Task: songer_subevid

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court's interpretation of the substantial evidence rule support the government? For example, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" or "more than a mere scintilla". This issue is present only when the court indicates that it is using this doctrine, rather than when the court is merely discussing the evidence to determine whether the evidence supports the position of the appellant or respondent." Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
Today we have held in the companion case of Johnson v. Williford, 821 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1987), that the United States Parole Commission (“U.S. Commission”) is empowered by D.C.Code § 24-209 to determine whether to release on parole District of Columbia Code offenders (“D.C.Code offenders”) held in federal prisons, but under that statute must apply District of Columbia parole laws and regulations when making such determinations. Act of June 5, 1934, ch. 391, 48 Stat. 880 (codified at D.C. Code § 24-209). Petitioner David S. Ash-by-Bey (“Ashby-Bey”) is a D.C.Code offender and was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois (“Marion”) at the time he filed pro se this habeas corpus petition raising the same issues decided today in Johnson. AshbyBey’s petition was granted by Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers, and. Ashby-Bey was transferred to the District of Columbia for a parole hearing in January of 1985. Parole was denied at that time and we are advised by his counsel for this appeal that he was transferred back to Marion to continue serving his sentence.
The magistrate granted Ashby-Bey’s petition based on his reasoning in Drakeford v. United States Parole Commission, 83 C 4210 (S.D.Ill. May 24, 1984), opinion amended (S.D.Ill. July 15, 1984), vacated and dismissed as moot by unpublished order, Nos. 84-2295 and 84-2340 [799 F.2d 753 (table)] (7th Cir. Aug. 27,1986). Even if we assume that Drakeford correctly decided that only prisoners convicted in federal district courts are included in the term “federal prisoners” and because of that Ashby-Bey would not be an “eligible prisoner,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 4201(4), and thus would fall outside the U.S. Commission’s statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 4203(b)(1), which is limited to “eligible prisoners,” our conclusion that the U.S. Commission has authority to decide Ashby-Bey’s case is unaffected. That statutory authority is derived from the Congressional grant of power found in D.C.Code § 24-209 and does not depend on whether Ashby-Bey is within the definition of the term “federal prisoner.” Furthermore, D.C.Code § 24-209 applies to all persons convicted of a D.C.Code violation and held in federal prisons, no matter whether they were convicted in the District of Columbia Superior Court or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. As in Johnson, the issues are whether § 24-209 applies to the U.S. Commission and remains in effect and whether § 24-209 requires the U.S. Commission to use D.C. parole laws and regulations for D.C.Code offenders.
On the basis of Johnson, we hold that the magistrate erred in ruling that the U.S. Commission lacked statutory authority to decide Ashby-Bey’s suitability for release on parole. Ashby-Bey was convicted in the District of Columbia Superior Court for a D.C.Code offense, rather than in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as Johnson was for a D.C.Code offense. This distinction does not change the conclusion reached in Johnson that D.C.Code § 24-209 applies to the U.S. Commission and was not repealed by implication by either the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, or the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). Thus the U.S. Commission continues to have “the same power and authority” over D.C.Code offenders as the D.C. Parole Board would have if those prisoners were held in a D.C. prison. That part of AshbyBey’s petition seeking to require the U.S. Commission to apply D.C. parole laws and regulations is granted for the reasons stated in Johnson.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Question: Did the court's interpretation of the substantial evidence rule support the government? For example, "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" or "more than a mere scintilla". This issue is present only when the court indicates that it is using this doctrine, rather than when the court is merely discussing the evidence to determine whether the evidence supports the position of the appellant or respondent.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D