Task: songer_initiate

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify what party initiated the appeal. For cases with cross appeals or multiple docket numbers, if the opinion does not explicitly indicate which appeal was filed first, assumes that the first litigant listed as the "appellant" or "petitioner" was the first to file the appeal. In federal habeas corpus petitions, consider the prisoner to be the plaintiff.

STONE, Circuit Judge.
This litigation has been before this court three times — once, on questions of jurisdiction and parties (11 F. [2d] 854); once, on questions of practice and procedure, involving the modification of the order of this court on the above appeal (11 F.[2d] 854, 858); once, on an ancillary bill to protect and preserve the jurisdiction of the trial court (15 F.[2d] 797). The first trial was upon the merits but, as the decree thereon was a dismissal of the bill for lack of necessary and indispensable parties, there was no determination of the merits. On that appeal [our No. 7019,11 F.(2d) 854], counsel argued various points on the merits but, as this court, thought that necessary and indispensable parties were lacking, it did not examine the merits except so far as to answer the questions as to parties and jurisdiction. On the return to the trial court, the bill was amended bringing in all interested parties.and the second trial and decree were upon the merits. Generally speaking, the result of that decree was to grant the relief sought in the bill and by the interveners. From that result, the main appeal herein is taken. There are cross-appeals on costs and concerning the bonds required to be given under the decree. •
I. The Main Appeal.
These appellants argue their assignments under five headings. There is no material conflict in the evidence. The issues are as to the legal effect of the evidence. For an understanding of these issues an outline will be given of the material evidence with such further detailed statement, in connection with each issue, as may be necessary to develop the situation.
Prior to February 11, 1898, Ehrhardt D. Franz died testate in St. Louis, Mo., leaving an estate consisting (besides household goods and a small amount of cash) of (1) an undetermined interest in bonds, inventoried at $2,543.50; (2) bonds, inventoried at $24,-750; (3) shares in various corporations, valued at $55,185; (4) notes, inventoried at $14,307.50; (5) insurance, inventoried at $1,000; (6) thirteen pieces of real estate. The residuary portion of his will was as follows :
“The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, whether real, personal or mixed property, I give, bequeath and devise unto my beloved wife Sophie Franz, for and during the period of her natural life.
“After the termination of the life estate of my wife, I give, bequeath and devise the remainder in equal shares, share and share alike, unto my children, Minna, Johanna, Ehrhardt, Ernest, Amanda, Gustav, Walter, Otto, Henrietta and Adelheide, and unto their heirs and assigns forever.”
The estate was administered; the executrix discharged on March 10, 1900; and the residuary assets turned over to the wife (Sophie Franz) who was then 59 years old.
Among the assets of the estate turned over to Sophie Franz (in 1898) were 210 shares of the American Arithmometer Company. Thereafter, that company declared stock dividends of a like amount and, still later, the Burroughs Adding Machine Company acquired the assets and business of the Arithmometer Company and exchanged 4,-200 of its shares for the above 420 shares in the Arithmometer Company. All of this took place by 1905.
January 30, 1909, Sophie Franz executed a trust agreement with G. A. Franz (one of the sons) and G. A. Buder (who had been counsel for the deceased, the estate, and later, of Mrs. Franz).. This instrument conveyed from her to Franz and Buder, as trustees:
“All her right, title and interest of every kind and nature of, in and to the following described stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, deeds of trust, obligations, securities, and assets now held, owned and controlled by her in her own right as her absolute property, or as life tenant under the last will and testament of E. D. Franz, deceased, to which reference is hereby made, or whether held, owned or controlled in either one or both of said capacities and more particularly described as follows, to wit: * *
“3. Forty-two hundred (4200) shares of the capital stock of the Burroughs Adding Machine Company, evidenced by certificate No.-, issued to Sophie Franz, said certificate including and embracing two hundred ten (210) shares of the capital stock of the American Arithmometer Company of St. Louis, Missouri, of the par value of one hundred dollars ($100.00), per share, inventoried as part of the estate of E. D. Franz, deceased; the said American Arithmometer Company having changed its name to Burroughs Adding Machine Company, and being now located in the city of Detroit, Michigan, reference being hereby made to the inventory of the estate of the said E. D. Franz, deceased. * * *
“7. Any and all other assets, securities, bonds, stocks, notes) mortgages, deeds of trust, collaterals, commercial paper, or other obligations received, acquired, held or owned by the undersigned, under and by virtue of the last will and testament of Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased, dated August 9th, 1897, and duly filed and admitted to probate in the probate court of the eity of St. Louis, Missouri, said court having jurisdiction of said estate, said will appearing of record in the recorder’s office, of said city of St. Louis, Missouri, in Book No. 1441, page 443, to which said last will and testament reference is hereby made, and the same by such reference for all necessary purposes made part thereof.”
