Task: songer_othadmis

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile, (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless". 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Dwight Dion, Sr., Lyle Dion, Jr., Asa Primeaux, Sr., and Terry Fool Bull appeal their convictions of “taking” or “selling” eagles and other protected migratory birds or bird parts in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Act (BGEA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1982), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). As the appeals stood when we first heard oral arguments, the four appellants raised ten issues, one of which was whether, under United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir.1974), the charges against the Dions should be dismissed. In White, we held that an enrolled member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians who shot at an eagle within the boundaries of the Red Lake Reservation could not be convicted of “taking” an eagle under section 668 of the BGEA because Congress had not expressly provided that this section abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunt on their reservations.
We certified the treaty issues to the Court en banc which adhered to White, applied it to members of the Yankton Sioux Tribe hunting within the confines of their reservation, and extended White to criminal prosecutions under the ESA. The Court held, however, that White did not extend to “selling” protected birds or their parts or “taking” protected birds or their parts for commercial purposes. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of one “taking” count against Dwight Dion, Sr., vacated and remanded for retrial, at the government’s option, two “taking” counts against Dion, Sr., and one “taking” count against Lyle Dion and affirmed the remaining eight “selling” counts against Dion, Sr., and one “selling” count against.Lyle Dion. The en banc Court noted that Terry Fool Bull and Asa Primeaux, Sr., did not raise the treaty issues on appeal, but that, in any event, White was not applicable to their cases because their allegedly criminal acts were not committed on land reserved to an Indian tribe of which they were members. The en banc Court then remanded the appeals of the Dions, Fool Bull and Primeaux, Sr., to this panel to determine the remaining nontreaty issues. 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985) Before turning to an examination of the issues, we set forth the significant facts which relate to all four appellants.
1. FACTS.
These cases involve criminal prosecutions which arose from a United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) undercover operation (“Operation Eagle”) conducted in South Dakota from February 25, 1981, to June 15, 1983, to investigate the killing and selling of eagles and other protected birds. The government claims that it first learned of possible killing of protected birds in South Dakota in 1978 when FWS agent John L. Cooper received reports that “an excess number of birds were being picked up” around the Yankton Sioux Reservation near Lake Andes, South Dakota. Agent Cooper began an investigation to determine if individuals were violating federal wildlife laws and, in 1980, “actively” assigned an agent to do investigation in the area. In 1980, a Navaho medicine man in New Mexico told FWS agents that Indian crafts made with protected bird parts were arriving from South Dakota for sale in New Mexico. The medicine man gave FWS agent Nando Mauldin the names of the five alleged suppliers in the Lake Andes area of South Dakota. Shortly thereafter, “Operation Eagle” began.
Mauldin sent letters to the five alleged suppliers from the Lake Andes area advising them that he “was a trader in the Southwest part of the United States * * * interested in obtaining Indian-made items for resale throughout the Southwest.” In the fall of 1980, he received a response from Joe Abdo of Lake Andes inviting him to South Dakota and indicating that Abdo and several other individuals would sell eagle feathers to Mauldin. Mauldin traveled to South Dakota to meet Abdo, and on February 25,1981, was introduced to several Indians who traded in Indian crafts, including Asa Primeaux, Sr., and Dwight Dion, Sr. Mauldin claimed that his fictitious company, Night Hawk Trading Company, would pay “top dollar” for Indian handcrafts made from eagle or other protected bird feathers, or for parts of protected birds. On that day, Mauldin passed out approximately $2,000 in cash for several fans and other Indian crafts made from protected bird feathers and handed out several business cards.
Over the next year and a half, Mauldin visited the Yankton Reservation area several times and apparently paid several thousand dollars to a number of Indians, including appellants Asa Primeaux, Sr., and Dwight Dion, Sr., for Indian fans made from protected bird feathers, and for various protected bird feathers and parts. Mauldin passed out more business cards, and his willingness to pay handsomely for crafts made from protected bird parts or for the parts alone became well-known in the area. By August of 1982, the government had compiled substantial evidence of trafficking in protected bird parts against several Indians, including Dion, Sr., and Primeaux, Sr. Rather than prosecuting these individuals, who proved to be the main actors in the protected bird and feather trade, the government expanded “Operation Eagle” in August, 1982, by assigning a second agent, Robert Standish, to the undercover operation.
