Task: sc_caseorigin

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Held : The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
893 F.Supp.2d 133, reversed and remanded.
Chief Justice ROBERTS, joined by Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice ALITO, concluded that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment. Pp. 1444 - 1476.
(a) Appellants' substantial First Amendment challenge to the current system of aggregate limits merits plenary consideration. Pp. 1444 - 1448.
(1) In Buckley, this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits in FECA. Buckley distinguished the two types of limits based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. It subjected expenditure limits to "the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." 424 U.S., at 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612. But it concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech and thus applied a lesser but still "rigorous standard of review," id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612, under which such limits "may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms," id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. Because the Court found that the primary purpose of FECA-preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance-was a "sufficiently important" governmental interest, id., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, it upheld the base limit under the "closely drawn" test, id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph of its 139-page opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under FECA, noting that the provision "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. It concluded that the aggregate limit served to prevent circumvention of the base limit and was "no more than a corollary" of that limit. Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Pp. 1444 - 1445.
(2) There is no need in this case to revisit Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of review. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the "closely drawn" test applies, the analysis turns on the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. Here, given the substantial mismatch between the Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the "closely drawn" test.
Buckley's ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent just three sentences analyzing that limit, which had not been separately addressed by the parties. Appellants here, by contrast, have directly challenged the aggregate limits in place under BCRA, a different statutory regime whose limits operate against a distinct legal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley. The 1976 FECA Amendments added another layer of base limits-capping contributions from individuals to political committees-and an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. Since Buckley, the Federal Election Commission has also enacted an intricate regulatory scheme that further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits through "unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute" to a particular candidate. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. In addition to accounting for such statutory and regulatory changes, appellants raise distinct legal arguments not considered in Buckley, including an overbreadth challenge to the aggregate limit. Pp. 1445 - 1448.
(b) Significant First Amendment interests are implicated here. Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individual's right to participate in the electoral process through both political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is hardly a "modest restraint" on those rights. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. In its simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits. And it is no response to say that the individual can simply contribute less than the base limits permit: To require one person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to penalize that individual for "robustly exercis [ing]" his First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737.
In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is on an individual's right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole point of the First Amendment is to protect individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as useful to the democratic process. Pp. 1447 - 1450.
(c) The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Pp. 1450 - 1460.
(1) This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Davis,supra, at 741, 128 S.Ct. 2759. Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner "influence over or access to" elected officials or political parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights, and the Court must "err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it." Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). Pp. 1450 - 1452.
(2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount, even though Congress's selection of a base limit indicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in any meaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley's fear that an individual might "contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through... unearmarked contributions" to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckley's circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive "massive amounts of money" that could be traced back to a particular donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Government's scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or implausible. Pp. 1451 - 1457.
(3) The aggregate limits also violate the First Amendment because they are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Government argues that the aggregate limits prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might then recontribute a donation, but experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions are retained and spent by their recipients. And the Government has provided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is thus disproportionate to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention.
Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government's interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment rights. Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such alternatives might include targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees, or tighter earmarking rules. Transfers, after all, are the key to the Government's concern about circumvention, but they can be addressed without such a direct and broad interference with First Amendment rights. Pp. 1456 - 1460.
(4) Disclosure of contributions also reduces the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements, which are justified by "a governmental interest in 'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related spending," Citizens United, supra, at 367, 130 S.Ct. 876, may deter corruption "by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," Buckley, supra at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. Disclosure requirements may burden speech, but they often represent a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. Particularly with modern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against corruption than it did when Buckley was decided. Pp. 1459 - 1460.
(d) The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candidates or committees. That rationale dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior cases. Buckley confined its analysis to the possibility that "massive amounts of money" could be funneled to a particular candidate in excess of the base limits. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Recasting as corruption a donor's widely distributed support for a political party would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. And though the Government suggests that solicitation of large contributions poses the corruption danger, the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Pp. 1460 - 1462.
Justice THOMAS agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, and subject BCRA's aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail. Buckley's "analytic foundation... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions and expenditures are simply "two sides of the same First Amendment coin," and this Court's efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere "word games" rather than any cognizable constitutional law principle. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244, 96 S.Ct. 612 (BURGER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pp. 1440 - 1443.
ROBERTS, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

Erin E. Murphy, New York, NY, for Appellants.
Bobby R. Burchfield, Washington, DC, for Senator Mitch Connell as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Appellants.

