Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before us for review are orders of a three-judge court in the Western District of Texas effectively directing the State not to conduct this year's elections using districting plans that the court itself adopted some years earlier. The court developed those plans for use in the 2012 elections pursuant to our directions in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 132 S.Ct. 934, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (per curiam ). We instructed the three-judge court to start with the plans adopted by the Texas Legislature in 2011 but to make adjustments as required by the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. Id., at 392-396, 132 S.Ct. 934. After those plans were used in 2012, the Texas Legislature enacted them (with only minor modifications) in 2013, and the plans were used again in both 2014 and 2016.
Last year, however, the three-judge court reversed its prior analysis and held that some of the districts in those plans are unlawful. After reviewing the repealed 2011 plans, which had never been used, the court found that they were tainted by discriminatory intent and that the 2013 Legislature had not "cured" that "taint."
We now hold that the three-judge court committed a fundamental legal error. It was the challengers' burden to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent when it enacted plans that the court itself had produced. The 2013 Legislature was not obligated to show that it had "cured" the unlawful intent that the court attributed to the 2011 Legislature. Thus, the essential pillar of the three-judge court's reasoning was critically flawed.
When the congressional and state legislative districts are reviewed under the proper legal standards, all but one of them, we conclude, are lawful.
I
A
The 2010 decennial census revealed that the population of Texas had grown by more than 20% and the State was therefore apportioned four additional seats in the United States House of Representatives. C.J.S. 369a. To accommodate this new allocation and the population changes shown by the census, the Legislature adopted a new congressional districting plan, as well as new districting maps for the two houses of the State Legislature.
Redistricting is never easy, and the task was especially complicated in Texas in 2011. Not only was the Legislature required to draw districts that were substantially equal in population, see Perry, supra, at 391-392, 126 S.Ct. 2594 ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), and to comply with special state-law districting rules, but federal law imposed complex and delicately balanced requirements regarding the consideration of race.
Then, as now, federal law restricted the use of race in making districting decisions. The Equal Protection Clause forbids "racial gerrymandering," that is, intentionally assigning citizens to a district on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). It also prohibits intentional "vote dilution"-"invidiously... minimiz[ing] or cancel[ing] out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion).
While the Equal Protection Clause imposes these important restrictions, its application in the field of districting is complicated. For one thing, because a voter's race sometimes correlates closely with political party preference, see Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 1473-1474, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) ; Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001), it may be very difficult for a court to determine whether a districting decision was based on race or party preference. Here, the three-judge court found that the two factors were virtually indistinguishable.
At the same time that the Equal Protection Clause restricts the consideration of race in the districting process, compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 et seq. (VRA), pulls in the opposite direction: It often insists that districts be created precisely because of race. Two provisions of the VRA exert such demands, and in 2011, Texas was subject to both.
At that time, Texas was covered by § 5 of the VRA and was thus barred from making any districting changes unless it could prove that they did not result in "retrogression" with respect to the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidates of their choice. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015). That showing obviously demanded consideration of race.
On top of this, Texas was (and still is) required to comply with § 2 of the VRA. A State violates § 2 if its districting plan provides " 'less opportunity' " for racial minorities " 'to elect representatives of their choice.' " League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (LULAC ). In a series of cases tracing back to Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986), we have interpreted this standard to mean that, under certain circumstance, States must draw "opportunity" districts in which minority groups form "effective majorit[ies]," LULAC, supra, at 426, 126 S.Ct. 2594.
Since the Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race and the VRA demands consideration of race, a legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is vulnerable to " 'competing hazards of liability.' " Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (plurality opinion). In an effort to harmonize these conflicting demands, we have assumed that compliance with the VRA may justify the consideration of race in a way that would not otherwise be allowed. In technical terms, we have assumed that complying with the VRA is a compelling state interest, see, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 788, 800-801, 197 L.Ed.2d 85 (2017) ; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996), and that a State's consideration of race in making a districting decision is narrowly tailored and thus satisfies strict scrutiny if the State has " 'good reasons' " for believing that its decision is necessary in order to comply with the VRA. Cooper, supra, at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1464.
B
Facing this legal obstacle course, the Texas Legislature in 2011 adopted new districting plans, but those plans were immediately tied up in litigation and were never used. Several plaintiff groups quickly filed challenges in the District Court for the Western District of Texas, arguing that some of the districts in the new plans were racial gerrymanders, some were based on intentional vote dilution, and some had the effect of depriving minorities of the equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice. This case was assigned to a three-judge court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). (We will call this court "the Texas court" or simply "the District Court.")
