Task: sc_issue_10

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in Windward Shipping v. American Radio Assn., 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from Windward on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As in Windward, this ease arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse impact on American seamen of the operations of foreign-flag carriers which employ foreign crewmen at wages substantially below those paid to American seamen. As in Windward, the picketing occurred during 1971, but in this case it took place in Mobile, Ala., and was directed against the Aqua Glory, a ship of Liberian registry. The pickets displayed the same signs and distributed the same literature as they did in Windward, and they were subject to the same instructions.
The picketing in each case also had similar results. In Windward, we observed: “The picketing, although neither obstructive nor violent, was not without effect. Longshoremen and other port workers refused to cross the picket lines to load and unload petitioners’ vessels.” 415 U. S., at 108. Here, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in affirming a temporary injunction issued by the Alabama Circuit Court, said of petitioners’ activities in Mobile:
“Posting the pickets, as was done on the dock adjacent to the Aqua Glory, brought about an immediate refusal by the stevedore workers of the locals of International Longshoremen’s Association to cross the picket line of the appellant unions. About eighty percent of the cargo ships that enter the Port of Mobile, sail under a foreign-flag and are manned by alien crews.”
I
It is apparent from the facts already stated that the Houston picketing in Windward and the Mobile picketing here were for all practical purposes identical. Petitioners refer to Windward as “involving the union petitioners in the identical national picketing dispute as part of the Committee’s program....” Brief for Petitioners 7 n. 1. But petitioners contend that since the state-court plaintiffs in this cáse are not the foreign owners of a picketed ship, as they were in Windward, but are instead stevedoring companies which seek to service the ship and a shipper who wishes to have his crops loaded on it, the question of pre-emption of state-court jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Act should be answered differently than it was in Windward. Petitioners reason that respondents could have charged them with an unfair labor practice under the secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act, §8 (b)(4), 49 Stat.' 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(4), and that since petitioners’ activities were arguably prohibited under that section, the respondents’ exclusive remedy was to seek relief from the National Labor Relations Board. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Councils. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959).
Petitioners’ position in this respect contrasts markedly with their posture in the Windward litigation. There petitioners, as respondents in this Court, urged that “peaceful and truthful primary picketing, non obstructive and without trespass upon private property, by American workers protesting substandard wages and benefits paid,” are activities “actually protected by the Act.” Brief for Respondents in No. 72-1061, O. T. 1973, p. 15. They also urged that “the American seamen’s activities at bar constitutes [sic] typical lawful primary picketing, sanctioned and protected by the Act, Garner [v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953),] and [Longshoremen v.] Ariadne [Co.], 397 U. S. [195,] 202 [(1970)].” Brief for Respondents in No. 72-1061, O. T. 1973, p. 16. Petitioners apparently urged the same arguments in the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, whose judgment we reviewed in Windward, because that court stated:
“[Ajppellees’ picketing carefully remained within the guidelines for permissible picketing on the premises of a secondary employer promulgated in Sailor’s Union of the Pacific, 92 N. L. R. B. 547 and adopted in Local 761, Inter. Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667... (1961).”
Petitioners, having failed to persuade this Court in Windward that their Houston picketing was protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, now contend that their Mobile picketing was at least arguably a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8 (b) (4)(B) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4)(B). They would have us hold not only that there is an independent controversy between petitioner unions, representing American seamen, and the contracting stevedores represented by respondent, but also that this independent dispute is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.
Acceptance of petitioners’ argument would result in a rule whereby a state court had jurisdiction over a complaint for injunction filed by a foreign-ship owner claiming that picketing activities of a union were interfering with his business relationships with a contract stevedore, but the same court would have no jurisdiction where the contract stevedore sought an injunction on precisely the same grounds. The anomaly of such a result is reason enough to question it, but we believe that there is a more fundamental flaw in petitioners’ claim.
Even if there is a dispute between petitioners and respondents which is, in some semantic sense, independent of petitioners’ dispute with foreign-flag ships, that dispute is subject to state-court disposition unless it satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of the NLRA. In this regard, we note that a necessary predicate for a finding by the Board of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (i) is that the individual induced or encouraged must be employed by a “person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce.” Similarly, a necessary predicate for finding an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (ii) is that the person threatened, coerced, or restrained must have been engaged in “commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,” and a necessary predicate for Board jurisdiction of unfair labor practices under § 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a) is that they be practices “affecting commerce.”
Petitioners interpret Windward as having done nothing more than establish that the maritime operations of foreign ships are not “in commerce.” They assume that Windward said nothing about either the business activities of persons seeking to deal with such ships, or about whether, for these purposes, those activities are “in commerce” or “affecting commerce.” Petitioners therefore are able to state that the requirements of §§ 8 (b) (4) and 10 are satisfied because:
“Unquestionably, the Association, constituting stevedoring companies employing longshoremen to load and discharge vessels at the port of Mobile, Alabama, is an 'employer’ engaged in ‘commerce’ under the Act, and equally unquestionably, respondent Malone, delivering his soybeans to the dock elevator, is a ‘person’ engaged in ‘commerce,’ under the Act.” Brief for Petitioners 15-16.
