Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886), held that an action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness is maintainable under federal maritime law, but left the shaping of the new nonstatutory action to future cases. The question in this case is whether the widow of a longshoreman may maintain such an action for the wrongful death of her husband — alleged to have resulted from injuries suffered by him while aboard a vessel in navigable waters — after the decedent recovered damages in his lifetime for his injuries.
Respondent's husband suffered severe injuries while working as a longshoreman aboard petitioner’s vessel, the S. S. Claiborne, in Louisiana navigable waters. He recovered $140,000 for his permanent disability, physical agony, and loss of earnings in an action based on unseaworthiness, but died shortly after the action was terminated. Respondent brought this wrongful-death action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for damages suffered by her. Based on her husband’s recovery, the District Court dismissed the widow’s suit on grounds of res judicata and failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Moragne gave “Mrs. Gaudet... a compen-sable cause of action for Mr. Gaudet’s death wholly apart from and not extinguished by the latter’s recovery for his personal injuries....” 463 F. 2d 1331, 1332 (1972). We granted certiorari, 411 U. S. 963 (1973), and now affirm.
I
The harshness of the Harrisburg rule that in the absence of a statute, there is no maritime action for wrongful death, was only partially relieved by enactment of federal and state wrongful-death statutes. The Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. §§ 761-768, created a wrongful-death action for death outside the three-mile limit. The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688, incorporating the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60, established such an action based on negligence for the wrongful death of a seaman regardless of the situs of the wrong; but otherwise, wrongful-death actions for deaths occurring on navigable waters within the three-mile territorial waters of a State depended upon whether the State had enacted a wrongful-death statute and, if so, whether the statute permitted recovery.
Moragne reflected dissatisfaction with this state of the law that illogically and unjustifiably deprived the dependents of many maritime death victims of an adequate remedy for their losses. Three clearly unjust consequences were of particular concern:
“The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg holds sway: - within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed....
“The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit — since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958)—but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims....
“The third, and assertedly the ‘strangest’ anomaly is that a true seaman — that is, a member of a ship’s company, covered by the Jones Act — is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute (footnote omitted).” 398 U. S., at 395-396.
In overruling The Harrisburg, Moragne ended these anomalies by the creation of a uniform federal cause of action for maritime death, designed to extend to the dependents of maritime wrongful-death victims admiralty’s “special solicitude for the welfare of those men who under [take] to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.” Id., at 387. Our approach to the resolution of the issue before us must necessarily be consistent with the extension of this “special solicitude” to the dependents of the seafaring decedent.
Petitioner, Sea-Land Services, Inc. (Sea-Land), would attach no significance to this extension in shaping the maritime wrongful-death remedy. It argues that the wrongful-death remedy should recognize no loss independent of the decedent’s claim for his personal injuries, and therefore that respondent had a wrongful-death remedy only “in the event Gaudet failed to prosecute [his own claim] during his lifetime.” Brief for Petitioner 6. But Moragne had already implicitly rejected that argument; for we there recognized that a single tortious act might result in two distinct, though related harms, giving rise to two separate causes of action: “in the case of mere injury, the person physically harmed is made whole for his harm, while in the case of death, those closest to him- — usually spouse and children — seek to recover for their total loss of one on whom they depended.” Id., at 382. Thus, Moragne created a true wrongful-death remedy- — -founded upon the death itself and independent of any action the decedent may have had for his own personal injuries. Because the respondent’s suit involves a different cause of action, it is not precluded by res judicata. For res judicata operates only to bar
“repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. [The bar] rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound 'not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.' Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352. The judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some other factor invalidating the judgment. See Von Moschzisker, 'Res Judicata,' 38 Yale L. J. 299; Restatement of the Law of Judgments, §§ 47, 48.” Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597 (1948).
To be sure, a majority of courts interpreting state and federal wrongful-death statutes have held that an action for wrongful death is barred by the decedent’s recovery for injuries during his lifetime. But the bar does not appear to rest in those cases so much upon principles of res judicata or public policy as upon statutory limitations on the wrongful-death action. As one authority has noted, "[t]he fact that all civil remedies for wrongful death derive from statute has important consequences. Since the right was unknown to common law, the legislatures which created the right were free to impose restrictions upon it.” 2 Harper & James § 24.1, p. 1285. Thus, England’s Lord Campbell’s Act, the first wrongful-death statute, permits recovery “whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by [the] wrongful Act... [of another] and the Act... is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages in respect thereof....” Early English cases interpreting the Act held that this language conditioned wrongful-death recovery upon the existence of an actionable cause of the decedent at his death; if the deceased had reduced his claim to judgment and settled with or released his tortfeasor, and therefore up to the time he died could not have maintained a further action for his injuries, his dependents could have no cause of action for his wrongful death. Since Lord Campbell’s Act became the prototype of American wrongful-death statutes, most state statutes contained nearly identical language and have been similarly interpreted by state courts. Though the federal wrongful-death statutes do not contain the same controversial language, the FELA, at least, has been held to be “essentially identical with” Lord Campbell’s Act, Michigan C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 69 (1913), and therefore similar restrictions have been placed on FELA wrongful-death recovery. Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335, 345 (1928).
