Task: songer_appel1_2_2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private organization or association". Your task is to determine what category of private associations best describes this litigant.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:
Our principal task on this petition is to review the voluminous administrative proceedings that passed on these claims of unfair labor practices arising from reopen-er negotiations. Reopener clauses in collective bargaining agreements allow both parties an opportunity to modify their existing agreement in order to meet changing economic conditions. As such, they serve to minimize economic uncertainty at the time of bargaining. But, at the same time, as this case illustrates, the reopener has a potential to destabilize existing relationships by introducing an uncertainty of possible later conflicts concerning the practices pursued by the parties. Both parties to this appeal agreed to reopener negotiations. Yet, despite the fact that new contracts were signed, today, years after the fact, an employer and union are still litigating the claims of unfair labor practices that arose before and during the reopener negotiations.
The bargaining process engaged in by an employer and a union is not like a boxing contest where one side is declared “the winner.” Rather, it is a relationship where the adversaries are locked together so tightly that every action by one causes an opposite reaction by the other — verifying Newton’s law in the human arena. Hence, a necessary second task is to touch lightly on the judicial role in this process. It has been wisely observed that, subject only to duty to the community, labor combatants may struggle to the limits of their self-interest without courts setting boundaries for the contest. It is a legislative function to limit “individual and group rights of aggression and defense,” and to substitute in place of the ancient trial by combat the “processes of justice.” Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488, 41 S.Ct. 172, 184, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Congress has set forth those processes in the statute that defines our powers of review.
Background
Two National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) decisions, United, Technologies, 118 L.R.R.M. 1445 (February 28, 1985) and United Technologies, 118 L.R. R.M. 1556 (March 21, 1985), are consolidated in this appeal which encompasses three cases. In Case No. 4106 the NLRB seeks enforcement of its order finding that the employer, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft (Pratt & Whitney, Company or employer) violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982) by prohibiting the dissemination of scab literature and by placing constraints not permitted by statute on employee strike activity. The employer’s failure to provide the union with the results of an employee survey was also found to constitute § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) violations. In Case No. 4116, the International Association of Machinists (the Union) petitions for review from that part of the NLRB’s decision holding that Pratt & Whitney had neither participated in direct dealing nor surface bargaining in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5). In Case No. 4126 the Union further petitions for review of the Board’s decision finding the employer not guilty of direct dealing during a second set of negotiations.
Thus, there are five issues raised in the three cases — (1) dissemination of Union literature, (2) constraints on employee strike activity, (3) employee survey results not provided to Union, (4) direct dealing, and (5) surface bargaining. For organizational purposes, we begin with the first two appeals that raise all five issues. These two appeals — Nos. 4106 and 4116 — involve a common fact pattern arising from negotiations at Pratt & Whitney’s East Hartford, Middletown, North Haven, Southington and Windsor Locks facilities in Connecticut. The third appeal — Case No. 4126 — is based on negotiations at the company’s Hamilton Standard plant which is also located in Connecticut.
I SCOPE OF REVIEW
Because in portions of these cases there is a difference of opinion between the hearing officer and the Board, it is appropriate to discuss briefly the scope of review. Upon petition by the Board for enforcement of its order, this Court has jurisdiction over the entire proceeding. The scope of our review is long established. In 1913, the Supreme Court directed a court reviewing an Interstate Commerce Commission order to examine the record with a view to determining whether there was “substantial evidence to support the order.” Int. Com. Comm. v. Louis. & Nash R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 98, 33 S.Ct. 185, 189, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913). This standard of review is now mandated by statute in cases arising under the NLRA. “The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)(1982). This standard was designed by Congress to broaden the reviewing court’s scope of review and to require a closer examination of Board decisions. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The five issues raised in the appeals before us were all subject to a fact-finding hearing before an administrative law judge prior to consideration and determination by the Board. Thus, our review is governed on these petitions by the substantial evidence test.
Where the choice is between two conflicting views, even though the court might justifiably have reached a different conclusion if the case were before it de novo, the Board’s decision may not be set aside. A Board determination may only be vacated when a reviewing court cannot conscientiously conclude — after looking at the record as a whole, including the evidence opposed to the Board’s view — that the evidence supporting the Board’s decision is substantial. Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 464. The standard for review is not altered because the hearing officer and the Board, as here, disagree on some findings. But the evidence which the Board uses to support a conclusion “may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses... has drawn conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has reached the same conclusion.” Id. at 496, 71 S.Ct. at 468.