The powers of the trustees were to collect and recover:
“All profits, and income, dividends, interest, earnings, and principal of the said stocks * * * or other assets, * * * and shall have and are hereby given. and granted full power and authority, so far as is possible under the will and testament of said Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased, to sell, assign, exchange, transfer, convey, mortgage, pledge, incumber, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the said stocks, bonds, notes, obligations, mortgages, deeds of trust, collaterals, and securities, and the principal and proceeds thereof to them hereby transferred, assigned, conveyed and delivered, whenever in their judgment they deem it proper to do so,-upon such terms, conditions, and provisions as they may deem best and for the best interests of the trust estate of the undersigned hereby created.
“In ease of such conveyance, transfer, assignment, exchange, or other disposal of any of the assets, or any part of the assets, to them hereby conveyed, assigned, transferred, and delivered, they shall have and are hereby granted full power, right, and authority, and are hereby empowered, directed and authorized to invest and reinvest the proceeds of any such sale, transfer, or exchange, including principal, in such manner and in such form and securities as they may deem proper and for the best interests of said party of the first part and the trust estate hereby created.”
Also they were empowered:
“To expend, disburse, retain, and pay out of said trust estate and funds, any and all assessments, charges and taxes, ■whether general or special, attorneys’ fees, outlays, compensation, charges and costs of administration, necessary, incident or essential to and for the care, protection, preservation, administration, management and distribution of the assets hereby conveyed or hereafter acquired and are authorized and empowered to make, create, and pay all necessary debts, expenses and outlays for repairs, betterments, or improvements, which they may deem necessary or proper for the protection, preservation, improvement, sale or transfer of any and all real estate of which they may become owners as such trustees, whether acquired by foreclosure or otherwise, and are authorized and empowered to make any and all such other payments, outlays, and expenditures as they may deem necessary, expedient or proper for the protection of such real estate and the assets of such trust estate.”
Certain disbursements to Mrs. Franz and to the children (or their heirs) were provided for as follows: $4,000 annually “shall” be paid to Mrs. Franz “providing the income, rents, earnings, and profits of the estate which they may hold and securities hereby conveyed, admit of such payments being made,” with the power, in named emergencies, to “in their discretion increase said quarterly payment to her to such an amount, and for such time and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best and proper”; after these payments to Mrs. Franz, the trustees “may pay” $625.00 quarterly to each of the ten children (or the heirs thereof) but:
“In the event the earnings, income, rents, receipts and profits received by said trustees are not sufficient to admit of such payment quarterly to each of the distributees above named and cannot be conveniently made, then the said trustees, after so making payment to said Sophie Franz, of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) quarterly, or such other sum as they may deem necessary as aforesaid may pay to each of the said distributees such sum as they may deem proper, but in no event and under no circumstances shall the said payment encroach upon or impair the principal and assets of the trust estate hereby created.”
The instrument provided, also, that semiannual statements of the condition of the trust estate should be made to Mrs. Franz and:
“If it appears from the statement of said trustees that there remains on hand any earnings, income, rents, receipts and profits from the said trust estate, which have not been drawn by or set aside, or paid out for account of said Sophie Franz, or to the distributees above mentioned or otherwise expended as herein provided, such sums shall be invested and become and remain as part principal of said trust estate hereby created.”
The payments were to be made to Mrs. Franz during her life:
“And upon her death all these stocks, bonds, notes, collaterals, commercial paper, mortgages, deeds of trust, securities or other assets to them hereby conveyed or hereafter acquired or by them held, owned or controlled as such trustees, and any and all real estate by them acquired as such trustees, shall be held by them for account of the estate of said Sophie Franz, to be administered by the probate court of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, in accordance with the last will and testament of said Sophie Franz, and in accordance with the laws of the state of Missouri in such ease made and provided.”
