Task: sc_lcdispositiondirection

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Justice KENNEDYdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Following a jury trial, a class of employees recovered $2.9 million in compensatory damages from their employer for a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.The employees' primary grievance was that they did not receive statutorily mandated overtime pay for time spent donning and doffing protective equipment.
The employer seeks to reverse the judgment. It makes two arguments. Both relate to whether it was proper to permit the employees to pursue their claims as a class. First, the employer argues the class should not have been certified because the primary method of proving injury assumed each employee spent the same time donning and doffing protective gear, even though differences in the composition of that gear may have meant that, in fact, employees took different amounts of time to don and doff. Second, the employer argues certification was improper because the damages awarded to the class may be distributed to some persons who did not work any uncompensated overtime.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded there was no error in the District Court's decision to certify and maintain the class. This Court granted certiorari. 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2806, 192 L.Ed.2d 846 (2015).
I
Respondents are employees at petitioner Tyson Foods' pork processing plant in Storm Lake, Iowa. They work in the plant's kill, cut, and retrim departments, where hogs are slaughtered, trimmed, and prepared for shipment. Grueling and dangerous, the work requires employees to wear certain protective gear. The exact composition of the gear depends on the tasks a worker performs on a given day.
Until 1998, employees at the plant were paid under a system called "gang-time." This compensated them only for time spent at their workstations, not for the time required to put on and take off their protective gear. In response to a federal-court injunction, and a Department of Labor suit to enforce that injunction, Tyson in 1998 began to pay all its employees for an additional four minutes a day for what it called "K-code time." The 4-minute period was the amount of time Tyson estimated employees needed to don and doff their gear. In 2007, Tyson stopped paying K-code time uniformly to all employees. Instead, it compensated some employees for between four and eight minutes but paid others nothing beyond their gang-time wages. At no point did Tyson record the time each employee spent donning and doffing.
Unsatisfied by these changes, respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, alleging violations of the FLSA. The FLSA requires that a covered employee who works more than 40 hours a week receive compensation for excess time worked "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). In 1947, nine years after the FLSA was first enacted, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, which clarified that compensable work does not include time spent walking to and from the employee's workstation or other "preliminary or postliminary activities." § 254(d). The FLSA, however, still requires employers to pay employees for activities "integral and indispensable" to their regular work, even if those activities do not occur at the employee's workstation. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249, 255, 76 S.Ct. 330, 100 L.Ed. 267 (1956). The FLSA also requires an employer to "make, keep, and preserve... records of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment." § 211(c).
In their complaint, respondents alleged that donning and doffing protective gear were integral and indispensable to their hazardous work and that petitioner's policy not to pay for those activities denied them overtime compensation required by the FLSA. Respondents also raised a claim under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law. This statute provides for recovery under state law when an employer fails to pay its employees "all wages due," which includes FLSA-mandated overtime. Iowa Code § 91A.3(2013); cf. Anthony v. State, 632 N.W.2d 897, 901-902 (Iowa 2001).
Respondents sought certification of their Iowa law claims as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23permits one or more individuals to sue as "representative parties on behalf of all members" of a class if certain preconditions are met. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a). Respondents also sought certification of their federal claims as a "collective action" under 29 U.S.C. § 216. Section 216is a provision of the FLSA that permits employees to sue on behalf of "themselves and other employees similarly situated." § 216(b).
Tyson objected to the certification of both classes on the same ground. It contended that, because of the variance in protective gear each employee wore, the employees' claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a classwide basis. The District Court rejected that position. It concluded there were common questions susceptible to classwide resolution, such as "whether the donning and doffing of [protective gear] is considered work under the FLSA, whether such work is integral and [in]dispensable, and whether any compensable work is de minim[i]s." 564 F.Supp.2d 870, 899 (N.D.Iowa 2008). The District Court acknowledged that the workers did not all wear the same protective gear, but found that "when the putative plaintiffs are limited to those that are paid via a gang time system, there are far more factual similarities than dissimilarities." Id., at 899-900. As a result, the District Court certified the following classes:
"All current and former employees of Tyson's Storm Lake, Iowa, processing facility who have been employed at any time from February 7, 2004 [in the case of the FLSA collective action and February 7, 2005, in the case of the state-law class action], to the present, and who are or were paid under a 'gang time' compensation system in the Kill, Cut, or Retrim departments." Id., at 901.
