Task: sc_issue_9

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide in this case what authority the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have to review decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in bar admission matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reversing the United States District Court, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denials of the respondents’ requests for waivers of a bar admission rule that requires applicants to have graduated from an approved law school. We vacate the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
M
We have discussed in detail in earlier opinions the changes in the structure of the District of Columbia court system effected by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. See Key v. Doyle, 434 U. S. 59 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973). For purposes of this case, three provisions of that legislation are crucial. One provision made “[f]inal judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals... reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, United States Code.” § 111, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D. C. Code § 11-102 (1981)). Another provision amended 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to specify that the term “highest court of a State” as used in §1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590. These provisions make the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the judgments of state courts, directly reviewable in this Court. Cases no longer have to proceed from the local courts to the United States Court of Appeals and then to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254. See Key v. Doyle, supra, at 64. The third provision authorized the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to “make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and expulsion.” §111, 84 Stat. 521 (codified at D. C. Code § ll-2501(a) (1981)). This provision divested the United States District Court of its former authority to supervise admission to the District of Columbia Bar.
Pursuant to its new rulemaking authority, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted, as part of its general rules, Rule 461 (1973), which governs admission to the bar. Rule 461(b)(3) states:
“(3) Proof of Legal Education. An applicant who has graduated from a law school that at the time of graduation was approved by the American Bar Association or who shall be eligible to be graduated from an approved law school within 60 days of the date of the examination will be permitted to take the bar examination. Under no circumstances shall an applicant be admitted to the bar without having first submitted to the Secretary to the Committee [on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he has graduated from an approved law school.”
Neither of the respondents graduated from an approved law school. Their efforts to avoid the operation of Rule 461(b)(3) form the foundation of this case.
A
Respondent Feldman did not attend law school. Instead, he pursued an alternative path to a legal career provided by the State of Virginia involving a highly structured program of study in the office of a practicing attorney. See Va. Code §54-62 (1982). In addition to his work and study at a law firm in Charlottesville, Va., Feldman formally audited classes at the University of Virginia School of Law. For the final six months of his alternative course of study, Feldman served as a law clerk to a United States District Judge.
Having passed the Virginia bar examination, Feldman was admitted to that State’s Bar in April 1976. In March of that year he had begun working as a staff attorney for the Baltimore, Md., Legal Aid Bureau. He continued in that job until January 1977. Like the District of Columbia, Maryland has a rule limiting access to the bar examination to graduates of ABA-approved law schools, but the Maryland Board of Law Examiners waived the rule for Feldman. Feldman passed the Maryland examination and later was admitted to that State’s Bar.
In November 1976, Feldman applied to the Committee on Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar for admission to the District Bar under a rule which, prior to its recent amendment, allowed a member of a bar in another jurisdiction to seek membership in the District Bar without examination. In January 1977, the Committee denied Feldman’s application on the ground that he had not graduated from an approved law school. Initially, the Committee stated that waivers of Rule 461(b)(3), or exceptions to it, were not authorized. Following further contact with the Committee, however, Feldman was granted an informal hearing. After the hearing, the Committee reaffirmed its denial of Feld-man’s application and stated that only the District of Columbia Court of Appeals could waive the requirement of graduation from an approved law school.
In June 1977, Feldman submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for admission to the bar without examination. App. la. Alternatively, Feldman requested that he be allowed to sit for the bar examination. Id., at 5a. In his petition, Feldman described his legal training, work experience, and other qualifications. He suggested that his professional training and education were “equal to that received by those who have attended an A. B. A. approved law school.” Id., at 4a. In view of his training, experience, and success in passing the bar examinations in other jurisdictions, Feldman stated that “the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for admission to the Bar will not be frustrated by granting this petition.” Ibid.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not act on Feldman’s petition for several months. In March 1978, Feldman’s counsel wrote to the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to urge favorable action on Feld-man’s petition. The letter stated that Feldman had “abundantly demonstrated his fitness to practice law” and suggested that “it would be a gross injustice to exclude him from the Bar without even considering his individual qualifications.” Id., at 6a. The letter went on to state that “[i]n the unique circumstances of his case, barring Mr. Feldman from the practice of law merely because he has not graduated from an accredited law school would raise important questions under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust laws — questions that Mr. Feldman is prepared to pursue in the United States District Court if necessary.” Id., at 6a-7a. In support of Feldman’s position, the letter again stressed the strength of his training and the breadth of his experience. While acknowledging that a strict reading of Rule 461(b)(3) prevented Feldman from taking the bar examination, Feldman’s counsel suggested that the court was not precluded from considering “Mr. Feldman’s application on its merits.” Id., at 9a. The court has plenary power to regulate the licensing of attorneys, which, in the view of Feld-man’s counsel, includes the discretion to waive the requirements of Rule 461 in a deserving case. In view of Feldman’s “unusually high qualifications for admission” his case provided “an ideal occasion for the exercise of such discretion.” Ibid.
