Task: sc_casesource

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. 

Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this libel case, a public figure claims he was defamed by an author who, with full knowledge of the inaccuracy, used quotation marks to attribute to him comments he had not made. The First Amendment protects authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with what we have called “actual malice,” a term of art denoting deliberate or reckless falsification. We consider in this opinion whether the attributed quotations had the degree of falsity required to prove this state of mind, so that the public figure can defeat a motion for summary judgment and proceed to a trial on the merits of the defamation claim.
r-H
Petitioner Jeffrey Masson trained at Harvard University as a Sanskrit scholar, and in 1970 became a professor of Sanskrit & Indian Studies at the University of Toronto. He spent eight years in psychoanalytic training, and qualified as an analyst in 1978. Through his professional activities, he came to know Dr. Kurt Eissler, head of the Sigmund Freud Archives, and Dr. Anna Freud, daughter of Sigmund Freud and a major psychoanalyst in her own right. The Sigmund Freud Archives, located at Maresfteld Gardens outside of London, serves as a repository for materials about Freud, including his own writings, letters, and personal library. The materials, and the right of access to them, are of immense value to those who study Freud and his theories, life, and work.
In 1980, Eissler and Anna Freud hired petitioner as projects director of the archives. After assuming his post, petitioner became disillusioned with Freudian psychology. In a 1981 lecture before the Western New England Psychoanalytical Society in New Haven, Connecticut, he advanced his theories of Freud. Soon after, the board of the archives terminated petitioner as projects director.
Respondent Janet Malcolm is an author and a contributor to respondent The New Yorker, a weekly magazine. She contacted petitioner in 1982 regarding the possibility of an article on his relationship with the archives. He agreed, and the two met in person and spoke by telephone in a series of interviews. Based on the interviews and other sources, Malcolm wrote a lengthy article. One of Malcolm’s narrative devices consists of enclosing lengthy passages in quotation marks, reporting statements of Masson, Eissler, and her other subjects.
During the editorial process, Nancy Franklin, a member of the fact-checking department at The New Yorker, called petitioner to confirm some of the facts underlying the article. According to petitioner, he expressed alarm at the number of errors in the few passages Franklin discussed with him. Petitioner contends that he asked permission to review those portions of the article which attributed quotations or information to him, but was brushed off with a never-fulfilled promise to “get back to [him].” App. 67. Franklin disputes petitioner’s version of their conversation. Id., at 246-247.
The New Yorker published Malcolm’s piece in December 1983, as a two-part series. In 1984, with knowledge of at least petitioner’s general allegation that the article contained defamatory material, respondent Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., published the entire work as a book, entitled In the Freud Archives.
Malcolm’s work received complimentary reviews. But this gave little joy to Masson, for the book portrays him in a most unflattering light. According to one reviewer:
“Masson the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually, as a grandiose egotist — mean-spirited, self-serving, full of braggadocio, impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words reveal this psychological profile — a self-portrait offered to us through the efforts of an observer and listener who is, surely, as wise as any in the psychoanalytic profession.” Coles, Freudianism Confronts Its Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, pp. 58, 60.
Petitioner wrote a letter to the New York Times Book Review calling the book “distorted.” In response, Malcolm stated:
“Many of [the] things Mr. Masson told me (on tape) were discreditable to him, and I felt it best not to include them. Everything I do quote Mr. Masson as saying was said by him, almost word for word. (The ‘almost’ refers to changes made for the sake of correct syntax.) I would be glad to play the tapes of my conversation with Mr. Masson to the editors of The Book Review whenever they have 40 or 50 short hours to spare.” App. 222-223.
Petitioner brought an action for libel under California law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. During extensive discovery and repeated amendments to the complaint, petitioner concentrated on various passages alleged to be defamatory, dropping some and adding others. The tape recordings of the interviews demonstrated that petitioner had, in fact, made statements substantially identical to a number of the passages, and those passages are no longer in the case. We discuss only the passages relied on by petitioner in his briefs to this Court.
Each passage before us made by petitioner during the interviews. Yet in each instance no identical statement appears in the more than 40 hours of taped interviews. Petitioner complains that Malcolm fabricated all but one passage; with respect to that passage, he claims Malcolm omitted a crucial portion, rendering the remainder misleading.
(a) “Intellectual Gigolo.” a by petitioner of his relationship with Eissler and Anna Freud as follows:
“ 'Then I met a rather attractive older graduate student and I had an affair with her. One day, she took me to some art event, and she was sorry afterward. She said, “Well, it is very nice sleeping with you in your room, but you’re the kind of person who should never leave the room — you’re just a social embarrassment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own room.” And you know, in their way, if not in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me well enough “in my own room.” They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo — you get your pleasure from him, but you don’t take him out in public....’” In the Freud Archives 38.
