Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider in this case what a mutual fund shareholder must prove in order to show that a mutual fond investment adviser breached the “fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” that is imposed by § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b) (hereinafter § 36(b)).
I
A
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C. §80a-l et seq., regulates investment companies, including mutual funds. “A mutual fond is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, and belonging to the individual investors holding shares in the fund.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 (1979). The following arrangements are typical. A separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual fond, which may have no employees of its own. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 93 (1991); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U. S. 523, 536 (1984); Burks, 441 U. S., at 480-481. The adviser selects the fond’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and provides other services. See id., at 481. Because of the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often “ ‘cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fond industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.’” Ibid, (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 5 (1969) (hereinafter S. Rep.)).
“Congress adopted the [Investment Company Act of 1940] because of its concern with the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing that the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser was “fraught with potential conflicts of interest,” the Act created protections for mutual fund shareholders. Id., at 536-538 (internal quotation marks omitted); Burks, supra, at 482-483. Among other things, the Act required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors could be affiliated with the adviser and that fees for investment advisers be approved by the directors and the shareholders of the fund. See §§ 10, 15(c), 54 Stat. 806, 813.
The growth of mutual funds in the 1950’s and 1960’s prompted studies of the 1940 Act’s effectiveness in protecting investors. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 537-538. Studies commissioned or authored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) identified problems relating to the independence of investment company boards and the compensation received by investment advisers. See ibid. In response to such concerns, Congress amended the Act in 1970 and bolstered shareholder protection in two primary ways.
First, the amendments strengthened the “cornerstone” of the Act’s efforts to check conflicts of interest, the independence of mutual fund boards of directors, which negotiate and scrutinize adviser compensation. Burks, supra, at 482. The amendments required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors be “persons who are interested persons,” e. g., that they have no interest in or affiliation with the investment adviser. 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a); §80a-2(a)(19); see also Daily Income Fund, supra, at 538. These board members are given “a host of special responsibilities.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482-483. In particular, they must “review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser” annually, id., at 483, and a majority of these directors must approve an adviser’s compensation, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c). Second, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, of the Act imposed upon investment advisers a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation received from a mutual fund, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b), and granted individual investors a private right of action for breach of that duty, ibid.
The “fiduciary duty” standard contained in § 36(b) represented a delicate compromise. Prior to the adoption of the 1970 amendments, shareholders challenging investment adviser fees under state law were required to meet “common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ or ‘shocking,’ ” and “security holders challenging adviser fees under the [Investment Company Act] itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 540, n. 12. Aiming to give shareholders a stronger remedy, the SEC proposed a provision that would have empowered the Commission to bring actions to challenge a fee that was not “reasonable” and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf of an investment company. Id., at 538. This approach was included in a bill that passed the House. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (1967); see also S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (as introduced May 1,1967). Industry representatives, however, objected to this proposal, fearing that it “might in essence provide the Commission with ratemaking authority.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 538.
The provision that was ultimately enacted adopted “a different method of testing management compensation,” id., at 539 (quoting S. Rep., at 5; internal quotation marks omitted), that was more favorable to shareholders than the previously available remedies but that did not permit a compensation agreement to be reviewed in court for “reasonableness.” This is the fiduciary duty standard in § 36(b).
B
Petitioners are shareholders in three different mutual funds managed by respondent Harris Associates L. P., an investment adviser. Petitioners filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to § 36(b) seeking damages, an injunction, and rescission of advisory agreements between Harris Associates and the mutual funds. The complaint alleged that Harris Associates had violated § 36(b) by charging fees that were “disproportionate to the services rendered” and “not within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” App. 52.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Harris Associates. Applying the standard adopted in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F. 2d 923 (CA2 1982), the court concluded that petitioners had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to “whether the fees charged... were so disproportionately large that they could not have been the result of arm’s-length bargaining.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. The District Court assumed that it was relevant to compare the challenged' fees with those that Harris Associates charged its other clients. Id., at 30a. But in light of those comparisons as well as comparisons with fees charged by other investment advisers to similar mutual funds, the court held that it could not reasonably be found that the challenged fees were outside the range that could have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining. Id., at 29a-32a.
