Task: sc_casesource

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities. We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.
We upheld a similar law in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), and we recognize the importance of following precedent unless there are strong reasons for not doing so. But there are very strong reasons in this case. Fundamental free speech rights are at stake. Abood was poorly reasoned. It has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore overruled.
I
A
Under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA), employees of the State and its political subdivisions are permitted to unionize. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 5, § 315/6(a) (West 2016). If a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit vote to be represented by a union, that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees. §§ 315/3(s)(1), 315/6(c), 315/9. Employees in the unit are not obligated to join the union selected by their co-workers, but whether they join or not, that union is deemed to be their sole permitted representative. See §§ 315/6(a), (c).
Once a union is so designated, it is vested with broad authority. Only the union may negotiate with the employer on matters relating to "pay, wages, hours [,] and other conditions of employment." § 315/6(c). And this authority extends to the negotiation of what the IPLRA calls "policy matters," such as merit pay, the size of the work force, layoffs, privatization, promotion methods, and non-discrimination policies. § 315/4; see § 315/6(c); see generally, e.g., Illinois Dept. of Central Management Servs. v. AFSCME, Council 31, No. S-CB-16-17 etc., 33 PERI ¶ 67 (ILRB Dec. 13, 2016) (Board Decision).
Designating a union as the employees' exclusive representative substantially restricts the rights of individual employees. Among other things, this designation means that individual employees may not be represented by any agent other than the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate directly with their employer. §§ 315/6(c)-(d), 315/10(a)(4); see Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, 402 Ill.Dec. 1, 51 N.E.3d 753, 782 ; accord, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-684, 64 S.Ct. 830, 88 L.Ed. 1007 (1944). Protection of the employees' interests is placed in the hands of the union, and therefore the union is required by law to provide fair representation for all employees in the unit, members and nonmembers alike. § 315/6(d).
Employees who decline to join the union are not assessed full union dues but must instead pay what is generally called an "agency fee," which amounts to a percentage of the union dues. Under Abood, nonmembers may be charged for the portion of union dues attributable to activities that are "germane to [the union's] duties as collective-bargaining representative," but nonmembers may not be required to fund the union's political and ideological projects. 431 U.S., at 235, 97 S.Ct. 1782 ; see id., at 235-236, 97 S.Ct. 1782. In labor-law parlance, the outlays in the first category are known as "chargeable" expenditures, while those in the latter are labeled "nonchargeable."
Illinois law does not specify in detail which expenditures are chargeable and which are not. The IPLRA provides that an agency fee may compensate a union for the costs incurred in "the collective bargaining process, contract administration[,] and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours [,] and conditions of employment." § 315/6(e); see also § 315/3(g). Excluded from the agency-fee calculation are union expenditures "related to the election or support of any candidate for political office." § 315/3(g); see § 315/6(e).
Applying this standard, a union categorizes its expenditures as chargeable or nonchargeable and thus determines a nonmember's "proportionate share," § 315/6(e); this determination is then audited; the amount of the "proportionate share" is certified to the employer; and the employer automatically deducts that amount from the nonmembers' wages. See ibid. ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a; see also Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2633-2634, 189 L.Ed.2d 620 (2014) (describing this process). Nonmembers need not be asked, and they are not required to consent before the fees are deducted.
After the amount of the agency fee is fixed each year, the union must send nonmembers what is known as a Hudson notice. See Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). This notice is supposed to provide nonmembers with "an adequate explanation of the basis for the [agency] fee." Id., at 310, 106 S.Ct. 1066. If nonmembers "suspect that a union has improperly put certain expenses in the [chargeable] category," they may challenge that determination. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2633.
As illustrated by the record in this case, unions charge nonmembers, not just for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for many other supposedly connected activities. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-39a. Here, the nonmembers were told that they had to pay for "[l]obbying," "[s]ocial and recreational activities," "advertising," "[m]embership meetings and conventions," and "litigation," as well as other unspecified "[s]ervices" that "may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit." Id., at 28a-32a. The total chargeable amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues. Id., at 34a.
B
Petitioner Mark Janus is employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services as a child support specialist. Id., at 10a. The employees in his unit are among the 35,000 public employees in Illinois who are represented by respondent American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (Union). Ibid. Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes "many of the public policy positions that [it] advocates," including the positions it takes in collective bargaining. Id., at 10a, 18a. Janus believes that the Union's "behavior in bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens." Id., at 18a. Therefore, if he had the choice, he "would not pay any fees or otherwise subsidize [the Union]." Ibid. Under his unit's collective-bargaining agreement, however, he was required to pay an agency fee of $44.58 per month, id., at 14a-which would amount to about $535 per year.