The trustees were required to employ “Buder & Buder as their counsel and attorneys in the management and administration of said estate” and to appoint Oscar E. Buder (member of Buder & Buder) as the successor of either trustee. The certificates of stock in the Burroughs Company (and in two other companies — 30 shares of the Germania Savings Institution and 50 shares of the Third National Bank of St. Louis, Mo.) were to remain in a designated safety deposit box which could not be opened unless Mrs. Franz and both trustees were present-^he to have no power to remove any of such stock without “the consent and in the presence of both of said trustees.” What was to be done with other securities or valuable papers is not designated although 300 shares in two other companies and 20 bonds ($1,000 each) are described therein. Also an irrevocable power of attorney given the trustees to vote the Burroughs, Germania and Third National stock at all stockholders’ meetings and for all purposes — nothing said as to the stock in other companies. There was no requirement that any bond be given by the trustees.
About sixty days after this trust deed was executed, Ehrhardt W. Franz (one of the sons) brought an action in the state court, at St. Louis, Missouri, attacking the validity of the trust agreement, seeking to have it set aside, a receiver appointed and for other relief. The decree therein sustained and construed the trust agreement and required the trustees to give a bond of $100,000 “for the use and benefit of any and all parties interested in said trust estate” and to charge the cost and expense thereof to the trust estate.
Thereafter, dissention arose between Ehrhardt W. Franz (one of the sons) and the trustees which resulted in this suit. The parties defendant were Mrs. Franz, the trustees, the six children then living and the heirs, guardians of heirs and administrators (or executors) of three children who had died after the father, Ehrhardt D. Franz. The amended bill sets forth that the trust estate, coming from the estate of the father, exceeds three million dollars in value and includes 31,-500 non-par shares and 7,875 preferred shares in the Burroughs Adding Machine Company besides other stocks, bonds and securities; that the bond of $100,000 is “wholly inadequate in amount”; that the trustees refuse to give plaintiff “any information or account” concerning the “present nature, condition, extent and value of the various properties taken by them as aforesaid from the life tenant”; that the trustees are asserting and contending that “plaintiff no longer has or owns his said remainder interest in said properties.” The prayer is for disclosure and accounting, for restraint in disposing of the Burroughs stock, for a bond to plaintiff to protect his remainder interest, for an adjudication of the vested interest of plaintiff, and for general relief.
The administrator of the estates of Ernest H. Franz and of Walter G. Franz (two deceased sons) and the guardians ad litem of several grandchildren (heirs of deceased children of Ehrhardt D. Franz) answered, praying substantially the same relief as sought in the amended bill.
Answers were filed by G. A. Buder (one of the trustees), jointly by Mrs. Franz and the trustees, G. A. Franz and G. A. Buder, by the other defendants jointly. In so far as the issues presented on this main appeal are involved, those answers were as follows: First, that the action was premature because the parties seeking relief have, until the death of Mrs. Franz, “no right to the possession or enjoyment of any remainder interest, if any he has, and no right to have the amount or value of such interest, if any, determined or ascertained.” Second, denies the right of such parties to “demand any security.” Third, denies any duty to furnish any information or account. Fourth, estoppel to assail trust agreement and bound thereby because of receipt of payments thereunder. Fifth, that the decree in the state court suit found that “any and all stock dividends were part of the earnings, usufruct, profits and income of said estate to which the life-tenant was entitled in her own right,” which made the interest of the children res adjudieata. Sixth, estoppel because of agreements made January 7 and 30,1920. Seventh, the parties seeking relief have “no interest, remainder or otherwise, under the will of * * * Ehrhardt D. Franz” because of certain advancements and payments in excess of the value of their shares in the estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased.
The decree herein determined that the increase of Burroughs stock (as well as certain other property) belonged to the corpus of the residuary estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased; that the plaintiff had a one-tenth vested right, as remainderman under the will (the complaining defendants having similar rights); that such remaindermen will be entitled to possession thereof upon the death of Mrs. Franz, the life tenant; that the trustees file, within 30 days, a complete statement, under oath, of the property coming to their hands and their administration thereof, and, thereafter, render semiannual statements to the parties here asking relief; that the trustees, within 30 days, give bond for $500,000 for the “joint and several” protection of the parties here asking relief, said bond to be additional to the existing bond for $100,000 and the cost thereof to be paid by or charged to such parties. Jurisdiction was expressly retained to order an accounting and for other necessary orders and decrees. The costs of this proceeding to be paid by the trustees and charged “to the trust estate.”