The situation was further complicated by the requirement that Texas obtain preclearance of its new plans. To do this, Texas filed for a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Texas v. United States, 887 F.Supp.2d 133 (2012). (We will call this court "the D.C. court.") By early 2012, the D.C. court had not yet issued a decision, and Texas needed usable plans for its rapidly approaching primaries. Accordingly, the Texas court drew up interim plans for that purpose. Perez v. Perry, 835 F.Supp.2d 209 (W.D.Tex.2011). In creating those plans, the majority of the Texas court thought that it was not "required to give any deference to the Legislature's enacted plan." Id., at 213. Instead, it based its plans on what it called "neutral principles that advance the interest of the collective public good." Id., at 212.
Texas challenged those court-ordered plans in this Court, and we reversed. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 132 S.Ct. 934, 181 L.Ed.2d 900 (2012) (per curiam ). Noting that "[r]edistricting is 'primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,' " we held that the Texas court should have respected the legislative judgments embodied in the 2011 plans to the extent allowed by the Constitution and the VRA. Id., at 392-399, 132 S.Ct. 934.
We remanded the case with very specific instructions. The Texas court was told to start with the plans adopted by the Legislature but to modify those plans as needed so as "not to incorporate... any legal defects." Id., at 394, 132 S.Ct. 934. With respect to claims under the Constitution or § 2 of the VRA, the District Court was told to change a district if the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge. Ibid. And with respect to § 5 claims, the court was instructed to make whatever changes were needed to obviate any legal claim that was "not insubstantial." Id., at 395, 132 S.Ct. 934. Thus, our instructions, in an abundance of caution, demanded changes in the challenged 2011 plans without proof that those changes were actually required by either the Constitution or the VRA.
On remand, the Texas court ordered additional briefing and heard two more days of argument. App. 29a, 35a-50a; Order in Civ. No. 11-cv-00360, Doc. No. 616. It issued two opinions, totaling more than 70 pages, and analyzed disputed districts in detail. C.J.S. 367a-423a; H.J.S. 300a-315a. While stressing the preliminary nature of its determinations, see C.J.S. 368a; H.J.S. 314a-315a, the court found that some districts required change and that others were lawful, C.J.S. 367a-423a; H.J.S. 300a-315a. The court then adopted plans for the State's congressional districts and for both houses of the State Legislature. (The plan for the State Senate is not at issue.)
Both the congressional plan and the plan for the Texas House departed significantly from the State's 2011 plans. At least 8 of the 36 congressional districts were markedly altered, and 21 districts in the plan for the Texas House were "substantially" changed. H.J.S. 314a; C.J.S. 397a-408a.
In August 2012, the D.C. court denied preclearance of the plans adopted by the Legislature in 2011, see Texas v. United States, supra, so the State conducted the 2012 elections under the interim plans devised by the Texas court. At the same time, Texas filed an appeal in this Court contesting the decision of the D.C. court, but that appeal ultimately died for two reasons.
First, the 2011 plans were repealed. The Texas attorney general urged the Legislature to pass new redistricting plans, C.J.S. 429a, and in his view, the "best way to remedy the violations found by the D.C. court" was to "adopt the [Texas court's] interim plans as the State's permanent redistricting maps." Id., at 432a. Doing so, he said, would "confirm the legislature's intent" to adopt "a redistricting plan that fully comports with the law." Id., at 429a.
The Governor called a special session to do just that, and the Legislature complied. One of the legislative sponsors, Senator Seliger, explained that, although " 'the Texas Legislature remains confident that the legislatively-drawn maps adopted in 2011 are fair and legal..., there remain several outstanding legal questions regarding these maps that undermine the stability and predictability of the electoral process in Texas.' " 274 F.Supp.3d 624, 649, n. 40 (D.C.Cir.2017). Counsel for one of the plaintiff groups, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), testified in favor of the plans. C.J.S. 436a-439a. The 2013 Legislature then repealed the 2011 plans and enacted the Texas court's interim plans with just a few minor changes. The federal congressional plan was not altered at all, and only small modifications were made to the plan for the Texas House. C.J.S. Findings 231a-232a.
On the day after the Legislature passed the new plans and the day before the Governor signed them, this Court issued its decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), which invalidated the coverage formula in § 4 of the Voting Rights Act. Now no longer subject to § 5, Texas obtained a vacatur of the D.C. court's order on preclearance. 274 F.Supp.3d, at 634-635, and n. 11.
With the never-effective 2011 plans now repealed and any preclearance issues overcome by events, the State argued in the Texas court that the plaintiffs' case against the 2011 plans was moot. In September 2013, the Texas court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to challenge the 2013 plans, but the court held that their challenges to the 2011 plans were still alive, reasoning that the repeal of the 2011 plans represented the "voluntary cessation" of allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Texas conducted its 2014 and 2016 elections under the plans that had been preliminarily approved by the Texas court and subsequently adopted (with only minor changes) by the Legislature in 2013. But in March and April 2017, after multiple trials, the Texas court issued a pair of rulings on the defunct 2011 plans. The court reaffirmed the conclusions it had reached in 2012 about defects in the 2011 plans, and it went further. Contrary to its earlier decision, it held that Congressional District (CD) 35 is an impermissible racial gerrymander and that CD27 violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it has the effect of diluting the electoral opportunities of Latino voters. C.J.S. 181a, 193a-194a. Previously, the court had provided detailed reasons for rejecting the very arguments that it now accepted. Id., at 409a-423a. Similarly, the court held that multiple districts in the plan for the Texas House were the result of intentional vote dilution. These included districts in the counties of Nueces (House District (HD) 32, HD34), Bell (HD54, HD55), and Dallas (HD103, HD104, HD105). H.J.S. 275a-276a.
