Task: songer_judgdisc

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in any civil law cases including civil government, civil private, and diversity cases. The issue is: "Did the court's ruling on the abuse of discretion by the trial judge favor the appellant?" This includes the issue of whether the judge actually had the authority for the action taken, but does not include questions of discretion of administrative law judges. Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
A motorcycle policeman (Bradshaw) of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Force, while engaged in the performance of his duty on June 13, 1963, was hit and seriously injured by a bus owned by the United States which was being driven at the time on Government business by an employee of the United States. Following a period of hospitalization, Bradshaw attempted to return to work but he was subsequently found by the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons to be permanently disabled, as a result of the above accident, from performing his duties as a police officer and on March 31, 1964 he was retired from the District Police Force under the provisions of D.C. Code § 4-527(1) (1967), the Policemen and Firemen’s Retirement and Disability Act (hereinafter the “Disability Act” and “District Disability Act.”) In conformance with the provisions of this statute Bradshaw is presently receiving, and will continue to receive during his entire life, 66%% of the basic salary he was receiving at the time of his retirement. Pursuant to said statute Bradshaw also received medical and hospital treatment having a value of about $548.
On March 11, 1965, Bradshaw commenced a suit based on negligence against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for $100,000 in damages to compensate him for (1) medical services and hospitalization; (2) loss of working time; (3) being required to retire from his job; and (4) for suffering “other losses” which were subsequently specified to include pain and suffering. Ona Bradshaw, his wife, also joined in the suit and claimed damages of $25,000 “for loss of services, society and consortium.”
The United States, first in its answer, then in a motion for summary judgment and finally at trial, asserted that the District Disability Act provided Bradshaw’s exclusive method of recovery and precluded a suit against the United States under the Tort Claims Act. The trial court held that the existence of the District Disability Act did not preclude a suit against the United States under the Tort Claims Act and found that the accident occurred solely through the negligence of the driver of the Government vehicle. However, the court refused to allow Bradshaw to recover for the value of his medical services and in determining the amount of damages resulting from his projected loss of earnings took two factors into consideration. First, it held that Congress had appropriated some of the money for the retirement (disability) fund and to omit all consideration of that fund would result in at least “partial double payment,” and, secondly, it held that wooden reliance on the figure of Bradshaw’s present earnings projected to his retirement date would, because of unforeseen exigencies and contingencies, be entirely theoretical and unsafe and be a basis that a jury would not be likely to accept. Following such standards, the court awarded Bradshaw damages of $20,000. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, except we reverse to direct payment also of the value of the medical and hospital services received by Bradshaw.
I.
The District Disability Act and the Tort Claims Act
The first issue presented is whether the existence of the benefits available under the Disability Act for the District of Columbia precludes recovery by Bradshaw from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Neither the language contained in the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964), nor the one provision of the Disability Act which deals with exclusivity, D.C. Code § 4-538 (1967) (71 Stat. 400) provides an answer to the question of whether the Disability Act precludes a suit under the Tort Claims Act. However, the factual situation presented in the instant case is, for all practical purposes, identical to the one presented to this court in the case of Wham v. United States, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 128, 180 F.2d 38 (1960). There we held that although an injured District of Columbia policeman was entitled to benefits under the District Disability Act, he could nevertheless maintain a suit against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Questions have arisen concerning whether some of our subsequent decisions and those of the Supreme Court have eroded the holding in Wham or whether it should still be followed. We conclude that Wham is still good law and should be followed here.
In Wham we arrived at the result that we did chiefly for two reasons. The first was that the case of Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949) was, in our opinion, directly controlling. In Brooks, a soldier on furlough was injured when the private vehicle in which he was riding collided with a Government truck being operated negligently by a Government employee. Though he was covered by various compensation schemes created by the Government, see 337 U.S. at 53, 69 S.Ct. 918, the Court held that the soldier was entitled to maintain an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the injuries he received. In discussing the Brooks case, we said:
We think that decision controls this case. Soldiers on furlough fall within the presumption of being in line of duty and, generally speaking, enjoy the same benefits as soldiers on active duty. * * * In principle, claimants in the Brooks cases and the claimant here must stand on an equal footing before the Tort Claims Act. Each is favored with a special system of benefits by reason of his particular employment. Neither is expressly excluded by said Act. So why, if soldiers (on furlough) directly in the federal service are not excluded, should a policeman directly in the employ of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation * * * be excluded? We can see no reason for such discrimination.