Feldman’s counsel also pointed out that the court had granted waivers of the rule in the past and suggested that a “failure to consider Mr. Feldman’s application would be highly arbitrary and would raise serious questions about the fairness and even-handedness of the Court’s policies regarding bar admissions.” Id., at 10a. He went on to state that “serious questions under the United States Constitution are raised by any bar admissions procedure which automatically rejects applicants who have not graduated from an A. B. A. accredited law school, without any opportunity to show that their experience and education provide equivalent evidence of their fitness to practice law.” Id., at 10a-lla. Feldman’s counsel cited case authority in support of his position. Finally, Feldman’s counsel stated that “[t]he federal antitrust laws provide an alternative basis for questioning the legality of a bar admissions procedure which presumes applicants to be unqualified if they lack a law degree and denies them any opportunity to show that their individual training and experience still qualify them to practice law.” Id., at 12a. Feld-man’s counsel also cited cases in support of this position.
In late March 1978, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals responded to the letter from Feldman’s counsel. Id., at 16a. The Chief Judge stated that while the Committee on Admissions had recognized Mr. Feldman’s “exceptional opportunity for training” and his fine personal qualities, the purpose of the rule at issue was “to prevent the Committee and the Court from assuming the practicably impossible task of making separate subjective evaluations of each applicant’s training and education; hence, an objective and reasonable standard as prescribed by the rule must be utilized.” Ibid. In this light, the court decided not to waive the rule and upheld the Committee’s denial of Feldman’s application.
On March 30, 1978, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a per curiam order denying Feldman’s petition. Id., at 18a. The order stated simply that “[o]n consideration of the petition of Marc Feldman to waive the provisions of Rule 46 of the General Rules of this Court, it is ORDERED that applicant’s petition is denied.” Ibid.
In May 1978, Feldman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive Rule 461(b)(3) on his behalf. Id., at 35a. The complaint stated that the “[defendants’ refusal to consider plaintiff’s individual qualifications to practice law is unlawful in view of his demonstrated fitness and competence, as well as the prior admission to the D. C. bar of several other individuals who did not attend an accredited law school.” Id., at 36a. Feld-man sought “a declaration that defendants’ actions have violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act, and... an injunction requiring defendants either to grant plaintiff immediate admission to the District of Columbia bar or to permit him to sit for the bar examination as soon as possible.” Ibid'
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Id., at 78a, 79a. The court found that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ order denying Feld-man’s petition was a judicial act “which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised.” Id., at 82a. The court stated that if it were “to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit, it would find itself in the unsupportable position of reviewing an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.” Ibid.
B
Respondent Hickey began the study of law in March 1975 at the Potomac School of Law, Washington, D. C., after concluding a distinguished 20-year career as a pilot in the United States Navy. At the time he entered Potomac, Hickey was aware that it had not been accredited by the ABA, but he thought that he could transfer at some later date to an ABA-approved school. Shortly after Hickey started his studies, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of Rule 461(b)(3) to graduates of the International School of Law, a new and unapproved school in the area. The court granted waivers to members of the 1975, 1976, and 1977 graduating classes of International. This practice encouraged Hickey to believe that he also would be able to obtain a waiver of the rule. In November 1977, however, the Court of Appeals denied Potomac’s petition for a temporary waiver of the rule and announced that it would no longer grant waivers to future International graduates.
In April 1978, Hickey submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 461(b)(3) so that he could sit for the bar examination. Id., at 19a. In his petition, Hickey described his career in the Navy and his law school record. He also submitted affidavits from four law professors attesting to his competence in his legal studies. Hickey went on to suggest that it would be unfair to deny him, or other students currently enrolled at Potomac, a waiver after they had pursued three years of legal education in reliance on the court’s previous policy of granting waivers to International graduates. Hickey pointed out that denying his petition for waiver would impose an especially severe burden on him in view of his age and his status as a husband and father.
