Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

MR. Justice Harlan
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart.
In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, and Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, this Court held that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that both had been created by virtue of other, substantive, powers possessed by Congress under Article I. The Congress has since pronounced its disagreement by providing as to each that “such court is hereby declared to be a court established under article III of the Constitution of the United States.” The petitioners in these cases invite us to reaffirm the authority of our earlier decisions, and thus hold for naught these congressional pronouncements, at least as sought to be applied to judges appointed prior to their enactment.
No. 242 is a suit brought by individual employees in a New York state court to recover damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and removed to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York by the defendant employer on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The employees’ right to recover was sustained by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge J. Warren Madden, then an active judge of the Court of Claims sitting by designation of the Chief Justice of the United States under 28 U. S. C. § 293 (a). No. 481 is a criminal prosecution instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and resulting in a conviction for armed robbery. The trial was presided over by Judge Joseph R. Jackson, a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals sitting by similar designation. The petitioner’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals in forma pauperis, respecting the validity of this designation and alleged trial errors, was upheld by this Court last Term, 366 U. S. 712; we are now asked to review the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of his conviction. Because of the significance of the “designation” issue for the federal judicial system, we granted certiorari in the two cases, 368 U. S. 814, 815, limited to the question whether the judgment in either was vitiated by the respective participation of the judges named.
The claim advanced by the petitioners, that they were denied the protection of judges with tenure and compensation guaranteed by Article III, has nothing to do with the manner in which either of these judges conducted himself in these proceedings. No contention is made that either Judge Madden or Judge Jackson displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence, or that either sought by his rulings to curry favor with Congress or the Executive. Both indeed enjoy statutory assurance of tenure and compensation, and were it not for the explicit provisions of Article III we should be quite unable to say that either judge’s participation even colorably denied the petitioners independent judicial hearings.
Article III, § 1, however, is explicit and gives the petitioners a basis for complaint without requiring them to point to particular instances of mistreatment in the record. It provides:
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”
Apart from this provision, it is settled that neither the tenure nor salary of federal officers is constitutionally protected from impairment by Congress. Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 107-108; cf. Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416-418. The statutory declaration, therefore, that the judges of these two courts should serve during good behavior and with undiminished salary, see note 5, supra, was ineffective to bind any subsequent Congress unless those judges were invested at appointment with the protections of Article III. United States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, 145; see McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 186. And the petitioners naturally point to the Bakelite and Williams cases, supra, as establishing that no such constitutional protection was in fact conferred.
The distinction referred to in those cases between “constitutional” and “legislative” courts has been productive of much confusion and controversy. Because of the highly theoretical nature of the problem in its present context, we would be well advised to decide these cases on narrower grounds if any are fairly available. But for reasons that follow, we find ourselves unable to do so.
I.
No challenge to the authority of the judges was filed in the course of the proceedings before them in either case. The Solicitor General, who submitted briefs and arguments for the United States, has seized upon this circumstance to suggest that the petitioners should be precluded by the so-called de facto doctrine from questioning the validity of these designations for the first time on appeal.
Whatever may be the rule when a judge’s authority is challenged at the earliest practicable moment, as it was in United States v. American-Foreign S. S. Corp., 363 U. S. 685, in other circumstances involving judicial authority this Court has described it as well settled “that where there is an office to be filled and one acting under color of authority fills the office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer de facto and binding upon the public.” McDowell v. United States, 159 U. S. 596, 602. The rule is founded upon an obviously sound policy of preventing litigants from abiding the outcome of a lawsuit and then overturning it if adverse upon a technicality of which they were previously aware. Although a United States Attorney may be permitted on behalf of the public to upset an order issued upon defective authority, Frad v. Kelly, 302 U. S. 312, a private litigant ordinarily may not. Ball v. United States, 140 U. S. 118, 128-129.
The rule does not obtain, of course, when the alleged defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U. S. 132 (three-judge court); United States v. Emholt, 105 U. S. 414 (certificate of divided opinion). In other circumstances as well, when the statute claimed to restrict authority is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy concerning the proper administration of judicial business, this Court has treated the alleged defect as “jurisdictional” and agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the earliest practicable opportunity. E. g., American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U. S. 372, 387-388.
