Task: sc_issue_9

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners in these causes — a corporation and some of its stockholders — seek an accounting from respondents — certain other corporations which, prior to a reorganization in 1943, were subsidiaries of the petitioning corporation. It is petitioners’ theory that respondents had unjustly enriched themselves by wrongfully appropriating a “tax loss” incurred by petitioner Western Pacific Railroad Corporation and applying it to the sole benefit of respondent Western Pacific Railroad Company.
The factual background upon which petitioners’ complaint was founded is as complicated as it is unique. For present purposes, we may pass over it. Suffice it to say that the cause of action was founded on a theory of unjust enrichment; jurisdiction of the federal courts was invoked upon the grounds of the diverse citizenship of the parties.
The District Court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed by a two-to-one vote. Petitioners then applied for a rehearing before the Court of Appeals en banc. With one dissent, the rehearing was denied; the court in its order struck the request that the rehearing be en banc. Petitioners then filed a second application protesting that the action of the two judges, who struck out the request for a rehearing en banc, was error because such a request was authorized by statute and required the attention of the full court.
The Court of Appeals, en banc, declined to entertain this second application. Chief Judge Denman dissented. We granted certiorari; among other things, we deemed it important to resolve the en banc questions precipitated by this litigation. 344 U. S. 809.
The issues stem from 28 U. S. C. § 46 (c). It reads:
“Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges. of the circuit who are in active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the circuit.”
It is petitioners’ claim that the Code vests in a defeated party the right to ask for a rehearing en banc; the court as a whole must act upon such a petition; thus the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to entertain the application in this case.
Obviously, the claim calls for close analysis of § 46 (c). What particular right, if any, does it give to a litigant in a Court of Appeals? To what extent is he entitled to put the merits of his cause before each member of the court in pressing his demand for a hearing or a rehearing before the entire court?
In our view, § 46 (c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings en banc. It goes no further. It neither forbids nor requires each active member of a Court of Appeals to entertain each petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc. The court is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a majority may order such a hearing.
The statute, enacted in 1948, is but a legislative ratification of Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326 (1941) — a decision which went no further than to sustain the power of a Court of Appeals to order a hearing en banc. When the statute is cast in historical perspective, this becomes more readily apparent.
As early as 1938, the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges recommended that the Judicial Code be amended to make it clear that “the majority of the circuit judges may be able to provide for a court of more than three judges when in their opinion-unusual circumstances make such action advisable.” The recommendation was renewed in 1939 and again in 1940. Thereafter, in 1941, when a conflict developed between circuits as to the power to sit en banc under the old Judicial Code, identical bills were introduced in both the House (H. R. 3390) and the Senate (S. 1053) to amend the Code as recommended by the Judicial Conference. The proposed amendment took the form of a proviso to § 117:
“... Provided, That, in a circuit where there are more than three circuit judges, the majority of the circuit judges may provide for a court of all the active and available circuit judges of the circuit to sit in banc for the hearing of particular cases, when in their opinion such action is advisable.” H. R. 3390, S. 1053, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
When this legislation came up for a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Danaher expressly raised the problem, “On whose motion would the court assemble en banc?” He was told that counsel might make a “suggestion,” but that “the convening of the full court would be at the initiative of the court,” and that it would not be desirable “to encourage the initiation of this suggestion by counsel.” Senator McFarland said that from looking at the provision he got the impression that “they [the court] would be the ones to do the acting.” Senator Kilgore agreed. Senator Danaher concluded that the amendment would be “impractical unless we make it clear that... the judges themselves decide.”
This bit of legislative history is significant. Congress was attempting to frame legislation which would empower a majority of circuit judges in any Court of Appeals to “provide” for hearings en banc. The problem was immediately raised: how would a court be convened en banc — would the legislation, as framed, give litigants the right to compel every judge to act on an application for a full court? The proponents of the legislation, and those who studied it, worked out this answer in their study of the problem: the determination of how the en banc power was to be exercised was to rest with the court itself — litigants should be free to suggest that a particular case was appropriate for consideration by the full court, but they should be given no right to compel all circuit judges to take formal action on the suggestion.
Subsequent history of later proposals — drafted in substantially similar language — discloses no change in purpose. The amendment to § 117 of the old Judicial Code passed the House, but it was never acted upon by the Senate. It may have died because this Court’s decision in Textile Mills intervened.
The inter-circuit conflict which brought on the proposed amendment to § 117, and which was later resolved by the decision of this Court in Textile Mills, was purely a dispute over the power to sit en banc; it never reached the problem of how en banc proceedings were to be initiated. In Lang’s Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F. 2d 867 (1938), the Ninth Circuit had held that under § 117 there was no way in which a circuit of more than three judges could provide the means to convene itself en banc. But the Third Circuit, in Textile Mills, reached a contrary conclusion:
.. we cannot agree with Judge Denman’s contrary conclusion in Lang’s Estate.... We conclude that this court has power to provide, as it has done by Rule 4 (1), for sessions of the court en banc, consisting of all the circuit judges of the circuit in active service.” 117 F. 2d 62, 70-71. (Emphasis supplied.)
