Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions under the federal labor laws: first, whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has exclusive jurisdiction over a union member’s claims that his union both breached its duty of fair representation and violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. §401 et seq. (1982 ed.), by discriminating against him in job referrals made by the union hiring hall; and second, whether the union’s alleged refusal to refer him to employment through the hiring hall as a result of his political opposition to the union’s leadership gives rise to a claim under §§ 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U. S. C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529 (1982 ed.). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that petitioner’s suit fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and that petitioner had failed to state a claim under the LMRDA. 849 F. 2d 997 (1988) (per curiam). We reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision as to jurisdiction, but we affirm its holding that petitioner did not state a claim under LMRDA §§ 101(a)(5) and 609.
HH
Petitioner Lynn L. Breininger was at all relevant times a member of respondent, Local Union No. 6 of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association. Pursuant to a multi-employer collective-bargaining agreement, respondent operates a hiring hall through which it refers both members and nonmembers of the union for construction work. Respondent maintains an outTof-work list of individuals who wish to be referred to jobs. When an employer contacts respondent for workers, he may request certain persons by name. If he does not, the union begins at the top of the list and attempts to telephone in order each worker listed until it has satisfied the employer’s request. The hiring hall is not the exclusive source of employment for sheet metal workers; they are free to seek employment through other mechanisms, and employers are not restricted to hiring only those persons recommended by the union. Respondent also maintains a job referral list under the Specialty Agreement, a separate collective-bargaining agreement negotiated to cover work on siding, decking, and metal buildings.
Petitioner alleges that respondent refused to honor specific employer requests for his services and passed him over in making job referrals. He also contends that respondent refused to process his internal union grievances regarding these matters. Petitioner’s first amended complaint contained two counts. First, he asserted a violation of the duty of fair representation, contending that respondent, “in its representation of [petitioner], has acted arbitrarily, discriminator ily, and/or in bad faith and/or without reason or cause.” First Amended Complaint ¶ 13. Second, petitioner alleged that his union, “in making job referrals,... has favored a faction of members... who have been known to support... the present business manager,” as “part of widespread, improper discipline for political opposition in violation of 29 U. S. C. [§411(a)(5)] and 29 U. S. C. §529.” Id., ¶17. Respondent, in other words, “acting by and through its present business manager... and its present business agent [has] ‘otherwise disciplined’” petitioner within the meaning of LMRDA §§ 101(a)(5) and 609. Id., ¶ 16.
The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit because “discrimination in hiring hall referrals constitutes an unfair labor practice,” and “[t]he NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination in hiring hall referrals.” No. C 83-1126 (ND Ohio, Feb. 20, 1987), p. 6, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. A9. The District Court determined that adjudieatingpetitioner’s claims “would involve interfe[r]ing with the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id., at 7, App. to Pet. for Cert. A10.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. With respect to the fair representation claim, the court noted that “[c]ircuit courts have consistently held that... fair representation claims must be brought before the Board” and that “if the employee fails to affirmatively allege that his employer breached the collective bargaining agreement, which [petitioner] failed to do in the case at bar, he cannot prevail.” 849 F. 2d, at 999 (emphasis in original). In regard to the LMRDA count, the Court of Appeals found that “[discrimination in the referral system, because it does not breach the employee’s union membership rights, does not constitute ‘discipline’ within the meaning of LMRDA” and that “[hjiring hall referrals are not a function of union membership since referrals are available to nonmembers as well as members.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 489 U. S. 1009 (1989).
II
A
We have long recognized that a labor organization has a statutory duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)/ 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1982 ed.), “to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 177 (1967); see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 203 (1944). In Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N. L. R. B. 181 (1962), enf. denied, 326 F. 2d 172 (CA2 1963), the NLRB determined that violations of the duty of fair representation might also be unfair labor practices under §8(b) of the NLRA, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b) (1982 ed.). The Board held that the right of employees under § 7 of the NLRA, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from such activities, “is a statutory limitation on statutory bargaining representatives, and... that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory representative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.” 140 N. L. R. B., at 185. In addition, the Board reasoned that “a statutory bargaining representative and an employer also respectively violate Section 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) when, for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to derogate the employment status of an employee.” Id., at 186. While petitioner alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation, his claim might relate to conduct that under Miranda Fuel also constitutes an unfair labor practice. And, as a general matter, neither state nor federal courts possess jurisdiction over claims based on activity that is “arguably” subject to §§7 or 8 of the NLRA. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245 (1959).
