Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Motivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati has refused to allow respondents to distribute their commercial publications through freestanding newsracks located on public property. The question presented is whether this refusal is consistent with the First Amendment. In agreement with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we hold that it is not.
I
Respondent Discovery Network, Inc., is engaged in the business of providing adult educational, recreational, and social programs to individuals in the Cincinnati area. It advertises those programs in a free magazine that it publishes nine times a year. Although these magazines consist primarily of promotional material pertaining to Discovery’s courses, they also include some information about current events of general interest. Approximately one-third of these magazines are distributed through the 38 newsracks that the city authorized Discovery to place on public property in 1989.
Respondent Harmon Publishing Company, Inc., publishes and distributes a free magazine that advertises real" estate for sale at various locations throughout the United States. The magazine contains listings and photographs of available residential properties in the greater Cincinnati area, and also includes some information about interest rates, market trends, and other real estate matters. In 1989, Harmon received the city’s permission to install 24 newsracks at approved locations. About 15% of its distribution in the Cincinnati area is through those devices.
In March 1990, the city’s Director of Public Works notified each of the respondents that its permit to use dispensing devices on public property was revoked, and ordered the newsracks removed within 30 days. Each notice explained that respondent’s publication was a “commercial handbill” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the Municipal Code and therefore §714-23 of the code prohibited its distribution on public property. Respondents were granted administrative hearings and review by the Sidewalk Appeals Committee. Although the Committee did not modify the city’s position, it agreed to allow the dispensing devices to remain in place pending a judicial determination of the constitutionality of its prohibition. Respondents then commenced this litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
After an evidentiary hearing the District Court concluded that “the regulatory scheme advanced by the City of Cincinnati completely prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills on the public right of way violates the First Amendment. ” The court found that both publications were “commercial speech” entitled to First Amendment protection because they concerned lawful activity and were not misleading. While it recognized that a city “may regulate publication dispensing devices pursuant to its substantial interest in promoting safety and esthetics on or about the public right of way,” the District Court held, relying on Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989), that the city had the burden of establishing “a reasonable ‘fit' between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. (quoting Fox, 492 U. S., at 480). It explained that the “fit” in this case was unreasonable because the number of newsracks dispensing commercial handbills was “minute” compared with the total number (1,500-2,000) on the public right of way, and because they affected public safety in only a minimal way. Moreover, the practices in other communities indicated that the city’s safety and esthetic interests could be adequately protected “by regulating the size, shape, number or placement of such devices.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a.
On appeal, the city argued that since a number of courts had held that a complete ban on the use of newsracks dispensing traditional newspapers would be unconstitutional, and that the “Constitution... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression,” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563 (1980), its preferential treatment of newspapers over commercial publications was a permissible method of serving its legitimate interest in ensuring safe streets and regulating visual blight. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the lesser status of commercial speech is relevant only when its regulation was designed either to prevent false or misleading advertising, or to alleviate distinctive adverse effects of the specific speech at issue. Because Cincinnati sought to regulate only the “manner” in which respondents’ publications were distributed, as opposed to their content or any harm caused by their content, the court reasoned that respondents’ publications had “high value” for purposes of the Fox “reasonable fit” test. 946 F. 2d 464, 471 (CA6 1991) (italics omitted). Applying that test, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the burden placed on speech “cannot be justified by the paltry gains in safety and beauty achieved by the ordinance.” Ibid. The importance of the Court of Appeals decision, together with the dramatic growth in the use of newsracks throughout the country, prompted our grant of certiorari. 503 U. S. 918 (1992).
HH H-1
There is no claim in this case that there is anything unlawful or misleading about the contents of respondents’ publications. Moreover, respondents do not challenge their characterization as “commercial speech.” Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the city’s interest in safety and esthetics. It was, therefore, proper for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to judge the validity of the city’s prohibition under the standards we set forth in Central Hudson and Fox. It was the city’s burden to establish a “reasonable fit” between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests.
