Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the propriety of an award of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 523, 29 TJ. S. C. § 412. On August 6, 1962, at a regular meeting of the membership of petitioner Seafarers International Union of North America — Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, respondent introduced a set of resolutions alleging various instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies on the part of union officers. The resolutions were defeated and, on November 26, 1962, respondent was expelled from the union on the ground that his presentation of the resolutions violated a union rule proscribing “deliberate or malicious vilification with regard to the execution or the duties of any office or job.” After exhausting his intra-union remedies, respondent filed this suit under § 102 of the LMRDA, claiming that his expulsion under these circumstances violated his right of free speech as secured by § 101 (a) (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(2).
On May 27, 1964, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a temporary injunction restoring respondent’s membership in the union, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 339 F. 2d 881 (1965). Some five years later, the case came on for trial and the District Court, finding a violation of respondent’s rights under § 101 (a)(2), ordered him permanently reinstated to membership in the union and, although denying respondent’s damages claims, granted him counsel fees in the sum of $5,500 against the union. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects, 462 F. 2d 777 (1972). We granted certiorari limited to the questions whether (1) an award of attorneys' fees is permissible under § 102 of the LMRDA, and (2) if so, whether such an award under the facts of this case constituted an abuse of the District Court’s discretion. 409 U. S. 1074. We affirm.
I
Although the traditional American rule ordinarily disfavors the allowance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractual authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may award attorneys’ fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 166 (1939), and federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 391-392 (1970); see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 718 (1967).
Thus, it is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 54.77 [2], p. 1709 (2d ed. 1972); see, e. g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 n. 4 (1968); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U. S. 527 (1962); Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F. 2d 494 (CA4 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F. 2d 473 (CA4 1951). In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of “fee shifting” is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is therefore the existence of “bad faith” on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.
Another established exception involves cases in which the plaintiff’s successful litigation confers “a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, supra, at 393-394. “Fee shifting” is justified in these cases, not because of any “bad faith” of the defendant but, rather, because “[t]o allow the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's expense.” Id., at 392; see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra, at 719; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 532 (1882). Thus, in Mills y. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, we approved an award of attorneys’ fees to successful shareholder plaintiffs in a suit brought to set aside a corporate merger accomplished through the use of a misleading proxy statement in violation of § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a). In reaching this result, we reasoned that, since the dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations jeopardized important interests of both the corporation and “ 'the stockholders as a group,’ ” the successful enforcement of the statutory policy necessarily “rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 396. Under these circumstances, reimbursement of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees out of the corporate treasury simply shifted the costs of litigation to “the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.” Id., at 397.
The instant case is clearly governed by this aspect of Mills. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was based, in part, on a congressional finding “from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct....” 29 U. S. C. §401 (b). In an effort to eliminate these abuses, Congress recognized that it was imperative that all union members be guaranteed at least “minimum standards of democratic process....” Thus, Title I of the LMRDA — the “Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations” — was specifically designed to promote the “full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union,” and, as the Court of Appeals noted, the rights enumerated in Title I were deemed “vital to the independence of the membership and the effective and fair operation of the union as the representative of its membership.” 462 F. 2d, at 780. See also International Assn. of Machinists v. Nix, 415 F. 2d 212 (CA5 1969); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F. 2d 445 (CA2 1963).
Viewed in this context, there can be no doubt that, by vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by § 101 (a) (2) of Title I of the LMRDA, respondent necessarily rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution and to all of its members. When a union member is disciplined for the exercise of any of the rights protected by Title I, the rights of all members of the union are threatened. And, by vindicating his own right, the successful litigant dispels the “chill” cast upon the rights of others. Indeed, to the extent that such lawsuits contribute to the preservation of union democracy, they frequently prove beneficial “not only in the immediate impact of the results achieved but in their implications for the future conduct of the union’s affairs.” Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150 U. S. App. D. C. 253, 260, 466 F. 2d 424, 431 (1972). Thus, as in Mills, reimbursement of respondent’s attorneys’ fees out of the union treasury simply shifts the costs of litigation to “the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 397. See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra; Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525 (SDNY 1971); Cefalo v. International Union of District 50 United Mine Workers, 311 F. Supp. 946 (DC 1970); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677 (SDNY 1968). We must therefore conclude that an award of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in an action under § 102 of the LMRDA falls squarely within the traditional equitable power of federal courts to award such fees whenever “overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.” Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., supra, at 391-392.
