Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 879, bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain transactions with a “party in interest.” 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a). Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” of a plan to bring a civil aetion to obtain “appropriate equitable relief” to redress violations of ERISA Title I. 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3). The question is whether that authorization extends to a suit against a non-fiduciary “party in interest” to a transaction barred by § 406(a). We hold that it does.
I
Responding to deficiencies in prior law regulating transactions by plan fiduciaries, Congress enacted ERISA § 406(a)(1), which supplements the fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty to the plan’s beneficiaries, § 404(a), by categorically barring certain transactions deemed “likely to injure the pension plan,” Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 160 (1993). Section 406(a)(1) provides, among other things, that “[a] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect... sale or exchange... of any property between the plan and a party in interest.” 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1)(A). Congress defined “party in interest” to encompass those entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan’s beneficiaries. See § 3(14), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(14). Section 406’s prohibitions are subject to both statutory and regulatory exemptions. See §§ 408(a), (b), 29U.S. C. §§ 1108(a), (b).
This ease comes to us on the assumption that an ERISA pension plan (the Ameriteeh Pension Trust (APT)) and a party in interest (respondent Salomon Smith Barney (Salo-mon)) entered into a transaction prohibited by § 406(a) and not exempted by § 408. APT provides pension benefits to employees and retirees of Ameriteeh Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Salomon, during the late 1980’s, provided broker-dealer services to APT, executing nondis-cretionary equity trades at the direction of APT’s fiduciaries, thus qualifying itself (we assume) as a “party in interest.” See §3(14)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(14)(B) (defining “party in interest” as “a person providing services to [an employee benefit] plan”). During the same period, Salomon sold interests in several motel properties to APT for nearly $21 million. APT’s purchase of the motel interests was directed by National Investment Services of America (NISA), an investment manager to which Ameriteeh had delegated investment discretion over a portion of the plan’s assets, and hence a fiduciary of APT, see §3(21)(A)(i), 29 U. S. C. § lG02(21)(A)(i).
This litigation arose when APT’s fiduciaries — its trustee, petitioner Harris Trust and Savings Bank, and its administrator, petitioner Ameriteeh Corporation — discovered that the motel interests were nearly worthless. Petitioners maintain that the interests had been worthless all along; Salomon asserts, to the contrary, that the interests declined in value due to a downturn in the motel industry. Whatever the true cause, petitioners sued Salomon in 1992 under § 502(a)(3), which authorizes a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” to bring a civil action “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I]... or... to obtain other appropriate equitable relief... to redress such violations.” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3).
Petitioners claimed, among other things, that NISA, as plan fiduciary, had caused the plan to engage in a per se prohibited transaction under § 406(a) in purchasing the motel interests from Salomon, and that Salomon was liable on account of its participation in the transaction as a nonfiduei-ary party in interest. Specifically, petitioners pointed to § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1)(A), which prohibits a “sale or exchange... of any property between the plan and a party in interest,” and § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1)(D), whieh prohibits a “transfer to... a party in interest... of any assets of the plan.” Petitioners sought rescission of the transaction, restitution from Salomon of the purchase price with interest, and disgorgement of Salomon’s profits made from use of the plan assets transferred to it. App. 41.
Salomon moved for summary judgment, arguing that § 502(a)(3), when used to remedy a transaction prohibited by § 406(a), authorizes a suit only against the party expressly constrained by § 406(a) — the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the transaction — and not against the counterparty to the transaction. See § 406(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1) (“A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction...” (emphasis added)). The District Court denied the motion, holding that ERISA does provide a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction, but granted Salomon’s subsequent motion for certification of the issue for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 184 F. 3d 646 (1999). It began with the observation that § 406(a), by its terms and like several of its neighboring provisions, e.g., §404, governs only the conduct of fiduciaries, not of counterparties or other nonfiduciaries. See id., at 650. The court next posited that “where ERISA does not expressly impose a duty, there can be no cause of action,” ibid., relying upon dictum in our decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 254 (1993), that § 502(a)(3) does not provide a private cause of action against a nonfiduciary for knowing participation in a fiduciary’s breach of duty. The Seventh Circuit saw no distinction between the Mertens situation (involving §404) and the instant case (involving §406), explaining that neither section expressly imposes a duty on nonfidueiaries. Finally, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, Congress’ decision to authorize the Secretary of Labor to impose a civil penalty on a nonfiduciary “party in interest” to a § 406 transaction, see § 502(i), simply confirms that Congress deliberately selected one enforcement tool (a civil penalty imposed by the Secretary) instead of another (a civil action under § 502(a)(3)). Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that a nonfiduciary cannot be liable under § 502(a)(3) for participating in a §406 transaction and entered summary judgment in favor of Salomon.
