Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
United States Gypsum Company appeals from a decree of a three-judge court of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, entered December 9, 1954. This decree modified a final decree of that court, entered May 15, 1951, against Gypsum, the appellees National Gypsum Company and Certain-teed Products Corporation, and others, in a civil antitrust proceeding instituted by the Government in 1940. The modification was a provision ordering Gypsum to dismiss with prejudice four suits which it had brought in three different federal district courts against National, Certain-teed, and two other co-defendants in the antitrust proceeding, to recover compensation or damages for the pendente lite use of certain of its patents during the period February 1, 1948, to May 15, 1951.
At the outset some mention of the prolonged antitrust proceeding is required to put the present post-decree controversy in context. In that proceeding the Government charged Gypsum, National, Certain-teed, and a number of other corporate and individual defendants with conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in gypsum board and other gypsum products in violation of §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act. The crux of the Government’s charges was the alleged illegality of Gypsum’s system of industry-wide uniform patent licensing agreements containing clauses giving Gypsum the right to fix prices on gypsum board and products. In 1946, at the close of the Government’s case, the District Court dismissed the complaint. On appeal this Court, on March 8, 1948, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Thereafter the District Court, with one dissent, interpreting this Court’s decision to mean that Gypsum’s multiple uniform price fixing patent licenses were illegal per se under the antitrust laws, granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, accepting as true the defendants’ proffer of proof. On November 7, 1949, the District Court entered a decree which, among other things, adjudged Gypsum’s patent licensing agreements illegal, null and void, enjoined the performance of such agreements, provided for limited compulsory nonexclusive licensing of Gypsum’s patents on a reasonable royalty basis, and reserved jurisdiction over the case and parties for certain purposes. On appeals by both the Government and Gypsum, this Court, in 1950, dismissed Gypsum’s appeal, affirmed the summary judgment below, and held the Government entitled to broader relief in certain respects, remanding the case for that purpose. Meanwhile, in noting probable jurisdiction on the Government's appeal, this Court enjoined the defendants from carrying out the price fixing provisions of their current license agreements, and from entering into any agreements or engaging in concerted action in restraint of trade. This preliminary injunction, entered May 29, 1950, remained in force until the new final decree of the District Court was entered on May 15, 1951.
After this Court’s 1948 reversal of the District Court’s original order of dismissal, National, Certain-teed, and Gypsum’s other co-defendant licensees ceased paying royalties under their license agreements. Following the May 15, 1951, decree, National and Certain-teed, as authorized by Article VI of that decree, entered into new license agreements, effective May 15, for the future use of Gypsum’s patents, such licenses containing no price fixing clauses; the royalty rate was the same as under the old licenses, except that the licensee’s returns on unpatented gypsum products did not enter into its measure. The new licenses were without prejudice to Gypsum’s claim for compensation for the use of the patents during the period February 1, 1948, to May 15, 1951. The respondents not having paid for that period, Gypsum, in 1953, brought suit against them in the Iowa federal court. The complaints in these suits asserted three separate grounds for recovery: (a) the royalty provisions of the old license agreements (Counts I and II); (b) quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the use of the patents (Counts III and IV); and (c) damages for patent infringement (Count V).
Thereafter, National and Certain-teed, claiming that the institution of the Iowa actions violated the 1951 decree, and that in any event Gypsum was barred from recovery by reason of unpurged misuse of the patents involved, petitioned the antitrust court to enjoin further prosecution of the actions. The Government also filed a separate petition to enjoin Gypsum from maintaining any action based on the illegal license agreements, but took no position on Gypsum’s right to recover for the period in question on the grounds of quantum meruit or patent infringement. Gypsum’s answers to these petitions in substance alleged that the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the petitioners, and put in issue all of the allegations on which the right to relief was predicated.
