Task: songer_appel1_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

HILL, Circuit Judge:
This case arises out of the entry of conflicting child custody decrees by the Florida and Washington state courts. In 1980 Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (hereinafter “the PKPA”), P.L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 178A (1982), in an attempt to provide at least a limited federal response to the serious social and legal problems engendered by the availability and entry of conflicting child custody orders by the courts of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (1982). By setting forth uniform jurisdictional standards applicable to all states in child custody matters, the PKPA seeks both to reduce the likelihood that a jurisdictional conflict between states will lead to the entry of inconsistent decrees and to resolve those conflicts that do arise. Under the PKPA, only one state at a time may assert jurisdiction to issue or modify a child custody decree, and a custody order issued in accordance with the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA is enforceable anywhere in the United States. In the PKPA however, Congress did not expressly provide a federal forum for the resolution of the interstate jurisdictional disputes to which it was addressed. In this case we must determine whether, despite the absence of express authorization in the PKPA, a private party may prosecute an action in federal district court to resolve an interstate conflict implicating the jurisdictional requirements set forth in that legislation. The district court in this case held that a parent could successfully maintain an action in federal district court to obtain a declaratory judgment that would determine which of two conflicting state court custody orders was issued in accordance with the jurisdictional prerequisites of the PKPA. We agree.
FACTS
On June 1, 1979, the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Florida entered a divorce decree dissolving the marriage of appellant Vivian Jenson (then Vivian McDougald) (hereinafter referred to as “the mother”) and appellee Gary McDougald (hereinafter referred to as “the father”). The divorce decree provided that the couple’s son, Jeri-my, who was then three years old, would live with each parent for alternating six month periods for the next three and one-half years. Once Jerimy reached school age, his mother was to have custody of him during the school year, with the father receiving summer visitation rights. In accordance with the custody provisions of the decree, Jerimy lived with his father from June 23, 1979 through December 23, 1979, and then from June 23, 1980 through late December of that year. Jerimy and his father lived in Blountstown, Calhoun County, Florida through all of the first six month period and most of the second one. Some time in November of 1980, the father and Jerimy then moved to Dothan, Alabama, a town located approximately 70 miles from Blountstown and about 20 miles from the Florida state line. Jerimy returned to his mother in Washington at the end of his second six month stay with his father.
On or about February 26, 1981, the father filed a petition for modification of the original custody decree in the Calhoun County Circuit Court. The Florida court set a hearing for May 15, 1981, and the modification petition and a notice of hearing were served on the mother in Washington. Soon after she was served with the Florida petition and notice, the mother filed a petition for modification in the Superior Court of Pierce County, Washington. The Washington court immediately entered a temporary restraining order and initiated communications with the Florida court, resulting in a stay of the Washington proceedings and a continuance of the Florida hearing. A hearing was eventually held in Blountstown, Florida on August 14, 1981, before the same judge who had entered the 1979 divorce and custody decree.
Both parents appeared personally before the court in Florida and testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Florida judge ruled from the bench that primary custody should be awarded to the mother, with the father enjoying summer and holiday visitation rights. Before the court’s order was reduced to writing and entered, however, the father filed a motion for rehearing, and the matter was set for further hearing on October 9, 1981. At that hearing, the mother’s Florida attorney was permitted to withdraw, and the mother was directed to secure new counsel before the next hearing. The next hearing was held on December 11,1981, but the mother did not attend, nor was she represented by counsel. On January 5, 1982, the Florida court issued a written Order of Modification, in which it reversed its earlier ruling from the bench and awarded primary custody of Jerimy to the father, with the mother receiving summer and holiday visitation rights.
After the Florida court’s October hearing the mother renewed her efforts to secure a modification of the original Florida custody decree in Washington. On November 21, 1981, the mother filed a memorandum regarding jurisdiction in the Washington court. After the December hearing in Florida, but before the Florida court had issued its written order, the Washington court contacted the Florida court, contending that Washington had the better claim to jurisdiction over the case and noting that a hearing was set for January 20, 1982 on that and other issues. The Florida court responded with a copy of its written order of January 5 and a letter setting forth its view of the case. The father filed an objection to the Washington court’s assertion of jurisdiction and was represented by Washington counsel in the Washington proceedings.
