Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Fred Swartz, brought this action against defendant-appellee, New York Central Railroad Company, for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. His claim is based upon an injury to his knee he received on November 22, 1956, while employed by the railroad as a supervisor in the train yard at Elkhart, Indiana. He claims the railroad was negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care to provide him a safe place to tyork.
At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence, the trial judge granted the railroad’s motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment for defendant. The main question raised on this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in directing the verdict.
On the morning of November 22, 1956, plaintiff was told by his supervisor, Harlan Wingeart, the general car foreman, that a chain was needed to lift one of the cars from a train arriving at the yard. Wingeart requested plaintiff to bring the chain to Wingeart’s car, saying that he would give Swartz a ride to the area where the chain was needed. Wingeart then left for his car, which was parked in a lot located in the railroad yard.
Plaintiff picked up the chain at the railroad blacksmith’s shop and proceeded to the parking lot, where he approached the rear of Wingeart's car. He turned and walked backward to place the chain in the open trunk of the car. In doing so, he hit his knee against the bumper of the car and fell. He got up and entered the car. He told Wingeart that he had bumped the side of his leg or knee and it “stung” him.
The parking lot measured approximately sixty by eighty feet. The Wingeart car was parked about fifteen feet from the edge of the parking lot where there was a four-foot embankment to a railroad track. There was a slope of eight inches from one end of the lot to the other. Except for this gradual slope, the area where the car was standing was practically level.
The blacksmith’s shop was about two hundred feet from where the car was parked. Plaintiff, after picking up the chain, walked along the railroad track to the edge of the parking lot, down the embankment, on to the parking lot to the car, at which point his injury occurred.
There is evidence that although the spaces between the ties on the track had at one time been filled with crushed stone, the surface was now hard and covered in places with cinders and oil.
There is no evidence that there was oil on the bottom of plaintiff’s shoes as the result of his walking on the ties. He neither slipped nor fell on the four-foot embankment. In fact, there is no evidence that he fell at any time until after lie had hit his knee on the car bumper. Although there is evidence that there were water or “chuck” holes in the parking lot, there is no evidence that there were any holes in the vicinity where plaintiff was hurt. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a two-inch accumulation of freshly fallen snow on the parking lot created a dangerous condition.
In the light of the evidence, we fail to see any basis on which a jury might have found negligence had the trial judge permitted the case to go forward.
We are mindful that even though there is only slight evidence of negligence in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act case, the case must be submitted to a jury. Some evidence, nonetheless, of failure to exercise reasonable care, direct or inferential, must be adduced; otherwise, speculation would be substituted for probative facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.
The record here is devoid of any evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad. Consequently, the trial judge correctly granted the motion for a directed verdict. Milom v. New York Central Railroad Co., 248 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953, 78 S.Ct. 537, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958).
Plaintiff asked to reopen his case after having rested and after the trial judge had indicated that the motion for directed verdict would be granted. When plaintiff’s counsel was asked by the court as to what evidence could be produced if the case were reopened, counsel stated, “More specific evidence of the slip and fall. I don’t know exactly what it would be myself. I don’t know what the witness had testified to.” Under these circumstances, we do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing plaintiff’s request to submit further evidence. Ditter v. Yellow Cab Co., 221 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1955).
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1