Task: sc_adminaction_is

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Per Curiam.
In 1950 the District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an amended consent decree in a government Sherman Act suit requiring ASCAP inter alia to “grant to any user making written application therefor a non-exclusive license to perform all of the compositions in the ASCAP repertory” subject to a reasonable license fee. On request of petitioners for a license ASCAP refused to fix a fee and, as provided by the amended consent decree, this application was filed for an order to fix a reasonable fee. The District Court found that the consent decree did not require ASCAP to issue the type of license petitioners requested and, therefore, dismissed the application. 208 F. Supp. 896. The petitioners took an appeal to the Court of Appeals and also perfected a direct one to this Court under § 2 of the Expediting Act. 15 U. S. C. § 29. We dismissed the appeal filed here for want of jurisdiction, 371 U. S. 540 (1963). Thereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal perfected there, 317 F. 2d 90, on the ground that all appeals are “routed” to this Court by the Expediting Act and this petition brings that question here once again.
The dismissal that we heretofore entered was based on our unexpressed view that the appeal from an ancillary order of this type was not within the Expediting Act. Direct appeals to this Court are authorized by that Act only from final judgments where the United States is a complainant. The purpose of the Act is to expedite litigation of “great and general importance” where the Government is the aggrieved party. See 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (1903). The controversy which is disposed of by the District Court’s order is entirely between private parties and is outside the mainstream of the litigation in which the Government is directly concerned. Compare Terminal R. R. Assn. v. United States, 266 U. S. 17; Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U. S. 230. In these circumstances, and the order being final rather than interlocutory, we believe that the appeal does lie under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The petition is therefore granted and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration on its merits.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black acquiesces in the Court’s judgment because of the holding in the prior appeal.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?
A. No
B. Yes
Answer:

Answer: A