Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases were brought here on appeal, prior to the revision of Title 28, United States Code, under what was § 345 and since September 1 has become § 2101 of that Title, to review final decrees of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in a suit in equity brought by the United States under § 4 of the Sherman Law, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 36 Stat. 1167, 15 U. S. C. § 4. The cases present another phase of a multifarious litigation which has been occupying the attention of the federal judicial system for more than a decade. United States v. General Motors Corp., 26 F. Supp. 353 (N. D. Ind.); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618, rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 710; United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F. R. D. 346 (N. D. Ill.); United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F. R. D. 528 (N. D. Ill.); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 314 U. S. 583, rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 716; Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556. An analytical summary of this litigation will make clear the immediate issues before us and, indeed, largely dispose of them.
On May 27, 1938, indictments were returned in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, against the three leading automobile manufacturers and the companies which financed the sale of their automobiles. One indictment was against the present appellants, Ford Motor Company, and Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, Commercial Investment Trust, Inc., and Universal Credit Corporation, these three referred to collectively as CIT; another against Chrysler Corporation and Commercial Credit Company; a third against General Motors Corporation and its subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, to be abbreviated as GMAC. The indictments charged the automobile manufacturers and the jointly named finance companies with violations of the Sherman Law by influencing dealers who sold the automobiles of the respective manufacturers to give the finance companies the business of financing the dealers’ wholesale purchases and retail sales of automobiles.
Following these charges, negotiations were set afoot to secure the elimination through consent decrees of the practices described in the indictments. As to the Ford and Chrysler groups, the Government, on November 7, 1938, filed suits in equity and arranged for the dismissal of their indictments. (For present purposes we are not further concerned with Chrysler.) Although Ford and CIT formally resisted the complaint, denying its allegations and pleading affirmative defenses, negotiations for a consent decree proceeded. Efforts toward an.amicable settlement with General Motors and GMAC failed. The Government therefore pressed the criminal charges against them. In view of the competitive conditions in the automobile industry it obviously became of crucial importance to Ford not to consent to any restraints beyond those which would fall upon General Motors through the contingencies of litigation against it. But it would not have been enough merely to provide that restraints which Ford accepted should eventually be lifted to the extent not imposed upon General Motors at some remote time defined merely by the vicissitudes of litigation. Protection against competitive disadvantage, the appropriateness of which the Government recognized, required a time certain at the end of which the restraints against Ford would expire if General Motors were still free of them.
Accordingly, the consent decree, entered on November 15, 1938, assured Ford essential equality of position with the unconsenting General Motors by two explicit conditions. Their terms are fully set out in the margin; their essence can be briefly summarized. Paragraph 12 forbids Ford from acquiring control of any finance company. After enumerating various forbidden forms of financial interest, the paragraph provides that, if the Government should not have obtained a final decree against General Motors by January 1, 1941, requiring it to divest itself of all interest in GMAC, its affiliated finance company, the prohibition against Ford would cease. The second express condition, designed to relieve from restraints imposed by earlier paragraphs in the decree against various means of influencing dealers to patronize CIT, is found in paragraph 12a. That paragraph addressed itself to the possible eventualities of the criminal proceeding against General Motors and GMAC: (1) its termination with a result other than a judgment of conviction; (2) a general verdict of guilty; (3) a special verdict of guilty; (4) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Upon the first contingency all restrictive terms of the decree against Ford would be suspended until similar restraints were imposed upon General Motors and GMAC. The second was to be “deemed to be a determination of the illegality of any agreement, act or practice of General Motors Corporation which is held by the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of guilty.” The third and fourth were, respectively, to be deemed determinations of the illegality of “any agreement, act or practice” which was their subject matter.
These provisions furnish a litmus-paper test for determining what restraints survive the result of the proceeding against General Motors and GMAC. What was not illegal for General Motors was not longer to be prohibited to Ford. The sword of justice was to strike both alike. Paragraph 12a further defines how and when the restraints were to be relaxed. Sub-paragraph (3) provides that after the entry of a decree against General Motors, or after the entry of a judgment of conviction in the pending criminal proceedings “or after January 1, 1940 (whichever date is earliest), the court upon application of any respondent from time to time will enter orders” suspending any restraint against it (with exceptions not now relevant) “to the extent that it is not then imposed, and until it shall be imposed, in substantially identical terms” upon General Motors or GMAC.
On November 17, 1939, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty against General Motors, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment upon that verdict, 121 F. 2d 376, and this Court denied further review. 314 U. S. 618; id. at 710.
