Task: sc_casesource

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the second time this marathon litigation has been before us. It began in 1959 as a suit for patent infringement brought by Hazeltine Research, Inc. (hereafter HRI), against Zenith. In 1963, Zenith filed a counterclaim against HRI alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as amended, 26 Stat. 209, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2, 15, 26, by reason of HRI’s participation in patent pools in Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. These pools, it was claimed, operated to exclude Zenith from those foreign markets by refusing to grant patent licenses to American manufacturers seeking to export American-made radio and television sets. Trial was had without a jury. Zenith submitted telling evidence as to the existence and operation of the conspiracy and HRI’s participation in each of the markets. Zenith demonstrated the fact and extent of its business injury by estimating the percentage of the foreign market it would have enjoyed absent the conspiracy during the four years prior to 1963 and showing the portion it actually enjoyed during those years. The difference between the profits it actually made and the profits it would have made in a free market during the four years was the measure of the damages demanded.
A year after evidence was closed, the trial judge entered preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law favoring Zenith. He concluded that Zenith had been damaged $6,297,371 in the Canadian market, $9,248,926 in the English, and $692,555 in the Australian, a total of $16,238,872 before trebling. HRI then moved to amend its reply to Zenith’s counterclaim and to reopen the record for the taking of additional evidence. The motion sought leave to assert the defenses of limitations and release; the claim was that part or all of the damages awarded to Zenith for the four years 1959-1963 were caused by pre-1959 conduct and to that extent were barred by the statute of limitations, 15 U. S. C. § 15b, or by a release given by Zenith to certain American companies in 1957. HRI also sought leave to prove that until specified dates Zenith’s exclusion from the English and Australian markets had been due, not to1 the operation of the alleged patent pools, but to such matters as official embargoes, tariffs, and technical factors. The trial judge agreed to take additional evidence with respect to England and Australia but refused to reopen the record for other purposes or to modify his findings and conclusions concerning the Canadian market. He did, however, permit the limitations and release defenses to be filed and, after hearing evidence with respect to the English and Australian markets, reduced his award of damages with respect to them. 239 F. Supp. 51 (1965).
In the Court of Appeals, HRI asserted error on various grounds. Putting aside other issues, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that Zenith had failed to prove injury to its business in any of the three markets. 388 F. 2d 25 (1967). We, in turn, affirmed the judgment denying recovery for the alleged injury in the English and Australian markets, but reversed with respect to Canada, holding that Zenith’s evidence amply demonstrated the fact of damage in the Canadian market. 395 U. S. 100 (1969). We also noted that some portion of the damages proved and awarded resulted from conspiratorial conduct prior to 1959 and that the trial judge had either rejected on the merits the defenses of limitations and release or deemed them waived. Id., at 117 n. 13. We went no further, however, with respect to the issues surrounding either defense.
The Court of Appeals on remand accepted as duly proved that absent the conspiracy Zenith would have enjoyed a 16% share of the Canadian market and that the difference between 16% and the share it actually had was the measure of the total damages inflicted by the conspiracy during the four years 1959-1963. But recognizing that some portion of Zenith’s business injury resulted from conspiratorial conduct prior to 1959, the court went on to hold that the trial judge had not rejected the defenses of limitations and release on waiver grounds but had erroneously rejected them on their merits, and further that Zenith’s claim that the statute had been tolled had been waived by Zenith and was in any event unsound. Finally, the court ordered further evidence to be taken in the trial court to determine the extent to which, if any, the damages awarded by the trial court should be reduced by virtue of the defenses sustained in the Court of Appeals. 418 F. 2d 21 (1969).
We granted certiorari. 397 U. S. 979 (1970). Zenith’s principal contentions here are that the trial judge properly deemed the limitations and release defenses to have been waived, that if not waived, the defenses were without merit, and that in any event the statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of a Government suit against HRI’s coconspirators. We need not decide whether the trial judge held the defenses waived or rejected them on the merits, since in our view, either course would have been legally sound. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals.
I
We deal first with Zenith’s claim that the defenses of limitations and release were properly held by the trial court to have been waived. To do so it is essential briefly to outline the course of the trial and evidence. Zenith’s 1963 counterclaim alleged the existence of the conspiracy and the impact on its business and prayed for damages and injunctive relief, but made no allegations as to the time period as to which damages were sought. These latter matters became clear during the pretrial proceedings and during the course of the trial itself. In its pretrial brief and opening statement Zenith asserted that the illegal pools had existed for many years; that Zenith had conspiratorially been refused a license to import into Canada; and that litigation had been threatened and potential distributors discouraged. The conspiracy was said to have been not only a longstanding but also a worldwide one, against certain members of which the United States Government had brought an antitrust action and Zenith itself had recovered $10,000,000 in 1957 in settlement of a civil treble-damage action. But Zenith disclosed that, although the conspiracy had been worldwide and long existing, it would seek to recover damages for restraint of its trade in the three foreign markets only during the “four-year statutory damage period.”
