Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents are individual Medicare claimants who raise various challenges to the policy of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) as to the payment of Medicare benefits for a surgical procedure known as bilateral carotid body resection (BCBR). The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that in essence respondents are claiming entitlement to benefits for the BCBR procedure and therefore must exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), before pursuing their action in federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits. 697 F. 2d 1291 (1982). We granted certiorari to sort out the thorny jurisdictional problems which respondents’ claims present, 463 U. S. 1206 (1983), and we now reverse as to all respondents.
I
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq., commonly known as the Medicare Act, establishes a federally subsidized health insurance program to be administered by the Secretary. Part A of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1395c et seq., provides insurance for the cost of hospital and related posthospital services, but the Act precludes reimbursement for any “items or services... which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” § 1395y(a)(l). The Medicare Act authorizes the Secretary to determine what claims are covered by the Act “in accordance with the regulations prescribed by him.” § 1395ff(a). Judicial review of claims arising under the Medicare Act is available only after the Secretary renders a “final decision” on the claim, in the same manner as is provided in 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) for old age and disability claims arising under Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b)(l)(C).
Pursuant to her rulemaking authority, see 42 U. S. C. §§1395hh, 1395Ü (incorporating 42 U. S. C. § 405(a)), the Secretary has provided that a “final decision” is rendered on a Medicare claim only after the individual claimant has pressed his claim through all designated levels of administrative review. First, the Medicare Act authorizes the Secretary to enter into contracts with fiscal intermediaries providing that the latter will determine whether a particular medical service is covered by Part A, and if so, the amount of the reimbursable expense for that service. 42 U. S. C. § 1395h; 42 CFR § 405.702 (1983). If the intermediary determines that a particular service is not covered under Part A, the claimant can seek Teconsideration by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 CFR §§405.710-405.716 (1983). If denial of the claim is affirmed after reconsideration and if the claim exceeds $100, the claimant is entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge (AL J) in the same manner as is provided for claimants under Title II of the Act. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395ff(b)(l)(C), (b)(2); 42 CFR §405.720 (1983). If the claim is again denied, the claimant may seek review in the Appeals Council. 42 CFR §§405.701(c), 405.724 (1983) (incorporating 20 CFR §404.967 (1983)). If the Appeals Council also denies the claim and if the claim exceeds $1,000, only then may the claimant seek judicial review in federal district court of the “Secretary’s final decision.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395ff(b)(l)(C), (b)(2).
In January 1979, the Secretary through the HCFA issued an administrative instruction to all fiscal intermediaries, instructing them that no payment is to be made for Medicare claims arising out of the BCBR surgical procedure when performed to relieve respiratory distress. See 45 Fed. Reg. 71431-71432 (1980) (reproducing the instruction). Relying on information from the Public Health Service and a special Task Force of the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute of the National Institutes of Health, id., at 71426, the HCFA explained that BCBR has been “shown to lack [the] general acceptance of the professional medical community” and that “controlled clinical studies establishing the safety and effectiveness of this procedure are needed.” Id., at 71431. It concluded that the procedure “must be considered investiga-tional” and not “reasonable and necessary” within the meaning of the Medicare Act. Ibid.
Many claimants whose BCBR claims were denied by the intermediaries as a result of the instruction sought review of the denial before ALJs, who were not bound by the Secretary’s instructions to the intermediaries. Until October 1980, ALJs were consistently ruling in favor of individual BCBR claimants. The Appeals Council also authorized payment for BCRB Part A expenses in a consolidated case involving numerous claimants, see In re Ferguson, No. [ XXX-XX-XXXX ] (HHS Appeals Council, Oct. 18, 1979), while stressing that its decision applied only to the claimants involved in that case and was not to be cited as precedent in future cases.
In response to the rulings of the ALJs and the Appeals Council, on October 28, 1980, the Secretary through the HCFA issued a formal administrative ruling, intended to have binding effect on the ALJs and the Appeals Council, see 20 CFR §422.408 (1983), prohibiting them in all individual cases from ordering Medicare payments for BCBR operations occurring after that date. 45 Fed. Reg. 71426-71427 (1980). In the ruling the Secretary noted that she had examined the proceedings in In re Ferguson, had consulted with the Public Health Service, and again had concluded that the BCBR procedure was not “reasonable and necessary” within the meaning of the Medicare Act. Ibid.
