Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner electric companies seek review of ten orders of the Federal Power Commission (hereinafter “Commission”). In the challenged orders, the Commission refused to allow the electric companies to impose rate surcharges to compensate for alleged uncompensated fuel costs to which they allege they became entitled when they filed new rates based on fuel costs incurred in the billing month rather than for some prior period. The Commission held that the proposed surcharges amount to retroactive ratemaking, which is prohibited by the Federal Power Act. Petitioners counter that the surcharges are necessary because of changes in the companies’ rate structure, and that they are not retroactive ratemak-ing.
The First, Third and Fourth Circuits have already ruled on this issue. The First Circuit largely agreed with the position taken by the petitioners here. The Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, held that it was proper for the Commission to reject the surcharges as prohibited retroactive ratemaking. We agree with the decisions by the Third and Fourth Circuits and affirm the Commission’s orders, except those involving petitioner Appalachian Power Company.
I
Approved rates for electric service usually have two components. The “demand charge” covers the utility’s fixed (capacity related) costs. The “energy charge” is designed to recover variable costs, primarily the cost of fuel, which recently has been increasing.
The energy charge also has two elements. The first element is the “basic energy rate.” It recovers the “base cost” of fuel, which is an estimate of what fuel will cost. The basic energy rate must be approved in advance by the Commission. The second element is the “fuel adjustment” charge. This charge is based on a formula designed to recover the difference between the base cost of fuel and the actual cost of fuel. A utility’s fuel adjustment formula must be approved by the Commission, for it is considered part of the utility’s filed rate. The monthly charge calculated under the fuel adjustment formula, however, is not subject to Commission approval. Thus, fuel adjustment clauses enable utilities to keep their rates in line with the current cost of their fuel without continually having to file for rate increases and decreases.
While a utility’s fuel adjustment clause must fall within certain boundaries, much of the design is left to the utility. Basically, utilities have used one of two types of fuel adjustment formula. “Cost of service” tariffs are designed to reimburse the utility for its actual fuel expenditures. These tariffs have the advantage of being accurate, but the inclusion of current costs in the monthly billings must be deferred while the utility collects and assimilates current data. “Fixed rate” tariffs incorporate a charge of a “predetermined price per unit based on costs incurred during a past test period, subject to some adjustments.” Fixed rate tariffs are less accurate than cost of service tariffs, but monthly billings need not be postponed until information on fuel costs is tabulated. Each type of fuel adjustment formula has its advantages and disadvantages, and the Commission allows a utility to use either one.
II
Until late 1975, the fuel adjustment clauses employed by the petitioners used fuel costs from up to six months earlier to compute current fuel adjustment charges. For example, Public Service’s January billing incorporated a fuel adjustment charge which reflected the difference between the base cost and the actual cost of fuel in the preceding November. Petitioners term this a “billing lag.”
Petitioners were forced to amend their filed rates in late 1975 because of a change in Commission regulations. Some of the petitioners chose this occasion to eliminate the “billing lag” in their fuel adjustment charges. That is, rather than computing current fuel adjustment charges on the basis of costs in a period prior to the billing period, the utilities switched to formulas that incorporated the actual cost of the fuel in the billing month. Thus, where under Public Service’s old formula the January fuel adjustment charge was based on the cost of fuel in the preceding November, under the new formula, the January charge is computed on the basis of the actual January cost.
In addition to the changes just mentioned, petitioners requested approval for temporary rate surcharges. The surcharges are designed to recover “deferred charges” related to the “lag period” which petitioners allege are still owed by customers under the old (superseded) fuel adjustment clauses. Petitioners maintain that adoption of the new (non “billing lag”) fuel adjustment clauses wiped out the “deferred charges” and made them uncollectable.
Public Service’s experience illustrates how elimination of the “billing lag” arguably makes “deferred charges” unrecoverable. Public Service’s superseded fuel adjustment formula was based on the cost of fuel in “the second preceding month.” The January fuel adjustment charge reflected the cost of fuel in the preceding November. Therefore, recovery of the difference between the basic energy charge and November costs was “deferred” until the following January.
Public Service’s new fuel adjustment clause, which eliminated the “billing lag,” became effective on January 1, 1976. Under the new “cost of service” clause the cost of fuel in January is accounted for in the January charge. The January charge no longer reflects the difference between the actual and estimated costs in November. Thus, the “deferred charge” from November, 1975, and December as well, became uncollectable under the new fuel adjustment formula. (Instead the higher January cost was collected). Petitioners argue that the surcharges are necessary to recoup costs for such periods, which were never included in any billings.
