Task: songer_standing

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to some threshold issue at the trial court level. These issues are only considered to be present if the court of appeals is reviewing whether or not the litigants should properly have been allowed to get a trial court decision on the merits. That is, the issue is whether or not the issue crossed properly the threshhold to get on the district court agenda. The issue is: "Did the court determine that the parties had standing?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

PER CURIAM:
Appellant, a federal prisoner, takes this appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. He urges that the time he spent “in custody” but on parole must count as time served on his three year sentence.
As explained by the trial judge who heard the petition:
“In essence, petitioner’s argument is that after revocation of parole and return to prison, he was entitled to have the time during which he was on parole credited against [his] sentence because while on parole he was in the constructive custody of the Attorney General.”
Such a legal' position is specifically contrary to congressional enactment. 18 U.S.C. § 4205:
“ * * * and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.”
This court has rejected appellant’s contention in Chandler v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1943), and Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1954).
These cases not only reject appellant’s contention — they also uphold the constitutionality of the statutory release on parole procedure quoted above. It is only when congressional enactment transcends constitutional limitations, such as the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, enactment of ex post facto laws, and the like, that such statutes can be held unconstitutional.
We affirm what we said in Van Buskirk, supra:
“When appellant was conditionally released, he became subject to all the provisions of law relating to parole, one of which was that if he violated his parole he should again be taken into custody and the time spent on parole should not diminish the time he was originally sentenced to serve.” (p. 738)
Other courts, in an unbroken line of cases, have come to the same conclusion and have rejected appellant’s claim. We know of no cases to the contrary.
Appellant’s reliance on Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963), is misplaced. It held only that a prisoner on parole was in technical ‘custody’ for the purpose of filing a petition for ha-beas corpus. It did not consider appellant’s claim of unconstitutionality. As was said in O’Callahan v. Attorney General, 1 Cir., 351 F.2d 43 at 44 (1965):
“Petitioner accepted the parole ‘custody’ in the hope that it would discharge the balance of his prison sentence. Had he not violated the conditions it would have done so. The Constitution does not require that he have it both ways.”
Affirmed.
. First Circuit: O’Callahan v. Attorney General, 351 F.2d 43 at 44 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1017, 86 S.Ct. 632, 15 L.Ed.2d 531
Fourth Circuit: O’Neal v. Fleming, 201 F.2d 665 (1953)
Hall v. Welch, 185 F.2d 525 (1950)
Fifth Circuit: Clark v. Blackwell, 374 F.2d 952 (1967)
Van Horn v. Maguire, 328 F.2d 585 (1964)
Seventh Circuit: Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (1965)
Dolan v. Swope, 138 F.2d 301 (1943)
Eighth Circuit: Higgerson v. Attorney-General, 369 F.2d 398 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1026, 87 S.Ct. 1386, 18 L.Ed.2d 468
Vorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132 (1944) Tenth Circuit: Postelwait v. Willingham, 365 F.2d 759 (1966)
Weathers v. Willingham, 356 F.2d 421 (1966)
Evans v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 800 (1947)
D.C. Circuit: Bates v. Rivers, 116 U.S. App.D.C. 306, 323 F.2d 311 (1963)

Question: Did the court determine that the parties had standing?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D