Task: sc_issue_1

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Speedy Trial Act or Act), 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq., requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days after he is charged or makes an initial appearance, whichever is later, see § 3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, § 3162(a)(2). The Act, however, excludes from the 70-day period delays due to certain enumerated events. § 3161(h) (2006 ed. and Supp. II). As relevant here, “delay resulting from... proceedings concerning the defendant” is automatically excludable from a Speedy Trial Act calculation. § 3161(h)(1) (hereinafter subsection (h)(1)). In addition, “delay resulting from a continuance” granted by the district court may be excluded if the district court makes the findings required by § 3161(h)(7) (2006 ed., Supp. II) (hereinafter subsection (h)(7)).
This case requires us to decide the narrow question whether time granted to a party to prepare pretrial motions is automatically excludable from the Act’s 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1), or whether such time may be excluded only if a court makes case-specific findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that pretrial motion preparation time is automatically ex-cludable under subsection (h)(1). 534 F. 3d 893, 898 (2008). We granted certiorari, 556 U. S. 1181 (2009), and now reverse.
I
A
On August 2,2006, police officers surveilling an apartment building for drug activity saw petitioner and his girlfriend enter a car parked in front of the building and drive away. After observing petitioner commit several traffic violations, the officers stopped the vehicle. They approached the car and noticed two small bags of cocaine on petitioner’s lap. After the officers read petitioner his Miranda warnings, petitioner made inculpatory statements. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Petitioner denied any association with the apartment building where the car had been parked, but his girlfriend admitted that she lived there and consented to a search of her residence. The officers who conducted the search uncovered several items that belonged to petitioner, including an identification card, cocaine, three firearms, ammunition, and a bulletproof vest. The police arrested petitioner the next day.
On August 24, a grand jury indicted petitioner for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), and for knowing and intentional possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). The August 24 indictment started the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day clock. See 18 U. S. C. § 3161(c)(1). After petitioner’s arraignment on September 1, a Magistrate Judge entered a scheduling order requiring, inter alia, that the parties file pretrial motions by September 13.
On September 7, petitioner filed a motion to extend the deadline to file pretrial motions from September 13 to September 21. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion and extended the deadline by an extra four days beyond petitioner’s request, to September 25. On September 25, however, petitioner filed a "Waiver of Pretrial Motions” advising the court that he did not wish to file any pretrial motions.
On October 4, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing to consider petitioner’s “waiver,” at which petitioner confirmed that he wished to waive his right to file pretrial motions. After a colloquy, the Magistrate Judge found that petitioner’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent.
Over the next three months, petitioner’s trial was delayed for several reasons. Though these delays are not directly relevant to the question presented here, we recount them to explain the full context in which that question arises. On November 8, petitioner moved to continue the trial date, stating that his counsel needed additional time to prepare for trial. The District Court granted the motion and reset the trial for December 18.
The parties then met informally and prepared a plea agreement, which they provided to the court. The District Court scheduled a change of plea hearing for December 20. At the hearing, however, petitioner declined to implement the agreement and requested a new attorney. The District Court rescheduled the trial for February 26, 2007, granted petitioner’s attorney’s subsequent motion to withdraw, and appointed new counsel.
On February 19, 2007 — 179 days after petitioner was indicted — petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the Act’s 70-day limit had elapsed. The District Court denied the motion. In calculating how many of the 179 days counted toward the 70-day limit, the District Judge excluded the period from September 7 through October 4 as “within the extension of time granted to file pretrial motions.” Order in No. 4:06CR518-SNL (ED Mo.), Doc. 44, p. 2.
In late February, a matter arose in an unrelated case on the District Court’s docket, which required the court to reschedule petitioner’s trial. After obtaining the consent of the parties and finding that a continuance would serve the public interest, the District Court continued petitioner’s trial from February 26 to March 5, 2007. Petitioner’s 2-day trial began on that date. The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts, and the District Court later sentenced him to concurrent 30-year terms of imprisonment.
B
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial Act violation. As relevant, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the time from September 7 (the original deadline for filing pretrial motions) through October 4 (when the trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s decision to waive the right to file pretrial motions) was excludable from the Act’s 70-day limit. Although the District Court did not identify which provision of the Act supported this exclusion, the Court of Appeals held that “pretrial motion preparation time” is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1) — which covers “delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant”— as long as “the [district] court specifically grants time for that purpose.” 534 F. 3d, at 897. In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Cireuit joined seven other Courts of Appeals that interpret subsection (h)(1) the same way. Two Courts of Appeals, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, interpret subsection (h)(1) differently, holding that time for preparing pretrial motions is outside subsection (h)(l)’s scope. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
II
As noted, the Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within 70 days of a defendant’s initial appearance or indictment, but excludes from the 70-day period days lost to certain types of delay. Section 3161(h) specifies the types of delays that are excludable from the calculation. Some of these delays are excludable only if the district court makes certain findings enumerated in the statute. See § 3161(h)(7). Other delays are automatically excludable, i. e., they may be excluded without district court findings. As relevant here, subsection (h)(1) requires the automatic exclusion of “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to” periods of delay resulting from eight enumerated subcategories of proceedings. The Government contends that the time the District Court granted petitioner to prepare his pretrial motions is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1). We disagree, and conclude that such time may be excluded only when a district court enters appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7).