The Commission refused to approve the surcharges. It held that (1) the proposed surcharges would be retroactive rate increases, and (2) the Federal Power Act prohibits retroactive ratemaking.
Ill
The primary issue in this case is whether imposition of the proposed surcharges would be retroactive ratemaking. Petitioners argue that the surcharges are not retroactive rate increases. They contend that the fuel adjustment clauses which were superseded were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing and therefore that they (petitioners) were entitled under the superseded clauses to be compensated for all incurred fuel costs; and that since the surcharges merely enable petitioners to recover costs to which they were already entitled, but for which billing had been deferred, imposition of the surcharges would not constitute retroactive ratemaking.
The Commission disagrees with petitioners’ characterization of the superseded fuel adjustment clauses. It contends that the old clauses were fixed rate rather than cost of service tariffs. That is, the superseded clauses established a “formula, based on past experience, i. e., costs incurred during a prior test period, to” approximate the actual cost of fuel in the billing month. In Public Service’s case, for example, the costs in the second preceding month were a proxy for the costs in the billing month. Under this view, once a utility collected the fixed rate charge based on the costs in an earlier month it was fully paid, according to the rationale of its rate, for the service provided in the billing month. There were no “deferred charges” still owed by the customer. Under this analysis the requested surcharges would be retroactive rate increases.
Whether approval of the proposed surcharges would be retroactive ratemaking depends upon one’s characterization of the superseded fuel adjustment clauses. If those clauses are viewed (as petitioners do) as cost of service tariffs with deferred billing, then the requested surcharges — which merely assure that the utilities recover their fuel costs — would not be retroactive rate increases. But if the superseded clauses are viewed (as the Commission does) as fixed rate tariffs which used past costs as a proxy for the actual current cost, then the proposed surcharges would indeed be retroactive rate increases. We believe that the superseded fuel adjustment clauses were fixed rate tariffs, and therefore, we agree with the Commission’s finding that approval of the surcharges would be retroactive ratemaking.
A
Petitioners make four arguments to support their claim that the superseded clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. First, they argue that the language of the clauses supports their interpretation. That is not true. While the clauses do not state that past costs are a proxy for current costs, neither do they state that the formulas are a method by which billing is deferred. Construed most favorably to the petitioners, the clauses are ambiguous. In light of this ambiguity, other evidence must be considered.
Petitioners’ second argument is based on their use of “deferred fuel accounting.” Public Service’s deferred fuel accounting method “reflect[s] the amount to be collected for [fuel adjustment] charges in the month in which the increased fuel costs are incurred.” For example, the money to be received from a January billing is “entered in current revenues” for the preceding November. Pennsylvania Electric and Metropolitan Edison use a similar (though slightly different) accounting system. According to their counsel:
[The] accounting method defers recognition of actual expense... until such time as those actual dollar amounts are billed under the fuel clause. Thus, the portion of the fuel cost that is included in Penelec’s base rates is charged as an expense each month and the portion in excess of that base amount is deferred. The deferred costs are carried forward and recognized as expenses in the month in which the related fuel adjustment revenues are billed. Thus deferred fuel cost accounting properly matches costs and revenues.
Petitioners contend that their use of deferred fuel accounting “would not make sense” unless the superseded clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing.
Petitioners’ use of deferred fuel accounting is consistent with their claim that one month’s fuel adjustment charge was merely deferred billing for an earlier month’s costs. Nevertheless, petitioners’ choice of this accounting method does not establish that the superseded clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. First, at least with respect to Public Service, the deferred fuel accounting method was not adopted until over one year after the superseded fuel adjustment clause became effective. Thus, contrary to Public Service’s counsel’s contention, this accounting method is not “tangible evidence of the Company’s intent” at the time the superseded clause became effective. Second, a company’s accounting method may or may not evidence its intention with respect to fuel adjustment charges. Deferred fuel accounting may have been adopted because the companies believed that their fuel adjustment clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. But adoption of this accounting method may have been for entirely different reasons. The switch to this accounting method resulted in an increase in assets on the books of the utilities and could have helped in sales of their securities at a time when they were hard hit by the foreign oil embargo. Thus, a utility’s choice of an accounting method does not necessarily control the Commission’s decision as to the nature of the filed rate. Also, there is nothing in the Commission’s prior approval of the filed rate that requires a conclusion that it is a cost of service tariff. We are not persuaded, therefore, that petitioners’ accounting method establishes that the superseded clauses merely deferred billing.