The tape recordings contain the substance of petitioner’s reference to his graduate student friend, App. 95, but no suggestion that Eissler or Anna Freud considered him, or that he considered himself, an “‘intellectual gigolo.’” Instead, petitioner said:
“They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liability.... They liked me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught dead with me.” Id., at 104.
(b) “Sex, Women, Fun.” Malcolm quoted petitioner as describing his plans for Maresfield Gardens, which he had hoped to occupy after Anna Freud’s death:
“Tt was a beautiful house, but it was dark and sombre and dead. Nothing ever went on there. I was the only person who ever came. I would have renovated it, opened it up, brought it to life. Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholarship, but it would also have been a place of sex, women, fun. It would have been like the change in The Wizard of Oz, from black-and-white into color.’” In the Freud Archives 33.
The tape recordings contain a similar statement, but in place of the references to “sex, women, fun” and The Wizard of Oz, petitioner commented:
“[I]t is an incredible storehouse. I mean, the library, Freud’s library alone is priceless in terms of what it contains: all his books with his annotations in them; the Schreber case annotated, that kind of thing. It’s fascinating.” App. 127.
Petitioner did talk, earlier in the interview, of his meeting with a London analyst:
“I like him. So, and we got on very well. That was the first time we ever met and you know, it was buddy-buddy, and we were to stay with each other and [laughs] we were going to pass women on to each other, and we were going to have a great time together when I lived in the Freud house. We’d have great parties there and we were [laughs] —
“... going to really, we were going to live it up.” Id., at 129.
(c) “It Sounded Better.” Petitioner spoke with Malcolm about the history of his family, including the reasons his grandfather changed the family name from Moussaieff to Masson, and why petitioner adopted the abandoned family name as his middle name. The article contains the passage:
“ ‘My father is a gem merchant who doesn’t like to stay in any one place too long. His father was a gem merchant, too — a Bessarabian gem merchant, named Moussaieff, who went to Paris in the twenties and adopted the name Masson. My parents named me Jeffrey Lloyd Masson, but in 1975 I decided to change my middle name to Moussaieff — it sounded better.’” In the Freud Archives 36.
In the most similar tape-recorded statement, Masson explained at considerable length that his grandfather had changed the family name from Moussaieff to Masson when living in France, “[jjust to hide his Jewishness.” Petitioner had changed his last name back to Moussaieff, but his then-wife Terry objected that “nobody could pronounce it and nobody knew how to spell it, and it wasn’t the name that she knew me by.” Petitioner had changed his name to Mous-saieff because he “just liked it.” “[I]t was sort of part of analysis: a return to the roots, and your family tradition and so on.” In the end, he had agreed with Terry that “it wasn’t her name after all,” and used Moussaieff as a middle instead of a last name. App. 87-89.
(d) “I Don’t Know Why I Put It In. ” The article recounts part of a conversation between Malcolm and petitioner about the paper petitioner presented at his 1981 New Haven lecture:
“[I] asked him what had happened between the time of the lecture and the present to change him from a Freudian psychoanalyst with somewhat outré views into the bitter and belligerent anti-Freudian he had become.
“Masson sidestepped my question. ‘You’re right, there was nothing disrespectful of analysis in that paper,’ he said. ‘That remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis was something I tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratuitous. I don’t know why I put it in.’” In the Freud Archives 53.
The tape recordings instead contain the following discussion of the New Haven lecture:
Masson: “So they really couldn’t judge the material. And, in fact, until the last sentence I think they were quite fascinated. I think the last sentence was an in, [sic] possibly, gratuitously offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts. Uh, — ”
Malcolm: “What were the circumstances under which you put it [in]?...”
Masson: “That it was, was true.
“... I really believe it. I didn’t believe anybody would agree with me.
“... But I felt I should say something because the paper’s still well within the analytic tradition in a sense....
“... It’s really not a deep criticism of Freud. It contains all the material that would allow one to criticize Freud but I didn’t really do it. And then I thought, I really must say one thing that I really believe, that’s not going to appeal to anybody and that was the very last sentence. Because I really do believe psychoanalysis is entirely sterile....” App. 176.
