Task: songer_respond1_7_2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

SWAN, Chief Judge.
On July 6, 1951, an order was signed by me temporarily enlarging the applicant on bail, pending decision and determination of the said application after submission of the record. A transcript of the proceedings before the District Court and memoranda by counsel having been submitted, the application is now ripe for decision. The three points argued do not appear to me to raise any substantial question which would justify the granting of bail pending the appeal. Rule 46, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A.
The appellant’s argument on the jurisdictional point rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature of bail in a criminal proceeding. The giving of security is not the full measure of the bail’s obligation; it is hornbook law that the accused is delivered into the custody of the bail and the bail is bound to redeliver him so far as he can. It does not discharge the bail from that duty merely to abandon the security. The bail must assist in arresting the convict so far as possible; security is not a substitute. This being true the bail can have no constitutional privilege to conceal from the court all that he knows of the whereabouts of the convict and that necessarily includes an inquiry into his relation with him at the time when the security was posted. Rule 46(g) made no change in the old law; as the reviser’s note says it is “a restatement of existing law and practice.”
If it be argued that there may nevertheless be a “substantial question” about any of this, at least no doubt can extend to defendant’s refusal to answer fully about the books of the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress and to help towards their production. The claim of privilege against self-incrimination has no application to the contemnor’s refusal to produce books held by him in a representative capacity.
The claim that there was a technical failure to comply with Rule 42, F.R.Cr.P., if sustained, would result merely in a remand of the appellant for resentence, so that this defect, if it be one, is not prejudicial to the appellant. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 296-301, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884. Accordingly the application for bail is denied and the temporary bail allowed by my order of July 6th is hereby revoked and the appellant is directed to surrender to the United States Marshal.
If the appellant desires to have the appeal heard before commencement of the October Term of the Court of Appeals, I will convene a court to hear it as soon as counsel can prepare briefs and be ready for argument.
. Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. 13, 21, 19 L.Ed. 541; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371, 21 L.Ed. 287; United States v. Simmons, C.C., 47 F. 575, 14 L.R.A. 78; United States v. Lee, D.C., 170 F. 613; Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 2 Cr., 69 F.2d 78, 81, 91 A.L.R. 885; United States v. Caligiuri, D.C., 35 F.Supp. 799, 801; State ex rel. Howell v. Schiele, 85 Ohio App. 362, 88 N.E. 215. Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, was a civil case and the language at page 575, 32 S.Ct. 599, at page 600, 56 L.Ed. 889, on which the defendant relies is not applicable.
. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542.

Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.
A. not ascertained
B. male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
C. male - assumed because of name
D. female - indication in opinion of gender
E. female - assumed because of name
Answer:

Answer: C