We do not believe, however, that the line of cases commencing with Benz and culminating in Windward permit such a bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of pickets at a single site.
In Windward we stated that our task was to determine “whether the activities... complained of were activities ‘affecting commerce’ within the meaning of... the National Labor Relations Act,” and we concluded that they were not. 415 U. S., at 105-106. We recognized that the picketing activities did not involve the inescapable intrusion into the affairs of. foreign ships that was present in Benz and Inores, but we went on to say that the latter cases “do not purport to fully delineate the threshold of interference with the maritime operations of foreign vessels which makes the LMRA inapplicable.” 415 U. S., at 114. We further observed:
“At the very least, the pickets must have hoped to exert sufficient pressure so that foreign vessels would be forced to raise their operating costs to levels comparable to those of American shippers, either because of lost cargo resulting from the longshoremen’s refusal to load or unload the vessels, or because of wage increases awarded as a virtual self-imposed tariff to regain entry to American ports. Such a large-scale increase in operating costs would have more than a negligible impact on the ‘maritime operations’ of these foreign ships, and the effect would be by no means limited to costs incurred while in American ports. Unlike Ariadne, the protest here could not be accommodated by a wage decision on the part of the shipowners which would affect only wages paid within this country.” Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we thus spoke in Windward of the effect of the Houston pickets on the maritime operations of foreign ships, the quoted passage shows that we fully recognized that this effect would not be produced solely by the pickets and the messages carried by their signs. It would be produced in large part by the refusal of American workmen employed by domestic stevedoring companies to cross the picket line in order to load and unload cargo coming to or from the foreign ships. Since Windward held that the Houston picketing was not in or affecting commerce, it would be wholly inconsistent to now hold, insofar as concerns Board jurisdiction over a complaint by respondents, that the employer of the longshoremen who honored the picket line, or the shipper whose goods they did not handle, was in or affecting commerce.
That we found it unnecessary to expressly state this conclusion in Windward suggests not that the point is an undecided one, but that such a conclusion inevitably flows from the fact that the response of the employees of the American stevedores was a crucial part of the mechánism by which the maritime operations of the foreign ships were to be affected. The exaction of the “self-imposed tariff to regain entry to American ports” does not depend upon American shippers heeding the message on the picket signs and declining to ship their cargoes in foreign bottoms. The same pressure upon the foreign-flag owners will result if longshoremen refuse to load or unload their ships. The effect of the picketing on the operations of the stevedores and shippers, and thence on these maritime operations, is precisely the same whether it be complained of by the foreign-ship owners or by persons seeking to service and deal with the ships. The fact that the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case is invoked by stevedores and shippers does not convert into “commerce” activities which plainly were not such in Windward.
Our dissenting Brethren contend that our disposition is inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Hattiesburg Building & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U. S. 126 (1964), and with the Board’s decision in Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N. L. R. B. 547 (1950). Hattiesburg dealt with the quite different question of applying the Board’s own limitation of its statutory jurisdiction to those cases which have “a substantial effect on commerce.” 23 N. L. R. B. Ann. Rep. 7 (1958) (emphasis added). The Board had promulgated a series of administratively established standards, in effect ceding to state courts and agencies disputes involving entities which admittedly “affected commerce,” but whose volume of interstate business was not “sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of [Board] jurisdiction.” 29 U. S. C. § 164 (c). The standards provided that they could be “satisfied by reference to the business operations of either the primary or the secondary employer.” Hattiesburg, supra, at 126. Because of this provision, the Board had not in fact ceded its jurisdiction over the particular dispute that had been presented to the Mississippi courts. In Hattiesburg this Court did no more than enforce the natural consequence of this fact by holding that Garmon deprived the state courts of jurisdiction. We find nothing in that holding inconsistent with what we say or hold here. Certainly Hattiesburg does not, as Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissent would have it, stand for the proposition that a secondary employer’s domestic business activities may be the basis for Board jurisdiction where the primary dispute is beyond its statutory authority over unfair labor practices “affecting commerce.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 i,a).
