Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Scalia
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Stevens join.
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a state social-services agency could not lawfully treat personal injury awards as income when determining the eligibility of families seeking Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. Reed v. Health & Human Services, 774 F. 2d 1270 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F. 2d 474 (1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 477 U. S. 903 (1986).
I
Under the AFDC program, participating States that provide financial assistance to families with needy, dependent children are partially reimbursed by the Federal Government. 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§601-615 (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Although the States are largely free to determine the appropriate standard of need and the level of assistance, they must administer their assistance plans in conformity with applicable federal statutes and with regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Those statutes require States to consider a family’s “income and resources” when determining whether or not it is needy, 53 Stat. 1379, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(7)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), and prohibit them from providing AFDC benefits for any month in which either income or resources exceed state-prescribed limits (subject to a federal ceiling), 95 Stat. 844, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 602(a)(7)(B), 602(a)(17), 602(a)(18) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Because income eligibility and resource eligibility are separately computed (and also because state limits for the two generally differ), whether and for how long a family that acquires a sum of money is rendered ineligible for AFDC benefits may depend on whether the sum is classified as income or as a resource. Prior to 1981, however, the importance of the classification was minimized by an HHS requirement that States treat any income received in a given month as a resource in following months. Thus, a family that received an amount of income that exceeded the State’s income limit would be automatically ineligible for one month; whether or not it remained ineligible in subsequent months would depend on whether the amount of that income that had not yet been spent, combined with the value of the family’s other resources, exceeded the State’s resource limit. The Secretary of HHS became concerned that AFDC recipients who acquired a large amount of income had an incentive to spend it as rapidly as possible, in order to regain eligibility by reducing their resources to a level beneath the State’s resource limit. To solve this problem, the Secretary proposed and Congress passed an amendment to the AFDC statute. Under that amendment, AFDC recipients who receive an amount of income that exceeds the State’s standard of need are rendered ineligible for as many months as that income would last if the recipients spent an amount equal to the State’s standard of need each month. Section 2304 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), 95 Stat. 845, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(17) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
Because the OBRA amendment applies by its terms only to income, the distinction between income and resources took on new importance. If a given sum of money were treated as a resource, the family that received the sum would be ineligible only until it spent enough of the sum to bring its resources down to the State’s resource limit; but if the sum were treated as income, no matter how much was spent, the family would remain ineligible for the statutory period. In response to the OBRA amendment, the Virginia Department of Social Services (the agency responsible for administering Virginia’s AFDC program) revised its regulations to treat various lump-sum payments, including personal injury awards, as income rather than as resources. Virginia Department of Social Services, ADC Manual (Va. ADC Manual) §305.4C (Jan. 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71. It did not, however, alter its policy of treating the proceeds of the sale or conversion of real or personal property — including property damage awards — as resources. §303.3, App. 25.
Respondents, who had received personal injury awards and were disqualified from Virginia’s AFDC program for varying periods pursuant to Virginia’s revised regulations, filed a class action against the Secretary and petitioner Lukhard, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Social Services, in the United States District Court for the District of Western Virginia. They alleged that treating personal injury awards as income was inconsistent with the federal AFDC statute, and they sought monetary, injunc-tive, and declaratory relief under Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983, 5 U. S. C. §§701-706, and 28 U. S. C. §§2201-2202. After certifying a class of those whose AFDC benefits had been or would be decreased as a result of Virginia’s revised regulations, the District Court granted summary judgment in the class’ favor. It held that the common meaning of the term “income” precluded application of that term to personal injury awards, and that it was irrational for Virginia to treat personal injury awards as income but at the same time treat awards for property loss as resources. The District Court therefore issued an injunction forbidding Lukhard to apply the revised regulations to recipients of personal injury awards, ordering him to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named plaintiffs and other class members who would presently have been receiving them but for application of the revised regulations, and requiring him to notify AFDC recipients who had been deprived of past AFDC benefits as a result of the revised regulations. The court declined, however, to order Lukhard to pay retroactive AFDC benefits, and stayed the injunction pending appeal except insofar as it required Lukhard to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named plaintiffs. Lukhard and the Secretary appealed and the respondents cross-appealed. After the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in all respects, Reed v. Health & Human Services, 774 F. 2d 1270 (1985), Lukhard filed this petition. The Secretary did not file a separate petition but supported Lukhard’s petition and supports Lukhard’s position on the merits.
