Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.
Appellant, Felix Lake, to the use of Julius I. Peyser, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court of the District denying appellant’s motion to strike the defendant’s plea of limitations to plaintiff’s declaration.
Appellant sued the District of Columbia, October 4, 1932, to recover the sum of $1,-209.08, with interest and costs, which had been paid the District under a special assessment made April 17, 1923, under authority of the acts of Congress commonly known as the “Borland amendments,” July 21, 1914, 38 Stat. 517, 524; Sept. 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 676, 716. These acts were subsequently held unconstitutional in a number of cases: Johnson v. Rudolph et al., 57 App. D. C. 29, 16 F.(2d) 525; Dougherty et al. v. American Security & Trust Company, 59 App. D. C. 301, 40 F.(2d) 813; Taliaferro et al. v. Railway Terminal Warehouse Company, 59 App. D. C. 376, 43 F.(2d) 271; Crosby et al. v. Dodge, 60 App. D. C. 36, 46 F.(2d) 727. In all of these eases the assessments, under the Borland amendments, were held void because of inequality and discrimination.
The suit in the present case is to recover for an assessment paid on May 11, 1927, in which the District interposed the plea of the statute of limitations; and on the refusal of the court below to strike the plea of limitations this appeal was taken.
Under the Borland amendments, assessments for roadway improvements could not be levied prior to the completion of the work, and a large amount of work had been done and assessments levied prior to the declaration of this court that the assessments were void. Congress, to meet this situation, by Act of February 11, 1929, 45 Stats. 1160, provided as follows: “The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are hereby authorized and empowered to grant relief in claims for refund of taxes paid, or for cancellation of assessments heretofore made and subsequent to September 1, 1916, in such eases where like assessments, or assessments against property of similar character, have been held to be void or erroneous by decision of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, or the Supreme Court of the United States: Provided, That any claims for refunds of taxes heretofore paid or for cancellations of assessments heretofore made shall be filed within one year from the approval of this Act. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as reducing the period of the Statute of limitations.” Section 2.
Congress, by this act, authorized the Commissioners to waive the statute of limitations in favor of property owners where claims were presented not later than February 11, 1930; but as to claims filed after that date the District was required to avail itself of the defense of the statute of limitations. The present ease comes clearly within the provisions of this act, and since this case was not filed until after the expiration of one year from the passage of the act, and more than three years after the date of pay-merit of the assessment, D. C. Code (1929), title 24, e. 12, § 341, plaintiff’s claim is clearly barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellant contends that the statute of limitations began to run from June 7, 1932, on which date the Commissioners of the District of Columbia ordered the assessor to cancel assessments levied under the Borland amendments prior to February 20, 1928. This amounted merely to a direction to the assessor to cancel the record of paving assessments, which had been held by this court to be void ab initio. No reference to refunds was made by the Commissioners, or acknowledgment of indebtedness to persons who had paid their assessments, which would take this case out of the operation of the statute of limitations.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: I