Task: sc_casesource

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey. We hold that such a mandate violates the First Amendment.
I
March 17 is set aside for two celebrations in South Boston. As early as 1737, some people in Boston observed the feast of the apostle to Ireland, and since 1776 the day has marked the evacuation of royal troops and Loyalists from the city, prompted by the guns captured at Ticonderoga and set up on Dorchester Heights under General Washington’s command. Washington himself reportedly drew on the earlier tradition in choosing “St. Patrick” as the response to “Boston,” the password used in the colonial lines on evacuation day. See J. Crimmins, St. Patrick’s Day: Its Celebration in New York and other American Places, 1737-1845, pp. 15, 19 (1902); see generally 1 H. Commager & R. Morris, The Spirit of ’Seventy Six, pp. 138-183 (1958); The American Book of Days 262-265 (J. Hatch ed., 3d ed. 1978). Although the General Court of Massachusetts did not officially designate March 17 as Evacuation Day until 1938, see Mass. Gen. Laws §6:12K (1992), the City Council of Boston had previously sponsored public celebrations of Evacuation Day, including notable commemorations on the centennial in 1876, and on the 125th anniversary in 1901, with its parade, salute, concert, and fireworks display. See Celebration of the Centennial Anniversary of the Evacuation of Boston by the British Army (G. Ellis ed. 1876); Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston et al., Civ. Action No. 92-1518A (Super. Ct., Mass., Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. Bl, B8-B9.
The tradition of formal sponsorship by the city came to an end in 1947, however, when Mayor James Michael Curley himself granted authority to organize and conduct the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade to the petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an unincorporated association of individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups. Every year since that time, the Council has applied for and received a permit for the parade, which at times has included as many as 20,000 marchers and drawn up to 1 million watchers. No other applicant has ever applied for that permit. Id., at B9. Through 1992, the city allowed the Council to use the city’s official seal, and provided printing services as well as direct funding.
In 1992, a number of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants joined together with other supporters to form the respondent organization, GLIB, to march in the parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to demonstrate that there are such men and women among those so descended, and to express their solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in New York’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade. Id., at B3; App. 51. Although the Council denied GLIB’s application to take part in the 1992 parade, GLIB obtained a state-court order to include its contingent, which marched “uneventfully” among that year’s 10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators. App. to Pet. for Cert. B3, and n. 4.
In 1993, after the Council had again refused to admit GLIB to the upcoming parade, the organization and some of its members filed this suit against the Council, the individual petitioner John J. “Wacko” Hurley, and the city of Boston, alleging violations of the State and Federal Constitutions and of the state public accommodations law, which prohibits “any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of... sexual orientation... relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement.” Mass. Gen. Laws §272:98 (1992). After finding that “[f]or at least the past 47 years, the Parade has traveled the same basic route along the public streets of South Boston, providing entertainment, amusement, and recreation to participants and spectators alike,” App. to Pet. for Cert. B5-B6, the state trial court ruled that the parade fell within the statutory definition of a public accommodation, which includes “any place... which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public and, without limiting the generality of this definition, whether or not it be... (6) a boardwalk or other public highway [or]... (8) a place of public amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment,” Mass. Gen. Laws §272:92A (1992). The court found that the Council had no written criteria and employed no particular procedures for admission, voted on new applications in batches, had occasionally admitted groups who simply showed up at the parade without having submitted an application, and did “not generally inquire into the specific messages or views of each applicant.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B8-B9. The court consequently rejected the Council’s contention that the parade was “private” (in the sense of being exclusive), holding instead that “the lack of genuine selectivity in choosing participants and sponsors demonstrates that the Parade is a public event.” Id., at B6. It found the parade to be “eclectic,” containing a wide variety of “patriotic, commercial, political, moral, artistic, religious, athletic, public service, trade union, and eleemosynary themes,” as well as conflicting messages. Id., at B24. While noting that the Council had indeed excluded the Ku Klux Klan and ROAR (an antibusing group), id., at B7, it attributed little significance to these facts, concluding ultimately that “[t]he only common theme among the participants and sponsors is their public involvement in the Parade,” id., at B24.
The court rejected the Council’s assertion that the exclusion of “groups with sexual themes merely formalized [the fact] that the Parade expresses traditional religious and social values,” id., at B3, and found the Council’s “final position [to be] that GLIB would be excluded because of its values and its message, i. e., its members’ sexual orientation,” id., at B4, n. 5, citing Tr. of Closing Arg. 43, 51-52 (Nov. 23,1993). This position, in the court’s view, was not only violative of the public accommodations law but “paradoxical” as well-, since “a proper celebration of St. Patrick’s and Evacuation Day requires diversity and inclusiveness.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B24. The court rejected the notion that GLIB’s admission would trample on the Council’s First Amendment rights since the court understood that constitutional protection of any interest in expressive association would “requir[e] focus on a specific message, theme, or group” absent from the parade. Ibid. “Given the [Council’s] lack of selectivity in choosing participants and failure to circumscribe the marchers’ message,” the court found it “impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment.” Id., at B25. It concluded that the parade is “not an exercise of [the Council’s] constitutionally protected right of.expressive association,” but instead “an open recreational event that is subject to the public accommodations law.” Id., at B27.
