Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article of War 92, 10 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. IV) § 1564, which, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, governed trials for murder or rape before courts-martial, contained a proviso “That no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace.”
The question for decision concerns the meaning of the words “in time of peace” in the context of Article 92.
Petitioner, while serving with the United States Army in France, was convicted by a court-martial, dishonorably discharged, and sentenced to prison for 20 years. He was serving that sentence in the custody of the Army at Camp Cooke, California, when he was convicted by a court-martial of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. This offense occurred on June 10, 1949, at Camp Cooke. The question is whether June 10, 1949, was “in time of peace” as the term was used in the 92d Article. The question was raised by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the jurisdiction of the court-martial. Both the District Court (148 F. Supp. 23) and the Court of Appeals (248 F. 2d 783) ruled against petitioner. We granted certiorari, 356 U. S. 911.
The Germans surrendered on May 8, 1945 (59 Stat. 1857), the Japanese on September 2,1945 (59 Stat. 1733). The President on December 31, 1946, proclaimed the cessation of hostilities, adding that “a state of war still exists.” 61 Stat. 1048. In 1947, Senate Joint Resolution 123 was passed (61 Stat. 449) which terminated, inter alia, several provisions of the Articles of War but did not mention Article 92. The war with Germany terminated October 19, 1951, by a Joint Resolution of Congress (65 Stat. 451) and a Presidential Proclamation (66 Stat. c3). And on April 28, 1952, the formal declaration of peace and termination of war with Japan was proclaimed by the President (66 Stat. c31), that being the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Since June 10, 1949 — the critical date involved here — preceded these latter dates, and since no previous action by the political branches of our Government had specifically lifted Article 92 from the “state of war” category, it is argued that we were not then “in time of peace” for the purposes of Article 92. That argument gains support from a dictum in Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 9-10, that the term “in time of peace” as used in Article 92 “signifies peace in the complete sense, officially declared.” Of like tenor are generalized statements that the termination of a “state of war” is “a political act” of the other branches of Government, not the Judiciary. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 169. We do not think that either of those authorities is dispositive of the present controversy. A more particularized and discriminating analysis must be made. We deal with a term that must be construed in light of the precise facts of each case and the impact of the particular statute involved. Congress in drafting laws may decide that the Nation may be “at war” for one purpose, and “at peace” for another. It may use the same words broadly in one context, narrowly in another. The problem of judicial interpretation is to determine whether “in the sense of this law” peace had arrived. United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 69. Only mischief can result if those terms are given one meaning regardless of the statutory context.
In the Kahn case, the offense was committed on July 29, 1918, and the trial started November 4, 1918 — both dates being before the Armistice. It is, therefore, clear that the offense was not committed “in time of peace.” Moreover, a military tribunal whose jurisdiction over a case attaches in a time of actual war does not lose jurisdiction because hostilities cease. Once a military court acquires jurisdiction that jurisdiction continues until the end of the trial and the imposition of the sentence. See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 383. The broad comments of the Court in the Kahn case on the meaning of the term “in time of peace” as used in Article 92 were, therefore, quite unnecessary for the decision.
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, belongs in a special category of cases dealing with the power of the Executive or the Congress to deal with the aftermath of problems which a state of war brings and which a cessation of hostilities does not necessarily dispel. That case concerns the power of the President to remove an alien enemy after hostilities have ended but before the political branches have declared the state of war ended. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, involves the constitutionality under the war power of a prohibition law passed in 1918 after the armistice with Germany was signed and to be operative “until the conclusion of the present war and thereafter until the termination of demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President of the United States.” Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 138, concerns the constitutionality of control of housing rentals promulgated after hostilities were ended and before peace was formally declared. These cases deal with the reach of the war power, as a source of regulatory authority over national affairs, in the aftermath of hostilities. The earlier case of McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426, is likewise irrelevant to our problem. It was a suit for back pay by an officer, the outcome of which turned on a statute which allowed dismissal of an officer from the service “in time of peace” only by court-martial. The President had made the dismissal; and the Court held that such action, being before August 20, 1866, when the Presidential Proclamation announced the end of the rebellion and the existence of peace, was lawful, since there was extrinsic evidence that Congress did not intend the statute to be effective until the date of the Proclamation.
Our problem is not controlled by those cases. We deal with the term “in time of peace” in the setting of a grant of power to military tribunals to try people for capital offenses. Did Congress design a broad or a narrow grant of authority? Is the authority of a court-martial to try a soldier for a civil crime, such as murder or rape, to be generously or strictly construed? Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304.
We do not write on a clean slate. The attitude cf a free society toward the jurisdiction of military tribunals — our reluctance to give them authority to try people for nonmilitary offenses — has a long history.
We reviewed both British and American history, touching on this point, in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 23-30. We pointed out the great alarms sounded when James II authorized the trial of soldiers for nonmilitary crimes and the American protests that mounted when British courts-martial impinged on the domain of civil courts in this country. The views of Blackstone on military jurisdiction became deeply imbedded in our thinking: “The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king’s courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 413. And see Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England (1st ed. 1713), 40-41. We spoke in that tradition in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 22, “Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service.”
