Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal challenges a three-judge District Court’s construction and application of §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. That section provides that certain jurisdictions, including the one in which this case arose, may not implement any election practices different from those in force on November 1, 1964, without first obtaining approval from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, alternatively, from the Attorney General. The statute further provides that once a proposed change has been submitted to the Attorney General, he has 60 days in which to object. If an objection is interposed, the submitting authority may request reconsideration. 28 CFR § 51.44 (1984). Such a request triggers another 60-day period for the Attorney General to decide whether to continue or withdraw his objection. § 51.47. The District Court held that §5 did not require the changes in election practices involved here to be cleared by the Attorney General prior to their implementation. We noted probable jurisdiction, 467 U. S. 1250 (1984), and now reverse that judgment.
I — I
As of November 1, 1964, the Hampton County, South Carolina, public schools were governed by appointed officials and an elected Superintendent of Education. The county comprises two school districts, School District No. 1, where the vast majority of white students live, and School District No. 2, which is predominantly black. Each District was governed by a separate six-member Board of Trustees. These trustees were appointed by a six-member County Board of Education, which in turn was appointed by the county legislative delegation.
On February 18, 1982, apparently in an attempt to facilitate consolidation of these two School Districts, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted Act No. 547. This statute provided that, beginning in 1983, the six members of the County Board of Education were to be elected at large rather than appointed. The first election for the new Board was to be held simultaneously with the general election in November 1982, and prospective candidates were required to file with the Election Commission at least 45 days before the election. Pursuant ter §5 of the Voting Rights Act, the State submitted Act No. 547 for the approval of the Attorney General, who received it on February 27. On April 28, the Attorney General informed the State that he had no objection to the change in question.
On April 9, however, before the Attorney General had approved Act No. 547, the Governor of South Carolina signed Act No. 549, which was designed to supersede Act No. 547. Act No. 549 abolished the County Board of Education and the County Superintendent, devolving their duties upon the District Boards of Trustees, which were to be elected separately by each District. Like Act No. 547, Act No. 549 scheduled the first trustee election to coincide with the November 1982 general election. Candidates were required to file between August 16 and August 31. Implementation of the Act was made contingent upon approval in a referendum to be held in May 1982.
The State did not submit Act No. 549 to the Attorney General for clearance until June 16, 1982, 22 days after it was approved in the referendum and 68 days after it had been enacted. As of August 16 — the opening date of the filing period under Act No. 549 — no response had yet been received from the Attorney General. Nevertheless, the County Election Commission began accepting filings for elections to be held under Act No. 549. On August 23, the Attorney General interposed an objection. He informed the State that it had not sustained its burden of showing that the proposal to eliminate the County Board of Education did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The Attorney General noted that “the county board has been particularly responsive to the interests and needs of the black community in Hampton County and consistently has appointed bi-racial representation on the local boards of trustees for both School District 1 and School District 2.”
Because the State was contemplating requesting the Attorney General to reconsider this objection, the County Election Commission continued to accept filings under Act No. 549 through the end of the designated filing period, August 31. On that date, the State officially requested reconsideration. At the same time, the Election Commission began accepting filings under Act No. 547, in case the Attorney General refused to withdraw his objection to Act No. 549. On November 2, the date of the general election, the Attorney General had not yet responded to the request for reconsideration, and elections for County Board members were held pursuant to Act No. 547. No elections were held pursuant to Act No. 549.
On November 19, the Attorney General withdrew his objection to Act No. 549. The objection had been based primarily on the possibility that the County Board, which the Act would abolish, might have consolidated the two School Districts, but, upon reappraising South Carolina law, the Attorney General concluded that the Board lacked authority to approve such a consolidation. Therefore, its elimination would not have a potentially discriminatory impact.
The effect of the Attorney General’s clearance of Act No. 549 was to render Act No. 547 — and the November elections held pursuant to it — null and void. In response to a request for advice, the South Carolina Attorney General informed the County Election Commission in January that Act No. 549 was now in effect and that an election for school district trustees should be held “as soon as possible.” The State Attorney General further opined that there was no reason to reopen the filing period, “as only the date of the election has changed.” Accordingly, the Commission set March 15, 1983, as election day.
On March 11, appellants, two civil rights organizations and several residents of Hampton County, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina seeking to enjoin the election as illegal under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The defendants were the County Election Commission, the two School Districts, and various county officials. The complaint identified a number of alleged “changes” in election procedure, including the scheduling of an election at a time other than that specified in the statute, and the use of the August filing period for the March election. A preliminary injunction was denied, and the election took place as scheduled. Subsequently, a three-judge panel denied a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, holding that no violation of §5 of the Voting Rights Act had occurred. The court reasoned that, although Act No. 549 itself was a “change” under the Act, the scheduling of the election and the filing period were simply “ministerial acts necessary to accomplish the statute’s purpose..., and thus did not require preclearance.” App. to Juris. Statement 9a. In the alternative, the court held that even if these acts did constitute “changes,” they had now been “precleared along with the remaining provisions of Act No. 549.” Ibid. That this “preclearance” did not occur until after the filing period had been held was not considered dispositive. The court interpreted Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978), to stand for the proposition that after-the-fact federal approval under §5 might retroactively validate a change in voting procedures.