On October 4, 1940, the Government finally brought a suit in equity against General Motors seeking divestiture of its control of GMAC. But it was then too late for a decree to be entered before the lapse of Ford’s agreement not to become affiliated with a finance company. On December 21, 1940, therefore, the Government made a motion asking to have paragraph 12 modified by moving forward the date when the prohibition against affiliation would expire if a decree against General Motors had not then been entered. Each year after that, as the new deadline came near, the Government made a new motion to have it extended, and year after year Ford consented to the extension. On December 31, 1945, the Government again moved to have the prohibition against affiliation extended, this time to January 1, 1947. Ford now resisted the motion, and on May 4, 1946, both Ford and CIT filed motions of their own. They asked the District Court to suspend sub-paragraphs (i) and (k) of paragraph 6 and sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 7 and to modify sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 6 on the ground that the practices enjoined by these provisions of the decree were not “held by the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, to constitute a proper basis for the return of a general verdict of guilty.” Ford also moved that “an order be entered pursuant to paragraph 12... that nothing therein shall preclude the Manufacturer from acquiring and retaining ownership of and/or control over or interest in any finance company....” The District Court denied the motions by Ford and CIT and granted the Government’s motion for extension of the prohibition against affiliation to January 1, 1947. The present appeals followed. Although the particular extension of paragraph 12 appealed from has expired, the equity suit against General Motors has not yet been set down for trial and the Government’s motion for a further extension has been held in abeyance pending the outcome of these appeals. It is not a moot question therefore whether the District Court properly granted the extension to January 1, 1947. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 433, 452; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 514-16.
The restraints imposed against Ford by sub-paragraphs 6 (e), 6 (i), 6 (k) and 7 (d) must survive the outcome of the conviction against General Motors if the language of the trial judge’s charge to the jury in the criminal prosecution of General Motors can fairly be equated with the language of those sub-paragraphs. If, on the other hand, the judge’s charge falls short of holding illegal what those sub-paragraphs proscribed, appellants are entitled to a suspension of sub-paragraphs 6 (i), 6 (k) and 6 (d) and a modification of sub-paragraph 6 (e).
First, then, to summarize the contents of these provisions of the decree. Sub-paragraph 6 (i) precludes Ford from arranging with CIT or any other finance company “that an agent of the Manufacturer and an agent of the finance company shall together be present with any dealer or prospective dealer for the purpose of influencing the dealer to patronize” the finance company. Sub-paragraph 6 (k) provides that “the Manufacturer shall not recommend, endorse or advertise the Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to any dealer or to the public....” Sub-paragraph 7 (d), the counterpart of 6 (i), is directed against CIT. Sub-paragraph 6 (e) restrains Ford from establishing “any practice, procedure or plan for the retail or wholesale financing of automobiles for the purpose of enabling Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company or companies to enjoy a competitive advantage in obtaining the patronage of dealers” not equally available to any other finance company. Modification of this sub-paragraph is asked only to the extent necessary to permit them freedom to act in a manner otherwise permissible, if suspension of sub-paragraphs 6 (i), 6 (k) and 7 (d) is granted.
This brings us to the trial judge’s instructions, which, insofar as relevant, are fully set forth below. Their plain effect is to draw a line between such practices as cancellation of a dealer’s contract, or refusal to renew it, or discrimination in the shipment of automobiles, as a means of influencing dealers to use GMAC, all of which fall within the common understanding of “coercion,” and other practices for which “persuasion,” “exposition” or “argument” are fair characterizations. As a mere matter of interpreting language, the Government hardly challenges the fitness of the terms “persuasion,” “exposition” or “argument,” which the jury was charged were open to General Motors, to cover acts such as arranging for the presence of agents of both Ford and CIT with a view to putting the claims of CIT to a dealer or recommending, endorsing, and advertising CIT to a dealer. But all these acts were specifically forbidden Ford by the consent decree. The Government’s insistence is that since the indictment charged that advertising, endorsement and recommendation violated the Sherman Law and since evidence was introduced to support the charge, the jury might have found General Motors and GMAC guilty of “coercion” at least partly on the basis of that evidence. But sub-paragraph 12 (a) (2) was not designed to authorize speculative reconstruction of the jury’s process in reaching its verdict. It provided a definite standard for ascertaining what rules of law were at a future date to be made binding on a competitor of Ford. The rules which the trial judge formulated against General Motors were thereafter to be the rules of law against Ford. The trial judge used the word “coercion” to summarize practices which, if the jury found them to exist, would call for a verdict against General Motors. He used the words “persuasion,” “exposition” and “argument” to describe conduct which, in common usage, is not “coercion” and therefore would not support such a verdict. Nothing in other portions of the judge’s charge erases or blurs this line of distinction. The restraints imposed by the paragraphs appellants seek to have suspended are properly described by the terms “exposition,” “persuasion” and “argument.” So long as these paragraphs remain in effect and so long as there is no comparable decree enjoining their substance against General Motors and GMAC, Ford and CIT cannot do without risk of violating the consent decree that which General Motors and GMAC are free to do. Only a lawyer who is obtuse or reckless would advise Ford and CIT that they could subject a dealer to “persuasion,” “exposition” or “argument” without the hazard of contempt of the paragraphs under discussion. Thus the conditions have been fulfilled which entitled Ford and CIT to suspension of the restraints imposed by those terms of the decree.