It is familiar law that “[sjubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (citations omitted). “[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939) (citations omitted). “Congress was very deliberate in adopting this standard of review. It frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing the evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tribunal and it helps promote the uniform application of the statute.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
Today, the standard by which a reviewing court applies the rule of substantial evidence to Board determinations is summarized in the shorthand formula that Congress has directed the courts to “assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions....” Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490, 71 S.Ct. at 465. With this precept in mind, we consider the three cases on appeal.
Cases Nos. 4106, 4116
II SCAB LITERATURE
A. Background
The employer and the Union through its four locals are parties to four existing collective bargaining agreements which were to run for five years. Pursuant to these agreements, either party could reopen negotiations during a specified period for the limited purpose of changing the base hourly wage rate and cost-of-living allowance (COLA) for the final two years. If the new negotiations failed to produce modified agreements, then other aspects of the existing contracts, specifically the dues check-off and no strike or lockout provisions, would become void. These agreements, executed on November 28, 1977, were by their terms effective until November 28, 1982. The reopener negotiations could occur only between mid-August and November 30, 1980.
The actions contested on these appeals were all taken before or during the reopen-er negotiations. As the reopener period approached, both sides sought to strengthen their respective positions. Since the Union was not operating under a union security clause, it attempted to increase its membership. As part of a membership drive, it distributed and posted literature through Local 1746A at the employer’s Southington plant.
The first distribution occurred on February 26, 1980. The literature encouraged Union membership and referred to non-Union employees by such names as “scabs” and “freebies”. The author Jack London’s definition of “scab” was included, describing a scab as lower than a rattlesnake, toad and vampire. “The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer.” See National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 268, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2773, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (quoting London’s piece in full). The local continued this pattern of derisive language when it republished on April 16 the London definition and informed employees it would publish a list of non-Union employees working at the Southington facility. One such list appeared on May 7; two more lists were later distributed on May 13 and May 20. The May 13 distribution used the scab language and further elaborated on the aid that non-Union employees gave the employer in the upcoming negotiations; it urged these employees “to get ‘born again’ —to ride the Union train and pay the Union fare.” The second again referred to the non-Union workers as scabs.
The employer responded on May 30. It believed that such language violated the collective bargaining agreement’s stricture that workers be free to choose whether or not to become Union members, and that it was contrary to an arbitrator’s decision, at another plant, which prohibited the verbal use of such reviling language. As a result, the employer banned further distribution of this literature on its premises and threatened disciplinary action against any employee disregarding the prohibition.
B. Administrative Decisions
The AU found that the leaflets were distributed as part of an organizational campaign and as such were protected activity under § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). He further held that the scab terminology did not take the publications outside that protection. Relying on Austin, and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), the AU concluded that the Union was entitled to disseminate such literature and that the employer’s efforts to prohibit it violated § 8(a)(1).' He noted that the employer had not shown any labor unrest directly attributable to the challenged language. The NLRB adopted these findings and upheld the AU’s determination that the employer’s conduct violated § 8(a)(1). United Technologies Corporation, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1557-58.
C. Discussion
Consistent with the § 7 right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, workers can join, form, or assist labor unions and otherwise engage in group activity. 29 U.S.C. § 157. These rights extend not only to actions associated with collective bargaining, but also to actions directed at the workers’ “mutual aid or protection.” Id.
As part of their organizational efforts, unions may — subject to time, place and manner restrictions — communicate on an employer’s premises with employees whom they currently represent. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 1102, 39 L.Ed.2d 358 (1974). Such communication facilitates the process of transforming single workers into a collective bargaining entity and ensures that workers have the information necessary to make informed choices regarding their representational status and the positions to be taken on particular bargaining issues. Where, as here, a recognized union is engaged in a post-recognition membership drive aimed at non-union workers, its communicative actions — absent some statutory violation — are protected by § 7. Austin, 418 U.S. at 279, 94 S.Ct. at 2778. Thus, the distribution of these union leaflets or fliers is protected activity under § 7. NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284, 289 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 805, 104 S.Ct. 53, 78 L.Ed.2d 73 (1983).
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from interfering with the exercise of § 7 rights, and an employer cannot, for example, arbitrarily issue a blanket rule forbidding distribution. Although distribution and posting of union literature may not be prevented during non-working time in nonworking areas, such a restriction is enforceable when special circumstances are shown. Such special circumstances exist when the leaflet is on its face inflammatory or potentially inflammatory. “[T]he critical question is not merely whether the leaflets are provocative, but whether the provocation could be expected to threaten plant discipline.” New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 290. Special circumstances must be proved by the employer. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n. 10, 65 S.Ct. 982, 988 n. 10, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945). In evaluating such a claim, deference is granted to the Board’s findings.
