Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether Rule 28.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an investment company security holder first make a demand upon the company’s board of directors before bringing an action under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by the company to its investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in this case that the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 does not apply to such actions. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (1982). Two other Courts of Appeals have reached a contrary conclusion. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 460 U. S. 1021 (1983), and now affirm.
Respondent is a shareholder of petitioner Daily Income Fund,' Inc. (Fund), an open-end diversified management investment company, or “mutual fund,” regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or Act), 15 U. S. C. §80a-l et seq. (1982 ed.). The Fund invests in a portfolio of short-term money market instruments with the aim of achieving high current income while preserving capital. Under a written contract, petitioner Reich & Tang, Inc. (R&T), provides the Fund with investment advice and other management services in exchange for a fee currently set at one-half of one percent of the Fund’s net assets. From 1978 to 1981, the Fund experienced substantial growth; its net assets increased from about $75 million to $775 million. During this period, R&T’s fee of one-half of one percent of net assets remained the same. Accordingly, annual payments by the Fund to R&T rose from about $375,000 to an estimated $3,875,000 in 1981.
Alleging that these fees were unreasonable, respondent brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, naming both the Fund and R&T as defendants. The complaint alleged that, because the Fund’s assets had been continually reinvested in a limited number of instruments, R&T’s investment decisions had remained routine and substantially unchanged as the Fund grew. By receiving significantly higher fees for essentially the same services, R&T had, according to respondent, violated the fiduciary duty owed investment companies by their advisers under § 36(b) of the ICA. Pub. L. 91-547, §20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b) (1982 ed.). The complaint sought damages in favor of the Fund as well as payment of respondent’s costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which governs “a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders... to enforce a right of a corporation..., the corporation... having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it....” The Rule requires a shareholder bringing such a suit to set forth “the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors..., and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.” Respondent contended that the Rule 23.1 “demand requirement” does not apply to actions brought under § 36(b) of the ICA and that, in any event, demand was excused because the Fund’s directors had participated in the alleged wrongdoing and would be hostile to the suit. The District Court, finding Rule 23.1 applicable to § 36(b) actions and finding no excuse based on the directors’ possible self-interest or bias, dismissed the action. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F. R. D. 94 (1982).
The Court of Appeals reversed. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (1982). The court concluded that Rule 23.1 by its terms applies only when the corporation could itself “‘assert,’ in a court, the same action under the same rule of law on which the shareholder plaintiff relies.” Id., at 254. Relying on both the language and the legislative history of § 36(b), the court determined that an investment company may not itself sue under that section to recover excessive adviser fees. Id., at 254-261. Accordingly, the court held that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions by security holders brought under §36(b). Id., at 261.
I — I I — I
Although any action m which a shareholder asserts the rights of a corporation could be characterized as “derivative,” see n. 11, infra, Rule 23.1 applies in terms only to a “derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation [when] the corporation [has] failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it” (emphasis added). This qualifying language suggests that the type of derivative action governed by the Rule is one in which a shareholder claims a right that could have been, but was not, “asserted” by the corporation in court. The “right” mentioned in the emphasized phrase, which cannot sensibly mean any right without limitation, is most naturally understood as referring to the same right, or at least its substantial equivalent, as the one asserted by the plaintiff shareholder. And, in the context of a rule of judicial procedure, the reference to the corporation’s “failure to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it” obviously presupposes that the right in question could be enforced by the corporation in court.
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the understanding we have expressed, in a variety of contexts, of the term “derivative action.” In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, 460 (1882), for instance, the Court explained that a derivative suit is one “founded on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation itself is the appropriate plaintiff.” Similarly, Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548 (1949), stated that a derivative action allows a stockholder “to step into the corporation’s shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand in his own”; and the Court added that such a stockholder “brings suit on a cause of action derived from the corporation.” Id., at 549. Finally, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U. S. 531, 534 (1970), described a derivative action as “a suit to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third parties” (emphasis in original) and viewed the question there presented — whether the Seventh Amendment confers a right to a jury in such an action — as the same as whether the corporation, had it brought the suit itself, would be entitled to a jury. Id., at 538-539. In sum, the term “derivative action,” which defines the scope of Rule 23.1, has long been understood to apply only to those actions in which the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corporation could itself have enforced in court. See also Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947); Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945); Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. Co., 213 U. S. 435, 447 (1909).
