Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Wisconsin, like most other States, entrusts to its legislature the periodic task of redrawing the boundaries of the State's legislative districts. A group of Wisconsin Democratic voters filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that the legislature carried out this task with an eye to diminishing the ability of Wisconsin Democrats to convert Democratic votes into Democratic seats in the legislature. The plaintiffs asserted that, in so doing, the legislature had infringed their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
But a plaintiff seeking relief in federal court must first demonstrate that he has standing to do so, including that he has "a personal stake in the outcome," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), distinct from a "generally available grievance about government," Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam ). That threshold requirement "ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013). Certain of the plaintiffs before us alleged that they had such a personal stake in this case, but never followed up with the requisite proof. The District Court and this Court therefore lack the power to resolve their claims. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, in the course of which those plaintiffs may attempt to demonstrate standing in accord with the analysis in this opinion.
I
Wisconsin's Legislature consists of a State Assembly and a State Senate. Wis. Const., Art. IV, § 1. The 99 members of the Assembly are chosen from single districts that must "consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable." § 4. State senators are likewise chosen from single-member districts, which are laid on top of the State Assembly districts so that three Assembly districts form one Senate district. See § 5; Wis. Stat. § 4.001 (2011).
The Wisconsin Constitution gives the legislature the responsibility to "apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly" at the first session following each census. Art. IV, § 3. In recent decades, however, that responsibility has just as often been taken up by federal courts. Following the census in 1980, 1990, and 2000, federal courts drew the State's legislative districts when the Legislature and the Governor-split on party lines-were unable to agree on new districting plans. The Legislature has broken the logjam just twice in the last 40 years. In 1983, a Democratic Legislature passed, and a Democratic Governor signed, a new districting plan that remained in effect until the 1990 census. See 1983 Wis. Laws ch. 4. In 2011, a Republican Legislature passed, and a Republican Governor signed, the districting plan at issue here, known as Act 43. See Wis. Stat. §§ 4.009, 4.01 - 4.99 ; 2011 Wis. Laws ch. 4. Following the passage of Act 43, Republicans won majorities in the State Assembly in the 2012 and 2014 elections. In 2012, Republicans won 60 Assembly seats with 48.6% of the two-party statewide vote for Assembly candidates. In 2014, Republicans won 63 Assembly seats with 52% of the statewide vote. 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 853 (W.D.Wis.2016).
In July 2015, twelve Wisconsin voters filed a complaint in the Western District of Wisconsin challenging Act 43. The plaintiffs identified themselves as "supporters of the public policies espoused by the Democratic Party and of Democratic Party candidates." 1 App. 32, Complaint ¶ 15. They alleged that Act 43 is a partisan gerrymander that "unfairly favor[s] Republican voters and candidates," and that it does so by "cracking" and "packing"
Democratic voters around Wisconsin. Id., at 28-30, ¶¶ 5-7. As they explained:
"Cracking means dividing a party's supporters among multiple districts so that they fall short of a majority in each one. Packing means concentrating one party's backers in a few districts that they win by overwhelming margins."Id., at 29, ¶ 5.
Four of the plaintiffs-Mary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, and Jerome Wallace-alleged that they lived in State Assembly districts where Democrats have been cracked or packed. Id., at 34-36, ¶¶ 20, 23, 24, 26; see id., at 50-53, ¶¶ 60-70 (describing packing and cracking in Assembly Districts 22, 26, 66, and 91). All of the plaintiffs also alleged that, regardless of "whether they themselves reside in a district that has been packed or cracked," they have been "harmed by the manipulation of district boundaries" because Democrats statewide "do not have the same opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to the Assembly." Id., at 33, ¶ 16.
