Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment setting aside two deeds to certain land in Palm Beach county, Fla. There is no dispute as to the material facts. Taylor, appellee, was the owner of the property, and had considerable negotiations with Bingham, one of the appellants, as a broker for the sale of it, beginning about September, 1923. Eventually negotiations reached a point satisfactory to Taylor, who was then residing in Dayton, Ohio, and he executed a deed to Bingham and sent it for deposit in escrow to the First American Bank & Trust Company of West Palm Beach, Fla. The price stated in the deed was $18,250, and the bank was authorized to accept a binder sufficient to cover the payment of two notes secured by a mortgage to J. B. McGinley, bearing on the property, amounting to $27,-024, and certain taxes amounting to $45.75,, and was instructed as to the recording fees and other minor details.
Taylor knew that Bingham had in fact sold the property to the other appellants, who are the trustees of the First Presbyterian Church of West Palm Beach, and Bingham knew that Taylor had an option on certain property in Dayton, Ohio, for which he was negotiating a purchase, and expected to use the money from the Florida property to carry out that agreement. In the letter to the bank inclosing the deed, Taylor asked the bank to wire him after acceptance of the terms and the depositing of tne binder, and added: “Speed being of prime importance, in order that I may meet my obligations here. Kindly expedite.” This letter was dated January 25, 1924, and was received by the bank in due course. The sale was delayed because of certain negotiations between Bingham and the city of West Palm Beach for a strip of land adjoining plaintiff’s property, and which had previously been condemned by the city as a street. On February 14, 1924, the bank wrote to Taylor as follows:
“Mr. Bingham was in the bank yesterday, and he anticipates an early closing of this deal. However, it depends entirely upon his securing quitclaim deeds from the county and city to strip of land in front of your lot. We are doing all possible to effect closing of this deal for you, and we will remit promptly at such time.”
Taylor heard nothing more from either Bingham or the bank for approximately six weeks, and on March 24, 1924, wired the bank as follows:
“This afternoon the judge allowed me until Monday noon, March 31st, to complete terms of compromise arranged by him on my option here. Please interview Mr. Bingham if no prospect immediate action return my deed to Lake View avenue property. If he accepts wire me $1,000.00 cash.”
On March 26th the bank wired Taylor as follows:
“Bingham states his attorney has succeeded in having the city of West Palm Beach agree to give deed to strip of property on north part of your lot for $500.00. He has deposit $1,000.00 to-day and will pay the balance $17,250.00 within ten days from date. Please wire your acceptance.”
After receipt of this telegram, Taylor wired the bank, March 28, 1924, as follows: “Will accept $17,750.00 net spot cash within ten days for Lake View avenue property provided you wire me $1,000.00 through Postal Telegraph Company before noon Monday March 31st. Am writing you new letter instructions prefer to pay MeGinley notes from here myself.”
This telegram was received by the bank about 4:30 p. m. March 29th, but was not complied with. After 2 p. m. on March 31st Bingham wired $1,000 to Taylor at Dayton, Ohio, by the Western Union Telegraph Company. Taylor did not receive this message until late in the afternoon, by which time the option to purchase the Dayton property had expired. Taylor then wired the bank: “Bingham’s thousand arrived too late hold deal for further instructions.”
This telegram was delivered to the bank at 8:30 a. m. on April 1st. After the receipt of this telegram the bank accepted the balance of the purchase price from Bingham and delivered the deed. Bingham in turn executed the deed to the trustees of the church, and later on Taylor filed this suit to cancel the said deeds, and judgment was rendered in his favor.
It is the contention of appellants that the sale was made directly to Bingham as the purchaser, and that he fully complied with the terms of the deed. We cannot agree with this contention. We think it is shown with reasonable > certainty that all along Bingham was acting as the agent of Taylor, but this is immaterial in the view the District Court took of the ease, and with which we agree. Although the acts of the parties would indicate that the hank was at least friendly to Bingham, in ’contemplation of the law the bank was a trustee for both parties. Both Bingham and the bank knew that Taylor was anxious to receive his money promptly. After he forwarded the deed, if it was not accepted and the purchase money paid within a reasonable time, he had the right to recall it or to impose additional conditions. We think he was well within his rights in sending the telegram of March 28th, requiring that $1,000 be sent him by the Postal Telegraph Company before noon of March 31st, as this gave ample time to Bingham to comply with the request. Furthermore, the bank had already notified him that it had $1,000 on deposit for his account. As his instructions were not complied with in time, he then had the right, to cancel the escrow, or to order the bank to hold the deed for further instructions, which he did. For the, bank to thereafter deliver the deed to Bingham was a clear violation of the escrow.
It is well settled that a deed delivered in violation of the conditions under which it is deposited in escrow vests no title in the grantee, or in even an innocent third person to whom he subsequently transfers. Houston v. Adams, 85 Fla. 291, 95 So. 859; Ullendorff v. Graham, 80 Fla. 845, 87 So. 50; Cobban et al. v. Conklin, 208 F. 231, 125 C. C. A. 431.
The judgment of the District Court was right.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0