Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants, engaged in the business of growing, packing, and marketing in commerce, Florida avocados, brought this action in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California to enjoin respondents, state officers of California, from enforcing § 792 of the California Agricultural Code.
Section 792 prohibits, among other things, the importation into or sale in California of avocados containing “less than 8 per cent of oil, by weight of the avocado excluding the skin and seed.” The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the varieties of avocados grown in Florida do not normally, or at least not uniformly, contain at maturity as much as 8% of oil by weight; that in each year since 1954 appellants have shipped in interstate commerce, in full compliance with the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and Florida Avocado Order No. 69 issued under that Act by the Secretary of Agriculture on June 11, 1954, Florida avocados into the State of California and have attempted to sell them there; that appellees, or their agents, have consistently barred the sale of appellants’ avocados in California for failure uniformly to contain not less than 8% of oil by weight, resulting in denial to appellants of access to the California market, and forcing reshipment of the avocados to and their sale in other States, to the injury of appellants, all in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, as well as of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and Florida Avocado Order No. 69 issued thereunder.
Inasmuch as the complaint alleged federal unconstitutionality of the California statute, appellants requested the convening of, and there was convened, a three-judge District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 to hear the case. After hearing, the court concluded that, because appellants had not contested the validity of § 792 nor sought abatement of appellees’ condemnation of the avocados in the California state courts, the case presented “no more than a mere prospect of interference posed by the bare existence of the law in question,” and that it had “no authority to take jurisdiction [and was] left with no course other than to dismiss the action,” which it did. 169 F. Supp. 774, 776. Appellants brought the case here on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we postponed the question of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 360 U. S. 915.
The first and principal question presented is whether this action is one required by § 2281 to be heard by a District Court of three judges and, hence, whether we have jurisdiction of this direct appeal under § 1253.
Section 2281 provides that an injunction restraining the enforcement of a state statute may not be granted upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute “unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges...,” and §• 1253 provides that any order, granting or denying an injunction in any civil action required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a District Court of three judges, may be appealed directly to this Court.
Appellees concede that if the complaint had attacked § 792 solely on the ground of conflict with the United States Constitution, the action would have been one required by § 2281 to be heard and determined by a District Court of three judges. But appellees contend that because the complaint also attacks § 792 on the ground of conflict with the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and the Secretary’s Florida Avocado Order No. 69, it is possible that the action could be determined on the statutory rather than the constitutional ground, and, therefore, the action was not required to be heard by a District Court of three judges under § 2281 and, hence, a direct appeal does not lie to this Court under § 1253.
Section 2281 seems rather plainly to indicate a congressional intention to require an application for an injunction to be heard and determined by a court of three judges in any case in which the injunction may be granted on grounds of federal unconstitutionality. The reason for this is quite clear. The impetus behind the first three-judge court statute was the decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which it was held that a federal court could enjoin a state officer from enforcing a state statute alleged to be unconstitutional, despite the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment concerning suits against a State. Debate was immediately launched in the Senate with regard to cushioning the impact of the Young case, the principal concern being with the power thus activated in one federal judge to enjoin the operation or enforcement of state legislation on grounds of federal unconstitutionality.
The result of the debates on this subject was passage of a three-judge-court statute in 1910, 36 Stat. 557, which was codified as § 266 of the Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1162.® This statute prohibited the granting of an interlocutory injunction against a state statute upon grounds of federal unconstitutionality unless the application for injunction was heard and determined by a court of three judges.
The statute also contained its own provision for direct appeal to this Court from an order granting or denying an interlocutory injunction. The objective of § 266 was clearly articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm’n, 260 U. S. 212:
“The legislation was enacted for the manifest purpose of taking away the power of a single United States Judge, whether District Judge, Circuit Judge or Circuit Justice holding a District Court of the United States, to issue an interlocutory injunction against the execution of a state statute by a state officer or of an order of an administrative board of the State pursuant to a state statute, on the ground of the federal unconstitutionality of the statute. Pending the application for an interlocutory injunction, a single judge may grant a restraining order to be in force until the hearing of the application, but thereafter, so far as enjoining the state officers, his power is exhausted. The wording of the section leaves no doubt that Congress was by provisions ex industria seeking to make interference by interlocutory injunction from a federal court with the enforcement of state legislation, regularly enacted and in course of execution, a matter of the adequate hearing and the full deliberation which the presence of three judges, one of whom should be a Circuit Justice or Judge, was likely to secure. It was to prevent the improvident granting of such injunctions by a single judge, and the possible unnecessary conflict between federal and state authority always to be deprecated.” 260 U. S., at 216.
In 1925, § 266 was amended to require a three-judge court for issuance of a permanent as well as an interlocutory injunction, and § 238 of the Judicial Code (a broad statute governing direct appeals to this Court from District Courts) was amended, so far as here pertinent, to incorporate the provision for direct appeals to this Court from the orders of three-judge courts granting or denying an injunction in a § 266 case. 43 Stat. 938. Such is the present scheme of §§ 2281 and 1253.
