Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District sustaining motions to dismiss and dismissing appellant’s bill claiming a mechanic’s lien upon premises known as Stoneleigh Court, on the ground (among others) that the bill shows on its face that appellant made no contract with the owner of the property.
The bill discloses that on the 19th of January, 1926, the Connecticut Avenue Realty Corporation entered into a contract with the Wardman Construction Company, Inc., whereby the realty corporation contracted to furnish labor, material, and supervision in connection with the remodeling and alterations of the Stoneleigh Court building on Connecticut avenue in the eity of Washington; and that thereafter, to wit, on the 1st day of March, 1926, the Connecticut Avenue Realty Corporation entered into a contract with appellant whereby appellant agreed to furnish plans and specifications and the supervision of the work on Stoneleigh Court upon stated' terms and conditions. Appellant performed the services as agreed.
On March 9, 1926, the Realty Corporation acquired title to and ownership in the-real estate involved, and on the same day-executed-and recorded among the land records of the District three deeds of trust — one to the National Savings & Trust Company;another to the American Security & Trust Company; and the third to James D. Hobbs and Earl Macintosh, trustees.
Appellant does not contend that he acquired a right to a lien upon the date of his contract with the realty corporation, but he does contend “that his right to a lien under his aforesaid contract Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the said hereinbefore described lands and premises immediately upon the acquisition of title thereto by the said Connecticut Avenue Realty Corporation.” If he is wrong in this, it will be unnecessary to consider other questions raised by the motions to dismiss.
Section 1237 of our Code, entitled “Mechanic’s Lien,” reads as follows: “Every building erected, improved, added to, or repaired by the owner or his agent, and the lot of ground on which the same is erected, being all the ground used or intended to be used in connection therewith, or necessary to the use- and enjoyment thereof, to the extent of the right, title, and interest, at that time existing, of such owner, whether owner in fee or of a less estate, or lessee for a term of years, or vendee in possession under a contract of sale,, shall be subject to a lien in favor of the contractor with such owner or his duly authorized agent for the contract price agreed upon between them, or, in the absence of an express contract, for the reasonable value of' the work and materials furnished for and about the erection, construction, improvement, or repair of or addition to such building, or the placing of any engine, machinery,, or other thing therein or in connection therewith so as to become a fixture, though capable of being detached: -Provided, That the-person claiming the lien shall file the notiee herein prescribed.”
In determining whether a right to a lien exists the statute should be strictly construed, it being in derogation of the common law; but where the right to a lien is clear, and the question is whether the claimant has «proceeded properly, the statute should be liberally construed in his favor. Fidelity Storage Corp. v. Trussed Concrete Steel Co., 35 App. D. C. 1, 9, 20 Ann. Cas. 1157. See, also, Langley v. D’Audigne, 31 App. D. C. 409. It is apparent, therefore, that appellant’s right to a lien must rest solely upon the express terms of the statute.
That statute, after providing that the erection or improvement must be “by the owner or his agent,” makes his then existing interest “subject to a lien in favor of the contractor with such owner or his duly authorized agent for the contract price agreed upon between them, or, in the absence of an express contract, for the reasonable value of the work and materials furnished.” This language is unambiguous, and, unless it is to be given a strained interpretation, it must be held that the status of the parties at the time of the contract must determine the question of the right to a lien; and there is reason for this, as the record in the present ease demonstrates.
The Connecticut Avenue Realty Corporation when it entered into the contract with appellant was neither the owner nor the agent of the owner of the property. Under the statute the execution of this contract conferred no right to a lien in favor of appellant. Third parties had a right to deal with the property on that basis. When, therefore, the National Savings & Trust Company, the American Security & Trust Company, and Hobbs and Macintosh accepted deeds of trust from the realty company on the same date it acquired title, those grantees had a right to assume that there was no lien ahead of them because of any contract between the realty company and appellant, and yet, if appellant’s contention is sustained, his lien would take priority over theirs.
When appellant entered into the contract with the realty company he was not relying upon any right to a lien on the property, but was giving credit to the realty company. He concedes that he then acquired no right to a lien. The statute does not provide that such right shall thereafter arise by reason of a changed status of the parties. In this ease the realty company acquired title within a short time after the contract was made, but that was a mere fortuitous circumstance, as the acquisition of title might not have occurred for a year or longer, or not at all. Since notice of an intention to claim a lien may be filed at any time during the progress of the work or within three months thereafter (section 1238), it follows, if appellant’s contention is correct, that should the person with whom the lien claimant contracted acquire title to the premises after the completion of the work, but before the expiration of the three months’ period, the right to a lien would attach. Such a result would do violence to the intent and meaning of the statute.
The deeree is affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0