The origin and purposes of Rule 23.1 support this understanding of its scope. The Rule’s provisions derive from this Court’s decision in Hawes v. Oakland, supra. Prior to Hawes, federal courts exercising their equity powers had commonly entertained suits by minority stockholders to enforce corporate rights in circumstances where the corporation had failed to sue on its own behalf. Id., at 452. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 339 (1856); 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1821, pp. 296-297 (1972). The Court in Hawes, while emphasizing the importance of such suits as a means of “protecting the stockholder against the frauds of the governing body of directors or trustees,” 104 U. S., at 453, noted that this equitable device was subject to two kinds of potential abuse. First, corporations that were engaged in disputes with citizens of their home State could collude with out-of-state stockholders to obtain diversity jurisdiction in order to litigate the dispute in the federal courts. Id., at 452-453. Second, derivative actions brought by minority stockholders could, if unconstrained, undermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions of a corporation — including the decision to initiate litigation — should be made by the board of directors or the majority of shareholders. See id., at 454-457.
To address these problems, the Court in Hawes established a number of prerequisites to bringing derivative suits in the federal courts. These requirements were designed to limit the use of the device to situations in which, due to an unjustified failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropriate to permit a shareholder “to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to the corporation.” Id., at 460. With some additions and changes in wording, the conditions set out in Hawes have been carried forward in successive revisions of the federal rules.
Some of the requirements first announced in Hawes were intended to reduce the burden on the federal courts by diverting corporate causes of action “to the State courts, which are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum.” Id., at 452-453. At the same time, however, the Court sought to maintain derivative suits as a limited exception to the usual rule that the proper party to bring a claim on behalf of a corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its directors or the majority of its shareholders. Id., at 460-461. As the Court later explained, this aspect of the rules governing derivative suits reflects the basic policy that “[w]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stockholders.” United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263 (1917). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903).
The principal means by which the Court in Hawes sought to vindicate this policy was, of course, its requirement that a shareholder seek action by the corporation itself before bringing a derivative suit. 104 U. S., at 460-461. This “demand requirement” affords the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment and “waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right. They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the furtherance of the general business of the corporation in determining whether to waive or insist upon the right.” Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., supra, at 463. On the other hand, if, in the view of the directors, “litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the demand places the resources of the corporation, including its information, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit.” Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168,171-172 (1976) (footnote omitted). Like the Rule in general, therefore, the provisions regarding demand assume a lawsuit that could be controlled by the corporation’s board of directors.
In sum, the conceptual basis and purposes of Rule 23.1 confirm what its language suggests: the Rule governs only suits “to enforce a right of a corporation” when the corporation itself has “failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it” in court. In this case, therefore, we must decide whether the right asserted by a shareholder suing under § 36(b) of the ICA could be judicially enforced by the investment company. We turn to consider that question.
I ► — I
In determining whether § 36(b) confers a right that could be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look first, of course, at the language of the statute. As noted in n. 2, supra, § 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty on an investment company’s adviser “with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” paid by the company and provides that “[a]n action may be brought under this subsection by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company” against the adviser and other affiliated parties. By its terms, then, the unusual cause of action created by § 36(b) differs significantly from those traditionally asserted in shareholder derivative suits. Instead of establishing a corporate action from which a shareholder’s right to sue derivatively may be inferred, § 36(b) expressly provides only that the new corporate right it creates may be enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and security holders of the company.