With this background, it seems entirely clear that the central concern of Congress in 1910 was to prevent one federal judge from granting an interlocutory injunction against state legislation on grounds of federal unconstitutionality. And the 1925 amendment requiring a court of three judges for issuance of a permanent as well as an interlocutory injunction “was designed to end the anomalous situation in which a single judge might reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by three judges on the application for an interlocutory injunction.” Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 282 U. S. 10, 14. Section 2281, read in the light of this background, seems clearly to require that when, in any action to enjoin enforcement of a state statute, the injunctive decree may issue on the ground of federal unconstitutionality of the state statute, the convening of a three-judge court is necessary; and the joining in the complaint of a noncon-stitutional attack along with the constitutional one does not dispense with the necessity to convene such a court. To hold to the contrary would be to permit one federal district judge to enjoin enforcement of a state statute on the ground of federal unconstitutionality whenever a non-constitutional ground of attack was also alleged, and this might well defeat the purpose of § 2281.
Cases in this Court since Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913), have consistently adhered to the view that, in an injunction action challenging a state statute on substantial federal constitutional grounds, a three-judge court is required to be convened and has — just as we have on a direct appeal from its action — jurisdiction over all claims raised against the statute. These cases represent an unmistakable recognition of the congressional policy to provide for a three-judge court whenever a state statute is sought to be enjoined on grounds of federal unconstitutionality, and this consideration must be controlling.
Appellees place some reliance on Ex parte Buder, 271 U. S. 461, and Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 {Lemke I), in support of their position. Buder held merely that a claim of conflict between a state statute and a federal statute was not a constitutional claim requiring the convening of a three-judge court under § 266, and thus there could be no direct appeal here. Buder did not, however, require that a constitutional claim be the sole claim before the three-judge court. Lemke I held that it was permissible to appeal to the Court of Appeals rather than directly to this Court from the final order of a single district judge in a case in which a state statute was attacked on the grounds that it was both unconstitutional and in conflict with a federal statute. The case was decided under § 238, which, until 1925, was a broad statute calling for a direct appeal to this Court from the action of a District Court “in any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States... and in any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.” The breadth of § 238 had led the Court on several occasions to construe this provision to mean that a direct appeal to this Court was required only when the sole ground of District Court jurisdiction was the federal constitutional claim involved, Union & Planters’ Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 73; Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U. S. 305, 318, but if jurisdiction was based both on a constitutional ground and some other federal ground the appeal might properly be taken either to this Court or to the Court of Appeals. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397, 407-408; Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288, 293. Lemke I, decided in 1922, merely followed this line of decisions, and was not in any way concerned with a direct appeal to this Court under § 266 from the order of a three-judge court — the question now before us.
The distinction between the scope of our direct appellate jurisdiction under § 238 and § 266 prior to 1925 was effectively illustrated by the differing course of events in Lemke I and Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co., 258 U. S. 65 (Lemke II). Both cases involved an attack on a state statute on grounds of federal unconstitutionality and conflict with a federal statute. In both, interlocutory injunctions were sought before three-judge courts, and the injunctions were granted. Lemke I, however, also sought a permanent injunction before a single district judge, and, from his order denying the injunction, the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals before coming here. Lemke II, on the other hand, was directly appealed to this Court under § 266 from the interlocutory order of the three-judge court. As indicated, this Court held that the final order of the single judge in Lemke 1 was properly appealed to the Court of Appeals under § 238 because of the additional nonconstitutional basis for District Court jurisdiction. But in Lemke II this Court took jurisdiction over all issues presented in the direct appeal under § 266 from the interlocutory order of the three-judge court. See also Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, a case virtually identical with Lemke II, in which this Court also took jurisdiction over all questions in a § 266 direct appeal from an interlocutory injunction granted by a three-judge court.
The problem was greatly simplified in 1925 when § 266 was amended to require three-judge courts for the granting of both interlocutory and permanent injunctions on grounds of federal unconstitutionality, and § 238, while substantially amended to reduce the scope of our general appellate jurisdiction, so far as here pertinent, merely incorporated the provision for direct appeals to this Court from injunctions granted or denied under § 266. We do not find in these amendments any intention to curtail either the jurisdiction of three-judge courts or our jurisdiction on direct appeal from their orders. Indeed, the cases since 1925 have continued to maintain the view that if the constitutional claim against the state statute, is substantial, a three-judge court is required to be convened and has jurisdiction, as do we on direct appeal, over all grounds of attack against the statute. E. g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393-394; Railroad Comm’n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391; Public Service Comm’n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 312 U. S. 621, 625, n. 5.
To hold that only one judge may hear and decide an action to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute on both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds would be to ignore the explicit language and manifest purpose of § 2281, which is to provide for a three-judge court whenever an injunction sought against a state statute may be granted on federal constitutional grounds. Where a complaint seeks to enjoin a state statute on substantial grounds of federal unconstitutionality, then even though nonconstitutional grounds of attack are also alleged, we think the case is one. that is “required by... Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” 28 U. S. C. § 1253. (Emphasis added.) We, therefore, hold that we have jurisdiction of this direct appeal.
