Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for review in this case is whether an instruction informing jurors that they “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.
Respondent Albert Brown was found guilty by a jury of forcible rape and first-degree murder in the death of 15-year-old Susan J. At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that respondent had raped another young girl some years prior to his attack on Susan J. Respondent presented the testimony of several family members, who recounted respondent’s peaceful nature and expressed disbelief that respondent was capable of such a brutal crime. Respondent also presented the testimony of a psychiatrist, who stated that Brown killed his victim because of his shame and fear over sexual dysfunction. Brown himself testified, stating that he was ashamed of his prior criminal conduct and asking for mercy from the jury.
California Penal Code Ann. § 190.3 (West Supp. 1987) provides that capital defendants may introduce at the penalty phase any evidence “as to any matter relevant to . . . mitigation . . . including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense,. . . and the defendant’s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition.” The trial court instructed the jury to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to weigh them in determining the appropriate penalty. App. 23-24. But the court cautioned the jury that it “must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” Id., at 20. Respondent was sentenced to death.
On automatic appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed the sentence of death. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P. 2d 440 (1985). Over two dissents on this point, the majority opinion found that the instruction at issue here violates the Federal Constitution: “ ‘federal constitutional law forbids an instruction which denies a capital defendant the right to have the jury consider any “sympathy factor” raised by the evidence when determining the appropriate penalty ....’” Id., at 537, 709 P. 2d, at 453, quoting People v. Lanphear, 36 Cal. 3d 163, 165, 680 P. 2d 1081, 1082 (1984). Relying on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), the court ruled that the instruction “is calculated to divert the jury from its constitutional duty to consider ‘any [sympathetic] aspect of the defendant’s character or record,’ whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, in deciding the appropriate penalty.” 40 Cal. 3d, at 537, 709 P. 2d, at 453. We granted certiorari to resolve whether such an instruction violates the United States Constitution. 476 U. S. 1157 (1986).
The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of this Court establishes two separate prerequisites to a valid death sentence. First, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The Constitution instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). Second, even though the sentencer’s discretion must be restricted, the capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his “‘character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.’” Eddings, supra, at 110, quoting Lockett, supra, at 604. Consideration of such evidence is a “constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The instruction given by the trial court in this case violates neither of these constitutional principles.
We think that the California Supreme Court improperly focused solely on the word “sympathy” to determine that the instruction interferes with the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence. “The question, however, is not what the State Supreme Court declares the meaning of the charge to be, but rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1985); see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 516-517 (1979). To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an instruction, we “must focus initially on the specific language challenged.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S., at 315. If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law. Ibid. In this ease, we need not reach the second step of analysis because we hold that a reasonable juror would not interpret the challenged instruction in a manner that would render it unconstitutional.
The jury was told not to be swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.” Respondent does not contend, and the Supreme Court of California did not hold, that conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling should properly play any role in the jury’s sentencing determination, even if such factors might weigh in the defendant’s favor. Rather, respondent reads the instruction as if it solely cautioned the jury not to be swayed by “sympathy.” Even if we were to agree that a rational juror could parse the instruction in such a hypertechnical manner, we would disagree with both respondent’s interpretation of the instruction and his conclusion that the instruction is unconstitutional.
By concentrating on the noun “sympathy,” respondent ignores the crucial fact that the jury was instructed to avoid basing its decision on mere sympathy. Even a juror who insisted on focusing on this one phrase in the instruction would likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. While strained in the abstract, respondent’s interpretation is simply untenable when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. This instruction was given at the end of the penalty phase, only after respondent had produced 13 witnesses in his favor. Yet respondent’s interpretation would have these two words transform three days of favorable testimony into a virtual charade. We think a reasonable juror would reject that interpretation, and instead understand the instruction not to rely oh “mere sympathy” as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.
We also think it highly unlikely that any reasonable juror would almost perversely single out the word “sympathy” from the other nouns which accompany it in the instruction: conjecture, passion, prejudice, public opinion, and public feeling. Reading the instruction as a whole, as we must, it is no more than a catalog of the kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror’s decision to vote for or against the death penalty. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is based on common sense, and a rational juror could hardly hear this instruction without concluding that it was meant to confine the jury’s deliberations to considerations arising from the evidence presented, both aggravating and mitigating.