Issues on Main Appeal.
Appellants argue here five matters. One is a matter of procedure — that this aetion is prematurely brought. Two are urged as a bar to recovery — res adjudieata and estoppel. Two have to do with the merits of the aetion on the main facts — the increase of Burroughs Company stock is income and, therefore, the property of the life tenant and the intent of the testator, Ehrhardt D. Franz.
Premature Aetion.
This contention is that while the life tenant survives, there can be no aetion to adjudicate title of the remaindermen or to protect the remainder estate. The present aetion does not involve nor seek to affect the enjoyment of possession or other rights of the life tenant. Its sole purpose is to protect from spoliation and loss property which is in possession of the life tenant, but alleged to belong to the estate coming to the remainder-men (with absolute right of possession upon death of the life tenant), and, as to which, the life tenant is entitled only to the income therefrom. Therefore, the legal issue is whether a remainderman is entitled to equitable relief to have protected property belonging to him in the rightful possession of the life tenant who is entitled to the income, for life,- therefrom. As a necessary incident to sueh relief (if allowable), the remainder-man must prove that he is such as to the property involved but this is not, a proceeding where the only or main purpose is to have the title of the remainderman adjudicated — it is a bona fide action to protect a remainder estate alleged to exist.
Appellants rely upon several state cases and the following eases in the Supreme Court or in inferior federal courts: Williams v. Hagood, 98 U. S. 72, 25 L. Ed. 51; Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325, 5 S. Ct. 932, 962, 29 L. Ed. 205; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U. S. 696, 12 S. Ct. 103, 35 L. Ed. 906; United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 29 S. Ct. 507, 53 L. Ed. 803; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246; Arnold v. Garth (C. C.) 106 F. 13; Pluche v. Jones (C. C. A.) 54 F. 860; Preston v. Smith (C. C.) 26 F. 884. The Williams and Marye Cases involved the validity of state statutes relating to securities issued by the state and in each the court said that no existing or threatening injury was alleged and, therefore, the issue presented was purely abstract and courts would act only- upon legal rights actually in controversy. The Singer and Evans Cases were refused determination because the issues therein were purely moot. The Muskrat Case refused decision because the issue was not a justiciable controversy. The Arnold and Pluche Cases held merely that a statute of limitations did not begin to run against a remainderman until his right to possession accrued. The Preston Case (being, a ruling on demurrer to a bill) held the aetion was “more like an effort to establish a doubtful title than a proceeding to protect from serious wrong a clear or adjudicated title” (page 889), and that “only upon an adjudicated or a clear title will a court of equity issue an injunction to restrain waste” by the life tenant. Thus, it appears that none of the above eases are applicable here nor are any statements in the opinions therein except those above quoted from Judge Brewer in the Preston Case. Those expressions clearly imply that, at least under certain circumstances, sueh right of aetion would exist during^the life estate.
However, the matter is not in doubt. In Cross v. Del Valle, 1 Wall. 5, at page 15,17 L. Ed. 515, the court said:
“A remainderman may have a decree to protect the estate from waste, and have it so secured by the trustee as to protect his estate in expectancy. The court will interfere under all needful circumstances to protect his rights, but sueh eases do not come within the category of mere declaratory decrees as to future rights.”
Undoubtedly, the same rule prevails in the state courts. See 23 E. C. L. 5791, where it is said:
“One who has a vested remainder in land has a right to protect the estate, so that he may receive the same when it ought to come to him by the terms of the limitation, and may maintain a proper action for any injury to the inheritance, committed or threatened, whether by the tenant in possession on by a stranger.”
Also, at page 580, it is said:
“While a court of equity will not maintain a bill merely to declare future rights, it will interfere in all needful cases to protect the rights qf remaindermen.”
