Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.
In the late afternoon of July 11, 1953, Robert E. Carter entered Irvin I. Kozak’s dry-cleaning establishment at 1637 P Street, N. W., in the District of Columbia. He threatened Kozak with a pistol, pushed him into a closet, and struck him on the back of the head with the weapon. He then rifled the cash register. As the robber left through the front door, Kozak had raised himself to a sitting position and “came to,” as he said, in “a couple of minutes, two to four minutes." He called to police officer George W. Cassels, who was standing in front of the premises at 1633 P Street, just two doors away, where officer Berti lived. The two policemen, who were off duty, had just been to a grocery and Cassels was waiting for Berti, who had gone into his home to leave his purchases. Just beyond 1633 P Street was a playground, which extended back from that street to an alley in the rear of 16th Street.
As Kozak told Cassels his story, the latter saw appellant starting through the playground toward 16th Street. Cassels took after him, first calling to Berti who came out of the house and followed only a short distance behind. He pursued Carter through the playground and down the alley into Church Street, then on to 16th Street. When they were a short distance from the corner of 16th and Church Streets, Carter shot and wounded officer Cassels. Death ensued a few hours later.
Carter was indicted in three counts. ******Under the first, which charged him with first degree murder in that he purposely killed Cassels with deliberate and premeditated malice, he was acquitted by the jury. On the second count, which was laid under the murder-during-robbery provision of § 22-2401, D.C. Code (1951), and which charged that without purpose so to do he killed Cassels in the prepetration of the Kozak robbery, Carter was found guilty of murder in the first degree. Under the third count, which charged robbery alone, he was convicted.
Carter admits he robbed Kozák and shot Cassels. Nevertheless, he appeals from the conviction under the second, count of the indictment on the theory that an acquittal as to the charge of first degree murder in that count should have been directed. The basis of the theory is appellant’s contention that he had completely finished robbing Kozak when he shot the policeman. Carter argues that, when he left the “immediate vicinity” — a term he does not define— “there was sufficient asportation * * to make the robbery complete, there having been no pursuit.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus appellant recognizes, as he must, that so long as the essential ingredient of asportation continues, the crime of robbery is still in progress; and recognizes the further principle that during continuous pursuit immediately organized and begun, asportation is still going on, with the result that the robber is guilty of first degree murder if in those circumstances he kills a pursuer.
In this case, however, there was a slight interval between the time when Carter stole the money and thé time when Cassels began pursuing him. The question is whether, for that reason, the trial judge should have instructed the jury that as a matter of law asportation - had ended when the pursuit began and that therefore the robbery was no longer in progress when the appellant shot the pursuing officer; and that as a consequence Carter could not be found guilty of first degree murder under the murder-during-robbery count.
We have no doubt that the appellant had not secured to himself the fruits of the robbery, but was still feloniously carrying away the stolen money when Cassels began the chase. The delay was. so slight that the bandit had not been able to reach a place of seeming security. This is apparent from the following testimony which he gave during direct examination by his own counsel:
“A. That morning when I came back home, I was walking around. I walked down on 17th Street, just standing on the corner. I walked down to P Street where I held this cleaner up. I left there. I walked back down to 17th Street, around to the corner, up an alley. I went across the school yard. I got half way across. I seen these two fellows behind me. I started walking fast, and they started walking fast. I started running. They started running. So I ran out the school yard into Church Street, across 16th Street; on the other side of Church Street, I looked back, and there was just one. So I kept running. I heard him say something. I didn’t know what he was saying. I looked back over my shoulder. He was reaching to his coat, I still running. I pulled out the gun. I turned at the same time, and I shot, and kept running.
******
“Q. How long after you came out of this place was it before the two men got behind you? A. Five minutes — six minutes.
“Q. When you came out of this cleaning establishment where did you go ? A. I came out and walked to 17th Street.
“Q. How did you walk to 17th Street? A. I walked out of the store, walked to my left, — to my right, to 17th Street.
“Q. What did you do there? A. Then I walked up to the alley in back of the store, walked up that alley, across the school lot. I got half way, and that is when these two fellows got behind me.”
The trial judge carefully explained to the jury that appellant could not be found guilty of first degree murder under the second count unless the killing was done during the progress of the robbery; that asportation is an ingredient of robbery and that it was for them to say whether that crime was still in progress when the shooting occurred. The jury was amply justified in finding, as it did, that the murder of Cassels was done in the perpetration of the robbery of Kozak.
Affirmed.
. The first two counts were returned under § 22-2401, D.C.Code 1951, which is as follows:
“Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion kills another purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or without purpose so to do kills another in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any arson, as defined in section 22-401 or 22-402 of this Code, rape, mayhem, robbery, or kidnapping, or in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, is guilty of murder in the first degree.”
. By its verdict of not guilty under the first count, the jury found Carter had not killed Cassels purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice. Having reached that conclusion, the jury could, under the court’s charge, have found Carter guilty of no greater crime than the included offense of second degree murder, unless it had believed from the evidence that the robbery was still in progress when the shooting took place. The fact that a robbery is being perpetrated by one who kills another, without purpose so to do and without deliberate or premeditated malice, supplies the element necessary to constitute the crime of first degree murder. Goodall v. United States, 1950, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 150, 180 F.2d 397, 399, 17 A.L.R.2d 1070.
. In State v. Habig, 1922, 106 Ohio St. 151, 140 N.E. 195, at pages 197-198, a case strikingly similar to this as to facts and the legal question .presented, the Supreme Court of Ohio said:
“It will therefore be seen that the commission of the crime necessarily includes not only the violent and forcible taking but also the felonious carrying away of the proceeds of the robbery. It is argued with both force and logic that the crime is complete when there has been a violent and forcible taking, though the asportation of the goods'may be ever so slight, and' from this it is claimed that when the crime of robbery is once complete any homicide thereafter committed, connected with the robbery, is not a commission of homicide in perpe: trating a robbery. It is quite clear that the crime of robbery is; not completé withóut some carrying away, and the only .question which can-arise in this connection relates to the distance the goods must be carried, and the circumstances under which they are' carried,1'in -order to segregate the continued asportation from the crime itself. Though the crime of robbery is complete with only a slight asportation, yet, if the carrying away is in fact a long distance, the crime is still in process of commission if - pursuit • of the robber is immediately begun and continued without interruption until the flight has carried the perpetrator to a place of seeming security, or until' uninterrupted pursuit-'ds ho longer continuously active.' ■ The mere fact of d’er lay in beginning the pursuit until an alarm can be sounded and pursuit organized and instituted does not necesr 'sarily segregate the flight and prevent ■it being-2 part and .parcel of the crime. ■ * a.»'- *» • , • ■
Cf. Commonwealth v. Carey, 1951, 368 Pa. 157, 82 A.2d 240; Commonwealth v. Darcy, 1949, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A.2d 663; State v. McCarthy, 1938, 160 Or. 196, 83 P.2d 801; State v. Adams, 1936, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632, 108 A.L.R. 838; State v. Messino, 1930, 325 Mo. 743, 30 S.W.2d 750.
. There was evidence that this interval may have been substantially shorter than Carter’s estimate of it. This is a matter of secondary importance, however, for the essential question is whether the initial asportation was still in progress when pursuit began, — a question which must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case of this kind. Of course, the shorter the interval, the more probable it is that asportation was still in progress.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0