Task: songer_genstand

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the agency articulate the appropriate general standard?" This question includes whether the agency interpreted the statute "correctly". The courts often refer here to the rational basis test, plain meaning, reasonable construction of the statute, congressional intent, etc. This issue also includes question of which law applies or whether amended law vs law before amendment applies. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge.
No. 2244 is' an appeal from a judgment in an action at law for a refund of taxes paid under protest by the executors of the will of John B. Pierce, who died on June 23, 1917, at Peabody, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts. His will was duly proved and allowed, and the plaintiffs, together with Frank M. Peters, since deceased, wlero qualified as executors. No. 2245 is a cross-appeal by the collector, against whom the action was brought.
■ The testator'was a large owner of the stock of the American Radiator Company, with which he had been connected for many years. He made several specific bequests of shares of stock in this corporation, and in. paragraph 17 of his’ will disposed of the residue as follows;
“Paragraph 17. Ail the rest, residue and remainder of my estate and property, whether real, personal or mixed, owned by me at the time of my death, wheresoever situated, I give, deviso and bequeath unto the trustees of my estate, hereinafter named, in trust, to hold, manage, control, invest, dispose of and reinvest, as often as to them may seem desirable, in order to keep the same as productive as may be and upon the further trusts to hold my said estate for income and accumulation for the period of ten years from and after my death and thereafter until each of my two half-sisters, Ellie P. Watts and Mary B. Richardson, and also my wife, Adelaide Leonard Pierce, have died. In the meantime and until the expiration of aforesaid ten-year period or until the decease of my said two half-sisters, Ellie P. Watte and Mary B. Richardson, and of my said wife, Adelaide Leonard Pierce, to divide and distribute the income of said trust estate as hereinafter provided, and finally upon the death of my two half-sisters, Ellie P. Watte and Mary B. Richardson, and my said wife, Adelaide Leonard Pierce, or at the end of aforesaid ten-year period in case this should extend beyond all of said three lives, to divide and distribute, subject to the provisions of paragraph XI, the principal of said trust estate in manner hereinafter outlined.”
By paragraph 20 the testator directed that the income of the trust estate should be paid quarterly in each year, indicating the months on the first days of which preferably payments should be made to certain beneficiaries — 30' per cent, to his wife, Adelaide Leonard Pierce, during her life, 5 per cent, to each of his two half-sisters during the life of each, and the remaining percentage, ■.which was designated for convenience and brevity as “Employees’ Fund” to certain employees, whom he divided into five classes, and indicated the part which was to be paid to the members of each class.
He also provided that, when all three said life interests should terminate, the period of final distribution among his employees will have arrived, unless held in abeyance for the unexpired portion of the 10-year period mentioned in paragraph 17.
He also directed that the bequests should be paid, as well as the income payments to the named beneficiaries, as soon as practicable, and that the income payments should continue notwithstanding his estate should be in the process of probate, and that “each and every bequest intended to go at once to the legatee absolutely will be distributed by the representatives of my estate as executors and all income distribution will be made by them as trustees.”
During the remainder of the taxable year 1917 after the testator’s death the executors received as dividends upon the stock of the American Radiator Company, which had been specifically bequeathed, the sum of $40,071 paid to them as executors, and it was not until after January 1, 1918, that the shares of stock specifically bequeathed were transferred to the legatees upon the books of the corporation.
The executors also received from dividends on shares of stock constituting part of the residuary estate to be held in trust $52,919.27, and other income, distributable as part of the income of the residuary estate, amounting to $3,886.69, and as dividends upon that portion of the estate ultimately used for payment of the debts, expenses of administration, and taxes $24,-404.80.
The tax was assessed under the provisions of section 2 (b) of the Income Tax Law of 1916, 39. Stat. 756, as amended in 1917, which so far as applicable follows:
“Sec. 2. (b) Income received by estates of deceased persons during the period of administration or settlement of the estate, shall be subject to the normal and additional tax and taxed to their estates, and also such income of estates or any kind of property held in trust, including such income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or unascertained persons, or persons with contingent interests, and income held for future distribution under the terms of the will or trust shall be likewise taxed, the tax in each instance, except when the income is returned for the purpose of the tax by the beneficiary, to be assessed to the executor, administrator, or trustee, as the case may be: Provided, that where the income is -to be distributed annually or regularly between existing heirs or legatees, or beneficiaries the rate of tax and method of computing the same shall be based in each ease upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed.”
The Act of October 3, 1917, imposed an additional tax to the normal tax imposed by the act of 1916, also increased the surtax provided for by said act, and reduced the exemptions provided for by it. Section 1204 of the act of 1917, 40 Stat. 331, provides that subdivision (c) of section 8 of the act of 1916 be amended to read as follows:
“Guardians, trustees, executors, administrators, receivers, conservators, and all persons, corporations, or associations, acting in any fiduciary capacity, shall make and render a return of the income of the person, trust, or estate for whom or which they act, and be subject to all the provisions of this title which apply to individuals.”
Section 8 (e) of the act of 1916 was not changed apparently by this act of 1917, in so far as it required executors and administrators to “make and render a return of the * * * estate for * * * which, they act, and be subject to all the provisions of this title which apply to individuals.”
The District Court has held that the income received by the executors upon the several legacies specifically bequeathed iu the year 1917 after the death of the testator was income taxable to the estate under section 2 (b) of the Revenue Act of September 8,1916, and that the tax upon this income should be assessed upon the estate as an entity, and not computed “in each ease upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed.”
As to tho remainder of the income upon the dividends received by the executors upon the residue of the shares of stock held by them, as well as the residue of the estate, tho District Court held that, as the income from this was “to be distributed annually or regularly between existing heirs or legateees or beneficiaries, the rate of tax and method of computing the same” would “be based in each case upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed.”
