Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
These three consolidated appeals concern summary judgment. In our view the trial court failed to follow either the mandate or the spirit of Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. and we therefore reverse.
Roger Dolese, the Dolese Company, and the Dolese Concrete Company each instituted a separate action for the refund of federal income taxes and interest in a total amount of $1,533,755.38. The Government in due time filed an answer in each case denying that any refund was due and owing. The three cases were consolidated for trial and on January 14, 1975, the first of three pretrial conferences was held. A second pretrial conference was held on March 11, 1975, at which time the trial judge set the trial date for April 29, 1975, and at the same time set an additional pretrial conference for April 22, 1975.
On April 22, 1975, immediately preceding the third pretrial conference, the Government filed motions for summary judgment, and on that same date served copies thereof on counsel for the taxpayers. The trial court ordered the taxpayers to file within two days an answer to the Government’s motion for summary judgment. The taxpayers complied with this order and on the following day filed an answer resisting the Government’s motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment was not set for hearing and the entire matter was thereupon further pretrialed. This pretrial culminated in an order signed by the trial judge on April 25, 1975, wherein the taxpayer listed over thirty issues of fact which remained to be resolved, with the Government listing two issues of fact which were to be resolved upon trial. This pretrial order recognized a partial settlement of issues which had been entered into between the taxpayer and the Government. And, importantly, the pretrial order of April 25, 1975, reconfirmed the trial date of April 29, 1975.
The entire matter then came on for trial on April 29, 1975. At that time counsel for both the taxpayers and the Government were present in open court, presumably ready for trial. The taxpayers had present some seven witnesses who were prepared to give testimony. It was in this setting that the trial judge took the bench and indicated that he had determined to enter summary judgment in favor of the Government. In partial explanation thereof, the trial judge commented that “it was probably the best for all parties” that the Government’s motion for summary judgment be sustained so that counsel could “get on your way to the Court of Appeals, so you can cheaply find out what the law is.” Notwithstanding the judge’s solicitude, counsel for the taxpayers strenuously resisted the entry of summary judgment and argued that the issues of fact referred to in the pretrial order could not be thusly resolved. Such protests failed to dissuade the trial judge from his earlier decision and he forthwith signed an order which he had previously dictated granting summary judgment for the Government. These appeals followed.
In Adams v. Campbell County School District, 483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973), we declared as follows:
Rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.P., provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be served at least 10 days before the hearing date and before that date the adverse party may serve opposing affidavits. Noncompliance with the time provision of the rule deprives the court of authority to grant summary judgment.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is at once apparent that the time provisions of Rule 56(c) were not complied with by the trial court. In the first place the rule contemplates that there be a “hearing” on a motion for summary judgment. No hearing, as such, was held in the instant case on the Government’s motion for summary judgment. The rule further contemplates that such hearing should not be held sooner than ten days after the motion for summary judgment is served on opposing counsel. In the instant case no hearing was held, and the trial judge granted the summary judgment seven days after the motion was filed with the court and served on opposing counsel. The rule also provides that the adverse party may file counter affidavits at any time before the date set for hearing. In the instant case counsel for the taxpayers was deprived of that opportunity by the failure of the trial judge to set for hearing the Government’s motion for summary judgment. In this regard we note that the Government never did request that its motion be set for hearing. Since the several provisions of Rule 56(c) were not complied with by the trial judge, he had, in the words of Adams, no authority to grant summary judgment.
In accord with Adams, see our earlier opinion in Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973). In that case, as in Adams, we held that the trial court was without authority to enter summary judgment for failure to comply with the time provisions of Rule 56(c). In Mustang we indicated that under “proper circumstances” the requirements of Rule 56(c) may be waived. In the instant case the Government suggests that the taxpayers waived the requirements of the Rule 56(c). We fail to find any waiver. Certainly the continuing protest made by counsel after the trial judge indicated to all concerned that he was going to grant summary judgment does not amount to waiver. In this regard the instant case is actually somewhat akin to Mustang. There summary judgment was entered without compliance with the time provisions of Rule 56(c), but thereafter counsel was afforded a full scale hearing on his motion for new trial. Such hearing, we held in Mustang, did not cure the earlier failure to follow the requirements of the rule.
In sum, then, summary judgment was entered in the instant case with complete disregard to Rule 56(c). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. We are not by this opinion expressing any opinion as to the merits of the controversy.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0