Task: sc_adminaction_is

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Me. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the personal immunity of federal officials in the Executive Branch from claims for damages arising from their violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Respondent filed suit against a number of officials in the Department of Agriculture claiming that they had instituted an investigation and an administrative proceeding against him in retaliation for his criticism of that agency. The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the scope of their authority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state government. Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d 688 (1976). Because of the importance of immunity doctrine to both the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the effective functioning of government, we granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 1089.
I
Respondent controls Arthur N. Economou and Co., Inc., which was at one time registered with the Department of Agriculture as a commodity futures commission merchant. Most of respondent’s factual allegations in this lawsuit focus on an earlier administrative proceeding in which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend the company’s registration. On February 19, 1970, following an audit, the Department of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint alleging that respondent, while a registered merchant, had willfully failed to maintain the minimum financial requirements prescribed by the Department. After another audit, an amended complaint was issued on June 22, 1970. A hearing was held before the Chief Hearing Examiner of the Department, who filed a recommendation sustaining the administrative complaint. The Judicial Officer of the Department, to whom the Secretary had delegated his decisional authority in enforcement proceedings, affirmed the Chief Hearing Examiner’s decision. On respondent’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order of the Judicial Officer. It reasoned that “the essential finding of willfulness... was made in a proceeding instituted without the eustomary warning letter, which the Judicial Officer conceded might well have resulted in prompt correction of the claimed insufficiencies.” Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 494 F. 2d 519 (1974).
While the administrative complaint was pending before the Judicial Officer, respondent filed this lawsuit in Federal District Court. Respondent sought initially to enjoin the progress of the administrative proceeding, but he was unsuccessful in that regard. On March 31, 1975, respondent filed a second amended complaint seeking damages. Named as defendants were the individuals who had served as Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture during the relevant events; the Judicial Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner; several officials in the Commodity Exchange Authority; the Agriculture Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding; and several of the auditors who had investigated respondent or were witnesses against respondent.
The complaint stated that prior to the issuance of the administrative complaints respondent had been “sharply critical of the staff and operations of Defendants and carried on a vociferous campaign for the reform of Defendant Commodity Exchange Authority to obtain more effective regulation of commodity trading.” App. 157-158. The complaint also stated that, some time prior to the issuance of the February 19 complaint, respondent and his company had ceased to engage in activities regulated by the defendants. The complaint charged that each of the administrative complaints had' been issued without the notice or warning required by law; that the defendants had furnished the complaints “to interested persons and others without furnishing respondent's answers as well”; and that following the issuance of the amended complaint, the defendants had issued a “deceptive” press release that “falsely indicated to the public that [respondent’s] financial resources had deteriorated, when Defendants knew that their statement was untrue and so acknowledge [d] previously that said assertion was untrue.” Ibid.
The complaint then presented 10 “causes of action,” some of which purported to state claims for damages under the United States Constitution. For example, the first “cause of action” alleged that respondent had been denied due process of law because the defendants had instituted unauthorized proceedings against him without proper notice and with the knowledge that respondent was no longer subject to their regulatory jurisdiction. The third “cause of action” stated that by means of such actions “the Defendants discouraged and chilled the campaign of criticism [plaintiff] directed against them, and thereby deprived the [plaintiff] of [his] rights to free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that “as to the individual defendants it is barred by the doctrine of official immunity....” Id., at 163. The defendants relied on an affidavit submitted earlier in the litigation by the attorney who had prosecuted the original administrative complaint against respondent. He stated that the Secretary of Agriculture had had no involvement with the case and that each of the other named defendants had acted “within the course of his official duties.” Id., at 142-149.
