Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eighth Amendment, this Court has held, prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from "rational[ly] understanding" why the State seeks to impose that punishment. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007). In this case, Vernon Madison argued that his memory loss and dementia entitled him to a stay of execution, but an Alabama court denied the relief. We now address two questions relating to the Eighth Amendment's bar, disputed below but not in this Court. First, does the Eighth Amendment forbid execution whenever a prisoner shows that a mental disorder has left him without any memory of committing his crime? We (and, now, the parties) think not, because a person lacking such a memory may still be able to form a rational understanding of the reasons for his death sentence. Second, does the Eighth Amendment apply similarly to a prisoner suffering from dementia as to one experiencing psychotic delusions? We (and, now, the parties) think so, because either condition may-or, then again, may not-impede the requisite comprehension of his punishment. The only issue left, on which the parties still disagree, is what those rulings mean for Madison's own execution. We direct that issue to the state court for further consideration in light of this opinion.
I
A
This Court decided in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments precludes executing a prisoner who has "lost his sanity" after sentencing. Id., at 406, 106 S.Ct. 2595. While on death row, Alvin Ford was beset by "pervasive delusion[s]" associated with "[p]aranoid [s]chizophrenia." Id., at 402-403, 106 S.Ct. 2595. Surveying both the common law and state statutes, the Court found a uniform practice against taking the life of such a prisoner. See id., at 406-409, 106 S.Ct. 2595. Among the reasons for that time-honored bar, the Court explained, was a moral "intuition" that "killing one who has no capacity" to understand his crime or punishment "simply offends humanity." Id., at 407, 409, 106 S.Ct. 2595 ; see id., at 409, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (citing the "natural abhorrence civilized societies feel" at performing such an act). Another rationale rested on the lack of "retributive value" in executing a person who has no comprehension of the meaning of the community's judgment. Ibid. ; see id., at 421, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that the death penalty's "retributive force[ ] depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose"). The resulting rule, now stated as a matter of constitutional law, held "a category of defendants defined by their mental state" incompetent to be executed. Id., at 419, 106 S.Ct. 2595.
The Court clarified the scope of that category in Panetti v. Quarterman by focusing on whether a prisoner can "reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution." 551 U.S. at 958, 127 S.Ct. 2842. Like Alvin Ford, Scott Panetti suffered from "gross delusions" stemming from "extreme psychosis." Id., at 936, 960, 127 S.Ct. 2842. In reversing a ruling that he could still be executed, the Panetti Court set out the appropriate "standard for competency." Id., at 957, 127 S.Ct. 2842. Ford, the Court now noted, had not provided "specific criteria." 551 U.S. at 957, 127 S.Ct. 2842. But Ford had explored what lay behind the Eighth Amendment's prohibition, highlighting that the execution of a prisoner who cannot comprehend the reasons for his punishment offends moral values and "serves no retributive purpose." 551 U.S. at 958, 127 S.Ct. 2842. Those principles, the Panetti Court explained, indicate how to identify prisoners whom the State may not execute. The critical question is whether a "prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness" that he lacks a "rational understanding" of "the State's rationale for [his] execution." Id., at 958-959, 127 S.Ct. 2842. Or similarly put, the issue is whether a "prisoner's concept of reality" is "so impair[ed]" that he cannot grasp the execution's "meaning and purpose" or the "link between [his] crime and its punishment." Id., at 958, 960, 127 S.Ct. 2842.
B
Vernon Madison killed a police officer in 1985 during a domestic dispute. An Alabama jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. He has spent most of the ensuing decades on the State's death row.
In recent years, Madison's mental condition has sharply deteriorated. Madison suffered a series of strokes, including major ones in 2015 and 2016. See Tr. 19, 46-47 (Apr. 14, 2016). He was diagnosed as having vascular dementia, with attendant disorientation and confusion, cognitive impairment, and memory loss. See id., at 19-20, 52-54. In particular, Madison claims that he can no longer recollect committing the crime for which he has been sentenced to die. See Tr., Pet. Exh. 2, p. 8.