Standish made several visits to the Yank-ton Reservation, and represented himself as an Indian art dealer and owner of a gallery. During the late summer and fall of 1982, he and Mauldin passed out more business cards on the Reservation and paid out more money to several Indians including Primeaux, Sr., for Indian crafts made from protected bird feathers and parts, and for the feathers and parts themselves. The agents also offered several hundred dollars for each whole protected bird.
Word spread throughout the Yankton Reservation that Mauldin and Standish were paying thousands of dollars in cash for protected bird artifacts, feathers, parts and whole birds. This reservation is located in a remote and desolate area of South Dakota, and is one of the most impoverished areas in the nation. The 1980 census reports that the 1979 per capita income on the Yankton Sioux Reservation was less than $2,500, and more than half of all families on the Reservation were below the poverty level. Nearly a third of all persons on the Reservation, including two of the appellants in this case, Terry Fool Bull and Asa Primeaux, Sr., report Lakota as their primary language.
In December of 1982, nearly two years after Operation Eagle began, the agents purchased their first whole protected birds when they gave Dion, Sr., $2,300 for the carcasses of four eagles. At this time, the agents also made their first and only transaction with Lyle Dion, Jr., when they purchased an eagle tail and then the rest of the eagle from him.
The agents still made no arrests, however, and over the next several months paid several thousand more dollars to Dwight Dion, Sr., for an additional four bird carcasses, to Asa Primeaux, Sr., for three bird carcasses, and in their first and only transaction, to Terry Fool Bull, Asa’s son-in-law, for an eagle carcass.
The Dions, Primeaux, Sr., and Fool Bull were subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced to prison. We turn now to the contentions of each appellant.
A. Dwight Dion, Sr.
Dwight Dion, Sr., was convicted of ten counts of violating the BGEA, the ESA and the MBTA. The specific sections violated are set forth in detail in the en banc decision of this Court which vacated and remanded two of Dion, Sr.,’s ten counts. Dion, Sr., now raises four arguments why all ten counts, or at least certain of the counts, should be dismissed outright.
1. Religious Freedom.
Dion, Sr., first contends that his conviction for “taking” and “selling” eagles and other migratory birds under the BGEA, the ESA and the MBTA violates his first amendment right of religious freedom. He also notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982) provides that “it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian * * * including but not limited to * * * possession of sacred objects[.]” Additionally, Public Law 95-341, which enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1996, provides in part that “laws designed for such worthwhile purposes as conservation and preservation of natural species * * * were never intended to relate to Indian religious practices” or to “prohibit the use and possession of sacred objects necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies[.]”
The district court found that it “is clear from the record herein that possession and transportation of eagle feathers and parts of eagles are integral parts of Indian religious practices.” However, the court noted that Indians can acquire eagles and eagle parts from a government depository in Pocatello, Idaho, and thus, there is no need for Indians to kill eagles for religious purposes. Dion, Sr., contends that making Indian artwork from protected feathers is a part of his religious culture and that unless he can make and sell these items, he will be denied an opportunity to practice his religion fully.
The government contends that Dion, Sr., was taking and selling birds purely for commercial gain. It also notes that Dion, Sr., has never stated that the Native American Church of North America or his local chapter sanctions the killing of eagles, and that at least one court has found that the killing and selling of eagles and eagle parts is against tribal custom and religion. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir.1976). We also note that several Indian leaders testified at a consolidated hearing on September 2 and 6, 1983, that the killing of eagles, at least for commercial purposes, is contrary to Native American beliefs, and was generally an unknown practice on the reservations in South Dakota, at least before Operation Eagle began. Additionally, Douglas Long, current president of the Native American Church of North America, testified that Article II of the church’s laws provides that the church “looks with disfavor on the practice of the pawn and sale of religious prayer instruments” which includes feather fans.