Petitioners’ third argument is based on Commission regulation 35.14(a)(1). This regulation provides that a fuel adjustment formula must reflect “the difference between the fuel cost... in the base period and in the current period.. ” Petitioners contend that this regulation “scrupulously require[s] that only actual fuel costs enter into this calculation [of the fuel adjustment charge].” Since only “actual” costs can be reflected in the formula, petitioners maintain that the reference to past costs must have been a way to defer billing, rather than as a proxy for current costs.
The flaw in this argument is the assumption that “current costs” can not be estimated. If this assumption were correct, then the regulation would have the effect of prohibiting fixed rate tariffs entirely. Petitioners cite no language in the regulation that supports their assumption and there is no basis for us to conclude that the Commission would have instituted such a major change from its past practice in less than explicit language. A much more reasonable conclusion, which is consistent with Commission practice, is that “current costs” is a tferm of art. In cost of service tariffs, “current costs” are indeed the actual costs. But in fixed rate tariffs, “current costs” means an estimate of costs based on past experience. Therefore, we reject the argument that because of regulation 35.14 the superseded clauses must be viewed as cost of service tariffs.
Finally, petitioners contend that in light of the Commission policy of making utilities whole the superseded fuel adjustment clauses must be viewed as cost of service tariffs. We acknowledge, of course, that the goal of fuel adjustment clauses is to accurately compensate utilities for their fuel costs, and that cost of service tariffs are the best way of doing this. The Commission, however, does not require that utilities use cost of service tariffs. Within certain boundaries, utilities are permitted to design their own fuel adjustment clauses. The risk involved in the selection of a fuel adjustment clause is on the utility. Thus, when a utility chooses a fixed rate tariff, a kind of fuel clause that has long been permitted, Commission policy does not require that courts transform the clause into a cost of service tariff.
In short, none of petitioners’ arguments warrants the conclusion that the superseded fuel adjustment clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. We therefore turn to the arguments in support of the Commission’s decision.
B
We concur, for three reasons, in the Commission’s judgment that the superseded fuel adjustment clauses were fixed rate tariffs. First, the scheme of the superseded fuel adjustment clauses belies petitioners’ claim that the clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. Petitioners acknowledge that the superseded clauses were based on formulas. Their argument is that those formulas merely postponed recovery of the actual cost of service. An examination of the superseded clauses, however, indicates that was not the case. If the clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing, then the formulas would have applied the fuel adjustment factor based on a particular month’s fuel costs to the amount of energy used by the customer during that month. But instead, the clauses involved in the tariffs filed in this case (except Appalachian) applied the fuel adjustment factor (which was based on fuel costs in a prior month or months) “to all kilowatt-hours supplied during the billing month.” Thus, the fuel adjustment charge that was used was not based on the cost of fuel that had been used to generate the power for which users were billed. Since customer usage varies from month to month, this mismatch — applying a fuel adjustment factor based on one month to kilowatt-hours used during another month— would not lead to exact recovery of actual fuel expenses. Thus, the superseded clauses did not simply defer recovery of the cost of fuel. The clauses brought about a charge that differed from actual cost. This result is inconsistent with petitioners’ claim that the clauses were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing. But the result squares with the Commission’s view that the clauses were fixed rate tariffs which used fuel costs in a prior period as a proxy for actual current costs.
Second, petitioners’ billing practice is inconsistent with their claim that the superseded fuel adjustment clauses were merely a means of deferred billing. If these clauses were a method of deferred billing, then the utilities would not have begun billing under the superseded clauses immediately after the clauses became effective. Rather, they would have waited until the “billing lag” had elapsed. Yet the petitioners began billing under the superseded fuel adjustment clauses the first month they were effective.
Public Service’s billing practice illustrates this inconsistency. Its superseded fuel adjustment formula became effective in January, 1973. Public Service began billing in accordance with that formula immediately. Under petitioners’ analysis, the January bill was really a deferred charge for the “second preceding month” — November, 1972. But as the Commission notes, Public Service could not have intended to charge for November, 1972, because its customers had already paid for service received in November, and therefore the January charge “would have constituted retroactive rate-making and would have been barred.” If Public Service really intended its fuel adjustment clause to be a means of deferred billing, then the proper procedure would have been to start billing under that clause in March, 1973. The only reasonable explanation for Public Service’s decision to bill under the superseded clause the first month it was effective is the one arrived at by the Commission: the superseded clauses were fixed rate tariffs which used costs incurred during a prior test period as a proxy for actual current costs.