The only difference in definition between the classes was the date at which the class period began. The size of the class certified under Rule 23, however, was larger than that certified under § 216. This is because, while a class under Rule 23includes all unnamed members who fall within the class definition, the "sole consequence of conditional certification [under § 216] is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees... who in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing written consent with the court." Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1530, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). A total of 444 employees joined the collective action, while the Rule 23class contained 3,344 members.
The case proceeded to trial before a jury. The parties stipulated that the employees were entitled to be paid for donning and doffing of certain equipment worn to protect from knife cuts. The jury was left to determine whether the time spent donning and doffing other protective equipment was compensable; whether Tyson was required to pay for donning and doffing during meal breaks; and the total amount of time spent on work that was not compensated under Tyson's gang-time system.
Since the employees' claims relate only to overtime, each employee had to show he or she worked more than 40 hours a week, inclusive of time spent donning and doffing, in order to recover. As a result of Tyson's failure to keep records of donning and doffing time, however, the employees were forced to rely on what the parties describe as "representative evidence." This evidence included employee testimony, video recordings of donning and doffing at the plant, and, most important, a study performed by an industrial relations expert, Dr. Kenneth Mericle. Mericle conducted 744 videotaped observations and analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities took. He then averaged the time taken in the observations to produce an estimate of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.
Although it had not kept records for time spent donning and doffing, Tyson had information regarding each employee's gang-time and K-code time. Using this data, the employees' other expert, Dr. Liesl Fox, was able to estimate the amount of uncompensated work each employee did by adding Mericle's estimated average donning and doffing time to the gang-time each employee worked and then subtracting any K-code time. For example, if an employee in the kill department had worked 39.125 hours of gang-time in a 6-day workweek and had been paid an hour of K-code time, the estimated number of compensable hours the employee worked would be: 39.125 (individual number of gang-time hours worked) + 2.125 (the average donning and doffing hours for a 6-day week, based on Mericle's estimated average of 21.25 minutes a day) - 1 (K-code hours) = 40.25. That would mean the employee was being undercompensated by a quarter of an hour of overtime a week, in violation of the FLSA. On the other hand, if the employee's records showed only 38 hours of gang-time and an hour of K-code time, the calculation would be: 38 + 2.125 - 1 = 39.125. Having worked less than 40 hours, that employee would not be entitled to overtime pay and would not have proved an FLSA violation.
Using this methodology, Fox stated that 212 employees did not meet the 40-hour threshold and could not recover. The remaining class members, Fox maintained, had potentially been undercompensated to some degree.
Respondents proposed to bifurcate proceedings. They requested that, first, a trial be conducted on the questions whether time spent in donning and doffing was compensable work under the FLSA and how long those activities took to perform on average; and, second, that Fox's methodology be used to determine which employees suffered an FLSA violation and how much each was entitled to recover. Petitioner insisted upon a single proceeding in which damages would be calculated in the aggregate and by the jury. The District Court submitted both issues of liability and damages to the jury.
Petitioner did not move for a hearing regarding the statistical validity of respondents' studies under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), nor did it attempt to discredit the evidence with testimony from a rebuttal expert. Instead, as it had done in its opposition to class certification, petitioner argued to the jury that the varying amounts of time it took employees to don and doff different protective equipment made the lawsuit too speculative for classwide recovery. Petitioner also argued that Mericle's study overstated the average donning and doffing time. The jury was instructed that nontestifying members of the class could only recover if the evidence established they "suffered the same harm as a result of the same unlawful decision or policy." App. 471-472.
Fox's calculations supported an aggregate award of approximately $6.7 million in unpaid wages. The jury returned a special verdict finding that time spent in donning and doffing protective gear at the beginning and end of the day was compensable work but that time during meal breaks was not. The jury more than halved the damages recommended by Fox. It awarded the class about $2.9 million in unpaid wages. That damages award has not yet been disbursed to the individual employees.
Tyson moved to set aside the jury verdict, arguing, among other things, that, in light of the variation in donning and doffing time, the classes should not have been certified. The District Court denied Tyson's motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment and the award.
The Court of Appeals recognized that a verdict for the employees "require[d] inference"
from their representative proof, but it held that "this inference is allowable under Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-688, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946)." 765 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir.2014). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for similar reasons, holding that, under the facts of this case, the jury could have drawn "a'reasonable inference' of class-wide liability." Id., at 799(quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946)). Judge Beam dissented, stating that, in his view, the class should not have been certified.
For the reasons that follow, this Court now affirms.
