Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice SOTOMAYORdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or retaliating against their employees for opposing or seeking relief from such discrimination. Before a federal civil servant can sue his employer for violating Title VII, he must, among other things, "initiate contact" with an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor at his agency "within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory." 29 CFR § 1614.105(a)(1) (2015).
If an employee claims he has been fired for discriminatory reasons, the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" includes the discharge itself and the 45-day limitations period begins running only after the employee is fired.
We address here when the limitations period begins to run for an employee who was not fired, but resigns in the face of intolerable discrimination-a "constructive" discharge. We hold that, in such circumstances, the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" includes the employee's resignation, and that the 45-day clock for a constructive discharge begins running only after the employee resigns.
I
We recite the following facts in the light most favorable to petitioner Marvin Green, against whom the District Court entered summary judgment. Green is a black man who worked for the Postal Service for 35 years. In 2008, he was serving as the postmaster for Englewood, Colorado when he applied for a promotion to the vacant postmaster position in nearby Boulder. He was passed over. Shortly thereafter, Green complained he was denied the promotion because of his race.
Green's relations with his supervisors crumbled following his complaint. Tensions peaked on December 11, 2009, when two of Green's supervisors accused him of intentionally delaying the mail-a criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1703. They informed Green that the Postal Service's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was investigating the charge and that OIG agents had arrived to interview him as part of their investigation. After Green met with the OIG agents, his supervisors gave him a letter reassigning him to off-duty status until the matter was resolved. Even though the OIG agents reported to Green's supervisors that no further investigation was warranted, the supervisors continued to represent to Green that "the OIG is all over this" and that the "criminal" charge "could be a life changer." App. 53.
On December 16, 2009, Green and the Postal Service signed an agreement whose meaning remains disputed. Relevant here, the Postal Service promised not to pursue criminal charges in exchange for Green's promise to leave his post in Englewood. The agreement also apparently gave Green a choice: effective March 31, 2010, he could either retire or report for duty in Wamsutter, Wyoming-population 451-at a salary considerably lower than what he earned in his Denver suburb. Green chose to retire and submitted his resignation to the Postal Service on February 9, 2010, effective March 31.
On March 22-41 days after submitting his resignation paperwork to the Postal Service on February 9, but 96 days after signing the settlement agreement on December 16-Green contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor to report an unlawful constructive discharge. He contended that his supervisors had threatened criminal charges and negotiated the resulting agreement in retaliation for his original complaint. He alleged that the choice he had been given effectively forced his resignation in violation of Title VII.
Green eventually filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging, inter alia, that the Postal Service constructively discharged him. The Postal Service moved for summary judgment, arguing that Green had failed to make timely contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the "matter alleged to be discriminatory," as required by 29 CFR § 1614.105(a)(1). The District Court granted the Postal Service's motion for summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" encompassed only the Postal Service's discriminatory actions and not Green's independent decision to resign on February 9. Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135 (2014). Therefore, the 45-day limitations period started running when both parties signed the settlement agreement on December 16, 2009. Accordingly, because 96 days passed between the agreement and when Green contacted an EEO counselor on March 22, 2010, his constructive-discharge claim was time barred.
Two other Courts of Appeals agree with the Tenth Circuit's view that the limitations period begins to run for a constructive-discharge claim after the employer's last discriminatory act. As the Tenth Circuit recognized, however, other Courts of Appeals have held that the limitations period for a constructive-discharge claim does not begin to run until the employee resigns.
We granted certiorari to resolve this split. 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1892, 191 L.Ed.2d 762 (2015). Because no party here supports the Tenth Circuit's holding that an employee's resignation is not part of the "matter alleged to be discriminatory," we appointed Catherine M.A. Carroll to defend that aspect of the judgment below. 576 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 14, 386, 193 L.Ed.2d 308 (2015). She has ably discharged her duties and the Court thanks her for her service.
II
Before a federal civil servant can sue his employer in court for discriminating against him in violation of Title VII, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). To exhaust those remedies, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has promulgated regulations that require, among other things, that a federal employee consult with an EEO counselor prior to filing a discrimination lawsuit. Specifically, he "must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action." 29 CFR § 1614.105(a)(1). The timeliness of Green's claim therefore turns on our interpretation of this EEOC regulation implementing Title VII.
Although we begin our interpretation of the regulation with its text, the text in this case is not particularly helpful. Nowhere does § 1614.105indicate whether a "matter alleged to be discriminatory" in a constructive-discharge claim includes the employee's resignation, as Green contends, or only the employer's discriminatory conduct, as amica contends. The word "matter" simply means "an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense," Black's Law Dictionary 1126 (10th ed. 2014)-a term that could readily apply to a discrimination-precipitated resignation. So the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" could refer to all of the allegations underlying a claim of discrimination, including the employee's resignation, or only to those allegations concerning the employer's discriminatory conduct. We therefore must turn to other canons of interpretation.
