Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM.
Floreal Delagarza appeals from a conviction by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. On appeal he raises two issues: (1) whether the court erred in granting the government’s motion to dismiss Count I of the indictment without dismissing Count II, and (2) whether defendant’s conviction under a count referring to “cocaine, a Schedule II, narcotic drug” should be overturned because evidence at trial indicated that cocaine is not a narcotic.
A federal agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), investigating the narcotic dealings of one Hodges, made a purchase of cocaine from Hodges. Delagarza was present and participated in the transaction. The grand jury’s indictment charged Delagarza, in Count I, with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and, in Count II, with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.
On the day of Delagarza’s trial, but before the jury was impaneled, the government moved to dismiss Count I of the indictment, and the court granted the motion. After the government’s opening statement, Delagarza sought a dismissal of the remaining count on the ground that the dismissal of Count I was an amendment of the indictment. The court denied that motion. Delagarza contends the trial court erred in dismissing the conspiracy count because the dismissal constituted an unlawful amendment of the grand jury’s indictment. We disagree.
An indictment returned by a grand jury cannot be amended. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887). An indictment may be dismissed by the U. S. attorney prior to trial and with leave of the court, Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a). Consent of the defendant is not necessary when, as here, withdrawal occurred before the trial is begun. Id. The same rule governs the dismissal of one or more counts of an indictment. See United States v. Valencia, 492 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. United States, 398 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1968). Thus, the dismissal of Count I of the indictment on the motion of the government did not amend or add to the indictment. Nor has it been shown that Delagarza was prejudiced. We find no constitutional error under these circumstances. See United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095, 94 S.Ct. 728, 38 L.Ed. 553 (1973).
Count II of the indictment, on which Delagarza was convicted, charged possession with intent to distribute “a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, a Schedule II, narcotic drug, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.” (Emphasis added.) During trial, the government’s expert testified that “physiologically, [cocaine] is a non-narcotic” though it is legally classified as a narcotic. Delagarza contends that he should not have been convicted of possession with intent to distribute a narcotic drug when the drug was not shown to be a narcotic. We do not agree. Many courts, including this one, have upheld the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II, controlled substance in the face of arguments that it is not a narcotic. E. g., United States v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1978). (Congress’ action of classifying cocaine as a narcotic for penalty purposes is proper regardless of medical classification). Moreover, appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the indictment’s statement of the charge. The indictment named cocaine as a controlled substance and sufficiently identified the elements of the crime to fairly inform appellant of the charge against him and enable him to avoid double jeopardy. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); United States v. Tokoph, 514 F.2d 597, 605-06 (10th Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 871 (3d Cir. 1976). Additionally, we note Delagarza neither requested a jury instruction concerning the words “narcotic drug” nor objected to the jury instructions given on this aspect of the case.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1