The court held that because the statute did not mandate inclusion of GLIB but only prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation, any infringement on the Council’s right to expressive association was only “incidental” and “no greater than necessary to accomplish the statute’s legitimate purpose” of eradicating discrimination. Id., at B25, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 628-629 (1984). Accordingly, it ruled that “GLIB is entitled to participate in the Parade on the same terms and conditions as other participants.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B27.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed, seeing nothing clearly erroneous in the trial judge’s findings that GLIB was excluded from the parade based on the sexual orientation of its members, that it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose in the parade, that there was no state action, and that the parade was a public accommodation within the meaning of § 272:92A. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 418 Mass. 238, 242-248, 636 N. E. 2d 1293, 1295-1298 (1994). Turning to petitioners’ First Amendment claim that application of the public accommodations law to the parade violated their freedom of speech (as distinguished from their right to expressive association, raised in the trial court), the court’s majority held that it need not decide on the particular First Amendment theory involved “because, as the [trial] judge found, it is ‘impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment.’” Id., at 249, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1299 (footnote omitted). The defendants had thus failed at the trial level “to demonstrate that the parade truly was an exercise of... First Amendment rights,” id., at 250, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1299, citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293, n. 5 (1984), and on appeal nothing indicated to the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court that the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence on this point was clearly erroneous, 418 Mass., at 250, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1299. The court rejected petitioners’ further challenge to the law as overbroad, holding that it does not, on its face, regulate speech, does not let public officials examine the content of speech, and would not be interpreted as reaching speech. Id., at 251-252, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1300. Finally, the court rejected the challenge that the public accommodations law was unconstitutionally vague, holding that this case did not present an issue of speech and that the law gave persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what was prohibited. Id., at 252, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1300-1301.
Justice Nolan dissented. In his view, the Council “does not need a narrow or distinct theme or message in its parade for it to be protected under the First Amendment.” Id., at 256, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1303. First, he wrote, even if the parade had no message at all, GLIB’s particular message could not be forced upon it. Id., at 257, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1303, citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 717 (1977) (state requirement to display “Live Free or Die” on license plates violates First Amendment). Second, according to Justice Nolan, the trial judge clearly erred in finding the parade devoid of expressive purpose. 418 Mass., at 257, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1303. He would have held that the Council, like any expressive association, cannot be barred from excluding applicants who do not share the views the Council wishes to advance. Id., at 257-259, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1303-1304, citing Roberts, supra. Under either a pure speech or associational theory, the State’s purpose of eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, according to the dissent, could be achieved by more narrowly drawn means, such as ordering admission of individuals regardless of sexual preference, without taking the further step of prohibiting the Council from editing the views expressed in their parade. 418 Mass., at 256, 258, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1302, 1304. In Justice Nolan’s opinion, because GLIB’s message was separable from the status of its members, such a narrower order would accommodate the State’s interest without the likelihood of infringing on the Council’s First Amendment rights. Finally, he found clear error in the trial judge’s equation of exclusion on the basis of GLIB’s message with exclusion on the basis of its members’ sexual orientation. To the dissent this appeared false in the light of “overwhelming evidence” that the Council objected to GLIB on account of its message and a dearth of testimony or documentation indicating that sexual orientation was the bar to admission. Id., at 260, 636 N. E. 2d, at 1304. The dissent accordingly concluded that the Council had not even violated the State’s public accommodations law.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing a message not of the private organizers’ own choosing violates the First Amendment. 513 U. S. 1071 (1995). We hold that it does and reverse.
II
Given the scope of the issues as originally joined in this case, it is worth noting some that have fallen aside in the course of the litigation, before reaching us. Although the Council presents us with a First Amendment claim, respondents do not. Neither do they press a claim that the Council’s action has denied them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the guarantees of free speech and equal protection guard only against encroachment by the government and “erec[t] no shield against merely private conduct,” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948); see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 513 (1976), respondents originally argued that the Council’s conduct was not purely private, but had the character of state action. The trial court’s review of the city’s involvement led it to find otherwise, however, and although the Supreme Judicial Court did not squarely address the issue, it appears to have affirmed the trial court’s decision on that point as well as the others. In any event, respondents have not brought that question up either in a cross-petition for certiorari or in their briefs filed in this Court. When asked at oral argument whether they challenged the conclusion by the Massachusetts’ courts that no state action is involved in the parade, respondents’ counsel answered that they “do not press that issue here.”. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. In this Court, then, their claim for inclusion in the parade rests solely on the Massachusetts public accommodations law.