A
The eight subparagraphs in subsection (h)(1) address the automatic excludability of delay generated for certain enumerated purposes. Thus, we first consider whether the delay at issue in this case is governed by one of these sub-paragraphs. It is.
The delay at issue was granted to allow petitioner sufficient time to file pretrial motions. Subsection (h)(1)(D) (2006 edL, Supp. II) (hereinafter subparagraph (D)) renders automatically excludable “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Read, as it must be, in the context of subsection (h), this text governs the automatic excludability of delays “resulting” from a specific category of “proceedings concerning the defendant,” namely, proceedings involving pretrial motions. Because the delay at issue here results from a deeision granting time to prepare pretrial motions, if not from a pretrial motion itself (the defendant’s request for additional time), it is governed by subparagraph (D). But that does not make the delay at issue here automatically excludable.
Subparagraph (D) does not subject all pretrial motion-related delay to automatic exclusion. Instead, it renders automatically excludable only the delay that occurs “from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of” the motion. (Emphasis added.) In so doing, the provision communicates Congress' judgment that delay resulting from pretrial motions is automatically excludable, i. e., excludable without district court findings, only from the time a motion is filed through the hearing or disposition point specified in the subparagraph, and that other periods of pretrial motion-related delay are excludable only when accompanied by district court findings.
This limitation is significant because Congress knew how to define the boundaries of an enumerated exclusion broadly when it so desired. Subsection (h)(1)(A) (2006 ed.) (hereinafter subparagraph (A)), for example, provides for the automatic exclusion of “delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) With the word “including,” Congress indicated that other competency-related proceedings besides “examinations” might fall within subparagraph (A)’s automatic exelusion. In subparagraph (D), by contrast, Congress declined to use an expansive or illustrative term such as “including,” and provided instead that only pretrial motion-related delay “from the filing” of a motion to the hearing or disposition point specified in the provision is automatically excludable from the Act’s 70-day limit.
Thus, although the period of delay the Government seeks to exclude in this case results from a proceeding governed by subparagraph (D), that period precedes the first day upon which Congress specified that such delay may be automatically excluded. The result is that the pretrial motion preparation time at issue in this case is not automatically excludable.
B
The foregoing analysis resolves our inquiry into automatic excludability because “[a] specific provision” (here, subparagraph (D)) “controls one[s] of more general application” (here, subsections (h)(1) and (h)(7)). Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 407 (1991). In arguing that this principle applies, but requires a result different from the one we reach, the dissent (like the Government and several Courts of Appeals) departs from the statute in a manner that underscores the propriety of our approach.
1
There is no question that subparagraph (D) is more specific than the “general” language in subsection (h)(1), post, at 218, 222, or that “[gjeneral language of a statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment,” D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208 (1932). We part company with the dissent because we conclude that subparagraph (D) governs the period of delay at issue in this case. The dissent does not object to this conclusion on the ground that it is foreclosed by the statute. See post, at 221 (asserting that the delay at issue in this case is “not necessarily” covered by subparagraph (D)). Instead, it joins the Government in asserting that the Act is amenable to another interpretation that would avoid the “strange result” that “petitioner may be entitled to dismissal of the charges against him because his attorney persuaded a Magistrate Judge to give the defense additional time to prepare pretrial motions and thus delayed the commencement of his trial.” Post, at 217. This argument takes aim at an exaggerated target. Because we conclude that the type of delay at issue here is excludable under subsection (h)(7), courts can in future cases easily avoid the result the dissent decries, a result that is not certain even in this case. See infra, at 214-215. And even if dismissal is ultimately required on remand, a desire to avoid this result does not justify reading subsection (h)(1) (and specifically its reference to “other proceedings concerning the defendant”) to permit automatic exclusion of delay resulting from virtually any decision to continue a deadline.