In August 2017, having ruled on the repealed 2011 plans, the Texas court finally turned its attention to the plans then in effect-i.e., the plans that had been developed by the court, adopted by the Legislature in 2013, and used in both the 2014 and 2016 elections. The court invalidated the districts in those plans that correspond to districts in the 2011 plan that it had just held to be unlawful, i.e., CD27, CD35, HD32, HD34, HD54, HD55, HD103, HD104, and HD105. See 274 F.Supp.3d 624 (2017) (No. 17-586) and 267 F.Supp.3d 750 (2017) (No. 17-626).
In reaching these conclusions, the court pointed to the discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011 Legislature, and it attributed this same intent to the 2013 Legislature because it had failed to "engage in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 645-652 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 757. The court saw "no indication that the Legislature looked to see whether any discriminatory taint remained in the plans." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 649. And it faulted the State because it "did not accept [findings of the D.C. court] and instead appealed to the Supreme Court." Ibid. Seeing no evidence that the State had undergone "a change of heart," the court concluded that the Legislature's "decision to adopt the [District Court's] plans" was a "litigation strategy designed to insulate the 2011 or 2013 plans from further challenge, regardless of their legal infirmities." Id., at 649-650. Finally, summarizing its analysis, the court reiterated that the 2011 Legislature's "discriminatory taint was not removed by the [2013] Legislature's enactment of the Court's interim plans, because the Legislature engaged in no deliberative process to remove any such taint, and in fact intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from remedy." Id., at 686.
The Texas court's decisions about CD35 and all but three of the Texas House districts were based entirely on its finding that the 2013 Legislature had not purged its predecessor's discriminatory intent. However, the court also held that three districts-CD27, HD32, and HD34-were invalid under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act because they had the effect of depriving Latinos of the equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Id., at 682-686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 775-783. And the court found independent proof that HD90 was a racial gerrymander. Id., at 788-794.
The court held that violations in all these districts "must be remedied." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; see also 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795 (describing State House district violations that "must be remedied"). Mindful that October 1 was the deadline for the Texas Secretary of State to provide voter registration templates to the State's counties, App. 380a-381a, the court took steps to bring about prompt remedial action. In two orders issued on August 15 and 24, the Texas attorney general was instructed to advise the court, within three days, "whether the Legislature intends to take up redistricting in an effort to cure these violations." 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795. If the Legislature chose not to do so, the court warned, it would "hold a hearing to consider remedial plans." Ibid. After the Governor made clear that the State would not act, the court ordered the parties to proceed with a hearing on the congressional plan on September 5, as well as a hearing on the plan for the Texas House on September 6. 274 F.Supp.3d, at 686 ; 267 F.Supp.3d, at 795 ; App. 134a-136a; Defendants' Opposed Motion To Stay Order on Plan C235 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment in Civ. No. 11-cv-00360, Doc. 1538, pp. 3-4; Defendants' Opposed Motion To Stay Order on Plan H358 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment, Doc. No. 1550, pp. 4-5.
Texas applied for stays of both orders, but the District Court denied the applications. App. 134a-136a. Texas then asked this Court to stay the orders, and we granted that relief. After receiving jurisdictional statements, we postponed consideration of jurisdiction and set the cases for consolidated argument. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 735, 199 L.Ed.2d 601 (2018).
II
Before reaching the merits of these appeals, we must assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to review the orders at issue. Appellants claim that the orders amount to injunctions and are therefore appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Appellees disagree, contending that the orders do not qualify as injunctions. We hold that we have jurisdiction because the orders were effectively injunctions in that they barred Texas from using the districting plans now in effect to conduct this year's elections.
A
The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, "established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal." Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (emphasis deleted). But because "rigid application of this principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases," Congress created exceptions. Ibid. Two are relevant here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to hear an appeal from an order of a three-judge district court "granting or denying... an interlocutory or permanent injunction." Similarly, § 1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts" "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions," "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
The orders in these cases fall within § 1253. To be sure, the District Court did not call its orders "injunctions"-in fact, it disclaimed the term, App. 134a-136a-but the label attached to an order is not dispositive. We have previously made clear that where an order has the "practical

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 系