r-H ) — I
Respondents principal contention is that Virginia’s revised regulations are inconsistent with the meaning of “income” and “resources” as those terms are used in the AFDC statute. To support this argument they first advance the broader proposition that it does violence to common usage to interpret “income” to include personal injury awards. This argument begins from the premise that since personal injury awards are purely compensatory, they do not result in any gain to their recipients. And since both general and legal sources define “income” as involving gain, see, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1143 (1976) (“a gain or recurrent benefit that is usu. measured in money...”); 42 C. J. S., Income, p. 531 (1944) (“In common speech ‘income’ generally is understood as gain or profit...” (footnote omitted)); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920) (“‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined/ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets...” (quoting Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1918))), respondents conclude that personal injury awards cannot fairly be characterized as income. But the premise that personal injury awards cannot involve gain is obviously false, since they often are intended in significant part to compensate for the loss of gain, e. g., lost wages. See Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F. 2d, at 476. Since the gain would have been income, surely at least that part of a personal injury award that replaces it must also be income. More importantly, however, as Lukhard and the Secretary point out, general and legal sources also commonly define “income” to mean “any money that comes in,” without regard to any related expenses incurred and without any requirement that the transactions producing the money result in a net gain. See, e. g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 162 (1933) (“That which comes in... (considered in reference to its amount, and commonly expressed in money);... receipts...”); 42 C. J. S., Income, p. 529 (1944) (“Generally or ordinarily the term means all that comes in;... something which is paid over and delivered to the recipient;... without reference to the outgoing expenditures...” (footnotes omitted)); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184 (1985) (“income” under the AFDC statute means gross income, without reference to expenses reasonably attributable to its earning). Heckler is particularly significant, since there we indicated that the part of an employee’s salary that is allocated to work-related expenses — clearly not a gain in the sense that term is used by respondents —is properly treated as “income” under the AFDC statute. Id., at 202. Although that con-elusion was based in part on a provision not involved in this case, it demonstrates that the AFDC statute itself contradicts the theory that payments that do not constitute gain (as respondents use the term) to their recipients cannot reasonably be described as “income.” Thus, contrary to respondents’ assertion, Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with a perfectly natural use of “income.”
Respondents also seek to derive support from the fact that personal injury awards are not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code, the Food Stamp program, or the HHS poverty guidelines. See 26 U. S. C. § 104(a); 91 Stat. 962, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(d)(8); 48 Fed. Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983). But in each of these instances there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not to be treated as income— which causes them not only to fail to support the proposition that the term “income” automatically excludes personal injury awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it embraces them. Moreover, the fact that Congress was silent in the AFDC statute but has elsewhere been explicit when it wished to exclude personal injury awards from income tends to refute rather than support a legislative intent to exclude them from AFDC computations. Cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983). Nor is there any merit to respondents’ slightly different argument that since the relevant provisions of the Food Stamp program, the HHS poverty guidelines, and the AFDC statute have the common goal of defining who is needy, they should be presumed to have a common definition of “income” — one that necessarily excludes personal injury awards. The explicit differences between the definition of “income” in the Food Stamp program and the HHS poverty guidelines on the one hand and the AFDC statute on the other are simply too great to permit any such presumption. Compare 91 Stat. 962, 7 U. S. C. § 2014(d)(8) (Food Stamp program excludes all nonrecurring lump-sum payments, including retroactive lump-sum Social Security benefits), and 48 Fed. Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983) (HHS poverty guidelines exclude capital gains, gifts, and lump-sum inheritances), with Brief for Respondents 47 (conceding that retroactive Social Security benefits and other lump-sum payments that represent a true gain are income under the AFDC statute).
Respondents’ next contention is that Virginia’s treatment of personal injury awards is inconsistent with the administrative and legislative history of the AFDC statute. They first argue that for many years, and at least until 1981, HHS in fact took the position that personal injury awards were not “income” under the AFDC statute. But the materials upon which respondents rely do not support this contention, and indicate at most that HHS took no position on the question. See HHS Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Part IV, S-3120, Supplement for Administrative Use (Sept. 6, 1957), App. 58 (retroactive Social Security payments are income, but an award to compensate for the loss of a hand or foot might not be); HHS Memorandum of June 7, 1973, App. 55-56 (retroactive Social Security payments are income); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Lockhart v. Harden, No. C74-390A (ND Ga.), App. 61 (HHS regulations require that retroactive Social Security payments be treated as income but do not require that awards for damages be so treated). In fact, as Lukhard and the Secretary point out, there is evidence that HHS has for many years interpreted the AFDC statute to at least 'permit States to treat personal injury awards as income. See, e. g., 51 Fed. Reg. 9191, 9196 (1986) (“[U]nder longstanding federal policy..., a State agency has had the option to treat [e. g., personal injury awards] as resources instead of as income”); HHS Letter of October 17, 1983, App. 66 (“Based on longstanding precedent, States have historically had the option to consider nonrecurring lump-sum payments as either unearned income or resources. With the implementation of [the OBRA amendment], States continued to exercise this latitude”); HHS Memorandum of July 6, 1983, App. 47 (under current HHS policy, States are free to treat insurance settlements either as income or as resources; California apparently treats them as income); HHS Letter of April 8, 1982, App. 62-63 (States are free to treat damage claim settlements as income or as resources). See also Brief for State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae 5 (HHS has permitted States to treat personal injury awards as income under the OBRA amendment). Thus, the Secretary’s interpretation of the AFDC statute— which is entitled to deference, see, e. g., Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 126 (1986) — actually undermines rather than supports respondents’ claim that Virginia cannot lawfully treat personal injury awards as income.