The District Court, apparently relying on the plurality opinion in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), held that the individual defendants would be entitled to immunity if they could show that “their alleged unconstitutional acts were within the outer perimeter of their authority and discretionary.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. After examining the nature of the acts alleged in the complaint, the District Court concluded: “Since the individual defendants have shown that their alleged unconstitutional acts were both within the scope of their authority and discretionary, we dismiss the second amended complaint as to them.” Id., at 28a.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment of dismissal with respect to the individual defendants. Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d 688 (1976). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Barr v. Matteo, supra, did not “represen [t] the last word in this evolving area,” 535 F. 2d, at 691, because principles governing the immunity of officials of the Executive Branch had been elucidated in later decisions dealing with constitutional claims against state officials. E. g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975). These opinions were understood to establish that officials of the Executive Branch exercising discretionary functions did not need the protection of an absolute immunity from suit, but only a qualified immunity based on good faith and reasonable grounds. The Court of Appeals rejected a proposed distinction between suits against state officials sued pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and suits against federal officials under the Constitution, noting that “[o]ther circuits have also concluded that the Supreme Court’s development of official immunity doctrine in § 1983 suits against state officials applies with equal force to federal officers sued on a cause of action derived directly from the Constitution, since both types of suits serve the same function of protecting citizens against violations of their constitutional rights by government officials.” 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7. The Court of Appeals recognized that under Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), state prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 damages liability but reasoned that Agriculture Department officials performing analogous functions did not require such an immunity because their cases turned more on documentary proof than on the veracity of witnesses and because their work did not generally involve the same constraints of time and information present in criminal cases. 535 F. 2d, at 696 n. 8. The court concluded that all of the defendants were “adequately protected by permitting them to avail themselves of the defense of qualified ‘good faith, reasonable grounds’ immunity of the type approved by the Supreme Court in Scheuer and Wood.” Id., at 696. After noting that summary judgment would be available to the defendants if there were no genuine factual issues for trial, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings.
II
The single submission by the United States on behalf of petitioners is that all of the federal officials sued in this case are absolutely immune from any liability for damages even if in the course of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed respondent’s constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing and deliberate. Although the position is earnestly and ably presented by the United States, we are quite sure that it is unsound and consequently reject it.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), the victim of an arrest and search claimed to be violative of the Fourth Amendment brought suit for damages against the responsible federal agents. Repeating the declaration in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), that “‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,’ ” 403 U. S., at 397, and stating that “ [historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,” id., at 395, we rejected the claim that the plaintiff’s remedy lay only in the state court under state law, with the Fourth Amendment operating merely to nullify a defense of federal authorization. We held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal agents gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon the unconstitutional conduct. Ibid.
Bivens established that compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts, but we reserved the question whether the agents involved were “immune from liability by virtue of their official position,” and remanded the case for that determination. On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as has every other Court of Appeals that has faced the question, held that the agents were not absolutely immune and that the public interest would be sufficiently protected by according the agents and their superiors a qualified immunity.
In our view, the Courts of Appeals have reached sound results. We cannot agree with the United States that our prior cases are to the contrary and support the rule it now urges us to embrace. Indeed, as we see it, the Government’s submission is contrary to the course of decision in this Court from the very early days of the Republic.
The Government places principal reliance on Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). In that case, the acting director of an agency had been sued for malicious defamation by two employees whose suspension for misconduct he had announced in a press release. The defendant claimed an absolute or qualified privilege, but the trial court rejected both and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
In the 1958 Term, the Court granted certiorari in Barr “to determine whether in the circumstances of this case petitioner’s claim of absolute privilege should have stood as a bar to maintenance of the suit despite the allegations of malice made in the complaint.” Id., at 569. The Court was divided in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and there was no opinion for the Court. The plurality opinion inquired whether the conduct complained of was among those “matters committed by law to [the official's] control” and concluded, after an analysis of the specific circumstances, that the press release was within the “outer perimeter of [his] line of duty” and was “an appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must possess if the public service is to function effectively.” Id., at 575. The plurality then held that under Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), the act was privileged and that the officer could not be held liable for the tort of defamation despite the allegations of malice. Barr clearly héld that a false and damaging publication, the issuance of which was otherwise within the official’s authority, was not itself actionable and would not become so by being issued maliciously. The Court did not choose to discuss whether the director’s privilege would be defeated by showing that he was without reasonable grounds for believing his release was true or that he knew that it was false, although the issue was in the case as it came from the Court of Appeals.
Barr does not control this case. It did not address the liability of the acting director had his conduct not been within the outer limits of his duties, but from the care with which the Court inquired into the scope of his authority, it may be inferred that had the release been unauthorized, and surely if the issuance of press releases had been expressly forbidden by statute, the claim of absolute immunity would not have been upheld. The inference is supported by the fact that Me. Justice Stewaet, although agreeing with the principles announced by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissented and would have rejected the immunity claim because the press release, in his view, was not action in the line of duty. 360 U. S., at 592. It is apparent also that a quite different question would have been presented had the officer ignored an express statutory or constitutional limitation' on his authority.