II
This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where “fee-shifting” would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra, for example, we held that § 35 of the Lanham Act, 60 St-at. 439, 15 U. S. C. § 1117, precluded an award of attorneys’ fees as a separate element of recovery in a suit for deliberate infringement of a trademark. In reaching that result, we reasoned that, since § 35 “meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed,” Congress must have intended the express remedial provisions of § 35 “to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act.” Id., at 719, 721. Petitioners contend that this reasoning dictates a similar conclusion with respect to § 102 of the LMRDA. We do not agree. Unlike § 35 of the Lanham Act, which specifically “provided not only for injunctive relief, but also for compensatory recovery measured by the profits that accrued to the defendant by virtue of his infringement, the costs of the action, and damages which may be trebled,” § 102 of the LMRDA broadly authorizes the courts to grant “such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” 29 U. S. C. § 412. Thus, § 102 does not “meticulously detail the remedies available to a plaintiff,” and we cannot fairly infer from the language of that provision an intent to deny to the courts the traditional equitable power to grant counsel fees in “appropriate” situations.
Petitioners argue further, however, that because Congress expressly authorized the recovery of counsel fees in §§ 201 (c) and 501 (b) of the LMRDA, 29 U. S. C. §§ 431 (c), 501 (b), the absence of a similar express provision in § 102 indicates an intent to preclude “fee-shifting” in suits brought under that section. Sections 201 (c) and 501 (b), which are not a part of Title I, deal with narrowly defined problems under the Act, and specifically authorize such limited remedies as an examination of the union's books and records and an accounting. By contrast, § 102 was premised upon the fact that Title I litigation necessarily demands that remedies “be tailored to fit facts and circumstances admitting of almost infinite variety,” and § 102 was therefore cast as a broad mandate to the courts to fashion “appropriate” relief. Indeed, any attempt on the part of Congress to spell out all of the remedies available under § 102 would create the “danger that those [remedies] not listed might be proscribed with the result that the courts would be fettered in their efforts to ‘grant relief according to the necessities of the case.’ ” Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F. 2d 348, 353 (CA3 1967). See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., supra. Confronted with a virtually identical situation in Mills, we explained that the inclusion in certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of express provisions for recovery of attorneys' fees “should not be read as denying to the courts the power to award counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act when circumstances make such an award appropriate....” 396 U. S., at 390-391. That reasoning is equally persuasive today.
Finally, petitioners call our attention to two isolated comments in the legislative history of Title I — one by Senator Goldwater in his testimony before a House Committee and the other contained in a dissenting statement to a House Committee Report — expressing the fear that, in the absence of a specific provision for the award of counsel fees, such relief would be unavailable in suits brought under § 102. Although these statements plainly indicate “a feeling by some members of the Congress that it would have been desirable and prudent to spell out unmistakably a right to attorney’s fees,” they “hardly amount to a definitive and absolute setting of the Congressional face against the giving of such incidental relief by the courts where compatible with sound and established equitable principles.” Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 150 U. S. App. D. C., at 258, 466 F. 2d, at 429. See Gartner v. Soloner. supra, at 352. Indeed, both of these comments expressly favored the allowance of counsel fees in Title I litigation, and there is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that even a single member of Congress was opposed to such relief or desired the words “such relief... as may be appropriate” to restrict the historic equity powers of the federal courts. On the contrary, there are numerous expressions by sponsors and other supporters of the Act indicating that § 102 was intended to afford the courts “a wide latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case,” and “to give such relief as [the court] deems equitable under all the circumstances.”
