Task: songer_usc2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 33. Your task is to identify the second most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case. Answer "0" if fewer than two U.S. Code titles are cited. To choose the second title, the following rule was used: If two or more titles of USC or USCA are cited, choose the second most frequently cited title, even if there are other sections of the title already coded which are mentioned more frequently. If the title already coded is the only title cited in the headnotes, choose the section of that title which is cited the second greatest number of times.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
This is a case of first impression involving a conflict between two statutes in the field of Admiralty. They are the Limitation of Liability Act, adopted in 1851, 46 U.S.C., § 181 et seq. (1970), and the Rivers and, Harbors Act, originally passed in 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). We believe that, the plain purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act which we construe here cannot be served by subordinating it to the Limitation of Liability Act which Congress adopted in 1851 and that Congress did not intend the subordination to that Act which appellant now seeks. As a consequence, we hold that the statute later in time (The Rivers and Harbors Act) served to amend the unlimited language of the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act. We therefore affirm the order of the District Court which, by implication, reached this same result.
This is an admiralty case involving a series of accidents which occasioned loss of life and great property damage. An Ohio River tug owned and operated by appellant Hines was proceeding downstream when the Ohio River was at flood stage with three barges in its tow, two of which were loaded with gasoline. Attempting to enter the locks in a newly constructed government project, the tow boat was driven by strong water currents through the sluice gate and broke loose from its barges. Two of the barges struck the dam and locks, caught fire and sank, occasioning the major part of the property damage involved in the ease.
The pilot on the tugboat was lost at the time the tugboat went through the sluice gate and a claim has been filed on behalf of his survivors. Claims asserting injuries to other members of the crew have also been filed.
Hines initiated the first proceeding in this case by seeking limitation of liability in federal court and served notice on all of the parties to this proceeding. The United States appeared at the limitation proceeding and filed its claims. After Hines had filed an answer and counterclaim, the United States of America subsequently filed a motion to be exempted from the restraining order which had routinely issued restraining any other actions. The District Judge entered an order granting relaxation of the restraining order and allowing the filing of the government’s action. It is from the order printed below that Hines has now taken an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970):
1. It appearing to the Court that the United States is entitled to an order relaxing the injunction contained in the Court’s Order for Ad Interim Stipulation and Directing Issuance of Notice and Restraining Suits, entered May 10, 1972, and permitting the United States to file a complaint for damages and penalties pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401 et seq., it is therefore
2. Ordered, Adjudged and Décreed that the action pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 409, 411, 412, 414, and 415 for the costs incurred by the United States in removing the wrecks of Barge Hines 410 and Hines 411-B is not subject to the injunction contained in the Court’s Order for Ad Interim Stipulation and Directing Issuance of Notice and Restraining Suits entered in this limitation proceeding on May 10,1972; and it is further
3. Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the action pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 408, 411, and 412 for the costs incurred by the United States in making emergency, temporary, and permanent repairs to the completed portion of Cannelton Locks and Dam that sustained damage from being struck by the M/V Thomas W. Hines flotilla on April 20, 1972, is not subject to the injunction contained in the Court’s Order for Ad Interim Stipulation and Directing Issuance' of Notice and Restraining Suits entered in this limitation proceeding on May 10, 1972; and it is further
4. Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the action pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 408, 409, 411 and 412 for pecuniary penalties is not subject to the injunction contained in the Court’s Order for Ad Interim Stipulation and Directing ■ Issuance of Notice and Restraining Suits entered in this limitation proceeding on May 10, 1972; and it is further
5. Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the complaint of the United States for damages and penalties pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 401, et seq., predicated upon the collision of the M/V Thomas W. Hines flotilla with Cannelton Locks and Dam on April 20, 1972, is ordered Filed; and it is further
6. Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the Motion for Relaxation of Restraining Order filed by the United States is hereby granted.
(Numbering of paragraphs added.)
We are persuaded that the Supreme Court decision in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 88 S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967), establishes that the government has a right to in personam relief against the owner of a vessel for the negligent sinking of such vessel in the navigable waterways. The rationale of this opinion, which we quote extensively, applies to all the critical issues in this case.