A fortiori is this so when the challenge is based upon nonfrivolous constitutional grounds. In McDowell v. United States itself, supra, at 598-599, the Court, while, holding that any defect in statutory authorization for a particular intracircuit assignment was immunized from examination by the de facto doctrine, specifically passed upon and upheld the constitutional authority of Congress to provide for such an assignment. And in Lamar v. United States, 241 U. S. 103, 117-118, the claim that an intercircuit assignment violated the criminal venue restrictions of the Sixth Amendment and usurped the presidential appointing power under Art. II, § 2, was heard here and determined upon its merits, despite the fact that it had not been raised in the District Court or in the Court of Appeals or even in this Court until the filing of a supplemental brief upon a second request for review.
The alleged defect of authority here relates to basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 532-534. It should be examinable at least on direct review, where its consideration encounters none of the objections associated with the principle of res judicata, that there be an end to litigation. At the most is weighed in opposition the disruption to sound appellate process entailed by entertaining objections not raised below, and that is plainly insufficient to overcome the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of powers. So this Court has con-eluded on an analogous balance struck to protect against intruding federal jurisdiction into the area constitutionally reserved to the States: Whether diversity of citizenship exists may be questioned on direct review for the first time in this Court. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382; City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 277 U. S. 54, 59. We hold that it is similarly open to these petitioners to challenge the constitutional authority of the judges below.
II.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found it unnecessary to reach the question whether Judge Jackson enjoyed constitutional security of tenure and compensation. It held that even if he did not, Congress might authorize his assignment to courts in the District of Columbia, by virtue of its power “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over the District. Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The Solicitor General, in support of that ruling, argues here that because the criminal charge against petitioner Lurk was violation of a local statute, D. C. Code, 1961, § 22^2901, rather than of one national in application, its trial did not require the assignment of an Article III judge.
The question thus raised is itself of constitutional dimension, and one which we need not reach if an Article III judge was in fact assigned. In the companion case, No. 242, the necessity for such a judge is uncontested. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sat to determine a question of state contract law presented for its decision solely by reason of the diverse citizenship of the litigants. Authority for the Federal Government to decide questions of state law exists only by virtue of the Diversity Clause in Article III. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64; see Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 284. For this reason, the question whether Judge Madden enjoyed constitutional independence is inescapably presented. Since decision of that question involves considerations bearing directly upon the constitutional status of Judge Jackson, we deem it appropriate to dispose of both cases on the same grounds, without at present intimating any view as to the correctness of the holding below by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
III.
The next question is whether the character of the judges who sat in these cases may be determined without reference to the character of the courts to which they were originally appointed. If it were plain that these judges were invested upon confirmation with Article III tenure and compensation, it would be unnecessary for present purposes to consider the constitutional status of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
No such course, however, appears to be open. The statutes under which Judge Madden and Judge Jackson were appointed speak of service only on those courts. 28 U. S. C. §§ 171, 211. They were not, as were the judges selected for the late Commerce Court, appointed as “additional circuit judges,” Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 540, whose tenure might be constitutionally secured regardless of the fortunes of their courts. See 50 Cong. Rec. 5409-5418 (1913); Donegan v. Dyson, 269 U. S. 49; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court (1927), 168-173. It is true that at the time of Judge Jackson’s appointment there was in force a statute authorizing assignment of Court of Customs and Patent Appeals judges to serve on the courts of the District of Columbia. Act of September 14, 1922, c. 306, § 5, 42 Stat. 837, 839. At that time, however, before the O’Donoghue decision, there seems to have been a consensus that the courts of the District were not confined or protected by Article III; as late as 1930, this Court regarded it as “recognized that the courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the Constitution but are legislative courts....” Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 468; and see Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 894, 899-903 (1930). The 1922 Act cannot therefore be viewed ex proprio vigore as conferring Article III status on judges subsequently appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
A more novel suggestion is that the assignment statute itself, 28 U. S. C. §§ 291-296, authorized the Chief Justice to appoint inferior Article III judges in the course of designating them for service on Article III courts. See Shartel, Federal Judges — Appointment, Supervision, and Removal — Some Possibilities under the Constitution, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485 (1930); cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 397-398; Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 378. But we need not consider the constitutional questions involved in this suggestion, for the statute does not readily lend itself to such a construction. If nothing else, the authority given the Chief Justice in 28 U. S. C. § 295 to revoke assignments previously made is wholly inconsistent with a reading of the statute as empowering him to appoint inferior Article III judges. Judges assigned by the Chief Justice who are not previously endowed with constitutional security of tenure and compensation thus can gain nothing by the designation.
