Task: songer_r_natpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MANTON, Circuit Judge.
The appellee is a creditor of the bankrupt, which was adjudicated such on failure to answer a petition filed against it on September 23, 1929, in the Eastern district of New York. The trustee qualified June 30, 1930. Appellee, on January 27, 1930, procured an order in the Eastern district of New York for the arrest of the appellant, president of the bankrupt. The order of arrest was based on a petition of Mr. Lind-er, appellee’s attorney, and the affidavit of one Satloff. On December 4, 1930, on the sole petition of the appellee, the bankrupt’s trustee not joining therein, a District Judge in the Eastern district of New York authorized and empowered the appellee “to apply to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and for the District of New Jersey, and for an ancillary order of examination of such witnesses within the jurisdiction of said courts as may be necessary as to the acts, conduct or property of the bankrupt corporation herein, and for orders ne exeat directed to the Marshals for the Southern District of New York and for the District of New Jersey.”
On the same day, appellee, on its sole petition, without the trustee joining therein, obtained ex parte, in the Southern district of New York, an ancillary order ne exeat, and an ancillary order for the examination of the appellant before a special commissioner in bankruptcy was signed. It was therein ordered : “That the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York, or any of his deputies, be and he is hereby commanded that, without delay, he apprehend and take into custody Joseph Popkin, an officer of the bankrupt corporation above named, and bring him forthwith before me for examination or, at his option, cause him to give sufficient bail or security in the sum of $10,-000 to be approved by this Court or the Clerk thereof, that he, the said Joseph Popkin, will not depart from or go, or attempt to depart from or go beyond the territorial juiisdietion of this Court without its leave, and will at all times and in all manner, respect and things, obey and comply with the lawful orders and decrees of the Court herein for his examination, which shall or may be made on behalf of the said petitioner or other creditor of the said bankrupt.”
A warrant of arrest was executed by the marshal in the Southern district, and the appellant taken into custody^ Appellant furnished the required bail, and moved to vacate the ancillary order ne exeat. Prom an order denying this motion, this appeal is taken.
It is conceded that the order ne exeat was made pursuant to such authority as is found in section 2, subd. 15, of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 11 (15). It provides: “That the courts of bankruptcy * * * are hereby invested * * * with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings * * * [to] (15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title.”
Neither the court of primary jurisdiction nor the court below of ancillary jurisdiction has authority to issue such an order unless it be so pursuant to section 9, subd. b, of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 27 (b). A writ obtained under section 9, subd. b, of the Bankruptcy Act, requires a petition against a person to be obtained before the expiration of one month, after the qualification of the trustee upon satisfactory proof by affidavits of at least two persons that the bankrupt is about to leave the district in which he resides or has his principal place of business and is attempting, by his departure, to avoid examination and defeat the proceedings in bankruptcy. The section also provides for the arrest of the bankrupt and holding under bail for his appearance and examination.
No attempt was made by the appellee to comply with section 9, subd. b, 11 USCA § 27 (b), and the appellee rests its contention as to the validity of the order on section 2, subd. 15,11 USCA § 11 (15), giving authority to the District Courts to make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments provided for and necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
The writ and use of the writ of ne exeat is referred to and limited by section 261 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 376) in equity proceedings, where it is provided that it’ may be granted by a judge, “but no writ of ne exeat shall be granted unless a suit in equity is commenced, and satisfactory proof is made to the court or judge granting the same that the defendant designs quickly to depart from the United States.”
Limitations for permitting such, an arrest are made clear by tbe statute. If tbe bankrupt is to be taken into custody, be may be detained only ten days, and be must be arrested upon an order based upon the affidavits of two persons, which must show the facts, not opinions, and must be reasonably conclusive. The bankrupt cannot actually be imprisoned within these limitations. Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Edition, vol. 1, p. 390. The writ is punitive in its effect, and Congress recognized, by section 9, subd. b, of the act, 11 USCA § 27 (b), the high degree of proof necessary upon which to base such a writ. It is to be issued only as an order of arrest with the care that Congress intended. The general authority to issue orders contained in section 2, subd. 15, 11 USCA § 11 (15), cannot be regarded as extending a writ so specifically granted to a District Judge. The only other statutory authority to issue the writ is section 261 of the Judicial Code, which applies to suits in equity, and the writ can only be issued against a party defendant.
