Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the State of California may require a federally licensed Indian trader, who operates a general store on an Indian reservation, to obtain a state liquor license in order to sell liquor for off-premises consumption. Because we find that Congress has delegated authority to the States as well as to the Indian tribes to regulate the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
l-H
The respondent Rehner is a federally licensed Indian trader who operates a general store on the Pala Reservation in San Diego, Cal. The Pala Tribe had adopted a tribal ordinance
permitting the sale of liquor on the reservation providing that the sales conformed to state law, and this ordinance was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 Fed. Reg. 3343 (1960). Rehner then sought from the State an exemption from its law requiring a state license for retail sale of distilled spirits for off-premises consumption. When she was refused an exemption, Rehner filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that she did not need a license from the State, and an order directing that liquor wholesalers could sell to her. The District Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Rehner was required to have a state license under 18 U. S. C. § 1161, which provides that liquor transactions in Indian country are not subject to prohibition under federal law provided those transactions are “in conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country....”
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that § 1161 did not confer jurisdiction on the States to require liquor licenses. The court held that “18 U. S. C. § 1161 preempts state licensing and distribution jurisdiction over tribal liquor sales in Indian country.” 678 F. 2d 1340, 1351 (1982). In deciding the pre-emption issue, the court focused on two aspects of §1161. First, it held that “there is insufficient evidence to show that Congress intended section 1161 to confer on the states regulatory jurisdiction over on-reservation liquor traffic.” Id., at 1343. The court reasoned that the liquor transactions at issue were governed exclusively by federal law, and that if Congress wished to remove “its veil of preemption,” it needed to do so by an express statement that the State had jurisdiction to impose its licensing requirement. Ibid. Second, the court held that “section 1161 has preemptive effect” because Congress provided for tribal ordinances that were to be certified by the Secretary of the Interior and published in the Federal Register. Id., at 1348-1349,1349, n. 18. In this way, “the regulatory authority of the tribes... was safeguarded by federal supervision.” Id., at 1349.
II
The decisions of this Court concerning the principles to be applied in determining whether state regulation of activities in Indian country is pre-empted have not been static. In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 560 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall wrote that an Indian reservation “is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which [state laws] can have no force....” Despite this early statement emphasizing the importance of tribal self-government, “Congress has to a substantial degree opened the doors of reservations to state laws, in marked contrast to what prevailed in the time of Chief Justice Marshall,” Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 74 (1962). “[E]ven on reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973).
Although “[f]ederal treaties and statutes have been consistently construed to reserve the right of self-government to the tribes,” P. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 273 (1982 ed.) (hereafter Cohen), our recent cases have established a “trend... away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 172 (1973) (footnote omitted). The goal of any pre-emption inquiry is “to determine the congressional plan,” Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497, 504 (1956), but tribal sovereignty may not be ignored and we do not necessarily apply “those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143 (1980). We have instead employed a pre-emption analysis that is informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty, rather than determined by them. “[Cjongressional authority and the ‘semi-independent position’ of Indian tribes... [are] two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members.” Bracker, 448 U. S., at 142. Although “[t]he right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress/’ id., at 143, we still employ the tradition of Indian sovereignty as a “backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read” in our pre-emption analysis. McClanahan, supra, at 172. We do not necessarily require that Congress explicitly pre-empt assertion of state authority insofar as Indians on reservations are concerned, but we have recognized that “any applicable regulatory interest of the State must be given weight” and “ ‘automatic exemptions “as a matter of constitutional law” ’ are unusual.” Bracker, supra, at 144 (quoting Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 481, n. 17 (1976)).
The role of tribal sovereignty in pre-emption analysis varies in accordance with the particular “notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence.” Bracker, supra, at 145. These traditions themselves reflect the “accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.” Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 156 (1980). However, it must be remembered that “tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States.” Id., at 154. “The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Confederated Tribes, supra, at 178-179 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
When we determine that tradition has recognized a sovereign immunity in favor of the Indians in some respect, then we usually are reluctant to infer that Congress has authorized the assertion of state authority in that respect “ ‘except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.’” McClanahan, supra, at 171 (quoting U. S. Dept, of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958) (hereafter Indian Law)). Repeal by implication of an established tradition of immunity or self-governance is disfavored. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976). If, however, we do not find such a tradition, or if we determine that the balance of state, federal, and tribal interests so requires, our pre-emption analysis may accord less weight to the “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty. See Confederated Tribes, supra, at 154-159; Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra.
A
We first determine the nature of the “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty that will inform our pre-emption analysis. The “backdrop” in this case concerns the licensing and distribution of alcoholic beverages, and we must determine whether there is a tradition of tribal sovereign immunity that may be repealed only by an explicit directive from Congress.