Barr did not, therefore, purport to,depart from the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers. The immunity of federal executive officials began as a means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 865-866 (1824). A federal official who acted outside of his federal statutory authority would be held strictly liable for his trespassory acts. For example, Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804), held the commander of an American warship liable in damages for the seizure of a Danish cargo ship on the high seas. Congress had directed the President to intercept any vessels reasonably suspected of being en route to a French port, but the President had authorized the seizure of suspected vessels whether going to or from French ports, and the Danish vessel seized was en route from a forbidden destination. The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, held that the President’s instructions could not “change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass.” Id., at 179. Although there was probable cause to believe that the ship was engaged in traffic with the French, the seizure at issue was not among that class of seizures that the Executive had been authorized by statute to effect. See also Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806).
Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877), was a similar case. The relevant statute directed seizures of alcoholic beverages in Indian country, but the seizure at issue, which was made upon the orders of a superior, was not made in Indian country. The “objection fatal to all this class of defenses is that in that locality [the seizing officers] were utterly without any authority in the premises” and hence were answerable in damages. Id., at 209.
As these cases demonstrate, a federal official was protected for action tortious under state law only if his acts were authorized by controlling federal law. “To make out his defence he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him.” Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 19 (1896). Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there could be no immunity defense. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 218-223 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 285-292 (1885).
In both Barreme and Bates, the officers did not merely mistakenly conclude that the circumstances warranted a particular seizure, but failed to observe the limitations on their authority by making seizures not within the category or type of seizures they were authorized to make. Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87 (1845), addressed a different situation. The case involved a suit against the Postmaster General for erroneously suspending payments to a creditor of the Post Office. Examining and, if necessary, suspending paymentsTo creditors were among the Postmaster’s normal duties, and it appeared that he had simply made a mistake in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him. He was held not liable in damages since “a public officer, acting to the best of his judgment and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with an individual [is not] liable in an action for an error of. judgment.” Id., at 97-98. Having “the right to examine into this account” and the right to suspend it in the proper circumstances, id., at 98, the officer was not liable in damages if he fell into error, provided, however, that he acted “from a sense of public duty and without malice.” Id., at 99.
Four years later, in a case involving military discipline, the Court issued a similar ruling, exculpating the defendant officer because of the failure to prove that he had exceeded his jurisdiction or had exercised it in a malicious or willfully erroneous manner: “[I]t is not enough to show he committed an error of judgment, but it must have been a malicious and wilful error.” Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89, 131 (1849)..
In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), on which the Government relies, the principal issue was whether the malicious motive of an officer would render him liable in damages for injury inflicted by his official act that otherwise was within the scope of his authority. The Postmaster General was sued for circulating among the postmasters a notice that assertedly injured the reputation of the plaintiff and interfered with his contractual relationships. The Court first inquired as to the Postmaster General’s authority to issue the notice. In doing so, it “recognize[d] a distinction between action taken by the head of a Department in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision.” Id., at 498. Concluding that the circular issued by the Postmaster General “was not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope of his official duties,” the Court then addressed the major question in the case — whether the action could be “maintained because of the allegation that what the officer did was done maliciously?” Id., at 493. Its holding was that the head of a department could not be “held liable to a civil suit for damages on account of official communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority,” however improper his motives might have been. Id., at 498. Because the Postmaster General in issuing the circular in question “did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line of his duty,” id., at 499, it was irrelevant that he might have acted maliciously.
Spalding made clear that a malicious intent will not subject a public officer to liability for performing his authorized duties as to which he would otherwise not be subject to damages liability. But Spalding did not involve conduct manifestly or otherwise beyond the authority of the official, nor did it involve a mistake of either law or fact in construing or applying the statute. It did not purport to immunize officials who ignore limitations on their authority imposed by law. Although the “manifestly or palpably” standard for examining the reach of official power may have been suggested as a gloss on Bárreme, Bates, Kendall, and Wilkes, none of those cases was overruled. It is also evident that Spalding presented no claim that the officer was liable in damages because he had acted in violation of a limitation placed upon his conduct by the United States Constitution. If any inference is to be drawn from Spalding in any of these respects, it is that the official would not be excused from liability if he failed to observe obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application of the statute.