86 U.S.App.D.C. at 129, 180 F.2d at 39.
The Court in Brooks, however, left open the possibility, later confirmed in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), that soldiers on furlough and soldiers on active duty and operating directly under orders were distinguishable for purposes of the Tort Claims Act. 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S. Ct. 918. Faced in the latter case with suits under the Tort Claims Act by soldiers who had been injured while acting pursuant to orders, and disturbed over the possible effect on military discipline of suits being maintained for injuries resulting from negligently given orders, the Supreme Court held that no recovery under the Tort Claims Act was possible under such circumstances. It distinguished Brooks precisely because the claimant had been on furlough in that case. The lesson to be drawn from a combined reading of Brooks and Feres is that a suit by a member of the military establishment against the U.S. Government cannot be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the complainant has suffered what might be called a work-related injury and the Government he sues has already provided a “simple, certain and uniform compensation system.” (340 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 71 S.Ct. 153). See United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954); Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053, 89 S.Ct. 691, 21 L.Ed.2d 695 (1969); Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 933 (3d Cir. 1964); Snyder v. United States, 118 F.Supp. 585, 595-598 (D. Md. 1953). Thus, the Brooks-Feres distinction falls into the work related-non work related dichotomy characteristic of workmen’s compensation schemes generally. See Cobia v. United States, 384 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Browning, 359 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1966); Wolff v. Britton, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 328 F.2d 181 (1964).
Since Bradshaw’s injuries were obviously work related, Brooks has no applicability and that portion of Wham which relied on Brooks can no longer be considered a correct statement of controlling law as it applies to cases such as the one at bar.
In Wham, however, we indicated that a second reason existed for allowing the plaintiff in that case to maintain a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, i. e.:
However, independently of the Brooks decision, we think the facts concerning the [Disability Act] Fund suggest no sound basis for the exception read into the Tort Claims Act by the District Court. In our opinion the United States bears no such relationship to the [Disability Act'} Fund as to justify the Government’s claim for exemption from liability under the Tort Claims Act to appellant by reason of his position as a member of the Metropolitan Police [of the District of Columbia].
86 U.S.App.D.C. at 129, 180 F.2d at 39 (emphasis added). This is tantamount to holding that the United States cannot successfully assert immunity from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act because of the existence of available benefits under the District Disability Act since the nature of the relationship of the United States to the District Disability Act is not of such character as to justify immunity from suit.
The above quoted part of our opinion in Wham has not been undermined by the subsequent decisions of either this court or the Supreme Court. The District Disability Act, created in 1916 by Congress pursuant to its authority to legislate for the District of Columbia is administered by persons appointed by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, an independent municipal corporation. The revenues necessary to pay the requisite benefits under the Act come from a combination of revenues derived from District of Columbia taxes, gifts, fines, etc., employee contributions and a federal contribution. The federal contribution is intended to compensate the District for benefits received by the United States and takes the form of annual lump-sum payments to the District. These payments become a part of the District’s general revenues and some of the money included therein undoubtedly is paid to policemen and firemen as part of the benefits they receive under the Act. District policemen and firemen are under the control of the District Police and Fire Chiefs respectively and are not subject to the direction and control of the United States. In sum, the District (a municipal corporation) and not the United States is, in every meaningful sense, the employer of the District policemen and firemen who- — along with their dependents — benefit from the District Disability Act. See Grace v. Magruder, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 56, 148 F.2d 679, 682 (1945); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Hoage, 62 App.D.C. 245, 246, 66 F. 2d 275, 276 (1933); United States v. Griffith, 55 App.D.C. 123, 124, 2 F.2d 925, 926 (1924).