(e) “Greatest Analyst Who Ever Lived. ” The article contains the following self-explanatory passage:
“A few days after my return to New York, Masson, in a state of elation, telephoned me to say that Farrar, Straus & Giroux has taken The Assault on Truth [Mas-son’s book]. 'Wait till it reaches the best-seller list, and watch how the analysts will crawl,’ he crowed. ‘They move whichever way the wind blows. They will want me back, they will say that Masson is a great scholar, a major analyst — after Freud, he’s the greatest analyst who ever lived. Suddenly they’ll be calling, begging, cajoling: “Please take back what you’ve said about our profession; our patients are quitting.” They’ll try a short smear campaign, then they’ll try to buy me, and ultimately they’ll have to shut up. Judgment will be passed by history. There is no possible refutation of this book. It’s going to cause a revolution in psychoanalysis. Analysis stands or falls with me now.’” In the Freud Archives 162.
This material does not appear in the tape recordings. Petitioner did make the following statements on related topics in one of the taped interviews with Malcolm:
“... I assure you when that book comes out, which I honestly believe is an honest book, there is nothing, you know, mean-minded about it. It’s the honest fruit of research and intellectual toil. And there is not an analyst in the country who will say a single word in favor of it.” App. 136.
“Talk to enough analysts and get them right down to these concrete issues and you watch how different it is from my position. It’s utterly the opposite and that’s finally what I realized, that I hold a position that no other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud. At first I thought: Okay, it’s me and Freud against the rest of the analytic world, or me and Freud and Anna Freud and Kur[t] Eissler and Vic Calef and Brian Bird and Sam Lipton against the rest of the world. Not so, it’s me. it’s me alone.” Id., at 139.
The tape of this interview also contains the following exchange between petitioner and Malcolm:
Masson: “... analysis stands or falls with me now.”
Malcolm: “Well that’s a very grandiose thing to say.”
Masson: “Yeah, but it’s got nothing to do with me. It’s got to do with the things I discovered.” Id., at 137.
(f) “He Had The Wrong Man.” In discussing the archives’ board meeting at which petitioner’s employment was terminated, Malcolm quotes petitioner as giving the following explanation of Eissler’s attempt to extract a promise of confidentiality:
“‘[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me. “Do you want to poison Anna Freud’s last days? Have you no heart? You’re going to kill the poor old woman.” I said to him, “What have I done? You’re doing it. You’re firing me. What am I supposed to do — be grateful to you?” “You could be silent about it. You could swallow it. I know it is painful for you. But you could just live with it in silence.” “Why should I do that?” “Because it is the honorable thing to do.” Well, he had the wrong man.’” In the Freud Archives 67.
From the tape recordings, on the other hand, it appears that Malcolm deleted part of petitioner’s explanation (italicized below), and petitioner argues that the “wrong man” sentence relates to something quite different from Eissler’s entreaty that silence was “the honorable thing.” In the tape recording, petitioner states:
“But it was wrong of Eissler to do that, you know. He was constantly putting various kinds of moral pressure on me and, ‘Do you want to poison Anna Freud’s last days? Have you no heart?’ He called me: ‘Have you no heart? You’re going to kill the poor old woman. Have you no heart? Think of what she’s done for you and you are now willing to do this to her.’ I said, ‘What have I, what have I done? You did it. You fired me. What am I supposed to do: thank you? be grateful to you?’ He said, Well you could never talk about it. You could be silent about it. You could swallow it. I know it’s painful for you but just live with it in silence.’ ‘Fuck you,’ I said, Why should I do that? Why? You know, why should one do that?’ ‘Because it’s the honorable thing to do and you will save face. And who knows? If you never speak about it and you quietly and humbly accept our judgment, who knows that in a few years if we don’t bring you back?’ Well, he had the wrong man.” App. 215-216.
Malcolm submitted to the District Court that not all of her discussions with petitioner were recorded on tape, in particular conversations that occurred while the two of them walked together or traveled by car, while petitioner stayed at Malcolm’s home in New York, or while her tape recorder was inoperable. She claimed to have taken notes of these unrecorded sessions, which she later typed, then discarding the handwritten originals. Petitioner denied that any discussion relating to the substance of the article occurred during his stay at Malcolm’s home in New York, that Malcolm took notes during any of their conversations, or that Malcolm gave any indication that her tape recorder was broken.
