Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two appeals involve convictions of four appellants for refusal to answer certain questions put to them at sessions of the “Un-American Activities Commission” of the State of Ohio, established in the legislative branch of the Ohio Government. The appellants had claimed the privilege against self ^incrimination in refusing to answer each of the questions. The cases are before us for the second time; on prior appeals the judgments below were vacated and the causes remanded for reconsideration in the light of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, and Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178. See 354 U. S. 929. The remand resulted in a reaffirmance of the prior judgment without discussion, 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N. E. 2d 847, and on the present appeals we postponed further consideration of the jurisdictional questions presented until the arguments on the merits. 358 U. S. 862, 863.
The issues tendered by the parties range broadly and involve the powerof the Ohio Legislature, in view of existing federal legislation, to investigate activities deemed subversive of the forms of government within the Nation, cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497; the power of the State to compel disclosure of matters interconnected with the protected freedoms of speech and assembly, cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra; the existence of an expressed legislative interest for such an inquiry, and its definition and articulation to the person summoned, cf. Watkins v. United States, supra; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra; Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344; and the effect on testimonial compulsion of state immunity statutes not affording immunity from federal prosecution, cf. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371. But our disposition of these cases makes it unnecessary to corisider the application of the principles of the cases just cited. The appellants were informed by the Commission that they had a right to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by Art. I, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that the appellants were presumed to kriow the law of Ohio — that an Ohio immunity statute deprived them of the protection of the privilege — and that they therefore had committed an offense by not answering the questions as to which they asserted the privilege. We hold that in the circumstances of these cases, the judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the convict’ ¿ns violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and must be reversed, except as to one conviction, as to which we are equally divided. After the Commission, speaking for the State, acted as it did; to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment. would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State — convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him. We agree with that part of Judge Stewart’s dissenting opinion in the Ohio Supreme Court in which he said: “since the defendants were apprised by the commission at the time they were testifying that they had a right to refuse to answer questions which might incriminate' them, they could not possibly in following the admonition of the commission be in contempt of it....” 164 Ohio St., at 563, 133 N. E. 2d, at 125. A rather detailed description of the proceedings below must be made to illuminate - the basis- of decision below and the turning point of our review of it here.
- Mrs. Morgan, appellant in No. 463, was summoned before the Commission and interrogated mainly in regard to Communist Party activities. She appeared without counsel. To each question put she answered, “I regret that I cannot answer your question under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, because to do so would give your Committee an opportunity to incriminate me,” or some more abbreviated form of words to the same effect. Such responses were given to virtually all the questions and in almost every case the Commission proceeded directly to ask its next question after receiving the response. In no case did the Commission direct that she answer its question. In one or two. cases Commission members expressed surprise that she might consider an answer incriminating, and on such an occasion the Chairman asked her, “Mrs. Morgan, are you aware of the fact that your failure to answer questions — some questions of this Commission, might also tend to put you in an embarrassing situation?” At another point, the Chairman positively informed her, “I should like to advise you under the Fifth Amendment, you are permitted to refuse to answer questions that might tend to incriminate you.... But you are not permitted to refuse to answer questions simply for your own convenience.”
