Task: songer_appfed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a district court judgment affirming a bankruptcy court’s order granting E. Max Serafini and Doris Ann Serafini a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727.
On June 8, 1987, Max Serafini and Doris Serafini filed a voluntary joint petition under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On October 13, 1987, the First National Bank of Gordon, an unsecured creditor of the Serafinis, filed a complaint objecting to the Serafinis’ discharge. On February 9 and 10, 1988, trial was held before a bankruptcy judge, who, after the Bank had presented its evidence, dismissed the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). In so doing, the bankruptcy judge concluded, inter alia, that the Bank had not met its burden of proof to show by “clear and convincing evidence” such fraud on the part of the Serafinis as would trigger the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the Bank appealed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Judge to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. On April 26, 1990, the district court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court, stating on several occasions in its Memorandum Opinion and Order that the Bank had to establish its claim under § 727 by “clear and convincing evidence.” The district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order now appears as In re Serafini, 113 B.R. 692 (D.Colo.1990). Background facts detailed there will not be repeated here. The Bank now seeks review of the district court’s order and judgment.
Subsequent to the date of the judgment of the district court, the United States Supreme Court in Grogan v. Garner, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, rather than a “clear and convincing” standard, applies to all exceptions from the dischargeability of debts contained in Bankruptcy Code § 523(a), including the nondischargeability for fraud provision. Grogan, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 661.
Grogan is concerned with 11 U.S.C. § 523 rather than 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). However, we perceive no good reason to apply a different standard where § 727(a)(2) is involved. It would be incongruous to apply a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to § 523(a) and a “clear and convincing” standard to § 727(a)(2). Such would be clearly at odds with the rationale in Grogan,
Hence, it is apparent that in evaluating the Bank’s evidence, both the bankruptcy court and the district court used the wrong standard. We reject the suggestion of the Serafinis that the bankruptcy court and the district court would have reached the same result had it used the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard. Such is not for us to say. We also decline the invitation by the Bank to rule on its collateral estop-pel argument. So far as we can tell, that issue was not raised below. In our view, the collateral estoppel issue should first be raised below on remand.
Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.
. In Farmers Co-operative Association of Talmage, Kansas v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir.1982), we were concerned with Section 14(c) of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (repealed 1978) which required a court to grant discharge of a debt unless the court is satisfied that the debtor has committed an offense punishable by imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 152, which, in turn, provided that one who knowingly conceals property from the trustee or from creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. In connection therewith we said at p. 395 that "[p]roof of fraudulent concealment, in order to bar discharge, need be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence.” But see In re Posta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1989) and In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir.1986) where we held that, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), in Posta, and under U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), in Black, a creditor seeking to have his debt declared nondischargeable must prove that it comes within the statute by "clear and convincing evidence.”
. As stated in Grogan, the preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake. Grogan, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 658. A debtor does not have an interest in discharge sufficient to require a heightened standard of proof. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 659. Furthermore, Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when it has created substantive causes of action for fraud. Therefore, the fact that "most States” may require that fraud claims be proven by clear and convincing evidence would not support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt the clear and convincing standard for fraud discharge exceptions. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 660.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0