II
Petitioner challenges the class certification of the state-law claims and the certification of the FLSA collective action. The parties do not dispute that the standard for certifying a collective action under the FLSA is no more stringent than the standard for certifying a class under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This opinion assumes, without deciding, that this is correct. For purposes of this case then, if certification of respondents' class action under the Federal Rules was proper, certification of the collective action was proper as well.
Furthermore, as noted above, Iowa's Wage Payment Collection Law was used in this litigation as a state-law mechanism for recovery of FLSA-mandated overtime pay. The parties do not dispute that, in order to prove a violation of the Iowa statute, the employees had to do no more than demonstrate a violation of the FLSA. In this opinion, then, no distinction is made between the requirements for the class action raising the state-law claims and the collective action raising the federal claims.
A
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)requires that, before a class is certified under that subsection, a district court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." The "predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. "Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). This calls upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the relation between common and individual questions in a case. An individual question is one where "members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member," while a common question is one where "the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof." 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp. 196-197 (5th ed. 2012)(internal quotation marks omitted). The predominance inquiry "asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues." Id., § 4:49, at 195-196. When "one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3)even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members." 7AA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778, pp. 123-124 (3d ed. 2005)(footnotes omitted).
Here, the parties do not dispute that there are important questions common to all class members, the most significant of which is whether time spent donning and doffing the required protective gear is compensable work under the FLSA. Cf. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005)(holding that time spent walking between the locker room and the production area after donning protective gear is compensable work under the FLSA). To be entitled to recovery, however, each employee must prove that the amount of time spent donning and doffing, when added to his or her regular hours, amounted to more than 40 hours in a given week. Petitioner argues that these necessarily person-specific inquiries into individual work time predominate over the common questions raised by respondents' claims, making class certification improper.
Respondents counter that these individual inquiries are unnecessary because it can be assumed each employee donned and doffed for the same average time observed in Mericle's sample. Whether this inference is permissible becomes the central dispute in this case. Petitioner contends that Mericle's study manufactures predominance by assuming away the very differences that make the case inappropriate for classwide resolution. Reliance on a representative sample, petitioner argues, absolves each employee of the responsibility to prove personal injury, and thus deprives petitioner of any ability to litigate its defenses to individual claims.
Calling this unfair, petitioner and various of its amici maintain that the Court should announce a broad rule against the use in class actions of what the parties call representative evidence. A categorical exclusion of that sort, however, would make little sense. A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to establish or defend against liability. Its permissibility turns not on the form a proceeding takes-be it a class or individual action-but on the degree to which the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action. See Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 403, and 702.
It follows that the Court would reach too far were it to establish general rules governing the use of statistical evidence, or so-called representative evidence, in all class-action cases. Evidence of this type is used in various substantive realms of the law. Brief for Complex Litigation Law Professors as Amici Curiae 5-9; Brief for Economists et al. as Amici Curiae 8-10. Whether and when statistical evidence can be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the evidence is being introduced and on "the elements of the underlying cause of action," Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809, 131 S.Ct. 2179, 180 L.Ed.2d 24 (2011).
In many cases, a representative sample is "the only practicable means to collect and present relevant data" establishing a defendant's liability. Manual of Complex Litigation § 11.493, p. 102 (4th ed. 2004). In a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff's individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is brought on behalf of a class. To so hold would ignore the Rules Enabling Act's pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot "abridge... any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
One way for respondents to show, then, that the sample relied upon here is a permissible method of proving classwide liability is by showing that each class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual action. If the sample could have sustained a reasonable jury finding as to hours worked in each employee's individual action, that sample is a permissible means of establishing the employees' hours worked in a class action.
This Court's decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens explains why Mericle's sample was permissible in the circumstances of this case. In Mt. Clemens, 7 employees and their union, seeking to represent over 300 others, brought a collective action against their employer for failing to compensate them for time spent walking to and from their workstations. The variance in walking time among workers was alleged to be upwards of 10 minutes a day, which is roughly consistent with the variances in donning and doffing times here. 328 U.S., at 685, 66 S.Ct. 1187.
The Court in Mt. Clemens held that when employers violate their statutory duty to keep proper records, and employees thereby have no way to establish the time spent doing uncompensated work, the "remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it embodies... militate against making" the burden of proving uncompensated work "an impossible hurdle for the employee." Id., at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187; see also Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989)("The broad remedial goal of the statute should be enforced to the full extent of its terms"). Instead of punishing "the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work," the Court held "an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference." 328 U.S., at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187. Under these circumstances, "[t]he burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence." Id., at 687-688, 66 S.Ct. 1187.
