Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U. C. M. J.) to try a member of the Armed Forces depends on the “service connection” of the offense charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision in O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 (1969).
While petitioner Richard Solorio was on active duty in the Seventeenth Coast Guard District in Juneau, Alaska, he sexually abused two young daughters of fellow coastguardsmen. Petitioner engaged in this abuse over a 2-year period until he was transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors Island, New York. Coast Guard authorities learned of the Alaska crimes only after petitioner’s transfer, and investigation revealed that he had later committed similar sexual abuse offenses while stationed in New York. The Governors Island commander convened a general court-martial to try petitioner for crimes alleged to have occurred in Alaska and New York.
There is no “base” or “post” where Coast Guard personnel live and work in Juneau. Consequently, nearly all Coast Guard military personnel reside in the civilian community. Petitioner’s Alaska offenses were committed in his privately owned home, and the fathers of the 10- to 12-year-old victims in Alaska were active duty members of the Coast Guard assigned to the same command as petitioner. Petitioner’s New York offenses also involved daughters of fellow coast-guardsmen, but were committed in Government quarters on the Governors Island base.
After the general court-martial was convened in New York, petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for crimes committed in Alaska on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction under this Court’s decisions in O’Callahan v. Parker, supra, and Relford v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U. S. 355 (1971). Ruling that the Alaska offenses were not sufficiently “service connected” to be tried in the military criminal justice system, the court-martial judge granted the motion to dismiss. The Government appealed the dismissal of the charges to the United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which reversed the trial judge’s order and reinstated the charges. 21 M. J. 512 (1985).
The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Court of Military Review, concluding that the Alaska offenses were service connected within the meaning of O’Callahan and Relford. 21 M. J. 251 (1986). Stating that “not every off-base offense against a servicemember’s dependent is service-connected,” the court reasoned that “sex offenses against young children... have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization to which the family member is assigned.” Id., at 256. In reaching its holding, the court also weighed a number of other factors, including: the interest of Alaska civilian officials in prosecuting petitioner; the hardship on the victims, who had moved from Alaska, that would result if they were called to testify both at a civilian trial in Alaska and at the military proceeding in New York; and the benefits to petitioner and the Coast Guard from trying the Alaska and New York offenses together. This Court subsequently granted certiorari pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1259(3) (1982 ed., Supp. III) to review the decision of the Court of Military Appeals. 476 U. S. 1181 (1986). We now affirm.
The Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Exercising this authority, Congress has empowered courts-martial to try servicemen for the crimes proscribed by the U. C. M. J., Arts. 2, 17, 10 U. S. C. §§ 802, 817. The Alaska offenses with which petitioner was charged are each described in the U. C. M. J. See n. 1, supra. Thus it is not disputed that the court-martial convened in New York possessed the statutory authority to try petitioner on the Alaska child abuse specifications.
In an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to 1960, this Court interpreted the Constitution as conditioning the proper exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over an offense on one factor: the military status of the accused. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U. S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 240-241, 243 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 22-23 (1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 183-185 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 513-514 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123 (1866); cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 6-9 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 20-21 (1921). This view was premised on what the Court described as the “natural meaning” of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the Fifth Amendment’s exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces.” Reid v. Covert, supra, at 19; United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra, at 15. As explained in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra:
“The test for jurisdiction... is one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term ‘land and naval Forces.’...” Id., at 240-241 (emphasis in original).
“Without contradiction, the materials... show that military jurisdiction has always been based on the ‘status’ of the accused, rather than on the nature of the offense. To say that military jurisdiction ‘defies definition in terms of military “status” ’ is to defy the unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the historical background thereof and the precedents with reference thereto.” Id., at 243.
Implicit in the military status test was the principle that determinations concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by servicemen was a matter reserved for Congress:
“[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
See also Coleman v. Tennessee, supra, at 514; Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181, 187 (1962).
In 1969, the Court in O’Callahan v. Parker departed from the military status test and announced the “new constitutional principle” that a military tribunal may not try a serviceman charged with a crime that has no service connection. See Gosa v. Mayden, supra, at 673. Applying this principle, the O’Callahan Court held that a serviceman’s off-base sexual assault on a civilian -with no connection with the military could not be tried by court-martial. On reexamination of O’Callahan, we have decided that the service connection test announced in that decision should be abandoned.