Petitioners have no real answer to this point. They lamely contend that “the initial billings show no more than a lack of refined thinking on the correct application of the clause.” However, we cannot ascribe such carelessness in applying the clauses as their application is in conformance with their wording and they were obviously drafted in a very careful manner. Petitioners have generously offered to refund the extra money billed during the first months the superseded clauses were effective in exchange for the much greater amounts they would receive if their arguments about deferred billing were accepted. We are not persuaded. One’s thinking need not be very “refined” to understand that if the purpose of a fuel adjustment clause is to defer billing, then billing must be deferred. Petitioners’ decision to bill during the first months the superseded clauses were effective is a clear indication that petitioners did not consider the clauses to be cost of service tariffs with deferred billing.
Finally, the language and tone of the superseded fuel adjustment clauses is consistent with the Commission’s conclusion that they were fixed rate tariffs. It would have been very easy for petitioners, who wrote the clauses, to have included explicit language indicating that the fuel clauses merely deferred billing for one month’s fuel costs until a subsequent month. But the clauses do not contain such language. Instead they provide, for example, that a “fuel cost adjustment factor shall be applied... in accordance with the formula set forth... ” This emphasis on a formula, which as we indicated above, did not result in an exact recovery of fuel costs, belies petitioners’ claim that the clauses merely deferred billing for a few months.
For these reasons, we believe that the Commission properly characterized the superseded fuel adjustment clauses as fixed rate tariffs. Since we agree with the Commission, it is not necessary to address the niceties between various standards of review. Associated Press v. Federal Communications Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 361, 366-67, 452 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (1971). But even if we did not agree with the Commission, reversal on this point would be inappropriate. The Commission’s interpretation of fuel adjustment clauses is entitled to a considerable amount of deference. As Judge Leventhal wrote for the court in Gulf-States Utilities Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 64, 518 F.2d 450, 457 (1975):
where the decision involves the interpretation of the parties’ intent as revealed in the language of a contract, it is proper to defer to the Commission’s expertise if its decision is “amply supported both factually and legally.” United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division [358 U.S. 103, 79 S.Ct. 194, 3 L.Ed.2d 153] supra, 358 U.S. at 114, 79 S.Ct. at 201.
Accord: City of Kaukauna, Wis. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 581 F.2d 993, 997 (1978) (approached agency interpretation with deference but finally rejected it); New England Power v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 187 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 270, 571 F.2d 1213, 1219 (1977); Appalachian Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 109 n.67, 529 F.2d 342, 351 n.67, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 58, 50 L.Ed.2d 76 (1976). In the instant case, even if one were somewhat persuaded by petitioners’ arguments, there is no question that the Commission’s finding is “amply supported.”
c
The Commission held hearings before it concluded that the surcharges-proposed by Public Service, Pennsylvania Electric and Metropolitan Edison are retroactive rate increases. No such hearings were held involving Appalachian Power. Instead, relying on its decision in Public Service No. 790 the Commission “summarily disallow[ed] the proposed fuel surcharge..” Appalachian Power contends that even if the Commission is correct with respect to the other petitioners, rejection of Appalachian Power’s surcharges without a hearing was error. We agree.
The Commission may reach decisions without holding evidentiary hearings only when there are no material facts in dispute. Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 232, 414 F.2d 1125, 1128 (1969); Independent Bankers Association of Georgia v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 292, 516 F.2d 1206, 1220 (1975). On this record, material facts are in dispute and Appalachian Power’s formula as drafted does not determine the issue.
The central factual issue is whether the two superseded fuel adjustment clauses used by Appalachian Power were cost of service tariffs with deferred billing or fixed rate tariffs. Our decision that the clauses used by the other petitioners were fixed rate tariffs is based primarily on two facts. First, the formulas mismatched the costs from an earlier month with the power consumption in the billing month. Second, petitioners’ billing was not deferred. In Appalachian Power’s case these facts are not established in the record.
1. Mismatch. The fuel adjustment clauses that were used by Public Service, Pennsylvania Electric and Metropolitan Edison plainly applied the fuel adjustment factor (which was based on fuel costs in a prior month) “to all kilowatt-hours supplied during the billing month.” Thus there was a mismatch of costs from one month with fuel usage in a later month.