The District Court decided that it had jurisdiction to grant relief (one judge dissenting), and, after hearing the parties through briefs and oral argument, but without taking any evidence beyond that already of record in the antitrust proceeding, concluded that the 1951 decree should be modified so as to enjoin the prosecution of Gypsum’s suits. The court held that prosecution of Counts I and II, which declared upon the illegal license agreements, could not be maintained under the terms of the 1951 decree. Although finding that the other three Counts were not barred by that decree, it further held that the suits should be prohibited in their entirety because of Gypsum’s unpurged misuse of its patents. There followed the modifying decree of December 9, 1954, from which this appeal was taken. We noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U. S. 946. For the reasons given hereafter we conclude that, except as it related to the two causes of action based on the illegal license agreements (Counts I and II), this proscriptive modification of the 1951 decree was not justified by the record before the District Court.
I.
Preliminarily, we conclude that three aspects of the lower court’s holding must be upheld. First, we think that Article X of the 1951 decree, reserving to the antitrust court jurisdiction, upon application of “any of the parties” to the decree, to make such “directions” and “modifications” as may be appropriate to the “carrying out” and “enforcement” of the decree, provided a fully adequate basis for the jurisdiction exercised below. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114; Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U. S. 502. See also Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U. S. 556. Gypsum argues that insofar as the relief granted below was rested upon patent misuse, instead of a construction of the 1951 decree which was the basis of enjoining the prosecution of Counts I and II of Gypsum’s suits, the lower court’s decision involved a determination of a collateral private controversy between this group of antitrust defendants, rather than a “carrying out” or “enforcement” of the terms of that decree. But we think that whether Gypsum was barred from recovery in these suits by reason of the abuse of its patent rights was a problem sufficiently related to the rationale of the 1951 decree to bring it within the reserved jurisdiction clause. This is especially so because patent misuse was the essence of the old antitrust litigation, and its continuance or renewal were thus issues peculiarly within the province of the antitrust court, whose determination would avoid multiple litigation and possibly conflicting decisions on that issue among the courts in which Gypsum had brought suit.
Likewise we conclude that there is no basis for disturbing the District Court’s determinations that prosecution of Counts I and II, based on the old license agreements, was not permissible under the 1951 decree, but that its terms did not reach the quantum meruit and infringement Counts.
The outcome of this appeal then turns on whether the District Court was right in holding as a matter of law that Gypsum was barred from any kind of recovery for the pendente lite use of its patents because of their unpurged misuse. It is now, of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or “purged” as the conventional saying goes. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488; B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U. S. 495; Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U. S. 394; MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U. S. 402; Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U. S. 680. The rule is an extension of the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” to the patent field. In terms of this case this means that Gypsum may not recover from these appellees for their use of its patents between February 1, 1948, and May 15, 1951, if Gypsum has been guilty of misuse of the patents since 1948, or if the original misuse found in the antitrust litigation remained unpurged. This issue, of course, involves essentially a question of fact. And since the record is barren of any facts with respect to the situation existing in the gypsum industry since 1941, we think that the District Court erred in holding purely as a matter of law that an unpurged misuse had been shown.
II.
Putting aside the two contract Counts, the enjoining of which we have held was sufficiently supported by the court’s finding that they could not be maintained under the terms of the 1951 decree, there are three aspects to the lower court’s holding as to the remaining Counts. First, the court held those Counts barred because Gypsum had engaged in “fresh” patent misuse — misuse unrelated to the original antitrust litigation. Secondly, it was held that since the “old” misuse adjudicated in the antitrust proceeding had continued unpurged, recovery must in any case be barred. And finally, the court held that irrespective of purge, the “old” misuse itself was sufficient to bar the patent infringement Count. We discuss each of these holdings in turn.
A.
The “fresh” misuse found by the lower court was simply the fact of the inclusion of Counts I and II in the 1953 suits. These Counts sought recovery of royalties under the illegal licensing agreements. Such inclusion, the court held, was a renewed attempt to enforce these illegal agreements, and as such should be regarded as a new misuse of the patents which barred recovery under the other Counts as well. We do not agree.
