Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice White
delivered an opinion, Parts I, II, and IV of which are the opinion of the Court, and Part III of which is a dissenting opinion.
The Arizona Supreme Court ruled in this case that respondent Oreste Fulminante’s confession, received in evidence at his trial for murder, had been coerced and that its use against him was barred by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The court also held that the harmless-error rule could not be used to save the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the Arizona court, although for different reasons than those upon which that court relied.
I
Early in the morning of September 14, 1982, Fulminante called the Mesa, Arizona, Police Department to report that his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Jeneane Michelle Hunt, was missing. He had been caring for Jeneane while his wife, Jeneane’s mother, was in the hospital. Two days later, Je-neane’s body was found in the desert east of Mesa. She had been shot twice in the head at close range with a large caliber weapon, and a ligature was around her neck. Because of the decomposed condition of the body, it was impossible to tell whether she had been sexually assaulted.
Fulminante’s statements to police concerning Jeneane’s disappearance and his relationship with her contained a number of inconsistencies, and he became a suspect in her killing. When no charges were filed against him, Fulminante left Arizona for New Jersey. Fulminante was later convicted in New Jersey on federal charges of possession of a firearm by a felon.
Fulminante was incarcerated in the Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution in New York. There he became friends with another inmate, Anthony Sarivola, then serving a 60-day sentence for extortion. The two men came to spend several hours a day together. Sarivola, a former police officer, had been involved in loansharking for organized crime but then became a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While at Ray Brook, he masqueraded as an organized crime figure. After becoming friends with Ful-minante, Sarivola heard a rumor that Fulminante was suspected of killing a child in Arizona. Sarivola then raised the subject with Fulminante in several conversations, but Ful-minante repeatedly denied any involvement in Jeneane’s death. During one conversation, he told Sarivola that Jeneane had been killed by bikers looking for drugs; on another occasion, he said he did not know what had happened. Sarivola passed this information on to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who instructed Sarivola to find out more.
Sarivola learned more one evening in October 1983, as he and Fulminante walked together around the prison track. Sarivola said that he knew Fulminante was “starting to get some tough treatment and whatnot” from other inmates because of the rumor. App. 83. Sarivola offered to protect Fulminante from his fellow inmates, but told him, “ ‘You have to tell me about it,’ you know. I mean, in other words, ‘For me to give you any help.’ ” Ibid. Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola that he had driven Jeneane to the desert on his motorcycle, where he choked her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for her life, before shooting her twice in the head. Id., at 84-85.
Sarivola was released from prison in November 1983. Fulminante was released the following May, only to be arrested the next month for another weapons violation. On September 4, 1984, Fulminante was indicted in Arizona for the first-degree murder of Jeneane.
Prior to trial, Fulminante moved to suppress the statement he had given Sarivola in prison, as well as a second confession he had given to Donna Sarivola, then Anthony Sarivola’s fiancée and later his wife, following his May 1984 release from prison. He asserted that the confession to Sarivola was coerced, and that the second confession was the “fruit” of the first. Id., at 6-8. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, specifically finding that, based on the stipulated facts, the confessions were voluntary. Id., at 44, 63. The State introduced both confessions as evidence at trial, and on December 19, 1985, Fulminante was convicted of Jeneane’s murder. He was subsequently sentenced to death.
Fulminante appealed, arguing, among other things, that his confession to Sarivola was the product of coercion and that its admission at trial violated his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After considering the evidence at trial as well as the stipulated facts before the trial court on the motion to suppress, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the confession was coerced, but initially determined that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless error, because of the overwhelming nature of the evidence against Fulminante. 161 Ariz. 237, 778 P. 2d 602 (1988). Upon Fulminante’s motion for reconsideration, however, the court ruled that this Court’s precedent precluded the use of the harmless-error analysis in the case of a coerced confession. Id., at 262, 778 P. 2d, at 627. The court therefore reversed the conviction and ordered that Fulminante be retried without the use of the confession to Sarivola. Because of differing views in the state and federal courts over whether the admission at trial of a coerced confession is subject to a harmless-error analysis, we granted the State’s petition for certiorari, 494 U. S. 1055 (1990). Although a majority of this Court finds that such a confession is subject to a harmless-error analysis, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Arizona court.
