Task: songer_genresp1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by J. E. Bates & Co., Inc., from a decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Patents, denying a petition of the appellant, seeking a cancellation of the registration of “The Bates Shoe” as a trade-mark of the appellee.
The record contains extended evidence, but the controlling facts are plain. In the year 1866 A. J. Bates and J. E. Bates were co-partners, engaged in the wholesale and retail shoe business in New York City. In the year 1885 the firm, as part of its going business, established a shoe factory at Webster, Mass. From 1886 until 1905 the factory put out certain lines of shoes under the trade-name of “The Bates Shoe,” chiefly but not exclusively for sale at the company’s New York store. In the year 1905 the partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement, and the assets, including the factory and store, were divided between the two partners. In conformity with the terms of the agreement, the firm made over to the partner A. J. Bates the said factory, including all the property of the copartnership of every name and nature owned by the firm in and about Webster, Mass., consisting of all machinery, tools, implements, lasts, and other personal property used in the manufacture of shoes at the “plant of said firm” in Webster, including all merchandise and stock on hand, whether raw material, finished or unfinished, all bills receivable standing on the books of the firm at Webster, whether in the name of the firm or in the name of the Webster Shoe Company, all notes payable to said firm at Webster, all cash on hand or in bank in Webster, all unexpired insurance, “and other assets of every name and nature pertaining to the business at Webster, Mass., intending to include hereby not only the items above specifically mentioned, but all others that may be there located.” By the terms of the agreement the partner, J. E. Bates, acquired the New York store.
The trade-mark now in question had not been registered prior to this time, but in January, 1906, the appellee, A. J. Bates Company, as assignee of A. J. Bates, filed an application for its registration, and it was regularly registered on June 5, 1906, under the 10-year clause of section 5 of the. Act of February 20, 1905 (Comp. St. § 9490). The mark has been used continuously by A. J. Bates and the appellee, as his successor, at the Webster factory since that time. •
The appellant, J. E. Bates & Co., Inc., in succession to J. E. Bates, continued the business of the New York store, and in 1918 also established a factory for the manufacture of shoes. In 1922 the appellant filed the present petition for a cancellation of the trademark in question. The petition was sustained by 'the Examiner of Interferences, but upon appeal was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner of Patents.
The facts above recited fully justify the conclusion that the transfer to A. J. Bates of the Webster factory, with all of its assets, carried with it all of the firm’s rights in and about the factory as a going business, including the trade-marks or trade-names under which the factory’s production had been put out and marketed, and that among these was the mark “The Bates Shoe,” which at the time of the dissolution had been in continuous use by the factory for more than 10 years. Accordingly, under the 10-year provision of the statute, the registration of the mark was lawful, and the Assistant Commissioner was correct in denying the appellant’s petition for its cancellation.
The decision is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A