The power to try soldiers for the capital crimes of murder and rape was long withheld. Not until 1863 was authority granted. 12 Stat. 736. And then it was restricted to times of “war, insurrection, or rebellion.” The theory was that the civil courts, being open, were wholly qualified to handle these cases. As Col. William Winthrop wrote in Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1920) 667, about this 1863 law:
“Its main object evidently was to provide for the punishment of these crimes in localities where, in consequence of military occupation, or the prevalence of martial law, the action of the civil courts is suspended, or their authority can not be exercised with the promptitude and efficiency required by the exigencies of the period and the necessities of military government.”
Civil courts were, indeed, thought to be better qualified than military tribunals to try nonmilitary offenses. They have a more deeply engrained judicial attitude, a more thorough indoctrination in the procedural safeguards necessary for a fair trial. Moreover, important constitutional guarantees come into play once the citizen— whether soldier or civilian — is charged with a capital crime such as murder or rape. The most significant of these is the right to trial by jury, one of the most important safeguards against tyranny which our law has designed. We must assume that the Congress, as well as the courts, was alive to the importance of those constitutional guarantees when it gave Article 92 its particular phrasing. Statutory language is construed to conform as near as may be to traditional guarantees that protect the rights of the citizen. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 301-304; Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 129. We will attribute to Congress a purpose to guard jealously against the dilution of the liberties of the citizen that would result if the jurisdiction of military tribunals were enlarged at the expense of civil courts. General Enoch H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General, in testifying in favor of the forerunner of the present proviso of Article 92, spoke of the protection it extended the officer and soldier by securing them “a trial by their peers.” We think the proviso should be read generously to achieve that end.
We refused in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, to construe “martial law,” as used in an Act of Congress, broadly so as to supplant all civilian laws and to substitute military for judicial trials of civilians not charged with violations of the law of war. We imputed to Congress an attitude that was more consonant with our traditions of civil liberties. We approach the analysis of the term “in time of peace” as used in Article 92 in the same manner. Whatever may have been the plan of a later Congress in continuing some controls long after hostilities ceased, we cannot readily assume that the earlier Congress used “in time of peace” in Article 92 to deny soldiers or civilians the- benefit of jury trials for capital offenses four years after all hostilities had ceased. To hold otherwise would be to make substantial rights turn on a fiction. We will not presume that Congress used the words “in time of peace” in that sense. The meaning attributed to them is at war with common sense, destructive of civil rights, and unnecessary for realization of the balanced scheme promulgated by the Articles of War. We hold that June 10,1949, was “in time of peace” as those words were used in Article 92. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the other questions presented, including the constitutional issues which have been much mooted.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
64 Stat. 108, 10 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 801 et seq., enacted May 5, 1950. For the present provisions governing murder and rape see Articles 118, 120.
Article 92 read as follows:
“Any person subject to military law found guilty of murder shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct; but if found guilty of murder not premeditated, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Any person subject to military law who is found guilty of rape shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct: Provided, That no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time of peace.”
See H. R. Rep. No. 2682, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 799, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 339, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
In Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, a companion ease to the Kahn case, the crime was committed on September 28, 1918, and the court-martial convened on October 30, 1918.
Prior to that time only state courts could try a soldier for murder or rape. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 514. And that Act was construed as not giving the military exclusive jurisdiction.
“With the known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts, no such intention should be ascribed to Congress in the absence of clear and direct language to that effect.” Id.
We said in Toth v. Quarles, supra, pp. 17-19:
. . there is a great difference between trial by jury and trial by selected members of the military forces. It is true that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of military rules. Such training is no doubt particularly important where an offense charged against a soldier is purely military, such as disobedience of an order, leaving post, etc. But whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task. This idea is inherent in the institution of trial by jury.
“Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the military field. On many occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors — plain people — have manfully stood up in defense of liberty against the importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. The acquittal of William Penn is an illustrious example. Unfortunately, instances could also be cited where jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures. In such circumstances independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have power to set aside convictions.”
See S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 88'.
General Crowder was opposed to a proposal of the General Staff that capital crimes even when committed in this country be tried by court-martial as well as by civil courts. He said, “We never have had that law, and I doubt very much whether it is desirable to divorce the Army to that extent from accountability in the civil courts. . . . I think that here in the United States proper the Army should be under the same accountability as civilians for capital crimes.” Id., at 32.
The method employed by the Executive and the Congress in terminating wartime controls was different at the end of World War II than it was when World War I terminated. In the earlier war most of the legislation dependent on the existence of a state of war was terminated at one time. See 41 Stat. 1359, H. R. Rep. No. 1111, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 706, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. At the end of World War II Congress acted more selectively. See H. R. Rep. No. 2682, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. Thus Congress by S. J. Res. 123, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., declared that, for the purpose of construing specified statutes (among them certain Articles of War — but not Article 92), the effective date of the Resolution should be deemed the termination date of the state of war. The fact that Article 92 was not in that list leaves the problem where it was at the time the law was enacted. The failure to repeal, alter, or amend this law plainly has no bearing on its original purpose.

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 密