Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the effect of 11 U. S. C. § 522(f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which permits individual debtors in bankruptcy proceedings to avoid liens on certain property. The Court of Appeals consolidated seven appeals from the Bankruptcy Courts for the Districts of Kansas and Colorado. In each case the debtor was an individual who instituted bankruptcy proceedings after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978 Act), became effective on October 1, 1979. In each case one of the appellees had loaned the debtor money and obtained and perfected a lien on the debtor’s household furnishings and appliances before the 1978 Act was enacted on November 6, 1978. None of these liens was possessory, and none secured purchase-money obligations.
Included within the personal property subject to the appel-lees’ liens were household items that are exempt from the property included within the debtors’ estates by virtue of subsections (b) and (d) of § 522. The debtors claimed these exemptions in their respective bankruptcy proceedings, relying on § 522(f)(2) to avoid the liens. That section provides:
“Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is—
“(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any—
“(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
“(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
“(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”
The appellees asserted that application of § 522(f)(2) to liens acquired before the enactment date would violate the Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in each case to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute, but the Bankruptcy Courts in each case refused to apply § 522(f)(2) to abrogate liens acquired before the enactment date.
The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed the judgments of the Bankruptcy Courts. 642 F. 2d 1193 (CA10 1981). It held that the 1978 Act was intended to apply retrospectively, and thus was designed to invalidate liens acquired before the enactment date. It also held, however, that such an application violates the Fifth Amendment. The court stated that § 522(f)(2) effects a “complete taking of the secured creditors’ property interests,” and is thus invalid under Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935). The United States appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1122 (1981).
The appellees, of course, defend the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Government argues at some length that retrospective application of § 522(f)(2) to these liens would not violate the Fifth Amendment. It contends that the enactment is a “rational” exercise of Congress’ bankruptcy power, that for “bankruptcy purposes” property interests are all but indistinguishable from contractual interests, and that these particular interests were “insubstantial” and therefore their destruction does not amount to a “taking” of property requiring compensation. We do not decide the constitutional question reached by the Court of Appeals. We address it only to determine whether the attack on the retrospective application of the statute raises substantial enough constitutional doubts to warrant the employment of the canon of statutory construction referred to infra, at 78-81.
It may be readily agreed that § 522(f)(2) is a rational exercise of Congress’ authority under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and that this authority has been regularly construed to authorize the retrospective impairment of contractual obligations. Hano ver National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 188 (1902). Such agreement does not, however, obviate the additional difficulty that arises when that power is sought to be used to defeat traditional property interests. The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against taking private property without compensation. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra. Thus, however “rational” the exercise of the bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the question whether the enactment takes property within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
The Government apparently contends (Brief for United States 30-32) that because cases such as Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), defined “property” for purposes of the Due Process Clause sufficiently broadly to include rights which at common law would have been deemed contractual, traditional property rights are entitled to no greater protection under the Takings Clause than traditional contract rights. It argues that “bankruptcy principles do not support a sharp distinction between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors.” Brief for United States 31. However “bankruptcy principles” may speak to this question, our cases recognize, as did the common law, that the contractual right of a secured creditor to obtain repayment of his debt may be quite different in legal contemplation from the property right of the same creditor in the collateral. Compare Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra, with Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra, and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979).
Since the governmental action here would result in a complete destruction of the property right of the secured party, the case fits but awkwardly into the analytic framework employed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), where governmental action affected some but not all of the “bundle of rights” which constitute the “property” in question. The Government argues that the interest of a secured party such as was involved here is “insubstantial,” apparently in part because it is a nonpurchase-money, nonpossessory interest in personal property. The “bundle of rights” which accrues to a secured party is obviously smaller than that which accrues to an owner in fee simple, but the Government cites no cases supporting the proposition that differences such as these relegate the secured party’s interest to something less than property. And our decisions in Radford, supra, and Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40 (1960), militate against such a proposition.
In Radford, we held that the Frazier-Lemke Act, 48 Stat. 1289, violated the Takings Clause. The bank held a nonpurchase-money mortgage on Radford’s farm. Radford defaulted and instituted bankruptcy proceedings. The Frazier-Lemke Act, which by its terms applied only retrospectively, permitted the debtor to purchase the property for less than its fair market value. We held the statute was void because it effected a “taking of substantive rights in specific property acquired by the Bank prior to” its enactment. 295 U. S., at 590. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brandéis stated:
“[T]he Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the Nation’s need, private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public.” Id., at 602.
In Armstrong, materialmen delivered materials to a prime contractor for use in constructing Navy personnel boats. Under state law, they obtained liens in the vessels. The prime contractor defaulted on his obligations to the United States, and the Government took title to and possession of the uncompleted hulls and unused materials, thus making it impossible for the materialmen to enforce their liens. We held that this constituted a taking:
“The total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’ and is not a mere ‘consequential incidence’ of a valid regulatory measure.” 364 U. S., at 48.
The Government seeks to distinguish Armstrong on the ground that it was a classical “taking” in the sense that the Government acquired for itself the property in question, while in the instant case the Government has simply imposed a general economic regulation which in effect transfers the property interest from a private creditor to a private debtor. While the classical taking is of the sort that the Government describes, our cases show that takings analysis is not necessarily limited to outright acquisitions by the government for itself. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982); PruneYard, Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).
The Government finally contends that because the resale value of household goods is generally low, and because creditors therefore view the principal value of their security as a lever to negotiate for reaffirmation of the debt rather than as a vehicle for foreclosure, the property interests involved here do not merit protection under the Takings Clause. While this contention cannot be dismissed out of hand, it seems to run counter to the State’s characterization of the interest as property, see n. 6, supra, to our reliance in other “takings” cases on state-law characterizations, see, e. g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 179, and also to at least some of the implications of Radford, supra, and Armstrong, supra.