The plaintiffs argued that, on a statewide level, the degree to which packing and cracking has favored one party over another can be measured by a single calculation: an "efficiency gap" that compares each party's respective "wasted" votes across all legislative districts. "Wasted" votes are those cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that candidate needs to win. Id., at 28-29, ¶ 5. The plaintiffs alleged that Act 43 resulted in an unusually large efficiency gap that favored Republicans. Id., at 30, ¶ 7. They also submitted a "Demonstration Plan" that, they asserted, met all of the legal criteria for apportionment, but was at the same time "almost perfectly balanced in its partisan consequences." Id., at 31, ¶ 10. They argued that because Act 43 generated a large and unnecessary efficiency gap in favor of Republicans, it violated the First Amendment right of association of Wisconsin Democratic voters and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The plaintiffs named several members of the state election commission as defendants in the action. Id., at 36, ¶¶ 28-30.
The election officials moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of Act 43 as a whole because, as individual voters, their legally protected interests extend only to the makeup of the legislative districts in which they vote. A three-judge panel of the District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), denied the defendants' motion. In the District Court's view, the plaintiffs "identif[ied] their injury as not simply their inability to elect a representative in their own districts, but also their reduced opportunity to be represented by Democratic legislators across the state." Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F.Supp.3d 918, 924 (W.D.Wis.2015). It therefore followed, in the District Court's opinion, that "[b]ecause plaintiffs' alleged injury in this case relates to their statewide representation,... they should be permitted to bring a statewide claim." Id., at 926.
The case proceeded to trial, where the plaintiffs presented testimony from four fact witnesses. The first was lead plaintiff William Whitford, a retired law professor at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Whitford testified that he lives in Madison in the 76th Assembly District, and acknowledged on cross-examination that this is, under any plausible circumstances, a heavily Democratic district. Under Act 43, the Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford's district is 81.9%; under the plaintiffs' ideal map-their Demonstration Plan-the projected Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford's district would be 82%. 147 Record 35-36. Whitford therefore conceded that Act 43 had not "affected [his] ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in [his] district."Id., at 37. Whitford testified that he had nevertheless suffered a harm "relate[d] to [his] ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the Assembly and the Senate." Ibid. As he explained, "[t]he only practical way to accomplish my policy objectives is to get a majority of the Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer." Id., at 33.
The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of legislative aides Adam Foltz and Tad Ottman, as well as that of Professor Ronald Gaddie, a political scientist who helped design the Act 43 districting map, regarding how that map was designed and adopted. In particular, Professor Gaddie testified about his creation of what he and the District Court called "S curves": color-coded tables of the estimated partisan skew of different draft redistricting maps. See 218 F.Supp.3d, at 850, 858. The colors corresponded with assessments regarding whether different districts tilted Republican or Democratic under various statewide political scenarios. The S curve for the map that was eventually adopted projected that "Republicans would maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario," with Democrats needing 54% of the statewide vote to secure a majority in the legislature. Id., at 852.
Finally, the parties presented testimony from four expert witnesses. The plaintiffs' experts, Professor Kenneth Mayer and Professor Simon Jackman, opined that-according to their efficiency-gap analyses-the Act 43 map would systematically favor Republicans for the duration of the decade. See id., at 859-861. The defendants' experts, Professor Nicholas Goedert and Sean Trende, opined that efficiency gaps alone are unreliable measures of durable partisan advantage, and that the political geography of Wisconsin currently favors Republicans because Democrats-who tend to be clustered in large cities-are inefficiently distributed in many parts of Wisconsin for purposes of winning elections. See id., at 861-862.
At the close of evidence, the District Court concluded-over the dissent of Judge Griesbach-that the plaintiffs had proved a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court set out a three-part test for identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders: A redistricting map violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it "(1) is intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds." Id., at 884.
The court went on to find, based on evidence concerning the manner in which Act 43 had been adopted, that "one of the purposes of Act 43 was to secure Republican control of the Assembly under any likely future electoral scenario for the remainder of the decade." Id., at 896. It also found that the "more efficient distribution of Republican voters has allowed the Republican Party to translate its votes into seats with significantly greater ease and to achieve-and preserve-control of the Wisconsin legislature." Id., at 905. As to the third prong of its test, the District Court concluded that the burdens the Act 43 map imposed on Democrats could not be explained by "legitimate state prerogatives [or] neutral factors." Id., at 911. The court recognized that "Wisconsin's political geography, particularly the high concentration of Democratic voters in urban centers like Milwaukee and Madison, affords the Republican Party a natural, but modest, advantage in the districting process," but found that this inherent geographic disparity did not account for the magnitude of the Republican advantage. Id., at 921, 924.
