Task: sc_issue_3

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee was convicted in Superior Court, Fulton County, Georgia, on two counts of using opprobrious words and abusive language in violation of Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303, which provides: “Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Appellee appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court of Georgia on the ground, among others, that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because vague and overbroad. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected that contention and sustained the conviction. Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S. E. 2d 446 (1967). Appellee then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The District Court found that, because appellee had failed to exhaust his available state remedies as to the other grounds he relied upon in attacking his conviction, only the contention that § 26-6303 was facially unconstitutional was ripe for decision. 303 F. Supp. 952 (1969). On the merits of that question, the District Court, in disagreement with the Georgia Supreme Court, held that § 26-6303, on its face, was unconstitutionally vague and broad and set aside appellee’s conviction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 431 F. 2d 855 (1970). We noted probable jurisdiction of the State’s appeal, 403 U. S. 930 (1971). We affirm.
Section 26-6303 punishes only spoken words. It can therefore withstand appellee’s attack upon its facial constitutionality only if, as authoritatively construed by the Georgia courts, it is not susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 18-22 (1971); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4-5 (1949). Only the Georgia courts can supply the requisite construction, since of course “we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.” United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). It matters not that the words appellee used might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute. At least when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when “no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491 (1965), the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing “attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity,” id., at 486; see also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 366 (1964); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 616 (1971); id., at 619-620 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21-22 (1960); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.
“Although a statute may be neither vague, over-broad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the statute. The statute, in effect, is stricken down on its face. This result is deemed justified since the otherwise continued existence of the statute in unnarrowed form would tend to suppress constitutionally protected rights.” Coates v. City of Cincinnati, supra, at 619-620 (opinion of White, J.) (citation omitted).
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within “narrowly limited classes of speech.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942). Even as to such a class, however, because “the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn,” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958), “[i]n every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom,” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 304 (1940). In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” NAACP v. Button, supra, at 433.
Appellant does not challenge these principles but contends that the Georgia statute is narrowly drawn to apply only to a constitutionally unprotected class of words — “fighting” words — “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572. In Chaplinsky, we sustained a conviction under Chapter 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire, which provided: “No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name....” Chaplinsky was convicted for addressing to another on a public sidewalk the words, “You are a God damned racketeer,” and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.” Chaplinsky challenged the constitutionality of the statute as inhibiting freedom of expression because it was vague and indefinite. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, however, “long before the words for which Chaplinsky was convicted/’ sharply limited the statutory language “offensive, derisive or annoying word” to “fighting” words:
“[N]o words were forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed....
“The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.... Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute... only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace....
“The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee....” 91 N. H. 310, 313, 320-321, 18 A. 2d 754, 758, 762 (1941).
In view of that authoritative construction, this Court held: “We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.” 315 U. S., at 573. Our decisions since Chaplinsky have continued to recognize state power constitutionally to punish “fighting” words under carefully drawn statutes not also susceptible of application to protected expression, Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 20; Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 567 (1970); see Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969). We reaffirm that proposition today.
Appellant argues that the Georgia appellate courts have by construction limited the proscription of § 26-6303 to “fighting” words, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court limited the New Hampshire statute. “A consideration of the [Georgia] cases construing the elements of the offense makes it clear that the opprobrious words and abusive language which are thereby prohibited are those which as a matter of common knowledge and under ordinary circumstances will, when used to or of another person, and in his presence, naturally tend to provoke violent resentment. The statute under attack simply states in statutory language what this Court has previously denominated 'fighting words.’ ” Brief for Appellant 6. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals so read the Georgia decisions. On the contrary, the District Court expressly stated, “Thus, in the decisions brought to this Court’s attention, no meaningful attempt has been made to limit or properly define these terms.” 303 F. Supp., at 955. The District Judge and one member of the unanimous Court of Appeals panel were Georgia practitioners before they ascended the bench. Their views of Georgia law necessarily are persuasive with us. C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 58, pp. 240-241 (2d ed. 1970). We have, however, made our own examination of the Georgia cases, both those cited and others discovered in research. That examination brings us to the conclusion, in agreement with the courts below, that the Georgia appellate decisions have not construed § 26-6303 to be limited in application, as in Chaplinsky, to words that “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”
The dictionary definitions of “opprobrious” and “abusive” give them greater reach than “fighting” words. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961) defined “opprobrious” as “conveying or intended to convey disgrace,” and “abusive” as including “harsh insulting language.” Georgia appellate decisions have construed § 26-6303 to apply to utterances that, although within these definitions, are not “fighting” words as Chaplinsky defines them. In Lyons v. State, 94 Ga. App. 570, 95 S. E. 2d 478 (1956), a conviction under the statute was sustained for awakening 10 women scout leaders on a camp-out by shouting, “Boys, this is where we are going to spend the night.” “Get the G— d— bed rolls out... let’s see how close we can come to the G— d— tents.” Again, in Fish v. State, 124 Ga. 416, 52 S. E. 737 (1905), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury question was presented by the remark, “You swore a lie.” Again, Jackson v. State, 14 Ga. App. 19, 80 S. E. 20 (1913), held that a jury question was presented by the words addressed to another, “God damn you, why don’t you get out of the road?” Plainly, although “conveying... disgrace” or “harsh insulting language,” these were not words “which by their very utterance... tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, at 572.