The foregoing discussion satisfies us that there is substantial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the appel-lees’ liens in this case comports with the Fifth Amendment. We now consider whether, as a matter of statutory construction, § 522(f)(2) must necessarily be applied in that manner. We consider the statutory question because of the “ ‘cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional question may be avoided.’” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577 (1978), quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932).
The Court of Appeals thought § 522(f)(2) must apply retroactively, that is, to liens which attached before the enactment date, because “there would be no bankruptcy law applicable to cases [involving such liens if it did not].” 642 F. 2d, at 1197. The court apparently thought that if § 522(f)(2) does not apply to liens which came into existence before the enactment date, then no part of the 1978 Act could apply to cases involving such liens. This is not necessarily the case. The liens, of course, exist under state law independently of the 1978 Act. Although the 1978 Act, in general, is effective for all cases commenced after its effective date, Congress might have intended that provisions that destroy previously vested property rights apply only to interests that came into effect after the enactment date. If § 522(f)(2) is such a provision, the remainder of the 1978 Act would not affect the enforceability of these liens, but would still apply to these liens and these cases. We think that the analysis of the Court of Appeals did not adequately dispose of the question as to the retrospective effect of § 522(f), and we therefore pursue the inquiry further.
The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student. Compare 1 C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 1.06 (4th ed. 1972), with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622-625 (1965). This Court has often pointed out:
“[T]he first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past.... The rule has been expressed in varying degrees of strength but always of one import, that a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights... unless such be ‘the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature.’” Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190, 199 (1913) (citations omitted).
See, e. g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306, 314 (1908) (“The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, and it ought never to receive such a construction if it is susceptible of any other”); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801).
This principle has been repeatedly applied to bankruptcy statutes affecting property rights. In Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637 (1914), the Court had before it a new statute granting bankruptcy trustees the position of a lienholder with priority over sellers on conditional sales contracts. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, §8, 36 Stat. 840. This provision, like § 522(f)(2), could be read literally to divest property interests which had been created before it was enacted. The 1910 statute, like the 1978 Act, applied to all bankruptcy cases instituted after it became effective. Nonetheless, the Court followed the lead of the lower courts in refusing to infer retroactivity absent an explicitly “expressed intent of Congress.” Arctic Ice Machine Co. v. Armstrong County Trust Co., 192 F. 114, 116 (CA3 1911). See also In re Schneider, 203 F. 589, 590 (ED Pa. 1913). In his opinion for the unanimous Court, Justice Holmes stated that “the reasonable and usual interpretation of [bankruptcy] statutes is to confine their effect, so far as may be, to property rights established after they were passed.” 232 U. S., at 639. See Auffm’ordt v. Rasin, 102 U. S. 620, 622 (1881).
The Government nonetheless contends that bankruptcy statutes are usually construed to apply to pre-existing rights. This statement is unobjectionable in the context of traditional contract rights, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S., at 188, but none of the cases cited by the Government extend it to property rights such as those involved here.
Neither these cases, nor any other that has come to our attention, casts doubt on the principle of statutory construction deducible from Holt and Auffm’ordt: No bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an explicit command from Congress. In light of this principle, the legislative history of the 1978 Act suggests that Congress may not have intended that § 522(f) operate to destroy pre-enactment property rights.
An early version of the 1978 Act contained an explicit requirement that all its provisions “shall apply in all cases or proceedings instituted after its effective date, regardless of the date of occurrence of any of the operative facts determining legal rights, duties, or liabilities hereunder.” § 10-108(a), H. R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H. R. 31 and H. R. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix 320-321 (1975). This provision may or may not have been deleted directly in response to the comments of witness William Plumb to the effect that retroactive invalidation of liens may be an unconstitutional taking. Id., at 2066-2067. Nonetheless, Congress’ elimination of an explicit command is some evidence that it did not intend to depart from the usual principle of construction. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 716, n. 23 (1974) (“we are reluctant to read into the statute the very... limitation that Congress eliminated”).
“Accordingly, in the absence of a clear expression of Congress’ intent to” apply § 522(f)(2) to property rights established before the enactment date, “we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the” Takings Clause. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 507 (1979). The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be
Affirmed.
The exemptions were designed to permit individual debtors to retain exempt property so that they will be able to enjoy a “fresh start” after bankruptcy.
Subsections (b) and (d) of § 522 provide in pertinent part:
“(b) [A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate... —
“(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section...
“(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
“(3) The debtor’s interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
“(4) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or the dependent of the debtor.
“(6) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor.
“(9) Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”
See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a).
In Schulte v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., and Hunter v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., 8 B. R. 12 (1980), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas noted that retrospective application of § 522(f)(2) creates constitutional problems and held that it should be applied only prospectively. In Jackson v. Security Industrial Bank, and Stevens v. Liberty Loan Corp., 4 B. R. 293 (1980), Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank, and Knezel v. Security Industrial Bank, 3 B. R. 629 (1980), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado concluded that § 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Hoops v. Freedom Finance, 3 B. R. 635 (1980), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado concluded that § 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates “substantive due process.”
In re Gifford, 688 F. 2d 447 (CA7 1982) (en bane), holds that § 522(f)(2) constitutionally applies to liens created before the enactment date. In re Webber, 674 F. 2d 796 (CA9 1982), holds that § 522(f

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 自