In affirming the Third Circuit, this Court did no more than sustain that court’s exercise of the “power to provide... for sessions of the court en banc.” There is nothing in that decision to indicate that we recognized any right in parties to have their cases passed upon by more than three circuit judges.
This was the state of the law in 1944, when the movement to revise the Judicial Code was in its early stages. At that time, Judge Maris, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Revision of the Judicial Code, submitted a memorandum to the House Committee on Revision of Laws. Pointing to this Court’s decision in Textile Mills, he urged that the new Code should expressly provide “that except in cases and controversies... which the court by rule or special order directs to be heard by the full court, all cases and controversies brought before the court shall be heard by not more than three judges.” This proposal was the genesis of the present § 46 (c). It was motivated by a dual purpose: to give express recognition to the doctrine of Textile Mills, while at the same time securing the tradition of three-judge courts against any further intrusion.
The first legislative draft of § 46 (c) did not differ in any material respect from its present form, and the provision passed through the succeeding drafts and stages of legislative development without attracting any specific comment. But we are not left unassisted when we seek to divine the legislators’ understanding of § 46 (c). We have the Reviser’s Notes, which are entitled to great weight. These comments were before Congress when it reviewed the proposed revision of the Code, and were relied upon to “explain... the source of the law and the changes made in the course of the codification and revision.”
The Reviser’s Notes tell us that their purpose was twofold: to “authorize the establishment of divisions of the court,” and to “provide for the assignment of circuit judges for hearings” en banc. Referring to the latter purpose, the Notes quote extensively from this Court’s opinion in Textile Mills. The language they quote is significant. It describes certain housekeeping functions of a Court of Appeals — functions which cannot be discharged by the court unless, on its own motion, it convenes itself as a body and acts as a body — such as rule making, appointing clerks and fixing the times when court shall be held. Clearly the Reviser’s Notes assimilated the power to sit en banc to the power to discharge these housekeeping functions, and it was precisely that description of the power which the revisers saw fit to use in describing to Congress what they deemed to be the nature of the power conferred by § 46 (c).
Furthermore, the Notes make it apparent that if the revisers intended to do anything more than codify Textile Mills, their concern was with preserving the “tradition” of three-judge courts against any further inroads. An interpretation of § 46 (c), which authorizes litigants, of right, to compel nonsitting judges to act in every case, is certainly a departure from the tradition of three-judge courts — a most controversial change which was plainly not anticipated by Textile Mills. Yet Congress’ purpose was codification, not alteration, of the rules pertaining to the administration of the courts. The Senate was told by its Judiciary Committee that “great care has been exercised to make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval.” Similarly, Judge Maris told the House Committee on the Judiciary that the new Code “embodies a number of practical improvements in the judicial machinery of a wholly noncontroversial nature which have resulted from suggestions originating with the judges whose day to day administration of the various provisions of the Judicial Code gives them a special knowledge of these matters.”
A first reading of § 46 (c) may well leave one with doubts. It reposes power in “a majority of active circuit judges,” and says no more. Perhaps, without further study, one might be inclined to fall back upon the general experience of our jurisprudence, and determine that the litigant is, by implication, given the right to compel the full court to determine whether it will exercise its power in a given case. But a study of the legislative background of § 46 (c) dispels such an idea and makes it quite clear that the draftsmen intended to grant the en banc power and no more; the court itself was to establish the procedure for exercise of the power.
This interpretation makes for an harmonious reading of the whole of § 46. In this Section, Congress speaks to the Courts of Appeals: the court, itself, as a body, is authorized to arrange its calendar and distribute its work among its membership; the court, itself, as a body, may designate the places where it will sit. Ordinarily, added Congress, cases are to be heard by divisions of three. But Congress went further; it left no doubt that the court, by a majority vote, could convene itself en banc to hear or rehear particular cases.
The juxtaposition of this last enactment with the others negates petitioners’ interpretation of the Act. Litigants are certainly given no special standing to partake, as of right, in the court’s decisions pertaining to arrangement of its calendar and the assignment of its cases to divisions. Just as the statute makes no provision binding the court to entertain every request that a particular case be assigned to a particular division, so it should not be construed to compel the court to entertain, en banc, motions for a hearing or rehearing en banc.
A contrary reading — one which would sustain petitioners — would obviously require a practice which might thrust unwarranted extra burdens on the court. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to give an automatic, second appeal to each litigant in a Court of Appeals composed of more than three judges. Yet petitioners would have us hold that such a “horizontal” appeal is implicit in § 46. And, if petitioners are correct as to their claim that petitions for rehearing en banc must, as a matter of law, be passed upon by the full bench, the argument should apply equally to petitions requesting that the initial hearing of the case be en banc, because § 46 (c) treats “hearings” and “rehearings” with equality. But, again, there is nothing to suggest that every party in every case in every Court of Appeals may submit, as of right, a petition to every judge — a petition in the nature of a preliminary appeal — asking that the full bench examine his cause and formally rule on the question of whether it shall be heard en banc.
