Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy began in 1931, when respondent’s predecessors as receivers of the Georgia & Florida Railroad filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for a reexamination of rates then applicable to it for transporting the mails. Since then, in one form or another, the dispute has found its way back and forth through the Commission and the courts, finally to come here now for the second time. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226.
Through all these years the carrier and the Commission have been at odds over whether the railroad is entitled to an increase in the rates prescribed for its service for the period beginning April 1, 1931, and ending, as covered by the present suit, February 28, 1938. The case is now here on certiorari to the Court of Claims, 335 U. S. 883, which has rendered a judgment awarding respondent $186,707.06 as increased compensation due for the years 1931 to 1938, Griffin v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 330, contrary to the findings and orders of the Commission denying any increase beyond the amounts already paid for that service under the rates fixed by it. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 192 I. C. C. 779; id., 214 I. C. C. 66.
I.
A statement of the background and course of the litigation will aid in understanding the rather complicated problems presented, both on the merits and affecting jurisdiction.
In 1916 Congress enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act. 39 U. S. C. §§ 523-568. This embodied a comprehensive scheme for regulating transportation of the mails by railroad common carriers. Such carriers were required to transport the mails pursuant to the Act’s provisions. These included that the carriers should be compensated at “fair and reasonable rates” to be fixed and determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rates were to be established only after notice and hearing. But after six months from the entry of a rate order the Postmaster General or a carrier was authorized to apply for a reexamination of the order. 39 U. S. C. §§ 541, 542, 544-554.
The Commission was authorized to prescribe “the method or methods by weight, or space, or both, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rate,” 39 U. S. C. § 542, and for the same purpose “to make such classification of carriers as may be just and reasonable and, where just and equitable, fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.” 39 U. S. C. § 549. Other sections specify and define four classes of service, namely, full railway post-office car service, apartment service, storage-car service and closed-pouch service. 39 U. S. C. §§ 525-530. Only apartment service and closed-pouch service are involved in this case.
On December 23, 1919, after extended investigation and hearings, the Commission entered its first general mail rate order. Railway-Mail Pay, 56 I. C. C. 1. This adopted the space basis for determining “fair and reasonable rates.” On July 10, 1928, in proceedings for reexamination the Commission granted a general increase of 15% over the preexisting rates. Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675. The Georgia & Florida Railroad accepted these general rates until April 1, 1931.
At that time it applied to the Commission for a reexamination of the rates as applied to itself. The application was heard and determined by Division 5. On May 10,1933, the Commission denied any increase, holding the general rates established by the order of July 10, 1928, fair and reasonable as applied to this carrier. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 192 I. C. C. 779. This order is in substance, though not technically, the one now involved.
After the Commission had denied reconsideration, the railroad sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to set aside the Commission’s order. A special three-judge court was convened, cf. the Urgent Deficiencies Act, former 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (28), 47; held the order unlawful; and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. This decree was filed on January 23, 1935.
Thereupon the full Commission conducted further hearings and in a report filed February 4, 1936, again found the rates previously fixed to be fair and reasonable in their application to the Georgia & Florida Railroad. The order therefore denied any increase. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 214 I. C. C. 66.
Again the carrier resorted to the District Court, filing a supplemental bill. And again that court, composed of the same three judges, held the Commission’s order unlawful in a decree filed on February 23, 1937. The Government appealed directly to this Court, which, in United States v. Griffin, supra, held that the order was not of a type reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Accordingly, on February 28, 1938, the District Court’s judgment was reversed with directions to dismiss the bill and without determination of the cause on the merits.
After nearly four years the receivers renewed the litigation by filing this suit in the Court of Claims. The amended petition sets forth in some detail the history of the previous stages of controversy before the Commission and the courts. The carrier’s basic claims on the merits are substantially the same as in those proceedings. They are, in effect, (1) that the Commission’s orders denying any increase are confiscatory, in that the rates prescribed by the general rate order of July 10, 1928, and continued in effect specifically as to this carrier by the orders of May 10, 1933, and February 4, 1936, do not afford just compensation under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that they do not provide for payment of the cost of the service rendered plus a reasonable return upon invested capital allocated to that service; and (2) that the Commission’s orders do not afford the “fair and reasonable” compensation required by the Railway Mail Pay Act. Both claims rest upon attacks made on the Commission’s findings as being unsupported by the evidence before it and on its conclusions as being contrary to that evidence.