Raley, Stern, and Brown, appellants in No. 175, appeared before the Commission successively on another occasion, about six months later. They were interrogated about subversive activities in the labor movement. Raley answered some questions, but to most of them asserted the privilege against self-incrimination of the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. Most of his assertions of the privilege, including his initial ones, were not made the subject of comment or question by the Commission, the next question in the inquiry being put at once. On some few occasions, when Raley claimed the privilege, the Commission members indicated their doubts whether any answer to a specific question put could be incriminating. On one occasion, the Commission asked Raley as- to whether he recollected a certain interview. Raley claimed the.privilege. The Chairman took the view that Raley was required to speak as to whether he recalled the interview, but assured him that the privilege existed, as to the details of the interview: “If you recall it, and we ask you as to your recollection, then, you are privileged to claim.your rights under the Constitution....”' This and one other occasion were the only ones in which the Commission even approached directing an answer to a question by Raley; but in one case the Chairman finally asked Raley to confer with his counsel to determine whether in:-his opinion the privilege applied, and in another- Raley did so" of his own accord; then, upon an affirmative reply by Raley’s counsel, the Commission passed at once to the next question,
Stern was the next person to appear at the inquiry. After giving his name, he claimed the privilege against self-incrimination at the very next question, which called for his address. Commission counsel asked him, “Is there something about the nature or character of the home in which you live that to admit you live there would make you subject to criminal prosecution?” On.Stern’s continued refusal to answer, the Chairman directed an answer to the question, which was refused. To most subsequent questions, Stern again claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, and on the great majority of questions, the Commission simply passed on to the next question. The Chairman and Stern worked out a short form of words whereby he would be understood to be claiming the privilege as'to a particular question. At one point Stern asked the Commission if the Commission had the right to go into his opinions and to require him to speak as to them. The Chairman informed him, “Not if iii your opinion by' so doing, you might tend to incriminate yourself.” On a few occasions the Chairman requested that Stern answer a question, but except for the question as to his residence, the occasions were-those in which Stern had neither given a direct answer nor invoked the privilege, and upon assertion of the privilege in these cases the request was not renewed.
Brown then was subjected to inquiry. He claimed the privilege as to self-incrimination to most of the questions put to him. While the Chairman never told him in so many words (as hfe had told the other three appellants) that the privilege was available, Brown and the Chairman engaged in long colloquies in an attempt by the Chairman to clarify that by using a certain form of words Brown was claiming the privilege. The Chairman’s com cern is inexplicable on any other basis than that he. deemed the privilege available at the inquiry, and his statements would tend to create such an impression in one appearing at the inquiry. When once he made it clear that he was claiming the privilege as to a question, Brown was never directed to answer. He was on a couple of occasions directed to answer a question when he was engaging iñ a colloquy with the Commission without either having answered it directly or having claimed the privilege; upon his claim of the privilege, the next question was at once put.
The Ohio immunity statute extends, so far as is here relevant, to any person appearing before a legislative committee and grants immunity from state prosecutions or penalties “on account of a transaction, matter, or thing, concerning which he testifies”; the statute declares that the testimony given on such an appearance “shall not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding” against the person testifying. Ohio Rev. Code § 101.44. For reasons unexplained, the existence of this immunity was never suggested by the Commission to any of the appellants, and in fact, as the above statement makes..evident, the Commission’s actions were totally inconsistent with á view on its part- that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available. The Commission thought the privilege available, and it gave positive advice that it could be used. As the Chairman testified in the proceedings below: “It was the policy of the commission not [to] press questions which we felt would be of an incriminating nature. For instance, whenever a witness was asked a question — I believe every witness before the commission was asked the question — Are you or have you ever been a member of the communist party, and if the witness refused to answer that qúestion, we did not press, it. Frequently I made statements which indicated the policy of the commission.”
Indictments were found against the four appellants for failure to answer various of the questions put to them at the inquiry. In the cases of Raley, Stern, and Brown— who were indicted at the same time and tried together, but in a different court from Mrs. Morgan — only a-.few of the questions were made the subject of the indictment. There appears to have been some effort to restrict their indictments to those questions to which the prosecution thought no answer co,uld have been incriminating. On the other hand, virtually every question asked Mrs. Morgan was made the subject of her indictment. •
A jury was waived by Raley, Stern, and Brown, and they were found guilty on each of the relatively few counts found against them, the trial court filing no opinion or conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on some of the counts as to Raley, on one of the two counts as to Stern, and on all the counts as to Brown, and reversed the convictions on some of the counts as to Raley and on one count as to Stern. 100 Ohio App. 75, 99-100, 136 N. E. 2d 295, 315-316. It held that there was sufficient direction to the witnesses to answer the questions involved, so that their refusal was willful. The touchstone by which it affirmed some of the counts of the convictions and reversed others was whether, in the court’s view, an answer to the question might have in fact been incriminating. While the court indicated that the immunity statute applied, it did not rely upon it in its judgment — as it expressly stated, 100 Ohio App., at 99, 136 N. E. 2d, at 315, and as its reversals of certain of the counts indicated.