After his 2016 stroke, Madison petitioned the trial court for a stay of execution on the ground that he had become mentally incompetent. Citing Ford and Panetti, he argued that "he no longer understands" the "status of his case" or the "nature of his conviction and sentence." Pet. for Suspension in No. CC-85-1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Feb. 12, 2016), pp. 11, 14. And in a later filing, Madison emphasized that he could not "independently recall the facts of the offense he is convicted of." Brief Pursuant to Order (Apr. 21, 2016), p. 8. Alabama countered that Madison had "a rational understanding of [the reasons for] his impending execution," as required by Ford and Panetti, even assuming he had no memory of committing his crime. Brief on Madison's Competency (April 21, 2016), pp. 4-5, 8. And more broadly, the State claimed that Madison could not possibly qualify as incompetent under those two decisions because both "concerned themselves with '[g]ross delusions' "-which all agree Madison does not have. Id., at 2; see ibid. (Madison "failed to implicate" Ford and Panetti because he "does not suffer from psychosis or delusions").
Expert reports from two psychologists largely aligned with the parties' contending positions. Dr. John Goff, Madison's expert, found that although Madison "underst[ood] the nature of execution" in the abstract, he did not comprehend the "reasoning behind" Alabama's effort to execute him. Tr., Pet. Exh. 2 (Apr. 14, 2016), p. 8; see id., at 9. Goff stated that Madison had "Major Vascular Neurological Disorder"-also called vascular dementia-which had caused "significant cognitive decline." Ibid. And Goff underscored that Madison "demonstrate[d] retrograde amnesia" about his crime, meaning that he had no "independent recollection[ ]" of the murder. Id., at 8; see id., at 9. For his part, Dr. Karl Kirkland, the court-appointed expert, reported that Madison "was able to discuss his case" accurately and "appear[ed] to understand his legal situation." Tr., Ct. Exh. 1, pp. 10-11. Although Kirkland acknowledged that Madison's strokes had led to cognitive decline, see id., at 10, the psychologist made no mention of Madison's diagnosed vascular dementia. Rather, Kirkland highlighted that "[t]here was no evidence of psychosis, paranoia, or delusion." Id., at 9; see ibid. (Madison "did not seem delusional at all").
At a competency hearing, Alabama similarly stressed Madison's absence of psychotic episodes or delusions. The State asked both experts to affirm that Madison was "neither delusional [n]or psychotic." Tr. 56; see id., at 22. And its closing argument focused on their agreement that he was not. As the State summarized: "He's not psychotic. He's not delusional." Id., at 81. On the State's view, that fact answered the competency question because "[t]he Supreme Court is looking at whether someone's delusions or someone's paranoia or someone's psychosis is standing in the way of" rationally understanding his punishment. Id., at 82. Madison's counsel disputed that point. "[T]he State would like to say, well, he's not delusional, he's not psychotic," the attorney recapped. Id., at 83. But, she continued, "[t]hat's not really the criteria" under Panetti. Tr. 83. Rather, the Court there barred executing a person with any mental illness-"dementia" and "brain injuries" no less than psychosis and delusions-that prevents him from comprehending "why he is being executed." Ibid.
The trial court found Madison competent to be executed. Its order first recounted the evidence given by each expert witness. The summary of Kirkland's report and testimony began by stating that the psychologist had "found no evidence of paranoia[,] delusion [or] psychosis." Order (Apr. 29, 2016), p. 5 (2016 Order). The court then noted Kirkland's view that Madison could "give details of the history of his case" and "appear[ed] to understand his legal situation." Ibid. Turning to the Goff report, the court noted the expert's finding that Madison was "amnesic" and could not recollect his crime. Id., at 6; see id., at 7. In a single, final paragraph, the court provided both its ruling and its reasoning. Madison had failed to show, the court wrote, that he did not "rationally understand the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it." Id., at 10. The court "accept[ed] the testimony of Dr. Kirkland as to the understanding Madison has concerning the situation." Ibid. "Further," the court concluded, "the evidence does not support that Mr. Madison is delusional." Ibid.
