Task: songer_appel2_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

JONES, Circuit Judge.
The taxpayer, H. B. Snively, purchased all of the stock of a corporation which owned and operated a citrus grove. Thereafter he liquidated the corporation and the grove was transferred to the taxpayer. Upon the completion of liquidation the taxpayer conveyed the grove property to his son. It was held that the proceeds received by the taxpayer from the sale of fruit from the grove prior to liquidation were income to the corporation for the purpose of income and excess profits taxes. Transferee liability of the taxpayer was asserted by the Commissioner and his determination was upheld by the Tax Court. Snively v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 850. This Court affirmed. Snively v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1955, 219 F.2d 266. The liability so determined was discharged by the taxpayer’s payment of the tax and interest in 1954. In his return for that year the taxpayer claimed a deduction for the amount paid by him The Commissioner allowed the deduction to the extent of the interest but disallowed as to the amount of the tax. The resulting deficiency was paid by the taxpayer, a claim for refund was filed, and thereafter suit was brought for the recovery of an alleged over-payment. The district court regarded W. D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 5th Cir. 1948, 165 F.2d 588, as controlling and entered an order dismissing the action on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal the taxpayer’s single specification of error is that the district court erroneously determined that the payment of the tax deficiency of the corporation constituted a capital expenditure rather than an ordinary loss in a transaction entered into for profit.
The taxpayer would distinguish the Haden case upon the ground, among others, that in Haden there was a tax-free exchange and merger while here there was a corporate liquidation and distribution pursuant thereto. There is no difference, we think, between the tax incident here, in a tax-free liquidation, and in Haden, where there was a tax-free exchange and merger. The district court held that the tax was not deductible as a business expense because it accrued from fruit sold from the groves. We agree. The tax was a liability of the corporation and the moneys paid in discharging that liability were part of the consideration for the property and required to be capitalized.
The final contention is that the payment should be allowed as an ordinary loss in a transaction entered into for profit under 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1939) § 23(e) (2), 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 165(c). To dispose of this contention it seems that no more need be said than that the property was not acquired in a transaction entered into for profit. The taxpayer acquired the grove with the intention of making a gift of it to his son and this he did soon after getting title to it.
We find no error in the district court’s decision. Its judgment is
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: A