A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on different reasoning, explicitly “disapprov[ing] the Gartenberg approach.” 527 F. 3d 627, 632 (2008). Looking to trust law, the panel noted that, while a trustee “owes an obligation of candor in negotiation,” a trustee, at the time of the creation of a trust, “may negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settlor or governance institution agrees to pay.” Ibid, (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, and Comment /). The panel thus reasoned that “[a] fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make foil disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. In the panel’s view, the amount of an adviser’s compensation would be relevant only if the compensation were “so unusual” as to give rise to an inference “that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.” Ibid.
The panel argued that this understanding of § 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the contemporary mutual fond market. Noting that “[tjoday thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that generally keeps fees low. Id., at 633-634. The panel faulted Gartenberg on the ground that it “relies too little on markets.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. And the panel firmly rejected a comparison between the fees that Harris Associates charged to the funds and the fees that Harris Associates charged other types of clients, observing that “[djifferent clients call for different commitments of time” and that costs, such as research, that may benefit several categories of clients “make it hard to draw inferences from fee levels.” Id., at 634.
The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote. 537 F. 3d 728 (2008) (per curiam). The dissent from the denial of rehearing argued that the panel’s rejection of Gartenberg was based “mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination.” 537 F. 3d, at 730 (opinion of Posner, J.). Among other things, the dissent expressed concern that Harris Associates charged “its captive funds more than twice what it charges independent funds,” and the dissent questioned whether high adviser fees actually drive investors away. Id., at 731.
We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals over the proper standard under § 36(b). 556 U. S. 1104 (2009).
II
A
Since Congress amended the Investment Company Act in 1970, the mutual fund industry has experienced exponential growth. Assets under management increased from $38.2 billion in 1966 to over $9.6 trillion in 2008. The number of mutual fund investors grew from 3.5 million in 1965 to 92 million in 2008, and there are now more than 9,000 open- and closed-end funds.
During this time, the standard for an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty has remained an open question in our Court, but, until the Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something of a consensus had developed regarding the standard set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg, 694 F. 2d 923. The Gartenberg standard has been adopted by other federal courts, and “[t]he SEC’s regulations have recognized, and formalized, GartenbergASke factors.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. See 17 CFR §240.14a-101, Sched. 14A, Item 22, par. (c)(ll)(i) (2009); 69 Fed. Reg. 39801, n. 31, 39807-39809 (2004), In the present case, both petitioners and respondent generally endorse the Gartenberg approach, although they disagree in some respects about its meaning.
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit noted that Congress had not defined what it meant by a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation but concluded that “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.” 694 F. 2d, at 928. The Second Circuit elaborated that, “[t]o be guilty of a violation of § 36(b),... the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining” Ibid. “To make this determination,” the court stated, “all pertinent facts must be weighed,” id., at 929, and the court specifically mentioned “the adviser-manager's cost in providing the service,... the extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be processed by the manager,” id., at 930. Observing that competition among advisers for the business of managing a fund may be “virtually nonexistent,” the court rejected the suggestion that “the principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee's fairness is the price charged by other similar advisers to funds managed by them,” although the court did not suggest that this factor could not be “taken into account.” Id., at 929. The court likewise rejected the “argument that the lower fees charged by investment advisers to large pension funds should be used as a criterion for determining fair advisory fees for money market funds,” since a “pension fund does not faee the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions throughout the nation which must be handled by [a money market fund].” Id., at 930, n. 3.
B
The meaning of § 36(b)'s reference to “a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” is hardly pellucid, but based on the terms of that provision and the role that a shareholder action for breach of that duty plays in the overall structure of the Act, we conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic formulation of what § 36(b) requires: To face liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.
1
We begin with the language of § 36(b). As noted, the Seventh Circuit panel thought that the phrase “fiduciary duty” incorporates a standard taken from the law of trusts. Petitioners agree but maintain that the panel identified the wrong trust-law standard. Instead of the standard that applies when a trustee and a settlor negotiate the trustee’s fee at the time of the creation of a trust, petitioners invoke the standard that applies when a trustee seeks compensation after the trust is created. Brief for Petitioners 20-23, 35-37. A compensation agreement reached at that time, they point out, “‘will not bind the beneficiary’ if either ‘the trustee failed to make a full disclosure of all circumstances affecting the agreement’” which he knew or should have known or if the agreement is unfair to the beneficiary. Id., at 23 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, Comment i). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the term “fiduciary” is not exclusive to the law of trusts, that the phrase means different things in different contexts, and that there is no reason to believe that § 36(b) incorporates the specific meaning of the term in the law of trusts. Brief for Respondent 34-36.