There is ample support in the record for the conclusion that the city did not “establish the reasonable fit we require.” Fox, 492 U. S., at 480. The ordinance on which it relied was an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any commercial handbills on public property. It was enacted long before any concern about newsracks developed. Its apparent purpose was to prevent the kind of visual blight caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing devices. The fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it has not “carefully calculated” the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. The benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was considered “minute” by the District Court and “paltry” by the Court of Appeals. We share their evaluation of the “fit” between the city’s goal and its method of achieving it.
In seeking reversal, the city argues that it is wrong to focus attention on the relatively small number of newsracks affected by its prohibition, because the city’s central concern is with the overall number of newsracks on its sidewalks, rather than with the unattractive appearance of a handful of dispensing devices. It contends, first, that a categorical prohibition on the use of newsracks to disseminate commercial messages burdens no more speech than is necessary to further its interest in limiting the number of newsracks; and, second, that the prohibition is a valid “time, place, and manner” regulation because it is content neutral and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. We consider these arguments in turn.
II
The city argues that there is a close fit between its ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills” and its interests in safety and esthetics because every decrease in the number of such dispensing devices necessarily effects an increase in safety and an improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape. In the city’s view, the prohibition is thus entirely related to its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics.
We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider it an insufficient justification for the discrimination against respondents’ use of newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on the city’s sidewalks. The major premise supporting the city’s argument is the proposition that commercial speech has only a low value. Based on that premise, the city contends that the fact that assertedly more valuable publications are allowed to use newsracks does not undermine its judgment that its esthetic and safety interests are stronger than the interest in allowing commercial speakers to have similar access to the reading public.
We cannot agree. In our view, the city’s argument attaches more importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech.
This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category. For respondents’ publications share important characteristics with the publications that the city classifies as “newspapers.” Particularly, they are “commercial handbills” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the city’s code because they contain advertising, a feature that apparently also places ordinary newspapers within the same category. Separate provisions in the code specifically authorize the distribution of “newspapers” on the public right of way, but that term is not defined. Presumably, respondents’ publications do not qualify as newspapers because an examination of their content discloses a higher ratio of advertising to other text, such as news and feature stories, than is found in the exempted publications. Indeed, Cincinnati’s City Manager has determined that publications that qualify as newspapers and therefore can be distributed by newsrack are those that are published daily and/or weekly and “primarily presen[t] coverage of, and commentary on, current events.” App. 230 (emphasis added).
The absence of a categorical definition of the difference between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” in the city’s code is also a characteristic of our opinions considering the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech. Fifty years ago, we concluded that the distribution of a commercial handbill was unprotected by the First Amendment, even though half of its content consisted of political protest. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). A few years later, over Justice Black’s dissent, we held that the “commercial feature” of door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions was a sufficient reason for denying First Amendment protection to that activity. Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951). Subsequent opinions, however, recognized that important commercial attributes of various forms of communication do not qualify their entitlement to constitutional protection. Thus, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we explained:
“We begin with several propositions that already are settled or beyond serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S., at 384; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 266. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S., at 111 (religious literature), and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S., at 417; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306-307 (1940).
“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject. No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a fact. Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S., at 822; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940).” Id., at 761-762.
We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 762.
In later opinions we have stated that speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978). We have also suggested that such lesser protection was appropriate for a somewhat larger category of commercial speech — “that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 561. We did not, however, use that definition in either Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 (1983), or in Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989).
In the Bolger case we held that a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives could not be applied to the appellee’s promotional materials. Most of the appellee’s mailings consisted primarily of price and quantity information, and thus fell “within the core notion of commercial speech — ‘speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”’” Bolger, 463 U. S., at 66 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U. S., at 762, in turn quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973)). Relying in part on the appellee’s economic motivation, the Court also answered the “closer question” about the proper label for informational pamphlets that were concededly advertisements referring to a specific product, and concluded that they also were “commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 66-67. It is noteworthy that in reaching that conclusion we did not simply apply the broader definition of commercial speech advanced in Central Hudson — a definition that obviously would have encompassed the mailings — but rather “examined [them] carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed.” 463 U. S., at 66. In Fox, we described the category even more narrowly, by characterizing the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identifying commercial speech.” 492 U. S., at 473-474 (emphasis added).
Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordinary newspapers is commercial speech and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents’ promotional publications is not what we have described as “core” commercial speech. There is no doubt a “commonsense” basis for distinguishing between the two, but under both the city’s code and our cases the difference is a matter of degree.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of deciding this case, we assume that all of the speech barred from Cincinnati’s sidewalks is what we have labeled “core” commercial speech and that no such speech is found in publications that are allowed to use newsracks. We nonetheless agree with the Court of Appeals that Cincinnati’s actions in this case run afoul of the First Amendment. Not only does Cincinnati’s categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city’s admittedly legitimate interests. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 120 (1991) (distinction drawn by Son of Sam law between income derived from criminal’s descriptions of his crime and other sources “has nothing to do with” State’s interest in transferring proceeds of crime from criminals to victims); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980) (State’s interest in residential privacy cannot sustain statute permitting labor picketing, but prohibiting nonlabor picketing when “nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy”).
The city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Each newsrack, whether containing “newspapers” or “commercial handbills,” is equally unattractive. While there was some testimony in the District Court that commercial publications are distinct from noncommercial publications in their capacity to proliferate, the evidence of such was exceedingly weak, the Court of Appeals discounted it, 946 F. 2d, at 466-467, and n. 3, and Cincinnati does not reassert that particular argument in this Court. As we have explained, the city’s primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggregate number of newsracks on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault. In fact, the newspapers are arguably the greater culprit because of their superior number.
Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by respondent publishers’ newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech. See, e. g., Bolger, 463 U. S., at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he commercial aspects of a message may provide a justification for regulation that is not present when the communication has no commercial character”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S., at 456-456 (commercial speech, unlike other varieties of speech, “occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation”).
A closer examination of one of the cases we have mentioned, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, demonstrates the fallacy of the city’s argument that a reasonable fit is established by the mere fact that the entire burden imposed on commercial speech by its newsrack policy may in some small way limit the total number of newsracks on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Here, the city contends that safety concerns and visual blight may be addressed by a prohibition that distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial publications that are equally responsible for those problems. In Bolger, however, in rejecting the Government’s reliance on its interest in protecting the public from “offensive” speech, “[we] specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 71-72 (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 701, n. 28 (1977)). Moreover, the fact that the regulation “provide[d] only the most limited incremental support for the interest asserted,” 463 U. S., at 73 — that it achieved only a “marginal degree of protection,” ibid., for that interest — supported our holding that the prohibition was invalid. Finally, in Bolger, as in this case, the burden on commercial speech was imposed by denying the speaker access to one method of distribution— there the United States mails, and here the placement of newsracks on public property — without interfering with alternative means of access to the audience. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained in his separate opinion, that fact did not minimize the significance of the burden:
“[T]he Postal Service argues that Youngs can communicate with the public otherwise than through the mail. [This argument falls] wide of the mark. A prohibition on the use of the mails is a significant restriction of First Amendment rights. We have noted that ‘“[t]he United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.”’ Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S., at 416, quoting Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 256 U. S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).” Id., at 79-80 (footnote omitted).
In a similar vein, even if we assume, arguendo, that the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property, as long as this avenue of communication remains open, these devices continue to play a significant role in the dissemination of protected speech.
In the absence of some basis for distinguishing between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the “low value” of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for. its selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills.” Our holding, however, is narrow. As should be clear from the above discussion, we do not reach the question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks. We simply hold that on this record Cincinnati has failed to make such a showing. Because the distinction Cincinnati has drawn has absolutely no bearing on the interests it has asserted, we have no difficulty concluding, as did the two courts below, that the city has not established the “fit” between its goals and its chosen means that is required by our opinion in Fox. It remains to consider the city’s argument that its prohibition is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation.
IV
The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified “‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984). Thus, a prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting “loud and raucous” noise in residential neighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech, and advertising. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). The city contends that its regulation of newsracks qualifies as such a restriction because the interests in safety and esthetics that it serves are entirely unrelated to the content of respondents’ publications. Thus, the argument goes, the justification for the regulation is content neutral.
The argument is unpersuasive because the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. True, there

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 日