Task: songer_appnonp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

OPINION
Before HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.
HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question: Can founded suspicion, unlike probable cause, be based solely on the receipt by the stopping officer of a radio dispatch to stop the described vehicle, without any proof of the factual foundation for the relayed message? We hold that it cannot.
Robinson appeals from his conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. The district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained after the vehicle that Robinson was driving was stopped by Officer Holland, a state police officer. Robinson claimed that the evidence was the fruit of a stop that was not justified by founded suspicion and thus was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
On the evening of September 25, 1975, Officer Holland received a radio message from the Kingman, Arizona police dispatcher advising him to be on the lookout for a possible stolen 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass, Nevada license CKC 434. Officer Holland testified that at the time he received the message, he believed that the dispatcher had obtained some information from an inspector at the Agricultural Inspection Station located at the Nevada-Arizona border. The Government did not call either the dispatcher or the inspector to testify. Officer Holland knew nothing more about the information upon which the dispatcher relied, and he knew none of the facts upon which the inspector relied to transmit the message. Based solely on the dispatcher’s report, and not upon any observations of his own to justify the stop, Officer Holland saw the described vehicle and stopped it. Robinson was unable to produce his driver’s license or the vehicle registration. A search of the automobile followed, during the course of which a bill of lading was discovered showing that the automobile had been shipped to a dealer in Las Vegas. The speedometer registered the exact mileage between Las Vegas, Nevada, and Kingman, Arizona. Officer Holland arrested Robinson for driving without a license. While Robinson was in custody, after effectively waiving his Miranda rights, he confessed the theft and the interstate transportation of the automobile. Robinson moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained after the stop as fruit of the illegal stop. Because we agree that the stop was illegal, the evidence should have been suppressed.
As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 486:
“The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 899 (1968).”
The stop violated the Fourth Amendment unless specific articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted a founded suspicion that Robinson was engaged in criminal activity. (E. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; United States v. Mallides (9th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 859, 861.)
Officer Holland had no personal knowledge of any facts upon which to found suspicion. The foundation, if any, had to be supplied by the person whose observations and information generated the suspicion. The dispatch to Officer Holland, standing alone, does not prove the existence of founded suspicion. A facially valid direction from one officer to another to stop a person or a vehicle insulates the complying officer from assuming personal responsibility or liability for his act done in obedience to the direction. But the direction does not itself supply legal cause for the detention, any more than the fact of detention supplies its own justification.
We recognize that effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information. The fact that an officer does not have to have personal knowledge of the evidence supplying good cause for a stop before he can obey a direction to detain a person or a vehicle does not mean that the Government need not produce evidence at trial showing good cause to legitimate the detention when the legality of the stop is challenged. If the dispatcher himself had had founded suspicion, or if he had relied on information from a reliable informant who supplied him with adequate facts to establish founded suspicion, the dispatcher could properly have delegated the stopping function to Officer Holland. But if the dispatcher did not have such cause, he could not create justification simply by relaying a direction to a fellow officer to make the stop.
The Government’s argument that effective law enforcement requires us to validate stops made in response to calls from fellow law enforcement officers, without any proof at trial that a factual foundation existed to support the call, was made and firmly rejected in Whiteley v. Warden (1970) 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306. Whiteley involved probable cause, rather than founded suspicion, but we perceive no substantive difference between the two doctrines that would warrant a different result.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0