Moragne, on the other hand, requires that the shape of the new maritime wrongful-death remedy (not a statutory creation but judge-made, see The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, 611 (1959) (opinion of Brennan, J.)) be guided by the principle of maritime law that “certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules,” The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C. C. Md. 1865), quoted in Moragne, 398 U. S., at 387. Since the policy underlying the remedy is to insure compensation of the dependents for their losses resulting from the decedent's death, the remedy should not be precluded merely because the decedent, during his lifetime, is able to obtain a judgment for his own personal injuries. No statutory language or “established and inflexible rules” of maritime law require a contrary conclusion.
II
Sea-Land argues that, if dependents are not prevented from bringing a separate cause of action for wrongful death in cases where the decedent has already received a judgment for his personal injuries, then necessarily it will be subject to double liability. In order to evaluate this argument it is necessary first to identify the particular harms suffered by the dependents, for which the maritime wrongful-death remedy permits recovery of damages. In identifying these compensable harms, we are not without useful guides; for in Moragne we recognized that with respect to “particular questions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for decades. The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill.” 398 U. S., at 408. Our review of those authorities, and the policies of maritime law, persuade us that, under the maritime wrongful-death remedy, the decedent’s dependents may recover damages for their loss of support, services, and society, as well as funeral expenses.
Recovery for loss of support has been universally recognized, and includes all the financial contributions that the decedent would have made to his dependents had he lived. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state wrongful-death acts and courts interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act have permitted recovery for the monetary value of services the decedent provided and would have continued to provide but for his wrongful death. Such services include, for example, the nurture, training, education, and guidance that a child would have received had not the parent been wrongfully killed. Services the decedent performed at home or for his spouse are also compensable.
Compensation for loss of society, however, presents a closer question. The term “society” embraces a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection. Unquestionably, the deprivation of these benefits by wrongful death 4s a grave loss to the decedent’s dependents. Despite this fact, a number of early wrongful-death statutes were interpreted by courts to preclude recovery for these losses on the ground that the statutes were intended to provide compensation only for “pecuniary loss,” and that the loss of society is not such an economic loss. Other wrongful-death statutes contain express language limiting recovery to pecuniary losses; for example, the Death on the High Seas Act limits recovery to “a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought...,” 46 U. S. C. § 762 (emphasis added), and consequently has been construed to exclude recovery for the loss of society.
A clear majority of States, on the other hand, have rejected such a narrow view of damages, and, either by express statutory provision or by judicial construction, permit recovery for loss of society. This expansion of damages recoverable under wrongful-death statutes to include loss of society has led one commentator to observe that “[w]hether such damages are classified as 'pecuniary/ or recognized and allowed as non-pecuniary, the recent trend is unmistakably in favor of permitting such recovery.” Speiser 218. Thus, our decision to permit recovery for loss of society aligns the maritime wrongful-death remedy with a majority of state wrongful-death statutes. But in any event, our decision is compelled if we are to shape the remedy to comport with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show “special solicitude” for those who are injured within its jurisdiction.
Objection to permitting recovery for loss of society often centers upon the fear that such damages are somewhat speculative and that factfinders will return excessive verdicts. We were not unaware of this objection in Moragne, where we said:
“[O]ther courts have recognized that calculation of the loss sustained by dependents or by the estate of the deceased, which is required under most present wrongful-death statutes... does not present difficulties more insurmountable than assessment of damages for many nonfatal personal injuries.” 398 U. S., at 385.
For example, juries are often called upon to measure damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish in disfigurement cases, or intentional infliction of emotional harm. In fact, since the 17th century, juries have assessed damages for loss of consortium — which encompasses loss of society — in civil actions brought by husbands whose wives have been negligently injured. More recently, juries have been asked to measure loss of consortium suffered by wives whose husbands have been negligently harmed. Relying on this history, the Florida Supreme Court recognized as early as 1899 that the damages for loss of society recovered by a wife for the wrongful death of her husband were “no more fanciful or speculative than the frugality, industry, usefulness, attention and tender solicitude of a wife [all of which a husband might recover at common law in an action for consortium], and the one can be compensated [as easily] by that simple standard of pecuniary loss... as the other.” Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 73, 25 So. 338, 348.
