Task: sc_issue_10

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202 (1985), this Court held that “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,” the plaintiff’s claim is pre-empted by §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. §185. 471 U. S., at 220. The question presented by this case is whether a state-law tort claim that a union has breached its duty of care to provide a union member with a safe workplace is sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force of §301.
I
At all times relevant to this case, plaintiff-respondent Sally Hechler was employed by Florida Power and Light Company (Florida Power) as an electrical apprentice. Petitioners, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and its Local 759 (collectively referred to as the Union), are the exclusive bargaining representatives for the bargaining unit in which respondent was employed. On January 11, 1982, Florida Power assigned respondent to a job in an electrical substation that required her to perform tasks she alleges were beyond the scope of her training and experience. Shortly after commencing her new assignment, respondent was injured when she came into contact with highly energized components at the substation.
Two years later, respondent sued the Union in state court in Broward County, Fla. In her complaint, she alleged that “pursuant to contracts and agreements entered into by and between” the Union and Florida Power, and “pursuant to the relationship by and between” the Union and respondent, the Union had a duty to ensure that respondent “was provided safety in her work place and a safe work place,” and to ensure that respondent “would not be required or allowed to take undue risks in the performance of her duties which were not commensurate with her training and experience.” App. 4. The Union, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1441, removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on the grounds that the “alleged duty arises solely from the alleged collective bargaining agreement between [the Union] and Florida Power,” and therefore that any breach of this duty was actionable under §301. 1 Record 3. Respondent at that time raised no objection to the removal.
In federal court, the Union moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that respondent’s claim arose solely under federal labor law and was untimely under the applicable federal statute of limitations. Id., at 66-70. Respondent conceded: “The nature and scope of the duty of care owed [her] is determined by reference to the collective bargaining agreement.” Id., at 98. She argued, however, that the basic nature of her action was a state common-law “suit in tort” for the Union’s negligence in failing to provide her á safe workplace. Id., at 100-102. Respondent prayed that the case be remanded to the state court.
The District Court granted the Union’s motion to dismiss. The court observed that the gravamen of the complaint was that the Union had breached a duty of care to respondent to provide her a safe workplace. “Significantly, the duty allegedly owed to [Hechler] flows from the collective bargaining agreement, which imposes a duty on the [Union] to monitor the safety and training of its members.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The court concluded that because respondent had failed “to demonstrate that the [Union’s] allegedly negligent activity was unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement or beyond the scope of the employee-union fiduciary relationship,” her claim was pre-empted by federal labor law. Id., at 4a. Having found that respondent’s suit was governed by federal law, the court then held that the 6-month statute of limitations adopted in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983), applied to Hechler’s case, and dismissed the suit as untimely.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 772 F. 2d 788 (1985). It ruled that the complaint “on its face states a common law negligence claim that may be cognizable in state court and is not preempted by the federal labor laws.” Id., at 790-791. The court concluded: “Though the [collective-bargaining] contract may be of use in defining the scope of the duty owed, liability will turn on basic negligence principles as developed by state law.” Id., at 794. Finding that “federal labor law was not invoked in plaintiff’s complaint,” id., at 799, the court directed that the District Court remand the case to the state court for adjudication on the merits.
Because the Eleventh Circuit’s decision appeared to conflict with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Michigan Mutual Ins. Co. v. Steelworkers, 774 F. 2d 104 (1985), we granted certiorari. 476 U. S. 1113 (1986).
1 H-i
A
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202 (1985), we reviewed the pre-emptive scope of §301. We think it useful, at the outset, to repeat briefly the background outlined in the opinion in Allis-Chalmers. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), the Court held that § 301 does more than simply confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits charging violations of collective-bargaining agreements. Id., at 450-451. The Court concluded that Congress, through § 301, had authorized federal courts to create a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements — law “which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. ” Id., at 456. It was explained in Allis-Chalmers, 471 U. S., at 209, that the Court in Lincoln Mills “understood § 301 as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts.”
