Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The question we must decide in this case is whether an Illinois remedy which requires property owners contesting their property taxes to pay under protest and if successful obtain a refund without interest in two years is “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” within the meaning of the Act.
I
LaSalle National Bank is trustee of a land trust for Patricia Cook, the beneficial owner of property improved with a 22-unit apartment building in' the all-black low-income community of East Chicago Heights, Ill., located in Cook County. Respondent alleged that, as of January 1, 1977, her property had a fair market value of $46,000. In accordance with a Cook County ordinance, her property should have been assessed for property tax purposes at 33% of fair market value — $15,180. Instead, for the 1977 tax year, the County Assessor assessed the property at $52,150. As a result, respondent's property tax liability was $6,106 instead of $1,775, an overcharge of $4,331.
Respondent also claimed that the County Assessor “knowingly as official policy or governmental custom maintained, adopted or promulgated policy statements, regulations, decisions and systems of assessment which have produced egregious disparities in assessments throughout the County." Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 11, App. 7. In particular, she cited a study of the Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs showing that, for 1975, property in the same class as respondent's was assessed as low as 3% and as high as 973% of fair market value. She furthermore alleged that such disparities in assessments were “far greater in number and size in older, inner city and county areas, owned, inhabited or used to a larger extent by minorities and poorer people.” Ibid. Finally, she contended that the Assessor knew that she had previously challenged the 1974, 1975, and 1976 assessments of her property.
Respondent first exhausted her administrative remedy by appealing unsuccessfully for a correction of her 1977 assessment before the Cook County Board of Appeals. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 594 (1), 596, 597, 598, 599 (1977). Her only remaining state remedy was to pay the contested tax under protest, and then to file an objection to the Cook County Collector’s Application for Judgment before the Circuit Court of Cook County — in effect a reverse suit for refund. §§ 675, 716. Although Illinois’ statutory refund procedure could theoretically provide a final resolution of the dispute within one year of payment of the tax under protest, respondent alleged that the customary delay from the time of payment until the receipt of refund upon successful protest is two years. The tax refund is not accompanied by a payment of interest. Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 109, 306 N. E. 2d 299, 303 (1973); Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 422-423, 167 N. E. 2d 236, 240-241 (1960).
Respondent refused to pay her 1977 property taxes and instead brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent petitioner Rosewell from publishing an advertisement of notice and the intended date of Application for Judgment, from applying for judgment and order of sale against her property, and from selling it. Respondent contended that, by requiring payment of taxes times the lawful amount, petitioners deprived her of equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and violated state constitutional and statutory rights as well. Respondent further alleged that she had no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Illinois courts.
Petitioners moved to dismiss, claiming that actions challenging state tax assessments are not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343, and that Illinois’ statutory refund procedure is a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy even though it fails to pay interest. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, App. 11.
The District Court denied respondent’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1341. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-21a. However, the court enjoined petitioner Rose well from proceeding to judgment and order of sale against respondent’s property pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62 (c). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal district court jurisdiction because Illinois’ procedure of no-interest refunds after two years was not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” 604 F. 2d 530, 536-537 (1979). A petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied. Id., at 530. We granted certiorari, 445 U. S. 925 (1980), and now reverse.
II
At the outset, it must be recognized that the issue we decide is one of statutory construction. Our task is to determine whether the Illinois refund procedure constitutes “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy... in the courts of such State” within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, thereby barring federal jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Our review of the plain language of the Act, its legislative history, and its underlying purpose persuades us that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Illinois remedy is not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.”
A
The starting point of our inquiry is the plain language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979); 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951). See ERA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, 73 (1980). The Tax Injunction Act generally prohibits federal district courts from enjoining state tax administration except in instances where the state-court remedy is not “plain, speedy and efficient.” On its face, the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception appears to require a state-court remedy that meets certain minimal procedural criteria. The Court has only occasionally sought to define the meaning of the exception since passage of the Act in 1937. When it has done so, however, the Court has emphasized a procedural interpretation in defining both the entire phrase and its individual word components.
Discussing the general meaning of the phrase, the Court, in Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74 (1976), described its “basic inquiry” as “whether under New York law there is a 'plain, speedy and efficient’ way for [the taxpayer] to press its constitutional claims while preserving the right to challenge the amount of tax due.” More directly, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 300-301 (1943), the Court stated:
“[I]t is the court’s duty to withhold such relief when, as in the present case, it appears that the state legislature has provided that on payment of any challenged tax to the appropriate state officer, the taxpayer may maintain a suit to recover it back. In such a suit he may assert his federal rights and secure a review of them by this Court. This affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer, and at the same time leaves undisturbed the state’s administration of its taxes.” (Emphasis added.)
See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 625 (1946) (issue is “whether the State affords full protection to the federal rights”).