It is in light of the relationship between the Government, the District and Bradshaw that the Government’s claim regarding the exclusivity of the District Disability Act must be analyzed. All of the cases which the Government cites for the proposition that the District Disability Act provides an exclusive remedy for Bradshaw deal with situations in which a person engaged or employed in the service of the United States was entitled to compensation paid by the United States principally from U.S. revenues under a scheme established and maintained by the United States and was seeking a second method of recovery from the United States in a tort action. Demko v. United States, 385 U.S. 149, 87 S.Ct. 382, 17 L.Ed.2d 258 (1966); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 72 S.Ct. 849, 96 L.Ed. 1051 (1952); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); Lewis v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 190 F.2d 22, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869, 72 S.Ct. 110, 96 L.Ed. 653 (1951). See also Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495, 79 S.Ct. 936, 3 L.Ed.2d 971 (1959). In none of such cases has recovery in tort been permitted.
The principle in such cases behind denial of recovery from the United States in tort, even in the absence of language in the applicable statute expressly precluding it, was expressed by the Court in Johansen:
As the Government has created a comprehensive system to award payments for injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legislation to that effect.
343 U.S. at 441, 72 S.Ct. 849, at 857. Thus the existence of a comprehensive scheme for compensation was felt by the Court to carry with it a presumption that it was thie exclusive method of recovery for the injuries which it covered. See also Demko v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. at 152, 87 S.Ct. 382. The Supreme Court, however, was careful to limit this presumption to the relations between the United States and its employees. Thus limited, the presumption is in harmony with the pattern workmen’s compensation schemes have taken on generally: in place of an employer’s liability in tort, often leaving employees with no compensation for “industrial” or work-related injuries, there is substituted a fixed and exclusive liability on the part of the employer with the employee’s rights against third parties left unaffected expressly or by implication. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601, 83 S. Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949); Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157-158, 159, 52 S.Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026 (1932); Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421, 423-424, 42 S.Ct. 320, 66 L.Ed. 696 (1922); Davis v. Harrod, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 347 n.2, 407 F.2d 1280, 1282 n.2 (1969); S. Rep. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1949); 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 1.10, at 2 (1968); McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 39 Tex.L.Rev. 389, 392-394 (1959); cf. Lewis v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 22 n.6, 190 F.2d 22, 23 n.6 (1951).
Aubrey v. United States, 103 U.S. App.D.C. 65, 254 F.2d 768 (1958) does not depart from this general pattern. There the plaintiff was an employee of a U.S. Naval Officers’ Mess, a non-appropriated fund activity. He was injured in the course of his employment through the alleged negligence of personnel in the United States Navy, and was compensated under the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1964), which, by virture of 5 U.S..C. § 8171 (Supp. V, 1969), applies to all employees of nonappropriated fund activities. Aubrey then commenced a suit against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and in that decision, while acknowledging that he was not an “employee” of the United States, we held that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act nevertheless provided his exclusive remedy.
Aubrey, however, was not considered to be an employee of the United States for certain purposes only, primarily for the purposes of the Civil Service and Federal Employees Compensation Acts. See 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (Supp. V, 1969); Denenberg v. United States, 305 F.2d 378, 158 Ct.Cl. 401 (1962). He worked for an instrumentality of the United States, 5 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (Supp. V, 1969); see Nimro v. Davis, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 204 F.2d 734, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901, 74 S.Ct. 229, 98 L.Ed. 401 (1953), and was therefore presumably an employee of the United States for purposes of unemployment compensation, 5 U.S.C. § 8501 (Supp. V, 1969), or, in the absence of special legislation, for purposes of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. United States v. Forfari, 268 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1959). He worked under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy, 10 U. S.C. § 6011 (1964), and was subject to the control of Naval personnel in all facets of his job. Aubrey v. United States, supra, 103 U.S.App.D.C. at 68, 254 F.2d at 771. In short, he was not considered to be an employee of the United States for narrowly circumscribed statutory purposes, see Daniels v. Chanute A.F.B. Exchange, 127 F.Supp. 920, 924 (E.D. Ill.1955), and under such circumstances the presumption that the compensation scheme provided by statute was his exclusive remedy was in harmony with the normal effect of such compensation schemes on the relations between employers and employees generally.