Madison next sought habeas relief in federal court, where he faced the heavy burden of showing that the state-court ruling "involved an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established federal law" or rested on an "unreasonable determination of the facts." Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The District Court rejected his petition, but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Madison had demonstrated both kinds of indisputable error. See Madison v. Commissioner, 851 F.3d 1173 (2017). This Court then summarily reversed the appeals court's decision. See Dunn v. Madison, 583 U. S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 9, 199 L.Ed.2d 243 (2017) (per curiam ). We explained, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's principal holding, that "[n]either Panetti nor Ford 'clearly established' that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed" because of a simple failure to remember his crime. Id., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 11-12. And we found that the state court did not act unreasonably-otherwise put, did not err "beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement"-when it found that Madison had the necessary understanding to be executed. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). But we made clear that our decision was premised on AEDPA's "demanding" and "deferential standard." Id., at ----, ----, 138 S.Ct., at 11, 11-12. "We express[ed] no view" on the question of Madison's competency "outside of the AEDPA context." Id., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 11-12.
When Alabama set an execution date in 2018, Madison returned to state court to argue again that his mental condition precluded the State from going forward. In his petition, Madison reiterated the facts and arguments he had previously presented to the state court. But Madison also claimed that since that court's decision (1) he had suffered further cognitive decline and (2) a state board had suspended Kirkland's license to practice psychology, thus discrediting his prior testimony. See Pet. to Suspend Execution in No. CC-85-1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 18, 2017), pp. 1-2, 16-19. Alabama responded that nothing material had changed since the court's first competency hearing. See Motion to Dismiss (Dec. 20, 2017), p. 9. The State also repeated its argument that Panetti permits executing Madison, pointing to the experts' agreement that he is "not delusional or psychotic" and asserting that neither "memory impairment [n]or dementia [could] suffice to satisfy the Panetti and Ford standards" without "an expansion" of those decisions. Motion to Dismiss 4, 10. A week before the scheduled execution, the state court again found Madison mentally competent. Its brief order stated only that Madison "did not provide a substantial threshold showing of insanity[ ] sufficient to convince this Court to stay the execution." App. A to Pet. for Cert.
Madison then filed in this Court a request to stay his execution and a petition for certiorari. We ordered the stay on the scheduled execution date and granted the petition a few weeks later. See 583 U. S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1172, 200 L.Ed.2d 314 (2018). Because the case now comes to us on direct review of the state court's decision (rather than in a habeas proceeding), AEDPA's deferential standard no longer governs. (And for that reason-contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at -----our decision on Madison's habeas petition cannot help resolve the questions raised here.)
II
Two issues relating to Panetti's application are before us. Recall that our decision there held the Eighth Amendment to forbid executing a prisoner whose mental illness makes him unable to "reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution." 551 U.S. at 958, 127 S.Ct. 2842 ; see supra, at ---- - ----. The first question presented is whether Panetti prohibits executing Madison merely because he cannot remember committing his crime. The second question raised is whether Panetti permits executing Madison merely because he suffers from dementia, rather than psychotic delusions. In prior stages of this case, as we have described, the parties disagreed about those matters. See supra, at ---- - ----. But at this Court, Madison accepted Alabama's position on the first issue and Alabama accepted Madison's on the second. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 36. And rightly so. As the parties now recognize, the standard set out in Panetti supplies the answers to both questions. First, a person lacking memory of his crime may yet rationally understand why the State seeks to execute him; if so, the Eighth Amendment poses no bar to his execution. Second, a person suffering from dementia may be unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment does not allow his execution. What matters is whether a person has the "rational understanding" Panetti requires-not whether he has any particular memory or any particular mental illness.
A
Consider initially a person who cannot remember his crime because of a mental disorder, but who otherwise has full cognitive function. The memory loss is genuine: Let us say the person has some kind of amnesia, which has produced a black hole where that recollection should be. But the person remains oriented in time and place; he can make logical connections and order his thoughts; and he comprehends familiar concepts of crime and punishment. Can the State execute him for a murder? When we considered this case before, using the deferential standard applicable in habeas, we held that a state court could allow such an execution without committing inarguable error. See Madison, 583 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 11-12 (stating that no prior decision had "clearly established" the opposite); supra, at ----. Today, we address the issue straight-up, sans any deference to a state court. Again, is the failure to remember committing a crime alone enough to prevent a State from executing a prisoner?