On September 18, 1980, respondents in this case filed a complaint in the District Court for the Central District of California, raising numerous challenges focused on the Secretary’s January 1979 instructions to her intermediaries precluding payment for BCBR surgery. On November 7,1980, after the Secretary issued the formal ruling binding on the ALJs and the Appeals Council as well as the intermediaries, respondents amended their complaint to challenge that ruling as well. Respondents relied on 28 U. S. C. § 1381 (federal question), 28 U. S. C. §1361 (mandamus against a federal official), and 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (Social Security Act), to establish jurisdiction in the District Court.
The individuals named in the amended complaint, who are respondents before this Court, are four individual Medicare claimants. Their physician, Dr. Benjamin Winter, who has developed a special technique for performing BCBR surgery and who has performed the surgery over 1,000 times, prescribed BCBR surgery for all four respondents to relieve their pulmonary problems. Respondents Sanford Holmes, Norman Webster-Zieber, and Jean Vescio had the surgery before October 28, 1980, and all three filed a claim for reimbursement with their fiscal intermediary. At the time that the amended complaint was filed, none of the three had exhausted their administrative remedies, and thus none had received a “final decision” on their claims for benefits from the Secretary. The fourth respondent, Freeman Ringer, informally inquired of the Secretary and learned that BCBR surgery is not covered under the Medicare Act. Thus he has never had the surgery, claiming that he is unable to afford it. App. 32.
The essence of their amended complaint is that the Secretary has a constitutional and statutory obligation to provide payment for BCBR surgery because overwhelmingly her ALJs have ordered payment when they have considered individual BCBR claims. Id., at 9-10. According to the complaint, the Secretary’s instructions to the contrary to her intermediaries violate constitutional due process and numerous statutory provisions in that they force eligible Medicare claimants who have had BCBR surgery to pursue individual administrative appeals in order to get payment, even though ALJs overwhelmingly have determined that payment is appropriate. Id., at 16-22. Regarding the Secretary’s formal administrative ruling, the complaint asserts that the ruling merely reaffirms the instructions and creates an “additional administrative barrier” to Medicare beneficiaries desiring the BCBR treatment, and that it also is unlawful on numerous substantive and procedural grounds. Id., at 23-25. The complaint seeks a declaration that the Secretary’s refusal to find that BCBR surgery is “reasonable and necessary” under the Act is unlawful, an injunction compelling the Secretary to instruct her intermediaries to provide payment for BCBR claims, and an injunction barring the Secretary from forcing claimants to pursue individual administrative appeals in order to obtain payment. Id., at 9-10, 25-27.
The District Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that “[t]he essence of [respondents’ claim]... is a claim of entitlement [to] benefits for the BCBR procedure,” and that any challenges respondents raise to the Secretary’s procedures are “inextricably intertwined” with their claim for benefits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. Thus the court concluded that 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) with its administrative exhaustion prerequisite provides the sole avenue for judicial review. Relying on our decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 330-332 (1976), the court concluded that none of respondents’ claims are so “collateral” to their overall claim for benefits that the exhaustion requirement should be waived as to those claims. Because none of the named respondents have satisfied the exhaustion prerequisite of § 405(g), the court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It concluded that the thrust of respondents’ claim is that “the Secretary’s presumptive rule that the BCBR operation is not reasonable and necessary was an unlawful administrative mechanism for determining awards of benefits.” 697 F. 2d, at 1294. The Court of Appeals concluded that to the extent that respondents are seeking to invalidate the Secretary’s 'procedure for determining entitlement to benefits, those claims are cognizable without the requirement of administrative exhaustion under the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. §1331, and the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1361. 697 F. 2d, at 1294.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that respondents also had raised substantive claims for benefits, in that they had sought an injunction requiring the Secretary to declare that BCBR is reasonable and necessary under the Act. In the Court of Appeals’ view, the fact that respondents had not sought an actual award of benefits in their complaint did not alter the court’s characterization of a portion of their claim as essentially a claim for benefits. Ibid. Acknowledging that § 405(g) with its exhaustion prerequisite provides the only jurisdictional basis for seeking judicial review of claims for benefits, the court nonetheless concluded that the District Court had erred in requiring respondents to exhaust their administrative remedies in this case. Relying on our opinions in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, the Court of Appeals concluded that exhaustion would be futile for respondents and that it may not fully compensate them for the injuries they assert because they seek payment without the prejudice— and the necessity of appeal — resulting from the existence of the instructions and the rule. 697 F. 2d, at 1294-1296. Because we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ characterization of the claims at issue in this case and its reading of our precedents, we now reverse.