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forces, Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate commerce among the several States, to coin money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication that the grant of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other authority to Congress in the same section. Whatever doubts there might be about the extent of Congress’ power under Clause 14 to make rules for the “Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” that power surely embraces the authority to regulate the conduct of persons who are actually members of the Armed Services. As noted by Justice Harlan in his O’Callahan dissent, there is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the Constitution that the Framers intended the language of Clause 14 to be accorded anything other than its plain meaning. Alexander Hamilton described these powers of Congress “essential to the common defense” as follows:
“These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them....
“... Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary for this purpose [common safety]? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them.” The Federalist No. 23, pp. 152-154 (E. Bourne ed. 1947).
The O’Callahan Court’s historical foundation for its holding rests on the view that “[b]oth in England prior to the American Revolution and in our own national history military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed with suspicion.” 395 U. S., at 268. According to the Court, the historical evidence demonstrates that, during the late 17th and 18th centuries in England as well as the early years of this country, courts-martial did not have authority to try soldiers for civilian offenses. The Court began with a review of the 17th-century struggle in England between Parliament and the Crown over control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. As stated by the Court, this conflict was resolved when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights in 1689, which granted Parliament exclusive authority to define the jurisdiction of military tribunals. See ibid. The Court correctly observed that Parliament, wary of abuses of military power, exercised its new authority sparingly. Indeed, a statute enacted by Parliament in 1689 provided for court-martial only for the crimes of sedition, mutiny, and desertion, and exempted members of militia from its scope. Mutiny Act of 1689, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5.
The O’Callahan Court’s representation of English history following the Mutiny Act of 1689, however, is less than accurate. In particular, the Court posited that “[i]t was... the rule in Britain at the time of the American Revolution that a soldier could not be tried for a civilian offense committed in Britain; instead military officers were required to use their energies and office to insure that the accused soldier would be tried before a civil court.” 395 U. S., at 269. In making this statement, the Court was apparently referring to Section XI, Article I, of the British Articles of War in effect at the time of the Revolution. This Article provided:
“Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a Capital Crime, or of having used Violence, or committed any Offence against the Persons or Property of Our Subjects,... the Commanding Officer, and Officers of every Regiment, Troop, or Party to which the... accused shall belong, are hereby required, upon Application duly made by, or in behalf of the Party or Parties injured, to use... utmost Endeavors to deliver over such accused... to the Civil Magistrate.” British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in G. Davis, Military Law of the United States 581, 589 (3d rev. ed. 1915).
This provision, however, is not the sole statement in the Articles bearing on court-martial jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Specifically, Section XIV, Article XVI, provided that all officers and soldiers who
“shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to any of Our Subjects, unless by Order of the then Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy Rebels or other Enemies in Arms against Us, he or they that shall be found guilty of offending herein shall (besides such Penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished according to the Nature and Degree of the Offence, by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court Martial.” Id., at 593.
Under this provision, military tribunals had jurisdiction over offenses punishable under civil law. Nelson & Westbrook
11. Accordingly, the O’Callahan Court erred in suggesting that, at the time of the American Revolution, military tribunals in England were available “only where ordinary civil courts were unavailable.” 395 U. S., at 269, and n. 11.
The history of early American practice furnishes even less support to O’Callahan’s historical thesis. The American Articles of War of 1776, which were based on the British Articles, contained a provision similar to Section XI, Article I, of the British Articles, requiring commanding officers to deliver over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of “a capital crime,... having used violence, or... any offence against the persons or property of the good people of any of the United American States” upon application by or on behalf of an injured party. American Articles of War of 1776, Section X, Article I, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1494. It has been postulated that American courts-martial had jurisdiction over the crimes described in this provision where no application for a civilian trial was made by or on behalf of the injured civilian. Indeed, American military records reflect trials by court-martial during the late 18th century for offenses against civilians and punishable under civil law, such as theft and assault.
The authority to try soldiers for civilian crimes may be found in the much-disputed “general article” of the 1776 Articles of War, which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over “[a]ll crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.” American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 Winthrop 1503. Some authorities, such as those cited by the O’Callahan Court, interpreted this language as limiting court-martial jurisdiction to crimes that had a direct impact on military discipline. Several others, however, have interpreted the language as encompassing all noncapital crimes proscribed by the civil law. Even W. Winthrop, the authority relied on most extensively by the majority in O’Callahan, recognized that military authorities read the general article to include crimes “committed upon or against civilians... at or near a military camp or post.” 2 Winthrop 1124, 1126, n. 1.
We think the history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this country during the 17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction on the plain language of Clause 14 which O’Callahan imported into it. There is no doubt that the English practice during this period shows a strong desire in that country to transfer from the Crown to Parliament the control of the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. And it is equally true that Parliament was chary in granting jurisdiction to courts-martial, although not as chary as the O’Callahan opinion suggests. But reading Clause 14 consistently with its plain language does not dis-serve that concern; Congress, and not the Executive, was given the authority to make rules for the regulation of the Armed Forces.