Accordingly, we hold that § 46 (c) does not require a Court of Appeals to do what petitioners claim should have been done in this case. The statute deals, not with rights, but with power. The manner in which that power is to be administered is left to the court itself. A majority may choose to abide by the decision of the division by entrusting the initiation of a hearing or rehearing en banc to the three judges who are selected to hear the case. On the other hand, there is nothing in § 46 (c) which requires the full bench to adhere to a rule which delegates that responsibility to the division. Because § 46 (c) is a grant of power, and nothing more, each Court of Appeals is vested with a wide latitude of discretion to decide for itself just how that power shall be exercised.
But even if the statute grants only power plus the discretion for its exercise, that does not mark the end of our review of the en banc phase of this case. The en banc power, confirmed by § 46 (c), is, as we emphasized in the Textile Mills case, a necessary and useful power — indeed too useful that we should ever permit a court to ignore the possibilities of its use in cases where its use might be appropriate. If § 46 (c) is to achieve its fundamental purpose, certain fundamental requirements should be observed by the Courts of Appeals. In the exercise of our “general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,” the responsibility lies with this Court to define these requirements and insure their observance.
It is essential, of course, that a circuit court, and the litigants who appear before it, understand the practice— whatever it may be — whereby the court convenes itself en banc. In promulgating the rules governing that procedure the court should recognize the full scope of its powers under § 46 (c). Consistent with the statute, the court may, as has been shown, adopt a practice whereby the majority of the full bench may determine whether there will be hearings or rehearings en banc, or they may delegate the responsibility for the initiation of the en banc power to the divisions of the court. But in recognizing the full scope of § 46 (c), the full membership of the court will be mindful, of course, that the statute commits the en banc power to the majority of active circuit judges so that a majority always retains the power to revise the procedure and withdraw whatever responsibility may have been delegated to the division. And, recognizing the value of an efficient use of the en banc power, the court should adopt such means as will enable its full membership to determine whether the court’s administration of the power is achieving the full purpose of the statute so that the court will better be able to change its en banc procedure, should it deem change advisable.
It is also essential that litigants be left free to suggest to the court, or to the division — depending upon where power of initiation resides, as determined by the active circuit judges of the court — that a particular case is appropriate for consideration by all the judges. A court may take steps to use the en banc power sparingly, but it may not take steps to curtail its use indiscriminately. Counsel are often well equipped to point up special circumstances and important implications calling for en banc consideration of the cases which they ask the court to decide. If, in the exercise of its discretion under § 46 (c), a court denies litigants the privilege of reaching the ear of every circuit judge on the en banc question, there is still no reason to deny them access to the few circuit judges who must act initially, and perhaps decisively, on the matter for the others. Counsel’s suggestion need not require any formal action by the court; it need not be treated as a motion; it is enough if the court simply gives each litigant an opportunity to call attention to circumstances in a particular case which might warrant a rehearing en banc. And of course to hold that counsel are entitled to speak to the en banc question, is not to hold that the court itself is in any way deprived of the power to initiate én banc hearings sua sponte. The statute commits the power of initiation to the court; the litigants’ function must therefore be limited; but, certainly, if the en banc power is to be wisely utilized, there is no reason to deny the litigants any chance to aid the court in its effective implementation of the statute.
Finally, it is essential to recognize that the question of whether a cause should be heard en banc is an issue which should be considered separate and apart from the question of whether there should be a rehearing by the division. The three judges who decide an appeal may be satisfied as to the correctness of their decision. Yet, upon reflection, after fully hearing an appeal, they may come to believe that the case is of such significance to the full court that it deserves the attention of the full court.
The foregoing should make it clear that rejection of petitioners’ interpretation of § 46 (c) does not compel affirmance of all that was done below in disposing of the applications for a rehearing en banc. It should also be decided whether the en banc issue has been adequately-treated by the Court of Appeals. A review of the proceedings below convinces us that further consideration by that court is appropriate.
After the division which heard the appeal had announced its decision, petitioners asked for a rehearing en banc. A per curiam issued from the division:
“The petitions of the appellants and intervenors for a rehearing are denied. Insofar as the petitions seek a rehearing en banc, they are stricken as being without authority in law or in the rules or practice of the court. See Kronberg v. Hale, 9 Cir., 181 F. 2d 767.” 197 F. 2d, at 1012.
The striking of petitioners’ motion is certainly ambiguous. If we accord full legal significance to this order, we must conclude that the division ruled that counsel were not free to suggest, even to the division, that the case was appropriate for a rehearing en banc. Enough has already been said to show that this was error.
Indeed, if the three judges who decided the merits of this cause were of the opinion that counsel’s request was “without authority in law,” it may well be that they simply considered themselves powerless to act in any way on the en banc question. Two judges on the panel were district judges. One district judge dissented from the denial of a rehearing, and his understanding of the procedure which the Court of Appeals utilized to convene its full bench seems to differ from what was subsequently-announced by six members of the court. Indeed, at

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
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