The Washington court held a hearing and, on May 20, 1982, ruled that it had jurisdiction over the matter. The court set a custody hearing and ordered that Jerimy remain in the custody of his mother during the pendency of the Washington proceedings. The Washington court subsequently awarded primary custody of Jerimy to his mother, with four week summer visitation rights to the father. Pursuant to that arrangement, the Washington court permitted the father to take Jerimy to Florida in July of 1982.
Apparently relying on the Florida custody order, the father did not return Jerimy to his mother at the end of the summer. Relying on the contrary Washington court orders, the mother and her father (appellant Clarence Ehli) retrieved Jerimy from Florida on April 14,1983 and took him back to Washington. Arrest warrants were issued for the mother and grandfather, who were charged with abducting Jerimy with the intent to remove him from the jurisdiction of the Florida courts.
In July of 1983 the Washington court granted the father an' order to show cause why the Washington court should not restore the custody and visitation provisions of the original 1979 Florida divorce decree. On October 28, 1983 the Washington court entered an order essentially restoring the parties to the position they were in before the father sought the modification he was eventually granted in Florida. The mother was awarded primary custody of Jerimy, with the father enjoying summer visitation rights. On January 6, 1984, the father moved to vacate the Washington orders on the basis of the supremacy and full faith and credit clauses of the United States Constitution, as well as on jurisdictional grounds. That motion was denied on February 10, 1984.
On February 23, 1984, the father filed this action in federal district court. The father’s amended complaint stated four separate claims. Named as defendants were the mother, the grandfather, and a Washington state court judge who was involved in the proceedings in that state. In Count I, the father named as defendants the mother and the Washington judge and sought damages and other relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Naming the mother as defendant, Count II sought enforcement of the Florida state court order of modification on the basis of constitutional principles of full faith and credit, alleging diversity as the basis for jurisdiction. Count III sought damages in tort from the mother and the grandfather for the alleged kidnapping of the child. Naming the Washington judge and the mother as defendants, Count IV sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the provisions of the PKPA that are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), alleging both federal question and diversity jurisdiction.
On the father’s motion for summary judgment, the district court granted the Washington state court judge's motion to dismiss the father’s claims against him in their entirety for lack of personal jurisdiction. McDougald v. Jenson, 596 F.Supp. at 684. The court dismissed Count I of the amended complaint, the father’s section 1983 claim against the mother, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. The court dismissed Count II, seeking enforcement of the Florida decree, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Id. at 685. Dismissing Count III, the court found that the father’s allegations of “child-snatching” did not constitute an actionable tort under Florida law, and that the court lacked diversity jurisdiction over such a claim if one existed under state law. Id. On Count IV, however, the court granted declaratory relief, finding that the Florida order of modification was entered consistently with the provisions of section 1738A and was therefore entitled to enforcement according to its terms. Id. at 685-89. The father had also moved for a preliminary injunction, which was denied. Id. at 689. The court’s declaratory judgment was ordered on September 26, 1984 and filed the next day. On October 29, 1984 the district court issued a supplemental order clarifying its previous order and denying the mother’s motion to stay the execution of any proceedings to enforce the court's judgment.
The mother failed to deliver Jerimy immediately to the father. On Thursday, November 15, the father filed an emergency motion for an injunction in the district court, seeking immediate custody of Jeri-my. Late that afternoon the court entered a temporary restraining order (hereinafter “the TRO”) requiring the mother to deliver Jerimy to the father by noon the next day. The mother was enjoined from taking any further action in the Washington courts that was inconsistent with, or contrary to, the district court’s earlier order. The mother was also ordered to appear personally before the court the following Monday to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court.
