Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SOPER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is taken from a judgment for $5,000 in favor of Clifton M. Grooms on account of injuries suffered by him while engaged as an employee of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company in setting tile in the wall of a store of the company in Charleston, South Carolina. The company had elected not to operate under the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation law, and in consequence could not defend the suit on the ground of the negligence of its employee or of his fellow employees or on the ground that the employee had assumed the risk of the injury. See South Carolina Code, 1952, § 72-118. The case was tried by the judge without a jury and the whole question for decision is whether under the terms of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., the judge was clearly wrong in finding from the evidence that the company was negligent in that it failed in its duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work.
Grooms was an experienced carpenter. He was directed by his foreman, a fellow employee, to place some sheets of tile board upon the wall of the store which was at the time open for business. For this purpose he was directed to stand upon a ledge facing the wall seven and a half feet above the floor. The wall was first covered with an adhesive substance so that the sheets which were four feet wide and twelve feet long adhered to the wall when pressed against it by the carpenter and his helper.
The area to be covered ran from a line seven and a half feet above the floor to the ceiling which was thirteen feet high. The ledge upon which the workman stood was less than twelve inches in width. It was formed by placing boards upon a series of two by four inch timbers which projected twelve inches horizontally from the wall and were designed to support a shelf to be used in connection with lighting fixtures to be installed in the store. The work consisted in lifting the sheets and pressing them against the flat surface while standing on the narrow ledge. The work was fatiguing and from time to time the plaintiff descended from the ledge to rest. At the end of five hours, while handling a sheet of tile with the aid of his helper, he lost his balance and in jumping to avoid implements on a meat block beneath him, he landed in the aisle of the store and was injured.
It seems obvious to us as it did to the District Judge that the ledge was an unsafe place to stand while doing the work and that the employer failed in the duty imposed upon it by the South Carolina law to furnish its employees with a reasonably safe place to work. Nuckolls v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 192 S.C. 156, 5 S.E.2d 862. The finding of the District Judge was based in part upon testimony which showed that before beginning the work the carpenter expressed the opinion that a scaffold was needed and that with the consent of the foreman, some timbers were brought into the store to build it, but later the foreman changed his mind and directed the carpenter to go on with the work in the manner described. The conclusion of the court that the employer failed in its duty to furnish to its employees a safe place to work was clearly correct.
The appellee, however, contends that the case is governed by the “simple tool” doctrine that an employer is not ordinarily liable for defects in tools of simple construction, because usually no danger to the employee is to be apprehended from defects therein and because the employee has a better opportunity than the employer to observe the defects, if any, and guard himself against them. This rule was approved for the reasons stated in Tucker v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., 200 S.C. 259, 20 S.E.2d 704. See also Langston v. Fiske-Carter Const. Co., 180 S.C. 113, 185 S.E. 62; Newbern v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F.2d 523, 91 A.L.R. 781.
It is manifest, however, that the facts give no place for the application of the doctrine in this case. In Tucker v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., supra, a simple tool is described as an instrument of manual operation. In the instant case no tools were required but only a place to stand on to do the work, boards being used for this purpose, and the deficiency which led to the accident lay in the mechanical arrangement of the place in which the work was done. In that respect the facts resemble those in Boling v. Woodside Cotton Mills, 171 S.C. 34, 171 S.E. 9, where ladders defectively braced were used to install heavy overhead pipes and it was held that although a ladder may be considered a simple tool, the faulty arrangement of the equipment amounted to a failure to furnish a safe place to work. See also Nance v. Swift & Co., 180 S.C. 470, 186 S.E. 389.
Moreover, it may be doubted whether the “simple tool” doctrine, which has been described as merely an application of the doctrine of the assumption of the risk, may now be invoked in South Carolina by an employer who having rejected the Workmen’s Compensation statute of the state is denied the right to defend any suit instituted by an employee on the ground that the employee had assumed the risk of injury. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63-64, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610, it was held that the “simple tool” doctrine and other vestiges of the assumption doctrine were swept into the discard by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act; and in Bath Mills, Inc., v. Odom, 4 Cir., 168 F.2d 38, we pointed out the similarity in cases of negligence between the defenses available to an employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., and those available to an employer in South Carolina who has elected not to operate under the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation law.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0