An instruction prohibiting juries from basing their sentencing decisions on factors not presented at the trial, and irrelevant to the issues at the trial, does not violate the United States Constitution. It serves the useful purpose of confining the jury’s imposition of the death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors, which, we think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant than for him. And to the extent that the instruction helps to limit the jury’s consideration to matters introduced in evidence before it, it fosters the Eighth Amendment’s “need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson, 428 U. S., at 305. Indeed, by limiting the jury’s sentencing considerations to record evidence, the State also ensures the availability of meaningful judicial review, another safeguard that improves the reliability of the sentencing process. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325, 335, and n. 11 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
We hold that the instruction challenged in this case does not violate the provisions of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
We have noted our approval of this statutory scheme. California v. Ramos, 468 U. S. 992, 1005, n. 19 (1983). See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 53 (1984).

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
数. U.S. Court of International Trade
日. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
的. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
月. U.S. Court of Military Review
用. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
成. U.S. Customs Court
名. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
时. U.S. Tax Court
件. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
一. U.S. Court for China
请. U.S. Consular Courts
中. U.S. Commerce Court
据. Territorial Supreme Court
码. Territorial Appellate Court
不. Territorial Trial Court
新. Emergency Court of Appeals
文. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
下. Bankruptcy Court
分. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
入. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
人. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
功. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
上. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
户. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
为. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
间. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
号. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
取. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
回. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
在. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
页. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
字. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
有. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
个. Alaska U.S. District Court
作. Arizona U.S. District Court
示. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
出. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
是. California Central U.S. District Court
失. California Eastern U.S. District Court
表. California Northern U.S. District Court
除. California Southern U.S. District Court
加. Colorado U.S. District Court
败. Connecticut U.S. District Court
生. Delaware U.S. District Court
信. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
类. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
置. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
理. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
本. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
息. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
行. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
定. Guam U.S. District Court
改. Hawaii U.S. District Court
市. Idaho U.S. District Court
期. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
以. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
修. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
元. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
方. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
录. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
区. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
单. Kansas U.S. District Court
位. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
型. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
法. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
县. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
存. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
品. Maine U.S. District Court
前. Maryland U.S. District Court
称. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
注. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
值. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
输. Minnesota U.S. District Court
建. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
能. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
大. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
例. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
度. Montana U.S. District Court
始. Nebraska U.S. District Court
到. Nevada U.S. District Court
面. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
载. New Jersey U.S. District Court
点. New Mexico U.S. District Court
密. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
动. New York Northern U.S. District Court
果. New York Southern U.S. District Court
图. New York Western U.S. District Court
提. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
发. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
式. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
国. North Dakota U.S. District Court
登. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
错. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
者. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
认. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
误. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
接. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
关. Oregon U.S. District Court
重. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
第. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
地. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
如. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
设. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
目. South Carolina U.S. District Court
开. South Dakota U.S. District Court
事. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
可. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
要. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
代. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
小. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
选. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
标. Texas Western U.S. District Court
明. Utah U.S. District Court
编. Vermont U.S. District Court
求. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
列. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
网. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
万. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
最. Washington Western U.S. District Court
器. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
所. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
内. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
体. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
通. Wyoming U.S. District Court
务. Louisiana U.S. District Court
此. Washington U.S. District Court
商. West Virginia U.S. District Court
序. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
化. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
消. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
否. Alabama U.S. District Court
保. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
使. Georgia U.S. District Court
次. Illinois U.S. District Court
机. Indiana U.S. District Court
对. Iowa U.S. District Court
量. Michigan U.S. District Court
查. Mississippi U.S. District Court
部. Missouri U.S. District Court
性. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
和. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
更. New York U.S. District Court
后. North Carolina U.S. District Court
证. Ohio U.S. District Court
题. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
确. Tennessee U.S. District Court
格. Texas U.S. District Court
了. Virginia U.S. District Court
于. Norfolk U.S. District Court
金. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
公. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
午. New Jersey U.S. District Court
円. California U.S. District Court
片. Florida U.S. District Court
空. Arkansas U.S. District Court
态. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
管. State Supreme Court
主. State Appellate Court
天. State Trial Court
自. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
我. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
全. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
今. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
来. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
正. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
说. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
意. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
送. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
容. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
已. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
结. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
会. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
段. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
计. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
源. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
色. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
時. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
交. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
系. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 天