Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in this case is whether the United States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches of trust in connection with its management of forest resources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation.
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In the 1850’s, the United States undertook a policy of removing Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific Northwest in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory began negotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast of the Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty between the United States and the Quinault and Quileute Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the Indians.
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provisionally chosen for the tribes. This tract proved undesirable because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Quinault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost entirely from the water, they should be collected on a reservation suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this suggestion, President Grant issued an Executive Order on November 4, 1873, designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast as an Indian reservation. The vast bulk of this land consisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees.
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Qui-nault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. ° See also the Quinault Allotment Act of Mar. 4, 1911, ch. 246, 36 Stat. 1345. The Government initially determined that the forested areas of the Reservation were not to be allotted because they were not suitable for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act. United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449. Thereafter, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted. By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340 trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily timbered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust status.
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises “comprehensive” control over the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U. S. 136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations. See 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407. Sales of timber “shall be based upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs,” § 406(a), and the proceeds from such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his supervision. 25 U. S. C. § 466. Under these statutes, the Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR pt. 163 (1983). The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allot-tees. 25 U. S. C. §§406(a), 413.
B
The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Qui-nault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were consolidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to recover damages from the United States based on allegations of pervasive waste and mismanagement of timberlands on the Quinault Reservation. More specifically, respondents claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from timber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed them by the United States as trustee under various statutes.
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the United States’ part to manage the timber resources properly and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of damages against the United States. Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591 F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en banc).
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that the General Allotment Act “created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources.” Id., at 542. We concluded that “[a]ny right of the respondents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act.” Id., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered respondents’ assertion that other statutes render the United States answerable in money damages for the alleged mismanagement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546, n. 7.
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United States subject to suit for money damages on most of respondents’ claims. 229 Ct. Cl. 1, 664 P. 2d 265 (1981) (en banc). The court ruled that the timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal statutes governing roadbuilding and rights of way, §§318 and 323-325, statutes governing Indian funds and Government fees, §§162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United States in its management of forested allotted lands. The court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly required compensation for damages sustained as a result of the Government’s breach of its duties. Thus, the court held that respondents could proceed on their claims.
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of substantial importance concerning the liability of the United States, we granted the Government’s petition for certiorari. 457 U. S. 1104 (1982). We affirm.
» — l t — I
Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491, and its counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. The Tucker Act states in pertinent part:
“The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. The terminology employed in some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States, the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those claims.
A
Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only recourse available to private claimants was to petition Congress for relief. In order to relieve the pressure caused by
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and inequities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the Court of Claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a private bill in each case which received a favorable decision. §7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon the court failed to relieve Congress from “the laborious necessity of examining the merits of private bills.” Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, President Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to render final judgments. He declared that it is “as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.” Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., App. 2 (1861). Congress adopted President Lincoln’s recommendation and made the court’s judgments final. Act of Mar. 3, 1863,12 Stat. 765.
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the bill was a “comprehensive measure by which claims against the United States may be heard and determined.” H. R. Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1886). The measure was designed to “give the people of the United States what every civilized nation of the world has already done — the right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for their grievances.” 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep. Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The eventual enactment thus “provide[d] for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States.” Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505.
The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar history. An early amendment to the original enactment creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian tribes. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a result, Congress eventually confronted a “vast and growing burden” resulting from the large number of tribes seeking special jurisdictional Acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim “of a character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.” Id., at 13. As the House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act was to ensure that it would “never again be necessary to pass special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriations of Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future.” 92 Cong. Rec. 5313 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be given “their fair day in court so that they can call the various Government agencies to account on the obligations that the Federal government assumed.” Id., at 5312. The House Report stressed the same point: “If we fail to meet these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the United States.” H. R. Rep. No. 1466, supra, at 5.
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker Act as having provided the consent of the United States to be sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act. See, e. g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590 (1941); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 734 (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam). These decisions confirm the unambiguous thrust of the history of the Act.
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims founded upon “any express or implied contract with the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction over contract claims against the Government has long been recognized, and Government liability in contract is viewed as perhaps “the widest and most unequivocal waiver of federal immunity from suit.” Developments in the Law— Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656, p. 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistakably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other official is empowered to consent to suit against the United States. The same is true for claims founded upon executive regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinction between claims founded upon contracts and claims founded upon other specified sources of law.
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976), and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at 217-218. Without in any way questioning the result in either case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disregarded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively consented to suit.
B
It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act “ ‘does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.’” United States v. Mitchell, supra, at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, supra, at 398. A substantive right must be found in some other source of law, such as “the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969), and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon “‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” United States v. Testan, supra, at 400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967).
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two Government attorneys contended that they were entitled to a higher salary grade under the Classification Act, and to an award of backpay under the Back Pay Act for the period during which they were classified at a lower grade. This Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring compensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at 398-407. Particularly in light of the “established rule that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it,” id., at 402, the Classification Act does not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy “in carefully limited circumstances” such as wrongful reductions in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifications. Id., at 405.
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a right to recover money damages against the United States. While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold land “in trust” for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship. 445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not impose any fiduciary management duties or render the United States answerable for breach thereof, but only prevents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures their immunity from state taxation. Id., at 544.
Thus, for claims against the United States “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department,” 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this inquiry, a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign immunity in the substantive provision, just as a court need not find consent to suit in “any express or implied contract with the United States.” Ibid. The Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent.
Of course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States’ consent to suit. See United States v. King, supra, at 4-5 (Court of Claims lacks general authority to issue declaratory judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S., at 276 (nontolling of limitations beyond statutory provisions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to claims founded upon any implied contract with the United States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925).
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the Tucker Act provides the United States’ consent to suit for claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create substantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28, 32 (1915). “‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’” United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
Ill
Respondents have based their money claims against the United States on various Acts of Congress and executive department regulations. We begin by describing these sources of substantive law. We then examine whether they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose.
A
The Secretary of the Interior’s pervasive role in the sales of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25, 1910, §§7, 8, 36 Stat. 857, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right to sell timber on reservation land, and there existed “‘no general law under which authority for the sale of timber on Indian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted.’” H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1910) (quoting letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized that this situation was undesirable “‘because in many instances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.’” Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress thus sought to provide for harvesting timber “in such a manner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reservations, namely, the Indians.” 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Saunders).
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 关