Donald B. Verrilli, Solicitor General, for Appellee.
Erin E. Murphy, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, Dan Backer, Paul Henry Jossey, DB Capitol Strategies, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, Michael T. Morley, Counsel of Record, Cranford, NJ, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon.
Stephen M. Hoersting, Dayton, OH, James Bopp, Jr., Counsel of Record, Richard E. Coleson, Anita Y. Woudenberg, The Bopp Law Firm, PC, Terre Haute, IN, for Appellant Republican National Committee.
Lisa J. Stevenson, Deputy General Counsel, Kevin Deeley, Adav Noti, Acting Associate General Counsels, Charles Kitcher, Attorney, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C., Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Dan Backer, Paul Henry Jossey, DB Capitol Strategies, PLLC, Washington, DC, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, Michael T. Morley, Counsel of Record, Cranford, NJ, for Appellant.
Chief Justice ROBERTS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice ALITO join.
There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a candidate's campaign. This case is about the last of those options.
The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g.,Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam). At the same time, we have made clear that Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2825-2826, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011).
Many people might find those latter objectives attractive: They would be delighted to see fewer television commercials touting a candidate's accomplishments or disparaging an opponent's character. Money in politics may at times seem repugnant to some, but so too does much of what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades-despite the profound offense such spectacles cause-it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular opposition. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011); National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977) ( per curiam). Indeed, as we have emphasized, the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971).
In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have spelled out how to draw the constitutional line between the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political process and the impermissible desire simply to limit political speech. We have said that government regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford. "Ingratiation and access... are not corruption." Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). They embody a central feature of democracy-that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.
Any regulation must instead target what we have called " quid pro quo " corruption or its appearance. See id., at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876. That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991). "The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo : dollars for political favors." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government "into the debate over who should govern." Bennett, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2826. And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern.
The statute at issue in this case imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. The first, called base limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. § 441a(a)(3).
This case does not involve any challenge to the base limits, which we have previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also serve that objective, by preventing circumvention of the base limits. We conclude, however, that the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First Amendment.
I
A
For the 2013-2014 election cycle, the base limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate ($5,200 total for the primary and general elections); $32,400 per year to a national party committee; 1 $10,000 per year to a state or local party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political action committee, or "PAC." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532 (2013). 2 A national committee, state or local party committee, or multicandidate PAC may in turn contribute up to $5,000 per election to a candidate. § 441a(a)(2).3
The base limits apply with equal force to contributions that are "in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit" to a candidate. § 441a(a)(8). If, for example, a donor gives money to a party committee but directs the party committee to pass the contribution along to a particular candidate, then the transaction is treated as a contribution from the original donor to the specified candidate.
For the 2013-2014 election cycle, the aggregate limits in BCRA permit an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total of $74,600 to other political committees. Of that $74,600, only $48,600 may be contributed to state or local party committees and PACs, as opposed to national party committees.
§ 441a(a)(3); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. All told, an individual may contribute up to $123,200 to candidate and noncandidate committees during each two-year election cycle.
The base limits thus restrict how much money a donor may contribute to any particular candidate or committee; the aggregate limits have the effect of restricting how many candidates or committees the donor may support, to the extent permitted by the base limits.
B
In the 2011-2012 election cycle, appellant Shaun McCutcheon contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 different federal candidates, in compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that he wished to contribute $1,776 to each of 12 additional candidates but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates. McCutcheon also contributed a total of $27,328 to several noncandidate political committees, in compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that he wished to contribute to various other political committees, including $25,000 to each of the three Republican national party committees, but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees. McCutcheon further alleges that he plans to make similar contributions in the future. In the 2013-2014 election cycle, he again wishes to contribute at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to non-candidate political committees. Brief for Appellant McCutcheon 11-12.
Appellant Republican National Committee is a national political party committee charged with the general management of the Republican Party. The RNC wishes to receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly situated individuals would like to make-contributions otherwise permissible under the base limits for national party committees but foreclosed by the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees.
In June 2012, McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint before a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See BCRA § 403(a), 116 Stat. 113-114. McCutcheon and the RNC asserted that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and to noncandidate political committees were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. They moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and the Government moved to dismiss the case.
The three-judge District Court denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the Government's anticorruption interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits. 893 F.Supp.2d 133, 140 (2012).
In particular, the District Court imagined a hypothetical scenario that might occur in a world without aggregate limits. A single donor might contribute the maximum amount under the base limits to nearly 50 separate committees, each of which might then transfer the money to the same single committee. Ibid. That committee, in turn, might use all the transferred money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate, allowing the single donor to circumvent the base limit on the amount he may contribute to that candidate. Ibid. The District Court acknowledged that "it may seem unlikely that so many separate entities would willingly serve as conduits" for the single donor's interests, but it concluded that such a scenario "is not hard to imagine." Ibid. It thus rejected a constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits, characterizing the base limits and the aggregate limits "as a coherent system rather than merely a collection of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon prophylaxis." Ibid.
McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to this Court, as authorized by law. 28 U.S.C. § 1253. In such a case, "we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits," Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), and accordingly we noted probable jurisdiction. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1242, 185 L.Ed.2d 177 (2013).
II
A
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, presented this Court with its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits set forth in FECA. FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on contributions from an individual to a federal candidate. It also imposed a $25,000 per year aggregate limit on all contributions from an individual to candidates or political committees. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b)(1), 608(b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). On the expenditures side, FECA imposed limits on both independent expenditures and candidates' overall campaign expenditures. §§ 608(e)(1), 608(c).
Buckley recognized that "contribution and expenditure limitations

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
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未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 信