Georgia appellate decisions construing the reach of “tending to cause a breach of the peace” underscore that § 26-6303 is not limited, as appellant argues, to words that “naturally tend to provoke violent resentment.” Lyons v. State, supra; Fish v. State, supra; and Jackson v. State, supra. Indeed, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461, 83 S. E. 799 (1914), construed “tending to cause a breach of the peace” as mere
“words of description, indicating the kind or character of opprobrious or abusive language that is penalized, and the use of language of this character is a violation of the statute, even though it be addressed to one who, on account of circumstances or by virtue of the obligations of office, can not actually then and there resent the same by a breach of the peace....
“... Suppose that one, at a safe distance and out of hearing of any other than the person to whom he spoke, addressed such language to one locked in a prison cell or on the opposite bank of an impassable torrent, and hence without power to respond immediately to such verbal insults by physical retaliation, could it be reasonably contended that, because no breach of the peace could then follow, the statute would not be violated?...
“... [T] hough, on account of circumstances or obligations imposed by office, one may not be able at the time to assault and beat another on account of such language, it might still tend to cause a breach of the peace at some future time, when the person to whom it was addressed might be no longer hampered by physical inability, present conditions, or official position.” 15 Ga. App., at 461-463, 83 S. E., at 799-800.
Moreover, in Samuels v. State, 103 Ga. App. 66, 67, 118 S. E. 2d 231, 232 (1961), the Court of Appeals, in applying another statute, adopted from a textbook the common-law definition of “breach of the peace.”
“The term ‘breach of the peace’ is generic, and includes all violations of the public peace or order, or decorum; in other words, it signifies the offense of disturbing the public peace or tranquility enjoyed by the citizens of a community.... By ‘peace,’ as used in this connection, is meant the tranquility enjoyed by the citizens of a municipality or a community where good order reigns among its members.”
This definition makes it a “breach of peace” merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly. Street v. New York, 394 U. S., at 592. “[H]ow infinitely more doubtful and uncertain are the boundaries of an offense including any ‘diversion tending to a breach of the peace’....” Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 119 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that our decisions in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195 (1966), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), compel the conclusion that § 26-6303, as construed, does not define the standard of responsibility with requisite narrow specificity. In Ashton we held that “to make an offense of conduct which is ‘calculated to create disturbances of the peace’ leaves wide open the standard of responsibility.” 384 U. S., at 200. In Cox v. Louisiana the statute struck down included as an element congregating with others “with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby.” As the District Court observed, “[a]s construed by the Georgia courts, especially in the instant case, the Georgia provision as to breach of the peace is even broader than the Louisiana statute.” 303 F. Supp., at 956.
We conclude that “[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than [Georgia] has supplied.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S., at 525. The most recent decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, Wilson v. State, supra, in rejecting appel-lee’s attack on the constitutionality of § 26-6303, stated that the statute “conveys a definite meaning as to the conduct forbidden, measured by common understanding and practice.” 223 Ga., at 533, 156 S. E. 2d, at 448. Because earlier appellate decisions applied § 26-6303 to utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response, it is clear that the standard allowing juries to determine guilt “measured by common understanding and practice” does not limit the application of § 26-6303 to “fighting” words defined by Chaplinsky. Rather, that broad standard effectively “licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case.” Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 263 (1937). Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion of the District Court, “[t]he fault of the statute is that it leaves wide open the standard of responsibility, so that it is easily susceptible to improper application.” 303 F. Supp., at 955-956. Unlike the construction of the New Hampshire statute by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the Georgia appellate courts have not construed § 26-6303 “so as to avoid all constitutional difficulties.” United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S., at 369.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Powell- and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The District Court stated, “Accordingly, this order will not deal with the alleged unconstitutional application of this statute nor any of the other points raised in the writ, except for the facial unconstitutionality of Georgia Code §26-6303.” 303 F. Supp., at 953. The state conviction was upon two counts of assault and battery as well as upon two counts of using opprobrious and abusive language. Appellee was also convicted of federal offenses arising out of the same incident, and those convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Tillman v. United States, 406 F. 2d 930 (1969). The facts giving rise to the prosecutions are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia as follows:
“The defendant was one of a group of persons who, on August 18, 1966, picketed the building in which the 12th Corps Headquarters of the United States Army was located, carrying signs opposing the war in Viet Nam. When the inductees arrived at the building, these persons began to block the door so that the inductees could not enter. They were requested by police officers to move from the door, but refused to do so. The officers attempted to remove them from the door, and a scuffle ensued. There was ample evidence to show that the defendant committed assault and battery on the two police officers named in the indictment. There was also sufficient evidence of the use of the opprobrious and abusive words charged, and the jury was authorized to find from the circumstances shown by the evidence that the words were spoken without sufficient provocation, and tended to cause a breach of the peace.” 223 Ga. 531, 535, 156 S. E. 2d 446, 449-450.
“Count 3 of the indictment alleged that the accused 'did without provocation use to and of M. G. Redding and in his presence, the following abusive language and opprobrious words, tending to cause a breach of the peace: “White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you.” “You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.”’ Count 4 alleged that the defendant ‘did without provocation use to and of T. L. Raborn, and in his presence, the following abusive language and opprobrious words, tending to cause a breach of the peace: “You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.” ’ ” Id., at 534, 156 S. E. 2d, at 449.
Judge Sidney O. Smith, Jr., of Gainesville, Georgia, was the District Judge.

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 列