Nevertheless, the District Court was not deprived of jurisdiction. In Vaca v. Sipes, supra, we held that Garmon's, pre-emption rule does not extend to suits alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation. Our decision in Vaca was premised on several factors. First, we noted that courts developed and elaborated the duty of fair representation before the Board even acquired statutory jurisdiction over union activities. Indeed, fair representation claims often involve matters “not normally within the Board’s unfair labor practice jurisdiction,” 386 U. S., at 181, which is typically aimed at “effectuating the policies of the federal labor laws, not [redressing] the wrong done the individual employee,” id., at 182, n. 8. We therefore doubted whether “the Board brings substantially greater expertise to bear on these problems than do the courts.” Id., at 181. Another consideration in Vaca for finding the fair representation claim judicially cognizable was the NLRB General Counsel’s unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute unfair labor practice proceedings. “[T]he General Counsel will refuse to bring complaints on behalf of injured employees when the injury complained of is ‘insubstantial.’” Id., at 183, n. 8. The right of the individual employee to be made whole is “[o]f paramount importance,” Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U. S. 212, 222 (1983), and “[t]he existence of even a small group of cases in which the Board would be unwilling or unable to remedy a union’s breach of duty would frustrate the basic purposes underlying the duty of fair representation doctrine,” Vaca, supra, at 182-183. Consequently, we were unwilling to assume that Congress intended to deny employees their traditional fair representation remedies when it enacted § 8(b) as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). As Justice White described Vaca v. Sipes last Term in Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U. S. 527, 535 (1989):
“As we understood our inquiry, it was whether Congress, in enacting § 8(b) in 1947, had intended to oust the courts of their role enforcing the duty of fair representation implied under the NLRA. We held that the ‘tardy assumption’ of jurisdiction by the NLRB was insufficient reason to abandon our prior cases, such as Syres [v. Oil Workers, 350 U. S. 892 (1955)].”
That a breach of the duty of fair representation might also be an unfair labor practice is thus not enough to deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over the fair representation claim. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 743 (1988).
We decline to create an exception to the Vaca rule for fair representation complaints arising out of the operation of union hiring halls. Although the Board has had numerous opportunities to apply the NLRA to hiring hall policies, we reject the notion that the NLRB ought to possess exclusive jurisdiction over fair representation complaints in the hiring hall context because it has had experience with hiring halls in the past. As an initial matter, we have never suggested that the Vaca rule contains exceptions based on the subject matter of the fair representation claim presented, the relative expertise of the NLRB in the particular area of labor law involved, or any other factor. We are unwilling to begin the process of carving out exceptions now, especially since we see no limiting principle to such an approach. Most fair representation cases require great sensitivity to the tradeoffs between the interests of the bargaining unit as a whole and the rights of individuals. Furthermore, we have never indicated that NLRB “experience” or “expertise” deprives a court of jurisdiction over a fair representation claim. The Board has developed an unfair labor practice jurisprudence in many areas traditionally encompassed by the duty of fair representation. The Board, for example, repeatedly has applied the Miranda Fuel doctrine in cases involving racial discrimination. See International Brotherhood of Painters, Local 1066 (W. J. Siebenoller, Jr., Paint Co.), 205 N. L. R. B. 651, 652 (1973); Houston Maritime Assn., Inc. (Longshoremen Local 1351), 168 N. L. R. B. 615, 616-617 (1967), enf. denied, 426 F. 2d 584 (CA5 1970); Cargo Handlers, Inc. (Longshoremen Local 1191), 159 N. L. R. B. 321, 322-327 (1966); United Rubber Workers, Local No. 12 (Business League of Gadsden), 150 N. L. R. B. 312, 314-315 (1964), enf’d, 368 F. 2d 12 (CA5 1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 837 (1967); Automobile Workers, Local J)53 (Maremont Corp.), 149 N. L. R. B. 482, 483-484 (1964); Longshoremen, Local 1367 (Galveston Maritime Assn., Inc.), 148 N. L. R. B. 897, 897-900 (1964), enf’d, 368 F. 2d 1010 (CA5 1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 837 (1967); Independent Metal Workers, Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N. L. R. B. 1573, 1574 (1964); see also Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N. L. R. B. 447, 455-456 (1977). In addition, the Board has found gender discrimination by unions to be an unfair labor practice. See Wolf Trap Foundation for the Performing Arts, 287 N. L. R. B. 1040 (1988), 127 LRRM 1129, 1130 (1988); Olympic S. S. Co., 233 N. L. R. B. 1178, 1189 (1977); Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., Local 106 (Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 210 N. L. R. B. 943, 943-944 (1974), enf’d, 520 F. 2d 693 (CA6 1975); Pacific Maritime Assn. (Longshoremen and Warehousemen, Local 52), 209 N. L. R. B. 519, 519-520 (1974) (Member Jenkins, concurring). In short, “[a] cursory review of Board volumes following Miranda Fuel discloses numerous cases in which the Board has found the duty of fair representation breached where the union’s conduct was motivated by an employee’s lack of union membership, strifes resulting from intraunion politics, and racial or gender considerations.” United States Postal Service, 272 N. L. R. B. 93, 104 (1984). Adopting a rule that NLRB expertise bars federal jurisdiction would remove an unacceptably large number of fair representation claims from federal courts.