In Wyandotte the Supreme Court said:
“The position of petitioners is, therefore, that in the case of a negligently sunk vessel, the Government may require the owner to mark it; it may expect him to remove it or forfeit his interest in the vessel; and if the Government proceeds to remove the vessel, it possesses the right to sell vessel and cargo and retain the proceeds of these sales. Moreover, the Government may proceed criminally, under § 16 [33 U.S.C. § 411], against those responsible for the negligent sinking. But, petitioners argue, the Government may do no more. Under their view, the very detail of the Rivers and Harbors Act negates the possibility that Congress intended the Government to be able to recover removal expenses exceeding the value of the vessel and its cargo. Petitioners would apply the same analysis to a government action for declaratory or injunctive relief. Indeed, petitioners believe that authorization of the injunction remedy in another, analogous, section of the Act indicates congressional intent to withhold declaratory or injunctive relief as a means of enforcing § 15 [33 U.S.C. § 409],
“We do not agree. Petitioners’ interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 would ascribe to Congress an intent at variance with the purpose of that statute. Petitioners’ proposal is, moreover, in disharmony with our own prior construction of the Act, with our decisions on analogous issues of statutory construction, and with a major maritime statute of the United States. If there were no other reasonable interpretation of the statute, or if petitioners could adduce some persuasive indication that their interpretation accords with the congressional intent, we might be more disposed to accept that interpretation. But our reading of the Act does not lead us to the conclusion that Congress must have intended the statutory remedies and procedures to be exclusive of all others. There is no indication anywhere else — in the legislative history of the Act, in the predecessor statutes, or in nonstatutory law — that Congress might have intended that a party who negligently sinks a vessel should be shielded from personal responsibility. We therefore hold that the remedies and procedures specified by the Act for the enforcement of § 15 were not intended to be exclusive. Applying the principles of our decision in Republic Steel, [United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903] we conclude that other remedies, including those here sought, are available to the Government.
“II.
“Article I, § 8, of the Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce. For the exercise of this power, the navigable waters of the United States are to be deemed the ‘public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.’ Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 725 [18 L.Ed. 96] (1866). The Federal Government is charged with ensuring that navigable waterways, like any other routes of commerce over which it has assumed control, remain free of obstruction. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 586 [15 S.Ct. 900, 907, 39 L.Ed. 1092] (1895). The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, an assertion of the sovereign power of the United States, Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U. S. 405 [45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352] (1925), was obviously intended to prevent obstructions in the Nation’s waterways. Despite some difficulties with the wording of the Act, we have consistently found its coverage to be broad. See, e. g., Sanitary District v. United States, supra; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 [80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903] (1960). And we have found that a principal beneficiary of the Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Government itself. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra, at 492 [80 S.Ct. [884] at 890.]
“Our decisions have established, too, the general rule that the United States may sue to protect its interests. Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229 [13 L.Ed. 675] (1851); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 [8 S.Ct. 850, 31 L.Ed. 747] (1888); Sanitary District v. United States, supra. This rule is not necessarily inapplicable when the particular governmental interest sought to be protected is expressed in a statute carrying criminal penalties for its violation. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra. Our decisions in cases involving civil actions of private parties based on the violation of a penal statute so indicate. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 [36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874] (1916); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 [84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423] (1964). In those cases we concluded that criminal liability was inadequate to ensure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had intended. Because the interest of the plaintiff in those cases fell within the class that the statute was intended to protect, and because the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute was intended to forestall, we held that civil actions were proper. That conclusion was in accordance with a general rule of the law of torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286. We see no reason to distinguish the Government, and to deprive the United States of the benefit of that rule.
“The inadequacy of the criminal penalties explicitly provided by § 16 of the Rivers.and Harbors Act is beyond dispute. That section contains only meager monetary penalties. In many cases, as here, the combination of these fines and the Government’s in rem rights would not serve to reimburse the United States for removal expenses. It is true that § 16 also provides for prison terms, but this punishment is hardly a satisfactory remedy for the pecuniary injury which the negligent shipowner may inflict upon the sovereign. Cf. United States v. Acme Process Equipment Co., 385 U.S. 138 [87 S.Ct. 350, 17 L.Ed.2d 249] (1966).