A jury was also waived by Mrs. Morgan and she too was found guilty by a trial judge. The judge acquitted her on a few counts as to questions found not pertinent to the inquiry or duplicative of other questions. But as to the remaining counts, he ruled that her plea of self-incrimination was not valid, because she had referred solely to the Fifth Amendment andjiot to the appropriate provision of the Ohio Constitution guaranteeing freedom from compulsory self-incrimination. Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. Because of this, he held that it was unnecessary to have directed Mrs. Morgan to answer the questions or to have advised her at the inquiry that her plea of the privilege against self-incrimination was rejected. Further constitutional claims were summarily rejected. The Court of Appeals — a different &ne from that which passed on the appeal of Raley, Stern, and Brown — affirmed the judgment for the reasons stated in the trial court’s opinion.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio, though affirming the convictions, abandoned reliance on the theories under.which the appellants were found guilty by the courts below. It ruled that a fair reference to the privilege against self-incrimination of the United States Constitution was adequate to invoke the privilege under the Ohio Constitution, finding such reference made. 164 Ohio St., at 538-539, 133 N. E. 2d, at 111-112. And it did not discuss the theory on which the Court of Appeals relied in the case of Raley, Stern, and Brown; its basis for. affirming the judgment was entirely independent of that of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court placed its reliance entirely on the immunity statute. It held that the immunity under the statute was automatically available to the appellants, that even though it did not preclude federal prosecution it was adequate to make answers compellable, and that since “the immunity granted... precluded the possibility of justifying a refusal” to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination, 164 Ohio St., at 553, 133 N. E. 2d, at 120, a direction by the Commission to the appellants to answer was not necessary. Various objections to the convictions under state law were also passed on and rejected. As we have noted, on remand from this Court, the Ohio Supreme Court passed on contentions made under Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, and Watkins v. United States, supra, and adhered to its former judgments.
First. We must examine our. jurisdiction over these appeals. Appellants assert jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), a grant of jurisdiction oru appeal, “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.” In their notices of appeal to this Court, appellants have phrased some of their federal constitutional claims’ as attacks on the constitutionality of the Ohio statute authorizing the Commission and the statute providing for immunity. But this dogs not suffice: “It is essential to our jurisdiction on appeal ;.. that there be an explicit and timely insistence in the state courts that a state statute, as applied, is repugnant to the federal Constitution, treaties or laws.” Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185. Despite the import of our order postponing the consideration of jurisdiction' till the hearing on the merits, see Rule 16 (4) of this Court, appellants have made no effort to support their burden of demonstrating an attack made by them on the validity of a state statute in the state courts, and we have found none. Accordingly the appeals are dismissed. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, at 236. But since various rights, privileges and immunities under the Federal Constitution were claimed below, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3), we consider the appeal papers as petitions for certiorari, and in view of the public importance of the questions presented, grant certiorari. 28 U. S. C. § 2103.
The view we take of the merits of the case requires us to examine whether the appellants made a proper challenge to their convictions below, on federal constitutional grounds, on the theory that they were being convicted for claiming the privilege against self-incrimination after not being given to understand at the time of the inquiry that such a privilege was unavailable. In the lower Ohio courts, federal constitutional questions as to the adequacy of the insistence of the Commission on an answer to its questions were involved in the lower courts’ discussion of the cases. In the appeal of Raley, Stern and Brown, the Court of Appeals discussed the extent to which the Commission gave the defendants to understand that answers were in fact desired to particular questions, and this as part of its consideration of constitutionál claims under both the Federal and Ohio Constitutions. 100 Ohio App., at 87-90, 136 N. E. 2d, at 308-310. The trial court’s opinion, in Mrs. Morgan’s case refers to the contention that a direction to answer was not given to the defendant, and also recites that a due process claim under the Federal Constitution was made.