Language in union distributions can threaten plant discipline in two possible ways. First, the words chosen could themselves be so offensive on their face as to create a reasonable expectation that plant discipline will be disrupted. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 290. Neither the use of the scab terminology nor the London definition fall in this per se category. The Supreme Court has noted, that “the Board has concluded that epithets such as ‘scab,’ ‘unfair,’ and ‘liar’ are commonplace in these struggles and not so indefensible as to remove them from the protection of § 7....” Linn, 383 U.S. at 60-61, 86 S.Ct. at 661-62. Second, the language can be sufficiently provocative so that in the context of the particular negotiations, plant peace is threatened, and § 7 rights are outweighed by these concerns of plant discipline. Pratt & Whitney failed to show that this was the case here. No example of actual unrest can be pointed to, nor was the language shown to implicate safety concerns. See New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d at 289-91; cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 200 NLRB 667, 670-71 (1972) (employees wore T-shirts adorned with anti-employer language perceived as threat to plant discipline); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 160 NLRB 334, 391-95 (1966) (actual fight between two employees). Since the scab terminology has been previously accepted, and there is no proof demonstrating labor unrest, we accept the Board’s findings that the employer violated § 8(a)(1) by prohibiting the distribution and posting of the scab literature.
Ill THE SURVEY
A. Background
During the period from April 1 to August 1, 1980, the employer conducted interviews and surveyed employees at all four plants who were hired after November 1977. Pratt & Whitney conducted the survey to determine employees’ attitudes regarding the workplace and to evaluate employees’ knowledge of and attitudes toward various benefit programs provided by the employer. United Technologies, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1559. The survey asked the employees to rate their various health, vacation, and bonus benefits on a scale of poor to excellent. Additional questions probed whether the employees were satisfied with their remuneration and examined whether there was general knowledge concerning the calculation of retirement benefits. Employee views and suggestions on any aspect of the company’s performance were also solicited. Three of the interviews included brief discussions of the issues to be raised in the upcoming reopener negotiations. Employee participation was voluntary and all responses were to be confidential. From the survey responses, a report was subsequently prepared that enabled Pratt & Whitney to ascertain employee opinions regarding the employer’s wage structure, fringe benefits and physical working conditions.
The Union was first made aware of the survey during early July by employees and shop stewards at the North Haven plant. That plant’s personnel manager informed the president of Local 707 that the “interviews were being conducted by a guidance counselor from one of the local high schools and that they were directed toward improving the preparation of the students from that school for employment at [Pratt & Whitney].” When asked whether the questions addressed contractual benefits, the manager responded that the survey “related to the employees’ knowledge of the benefits that they received and the conditions under which they worked.” The Local President’s request to participate in administering the survey was turned down, as was his request for its results.
B. Administrative Decisions
The AU found that the survey, undertaken by the employer without notifying the Union, constituted direct dealing in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5). Relying on Obie Pacific Inc., 196 NLRB 458, 460 (1972), the ALJ held that though an employer may communicate with its employees, it cannot use a survey for the purpose of ascertaining employee sentiment and undermining the Union just before a negotiating session, when such knowledge could be used to gauge the strength of employee support for various provisions of the union bargaining position. He noted that additional factors, specifically the “failure to notify the Union of its intention to take this survey, its refusal to permit the Union to either sit in on the interviews or see a copy of the questions being asked, and its refusal to furnish the Union with a copy of the results of that survey constituted additional aspects of... [the employer’s] refusal to bargain in good faith with the Union.”
The Board reversed the AU’s determination that the employer’s conduct in taking the survey amounted to an unfair labor practice. United Technologies, 118 L.R. R.M. at 1559-60. The Board distinguished Obie Pacific, and other similar cases observing that the violations in those cases were all based on employer attempts to circumvent the union by soliciting information directly relevant to ongoing negotiations or current union positions. In contrast, the Board found that the survey’s questions “solicited employee sentiment with respect to contractual benefits which were clearly outside the scope of the upcoming reopener negotiations.” Id. at 1559. It noted that the questions were not designed to increase the employer’s knowledge of the employees’ positions; rather, they were intended to ascertain how well the employer was communicating its position to the employees. Unlike Obie Pacific, the employer did not hold itself out as the employees’ friend, ready to correct employee complaints voiced in the survey, and impliedly indicating the Union’s comparative inability to produce results. Given these findings, the Board concluded that there was no labor violation implicated in taking such a survey.