The mother delivered Jerimy to the father as ordered and filed a timely notice of appeal from the declaratory judgment and the TRO. After the notice of appeal had been filed, the mother and the father entered into a stipulation requesting the district court to dissolve its show cause order and enter a permanent injunction awarding custody to the father. The stipulation expressly reserved all appellate rights either party might enjoy with respect to any such orders. The district court approved the stipulation, dissolved the TRO, and entered a permanent injunction directing the mother to comply with the Florida court’s 1982 modification order, as modified by that court or any other court with jurisdiction to modify such a decree pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). The mother filed no notice of appeal from the order entering the permanent injunction.
The father filed a timely notice of cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s dismissal of Counts I, II, and III. By agreement of the parties, the appeal against the Washington state court judge has been dismissed. The father has filed a motion to dismiss the mother’s appeal. That motion has been carried with the case and decided on this appeal.
DISCUSSION
We consider the father’s motion to dismiss the mother’s appeal in Part I below.
In Part II, we address the remaining issues presented by the mother’s appeal. In Part III, we resolve the claims raised on the father's cross-appeal.
I. THE FATHER’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE MOTHER’S APPEAL
In support of his motion to dismiss the mother’s appeal in its entirety, the father makes the following three arguments. First, the father argues, a TRO is not appealable, and even if the instant TRO is characterized as an injunction, the appeal therefrom is moot, since the order expired by its terms on November 21, 1984. Further, the father argues, any such preliminary order must be considered to have merged with the final permanent injunction order, so that appeal is proper only from the order of permanent injunction. Second, the father argues, this court lacks jurisdiction over the mother’s claims as they relate to the permanent injunction because she agreed to the terms of the injunction in a signed stipulation, and because she never filed or intended to file a notice of appeal from the permanent injunction. Third, the father argues, the mother’s appeal from the declaratory judgment is moot because even if this court were to reverse that judgment, the permanent injunction, from which no appeal has been or can be taken, would remain in effect granting custody of Jerimy to the father. As a result, the father concludes, any ruling this court made on the declaratory judgment action would be purely advisory.
In response to the father’s first argument above, the mother claims the order labeled a TRO was instead an injunction commanding her to perform an affirmative act and, as such, is appealable. If the order is characterized as a TRO, the mother urges us to exercise our inherent power to review an otherwise unreviewable order under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). She also argues that an appeal from the TRO should be allowed regardless of the expiration of the order by its terms because the order resulted in irreparable harm that is capable of repetition.
Regarding the permanent injunction, the mother argues that the stipulation she entered into agreeing to the terms of the injunction should not be held to constitute consent to the entry of such an order. Rather, the mother claims she never consented to the entry of the injunction and that she only agreed to the terms of the order to provide a stable environment for Jerimy for the duration of this legal battle. In support of this construction of the stipulation, the mother notes that the stipulation by its terms provided as follows:
The parties hereto agree that this document is entered into without prejudice to the appellate rights of either side and does not constitute a waiver of objection to the propriety of the Court’s Orders herein in any fashion.
The mother argues on this appeal that the permanent injunction must be reversed because it was “fundamental error” for the district court to enter the injunction eight days after the mother’s notice of appeal from the preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment had been filed, which the mother argues had the effect of divesting the district court of further jurisdiction to enter such an order in the case. The mother also argues that where, as here, a prenotice of appeal preliminary injunction has been appealed, the appeal should ■ be deemed taken also from any post-notice permanent injunction that should not have been entered.