The dissent first argues that the delay in this case is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1) because the provision's use of the phrase “including but not limited to” shows that subsection (h)(1) permits automatic exclusion of delays beyond those covered by its enumerated subparagraphs. See post, at 219; see also United States v. Oberoi, 547 F. 3d 436, 450 (CA2 2008). This argument confuses the illustrative nature of subsection (h)(l)’s list of categories of excludable delay (each of which is represented by a subparagraph) with the contents of the categories themselves. That the list of categories is illustrative rather than exhaustive in no way undermines our conclusion that a delay that falls within the category of delay addressed by subparagraph (D) is governed by the limits in that subparagraph. The “in-eluding but not limited to” clause would affect our conclusion only if one read it to modify the contents of subparagraph (D) as well as the list itself. As noted, such a reading would violate settled principles of statutory construction because it would ignore the structure and grammar of subsection (h)(1), and in so doing render even the clearest of the sub-paragraphs indeterminate and virtually superfluous. See Gozlon-Peretz, supra, at 410; Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (“[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our reading avoids these problems by treating the list as illustrative, but construing each of the eight subparagraphs in (h)(1) to govern, conclusively unless the subparagraph itself indicates otherwise, see, e. g., § 3161(h)(1)(A); supra, at 206-207, the automatic excludability of the delay resulting from the category of proceedings it addresses.
The dissent responds that, even if subparagraph (D)’s limits are conclusive rather than merely illustrative, we should automatically exclude the delay at issue here under subsection (h)(l)’s opening clause, see post, at 218, because it is not “clear” that the delay is governed by the more specific (and restrictive) language in subparagraph (D). Post, at 222. We decline this invitation to use the alleged uncertainty in subparagraph (D)’s scope as a justification for disregarding its limits and instead expanding, through liberal interpretation of subsection (h)(l)’s generic opening clause, what the dissent itself describes as the automatic exclusion “exception]” to the Act’s 70-day period and the Act’s “general rule” requiring “ends-of-justice findings for continuances.” Post, at 227.
On the dissent’s reading of subsection (h)(1), a court could extend by weeks or months, without any finding that the incursion on the Act’s timeliness guarantee is justified, the entire portion of a criminal proceeding for which the Act sets a default limit of 70 days. The problem with this reading is clear: It relies on an interpretation of subsection (h)(1) that admits of no principled, text-based limit on the definition of a “proceeding] concerning the defendant,” and thus threatens the Act’s manifest purpose of ensuring speedy trials by construing the Act’s automatic exclusion exceptions in a manner that could swallow the 70-day rule. This approach is not justified, much less compelled, by the textual ambiguities and legislative history upon which the dissent relies. Nor is it justified by the prospect, however appealing, of reaching a different result in this case. Hence our conclusion that the text and structure of subsection (h)(1) do not permit automatic exclusion of the delay at issue in this case.
2
Our conclusion is further supported by subsection (h)(l)’s context, particularly neighboring subsection (h)(7). Subsection (h)(7) provides that delays “resulting from a continuance granted by any judge” may be excluded, but only if the judge finds that “the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial” and records those findings. In setting forth the statutory factors that justify a continuance under subsection (h)(7), Congress twice recognized the importance of adequate pretrial preparation time. See § 3161(h) (7)(B)(ii) (requiring a district court to consider whether the “unusual” or “complex” nature of a case makes it “unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits” (emphasis added)); §3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (requiring a district court to consider in other cases “[wjhether the failure to grant such a continuance... would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence” (emphasis added)). Our determination that the delay at issue here is not automatically excludable gives full effect to subsection (h)(7), and respects its provisions for excluding certain types of delay only where a district court makes findings justifying the exclusion. Cf. post, at 227 (construing subsection (h)(1) in a manner that could encompass, and govern, delays expressly within subsection (h)(7)’s purview).
3
Finally, our Speedy Trial Act precedents support our reading of subsection (h)(1). We recently explained that the Act serves not only to protect defendants, but also to vindicate the public interest in the swift administration of justice. We thus held that a defendant may not opt out of the Act even if he believes it would be in his interest; “[ajilowing prospective waivers would seriously undermine the Act because there are many cases... in which the prosecution, the defense, and the court would all be happy to opt out of the Act, to the detriment of the public interest.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U. S. 489, 502 (2006).
Courts of Appeals that have read subsection (h)(1) to exclude automatically pretrial motion preparation time have reasoned that their interpretation is necessary to provide defendants adequate time to build their defense. See, e. g., United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 871 E 2d 902, 913 (per curiam), opinion supplemented on other grounds on rehearing, 881 F. 2d 866 (CA10 1989) (per curiam). Yet these same courts have recognized that reading subsection (h)(1) to exclude all time for preparing pretrial motions would undermine the guarantee of a speedy trial, and thus harm the public interest we have recognized in preserving that guarantee even where one or both parties to a proceeding would be willing to waive it. See Zedner, supra, at 502. To avoid a result so inconsistent with the statute’s purpose — i. e., “to avoid

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 元