Task: songer_appel1_7_2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

PER CURIAM.
John Wesley Arnold appeals from a conviction in the Eastern District of Arkansas for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. After trial to a jury the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to three years imprisonment with two years and eight months suspended.
Arnold admits filling out an American Express Company credit card application using his mother’s name, Sutilla Arnold, as the primary applicant. He listed his own address, telephone number and social security number as his mother’s, and, in addition, gave false information as to his mother’s age, employment and yearly salary. He supplied as credit references the Farmers Bank, Hamburg, Arkansas, where his mother had an account, and other businesses where his mother traded. He requested that American Express send a supplementary credit card for an immediate member of Sutilla Arnold’s family, John Wesley Arnold. The application was signed, “Sutilla Arnold, 6-7-74.” However it is not disputed that the defendant signed his mother’s name.
Upon receiving the application, American Express checked Sutilla Arnold’s credit and issued the two cards requested. They made no check of John Wesley Arnold’s credit. In a short period of time the defendant and a friend ran up a total bill of $4,042.70. American Express refused the defendant’s offer to make monthly payments of $100. No payments have been made. The matter was referred to a postal inspector for investigation and this prosecution resulted.
On appeal the defendant claims that the government failed to prove specific intent to defraud: first, because Arnold’s scheme would not have resulted in loss to American Express, and American Express was not deceived as to John Wesley Arnold’s identity as a credit card holder and a credit risk; and second, because Arnold dealt with American Express in good faith. Intent to defraud, of course, is an essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).
In reviewing the record we must sustain the verdict if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Direct evidence of willful intent is not required. The requisite intent may be inferred from the acts of the defendant. United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204, 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 238, 30 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971), and cases cited therein. We find the government’s evidence sufficient to show that the application was made so as to deceive, was made with the intent to deceive, and did, in fact, deceive American Express.
One of the salient factors in weighing the sufficiency of the proof as to intent to defraud is the party’s use of material misrepresentations in carrying out the venture. United States v. Porter, supra, 441 F.2d at 1210. Here, although Arnold eventually informed his mother of the application, and she approved on the condition that he be liable for all bills incurred, there is no question that Arnold submitted an application, containing what he knew to be false information, in his mother’s name and without her knowledge, and that he offered the information so American Express would act favorably on the application. From this the jury could properly infer willful intent.
Good faith, of course, is a defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 16 S.Ct. 508, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896); Gold v. United States, 36 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1929). However, this defense must be weighed in light of the defendant’s misrepresentations and use of credit once received. We find support for the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer:

Answer: B