What little can be gleaned from the legislative history of the Act on the phrase “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” lends further support to a procedural interpretation. Senator Bone, the Act’s primary sponsor, referred to the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” provision and then stated: “Thus a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy is assured.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). The Senate Report accompanying the Act mirrors Senator Bone’s understanding, adding that “[a]n appeal to the Supreme Court of the United State is available as in other cases.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).
The phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in the Tax Injunction Act was “modeled” after verbatim language in the Johnson Act of 1934, an Act prohibiting federal-court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities. As Senator Bone made clear, “[m]ost of the arguments which were used in support of the Johnson Act... apply in like manner” to the Tax Injunction Act. 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). Our examination of the Johnson Act and its legislative history reveals the same procedural emphasis as found in the Tax Injunction Act and its legislative history. As gloss on the words “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” the Senate Report on the Johnson Act spoke of state laws that provided for an appeal from the determination of the state agency by any dissatisfied party. S. Rep. No. 701, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1932). The Senate Report continued: “This appeal is taken to the courts of the State, thus giving to both sides of any controversy which may arise a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy.” Id., at 2 (emphasis added).
There is no doubt that the Illinois state-court refund procedure provides the taxpayer with a “full hearing and judicial determination” at which she may ratee any and all constitutional objections to the tax. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 (1974). Appeal to the higher Illinois courts is authorized, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675 (1977), and review is ultimately available in this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Respondent does not allege any procedural defect in the Illinois remedy, other than delay, that would preclude preservation and consideration of her federal rights, since she is free to raise her equal protection and due process federal constitutional objections during the Application for Judgment proceedings before the Circuit Court of Cook County. Rather, respondent's argument — that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on the tax refund makes the remedy not “plain, speedy and efficient” — appears to address a more substantive concern. Whether she has any “federal right” to receive interest — a right she has not asserted and on which we express no view — it would appear that she could assert this right in the state-court proceeding. The procedural mechanism for correction of her tax bill remains the same, however, whether interest is paid or not.
B
A procedural interpretation of the phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” and the procedural sufficiency of Illinois’ remedy, are supported further by analysis of the phrase’s individual words. According to the 1934 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary, plain means “clear” or “manifest,” speedy means “quick,” efficient means “characterized by effective activity,” and a remedy is the “legal means to recover a right... or obtain redress for... a wrong.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 819, 1878, 2106, 2418 (2d ed. 1934).
While the Court has never addressed the meaning of the word “speedy,” it has interpreted the words “plain” and “efficient.” Thus, the Court suggested that “uncertainty concerning a State’s remedy may make it less than ‘plain’ under 28 U. S. C. § 1341.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 76. Earlier cases, without making a direct connection to the word “plain,” have held that “uncertainty” surrounding a state-court remedy lifts the bar to federal-court jurisdiction. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 625-626. Respondent has made no argument that the Illinois refund procedure is uncertain or otherwise unclear. There is no question that under the Illinois procedure, the court will hear and decide any federal claim. Paying interest or eliminating delay would not make the remedy any more “plain.”
This Court’s interpretation of the word “efficient” has also stressed procedural elements. In Tully, the Court commented that “a State’s remedy does not become ‘inefficient,’ merely because a taxpayer must travel across a state line in order to resist or challenge the taxes sought to be imposed.” 429 U. S., at 73. In addition, without explicitly mentioning the word “efficient,” we have permitted federal-court jurisdiction when the taxpayer’s state-court remedy would require a multiplicity of suits, Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 303 (1952) (where remedy “would require the filing of over three hundred separate claims in fourteen different counties to protect the single federal claim asserted by [the taxpayer]”), or when the remedy would allow a challenge against only one of many taxing authorities, id., at 301, 303 (where suit-for-refund remedy-applied only to state taxes, yet taxpayer railroad also wanted to challenge on the same basis taxes paid to counties, school districts, and municipalities). Because the Illinois remedy imposes no unusual hardship on respondent requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy, we cannot say that it is not “efficient.”
This Court has never expressly discussed the meaning of the word “speedy,” an issue that is squarely presented in this case. We must decide whether Illinois’ refund after two years qualifies as a “speedy” remedy. “Speedy” is perforce a relative concept, and we must assess the 2-year delay against the usual time for similar litigation. It surely is no secret that state and federal trial courts have been beset by docket congestion and delay for many years. Whether this is a necessary, let alone a reasonable, condition of 20th-century litigation is beside the point: The fact of the matter is that legal conflicts are not resolved as quickly as we would like.
