Task: sc_issue_1

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice ALITOdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Darius Clark sent his girlfriend hundreds of miles away to engage in prostitution and agreed to care for her two young children while she was out of town. A day later, teachers discovered red marks on her 3-year-old son, and the boy identified Clark as his abuser. The question in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause prohibited prosecutors from introducing those statements when the child was not available to be cross-examined. Because neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in Clark's prosecution, the child's statements do not implicate the Confrontation Clause and therefore were admissible at trial.
I
Darius Clark, who went by the nickname "Dee," lived in Cleveland, Ohio, with his girlfriend, T.T., and her two children: L.P., a 3-year-old boy, and A.T., an 18-month-old girl.Clark was also T.T.'s pimp, and he would regularly send her on trips to Washington, D.C., to work as a prostitute. In March 2010, T.T. went on one such trip, and she left the children in Clark's care.
The next day, Clark took L.P. to preschool. In the lunchroom, one of L.P.'s teachers, Ramona Whitley, observed that L.P.'s left eye appeared bloodshot. She asked him " '[w]hat happened,' " and he initially said nothing. 137 Ohio St.3d 346, 347, 2013-Ohio-4731, 999 N.E.2d 592, 594. Eventually, however, he told the teacher that he " 'fell.' " Ibid. When they moved into the brighter lights of a classroom, Whitley noticed " '[r]ed marks, like whips of some sort,' " on L.P.'s face. Ibid.She notified the lead teacher, Debra Jones, who asked L.P., " 'Who did this? What happened to you?' " Id., at 348, 999 N.E.2d, at 595. According to Jones, L.P. "'seemed kind of bewildered' " and "'said something like, Dee, Dee.' " Ibid. Jones asked L.P. whether Dee is "big or little," to which L.P. responded that "Dee is big." App. 60, 64. Jones then brought L.P. to her supervisor, who lifted the boy's shirt, revealing more injuries. Whitley called a child abuse hotline to alert authorities about the suspected abuse.
When Clark later arrived at the school, he denied responsibility for the injuries and quickly left with L.P. The next day, a social worker found the children at Clark's mother's house and took them to a hospital, where a physician discovered additional injuries suggesting child abuse. L.P. had a black eye, belt marks on his back and stomach, and bruises all over his body. A.T. had two black eyes, a swollen hand, and a large burn on her cheek, and two pigtails had been ripped out at the roots of her hair.
A grand jury indicted Clark on five counts of felonious assault (four related to A.T. and one related to L.P.), two counts of endangering children (one for each child), and two counts of domestic violence (one for each child). At trial, the State introduced L.P.'s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark's guilt, but L.P. did not testify. Under Ohio law, children younger than 10 years old are incompetent to testify if they "appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." Ohio Rule Evid. 601(A)(Lexis 2010). After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded that L.P. was not competent to testify. But under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807, which allows the admission of reliable hearsay by child abuse victims, the court ruled that L.P.'s statements to his teachers bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted as evidence.
Clark moved to exclude testimony about L.P.'s out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that L.P.'s responses were not testimonial statements covered by the Sixth Amendment. The jury found Clark guilty on all counts except for one assault count related to A.T., and it sentenced him to 28 years' imprisonment. Clark appealed his conviction, and a state appellate court reversed on the ground that the introduction of L.P.'s out-of-court statements violated the Confrontation Clause.
In a 4-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. It held that, under this Court's Confrontation Clause decisions, L.P.'s statements qualified as testimonial because the primary purpose of the teachers' questioning "was not to deal with an existing emergency but rather to gather evidence potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution." 137 Ohio St.3d, at 350, 999 N.E.2d, at 597. The court noted that Ohio has a "mandatory reporting" law that requires certain professionals, including preschool teachers, to report suspected child abuse to government authorities. See id.,at 349-350, 999 N.E.2d, at 596-597. In the court's view, the teachers acted as agents of the State under the mandatory reporting law and "sought facts concerning past criminal activity to identify the person responsible, eliciting statements that 'are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' " Id.,at 355, 999 N.E.2d, at 600(quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,557 U.S. 305, 310-311, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009); some internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 43, 189 L.Ed.2d 896 (2014), and we now reverse.
