Task: sc_authoritydecision

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of "             nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Per Curiam.
In this case we noted probable jurisdiction, 411 U. S. 915 (1973), in order to consider whether the published notice provisions of the then-applicable Oklahoma tax-sale statutes, Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, §§ 382 and 432b (1951), comported with due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mullane v. Central Han over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950). This was the only issue addressed by the appellate courts of Oklahoma and by the parties in the Jurisdictional Statement and the papers responsive thereto filed with this Court.
After oral argument and upon our review of the record, it now appears that there might have been an independent and, possibly, an unchallenged ground for the judgment of the state trial court, viz., the running of the Oklahoma period of limitation for adverse claims. If that should prove to be the case, any decision by this Court would be advisory and beyond our jurisdiction. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 636 (1875).
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is therefore vacated and the case is remanded to that court to consider whether the appellants preserved the right to challenge the 'trial court’s determination that the State’s statute of limitations is a bar to their mineral rights claim, and, if so, whether, under state law, the statute of limitations independently bars appellants’ claim, irrespective of the constitutional adequacy of the tax-sale notice provisions of §§ 382 and 432b. Cf. Walker v. Hoffman, 405 P. 2d 57 (Okla. 1965).
It is so ordered.
The ad valorem taxes in question were for the year 1952. The original tax sale took place in November 1953 and the resale in May 1956. Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, §§ 383 and 432 (1951). The statutes cited (§§ 382, 383, 432, and 432b) were repealed by Okla. Sess. Laws 1965, c. 501, § 3, and replaced by corresponding provisions of the State’s present Ad Valorem Tax Code, namely, Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 68, §§24312, 24313, 24329, and 24331 (1966).
See 502 P. 2d 1265 (1972). The earlier opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, Division 2, is not reported; it is reproduced in the Jurisdictional Statement, App. A, p. vii.
The trial court’s judgment read in part as follows:
“ (2) The Court Further Finds, Orders, Adjudges and Decrees that from the date of the recording of said resale tax deed, on June 6, 1956 ... said Grantees therein, the Cross-Petitioners, R. W. Garrett and R. H. Vaughn, have been in the open, continuous, visible, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession of said lands and premises, receiving all of the rents, profits and income therefrom, and that said contesting substituted party defendants, are further forever barred and precluded by the statute of limitations, from seeking to assert the invalidity of said resale tax deed, as provided by 12 O. S. 1961, Sec. 93 (3) and (6).” Jurisdictional Statement, App. B, p. xvii.
Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, §93 (Supp. 1973-1974), reads:
§ 93. Limitation of real actions. — “Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or interest therein, can only be brought within the periods hereinafter prescribed, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and at no other time thereafter:
“(3) An action for the recovery of real property sold for taxes, within five (5) years after the date of the recording of the tax deed . . . provided, nothing herein shall be construed as reviving any cause of action for recovery of real property heretofore barred nor as divesting any interest acquired by adverse possession prior to the effective date hereof.
“(6) Numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 shall be fully operative regardless of whether the deed or judgment or the precedent -action or proceeding upon which such deed or judgment is based is void or voidable in whole or in part, for any reason, jurisdictional or otherwise; provided that this paragraph shall not be applied so as to bar causes of action which have heretofore accrued, until the expiration of one (1) year from and after its effective date.”
Whether the alleged lack of constitutionally valid notice would preclude the running of the statute of limitations for an adverse land claim is a question that has not been presented to this Court or to the Oklahoma courts below. Cf. Shroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 213-214 (1962). We intimate no view on this issue.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?
A. judicial review (national level)
B. judicial review (state level)
C. Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
D. statutory construction
E. interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
F. diversity jurisdiction
G. federal common law
Answer:

Answer: C