Task: songer_numresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge:
Ward was convicted for violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462, refusal to submit to induction. We reverse.
On March 18, 1968, Ward was ordered to report for induction. That same day, the induction was “postponed until further notice”, and Ward was reclassified I-S(C) [student deferment] “until October 1968.” On March 29, 1968, Ward completed and returned Selective Service Form 150, in which he described his conscientious objection to war. The board then classified Ward I-A-0 [eligible for non-combatant military training] on April 17, 1968. Within the 30-day appeal period, Ward visited the local board offices and, in response to his inquiries, a board secretary allegedly informed him that he could not appeal his I-A-0 classification without “new evidence.” In mid-June of 1968, Ward withdrew from his college courses with the intention of enrolling in a “bible school” to become a minister. On August 16, 1968, Ward received a new induction order and, after one postponement, reported on January 9, 1969, but refused induction.
The question presented on appeal is whether the local board erred on April 17 by classifying Ward I-A-0 at a time when he was a college student and legally entitled to a I-S(C) deferment. The Government asserts that Ward requested a I-A-0 classification by filing his Form 150 on March 20, and the board merely granted his request on April 17. It is correct that a Form 150 incorporates a request for exemption. It might also be considered “informational”, however, in view of a registrant’s duty to report to the board the occurrence of any fact that might bear upon his classification [32 C.F.R. § 1625.1]. Thus, it is possible that Ward filed the Form 150 to announce the crystallization of his C.O. beliefs as groundwork for establishing “sincerity” for future I-A-0 classification when his I-S(C) deferment expired. Such a conclusion would seem more plausible than that insisted upon by the Government, to wit —a professed C.O. requested immediate reclassification from a I-S(C) deferred status to a I-A-0 draft-eligible status.
The Form 150 in use at that time [2-10-66 version] also provided that if a C.O. claim was made, “the local board shall proceed in the prescribed manner to determine [registrant’s] proper classification.” The “prescribed manner” referred to is specifically set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2, to wit:
“Consideration of Classes. Every registrant shall be placed in Class I-A under the provisions of section 1622.-10 of this chapter except that when grounds are established to place a registrant in one or more of the classes listed in the following table, the registrant shall be classified in the lowest class for which he is determined to be eligible, with Class I-A-0 considered the highest class and Class I-C considered the lowest class according to the following table: I-A-O, I-O, I-S * * [emphasis added].
Thus, the local board violated its own regulation by removing Ward’s I-S(C) deferment and substituting the “higher” I-A-0 classification.
This court has held that an induction order based upon an erroneous classification is invalid. United States v. Brandt, (9 Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 324, 327; Franks v. United States, (9 Cir. 1954) 216 F.2d 266, 270; Goetz v. United States, (9 Cir. 1954) 216 F.2d 270, 272.
As to prejudice, if Ward had been retained in Class I-S(C) until he withdrew from college in mid-June, his subsequent reclassification to I-A would have given rise to two consecutive 30-day periods in which Ward could request a personal appearance and, if unsuccessful there, request an appeal to the State Board. Even assuming absolute efficiency in the review process, the board could not have validly issued an induction order until after the date of the order here involved. The prejudice resulting from the premature issuance of an induction order is obvious in view of the severe limitations upon reopening a classification and presenting new evidence provided by 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2. See, United States v. Zablen, (9 Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1075.
Accordingly, Ward’s conviction based upon refusal to submit to this invalid induction order is reversed. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
. The Government did not raise the issue of Ward’s apparent failure to exhaust his administrative remedies within the Selective Service System. Therefore, that issue is not before this court on appeal.
. The board was under a mandatory (i. e. not discretionary) duty to place and retain Ward in Class I-S until the end of the academic year or until he ceased to satisfactorily pursue his course of study. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (i) (2) ; 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15; United States v. Zablen, (9 Cir. 1971) 436 F.2d 1075, 1076.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1