In response to the father’s third argument above, the mother argues that her appeal from.the declaratory judgment is not moot even if the permanent injunction is not properly before this court because if we reverse the declaratory judgment, she can subsequently move to set aside the permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides, inter alia, that “the court may relieve a party... from a final judgment, order or proceeding... [because] a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”
We conclude that the mother’s appeal from the TRO entered in this case, whether denominated a TRO or a preliminary injunction, is not properly before the court. It is well settled in this circuit that a TRO is not ordinarily appealable. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429 (11th Cir.1982); Nelson v. Rosenthal, 539 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.1976); Chandler v. Garrison, 394 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.1967). The mother argues that, because the TRO was in reality a short-lived mandatory injunction commanding her to perform an affirmative act, it is appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We agree that the label placed on an order such as the one entered in this case is not dispositive of its nature and appealability under section 1292(a)(1). “A district court, if it were able to shield its orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunctive proceeding.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-87, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). When determining whether to consider an order a TRO or a preliminary injunction, however, courts typically look to such factors as the duration of the order, whether it was issued after notice and a hearing, and the showing made to obtain the order. See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 708 (4th ed. 1983). The lengthier the duration of the order, and the more stringent the procedural safeguards employed in the district court, the more likely a TRO will be considered a preliminary injunction. See e.g., Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir.1965). An examination of those considerations in this case strongly suggests that the order entered and labeled a TRO should not be considered a permanent injunction for purposes of this appeal.
Militating in favor of the appealability of the TRO entered in this case, however, is “a slowly emerging doctrine that temporary restraining order rulings may be appealable as interlocutory injunction orders if the appellant can disprove the general presumption that there is no irreparable harm.” 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper and E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3922, at 37 (1977). Thus it has been suggested that “if the TRO goes beyond simply preserving the opportunity to grant affirmative relief and actually grants affirmative relief, an appeal may be taken.” Id. See Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C.Cir.1978); Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir.1970); Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 420 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir.1970).
In the context of this case, the consequences of the district court’s order were such that an immediate appeal of the TRO may well have been appropriate. The mother had not yet filed a notice of appeal from the court’s declaratory judgment when the TRO was issued, but an appeal was still available and was taken with her appeal from the TRO. Thus the possibility remained that the district court would be found by this court to lack the legal authority to issue an injunction ordering delivery of Jerimy from his mother in Washington to his father in Florida. Alternatively, the court may have been found to lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case at all. In either event, the district court may have been unable to remedy the obviously severe harm to the mother’s interest occasioned by the physical transfer of Jerimy from Washington, where she retained custody of the child pursuant to a state court judgment apparently enforceable in state court there, to Florida, where the father could enforce a state court decree granting custody to him. In light of the uncertain state of the law concerning the district court’s ability to remedy the effects of its order if it turned out to be in error, an immediate appeal prior to the carrying out of its terms may have been necessary to protect the rights of the mother and therefore appropriate under the circumstances.
Any such appeal from the TRO, however, has since been rendered moot. The mother delivered Jerimy to the father, the TRO expired by its terms, and a permanent injunction was subsequently entered ordering compliance with the Florida decree, as modified consistently with the provisions of section 1738A. Thus any finding that the district court issued the TRO without the legal authority to do so, without subject matter jurisdiction over the case, or otherwise erroneously could have no practical or legal effect. We have held that once a permanent injunction is entered, any similar prior preliminary injunction merges into the permanent order, and appeal is proper only from the order of permanent injunction. Securities Exchange Commission v. First Financial Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.1981). See also Payne v. Fite, 184 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1950). To the extent that a TRO might have been appealable but has been replaced by a permanent injunction, that principle is applicable to determine the appealability of the TRO as well. Here no appeal was taken from the order of permanent injunction and, as we indicate below, that order is therefore not properly before us at this time. Further, in light of our resolution of the issues raised by the mother’s appeal from the declaratory judgment entered by the district court, we do not find compelling the mother’s argument that the TRO should be reviewed in spite of its mootness because some future irreparable harm might otherwise result. We thus dismiss the mother’s appeal from the TRO as moot.
We also cannot exercise our appellate jurisdiction over the permanent injunction entered by the district court in this case. We are aware of the general rule that litigants may not appeal injunctions to which they have agreed. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 614 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.1980). Under the circumstances of this case, however, we choose not to rest our refusal to hear the mother’s claims concerning the propriety of the permanent injunction on this principle. Rather, we find her failure to file a timely notice of appeal from the permanent injunction to leave us without jurisdiction over that order on this appeal. The permanent injunction had not been entered when the mother filed her only notice of appeal in this case; the notice of appeal thus made no reference to the permanent injunction at all. Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from.” Ordinarily, failure to abide this requirement will preclude the appellate court from reviewing any judgment or order not so specified. Pitney Bowes v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1375 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893, 104 S.Ct. 239, 78 L.Ed.2d 230 (1983).