“It was a similar process of reasoning that underlay our decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 [80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903] (1960). That case concerned the deposit of industrial solids which, we believed, created an ‘obstruction. to the navigable capacity’ of a waterway of the United States, within the meaning of § 10 of the Act [33 U.S.C. § 403]. We decided that the Government might seek injunctive relief to compel removal of such an obstruction, even though such relief was nowhere specifically authorized by the Act. We concluded that the authorization of injunctive relief in § 12 [33 U.S.C. § 406], which is applicable only to a limited category of § 10 obstructions (structures), should not be read to exclude injunctions to compel removal of other types of § 10 obstructions. In referring to the Act, we noted that ‘Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legislation.’ 362 U.S., at 492 [80 S.Ct. [884] at 890].
“Although we do not approach the instant cases in the context of § 10, we believe the principles of Republic Steel apply, by analogy, to the issues now before us. The Government may, in our view, seek an order that a negligent party is responsible for rectifying the wrong done to maritime commerce by a § 15 violation. Denial of such a remedy to the United States would permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his victim. It might in some cases permit the negligent party to benefit from commission of a criminal act. We do not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the Act. We think we correctly divine the congressional intent in inferring the availability of that remedy from the prohibition of § 15.
“It is but a small step from declaratory relief to a civil action for the Government’s expenses incurred in removing a negligently sunk vessel. See United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1964). Having properly chosen to remove such a vessel, the United States should not lose the right to place responsibility for removal upon those who negligently sank the vessel. See Restatement of Restitution § 115; United States v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1967). No issue regarding the propriety of the Government’s removal of Wyandotte’s barge is now raised. Indeed, the facts surrounding that sinking constitute a classic case in which rapid removal by someone was essential. Wyandotte was unwilling to effectuate removal itself. It would be surprising if Congress intended that, in such a situation, the Government’s commendable performance of Wyandotte’s duty must be at Government expense. Indeed, in any case in which the Act provides a right of removal in the United States, the exercise of that right should not relieve negligent parties of the responsibility for removal. Otherwise, the Government would be subject to a financial penalty for the correct performance of its duty to prevent impediments in inland waterways. See United States v. Perma Paving Co., supra, at 758.
“We note, moreover, that under the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq., the liability of a shipowner ‘for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture’ may be limited to ‘the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending’; but this limitation is available only if the act or damage occurred ‘without the privity or knowledge of such owner.’ 46 U.S.C. § 183. ‘For his own fault, neglect and contracts the owner remains liable.’ American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 264 [53 S.Ct. 618, 619, 77 L.Ed. 1162] (1933). The reading that petitioners would place on the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 would create an additional right of limitation, applicable in the special case of a sinking even though the owner is himself negligent. Yet Congress gave no indication, in passing the Rivers and Harbors Act, that it intended to alter or qualify the 1851 Act. In the
congressional failure to connect these two statutes, we find at least some evidence that petitioners’ discovery of a limitation of liability in the Rivers and Harbors Act is unwarranted.
“III.
“Petitioners contend that, despite our pri- or decisions and the silence of the Rivers and Harbors Act on this point, that statute authorizes them simply to abandon their negligently sunk vessels, without further responsibility for those vessels. We find in the Act no support for such an absolute right of abandonment. The provision upon which petitioners place most reliance, the final clause of § 15, creates a ‘duty of the owner of [a] sunken craft to commence the immediate removal of the same, and prosecute such removal diligently.’ Because ‘failure to do so shall be considered as an abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by the United States as provided for in sections [19 and 20],’ petitioners contend that such failure in no case has other consequences. But the duty imposed by and the remedy provided in the final clause of § 15 and §§ 19 and 20 [33 U.S.C. §§ 414 and 415] are not prescribed only for owners of negligently sunk vessels. Those provisions apply ‘whenever a vessel. is wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel, accidentally or otherwise Unlike a negligent sinking, a non-negligent sinking is not declared by the Act to be unlawful. It seems highly unlikely that Congress, having specified that only a negligent or intentional sinking is a crime, would then employ such indirect language to grant the culpable owner a personal civil immunity from the consequences. of that crime.