Not long after Lincoln Mills was decided, the Court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over §301 claims. Charles Dowd, Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 (1962). Although the Court in Dowd proceeded upon the hypothesis that state courts would apply federal law when they exercised jurisdiction over §301 claims, it was in another case that same Term, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), that the Court expressly held that federal law, and not state law, must be used in adjudicating §301 claims. There the Court observed: “The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.” 369 U. S., at 103. The need for this uniformity was clearly explained:
“The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal sys-terns would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation.” Id., at 103-104.
The Court thus concluded that “in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.” Id., at 104.
While the Court in Lucas Flour observed that federal law was paramount in “the area covered by” §301, 369 U. S., at 103, in Allis-Chalmers the Court defined the range of claims that should be considered as coming within that coverage. The ordinary § 301 case is a contract claim in which a party to the collective-bargaining agreement expressly asserts that a provision of the agreement has been violated. See, e. g., Lucas Flour, 369 U. S., at 104 (claim by employer that strike by union violated provision of collective-bargaining agreement). In Allis-Chalmers, however, the Court considered an employee’s state-law tort action against his employer for bad-faith handling of disability-benefit payments due under a collective-bargaining agreement, and concluded that the interests supporting the uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements under federal common law apply equally in the context of certain state-law tort claims. The Court set forth this basic principle:
“The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.” 471 U. S., at 211.
The Court pointed out that if state law, in the context of a tort action, were allowed to determine the meaning of particular contract phrases or terms in a collective-bargaining agreement, “all the evils addressed in Lucas Flour would recur”; the “parties would be uncertain as to what they were binding themselves to” in a collective-bargaining agreement, and, as a result, “it would be more difficult to reach agreement, and disputes as to the nature of the agreement would proliferate.” Ibid.
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court applied the rule that a tort claim “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract” is pre-empted under §301, 471 U. S., at 213, and concluded that the claim in Allis-Chalmers fell within that category. The employee’s allegation there was that his employer and its insurance company intentionally had failed to make required disability payments under a plan negotiated in a collective-bargaining agreement, and that, in so doing, they had breached a state-law insurance duty to act “in good faith” in’paying disability benefits. Id., at 206. The Court observed that any attempt to assess liability on the part of the employer would inevitably involve interpretation of the underlying collective-bargaining contract. First, the disability plan adopted in the collective-bargaining agreement might itself have included an implied requirement of good faith that the employer breached by its conduct. The Court explained: “[I]t is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there was an obligation under this labor contract to provide the payments in a timely manner, and, if so, whether Allis-Chalmers’ conduct breached that implied contract provision. ” Id., at 215. Second, under the relevant state law, the duty of “good faith” on which the plaintiff relied “intrinsically relate[d] to the nature and existence of the contract.” Id., at 216. The concept of “good faith” meant ‘“being faithful to one’s duty or obligation/” ibid., quoting Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 13, 235 N. W. 413, 414 (1931), and, under state law, that duty was determined primarily by analyzing the responsibilities agreed to by the insurer in the written contract. The Court reasoned: “Because the right asserted not only derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will involve contract interpretation.” 471 U. S., at 218. Inasmuch as federal law must control the uniform meaning given to contract terms in a collective-bargaining agreement, however, an employee’s state-law tort action that necessarily rests on an interpretation of those terms is pre-empted by § 301. Id., at 218-219.
B
Under the principle set forth in Allis-Chalmers, we must determine if respondent’s claim is sufficiently independent of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the preemptive force of § 301. Respondent’s state-law tort claim is based on her allegation that the Union owed a duty of care to provide her with a safe workplace and to monitor her work assignments to ensure that they were commensurate with her skills and experience. Under the common law, however, it is the employer, not a labor union, that owes employees a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing a safe workplace. See, e. g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 569 (5th ed. 1984); White v. Consolidated Freight Lines, 192 Wash. 146, 148, 73 P. 2d 358, 359 (1937). Under Florida case law, as under the general common law, the employer “owes a duty to his employees to furnish a reasonably safe place to work, and must use ordinary care and diligence to keep it safe.” 2 Fla. Jur. 2d, Agency and Employment § 154, p. 343 (1977) (footnote omitted); see, e. g., Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 604-607, 2 So. 2d 133, 137-138 (1941). See also Fla. Stat. §440.56(1) (1981) (“Every employer... shall furnish employment which shall be safe for the employees therein, furnish and use safety devices and safeguards... and do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of such employees”).