Insofar as cases in this Court dealing with the immunity or privilege of federal officers are concerned, this is where the matter stood until Barr v. Matteo. There, as we have set out above, immunity was granted even though the publication contained a factual error, which was not the case in Spalding. The plurality opinion and judgment in Barr also appear— although without any discussion of the matter — to have extended absolute immunity to an officer who was authorized to issue press releases, who was assumed to know that the press release he issued was false and who therefore was deliberately misusing his authority. Accepting this extension of immunity with respect to state tort claims, however, we are confident that Barr did not purport to protect an official who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but also violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution. Whatever level of protection from state interference is appropriate for federal officials executing their duties under federal law, it cannot be doubted that these officials, even when acting pursuant to congressional authorization, are subject to the restraints imposed by the Federal Constitution.
The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in either Barr or Spalding. Neither of those cases supports the Government’s position. Beyond that, however, neither case purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.
Although it is true that the Court has not dealt with this issue with respect to federal officers, we have several times addressed the immunity of state officers when sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional rights. These decisions are instructive for present purposes.
Ill
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), decided that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate the immunity of state judges which existed under the common law and which the Court had held applicable to federal judges in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). Pierson also presented the issue “whether immunity was available to that segment of the executive branch of a state government that is... most frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims under § 1983 — the local police officer.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 244-245. Relying on the common law, we held that police officers were entitled to a defense of “good faith and probable cause,” even though an arrest might subsequently be proved to be unconstitutional. We observed, however, that “[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim that they ■ are entitled to one.” 386 U. S., at 555.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, the issue was whether “higher officers of the executive branch” of state governments were immune from liability under § 1983 for violations of constitutionally protected rights. 416 U. S., at 246. There, the Governor of a State, the senior and subordinate officers of the state National Guard, and a state university president had been sued on the allegation that they had suppressed a civil disturbance in an unconstitutional manner. We explained that the doctrine of official immunity from § 1983 liability, although not constitutionally grounded and essentially a matter of statutory construction, was based on two mutually dependent rationales:
“(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” 416 U. S., at 240.
The opinion also recognized that executive branch officers must often act swiftly and on the basis of factual information supplied by others, constraints which become even more acute in the “atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events” created by a civil disturbance. Id., at 246-247. Although quoting at length from Barr v. Matteo, we did not believe that there was a need for absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for these high-ranking state officials. Rather the considerations discussed above indicated:
“[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” 416 U. S., at 247-248.
Subsequent decisions have applied the Scheuer standard in other contexts. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975), school administrators were held entitled to claim a similar qualified immunity. A school board member would lose his immunity from a § 1983 suit only if “he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.” 420 U. S., at 322. In O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), we applied the same standard to the superintendent of a state hospital. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978), we held that prison administrators would be adequately protected by the qualified immunity outlined in Scheuer and Wood. We emphasized, however, that, at least in the absence of some showing of malice, an official would not be held liable in damages under § 1983 unless the constitutional right he was alleged to have violated was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.
None of these decisions with respect to state officials furnishes any support for the submission of the United States that federal officials are absolutely immune from liability for their constitutional transgressions. On the contrary, with impressive unanimity, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that federal officials should receive no greater degree of protection from constitutional claims than their counterparts in state government. Subsequent to Scheuer, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that “[although Scheuer involved a suit against state executive officers, the court’s discussion of the qualified nature of executive immunity would appear to be equally applicable to federal executive officers.” States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F. 2d 1146, 1159 (1974). In the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
“it would be ‘incongruous and confusing, to say the least’ to develop different standards of immunity for state officials sued under § 1983 and federal officers sued on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly on the Constitution.” Economou v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7, quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 456 F. 2d 1339, 1346-1347 (CA2 1972) (on remand).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reasoned:
“[Defendants] offer no significant reason for distinguishing, as far as the immunity doctrine is concerned, between litigation under § 1983 against state officers and actions against federal officers alleging violation of constitutional rights under the general federal question statute. In contrast, the practical advantage of having just one federal immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is self-evident. Further, the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the Bill of Rights are no less worthy of full protection than the constitutional and statutory rights protected by § 1983.” Mark v. Groff, 521 F. 2d 1376, 1380 (1975).
