Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

OPINION OF THE COURT
ADAMS, Circuit Judge.
In this case arising from an abortive attempt to smuggle one ton of marijuana from Mexico by way of Texas to Philadelphia, appellant Whipple was convicted of dealing in and conspiring to import marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a); 26 U.S.C. § 4755. The district court denied a suppression petition, and Whipple has appealed.
Richard Esch and John Schenck went to Mexico in early 1971 to discuss with David Miller the possibility of flying “illicit” drugs into the United States. After agreeing to work together in upcoming drug ventures, Esch and Schenck returned to the United States while Miller remained in Mexico.
Thereafter, Leonard Glassberg flew to Mexico and met with Miller in January, 1971, to discuss the plans for smuggling the marijuana into the United States. In February, 1971, Whipple came to see Glassberg in his hotel room and indicated that he, Whipple, was “fully capable of procuring an airplane and pilot, and asked if it were possible for him to enter into some sort of contractual agreement with [Glassberg] and David Miller in relationship to smuggling marijuana.” Glassberg’s girl friend, Maria Kirby, who was present at the meeting, confirmed this story.
Celcer, the pilot of the plane, testified that Whipple hired him with instructions to pick up a load of marijuana in Vera Cruz, Mexico. Celcer received the marijuana, landed in Texas, and, after obtaining further instructions from Whipple, flew the marijuana to Philadelphia. Whipple’s conversations with Cel-cer were intercepted electronically by government agents with the pilot’s permission.
Under these circumstances there was probable cause to issue an arrest warrant, which was properly executed upon Whipple in a public airport lobby in Harlington, Texas on April 12,1971.
When taken into custody, Whipple was carrying a large clothes bag and some carry-on luggage that were taken from him by the arresting authorities. He was immediately driven to the United States Customs House in Brownsville, Texas. Upon arrival in Brownsville, approximately one hour after his arrest in Harlington, the authorities examined Whipple’s baggage and retained certain documents later used at trial. They had no search warrant.
Whipple contends, among other things, that the warrantless search of his luggage at the Brownsville Customs House following his arrest at the airport nearly one hour earlier violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Having carefully examined all the evidence in this case, this Court is of the opinion that it is unnecessary to determine the legality of the search of appellant’s baggage. Even assuming that the search was unlawful, the mass of remaining evidence against Whipple was overwhelming. Glassberg and Miller both changed their pleas to guilty and testified on behalf of the government. Maria Kirby confirmed Glassberg’s trial testimony. Celcer, the pilot, also testified against Whipple, and the conversations between Whipple and him, which had been tape recorded with Celcer’s permission, were played to the jury. In addition, U. S. Customs Agents testified to having seen Whipple meet with Miller and to having heard Whipple planning the touchdown of the plane in Philadelphia. Under these circumstances, the admission of the “fruit” of the allegedly unlawful search was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963).
As intellectually alluring as it might be to address ourselves to the intriguing question whether the examination of the luggage at the Customs House constitutes a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, in view of the conclusion that any error committed by the admission of the fruits of that activity was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we eschew, as unnecessary and thus inappropriate, that attractive assignment.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. Appellant also contends: (1) adverse trial publicity denied him a fair trial; (2) the court erred in admitting evidence of conspiracies other than the one charged in the indictment and in failing to give a cautionary instruction; (3) the court erred in not dismissing the indictment because government agents failed to make an inventory of personal property seized from appellant and failed to return all of appellant’s property; (4) the court erred in not warning appellant that if he jumped bail, trial would proceed in his absence; (5) the court erred in failing to charge on entrapment; (6) the court charged improperly on unexplained possession of marijuana; and (7) his rights under Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sixth Amendment were violated by the court’s refusal to sentence appellant on all counts for which he was convicted. We have concluded that these arguments are without merit.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1