II
A
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which is binding on the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." In Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), we interpreted the Clause to permit the admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness, so long as the statements bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " Such indicia are present, we held, if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ibid.
In Crawford v. Washington,541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), we adopted a different approach. We explained that "witnesses," under the Confrontation Clause, are those "who bear testimony," and we defined "testimony" as "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Id.,at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Sixth Amendment, we concluded, prohibits the introduction of testimonial statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is "unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id.,at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Applying that definition to the facts in Crawford,we held that statements by a witness during police questioning at the station house were testimonial and thus could not be admitted. But our decision in Crawforddid not offer an exhaustive definition of "testimonial" statements. Instead, Crawfordstated that the label "applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations." Id.,at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Our more recent cases have labored to flesh out what it means for a statement to be "testimonial." In Davis v. Washingtonand Hammon v. Indiana,547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), which we decided together, we dealt with statements given to law enforcement officers by the victims of domestic abuse. The victim in Davismade statements to a 911 emergency operator during and shortly after her boyfriend's violent attack. In Hammon,the victim, after being isolated from her abusive husband, made statements to police that were memorialized in a " 'battery affidavit.' " Id.,at 820, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
We held that the statements in Hammonwere testimonial, while the statements in Daviswere not. Announcing what has come to be known as the "primary purpose" test, we explained: "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Id.,at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Because the cases involved statements to law enforcement officers, we reserved the question whether similar statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers would raise similar issues under the Confrontation Clause. See id.,at 823, n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
In Michigan v. Bryant,562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), we further expounded on the primary purpose test. The inquiry, we emphasized, must consider "all of the relevant circumstances." Id.,at 369, 131 S.Ct. 1143. And we reiterated our view in Davisthat, when "the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an 'ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the [Confrontation] Clause." 562 U.S., at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143. At the same time, we noted that "there may be othercircumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Ibid."[T]he existence vel nonof an ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial inquiry." Id.,at 374, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Instead, "whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor... that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the 'primary purpose' of an interrogation." Id.,at 366, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
One additional factor is "the informality of the situation and the interrogation." Id.,at 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143. A "formal station-house interrogation," like the questioning in Crawford,is more likely to provoke testimonial statements, while less formal questioning is less likely to reflect a primary purpose aimed at obtaining testimonial evidence against the accused. Id.,at 366, 377, 131 S.Ct. 1143. And in determining whether a statement is testimonial, "standard rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant." Id.,at 358-359, 131 S.Ct. 1143. In the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the "primary purpose" of the conversation was to "creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Id.,at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Applying these principles in Bryant,we held that the statements made by a dying victim about his assailant were not testimonial because the circumstances objectively indicated that the conversation was primarily aimed at quelling an ongoing emergency, not establishing evidence for the prosecution. Because the relevant statements were made to law enforcement officers, we again declined to decide whether the same analysis applies to statements made to individuals other than the police. See id.,at 357, n. 3, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
Thus, under our precedents, a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial. "Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause." Id.,at 359, 131 S.Ct. 1143. But that does not mean that the Confrontation Clause bars every statement that satisfies the "primary purpose" test. We have recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding. See Giles v. California,554 U.S. 353, 358-359, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008); Crawford,541 U.S., at 56, n. 6, 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Thus, the primary purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause.