Janus's concern about Illinois' current financial situation is shared by the Governor of the State, and it was the Governor who initially challenged the statute authorizing the imposition of agency fees. The Governor commenced an action in federal court, asking that the law be declared unconstitutional, and the Illinois attorney general (a respondent here) intervened to defend the law. App. 41. Janus and two other state employees also moved to intervene-but on the Governor's side. Id., at 60.
Respondents moved to dismiss the Governor's challenge for lack of standing, contending that the agency fees did not cause him any personal injury. E.g., id., at 48-49. The District Court agreed that the Governor could not maintain the lawsuit, but it held that petitioner and the other individuals who had moved to intervene had standing because the agency fees unquestionably injured them. Accordingly, "in the interest of judicial economy," the court dismissed the Governor as a plaintiff, while simultaneously allowing petitioner and the other employees to file their own complaint. Id., at 112. They did so, and the case proceeded on the basis of this new complaint.
The amended complaint claims that all "nonmember fee deductions are coerced political speech" and that "the First Amendment forbids coercing any money from the nonmembers." App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. Respondents moved to dismiss the amended complaint, correctly recognizing that the claim it asserted was foreclosed by Abood. The District Court granted the motion, id., at 7a, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 851 F.3d 746 (2017).
Janus then sought review in this Court, asking us to overrule Abood and hold that public-sector agency-fee arrangements are unconstitutional. We granted certiorari to consider this important question. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 54, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017).
II
Before reaching this question, however, we must consider a threshold issue. Respondents contend that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution because petitioner "moved to intervene in [the Governor's] jurisdictionally defective lawsuit." Union Brief in Opposition 11; see also id., at 13-17; State Brief in Opposition 6; Brief for Union Respondent i, 16-17; Brief for State Respondents 14, n. 1. This argument is clearly wrong.
It rests on the faulty premise that petitioner intervened in the action brought by the Governor, but that is not what happened. The District Court did not grant petitioner's motion to intervene in that lawsuit. Instead, the court essentially treated petitioner's amended complaint as the operative complaint in a new lawsuit. App. 110-112. And when the case is viewed in that way, any Article III issue vanishes. As the District Court recognized-and as respondents concede-petitioner was injured in fact by Illinois' agency-fee scheme, and his injuries can be redressed by a favorable court decision. Ibid. ; see Record 2312-2313, 2322-2323. Therefore, he clearly has Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It is true that the District Court docketed petitioner's complaint under the number originally assigned to the Governor's complaint, instead of giving it a new number of its own. But Article III jurisdiction does not turn on such trivialities.
The sole decision on which respondents rely, United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893 (1914), actually works against them. That case concerned a statute permitting creditors of a government contractor to bring suit on a bond between 6 and 12 months after the completion of the work. Id., at 162, 34 S.Ct. 550. One creditor filed suit before the 6-month starting date, but another intervened within the 6-to-12-month window. The Court held that the "[t]he intervention [did] not cure th[e] vice in the original [prematurely filed] suit," but the Court also contemplated treating "intervention... as an original suit" in a case in which the intervenor met the requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy-e.g., filing a separate complaint and properly serving the defendants. Id., at 163-164, 34 S.Ct. 550. Because that is what petitioner did here, we may reach the merits of the question presented.
III
In Abood, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an agency-shop arrangement like the one now before us, 431 U.S., at 232, 97 S.Ct. 1782, but in more recent cases we have recognized that this holding is "something of an anomaly," Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. 298, 311, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012), and that Abood's "analysis is questionable on several grounds," Harris, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2632 ; see id., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2632-2634 (discussing flaws in Abood's reasoning). We have therefore refused to extend Abood to situations where it does not squarely control, see Harris, supra, at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2638-2639, while leaving for another day the question whether Abood should be overruled, Harris, supra, at ----, n. 19, 134 S.Ct., at 2638, n. 19 ; see Knox, supra, at 310-311, 132 S.Ct. 2277.
We now address that question. We first consider whether Abood's holding is consistent with standard First Amendment principles.
A
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech. We have held time and again that freedom of speech "includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ; see Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-797, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) ; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) ; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-257, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) ; accord, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). The right to eschew association for expressive purposes is likewise protected. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) ("Freedom of association... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate"); see Pacific Gas & Elec., supra, at 12, 106 S.Ct. 903 ("[F]orced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible"). As Justice Jackson memorably put it: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (emphasis added).
Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in most contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned. Suppose, for example, that the State of Illinois required all residents to sign a document expressing support for a particular set of positions on controversial public issues-say, the platform of one of the major political parties. No one, we trust, would seriously argue that the First Amendment permits this.
Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the Constitution, most of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, rather than laws compelling speech. But measures compelling speech are at least as threatening.
Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our democratic form of government, see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), and it furthers the search for truth, see, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). Whenever the Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines these ends.
When speech is compelled, however, additional damage is done. In that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that a law commanding "involuntary affirmation" of objected-to beliefs would require "even more immediate and urgent grounds" than a law demanding silence. Barnette, supra, at 633, 63 S.Ct. 1178 ; see also Riley, supra, at 796-797, 108 S.Ct. 2667 (rejecting "deferential test" for compelled speech claims).
Compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private speakers raises similar First Amendment concerns. Knox, supra, at 309, 132 S.Ct. 2277 ; United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410, 121 S.Ct. 2334, 150 L.Ed.2d 438 (2001) ; Abood, supra, at 222, 234-235, 97 S.Ct. 1782. As Jefferson famously put it, "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical." A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) (emphasis deleted and footnote omitted); see also Hudson, 475 U.S., at 305, n. 15, 106 S.Ct. 1066. We have therefore recognized that a "'significant impingement on First Amendment rights' " occurs when public employees are required to provide financial support for a union that "takes many positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic consequences." Knox, supra, at 310-311, 132 S.Ct. 2277 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984) ).
Because the compelled subsidization of private speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed. Our free speech cases have identified "levels of scrutiny" to be applied in different contexts, and in three recent cases, we have considered the standard that should be used in judging the constitutionality of agency fees. See Knox, supra ; Harris, supra ; Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn., 578 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1083, 194 L.Ed.2d 255 (2016) (per curiam ) (affirming decision below by equally divided Court).
In Knox, the first of these cases, we found it sufficient to hold that the conduct in question was unconstitutional under even the test used for the compulsory subsidization of commercial speech. 567 U.S., at 309-310, 321-322, 132 S.Ct. 2277. Even though commercial speech has been thought to enjoy a lesser degree of protection, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-563, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), prior precedent in that area, specifically United Foods, supra, had applied what we characterized as "exacting" scrutiny, Knox, 567 U.S., at 310, 132 S.Ct. 2277, a less demanding test than the "strict" scrutiny that might be thought to apply outside the commercial sphere. Under "exacting" scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy must "serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
In Harris, the second of these cases, we again found that an agency-fee requirement failed "exacting scrutiny." 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2641. But we questioned whether that test provides sufficient protection for free speech rights, since "it is apparent that the speech compelled" in agency-fee cases "is not commercial speech." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2639.
Picking up that cue, petitioner in the present case contends that the Illinois law at issue should be subjected to "strict scrutiny." Brief for Petitioner 36. The dissent, on the other hand, proposes that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review, that is, that we ask only whether a government employer could reasonably believe that the exaction of agency fees serves its interests. See post, at 2489 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) ("A government entity could reasonably conclude that such a clause was needed"). This form of minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it here. At the same time, we again find it unnecessary to decide the issue of strict scrutiny because the Illinois scheme cannot survive under even the more permissive standard applied in Knox and Harris.
In the remainder of this part of our opinion (Parts III-B and III-C), we will apply this standard to the justifications for agency fees adopted by the Court in Abood. Then, in Parts IV and V, we will turn to alternative rationales proffered by respondents and their amici.
B
In Abood, the main defense of the agency-fee arrangement was that it served the State's interest in "labor peace," 431 U.S., at 224, 97 S.Ct. 1782. By "labor peace," the Abood Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would occur if the employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. In such a situation, the Court predicted, "inter-union rivalries" would foster "dissension within the work force," and the employer could face "conflicting demands from different unions." Id., at 220-221, 97 S.Ct. 1782. Confusion would ensue if the employer entered into and attempted to "enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment." Id., at 220, 97 S.Ct. 1782. And a settlement with one union would be "subject to attack from [a] rival labor organizatio [n]." Id., at 221, 97 S.Ct. 1782.
We assume that "labor peace," in this sense of the term, is a compelling state interest, but Abood cited no evidence that the pandemonium it imagined would result if agency fees were not allowed, and it is now clear that Abood's fears were unfounded. The Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency fees are inextricably linked, but that is simply not true. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2640.