The Board nonetheless affirmed that part of the AU’s decision which found that the failure to provide the Union with the survey results violated § 8(a)(1) and (5). Although the information sought was not directly relevant to the reopener negotiations, it did relate to wages and other terms of employment. Such information must be provided to the Union when requested because it is presumptively relevant to general collective bargaining, though an employer may rebut this presumption by showing that the requested information is not relevant. Here the company did not meet that burden simply by denying the Union’s request without explanation, or by later stating that the survey information is irrelevant because it relates only to employees with limited seniority.
C. Discussion
The issue is whether the refusal to supply the survey results constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(1) and (5). An employer has an obligation to provide a union with all information necessary for the proper performance of its duties as the exclusive bargaining representative. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36, 87 S.Ct. 565, 567-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967); Prudential Insurance Company of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928, 90 S.Ct. 263, 24 L.Ed.2d 226 (1969). This obligation extends not only to information relevant to the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement, but also encompasses information relevant to the supervision of an existing agreement. See Acme, 385 U.S. at 436, 87 S.Ct. at 568; Prudential, 412 F.2d at 81. Refusal to provide such information is a failure to bargain in good faith. See Acme, 385 U.S. at 435, 87 S.Ct. at 567; NLRB v. Leonard B. Hebert, Jr. & Co., 696 F.2d 1120, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817, 104 S.Ct. 76, 78 L.Ed.2d 88 (1983).
Wage and other benefit material pertaining to bargaining unit employees must be produced by an employer as it is presumptively relevant to the union's duties as exclusive bargaining agent. Grand Islander Health Care Center, 256 NLRB 1255, 1256 (1981); Western Massachusetts Electric Company, 234 NLRB 118, 118-19 (1978). Consequently, the facts gleaned by the survey — admittedly relating to wages and fringe benefits — are pertinent to the union’s role as representative both for the existing contract and for the new contract being negotiated pursuant to the reopener clauses.
The employer argues that the Board’s initial finding — that the taking of the survey did not constitute direct dealing because the subjects inquired into were not subjects of bargaining under the reopener clause — logically leads to the conclusion that the survey results were not material to the upcoming negotiations. To the contrary, the first finding does not compel the second. Although the questions related to issues outside the scope of the reopener negotiations, they addressed areas important to the Union’s role in supervising the existing agreement and could have played a role in any Union decision regarding whether to accept a three-year as opposed to a two-year offer. Further, Pratt & Whitney’s argument is procedurally barred as it did not present this argument to the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
The employer also asserts that it cannot reveal the survey results because it told the employees that the responses would be confidential. Unquestionably, there are instances when the harm to employees that might result from disclosure are significant enough to affect the union’s right to obtain the information. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 312-17, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 1130-32, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an employer did not have to turn test questions over to the union where such dissemination would ruin the test’s value because future takers would already know the questions. The Court explained that these tests were critical in determining who would be the best suited for a particular company position.
The confidential concerns in this case do not rise to the same level as those recognized in Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 317-20, 99 S.Ct. at 1132-33, which involved the potential for harassment and embarrassment associated with psychological testing. A mere promise of confidentiality is not a defense to furnishing the results, though the reason for making such promise may provide a defense. But here the employer cannot identify any substantial reason why the information should remain confidential. Many employers are interested in learning how effectively their benefit packages are communicated to employees and whether their employees are satisfied. Simply asserting that the results should remain confidential because the employees were promised confidentiality does not discharge the employer’s burden. Hence, the refusal to disclose the survey results was properly found to violate § 8(a)(1) and (5). We therefore agree with the Board’s conclusion and order.
IV FOREMAN STRONCEK’S REMARKS
A. Background
We turn now to events which occurred during the actual reopener negotiations. We begin with the actions of one individual during these negotiations — Foreman Stron-cek. The allegations arising from the entire pattern of bargaining will be discussed' later.
On November 26, 1980 as the reopener negotiations stalled and a strike appeared more likely, Stroncek called a meeting of the employees in his department at the East Hartford Plant to answer questions regarding the possibility of a strike and the workers’ rights if a strike should occur. He told the employees that they would have to call in every day that they missed work and provide a reason for their absence. Failure to follow these procedures would warrant dismissal. The shop steward was absent at the time of the meeting and his efforts to have a new meeting scheduled in order to advise employees that they did not have to call in daily were rebuffed. On the same day, Pratt & Whitney published a special edition of its plant newsletter answering a number of questions concerning the workers’ rights and responsibilities during a strike. Workers were informed that they had the right to strike, that they could resign from the Union before a strike, that as economic strikers they could be reinstated after the strike’s termination, and that no strike at Pratt & Whitney had resulted in increased benefits to strikers.
