Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must decide whether a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employees in the event of a plant closing, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, §625-B (Supp. 1986-1987), is pre-empted by either the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§1001-1381 (ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982), and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and now affirm.
l — l
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine, for almost two decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontinued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees except several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Forty-five had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20 years, and 2 for 29 years. Plaintiff’s Supplementary Response to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Following the closing, the Company met with state officials and with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which represented many of the employees who had worked in the plant. While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain concessions in the form of amendments to the collective-bargaining agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resuming operations and to close the plant.
On October 30, 1981, 11 employees filed suit in Superior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, §625-B (Supp. 1986-1987). This statute, which is set forth in n. 1, supra, provides that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with 100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more than 100 miles away, must provide one week’s pay for each year of employment to all employees who have worked in the plant at least three years. The employer has no such liability if the employee accepts employment at the new location, or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the issue of severance pay. §§625-B(2), (3). Under authority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce the provisions of the state law, which action superseded the suit filed by the employees.
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, granted the Director’s motion, holding that Fort Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). The court rejected the Company’s contention that the plant-closing statute was pre-empted by ERISA, holding that ERISA preempted only benefit plans created by employers or employee organizations. Id., at 1059. It observed that the severance pay liability in this case results from the operation of the state statute, rather than from the operation of an employer-created benefit plan. Ibid. Therefore, reasoned the court, “[inasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be preempted by ERISA.” Ibid. The court also rejected the argument that the state provision was pre-empted by the NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either § 7 or § 8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects “the state’s substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from the economic dislocation that accompanies large-scale plant closings.” Id., at 1062. As a result, the court found that eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the closure of the plant at Winslow.
We hold that the Maine statute is not pre-empted by ERISA, not for the reason offered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare benefit “plan” under that federal statute. We hold further that the Maine law is not pre-empted by the NLRA, since it establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon the collective-bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Maine statute is not pre-empted by either ERISA or the NLRA.
II
Appellant’s basic argument is that any state law pertaining to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be pre-empted. Because severance benefits are included in ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that ERISA pre-empts the Maine statute. In effect, appellant argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, however, in fight of the plain language of ERISA’s pre-emption provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the overall objectives of ERISA itself.
A
The first answer to appellant’s argument is found in the express language of the statute. ERISA’s pre-emption provision does not refer to state laws relating to “employee benefits,” but to state laws relating to “employee benefit plans”:
“[T]he provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in § 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
We have held that the words “relate to” should be construed expansively: “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports appellant’s position that the word “plan” should in effect be read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state law’s connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The words “benefit” and “plan” are used separately throughout ERISA, and nowhere in the statute are they treated as the equivalent of one another. Given the basic difference between a “benefit” and a “plan,” Congress’ choice of language is significant in its pre-emption of only the latter.
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA presents a formidable obstacle to appellant’s argument. The reason for Congress’ decision to legislate with respect to plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination of the purpose of both the pre-emption section and the regulatory scheme as a whole.
B
The second answer to appellant’s argument is that preemption of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of ERISA pre-emption. In analyzing whether ERISA’s preemption section is applicable to the Maine law, “as in any preemption analysis, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to purpose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms “employee benefit plan” and “plan” are defined only tautologically in the statute, each being described as “an employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3).
Statements by ERISA’s sponsors in the House and Senate clearly disclose the problem that the pre-emption provision was intended to address. In the House, Representative Dent stated that “with the preemption of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared: “It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.” Id., at 29933.
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in differing States. A plan would be required to keep certain records in some States but not in others; to make certain benefits available in some States but not in others; to process claims in a certain way in some States but not in others; and to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some States but not in others.
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA’s pre-emption provision where state law created the prospect that an employer’s administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting requirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is permissible under federal law and the law of other States, the effect of the statute was to force the employer either to structure all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees inside and outside the State. The employer therefore was required to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a system for processing claims and paying benefits — precisely the burden that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid.
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said with respect to another form of State regulation: “Obligating the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting requirements of particular state fair employment laws... would make administration of a nationwide plan more difficult.” 463 U. S., at 105, n. 25. Such a situation would produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the Court in Shaw indicated, “ERISA’s comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interference with the administration of employee benefit plans,” ibid., so that employers would not have to “administer their plans differently in each State in which they have employees.” Id., at 105 (footnote omitted).
