Task: songer_direct1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for government tax claim; for person claiming patent or copyright infringement; for the plaintiff alleging the injury; for economic underdog if one party is clearly an underdog in comparison to the other, neither party is clearly an economic underdog; in cases pitting an individual against a business, the individual is presumed to be the economic underdog unless there is a clear indication in the opinion to the contrary; for debtor or bankrupt; for government or private party raising claim of violation of antitrust laws, or party opposing merger; for the economic underdog in private conflict over securities; for individual claiming a benefit from government; for government in disputes over government contracts and government seizure of property; for government regulation in government regulation of business; for greater protection of the environment or greater consumer protection (even if anti-government); for the injured party in admiralty - personal injury; for economic underdog in admiralty and miscellaneous economic cases. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.

PER CURIAM.
We are satisfied in this matter that the exhaustive opinion of the trial judge, supported by the subsequent majority opinion in Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 1959, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413, correctly decides the issues involved herein.
We therefore refer to and adopt the recited facts and the conclusions of that court. Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International, D.C.S.D.Cal.1959, 170 F.Supp. 601.
Appellant first differs with the trial court’s conclusions by urging that a more extensive duty is owed to the stevedoring company by the ship than that found due by the trial court. The cases cited to support such a theory, however, are primarily cases dealing with active versus passive negligence determined prior to the Supreme Court cases establishing the contract theory of liability, rather than one arising in tort. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, supra; Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 1958, 355 U.S. 563, 78 S.Ct. 438, 2 L.Ed.2d 491; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 1956, 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133. Further, the policy considerations discussed by the court below seem valid— (a) the possibility, or even probability, of unseaworthiness after long voyages, and (b) the expertise of the stevedoring company and its employees.
Appellant’s second contention is that it did not waive the shipowner’s breach of seaworthiness. In view of our decision on appellant’s first point, we need not consider this. We point out, however, that this factual issue depends upon the court’s conclusion as to whether the stevedoring company continued to unload as it had before the temporary halt in operation. There was no change in procedures used, and no attempt to avoid the danger by the use of another method. The evidence fully supports the finding of waiver, were it necessary.
Appellant next contends that there was no finding of negligence on its part, and had there been such, the evidence wTould not have sustained it. There was no express finding of negligence, but the third conclusion of law (Tr. 20), reads as follows:
“3. Third-party defendant failed to perform its obligation under the stevedoring contract to discharge the cargo in a workmanlike manner and with reasonable safety to persons and property.”
This finding covers the gap asserted by appellant, and is more germane to the issues of this, a contract case, than a finding of negligence would be. The inference of negligence is readily drawn from the evidence. Metropolitan’s own foreman testified that there were alternative methods of discharging the same cargo which would not entail use of the loose hatchboards. That the work was carried out in this knowingly dangerous fashion would seem sufficient to support the breach of duty found by the trial judge.
Metropolitan next contends that appellee was a volunteer in paying Hugev for his injuries, and since the payment was not necessary, no action for indemnity will lie. Appellant cites cases for the proposition that an injury incurred by a worker attempting to repair an unseaworthy condition is not covered by the warranty of unseaworthiness. Whether such proposition would apply to work traditionally done by members of the crew (cf., United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass’n v. Halecki, 1959, 358 U.S. 613, 79 S.Ct. 517, 3 L.Ed.2d 541), we need not decide. It would require characterization of the activities of Metropolitan in continuing to unload as merely an attempt to repair the unseaworthy condition resulting from the use of the wrong queen-beam. The trial judge did not so find. He dismissed this argument as being wholly without merit. While the bales of rubber had to be removed in order to repair the condition, no change in mode of operation was commenced which would indicate that the removal of bales by Metropolitan was other than a continuation of the unloading operation.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: D