There is no corresponding concession from the other side, however, and certainly not to the state courts’ characterization of the parade as lacking the element of expression for purposes of the First Amendment. Accordingly, our review of petitioners’ claim that their activity is indeed in the nature of protected speech carries with it a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the trial court. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984). The “requirement of independent appellate review... is a rule of federal constitutional law,” id., at 510, which does not limit our deference to a trial court on matters of witness credibility, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657, 688 (1989), but which generally requires us to “review the finding of facts by a State court... where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts,” Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 385-386 (1927). See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271 (1951); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 189 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.). This obligation rests upon us simply because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to embrace, and we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given course of conduct falls on the near or far side of the line of constitutional protection. See Bose Corp., supra, at 503. Even where a speech case has originally been tried in a federal court, subject to the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) that “[findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,” we are obliged to make a fresh examination of crucial facts. Hence, in this case, though we are confronted with the state courts’ conclusion that the factual characteristics of petitioners’ activity place it within the vast realm of nonexpressive conduct, our obligation is to “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record,’... so as to assure ourselves that th[is] judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 285 (1964) (footnote omitted), quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963).
y — i
A
If there were no reason for a group of people to march from here to there except to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing any message beyond the fact of the march itself. Some people might call such a procession a parade, but it would not be much of one. Real “[pjarades are public dramas of social relations, and in them performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are available for communication and consideration.” S. Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia 6 (1986). Hence, we use the word “parade” to indicate marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way. Indeed, a parade’s dependence on watchers is so extreme that nowadays, as with Bishop Berkeley’s celebrated tree, “if a parade or demonstration receives no media coverage, it may as well not have happened.” Id., at 171. Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest marches. In Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 112 (1969), for example, petitioners had taken part in a procession to express their grievances to the city government, and we held that such a “march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Similarly, in Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 235, where petitioners had joined in a march of protest and pride, carrying placards and singing The Star Spangled Banner, we held that the activities “reflect an exercise of these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form.” Accord, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152 (1969).
The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression. Noting that “[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 (1943), our cases have recognized that the First Amendment shields such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), id., at 632, 642, wearing an armband to protest a war, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 505-506 (1969), displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931), and even “[m] arching, walking or parading” in uniforms displaying the swastika, National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43 (1977). As some of these examples show, a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a “particularized message,” cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam), would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabber-wocky verse of Lewis Carroll.
Not many marches, then, are beyond the realm of expressive parades, and the South Boston celebration is not one of them. Spectators line the streets; people march in costumes and uniforms, carrying flags and banners with all sorts of messages (e.g., “England get out of Ireland,” “Say no to drugs”); marching bands and pipers play; floats are pulled along; and the whole show is broadcast over Boston television. See Record, Exh. 84 (video). To be sure, we agree with the state courts that in spite of excluding some applicants, the Council is rather lenient in admitting participants. But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech. Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication. Cable operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech activities even when they only select programming originally produced by others. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 636 (1994) (“Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment”). For that matter, the presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers’ opinion pages, which, of course, fall squarely within the core of First Amendment security, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 258 (1974), as does even the simple selection of a paid noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a daily paper, see New York Times, 376 U. S., at 265-266. The selection of contingents to make a parade is entitled to similar protection.
Respondents’ participation as a unit in the parade was equally expressive. GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in it, as the trial court found, in order to celebrate its members’ identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in the community, and to support the like men and women who sought to march in the New York parade. App. to Pet. for Cert. B3. The organization distributed a fact sheet describing the members’ intentions, App. A51, and the record otherwise corroborates the expressive nature of GLIB’s participation, see Record, Exh. 84 (video); App. A67 (photograph). In 1993, members of GLIB marched behind a shamrock-strewn banner with the simple inscription “Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.” GLIB understandably seeks to communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its own.
B
The Massachusetts public accommodations law under which respondents brought suit has a venerable history. At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who “made profession of a public employment,” were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer. Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484-485, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464-1465 (K. B. 1701) (Holt, C. J.); see Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226, 298, n. 17 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267, 277 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). As one of the 19th-century English judges put it, the rule was that “[t]he innkeeper is not to select his guests[;] [h]e has no right to say to one, you shall come into my inn, and to another you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received; and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servants.” Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213, 219, 173 Eng. Rep. 94, 96 (N. P. 1835); M. Konvitz & T. Leskes, A Century of Civil Rights 160 (1961).
After the Civil War, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was the first State to codify this principle to ensure access to public accommodations regardless of race. See Act Forbidding Unjust Discrimination on Account of Color or Race, 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277 (May 16, 1865); Konvitz & Leskes, supra, at 155-156; Lerman & Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N. Y. U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215, 238 (1978); Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 B. U. L. Rev. 30, 58 (1964). In prohibiting discrimination “in any licensed inn, in any public place of amusement, public conveyance or public meeting,” 1865 Mass. Acts, ch. 277, § 1, the original statute already expanded upon the common law, which had not conferred any right of access to places of public amusement, Lerman & Sanderson, supra, at 248. As with'many public accommodations statutes across the Nation, the legislature continued to broaden the scope of legislation, to the point that the law today prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religious

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合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
Answer:

Answer: 管