Task: songer_appnonp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:
The Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Nevada Outdoor Recreation Association (collectively referred to as NRDC) brought suit challenging the environmental impact statement (EIS) and land use plan issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) concerning livestock grazing on public lands in the Reno, Nevada area. The district court granted summary judgment for the BLM in a published opinion dated December 30, 1985. NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F.Supp. 1045 (D.Nev.1985). We affirm on the basis of that published opinion.
FACTS
The BLM manages approximately 171 million acres of federal lands in 11 western states. The BLM was entrusted with this management responsibility by the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-l (1982). For the purpose of supervising livestock grazing on these lands, the BLM divides the lands into grazing districts, which are subdivided into planning areas. These planning areas are further subdivided into grazing allotments, for which the BLM issues grazing permits. This case deals with the 5 million acre Reno planning area, which includes some 700,000 acres under BLM supervision.
In the leading case in this area, NRDC v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C.1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1976), a single EIS which the BLM had prepared for its entire livestock grazing program was rejected as inadequate under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982). The reason for rejection was that the program-wide EIS did not provide “the detailed analysis of local geographic conditions necessary for the decision-maker to determine what course of action is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 838-39. The Morton court held that NEPA required assessment of the environmental effects of particular permits or groups of permits in specific areas, although it emphasized that it was not requiring preparation of an EIS for each grazing permit. Id. at 841.
After the decision in Morton, Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (Land Policy and Management Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1982), to guide the BLM’s management of grazing and other activities on public lands. That act states that it is the policy of the United States that present and future use of public lands be projected through a land use planning process. Id. at § 1701(a)(2). The act lists criteria for developing and revising land use plans, including observation of multiple use and sustained yield principles, and the giving of priority to the protection of areas of critical environmental concern. Id. at 1712(c)(lH8). Congress also enacted additional legislation, the Public Rangelands Improvements Act of 1978 (Rangelands Act), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1982), to supplement and refine the Land Policy and Management Act. It did so by authorizing additional funding for on-the-ground range rehabilitation, maintenance and the construction of range improvements. Id. at § 1904.
In the late 1970’s, the BLM began gathering inventory data and listing available resources, laying the groundwork for a comprehensive grazing management plan and EIS for the Reno planning area. The BLM then drafted the first Management Framework Plan (Plan I), in which individual planning recommendations were compiled and justified based on substantive law or agency policies. Subsequently, the BLM drafted a second land use plan (Plan II), which attempted to identify and analyze resource conflicts between various recommendations or uses.
Plan II then served as the “proposed action” within a draft EIS which was issued in July 1982. The draft EIS compared the “proposed action” with three alternatives denominated as “no action,” “resource protection,” and “maximization of livestock.” After purportedly considering public commentary, the BLM issued a final EIS, which essentially incorporated the draft EIS. In December 1982, the “proposed action” was adopted as Plan III, or final land use plan for grazing in the Reno planning area.
The. final land use plan places each of the approximately 55 grazing allotments contained within the Reno planning area into one of the following three categories: (1) Maintenance, for allotments which are in adequate ecological condition, and for which present management policies are satisfactory; (2) Improvement, for allotments which are in fair to poor ecological condition but have potential for improvement, and for which present management practices are not adequate to meet long term objectives; and (3) Custodial, for allotments which are in stable ecological condition but with limited potential for improvement. The plan focuses BLM efforts on allotments in the Improvement category, by initially allowing grazing to continue at existing levels, while attempting to effect improvement through range improvements, monitoring, and consultation with affected parties. The plan called for continued monitoring of the allotments so that adjustments in grazing levels could be made later as needed.
The NRDC protested the adoption of Plan III as a final agency decision to both the state BLM Director and the Director of the BLM. These protests were rejected. The NRDC then filed suit in federal district court, challenging the adequacy and legality of the EIS and final land use plan. The district court granted the BLM’s motion for summary judgment, and denied the NRDC’s motion for summary judgment. The NRDC timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 981 (9th Cir.1985).