HH I — i
Preliminarily, we must point out that, although the Court of Appeals seemed not to have distinguished them, there are in fact two groups of respondents in this case. Respondents Holmes, Vescio, and Webster-Zieber constitute one group of respondents, those who have had BCBR surgery before October 28, 1980, and who have requested reimbursement at some, but not all, levels of the administrative process. Although the Court of Appeals did not seem to realize it, there is no dispute that the Secretary’s formal administrative ruling simply does not apply to those three respondents’ claims for reimbursement for their BCBR surgery. Their claims only make sense then if they are understood as challenges to the Secretary’s instructions to her intermediaries, instructions which resulted in those respondents’ having to pursue administrative remedies in order to get payment. They have standing to challenge the formal ruling as well only because, construing their complaint liberally, they argue that the existence of the formal rule creates a presumption against payment of their claims in the administrative process, even though the rule does not directly apply to bar their claims. The relief respondents request is that the Secretary change her policy so as to allow payment for BCBR surgery so that respondents simply will not have to resort to the administrative process.
It seems to us that it makes no sense to construe the claims of those three respondents as anything more than, at bottom, a claim that they should be paid for their BCBR surgery. Arguably respondents do assert objections to the Secretary’s “procedure” for reaching her decision — for example, they challenge her decision to issue a generally applicable rule rather than to allow individual adjudication, and they challenge her alleged failure to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the APA in issuing the instructions and the rule. We agree with the District Court, however, that those claims are “inextricably intertwined” with respondents’ claims for benefits. Indeed the relief that respondents seek to redress their supposed “procedural” objections is the invalidation of the Secretary’s current policy and a “substantive” declaration from her that the expenses of BCBR surgery are reimbursable under the Medicare Act. We conclude that all aspects of respondents’ claim for benefits should be channeled first into the administrative process which Congress has provided for the determination of claims for benefits. We, therefore, disagree with the Court of Appeals’ separation of the particular claims here into “substantive” and “procedural” elements. We disagree in particular with its apparent conclusion that simply because a claim somehow can be construed as “procedural,” it is cognizable in federal district court by way of federal-question jurisdiction.
The third sentence of 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), made applicable to the Medicare Act by 42 U. S. C. § 1B95Ü, provides that § 405(g), to the exclusion of 28 U. S. C. § 1331, is the sole avenue for judicial review for all “claim[s] arising under” the Medicare Act. See Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 760-761. Thus, to be true to the language of the statute, the inquiry in determining whether § 405(h) bars federal-question jurisdiction must be whether the claim “arises under” the Act, not whether it lends itself to a “substantive” rather than a “procedural” label. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 327 (recognizing that federal-question jurisdiction is barred by 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) even in a case where claimant is challenging the administrative procedures used to terminate welfare benefits).
In Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 760-761, we construed the “claim arising under” language quite broadly to include any claims in which “both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation” of the claims is the Social Security Act. In that case we held that a constitutional challenge to the duration-of-relationship eligibility statute pursuant to which the claimant had been denied benefits, was a “claim arising under” Title II of the Social Security Act within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), even though we recognized that it was in one sense also a claim arising under the Constitution.