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. E. g., Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 506 F. 2d 83 (1974) ; Brubaker v. King, 505 F. 2d 534 (CA7 1974); see Weir v. Muller, 527 F. 2d 872 (CA5 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F. 2d 862 (CA3 1975); Jones v. United States, 536 F. 2d 269 (CA8 1976); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F. 2d 1011 (CA10 1977).
We agree with the perception of these courts that, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983. The constitutional injuries made actionable by § 1983 are of no greater magnitude than those for which federal officials may be responsible. The pressures and uncertainties facing decisionmakers in state government are little if at all different from those affecting federal officials. We see no sense in holding a state governor liable but immunizing the head of a federal department; in holding the administrator of a federal hospital immune where the superintendent of a state hospital would be liable; in protecting the warden of a federal prison where the warden of a state prison would be vulnerable; or in distinguishing between state and federal police participating in the same investigation. Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers.
The Government argues that the cases involving state officials are distinguishable because they reflect the need to preserve the effectiveness of the right of action authorized by § 1983. But as we discuss more fully below, the cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), would similarly be “drained of meaning” if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their constitutional transgressions. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 248.
Moreover, the Government’s analysis would place undue emphasis on the congressional origins of the cause of action in determining the level of immunity. It has been observed more than once.that the law of privilege as -a defense to damages actions against officers of Government has “in large part been of judicial making.” Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 569; Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 318 (1973). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 — the predecessor of § 1983— said nothing about immunity for state officials. It mandated that any person who under color of state law subjected another to the deprivation of his constitutional rights would be liable to the injured party in an action at law. This Court nevertheless ascertained and announced what it deemed to be the appropriate type of immunity from § 1983 liability in a variety of contexts. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. The federal courts are equally competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity where the suit is a direct claim under the Federal Constitution against a federal officer.
The presence or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution. In Bivens, the Court noted the “absence of affirmative action by Congress” and therefore looked for “special factors counselling hesitation.” 403 U. S., at 396. Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think-more carefully about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages, id., at 397, and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's claim, see id., at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
But once this analysis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity. Having determined that the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy in damages for a constitutional violation, the court then must address how best to reconcile the plaintiff’s right to compensation with the need to protect the decisionmaking processes of an executive department. Since our decision in Scheuer was intended to guide the federal courts in resolving this tension in the myriad factual situations in which it might arise, we see no reason why it should not supply the governing principles for resolving this dilemma in the case of federal officials. The Court’s opinion in Scheuer relied on precedents dealing with federal as well as state officials, analyzed the issue of executive immunity in terms of general policy considerations, and stated its conclusion, quoted supra, in the same universal terms. The analysis presented in that case cannot be limited to actions against state officials.
Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. The § 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional rights. That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.
IV
As we have said, the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official. As Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, pointed out, the action for damages recognized in Bivens could be a vital means of providing redress for persons whose constitutional rights have been violated. The barrier of sovereign immunity is frequently impenetrable. Injunctive or declaratory relief is useless to a person who has already been injured. “For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.” 403 U. S., at 410.
Our opinion in Bivens put aside the immunity question; but we could not have contemplated that immunity would be absolute. If, as the Government argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no compensation would be available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for injuries stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has been abused.
The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional guarantees. The broad authority possessed by these officials enables them to direct their subordinates to undertake a wide range of projects — including some which may infringe such important personal interests as liberty, property, and free speech. It makes little sense to hold that a Government agent is liable for war-rantless and forcible entry into a citizen’s house in pursuit of evidence, but that an official of higher rank who actually orders such a burglary is immune simply because of his greater authority. Indeed, the greater power of such officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct. Extensive Government operations offer opportunities for unconstitutional action on a massive scale. In situations of abuse, an action for damages against the responsible official can be an important means of vindicating constitutional guarantees.
Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law:
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U. S., at 220.
See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 239-240. In light of this principle, federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope.
This is not to say that considerations of public policy fail to support a limited immunity for federal executive officials. We consider here, as we did in Scheuer, the need to protect

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer:

Answer: B