Moreover, the award of attorneys’ fees under § 102 is clearly consonant with Congress’ express desire to adopt “legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally....” 29 U. S. C. § 401 (b). As the Court of Appeals recognized:
“Not to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose. It is difficult for individual members of labor unions to stand up and fight those who are in charge. The latter have the treasury of the union at their command and the paid union counsel at their beck and call while the member is on his own.... An individual union member could not carry such a heavy financial burden. Without counsel fees the grant of federal jurisdiction is but a gesture for few union members could avail themselves of it.” 462 F. 2d, at 780-781.
Thus, it is simply “untenable to assert that in establishing the bill of rights under the Act Congress intended to have those rights diminished by the unescapable fact that an aggrieved union member would be unable to finance litigation....” Gartner v. Soloner, supra, at 355. See Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, at 259, 466 F. 2d, at 430; Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp., at 531; Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp., at 686; cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S., at 402. We therefore hold that the allowance of counsel fees to the successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 of the LMRDA is consistent with both the Act and the historic equitable power of federal courts to grant such relief in the interests of justice.
Ill
Finally, petitioners maintain that the award of counsel fees to respondent under the facts of this case constituted an abuse of the District Court’s discretion. Specifically, petitioners argue that the District Court’s finding that some of respondent’s actions “were, in part, motivated by [his] political ambitions for union office” represents a finding of “bad faith” on the part of respondent. The District Court clearly rejected the “logic” of this contention, and we agree. Title I of the LMRDA was specifically designed to protect the union member’s right to seek higher office within the union, and we can hardly accept the proposition that the exercise of that right is tantamount to “bad faith.” See Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, at 259-260, 466 F. 2d, at 430-431.
Petitioners also contend that the award of attorneys' fees in this case was improper because the District Court, in denying respondent’s claim for punitive damages, found that “the defendants, in good faith, believed that they had a right to charge and discipline [respondent] for his actions.” It is clear, however, that “bad faith” may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation. And, as the Court of Appeals noted, the conduct of this particular litigation was marked by “the dilatory action of the union and its officers....” 462 F. 2d, at 780. Moreover, although the presence of “bad faith” is essential to “fee-shifting” under a “punishment” rationale, neither the presence nor absence of “bad faith” is in any sense disposi-tive where attorneys’ fees are awarded to the successful plaintiff under the “common benefit” rationale recognized in Mills and operative today. Under that theory, counsel fees are granted, not because of the “bad faith” of the defendant but, rather, because the litigation confers substantial benefits on an ascertainable class of beneficiaries. In that situation, the element of “bad faith” of the defendant is simply one of many considerations best addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the District Court abused that discretion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 102 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 412, provides in pertinent part:
"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this sub-chapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.”
Section 101 (a) (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a) (2), provides:
“Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization’s established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.”
In its unreported opinion, the District Court found that respondent “suffered no loss of wages as a result of his expulsion from the union.” And although respondent “was deprived of his right to attend meetings, and run for union office” during the period of his expulsion, the District Court concluded that “[t]he record is barren of any proof on which the court might make a determination of the value of [these rights].” Finally, the court denied respondent’s claim for punitive damages on the ground that the union’s decision to expel respondent was motivated neither by malice nor bad faith.
The American rule, it might be noted, is more restrictive than the general rule that prevails in most other nations. See, e. g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792, 793 (1966). Many commentators have argued for a “liberalization” of the American rule. See, e. g., Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202 (1966); Ehrenzweig, supra; Kuenzel, The Attorney’s Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931); Comment, The" Allocation of Attorney’s Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316 (1971); Note, Attorney’s Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1216 (1967).
See, e. g., Clayton Act, §4, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. §15; Communications Act of 1934, § 206, 48 Stat. 1072, 47 U. S. C. § 206; Interstate Commerce Act, § 16, 34 Stat. 590, 49 U. S. C. § 16 (2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9 (e), 18 (a), 48 Stat. 890, 897, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i (e), 78r (a).
See, e. g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714, 717 (1967); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852).
This exception has its origins in the “common fund” cases, which have traditionally awarded attorneys’ fees to the successful plaintiff when his representative action creates or traces a “common fund,” the economic benefit of which is shared by all members of the class. See, e. g., Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (1882). In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161 (1939), the rationale of these cases was extended to authorize an award of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff who, although suing on her own behalf rather than as representative of a class, nevertheless

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 時