We are confident that the measure of damages for loss of society in a maritime wrongful-death action can “be left to turn mainly upon the good sense and deliberate judgment of the tribunal assigned by law to ascertain what is a just compensation for the injuries inflicted.” The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 453, 464 (1880). As in all damages awards for tortious injury, “[insistence on mathematical precision would be illusory and the judge or juror must be allowed a fair latitude to make reasonable approximations guided by judgment and practical experience,” Whitaker v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 296 F. 2d 554, 555 (CA4 1961). Moreover, appellate tribunals have amply demonstrated their ability to control excessive awards, see, e. g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F. 2d 583 (CA2 1961); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F. 2d 1386 (CA3 1971).
Finally, in addition to recovery for loss of support, services, and society, damages for funeral expenses may be awarded under the maritime wrongful-death remedy in circumstances where the decedent’s dependents have either paid for the funeral or are liable for its payment. A majority of States provided for such recovery under their wrongful-death statutes. Furthermore, although there is a conflict over whether funeral expenses are com-pensable under the Death on the High Seas Act, compare The Culberson, 61 F. 2d 194 (CA3 1932), with Moore v. The O S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816 (SD Tex. 1963), aff’d, sub nom. Wilhelm Seafoods, Inc. v. Moore, 328 F. 2d 868 (CA5 1964), it is clear that funeral expenses were permitted under the general maritime law prior to The Harrisburg, see, e. g., Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6,625) (Md. 1879). We therefore find no persuasive reason for not following the earlier admiralty rule and thus hold that funeral expenses are compensable.
Turning now to Sea-Land’s double-liability argument, we note that, in contrast to the elements of damages which we today hold may be recovered in a maritime wrongful-death action, the decedent recovered damages only for his loss of past and future wages, pain and suffering, and medical and incidental expenses. Obviously, the decedent’s recovery did not include damages for the dependents’ loss of services or of society, and funeral expenses. Indeed, these losses — unique to the decedent’s dependents — could not accrue until the decedent’s death. Thus, recovery of damages for these losses in the maritime wrongful-death action will not subject Sea-Land to double liability or provide the dependents with a windfall.
There is, however, an apparent overlap between the decedent’s recovery for loss of future wages and the dependents’ subsequent claim for support. In most instances, the dependents’ support will derive, at least in part, from the decedent’s wages. But, when a tortfeasor has already fully compensated the decedent, during his lifetime, for his loss of future wages, the tortfeasor should not be required to make further compensation in a subsequent wrongful-death suit for any portion of previously paid wages. Any potential for such double liability can be eliminated by the application of familiar principles of collateral estoppel to preclude a decedent’s dependents from attempting to relitigate the issue of the support due from the decedent’s future wages.
Collateral estoppel applies
“where the second action between the same parties is upon a different cause or demand.... In this situation, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.' Cromwell v. County of Sac, [94 U. S. 351,] 353. And see Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 48; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 671. Since the cause of action involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though such points might have been tendered and decided at that time. But matters which were actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding cannot later be relitigated.” Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S., at 597-598.
And while the general rule is that nonparties to the first action are not bound by a judgment or resulting determination of issues, see Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320-327 (1971), several exceptions exist. The pertinent exception here is that nonparties may be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues necessarily decided in a suit brought by a party who acts as a fiduciary representative for the beneficial interest of the nonparties. In such cases, “the beneficiaries are bouhd by the judgment with respect to the interest which was the subject of the fiduciary relationship ; they are... bound by the rules of collateral estop-pel in suits upon different causes of action,” F. James, Civil Procedure § 11.28, p. 592 (1965).
Under the prevailing American rule, a tort victim suing for damages for permanent injuries is permitted to base his recovery “on his prospective earnings for the balance of his life expectancy at the time of his injury undiminished by any shortening of that expectancy as a result of the injury,” 2 Harper & James § 24.6, pp. 1293-1294 (emphasis in original). Thus, when a decedent brings his own personal-injury action during his lifetime and recovers damages for his lost wages he acts in a fiduciary capacity to the extent that he represents his dependents' interest in that portion of his prospective earnings which, but for his wrongful death, they had a reasonable expectation of his providing for their support. Since the decedent’s recovery of any future wages will normally be dependent upon his fully litigating that issue, we need not fear that applying principles of collateral estoppel to pre-elude the decedent’s dependents’ claim for a portion of those future wages will deprive the dependents of their day in court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The jury reduced a verdict of $175,000 by 20% because of decedent’s contributory negligence.
Wrongful-death statutes are to be distinguished from survival statutes. The latter have been separately enacted to abrogate the common-law rule that an action for tort abated at the death of either the injured person or the tortfeasor. Survival statutes permit the deceased’s estate to prosecute any claims for personal injury the deceased would have had, but for his death. They do not permit recovery for harms suffered by the deceased’s family as a result of his death. See Michigan C. B. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913); Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 114 (1924) (hereafter Schumacher); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Col. L. Rev. 239 (1929); Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions, A Proposal for California Legislation, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 63 (1949); New York Law Revision Commission Report 157 et seq. (1935). The underlying reasons for survival statutes have been summarized by Professor Harper:
“At early common law,

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 输