Respondent calls to our attention language in some of our decisions recognizing that “[t]he problems inherent in the operation of union hiring halls are difficult and complex, and point up the importance of limiting initial competence to adjudicate such matters to a single expert federal agency.” Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 695 (1963) (citation omitted). For this reason, respondent contends that “[wjhether a hiring hall practice is discriminatory and therefore violative of federal law is a determination Congress has entrusted to the Board.” Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290, 303, n. 12 (1977). The cases cited by respondent, however, focus not on whether unions have administered properly out-of-work lists as required by their duty of fair representation, but rather on whether exclusive hiring halls have encouraged union membership im-permissibly as forbidden by § 8(b). Such exclusive arrangements are not illegal per se under federal labor law, but rather are illegal only if they in fact result in discrimination prohibited by the NLRA. See Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 673-677 (1961); see also Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U. S. 645, 664-665 (1982). We have found state law pre-empted on the ground that “Board approval of various hiring hall practices would be meaningless if state courts could declare those procedures violative of the contractual rights implicit between a member and his union.” Farmer, supra, at 300, n. 9. These state-law claims frequently involve tort, contract, and other substantive areas of law that have developed quite independently of federal labor law. Cf. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U. S. 399, 403-406 (1988); Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U. S. 851, 855-859 (1987); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, 211 (1985); Teamsters v. Lacas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 103-104 (1962).
The duty of fair representation is different. It has “judicially evolved,” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 301 (1971), as part of federal labor law — predating the prohibition against unfair labor practices by unions in the 1947 LMRA. It is an essential means of enforcing fully the important principle that “no individual union member may suffer invidious, hostile treatment at the hands of the majority of his coworkers.” Ibid.; see also United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 63 (1981) (“[T]he unfair representation claim made by an employee against his union... is more a creature of ‘labor law’ as it has developed... than it is of general contract law”). The duty of fair representation, unlike state tort and contract law, is part of federal labor policy. Our “refusal to limit judicial competence to rectify a breach of the duty of fair representation rests upon our judgment that such actions cannot, in the vast majority of situations where they occur, give rise to actual conflict with the operative realities of federal labor policy.” Lockridge, supra, at 301; see also Vaca, 386 U. S., at 180-181 (“A primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine — the need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the desirability of leaving the development of such rules to the administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose — is not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the union’s duty of fair representation”). We therefore decline to interpret the state-law pre-emption cases as establishing a principle that hiring halls are somehow so different from other union activities that fair representation claims are not cognizable outside of the NLRB.
The Court of Appeals below also held that if an employee fails to allege that his employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement, then he cannot prevail in a fair representation suit against his union. See 849 F. 2d, at 999. This is a misstatement of existing law. In Vaca, we identified an “intensely practical consideration],” 386 U. S., at 183, of having the same entity adjudicate a joint claim against both the employer and the union when a wrongfully discharged employee who has not obtained relief through any exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the collective-bargaining agreement brings a breach-of-contract action against the employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a) (1982 ed.). We noted that where the union has control of the grievance and arbitration system, the employee-plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his contractual remedies may be excused if the union has wrongfully refused to process his claim and thus breached its duty of fair representation. See Vaca, 386 U. S., at 185-186. “[T]he wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union as a bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee’s grievance.” Id., at 186.
Our reasoning in Vaca in no way implies, however, that a fair representation action requires a concomitant claim against an employer for breach of contract. Indeed, the earliest fair representation suits involved claims against unions for breach of the duty in negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement, a context in which no breach-of-contract action against an employer is possible. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944). Even after a collective-bargaining agreement has been signed, we have never required a fair representation plaintiff to allege that his employer breached the agreement in order to prevail. See, e. g., Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S., at 743; Czosek v. O’Mara, 397 U. S. 25, 29 (1970). “[A]n action seeking damages for injury inflicted by a breach of a union’s duty of fair representation [is] judicially cognizable in any event, that is, even if the conduct complained of [is] arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and whether or not the lawsuit [is] bottomed on a collective agreement.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra, at 299 (emphasis added).
Respondent argues that the concern in Vaca that suits against the employer and union be heard together in the same forum is applicable to the hiring hall situation, because any action by petitioner against an employer would be premised not on § 301 but rather on the contention that the employer had knowledge of the union conduct violating § 8(b)(1)(A) and acted on that knowledge in making an employment decision. The employer would thereby violate NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), see Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U. S. 248, 255-256 (1944), and be held jointly and severally liable with the union, but only in a suit before the Board. In the hiring hall environment, permitting courts to hear fair representation claims against the union would create the danger of bifurcated proceedings-before a court and the NLRB. The absence of a §301 claim, according to respondent, requires that we hold that the NLRB possesses exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner’s fair representation suit.
This argument misinterprets our reasoning in Vaca. Because a plaintiff must as a matter of logic prevail on his unfair representation allegation against the union in order to excuse his failure to exhaust contractual remedies before he can litigate the merits of his § 301 claim against his employer, we found it “obvious that the courts will be compelled to pass upon whether there has been a breach of the duty of fair representation in the context of many §301 breach-of-contract actions.” 386 U. S., at 187. Moreover, because the union’s breach may have enhanced or contributed to the employee’s injury, permitting fair representation suits to be heard in court facilitates the fashioning of a remedy. Ibid. We concluded that it made little sense to prevent courts from adjudicating fair representation claims.
The situation in the instant case is entirely different. In the hiring hall context, the Board may bring a claim alleging a violation of §

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 時