Regarding standing, the court held that the plaintiffs had a "cognizable equal protection right against state-imposed barriers on [their] ability to vote effectively for the party of [their] choice." Id., at 928. It concluded that Act 43 "prevent[ed] Wisconsin Democrats from being able to translate their votes into seats as effectively as Wisconsin Republicans," and that "Wisconsin Democrats, therefore, have suffered a personal injury to their Equal Protection rights." Ibid. The court turned away the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' injury was not sufficiently particularized by finding that "[t]he harm that the plaintiffs have experienced... is one shared by Democratic voters in the State of Wisconsin. The dilution of their votes is both personal and acute." Id., at 930.
Judge Griesbach dissented. He wrote that, under this Court's existing precedents, "partisan intent" to benefit one party rather than the other in districting "is not illegal, but is simply the consequence of assigning the task of redistricting to the political branches." Id., at 939. He observed that the plaintiffs had not attempted to prove that "specific districts... had been gerrymandered," but rather had "relied on statewide data and calculations." Ibid. And he argued that the plaintiffs' proof, resting as it did on statewide data, had "no relevance to any gerrymandering injury alleged by a voter in a single district." Id., at 952. On that basis, Judge Griesbach would have entered judgment for the defendants.
The District Court enjoined the defendants from using the Act 43 map in future elections and ordered them to have a remedial districting plan in place no later than November 1, 2017. The defendants appealed directly to this Court, as provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. We stayed the District Court's judgment and postponed consideration of our jurisdiction. 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2268, 198 L.Ed.2d 698 (2017).
II
A
Over the past five decades this Court has been repeatedly asked to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution sets on the gerrymandering of voters along partisan lines. Our previous attempts at an answer have left few clear landmarks for addressing the question. What our precedents have to say on the topic is, however, instructive as to the myriad competing considerations that partisan gerrymandering claims involve. Our efforts to sort through those considerations have generated conflicting views both of how to conceive of the injury arising from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary in remedying that injury.
Our first consideration of a partisan gerrymandering claim came in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). There a group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a Connecticut redistricting plan that "consciously and overtly adopted and followed a policy of 'political fairness,' which aimed at a rough scheme of proportional representation of the two major political parties." Id., at 738, 93 S.Ct. 2321. To that end, the redistricting plan broke up numerous towns, "wiggl[ing] and joggl[ing]" district boundary lines in order to "ferret out pockets of each party's strength." Id., at 738, and n. 3, 752, n. 18, 93 S.Ct. 2321.
The plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the rough population equality of the districts, the plan was unconstitutional because its consciously political design was "nothing less than a gigantic political gerrymander." Id., at 752, 93 S.Ct. 2321. This Court rejected that claim. We reasoned that it would be "idle" to hold that "any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it," because districting "inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences." Id., at 752-753, 93 S.Ct. 2321.
Thirteen years later came Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986). Unlike the bipartisan gerrymander at issue in Gaffney, the allegation in Bandemer was that Indiana Republicans had gerrymandered Indiana's legislative districts "to favor Republican incumbents and candidates and to disadvantage Democratic voters" through what the plaintiffs called the "stacking" (packing) and "splitting" (cracking) of Democrats. 478 U.S., at 116-117, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (plurality opinion). A majority of the Court agreed that the case before it was justiciable. Id., at 125, 127, 106 S.Ct. 2797. The Court could not, however, settle on a standard for what constitutes an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
Four Justices would have required the Bandemer plaintiffs to "prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group." Id., at 127, 106 S.Ct. 2797. In that plurality's view, the plaintiffs had failed to make a sufficient showing on the latter point because their evidence of unfavorable election results for Democrats was limited to a single election cycle. See id., at 135, 106 S.Ct. 2797.
