Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation has a protracted history in the courts below and has already resulted in one judgment and opinion by this Court. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977) (Dayton I). In its most recent opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approved a systemwide plan for desegregating the public schools of Dayton, Ohio. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F. 2d 243 (1978). The Court of Appeals found that the Dayton Board of Education had operated a racially segregated, dual school system at the time of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), and that “'[t]he evidence of record demonstrates convincingly that defendants have failed to eliminate the continuing systemwide effects of their prior discrimination” and “actually have exacerbated the racial separation existing at the time of Brown I.” 583 F. 2d, at 253. We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1066 (1979), and heard argument in this case in tandem with Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, ante, p. 449. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The public schools of Dayton are highly segregated by race. In the year the complaint was filed, 43% of the students in the Dayton system were black, but 51 of the 69 schools in the system were virtually all white or all black. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (SD Ohio 1977). A number of students in the Dayton system, through their parents, brought this action on April 17, 1972, alleging that the Dayton Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and the appropriate local and state officials were operating a racially segregated school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought a court order compelling desegregation. The District Court sustained their challenge, determining that certain actions by the Dayton Board amounted to a “cumulative” violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 1259. The District Court also approved a plan having limited remedial objectives.
The District Court’s judgment that the Board had violated the Fourteenth Amendment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; but after twice being reversed on the ground that the prescribed remedy was inadequate to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation, the District Court ordered the Board to take the necessary steps to assure that each school in the system would roughly reflect the systemwide ratio of black and white students. App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a. The Court of Appeals then affirmed. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 539 F. 2d 1084 (1976).
We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Dayton I, supra. In light of the District Court’s limited findings regarding liability, we concluded that there was no warrant for imposing a systemwide remedy. Rather, the District Court should have “determine [d] how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy.” 433 U. S., at 420. In view of the confusion evidenced at various stages of the proceedings regarding the scope of the violation established, we remanded the case to permit supplementation of the record and specific findings addressed to the scope of the remedy, id., at 418-419, but allowed the existing remedy to remain in effect on remand subject to further orders of the District Court, id., at 420-421.
The District Court held a supplemental evidentiary hearing, undertook to review the entire record anew, and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment dismissing the complaint. In support of its judgment, the District Court observed that, although various instances of purposeful segregation in the past evidenced “an inexcusable history of mistreatment of black students,” 446 F. Supp., at 1237, plaintiffs had failed to prove that acts of intentional segregation over 20 years old had any current incremental segregative effects. The District Court conceded that the Dayton schools were highly segregated but ruled that the Board's failure to alleviate this condition was not actionable absent sufficient evidence that the racial separation had been caused by the Board's own purposeful discriminatory conduct. In the District Court's eyes, plaintiffs had failed to show either discriminatory purpose or segregative effect, or both, with respect to the challenged practices and policies of the Board, which included faculty hiring and assignments, the use of optional attendance zones and transfer policies, the location and construction of new and expanded school facilities, and the rescission of certain prior resolutions recognizing the Board’s responsibility to eradicate racial separation in the public schools.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The basic ingredients of the Court of Appeals’ judgment were that at the time of Brown I, the Dayton Board was operating a dual school system, that it was constitutionally required to disestablish that system and its effects, that it had failed to discharge this duty, and that the consequences of the dual system, together with the intentionally segregative impact of various practices since 1954, were of systemwide import and an appropriate basis for a systemwide remedy. In arriving at these conclusions, the Court of Appeals found that in some instances the findings of the District Court were clearly erroneous and that in other respects the District Court had made errors of law. 583 F. 2d, at 247. Petitioners contend that the District Court, not the Court of Appeals, correctly understood both the facts and the law.
II
A
The Court of Appeals expressly held that, “at the time of Brown I, defendants were intentionally operating a dual school system in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment,” and that the “finding of the district court to the contrary is clearly erroneous.” 583 F. 2d, at 247 (footnote omitted). On the record before us, we perceive no basis for petitioners’ challenge to this holding of the Court of Appeals.
Concededly, in the eariy 1950’s, "77.6 percent of all students attended schools in which one race accounted for 90 percent or more of the students and 54.3 percent of the black students were assigned to four schools that were 100 percent black.” Id., at 248-249. One of these schools was Dunbar High School, which, the District Court found, had been established as a districtwide black high school with an all-black faculty and a black principal, and remained so at the time of Brown I and up until 1962. 446 F. Supp., at 1245. The District Court also found that “among” the early and relatively undisputed acts of purposeful segregation was the establishment of Garfield as a black elementary school. Id., at 1236-1237. The Court of Appeals found that two other elementary schools were, through a similar process of optional attendance zones and the creation and maintenance of all-black faculties, intentionally designated and operated as all-black schools in the 1930’s, in the 1940’s, and at the time of Brown I. 583 F. 2d, at 249, 250-251. Additionally, the District Court had specifically found that in 1950 the faculty at 100% black schools was 100% black and that the faculty at all other schools was 100% white. 446 F. Supp., at 1238.