We begin by noting that there is nothing in the record to indicate that a federally licensed Indian trader like Rehner may sell liquor for off-premises consumption only to members of the Pala Tribe. Indeed, the State contends, and Rehner does not dispute, that Rehner, or any other federally licensed trader, may sell liquor to Indian and non-Indian buyers alike. See Brief for Petitioner 81; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. To the extent that Rehner seeks to sell to non-Indians, or to Indians who are not members of the tribe with jurisdiction over the reservation on which the sale occurred, the decisions of this Court have already foreclosed Rehner’s argument that the licensing requirements infringe upon tribal sovereignty.
If there is any interest in tribal sovereignty implicated by imposition of California’s alcoholic beverage regulation, it exists only insofar as the State attempts to regulate Rehner’s sale of liquor to other members of the Pala Tribe on the Pala Reservation. The only interest that Rehner advances in this regard is that freedom to regulate alcoholic beverages is important to Indian self-governance. To the extent California limits the absolute number of licenses that it distributes, state regulation may effectively preclude this aspect of self-governance. See Brief for Respondent 63-74. Rehner relies on our statement in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975), that the distribution and use of intoxicants is a “matte [r] that affect[s] the internal and social relations of tribal life.”
Rehner’s reliance on Mazurie as establishing tribal sovereignty in the area of liquor licensing and distribution is misplaced. In Mazurie, we held that “independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress’ decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of [Congress'] own authority” to regulate commerce with the Indians. Ibid, (emphasis added). We expressly declined to base our holding on whether “independent [tribal] authority is itself sufficient for the tribes to impose” their own liquor regulations. Ibid, (emphasis added).
The reason that we declined is apparent in the light of the history of federal control of liquor in this context, which must be characterized as “one of the most comprehensive [federal] activities in Indian affairs....” Cohen, at 307. Unlike the authority to tax certain transactions on reservations that we have characterized as “a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status,” Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S., at 152, tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians. The colonists regulated Indian liquor trading before this Nation was formed, and Congress exercised its authority over these transactions as early as 1802. See Indian Law, at 381. Congress imposed complete prohibition by 1832, and these prohibitions are still in effect subject to suspension conditioned on compliance with state law and tribal ordinances.
Although in Indian matters Congress usually acts “upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,” Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), that assumption would be unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor. In addition to the congressional divestment of tribal self-government in this area, the States have also been permitted, and even required, to impose regulations related to liquor transactions. As a condition of entry into the United States, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma were required by Congress to enact prohibitions against the sale of liquor to Indians and introduction of liquor into Indian country. Several States, including California, pursuant to state police power, long prohibited liquor transactions with Indians. These state prohibitions indicate that “ ‘absolute’ federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction.” Kake Village, 369 U. S., at 68. Indeed, we have recognized expressly that “[t]he federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into this Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its sovereignty over the area in question. The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the operation, within the colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enactments.” United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539 (1938) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
This historical tradition of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over the use and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Indian country is justified by the relevant state interests involved. See Confederated Tribes, supra, at 156. Rehner’s distribution of liquor has a significant impact beyond the limits of the Pala Reservation. The State has an unquestionable interest in the liquor traffic that occurs within its borders, and this interest is independent of the authority conferred on the States by the Twenty-first Amendment. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 91 (1890). Liquor sold by Rehner to other Pala tribal members or to nonmembers can easily find its way out of the reservation and into the hands of those whom, for whatever reason, the State does not wish to possess alcoholic beverages, or to possess them through a distribution network over which the State has no control. This particular “spillover” effect is qualitatively different from any “spillover” effects of income taxes or taxes on cigarettes. “A State’s regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 336 (1983).
There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area. In the area of liquor regulation, we find no “congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143 (footnote omitted). With respect to the regulation of liquor transactions, as opposed to the state income taxation involved in McClanahan, Indians cannot be said to “possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government.” McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 167-168.
The court below erred in thinking that there was some single notion of tribal sovereignty that served to direct any pre-emption analysis involving Indians. See 678 F. 2d, at 1348. Because we find that there is no tradition of sovereign immunity that favors the Indians in this respect, and because we must consider that the activity in which Rehner seeks to engage potentially has a substantial impact beyond the reservation, we may accord little if any weight to any asserted interest in tribal sovereignty in this case.
B
We must next determine whether the state authority to license the sale of liquor is pre-empted by federal law. Bracker, supra, at 142; McClanahan, supra, at 172. The court below held that § 1161 pre-empted state regulation of licensing and distribution, and that the reference to state law in § 1161 was not sufficiently explicit to permit application of the state licensing law.
We disagree with both aspects of the court’s analysis. As we explained in Part II-A above, the tribes have long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation by both the explicit command of Congress and as a “necessary implication of their dependent status.” Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S., at 152. Congress has also historically permitted concurrent state regulation through the imposition of criminal penalties on those who supply Indians with liquor, or who introduce liquor into Indian country. Therefore, this is not a case in which we apply a presumption of a lack of state authority.