Respondents also make two arguments based upon the legislative history of the 1981 OBRA amendment. First, they argue that the Congress that passed the OBRA amendment must have been aware of HHS’ longstanding position that “income” excluded personal injury awards, and that its use of “income” in the OBRA amendment therefore necessarily indicated an intent that the term be interpreted in that manner. It is of course not true that whenever Congress enacts legislation using a word that has a given administrative interpretation it means to freeze that administrative interpretation in place. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 100-101 (1939). But if that were the case here, it would damage rather than aid respondents’ cause, since, as we have seen, HHS’ position at the time of the OBRA amendment was that it was permissible for States to treat personal injury awards as income.
At oral argument, respondents sought to derive support from a legislative hearing conducted while the OBRA amendment was under consideration, in which the Secretary submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee a document estimating that the amendment would eliminate 5,000 families from the AFDC rolls each year. Hearings on Tax Aspects of the President’s Economic Program before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 266-266 (1981), App. 75-76. The record suggests that Virginia has been terminating over 400 families each year under the revised regulations it promulgated to implement the OBRA amendment. Since Virginia has only 1.6% of the national AFDC caseload, respondents argue, it should only be terminating 80 families each year according to the Secretary’s estimate. But even granting the accuracy of respondents’ numerical analysis —which petitioner and the Secretary have had no opportunity to contest — and ignoring the dubious authority of an unexplained forecast made during a committee hearing, the disparity respondents note does not provide the faintest support for an inference that the Congress which passed the OBRA amendment understood the AFDC statute to exclude personal injury awards from income. The record indicates that only about one-third of the families removed from the rolls in Virginia were removed as a result of personal injury awards; since the number of remaining terminations still far exceeds the Secretary’s forecast (about 270 instead of 80), the disparity certainly is not explicable by Virginia’s decision to treat personal injury awards as income. One is left with the suspicion that the error was in the Secretary’s forecast. Nothing respondents have identified in the legislative history of the OBRA amendment supports the conclusion that Virginia’s revised regulations are unlawful.
Respondents’ penultimate argument is that logic requires personal injury awards to be treated as resources rather than income. The argument rests upon the following syllogism: (1) healthy bodies are resources; (2) personal injury awards merely compensate for damage to healthy bodies; and therefore (3) personal injury awards necessarily are resources too. We have already noted that the minor premise of this syllogism is false, see supra, at 375-376. More importantly, however, so is the major premise. Although there is a sense in which a healthy body can be said to be a resource, it certainly is not one within the meaning of the AFDC statute and regulations, which count only real and personal property (including liquid assets). See 95 Stat. 844, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 45 CFR §§ 233.20(a)(3)(i)(B), (ii)(E) (1986). Since healthy bodies are worth far more than the statute’s $1,000 family resource limit, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(B), acceptance of respondents’ major premise would render every family ineligible for AFDC benefits. The fact that the AFDC statute and its implementing regulations consider only real and personal property in determining families’ resources permits (if it does not indeed require) the conclusion that personal injury awards are compensation for diminution of well-being of a kind not covered by the AFDC statute, except to the extent they compensate for lost wages (to which extent they clearly are gain, see supra, at 375) or for economic expenses caused by the injury (to which extent Virginia permits them to be in large part offset, see n. 1, supra). Thus, personal injury awards are almost entirely a gain in well-being, as well-being is measured under the AFDC statute, and can reasonably be treated as income even on respondents’ definition of the term.
Once this is understood, it is clear that Virginia’s policy of treating personal injury awards as income but property damages awards as resources is also reasonable. The former can be viewed as increasing their recipients’ pecuniary well-being, and the latter as merely restoring resources to previous levels. The existence of this distinction, coupled with the substantial deference owed to the Secretary’s conclusion that Virginia’s revised regulations are consistent with HHS’ regulations, see, e. g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986), leads us to reject respondents’ argument that the difference in treatment violates HHS’ regulation requiring that “eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 始