These facts, the Court of Appeals held, made clear that the Board was purposefully operating segregated schools in a substantial part of the district, which warranted an inference and a finding that segregation in other parts of the system was also purposeful absent evidence sufficient to support a finding that the segregative actions “were not taken in effectuation of a policy to create or maintain segregation” or were not among the “factors... causing the existing condition of segregation in these schools.” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189, 214 (1973); see id., at 203; Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, ante, at 467-468. The District Court had therefore ignored the legal significance of the intentional maintenance of a substantial number of black schools in the system at the time of Brown 1. It had also ignored, contrary to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 18 (1971), the significance of purposeful segregation in faculty assignments in establishing the existence of a dual school system; here the “purposeful segregation of faculty by race was inextricably tied to racially motivated student assignment practices.” 583 F. 2d, at 248. Based on its review of the entire record, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Board had not responded with sufficient evidence to counter the inference that a dual system was in existence in Dayton in 1954. Thus, it concluded that the Board’s “intentional seg-regative practices cannot be confined in one distinct area”; they “infected the entire Dayton public school system.” Id., at 252.
B
Petitioners next contend that, even if a dual system did exist a quarter of a century ago, the Court of Appeals erred in finding any widespread violations of constitutional duty since that time.
Given intentionally segregated schools in 1954, however, the Court of Appeals was quite right in holding that the Board was thereafter under a continuing duty to eradicate the effects of that system, Columbus, ante, at 458, and that the systemwide nature of the violation furnished prima facie proof that current ségregation in the Dayton schools was caused at least in part by prior intentionally segregative official acts. Thus, judgment for the plaintiffs was authorized and required absent sufficient countervailing evidence by the defendant school officials. Keyes, supra, at 211; Swann, supra, at 26. At the time of trial, Dunbar High School and the three black elementary schools, or the schools that succeeded them, remained black schools; and most of the schools in Dayton were virtually one-race schools, as were 80% of the classrooms. “ ‘Every school which was 90 percent or more black in 1951-52 or 1963-64 or 1971-72 and which is still in use today remains 90 percent or more black. Of the 25 white schools in 1972-73, all opened 90 percent or more white and, if open, were 90 percent or more white in 1971-72, 1963-64 and 1951-52.’ ” 583 F. 2d, at 254 (emphasis in original), quoting Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F. 2d 684, 694-695 (CA6 1974). Against this background, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he evidence of record demonstrates convincingly that defendants have failed to eliminate the continuing systemwide effects of their prior discrimination and have intentionally maintained a segregated school system down to the time the complaint was filed in the present case.” 583 F. 2d, at 253. At the very least, defendants had failed to come forward with evidence to deny “that the current racial composition of the school population reflects the systemwide impact” of the Board’s prior discriminatory conduct. Id., at 258.
Part of the affirmative duty imposed by our cases, as we decided in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972), is the obligation not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects. See also United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484 (1972). The Dayton Board, however, had engaged in many post-Brown I actions that had the effect of increasing or perpetuating segregation. The District Court ignored this compounding of the original constitutional breach on the ground that there was no direct evidence of continued discriminatory purpose. But the measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system. Wright, supra, at 460, 462; Davis v. School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33, 37 (1971); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 243 (1976). As was clearly established in Keyes and Swann, the Board had to do more than abandon its prior discriminatory purpose. 413 U. S., at 200-201, n. 11; 402 U. S., at 28. The Board has had an affirmative responsibility to see that pupil assignment policies and school construction and abandonment practices “are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system,” Columbus, ante, at 460, and the Board has a “ 'heavy burden’ ” of showing that actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual system serve important and legitimate ends. Wright, supra, at 467, quoting Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 439 (1968).
