Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plaintiffs with "actual knowledge" of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply. § 413(a)(2)(A), 88 Stat. 889, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1113. The question here is whether a plaintiff necessarily has "actual knowledge" of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. We hold that he does not and therefore affirm.
I
A
Retirement plans governed by ERISA must have at least one named fiduciary, § 1102(a)(1), who must manage the plan prudently and solely in the interests of participants and their beneficiaries, § 1104(a). Fiduciaries who breach these duties are personally liable to the plan for any resulting losses. § 1109(a). ERISA authorizes participants and their beneficiaries, as well as co-fiduciaries and the Secretary of Labor, to sue for that relief. § 1132(a)(2).
Such suits must be filed within one of three time periods, each with different triggering events. The first begins when the breach occurs. Specifically, under § 1113(1), suit must be filed within six years of "the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation" or, in cases of breach by omission, "the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation." We have referred to § 1113(1) as a statute of repose, which "effect[s] a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time." California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2049, 198 L.Ed.2d 584 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The second period, which accelerates the filing deadline, begins when the plaintiff gains "actual knowledge" of the breach. Under § 1113(2), suit must be filed within three years of "the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation." Section 1113(2) is a statute of limitations, which "encourage[s] plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution of known claims." Id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 2049 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The third period, which applies "in the case of fraud or concealment," begins when the plaintiff discovers the alleged breach. § 1113. In such cases, suit must be filed within six years of "the date of discovery." Ibid.
B
Respondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from 2010 to 2012. He participated in two Intel retirement plans, the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan and the Intel 401(k) Savings Plan. Payments into these plans were in turn invested in two funds managed by the Intel Investment Policy Committee. These funds mostly comprised stocks and bonds. After the stock market decline in 2008, however, the committee increased the funds' shares of alternative assets, such as hedge funds, private equity, and commodities. These assets carried relatively high fees. And as the stock market rebounded, Sulyma's funds lagged behind others such as index funds.
Sulyma filed this suit on behalf of a putative class in October 2015, alleging primarily that the committee and other plan administrators (petitioners here) had breached their fiduciary duties by overinvesting in alternative assets. Petitioners countered that the suit was untimely under § 1113(2). Although Sulyma filed it within six years of the alleged breaches, he filed it more than three years after petitioners had disclosed their investment decisions to him.
ERISA and its implementing regulations mandate various disclosures to plan participants. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021 - 1031 ; see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 936, 944, 194 L.Ed.2d 20 (2016). Sulyma received numerous disclosures while working at Intel, some explaining the extent to which his retirement plans were invested in alternative assets. In November 2011, for example, he received an e-mail informing him that a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA) notice was available on a website called NetBenefits, where many of his disclosures were hosted. See App. 149-151; see also 29 CFR §§ 2550.404c-5(b) - (d) (2019) (QDIA
notices); § 2520.104b-1(c) (regulating electronic disclosure). This notice broke down the percentages at which his 401(k) fund was invested in stocks, bonds, hedge funds, and commodities. See App. 236. In 2012, he received a summary plan description explaining that the funds were invested in stocks and alternative assets, id., at 227, and referring him to other documents-called fund fact sheets-with the percentages in graphical form. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024(b) (summary plan descriptions); see also App. 307 (June 2012 fact sheet for his 401(k) plan fund); id., at 338 (June 2012 fact sheet for his retirement contribution plan fund); id., at 277-340 (other fact sheets provided during his tenure at Intel). Also in 2012, he received e-mails directing him to annual disclosures that petitioners provided for both his plans, which showed the underlying funds' return rates and again directed him to the NetBenefits site for further information. See 29 CFR § 2550.404a-5 ; see also App. 242-243 (retirement contribution plan annual disclosure); id., at 250-251 (401(k) plan annual disclosure).
Petitioners submitted records showing that Sulyma visited the NetBenefits site repeatedly during his employment. Id., at 258-276. But he testified in his deposition that he did not "remember reviewing" the above disclosures during his tenure. Id., at 175; see also id., at 183, 193, 196-197. He also stated in a declaration that he was "unaware" while working at Intel "that the monies that [he] had invested through the Intel retirement plans had been invested in hedge funds or private equity." Id., at 212. He recalled reviewing only account statements sent to him by mail, which directed him to the NetBenefits site and noted that his plans were invested in "short-term/other" assets but did not specify which. See, e.g., id., at 375.
