Task: songer_weightev

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?" This includes discussions of whether the litigant met the burden of proof. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

HAND, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). We have been unable to see the significance of the defendant’s argument that the limitation in section 250 (d) is upon the right, and not upon the remedy, and that it “is jurisdictional in its character.” That the section is a statute of limitations appeal’s to us too plain for argument, and we are as much compelled to determine when the action is “begun,” if the limitation be upon the right, as if it be upon the remedy. As a statute of limitations it appears to us that it must be read as such statutes always have been, especially as we can see no difference in meaning between the word “begun,” here chosen, and the usual word, “commenced,” or the phrase, “commenced and sued,” of the statute of James I (1623).
It has been the general, if not the uniform, interpretation of statutes of limitation, that the action is commenced at least as soon as the writ, after issuance, has been lodged in the sheriff’s hand for service. Brown v. Babbington, 2 Ld. Raymond, 880; Harris v. Woolford, 6 Term Rep. 617; Parsons v. King, 7 Term Rep. 6; Bell v. Ohio, etc., Co., Fed. Cas. No. 1,260; Burdick v. Green, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 14; Jackson v. Brooks, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 649; Day v. Lamb, 7 Vt. 426; McCracken v. Richardson, 46 N. J. Law, 50; Mason v. Cheney, 47 N. H. 24; Johnson v. Farwell, 7 Greenl. (7 Me.) 370, 22 Am. Dec. 203; Wood on Limitations, vol. 2, p. 570. The question is now generally expressly covered by statute, as it is in New York. Section 17 of the Civil Practice Act. Indeed, the best modern instances are those of suits in equity, which accept the statute of limitation by analogy from actions at law. Here it is the usual rule that the issuance of subpoena, after bill filed, and the lodgment of it for service in the sheriff’s hands, tolls the statute. Linn & Lane Timber Co., v. U. S., 236 U. S. 574, 35 S. Ct. 440, 59 L. Ed. 725; U. S. v. American Lumber Co., 85 F. 827 (C. C. A. 9); U. S. v. Miller (C. C.) 164 F. 444; International Paper Co. v. Commonwealth, 232 Mass. 7, 121 N. E. 510. The mere filing of the hill is at times enough, Armstrong Cork Co. v. Merchants’ Refrigerating Co., 184 F. 199 (C. C. A. 8), following the Missouri statute. Why a different rule should apply to this statute we cannot see. This result is quite independent of section 17 of the New York Practice Act, which does no more than codify the prevailing construction of statutes of limitation which had preceded it.
Strictly, the ease does not involve the question whether the section should have a uniform meaning, wherever the action is brought, or whether the time when it is “begun” is to be determined by the local law. In either ease the statute was tolled in the ease at bar, though so far as we can see, Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U. S. 162, 2 S. Ct. 388, 27 L. Ed. 686, is fiat for the second view, and rules. The defendant by way of distinction suggests that that was a removed suit, and that the court overlooked the jurisdictional point. But the limitation of the statute there at bar applied equally in whatever court the suit was brought, and, as we have just said, the supposed jurisdictional question had nothing to do with its meaning.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the agreed facts.

Question: Did the factual interpretation by the court or its conclusions (e.g., regarding the weight of evidence or the sufficiency of evidence) favor the appellant?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: D