Quite apart from Ford’s and CIT’s consent to forego the opportunities outlawed by sub-paragraphs 6 (e), (i), (k) and 7 (d), the Government urges that a court of equity should refuse to suspend or modify them by claiming that the practices restrained by those paragraphs are in any event illegal under the Sherman Law. But since this has neither been admitted nor proven, and since ascertainment of illegality under the Sherman Law normally depends on the circumstances of a particular situation and the inferences they yield, the appellants have a right to insist that, so long as interdiction of these practices has not been decreed against General Motors, the Government be put to its proof. The lifting of the restraints imposed by the consent decree does not, of course, affect the liability of Ford for any violations of the Sherman Law that the Government may establish in court. Moreover, to the extent that such restraints may at some future date be imposed on General Motors, they will, by sub-paragraph 12a (3), equally fetter Ford.
There remains for consideration the question whether the District Court properly extended the prohibition against affiliation between Ford and a finance company. This was the sixth time that the Government had applied for extension. The equity suit begun more than six years earlier had not yet been brought to trial. The court was faced at the same time with a motion for suspension of the prohibition against affiliation which was made by appellants under the express provision of paragraph 12 reserving the right to such a motion. The court denied the appellant’s motion and granted the Government’s on the ground, (1) that the “time clause” of paragraph 12 was subsidiary to the “main purpose” of paragraph 12 which was “to provide that the test of the permanency of the bar against affiliation was to abide the outcome of the civil antitrust suit against General Motors Corporation,” and (2) “That the purpose and intent of the decree will be carried out if Ford Motor Company is given the opportunity at any future time to propose a plan for the acquisition of a finance company, and to make a showing that such plan is necessary to prevent Ford Motor Company from being placed at a competitive disadvantage....”
The Government seeks to support these conclusions by insisting on a mechanical application of the decision in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556, involving a parallel prohibition against Chrysler. The Chrysler case was decided on June 1, 1942. In the intervening years the factors of the problem have drastically changed. More than nine years have elapsed since the criminal prosecution against General Motors was concluded; what was at the time of the Chrysler decision a two-year delay in obtaining a civil decree against General Motors has now stretched into a ten-year delay. Even then, six and a half years ago, this Court characterized the District Court’s finding that the Government had proceeded “diligently and expeditiously” as “markedly generous.” 316 U. S. at 563. At that time the Court also found support for the District Court in the fact that “the complete cessation of the manufacture of new automobiles and light trucks has drastically minimized the significance of the competitive factor.” Id. at 564. But circumstances that were found extenuating on behalf of the Government two years after the entry of the decree are hardly compelling ten years afterward. While a showing that continuance of the bar against affiliation would cause competitive disadvantage may not, as a practical matter, unreasonably have been called for at a time when competition in the industry was completely suspended during the indeterminate period of war, the resumption of full-scale competition makes such a showing unnecessary. And this is unaffected by the fact that automobiles are still in short supply. The appellants agreed for a limited term to refrain from pursuing conduct which, in the absence of an adjudication that it was illegal, they were otherwise free to pursue and which General Motors has always been free to pursue. There has been no such adjudication and successive extensions of the term have expired. The crucial fact now is not the degree of actual disadvantage but the persistence of an inequality against which the appellants had secured the Government’s protection. Yet the Government seeks a change in the express terms of the decree which would perpetuate that inequality. The Government has not sustained the burden of showing good cause why a court of equity should grant relief from an undertaking well understood and carefully formulated. If the Government seeks to outlaw possible arrangements by Ford with a finance corporation, it must establish its case in court against Ford as against General Motors and not draw on a consent which by its very terms is not available.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
“12. The Respondent Finance Company shall not pay to any automobile manufacturing company and the Manufacturer shall not obtain from any finance company any money or other thing of value as a bonus or commission on account of retail time sales paper acquired by the finance company from dealers of the Manufacturer. The Manufacturer shall not make any loan to or purchase the securities of Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company, and if it shall pay any money to Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company with the purpose or effect of inducing or enabling such finance company to offer to the dealers of the Manufacturer a lower finance charge than it would offer in the absence of such payment, it shall offer in writing to make, and if such offer is accepted it shall make, payment upon substantially similar bases, terms and conditions to every other finance company offering such lower finance charge; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph contained shall be construed to prohibit the Manufacturer from acquiring notes, bonds, commercial paper, or other evidence of indebtedness of Respondent Finance Company or any other finance company in the open market.
“It is an express condition of this decree that notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph of this paragraph 12 and of any other provisions of this decree, if an effective final order or decree not subject to further review shall not have been entered on or before January 1, 1941, requiring General Motors Corporation permanently to divest itself of all ownership and control of General Motors Acceptance Corporation and of all interest therein, then and in that event, nothing in this decree shall preclude the Manufacturer from acquiring and retaining ownership of and/or control over or interest in any finance company, or from dealing with such finance company and with the dealers in.the manner provided in this decree or in any order of modification or suspension thereof entered pursuant to paragraph 12a. The court, upon application of the respondents or any of them, will enter an order or decree to that effect at the foot of this decree, and the right of any respondent herein to make the application and to obtain such order or decree is expressly conceded and granted.
“12a. It is a further express condition of this decree that:
“(1) If the proceeding now pending in this court against General Motors Corporation instituted by the filing of an indictment by the Grand Jury on May 27, 1938, No. 1039, or any further proceeding initiated by reindictment of General Motors

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 主