Another party, such as a labor union, of course, may assume a responsibility towards employees by accepting a duty of care through a contractual arrangement. If a party breaches a contractual duty, the settled rule under Florida law is that the aggrieved party may bring either an action for breach of contract or a tort action for the injuries suffered as a result of the contractual breach. See, e. g., Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 669-670, 140 So. 893, 897 (1932); Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 603, 145 So. 848, 850 (1933) (“[A]n action may arise for the breach of the contract, or for the positive tort committed by the violation of a duty arising out of the assumption of the contractual relation”); Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 452 So. 2d 45, 48 (Fla. App. 1984) (it is a “long-established general principle that injuries caused by the allegedly negligent performance of a contractual duty may be redressed through a tort action”). The threshold inquiry for determining if a cause of action exists is an examination of the contract to ascertain what duties were accepted by each of the parties and the scope of those duties. See 38 Fla. Jur. 2d, Negligence § 17, p. 29 (1982); Vorndran v. Wright, 367 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. App. 1979) (architect’s contract did not include a duty to ensure compliance with safety regulations and thus employee injured on the job had no cause of action against the architect); Schauer v. Blair Construction Co., 374 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. App. 1979) (summary judgment in favor of architect improperly granted when genuine issue of material fact existed regarding architect’s alleged contractual obligation to supervise construction).
In her complaint, respondent alleges precisely this type of tortious breach-of-contract claim. She asserts that “pursuant to contracts and agreements” between the Union and Florida Power, “to which contracts and agreements the Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary,” the Union owed respondent a duty of care to ensure her a safe working environment. App. 4. Having assumed this duty under the collective-bargaining agreement, the Union — according to the complaint — was then negligent “by allowing [Hechler] to be assigned to work in... a dangerous location and environment and by failing to provide her with or ascertaining that she had the necessary training, experience, background, and education to work in such a dangerous environment,” and was further negligent in failing to “provid[e] and/or enforc[e] safety rules, regulations and requirements which would preclude such persons with inadequate and insufficient background, training, education, and experience, such as the Plaintiff,... from being placed in such an inherently dangerous working environment.” Id., at 5.
Respondent’s allegations of negligence assume significance if — and only if — the Union, in fact, had assumed the duty of care that the complaint alleges the Union breached. The collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and Florida Power, and ancillary agreements between those parties, contain provisions on safety and working requirements for electrical apprentices on which Hechler could try to base an argument that the Union assumed an implied duty of care. In order to determine the Union’s tort liability, however, a court would have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care on the Union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, that is, whether, and to what extent, the Union’s duty extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by respondent in her complaint. Thus, in this case, as in Allis-Chalmers, it is clear that “questions of contract interpretation... underlie any finding of tort liability.” 471 U. S., at 218. The need for federal uniformity in the interpretation of contract terms therefore mandates that here, as in AUis-Chalmers, respondent is precluded from evading the preemptive force of § 301 by casting her claim as a state-law tort action.
l — I HH y — i
If respondent’s suit is treated as a § SOI claim, a court must determine whether her claim is time barred by the applicable statute of limitations under federal law. The Union argues that respondent’s claim can be characterized only as a “duty of fair representation” claim against the Union for failing properly to represent Hechler’s interests before the employer, and that her claim must therefore be governed by the 6-month period of limitations prescribed by DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983). Respondent argues, however, that her suit is not a “duty of fair representation” claim, but is simply a § 301 claim, on the basis of her status as a third-party beneficiary of the collective-bargaining agreement and the Union’s breach of duties assumed under that agreement.
The Court of Appeals did not review the District Court’s holding that the 6-month period of limitations adopted in DelCostello governs Hechler’s suit, because it concluded that respondent’s claim was not pre-empted under federal labor law. We believe it appropriate for the Court of Appeals to consider, in the first instance, whether the period of limitations adopted in DelCostello is applicable to Hechler’s claim.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit therefore is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) states:
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 外