It is significant that Congress did not enact the present broad assignment statute until after it had declared the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to be constitutional courts. Act of August 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 848. A major purpose of these declarations was to eliminate uncertainty whether regular Article III judges might be assigned to assist in the business of those courts when disability or disqualification made it difficult for them to obtain a quorum. Those doubts, suggested by dicta in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 460, would be expanded rather than allayed were we to hold that the judges of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals enjoy the protections of Article III while leaving at large the status of those courts. For these various reasons, the constitutional quality of tenure and compensation extended Judges Madden and Jackson at the time of their confirmation must be deemed to have depended upon the constitutional status of the courts to which they were primarily appointed.
IV.
In determining the constitutional character of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, as we are thus led to do, we may not disregard Congress’ declaration that they were created under Article III. Of course, Congress may not by fiat overturn the constitutional decisions of this Court, but the legislative history of the 1953 and 1958 declarations makes plain that it was far from attempting any such thing. Typical is a statement in the 1958 House Report that the purpose of the legislation was to “declare which of the powers Congress was intending to exercise when the court was created.” H. R. Rep. No. 2349, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958); accord, H. R. Rep. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5, 7 (1953); and see S. Rep. No. 275, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953), substituted for S. Rep. No. 261, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953); 99 Cong. Rec. 8943, 8944 (1953) (remarks of Senator Gore).
“Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law,” this Court has noted, “is not, of course, conclusive in determining w'hat the previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction.” Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90; accord, New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Peninsula Exchange, 240 U. S. 34, 39. Especially is this so when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate the historical materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary conclusion. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 235-237. As examination of the House and Senate Reports makes evident, that is what occurred here. E. g., S. Rep. No. 2309, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958); H. R. Rep. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1953).
At the time when Bakelite and Williams were decided, the Court did not have the benefit of this congressional understanding. The Williams case, for example, arose under the Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932, c. 314, § 107 (a)(5), 47 Stat. 382, 402, which reduced the salary of all judges “except judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office.” Mr. Justice Sutherland, who wrote the Court’s opinions in both Williams and O’Don-oghue, was plainly disadvantaged by the absence of congressional intimation as to which judges of which courts were to be deemed exempted. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516, 529.
In the Bakelite case, to be sure, Mr. Justice Van De-vanter said of an argument drawn from tenuous evidence of congressional understanding that it “mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred.” 279 U. S., at 459. Yet he would hardly have denied that explicit evidence of legislative intendment concerning the factors he thought controlling may be relevant and indeed highly persuasive. In any event, the Bakelite dictum did not embarrass the Court in deciding O’Donoghue, where it looked searchingly at “congressional practice” to determine what classification that body “recognizes.” 289 U. S., at 548-550. We think the forthright statement of understanding embraced in the 1953 and 1958 declarations may be taken as similarly persuasive evidence for the problem now before us.
To give due weight to these congressional declarations is not of course to compromise the authority or responsibility of this Court as the ultimate expositor of the Constitution. The Bakelite and Williams decisions have long been considered of questionable soundness. See, e. g., Brown, The Rent in Our Judicial Armor, 10 G. W. L. Rev. 127 (1941); Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953), 348-351; 1 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1961), 71 n. 21. They stand uneasily next to O’Donoghue, much of whose reasoning in sustaining the Article III status of the District of Columbia superior courts seems applicable to the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1, 13-14, where the Solicitor General argued at length against the continued vitality of Bakelite and Williams, their authority was regarded as an open question.
Furthermore, apart from this Court’s considered practice not to apply stare decisis as rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases, e. g., United States v. South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U. S. 771, 774-775; see Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405-408 and n. 1-3 (Brandéis, J., dissenting), there is the fact that Congress has acted on its understanding and has provided for assignment of judges who have made decisions that are now said to be impeachable. In these circumstances, the practical consideration underlying the doctrine of stare decisis — protection of generated expectations — actually militates in favor of reexamining the decisions. We are well-advised, therefore, to regard the questions decided in those cases as entirely open to reconsideration.
