Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, brought under § 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 891, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), concerns ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses. The preemption clause, § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), broadly states that ERISA provisions “shall supersede... State laws” to the extent that those laws “relate to any employee benefit plan.” The saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), phrased with similar breadth, exempts from preemption “any law of any State which regulates insurance.” The key words “regulates insurance” in § 514(b)(2)(A), and “relate to” in § 514(a), once again require interpretation, for their meaning is not “plain”; sensible construction of ERISA, our decisions indicate, requires that we measure these words in context. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987) (noting that repeated calls for interpretation are not surprising in view of “the wide variety of state statutory and decisional law arguably affected” by ERISA’s preemption and saving clauses).
The context here is a suit to recover disability benefits under an ERISA-governed insurance policy issued by defendant-petitioner UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM). Plaintiff-respondent John E. Ward submitted his proof of claim to UNUM outside the time limit set in the policy, and UNUM therefore denied Ward’s claim.
and reversing the District Court’s summary judgment for UNUM, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on decisional law in California, the State in which Ward worked and in which his employer operated. The Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on two grounds. That court relied first on California’s “notice-prejudice” rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it was prejudiced by the delay. The notice-prejudice rule is saved from preemption, the Court of Appeals held, because it is “law... which regulates insurance.” See Ward v. Management Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F. 3d 1276, 1280 (1998).
The Court of Appeals announced a further reversing the District Court’s judgment for UNUM, one that would come into play if the insurer proved prejudice due to the delayed notice. Under California’s decisions, the Ninth Circuit said, the employer could be deemed an agent of the insurer in administering group insurance policies. Ward’s employer knew of his disability within the time the policy allowed for proof of claim. The Ninth Circuit held that the generally applicable agency law reflected in the California eases does not “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore is not preempted. See id., at 1281-1283, 1287-1288.
We granted the Court of Appeals’ first disposition, and reverse the second. California’s notice-prejudice rule, we agree, is a “law... which regulates insurance,” and is therefore saved from preemption by ERISA. California’s agency law, we further hold, does “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore does not occupy ground outside ERISA’s preemption clause.
I
UNUM issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA, effective November 1, 1983. The policy provides that proofs of claim must be furnished to UNUM, at the latest, one year and 180 days after the onset of disability.
Ward was employed by MAC from 1983 Throughout this period, premiums for the disability policy were deducted from Ward’s paycheck. Under the admitted facts of the case, Ward became permanently disabled with severe leg pain on the date of his resignation, May 5, 1992. See 135 F. 3d, at 1280.
Ward’s condition was diagnosed as diabetic neuropathy in December 1992. In late February or early March 1993, he qualified for state disability benefits and thereupon informed MAC of his disability and inquired about continuing health insurance benefits. In July 1993, Ward received a determination of eligibility for Social Security disability benefits and forwarded a copy of this determination to MAC’S human resources division. See id., at 1279. In April 1994, Ward discovered among his papers a booklet describing the long-term disability plan and asked MAG whether the plan covered his condition. When MAC told him he was covered, Ward completed an application for benefits and forwarded it to MAC. In turn, and after filling in the employer information section, MAC forwarded the application to UNUM. UNUM received proof of Ward’s claim on April 11, 1994. See ibid. This notice was late under the terms of the policy, which required submission of proof of claim by November 5, 1993. See id., at 1280. By letter dated April 13, 1994, UNUM advised Ward that his claim was denied as untimely. See id., at 1279.
In September 1994, Ward filed suit against the MAC plan under §502 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1132, to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. UNUM appeared as a defendant and answered on behalf of itself and the plan. See 135 P. 3d, at 1279. To the District Court, Ward argued that under Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 512, 432 P. 2d 731, 737 (1967) (en banc), a California employer that administers an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the agent of the insurance company. Therefore, Ward asserted, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in February or March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that the agency rule announced in Elfstrom “relate[s] to” ERISA plans; hence it is preempted under § 514(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a. The District Court further held that the Elfstrom rule is not saved from preemption as a law that “regulates insurance” within the compass of ERISA’s insurance saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Accordingly, the court rendered summary judgment in UNUM’s favor. See id., at 33a.
The Court of tifying two grounds on which Ward might prevail. First, following the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Cisneros v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 134 F. 3d 939 (1998), the appeals court held that California’s notice-prejudice rule is saved from ERISA preemption as a law that “regulates insurance”; under the notice-prejudice rule, Ward’s late notice would not preclude his ERISA claim absent proof that the insurer suffered actual prejudice because of the delay. See 135 F. 3d, at 1280. Second, and contingently, the Ninth Circuit held that the Elfstrom rule, under which the employer could be deemed an agent of the insurer, does not “relate to” employee benefit plans, and therefore is not preempted by reason of ERISA. See 135 F. 3d, at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for a determination whether UNUM suffered actual prejudice on account of the late submission of Ward’s notice of claim; and if so, whether, under the reasoning of Elfstrom, Ward could nevertheless prevail because he had timely filed his claim. See 135 F. 3d, at 1289.
