Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

PER CURIAM.
There awaits our disposition a motion by David S. Jacobanis for the appointment of counsel. Though Jacobanis has not prosecuted this appeal in forma pau-peris, because he is not a citizen of the United States, an affidavit attached to his motion affirms that he is “indigent” and wholly without legal knowledge necessary to conduct his appeal.
It seems that on October 27, 1952, the United States District .Court for the District of Massachusetts, after verdict of guilty, entered judgment and commitment against Jacobanis for a term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment on a charge of bank robbery and incidental crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Jacobanis took an appeal from this judgment of conviction, but this court on April 17, 1953, entered the following order: “Upon consideration of motion of appellee to docket and dismiss, and of memorandum of appellant in opposition thereto, It is ordered that this case be docketed, and It is further ordered that the appeal herein be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for want of diligent prosecution.”
Under date of March 23, 1958, Jacobanis, writing from Alcatraz, California, addressed a lengthy and rather confusing letter or document to Chief Judge Sweeney. This letter, proceeding upon the erroneous assumption that the district court had granted a new trial to Jacobanis’ co-defendant Theodore Green, asked the court of its own motion to “grant me the same relief granted Green, whatever that may have been.” Following various allegations of misconduct by the prosecuting officials, Jacobanis concluded with a prayer that the court “grant me a new trial”, which of course the court had long since lost power to grant. Rule 33, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. Other allegations seem directed toward a revival of the old appeal from the judgment of conviction, which the court of appeals had dismissed in 1953. This part of the letter was of no concern to the district court. Certain other allegations in the document or letter might by a bit of liberal interpretation be construed to be a pleading for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Judge Wyzanski, to whom Judge Sweeney had transmitted the foregoing letter, entered an order on April 17,1958, in the following terms: “Whether the document dated March 23, 1958 addressed to Chief Judge Sweeney be construed as a motion to vacate sentence imposed on October 27, 1952 or as a motion for some other type of relief, the said motion, in accordance with the memorandum filed this day, is Ordered denied.”
There followed some correspondence between Jacobanis and Judge Wyzanski with reference to the judge’s memorandum of April 17, 1958.
Finally, on May 19, 1958, Jaeobanis filed in the district court a so-called Notice of Appeal which, for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., was obviously inadequate to confer upon this court any appellate jurisdiction. This notice, in designating the order appealed from, states merely “Correspondence Seeking Relief”.
We shall therefore on our own motion enter an order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It necessarily follows that the motion for appointment of counsel to prosecute the appeal is also denied.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A