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit departed from the uniform position of the Courts of Appeals that § 502(a)(3) — and the similarly worded § 502(a)(5), which authorizes civil actions by the Secretary — does authorize a civil action against a non-fiduciary who participates in a transaction prohibited by § 406(a)(1). See LeBlanc v. Cahill, 153 F. 3d 134, 152-153 (CA4 1998) (§ 502(a)(3)); Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F. 3d 726, 734 (CA9 1995) (same); Herman v. South Carolina National Bank, 140 F. 3d 1413, 1421-1422 (CA11 1998) (§ 502(a)(5)), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1140 (1999); Reich v. Stangl, 73 F. 3d 1027, 1032 (CA10) (same), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 807 (1996); Reich v. Compton, 57 F. 3d 270, 287 (CA3 1995) (same). We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1068 (2000), and now reverse.
H-4
We agree with the Seventh Circuit’s and Salomon’s interpretation of § 406(a). They rightly note that § 406(a) imposes a duty only on the fiduciary that causes the plan to engage in the transaction. See § 406(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1) ("A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction...” (emphasis added)). We reject, however, the Seventh Circuit’s and Salomon’s conclusion that, absent a substantive provision of ERISA expressly imposing a duty upon a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfidueiary party may not be held liable under § 502(a)(3), one of ERISA’s remedial provisions. Petitioners contend, and we agree, that § 502(a)(3) itself imposes certain duties, and therefore that liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA’s substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued.
Section 502 provides:
“(a)...
"A civil action may be brought—
“(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3).
This language, to be sure, “does not... authorize ‘appropriate equitable relief’ at large, but only ‘appropriate equitable relief’ for the purpose of ‘redressing any] violations or... enforcing] any provisions’ of ERISA or an ERISA plan.” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U. S. 349, 353 (1996) (quoting Mertens, supra, at 253 (emphasis and alterations in original)). But § 502(a)(3) admits of no limit (aside from the “appropriate equitable relief” caveat, which we address infra) on the universe of possible defendants. Indeed, § 502(a)(3) makes no mention at all of which parties may be proper defendants — the focus, instead, is on redressing the “act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I].” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). Other provisions of ERISA, by contrast, do expressly address who may be a defendant. See, e.g., § 409(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a) (stating that “[a]wy person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subehapter shall be personally liable” (emphasis added)); § 502(Z), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(Z) (authorizing imposition of civil penalties only against a “fiduciary” who violates part 4 of Title I or “any other person” who knowingly participates in such a violation). And § 502(a) itself demonstrates Congress’ care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions. See, e. g., § 502(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3) (“A civil action may be brought... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary...” (emphasis added)); § 502(a)(5), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(5) (“A civil action may be brought... by the Secretary...” (emphasis added)).
In light of Congress’ precision in these respects, we would ordinarily assume that Congress’ failure to specify proper defendants in § 502(a)(3) was intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983). But ERISA’s “‘comprehensive and reticulated’” scheme warrants a cautious approach to inferring remedies not expressly authorized by the text, Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 146 (1985) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359,361 (1980)), especially given the alternative and intuitively appealing interpretation, urged by Salomon, that § 502(a)(3) authorizes suits only against defendants upon whom a duty is imposed by ERISA’s substantive provisions. In this case, however, § 502(2) resolves the matter — it compels the conclusion that defendant status under § 502(a)(3) may arise from duties imposed by § 502(a)(3) itself, and hence does not turn on whether the defendant is expressly subject to a duty under one of ERISA’s substantive provisions.
Section 502(Z) provides in relevant part:
“(1) In the case of—
“(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4 of this subtitle by a fiduciary, or
“(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other person,
“the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery amount.
“(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ‘applicable recovery amount’ means any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect to a breach or violation described in paragraph (1)—
“(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
“(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the_ Secretary under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.” 29 U.S. C. §§ 1132(Z)(1) — (2).
Section 502(Z) contemplates civil penalty actions by the Secretary against two classes of defendants, fiduciaries and “other person[s].” The latter class concerns us here. Paraphrasing, the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against an “other person” who “knowing[ly] participates] in” “any... violation of... part 4... by a fiduciary.” And the amount of such penalty is defined by reference to the amount “ordered by a court to be paid by such... other person to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5).” Ibid, (emphasis added).