We have previously noted that “it is well settled that an appeal is not lost if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal.” Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 739 n. 1 (5th Cir.1980). This has resulted in the liberal allowance of appeals from orders not expressly designated in the notice of appeal, at least where the order that was not designated was entered prior to or contemporaneously with the order(s) properly designated in the notice of appeal. See e.g., Comfort Trane Air Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1390 n. 15 (5th Cir.1979). In this case, however, we cannot find the mother to have intended her notice of appeal to constitute an appeal from the order of permanent injunction, as that order had not yet been entered when her notice of appeal was filed. Because the intent to appeal is not apparent, review of the permanent injunction on the merits at this time would likely result in prejudice to the father, who has not briefed any non-jurisdictional issues relating solely to the permanent injunction on this appeal. We therefore decline to review the propriety of the permanent injunction entered by the district court on this appeal. See C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 974, 71 L.Ed.2d 112 (1981).
Finally, we conclude that the mother’s timely appeal from the declaratory judgment entered by the district court is properly before us and that it is not rendered moot by her failure to appeal from the order entering a permanent injunction to replace the TRO. The appeal cannot be considered moot simply because further action will be required on remand before our decision can have any practical effect. It is clear that no impediment to obtaining further relief consistent with our decision will exist on remand, regardless of our decision. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5). Thus our decision is no more advisory than the decision of any other declaratory judgment action, and we reject the father’s argument to the contrary.
II. THE MOTHER’S APPEAL
The mother raises a number of claims, several of which are unrelated to the PKPA, in her challenge to the district court’s order on summary judgment granting declaratory judgment in favor of the father on Count IV of his amended complaint. We will consider the issues the mother raises that involve the PKPA, as codified in section 1738A, in parts II.A arid II.B below. In part II.C we will address the claims she raises that do not concern the federal statute.
A. The Availability of Federal Relief
Raising an issue of first impression in this circuit, the mother argues strenuously on this appeal that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the father’s claims under section 1738A. Alternatively, the mother contends, the father’s claims concerning section 1738A fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have held that the federal district courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over complaints seeking to enforce compliance with the dictates of section 1738A. See Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1985); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984). According to those courts, section 1738A vests in a parent a federal right, enforceable in federal district court, to have a custody determination made in one state in accordance with the terms of section 1738A enforced in other states as the statute provides. Although our analysis differs somewhat, we also hold that an action seeking an authoritative federal construction of section 1738A to resolve a conflict concerning the validity of conflicting state court custody orders may be maintained in federal district court.
The operative provisions of the PKPA, as codified, impose upon the appropriate state authorities the following obligations:
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms... any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). The statute also provides detailed federal standards, carefully tailored to the national problem to which the statute responds, for use in determining state court jurisdiction to enter or modify a custody decree, and thus for determining which of two conflicting state court custody orders is the valid one under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)-(f) (1982).
There can be little doubt that Congress contemplated that one parent would be permitted to enforce compliance with the dictates of the PKPA, as codified in section 1738A, in a private action against the other parent. Parties have traditionally determined the validity and enforceability of child custody orders in just such a manner, and we cannot conclude that Congress intended or expected that the validity and enforceability of a custody order under section 1738A would be determined any other way. Rather, the questions raised by the mother on this appeal are (1) the availability of a federal forum — that is, federal jurisdiction — and (2) the availability of the federal remedy obtained in this case — that is, a judgment declaring the rights of the parties under federal law.
1. Subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint.
The father sued for and was granted a declaratory judgment in this case. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1982), a party may obtain from a federal district court a judicial declaration of his or her rights under federal law. It has long been recognized, however, that “the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). The Supreme Court explained the jurisdictional implications of that observation in its opinion in the leading case of Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950), as follows:
[By enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act,] Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, “jurisdiction” means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act____ The Declaratory Judgment Act allow[s] relief to be given.by way of recognizing the plaintiff’s right even though no immediate enforcement of it [is] asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction — the limited subject matters which alone Congress has authorized the District Courts to adjudicate — were not impliedly repealed or modified.”