Y.
The Constitution nowhere makes reference to “legislative courts.” The power given Congress in Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, “To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,” plainly relates to the “inferior Courts” provided for in Art. Ill, § 1; it has never been relied on for establishment of any other tribunals.
The concept of a legislative court derives from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, dealing with courts established in a territory. A cargo of cotton salvaged from a wreck off the coast of Florida had been purchased by Canter at a judicial sale ordered by a court at Key West invested by the territorial legislature with jurisdiction over cases of salvage. The insurers, to whom the property in the cargo had been abandoned by the owners, brought a libel for restitution, claiming in part that the prior decree was void because not rendered in a court created by Congress, as required for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III. Chief Justice Marshall for the Court swept this objection aside by noting that the Superior Courts of Florida, which had been created by Congress, were staffed with judges appointed for only four years, and concluded that Article III did not apply in the territories:
“These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.” 1 Pet., at 546.
By these arresting observations the Chief Justice certainly did not mean to imply that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. Elsewhere in the opinion he distinctly referred to the provisions of Article III to show that it was such a case. 1 Pet., at 545. All the Chief Justice meant, and what the case has ever after been taken to establish, is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article; courts, that is, having judges of limited tenure and entertaining business beyond the range of conventional cases and controversies.
The reasons for this are not difficult to appreciate so long as the character of the early territories and some of the practical problems arising from their administration are kept in mind. The entire governmental responsibility in a territory where there was no state government to assume the burden of local regulation devolved upon the National Government. This meant that courts had to be established and staffed with sufficient judges to handle the general jurisdiction that elsewhere would have been exercised in large part by the courts of a State. But when the territories began entering into statehood, as they soon did, the authority of the territorial courts over matters of state concern ceased; and in a time when the size of the federal judiciary was still relatively small, that left the National Government with a significant number of territorial judges on its hands and no place to put them. When Florida was admitted as a State, for example, Congress replaced three territorial courts of general jurisdiction comprising five judges with one Federal District Court and one judge.
At the same time as the absence of a federal structure in the territories produced problems not foreseen by the Framers of Article III, the realities of territorial government typically made it less urgent that judges there enjoy the independence from Congress and the President envisioned by that article. For the territories were not ruled immediately from Washington; in a day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that they should be. Rather, Congress left municipal law to be developed largely by the territorial legislatures, within the framework of organic acts and subject to a retained power of veto. The scope of self-government exercised under these delegations was nearly as broad as that enjoyed by the States, and the freedom of the territories to dispense with protections deemed inherent in a separation of governmental powers was as fully recognized.
Against this historical background, it is hardly surprising that Chief Justice Marshall decided as he did. It would have been doctrinaire in the extreme to deny the right of Congress to invest judges of its creation with authority to dispose of the judicial business of the territories. It would have been at least as dogmatic, having recognized the right, to fasten on those judges a guarantee of tenure that Congress could not put to use and that the exigencies of the territories did not require. Marshall chose neither course; conscious as ever of his responsibility to see the Constitution work, he recognized a greater flexibility in Congress to deal with problems arising outside the normal context of a federal system.