Three Justices, concurring in the judgment, would have held that the "Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims." Id., at 147, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor took issue, in particular, with the plurality's focus on factual questions concerning "statewide electoral success." Id., at 158, 106 S.Ct. 2797. She warned that allowing district courts to "strike down apportionment plans on the basis of their prognostications as to the outcome of future elections or future apportionments invites 'findings' on matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else can have any confidence." Id., at 160, 106 S.Ct. 2797.
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dissented in part. In his view, the plaintiffs' claim was not simply that their "voting strength was diluted statewide," but rather that "certain key districts were grotesquely gerrymandered to enhance the election prospects of Republican candidates." Id., at 162, 169, 106 S.Ct. 2797. Thus, he would have focused on the question "whether the boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate ends." Id., at 165, 106 S.Ct. 2797.
Eighteen years later, we revisited the issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004). In that case the plaintiffs argued that Pennsylvania's Legislature had created "meandering and irregular" congressional districts that "ignored all traditional redistricting criteria, including the preservation of local government boundaries," in order to provide an advantage to Republican candidates for Congress. Id., at 272-273, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (plurality opinion) (brackets omitted).
The Vieth Court broke down on numerous lines. Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Scalia would have held that the plaintiffs' claims were nonjusticiable because there was no "judicially discernible and manageable standard" by which to decide them. Id., at 306, 124 S.Ct. 1769. On those grounds, the plurality affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Ibid. Justice KENNEDY concurred in the judgment. He noted that "there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting," and that, consequently, "we have no basis on which to define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden" on constitutional rights. Id., at 307-308, 124 S.Ct. 1769. He rejected the principle advanced by the plaintiffs-that "a majority of voters in [Pennsylvania] should be able to elect a majority of [Pennsylvania's] congressional delegation"-as a "precept" for which there is "no authority." Id., at 308, 124 S.Ct. 1769. Yet Justice KENNEDY recognized the possibility that "in another case a standard might emerge that suitably demonstrates how an apportionment's de facto incorporation of partisan classifications burdens" representational rights. Id., at 312, 124 S.Ct. 1769.
Four Justices dissented in three different opinions. Justice Stevens would have permitted the plaintiffs' claims to proceed on a district-by-district basis, using a legal standard similar to the standard for racial gerrymandering set forth in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). See 541 U.S., at 335-336, 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769. Under this standard, any district with a "bizarre shape" for which the only possible explanation was "a naked desire to increase partisan strength" would be found unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769. Justice Souter, joined by Justice GINSBURG, agreed that a plaintiff alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering should proceed on a district-by-district basis, as "we would be able to call more readily on some existing law when we defined what is suspect at the district level." See id., at 346-347, 124 S.Ct. 1769.
Justice BREYER dissented on still other grounds. In his view, the drawing of single-member legislative districts-even according to traditional criteria-is "rarely... politically neutral." Id., at 359, 124 S.Ct. 1769. He therefore would have distinguished between gerrymandering for passing political advantage and gerrymandering leading to the "unjustified entrenchment" of a political party. Id., at 360-361, 124 S.Ct. 1769.
The Court last took up this question in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 126 S.Ct. 2594, 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (LULAC ). The plaintiffs there challenged a mid-decade redistricting map passed by the Texas Legislature. As in Vieth, a majority of the Court could find no justiciable standard by which to resolve the plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims. Relevant to this case, an amicus brief in support of the LULAC plaintiffs proposed a "symmetry standard" to "measure partisan bias" by comparing how the two major political parties "would fare hypothetically if they each... received a given percentage of the vote." 548 U.S., at 419, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Justice KENNEDY noted some wariness at the prospect of "adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs." Id., at 420, 126 S.Ct. 2594. Aside from that problem, he wrote, the partisan bias standard shed no light on "how much partisan dominance is too much." Ibid.

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 系