Under that broad test, we have no trouble concluding that all aspects of respondents Holmes’, Vescio’s, and Webster-Zieber’s challenge to the Secretary’s BCBR payment policy “aris[e] under” the Medicare Act. It is of no importance that respondents here, unlike the claimants in Weinberger v. Salfi, sought only declaratory and injunctive relief and not an actual award of benefits as well. Following the declaration which respondents seek from the Secretary — that BCBR surgery is a covered service — only essentially ministerial details will remain before respondents would receive reimbursement. Had our holding in Weinberger v. Salfi turned on the fact that claimants there did seek retroactive benefits, we might well have done as the dissent in that case suggested and held that § 405(h) barred federal-question jurisdiction only over claimants’ specific request for benefits, and not over claimants’ declaratory and injunctive claims as well. See 422 U. S., at 798-799, and n. 13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that any portion of Holmes’, Vescio’s, or Webster-Zieber’s claims here can be channeled into federal court by way of federal-question jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals also relied on the mandamus statute as a basis for finding jurisdiction over a portion of those three respondents’ claims. We have on numerous occasions declined to decide whether the third sentence of § 405(h) bars mandamus jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act, either because we have determined that jurisdiction was otherwise available under § 405(g), see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 698 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 332, n. 12, or because we have determined that the merits of the mandamus claim were clearly insubstantial, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 528-533 (1976). We need not decide the effect of the third sentence of § 405(h) on the availability of mandamus jurisdiction in Social Security cases here either.
Assuming without deciding that the third sentence of § 405(h) does not foreclose mandamus jurisdiction in all Social Security cases, see generally Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F. 2d 865, 867-868 (CA2 1983); Ellis v. Blum, 643 F. 2d 68, 78-82 (CA2 1981), the District Court did not err in dismissing respondents’ complaint here because it is clear that no writ of mandamus could properly issue in this case. The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U. S. 394, 402-403 (1976) (discussing 28 U. S. C. § 1651); United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U. S. 540, 543-544 (1937).
Here respondents clearly have an adequate remedy in § 405(g) for challenging all aspects of the Secretary’s denial of their claims for payment for the BCBR surgery, including any objections they have to the instructions or to the ruling if either ultimately should play a part in the Secretary’s denial of their claims. The Secretary’s decision as to whether a particular medical service is “reasonable and necessary” and the means by which she implements her decision, whether by promulgating a generally applicable rule or by allowing individual adjudication, are clearly discretionary decisions. See 42 U. S. C. §1395ff(a); see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 467 (1983).
Thus § 405(g) is the only avenue for judicial review of respondents’ Holmes’, Vescio’s, and Webster-Zieber’s claims for benefits, and, when their complaint was filed in District Court, each had failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement that is a prerequisite to jurisdiction under that provision. We have previously explained that the exhaustion requirement of § 405(g) consists of a nonwaivable requirement that a “claim for benefits shall have been presented to the Secretary,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 328, and a waivable requirement that the administrative remedies prescribed by the Secretary be pursued fully by the claimant. Ibid. All three respondents satisfied the nonwaivable requirement by presenting a claim for reimbursement for the expenses of their BCBR surgery, but none satisfied the waivable requirement.
Respondents urge us to hold them excused from further exhaustion and to hold that the District Court could have properly exercised jurisdiction over their claims under § 405(g). We have held that the Secretary herself may waive the exhaustion requirement when she deems further exhaustion futile, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 76-77 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 766-767. We have also recognized that in certain special cases, deference to the Secretary’s conclusion as to the utility of pursuing the claim through administrative channels is not always appropriate. We held that Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 330-332, was such a case, where the plaintiff asserted a procedural challenge to the Secretary’s denial of a pretermination hearing, a claim that was wholly “collateral” to his claim for benefits, and where he made a colorable showing that his injury could not be remedied by the retroactive payment of benefits after exhaustion of his administrative remedies.
The latter exception to exhaustion is inapplicable here where respondents do not raise a claim that is wholly “collateral” to their claim for benefits under the Act, and where they have no colorable claim that an erroneous denial of BCBR benefits in the early stages of the administrative process will injure them in a way that cannot be remedied by the later payment of benefits. And here, it cannot be said that the Secretary has in any sense waived further exhaustion. In the face of the Secretary’s vigorous disagreement, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Secretary’s formal ruling denying payment for BCBR claims rendered further exhaustion by respondents futile. But as we have pointed out above, the administrative ruling is not even applicable to respondents’ claims because they had their surgery before October 28, 1980. We therefore agree with the Secretary that exhaustion is in no sense futile for these three respondents and that the Court of Appeals erred in second-guessing the Secretary’s judgment.
Respondents also argue that there would be a presumption against them as they pursue their administrative appeals because of the very existence of the Secretary’s instructions and her formal ruling and thus that exhaustion

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 北