To sustain jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, respondent rests upon § 145 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 250, now 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and upon statements made in part Fourth of the opinion in United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. at 238.
II.
Although the Railway Mail Pay Act contains no explicit provision for judicial review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing rates of pay for transporting the mails pursuant to authorizations of the Postmaster General for such service, it had been thought, until the decision in United States v. Griffin, supra, that such orders were of the kind reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. The effect of that decision, however, was to rule out such orders as those now in question from the jurisdiction conferred by the latter Act.
While the “negative order” basis for the Court’s ruling is no longer effective, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, the alternative grounding remains in full force. 303 U. S. at 234. Since the very orders now in issue were involved in the Griffin case, it is settled that the railroad or its receivers had no recourse to a district court, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, for securing review of the Commission’s orders or relief of the type now sought.
The Court in the Griffin case, however, was not content to rest merely with this negative jurisdictional ruling. In part Fourth of the opinion the Court went on to say that its ruling did not “preclude every character of judicial review.” 303 U. S. at 238. The opinion then suggested three possible other methods, two in the Court of Claims and one in the district courts.
Without doubt it was due to these suggestions that respondent’s predecessors chose to bring this suit in the Court of Claims. The language in which the suggestions were made has assumed such importance, in view of the problems raised by the receivers’ choice in following them, that it seems wise here to quote in full what the Court said:
“If the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount which the railroad believes is payable under the finding, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of an action for the balance, as the claim asserted is one founded upon a law of Congress. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 603. Compare United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U. S. 73, affirming 65 Ct. Cl. 115, 121. And since railway mail service is compulsory, the Court of Claims would, under the general provisions of the Tucker Act, have jurisdiction also of an action for additional compensation if an order is confiscatory. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. United States, 253 U. S. 330, 333; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16. Moreover, as district courts have jurisdiction of every suit at law or in equity ‘arising under the postal laws' 28 U. S. C., § 41 (6), suit would lie under their general jurisdiction if the Commission is alleged to have acted in excess of its authority, or otherwise illegally. Compare Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 288, 289.” 303 U. S. at 238.
Respondent and the Court of Claims are at odds over whether the carrier’s claims now asserted fall under the first or the second class of cases of which this Court said the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction. Respondent insists, both in the complaint and in the brief filed here, that his claim is grounded on the basis that the Commission’s orders are confiscatory and have the effect of depriving the carrier of its property and services without just compensation due under the Fifth Amendment.
On the other hand, the Court of Claims expressly disclaims that it was exercising any jurisdiction over constitutional matters. This was done in denying the carrier’s claim to interest on the award. In the court’s view therefore the jurisdiction which it was exerting fell within the first class of cases stated in the Griffin opinion to be within the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, namely, where the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount the carrier believes payable under the finding.
The Government, however, insists that the Court of Claims did not exercise jurisdiction under this category. It disputes that the court “gave effect,” as the court stated, to the Commission’s order or ordered payment of any balance due under the Commission’s finding. Rather, the Government urges, the court flouted that order, substituted its own judgment for the Commission’s concerning the appropriate order to be entered, and in effect entered a wholly new and different order from that made by the Commission, together with a money judgment giving its own view effect.
Ordinarily it would be sufficient for us to take the Court of Claims at its word and accept its stated view of the nature of the jurisdiction it was exerting. But the three differing views of its action taken by itself, by the Government, and by the respondent, together with the difficulties each raises on the record for disposing of the cause, compel us to examine those claims.
If, as the court asserts, it was “giving effect” to the Commission’s order and doing so without substituting its own judgment for the Commission’s as to what was a “fair and reasonable rate,” there should be little difficulty in sustaining the jurisdiction; that is, unless respondent is right in his contention that the Court was called upon to and, notwithstanding its disclaimer, in fact did adjudicate his claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In that event and on the assumption that the award was proper on the merits, reversal would be required in order that the court might make appropriate allowance for interest.
On the other hand, if the Government is correct in the view that the court did not give effect to the Commission’s order, but instead disregarded that order and substituted its own judgment for the Commission’s concerning what constituted a “fair and reasonable rate,” the question arises whether the Griffin statements were intended to give that power to the Court of Claims under either category of jurisdiction the opinion said that court might have.
