Task: songer_numappel

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District for the defendant (ap-pellee here).
Appellant (plaintiff below) filed a declaration in three counts. A demurrer was interposed, whieh was sustained, and plaintiff by leave of court filed an amended declaration. To this, a. demurrer was filed and sustained. By leave of court, a second amended declaration was filed. Again a demurrer was interposed and sustained. Again leave was given to amend, but plaintiff elected to stand on her second amended declaration.
In the first count of the declaration it is alleged that defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the District of Columbia; that from the 4th of October, 1927, to the 29th. of August, 1928, plaintiff “was in. the possession and occupancy of premises known as Apartment 606, at 130.1 Mass. Avenue, Northwest, in the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, and paid rent to the defendant for the occupancy of the said premises”; that the possession and occupancy of the premises was held by her under and by virtue of a certain lease to her in writing, dated the 4th day of October, 1927, for the period of twelve months, commencing on the 1st of October, 1927, and whieh said lease was on- the 29th day of August, 1928, in full force and effect; that on the 29th of August, 1928, she was not in default “of any of the terms and conditions of the said lease”; that upon the 29th of August, 1928, “while she was in the possession and occupancy of the said premises as aforesaid, under said lease, she attempted to enter the said premises and was wrongfully and unlawfully prevented by the defendant from doing so. The said defendant wrongfully and unlawfully blocking her entrance into said premises, and wrongfully and unlawfully prohibiting her from entering the same.” She further alleges “that by reason of the premises, she has been put to great inconvenience and annoyance, mortification and humiliation, and her business has been ruined and destroyed.”
The second count differs from the first, in that it is alleged that the plaintiff held the premises as a tenant by 'sufferance, “without an agreement for a term.”
The third count is substantially, like the second.
Defendant contends, and evidently the court below found, that “the form of the action is misconceived, it being impossible from the structure and phraseology of the declaration to determine whether it is intended to be in trespass, covenant, ease or some other form.”
This being plaintiff’s third attempt to state her ease, it must be assumed that she has stated it in its most favorable aspect. Sloan v. Thompson, 58 App. D. C. 318, 30 F.(2d) 560; Lyons v. Reinecke (C. C. A.) 10 F.(2d) 3, 7; Chambers v. Whelen (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 340, 341. She alleges that she “paid rent to the defendant for the occupancy of the said premises.” Her failure to allege that the defendant was the lessor or owner justifies the inference that it merely collected the rent for the landlord. Had the relationship of landlord and tenant existed, it would have been very easy for the pleader to have alleged the facts out of which such a relationship sprang. Certainly collecting rent for the landlord does not make the collector a landlord. Further support is found for this conclusion in the averment that “the said premises aforesaid was held by her under and by virtue of a certain lease to her in writing,” etc. Here, again, the pleader for some reason failed to reveal the identity of the lessor. Why? Certainly it may not be assumed that the defendant was the lessor.
Notwithstanding the failure of plaintiff to allege facts giving rise to the relationship of landlord and tenant, her counsel contended below, and contends here, that the action is against the defendant as landlord for disturbing its tenant in the possession of the premises; in other words, that this is an action ex contractu. For the reasons already indicated, we are of the view that the declaration does not state such a cause of action. Nor is it our duty in the circumstances to attempt a reconstruction of plaintiff’s declaration to make a case differing from that evidently intended. “Having therefore, elected to stand on the complaint as it is now written, there is no reason why the court should attempt to give to their pleading some form and theory which they themselves are unwilling to adopt.” Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N. Y. 163, 169, 149 N. E. 338, 340, 43 A. L. R. 512. See, also, Schilling v. Moore, 34 Okl. 155, 125 P. 487.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1