Task: songer_appsubst

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM:
The district court dismissed an indictment for “willfully misapplying]” funds obtained under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act [CETA], 29 U.S.C. § 801-999 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 665 (1976), because the government conceded it could not prove intent to injure or defraud the United States. We affirm.
I.
Appellees are directors of Northwest Rural Opportunities [NRO], a private, nonprofit organization. NRO is a grantee under Title III of CETA providing social services under contract with the Department of Labor. In late 1980 the owner of the building NRO rented as a site for training migrant and seasonal farmworkers informed appellees the building could no longer be rented and offered NRO an option to purchase. The contract between the Department and NRO required NRO to obtain the Department’s approval before acquiring property for more than $300.00. Appellees used $32,000 of CETA funds, earmarked for “space,” to place a down payment on the building without obtaining prior approval.
Appellees were indicted for “willfully misapplying” the $32,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 665(a). Appellees moved to dismiss because the indictment did not allege appellees had converted the funds to their own use or benefit. The government argued that benefit to a third party — here NRO — was sufficient. The district court agreed.
After denying the motion to dismiss, the district court’s memorandum order went on to note: “[t]here is not even a hint that [appellees] either sought or realized any personal gain, nor is it contested acquisition of the subject property was designed to implement the efficient administration of CETA training functions.” The court advised counsel that the court was “inclined” to rule that willful misapplication requires willful conversion with intent to defraud. Counsel was told to anticipate instructions that the government must demonstrate “some measure of harm, injury, or deprivation.” The court suggested that loss by the government of control of its funds might constitute sufficient deprivation, but that the government in addition must show defendants “intended some measure of injury.”
The government filed a response to the court’s memorandum order. The government asserted that “willful misapplication” did not require a specific intent to injure or defraud, and that the government “would not be able to produce any” evidence suggesting “a specific intent on behalf of the Defendants to injure the United States,” but only evidence that appellants “knowingly and willfully” paid the down payment “with the knowledge that they were in violation of NRO’s contract with the Department of Labor.” Relying on the government’s assertion, the district court dismissed the indictment.
CETA contains no prohibition against using grant money to purchase space or for other capital expenditures necessary to carry out CETA functions. The regulations governing the grant of funds to NRO do not require prior approval for capital expenditures. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 97.-210-97.280, 98.1-98.29a (1980). It is only NRO’s operating contract with CETA that provides that NRO must obtain CETA’s approval before using CETA funds to purchase capital items over $300. The government argues that use of funds in knowing violation of this contract provision is sufficient to constitute willful misapplication because it deprives CETA of the power to control the expenditure of its funds. We hold, with the district court, that the government must prove defendants intended not merely to deprive the government of control over the expenditure of funds, but also to injure or defraud the United States. The simple intent to use funds in a manner not fully in compliance with contract procedures is not alone sufficient.
II.
In Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), the Supreme Court construed a similar statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, which provides for punishment as a felon of “[wjhoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts” property of the United States. The Court held that in this context to “knowingly convert” required an intention “wrongfully to deprive another of possession of property.” Id. at 276, 72 S.Ct. at 256 (emphasis in original).
In a criminal statute, “willfully” generally means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty in bad faith or with evil purpose. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12, 97 S.Ct. 22, 23-24, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 2017, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). A general intent to commit the proscribed act is not enough; a specific intent to do something the law forbids is required. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1980). The definition of “misapplication” suggests a similar element: “[ijmproper, illegal, wrongful, or corrupt use [or] application of funds, property, etc.” Black’s Law Dictionary 901 (5th Ed. 1979).
The term “willfully misapply” in 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) is embedded in a series of words referring to harmful or wrongful acts clearly causing financial injury to the United States or impeding the achievement of CETA’s goals. Cf. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 265-70, 72 S.Ct. at 250-54 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 641). All the acts prohibited by the statute are more serious in character than simple violations of procedural requirements.