At trial Zenith introduced voluminous evidence with respect to the operations of the conspiracy and its impact on its business. The testimony with respect to Canada was that in a free market Zenith would have had the same share of the Canadian market as it enjoyed in the United States and that the existence and operation of the conspiracy had restricted its Canadian business. Specifically, Zenith claimed that in the four years after June 1, 1959, it had lost profits aggregating some $6,300,000 as the result of conspiratorial conduct by the Canadian patent pool during and prior to that period. Counsel made Zenith’s position perfectly clear in his summation and post-trial brief: except for the Canadian pool, Zenith would have had a 16% share of the Canadian market, but as a result of the pool it had only a 3% share. Zenith thus argued that it was entitled to the full difference between 16% and 3% for the entire four-year period. It also made similar claims with respect to the English and Australian markets.
Although Zenith’s counterclaim on its face sought to recover all damages suffered in past years without restriction, HRI pleaded neither limitations nor release in its reply to the counterclaim. Zenith instead revealed its own awareness of the statutory limitation period during the trial and expressly restricted its proof to damages suffered during the statutory four-year damage period. However, Zenith sought to recover all damages suffered during those years even though it was unmistakably clear that some of this damage had been caused by conspiratorial action prior to 1959. Yet, at no time during the trial did HRI suggest that the statute barred Zenith’s recovery of any part of its total damage suffered during that period. HRI did challenge Zenith’s claim that it would have had a 16% share of the Canadian market on the ground that the evidence was speculative — indeed, that it was so speculative that Zenith had failed entirely to sustain its burden of proving damage, but it interposed no objection to Zenith’s demand for all damages sustained during the four-year period, no matter when the operative acts had occurred. Not until one year after trial, when it learned that the judge’s findings and conclusions were unfavorable, did HRI assert that part of the post-1959 damage was the result of pre-1959 conduct and was barred either by the statute of limitations or by the release given by Zenith in 1957 in settlement of its suit against other American companies.
Other than a general attack on the sufficiency of Zenith’s proof of damages and a demand that the matter be relitigated, HRI’s post-trial motion had three principal branches. First, it sought leave to file the defense of limitations. The motion in effect asserted that the conspiracy, even if it had continued during the damage period, had committed no damaging overt acts during that period, all of Zenith’s damage being caused by pre-1959 operations of the pool. HRI asserted as a legal matter that the statute of limitations would therefore bar Zenith’s entire claim on the record then before the Court. Second, HRI sought to interpose the defense of release. The argument was that some or all of Zenith’s post-1959 damages were the consequence of pool activity occurring prior to the date of a 1957 release given to American companies which were coconspirators of HRI in the Canadian pool. That release, it was claimed, also released HRI. Third, HRI sought to reopen the record to show that until well into the four-year damage period Zenith’s inability to enter the English and Australian markets was due to official embargoes, other governmental policies and technical difficulties rather than to the operations of the patent pools.
The motion was thoroughly and extensively argued. With respect to the defenses of limitations and release, the trial court’s ruling, after Zenith objected to them as being “too late,” was expressed as follows: “Well, the record will show that leave is given to file them at this time, after proofs are closed and after findings have been made.” This ruling was immediately followed by the court’s refusal either to reopen the record for additional evidence with respect to Canada or to modify its judgment in any way as to that market. The record as to England and Australia, however, was reopened for further proof as to the operative forces other than the patent pools which in fact had prevented importation of Zenith’s products into those markets.
Arguably, since the trial judge permitted the limitations and release defenses to be filed but then rejected them by refusing to amend the judgment with respect to Canada, rejection was necessarily on the merits. But the record also yields to the construction that the two defenses were overruled because a just and sensible ruling on their merits would have required a reopening of the record for a virtual retrial of the issue of damages, an eventuality which the trial court deemed unwarranted in view of HRI’s delinquency in raising the defenses. If this was the course the trial judge took, we would not disturb his judgment.
At the time of the trial Rule 8 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required that “[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively... release... statute of limitations... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Rule 12 (h) at that time provided that “[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present” either by motion or in answer or reply. Based on these rules, Zenith claims that the trial court was required to, and did, hold the two defenses waived.