We turn now to the merits. The Court is of the view that the District Court was in error in holding that, because appellants had not contested the validity of § 792 nor sought abatement of appellees’ condemnation of their avocados, there was no “existing dispute as to present legal rights,” but only “a mere prospect of interference posed by the bare existence of the law in question [§792],” and in accordingly dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction. As earlier stated, the complaint alleges that, since the issuance of the Secretary’s Florida Avocado Order No. 69 in 1954, appellants have made more than a score of shipments in interstate commerce of Florida avocados to and for sale in California, and appellees, or their agents-, have in effect consistently condemned those avocados for failure to contain 8% or more of oil by weight, thus requiring appellants — to prevent destruction and complete loss of their shipments — to reship the avocados to and sell them in other States, all in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution as well as the Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. It is therefore evident that there is an existing dispute between the parties as to present legal rights amounting to a justiciable controversy which appellants are entitled to have determined on the merits. In these circumstances, the fact that appellants did not contest the validity of § 792 nor seek abatement of appellees’ condemnation of the avocados in the California state courts — which, because of the time period necessarily involved, would have resulted in the complete spoilage and loss of the product — does not constitute an impediment to their right to seek an injunction in the federal court against enforcement of § 792 on the ground that it violates both the Constitution of the United States and the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas joins in the part of the opinion that passes on the merits, the Court having held, contrary to his view, that the case is properly here on direct appeal from a three-judge court.
Deering’s Agricultural Code of the State of California, 1950; c. 2, Div. 5, of West’s Ann. California Agricultural Code.
50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq.
28 U. S. C. § 2281 provides:
“An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be'granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.”
28 U. S. C. § 1253 provides:
“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
In the Senate debates Senator Overman of North Carolina commented as follows:
“This measure proposes that whenever a petition is presented the circuit judge before whom it is presented shall, before granting the injunction, call in one circuit judge and one district judge or another circuit court judge, making three judges who shall pass upon the question of the injunction.
“We think, sir, that if this could be done it would allay much intense feeling in the States. As was said by Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in the Minnesota case [Ex parte Young], we have come to a sad day when one subordinate Federal judge can enjoin the officer of a sovereign State from proceeding to enforce the laws of the State passed by the legislature of his own State, and thereby suspending for a time the laws of the State.... That being so, there being great feeling among the people of the States by reason of the fact that one Federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State and enjoined in this manner the great officer who is charged with the enforcement of the laws of the State, causing almost a revolution, as it did in my State, and in order to allay this feeling, if this substitute is adopted and three judges have to pass upon the question of the constitutionality of a State statute and three great judges say that the statute is unconstitutional, the officers of the State will be less inclined to resist the orders and decrees of our Federal courts. The people and the courts of the State are more inclined to abide by the decision of three judges than they would of one subordinate inferior Federal judge who simply upon petition or upon a hearing should tie the hands of a State officer from proceeding with the enforcement of the laws of his sovereign State... 42 Cong. Rec. 4847.
And Senator Bacon of Georgia remarked:
“The purpose of the bill is to throw additional safeguards around the exercise of the enormous powers claimed for the subordinate Federal courts. If these courts are to exercise the power of stopping the operation of the laws of a State and of punishing the officers of a State, then at least let it be done on notice and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three judges to decide such questions, and not permit such dangerous power to one man.
“The necessity for this legislation is a very grave one. It is a most serious trouble which now exists — that by the action of one judge the machinery of State laws can be arrested....” 42 Cong. Rec. 4853.
Section 266 of the Judicial Code originally provided in pertinent part:
“No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute, shall be issued or granted by any justice of the Supreme Court, or by any district court of the United States, or by any judge thereof, or by any circuit judge acting as district judge, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute, unless the application for the same shall be presented to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to a circuit or district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at least one shall be a justice of the Supreme Court, or a circuit judge, and the other two may be either circuit or district judges, and unless a majority of said three judges shall concur in granting such application.... An appeal may be taken direct to the Supreme Court of the United States from the order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory injunction in such case.” 36 Stat. 1162.
See, e. g., Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U. S. 39; Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453; Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co., 258 U. S. 65 (Lemke II); Chicago, Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94; Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189; Herkness v. Irion, 278 U. S. 92; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89; Railroad Comm’n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388; Public Service Comm’n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 312 U. S. 621; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341.
In the Garrett case, the following observations were made by Mr. Justice Hughes:
“Because of the Federal questions raised by the bill the Circuit [District] Court had jurisdiction and was authorized to determine all the questions in the case, local as well as Federal. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191. A similar rule must be deemed to govern the application for preliminary injunction under the statute which requires a hearing before three judges, and authorizes an appeal to this court. 36 Stat. 557. This statute applies to cases in which the preliminary injunction is sought in order to restrain the enforcement of a state enactment upon the

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 下