Respondents moved for summary judgment. The parties agreed that petitioner was a public figure and so could escape summary judgment only if the evidence in the record would permit a reasonable finder of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, to conclude that respondents published a defamatory statement with actual malice as defined by our cases. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255-256 (1986). The District Court analyzed each of the passages and held that the alleged inaccuracies did not raise a jury question. The court found that the allegedly fabricated quotations were either substantially true, or were “ ‘one of a number of possible rational interpretations’ of a conversation or event that ‘bristled with ambiguities,”’ and thus were entitled to constitutional protection. 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (ND Cal. 1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 486, 512 (1984)). The court also ruled that the “he had the wrong man” passage involved an exercise of editorial judgment upon which the courts could not intrude. 686 F. Supp., at 1403-1404.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 895 F. 2d 1535 (CA9 1989). The court assumed for much of its opinion that Malcolm had deliberately altered each quotation not found on the tape recordings, but nevertheless held that petitioner failed to raise a jury question of actual malice, in large part for the reasons stated by the District Court. In its examination of the “intellectual gigolo” passage, the court agreed with the District Court that petitioner could not demonstrate actual malice because Malcolm had not altered the substantive content of petitioner’s self-description, but went on to note that it did not consider the “intellectual gigolo” passage defamatory, as the quotation merely reported Kurt Eissler’s and Anna Freud’s opinions about petitioner. In any event, concluded the court, the statement would not be actionable under the “ ‘incremental harm branch’ of the ‘libel-proof’ doctrine,” id., at 1541 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 781 F. 2d 298, 310-311 (CA2 1986)).
The dissent argued that any intentional or reckless alteration would prove actual malice, so long as a passage within quotation marks purports to be a verbatim rendition of what was said, contains material inaccuracies, and is defamatory. 895 F. 2d, at 1562-1570. We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 808 (1990), and now reverse.
II
A
Under California law, “[l]ibel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation.” Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 45 (West 1982). False attribution of statements to a person may constitute libel, if the falsity exposes that person to an injury comprehended by the statute. See Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1132, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (1985); Cameron v. Wernick, 251 Cal. App. 2d 890, 60 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1967); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213, 127 P. 2d 577, 581 (1942); cf. Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 42 Cal. 3d 254, 260-261, 721 P. 2d 87, 90-91 (1986). It matters not under California law that petitioner alleges only part of the work at issue to be false. “[T]he test of libel is not quantitative; a single sentence may be the basis for an action in libel even though buried in a much longer text,” though the California courts recognize that “[w]hile a drop of poison may be lethal, weaker poisons are sometimes diluted to the point of impotency.” Washburn v. Wright, 261 Cal. App. 2d 789, 795, 68 Cal. Rptr. 224, 228 (1968).
The First Amendment limits California’s libel law in various respects. When, as here, the plaintiff is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice, i. e., with “knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964). Mere negligence does not suffice. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the author “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), or acted with a “high degree of awareness of... probable falsity,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74 (1964).
Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will. See Greenbelt Cooper ative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6 (1970). We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation, and we continue to do so here. But the term can confuse as well as enlighten. In this respect, the phrase may be an unfortunate one. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657, 666, n. 7 (1989). In place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury instructions refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. This definitional principle must be remembered in the case before us.
B
In general, quotation marks around a passage indicate to the reader that the passage reproduces the speaker’s words verbatim. They inform the reader that he or she is reading the statement of the speaker, not a paraphrase or other indirect interpretation by an author. By providing this information, quotations add authority to the statement and credibility to the author’s work. Quotations allow the reader to form his or her own conclusions and to assess the conclusions of the author, instead of relying entirely upon the author’s characterization of her subject.
A fabricated quotation may injure reputation in at least two senses, either giving rise to a conceivable claim of defamation. First, the quotation might injure because it attributes an untrue factual assertion to the speaker. An example would be a fabricated quotation of a public official admitting he had been convicted of a serious crime when in fact he had not.
Second, regardless of the truth or falsity of the factual matters asserted within the quoted statement, the attribution may result in injury to reputation because the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold. John Lennon once was quoted as saying of the Beatles, “We’re more popular than Jesus Christ now.” Time, Aug. 12, 1966, p. 38. Supposing the quotation had been a fabrication, it appears California law could permit recovery for defamation because, even without regard to the truth of the underlying assertion, false attribution of the statement could have injured his reputation. Here, in like manner, one need not determine whether petitioner is or is not the greatest analyst who ever lived in order to determine that it might have injured his reputation to be reported as having so proclaimed.
A self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force criticism by another. It is against self-interest to admit one’s own criminal liability, arrogance, or lack of integrity, and so all the more easy to credit when it happens. This principle underlies the elemental rule of evidence which permits the introduction of statements against interest, despite their hearsay character, because we assume “that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 789 (citing Hileman v. Northwest Engineering Co., 346 F. 2d 668 (CA6 1965)).
Of course, quotations do not always convey that the speaker actually said or wrote the quoted material. “Punctuation marks, like words', have many uses. Writers often use quotation

Question: What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed?
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过. Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota
电. Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi
询. Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri
符. Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada
未. New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire
程. New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey
常. New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York
条. North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina
当. Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio
情. Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon
口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
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