In this suit, as in Mt. Clemens, respondents sought to introduce a representative sample to fill an evidentiary gap created by the employer's failure to keep adequate records. If the employees had proceeded with 3,344 individual lawsuits, each employee likely would have had to introduce Mericle's study to prove the hours he or she worked. Rather than absolving the employees from proving individual injury, the representative evidence here was a permissible means of making that very showing.
Reliance on Mericle's study did not deprive petitioner of its ability to litigate individual defenses. Since there were no alternative means for the employees to establish their hours worked, petitioner's primary defense was to show that Mericle's study was unrepresentative or inaccurate. That defense is itself common to the claims made by all class members. Respondents' "failure of proof on th[is] common question" likely would have ended "the litigation and thus [would not have] cause[d] individual questions... to overwhelm questions common to the class." Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1196, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013). When, as here, "the concern about the proposed class is not that it exhibits some fatal dissimilarity but, rather, a fatal similarity-[an alleged] failure of proof as to an element of the plaintiffs' cause of action-courts should engage that question as a matter of summary judgment, not class certification." Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 107 (2009).
Petitioner's reliance on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011), is misplaced. Wal-Mart does not stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability.
Wal-Mart involved a nationwide Title VII class of over 1 ½ million employees. In reversing class certification, this Court did not reach Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance prong, holding instead that the class failed to meet even Rule 23(a)'s more basic requirement that class members share a common question of fact or law. The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart did not provide significant proof of a common policy of discrimination to which each employee was subject. "The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs' evidence convincingly establishe[d was] Wal-Mart's 'policy' of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters"; and even then, the plaintiffs could not identify "a common mode of exercising discretion that pervade[d] the entire company." Id., at 355-356, 131 S.Ct. 2541(emphasis deleted).
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart proposed to use representative evidence as a means of overcoming this absence of a common policy. Under their proposed methodology, a "sample set of the class members would be selected, as to whom liability for sex discrimination and the backpay owing as a result would be determined in depositions supervised by a master." Id., at 367, 131 S.Ct. 2541. The aggregate damages award was to be derived by taking the "percentage of claims determined to be valid" from this sample and applying it to the rest of the class, and then multiplying the "number of (presumptively) valid claims" by "the average backpay award in the sample set." Ibid. The Court held that this "Trial By Formula" was contrary to the Rules Enabling Act because it " 'enlarge[d]' " the class members' "'substantive right[s]' " and deprived defendants of their right to litigate statutory defenses to individual claims. Ibid.
The Court's holding in the instant case is in accord with Wal-Mart. The underlying question in Wal-Mart, as here, was whether the sample at issue could have been used to establish liability in an individual action. Since the Court held that the employees were not similarly situated, none of them could have prevailed in an individual suit by relying on depositions detailing the ways in which other employees were discriminated against by their particular store managers. By extension, if the employees had brought 1 ½million individual suits, there would be little or no role for representative evidence. Permitting the use of that sample in a class action, therefore, would have violated the Rules Enabling Act by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class proceeding than they could have asserted in an individual action.
In contrast, the study here could have been sufficient to sustain a jury finding as to hours worked if it were introduced in each employee's individual action. While the experiences of the employees in Wal-Mart bore little relationship to one another, in this case each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same policy. As Mt. Clemens confirms, under these circumstances the experiences of a subset of employees can be probative as to the experiences of all of them.
This is not to say that all inferences drawn from representative evidence in an FLSA case are "just and reasonable." Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S., at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187. Representative evidence that is statistically inadequate or based on implausible assumptions could not lead to a fair or accurate estimate of the uncompensated hours an employee has worked. Petitioner, however, did not raise a challenge to respondents' experts' methodology under Daubert ; and, as a result, there is no basis in the record to conclude it was legal error to admit that evidence.
Once a district court finds evidence to be admissible, its persuasiveness is, in general, a matter for the jury. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether the average time Mericle calculated is probative as to the time actually worked by each employee. Resolving that question, however, is the near-exclusive province of the jury. The District Court could have denied class certification on this ground only if it concluded that no reasonable juror could have believed that the employees spent roughly equal time donning and doffing. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The District Court made no such finding, and the record here provides no basis for this Court to second-guess that conclusion.