The record does not conclusively establish that Appalachian Power’s superseded fuel adjustment clauses prescribed such a mismatch. For example, the clause in Appalachian Power’s filed rates for its wholesale customers provided that if the cost of fuel exceeded the base cost, then “an additional charge... equal to the product of the actual kiloWatt-hours used and a fuel clause adjustment factor... shall be made....” Appalachian Power acknowledges that the fuel adjustment factor was based on the costs in the second preceding month. Its fuel adjustment factor, therefore, was essentially the same as that used by the other petitioners. But while the fuel adjustment factor was similar, the fuel consumption that this factor was applied to may have been different. Appalachian Power’s clause (see Appendix of 195 U.S.App.D.C., 963 of 600 F.2d) provides that the factor should be applied to “the actual kiloWatt-hours used,” but the clause does not indicate which month’s “actual kiloWatt-hours” is intended. Perhaps the factor was applied to the kilowatt-hours consumed in the billing month, just as in the clauses used by the other petitioners. But it is also possible that the factor was applied to the kilowatt-hours used in the second preceding month— the same month that was the basis for the fuel adjustment factor. If the latter were true, then the fuel adjustment charge would have accurately recovered the actual cost of service on a deferred basis.
The testimony of Appalachian Power’s witnesses supports its contention that there was no mismatch in Appalachian Power’s fuel adjustment clauses. One witness stated:
The terms of the [superseded] clause reflected, as a practical matter a billing lag; i. e., if fuel cost in one month were above (or below) the base rate level, then this increased fuel cost would be recovered in the rates for the next succeeding month.
Similarly, another Appalachian Power witness indicated that under the superseded fuel adjustment clause the exact difference between the base cost and actual cost of fuel in one month was recovered in a subsequent month.
Since the fuel adjustment clause is ambiguous, and since Appalachian Power’s witnesses support the company’s claim that there was no mismatch in billing under the superseded clauses, we are unable to agree with the Commission that there are no material facts in dispute. At the same time, the testimony provided by Appalachian Power does not establish that there was not a mismatch. On remand, therefore, the Commission should determine the actual billing practice used by Appalachian. If the Commission finds that the fuel adjustment factor was applied to fuel consumption in the billing month, then this would support the Commission’s belief that the clause was a fixed rate tariff. But if the superseded clause was applied in a way that resulted in exact recovery of actual costs (e. g., no mismatch), then this would support the company’s claim that the clause was a cost of service tariff with deferred billing.
2. Immediate billing of fuel adjustment charges. With respect to billing practices, Public Service, Pennsylvania Electric and Metropolitan Edison all started billing customers for fuel adjustment charges in the first month that their superseded clauses were effective. This billing practice is inconsistent with their claim that the fuel adjustment clauses were a method of deferred billing. But since no hearings were held on Appalachian Power’s billing practice, we have no record evidence to review. Thus, as with the mismatch question, this factual issue is still in dispute as to Appalachian.
In summary, it is not certain, on this record, that Appalachian Power’s superseded clauses mismatched costs and consumption. Similarly, there is no evidence as to Appalachian Power’s billing practice. In short, the primary reasons that the other petitioners’ superseded clauses were found to be fixed rate tariffs do not appear on this record to be true as to Appalachian Power. Neither are such reasons disproved. The Commission’s rejection of Appalachian Power’s proposed surcharges based solely on the Commission’s holding with respect to the other petitioners, therefore, was erroneous. There is still a dispute as to whether Appalachian Power’s superseded clauses were fixed rate tariffs. A remand on that question is therefore necessary.
IV
Thus far, we have determined that the superseded clauses were fixed rate tariffs, and therefore that the proposed surcharges are retroactive rate increases. The second major issue to be resolved is whether this finding absolutely precludes approval of the surcharges. The Commission held that it does, relying on the rule against retroactive ratemaking. The First Circuit, however, suggests that the rule need not be strictly applied, and that in some cases retroactive ratemaking is permissible. Since we disagree with the decision of the First Circuit, and since the rule against retroactive rate-making was barely mentioned in the opinions by the Third and Fourth Circuits we will address this issue.
A
This court stated in Nader v. Federal Communications Commission, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 21, 520 F.2d 182, 202 (1975) that “[i]t is... a cardinal principle of rate-making that a utility may not set rates to recoup past losses, nor may the Commission prescribe rates on that principle.” Though this rule is applied in a variety of settings, it is most prominent in ratemaking under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (1977) and the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1977).
[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1977). If the Commission finds that existing rates are unreasonable, then it may establish reasonable rates “to be thereafter observed and in force..” 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (emphasis added). The provisions of the Natural Gas Act are “virtually identical.” As a result of the similarity in the two Acts, cases applying the rule against retroactive ratemaking to ratemaking under one Act have been viewed as authority for applying the rule to ratemaking under the other Act as well. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 342, 502 F.2d 336, 344 n.2 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946, 95 S.Ct. 1326, 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975).
