Task: songer_app_stid

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

PER CURIAM.
Arthur Summer was adjudicated a bankrupt upon his voluntary petition on April 20, 1938. In due course he presented his petition for a discharge from his debts, to which the appellant, Manufacturers Trust Company, filed specifications of objection, praying that the indebtedness owing to it be excepted from any order granting a discharge to the bankrupt. Its specifications alleged the following facts: In 1930 the bankrupt and another were duly adjudicated bankrupt individually and as co-partners doing business under the firm name and style of Ben Schindelheim & Co.; in such prior bankruptcy proceeding the appellant was scheduled as a creditor and filed its proof of claim based on promissory notes in the amount of $11,500 made by the said partners; no application for a discharge from his debts was ever made by the bankrupt in such prior proceeding; thereafter, in 1933, the appellant obtained a judgment against the bankrupt in the sum of $13,826.85, such judgment representing the principal due on said notes, interest to the date of judgment .and costs; and in the present proceeding the bankrupt has scheduled the appellant ns a creditor for said indebtedness. The bankrupt’s exceptions to the specifications of objection to his discharge denied none of the foregoing facts, but asserted as a legal conclusion that the appellant’s judgment was not the same debt as was íisted by the bankrupt in his schedules in the prior bankruptcy proceeding and, being a new debt, was properly dischargeable. The district judge sustained the exceptions and granted a discharge in the customary form.
It is apparent from the authorities cited by the district judge in a short memorandum of decision, In re Sutton, D.C., 19 F.Supp. 892, and In re Devereaux, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 522, that he believed that the issue before him was the right to a discharge and that the objecting creditor must be relegated to another forum for a determination of the effectiveness of the discharge as a bar to the debt. This was a plain misapprehension of the applicable law. As the debt scheduled in the first proceeding was dischargeable therein, the failure of the bankrupt to apply for a discharge in that proceeding precludes him from obtaining a discharge of the same debt in the later proceeding. See In re Schwartz, 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 172, where the authorities were recently reviewed by this court. Within this rule the reduction of the appellant’s claim to judgment did not make the debt a new or different one. In re Kuffler, 2 Cir., 168 F. 1021, certiorari denied, 214 U.S. 520, 29 S.Ct. 701, 53 L.Ed. 1066; In re Schnabel, D.C., 166 F. 383. Nor can the bankrupt successfully maintain his contention that in the prior proceeding only the partnership was adjudicated bankrupt, for the objecting creditor’s specifications allege, and the bankrupt’s exceptions admit, that the partners were also adjudicated individually.
In a case where the debts listed in both bankruptcy proceedings are the same, a discharge may be denied altogether in the later proceeding, as was done in In re Schwartz, supra; but where the later proceeding includes additional debts, the practice is to grant a discharge which specifically excepts from its operation the debts that were listed in the prior proceeding, See Freshman v. Atkins, 269 U.S. 121, 46 S.Ct. 41, 70 L.Ed. 193; In re Zeiler, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 539, and authorities there collected. Indeed, it appears to be necessary for the creditor to obtain such an exception if his claim is to be preserved against the bar of the discharge. See Bluthenthal v. Jones, 208 U.S. 64, 28 S.Ct. 192, 52 L.Ed. 390. The record in the case at. bar does not disclose that additional debts were scheduled in the later proceeding but on oral argument counsel so stated. Therefore, the district court should have overruled the exceptions and should have granted a discharge- with the appellant’s claim specifically excepted from it. The order must be modified accordingly, and it is so ordered.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?
年. not
数. Alabama
日. Alaska
的. Arizona
月. Arkansas
用. California
成. Colorado
名. Connecticut
时. Delaware
件. Florida
一. Georgia
请. Hawaii
中. Idaho
据. Illinois
码. Indiana
不. Iowa
新. Kansas
文. Kentucky
下. Louisiana
分. Maine
入. Maryland
人. Massachussets
功. Michigan
上. Minnesota
户. Mississippi
为. Missouri
间. Montana
号. Nebraska
取. Nevada
回. New
在. New
页. New
字. New
有. North
个. North
作. Ohio
示. Oklahoma
出. Oregon
是. Pennsylvania
失. Rhode
表. South
除. South
加. Tennessee
败. Texas
生. Utah
信. Vermont
类. Virginia
置. Washington
理. West
本. Wisconsin
息. Wyoming
行. Virgin
定. Puerto
改. District
市. Guam
期. not
以. Panama
Answer:

Answer: 年