Task: songer_casetyp1_2-3-2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to identify the issue in the case, that is, the social and/or political context of the litigation in which more purely legal issues are argued. Put somewhat differently, this field identifies the nature of the conflict between the litigants. The focus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.
Your task is to determine the specific issue in the case within the broad category of "civil rights - voting rights, race discrimination, sex discrimination". 

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
The Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States and Canada [Brotherhood] appeals from the district court’s finding that the union violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, as amended (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976)), by participating in racially discriminatory promotion practices. Appellant urges us to reverse the judgment on the grounds that the district court 1) lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims; 2) erred in not finding that the alleged discrimination resulted from a bona fide seniority system protected from attack under § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 3) applied the wrong legal standards in finding that the Brotherhood violated Title VII; 4) resolved issues of material fact on summary judgment and 5) improperly refused to permit a Brotherhood witness to testify. In addition, the Brotherhood appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) to set aside the back pay award, arguing that the court abused its discretion in denying its motion. Appellees cross-appeal from a jury verdict for the Brotherhood on their claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, on the ground that the district court erred in not directing a partial verdict for the appellees. Finding the parties’ contentions without merit, we affirm the decisions of the district court.
I. Factual Background
Since the 1940’s, the Brotherhood Railway Carmen of the United States and Canada has represented those employees at Seaboard Coast Line Railroad’s [SCL’s] Way cross, Georgia Car Department, whose task is to maintain and repair the railroad’s rolling stock. Craft members include car-men, carman apprentices, helper apprentices, and carman helpers. Carmen are the highest paid members of the craft. The only promotion as of right to the carman position accrues to carman apprentices and helper apprentices. Carman apprentices are hired under a formal apprenticeship agreement, which contemplates a four year training period. Helper apprentices serve two years as carman helpers and then enter the carman apprenticeship program with one year of credit toward satisfying the apprenticeship requirements. Carman helpers assist carmen and carman apprentices and receive no credit toward becoming car-men, regardless of their length of service. A carman helper can qualify for the car-men’s roster by serving 8320 hours, approximately four work years, as a temporary— “set-up” — carman.
Appellees, all of whom were black, were hired by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad [ACL], SCL’s predecessor, in the early 1940’s and have for the most part served as carman helpers since 1950. When appel-lees were first hired as carman helpers, blacks could not obtain jobs as carmen, car-man apprentices, or helper apprentices. Although both blacks and whites were employed as carman helpers, only the white carman helpers were admitted into the helper apprenticeship program. In other words, blacks could obtain jobs in the car-man craft only as carman helpers — the position of lowest standing in the craft and the only position offering no opportunity for advancement. Nevertheless, in the early 1950’s a few black carman helpers were promoted to the position of carman at the insistence of Roy P. Osborne, chairman of the grievance committee of the local union, who believed it unfair that qualified blacks were not permitted to join the carmen’s roster. After Osborne retired from that position, the union never again requested the railroad to promote black carman helpers to carmen.
In 1955, the railroad ceased hiring car-man helpers. By 1960, all of the white carman helpers who so desired had been promoted, leaving the job of carman helper to the exclusive dominion of black employees — the appellees and a few others. The district court found that as of 1960, each appellee was qualified to serve as a carman. In 1955, when business was booming, all of the appellees except Parker were set-up to carmen and performed satisfactorily until demoted to their carman helper positions when work slowed down. Appellee Parker learned the carman’s trade during the decade from 1950-60 while working as a car-man helper. Thus, appellees were not relegated to the position of carman helper because they were unqualified.
In 1960, all of the appellees except Scret-chen were laid-off from their positions as carman helpers and except for Cooper and McClendon remained furloughed throughout the decade. See note 3 supra. During the decade, however, two events significant to this action occurred. First, in 1965, in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the railroad began hiring blacks into its carman apprenticeship program. The Brotherhood asserts that the appellees were offered the opportunity to become apprentices; however, the appellees testified at trial that they had received no such offers. Second, in 1967, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad merged with the Seaboard Airline Railroad to form the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad. Shortly thereafter the Brotherhood and SCL entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, effective 1968, which contained many provisions similar to those in collective bargaining agreements between the union and SCL’s predecessors. See note 2 supra. For example, Appendix F detailed the scheme for advancement to the position of carman as described above, as well as the manner in which shortages in the carman position were to be filled. It provided for the continued automatic promotion of car-man apprentices and helper apprentices to the position of carman and retained the requirement that carman helpers serve 8320 hours as set-up carmen before qualifying for the carmen’s roster. This latter requirement affected only black employees, including appellees, all of whom were hired as carman helpers prior to 1952. It also effectively precluded appellees from advancing to carmen even though they were qualified to serve in that position. A union official testified that the Brotherhood could have negotiated to modify the existing promotion system to permit qualified carman helpers to advance to the ranks of carmen without first serving 8320 hours as set-up carmen but did not. In fact, in negotiating Appendix F, the Brotherhood insisted on a new promotion provision that gave the union more control over the railroad’s decisions regarding the promotion and demotion of employees.