By contrast, the standards of review which the district court was bound to apply in reviewing the EIS and final land use plan are deferential. The standard which a district court must apply in assessing the adequacy of an EIS is two-fold. First, under the Administrative Procedure Act, NEPA’s procedural requirements must be observed. Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.1985); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982). Second, the court must determine whether the EIS accomplishes its purpose, which is both to provide decision makers with enough information to assist them in deciding whether to proceed with a project in light of its environmental consequences, and to provide the public with information and the chance to participate in gathering information. Citizens for a Better Henderson, 768 F.2d at 1056. We have emphasized that this standard requires the court to make a pragmatic judgment as to whether the EIS promotes informed decision-making and public participation, without substituting its judgment for that of the agency concerning the wisdom or prudence of a proposed action. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir.1982).
The standard which the district court was bound to apply in assessing the validity of the final land use plan is whether this agency action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). We have pointed out that the scope of judicial review under this standard is narrow, and that a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692-93 (9th Cir.1974). Moreover, an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers, or of its own regulations, is entitled to deference, although the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory or regulatory construction. See Southern California Edison Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.1985); McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.1982).
Here, the district court concluded that the BLM had not violated NEPA by adopting a course of action prior to preparation of the EIS. NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F.Supp. at 1049-50. It further concluded that neither NEPA nor the Morton decision required the EIS to contain specific proposals and alternatives for each of the 55 grazing allotments within the Reno planning area, as suggested by the NRDC. The court held that the range of alternatives presented in the EIS was sufficiently broad to satisfy NEPA, and that inclusion of a “no grazing” alternative was not required under NEPA or applicable federal regulations. Id. at 1051-54. The court also held that neither NEPA nor federal regulations required inclusion of site-specific estimates of grazing capacity in the EIS, and that the EIS adequately described the proposed action. Id. at 1055-56.
Similarly, the district court rejected the NRDC’s arguments that the final land use plan allowed continued overgrazing and failed to assure improvement of public rangelands in violation of the Land Policy and Management Act and the Rangelands Act. Id. at 1057-58. Moreover, it held that the plan was sufficiently detailed, and need not determine grazing capacity or allocate forage for each individual allotment in order to satisfy the Land Policy and Management Act, the Rangelands Act, and BLM regulations. Id. at 1059-60. Finally, the court concluded that the BLM’s policy decision to eschew the use of available inventory and monitoring data for purposes of setting grazing levels on the various allotments in the Reno area was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Id. at 1060-62.
Reduced to its essence, the NRDC’s challenge to the EIS and the final land use plan is a challenge to the BLM’s policy decision to postpone livestock grazing adjustments until reliable data was available. While we sympathize with the NRDC’s strong desire to preserve the environment, we agree with the district court that we cannot label this policy decision as either irrational, or contrary to law. Thus, “[a]t this point, judicial inquiry is at an end.” Id. at 1062.
Having thoroughly reviewed the district court’s thoughtful opinion, as well as the NRDC’s challenges to that opinion on this appeal, we conclude the court properly applied the governing standards of review to arrive at reasonable conclusions. Accordingly, substantially as set forth in Judge Burns’ published opinion, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
. The NRDC complains that the district court incorrectly assumed that the BLM sets grazing capacity on an on-going basis when it issues or renews grazing permits or licenses. We agree with the BLM that this assumption was not essential to the district court’s conclusion that the Land Policy and Management Act and Rangelands Act "demand no more” than broad, objective-oriented land use plans. NRDC v. Hodel, 624 F.Supp. at 1060. And, if grazing capacity specifications are not essential to a valid land use plan, they do not need to be included in an EIS that evaluates the plan and compares it to other alternatives. Id.
The NRDC also claims the district court erred in citing provisions of the “proposed action" alternative in the EIS in support of the final land use plan’s validity. Our review of the record satisfies us, however, that the plan incorporated the "proposed action.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 3