The most helpful canon in this context is "the'standard rule' " for limitations periods. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390 (2005). Ordinarily, a " 'limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.' " Ibid. "[A] cause of action does not become 'complete and present' for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201, 118 S.Ct. 542, 139 L.Ed.2d 553 (1997). Although the standard rule can be displaced such that the limitations period begins to run before a plaintiff can file a suit, we "will not infer such an odd result in the absence of any such indication" in the text of the limitations period. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 267, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993).
Applying this default rule, we are persuaded that the "matter alleged to be discriminatory" in a constructive-discharge claim necessarily includes the employee's resignation for three reasons. First, in the context of a constructive-discharge claim, a resignation is part of the "complete and present cause of action" necessary before a limitations period ordinarily begins to run. Second, nothing in the regulation creating the limitations period here, § 1614.105, clearly indicates an intent to displace this standard rule. Third, practical considerations confirm the merit of applying the standard rule here. We therefore interpret the term "matter alleged to be discriminatory" for a constructive-discharge claim to include the date Green resigned.
A
The standard rule for limitations periods requires us first to determine what is a "complete and present cause of action" for a constructive-discharge claim. We hold that such a claim accrues only after an employee resigns.
The constructive-discharge doctrine contemplates a situation in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point such that his "working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign." Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). When the employee resigns in the face of such circumstances, Title VII treats that resignation as tantamount to an actual discharge. Id., at 142-143, 124 S.Ct. 2342.
A claim of constructive discharge therefore has two basic elements. A plaintiff must prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign. Id., at 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342. But he must also show that he actually resigned. Ibid. ("A constructive discharge involves both an employee's decision to leave and precipitating conduct..." (emphasis added)). In other words, an employee cannot bring a constructive-discharge claim until he is constructively discharged. Only after both elements are satisfied can he file suit to obtain relief.
Under the standard rule for limitations periods, the limitations period should begin to run for a constructive-discharge claim only after a plaintiff resigns. At that point-and not before-he can file a suit for constructive discharge. So only at that point-and not before-does he have a "complete and present" cause of action. And only after he has a complete and present cause of action does a limitations period ordinarily begin to run. Cf. Mac's Shell Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products Co., 559 U.S. 175, 189-190, 130 S.Ct. 1251, 176 L.Ed.2d 36 (2010)(the limitations period for a constructive termination of a franchise agreement starts running when the agreement is constructively terminated).
In this respect, a claim that an employer constructively discharged an employee is no different from a claim that an employer actually discharged an employee. An ordinary wrongful discharge claim also has two basic elements: discrimination and discharge. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); 1 B. Lindemann, P. Grossman, & C. Weirich, Employment Discrimination Law 21-33 (5th ed. 2012) (Lindemann) ("The sine qua non of a discharge case is, of course, a discharge"). The claim accrues when the employee is fired. At that point-and not before-he has a "complete and present cause of action." So at that point-and not before-the limitations period begins to run.
With claims of either constructive discharge or actual discharge, the standard rule thus yields the same result: a limitations period should not begin to run until after the discharge itself. In light of this rule, we interpret the term "matter alleged to be discriminatory" in § 1614.105to refer to all of the elements that make up a constructive-discharge claim-including an employee's resignation.
B
Although the standard rule dictates that a limitations period should commence only after a claim accrues, there is an exception to that rule when the text creating the limitations period clearly indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 360, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005). Nothing in the text of Title VII or the regulation, however, suggests that the standard rule should be displaced here. To the contrary, the language of the regulation confirms our application of the default rule.
As noted previously, the word "matter" generally refers to "an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense." Black's Law Dictionary 1126. The natural reading of "matter alleged to be discriminatory" thus refers to the allegation forming the basis of the discrimination claim-here, a claim of constructive discharge. And as discussed above, a constructive discharge claim requires two basic allegations:
discriminatory conduct by the employer that leads to resignation of the employee. So long as those acts are part of the same, single claim under consideration, they are part of the "matter alleged to be discriminatory," whatever the role of discrimination in each individual element of the claim. Cf. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-121, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)(holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is a single "unlawful employment practice" that includes every act composing that claim, whether those acts are independently actionable or not).
C
Finally, we are also persuaded that applying the standard rule for limitations periods to constructive discharge makes a good deal of practical sense. Starting the limitations clock ticking before a plaintiff can actually sue for constructive discharge serves little purpose in furthering the goals of a limitations period-and it actively negates Title VII's remedial structure. Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)(holding that the Title VII limitations period should be construed to "honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement").
This Court has recognized "that the limitations perio[d] should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes." Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262, n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). If the limitations period begins to run following the employer's precipitating discriminatory conduct, but before the employee's resignation, the employee will be forced to file a discrimination complaint after the employer's conduct and later amend the complaint to allege constructive discharge after he resigns. Nothing in the regulation suggests it intended to require a layperson, while making this difficult decision, to follow such a two-step process in order to preserve any remedy if he is constructively discharged.