The Court reiterates that, while petitioner, respondents, or their respective amici may urge adoption of broad and categorical rules governing the use of representative and statistical evidence in class actions, this case provides no occasion to do so. Whether a representative sample may be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the purpose for which the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of action. In FLSA actions, inferring the hours an employee has worked from a study such as Mericle's has been permitted by the Court so long as the study is otherwise admissible. Mt. Clemens, supra, at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187; see also Fed. Rules Evid. 402and 702. The fairness and utility of statistical methods in contexts other than those presented here will depend on facts and circumstances particular to those cases.
B
In its petition for certiorari petitioner framed its second question presented as whether a class may be certified if it contains "members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages." Pet. for Cert. i. In its merits brief, however, petitioner reframes its argument. It now concedes that "[t]he fact that federal courts lack authority to compensate persons who cannot prove injury does not mean that a class action (or collective action) can never be certified in the absence of proof that all class members were injured." Brief for Petitioner 49. In light of petitioner's abandonment of its argument from the petition, the Court need not, and does not, address it.
Petitioner's new argument is that, "where class plaintiffs cannot offer" proof that all class members are injured, "they must demonstrate instead that there is some mechanism to identify the uninjured class members prior to judgment and ensure that uninjured members (1) do not contribute to the size of any damage award and (2) cannot recover such damages." Ibid. Petitioner contends that respondents have not demonstrated any mechanism for ensuring that uninjured class members do not recover damages here.
Petitioner's new argument is predicated on the assumption that the damages award cannot be apportioned so that only those class members who suffered an FLSA violation recover. According to petitioner, because Fox's mechanism for determining who had worked over 40 hours depended on Mericle's estimate of donning and doffing time, and because the jury must have rejected Mericle's estimate when it reduced the damages award by more than half, it will not be possible to know which workers are entitled to share in the award.
As petitioner and its amici stress, the question whether uninjured class members may recover is one of great importance. See, e.g., Brief for Consumer Data Industry Association as Amicus Curiae. It is not, however, a question yet fairly presented by this case, because the damages award has not yet been disbursed, nor does the record indicate how it will be disbursed.
Respondents allege there remain ways of distributing the award to only those individuals who worked more than 40 hours. For example, by working backwards from the damages award, and assuming each employee donned and doffed for an identical amount of time (an assumption that follows from the jury's finding that the employees suffered equivalent harm under the policy), it may be possible to calculate the average donning and doffing time the jury necessarily must have found, and then apply this figure to each employee's known gang-time hours to determine which employees worked more than 40 hours.
Whether that or some other methodology will be successful in identifying uninjured class members is a question that, on this record, is premature. Petitioner may raise a challenge to the proposed method of allocation when the case returns to the District Court for disbursal of the award.
Finally, it bears emphasis that this problem appears to be one of petitioner's own making. Respondents proposed bifurcating between the liability and damages phases of this proceeding for the precise reason that it may be difficult to remove uninjured individuals from the class after an award is rendered. It was petitioner who argued against that option and now seeks to profit from the difficulty it caused. Whether, in light of the foregoing, any error should be deemed invited, is a question for the District Court to address in the first instance.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice ALITOjoins as to Part II, concurring.
Petitioner Tyson Foods presents two primary arguments. First, it claims that class certification was improper because each individual plaintiff spent different amounts of time donning and doffing protective gear. Therefore, according to Tyson, whether and to what extent it owed damages to each individual employee for uncompensated overtime was not a question capable of resolution on a class-wide basis. Second, Tyson argues that the verdict cannot stand because, while no one disputes that the class as certified contains hundreds of uninjured employees, the plaintiffs have not come up with any way to ensure that those employees do not recover damages from the jury's lump-sum award.
The Court rejects the first argument and leaves the second for initial resolution by the lower courts. I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to explain my understanding of the Court's resolution of the case and to express my concern that the District Court may not be able to fashion a method for awarding damages only to those class members who suffered an actual injury.
I
A class may be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)only if "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." A common question is one in which "the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof." Ante, at 1045 (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp. 196-197 (5th ed. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To prove liability and damages, respondents had to establish the amount of compensable (but uncompensated) donning and doffing time for each individual plaintiff. The Court properly concludes that despite the differences in donning and doffing time for individual class members, respondents could adequately prove the amount of time for each individual through generalized, class-wide proof. That proof was Dr. Mericle's representative study. As the Court observes, "each class-member could have relied on that [study] to establish liability if he or she had brought an individual action." Ante, at 1046. And when representative evidence would suffice to prove a plaintiff's individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is brought as part of a class action. See ante, at 1046 - 1047.
I agree with Justice THOMAS that our decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (194

Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court?
A. Conservative
B. Liberal
C. Unspeciﬁable
Answer:

Answer: B