Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

PER CURIAM.
On June 2, 1975 a panel of this court filed an amended opinion holding that the plaintiffs in this civil rights case, which was prosecuted as a class action, were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition, the court determined that notwithstanding the holding of the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), plaintiffs were entitled to an award of an attorney’s fee against the defendant, John H. Poelker, Mayor of the City of St. Louis, Missouri. This court fixed a fee of $3500.00 as compensation for the services of plaintiffs’ counsel at the appellate level, and remanded the case to the district court with directions to fix a fee for the services of counsel in that court. Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975).
With specific regard to the attorney’s fee to be awarded the court said (515 F.2d at 548):
On remand the district court is directed to determine attorneys’ fees and to award them to Doe, together with court costs, against the defendant Poelker for that portion of the case carried on in that court. This should be a fair award based on the guidelines listed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974).
Pursuant to the mandate of this court, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. It found that $9317.50 would be a reasonable fee for the district court services of plaintiffs’ counsel, but on the basis of a statement appearing in the opinion in the Johnson case, supra, the district court concluded that no fee should be allowed since the plaintiffs were not contractually obligated to pay any fee, fixed or contingent, to their attorney. An order denying plaintiffs’ application for a fee was entered. Plaintiffs appeal.
Johnson was an individual and class action brought ultimately by two Negroes under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; they claimed racial discrimination in employment and sought back pay and injunctive relief. The defendant initially objected to the maintenance of the action as a class suit and also demanded a jury trial on the legal issues presented by the complaint. The district court upheld the defendant on both points. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 327 (N.D.Ga. 1968). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). Thereafter, the case was tried on the merits, and the plaintiffs prevailed. They were represented throughout by practicing Georgia lawyers, some of whom at least were connected with the NAACP, and by a New York lawyer also associated with the organization just mentioned. The district court allowed the plaintiffs a substantial attorneys’ fee which plaintiffs deemed insufficient, and they appealed.
The court of appeals was of the opinion that the district court had not spelled out with sufficient clarity the factors which it took into consideration in fixing the fee and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of twelve specific factors which the appellate court mentioned.
One of those factors was whether counsel were representing the plaintiffs on a contingent rather than a fixed fee basis if, in fact, the parties had made any agreement as to a fee. After quoting from Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F.Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.La. 1970), aff’d 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971), the court said (488 F.2d at 718):
In no event, however, should the litigant be awarded a fee greater than he is contractually bound to pay, if indeed the attorneys have contracted as to amount.
On the basis of that language the district court reasoned in the instant case that the obligation of a losing defendant to pay a judicially imposed attorney’s fee to a successful plaintiff does not exceed in amount the fee that the plaintiff would be obligated contractually to pay to his lawyer in the absence of any judicial award, and that where the plaintiff’s contractual obligation to his lawyer is zero, the defendant’s obligation with respect to the court imposed fee is also zero.
We do not think that the language from Johnson, quoted above, when read in context and in connection with the opinion of the district court in Clark v. American Marine Corp., supra, is fairly susceptible to the construction that the court below evidently placed upon it.
The district court wisely entered his evidentiary findings with respect to a reasonable fee notwithstanding his conclusion that such fees could not be awarded. We accept the district court’s determination that in the light of the Johnson factors the sum of $9317.50 would be a reasonable fee for the services of plaintiff’s counsel in the district court, and we remand the case with directions to the district court to enter an order awarding that amount against the defendant Poelker.
Counsel for plaintiffs asks that we award an additional fee for his services in connection with this appeal. We decline to do so.
Reversed and remanded.
. See also Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1974).
. Senior Circuit Judge Van Oosterhout, a member of the panel, dissented from so much of the holding as allowed an attorney’s fee at either the appellate or the district court level without a prior finding of bad faith by the district court.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: D