Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

PER CURIAM:
Defendant Ernesto Bosquez-Villarreal appeals the denial by the district court of his motion for release pending his trial for various drug offenses. Persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to release Villarreal pending his trial, we affirm.
I.
Defendant Bosquez was arrested on November 4, 1988, on the United States/Mexican border in Laredo after approximately five kilograms of cocaine was discovered during a search of his vehicle. Bosquez was ultimately indicted by a grand jury on charges of (1) conspiracy to import into the United States in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 952(a), and 960(b)(1) (Count 1); (2) knowing importation of in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(b)(1); (Count 2); (3) possession with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count 3); (4) making a false statement as to his name to the Drug Enforcement Agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 4); and (5) making a false statement as to his name to a United States Magistrate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Count 5). Record Vol. 1 at 6-8.
Thereafter, Bosquez filed a “Motion Requesting that Court Set Reasonable Bail on Pending Charges.” At the evidentiary hearing on the above motion before the district court, Bosquez presented evidence of his good character and stability through the testimony of two friends. On cross-examination, however, it was revealed that the two friends had in fact not seen Bos-quez for some period of time. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Bosquez’s motion for reasonable bail after noting that Bosquez committed a crime involving a large amount of cocaine, that the maximum sentence for the crime was more than ten years, that the minimum sentence for the crime was at least ten years, and that Bosquez had lied about his identity when he was initially arrested and brought before a United States magistrate. Bosquez now appeals.
II.
Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50, “[t]he setting of bail is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court. We review the exercise of that discretion only for abuse.” United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir.1988). To successfully detain an individual without bail pending trial, the Government is obligated to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the appearance of the defendant cannot reasonably be assured by any condition or combination of conditions of bail. United States v. Trosper, 809 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir.1987); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In satisfying the above burden, the Government is aided by a rebuttable presumption which arises by virtue of section 3142(e)
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required ... if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act....
Nevertheless, the Government still retains the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the defendant’s pretrial detention.
In the instant case, the above statutory presumption against bail was invoked after the district court found probable cause to conclude that Bosquez committed the drug offenses with which he was charged. Even though Bosquez introduced controverting evidence to rebut that presumption, the district court found Bosquez’s evidence to be unconvincing and to “raise a lot of questions.” After reviewing the record, we are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bosquez’s motion for bail pending trial; therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A