Task: sc_jurisdiction

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, concurring as to all but Part IV-A.
I agree with most of the Court's rationale, and so I join all but Part IV-A of its opinion. I write separately, however, to underscore three points. First, overruling precedent here is not only warranted, but compelled. Second, the interests at stake point far more clearly to that outcome than those in other recent cases. And finally, the racially biased origins of the Louisiana and Oregon laws uniquely matter here.
I
Both the majority and the dissent rightly emphasize that stare decisis "has been a fundamental part of our jurisprudence since the founding." Post, at 1432 (opinion of ALITO, J.); see ante, at 1404 - 1405. Indeed, "[w]e generally adhere to our prior decisions, even if we question their soundness, because doing so 'promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' " Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) ).
But put simply, this is not a case where we cast aside precedent "simply because a majority of this Court now disagrees with" it. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 133, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (ALITO, J., dissenting). Rather, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), was on shaky ground from the start. That was not because of the functionalist analysis of that Court's plurality: Reasonable minds have disagreed over time-and continue to disagree-about the best mode of constitutional interpretation. That the plurality in Apodaca used different interpretive tools from the majority here is not a reason on its own to discard precedent.
What matters instead is that, as the majority rightly stresses, Apodaca is a universe of one-an opinion uniquely irreconcilable with not just one, but two, strands of constitutional precedent well established both before and after the decision. The Court has long recognized that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity. Ante, at 1399 - 1400, 1404 - 1406. Five Justices in Apodaca itself disagreed with that plurality's contrary view of the Sixth Amendment. Justice Powell's theory of dual-track incorporation also fared no better: He recognized that his argument on that score came "late in the day." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) (concurring opinion).
Moreover, "[t]he force of stare decisis is at its nadir in cases concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules that implicate fundamental constitutional protections." Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116, n. 5, 133 S.Ct. 2151. And the constitutional protection here ranks among the most essential: the right to put the State to its burden, in a jury trial that comports with the Sixth Amendment, before facing criminal punishment. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506, 515-516, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974) ("The Sixth Amendment represents a deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where the State's power to imprison those like Ramos rests on an erroneous interpretation of the jury-trial right, the Court should not hesitate to reconsider its precedents.
II
In contrast to the criminal-procedure context, "[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights." Payne, 501 U.S. at 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Despite that fact, the Court has recently overruled precedent where the Court's shift threatened vast regulatory and economic consequences. Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) ; id., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 2499 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's opinion called into question "thousands of... contracts covering millions of workers"); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U. S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2098, 201 L.Ed.2d 403 (2018) (noting the "legitimate" burdens that the Court's overruling of precedent would place on vendors who had started businesses in reliance on a previous decision).
This case, by contrast, threatens no broad upheaval of private economic rights. Particularly when compared to the interests of private parties who have structured their affairs in reliance on our decisions, the States' interests here in avoiding a modest number of retrials-emphasized at such length by the dissent-are much less weighty. They are certainly not new: Opinions that force changes in a State's criminal procedure typically impose such costs. And were this Court to take the dissent's approach-defending criminal-procedure opinions as wrong as Apodaca simply to avoid burdening criminal justice systems-it would never correct its criminal jurisprudence at all.
To pick up on the majority's point, ante, at 1406 - 1407, in that alternate universe, a trial judge alone could still decide the critical facts necessary to sentence a defendant to death. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). An officer would still be able to search a car upon the arrest of any one of its recent occupants. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), holding limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). And States could still deprive a defendant of the right to confront her accuser so long as the incriminating statement was "reliable." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Constitution demands more than the continued use of flawed criminal procedures-all because the Court fears the consequences of changing course.
III
Finally, the majority vividly describes the legacy of racism that generated Louisiana's and Oregon's laws. Ante, at 1393 - 1394, 1400 - 1401, and n. 44. Although Ramos does not bring an equal protection challenge, the history is worthy of this Court's attention. That is not simply because that legacy existed in the first place-unfortunately, many laws and policies in this country have had some history of racial animus-but also because the States' legislatures never truly grappled with the laws' sordid history in reenacting them. See generally United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 120 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992) (policies that are "traceable" to a State's de jure racial segregation and that still "have discriminatory effects" offend the Equal Protection Clause).