Again, at page 581, the right of the remainderman to require security bond and accounting (the relief here sought and accorded by the trial court) is stated as follows:
“Formerly it was the practice to exact from the tenant for life security that the property should be forthcoming on the happening of the contemplated event. This seeurity is still required in exceptional eases. But, before security for the forthcoming of the property at the termination of the life estate will be required, the remainder-man must have reasonable grounds to apprehend the loss or removal of the property, or that his rights are in danger.
“139. Filing of Inventory. Unless the remainderman can show some necessity for exacting security, the only remedy which he now has is to require the tenant to make an inventory which shall show the property which he received, and to which the remainderman will become entitled upon the termination of the particular estate. And, though an inventory has been filed, the tenant, upon a proper showing of real danger, may be called on to account and be required to give bond.
“140. Seizure and Impounding of Property. The property may also be seized and impounded for the protection of the remainderman. Should the tenant attempt to sell, or in any other mode waste or misuse the property, so as to threaten its destruction, the court may impound it, that is, take it into the hands of the court, by its officer,- and give the first taker the profits. The practice is to require, security for the lawful use of the property during the life estate, and if this is not given, then pursue the mode of seizing upon the property.”
Also in 21 C. J. at page 996, § 153, it is said:
“Since a remainderman has only an estate to vest in possession in futuro, he is entitled neither to actual nor to constructive possession of the property until the termination of the particular estate. He may however bring an action in equity during the lifetime of the life tenant to preserve the property, and, without taking actual possession to complete his title, he is entitled to all the remedies which may be necessary to protect and enforce his right at law.”
Again, at page 1013, § 172, it is said:
“Where the property is in the hands of a trustee any breach of trust or improper conduct on the part of the trustee is a ground for equitable relief, and where a trust deed has been set aside under a decree fraudulently obtained, the remainderman may maintain a bill to have the property restored to the original trust. If the trustee is already under a valid and'sufficient bond to protect the remainder interest, the remainderman is not entitled to any other relief; and the remainderman cannot, during the continuance of the" life estate, sue on the trustee’s bond to recover any part of the amount wasted, although he could proceed in equity to compel the trustee to bring the money into court to be invested. The remainderman may maintain a suit for the appointment of a new trustee and for an accounting.”
Also at page 967, § 105, it is said:
“Bight to Equitable Belief in General A remainderman or reversioner unless barred by laches, is entitled to come into equity by a bill quia timet for the protection of his interest when the property in the hands of a life tenant is in danger of loss, deterioration or injury, or when the life tenant is claiming a right to the property adverse to that of the remainderman.”
Also, at page 967, section 106 states that, under certain circumstances, injunction may be employed to protect the remainder estate; page 968, section 107, that accounting may be had; page 968, sections 108 and 109, that sequestration and a receiver are sometimes proper. The above statements in Ruling Case Law and in Corpus Juris are based upon abundant citations from various state courts — to which may be added later citations as follows: Abbott v. Wagner, 108 Neb. 359, 188 N. W. 113, 121; Ivey v. Lewis, 133 Va. 122, 112 S. E. 712, 716; Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 231 P. 987, 994; Commercial Building Co. v. Parslow (Fla.) 112 So. 378, 381; Huey v. Brock, 207 Ala. 175, 92 So. 904, 905; Powe v. Payne, 208 Ala. 527, 94 So. 587; Colburn v. Burlingame, 190 Cal. 697, 214 P. 226, 27 A. L. R. 1374; Hodgman v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 259, 195 N. Y. S. 428; In re Niles, 122 Misc. Rep. 17, 202 N. Y. S. 475; Thomas’ Adm’r v. Thomas, 220 Ky. 101, 294 S. W. 776. The last four eases deal with protecting bonds.
This record leaves no doubt that these trustees, the life tenant and several of the remaindermen are denying any right or interest of plaintiff to any property in the possession of the trustees and especially to the increases of stock in the Burroughs Company. Also, all of the property is in the form of securities which might be easily disposed of. These securities are eoneededly worth more than $4,000,000, yet the trustees are under a bond of only $100,000. Also, the trustees have always refused to give plaintiff any inventory or accounting and persistently deny his right to'sueh. Also, the trust agreement provides that, on the death of Mrs. Franz (now more than 83 years old), all of the property “shall be held by them for account of the estate of said Sophie Franz, to be administered by the probate court of the city of St. Louis, Missouri, in accordance with the last will and testament of said Sophie Franz, and in accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri in such case made and provided.” If this quoted provision were followed, aU of this property would be subject to various taxes, fees and costs (in course of such administration) which should not attach to any of such property belonging to the remaindermen because such would be deliverable direct to them by the trustees, upon termination of the life estate, and would not pass through the administration of the estate of Sophie Franz.