Petitioners nevertheless contend that an investment company has an implied right of action under § 36(b). In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377-378 (1982). That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a number of factors, including the legislative history and purposes of the statute, the identity of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of express statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative purpose, and the traditional role of the States in affording the relief claimed. Ibid.; Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). In this case, consideration of each of these factors plainly demonstrates that Congress intended the unique right created by § 36(b) to be enforced solely by the SEC and security holders of the investment company.
As we have previously noted, Congress adopted the ICA because of its concern with “the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 (1979). Unlike most corporations, an investment company is typically created and managed by a pre-existing external organization known as an investment adviser. Id., at 481. Because the adviser generally supervises the daily operation of the fund and often selects affiliated persons to serve on the company’s board of directors, the “‘relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential conflicts of interest.’” Ibid., quoting Golf and v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). In order to minimize such conflicts of interest, Congress established a scheme that regulates most transactions between investment companies and their advisers, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-17 (1982 ed.); limits the number of persons affiliated with the adviser who may serve on the fund’s board of directors, § 80a-10; and requires that fees for investment advice and other services be governed by a written contract approved both by the directors and the shareholders of the fund, § 80a-15.
In the years following passage of the Act, investment companies enjoyed enormous growth, prompting a number of studies of the effectiveness of the Act in protecting investors. One such report, commissioned by the SEC, found that investment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees than those charged the advisers’ other clients and further determined that the structure of the industry, even as regulated by the Act, had proved resistant to efforts to moderate adviser compensation. Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-30, 34, 66-67 (1962). Specifically, the study concluded that the unaffiliated directors mandated by the Act were “of restricted value as an instrument for providing effective representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings between the fund and its investment adviser.” Id., at 34. A subsequent report, authored by the SEC itself, noted that investment advisers were generally compensated on the basis of a fixed percentage of the fund’s assets, rather than on services rendered or actual expenses. Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 89 (1966) (hereinafter SEC Report). The Commission determined that, as a fund’s assets grew, this form of payment could produce unreasonable fees in light of the economies of scale realized in managing a larger portfolio. Id., at 94, 102. Furthermore, the Commission concluded that lawsuits by security holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees had been largely ineffective due to the standards employed by courts to judge the fees. Id., at 132-143. See infra, at 540, and n. 12.
In order to remedy this and other perceived inadequacies in the Act, the SEC submitted a series of legislative proposals to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act. Some of the proposals Congress ultimately adopted were intended to make the fund’s board of directors more independent of the adviser and to encourage greater scrutiny of adviser contracts. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a) (1982 ed.) (requiring that at least 40% of the directors not be “interested persons,” a broader category than the previously identified group of persons “affiliated” with the adviser, see §80a-2(a)(19)); §80a-15(c) (requiring independent directors as well as shareholders to approve adviser contracts); Burks v. Lasker, supra, at 482-483. The SEC had, however, determined that approval of adviser contracts by shareholders and independent directors could not alone provide complete protection of the interests of security holders with respect to adviser compensation. See SEC Report, at 128-131, 144, 146-147. Accordingly, the Commission also proposed amending the Act to require “reasonable” fees. Id., at 143-147. As initially considered by Congress, the bill containing this proposal would have empowered the SEC to bring actions to enforce the reasonableness standard and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf of the company. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., §8(d) (1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., §8(d) (1967).
Representatives of the investment company industry, led by amicus Investment Company Institute (ICI), expressed concern that enabling the SEC to enforce the fairness of adviser fees might in essence provide the Commission with ratemaking authority. Accordingly, ICI proposed an alternative to the SEC bill which would have provided that actions to enforce the reasonableness standard “be brought only by the company or a security holder thereof on its behalf.” Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter 1967 Hearings). The version that the Senate finally passed, however, rejected the industry’s suggestion that the investment company itself be expressly authorized to bring suit. S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., §8(d)(6) (1968). Instead, the Senate bill required a security holder to make demand on the SEC before bringing suit

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 已