HH
California’s notice-prejudice rule prescribes:
“[A] defense based on an insured’s failure to give timely notice [of a claim] requires the insurer to prove that it suffered substantial prejudice. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone. The insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice.” Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 760-761, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 845 (1st Dist. 1993) (citations omitted).
The parties agree that the notice-prejudice rule falls under ERISA’s preemption clause, § 514(a), as a state law that “relate[s] to” an employee benefit plan. Their dispute hinges on this question: Does the rule “regulat[e] insurance” and thus escape preemption under the saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A).
Our precedent provides a framework for resolving whether a state law “regulates insurance” within the meaning of the saving clause. First, we ask whether, from a “common-sense view of the matter,” the contested prescription regulates insurance. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 740 (1985); see Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 48. Second, we consider three factors employed to determine whether the regulation fits within the “business of insurance” as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq.: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743 (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 48-49.
A
The Ninth Circuit concluded that California’s notice-prejudice rule “regulates insurance” as a matter of common sense. See Cisneros, 134 E 3d, at 945. We do not normally disturb an appeals court’s judgment on an issue so heavily dependent on analysis of state law, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 181-182 (1976), and we lack cause to do so here. The California notice-prejudice rule controls the terms of the insurance relationship by “requiring the insurer to prove prejudice before enforcing proof-of-claim requirements.” Cisneros, 134 F.3d, at 945. As the Ninth Circuit observed, the rule, by its very terms, “is directed specifically at the insurance industry and is applicable only to insurance contracts.” Ibid.; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12 (“[0]ur survey of California law reveals no cases where the state courts apply the notice-prejudice rule as such outside the insurance area. Nor is this surprising, given that the rule is stated in terms of prejudice to an ‘insurer’ resulting from untimeliness of notice.”). The rule thus appears to satisfy the common-sense view as a regulation that homes in on the insurance industry and does “not just have an impact on [that] industry.” Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 50.
UNUM and its urge cuit’s common-sense conclusion that the notice-prejudice rule is merely an industry-specific application of the general principle that “disproportionate forfeiture should be avoided in the enforcement of contracts.” See Brief for American Council of Life Insurance et al. as Amici Curiae 13; Brief for Association of California Life and Health Insurance Companies as Amicus Curiae 5 (“[Njotice-prejudice is merely a branch of the broad doctrine of harmless error.”). Given the tenet from which the notice-prejudice rule springs, UNUM maintains, the rule resembles the Mississippi law at issue in Pilot Life; under that law, punitive damages could be sought for “bad faith” in denying claims without any reasonably arguable basis for the refusal to pay. See 481 U. S., at 50. We determined in Pilot Life that although Mississippi had “identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law.” Ibid. “Any breach of contract,” we observed, “and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under [the Mississippi common law of bad faith].” Ibid. Accordingly, we concluded, the Mississippi law did not “regulate] insurance” within the meaning of ERISA’s saving clause. Ibid.
We do not find it fair to bracket California’s notice-prejudice rule for insurance contracts with Mississippi’s broad gauged “bad faith” claim for relief. Insurance policies like UNUM’s frame timely notice provisions as conditions precedent to be satisfied by the insured before an insurer’s contractual obligation arises. See 1 B. Witkin, Summary of California Law, Contracts § 726, p. 657 (9th ed. 1987); Zurn Engineers v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 499, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206, 210 (2d Dist. 1976). Ordinarily, “failure to comply with conditions precedent... prevents an action by the defaulting party to enforce the contract.” 14 Cal. Jur. 3d, Contracts §245, p. 542 (3d ed. 1974). A recent California decision, Platt Pacific Inc. v. Andelson, 6 Cal. 4th 307, 862 P. 2d 158 (1993) (en bane), is illustrative. In that case, the California Supreme Court adhered to the normal course: It refused to excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a contractual requirement to timely demand arbitration, although there was no allegation that the defendant had been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s lapse. The plaintiff had forfeited the right to pursue arbitration, the court concluded, for “the condition precedent [of a timely demand] was neither legally excused nor changed by modification of the parties’ written agreement.” Id., at 321, 862 P. 2d, at 167. “A contrary conclusion,” the court stated, “would undermine the law of contracts by vesting in one contracting party the power to unilaterally convert the other contracting party’s conditional obligation into an independent, unconditional obligation notwithstanding the terms of the agreement.” Id., at 314, 862 P. 2d, at 162.
It is no doubt true that out the maxim that “law abhors a forfeiture” and that the notice-prejudice rule is an application of that maxim. But it is an application of a special order, a rule mandatory for insurance contracts, not a principle a court may pliably employ when the circumstances so warrant. Tellingly, UNUM has identified no California authority outside the insurance-specific notice-prejudice context indicating that as a matter of law, failure to abide by a contractual time condition does not work a forfeiture absent prejudice. Outside the notice-prejudice context, the burden of justifying a departure from a contract’s written terms generally rests with the party seeking the departure. See, e. g., American Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F. 3d 1401, 1413 (CA9 1996); CQL Original Products, Inc. v. National Hockey League Players’ Assn., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1347, 1357-1358, n. 6, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 418, n. 6 (4th Dist. 1995). In short, the notice-prejudice rule is distinctive most notably because it is a rule firmly applied to insurance contracts, not a general principle guiding a court’s discretion in a range of matters.