“We believe the sections noted by petitioners are intended to protect the United States against liability for removing a sunken vessel if it chooses to do so. See Zubik v. United States, 190 F.2d 278 (C.A. 3d Cir. 1951); Gulf Coast Transp. Co. v. Ruddock-Orleans Cypress Co., 17 F.2d 858 (D.C.E.D.La.1927). Section 19 speaks explicitly of the discretion of the Secretary of the Army to break up, remove, sell, or otherwise dispose of a sunken vessel that has obstructed a waterway ‘without liability for any damage to the owners of the same.’ These sections do not negate the rights of the United States to obtain declaratory relief or to recover removal expenses. It is true that a proviso to § 19 states ‘[t]hat any money received from the sale of any such wreck... shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States.’ But that proviso does not indicate that the United States, having chosen to remove a sunken vessel, shall receive no other monies. At most, the proviso establishes the proposition that, if the United States chooses to sell a wreck, the owner of the vessel has no right to any monies received. Section 20, the emergency section, closely parallels § 19. It adds nothing to petitioners’ argument.
“Petitioners also claim that a substantial body of non-statutory law establishes the rule that a shipowner who has negligently sunk a vessel may abandon it and be insulated from all but in rem liability. They argue that Congress must have intended to codify this rule in the Rivers and Harbors Act. We do not accept petitioners’ claim. Although several modern courts have assumed the existence of such a common-law rule, see, e. g., United States v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., 374 F.2d 656, 667 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512, 518-519 (C.A. 9th Cir. 1963), the rule evaporates upon close analysis. We do not believe Congress intended the Rivers and Harbors Act to embody this illusory nonstatutory law.”
Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, supra at 199-209, 88 S.Ct. at 384 (Footnotes 11-16, 19-22 omitted).
While we note that in footnote 17, Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, supra at 205-06, 88 S.Ct. 379, the Wyandotte opinion explicitly reserved decision on the effect of the Limitation Act (Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.) courts and commentators have read it as implying that in person-am liability could not be so limited in a Wreck Act case. See In re University of Texas, C.A. 74-H-1438 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 2, 1975); In re Pentzien, Inc., 1974 A.M.C. 1201 (D.Neb.1974); In re Scranton Industries, Inc., 358 F.Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y.1972); In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 314 F.Supp. 1339 (N.D.Cal.1970) aff’d on separate issue, 472 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1973). See also In re Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd., 361 F.Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y.1972), aff’d 478 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143, 94 S.Ct. 894, 39 L.Ed.2d 98 (1974).
Benedict on Admiralty quotes the Wreck Act (33 U.S.C. § 409; Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425 § 15; 30 Stat. 1152), and summarizes the effect of the Wyandotte opinion as follows:
Wreck Act. The so-called Wreck Act provides:
“It shall not be lawful... to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit or cause to be sunk, vessels or other craft in navigable channels And whenever a vessel, raft or other craft is wrecked and sunk in a navigable channel, accidentally or otherwise, it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon during the day and a lighted lantern at night, and to maintain such marks until the sunken craft is removed or abandoned, and the neglect or failure of the said owner so to do shall be unlawful; and it shall be the duty of the owner of such sunken craft to commence the immediate removal of the same, and prosecute such removal diligently, and failure to do so shall be considered as an abandonment of such craft, and subject the same to removal by the United States.
A vessel owner who fails to comply with this statute may not limit his liability for any resulting damage. As
soon as the owner decides to abandon his wreck, and succeeds in such abandonment, his further liability ceases. However, the shipowner will remain liable, without limitation, for removal expenses incurred by the United States where he is deemed to have “privity or knowledge” of the loss under § 183(a).