The above discussed law leaves no doubt that equity does afford, during the life tenancy, remedies for remaindermen to protect their estates and the above facts make it-equally clear that a situation is here present justifying the use of such remedies at this time. Therefore, the suit was not prematurely brought.
Res Adjudicata.
Appellants contend that the decree (June 16, 1910) in the state court suit brought by plaintiff, shortly after the trust agreement was made; determined that “the stock dividends and other increases” in the property belonged to the life tenant and not to the remaindermen. The supporting argument takes two lines.
The first is that the fourth finding of that court was that Sophie Franz was entitled to all of such increases. That finding is as follows:
“4. The court doth further find that under and by virtue of the terms of the will of said Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased, the defendant Sophie Franz, during her natural lifetime, became and was and is entitled to all of the usufruct and benefit of all of the property of said deceased and to all of the income, profits and earnings thereof, in her own right and absolutely.”
Standing alone, this language is far from meaning that increases in the corpus of the estate, as distinguished from income therefrom, is the property of the life tenant. Nor do the words “profits and earnings,” used in conjunction with “income,” suggest such a meaning. The obvious meaning of the entire paragraph is that Sophie Franz is entitled to the revenue produced by the estate, in the nature of income. But even supposing the paragraph were ambiguous and, taken alone, might have either of the above meanings, yet the issues presented to the. court and the entire decree leave no doubt.
The petition therein was an attack upon the trust agreement as being contrary to the rights of plaintiff under the will because it turned over to trustees property which would, at the end of the life estate, belong to the remaindermen and in which they had a present vested interest; also, that this property was being managed and wasted by the trustees without information or accounting to the remaindermen and without “being amenable to the plaintiff and the other remaindermen named in the said will by any bond or security whatever.” It set forth that G-. A. Buder (trustee) was denying that plaintiff had “any vested interest in the said property” and that plaintiff was the owner of “a one-tenth vested interest in the corpus of the aforesaid property.” The prayer was for cancellation of the trust agreement and delivery of the property to a receiver; that the court construe the will and determine the rights and interests of the parties named therein and “whether their interests became contingent or vested at the death of the aforesaid testator”; and for general relief.
A joint and separate answer was filed by the trustees and other defendants (Mi's. Franz and other of her children). This answer alleged that Mrs. Franz owned absolutely considerable property which did not come from her husband’s estate or which “had been acquired by her out of income which was hers.” Further answering:
“These defendants say that at the time that she executed said instrument of January 30, 1909, defendant Sophie Franz was possessed in her own exclusive right as aforesaid of certain property and had a life estate and life interest in the property derived by her from the estate of her said deceased husband, and that the object and purpose of said instrument was to transfer to her son, the defendant G. A. Franz, and to defendant Buder, all such interest, right and title as she might and could properly and lawfully convey; that she intended to convey, and by said instrument did convey, to said two named defendants all of her said life estate, and no more, in the property so derived from her said deceased husband, and the absolute title to the property owned by her in her own exclusive right; that her object and purpose was to. enable said two named defendants to distribute the income of all of said property,- that in which she had but a life estate and that which belonged to her absolutely, between herself and her nine children, including the plaintiff, and her two grandchildren, the minor defendants herein. That in order to accomplish such purpose, she provided that $4,000 annually should be paid to her in quarterly installments and that $2,500 annually, in like installments, should be paid to each of her said children and to the defendant Sherman H. Kleinschmidt for said grandchildren. That she expressly, however, provided that in making such distributions there should be no encroachment on or impairment of the principal assets thus conveyed to said two defendants. That she intended by said conveyance to provide, and she did provide, that on her death so much of said property as belonged to her absolutely and exclusively should be disposed of in accordance with her last will and testament and that so much of said property as was not hers exclusively and absolutely should be disposed of in accordance with the laws of Missouri in such case made and provided. * ® *
“Defendants deny that said instrument attempts to dispose of any part of the estate of E. D. Franz, in contravention of his will, and deny that said defendant Buder has denied that the remaindermen have any interest in said property and has denied them or plaintiff any information to which they or he is entitled; also deny that said defendant Buder has declared that the remaindermen have no voice in the management, control or preservation of said property; but in that connection state that the said Buder has maintained, and these defendants also maintain, that the management and control and preservation of the property coming from the estate of said E. D. Franz is in defendant Sophie Franz or her grantees or assigns, during her lifetime, and that in any property acquired by her out of the income, the sole and exclusive management is in her and in her grantees or assigns, and that the remaindermen have no interest whatever in such last mentioned property.