Prom the first ruling the plaintiffs have appealed hero, and from the second the defendant has appealed. Tho plaintiffs have also appealed from the ruling of the District Court that tho rates provided by the law of 1917 should be applied.
The questions, therefore, presented for our consideration, are (1) whether income received by the executors within the taxable year 1917 upon the specific legacies was taxable to the estate to be paid by the executors, or whether the tax should be paid by the legatees; (2) whether tho income accumulated in the hands of the executors from the residuary estate before January 1, 1918, should be taxed to the estate or to the legatees; and (3) whether the rates provided by the act of 1917 should be applied in determining the tax or the rates under the act of 1916.
Section 2 (b) of the act of 1916 specifically provides that “income received by estates of deceased persons during the period of administration or settlement of the estate, shall be sub ject to the normal and additional tax and taxed to their estates.” The dividends received upon the specific legacies were received during the period of administration and before these legacies were paid. R. L. Mass. 1902, e. 141, § 24, now General Laws, e. 197, § 26, is cited as authority for assessing the tax upon the income of the specific legacies to the legatees therein named, as are also provisions in the will.
The power of Congress to make income of the estate received by tho executors during the period of administration taxable to the estate, a pure revenue measure, may be exercised irrespective of any state statute fixing the time at which title to a legacy shall vest. Nor could tho testator by any provision in. bis will modify or prevent the application of a federal statute.
The District Court was right in holding that the income received upon the- specific legacies was taxable to the estate of: the deceased under the act of 1917, which raised the rates of both the normal tax and tho additional lax provided for In the law of 1916.
It is contended by the plaintiffs that the rates, provided for in the law of 1916 applied only to individuals, but in section 8 (e) of the act of 1916, hereinbefore quoted, it is provided that executors shall “be subject to all the provisions of this title which apply to individuals.” The same provision appears under section 1204 (c) of the Revenue Act of 39.17, and the District Court was right in applying the rates provided for, in the act of 1917.
Under the will in question tho residue of the estate was devised and bequeathed to trustees to be held in trust for certain named beneficiaries, among whom was a largo number of employees entitled to share in the “Employees’ Fund” created by the will.
From the agreed statement in tho record it appears that, in addition to $40,073 received by the executors as dividends on shares of stock specifically bequeathed, they received $81,114.76, a portion of which accrued upon shares which, after the close of the taxable year of! 1917, were determined to be a part of the residuary estate, hut before April 1,1918, the executors were able to ascertain that $52,911.27 of these dividends and $3,889.69 of other income were distributable among existing beneficiaries of the trust, and in tho opinion of the District Judge it appears that the plaintiffs concede that $56,797.96 of this income was properly taxable to tho estate; but it is claimed that, as this was “income to be distributed regularly between existing beneficiaries,” the rate of tax and method of computing the same should be based in each case upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed, and not upon the entire sum as income received by tho estate during the process of administration. The learned judge of the District Court has ruled that tho fact that the trust fund was not turned over to tho executors in their capacity as trustees under the will would not prevent the application of this method of computing the tax based upon individual shares, and he ruled that the “defendant erred in refusing to base the computation of the tax upon $56,707.96 of income * * * upon the amount of ■the individual shares to be distributed.”
Under the will, this residuary fund, when ■determined, was to pass from the hands of the executors and to be administered by them as trustees. The estate was in process of administration until the residue could be determined, which was not until after the close of the taxable year of 1917. The case here is unlike Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U. S. 3, 43 S. Ct. 5, 67 L. Ed. 99, Bowers v. Slocum (C, C. A.) 20 F.(2d) 350, and McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co. (C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 218, and they are not applicable, because in them the administration of the estate had practically ceased, and the residuary fund, which was to he distributed, had been determined and fixed upon. In the present case the beneficiaries among the employees, who are to share in the distribution of the residuary fund, axe to be those who are found by some one, presumably the trustees, to be in good standing, making it uncertain who the ultimate beneficiaries may be.
Under the law of Massachusetts, it could not be determined, until the lapse of a year after the death of the testator what claims would be presented against the estate, and what the residuary estate might be. It appears from the agreed statement in the record that it was necessary for the executors to dispose of some of the shares of stock of which the testator died possessed, and in a letter to the collector, dated April 11, 1919, the executors estimated that $30,000 received as income in 1917 would be required to pay taxes, debts, and expenses of administration. There was then no definite, distinct fund in the possession of the .executors to which the beneficiaries who are to share in the residuum of the estate could lay claim until debts, taxes, and expenses of administration had been determined, and there could be no fund in the possession of the trustees for distribution under the proviso in section 2 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1916, or under the amendments contained in the act of 1917, until the time for the presentation of claims had expired and the expenses of administration had been determined. All of the income of the estate had been received by the executors during the year 1917, and “during the period of administration or settlement of the estate,” and was properly assessed to them. Under the provisions of the Revenue Acts of 1916 and of 1917 the normal tax and additional tax imposed upon individuals was correctly imposed upon the executors as taxable persons under section 8 (e) of the Act of 1916 as amended by section 1204 (1) of the Act of October 3,1917, by which they were required to make a return of the income of the estate which they were administering and be subject to all the provisions of title 1 of that act which provides for the assessing of a normal tax and additional tax upon individuals. The tax was therefore correctly assessed and computed by the Commissioner.
In No. 2244, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
In No. 2245, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court, with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant in accordance with this opinion.

Question: Did the agency articulate the appropriate general standard? This question includes whether the agency interpreted the statute "correctly". The courts often refer here to the rational basis test, plain meaning, reasonable construction of the statute, congressional intent, etc. This issue also includes question of which law applies or whether amended law vs law before amendment applies.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: A