We agree with the government and affirm the district court’s ruling. The record reveals that Dion, Sr., was killing eagles and other protected birds for commercial gain and not for religious purposes, and thus his religious freedom argument is without merit. See Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 485.
2. Selective Prosecution.
After his trial, Dwight Dion, Sr., moved to overturn his convictions and dismiss the indictments on the ground he was selectively prosecuted. He also claims that the government had been served with materials in two other prosecutions under “Operation Eagle” which supported the selective prosecution claim and should have been turned over to him under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). These materials contain the following: (1) numerous advertisements in national magazines offering for sale Indian art items allegedly containing protected bird feathers or parts; (2) a picture of a famous entertainer wearing an alleged bald eagle feather headdress while performing at the White House before a group which included then-Secretary of Interior James Watt; and (3) pictures of an Indian shield attached to which are several protected bird feathers. Dion claims the shield was purchased at a Mt. Rushmore store run by white proprietors and that the proprietors were not prosecuted. Dion, Sr., claims that the government was not prosecuting whites who dealt in protected bird feathers and parts but had prosecuted only Indians because of their race. The trial court denied the motion, and Dion, Sr., appeals this ruling.
The government contends that under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(f), Dion, Sr.’s, selective prosecution motion was untimely because it was not made prior to trial. We agree. A selective prosecution claim “brings into question the institution of the prosecution; Rule 12(b) requires such issues to be raised prior to trial.” United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 205 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 228 (1984).
3. Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Authority.
Dion, Sr., next contends that the district court erred in refusing to dismiss his six counts of selling migratory birds in violation of the MBTA because section 3 of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 704 (1982), which authorizes the Secretary of Interior to promulgate regulations establishing who may take or possess migratory birds, constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch. Dion, Sr., claims that section 3 of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 704, lacks definite standards, as required by Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935), to guide the Secretary in deciding who should be exempted from prosecution under 16 U.S.C. § 703.
In response, the government notes that several courts have upheld the validity of the delegated rulemaking authority in 16 U.S.C. § 704. See, e.g., Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317, 321 (4th Cir.1942); Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 629 (9th Cir.1938); United States v. Griffin, 12 F.Supp. 135, 137-38 (S.D.Ga.1935). It also points out that section 704 does contain definite criteria to guide the Secretary’s rulemaking authority because it provides that the Secretary’s regulations shall be “compatible with the terms of the conventions” enumerated in 16 U.S.C. § 703. It notes that these conventions identify clear standards for determining when and for what purposes migratory birds may be taken or possessed. See, e.g., 1916 Convention with Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702 (Aug. 16, 1916). Dion, Sr., however, agrees that section 704 sets forth adequate standards under which the Secretary can determine when and for what purposes migratory birds can be taken or possessed, but argues there are inadequate standards on who should be allowed to take or possess these birds.
We find, however, that the standards set forth in section 704 on when and for what purposes migratory birds can be taken also give the Secretary sufficient guidance on who should be allowed to take migratory birds. Section 704 and the conventions enumerated in section 703 essentially provide that, in limited situations, migratory birds can be taken for scientific or educational purposes. Consistent with this, the Secretary’s regulations on who can take or possess migratory birds permit the taking of these birds or their parts by persons or institutions who need them for certain specified scientific or educational purposes. 50 C.F.R. § 21.12 (1984). Finally, we agree with the government that section 704 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority because the Secretary has not promulgated a regulation permitting Indians to sell migratory birds or their parts.
4. Equal Protection.
Dion, Sr.’s, final argument is quite similar to the unlawful delegation argument discussed above. He argues that his six convictions for selling migratory birds or their parts in violation of the MBTA must be reversed because the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Interior pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 704, which do not include an exemption permitting Indians to sell migratory birds or their parts, deny him equal protection of the law. We reject this argument because the regulations do not permit anyone, Indian or non-Indian, to sell migratory birds or their parts for commercial purposes unrelated to education or science. Therefore, the MBTA applies neutrally to all persons.