Hickey also suggested that it would be burdensome for him to attempt to comply with Rule 461(b)(4), which permits graduates of unapproved law schools to sit for the bar examination after completing 24 credit hours at an approved law school. Furthermore, Hickey contended that he would be unable to comply with the rule because the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement.
Finally, Hickey stated that his 20 years of military service had demonstrated “far beyond that of the average bar exam candidate, that he possesses the qualities essential to a good lawyer, including: judgment, maturity, courage in the face of adversity, concern for his fellow man, commitment to our society and attention to detail.” App. 24a. He suggested that “[f ]ar more than most, [he had] earned the right to sit for the bar examination.” Ibid.
On June 12, 1978, the court issued a per curiam order denying Hickey’s petition for a waiver. Id., at 49a. The order stated that the court had considered the petition and Hickey’s contention that the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement. The court stated: “The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure, as amended — 1977, permit enrollment of persons in petitioner’s category under Standard 506(ii) if they can satisfy the requirement for admission set forth in Standard 502.” Ibid.
In July 1978, Hickey filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of his waiver petition. Id., at 60a. Hickey alleged that the denial of his petition violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws. Id., at 64a-65a. The allegations and prayer for relief in Hickey’s complaint were virtually identical to the allegations and prayer for relief in Feldman’s complaint, see n. 3, supra, except that Hickey simply sought an order requiring the defendants to allow him to sit for the bar examination at the earliest possible date. App. 66a.
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hickey’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id., at 142a. In this regard, the court stated that “[i]t is well settled that the admission and exclusion of attorneys by the members of the highest court of a state is the exercise of a judicial function which may be reviewed only by the United States Supreme Court.” Id., at 143a. In the District Court’s view, Hickey was seeking review of the defendants’ denial of his petition for admission to the bar examination. The court suggested that “[t]he constitutional challenge to that denial is wholly and directly intertwined with plaintiff’s efforts to secure an exemption from Rule 46, and the allegations of the complaint and the relief requested concern essentially the application of the Rule to his own particular case.” Ibid. In this light the court concluded that “there is no basis for the extraordinary attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on a matter entrusted by the Congress to the D. C. Court of Appeals.” Ibid.
c
Both Hickey and Feldman appealed the dismissals of their complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Hickey’s and Feldman’s antitrust claims on the ground that they were insubstantial. Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 122, 661 F. 2d 1295, 1298 (1981). The court, however, concluded that the waiver proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District Court.” Ibid. The court therefore reversed the dismissals of the constitutional claims and remanded them for consideration on the merits. Ibid.
Although the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that “review of a final judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of the United States,” id., at 134, 661 F. 2d, at 1310 (footnote omitted), and that the United States District Court therefore is without authority to review determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings, the court found that the District Court has jurisdiction over these cases because the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial....” Ibid. The court based this conclusion on a finding that neither Feldman nor Hickey asserted in their waiver petitions “any sort of right to be admitted to the District of Columbia bar, or even to take the examination therefor.” Id., at 139, 661 F. 2d, at 1315 (emphasis in original). Feldman and Hickey simply sought an exemption from the rule. In particular, Hickey did not present any legal arguments nor did “he demand admission to the examination as a matter of legal entitlement. ” Ibid. He “merely asked the court to exercise its administrative discretion to permit him to take the test.” Ibid. This amounted to a request that the court “make a policy decision equating his personal qualities with accredited legal education, not an adjudication requiring resort to legal principles.” Ibid. (footnote omitted).
The District of Columbia Circuit found Feldman’s case more difficult, id., at 140, 661 F. 2d, at 1316, but still concluded that the proceedings on his waiver petition were not judicial in nature because the “claim-of-right element” was lacking. Ibid. Feldman’s petition did not “claim that a refusal of his waiver request would deny him any right at all.” Ibid. Instead, the petition “invoked the administrative discretion of [the court], simply asking that it temper its rule in his favor, for personal and not legal reasons.” Ibid. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument that the letter from Feldman’s counsel, which raised certain legal arguments, changed the nature of the proceedings. Id., at 140-141, 661 F. 2d, at 1316-1317. The District of Columbia Circuit stated: “We are unable to discern in the letter any desire that the court consider Feldman’s legal criticisms of the rule on their merits, or hand down a decision dealing with them. The letter made unmistakably clear that these criticisms would be litigated, if at all, in the District Court....” Ibid, (footnotes omitted).
II
The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 415, 416 (1923). A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature.
A

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 道