The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners under § 1113(2), reasoning that "[i]t would be improper to allow Sulyma's claims to survive merely because he did not look further into the disclosures made to him." 2017 WL 1217185, *9 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 31, 2017). The Ninth Circuit reversed. As relevant here, the court construed "actual knowledge" to mean "what it says: knowledge that is actual, not merely a possible inference from ambiguous circumstances." 909 F.3d 1069, 1076 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Sulyma "had sufficient information available to him to know about the allegedly imprudent investments" more than three years before filing suit, the court held that his testimony created a dispute as to when he actually gained that knowledge. Id., at 1077.
Several Circuits have likewise construed § 1113(2) to require "knowledge that is actual," id., at 1076, but one has construed it to require only proof of sufficient disclosure. We granted certiorari, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2692, 204 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2019), to resolve whether the phrase "actual knowledge" does in fact mean "what it says," 909 F.3d at 1076, and hold that it does.
II
A
"We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language" in ERISA, as in any statute, "according to its terms." Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010). Although ERISA does not define the phrase "actual knowledge," its meaning is plain. Dictionaries are hardly necessary to confirm the point, but they do. When Congress passed ERISA, the word "actual" meant what it means today: "existing in fact or reality." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 13 (11th ed. 2005) (same); see also American Heritage Dictionary 14 (1973) ("In existence; real; factual"); id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) ("Existing in reality and not potential, possible, simulated, or false"). So did the word "knowledge," which meant and still means "the fact or condition of being aware of something." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 691 (2005) (same); see also American Heritage Dictionary 725 (1973) ("Familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study"); id., at 973 (2011) (same). Thus, to have "actual knowledge" of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.
Legal dictionaries give "actual knowledge" the same meaning: "[r]eal knowledge as distinguished from presumed knowledge or knowledge imputed to one." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black's Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "actual knowledge" as "[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge"). The qualifier "actual" creates that distinction. In everyday speech, "actual knowledge" might seem redundant; one who claims "knowledge" of a topic likely means to suggest that he actually knows a thing or two about it. But the law will sometimes impute knowledge-often called "constructive" knowledge-to a person who fails to learn something that a reasonably diligent person would have learned. See id., at 1043. Similarly, we held in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 130 S.Ct. 1784, 176 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010), that the word "discovery," when used in a statute of limitations without qualification, "encompasses not only those facts the plaintiff actually knew, but also those facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known." Id., at 648, 130 S.Ct. 1784. The addition of "actual" in § 1113(2) signals that the plaintiff's knowledge must be more than "potential, possible, virtual, conceivable, theoretical, hypothetical, or nominal." Black's Law Dictionary 53 (4th ed. 1951). Indeed, in Merck, we cited § 1113(2) as evidence of the "linguistic distinction" between " 'actual knowledge'" and the "hypothetical" knowledge that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have.
559 U.S. at 646-647, 130 S.Ct. 1784 (quoting § 1113(2) ; emphasis in original).
Congress has drawn the same distinction elsewhere in ERISA. Multiple provisions contain alternate 6-year and 3-year limitations periods, with the 6-year period beginning at "the date on which the cause of action arose" and the 3-year period starting at "the earliest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of action." §§ 1303(e)(6), (f)(5) (emphasis added); accord, §§ 1370(f)(1)-(2), 1451(f)(1)-(2). ERISA also requires plaintiffs challenging the suspension of benefits under § 1085 to do so within "one year after the earliest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of action." § 1085(e)(9)(I)(iv). Thus, Congress has repeatedly drawn a "linguistic distinction" between what an ERISA plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know. Merck, 559 U.S. at 647, 130 S.Ct. 1784. And when Congress has included both forms of knowledge in a provision limiting ERISA actions, it has done so explicitly. We cannot assume that it meant to do so by implication in § 1113(2). Instead we "generally presum[e] that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another." BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U.S. 531, 537, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners dispute the characterization of anything less than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge, arguing that the latter term usually refers to information that a plaintiff must seek out rather than information that is sent to him. But if a plaintiff is not aware of a fact, he does not have "actual knowledge" of that fact however close at hand the fact might be. § 1113(2). And Congress has never added to § 1113(2) the language it has used in other ERISA limitations provisions to encompass both what a plaintiff actually knows and what he reasonably could know.