Where a law otherwise is untethered to racial bias-and perhaps also where a legislature actually confronts a law's tawdry past in reenacting it-the new law may well be free of discriminatory taint. That cannot be said of the laws at issue here. While the dissent points to the "legitimate" reasons for Louisiana's reenactment, post, at 3-4, Louisiana's perhaps only effort to contend with the law's discriminatory purpose and effects came recently, when the law was repealed altogether.
Today, Louisiana's and Oregon's laws are fully-and rightly-relegated to the dustbin of history. And so, too, is Apodaca. While overruling precedent must be rare, this Court should not shy away from correcting its errors where the right to avoid imprisonment pursuant to unconstitutional procedures hangs in the balance.
Justice KAVANAUGH, concurring in part.
In Apodaca v. Oregon, this Court held that state juries need not be unanimous in order to convict a criminal defendant. 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972). Two States, Louisiana and Oregon, have continued to use non-unanimous juries in criminal cases. Today, the Court overrules Apodaca and holds that state juries must be unanimous in order to convict a criminal defendant.
I agree with the Court that the time has come to overrule Apodaca. I therefore join the introduction and Parts I, II-A, III, and IV-B-1 of the Court's persuasive and important opinion. I write separately to explain my view of how stare decisis applies to this case.
I
The legal doctrine of stare decisis derives from the Latin maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere," which means to stand by the thing decided and not disturb the calm. The doctrine reflects respect for the accumulated wisdom of judges who have previously tried to solve the same problem. In 1765, Blackstone-"the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation," Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) -wrote that "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents," to "keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765). The Framers of our Constitution understood that the doctrine of stare decisis is part of the "judicial Power" and rooted in Article III of the Constitution. Writing in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the importance of stare decisis : To "avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable" that federal judges "should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." The Federalist No. 78, p. 529 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In the words of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, stare decisis'"greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal-the rule of law." Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 378, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (concurring opinion).
This Court has repeatedly explained that stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The doctrine "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986).
The doctrine of stare decisis does not mean, of course, that the Court should never overrule erroneous precedents. All Justices now on this Court agree that it is sometimes appropriate for the Court to overrule erroneous decisions. Indeed, in just the last few Terms, every current Member of this Court has voted to overrule multiple constitutional precedents. See, e.g., Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019) ; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 1485, 203 L.Ed.2d 768 (2019) ; Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) ; Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ; Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) ; Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) ; Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) ; see also Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2020 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 4 (forthcoming) ("Nobody on the Court believes in absolute stare decisis").
Historically, moreover, some of the Court's most notable and consequential decisions have entailed overruling precedent. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) ; Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ; Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009) ;
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) ; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ; Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) ; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) ; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) ; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) ; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) ; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ; United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) ; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) ; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam ); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) ; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941) ; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937).
The lengthy and extraordinary list of landmark cases that overruled precedent includes the single most important and greatest decision in this Court's history, Brown v. Board of Education, which repudiated the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
As those many examples demonstrate, the doctrine of stare decisis does not dictate, and no one seriously maintains, that the Court should never overrule erroneous precedent. As the Court has often stated and repeats today, stare decisis is not an "inexorable command." E.g., ante, at 1405.
On the other hand, as Justice Jackson explained, just "because one should avoid Scylla is no reason for crashing into Charybdis." Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A. B. A. J. 334 (1944). So no one advocates that the Court should always overrule erroneous precedent.
Rather, applying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court ordinarily adheres to precedent, but sometimes overrules precedent. The difficult question, then, is when to overrule an erroneous precedent.
To begin with, the Court's precedents on precedent distinguish statutory cases from constitutional cases.