III.
The Railway Mail Pay Act gives the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive jurisdiction to determine “fair and reasonable rates.” The Urgent Deficiencies Act provided for judicial review of the Commission’s rate orders in “cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend” such orders. No power was given the reviewing court to revise them when found invalid, or to render judgment for any amount thought to be due under such a revision.
It would be strange, indeed anomalous in the extreme, if this Court by its Griffin pronouncements intended to confer on the Court of Claims, by implication in the cases there held not reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, a broader, more conclusive and final power of judicial review than that Act expressly provided for like orders within its purview. The assumption is hardly tenable that Congress intended such a result when it enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act or the Urgent Deficiencies Act or both. Congress in no instance has expressly empowered the Court of Claims to review rate orders of the Commission, either to set them aside or to render a money judgment for additional amounts found due upon a determination of an order’s invalidity. To infer such an intention would be contrary not only in spirit to the limitations Congress has placed upon review of such orders wherever expressly provided, but also to the whole history and practice of Congress in conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims.
Thus, when these very orders were twice before the district court, under the assumption that it had jurisdiction, that court found the orders invalid. But in each instance it remanded the cause to the Commission for further proceedings; there was no attempt to render a money judgment for the carrier.
Necessarily this restraint reflected the jurisdictional limitations placed upon the court by the Urgent Deficiencies Act. But those limitations themselves reflected another policy, quite apart from and in addition to that giving effect to the constitutional limitations of Article III. The limitations exemplify settled congressional policy concerning the relations of rate-making bodies and reviewing courts. Not only is rate making essentially legislative in the first instance. The policy of judicial restraint is one having regard for the expertise of special agencies charged with performing the rate-making function and for the inherent actual, as well as legal, disability of courts to execute that function. Such doctrines or policies as those of “primary jurisdiction” and exhaustion of administrative remedies lie at the very root of the problem. And this is as true of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, which is not restricted by Article III, as it is of courts so limited.
Hardly can it be conceived therefore that Congress would have provided expressly for review of the Commission’s rate-making orders by the Court of Claims; or that, if it had done so, it would have authorized a money judgment for such amount as that court in its own judgment considered the rate should have produced.
It is equally significant, we think, that when the three-judge district court twice set aside the Commission’s order it did so on grounds substantially similar to those used by the Court of Claims in this case for holding the order invalid. In other words, what the district court did by way of examining the orders on their merits, factual as well as legal, the Court of Claims has done in this case. Indeed, it has gone much further, since it has rendered a money judgment for the carrier covering the period 1931-1938, having the effect in the particular circumstances of a new and final order.
IV.
A full understanding of the Commission’s orders and of the effects of the action taken regarding them, both by the three-judge district court and by the Court of Claims, can be had only by reading and comparing the reports and opinions. The limitations of space prevent summarizing their content here in substantial detail. But the gist of the controversy between the Commission and the courts may be indicated.
We note, to begin with, that the court awarded to the respondent $186,707.06, or some 87 per cent more than the amount allowable under the Commission’s orders. This in itself shows the wide discrepancy between the Commission’s view and the court’s concerning the amount of a “fair and reasonable rate.”
Moreover, the Commission’s task in fixing that rate was both gigantic and complex. It was authorized to make classification of carriers where “just and reasonable” and, “where just and equitable,” to “fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.” 39 U. S. C. § 549. That authority of course was not to be ignored in applying the requirement for compensation of carriers at “fair and reasonable rates.” 39 U. S. C. § 542. The two were not entirely separate, but were merely different prongs of the same fork.
In its first general rate proceeding the Commission classified the nation’s carriers, for mail-pay compensation purposes, placing the Georgia & Florida Railroad in Class I. It also decided generally upon the space basis as an appropriate method of determining fair and reasonable compensation. 56 I. C. C. 1.
Railroad accounting, however, does not, and concededly cannot, accurately reflect actual operating costs of each type of service rendered, or the proportionate amounts of capital employed in rendering each service. The Commission therefore sought a method or methods for making such allocations tentatively as the initial stage of performing its rate-making function. This required, first, segregating freight service from passenger train service; then dividing the latter into three categories: passenger service proper (including baggage service), express service, and mail service.