HRI contends that the District Court should have granted it leave to amend its answer under Rule 15 (a), which provides that such “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” HRI’s position is that the evidence in the record at the time it offered its defenses showed that all of the acts causing damage during the 1959-1963 period had occurred prior to 1959; from this it follows that Zenith had failed, according to HRI, to offer any evidence upon which an award of damages could have been sustained. In the alternative, HRI argues that the record showed that it had been released from all liability for damages flowing from pre-1957 acts. In either case, HRI urges that the damage award be set aside.
It is settled that the grant of leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15 (a) is within the discretion of the trial court. Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962) (dictum). In a matter as substantial and complex as this one, where HRI claimed it had been misled or at the very least asked to be relieved of mistake or oversight, it might have been within the discretion of the trial judge to have permitted HRI to amend its pleadings to include therein the defenses of limitations and release. But, in deciding whether to permit such an amendment, the trial court was required to take into account any prejudice that Zenith would have suffered as a result, see Kanelos v. Kettler, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 133, 136-137, n. 15, 406 F. 2d 951, 954-955, n. 15 (1968); United States v. 47 Bottles, More or Less, 320 F. 2d 564, 573-574 (CA3 1963); Caddy-Imler Creations v. Caddy, 299 F. 2d 79, 84 (CA9 1962); 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 15.08 [4] (2d ed. 1968), and here the prejudice to Zenith would have been substantial. Zenith’s theory that all of its damages suffered during the four-year period were legally recoverable had been made quite clear during the trial, and Zenith had proved up its damages in accordance with that theory. Meanwhile HRI had neither pleaded its defenses, objected to Zenith’s evidence, nor otherwise hinted that post-1959 damages caused by pre-1959 conduct were for any reason barred until long after the record had been closed. To have then sustained HRI’s defenses would have been to deny Zenith the opportunity to prove its recoverable damages — a denial that hardly comports with the letter or the spirit of Rule 15 (a). At the very minimum, if the defense of limitations or release was to be entertained and deemed to bar that part of Zenith’s damages resulting from the lingering consequences of past acts, Zenith would have been entitled to perfect its proof as to damage resulting from pool operations during the four-year period, as well as to prove, if it could, what damages it might have suffered in the future from those acts. To have permitted Zenith to perfect its proof would, of course, have required reopening of the record and a virtual retrial of the issue of damages.
The trial judge here might have permitted reopening. Like a motion under Rule 15 (a) to amend the pleadings, a motion to reopen to submit additional proof is addressed to his sound discretion. See, e. g., Swartz v. New York Central R. Co., 323 F. 2d 713, 714 (CA7 1963); Locklin v. Switzer Bros., 299 F. 2d 160, 169-170 (CA9 1961); Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agricultural Properties, Inc., 150 F. 2d 363, 366, rehearing denied, 150 F. 2d 1020 (CA5 1945); 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 59.04 [13] (2d ed. 1966). But. the-record is clear that he refused to reopen with respect to damages in the Canadian market or otherwise to modify the Canadian judgment, and that he thereby rejected HRI’s proffered defenses. Although we are not privy to his unexpressed thinking and although his refusal can be read as a rejection of the defenses on the merits, it can also be read as a holding that the defenses were, in effect, waived by the untimeliness of their presentation and hence that the pleadings would not be amended, except as a matter of form, and that the trial would not be reopened.
On the assumption that the trial court did hold the defenses of limitations and release to have been waived, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion or stressed too much the value of avoiding reopening a trial to litigate matters that HRI had had an opportunity, but neglected, to litigate. Nor is it irrelevant in this connection that HRI’s central claims during trial were that there was no conspiracy and that Zenith had suffered no damage at all. The defenses that HRI set out in the post-trial motions were in a sense inconsistent with these trial claims, for the defenses conceded, albeit only arguendo, that a conspiracy did exist and that Zenith, absent the conspiracy, would have controlled a sizable share of the Canadian market. HRI’s post-trial argument, in effect, was one of confession and avoidance showing that the conspiracy had been so successful in the pre-1959 period that it could be relatively or entirely quiescent from 1959 to 1963 and nonetheless cause Zenith substantial damages in those years. It is quite possible that HRI knew exactly what it was doing in not presenting this argument during trial and that it realized a need to present it only after it learned that its original arguments had not induced the court to hold in its favor.
Whatever HRI’s reasons for not offering its limitations and release defenses during trial, however, the trial court would not have erred in concluding that they were waived.