As the 1960’s came to a close, the appel-lees began to return to their positions as carman helpers. Appellee Cooper returned to his position in 1966, McClendon returned in 1969 and the remaining appellees returned in 1971. In 1971, the appellees were temporarily set-up to carmen and performed satisfactorily. Soon thereafter they began to inquire whether they would ever be promoted. By 1971 some of the plaintiffs had been with the railroad for thirty years and all had been there twenty years. Nevertheless, they were told that they could be promoted only after serving 8320 hours as set-up carmen as required by the collective bargaining agreement.
Prompted by the promotion of three white employees to carmen in late February of 1973, appellee Jackson wrote a letter March 12, 1973, to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], complaining that he had “been discriminated against ever since 1955 in reference to promotion.” On April 6, 1973, Jackson wrote Shop Superintendent O. G. Wood, asking for “favorable consideration to my request that I be promoted to carman,” and that same day filed a formal charge with the EEOC, alleging that Seaboard Coast Line Railroad and “BRC of A Local No. 508” had discriminated against him by “upgrading other employees (white) with less experience or seniority.”
Jackson timely filed this action in federal district court after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Originally, the suit was brought as a class action under Title VII against the SCL and the Brotherhood, alleging in essence that the promotion provisions contained in the 1967 collective bargaining agreement, as well as in predecessor agreements, have served to perpetuate past employment discrimination against black carman helpers and have continuously discriminated against them by depriving them of advancement to the position of carman. Jackson subsequently amended the original complaint: he deleted the railroad as a primary defendant, dropped the class action allegations, joined as named plaintiffs W. C. McClendon, Lige Scretchen, Nathanial Cooper, and W. E. Parker, who were initially members of the class, and added additional claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After discovery was completed, the appellees and the appellant filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied. Following a three day trial, the jury returned a verdict on the § 1981 claims in favor of the Brotherhood. Nine months later, on May 15, 1980, the district court issued its order on the Title VII claims, finding for the appellees.
The court reinstated the railroad as a defendant for the purpose of providing full relief to the appellees and ordered the SCL and the Brotherhood to admit the appellees to the carmen’s roster, giving each appellee the seniority date of July 2, 1965, in the order of his hire in relation to the other appellees. The court did not resolve the issue of back pay at that time, however; instead, it encouraged the parties to reach an accord within forty-five days, after which time the appellees could apply for a hearing or ruling on any disputed issue of law or fact. The parties were unable to reach an agreement, and on August 12, 1980 the appellees filed for summary judgment on the issue of back pay, requesting $43,133.14. A month later, on September 23, 1980, having received no response from the Brotherhood to the appellees’ motion, the court granted summary judgment for the appellees. The Brotherhood moved to vacate the back pay award under Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. The district court denied the motion. These appeals followed.
II. Title VII Jurisdiction
Before instituting a Title VII suit in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint against the discriminating party within 180 days of the alleged discrimination and must receive statutory notice of the right to sue the respondent named in the charge. Alexan der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Mississippi, 621 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1980); Crawford v. Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980); Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1977). Appellant claims that appellees failed to satisfy these requirements and that their Title VII claims must therefore be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. More specifically, appellant argues that 1) the Brotherhood was never named as a respondent in the EEOC charge filed by Jackson or in the right-to-sue letter received by the appellees; 2) the appellees failed to demonstrate at trial that Jackson filed his EEOC charge within 180 days after an act of discrimination committed by the Brotherhood; and 3) the EEOC charge filed by Jackson cannot be used by the non-filing plaintiffs to pursue their Title VII claims against the Brotherhood. For the following reasons we reject these contentions and find that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the Title VII claims against the appellant.