The presumption of pre-emption derives from the rule against construing legislation to repeal by implication some aspect of tribal self-government. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S., at 391-392; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549-551 (1974). Because there is no aspect of exclusive tribal self-government that requires the deference reflected in our requirement that Congress expressly provide for the application of state law, we have only to determine whether application of the state licensing laws would “impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.” Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U. S., at 148; Kake Village, 369 U. S., at 75. Our examination of § 1161 leads us to conclude that Congress authorized, rather than pre-empted, state regulation over Indian liquor transactions.
The legislative history of § 1161 indicates both that Congress intended to remove federal prohibition on the sale and use of alcohol imposed on Indians in 1832, and that Congress intended that state laws would apply of their own force to govern tribal liquor transactions as long as the tribe itself approved these transactions by enacting an ordinance. It is clear that by 1953, federal law curtailing liquor traffic with the Indians came to be “viewed as discriminatory.” Indian Law, at 382. As originally introduced, the bill that was later to become § 1161 was intended only to “[t]o terminate Federal discriminations against the Indians of Arizona.” See Hearings on H. R. 1055 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 6, 1953) (Hearings), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-4. In hearings on this original bill, Representative Rhodes of Arizona, speaking on behalf of Representative Patten, who introduced the bill, stated that the sole purpose of the bill was to eliminate federal prohibition because it was discriminatory and had a detrimental effect on the Indians. He also commented that the bill would permit Arizona to amend its Constitution to remove the state prohibitions on sale of liquor to Indians and on introduction of liquor into Indian country. At these same hearings, Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, submitted a revision of the bill proposed by Representative Patten. This revision was different from the original bill in a number of respects, the most important of which for present purposes is that the revision applied to all States, and not just to Arizona. In the context of discussing the bill, Commissioner Myer stated: “We certainly do not intend to try to revise State laws regarding Indians or anyone else, and it should be clear that is provided.... [The revision] is intended to eliminate all of the sections in the statutes which discriminate against Indians and at the same time not interfere with State laws, and at the same time provide opportunity for the tribes to have prohibition on the reservation if they wish to, if it is not covered by State law.” Id., at A-26 — A-27.
In a later hearing, the Department of the Interior submitted an unofficial report in which it was again urged that federal Indian liquor prohibition be ended generally, and not just in Arizona, as long as liquor “transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned and are not contrary to state law.” See Hearings (May 6, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-54. Representative D’Ewart read into the record a telegram sent by the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council. The telegram indicated that the Navajo people supported the “anti-discrimination bill” as a measure to ensure “equal rights.” Id., at A-59.
Representative Patten, the sponsor of the original bill, stated that “if this bill were passed to remove all discrimination, the Indians would still have to comply with State law in every regard....” See Hearings (June 2, 1953), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-69. Representative Patten’s remarks are particularly valuable in determining the meaning of § 1161. As the sponsor of the bill, Representative Patten’s interpretation is an “'authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.’” Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U. S. 824, 832 (1983) (quoting North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 527 (1982).
The House Report explained the bill as eliminating discrimination caused by legislation “applicable only to Indians.” H. R. Rep. No. 775, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). It included an official report of the Department of the Interior stating that federal prohibition would be lifted only if liquor “transactions are in conformity with the ordinances of the tribes concerned and are not contrary to State law.” Id., at 3. The Senate Report also expressed these sentiments: “if this bill is enacted, a State or local municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians, they may do so.” S. Rep. No. 722, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1953) (emphasis added).
It is clear then that Congress viewed § 1161 as abolishing federal prohibition, and as legalizing Indian liquor transactions as long as those transactions conformed both with tribal ordinances and state law. It is also clear that Congress contemplated that its absolute but not exclusive power to regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the tribes themselves, and to the States, which historically shared concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government in this area. Early administrative practice and our prior decision in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975), confirm this understanding of § 1161.
As noted above, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior was heavily involved in drafting the revised bill that eventually became § 1161. In a 1954 administrative opinion, ironically rendered in response to California’s interpretation of § 1161, the Department’s Solicitor stated plainly that the Bureau contemplated that liquor transactions on reservations would be subject to state laws, including state licensing laws. Specifically, the Solicitor stated:
“The fact that a tribe in California may by ordinance authorize the sale of liquor on its reservation in packages for consumption only off the premises where it is sold would not, in my opinion, impinge upon the foregoing authority of the State Board of Equalization to license sales of liquor on such reservation for consumption both on and off the premises where the liquor is sold. In such circumstances, if any person so licensed by the State were to sell liquor on the reservation for on-premises consumption in accordance with his license, presumably he would he immune from State prosecution and, thus, the license issued by the State agency would be fully effective insofar as State law is concerned” Memo. Sol. M-36241 (Sept. 22, 1954), Liquor — Tribal Ordinance Regulating Traffic Within Reservation, 2 Op. Solicitor of Dept, of Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, pp. 1648

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 下