Because Bradshaw is not an employee of the United States, however, the presumption found in the above cases is not applicable to his suit against the United States, and nothing those cases contain undermines the second ground of our decision in Wham. Nevertheless, since stare decisis is not an inflexible rule, see, e. g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940), the result dictated by Wham should be examined to determine whether it still fits into the system of remedies created by statute as part of a workable, consistent and equitable whole. Johansen v. United States, supra, 343 U.S. at 432, 72 S.Ct. 849.
The task is somewhat complicated by the multiplicity of sources from which Government employees may obtain compensation and by the complexity of the provisions governing the administration of the various benefit plans. Beginning with certainties, Park Policemen, White House Policemen and Secret Service personnel covered by the Disability Act cannot recover from the United States in tort for damages or expenses which, in one way or another, are compensable under its provisions. As employees of the United States for whom their employer has provided a “simple, certain and uniform compensation system,” they are subject to the presumption of exclusivity announced in Johansen, Demko and Feres. See Lewis v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 190 F.2d 22 (1951). This is true despite the fact that these employees, and particularly the Park Police, do much the same work as the Metropolitan Police. See 103 Cong.Rec. 14329 (1957).
From here, the waters become less clear. Employees of the District of Columbia, other than policemen and firemen, are covered by the provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1) (D) (Supp. V, 1969). The cost of such compensation paid to District employees under the Act is borne by the District, see 5 U.S.C. § 8147(b) (c) (Supp. V, 1969), and payment to such District employees is made in the same manner as are the general expenses of the District, 5 U.S.C. § 8139 (Supp. V, 1969); see. e. g., 82 Stat. 695 (1968). But, unlike District policemen and firemen, other District employees can receive specified payments for specified injuries under the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 8107 (Supp. V, 1969). In addition, while eligibility for recovery under the Federal Employees Compensation Act would seem to preclude any recovery in tort against the United States by a District employee for the same injury, 5 U. S.C. § 8116(c) (Supp. V, 1969), the matter is not free from doubt. Moreover, under the Federal Employees Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8301 et seq. (Supp. V, 1969) an injured District employee (other than a policeman or fireman) who is eligible for compensation under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, if he has been employed for five years or more, and if he has become disabled, can, instead of his benefits under the Compensation Act, elect to receive his benefits under the Retirement Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8337(a), (f), 8339(a), (f) (Supp. V, 1969). The Retirement Act contains no exclusivity provision whatsoever, and, since each employee contributes to the fund from which benefits are paid, 5 U.S.C. § 8334 (Supp. V, 1969), receipt of, or eligibility for, benefits under its provisions does not appear to.preclude recovery in tort against the United States. Cf., e. g., United States v. Price, 179 F.Supp. 309 (E.D.Ya.1959), aff’d, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961).
In light of the different provisions of the District Disability Act, the Federal Employees Compensation Act and the Retirement Act, the interpretation of the one which would promote the greatest amount of equity and consistency in the remedial schemes for all District employees is perhaps impossible to find. In addition to the difficulty of the task, it appears that Congress has made its own choice on the matter and did not “intend” that the compensatory scheme provided for policemen and firemen and those provided for other District employees would be entirely consistent. An attempt to make them so would thus run directly counter to the congressional purposes in their enactment.
We come to this conclusion because, during the debates which preceded the passage of the Policemen and Firemen’s Relief Act Amendments of 1957, Pub.L. No. 85-157, 71 Stat. 391, D.C. Code § 4-521 et seq. (1967) (hereinafter 1957 Amendments), congressional sponsors of the bill stated that the Metropolitan Police Force was having difficulty obtaining and retaining its authorized quota of members and that an improved pension plan might l’emedy that situation. 103 Cong. Rec. 14324 (1957); see Hearings on S. 1770 before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Affairs of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957). In addition, a limited exclusivity provision was placed in the Act. This was done after we had decided the Wham ease, nine years after a broader exclusivity provision had been placed in the Federal Employees Compensation Act, and one year before a broad exclusivity provision was added to the sections dealing with employees of non-appropriated fund activities. In addition, the limited exclusivity provision in the District Disability Act was inserted at the request of the Bureau of the Budget to provide “clarification of any doubtful areas which might later be the subject of interpretation unless made clear by substantive legislation.” Thus, even in light of the principle that one should be wary of finding any congressional purposes in congressional silence, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241-242, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), the problems posed by possibilities of dual recovery under compensation schemes can hardly have been unfamiliar to the Congress and what it failed to prohibit expressly, this court should be reluctant to find it prohibited by implication.