II
Appellants contend that the opening of the August filing period before preclearance, and the scheduling of an election in March after the Attorney General had approved only a November election date, are changes that come within the scope of § 5. Appellees, echoing the rationale of the District Court, maintain that opening the filing period as required by Act No. 549 — albeit before the Act had been approved — was merely a preliminary step in its implementation. If the Attorney General had ultimately disapproved Act No. 549, the county would not have held an election under it, and the filing period would have become a nullity. Because Act No. 549 was in fact cleared, the filing period it specified was necessarily cleared as well. The alteration of the date of the election, according to appellees, was merely an “unfreezing” of a process that had been temporarily suspended by the operation of the Voting Rights Act. Although appellees concede that a legislatively enacted change in the date of an election is covered by the Act, they distinguish the change at issue here because it was required only by the Attorney General’s failure to approve Act No. 549 before the scheduled election date, and because it was undertaken only to effect the initial implementation of the statute.
We need not decide whether a jurisdiction covered by § 5 may ever open a filing period under a statute that has not yet been precleared. In this case, Hampton County not only opened the filing period for School District trustees before preclearance, but it also scheduled the election for a date four months later than that approved by the Attorney General. Thus the county effectively altered the filing deadline from a date approximately two months before the election to one that was almost six months before the election.
These changes cannot fairly be characterized as “ministerial” in light of the sweeping objectives of the Act. The Voting Rights Act was aimed at “the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 565 (1969). Our precedents recognize that to effectuate the congressional purpose, §5 is to be given broad scope. Id., at 567; see also Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U. S. 32, 38 (1978). Also, far from exempting alterations that might be perceived as minor, Congress failed to adopt such a suggestion when it was proposed in debates on the original Act.
Developments since the passage of the Act provide no basis for concluding that our cases had misinterpreted the intent of Congress. On the contrary, the legislative history of the most recent extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 reveals that the congressional commitment to its continued enforcement is firm. The Senate Committee found “virtual unanimity among those who [had] studied the record,” S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 9 (1982), that §5 should be extended. And, as it had in previous extensions of the Act, Congress specifically endorsed a broad construction of the provision.
Although this Court has never addressed itself to alterations in voting procedures that exactly parallel those at issue in this case, we have twice held that the rescheduling of a candidate qualifying period is a “change” that comes within the scope of § 5. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U. S. 358, 365-366 (1969); Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 551, 570. Of course, there was no alteration in the filing period itself in this case; it was held between August 16 and August 31, exactly as Act No. 549 required. But a filing period cannot be considered in isolation from the election of which it forms a part. As we have recognized in an analogous context, issues that provoke responses from the electorate and from potential candidates are most likely to arise shortly before election time. Under appellees’ approach, a filing period held years before an election would serve as well as one held on election eve. But clearly, the former has a much greater potential for hindering voter participation than the latter. Furthermore, the August filing period was held at a time when the Attorney General still had an outstanding objection to Act No. 549. Potential candidates who considered the opening of the filing period illegal in these circumstances may have deliberately stayed away.
Appellees do not seriously dispute that a change in the date of an election, if effected by statute, requires approval by the Attorney General under § 5. Rather, they argue that because the rescheduling in this case was merely an administrative effort to comply with a statute that had already received clearance, it was not a change of such magnitude as to trigger the requirements of § 5. But plainly, the form of a change in voting procedures cannot determine whether it is within the scope of § 5. That section reaches informal as well as formal changes, such as a bulletin issued by a state board of elections. Allen, supra. If it were otherwise, States could evade the requirements of § 5 merely by implementing changes in an informal manner. Neither is it determinative that an alteration in scheduling is unlikely to be repeated, as it would be if it were embodied in a statute or rule. The Voting Rights Act reaches changes that affect even a single election. As we have noted, the change in the election date in this instance extended the gap between the filing period and the election, possibly preventing relative latecomers from entering the race. In addition, an election in March is likely to draw significantly fewer voters than an election held simultaneously with a general election in November.
Any doubt that these changes are covered by §5 is resolved by the construction placed upon the Act by the Attorney General, which is entitled to considerable deference. Under Department of Justice regulations:
“Any change affecting voting, even though it appears to be minor or indirect, even though it ostensibly expands voting rights, or even though it is designed to remove the elements that caused objection by the Attorney General to a prior submitted change; must meet the Section 5 preclearance requirement.” 28 CFR §51.11 (1984).