Id. at 671-72, 70 S.Ct. at 878-79. Thus, “if the federal issue [presented in a declaratory judgment action] would inhere in the claim on the face of the complaint that would have been presented in a traditional damage or coercive action, then federal jurisdiction exists over the declaratory judgment action.” 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2767, at 745 (2d ed. 1983); see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974). If, however, the federal issue would necessarily arise only as an ingredient of the defense of such an action, federal jurisdiction will be denied. See Shelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 672, 70 S.Ct. at 879. See also Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2851-53, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). As a result, the district court cannot be held to possess subject matter jurisdiction over the father’s claim for a declaratory judgment determining his rights under section 1738A unless the court would also have jurisdiction to entertain his claim for injunctive relief.
In Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, the Third Circuit held that a federal district court could exercise its federal subject matter jurisdiction to entertain such suits. In Flood, a New Jersey state court had awarded custody to the mother, while a North Dakota court had awarded custody to the father. Each court refused to enforce the custody order entered by the other. The mother brought an action in federal district court in New Jersey to enforce the New Jersey custody decree. The circuit court found the district court to have erred when it summarily dismissed the mother’s complaint for failure to state a basis for federal jurisdiction.
The Flood, court first discussed the “domestic relations exception” to diversity jurisdiction, see Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1859), finding it inapplicable to a case in which a well-pleaded complaint has otherwise made out a substantial ease for federal question jurisdiction. Flood, 727 F.2d at 307. See generally 13B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3609 (2d ed. 1984). Further, the court found the principles underlying the reluctance of federal courts to enforce custody decrees under the full faith and credit statute to be inapposite, since adjudicating a dispute under section 1738A would not require the court to become enmeshed in the underlying custody suit in the manner in which a straightforward enforcement action would. The court would not have to inquire into whether, as a matter of state law, some modification of the decree was appropriate, but would instead only have to inquire into the jurisdictional facts that would determine which of two states rendering conflicting custody decrees had asserted jurisdiction over the controversy in conformity with federal law. Id. at 309-310. Finally, the circuit court examined the legislative history of section 1738A in an effort to determine whether Congress intended federal courts to possess jurisdiction to enforce compliance with its provisions. See id. at 310-12. After extended analysis the court concluded that Congress must have intended the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to extend to such actions, as any other result would “render § 1738A virtually nugatory by so restricting the availability of a federal forum that state compliance with the legislation would become optional.” Id. at 312.
In Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, the Fifth Circuit also found that “where courts of two different states assert jurisdiction over a custody determination, federal district court intervention is proper and in fact necessary to enforce compliance with § 1738A.” Id. at 1141. In that case the father filed suit in federal district court in Texas seeking an injunction to restrain the mother from obtaining a modification of the custody and visitation provisions of a Texas divorce decree in Louisiana. The father brought his action under section 1738A, alleging federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1982). The father was successful in obtaining the injunction, and the mother appealed. Agreeing with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Flood, the Fifth Circuit panel found federal question jurisdiction to exist over an action under section 1738A. Id. at 1140-41. The Heartfield court further agreed with the district court that, under section 1738A, Texas could exercise continuing exclusive jurisdiction to issue visitation and child support orders in the underlying custody and visitation dispute. Id. at 1141-43. The court held, however, that the injunction issued by the district court should not have been entered, as no confrontation between the Texas and Louisiana courts had yet occurred. Injunctive relief under section 1738A was therefore considered by the court to have been premature. Id. at 1143.
In this case, the father has alleged the federal question jurisdiction conferred in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a jurisdictional basis for the federal court’s exercise of its authority. Because we are not being asked to imply a grant of federal jurisdiction in section 1738A, we need not conduct an exhaustive inquiry into the intent of Congress in passing the PKPA. Where federal question jurisdiction does not already exist pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: A