Task: songer_subevid

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court's interpretation of the substantial evidence rule support the government? For example, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" or "more than a mere scintilla". This issue is present only when the court indicates that it is using this doctrine, rather than when the court is merely discussing the evidence to determine whether the evidence supports the position of the appellant or respondent." Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

WOODROUGH, District Judge.
This appeal is taken to reverse an order of the trial court appointing receiver for the Continental National Bank. The order was made in a suit brought by a judgment creditor of the bank in the nature of a creditor’s bill to enforce the judgment against the bank’s assets and to recover against the shareholders on their liability for any deficiency. The bank had discontinued its ordinary business and turned its assets over to a committee of its own shareholders for voluntary liquidation before the plaintiff’s judgment was obtained, and the members of the committee as well as the bank and its shareholders were all made parties defendant in the bill. The application for the appointment of receiver was heard upon the verified bill and the objections to the appointment of receiver, and there was some colloquy between the court and counsel. the application for the appointment of receiver has been certified to us by the trial judge.
It appeared to the trial judge from the pleadings and the admissions of the parties that the plaintiff had a judgment against the bank from which the bank had appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and that court had affirmed the judgment; that the assets in the hands of the shareholders’ committee were insufficient to pay the judgment and interest; that the directors of the bank and the liquidating committee were denying the validity of the judgment and refusing to recognize it, and some assets of the bank had been liquidated and paid to shareholders with full knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff’s claims. There were strenuous denials that the shareholders’ committee had been guilty of any mismanagement of their trust, and it was urged that they were the ones best qualified to carry out the liquidation. A principal contention was further that the judgment of the plaintiff had been obtained by fraud and was void.
We think the trial court in passing upon the propriety of appointing receiver rightly indulged the presumption that the plaintiff’s judgment was valid [Brictson Mfg. Co. v. Close (C. C. A.) 25 F.(2d) 794], that it rightly considered the bank’s liquidating eom- ' mittee to be in the position of trustees for the creditors, and that the action of the committee in liquidating assets and paying dividends to shareholders when the assets were insufficient to pay the judgment and interest justified appointing a receiver. The order to impound the bank’s assets in the hands of receiver pendente lite was clearly within the court’s jurisdiction and in the exercise of sound discretion. Adequate security was exacted, and there was no error.
After receiver was appointed, the defendant bank and its liquidating committee objected to the person selected on the ground of interest. The court stated he would defer consideration of that objection until determination of this appeal. It appears that Mr. John E. Cahill, named by the court to be receiver, is a deputy finance commissioner of the state of Missouri in charge of liquidation of the judgment creditor plaintiff, and is identified with and assisting the plaintiff in this litigation.' It would seem, therefore, that in his official position he has an interest in the litigation, and that some other suitable and wholly disinterested person should be appointed by the trial court.
Order for receiver is affirmed.

Question: Did the court's interpretation of the substantial evidence rule support the government? For example, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" or "more than a mere scintilla". This issue is present only when the court indicates that it is using this doctrine, rather than when the court is merely discussing the evidence to determine whether the evidence supports the position of the appellant or respondent.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D