Moreover, forcing an employee to lodge a complaint before he can bring a claim for constructive discharge places that employee in a difficult situation. An employee who suffered discrimination severe enough that a reasonable person in his shoes would resign might nevertheless force himself to tolerate that discrimination for a period of time. He might delay his resignation until he can afford to leave. Or he might delay in light of other circumstances, as in the case of a teacher waiting until the end of the school year to resign. Tr. 17. And, if he feels he must stay for a period of time, he may be reluctant to complain about discrimination while still employed. A complaint could risk termination-an additional adverse consequence that he may have to disclose in future job applications.
III
Amica and the dissent read "matter alleged to be discriminatory" as having a clear enough meaning to displace our reliance on the standard rule for limitations periods. They argue that "matter" is not equivalent to "claim" or "cause of action," and that the use of the phrase "matter alleged to be discriminatory" is a sufficiently clear statement that the standard claim accrual rule should not apply. According to amica and the dissent, "matter" refers only to the discriminatory acts of the Postal Service, not Green's resignation.
We disagree. There is nothing inherent in the phrase "matter alleged to be discriminatory" that clearly limits it to employer conduct. Rather, as discussed above, the term can reasonably be interpreted to include the factual basis for a claim. Green is not alleging just that the Postal Service discriminated against him. He claims that the discrimination left him no choice but to resign.
Amica and the dissent dispute that a constructive discharge is a separate claim. According to amica and the dissent, the constructive-discharge doctrine merely allows a plaintiff to expand any underlying discrimination claim to include the damages from leaving his job, thereby increasing his available remedies. See 1 Lindemann 21-49 (constructive discharge allows plaintiff to seek backpay, front pay, or reinstatement). In support of this argument, amica and the dissent emphasize this Court's statement in Suders that "[u]nder the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes." 542 U.S., at 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342(emphasis added); see also id., at 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342("[A] constructive discharge is functionally the same as an actual termination in damages-enhancing respects").
But the Court did not hold in Suders that a constructive discharge is tantamount to a formal discharge for remedial purposes exclusively. To the contrary, it expressly held that constructive discharge is a claim distinct from the underlying discriminatory act. Id., at 149, 124 S.Ct. 2342(holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is a "lesser included component" of the "graver claim of hostile-environment constructive discharge"). This holding was no mere dictum. See id., at 142, 124 S.Ct. 2342("[A] claim for constructive discharge lies under Title VII"). We see no reason to excise an employee's resignation from his constructive-discharge claim for purposes of the limitations period.
The concurrence sets out a theory that there are two kinds of constructive discharge for purposes of the limitations period: constructive discharge "claims" where the employer "makes conditions intolerable with the specific discriminatory intent of forcing the employee to resign, " and constructive discharge "damages" where the employer does not intend to force the employee to quit, but the discriminatory conditions of employment are so intolerable that the employee quits anyway. Post, at 1785 - 1788 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). According to the concurrence, the limitations period does not begin to run until an employee resigns under the "claim" theory of constructive discharge, but begins at the last discriminatory act before resignation under the "damages" theory.
This sometimes-a-claim-sometimes-not theory of constructive discharge is novel and contrary to the constructive discharge doctrine. The whole point of allowing an employee to claim "constructive" discharge is that in circumstances of discrimination so intolerable that a reasonable person would resign, we treat the employee's resignation as though the employer actually fired him. Suders, 542 U.S., at 141-143, 124 S.Ct. 2342. We do not also require an employee to come forward with proof-proof that would often be difficult to allege plausibly-that not only was the discrimination so bad that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his employer's plan all along.
Amica and the dissent also argue that their interpretation is more consistent with this Court's prior precedent on when the limitations period begins to run for discrimination claims. Under their interpretation, Green's resignation was not part of the discriminatory "matter," but was instead the mere inevitable consequence of the Postal Service's discriminatory conduct, and therefore cannot be used to extend the limitations period. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 21-27 (Brief for Amica Curiae ) (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007), overruled by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 5; Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977)); post, at 1791 - 1794 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431, and Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981)(per curiam )). Similarly, the concurrence argues these cases require that an act done with discriminatory intent must occur within the limitations period. Post, at 1784 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
But these cases are consistent with the standard rule that a limitations period begins to run after a claim accrues, not after an inevitable consequence of that claim. In Ricks, for example, the Court considered the discrimination claim of a college faculty member who was denied tenure and given a 1-year " 'terminal' " contract for his last year teaching. 449 U.S., at 258, 101 S.Ct. 498. The plaintiff's claim accrued-and he could have sued-when the college informed him he would be denied tenure and gave him "explicit notice that his employment would end" when his 1-year contract expired. Ibid. The Court held that the limitations period began to run on that date, and not after his 1-year contract expired. That final year of teaching was merely an inevitable consequence of the tenure denial the plaintiff claimed was discriminatory.
Green's resignation, by contrast, is not merely an inevitable consequence of the discrimination he suffered; it is an essential part of his constructive-discharge claim. That is, Green could not sue for constructive discharge until he actually resigned. Of course, Green could not resign and then wait until the consequences of that resignation became most painful to complain. For example, he could not use the date of the expiration of his health insurance after his resignation to extend the limitations period. But the "inevitable consequence" principle of Ricks, Ledbetter, and Evans does not change the focus of the limitations period, which remains on the claim of discrimination itself. See Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (201

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 退