In statutory cases, stare decisis is comparatively strict, as history shows and the Court has often stated. That is because Congress and the President can alter a statutory precedent by enacting new legislation. To be sure, enacting new legislation requires finding room in a crowded legislative docket and securing the agreement of the House, the Senate (in effect, 60 Senators), and the President. Both by design and as a matter of fact, enacting new legislation is difficult-and far more difficult than the Court's cases sometimes seem to assume. Nonetheless, the Court has ordinarily left the updating or correction of erroneous statutory precedents to the legislative process. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456-457, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015) ; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) ; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-284, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972). The principle that "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right" is "commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
In constitutional cases, by contrast, the Court has repeatedly said-and says again today-that the doctrine of stare decisis is not as "inflexible." Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406, 52 S.Ct. 443 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also ante, at 1404 - 1405; Payne, 501 U.S. at 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597 ; Scott, 437 U.S. at 101, 98 S.Ct. 2187. The reason is straightforward: As Justice O'Connor once wrote for the Court, stare decisis is not as strict "when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235, 117 S.Ct. 1997. The Court therefore "must balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right. " Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378, 130 S.Ct. 876 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring). It follows "that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent." Ibid. In his canonical opinion in Burnet, Justice Brandeis described the Court's practice with respect to stare decisis in constitutional cases in a way that was accurate then and remains accurate now: In "cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions." 285 U.S. at 406-407, 52 S.Ct. 443 (dissenting opinion).
That said, in constitutional as in statutory cases, to "overrule an important precedent is serious business." Jackson, 30 A. B. A. J., at 334. In constitutional as in statutory cases, adherence to precedent is the norm. To overrule a constitutional decision, the Court's precedents on precedent still require a "special justification," Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 994, 1003, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984), or otherwise stated, "strong grounds," Janus, 585 U. S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 2478.
In particular, to overrule a constitutional precedent, the Court requires something "over and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided." Allen, 589 U. S., at ----, 140 S.Ct., at 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Justice Scalia put it, the doctrine of stare decisis always requires "reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong," for "otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all." Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 131 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). To overrule, the Court demands a special justification or strong grounds.
But the "special justification" or "strong grounds" formulation elides a key question: What constitutes a special justification or strong grounds? In other words, in deciding whether to overrule an erroneous constitutional decision, how does the Court know when to overrule and when to stand pat?
As the Court has exercised the "judicial Power" over time, the Court has identified various stare decisis factors. In articulating and applying those factors, the Court has, to borrow James Madison's words, sought to liquidate and ascertain the meaning of the Article III "judicial Power" with respect to precedent. The Federalist No. 37, at 236.
The stare decisis factors identified by the Court in its past cases include:
• the quality of the precedent's reasoning;
• the precedent's consistency and coherence with previous or subsequent decisions;
• changed law since the prior decision;
• changed facts since the prior decision;
• the workability of the precedent;
• the reliance interests of those who have relied on the precedent; and
• the age of the precedent.
But the Court has articulated and applied those various individual factors without establishing any consistent methodology or roadmap for how to analyze all of the factors taken together. And in my view, that muddle poses a problem for the rule of law and for this Court, as the Court attempts to apply stare decisis principles in a neutral and consistent manner.
As I read the Court's cases on precedent, those varied and somewhat elastic stare decisis factors fold into three broad considerations that, in my view, can help guide the inquiry and help determine what constitutes a "special justification" or "strong grounds" to overrule a prior constitutional decision.
First, is the prior decision not just wrong, but grievously or egregiously wrong? A garden-variety error or disagreement does not suffice to overrule. In the view of the Court that is considering whether to overrule, the precedent must be egregiously wrong as a matter of law in order for the Court to overrule it. In conducting that inquiry, the Court may examine the quality of the precedent's reasoning, consistency and coherence with other decisions, changed law, changed facts, and workability, among other factors. A case may be egregiously wrong when decided, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944) ; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), or may be unmasked as egregiously wrong based on later legal or factual understandings or developments, see, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979), or both, ibid.
Second, has the prior decision caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world consequences? In conducting that inquiry, the Court may consider jurisprudential consequences (some of which are also relevant to the first inquiry), such as workability, as well as consistency and coherence with other decisions, among other factors. Importantly, the Court may also scrutinize the precedent's real-world effects on the citizenry, not just its effects on the law and the legal system. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. at 494-495, 74 S.Ct. 686 ; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630-642, 63 S.Ct. 1178 ; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 825-827, 111 S.Ct. 2597.
Third, would overruling the prior decision unduly upset reliance interests? This consideration focuses on the legitimate expectations of those who have reasonably relied on the precedent. In conducting that inquiry, the Court may examine a variety of reliance interests and the age of the precedent, among other factors.
In short, the first consideration requires inquiry into how wrong the precedent is as a matter of law. The second and third considerations together demand, in Justice Jackson's words, a "sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the questioned case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other." Jackson, 30 A. B. A. J., at 334.