We also reject Dion, Sr.’s, claim that the regulations, even if neutral, deny Indians equal protection because they fail to recognize that Indians have a unique need to “take” and “sell” eagles for commercial purposes. The record reveals that Dion, Sr., was one of extremely few Indians in the area who were taking or selling eagles and that the sale of eagles is contrary to Native American beliefs and practices. Dion, Sr.’s, claim is contrary to fact.
B. Lyle Dion.
Lyle Dion was convicted of violating 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B) and 1540(b)(1) (1982) of the ESA by taking a bald eagle (Count 1), and violating 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 707 (1982) of the MBTA by offering for sale or selling a bald eagle (Count 2). Count 1 was vacated and remanded by the Court en banc on Dion’s treaty defense and his remaining defenses were remanded for consideration by the panel. He raises two issues: (1) whether the court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution; and (2) whether he was entrapped as a matter of law by government agents into taking and selling the bald eagle.
Because Dion’s selective prosecution claim was raised for the first time after the trial was completed, we reject this claim because it was not timely, as we stated above.
Dion’s entrapment claim raises a more difficult question, an understanding of which requires a thorough review of the elements and rationales of the entrapment defense.
1. The development of the entrapment defense as a bar to prosecution of “innocent” persons tempted into a violation of the law.
The Supreme Court first suggested the possibility of an entrapment defense in the Decoy Letter Cases. Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 17 S.Ct. 366, 41 L.Ed. 727 (1897); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896); Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663, 16 S.Ct. 136, 40 L.Ed. 297 (1895); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 15 S.Ct. 470, 39 L.Ed. 550 (1895). In those cases, several defendants challenged their convictions of using the mails to distribute obscene materials across state lines on the ground the obscene material had been solicited by federal undercover agents. Although the Court affirmed the convictions without specifically discussing an entrapment defense, it wrote that the convictions could stand even though the contraband was solicited by a government agent because the undercover agent “suspeet[ed] that the defendant was engaged in a business offensive to good morals, sought information directly from him [and it] does not appear that it was the purpose of the post office inspector to induce or solicit the commission of a crime, but it was to ascertain whether the defendant was engaged in an unlawful business.” Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. at 610, 15 S.Ct. at 472.
Twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court to overturn a conviction on grounds of entrapment. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir.1915). That Court reviewed several state cases which established the principle “that a case is not within the spirit of the Criminal Code where an officer ‘originates the * * * intent, and apparently joins the defendant in the criminal act first suggested by the officer, merely to entrap the defendant.’ ” Id., at 415 (citation omitted). The Court quoted several cases, including Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878), in which Justice Marston wrote:
Some courts have gone a great way in giving encouragement to detectives, in some very questionable methods adopted by them to discover the guilt of criminals; but they have not yet gone so far, and I trust never will, as to lend aid or encouragement to officers who may, under a mistaken sense of duty, encourage and assist parties to commit crime, in order that they may arrest and have them punished for so doing.
Woo Wai, 223 Fed. at 416.
Applying these principles, the Woo Wai Court overturned the defendant’s convictions of conspiracy to bring Chinese persons into the United States because, “[t]here is no evidence that, prior to the time when the detectives first approached Woo Wai, any of the defendants had ever been engaged in the unlawful importation of Chinese, or had ever committed or thought of committing any offense against the immigration laws.” 223 Fed. at 414.
In Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir.1921), this Court relied on these principles underlying the entrapment defense in reversing Butts’s conviction of selling morphine. Judge Sanborn wrote that:
There was ample, if not conclusive, evidence * * * that * * * [t]he defendant had never committed any such offense as the officers of the government arrested and prosecuted him for prior to the time when they induced him to do the acts disclosed by this testimony. There is no evidence that he had ever contemplated, much less intended to sell any morphine. He had never done so.
273 Fed. at 38.
Judge Sanborn also indicated that:
The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it. * * * It is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt to commit it.
Id. (passage cited with approval in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444, 53 S.Ct. 210, 213, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932)).
In Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632 (1928), overruled on other grounds, Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), the Court refused to consider Casey’s claim that government agents improperly induced him to sell narcotics to prison inmates because he failed to raise that claim at trial. Id. at 418-19, 48 S.Ct. at 374. However, the Court implicitly approved the investigative technique because “there was probable cause to believe Casey was a habitual” drug user who had supplied drugs to inmates on previous occasions and because he “was in no way induced to commit the crime beyond the simple request of Cicero to which he seems to have acceded without hesitation and as a matter of course.” Id. at 419, 48 S.Ct. at 374. Justice Brandéis, joined by Justice Butler, dissented on the ground the prosecution “must fail because officers of the government instigated the commission of the alleged crime.” Id. at 421, 48 S.Ct. at 375. He distinguished government investigations of ongoing criminal schemes from those in which the government instigates the commission of the crime:
I am aware that courts — mistaking relative social values, and forgetting that a desirable end cannot justify foul means— have, in their zeal to punish, sanctioned the use of evidence obtained through criminal violation of property and personal rights or by other practices of detectives even more revolting. But the objection here is of a different nature. It does not rest merely upon the character of the evidence or upon the fact that the evidence was illegally obtained. The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime was instigated by officers of the government; that the act for which the government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. The government may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime, and then punish the criminal, its creature. If Casey is guilty of the crime of purchasing 3.4 grains of morphine, on December 31st, as charged, it is because he yielded to the temptation presented by the officers.
Two months later, Justice Brandéis reiterated his view in the following celebrated passage from his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928):
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its facel.[]
Justice Brandeis’s view that the entrapment defense should focus on the conduct of the enforcement officials, although adopted in later years by several justices of the Supreme Court and several state supreme courts, however, has never commanded a majority of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, his view that entrapment is concerned with the “origin of intent” to commit the crime is reflected in the modern view that entrapment focuses on the “predisposition” of the defendant to commit the crime.
Illustrative is Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), where Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, focused the on the defendant’s state of mind, noting that he was “a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish from an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.” Id. at 451, 53 S.Ct. at 216. The court held that:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of Congress in enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.
Id. at 448, 53 S.Ct. at 215.
In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), the Court reaffirmed that the law of entrapment is designed to prevent “tempting innocent persons into violations.” Id. at 372, 78 S.Ct. at 821. Applying the predisposition test outlined in Sorrells, the Court found that Sherman was entrapped as a matter of law because the evidence revealed that he was an innocent, although perhaps ductile, party who was beguiled into committing a crime he otherwise would not have attempted.
In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963), the defendant contended that the trial court’s entrapment instruction, to which he failed to object, constituted plain error. The Court held that “we need not * * * concern ourselves with any of these questions here, for under any approach, petitioner’s belated claim of entrapment is insubstantial[.]” Id. at 434, 83 S.Ct. at 1385. The evidence was clear that Lopez had made an unsolicited offer of $420 to an I.R.S. agent to drop his investigation of Lopez’s failure to pay a cabaret tax. The I.R.S. agent had never even suggested that he would drop his investigation in exchange for money or favors. Accordingly, Lopez had no claim of entrapment because:
[t]he conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents. Such conduct, of course, is far different from the permissible strategems involved in the detection and prevention of crime.
Id. (emphasis in original).
In its two most recent rulings on the defense of entrapment, the Court has reemphasized that this defense focuses on the defendant’s “predisposition” to commit the crime, and requires courts to draw a line between traps for the “unwary criminal” and the “unwary innocent.” In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), a five-to-four majority reinstated the defendant’s conviction of unlawfully manufacturing methamphetamine where he admitted “that he may have harbored a predisposition to commit the charged offenses,” id. at 433, 93 S.Ct. at 1643, and where the evidence confirmed that he was predisposed because he was involved in the illegal manufacturing of methamphetamine both before and after the undercover agent provided an essential ingredient for the manufacturing of the drug. The Court, in dicta, noted that “outrageous” law enforcement conduct might bar the government under due process principles from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction. Id. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1642-43.