“Further answering, these defendants say that defendant Sophie Franz had the) power and the right to execute said instrument of January 30,1909, as to the property in which she had a life estate, to the extent of her life interest, and had the right and the power to deliver said property to defendants Buder and Franz, to be held by them for and during the period and lifetime of the said Sophie Franz; and that as to property which belonged to said defendant Sophie absolutely and exclusively, she had the right to turn over and deliver the same to said defendants G. A. Franz and Buder without any limitation or restriction whatsoever.
“Further answering that part of the petition wherein plaintiff claims to have a vested interest in the property aforesaid, to the extent of at least $45,000, these defendants state that an undivided one-tenth interest in the estate left by said E. D. Franz, subject to the life estate of said defendant Sophie Franz, does not exceed the amount of $10,000; and that as a matter of fact, plaintiff has already received and accepted, by way of payments on account of his remainder interest, from defendant Sophie Franz, amounts exceeding in the aggregate $20,000.
“Further answering, these defendants say that none of the property whatsoever which was left by E. D. Franz, deceased, has been injured, wasted or destroyed; deny that there ever has been any threat on the part of defendant Buder or on the part of any defendant herein to injure, waste or destroy any part of said property whatsoever; deny that it is intended by said defendant Buder or by any of the defendants, to injure, waste or destroy any of said property whatsoever. On the contrary, these defendants aver that all of said property, has been well and earefully preserved and is so invested and so- managed that upon the death of defendant Sophie Franz and upon the termination of her life estate, any and all property in which plaintiff may then be interested will be forthcoming.
“Further answering, these defendants state that the defendants Sophie Franz, G. A. Franz and Gustavus A. Buder are each and all of them entirely solvent and fully able to respond to any right or claim which plaintiff herein may at any time be able to establish in the property left by the said E. D. Franz upon his decease.”
The answer closed with:
“Wherefore these defendants say that plaintiff should not now be permitted to question the right of said defendant Sophie Franz to the possession of the property given her for life by the last will and testament of her said deceased husband.”
In so far as the point now being discussed is concerned, the findings of the court were that the remaindermen had “a vested remainder” in the residuary property coming from the estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz; that Mrs. Franz was entitled to the income therefrom for life; that this property and other property, belonging absolutely to Mrs. Franz, was turned over to the trustees; that, as to the former, she conveyed to the trustees “only her life interest therein and no greater or other interest” but, as to the latter, she conveyed her entire title; that as to the estate property, the trustees had no power to dispose of any but her life interest; that, on her death, the estate property “should be divided between the plaintiff and the children named in the will of said Ehrhardt D. Franz * * * in accordance with the terms and provisions of said will” and her absolute property “in. accordance with her last will and testament, or if she should die intestate, then under the statutes of descents and distributions of the state of Missouri.” The findings and decree were included in one order. Th.e decree part followed the findings with a possible ambiguity as to a matter not pertinent to this point.
From the above it is clear that no issue was presented to the eourt as to whether the increase in Burroughs stock or from any other property belonged to Mrs. Franz nor as to what particular property the rights of the remaindermen attached. The issue was broader and more general. It was whether there was any property to which such rights attached and whether such rights were contingent or vested. The findings and decree determined this issue by holding that there was such property (without any particularization) and that the rights of the remainder-men were vested.
App

Question: What party initiated the appeal?
A. Original plaintiff
B. Original defendant
C. Federal agency representing plaintiff
D. Federal agency representing defendant
E. Intervenor
F. Not applicable
G. Not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: B