II
We deal first with the State’s contention that the court below erred in holding Fulminante’s confession to have been coerced. The State argues that it is the totality of the circumstances that determines whether Fulminante’s confession was coerced, cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 226 (1973), but contends that rather than apply this standard, the Arizona court applied a “but for” test, under which the court found that but for the promise given by Sarivola, Fulminante would not have confessed. Brief for Petitioner 14-15. In support of this argument, the State points to the Arizona court’s reference to Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). Although the Court noted in Bram that a confession cannot be obtained by “‘any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence,’” id., at 542-543 (quoting 3 H. Smith & A. Keep, Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanors 478 (6th ed. 1896)), it is clear that this passage from Bram, which under current precedent does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession, was not relied on by the Arizona court in reaching its conclusion. Rather, the court cited this language as part of a longer quotation from an Arizona case which accurately described the State’s burden of proof for establishing voluntariness. See 161 Ariz., at 244, 778 P. 2d, at 609 (citing State v. Thomas, 148 Ariz. 225, 227, 714 P. 2d 395, 397 (1986); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7 (1964); and Bram, supra, at 542-543). Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that a “determination regarding the voluntariness of a confession... must be viewed in a totality of the circumstances,” 161 Ariz., at 243, 778 P. 2d, at 608, and under that standard plainly found that Fulminante’s statement to Sarivola had been coerced.
In applying the totality of the circumstances test to determine that the confession to Sarivola was coerced, the Arizona Supreme Court focused on a number of relevant facts. First, the court noted that “because [Fulminante] was an alleged child murderer, he was in danger of physical harm at the hands of other inmates.” Ibid. In addition, Sarivola was aware that Fulminante had been receiving “ ‘rough treatment from the guys.’” Id., at 244, n. 1, 778 P. 2d, at 609, n. 1. Using his knowledge of these threats, Sarivola offered to protect Fulminante in exchange for a confession to Je-neane’s murder, id., at 243, 778 P. 2d, at 608, and “[i]n response to Sarivola’s offer of protection, [Fulminante] confessed.” Id., at 244, 778 P. 2d, at 609. Agreeing with Ful-minante that “Sarivola’s promise was ‘extremely coercive,’” id., at 243, 778 P. 2d, at 608, the Arizona court declared: “[T]he confession was obtained as a direct result of extreme coercion and was tendered in the belief that the defendant’s life was in jeopardy if he did not confess. This is a true coerced confession in every sense of the word.” Id., at 262, 778 P. 2d, at 627.
We normally give great deference to the factual findings of the state court. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 603-604 (1961). Nevertheless, “the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ is a legal question requiring independent federal determination.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 110 (1985). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 398 (1978); Davis, supra, at 741-742; Haynes, supra, at 515; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 228-229 (1940).
Although the question is a close one, we agree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that Fulminante’s confession was coerced. The Arizona Supreme Court found a credible threat of physical violence unless Fulminante confessed. Our cases have made clear that a finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient. As we have said, “coercion can be mental as well as physical, and... the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206 (1960). See also Culombe, supra, at 584; Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 440-441 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 540 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, 561 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 52 (1949). As in Payne, where the Court found that a confession was coerced because the interrogating police officer had promised that if the accused confessed, the officer would protect the accused from an angry mob outside the jailhouse door, 356 U. S., at 564-565, 567, so too here, the Arizona Supreme Court found that it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend (and Government agent) Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess. Accepting the Arizona court’s finding, permissible on this record, that there was a credible threat of physical violence, we agree with its conclusion that Fulminante’s will was overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion.
1 — 1 > — I
Four of us, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and myself, would affirm the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court on the ground that the harmless-error rule is inapplicable to erroneously admitted coerced confessions. We thus disagree with the Justices who have a contrary view.
The majority today abandons what until now the Court has regarded as the “axiomatic [proposition] that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 [(1961)], and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 [(1945)]; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 [(1952)]; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 376 (1964). The Court has repeatedly stressed that the view that the admission of a coerced confession can be harmless error because of the other evidence to support the verdict is “an impermissible doctrine,” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 537 (1963); for “the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Payne, supra, at 568. See also Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 578, n. 6 (1986); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 459 (1979); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 483 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 23, and n. 8 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 518; Blackburn v. Alabama, supra, at 206; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 324 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 475 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55, 63 (1951); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 599 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 597, n. 1 (1944). As the decisions in Haynes and Payne, supra, show, the rule was the same even when another confession of the defendant had been properly admitted into evidence. Today, a majority of the Court, without any justification, cf. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984), overrules this vast body of precedent without a word and in so doing dislodges one of the fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system.