California’s insistence that insurers show prejudice before they may deny coverage because of late notice is grounded in policy concerns specific to the insurance industry See Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 10-14. That grounding is key to our decision. Announcing the notice-prejudice rule in Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P. 2d 155 (1963) (en banc), the California Supreme Court emphasized the “public policy of this state” in favor of compensating insureds. Id., at 307, 384 P. 2d, at 157; see ibid, (weighing the relative burdens of notice-prejudice on insurers and insureds). Subsequent notice-prejudice rulings have likewise focused on insurance industry policy and governance. See, e. g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 241 Cal. App. 2d 558, 570, 50 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1st Dist. 1966) (public policy respecting compensation of insured injured parties); Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 143-144, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1st Dist. 1970) (extending notice-prejudice rule to “elaims-type” policies, rejecting contention that sound public policy required limitation of rule to “occurrence-type” policies); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1348,1359-1360, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784-785 (2d Dist. 1990) (evaluating insurance industry public policy considerations in reaching the opposite conclusion). Decisions of courts in other States similarly indicate that the notice-prejudice rule addresses policy concerns specific to insurance. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N. J. 86, 94, 237 A. 2d 870, 874 (1968) (failure to adopt notice-prejudice would “disserve the public interest, for insurance is an instrument of a social policy that the victims of negligence be compensated”); Great American Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co., 303 N. C. 387, 395, 279 S. E. 2d 769, 774 (1981) (“The [notice-prejudice] rule we adopt today has the advantages of promoting social policy and fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the purchaser while fully protecting the ability of the insurer to protect its own interests.”); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S. W. 2d 845, 851-853 (Tenn. 1998) (surveying the “compelling public policy justifications” that support departing from traditional contract interpretation in favor of notice-prejudice).
In sum, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that notice-prejudice is a rule of law governing the insurance relationship distinctively. We reject UNUM’s contention that the rule merely restates a general principle disfavoring forfeitures and conclude instead that notice-prejudice, as a matter of common sense, regulates insurance.
B
We next consider the criteria used to determine whether a state law regulates the “business of insurance” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Preliminarily, we reject UNUM’s assertion that a state regulation must satisfy all three McCarran-Ferguson factors in order to “regulate insurance” under ERISA’s saving clause. Our precedent is more supple than UNUM conceives it to be. We have indicated that the McCarran-Ferguson factors are “considerations [to be] weighed” in determining whether a state law regulates insurance, Pilot Life, 481 U. S., at 49, and that “[n]one of these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself,” Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U. S. 119, 129 (1982). In Metropolitan Life, the case in which we first used the McCarran-Ferguson formulation to assess whether a state law “regulates insurance” for purposes of ERISA’s saving clause, we called the McCarran-Ferguson factors “relevant”; we did not describe them as “required.” See 471 U. S., at 743; O’Connor v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 146 F. 3d 959, 963 (CADC 1998) (“That the factors are merely ‘relevant’ suggests that they need not all point in the same direction, else they would be ‘required.’”). As the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, Metropolitan Life asked first whether the law there in question “fit a common-sense understanding of insurance regulation,” Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 945, and then looked to the McCarran-Ferguson factors as cheeking points or “guideposts, not separate essential elements... that must each be satisfied” to save the State’s law, id., at 946.
The first McCarran-Ferguson factor asks whether the at issue “has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit determined that the notice-prejudice rule does not satisfy that criterion because it “does not alter the allocation of risk for which the parties initially contracted, namely the risk of lost income from long-term disability.” Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 946. The United States as amicus curiae, however, suggests that the notice-prejudice rule might be found to satisfy the McCarran-Ferguson “risk-spreading” factor: “Insofar as the notice-prejudice rule shifts the risk of late notice and stale evidence from the insured to the insurance company in some instances, it has the effect of raising premiums and spreading risk among policyholders.” Brief for United States as Ami-cus Curiae 14. We need not pursue this point, because the remaining McCarran-Ferguson factors, verifying the common-sense view, are securely satisfied.
Meeting as “an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 743. California’s rule changes the bargain between insurer and insured; it “effectively creates a mandatory contract term” that requires the insurer to prove prejudice before enforcing a timeliness-of-elaim provision. Cisneros, 134 F. 3d, at 946. As the Ninth Circuit stated: “The [notice-prejudice] rule dictates the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured, and consequently, is integral to that relationship.” Ibid.
The third McCarran-Ferguson factor — which asks whether the rule is limited to entities within the insurance industry— is also well met. As earlier explained, see supra, at 368-373, California’s notice-prejudice rule

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 输