On its face, the primary thrust of section 665 is the punishment of theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent conversion of CETA funds. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended these criminal provisions to reach embezzlement and obstruction of CETA investigations and “kickbacks and similar schemes.” See S.Rep. No. 891, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-44, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4522-23. Thus, the offenses specifically identified on the face of the statute and those that concerned Congress differ in kind from the procedural violation charged here.
CETA grants the Secretary of Labor extensive administrative authority to take corrective action if any provision of the statute or regulations is violated. “If the Secretary concludes that any recipient of funds under this Act is failing to comply with any provision of this Act or the regulations under this Act ... the Secretary shall have authority to terminate or suspend financial assistance in whole or in part and order such sanctions or corrective actions as are appropriate.” See CETA Amendments of 1978, Section 106, 92 Stat. 1909, 1927 (1978) (repealed 1982) (previously codified at 29 U.S.C. § 816(d)). This broad and flexible administrative authority to deal with administrative violations makes it unlikely that Congress in prohibiting “willful misapplication]” of funds in 18 U.S.C. § 665 intended to punish as felonies all departures from contract procedures in the funding process, however harmless and routine.
III.
In concluding that section 665 requires a specific intent to injure or defraud the United States, the district court relied on the interpretation of the similarly-worded bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 656. See, e.g., United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 548 (9th Cir.1978). The government argues the analogy is not compelling because precodification versions of section 656 explicitly required an intent to injure or defraud the bank, and the codifiers disclaimed any intention of changing the law. See S.Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 4, reprinted in 1948 U.S.Code Cong. Serv. 2429-30 (Title 18 United States Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure). But this circumstance cuts against the government’s reading of the statute. The only reason Congress could have considered the explicit requirement of a purpose to injure or defraud redundant was that Congress understood the term “willful misapplication” to include such an intent by implication.
The few opinions that have construed section 665 suggest that to willfully misapply funds requires more than the intent to use the funds without prior approval. The defendants in United States v. Tamargo, 637 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.1981), were convicted of willfully misapplying CETA funds to pay the salaries of their employees even though no training services were provided, and for periods far longer than reasonable for training purposes. In rejecting a constitutional vagueness challenge to the term “willfully misapplies,” the court approved the trial court’s instruction defining the offense to require a conversion or taking “with intent to defraud.” Id. at 350. See also United States v. Pappas, 611 F.2d 399, 404 (1st Cir.1979) (“[T]he question ... is ... whether a jury could reasonably find that [the facts] indicated dishonesty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
IV.
The government having conceded a specific intent to injure or defraud the United States cannot be proven, an essential element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 665 is lacking. Dismissal of the indictment is therefore AFFIRMED.
. CETA has since been repealed, Pub.L. No. 97-300, Title I, § 184(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1357 (1982), and in many respects replaced by the Jobs Training Partnership Act, Pub.L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1324 (1982), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1501-1781.
. Section 97.255(f)(6)(ii) lists "office space costs” as allowable administrative costs. 29 C.F.R. § 97.255(c) forbids the expenditure of funds for new construction, but the building involved here was old. Section 97.-213(b)(3)(i)(E) requires a grantee to provide an “itemized budget of allowable costs, as defined in §§ 97.255 and 260” in its funding request, but no issue is made that NRO failed to comply with this requirement.
. In 1980, 18 U.S.C. § 665(a) provided:
Whoever, being an officer [or] director ... of ... any agency receiving financial assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act knowingly hires an ineligible individual or individuals, embezzles, willfully misapplies, steals, or obtains by fraud any of the moneys, funds, assets, or property which are the subject of a grant or contract of assistance pursuant to such Act shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both,____
The 1982 amendments to this section did not alter its substance.
. Appellees offered to prove at trial that it was standard practice to request approval to make purchases from the Department of Labor, receive no response, procure the required item without prior approval, and obtain post hoc approval despite the procedural violation following the annual audit.
This is not to say a violation of administrative regulations or contract provisions may not constitute a violation of the Act if accompanied by the specific intent to injure or defraud. See United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir.1980) (under 18 U.S.C. § 656).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0