In sum, whether allowing Bradshaw to maintain this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act would be equitable and consistent in light of the compensation schemes for other Distict employees and federal employees who are covered by the District Disability Act, besides being a difficult question to answer, is perhaps an irrelevant question in light of the legislative record of the District Disability Act. The Congress created the Act and in this particular case it is in a better position to provide the equity and consistency which it feels to be requisite than is this court. Thus, there is nothing which compels the court to abandon the holding in Wham? and, on that basis, the decision of the trial court to permit Bradshaw to maintain the instant action should be affirmed. Doing so absolves the driver of the truck from suit (28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)) and in the event that Congress considers it improper to subject the United States to suit in such a case, a simple amendment to the District Disability Act would accomplish that result.
II
The Collateral Source Rule
The second issue presented here is whether the collateral source rule is available to a police officer of the District of Columbia in a tort suit against the United States. In issue is the value of Bradshaw’s medical, and hospital expenses which were paid by the District of Columbia in accordance with the provisions of the District Disability Act, and Bradshaw contends he is nevertheless entitled under the collateral source rule to recover their value from the United States.
The trial court made no finding of fact concerning the amount of medical and hospital expenses which had been paid, but said that there was evidence that $548 had been so expended. The court however held that Bradshaw was not entitled to recover for this item, saying:
The Court is of the opinion that the Collateral Source Rule, as formulated in the decision of the Court of Appeals in Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 U.S. App.D.C. 16, 217 F.2d 344 is not applicable, because in this case the collateral source is not a third party but a fund established by an appropriated [sic] of funds. In other words, it is the defendant’s money which paid his medical and hospital bills.
Joint Appendix at 52.
We find that this disposition was erroneous. As the preceding discussion has established, it was not the defendant’s money which was used to pay the hospital bills. Compare Adams v. Turner, 238 F.Supp. 643 (D.D.C.1965). Most of the money came from District revenues and employee contributions. This court has applied the collateral source rule and allowed recovery in the past in similar situations, Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 217 F.2d 344 (1954), as have other courts. See Burke v. Byrd, 188 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.Fla. 1960). See generally Restatement of Torts § 920, comment (e) (1935); C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Damages § 90, at 310, 323-324 (1935); Schwartz, The Collateral-Source Rule, 41 B.U.L.Rev. 348 (1961); Comment, 38 Mich.L.Rev. 1073 (1940). Recovery of the value of the medical and hospital expenses should therefore be allowed here and the case should be reversed and remanded for a determination of the amount.
Bradshaw also claims that he is entitled to the present value of his future lost earnings computed without giving any consideration to the amounts which he will receive as part of his benefits under the District Disability Act. There was expert testimony that the present value of his loss of earnings from the date of his involuntary retirement to the date at which he would have been subject to mandatory retirement from the police force would be $91,000. If the amounts which he could expect to receive under the Disability Act were taken into account, the amount of his future loss of earnings would be $1,600.
The trial court declined to award Bradshaw the $91,000, saying, first of all, that the collateral source rule did not apply since the amounts paid under the Disability Act for retirement were paid by the defendant. Secondly, the court held that the $91,000 figure was too speculative, did not take into account “possible trials and tribulations of life and * * * unforeseen exigencies and circumstances,” and therefore probably would not be used by a jury as an accurate measure of damages for future lost earnings. The court therefore awarded Bradshaw $20,000.