Perhaps the leading case dealing with ratemaking under the Federal Power Act is Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Services Co., 341 U.S. 246, 254, 71 S.Ct. 692, 696, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951). Therein, the court cited the legislative history of the Act for the proposition that “Congress withheld from the Commission power to grant reparations.” Justice Frankfurter’s dissent (on other grounds) elaborated on this same point:
Despite the unqualified statutory declaration that unreasonable rates are unlawful, we think it clear that Congress did not intend either court or Commission to have the power to award reparations on the ground that a properly filed rate or charge has in fact been unreasonably high or low.
341 U.S. at 258, 71 S.Ct. at 698. Similarly, in Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355, 76 S.Ct. 368, 372, 100 L.Ed. 388 (1956), the court stated:
while it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.
Finally, this Circuit stated in Indiana & Michigan, supra, that the “Supreme Court has interpreted [the Federal Power Act] as precluding the Commission from ordering refunds, even when it determines that the rates in effect are unjust and unreasonable.” 162 U.S.App.D.C. at 343, 502 F.2d at 345.
The rule against retroactive rate-making is forcefully stated in cases involving the Natural Gas Act. The Supreme Court wrote in Federal Power Commission v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U.S. 145, 152-53, 83 S.Ct. 211, 215, 9 L.Ed.2d 199 (1962):
[A] rate for one class or zone of customers may be found by the Commission to be too low, but the company cannot recoup its losses by making retroactive the higher rate subsequently allowed... The company having initially filed the rates and.. failed to collect a sufficient one must, under the theory of the Act, shoulder the hazards incident to its action including... its losses where its filed rate is found to be inadequate.
Accord: Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 389, 79 S.Ct. 1246, 3 L.Ed.2d 1312 (1959), Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 618, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944), Gillring Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 566 F.2d 1323, 1325 (5th Cir. 1978), and State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas v. Federal Power Comm’n, 215 F.2d 176, 184 (8th Cir. 1954). In summary, cases under both the Federal Power Act (which applies here) and the Natural Gas Act establish the principle that only prospective ratemaking is allowed. A rate designed to recoup past losses is retroactive and illegal.
B
Basically, petitioners do not contest the validity of the rule against retroactive rate-making. The force of their argument is, as Appalachian Power stated, that the “proposed surcharge is not a reparations award.” But to a certain extent, petitioners pick up on the theme enunciated in the First Circuit’s Maine Public Service opinion: that the “Commission has more latitude in shaping a lawful rate than it has recognized.”
The First Circuit’s reasoning appears to be that while retroactive ratemaking is generally forbidden, in light of the unique circumstances involved in fuel adjustment clause cases, the rule should not be applied inflexibly. Judge Campbell explained:
the validity of the surcharge presents a unique policy question for the Commission rather than a black or white legal issue. The surcharge falls somewhere between a species of the forbidden “retroactive rate-making” and an acceptable adaptation of the earlier fuel clause to special conditions..
The difficulty in classification stems not only from the inflationary rise in fuel costs that triggered the problem, but from the fact that fuel cost adjustment clauses are themselves unique animals that are not easily assimilated to classical rate-making principles. We believe that the Commission erred insofar as it regarded itself as automatically precluded by prior judicial decision such as Montana-Dakota or Hope Natural Gas from approving the surcharge.
579 F.2d at 668. Thus, the First Circuit held that the Commission erred when it rejected the surcharge proposal solely on the basis of the rule against retroactive ratemaking. In so ruling the Court stated that the Commission should have paid more attention to whether the surcharge was “just and reasonable,” and it ordered a remand on the reasonableness issue.
The First Circuit offered four reasons for its conclusion that the rule against retroactive ratemaking was not controlling in cases involving fuel adjustment clauses. First, “fuel cost adjustment clauses are. unique animals” designed “ ‘to make utilities whole,’ and the surcharge can now be defended as simply implementing the same policy.” Second, a Commission regulation permits “deviation from the prescribed operation of fuel adjustment clauses. for good cause shown....” Third, “the Commission does allow in other circumstances for ‘after the fact matching of actual costs and revenues,’...” Finally, “the Commission.. has permitted a type of refund outside of the ordinary rate-suspension context.” We are not persuaded by any of these arguments.
1. “Unique Animals.” The purpose of fuel adjustment clauses is to

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1