The problem arose both in the proceedings culminating in the first general rate order, 56 I. C. C. 1, and in those resulting in the general rate increase of 1928. 1441. C. C. 675. In the latter the initial separation of total operating expenses between freight and passenger services was made on the basis of the Commission’s rules governing such separation on large steam railways. Id. at 685-688. But, for determining the cost of service in respect to the further allocation and apportionment of passenger-train service among its three components, the Commission, having determined upon the space basis for this initial stage in fixing “fair and reasonable rates,” was faced with the problem of what should be done with unused space.
That problem presents the crux of this case, as it did of the Commission’s action. In the proceedings leading to the 1928 order, three general plans were given primary consideration for distributing space. They are described in the report last cited. See id. at 681, 689. In general they were alike in allocating full-car space to the service it performed. But they differed widely in allocating unused space in so-called combination cars and mixed cars. Without going into further detail here, suffice it to say that Plan 3 allocated the largest amounts of unused space to passenger and express service and correspondingly the smallest amount to mail service; Plan 2, more nearly approximating the carrier’s proposals, worked out in inverse proportions; and Plan 1 lay between the two. See 144 I. C. C. at 681, 689.
The differences in results following from use of the various plans were highly significant, making the difference between net return and net deficit, or deficits of different sizes, depending upon which plan was used. In each plan after the ultimate space ratios were determined by complicated statistical studies, they were applied to total passenger-train service expense to determine expense ratios for the three constituent services. And those expense ratios were also used to apportion investment in road and equipment assigned to passenger-train service.
The Commission rejected Plan 3 because, it said, that plan had departed from the car-operating unit which it had adopted for making space allocations. 144 I. C. C. 689-691. While not specifically eliminating Plan 1 from consideration for purposes of comparison, the Commission primarily rested its allocations of space for purposes of tentative or preliminary apportionment of costs and capital on Plan 2. Id. at 691.
In utilizing the ratios derived from using Plan 2, however, the Commission expressly stated:
“In connection with the cost studies under any of the plans for dividing the train space, it should be borne in mind that in computations of this character where the direct allocations are relatively small and the great bulk of expenses and investment are necessarily divided, subdivided, apportioned, and reapportioned upon various theories and assump tions, the results can not be accepted as an accurate ascertainment of the costs of service. At best, they are approximations to be given such weight as seems proper in view of all the circumstances under which they have been obtained and the theories underlying the assumptions and the various steps in the computations.” 144 I. C. C. at 691-692. (Emphasis added.)
The Commission proceeded to consider the results obtained by the use of the Plan 2 formula in the light of other circumstances and considerations deemed relevant, including comparison with results obtained upon the basis of the total equated 60-foot-car miles (see 144 I. C. C. at 692), the fact that there was no such incentive to limit the amount of space utilized for passenger, baggage and express services as existed in the case of mail service, id. at 693, and other factors. The Commission then concluded:
“Giving consideration to all the figures based upon the respective cost studies; to the fact that none of these figures except those in the carriers’ exhibits, includes any charge against the passenger-train service for its proportion of the cost of handling nonrevenue freight; giving special weight to the figures based on the plan for the division of train space followed in the original proceeding and subsequent reexaminations; and making allowance for weaknesses of theories and methods, an increase of 15 per cent in mail revenues for the carriers as a whole in this group is justified.” 144 I. C. C. at 695. (Emphasis added.)
This increase, very much smaller than a use of the results obtained by unqualified application of Plan 2 would have produced, resulted in general rates of 14.5 cents per mile of service in a “15-foot apartment car” and 4.5 cents per mile of service in a “3-foot closed-pouch service space.” Those rates became applicable to the Georgia & Florida Railroad, were accepted by it from 1928 to 1931, and are the rates now in question.
In this suit and in the prior proceedings since 1931, no attack has been made on the validity of these rates as general rates applicable to Class I carriers. But the 1931 proceedings challenged their validity as applied to this particular carrier. This has been the bone of contention throughout the subsequent phases of controversy.
When in 1931 the carrier’s application for reexamination was filed, the Commission by its Division 5 first proceeded to make a cost study of the railroad’s individual operations, conducted along the same lines as the cost studies in its general rate hearings. A test period of 28 days from September 28 to October 25, 1931, was selected for obtaining space and

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 天