Those three considerations together provide a structured methodology and roadmap for determining whether to overrule an erroneous constitutional precedent. The three considerations correspond to the Court's historical practice and encompass the various individual factors that the Court has applied over the years as part of the stare decisis calculus. And they are consistent with the Founding understanding and, for example, Blackstone's shorthand description that overruling is warranted when (and only when) a precedent is "manifestly absurd or unjust." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 70.
Taken together, those three considerations set a high (but not insurmountable) bar for overruling a precedent, and they therefore limit the number of overrulings and maintain stability in the law. Those three considerations also constrain judicial discretion in deciding when to overrule an erroneous precedent. To be sure, applying those considerations is not a purely mechanical exercise, and I do not claim otherwise. I suggest only that those three considerations may better structure how to consider the many traditional stare decisis factors.
It is inevitable that judges of good faith applying the stare decisis considerations will sometimes disagree about when to overrule an erroneous constitutional precedent, as the Court does in this case. To begin with, judges may disagree about whether a prior decision is wrong in the first place-and importantly, that disagreement is sometimes the real dispute when judges joust over stare decisis. But even when judges agree that a prior decision is wrong, they may disagree about whether the decision is so egregiously wrong as to justify an overruling. Judges may likewise disagree about the severity of the jurisprudential or real-world consequences caused by the erroneous decision and, therefore, whether the decision is worth overruling. In that regard, some judges may think that the negative consequences can be addressed by narrowing the precedent (or just living with it) rather than outright overruling it. Judges may also disagree about how to measure the relevant reliance interests that might be affected by an overruling. And on top of all of that, judges may also disagree about how to weigh and balance all of those competing considerations in a given case.
This case illustrates that point. No Member of the Court contends that the result in Apodaca is correct. But the Members of the Court vehemently disagree about whether to overrule Apodaca.
II
Applying the three broad stare decisis considerations to this case, I agree with the Court's decision to overrule Apodaca.
First, Apodaca is egregiously wrong. The original meaning and this Court's precedents establish that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury. Ante, at 1396 - 1397; see, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) ; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 351, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898). And the original meaning and this Court's precedents establish that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment jury trial right against the States. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) ; id., at 166, 88 S.Ct. 1444 (Black, J., concurring); see also Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489 ; see generally Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 682, 203 L.Ed.2d 11 (2019) ; McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). When Apodaca was decided, it was already an outlier in the Court's jurisprudence, and over time it has become even more of an outlier. As the Court today persuasively explains, the original meaning of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and this Court's two lines of decisions-the Sixth Amendment jury cases and the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation cases-overwhelmingly demonstrate that Apodaca's holding is egregiously wrong.
Second, Apodaca causes significant negative consequences. It is true that Apodaca is workable. But Apodaca sanctions the conviction at trial or by guilty plea of some defendants who might not be convicted under the proper constitutional rule (although exactly how many is of course unknowable). That consequence has traditionally supplied some support for overruling an egregiously wrong criminal-procedure precedent. See generally Malloy, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653.
In addition, and significant to my analysis of this case, the origins and effects of the non-unanimous jury rule strongly support overruling Apodaca. Louisiana achieved statehood in 1812. And throughout most of the 1800s, the State required unanimous juries in criminal cases. But at its 1898 state constitutional convention, Louisiana enshrined non-unanimous juries into the state constitution. Why the change? The State wanted to diminish the influence of black jurors, who had won the right to serve on juries through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-310, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880) ; T. Aiello, Jim Crow's Last Stand: Nonunanimous Criminal Jury Verdicts in Louisiana 16, 19 (2015). Coming on the heels of the State's 1896 victory in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256, the 1898 constitutional convention expressly sought to "establish the supremacy of the white race." Semmes, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, Address at the Louisiana Constitutional Convention in 1898, in Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana 375 (H. Hearsey ed. 1898). And the convention approved non-unanimous juries as one pillar of a comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service. See Aiello, supra

Question: What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction?
A. cert
B. appeal
C. bail
D. certification
E. docketing fee
F. rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument
G. injunction
H. mandamus
I. original
J. prohibition
K. stay
L. writ of error
M. writ of habeas corpus
N. unspecified, other
Answer:

Answer: A