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the administration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw’s holding that only disability programs administered separately from other benefit plans fall within ERISA’s pre-emption exemption for plans maintained “for the purpose of complying with... disability insurance laws.” 29 U. S. C. § 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA’s pre-emption provision:
“An employer with employees in several States would find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits the State mandated under disability, workmen’s compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a plan is apparent.” 463 U. S., at 107-108.
It is thus clear that ERISA’s pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 12 (1973) (“[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of facts may differ from state to state”).
The purposes of ERISA’s pre-emption provision make clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the types of concerns that prompted pre-emption. Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only arises, however, with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer’s obligation. It is for this reason that Congress pre-empted state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits. Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork scheme of regulation.
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee benefit plan. The requirement of a one-time, lump-sum payment triggered by a single event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet the employer’s obligation. The employer assumes no responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer’s obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may never materialize. The employer may well never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that the obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty involves only making a single set of payments to employees at the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. Once this single event is over, the employer has no further responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing administrative program for processing claims and paying benefits.
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), summarily aff’d, 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had required that employers provide employees with a comprehensive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for it posed two types of problems. First, the employer in that case already had in place a health care plan governed by ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative efficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing plan, different components of its single plan would be subject to different requirements. If it established a separate plan to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme. Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular benefit plan, so could other States, which would require that the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs. Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an existing plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the establishment of a separate plan where none existed before, the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impossibility of structuring administrative practices according to a set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce benefits or simply not to pay them at all.
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a separate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required by the State. This is because there is no state-mandated benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the obligations it might face in the event that some day it might go bankrupt. The Company makes no contention that its statutory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retirement, death, and permanent and total disability benefits on an ongoing basis. App. 40. The obligation imposed by the Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a requirement that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous basis.
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an employer’s adoption of a uniform benefit administration scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of benefit plans that ERISA pre-emption was intended to prevent. As a result, pre-emption of the Maine law would not serve the purpose for which ERISA’s pre-emption provision was enacted.
C
The third answer to appellant’s argument is that the Maine statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA’s pre-emption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself. The congressional declaration of policy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was enacted because Congress found it desirable that “disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] plans.” § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA’s fiduciary standards “will prevent abuses of the special responsibilities borne by those dealing with plans.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated that these standards would safeguard employees from “such abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappropriation of plan funds.” Id., at 29932. The focus of the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit plans —which presumes that some type of administrative activity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 94-1785, p. 46 (1977) (“In electing deliberately to preclude state authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniformity of regulation with respect to their activities”) (emphasis added); 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure and reporting requirements “will enable both participants and the Federal Government to monitor the plans’ operations”) (emphasis added); id., at 29935 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (disclosure meant to provide employees information “covering in detail the fiscal operations of their plan”) (emphasis added).
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned with regulating benefit “plans” and why the Maine statute does not establish one. Only “plans” involve administrative activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obligation imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is no occasion to determine whether a “plan” is “operated” in the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is “operated.” No financial transactions take place that would be listed in an annual report, and no further information regarding the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed because the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would make no sense for pre-emption to clear the way for exclusive federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate. Under such circumstances, pre-emption would in no way serve the overall purpose of ERISA.
D
Appellant contends that failure to pre-empt the Maine law will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent ERISA’s regulatory requirements by persuading a State to require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise would establish on its own. That may be so under the rationale offered by the State Supreme Judicial Court, but that is not the rationale on which we rely today.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on the premise that ERISA only pre-empts state regulation of pre-existing benefit plans established by the employer, and not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an approach would afford employers a readily available means of evading ERISA’s regulatory scope, thereby depriving employees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it would permit States to circumvent ERISA’s pre-emption provision, by allowing them to require directly what they are forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the purpose of ERISA pre-emption makes clear why the mere fact that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off pre-emption. The requirements imposed by a State’s establishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to the development of a uniform set of administrative practices. As Standard Oil Co. of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), illustrates, an employer would be put to the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and would face the prospect that numerous other States would impose their own distinct requirements — a result squarely inconsistent with the goal of ERISA pre-emption.
Appellant’s arguments are thus well taken insofar as they are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with respect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that normally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified administrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant contends will result from upholding the Maine law.
Appellant also argues that its contention that the severance obligation under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is supported by Holland v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), summarily aff’d, 477 U. S. 901 (1986). We disagree. Those cases hold that a plan that pays severance benefits out of general assets is an ERISA plan. That holding is completely consistent with our analysis above. There was no question in the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the employer had a “plan”; there was a “plan” and the only issue was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among those covered by ERISA. The precise question was simply whether severance benefits paid by a plan out of general assets,

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 下