The same confluence

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
数. U.S. Court of International Trade
日. U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims
的. U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
月. U.S. Court of Military Review
用. U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals
成. U.S. Customs Court
名. U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit
时. U.S. Tax Court
件. Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals
一. U.S. Court for China
请. U.S. Consular Courts
中. U.S. Commerce Court
据. Territorial Supreme Court
码. Territorial Appellate Court
不. Territorial Trial Court
新. Emergency Court of Appeals
文. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
下. Bankruptcy Court
分. U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit
入. U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
人. U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
功. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
上. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
户. U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
为. U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
间. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
号. U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
取. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
回. U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
在. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)
页. Alabama Middle U.S. District Court
字. Alabama Northern U.S. District Court
有. Alabama Southern U.S. District Court
个. Alaska U.S. District Court
作. Arizona U.S. District Court
示. Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court
出. Arkansas Western U.S. District Court
是. California Central U.S. District Court
失. California Eastern U.S. District Court
表. California Northern U.S. District Court
除. California Southern U.S. District Court
加. Colorado U.S. District Court
败. Connecticut U.S. District Court
生. Delaware U.S. District Court
信. District Of Columbia U.S. District Court
类. Florida Middle U.S. District Court
置. Florida Northern U.S. District Court
理. Florida Southern U.S. District Court
本. Georgia Middle U.S. District Court
息. Georgia Northern U.S. District Court
行. Georgia Southern U.S. District Court
定. Guam U.S. District Court
改. Hawaii U.S. District Court
市. Idaho U.S. District Court
期. Illinois Central U.S. District Court
以. Illinois Northern U.S. District Court
修. Illinois Southern U.S. District Court
元. Indiana Northern U.S. District Court
方. Indiana Southern U.S. District Court
录. Iowa Northern U.S. District Court
区. Iowa Southern U.S. District Court
单. Kansas U.S. District Court
位. Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court
型. Kentucky Western U.S. District Court
法. Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court
县. Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court
存. Louisiana Western U.S. District Court
品. Maine U.S. District Court
前. Maryland U.S. District Court
称. Massachusetts U.S. District Court
注. Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court
值. Michigan Western U.S. District Court
输. Minnesota U.S. District Court
建. Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court
能. Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court
大. Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court
例. Missouri Western U.S. District Court
度. Montana U.S. District Court
始. Nebraska U.S. District Court
到. Nevada U.S. District Court
面. New Hampshire U.S. District Court
载. New Jersey U.S. District Court
点. New Mexico U.S. District Court
密. New York Eastern U.S. District Court
动. New York Northern U.S. District Court
果. New York Southern U.S. District Court
图. New York Western U.S. District Court
提. North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
发. North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court
式. North Carolina Western U.S. District Court
国. North Dakota U.S. District Court
登. Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court
错. Ohio Northern U.S. District Court
者. Ohio Southern U.S. District Court
认. Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court
误. Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court
接. Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court
关. Oregon U.S. District Court
重. Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court
第. Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court
地. Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court
如. Puerto Rico U.S. District Court
设. Rhode Island U.S. District Court
目. South Carolina U.S. District Court
开. South Dakota U.S. District Court
事. Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court
可. Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court
要. Tennessee Western U.S. District Court
代. Texas Eastern U.S. District Court
小. Texas Northern U.S. District Court
选. Texas Southern U.S. District Court
标. Texas Western U.S. District Court
明. Utah U.S. District Court
编. Vermont U.S. District Court
求. Virgin Islands U.S. District Court
列. Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court
网. Virginia Western U.S. District Court
万. Washington Eastern U.S. District Court
最. Washington Western U.S. District Court
器. West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court
所. West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court
内. Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court
体. Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court
通. Wyoming U.S. District Court
务. Louisiana U.S. District Court
此. Washington U.S. District Court
商. West Virginia U.S. District Court
序. Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court
化. South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court
消. South Carolina Western U.S. District Court
否. Alabama U.S. District Court
保. U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone
使. Georgia U.S. District Court
次. Illinois U.S. District Court
机. Indiana U.S. District Court
对. Iowa U.S. District Court
量. Michigan U.S. District Court
查. Mississippi U.S. District Court
部. Missouri U.S. District Court
性. New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)
和. New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)
更. New York U.S. District Court
后. North Carolina U.S. District Court
证. Ohio U.S. District Court
题. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court
确. Tennessee U.S. District Court
格. Texas U.S. District Court
了. Virginia U.S. District Court
于. Norfolk U.S. District Court
金. Wisconsin U.S. District Court
公. Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court
午. New Jersey U.S. District Court
円. California U.S. District Court
片. Florida U.S. District Court
空. Arkansas U.S. District Court
态. District of Orleans U.S. District Court
管. State Supreme Court
主. State Appellate Court
天. State Trial Court
自. Eastern Circuit (of the United States)
我. Middle Circuit (of the United States)
全. Southern Circuit (of the United States)
今. Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama
来. Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas
正. California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California
说. Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut
意. Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware
送. Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida
容. Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia
已. Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois
结. Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana
会. Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa
段. Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
计. Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky
源. Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana
色. Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine
時. Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland
交. Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts
系. Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan
过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 果