This writ is intended to be issued against the bankrupt only. In re Hale, Fed. Cas. No. 5,911. In the Hale Case, Judge Choate said: “It can hardly be doubted that so great a power, practically reviving imprisonment for debt, and touching so seriously the personal liberty of a very large class of' citizens, would, if intended to be given, have been given expressly and not left to be inferred merely from the grant of other powers, and that, if given, its exercise would have been carefully limited by the act, to prevent hardship and abuse. The express grant of the power in one case shows that the attention of the framers of the law was called to the subject, and they are silent as to all other cases. This raises a presumption of some strength against the existence of the power in other eases. & * * And the fact that no provision has been made * * for a warrant of arrest in any other case than that expressly provided for in the act, indicates the opinion of the supreme court that no such remedy is available.” See In re Hassenbusch (C. C. A.) 108 F. 35.
In the court below, In re Lipke (D. C.) 98 F. 970, 971, was referred to, but the question there presented was whether a bankrupt, about to abscond with the assets, can be detained by a writ, and under the general power of section 2, subd. 15, 11 USCA § 11 (15), it was ruled that he could. Judge Brown said: “The necessity of the occasional exercise of this power for the efficient administration of the bankrupt law is evident. Without it the bankrupt might easily defy, and largely nullify, all adverse proceedings against him, by absconding with his assets.”
In re Cohen (D. C.) 136 F. 999, and the Matter of Berkowitz (D. C.) 173 F. 1012, to which our attention is also called, both District Court cases, we think disregard the limitations of section 9, subd. b, 11 USCA § 27 (b), and erroneously hold the power, did exist to issue the writ of ne exeat under section 2, subd. 15. However, in both instances, the writ was against the bankrupt. We think it better to follow the apparent intent of Congress to permit the writ to issue when and as specifically granted under section 9, subd. b, and when the terms of that section are complied with.
Moreover, there is no provision in section 9, subd. b, which vested jurisdiction or authority in the court below to issue a writ of ne exeat against an officer of a bankrupt corporation. And there is no inherent power to issue such an order and thus hold him to be examined concerning the acts of the bankrupt. Congress by the general provision of section 2, subd. 15, did not intend the issuance of orders of arrest, for, at the same time, by section 9b, it provided specific requirements before arrests might be granted. An officer of a bankrupt corporation is not the bankrupt. Kaufman v. United States (C. C. A.) 212 F. 613, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 466. The section is without application to him. Congress recognized this in prescribing punishment for crime (section 29b) under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 52 (b). Such a drastic remedy as an arrest provided for by section 9 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 USCA § 27 (b), is one directed against the liberty of a person, and should be strictly construed and carefully applied. In re Schenkein (D. C.) 113 F. 421. It is the bankrupt, not an officer, who is referred to as subject to arrest in section 9 (b). It was intended to be issued only against the bankrupt, not a third party. If an officer of the corporation fails to appear for examination under section 21 (a) of the act, 11 USCA § 44 (a), or becomes a recalcitrant witness, he may be punnished for contempt. This remedy is ample; at least it is all Congress has provided.
Another sufficient reason why the order was improperly granted below is the fact that it was applied for by a creditor and not the trustee in bankruptcy. In re Lewensohn, 121 F. 538, 539 (C. C. A. 2). There the court said: “The trustee represents every creditor. • * * If the trustee should, without sufficient reason, refuse to proceed, tlie'court, by its order, could compel him to do so, or remove him for disobedience. It has been held under the present act that a creditor cannot prosecute an appeal from the judgment of a court of bankruptcy allowing the claim of another creditor, and that the trustee is the only party who can do so.” See, also, In re Rogers-Johnson Bldg. Co. (C. C. A.) 30 F.(2d) 359.
While the trustee is serving as such, any controversy arising out of and connected with the bankrupt’s estate must be instituted by the trustee, for no useful purpose can be served by a creditor’s duplication. Any other interpretation of the act would leave the bankrupt at the mercy of every creditor for his real or fancied wrongs. The creditor cannot usurp the power conferred upon the trustee while the trustee is in office.
Order reversed, and motion to vacate granted.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0