In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), Hampton alleged that an undercover agent supplied him with drugs which were subsequently purchased by another government agent involved in the operation. Because Hampton admitted that he was predisposed to commit the crime, this Court and the Supreme Court, five-to-three, refused to consider the propriety of the agent’s conduct and affirmed Hampton’s conviction. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and Rehnquist, wrote that the due process bar to a conviction in an entrapment case is limited to situations in which the defendant is not predisposed. 425 U.S. at 488-90, 96 S.Ct. at 1649-50. However, Justices Powell and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, and Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, dissenting, determined that the due process protection against outrageous governmental conduct is available even when the defendant has been shown to be predisposed. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
In sum, as we recently noted in United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.1984):
[Although the Supreme Court has sharply divided on the proper standard for applying the entrapment defense, it is generally agreed that “[t]he conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents.” * * * The key question is therefore whether the government agent caused or induced the defendant to commit a crime he was not otherwise predisposed — i.e., willing and ready — to commit whenever a propitious opportunity arose.
Id. at 1293 (citations omitted).
We also held, in accordance with the prevailing case law, that the prosecution must prove a defendant’s predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1294 n. 3, (citing United States v. French, 683 F.2d 1189, 1191 n. 1 (8th Cir.)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 103 S.Ct. 304, 74 L.Ed.2d 284 (1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982).
2. Did the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lyle Dion was predisposed to take or sell an eagle?
The government suggests that we eschew an examination of the myriad factors used by the courts to determine predisposition by arguing that Dion’s predisposition is proven beyond a reasonable doubt solely because the undercover agents allegedly did nothing more than afford him the opportunity to sell an eagle to them. The government used this argument below in an attempt to keep the entrapment issue from the jury, and when the trial court rejected this, to convince the jury that Dion could not possibly have been entrapped.
We cannot agree with the government that its agents did nothing more than provide Lyle Dion with an opportunity to commit the crime as these terms have been construed by the courts. While Asa Primeaux, Sr., and Dwight Dion, Sr., readily responded to the government’s offers to buy protected birds or their parts, Lyle Dion did not. Dion was first afforded an opportunity to receive a large sum of money for eagle parts on February 25, 1981, when Agent Mauldin visited his father’s home and extended an offer of money for protected bird crafts to all who were present, including Lyle Dion. Dwight Dion, Sr., testified that Mauldin had visited his home several times and that, in July of 1982, “he asked my boy, Lyle, if he can go out and get him some birds.” Lyle also testified that Mauldin had asked him to kill eagles for him.
In addition to being directly solicited to kill and sell eagles, Lyle claims that he was indirectly induced to do so throughout 1981 and 1982, as word spread throughout the Yankton Reservation that Mauldin and Standish were offering big sums of money for protected bird feathers, crafts, and whole eagles. Lyle also suggests that during this nearly two-year period when money for protected bird feathers, crafts, and whole eagles. Lyle also suggests that during this nearly two-year period when his father was building a relationship of friendship and trust with Mauldin and receiving hundreds of dollars for protected bird crafts and offers of additional money for whole birds, his father encouraged him to kill an eagle for Mauldin.
We need not address here whether an individual can ever be indirectly entrapped through government inducements directed to him solely by an unwitting middleman because the government agents not only indirectly solicited Dion to sell them an eagle, but they also directly extended to him at least one offer to purchase an eagle. The important point is not that this conduct by the government agents was necessarily outrageous, but that Lyle was not merely given an opportunity to take or kill an eagle but was encouraged to do so by the agents’ repeated direct and indirect solicitations over a nearly two-year period. See United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir.1980). Under these circumstances, we cannot agree with the government that Lyle Dion readily and willingly responded to a mere opportunity to kill an eagle for profit.
In any event, determining whether Dion was predisposed requires an examination not only of the government’s conduct, but more importantly of several factors which relate to Dion’s character, background and state of mind. The government’s suggestion that we should look only at the nature of the inducements offered is based on a sentence in Sorrells that “[i]t is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution.” Id., 287 U.S. at 441, 53 S.Ct. at 212. However, the Court continued by saying that “[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises,” and that a “different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent

Question: Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: E