3 Benedict on Admiralty § 32, at 4-5,'4-6 (7th ed. I. Hall, A. Sann, K. Halajan 1975). (Footnote 7 omitted. Balance of fn. 8 omitted.)
Similarly concerning the pecuniary penalties provided by 33 U.S.C. § 412 for violations of 33 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409, Benedict says:
Criminal Statutes. Public policy forbids that a person liable to a fine or penalty under the criminal laws should be permitted to limit or reduce his liability by claiming the benefit of the shipowner’s limitation statutes.
3 Benedict on Admiralty, supra at 4-7.
As to the cause of action described in paragraph 3 of the District Judge’s order, more needs to be said.
The legal logic which applies to_ the Wreck Act claims and other pecuniary damage claims could apply just as well to the government’s claims stated in the third paragraph of the District Judge’s order. These claims relate to damages occasioned to the lock and dam and are asserted to represent the sum of $2,200,000. They are brought under, the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.SiC. §§ 408, 412 (1970):
It shall not be lawful- for any person or persons to take possession of or make use of for any purpose, or build upon, alter, deface, destroy, move, injure, obstruct by fastening vessels thereto or otherwise, or in any manner whatever impair the usefulness of any sea wall, bulkhead, jetty, dike, levee, wharf, pier, or other work built by the United States, or any piece of plant, floating or otherwise; uséd in the construction of such work under the control of the United States, in whole or in part, for the preservation and improvement of any of its navigable waters or to prevent floods, or as boundary marks, tide gauges, surveying stations, buoys, or other established marks, nor remove for ballast or other purposes any stone or other material composing such works: Provided, That the Secretary of the Army may, on the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, grant permission for the temporary occupation or use of any of the aforementioned public works when in his judgment such occupation or use will not be injurious to the public interest. 33 U.S.C. §-408 (1970).
This language appears to this court to be more positive than that employed in § 409 pertaining to negligently sunk vessels. Section 408 imposes strict liability, as compared to § 409’s requirement of negligence. Section 412 also provides that “any boat, vessel... or other craft used or employed in violating any of the provisions of sections 407, 408 and 409 of this title shall be liable for... the amount of the damages done by said boat, vessel. or other craft..
The sections we have referred to make unlawful injury to river improvements of the nature of the Cannelton Locks and Dam. Further, § 411, which follows, authorizes fines and imprisonment for anyone who knowingly violates these rules:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provisions of sections 407, 408, and 409 of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine -not exceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, one-half of said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.
33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
All of this to the contrary notwithstanding, appellant Hines, Incorporated, the owner of the tugboat and barges involved in this accident, contends that it is entitled to limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970), which provides:
(a) The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the eases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
While the question posed in this regard is certainly not without difficulty, and while we find no precedent squarely on point, we believe the Congressional intent in adopting §§ 408 and 411 did not contemplate application to the United States of the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. As a general rule of law when the purposes of two statutes appear to be in conflict with each other, and there is no statutory language which makes any cross-reference, and, as here, the legislative history is silent as to the possible conflict, it is generally assumed that the later statute constitutes an amendment of the earlier one. United States v. Ohio Valley Company, Inc., 510 F.2d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1975); 2 A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 51.02, 51.05 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973).
2. While as indicated above we recognize that the Supreme Court in the Wyandotte case specifically reserved judgment on the precise question which our instant case requires us to decide, we believe the Wyandotte decision nonetheless points toward the no limitation result outlined above. Two paragraphs which we have previously quoted, in our view, constitute a strong underpinning of logical reasoning for giving precedence to the purpose of the Rivers and Harbors Act over the Limitation of Liability Act:
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce. For the exercise of this power, the navigable waters of the United States are to be deemed the “public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.” Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 725 [18 L.Ed. 96] (1866). The Federal Government is charged with ensuring that navigable waterways, like any other routes of commerce over which it has assumed control, remain free of obstruction. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 [15 S.Ct. 900, 907, 39 L.Ed. 1092] (1895). The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, an assertion of the sovereign power of the United States, Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 [45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352] (1925), was obviously intended to prevent obstructions in the Nation’s waterways. Despite some difficulties with the wording of the Act, we have consistently found its coverage to be broad. See, e. g., Sanitary District v. United States, supra; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 [80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903] (1960). And we have found that a principal beneficiary of the Act, if not the principal beneficiary, is the Government itself. United States v. Re public Steel Corp., supra, at 492 [80 S.Ct. [884] at 890].