II
Assuming, however, that the District Judge rejected the defenses of limitations and release on the merits, as the Court of Appeals held, we confront the issue of whether it is consistent with the controlling limitations statute, 15 U. S. C. § 15b, to permit Zenith to recover all of the damages it suffered during the years 1959-1963 even though some undetermined portion of those damages was the proximate result of conduct occurring more than four years prior to the filing of the counterclaim. HRI contends, and the Court of Appeals held, that the statute permits the recovery only of those damages caused by overt acts committed during the four-year period. We do not agree.
A
We turn first to Zenith’s argument that, even if the statute of limitations were to be held applicable in this case, the statute was nonetheless tolled from November 24, 1958, to November 1, 1963, pursuant to 15 U. S. C. § 16 (b) by reason of a Government antitrust action brought against various American companies participating along with HRI in the Canadian pool. If Zenith is correct in this respect and the running of the statute of limitations was suspended during the pend-ency of the Government suit, then it was entitled at the very least to sue in 1963 for any damage to its business occurring by reason of conspiratorial conduct at any time after November 24, 1954.
The Court of Appeals rejected the tolling argument. It had some doubt whether tolling was properly before it since Zenith had never entered a formal plea of tolling, and HRI now contends that Zenith’s failure to so plead in its original complaint bars it forever from raising such a claim. This contention is without merit. The cases on which HRI relies themselves establish that where, as here, a plaintiff has no reason to anticipate that a claim of limitations will be raised against him, he need not set forth his claim of tolling until the limitations claim is raised. See National & Transcontinental Trading Corp. v. International General Elec. Co., 15 F. R. D. 379, 382 (SDNY 1954). Cf. Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F. 2d 80, 88 (CA2 1961). Nor should Zenith be penalized for failing to enter a formal plea of tolling in response to HRI’s belated limitations plea, for Zenith can hardly be blamed for reading the remarks of the trial judge as a rejection of the limitations defense on the ground of waiver. Zenith was never unambiguously called upon to submit a formal plea; to hold under such circumstances that want of a submission amounts to a waiver would be to treat pleading as “a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome” — an approach we have consistently rejected. See Foman v. Davis, supra, at 181-182; United States v. Hougham, 364 U. S. 310, 317 (1960); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 48 (1957). The interests of justice thus clearly require that if HRI’s limitations defense is to be considered on its merits, Zenith’s claim of tolling must be dealt with as well.
The Court of Appeals did, in fact, consider the tolling issue on the merits, but concluded that tolling takes place only with respect to parties to a Government suit and hence that tolling did not occur here because HRI was not such a party. This was error. The language of 15 U. S. C. § 16 (b) expressly provides for tolling of the statute of limitations "in respect of every private right of action... based in whole or in part on any matter complained of” in the proceeding instituted by the Government. (Emphasis added.) On the face of this section, a private party who brings suit for a conspiracy against which the Government has already brought suit is undeniably basing its claim in whole or in part upon the matter complained of in the Government suit, even if the defendant named in the private suit was named neither as a defendant nor as a coconspirator by the Government. If, that is, the Government sues only certain conspirators, but also alleges and proves during trial that others were conspirators, the fact of the tolling of the statute against those so proved but not sued can hardly be denied. Nor could tolling be denied if a defendant had never been shown to be a conspirator by the evidence offered in the earlier Government suit, but then had been proved to be such in the subsequent private suit.
We find no indication in the legislative history of § 16 (b) that Congress intended it to toll the statute of limitations only against parties defendant in the Government action. Nor is anything cited to us in this respect. On the contrary, as we have said earlier, Congress, believing that “private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws,” enacted § 16 (b) in order to “assist private litigants in utilizing any benefits they might cull from government antitrust actions.” Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U. S. 311, 317-318 (1965). We see nothing destructive of Congress’ purpose in holding that § 16 (b) tolls the statute of limitations against all participants in a conspiracy which is the object of a Government suit, whether or not they are named as defendants or conspirators therein; indeed, to so hold materially furthers congressional policy by permitting private litigants to await the outcome of Government suits and use the benefits accruing therefrom.
