Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, Edward W. Bentz, appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On March 23, 1936 petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty years’ imprisonment for bank robbery by the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. He served his full term in the United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, less “good time” allowance of 2,720 days.
On October 10, 1948 petitioner was granted a conditional release from Alcatraz. He was discharged to the custody of a United States marshal on October 4, 1948 and delivered to the Massachusetts State Prison to serve a Massachusetts sentence. He was released from that prison March 12, 1953.
On June 14, 1954 petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Wisconsin State Prison for a crime committed in that state. As a result of the Wisconsin conviction, a warrant for the retaking of petitioner was issued by the United States Board of Parole bn the ground that petitioner had violated the conditions of his release from Alcatraz. This warrant was issued June 18, 1954 and was signed by James A. Johnson as a member of the Board of Parole. It was executed February 6, 1962, when petitioner was discharged from the Wisconsin State Prison.
The issue is whether James A. Johnson was a properly constituted member of the Board of Parole on June 18, 1954, when he signed the warrant for the retaking of petitioner.
Petitioner contends the warrant is invalid because Mr. Johnson was not appointed by the President as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4201 but was appointed by the Attorney General.
Mr. Johnson was appointed to the-Board by the then Attorney General,. Tom C. Clark, on October 13, 1948. This-appointment was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4201 which was enacted June 25, 1948 and which provided that, “A Board of Parole, consisting of five members,, shall be appointed by the Attorney General, at a salary of $7,500 each per annum.” Thus, unquestionably Johnson’s appointment in 1948 by the Attorney General was proper.
Petitioner’s confusion apparently stems from his failure to recognize that it was not until September 30, 1950 that Section 4201 was amended as follows:
“There is hereby created in the-Department of Justice a Board of' Parole to consist of eight members-to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of' the Senate. * * *”
There is no indication in the record' that Johnson’s membership on the Board of Parole was not continuous from October 13, 1948 until his death on September 6, 1954. Consequently, we hold that he was a properly constituted member of the Board on June 18, 1954, and accordingly the warrant for petitioner's retaking is valid.
Furthermore, it appears from an affidavit of a Department of Justice official' filed in the District Court, that Johnson was reappointed to the Board of Parole by President Eisenhower in accordance with the provisions of Section 4201, as amended, on August 5, 1953. This appointment followed confirmation by the Senate of Johnson’s nomination on August 1, 1953. 99 Cong.Rec. 10747 (1953).
According to the affidavit, Johnson’s reappointment by the President was for the term expiring September 30, 1953. No successor was appointed after the expiration of Johnson’s term and consequently he continued to serve as a Board member until his death September 6, 1954.
Thus, on June 18, 1954, when the warrant for retaking was signed, Johnson was a legally constituted member of the Board of Parole, whether his appointment is considered to have been by the Attorney General on October 13, 1948 or by the President on August 5, 1953.
The judgment of the District Court denying petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 provides that, “A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole, or a member thereof * *
. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 provides that, “Upon the expiration of his term of office, a member of the Board shall continue to act until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.”
Johnson’s successor was appointed July 29, 1955.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A