We find it unnecessary to take sides in this dispute. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939), we discussed the meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty in a context that is analogous to that presented here, and we also looked to trust law. At issue in Pepper was whether a bankruptcy court could disallow a dominant or controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt corporation. Dominant or controlling shareholders, we held, are “fiduciaries]” whose “powers are powers [held] in trust.” Id., at 306. We then explained:
“Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.... The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside.” Id., at 306-307 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1921) (standard of fiduciary duty for interested directors).
We believe that this formulation expresses the meaning of the phrase “fiduciary duty” in § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429. The Investment Company Act modifies this duty in a significant way: It shifts the burden of proof from the fiduciary to the party claiming breach, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)(l), to show that the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length bargaining would produce.
The Gartenberg approach fully incorporates this understanding of the fiduciary duty as set out in Pepper and reflects §36(b)(l)’s imposition of the burden on the plaintiff. As noted, Gartenberg insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account, see 694 F. 2d, at 929, as does § 36(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1429 (“[A]pproval by the board of directors... shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances” (emphasis added)). And Gartenberg uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s-length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.
2
Gartenberg’s approach also reflects §36(b)’s place in the statutory scheme and, in particular, its relationship to the other protections that the Act affords investors.
Under the Act, scrutiny of investment-adviser compensation by a fully informed mutual fund board is the “cornerstone of the... effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482. The Act interposes disinterested directors as “independent watchdogs” of the relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser. Id., at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). To provide these directors with the information needed to judge whether an adviser’s compensation is excessive, the Act requires advisers to furnish all information “reasonably... necessary to evaluate the terms” of the adviser’s contract, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c), and gives the SEC the authority to enforce that requirement. See §80a-41. Board scrutiny of adviser compensation and shareholder suits under § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, are mutually reinforcing but independent mechanisms for controlling conflicts. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 541 (Congress intended for § 36(b) suits and directorial approval of adviser contracts to act as “independent checks on excessive fees”); Kamen, 500 U. S., at 108 (“Congress added § 36(b) to the [Act] in 1970 because it concluded that the shareholders should not have to rely solely on the fund’s directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased disinterestedness of the board” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In recognition of the role of the disinterested directors, the Act instructs courts to give board approval of an adviser’s compensation “such consideration... as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.” § 80a-35(b)(2). Cf. Burks, supra, at 485 (“[X]t would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon [boards of directors as] ‘watchdogs' to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the ‘watchdogs’ have done precisely that, require that they be totally muzzled”).
From this formulation, two inferences may be drawn. First, a measure of deference to a board’s judgment may be appropriate in some instances. Second, the appropriate measure of deference varies depending on the circumstances.
Gartenberg heeds these precepts. Gartenberg advises that “the expertise of the independent trustees of a fund, whether they are fully informed about all facts bearing on the [investment adviser’s] service and fee, and the extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their duties are important factors to be considered in deciding whether they and the [investment adviser] are guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty in violation of § 36(b).” 694 F. 2d, at 930.
III
While both parties in this case endorse the basic Gartenberg approach, they disagree on several important questions that warrant discussion.
The first concerns comparisons between the fees that an adviser charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that it charges its independent clients. As noted, the Gartenberg court rejected a comparison between the fees that the adviser in that case charged a money market fund and the fees that it charged a pension fund. 694 F. 2d, at 930, n. 3 (noting that “[t]he nature and extent of the services required by each type of fund differ sharply”). Petitioners contend that such a comparison is appropriate, Brief for Petitioners 30-31, but respondent disagrees, Brief for Respondent 38-44. Since the Act requires consideration of all relevant factors, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)(2); see also §80a-15(c), we do not think that there can be any categorical rule regarding the comparisons of the fees charged different types of clients. See Daily Income Fund, supra, at 537 (discussing concern with investment advisers’ practice of charging higher fees to mutual funds than to their other clients). Instead, courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but courts must be wary of inapt comparisons. As the panel below noted, there may be significant differences between the services provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to a pension fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of shareholder redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fond assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and higher marketing costs. 527 F. 3d, at 634 (“Different clients call for different commitments of time”). If the services rendered are sufficiently different that a comparison is not probative, then courts must reject such a comparison. Even if the services provided and fees charged to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds and institutional clients, contrary to petitioners’ contentions. See id., at 631 (“Plaintiffs maintain that a fiduciary may charge its controlled clients no more than its independent clients”).
By the same token, courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers. These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length. See 537 F. 3d, at 731-732 (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 地