A. Conditions Precedent or Jurisdictional Prerequisites?
Appellant did not assert that appellees’ Title VII claim should be dismissed on the grounds that appellant was not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge and that the EEOC charge was not filed within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act until after trial in its motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If the conditions precedent to a Title VII action constitute jurisdictional prerequisites, then the appellant could properly raise these contentions after trial pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s competency to consider a given type of case and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties. E.g., People’s Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61, 26 L.Ed. 101 (1880). Otherwise, a party could “work a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied them.” American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18, 71 S.Ct. 534, 542, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1950). If, however, the failure to satisfy the preconditions to a Title VII action does not deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction, then the appellant waived its right to assert ap-pellees’ nonfulfillment of conditions precedent by failing to raise that issue in a timely manner. The courts in recent years have struggled with the question whether or not the conditions precedent to a Title VII action are jurisdictional. After carefully considering the statutory language, legislative history, and case law, we conclude that Congress did not intend Title VII’s procedural requirements to be jurisdictional prerequisites, which if not satisfied deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.
A court’s function in interpreting a statute “is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress,” and the most persuasive evidence of Congressional intent is the wording of the statute. United States v. American Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1063, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1939). See Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), the statutory provision conferring jurisdiction over Title VII suits to federal district courts, provides that “[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions under this subchapter.” This provision unconditionally confers jurisdiction over claims arising under Title VII to federal district courts. Nothing in the express language of section 2000e-5(f)(3) suggests that the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is conditioned upon the fulfillment of other procedural requirements for pursuing a Title VII claim. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,-U.S.-,-, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Nor do any of the provisions that detail the prerequisites to filing a Title VII action contain language qualifying section 2000e-5(f)(3). See, eg., note 7 supra. We cannot conclude that Congress’ omission of such qualifying language was inadvertent. The preconditions to filing a Title VII action and the jurisdictional provision are found in the same subsection of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and if Congress had wanted to limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts over Title VII claims brought under section 2000e-5(f)(3), it certainly knew how to do it. In conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts over “pattern or practice” suits instituted by the Attorney General under Title VII, Congress specifically limited federal court jurisdiction to “proceedings instituted pursuant to this section.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b). But Congress chose not to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over suits brought by private parties, the EEOC, or the Attorney General under section 2000e-5 in this manner; instead Congress conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts over “actions brought under this title [Title VII],” without special reference to § 2000e-5 and its procedural requirements. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 706(f)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976)). Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that Congress did not intend the conditions precedent to a Title VII action to constitute jurisdictional prerequisites.
Nor does the legislative history of Title VII suggest that Congress intended the statute to be read otherwise. Congress never specifically addressed this issue and never mentioned the interplay between procedural requirements for filing suit and federal court jurisdiction, even though in 1972 Congress amended several of the conditions precedent and vigorously debated whether or not to alter Title VII’s enforcement scheme by giving the EEOC authority to hold hearings and issue cease and desist orders, restricting the jurisdiction of federal district courts. If the legislative history of the conditions precedent and jurisdictional provision provides any insight into this question, it suggests that Congress did not intend the conditions precedent to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The legislative history indicates that Congress considered Title VII’s preconditions to be analogous to procedural requirements, which do not limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in other contexts. For example, Congress considered Title VIPs filing periods to operate as statutes of limitations. Final Conference Committee section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1745, The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 7166, 7177; 110 Cong.Rec. 7243 (remarks of Sen. Case); 110 Cong.Rec. 12712 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra,-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1132; Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra at 593-94 & n. 18. The failure to satisfy statutes of limitations, conditions precedent, in personam jurisdiction, and other procedural requirements similar to Title VII’s preconditions does not deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought under jurisdictional provisions similar to § 2000e-5(f)(3). Thus, although Congress never expressly addressed this issue, we find some support in the legislative history for our reading of Title VII as providing federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under § 2000e-5(f)(3), unqualified by the procedural requirements found in other subsections of section 2000e-5.
The case law also supports our conclusion that the conditions precedent to filing a Title VII suit are not jurisdictional prerequisites. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has expressly decided that none of the conditions precedent are jurisdictional; however, both courts have held that particular conditions precedent are not jurisdictional, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra; Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), and have interpreted and applied other conditions precedent in a manner that is inconsistent with their being jurisdictional.
For example, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the Supreme Court considered whether Title VII relief is available to members of a class action who not only failed to satisfy such conditions precedent as the timely filing of an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, timely filing of a Title VII action within 90 days after receiving a right to sue letter, or naming of a defendant as a respondent in the EEOC charge, but who did not file an EEOC complaint at all. Relying on the decisions of the courts of appeals and the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Court concluded that relief under Title VII “may be awarded on a class basis... without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class members.” Id. at 414 n.8. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 389 n.6, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 2468, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1267, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). The Court’s treatment of class members who failed to satisfy Title VII’s filing requirement stands in stark contrast to its treatment of class members who failed to fulfill the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the latter instance, the Court has barred participation in a class action by potential class members not satisfying the $10,000 requirement. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). “If the timely filing of an administrative claim is truly a jurisdictional prerequisite, then each class member should be required to file a claim before participating in a Title VII class action, just as each class member must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in other class actions. The fact that they do not is an indication that the Court does not consider the filing requirement to be jurisdictional.” Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra at 589. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 1133; Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1979).