It is true that the lower federal courts have until recently confined the operation of the section and held it applicable only to defendants named in the Government suit. See, e. g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F. 2d 284, 290-292 (CA7 1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 172 F. 2d 37, 48 (CA1 1948). But these cases and others like them, as we have indicated, fly in the face of the language of the statute, are antithetical to its aims, and cannot be squared with our recent decisions in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., supra, and Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U. S. 54 (1965). Minnesota Mining held that § 16 (b)’s tolling provision was not confined to those situations in which a Government decree, by virtue of § 16 (a), would be prima facie evidence against defendants in a private suit who had also been named as defendants in a Government suit. It rejected the view that §§ 16 (a) and 16 (b) are wholly interdependent and coextensive; on the contrary, § 16 (b) was given its full sweep. Leh, following Minnesota Mining, held that a private litigant was entitled to the benefit of tolling although the conspiracy he alleged covered a different time, named additional parties, and excluded some parties named in the prior Government suit. While Leh did not explicitly decide whether the statute would be tolled when the sole defendant in a private action covering the same ground as an earlier Government suit had been named neither as a conspirator nor as a party in the Government suit, we do not believe that such a case could be distinguished from Leh. Cases in the lower federal courts since Leh have also come to this conclusion. See New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F. 2d 94 (CA3 1967); Vermont v. Cayuga Rock Salt Co., 276 F. Supp. 970 (Me. 1967); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 53-56 (Minn. 1966), aff’d sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F. 2d 768 (CA8 1967).
We therefore hold that Zenith, although suing HRI, which was named neither as a party nor as a coconspirator in the Government suit, is not barred from obtaining the benefits of the tolling statute, since it is undisputed that the conspiracy in which HRI participated was at least in part the same conspiracy as was the object of the Government’s suit.

Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
数. U.S. Court of International Trade
日. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
的. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
月. U.S. Court of Military Review
用. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
成. U.S. Customs Court
名. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
时. U.S. Tax Court
件. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
一. U.S. Court for China
请. U.S. Consular Courts
中. U.S. Commerce Court
据. Territorial Supreme Court
码. Territorial Appellate Court
不. Territorial Trial Court
新. Emergency Court of Appeals
文. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
下. Bankruptcy Court
分. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
入. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
人. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
功. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
上. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
户. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
为. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
间. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
号. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
取. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
回. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
在. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
页. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
字. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
有. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
个. Alaska U.S. District Court
作. Arizona U.S. District Court
示. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
出. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
是. California Central U.S. District Court
失. California Eastern U.S. District Court
表. California Northern U.S. District Court
除. California Southern U.S. District Court
加. Colorado U.S. District Court
败. Connecticut U.S. District Court
生. Delaware U.S. District Court
信. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
类. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
置. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
理. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
本. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
息. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
行. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
定. Guam U.S. District Court
改. Hawaii U.S. District Court
市. Idaho U.S. District Court
期. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
以. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
修. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
元. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
方. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
录. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
区. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
单. Kansas U.S. District Court
位. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
型. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
法. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
县. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
存. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
品. Maine U.S. District Court
前. Maryland U.S. District Court
称. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
注. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
值. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
输. Minnesota U.S. District Court
建. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
能. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
大. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
例. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
度. Montana U.S. District Court
始. Nebraska U.S. District Court
到. Nevada U.S. District Court
面. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
载. New Jersey U.S. District Court
点. New Mexico U.S. District Court
密. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
动. New York Northern U.S. District Court
果. New York Southern U.S. District Court
图. New York Western U.S. District Court
提. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
发. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
式. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
国. North Dakota U.S. District Court
登. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
错. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
者. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
认. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
误. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
接. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
关. Oregon U.S. District Court
重. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
第. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
地. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
如. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
设. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
目. South Carolina U.S. District Court
开. South Dakota U.S. District Court
事. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
可. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
要. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
代. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
小. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
选. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
标. Texas Western U.S. District Court
明. Utah U.S. District Court
编. Vermont U.S. District Court
求. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
列. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
网. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
万. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
最. Washington Western U.S. District Court
器. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
所. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
内. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
体. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
通. Wyoming U.S. District Court
务. Louisiana U.S. District Court
此. Washington U.S. District Court
商. West Virginia U.S. District Court
序. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
化. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
消. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
否. Alabama U.S. District Court
保. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
使. Georgia U.S. District Court
次. Illinois U.S. District Court
机. Indiana U.S. District Court
对. Iowa U.S. District Court
量. Michigan U.S. District Court
查. Mississippi U.S. District Court
部. Missouri U.S. District Court
性. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
和. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
更. New York U.S. District Court
后. North Carolina U.S. District Court
证. Ohio U.S. District Court
题. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
确. Tennessee U.S. District Court
格. Texas U.S. District Court
了. Virginia U.S. District Court
于. Norfolk U.S. District Court
金. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
公. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
午. New Jersey U.S. District Court
円. California U.S. District Court
片. Florida U.S. District Court
空. Arkansas U.S. District Court
态. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
管. State Supreme Court
主. State Appellate Court
天. State Trial Court
自. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
我. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
全. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
今. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
来. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
正. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
说. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
意. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
送. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
容. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
已. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
结. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
会. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
段. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
计. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
源. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
色. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
時. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
交. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
系. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer:

Answer: 为