As presently written, therefore, § 1113(2) requires more than evidence of disclosure alone. That all relevant information was disclosed to the plaintiff is no doubt relevant in judging whether he gained knowledge of that information. See Part III, infra. To meet § 1113(2)'s "actual knowledge" requirement, however, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information.
B
Petitioners offer arguments for a broader reading of § 1113(2) based on text, context, purpose, and statutory history. All founder on Congress's choice of the word "actual."
As for text, petitioners do not dispute the normal definitions of "actual," "knowledge," or "actual knowledge." They focus instead on the least conspicuous part of the phrase "had actual knowledge": the word "had." § 1113(2). Once a plaintiff receives a disclosure, they argue, he "ha[s]" the knowledge that § 1113(2) requires because he effectively holds it in his hand. Ibid. In other words, he has the requisite knowledge because he could acquire it with reasonable effort. That turns § 1113(2) into what it is plainly not: a constructive-knowledge requirement.
Petitioners' contextual argument fails for the same reason. As they point out, ERISA's disclosure regime is meant to "ensur[e] that 'the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan.' " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 118, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973)).
This is the reason for ERISA's requirements that disclosures be written for a lay audience. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). Once plan administrators satisfy their obligations to impart knowledge, petitioners say, § 1113(2)'s knowledge requirement is satisfied too. But that is simply not what § 1113(2) says. Unlike other ERISA limitations periods-which also form § 1113(2)'s context- § 1113(2) begins only when a plaintiff actually is aware of the relevant facts, not when he should be. And a given plaintiff will not necessarily be aware of all facts disclosed to him; even a reasonably diligent plaintiff would not know those facts immediately upon receiving the disclosure. Although "the words of a statute must be read in their context," Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989), petitioners' argument again gives the word "actual" little meaning at all.
Petitioners also argue that § 1113(2)'s plain meaning undermines its purpose of protecting plan administrators from suits over bygone investment decisions. If a plan participant can simply deny knowledge, they say, administrators will rarely get the benefit of § 1113(2). But even if this is true, as it may well be, we cannot say that heeding the clear meaning of the word "actual" renders the statute so " '[in]coherent' " that it must be disregarded. Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1969, 1976, 195 L.Ed.2d 334 (2016).
For one thing, plan participants are not the only potential plaintiffs subject to § 1113. The Secretary of Labor, for example, may also sue imprudent fiduciaries for the benefit of plan participants. See § 1132(a)(2). And the United States represents that the Secretary will have a hard time doing so within § 1113(2)'s timeframe if deemed to have actual knowledge of the facts contained in the many reports that the Department receives from ERISA plans each year. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28. Moreover, the statute's repose period will still protect defendants from suits filed more than six years after the alleged breach. See § 1113(1).
Petitioners may well be correct that heeding the plain meaning of § 1113(2) substantially diminishes the protection that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries, but by the same token, petitioners' interpretation would greatly reduce § 1113(1)'s value for beneficiaries, given the disclosure regime that petitioners themselves emphasize. Choosing between these alternatives is a task for Congress, and we must assume that the language of § 1113(2) reflects Congress's choice. If policy considerations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to do it. See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1804, 1813, 204 L.Ed.2d 139 (2019).
Finally, petitioners argue that the plain meaning of "actual knowledge" renders an earlier version of § 1113(2) incoherent. As originally enacted, the § 1113(2) limitations period began either when the plaintiff gained actual knowledge of the alleged breach or when "a report from which [the plaintiff] could reasonably be expected to have obtained knowledge... was filed with" the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2) (1976 ed.). That latter, constructive-knowledge clause was later repealed. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 9342(b), 101 Stat. 1330-371. According to petitioners, if "actual knowledge" means what it says, then the original version of § 1113(2) charged plan participants with learning what was sent to the Secretary but not what was sent to them.
The version at issue here, however, is the current one-from which Congress removed any mention of constructive knowledge. "When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect." Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258-259, 124 S.Ct. 2466, 159 L.Ed.2d 355 (2004) (internal

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 说