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the former Fifth Circuit in Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) held that non-filing parties can be joined as members of a class in Title VII suits. In so deciding, it rejected the district court’s reasoning that since the filing of a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite, an individual who has not filed charges with the Commission cannot entertain a civil action as a class member. The court explained that “[t]he fallacy of the district court’s reasoning is that the matter is primarily procedural rather than substantive and thus the question is one of simple expediency. In this posture, it is perfectly clear that no procedural purpose could be served by requiring scores of substantially identical grievances to be processed through the EEOC when a single charge would be sufficient to effectuate both the letter and the spirit of Title VII.” Id. at 285 (emphasis added). Extending this rationale to non-filing plaintiffs in a multiple-plaintiff, non-class action, the court in Crawford v. United States Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1981) held that “in an action involving claims of several persons arising out of similar discriminatory treatment, not all of them need to have filed EEOC charges as long as one or more of the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirement.” Id. at 665; Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1982); Wheeler v. American Home Products Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 1977); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
The clear implication of these decisions is that the filing of an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. If it were, neither the Supreme Court nor the former Fifth Circuit could have permitted federal district courts to consider claims of non-filing plaintiffs, regardless of how similar the claims of such plaintiffs were to those raised by plaintiffs who had fulfilled the jurisdictional requirements. Only Congress — not the judiciary — can modify those requirements that must be satisfied to enable lower federal courts to exercise dominion over a cause of action. See Emco Machine Works Co., supra at 1298; Miller v. International Paper Co., supra at 285. If a party’s failure to file an EEOC charge and consequently receive a right-to-sue letter does not deprive the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, then certainly the technicalities of filing an EEOC charge or a Title VII suit cannot constitute jurisdictional prerequisites.
The Supreme Court’s treatment of Title VII’s time limitations for filing an EEOC charge, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and for bringing a civil action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), confirms our conclusion. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra, the Court expressly addressed for the first time whether or not a condition precedent to a Title VII action constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite. The issue before the Court was whether the requirement that an EEOC charge be timely filed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), is a jurisdictional prerequisite, which if not satisfied deprives federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims, or whether the requirement is more akin to a statute of limitations, which is not jurisdictional and thus may be subject to equitable modification.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court held “that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra,-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1132. First, the Court observed that the provision granting jurisdiction to district courts, section 2000e-5(f)(3), “does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely filing with the EEOC,” and that “[t]he provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Id. Second, the Court noted that the legislative history was sparse but that it indicated that Congress intended the filing limitation to operate like a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Id. Third, the Court found that prior case law was inconsistent with treating the filing requirement as limiting the jurisdiction of the district court. It noted that to hold the filing requirement to be a jurisdictional prerequisite would be inconsistent with Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, and Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, which, as discussed above, held that relief under Title VII may be awarded to class members who have not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC, and with the reasoning of other Supreme Court decisions, which treated the filing requirement as non-jurisdictional without expressly so holding. Id. -U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1133. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 441, 50 L.Ed.2d 427 (1976). And, finally, the Court reasoned that “[b]y holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.” Id. - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 1133.
In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), the Supreme Court also made clear that the requirement that a party file a Title VII action within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Before reaching the merits, the Court noted that the action had not been timely filed. But rather than dismissing the action sua sponte as it would have done had it considered the requirement a jurisdictional prerequisite, the Court considered the ease properly before it because the “[pjetitioner did not assert respondent’s failure to file the action within 90 days as a defense.” Id. at 811 n.9, 100 S.Ct. at 2489 n.9. In so doing, the Court held by implication that Title VIPs 90 day filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra-U.S. at-, 102 S.Ct. at 1133.