B
In this case, we consider statements made to preschool teachers, not the police. We are therefore presented with the question we have repeatedly reserved: whether statements to persons other than law enforcement officers are subject to the Confrontation Clause. Because at least some statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers could conceivably raise confrontation concerns, we decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding them from the Sixth Amendment's reach. Nevertheless, such statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers. And considering all the relevant circumstances here, L.P.'s statements clearly were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark's prosecution. Thus, their introduction at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
L.P.'s statements occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. When L.P.'s teachers noticed his injuries, they rightly became worried that the 3-year-old was the victim of serious violence. Because the teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release L.P. to his guardian at the end of the day, they needed to determine who might be abusing the child.Thus, the immediate concern was to protect a vulnerable child who needed help. Our holding in Bryantis instructive. As in Bryant,the emergency in this case was ongoing, and the circumstances were not entirely clear. L.P.'s teachers were not sure who had abused him or how best to secure his safety. Nor were they sure whether any other children might be at risk. As a result, their questions and L.P.'s answers were primarily aimed at identifying and ending the threat. Though not as harried, the conversation here was also similar to the 911 call in Davis. The teachers' questions were meant to identify the abuser in order to protect the victim from future attacks. Whether the teachers thought that this would be done by apprehending the abuser or by some other means is irrelevant. And the circumstances in this case were unlike the interrogation in Hammon,where the police knew the identity of the assailant and questioned the victim after shielding her from potential harm.
There is no indication that the primary purpose of the conversation was to gather evidence for Clark's prosecution. On the contrary, it is clear that the first objective was to protect L.P. At no point did the teachers inform L.P. that his answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L.P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the conversation between L.P. and his teachers was informal and spontaneous. The teachers asked L.P. about his injuries immediately upon discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunchroom and classroom, and they did so precisely as any concerned citizen would talk to a child who might be the victim of abuse. This was nothing like the formalized station-house questioning in Crawfordor the police interrogation and battery affidavit in Hammon.
L.P.'s age fortifies our conclusion that the statements in question were not testimonial. Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students understand the details of our criminal justice system. Rather, "[r]esearch on children's understanding of the legal system finds that" young children "have little understanding of prosecution." Brief for American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children as Amicus Curiae7, and n. 5 (collecting sources). And Clark does not dispute those findings. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child in L.P.'s position would intend his statements to be a substitute for trial testimony. On the contrary, a young child in these circumstances would simply want the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have no discernible purpose at all.
As a historical matter, moreover, there is strong evidence that statements made in circumstances similar to those facing L.P. and his teachers were admissible at common law. See Lyon & LaMagna, The History of Children's Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis,82 Ind. L.J. 1029, 1030 (2007); see also id.,at 1041-1044(examining child rape cases from 1687 to 1788); J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 239 (2003) ("The Old Bailey" court in 18th-century London "tolerated flagrant hearsay in rape prosecutions involving a child victim who was not competent to testify because she was too young to appreciate the significance of her oath"). And when 18th-century courts excluded statements of this sort, see, e.g., King v. Brasier,1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779), they appeared to do so because the child should have been ruled competent to testify, not because the statements were otherwise inadmissible. See Lyon & LaMagna, supra,at 1053-1054. It is thus highly doubtful that statements like L.P.'s ever would have been understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns. Neither Crawfordnor any of the cases that it has produced has mounted evidence that the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require the exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the time of the founding. Certainly, the statements in this case are nothing like the notorious use of ex parteexamination in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason, which we have frequently identified as "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed." Crawford,541 U.S., at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see also Bryant,562 U.S., at 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143.
Finally, although we decline to adopt a rule that statements to individuals who are not law enforcement officers are categorically outside the Sixth Amendment, the fact that L.P. was speaking to his teachers remains highly relevant. Courts must evaluate challenged statements in context, and part of that context is the questioner's identity. See id.,at 369, 131 S.Ct. 1143. Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Giles,554 U.S., at 376, 128 S.Ct. 2678. It is common sense that the relationship between a student and his teacher is very different from that between a citizen and the police. We do not ignore that reality. In light of these circumstances, the Sixth Amendment did not prohibit the State from introducing L.P.'s statements at trial.
III
Clark's efforts to avoid this conclusion are all off-base. He emphasizes Ohio's mandatory reporting obligations, in an attempt to equate L.P.'s teachers with the police and their caring questions with official interrogations. But the comparison is inapt. The teachers' pressing concern was to protect L.P. and remove him from harm's way. Like all good teachers, they undoubtedly would have acted with the same purpose whether or not they had

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 间