In extending to coerced confessions the harmless-error rule of Chapman v. California, supra, the majority declares that because the Court has applied that analysis to numerous other “trial errors,” there is no reason that it should not apply to an error of this nature as well. The four of us remain convinced, however, that we should abide by our cases that have refused to apply the harmless-error rule to coerced confessions, for a coerced confession is fundamentally different from other types of erroneously admitted evidence to which the rule has been applied. Indeed, as the majority concedes, Chapman itself recognized that prior cases “have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,” and it placed in that category the constitutional rule against using a defendant’s coerced confession against him at his criminal trial. 386 U. S., at 23, and n. 8 (emphasis added). Moreover, cases since Chapman have reiterated the rule that using a defendant’s coerced confession against him is a denial of due process of law regardless of the other evidence in the record aside from the confession. Lego v. Twomey, supra, at 483; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S., at 398; New Jersey v. Portash, supra, at 459; Rose v. Clark, supra, at-577, 578, and n. 6.
Chapman specifically noted three constitutional errors that could not be categorized as harmless error: using a coerced confession against a defendant in a criminal trial, depriving a defendant of counsel, and trying a defendant before a biased judge. The majority attempts to distinguish the use of a coerced confession from the other two errors listed in Chapman first by distorting the decision in Payne, and then by drawing a meaningless dichotomy between “trial errors” and “structural defects” in the trial process. Viewing Payne as merely rejecting a test whereby the admission of a coerced confession could stand if there were “sufficient evidence,” other than the confession, to support the conviction, the majority suggests that the Court in Payne might have reached a different result had it been considering a harmless-error test. Post, at 309 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.). It is clear, though, that in Payne the Court recognized that regardless of the amount of other evidence, “the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment,” because “where, as here, a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession.” 356 U. S., at 568. The inability to assess its effect on a conviction causes the admission at trial of a coerced confession to “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” cf. post, at 309 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.), just as certainly as do deprivation of counsel and trial before a biased judge.
The majority also attempts to distinguish “trial errors” which occur “during the presentation of the case to the jury,” post, at 307, and which it deems susceptible to harmless-error analysis, from “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,” post, at 309, which the majority concedes cannot be so analyzed. This effort fails, for our jurisprudence on harmless error has not classified so neatly the errors at issue. For example, we have held susceptible to harmless-error analysis the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U. S. 786 (1979), while finding it impossible to analyze in terms of harmless error the failure to instruct a jury on the reasonable-doubt standard, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979). These cases cannot be reconciled by labeling the former “trial error” and the latter not, for both concern the exact same stage in the trial proceedings. Rather, these cases can be reconciled only by considering the nature of the right at issue and the effect of an error upon the trial. A jury instruction on the presumption of innocence is not constitutionally required in every case to satisfy due process, because such an instruction merely offers an additional safeguard beyond that provided by the constitutionally required instruction on reasonable doubt. See Whorton, supra, at 789; Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 488-490 (1978). While it may be possible to analyze as harmless the omission of a presumption of innocence instruction when the required reasonable-doubt instruction has been given, it is impossible to assess the effect on the jury of the omission of the more fundamental instruction on reasonable doubt. In addition, omission of a reasonable-doubt instruction, though a “trial error,” distorts the very structure of the trial because it creates the risk that the jury will convict the defendant even if the State has not met its required burden of proof. Cf. Cool v. United States, 409 U. S. 100, 104 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970).
These same concerns counsel against applying harmless-error analysis to the admission of a coerced confession. A defendant’s confession is “probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him,” Cruz v. New York, 481 U. S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), so damaging that a jury should not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so, Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 140 (1968) (White, J., dissenting), and because in any event it is impossible to know what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. Cf. Payne, supra, at 568. Concededly, this reason is insufficient to justify a per se bar to the use of any confession. Thus, Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371 (1972), applied harmless-error analysis to a confession obtained and introduced in circumstances that violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Similarly, the Courts of Appeals have held that the introduction of incriminating statements taken from defendants in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), is subject to treatment as harmless error.
Nevertheless, in declaring that it is “impossible to create a meaningful distinction between confessions elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment and those in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,” post, at 312 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.), the majority overlooks the obvious. Neither Milton v. Wainwright nor any of the other cases upon which the majority relies involved a defendant’s coerced confession, nor were there present in these cases the distinctive reasons underlying the exclusion of coerced incriminating statements of the defendant. First, some coerced confessions may be untrustworthy. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S., at 385-386; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S., at 320. Consequently, admission of coerced confessions may distort the truth-seeking function of the trial upon which the majority focuses. More importantly, however, the use of coerced confessions, “whether true or false,” is forbidden “because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system — a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth,” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S., at 540-541; see also Lego, 404 U. S., at 485

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 取