The plain implication is that the Secretary may bring a civil action under § 502(a)(5) against an “other person” who “knowing[ly] participates]” in a fiduciary’s violation; otherwise, there could be no “applicable recovery amount” from which to determine the amount of the civil penalty to be imposed on the “other person.” This § 502(a)(5) action is available notwithstanding the absence of any ERISA provision explicitly imposing a duty upon an “other person” not to engage in such “knowing participation.” And if the Secretary may bring suit against an “other person” under subsection (a)(5), it follows that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit against an “other person” under the similarly worded subsection (a)(3). See Mertens, 508 U. S., at 260. Section 502©, therefore, refutes the notion that § 502(a)(3) (or (a)(5)) liability hinges on whether the particular defendant labors under a duty expressly imposed by the substantive provisions of ERISA Title I.
Salomon invokes Mertens as articulating an alternative, more restrictive reading of § 502© that does not support the inference we have drawn. In Mertens, we suggested, in dictum, that the “other person[s]” in § 502© might be limited to the “eofidueiaries” made expressly liable under § 405(a) for knowingly participating in another fiduciary’s breach of fiduciary responsibility. Id., at 261. So read, § 502© would be consistent with the view that liability under § 502(a)(3) depends entirely on whether the particular defendant violated a duty expressly imposed by the substantive provisions of ERISA Title I. But the Mertens dictum did not discuss— understandably, since we were merely flagging the issue, see 508 U. S., at 255, 260-261 — that ERISA defines the term “person” without regard to status as a cofidueiary (or, for that matter, as a fiduciary or party in interest), see § 3(9), 29 U. S. C. §1002(9). Moreover, § 405(a) indicates that a eofi-duciary is itself a fiduciary, see § 405(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1105(a) (“[A] fiduciary... shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary...”), and § 502© clearly distinguishes between a “fiduciary,” § 502©(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1132©(1)(A), and an “other person,” §502©(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §1132©(1)(B).
Ill
Notwithstanding the text of § 502(a)(3) (as informed by § 502©), Salomon protests that it would contravene common sense for Congress to have imposed civil liability on a party, such as a nonfidueiary party in interest to a § 406(a) transaction, that is not a “wrongdoer” in the sense of violating a duty expressly imposed by the substantive provisions of ERISA Title I. Salomon raises the specter of § 502(a)(3) suits being brought against innocent parties — even those having no connection to the allegedly unlawful “act or practice” — rather than against the true wrongdoer, i. e., the fiduciary that caused the plan to engage in the transaction.
But this reductio ad absurdum ignores the limiting principle explicit in § 502(a)(3): that the retrospective relief sought be “appropriate equitable relief.” The common law of trusts, which offers a “starting point for analysis [of ERISA]... [unless] it is inconsistent with the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes,” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 447 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), plainly countenances the sort of relief sought by petitioners against Salomon here. As petitioners and amicus curiae the United States observe, it has long been settled that when a trustee in breach of his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries transfers trust property to a third person, the third person takes the property subject to the trust, unless he has purchased the property for value and without notice of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. The trustee or beneficiaries may then maintain an action for restitution of the property (if not already disposed of) or disgorgement of proceeds (if already disposed of), and disgorgement of the third person’s profits derived therefrom. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§284, 291, 294, 295, 297 (1957); 4 A. Scott & W. Frateher, Law of Trusts §284, §291.1, pp. 77-78, §294.2, p. 101, §297 (4th ed. 1989) (hereinafter Law of Trusts); 5 id., §470, at 363; 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §4.7(1), pp. 660-661 (2d ed. 1993); G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §866, pp. 95-96 (rev. 2d ed. 1995). As we long ago explained in the analogous situation of property obtained by fraud:
“Whenever the legal title to property is obtained through means or under circumstances ‘which render it uneonseientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity impresses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in favor of the one who is truly and equitably entitled to the same, although he may never, perhaps, have had any legal estate therein; and a court of equity has jurisdiction to reach the property either in the hands of the original wrongdoer, or in the hands of any subsequent holder, until a purchaser of it in good faith and without notice acquires a higher right and takes the property relieved from the trust.’ ” Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122,128 (1889) (quoting 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1053, pp. 628-629 (1886)).
Importantly, that a transferee was not “the original wrongdoer” does not insulate him from liability for restitution. See also, e. g., Restatement of Restitution ch. 7, Introductory Note, p. 522 (1937); 1 Dobbs, supra, §4.3(2), at 597 (“The constructive trust is based on property, not wrongs”). It also bears emphasis that the common law of trusts sets limits on restitution actions against defendants other than the principal “wrongdoer.” Only a transferee of ill-gotten trust assets may be held liable, and then only when the transferee (assuming he has purchased for value) knew or should have known of the existence of the trust and the circumstances that rendered the transfer in breach of the trust. Translated to the instant context, the transferee must be demonstrated to have had actual or constructive knowledge of the circumstances that rendered the transaction unlawful. Those circumstances, in turn, involve a showing that the plan fiduciary, with actual or constructive knowledge of

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 置