Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

O’CONNELL, Circuit Judge.
In 1925, petitioner inherited real estate valued at $67,000 in the decedent’s estate tax return. In 1927, she sold the property. The sale price was $97,500, of which $27,-500 was paid in cash and the remaining $70,000 was covered by a purchase money bond and mortgage bearing 6% interest. She did not report the taxable gain in either her 1927 or any subsequent income tax return.
In 1932, on the due date of the mortgage, the purchaser defaulted. Petitioner agreed to let the purchaser remain on the property in return for the payment of the 6% interest as it accrued. This arrangement continued until 1936, when the interest rate was reduced to 3%.
In 1941, the purchaser failed to pay the interest and asked that the mortgage be reduced from $70,000 to $5,000. This request was refused. Petitioner investigated the' purchaser’s financial condition, as a result of which she concluded that the mortgage debt, over and above the value of the collateral, was uncollectible. She thereupon instructed her agent to write off on the agent’s records the difference between $70,-000 and $26,800, the value of the property at that time. Entry on the agent’s records-was made accordingly, and petitioner claimed on her 1941 return the difference, $43,200, as a partial bad debt deduction. Respondent, disallowing most of that deduction, determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 1941 tax return.
In an unreported memorandum opinion, the Tax Court held that petitioner was entitled to claim a partial bad debt in 1941, since that was the date when “she ascertained * * * that the debtor had no assets other than the property in question from which she might reasonably have expected to make any substantial recovery on the indebtedness.” The Tax Court further held, however, that petitioner had erred in computing the deduction. It said, “No evidence was offered by petitioner as to the value of the note as of the date of ■sale in 1927. The only evidence in the case •as to such value is the determination by the respondent fixing said value at $37,238.75 * * *.” Petitioner was accordingly held entitled to a deduction of only $10,438.75.
Petitioner urges that the purchase money bond and mortgage in 1927 was worth its face value, $70,000. The Tax 'Court finding is alleged to be wrong on two grounds: (a) petitioner did introduce evidence of the value of the note, in that the sale price of $97,500 was evidence that the note was worth face value, and (b) respondent’s “deficiency letter is not evidence before the Tax Court, unless it is stipulated to be,” and consequently respondent’s valuation of $37,238.75 “was not in evidence at all.”
There can be no doubt that the value of the note in 1927 — be it $70,000, $37,238.75, or some third figure — as well as the value of the property itself, are purely questions of fact. See Mistrot v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 1936, 84 F.2d 545, and Maxfield v. United States, 9 Cir., 1945, 152 F.2d 593. If there is any evidentiary basis for the Tax Court’s finding, therefore, it is equally clear that this court may not substitute its own evaluation for that of the Tax Court. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 1943, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248; John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 1946, 326 U.S. 521, 527, 66 S.Ct 299, 90 L.Ed. 278. The deficiency letter of the Commissioner was part of the record before the Tax Court, by virtue of Rule 6(i) of the Rules of Practice Before the Tax Court of the United States, revised August 1, 1946, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, following section £012, which rule is authorized by Section 1111 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1111, as amended by Section 504 of the Revenue Act of 1942, October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 1100. Consequently, whether or not the deficiency letter was stipulated is immaterial; and, even if we were to assume arguendo that the evidence of the 1927 sale was also evidence of the fair value of the property and note, petitioner’s position at best would be to allege that her basis of computation was more sound than that of respondent. In such reweighing of factual evidence we may not indulge. “The Tax Court has the primary function of finding the facts in tax disputes, weighing the evidence, and choosing from among conflicting factual inferences and conclusions those which it considers most reasonable. The Circuit Courts of Appeal have no power to change or add to those findings of fact or to reweigh the evidence. And when the Tax Court’s factual inferences and conclusions are determinative of compliance with statutory requirements, the appellate courts are limited to a determination of whether they have any substantial basis in the evidence. The judicial eye must not in the first instance rove about searching for evidence to support other conflicting inferences and conclusions which the judges or the litigants may consider more reasonable or desirable. It must be cast directly and primarily upon the evidence in support of those made by the Tax Court. If a substantial basis is lacking the appellate court may then indulge in making its own inferences and conclusions or it may remand the case to the Tax Court for further appropriate proceedings. But if such a basis is present the process of judicial review is at an end. [Citing cases.]” Commissioner v. Scottish American Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 119, 123, 124, 65 S.Ct. 169, 171, 89 L.Ed. 113.
Accordingly, we need not review defenses of respondent directed to the merits of the case at bar.
The decision of the Tax Court will be affirmed.
Respondent arrived at this figure by subtracting from $67,000, the value at inheritance, (1) $2,261.25, depreciation at 2% for the two-year period during which she owned the property, and (2) $27,500, the cash payment made at the time of sale.
The burden of proving respondent’s determination invalid was, of course, upon petitioner. Rule 32, Rules of Practice Before the Tax Court of the United States; and see Helvering v. Taylor, 1935, 293 U.S. 507, 515, 55 S.Ct. 287, 79 L.Ed. 623.
Pertinent portions of the rule are as follows:
“Rule 6. * * * The Petition shall be complete in itself so as fully to state the issues. It shall contain:
* * * ❖ * * *
“(i) A copy of the notice of deficiency (or liability, as the case may be), shall be appended to the petition. If a statement has accompanied the notice of deficiency, so much thereof as is material to the issues set out in the assignments of error likewise shall be appended. * * * ”
We point out in passing that petitioner’s evaluation depends upon a note being worth its face value, a conclusion on which a difference of opinion is by no moans unlikely.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1