Our decisions have established, too, the general rule that the United States may sue to protect its interests. Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229 [13 L.Ed. 675] (1851); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 [8 S.Ct. 850, 31 L.Ed. 747] (1888); Sanitary District v. United States, supra. This rule is not necessarily inapplicable when the particular governmental interest sought to be protected is expressed in a statute carrying criminal penalties for its violation. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., supra. Our decisions in cases involving civil actions of private parties based on the violation of a penal statute so indicate. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 [36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874] (1916); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 [84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423] (1964). In those cases we concluded that criminal liability was inadequate to ensure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress had intended. Because the interest of the plaintiffs in those cases fell within the class that the statute was intended to protect, and because the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute was intended to forestall, we held that civil actions were proper. That conclusion was in accordance with a general rule of the law of torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286. We see no reason to distinguish the Government, and to deprive the United States of the benefit of that rule. Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, supra 389 U.S. at 201-02, 88 S.Ct. at 385. (Footnotes omitted.)
It should be noted that § 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, cited above by the Supreme Court, provides as follows:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
Both §§ 408 and 411, which are quoted above, clearly establish “the standard of conduct of a reasonable man” which the court may apply to defendant shipowner in this case. They likewise may be read as identifying the United States as “one whose interest is invaded,” and hence, warranting protection. In this case it is obvious that if the Limitation of Liability statute be so construed as to terminate in personam liability on the part of appellant Hines, there would be no possibility for the government to recover the bulk of its damages as set forth in its stated claims.
3. In Wyandotte the Supreme Court also gave weight to the fact that, as here, Congress had seen fit to enact criminal penalties. It said:
The inadequacy of the criminal penalties explicitly provided by § 16 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is beyond dispute. That section contains only meager monetary penalties. In many cases, as here, the combination of these fines and the Government’s in rem rights would not serve to reimburse the United States for removal expenses. It is true that § 16 also provides for prison terms, but this punishment is hardly a satisfactory remedy for the pecuniary injury which the negligent shipowner may inflict upon the sovereign. Cf. United States v. Acme Process Equipment Co., 385 U.S. 138 [87 S.Ct. 350, 17 L.Ed.2d 249] (1966).
It was a similar process of reasoning that underlay our decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 [80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903] (1960). That case concerned the deposit of industrial solids which, we believed, created an “obstruction... to the navigable capacity” of a waterway of the United States, within the meaning of § 10 of the Act. We decided that the Government might seek injunctive relief to compel removal of such an obstruction, even though such relief was nowhere specifically authorized in the Act. We concluded that the authorization of injunctive relief in § 12,- which is applicable only to a limited category of § 10 obstructions (structures), should not be read to exclude injunctions to compel removal of other types of § 10 obstructions. In referring to the Act, we noted that “Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Congress á futility inconsistent with the great design of this legislation.” 362 U.S., at 492 [80 S.Ct. [884] at 890],
Although we do not approach the instant cases in the context of § 10, we believe the principles of Republic Steel apply, by analogy, to the issues now before us. The Government may, in our view, seek an order that a negligent party is responsible for rectifying the wrong done to maritime commerce by a § 15 violation. Denial of such a remedy to the United States would permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a wrong-doer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his victim. It might in some cases permit the negligent party to benefit from commission of a criminal act. We do not believe that Congress intended to withhold from the Government a remedy that ensures the full effectiveness of the Act. We think we correctly divine the congressional intent in inferring the availability of

Question: The most frequently cited title of the U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case is 33. What is the second most frequently cited title of this U.S. Code in the headnotes to this case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 46