The assignments of error made by Mrs. Morgan in the State Supreme Court show that she claimed in that court that the judgment of conviction was violative of due process, as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, in that while she claimed the privilege, she was not “charged with refusal to answer any questions asked by members of the Commission and that she was not notified that her claim of the privilege was rejected by the Commission.” The State Supreme Court passed on this claim, holding that a direction to answer was unnecessary because of the immunity statute, and stated generally that its reasoning and conclusions in her case “apply with equal force to the appeal of Raley, Stern and Brown.” 164 Ohio St., at 532, 133 N. E. 2d, at 108. There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it. See Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 134. We think this sufficient here to satisfy the statutory requirement that the federal right sought to be vindicated in this Court be one claimed below. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3).
Second. We conclude that the judgments of conviction rendered below violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with an exception, to be later noted. We need not decide whether there is demanded of state investigating bodies as explicit a rejection of a claimed privilege against self-incrimination as has been held to be' necessary under the statute punishing contempts of Congress. Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155; Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 202; Bart v. United States, 349 U. S. 219. Nor need we decide whether it would be a sufficient basis for reversal here simply that the appellants were not - given notice of the immunity law at the inquiry, though in analogous contexts we have insisted that state investigators make clear to those before them the basis on which an answer is required. Scull v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 344, 353. This case is more than that; here the Chairman of the Commission, who clearly appeared to be the agent of the State in a position to give such assurances, apprised three of the appellants that the privilege in fact existed, and by his behavior toward, the fourth obviously gave the same impression. Other members of the Commission and its counsel made statements which were totally inconsistent with any belief in the applicability of the immunity statute, and it is fair to characterize the whole conduct of the inquiry as to the four as identical with what it would have been if Ohio had had no immunity statute at all., Yet here the crim.e said to have been committed by the appellants, as defined by the State Supreme Court, was simply that of declining, to answer any relevant question on the groünd of possible self-incrimination. This was because the Court held that the Ohio immunity statute automatically removed any basis for a valid claim of the privilege, which generally exists under Ohio law. Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. Accordingly, any refusal to answer, based on a claim of the privilege, was said to constitute the offense. While there is no suggestion that the Commission had any intent to deceive the appellants, we repeat that to.sustain the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on such a basis after the Commission had acted as it did would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State — convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to him. Cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 442. A State may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal sanctions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of- what conduct might transgress them. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451. Inexplicably contradictory commands in statutes ordaining criminal penalties have, in the same fashion, judicially been denied the force of criminal sanctions. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174. Here there were more than commands simply vague or even contradictory. There was active misleading. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 197. The State Supreme Court dismissed the statements of the Commission as legally erroneous, but the fact remains that at the inquiry they were the voice of the State most presently speaking to the appellants; We cannot hold-that the Due Process Clause permits convictions to be obtained under such circumstances.
We cannot reach a contrary conclusion by joining with the speculation of the court below that some of appellants might have behaved the same way regardless of what the Commission told them. We think it impermissible in a criminal case to excuse fatal defects by assuming that a person summoned to an inquiry, simply because he expresses defiance beforehand, will continue to be defiant even if a proper explanation is made of what the inquiry wants of him and the basis on which it is wanted. See Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147, 151. It is alleged that the personal attitudes of the appellants toward the Commission were defective in various ways, but of course the indictments and convictions were had. simply for refusing to answer questions. Neither can we find any ground for affirmance in the fact that certain refusals to answer occurred before the Chairman’s assurances to the various appellants that the privilege existed became explicit. Certainly such assurances removed any reason for the appellants to reconsider their prior assertions of the privilege. And the positive assurances given only made explicit an attitude that the Commission had ■ manifested throughout its interviews with these appellants. We cannot carve the inquiry into segments; the record does not suggest any picture of the Commission’s negation of the privilege followed by an acquiescence in its use.
Finally, it is argued that the convictions may be supportable here as to those questions which an appellant was. directed to answer after claiming the privilege. As the statement of the case we have made indicates, it is not shown that there was such a direction as to any question except one put to Stern, which stands as the basis for the sole count on which his conviction rests. As to the.conviction based on this question, the Court is equally divided. To four of us, the matter is plain. Under the circumstances of the inquiry, the direction to answer given Stern was obviously not given because of the immunity statute, but because the Commission took the position that a generally available privilege did not

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 询