Task: songer_appel1_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of appellant’s application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A two-count indictment charged appellant with assault on an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and with destruction of government property valued at more than $100 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. A jury found him guilty on each count, and on March 17, 1966, he was sentenced to three-year concurrent terms.
The first claim is that the court improperly denied a motion for continuance of the trial. At his arraignment on January 14, 1966, appellant appeared with retained counsel and pleaded not guilty. The court announced that the trial would be held during the next jury term and no objection was made thereto. On February 28, appellant appeared in court and said that he was discharging his counsel and would obtain new counsel. The court told him that he should get new counsel immediately because the case was going to trial. On March 1, the court set the case for trial on March 9 and instructed the United States Attorney to advise the lawyer whom appellant had indicated he would employ. On March 9, the appellant appeared in court without a lawyer and asked that counsel be appointed. The court said that in anticipation of such a request he had asked attorney Mills to discuss the case with appellant and to be in court. Mills said that he had discussed the case with appellant and would undertake the appointment. When the case came on for trial on March 14, Mills announced that the defense was ready and then filed a motion for continuance on the ground of inadequate time to prepare and inability to secure a witness. The showing was insufficient under our decision in Leino v. United States, 10 Cir., 338 F.2d 154, 156. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. See Smith v. United States, 10 Cir., 273 F.2d 462, 466, cert. denied 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1619, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729, and Brooks v. United States, 10 Cir., 330 F. 2d 757, 758, cert. denied 379 U.S. 852, 85 S.Ct. 100, 13 L.Ed.2d 56.
Appellant says that he was denied a direct appeal from his conviction. He was sentenced on March 17, 1966, with the sentence to begin at the expiration of a state sentence. Two days later he was turned over to the state authorities as an escapee. He was kept in solitary confinement for six months. On October 2, 1967, over a year later, he filed a “Motion for Appeal” wherein he alleges that on the day of sentence he gave an oral notice of appeal. The transcript of the sentencing proceedings shows no such oral notice. No claim is made of lack of knowledge of right to appeal. No showing is made to satisfy the “plain error test” which justifies consideration of a notice of appeal which is filed out of time. See Fennell v. United States, 10 Cir., 339 F.2d 920, 923, cert. denied 382 U.S. 852, 86 S.Ct. 100, 15 L.Ed.2d 90. The claimed error is the denial of the continuance and we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in that regard.
The appellant made two requests for a free trial transcript. One was made five months before the § 2255 motion was filed and the other more than four weeks after the motion was denied. When the case came to this court, we ordered and received copies of the portions of the transcript which we deemed pertinent. In the circumstances, the denial of the transcripts was not error. See Prince v. United States, 10 Cir., 312 F. 2d 252, 253.
Appellant filed a motion under Rule 35, F.R.Crim.P., asking that he be given credit for time spent in pre-sentence confinement. It was denied and no appeal was taken. On this appeal from the denial of the § 2255 motion the point is raised, but it was not raised in the § 2255 proceedings before the district court. Accordingly, the point is not properly before us for review. Tyler v. United States, 10 Cir., 361 F.2d 862, 864. In any event, the point is of no avail. Sentence was passed before the 1966 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3568. The pertinent statutes do not provide for a mandatory minimum sentence. The court imposed identical concurrent terms which were well within the statutory máximums. The denial by the trial court of credit for pre-sentence confinement was within its power.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: A