Task: songer_direct1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be for government tax claim; for person claiming patent or copyright infringement; for the plaintiff alleging the injury; for economic underdog if one party is clearly an underdog in comparison to the other, neither party is clearly an economic underdog; in cases pitting an individual against a business, the individual is presumed to be the economic underdog unless there is a clear indication in the opinion to the contrary; for debtor or bankrupt; for government or private party raising claim of violation of antitrust laws, or party opposing merger; for the economic underdog in private conflict over securities; for individual claiming a benefit from government; for government in disputes over government contracts and government seizure of property; for government regulation in government regulation of business; for greater protection of the environment or greater consumer protection (even if anti-government); for the injured party in admiralty - personal injury; for economic underdog in admiralty and miscellaneous economic cases. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.

PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from an order of the District Court approving an order of the referee allowing bankrupt’s claim of exemption as to sixteen shares of corporate stock held by him. The sole controversy is as to the propriety of permitting a statutory exemption to cover property of the nature of shares of corporate stock. The only other asset of the estate is $285 received from some insurance policies. ’
Appellant is a Trust Company, acting as executor of one A. Van Tassel who is a creditor of the bankrupt to the extent of $6,500. The trustee in bankruptcy joins the Trust Company in opposing the granting of the exemption covering the stock.
The Bankruptcy Act provides, 11 U. S.C.A. § 24: “The provisions of this title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile * * ”
The Illinois exemption statute and decisions, if any, are therefore controlling in determining the validity of the bankrupt’s claimed exemption.
The Illinois statute, Smith-Hurd Stats, c. 52, § 13, provides:
“That the following personal property, owned by the debtor, shall be exempt from execution, writ of attachment and distress for rent, viz:
“First — The necessary wearing apparel, bible, school books, and family pictures of every person; and
“Second — For one year after the receipt thereof all money received by any person * * * as a pension 1 * * *; and
“Third — One hundred dollars’ worth of household furniture* and, in addition, when the debtor is the head of a family and resides with the same, three hundred dollars’ worth of other household furniture, in lieu thereof, or,
“Fourth — One hundred dollars’ worth of property, to be selected by the debtor, and in addition, when the debtor is the head of a family and resides with the same, three hundred dollars worth of other property, to be selected by thé debtor.
“Provided, that such selection and exemption shall not be made by the debtor, or allowed to him or her from any other money, salary or wages due him or her frbm any person or persons or corporation whatever * * *. ”
There is no Illinois Supreme Court decision pertinent to the issue, at least none that counsel or we have been able to find. However, that court has held that the Illinois Exemption Statute is to be liberally construed. See Finlen v. Howard, 126 Ill. 259, 18 N.E. 560; Washburn v. Goodheart, 88 Ill. 229. See, also, Burns v. Turner, 193 Ill.App. 172; McClellan v. Powell, 109 Ill. App. 222; In re Cameron, 6 F.Supp. 530, D.C.Ill.
The objecting creditor contends that the exemption was intended to comprehend only tangible property, and not intangible property, such as stocks. We can find no basis for this contention either in the wording of the statute or the Illinois cases construing that statute. The proviso is as to money, salary or wages due from a corporation. A stockholder, by virtue of his stock ownership, is not a creditor of a corporation. His stock certificate shows an undivided interest in the assets of the corporation. The corporation owes him no debt. He is an owner of an interest in the corporation. Fletcher, in his Cyclopedia on Corporations, states (Sec. 3431), “A share of stock is not a credit, nor a debt owing by the corporation to the stockholder, in the sense in which the term is generally used. Shares of stock are clearly not ‘money.’ ”
The Supreme- Court of Illinois in the case of Pease v. Chicago Crayon Co., 235 Ill. 391, 85 N.E. 619, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 1158, 14 Ann.Cas. 263, stated [page 620]: “Shares of the capital stock of a corporation are personal property subject to levy under a writ of attachment. * * * Neither under the'attachment act nor garnishment act can a corporation be summoned as a garnishee to answer for shares of its stock where the certificate has been issued and delivered. In such a case the corporation cannot be said either to be indebted to its stockholder or to have in its possession property or effects belonging to him. A corporation might be indebted to a stockholder for dividends, but that question is not involved here. * * * ”
The Illinois, statute provides that the exemption may in the alternative be taken from “property” and “other property” if not selected from household furniture. The legislature could easily have restricted the selection to tangible property by so stating. The fact that it did not so limit the. selection of exempt property is significant and impels us to the ■ conclusion that it did not mean to restrict the selection. The terminology “other property” is very broad and must be held by us to include intangible as well as tangible property, where not specifically excluded by the statute.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: B