The former Fifth Circuit also has concluded that Title VIPs filing periods are not jurisdictional. In Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., supra, the court addressed whether the 180 day limitation for filing an EEOC complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), is subject to equitable delay or interruption. See also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975). Confronted with prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court that loosely referred to the timely filing of an EEOC complaint as a “jurisdictional prerequisite,” the court acknowledged that “[i]t is illogical to designate a particular fact as necessary to the court’s jurisdiction, yet, in its absence, allow the court to adjudicate whether equities indicate that the jurisdictional defect should be ignored.” Id. at 1298. After carefully analyzing the relevant precedent, the court concluded that even though some holdings characterized the filing period as jurisdictional, they “do not preclude equitable modification of its requirements.” Id. at 1302. In Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra, the former Fifth Circuit, en banc, reaffirmed its holding in Chappell and made clear that while the 180 day filing requirement under Title VII is a condition precedent to filing suit in district court, it is not related to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 587-95. See Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982). Similarly, in Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that the 90 day limitation for filing a Title VII suit is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. “After the right-to-sue letter is issued, the timeliness of the suit in federal court does not involve the court’s jurisdiction but whether the litigant has fulfilled the statutory conditions.” Id. at 1070. See Whatley v. Department of Education, 673 F.2d 873, 879 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Page v. U. S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978); Zambuto v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, both the Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit have concluded that Title VIPs time limitations are not jurisdictional prerequisites.
The former Fifth Circuit has also treated other Title VII conditions precedent in a manner inconsistent with their being jurisdictional. In White v. Dallas Independent School District, 581 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), the court considered whether the district court properly dismissed the appellant’s Title VII suit for want of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to pursue her claim of employment
discrimination in an appropriate state agency before filing a charge with the EEOC as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Although the court found that the Texas statute in question was sufficient to trigger the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), it nevertheless held that the district court erred in dismissing the suit because the EEOC substantially misled the plaintiff and “their mistakes should not redound to her detriment.” Id. at 562. As the court later noted in Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., supra, “[a]lthough we expressly declined to decide whether the provision was a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite,’ we necessarily held that the equitable consideration of the misleading EEOC letters excused Mrs. White’s failure to file with the state agency.” Id. at 592. See Chappell v. Emco Machine Works Co., supra at 1300. The court could not have excused the plaintiff from filing a complaint with the appropriate state agency if the satisfaction of the precondition was necessary to the court’s jurisdiction. In EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1976), the court again interpreted a specific precondition to filing a Title VII suit in light of equitable considerations. The issue there was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the EEOC failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which requires the Commission to serve notice of a charge to the alleged violator within ten days after the charge is filed. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that the notice of the charge was mailed within the ten day period but that it was not received by the defendant until nine months after the charge was filed. Nevertheless, the former Fifth Circuit was “unwilling to hold that in the present situation — where there has been virtual compliance with all the statutory procedural steps, and where there has been no clear showing of substantial prejudice to Airguide — there has been a showing of a denial of due process sufficient to bar EEOC from bringing suit.” Id. at 1042. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cause to the district court for a determination of the prejudice suffered by defendant Airguide because of the lack of timely notice of the charge. Again, the court in EEOC v. Airguide Corp., supra, could not have equitably modified the condition precedent if the failure to satisfy the precondition deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Finally, a line of former Fifth Circuit cases explicitly treats the preconditions to filing a Title VII action as conditions precedent under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c). EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. The Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 500 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1353, 43 L.Ed.2d 440 (1975); EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106, 95 S.Ct. 776, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975). Rule 9(e) provides that “[i]n pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance shall be made specifically and with particularity.” Under this rule, if a party disagrees with a general averment that the conditions precedent have been met, that party may raise the issue with a specific and particular denial. If the party does not deny the satisfaction of the conditions precedent specifically and with particularity, however, the allegations are assumed admitted and cannot later be attacked. EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., supra at 107; EEOC v. Standard Forge and Axle Co., supra at 1395; Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 427 F.2

Question: What is the specific issue in the case within the general category of "civil rights - voting rights, race discrimination, sex discrimination"?
A. voting rights - reapportionment & districting
B. participation rights - rights of candidates or groups to fully participate in the political process; access to ballot
C. voting rights - other (includes race discrimination in voting)
D. desegregation of schools
E. other desegregation
F. employment race discrimination - alleged by minority
G. other race discrimination - alleged by minority
H. employment: race discrimination - alleged by caucasin (or opposition to affirmative action plan which benefits minority)
I. other reverse race discrimination claims
J. employment: sex discrimination - alleged by woman
K. pregnancy discrimination
L. other sex discrimination - alleged by woman
M. employment: sex discrimination - alleged by man (or opposition to affirmative action plan which benefits women)
N. other sex discrimination - alleged by man
O. suits raising 42 USC 1983 claims based on race or sex discrimination
Answer:

Answer: F