The federal employment experience is illustrative. Under federal law, a union chosen by majority vote is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees, but federal law does not permit agency fees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102, 7111(a), 7114(a). Nevertheless, nearly a million federal employees-about 27% of the federal work force-are union members. The situation in the Postal Service is similar. Although permitted to choose an exclusive representative, Postal Service employees are not required to pay an agency fee, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1203(a), 1209(c), and about 400,000 are union members. Likewise, millions of public employees in the 28 States that have laws generally prohibiting agency fees are represented by unions that serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is now undeniable that "labor peace" can readily be achieved "through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms" than the assessment of agency fees. Harris, supra, at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2639 (internal quotation marks omitted).
C
In addition to the promotion of "labor peace," Abood cited "the risk of 'free riders' " as justification for agency fees, 431 U.S., at 224, 97 S.Ct. 1782. Respondents and some of their amici endorse this reasoning, contending that agency fees are needed to prevent nonmembers from enjoying the benefits of union representation without shouldering the costs. Brief for Union Respondent 34-36; Brief for State Respondents

Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
数. U.S. Court of International Trade
日. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
的. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
月. U.S. Court of Military Review
用. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
成. U.S. Customs Court
名. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
时. U.S. Tax Court
件. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
一. U.S. Court for China
请. U.S. Consular Courts
中. U.S. Commerce Court
据. Territorial Supreme Court
码. Territorial Appellate Court
不. Territorial Trial Court
新. Emergency Court of Appeals
文. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
下. Bankruptcy Court
分. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
入. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
人. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
功. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
上. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
户. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
为. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
间. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
号. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
取. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
回. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
在. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
页. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
字. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
有. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
个. Alaska U.S. District Court
作. Arizona U.S. District Court
示. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
出. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
是. California Central U.S. District Court
失. California Eastern U.S. District Court
表. California Northern U.S. District Court
除. California Southern U.S. District Court
加. Colorado U.S. District Court
败. Connecticut U.S. District Court
生. Delaware U.S. District Court
信. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
类. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
置. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
理. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
本. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
息. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
行. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
定. Guam U.S. District Court
改. Hawaii U.S. District Court
市. Idaho U.S. District Court
期. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
以. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
修. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
元. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
方. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
录. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
区. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
单. Kansas U.S. District Court
位. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
型. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
法. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
县. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
存. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
品. Maine U.S. District Court
前. Maryland U.S. District Court
称. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
注. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
值. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
输. Minnesota U.S. District Court
建. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
能. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
大. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
例. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
度. Montana U.S. District Court
始. Nebraska U.S. District Court
到. Nevada U.S. District Court
面. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
载. New Jersey U.S. District Court
点. New Mexico U.S. District Court
密. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
动. New York Northern U.S. District Court
果. New York Southern U.S. District Court
图. New York Western U.S. District Court
提. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
发. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
式. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
国. North Dakota U.S. District Court
登. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
错. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
者. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
认. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
误. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
接. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
关. Oregon U.S. District Court
重. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
第. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
地. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
如. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
设. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
目. South Carolina U.S. District Court
开. South Dakota U.S. District Court
事. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
可. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
要. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
代. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
小. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
选. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
标. Texas Western U.S. District Court
明. Utah U.S. District Court
编. Vermont U.S. District Court
求. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
列. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
网. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
万. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
最. Washington Western U.S. District Court
器. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
所. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
内. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
体. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
通. Wyoming U.S. District Court
务. Louisiana U.S. District Court
此. Washington U.S. District Court
商. West Virginia U.S. District Court
序. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
化. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
消. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
否. Alabama U.S. District Court
保. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
使. Georgia U.S. District Court
次. Illinois U.S. District Court
机. Indiana U.S. District Court
对. Iowa U.S. District Court
量. Michigan U.S. District Court
查. Mississippi U.S. District Court
部. Missouri U.S. District Court
性. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
和. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
更. New York U.S. District Court
后. North Carolina U.S. District Court
证. Ohio U.S. District Court
题. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
确. Tennessee U.S. District Court
格. Texas U.S. District Court
了. Virginia U.S. District Court
于. Norfolk U.S. District Court
金. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
公. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
午. New Jersey U.S. District Court
円. California U.S. District Court
片. Florida U.S. District Court
空. Arkansas U.S. District Court
态. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
管. State Supreme Court
主. State Appellate Court
天. State Trial Court
自. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
我. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
全. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
今. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
来. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
正. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
说. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
意. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
送. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
容. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
已. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
结. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
会. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
段. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
计. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
源. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
色. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
時. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
交. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
系. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer:

Answer: 为