The O’Callahan Court cryptically stated: “The 17th century conflict over the proper role of courts-martial in the enforcement of the domestic criminal law was not, however, merely a dispute over what organ of government had jurisdiction. It also involved substantive disapproval of the general use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes.” 395 U. S., at 268. But such disapproval in England at the time of William and Mary hardly proves that the Framers of the Constitution, contrary to the plenary language in which they conferred the power on Congress, meant to freeze court-martial usage at a particular time in such a way that Congress might not change it. The unqualified language of Clause 14 suggests that whatever these concerns, they were met by vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to make rules for the government of the military.
Given the dearth of historical support for the O’Callahan holding, there is overwhelming force to Justice Harlan’s reasoning that the plain language of the Constitution, as interpreted by numerous decisions of this Court preceding O’Callahan, should be controlling on the subject of court-martial jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 275-278 (dissenting); cf. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 696 (1978) (“[W]e ought not ‘disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years’”), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962).
Decisions of this Court after O’Callahan have also emphasized that Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. As we recently reiterated, “ ‘[j]udicial deference... is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.’” Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.. S. 503, 508 (1986), quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 70 (1981). Since O’Callahan, we have adhered to this principle of deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional rights of servicemen were implicated. See, e. g., Goldman v. Weinberger, supra, at 509-510 (free exercise of religion); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 300-305 (1983) (racial discrimination); Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 64-66, 70-71 (sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 357, 360 (1980) (free expression); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 43 (1976) (right to counsel in summary court-martial proceedings); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 753 (1975) (availability of injunctive relief from an impending court-martial); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974) (due process rights and freedom of expression).
The notion that civil courts are “ill equipped” to establish policies regarding matters of military concern is substantiated by experience under the service connection approach. Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 305. In his O’Callahan dissent, Justice Harlan forecasted that “the infinite permutations of possibly relevant factors are bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation over the [court-martial] jurisdiction issue.” 395 U. S., at 284. In fact, within two years after O’Callahan, this Court found it necessary to expound on the meaning of the decision, enumerating a myriad of factors for courts to weigh in determining whether an offense is service connected. Relford v. Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U. S. 355 (1971). Yet the service connection approach, even as elucidated in Relford, has proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply.
Since O’Callahan and Relford, military courts have identified numerous categories of offenses requiring specialized analysis of the service connection requirement. For example, the courts have highlighted subtle distinctions among offenses committed on a military base, offenses committed off-base, offenses arising from events occurring both on and off a base, and offenses committed on or near the boundaries of a base. Much time and energy has also been expended in litigation over other jurisdictional factors, such as the status of the victim of the crime, and the results are difficult to reconcile. The confusion created by the complexity of the service connection requirement, however, is perhaps best illustrated in the area of off-base drug offenses. Soon after O’Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held that drug offenses were of such “special military significance” that their trial by court-martial was unaffected by the decision. United States v. Beeker, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 563, 565, 40 C. M. R. 275, 277 (1969). Nevertheless, the court has changed its position on the issue no less than two times since Beeker, each time basing its decision on O’Callahan and Relford.
When considered together with the doubtful foundations of O’Callahan, the confusion wrought by the decision leads us to conclude that we should read Clause 14 in accord with the plain meaning of its language as we did in the many years before O’Callahan was decided. That case’s novel approach to court-martial jurisdiction must bow “to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning.” Burnet v. Corona do Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We therefore hold that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the Armed Services at the time of the offense charged. The judgment of the Court of Military Appeals is
Affirmed.
Petitioner was charged with 14 specifications alleging indecent liberties, lascivious acts, and indecent assault in violation of U. C. M. J., Art. 134, 10 U. S. C. § 934, 6 specifications alleging assault in violation of Art. 128, 10 U. S. C. § 928, and 1 specification alleging attempted rape in violation of Art. 80, 10 U. S. C. § 880. The specifications alleged to have occurred in Alaska included all of the Article 128 and Article 80 specifications and 7 of the Article 134 specifications.
Following the decision of the Court of Military Appeals, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a stay from that court and from Chief Justice Burger. The court-martial reconvened and petitioner was convicted of 8 of the 14 specifications alleging offenses committed in Alaska and 4 of the 7 specifications alleging offenses committed in New York. These convictions are currently under review by the convening authority pursuant to U. C. M. J., Art. 60, 10 U. S. C. § 860.

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 间