The Board has never seriously contended that it fulfilled its affirmative duty or the heavy burden of explaining its failure to do so. Though the Board was often put on notice of the effects of its acts or omissions, the District Court found that “with one [counterproductive] exception... no attempt was made to alter the racial characteristics of any of the schools.” 446 F. Supp., at 1237. The Court of Appeals held that far from performing its constitutional duty, the Board had engaged in “post-1954 actions which actually have exacerbated the racial separation existing at the time of Brown 583 F. 2d, at 253. The court reversed as clearly erroneous the District Court’s finding that intentional faculty segregation had ended in 1951; the Court of Appeals found that it had effectively continued into the 1970’s. This was a systemwide practice and strong evidence that the Board was continuing its efforts to segregate students. Dunbar High School remained as a black high school until 1962, when a new Dunbar High School opened with a virtually all black faculty and student body. The old Dunbar was converted into an elementary school to which children from two black grade schools were assigned. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that since 1954 the Board had used some “optional attendance zones for racially discriminatory purposes in clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id., at 255. The District Court's finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. At the very least, the use of such zones amounted to a perpetuation óf the existing dual school system. Likewise, the Board failed in its duty and perpetuated racial separation in the schools by its pattern of school construction and site selection, recited by the District Court, see n. 7, supra, that resulted in 22 of the 24 new schools built between 1950 and the filing of the complaint opening 90% black or white. The same pattern appeared with respect to additions of classroom space made to existing schools. Seventy-eight of a total of 86 additions were made to schools that were 90% of one race. We see no reason to disturb these factual determinations, which conclusively show the breach of duty found by the Court of Appeals.
C
Finally, petitioners contend that the District Court correctly interpreted our earlier decision in this litigation as requiring respondents to prove with respect to each individual act of discrimination precisely what effect it has had on current patterns of segregation. This argument results from a misunderstanding of Dayton I, where the violation that had then been established included at most a few high schools. See Columbus, ante, at 458 n. 7 and 465-466; nn. 3 and 5, supra. We have found no reason to fault the Court of Appeals’ findings after our remand that a sufficient case of current, systemwide effect had been established. In reliance on its decision in Columbus, the Court of Appeals held:
“First, the dual school system extant at the time of Brown 1 embraced ‘a systemwide program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the schools, teachers, and facilities’ of the Dayton schools, and, thus, clearly had systemwide impact.... Secondly, the post-1954 failure of defendants to desegregate the school system in contravention of their affirmative constitutional duty obviously had systemwide impact.... The impact of defendants’ practices with respect to the assignment of faculty and students, use of optional attendance zones, school construction and site selection, and grade structure and reorganization clearly was systemwide in that the actions perpetuated and increased public school segregation in Dayton.” 583 F. 2d, at 258 (footnote omitted), quoting Keyes, 413 U. S., at 201.
As we note in Columbus today, this is not a misuse of Keyes, “where we held that purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted, and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial separation in other parts of the school system.” Columbus, ante, at 467-468. See also Swann, 402 U. S., at 26. The Court of Appeals was also quite justified in utilizing the Board’s total failure to fulfill its affirmative duty — and indeed its conduct resulting in increased segregation — to trace the current, systemwide segregation back to the purposefully dual system of the 1950’s and to the subsequent acts of intentional discrimination. See supra, at 537; Columbus, ante, at 464-465; Keyes, supra, at 211; Swann, supra, at 21, 26-27.
Because the Court of Appeals committed no prejudicial errors of fact or law, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
So ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Stewaet, see ante, p. 469.]
[For dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Powell, see ante, p. 479.]
The Court of Appeals set out the undisputed statistics:
“ ‘Enrollment data from the Dayton system reveals the substantial lack of progress that has been made over the past 23 years in integrating the Dayton school system. In 1951-52, of 47 schools, 38 had student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race (4 black, 34 white). Of the 35,000 pupils in the district, 19 per cent were black. Yet over half of all black pupils were enrolled in the four all black schools; and 77.6 per cent of all pupils were assigned to virtual one race schools. “Virtual one race schools” refers to schools with student enrollments of 90 per cent or more one race. In 1963-64, of 64 schools, 57 had student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race (13 black, 44 white). Of the 57,400 pupils in the district, 27.8 per cent were black. Yet 79.2 per cent of all black pupils were enrolled in the 13 black schools; and 88.8 per cent of all pupils were enrolled in such one race schools.
“Tn 1971-72 (the year the complaint was filed), of 69 schools, 49 had student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race (21 black, 28 white). Of the 54,000 pupils 42.7 per cent were black; and 75.9 per cent of all black students were assigned to the 21 black schools. In 1972-73 (the year the hearing was held) of 68 schools, 47 were virtually one race (22 black, 25 white); fully 80 per cent of all classrooms were virtually one race. (Of the 50,000 pupils in the district, 44.6 per cent were black

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
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Answer: 型