The five Counts in Gypsum’s complaints were merely alternative legal theories for reaching a single end, namely, recovery for the pendente lite use of Gypsum’s patents. Had the complaints declared only upon the quantum meruit and infringement Counts the mere bringing of the suits could then hardly have been regarded as fresh misuse, even though recovery might be defeated by showing some independent unpurged misuse of the patents involved. For as the lower court recognized, such recovery by way of quantum meruit or damages for infringement was not “expressly or impliedly” touched by the terms of the 1951 decree. Gypsum explains the inclusion of the two contract Counts as precautionary pleading to fend against the possibility that the defendants, if sued only for quantum meruit and infringement, might set up the license agreements in defense. Such alternative pleading is expressly sanctioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, and, even though that defense has turned out to be untenable in light of the lower court’s findings, we think that it distorts the doctrine of patent misuse to hold that recourse to this method of pleading here vitiated the other Counts of the complaints.
Moreover, in view of what transpired before the antitrust court in the hearings relating to the settlement of the 1949 decree, we are by no means satisfied that Gypsum was not entitled to a bona fide guess, at least as a matter of alternative pleading, that the decree would not be interpreted as barring the collection of these interim royalties. At those hearings counsel for one of the defendants, Celotex, without remonstrance by either of these respondents, stated:
“In order that United States Gypsum will have no misunderstanding of my position, I want them to know that my suggestion [that the decree should declare the licenses ‘illegal, null and void’] is in no sense based on any hope or desire on my part to get out of any license fees during any interim period, and if we can agree... as far as my client is concerned, we are willing to let the royalty rate [of the new compulsory licenses], whatever it is, agreed upon apply back to the time when we ceased paying royalties. I just want to make it clear to all that we are not attempting by this declaration of illegality of them to find some way of avoiding the license fees which during this [litigation] none of us have paid.”
Further, both the Government and the other co-defendants at that time seem to have regarded the “illegal, null and void” provisions of the decree as simply the equivalent of “cancellation” of the licenses. In view of the narrow adjudication of violation by this Court, infra, p. 470, we cannot say that Gypsum could not have reasonably entertained the belief that the price fixing provisions of the license agreements would ultimately be held separable from the basic undertaking to pay royalties. Indeed, the new licenses, authorized by the decree, which omitted the price fixing clauses, carried the same royalty rate on products made under the patents.
We conclude that in the circumstances present here it was error to regard the inclusion of the contract Counts as constituting a “fresh” patent misuse on Gypsum’s part.
B.
We come next to the holding that the “old” misuse, found in the antitrust proceeding, continued unpurged through the 1948-1951 period. And here we are met immediately by the fact that the record before the antitrust court is completely bare of any facts relating to this period, or indeed any period after 1941. For the Government’s proof in the antitrust case, presented from 1940 to 1944, concerned the gypsum industry prior to and until 1941, and no further evidence has ever been introduced into any of these litigations. We thus know literally nothing about the state of the gypsum industry between 1948, when this Court, on evidence not extending beyond 1941, first held that there had been an antitrust violation, and 1951. How, then, can we assume that this earlier violation, adjudicated for the first time in 1948, continued thereafter?
The answer to this question depends on the nature and extent of that violation. According to Gypsum, the only illegality ever adjudicated was the fixing of prices on gypsum materials under the industry-wide uniform price fixing clauses of patent licenses which were found to have been the product of concerted action between Gypsum and its co-defendants. In other words, Gypsum, relying on the 1949 decree, which followed this Court’s first decision, and its underlying findings, argues that the maintenance of uniform patent licenses with price fixing clauses was the only patent misuse ever found. It then points out that it offered to prove below that price fixing in the industry stopped in 1941, and that the licenses were rescinded in 1948. Add to this the fact that the 1949 decree, and again this Court’s 1950 interlocutory decree, enjoined Gypsum from enforcing these licenses, and, says Gypsum, the inference arises that the only patent misuse ever adjudicated had ceased by 1948 — an inference at least sufficient to allow the issue to go to trial on the facts.
