noted that these quantities, fixed in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Article 11(D) of the 1964 decree “shall continue to be subject to appropriate adjustment by agreement or decree of this Court in the event that the boundaries of the respective reservations are finally determined.” 439 U. S., at 421. The 1979 decree thus resolved outstanding issues in the litigation. But before that decree was entered new questions arose: The five Indian Tribes, ultimately joined by the United States, made claims for additional water rights to reservation lands.
Because the United States had represented their interests, the Indian Tribes previously had no part in the litigation. In 1977, however, the Fort Mojave, Chemehuevi, and Quechan (Fort Yuma) Indian Tribes moved for leave to intervene as indispensable parties. By April 10, 1978, the Colorado River Indian Tribes and the Cocopah Indian Tribe had also filed petitions for intervention. Three of the Tribes sought intervention to oppose entry of the 1979 decree that was to set the priority order for water rights in the Colorado River. The Tribes also raised claims for additional water rights appurtenant to two types of land: (1) the so-called “omitted” lands — irrigable lands, within the recognized 1964 boundaries of the reservations, for which it was said that the United States failed to claim water rights in the earlier litigation; and (2) “boundary” lands — lands that were or should have been officially recognized as part of the reservations and that had assertedly been finally determined to lie within the reservations within the meaning of the 1964 decree.
Initially, both the state parties and the United States opposed intervention. Subsequently, the United States dropped its opposition to the Tribes’ intervention. Still later, on December 22, 1978, the United States joined the Indians in moving for a supplemental decree to grant additional water rights to the reservations. In our 1979 decree, we denied the motion of the Fort Mojave, Chemehuevi, and Que-chan Tribes to' intervene insofar as they sought to oppose entry of the supplemental decree. Other matters raised by their motion, as well as that of the United States’ and the other two Tribes, were not resolved. We appointed Senior Judge Elbert P. Tuttle Special Master and referred these motions to him. 439 U. S., at 436-437.
After conducting hearings, the Special Master issued a preliminary report on August 28, 1979, granting the Indian Tribes leave to intervene in subsequent hearings on the merits. In addition, the Special Master concluded that certain boundaries of the reservations had now been finally determined within the meaning of Article 11(D) of the 1964 decree, primarily because of administrative decisions taken by the Secretary of the Interior. These decisions purported considerably to enlarge the reservations affected and, with respect to the Colorado River and Mojave Reservations, were for the most part reassertions of the positions submitted by the United States to Special Master Rifkind, rejected by him, and left open by us to later final resolution. We refused to allow the States to file exceptions at that time, 444 U. S. 1009 (1980), and the Special Master held further hearings on the merits.
On' February 22, 1982, the Special Master issued his final report. The Special Master’s findings were almost entirely consistent with the position of the United States and the Indian Tribes. Rejecting the States’ strong objections to reopening the question of whether more practicable irrigable acreage actually existed than the United States claimed, Special Master Rifkind found, and our 1963 opinion and 1964 decree specified, the Special Master concluded that each of the Tribes was entitled to additional water rights based on land that he determined to be irrigable over and beyond that previously found. Furthermore, based on his earlier boundary determination, the Master determined that there was additional practicably irrigable acreage for which the Indians were entitled to further water rights. The States have filed exceptions to both of these determinations, as well as to various factual findings concerning the amount of practicably irrigable acreage.
Ill
The States have also refiled their exceptions to the Special Master’s preliminary findings allowing the Indian Tribes to intervene in the action. We consider this matter first.
We agree with the Special Master that the Indian Tribes’ motions to intervene should be granted. The States oppose the motions and insist that, without their consent, the Tribes’ participation violates the Eleventh Amendment. Assuming, arguendo, that a State may interpose its immunity to bar' a suit brought against it by an Indian tribe, United States v. Minnesota, 270 U. S. 181, 193-195 (1926), the States involved no longer may assert that immunity with respect to the subject matter of this action. Water right claims for the Tribes were brought by the United States. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment “has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the United States.” United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965). See, e. g., United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 646 (1892); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936); United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 26-28 (1947). The Tribes do not seek to bring new claims or issues against the States, but only ask leave to participate in an adjudication of their vital water rights that was commenced by the United States. Therefore, our judicial power over the controversy is not enlarged by granting leave to intervene, and the States’ sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh Amendment is not compromised. See, e. g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981).