In 1976, the median number of days from filing a complaint to disposition of a civil trial matter in 13 urban trial courts ranged from 357 to 980. National Center for State Courts, Justice Delayed 10-11 (1978). In 7 of the 13, over 30% of the civil cases took more than two years from start to finish. Id., at 13. The Cook County Circuit Court had a similar record: from 1974 to 1975, the average time from date of filing to verdict was about 40 months. U. S. Department of Justice, State Court Caseload Statistics: The State of the Art 7 (1978). Federal district courts have not fared much better. As of 1980, the median time interval from filing to disposition for civil cases going to trial was 20 months; 10% of those took more than 46 months. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 81, A-30 (1980). For the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the District in which respondent brought this suit, the median time interval was 23 months, with 10% of all cases over 53 months. Id., at A-31.
Cast in this light, respondent’s 2-year wait, regrettably, is not unusual. Nowhere in the Tax Injunction Act did Congress suggest that the remedy must be the speediest. The payment of interest might make the wait more tolerable, but it would not affect the amount of time necessary to adjudicate respondent’s federal claims. Limiting ourselves to the circumstances of the instant case, we cannot say that respondent’s 2-year delay falls outside the boundary of a “speedy” remedy.
c
The overall purpose of the Tax Injunction Act is consistent with the view that the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception to the Act’s prohibition was only designed to require that the state remedy satisfy certain procedural criteria, and that Illinois’ refund procedure meets such criteria. The statute “has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 301 (Act “predicated upon the desirability of freeing, from interference by the federal courts, state procedures which authorize litigation challenging a tax after the tax has been paid”).
When it passed the Act, Congress knew that state tax systems commonly provided for payment of taxes under protest with subsequent refund as their exclusive remedy. The Senate Report to the Act noted:
“It is the common practice for statutes of the various States to forbid actions in State courts to enjoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is invalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes generally provide that taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest. This type of State legislation makes it possible for the States and their various agencies to survive while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937).
See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). See also Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 526 (1932).
It is only common sense to presume that Congress was also aware that some of these same States did not pay interest on their refunds to taxpayers, following the then-familiar rule that interest in refund actions was recoverable only when expressly allowed by statute. 3 T. Cooley, Law of Taxation § 1308, pp. 2596-2597 (4th ed. 1924). It would be wholly unreasonable, therefore, to construe a statute passed to limit federal-court interference in state tax matters to mean that Congress nevertheless wanted taxpayers from States not paying interest on refunds to have unimpaired access to the federal courts. If Congress had meant to carve out such an expansive exception, one would expect to find some mention of it. The statute’s broad prophylactic language is incompatible with such an interpretation.
Ill
For the most part, respondent rests her case on the persuasiveness of a syllogism: the Tax Injunction Act is coterminous with pre-1937 federal equity treatment of challenges to state taxes; federal equity practice at that time viewed a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate; therefore, it must follow that the Tax Injunction Act would view a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate, thereby authorizing federal jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 21. This argument also forms part of the basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision. 604 F. 2d, at 533, n. 4. And even petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 40, suggest that the Tax Injunction Act is “a congressional confirmation of the Court’s prior federal equity practice in the area of state and local taxation.” We are unpersuaded. It is true that post-1937 Court cases have suggested that the Tax Injunction Act recognized and sanctioned pre-existing federal equity practice. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 470 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 622-623; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 298-299. But these cases do no more than confirm that “the statute has its roots in equity practice,” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73, and that it was a longstanding rule of federal equity to keep out of state tax matters as long as a “plain, adequate and complete remedy” could be had at law. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, supra, at 622-623. Nothing in our decisions suggests that every wrinkle of federal equity practice was codified, intact, by Congress.
Indeed, Congress, among other things, legislated to solve an existing problem by cutting back federal equity jurisdiction. Senator Bone commented that the “existing practice of the Federal courts to entertain tax-injunction suits make[s] it possible for foreign corporations to withhold from a State and its governmental subdivisions taxes in such vast amounts and for such long periods as to disrupt State and county finances, and thus make it possible for such corporations to determine for themselves the amount of taxes they will pay.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (emphasis added). See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). He furthermore noted that “[p] revision is made that the bill is not to affect suits pending at the time of its enactment.” 81 Cong. Rec., at 1415. Thus, Congress plainly did not intend to permit the federal courts after passage of the Tax Injunction Act to entertain suits in all cases cognizable by them prior to the Act.
Furthermore, Congress did not equate § 1341’s “plain, speedy and efficient” with equity’s “plain, adequate and complete.” Ever since the early days of Congress, this “plain, adequate and complete”. standard of federal equity practice had been codified into statutory form. 1 Stat. 82. And it was not until 1948, more than 10 years after passage of the Tax Injunction Act, that the “Suits in Equity” statute was repealed. 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1946 ed.) (repealed June 25, 1948). Against this background, we will not interpret the Tax Injunction Act as substantially redundant of § 384.
IV
Finally, we note that the reasons supporting federal noninterference are just as compelling today as they were in 1937. If federal injunctive relief were available,
“state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 体