That dissent’s treatment of Moore Dry Dock, supra, reads a great deal more into that 1950 Board decision than its language and analysis can support. The decision itself contains no reference whatever to the jurisdiction of the Board over the primary employer, the foreign-flag vessel Phopho, and neither the decision nor the Trial Examiner’s report considered the jurisdictional challenge presently confronting this Court. The Trial Examiner’s report, from which that dissenting opinion quotes, did state that the Board, in an apparently unreported determination, had previously dismissed a petition for election aboard the Phopho, 92 N. L. R. B. 547, 560-561. The report later acknowledged that the Board had “left somewhat obscure the precise legal basis” of its jurisdictional ruling, a comment which was evoked by the contention that because the primary employer was “clearly engaged in commerce,” the ruling must have been based on a different jurisdictional defect. Id., at 568. This Court in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957), not only noted that Moore Dry Dock involved a different situation, but also rather pointedly stated: “We need only say that these cases are inapposite, without, of course, intimating any view as to their result.” 353 U. S., at 143 n. 5. A 1950 Board precedent such as this can scarcely be regarded as controlling when it is clearly contrary to the thrust of this Court’s Benz-Windward line of cases.
Petitioners rely on Teamsters Union v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U. S. 155 (1956), and Plumbers’ Union v. Door County, 359 U. S. 354 (1959), for the proposition that even though the Board may not have jurisdiction over the primary labor relations of a party which is excluded from the Act’s definition of “employer,” it is nonetheless competent to consider secondary disputes involving such a party. In Teamsters Union, supra, a railroad was held to be barred from seeking relief in the state courts against a secondary boycott. The Court held that while the railroad was not a statutory “employer,” it was nonetheless a “person” protected by § 8 (b)(4). A similar result was reached in Door County, supra, in which a non-“employer” county sought state court relief, not with respect to activities of its own employees, but with respect to a claimed secondary boycott arising from picketing against a nonunion subcontractor working on an addition to the county courthouse. While these cases establish the proposition that an entity which is not within the Act’s definition of “employer” may nonetheless be a “person” for purposes of protection against secondary boycotts, neither they nor any other case decided by this Court suggests that the Board has jurisdiction of § 8 (b) (4) complaints if the alleged unfair labor practice does not affect commerce. Indeed, in Door' County, supra, the Court pointedly inquired whether the out-of-state origin of construction materials was sufficient to establish the jurisdictionally required effect on interstate commerce. 359 U. S., at 356.
Here, neither the farmer seeking to ship his soybeans, the stevedores who contracted to unload the cargo of the foreign-flag vessel, nor the longshoremen whom the stevedores employed to carry out this undertaking, were for these purposes engaged in or affecting commerce within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore the petitioners’ picketing did not even “arguably” violate § 8 (b) (4) (B) of that Act. Since Congress did not intend to strain through the filament of the NLRA picketing activities which so directly affect the maritime operations of foreign vessels, we hold that the Alabama courts were competent to apply their own law in resolving the dispute between petitioners and respondents unless, as petitioners claim, such a resolution violated petitioners’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
II
After concluding that the state courts had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether the picketing was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U. S. 284 (1957), it concluded that if the picketing compromised valid public policies, it was not protected by its putative purpose of conveying information. The court therefore thought that the matter narrowed to whether or not the picketing had a purpose or objective to “wrongfully interfere” with respondents’ businesses. Recognizing that the unions were appealing a temporary injunction, issued as a matter of equitable discretion to preserve the status quo pending final resolution of the dispute, the court inquired only whether there was evidence of a prohibited purpose sufficient to establish that the trial judge had not abused the “wide discretion” he possesses in such matters. The court found such evidence in the testimony of a local union official charged with carrying out the picketing. He had expressed the hope that union men would not cross the lines, that the port would become cluttered with foreign ships unable to load or unload, and that the docks would be shut down. On this basis the court concluded that a substantial question was presented as to whether the picketing had a prohibited purpose, and that the trial judge had not abused his discretion.
Petitioners repeat their First and Fourteenth Amendment arguments before this Court. They contend that the picketing was expressive conduct informing the public of the injuries they suffer at the hands of foreign ships, and “imploring the public” to “ ‘Buy American’ or ‘Ship American.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 21. This conduct, they contend, constitutes “the lawful exercise of protected fundamental rights of free speech,” and is thus not subject to injunction.
We think this line of argument is foreclosed by our holding in Vogt, supra. There the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reviewed the cases in which we had dealt with disputes involving the interests of pickets in disseminating their message and of the State in protecting various competing economic and social interests. Vogt endorsed the view that picketing involves more than an expression of ideas, 354 U. S., at 289, and referred to our “growing awareness that these cases involved not so much questions of free speech as review of the balance struck by a State between picketing that involved more than ‘publicity’ and competing interests of state policy.” Id., at 290. The Court con-eluded that our cases “established a broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy.” Id., at 293. We believe that in the case now before us Alabama’s interference with petitioners’ picketing is well within that “broad field.”
Petitioners seek to escape from Vogt in three ways. First, they contend that this case is squarely controlled by Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968). In that case, claim petitioners, picketing “identical as at bar, [designed] to peacefully and truthfully publicize substandard wages and concomitantly request the public not to patronize the picketed entity,” was held to be protected.

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 外