B. Administrative Decisions
The ALT held that the call-in requirement would interfere with and impede the worker’s right to strike. Since an employer is prohibited under § 8(a)(1) from interfering with workers’ protected rights, the foreman’s actions constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board upheld this result, though it relied on different testimony to support the factual findings. United Technologies, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1557-58 & n. 4.
C. Discussion
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits an employer from interfering with employees’ § 7 rights. One of which — derived both from § 7 and specifically authorized by § 13 — is the right to strike. 29 U.S.C. § 163. Thus, employer actions which interfere with or attempt to discourage the exercise of the right to strike — by threatening employees with sanctions or penalties or imposing impermissible obligations on striking workers — are unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(a)(1). See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235-36, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963). Workers are not required to call in each day of a strike, nor are they required to provide reasons for their absence. Even though no strike took place in this case, advising the East Haven employees that a “call-in” was required interfered with their right to strike. Moreover, threatening discharge for failing to obey these edicts might have discouraged some employees from striking. Therefore, Foreman Stroncek’s remarks as a representative of the employer violated § 8(a)(1).
V THE DIRECT DEALING AND SURFACE BARGAINING CHARGES
A. Background
We now turn to the Union’s allegations that the company’s conduct throughout the reopener negotiations reveals a policy of direct dealing and a refusal to bargain in good faith. Several months preceding the actual negotiations the Union undertook two actions. It requested the company to supply data concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and it began a campaign to inform the workers of the Union’s position and to compare the employer’s wage and benefit package with those offered by major aerospace firms throughout the country. At this time Local 1746 was also engaged in its membership campaign and was distributing the challenged scab literature. This provoked preliminary skirmishing over furnishing the data, comparing nationwide aircraft rather than eastern aircraft engine manufacturers, and discussing informal reopener sessions without the full Union bargaining committee.
On November 1 the company made its first direct communication to its employees. Replying to the many prior Union mailings, it sent every bargaining unit employee a letter that compared the company’s wage and benefit package with those of major East Coast engine manufacturers and chided the Union for its comparisons to West Coast aircraft manufacturers. Further, employees were told that the Union’s advance publicity was putting the parties on a “collision course”, and that only through “common sense” and “good faith negotiations” could this pre-Christmas collision be avoided. The letter concluded by asking each employee to read the benefit comparisons and draw his own. conclusions.
Six bargaining sessions ensued between the employer and the Union. The first was held on November 3. The Union’s initial proposals were rejected by the employer as “pie in the sky;” the company made no counter-offer. Starting on November 4 and concluding on November 10, the Union sent six fliers to the employees describing the first bargaining session and providing strike-related information. The second negotiating session held on November 11 produced no change. On that day the employer communicated directly with the employees for the second time. It distributed a bulletin, which it had shown the Union, attacking the Union’s high initial demands, and characterizing them as “thoughtless and irresponsible.” The third meeting occurred on November 14 without changing the status quo. No offer was made by the company. The Union inquired as to whether an offer was being made to the Teamsters at the company’s Sikorsky plant and, if so, objected to using such a small plant as a potential trendsetter for all of Pratt & Whitney’s labor negotiations. The Union also demanded that any offer made at Sikorsky also be made to it.
The company announced on November 16 that the Sikorsky workers had accepted a new three-year contract outside the scope of their contract’s reopener terms. The next day the company distributed a bulletin to its supervisory personnel, which was available to all employees. Various aspects of the Sikorsky agreement were discussed and the benefits resulting from not limiting negotiations to the terms of the reopener were presented. The Union responded defending its decision to avoid Sikorsky-like negotiations, including early reopener bargaining on a wide range of issues and “private meetings” with the employees. The fourth bargaining session took place on November 18. Again, the employer refused to make an offer, but stated that when it made an offer it would be similar to the Sikorsky three-year offer. The Union replied that it would not accept any contract whose terms extended beyond the reopener’s scope. The day immediately following this meeting the company communicated a third time with the employees in a bulletin addressed to supervisors, but again seen by all employees. It discussed the Sikorsky agreement and described the Union’s recalcitrance as “unrealistic”.