Among the specific examples of changes listed in the regulations is “[a]ny change affecting the eligibility of persons to become or remain candidates.” §51.12. Pursuant to these regulations, the Attorney General has, since 1980, reviewed approximately 58 changes in election dates and approximately 10 changes in dates for candidate filing periods. In none of these instances did the Attorney General advise the covered jurisdiction that its submission was not a “change,” and on several occasions objections were interposed.
Appellees argue that these changes in voting procedures were exempt from preclearance because literal compliance with § 5 was impossible. The Attorney General did not approve the November election date until after that date had passed; hence, it was necessary to schedule another election date. Also, it is said that if the legislature had passed a statute setting a March election date and submitted it to the Attorney General, preclearance might not have been obtained by the date of the March election. In that event, yet another amendment would have been necessary, requiring yet another submission. The process might have continued ad infinitum.
To the extent that appellees found themselves in a dilemma, however, it was largely of their own making. Rather than submitting Act No. 549 shortly after its passage, which would have allowed ample time for preclearance before the scheduled opening of the filing period, the State delayed this action for two months. Even after Act No. 549 received clearance too late to allow the election to be held in November, appellees might still have submitted the new election date without encountering significant inconvenience. Because the Attorney General must respond to any submission within 60 days after he receives the necessary information, appellees need only have selected an election date sufficiently far in the future to allow preclearance.
Appellees would have us hold that the changes here at issue did not require preclearance because they were undertaken in good faith, were merely an attempt to implement a statute that had already been approved by the Attorney General, and were therefore an improvement over prior voting procedures. But the Attorney General’s approval of Act No. 549 signified only that it was not discriminatory, not that it was an improvement over Act No. 547, which had also been approved. Furthermore, neither the absence of discriminatory purpose nor a good-faith implementation of a change removes the potential for discriminatory effects.
More fundamentally, it is not our province, nor that of the District Court below, to determine whether the changes at issue in this case in fact resulted in impairment of the right to vote, or whether they were intended to have that effect. That task is reserved by statute to the Attorney General or to the District Court for the District of Columbia. Our inquiry is limited to whether the challenged alteration has the potential for discrimination. The changes effected here did have such potential and therefore should have been precleared under § 5.
Ill
Relying on Berry v. Doles, 438 U. S. 190 (1978), the District Court held as an alternative ground that these changes were implicitly approved when the Attorney General withdrew his objection to Act No. 549. Berry involved changes in voting procedures that were implemented without first being submitted to the Attorney General. In a decision rendered after the election had already taken place, a three-judge District Court held that the changes should have been submitted under §5 and enjoined further enforcement of the statute, but refused to set aside the election. We held that the appropriate remedy was to allow the covered jurisdiction 30 days in which to apply for approval of the change. We further stated:
“If approval is obtained, the matter will be at an end. If approval is denied, appellants are free to renew to the District Court their request for [a new election.]” Id., at 193.
From this, the District Court drew the conclusion that “a retroactive validation of an election law change under Section 5 could be achieved by after-the-fact federal approval.”
Regardless of whether this is a fair characterization of the holding of Berry, it clearly has no application to the facts of this case. The changes we have identified here — the retention of an August filing period in conjunction with a March election, and the scheduling of the March election — had not even been decided upon by state authorities at the time the Attorney General approved Act No. 549. That statute provided for an August filing period and a November election, which, as we have demonstrated, is quite another matter. Even an informal submission of a change in voting procedures does not satisfy the requirements of §5: the change must be submitted “in some unambiguous and recordable manner.” Allen, 393 U. S., at 571. See also McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236 (1984); United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 136 (1978). A change that was never submitted at all does not meet this standard. The Attorney General cannot be said to have validated these changes, retroactively or otherwise, because they were never before him.
í — I <1
Appellees’ use of an August filing period in conjunction with a March election, and the setting of the March election date itself, were changes that should have been submitted to the Attorney General under §5. These changes cannot be said to have been approved along with Act No. 549. As in Berry v. Doles, supra, it is appropriate in these circumstances for the District Court to enter an order allowing appellees 30 days in which to submit these changes to the Attorney General for approval. 438 U. S., at 192-193. If appellees fail to seek this approval, or if approval is not forthcoming, the results of the March 1983 election should be set aside. If, however, the Attorney General determines that the changes had no discriminatory purpose or effect, the District Court should determine, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, whether the results of the election may stand.
We therefore reverse the District Court’s judgment that § 5 was not violated by appellees’ failure to secure approval of these changes, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist concur in the judgment.
Section 5, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, provides in pertinent part:
“Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification... does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 区