According to appellees National and Certain-teed, however, the adjudication of misuse in the antitrust proceeding was much broader, encompassing the regimentation of the entire gypsum industry, the restraint of commerce in unpatented gypsum products, the elimination of jobbers, and the standardization of trade practices throughout the industry. This broad view of the character of the antitrust violation rests upon this Court’s 1950 decision, which held the 1949 decree too narrow and allowed the Government the broader relief embodied in the 1951 decree. Appellees argue that the fact that this Court felt it necessary to broaden the 1949 decree involved by necessity an adjudication of broad patent misuse, misuse not prohibited by the 1949 decree and therefore left un-purged by it. In other words, the argument runs, the broadening of the decree by this Court necessarily involved a holding that Gypsum was guilty of violations not proscribed by the original decree, violations which existed unpurged during part or all of the 1948-1951 period, since they were first adjudicated by this Court in 1950 and presumptively continued until 1951, when they were finally dealt with by the 1951 decree.
Appellees’ argument is ingenious, but incorrect. The course of decisions in the antitrust litigation clearly shows that the only misuse ever adjudicated was that arising from the uniform price fixing provisions of the license agreements. In the original suit the only undisputed issue of fact was that Gypsum had given its competitors uniform patent licenses containing a price fixing clause. The Government also charged Gypsum with a variety of other abuses, including price fixing on unpatented articles, elimination of jobbers, and standardization of trade practices. All of these charges were put in issue by Gypsum. On the appeal from the original dismissal of the proceedings, this Court held that the uniform price fixing licenses constituted a per se antitrust violation, and also that the Government’s evidence as to the other matters constituted a prima jade case of additional violation. On remand, the District Court, instead of going into a factual trial of these other matters, granted summary judgment on the price fixing violation. This left all of the other matters still at issue. They continued to remain at issue after the ensuing appeals to this Court, for in affirming the summary judgment and broadening the 1949 decree, this Court made it clear that it was proceeding solely on the basis of the narrow antitrust violation found by the District Court:
“We agree with a statement made by counsel for the Government in argument below that as a'matter of formulating the decree’ many facts offered to be proven would have effect upon the conclusion of a court as to the decree’s terms. However, we read the preliminary statement of the District Court... as an adjudication of violation of the Sherman Act by the action in concert of the defendants through the fixed-price licenses, accepting as true the underlying facts in defendants’ proof by proffer. The trial judges understood the summary judgment to be, as Judge Stephens said, ‘limited to that one undisputed question.’ Judge Garrett and Judge Jackson agreed. That conclusion entitled the Government only to relief based on that finding and the proffered facts. On that basis we dismissed United States Gypsum’s appeal from the decree, and on that basis we examine the Government’s objection to the decree.
“[A decree] is not limited to prohibition of the proven means by which the evil was accomplished, but may range broadly through practices connected with acts actually found to be illegal....
“... We turn then to the Government’s proposals for modification of the decree.on the assumption that only a violation through concerted industry license agreements has been proven, but recognizing, as is conceded by defendants, that relief, to be effective, must go beyond the narrow limits of the proven violation.” 340 U. S., at 87-89, 90.
Thus we see that the only patent misuse that has ever been established in this long-drawn-out litigation is concerted price fixing under the former patent licenses, and that the 1950 holding of this Court was not an adjudication of other violations but only an application of the well-known principle that relief in antitrust cases may range beyond the narrow area of proven violations. Nothing, therefore, in the broadening of the decree supports the inference that the acts prohibited therein and left open in the 1949 decree continued in the pendente lite period or, in fact, had ever taken place. Perhaps Gypsum did engage in broad regimentation of the industry, as charged in the Government’s 1940

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 主