It is not, under Panetti's own terms. That decision asks about understanding, not memory-more specifically, about a person's understanding of why the State seeks capital punishment for a crime, not his memory of the crime itself. And the one may exist without the other. Do you have an independent recollection of the Civil War? Obviously not. But you may still be able to reach a rational-indeed, a sophisticated-understanding of that conflict and its consequences. Do you recall your first day of school? Probably not. But if your mother told you years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the story. And similarly, if you somehow blacked out a crime you committed, but later learned what you had done, you could well appreciate the State's desire to impose a penalty. Assuming, that is, no other cognitive impairment, loss of memory of a crime does not prevent rational understanding of the State's reasons for resorting to punishment. And that kind of comprehension is the Panetti standard's singular focus.
The same answer follows from the core justifications Panetti offered for framing its Eighth Amendment test as it did. Echoing Ford, Panetti reasoned that execution has no retributive value when a prisoner cannot appreciate the meaning of a community's judgment. See 551 U.S. at 958-959, 127 S.Ct. 2842 (citing 477 U.S. at 407-408, 106 S.Ct. 2595 ); supra, at ----. But as just explained, a person who can no longer remember a crime may yet recognize the retributive message society intends to convey with a death sentence. Similarly, Ford and Panetti stated that it "offends humanity" to execute a person so wracked by mental illness that he cannot comprehend the "meaning and purpose of the punishment." 477 U.S. at 407, 106 S.Ct. 2595 ; 551 U.S. at 960, 127 S.Ct. 2842 ; see id., at 958, 127 S.Ct. 2842. But that offense to morality must be much less when a person's mental disorder causes nothing more than an episodic memory loss. Moral values do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever the neurological reason for their lack of recall.
But such memory loss still may factor into the "rational understanding" analysis that Panetti demands. If that loss combines and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive a person of the capacity to comprehend why the State is exacting death as punishment, then the Panetti standard will be satisfied. That may be so when a person has difficulty preserving any memories, so that even newly gained knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be quickly forgotten. Or it may be so when cognitive deficits prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that memory gaps go forever uncompensated. As Panetti indicated, neurologists, psychologists, and other experts can contribute to a court's understanding of issues of that kind. See id., at 962, 127 S.Ct. 2842. But the sole inquiry for the court remains whether the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his death sentence.
B
Next consider a prisoner who suffers from dementia or a similar disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The dementia, as is typical, has compromised this prisoner's cognitive functions. But it has not resulted in the kind of delusional beliefs that Alvin Ford and Scott Panetti held. May the prisoner nonetheless receive a stay of execution under Ford and Panetti? Or instead, is a delusional disorder a prerequisite to declaring a mentally ill person incompetent to be executed? We did not address that issue when we last considered this case, on habeas review; in that sense, the question is one of first impression. See supra, at ----, n. 1.
But here too, Panetti has already answered the question. Its standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has had a particular effect : an inability to rationally understand why the State is seeking execution. See supra, at ---- - ----. Conversely, that standard has no interest in establishing any precise cause : Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension. To be sure, Panetti on occasion spoke of "gross delusions" in explaining its holding. 551 U.S. at 960, 127 S.Ct. 2842. And similarly, Ford talked about the "insane," which sometimes refers to persons holding such irrational beliefs. See, e.g., 477 U.S. at 401, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595. But those references are no more than a predictable byproduct of the two cases' facts. At the same time (and interchangeably), Panetti used more inclusive terms, such as "mental illness," "mental disorder," and "psychological dysfunction." 551 U.S. at 936, 959, 960, 127 S.Ct. 2842 ; see Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-409, n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (referring to prisoners with "mental illness"). And most important, Panetti framed its test, as just described, in a way utterly indifferent to a prisoner's specific mental illness. The Panetti standard concerns, once again, not the diagnosis of such illness, but a consequence-to wit, the prisoner's inability to rationally understand his punishment.
And here too, the key justifications Ford and Panetti offered for the Eighth Amendment's bar confirm our conclusion about its reach. As described above, those decisions stated that an execution lacks retributive purpose when a mentally ill prisoner cannot understand the societal judgment underlying his sentence. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958-959, 127 S.Ct. 2842 ; Ford,

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 市