Mediators were finally called in and both parties had separate meetings with them on November 20 and 24. A revised Union offer was presented and a decision reached for both parties to begin direct bargaining later on the 24th. At this meeting the employer made its first offer for a new three-year comprehensive collective bargaining agreement, practically identical to that accepted by the Teamsters at Sikorsky. The proposal provided for a wide range of benefits and a new savings plan was introduced to replace the Christmas bonuses that the company hoped to eliminate. Consistent with its prior aversion to the Sikorsky contract, the Union rejected this offer, stating that it was only interested in an agreement structured within the terms of the reopener provisions. On November 25 both parties again met individually with the mediator.
The parties met for a fifth negotiating session on November 26. The company presented a two-year wage and COLA proposal which included a wage increase and a 30 percent capped COLA. In comparison to the Union’s latest proposal which would have increased labor costs by 45 percent, the employer’s proposal would have raised its costs by 20.3 percent. The Union deferred comment on the proposal pending further study. The final meeting took place on November 29. The company’s improved offer — a two-year wage increase with quarterly capped COLA adjustments amounting to a 23.3 percent increase in labor costs — was orally presented. The savings plan was included and the Christmas bonus dropped, though the company recognized that the plan was outside the reopener’s scope. Union requests to modify the offer by transferring the savings plan costs to the COLA were refused and the Union stated that it would recommend rejection of the offer. The company made its offer public before the Union received the official written version. On November 30, two full page advertisements were placed in area newspapers; one describing the employer’s offer, the other reprinting an earlier editorial concerning a possible strike.
The ratification meeting took place on November 30. Although a majority of the employees rejected the company’s offer, the rejection was by less than a two-thirds vote. Under the Union’s International Constitution a strike is only permitted upon a two-thirds vote rejecting an offer, and it further provides that if a strike is not authorized, the offer is automatically accepted. Consequently, Pratt & Whitney’s offer was accepted.
B. Administrative Decisions
The ALJ concluded that the employer’s refusal to provide the requested wage and hour information was not an unfair labor practice. Nonetheless, he held that the employer engaged in surface bargaining and in direct dealing through its combination of bargaining tactics and communications with the employees. All except two of the ALJ’s conclusions were accepted by the NLRB. The Board rejected the findings that the employer participated in direct dealing and surface bargaining. The Board looked at the totality of the bargaining relationship to find two parties involved in “very hard and intense bargaining.” United Technologies, 118 L.R.R.M. at 1561. It believed that the Union started the ball rolling by disseminating literature months before the beginning of the reopen-er negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, the Union informed the employees of their strike options and otherwise “engaged in a fair degree of saber rattling.” Id. at 1561-62. Much of this occurred before the employer’s position was even known. The employer, which has a right under § 8(c) to communicate with its employees, could therefore legitimately criticize the Union’s tactics and disseminate its views. The Board noted that: “[i]n no instance did the [company’s] material contain proposals or ideas which were not first submitted to the Union at the bargaining table.” Id. at 1562. Since free discussion Ultimately benefits the workers, employers should be encouraged to exercise their § 8(c) rights, absent explicit or implicit attempts to have the employees abandon the union. As there were no such attempts, there was no direct dealing.
The Board also rejected the AU’s finding of surface bargaining. It first noted that the AU based his opinion on “the... [employer’s] conducting of the wage survey, its communications with employees which the [ALJ] found constituted direct dealing, its conditioning of its offer of early negotiations on the Unions’s [sic] being willing to meet outside the presence of its full bargaining committee, its delay in submitting counterproposals, the inclusion of a savings plan in its counterproposals, and its prohibiting the employees’ distribution of prounion anti-scab literature.” Id. These factors no longer were valid because the Board reversed the AU’s finding that the taking of the survey violated § 8(a)(5) and his finding of direct dealing. Similarly, the employer’s refusal to make any offer until late in the reopener negotiations had already been upheld and therefore added little. Conditioning early meetings on the absence of the full bargaining committee was not bargaining to impasse, nor was it suggested to be a separate unfair labor practice. The remaining possible factors for finding surface bargaining — the company’s unlawful ban on the employees’ dissemination of the antiscab pamphlets and its refusal to provide wage survey information, provided an inadequate basis to support a finding of surface bargaining. Id. Therefore, the Board dismissed the surface bargaining finding. In the discussion that follows we analyze both direct dealing and surface bargaining.
C. Discussion
1. Direct Dealing by Employer
When workers have determined who their bargaining representative will be, an employer must bargain in good faith only with that representative. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private organization or association". What category of private associations best describes this litigant?
A. business, trade, professional, or union (BTPU)
B. other
Answer:

Answer: A