The States also oppose intervention on grounds that the presence of the United States insures adequate representation of the Tribes’ interests. The States maintain that the prerequisites for intervention as of right set forth in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not satisfied. Aside from the fact that our own Rules make clear that the Federal Rules are only a guide to procedures in an original action, see this Court’s Rule 9.2; Utah v. United States, 394 U. S. 89, 95 (1969), it is obvious that the Indian Tribes, at a minimum, satisfy the standards for permissive intervention set forth in the Federal Rules. The Tribes’ interests in the water of the Colorado basin have been and will continue to be determined in this litigation since the United States’ action as their representative will bind the Tribes to any judgment. Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 444-445 (1912). Moreover, the Indians are entitled “‘to take their place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic.’” Poafpybitty v. Shelly Oil Co., 390 U. S. 365, 369 (1968), quoting Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715 (1943). Accordingly, the Indians’ participation in litigation critical to their welfare should not be discouraged. The States have failed to present any persuasive reason why their interests would be prejudiced or this litigation unduly delayed by the Tribes’ presence. The Tribes’ motions to intervene are sufficiently timely with respect to this phase of the litigation. Of course, permission to intervene does not carry with it the right to relitigate matters already determined in the case, unless those matters would otherwise be subject to reconsideration. The motions to intervene are granted.
l — i <1
We turn now to the first major question m the case: whether the determination of practicably irrigable acreage within recognized reservation boundaries should be reopened to consider claims for “omitted” lands for which water rights could have been sought in the litigation preceding the 1964 decree. The Special Master agreed with the United States and the Tribes that it is not too late in the day to modify the 1964 adjudication and decree, notwithstanding his own finding that “[t]he claim in the original case... embraced the totality of water rights for the Reservation lands.” Tuttle Report, at 31. We disagree with the Special Master and sustain the exceptions filed by the States and state agencies to his conclusion. In our opinion, the prior determination of Indian water rights in the 1964 decree precludes relitigation of the irrigable acreage issue.
Arizona v. California, unlike many other disputes over water rights that we have adjudicated, has been and continues to be governed mainly by statutory considerations. The primary isfeue in the case — the allocation of the waters of the Lower Colorado River Basin among the States — was resolved by the distribution of waters intended by Congress and written into the Project Act. The question of Indian water rights — an important but ancillary concern — was also decided by recourse to congressional policy rather than judicial equity. We held that the creation of the reservations by the Federal Government implied an allotment of water necessary to “make the reservation livable.” 373 U. S., at 599-600. See Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U. S. 128, 141 (1976). We rejected the argument, urged by the States, that equitable apportionment should govern the question. We were “not convinced by Arizona’s argument that each reservation is so much like a State that its rights to water should be determined by the doctrine of equitable apportionment.” 373 U. S., at 597. “Moreover, even were we to treat an Indian reservation like a State, equitable apportionment would still not control, since, under our view, the Indian claims here are governed by the statutes and Executive Orders creating the reservations. ” Ibid.
We went on to reject Arizona’s further arguments that (1) the doctrine of Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 (1894), prevented the Federal Government from reserving waters for federally reserved lands, 373 U. S., at 597; (2) water rights could not be reserved by Executive Order, id., at 598; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that the United States intended to reserve water for the Tribes, id., at 598-600.
The standard for quantifying the reserved water rights was also hotly contested by the States, who argued that the Master adopted a much too liberal measure. Our decision to rely upon the amount of practicably irrigable acreage contained within the reservation constituted a rejection of Arizona’s proposal that the quantity-of water reserved should be measured by the Indians’ “reasonably foreseeable needs,” i. e., by the number of Indians. The practicably-irrigable-acreage standard was preferable because how many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be could “only be guessed,” id., at 601. By contrast, the irrigable-acreage standard allowed a present water allocation that would be appropriate for future water needs. Id., at 600-601. Therefore, with respect to the question of reserved rights for the reservations, and the measurement of those rights, the Indians, as represented by the United States, won what can be described only as a complete victory. A victory, it should be stressed, that was in part attributable to the Court’s interest in a fixed calculation of future water needs. Applying the irrigable-acreage standard, we found that the Master’s determination as to the amount of practicably irrigable acreage, an issue also subject to adversary proceedings, was reasonable. Our subsequent decree reflected this judgment. 376 U. S. 340 (1964).
The Tribes and the United States now claim that certain practicably irrigable acreage was “omitted” from those calculations. There is no question that if these claims were presented in a different proceeding, a court would be without power to reopen the matter due to the operation of res judicata. That would be true here were it not for Article IX of the 1964 decree which provides:
“Any of the parties may apply at the foot of this decree for its amendment or for farther relief. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy.”
We agree with the United States and the Tribes that this provision grants us power to correct certain errors, to determine reserved questions, and, if necessary, to make modifications in the decree. We differ in our understanding of the circumstances which make exercise of this power appropriate.
The Special Master believed that the decision whether to exercise that discretion should be governed by “law of the case” principles. Unlike the more precise requirements of res judicata, law of the case is an amorphous concept. As most commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. See IB J. Moore & T. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404 (1982) (hereinafter Moore). Law of the case directs a court’s discretion, it does not limit the tribunal’s power. Southern R. Co. v. Clift, 260 U. S. 316, 319 (1922); Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912). In that sense, the doctrine might appear applicable here. But law of the case

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 大