The first ground for denial of the award, like the ground on which the recovery of medical expenses was denied, was error. The second ground, however, cannot be said to be clearly erroneous and must therefore be upheld. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
Bradshaw argues that it was error for the trial court not to have accepted the unrebutted testimony of his expert witness as to the amount which he would have earned until the date of his mandatory retirement, and to discount such testimony because of its speculative nature. In support of this contention, he cites cases which stand for the proposition that future loss of earnings, though speculative, can nevertheless be ascertained and awarded as damages.
Bradshaw’s authorities do not go so far as to say that the speculative nature of estimates of future loss of earnings cannot be taken into account in making an award. The ultimate fact to be found is the amount of money which Bradshaw will lose because of the accident and the amount which he might have earned but for the accident is evidence on, and not a determination of, that question. The trier of fact is not required to use any particular formula in computing the amount of the loss. See Culley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F.Supp. 710, 716-719 (D.Del.1965); cf. Frankel v. Todd, 393 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1968); McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870, 81 S.Ct. 115, 5 L. Ed.2d 93 (1960). See generally C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Damages § 86 (1935). Moreover, the weight to be accorded even unrebutted expert testimony is for the trier of fact to determine. Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724, 731 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 365, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941); Merrill v. United States, 177 F.Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.N.Y.1959); see Luria Bros. & Co. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 676, 369 F.2d 701, 713-714 (1966); Armenia v. Wyer, 210 F.2d 592, 596 (2d Cir. 1954); Brill v. Mushinsky, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 194 F.2d 158 (1952). We accordingly find that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to award Bradshaw the full present value of his future loss of earnings as that value was calculated by his expert witness.
Ill
Adequacy of the Award
Bradshaw does not press heavily his contention that the damages awarded were inadequate in view of the nature and extent of his injuries. In his complaint the ad damnum, was $100,000 of which $91,000 was for future loss of earnings. An award of $20,000 could include $11,000 for lost earnings as well as the $9,000 for pain, suffering, etc. originally requested. While Bradshaw was found to be totally disabled under the procedures of the District Disability Act from performing his duties as a policeman that conclusion was not determinative of the extent of his general disability. He might still be able to perform work other than as a policeman and the evidence so indicated. In the four calendar years following his retirement he earned an average per year of $4,038 (Tr. 31-34). He was also receiving a minor amount of compensation from the Veterans’ Administration for a prior service-connected disability equal to 10 per cent of total disability or about $23 a month at the time the trial court entered the judgment in this case. While $11,000 is not overly generous it is not a clearly erroneous award and the trial court should therefore be affirmed. See Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp. v. Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 386 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1967).
IV
Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court was correct in allowing Bradshaw to maintain this action against the United States; and that the court did not commit reversible error in determining the award for loss of future earnings ; but that it was error to refuse to allow recovery for the value of his medical and hospital expenses.
The court’s judgment to the extent that it refuses recovery for the value of medical and hospital expenses is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court to determine the value of such expenses and to include such amount in the judgment.
It is so ordered.
. D.C. Code § 4-527(1) (1967) provides:
Whenever any member is injured or contracts a disease in the performance of duty or such injury or disease is aggravated by such duty at any time after appointment and such injury or disease or aggravation permanently disables Mm for the performance of duty, he shall upon retirement for such disability, receive an annuity computed at the rate of 2 per centum of his basic salary at the time of retirement for each year or portion thereof of his service: Provided, That such annuity shall not exceed 70 per centum [sic] of his basic salary at the time of retirement, nor shall it be less than 66% per centum of his basic salary at the time of retirement.
. D.C. Code § 4-525 (1967) provides :
Whenever any member shall become temporarily disabled by injury received or disease contracted in the performance of duty, to such an extent as to require medical or surgical services, other than such as can be rendered by the Commissioners, or to require hospital treatment, the expense of such medical or surgical services, or hospital
treatment, shall be paid by the District of Columbia; but no such expense shall be paid except upon a certificate of the Commissioners setting forth the necessity for such services or treatment and the nature of the injury or disease which rendered the same necessary.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with

Question: Did the court's ruling on the abuse of discretion by the trial judge favor the appellant? This includes the issue of whether the judge actually had the authority for the action taken, but does not include questions of discretion of administrative law judges.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Mixed answer
D. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: A