Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

FITZHENRY, Circuit Judge.
Appellee was in the military service from August 3, 1918, to September 12, 1919. On August 8, 1918, he obtained war risk insurance in the sum of $101,000. This contract lapsed for the nonpayment of the monthly premium due October 1, 1919, or within thirty-one days thereafter, unless the soldier became totally and permanently disabled while his contract was in force. Appellee made claim for insurance to the Veterans’ Bureau which was denied and he sued to recover. The cause was submitted to a jury which found for appellee and fixed the date of his total and permanent disability from November 1, 1919. A motion for a new trial was overruled and judgment was entered on the verdict, from which this appeal is taken.
The errors complained of may be grouped as: (1) Those involving the competency of appellee’s medical witnesses and the failure of the court to permit appellant to break into the examination in chief of appellee’s medical witnesses for the purpose of showing their incompetency. (2) Those involving the rulings of the court in permitting appellee’s -witnesses to testify as to his total and permanent disability without having explained to them the meaning of total and permanent disability. (3) The attempt of counsel for appellee to get incompetent testimony before the jury. (4) Appellant was denied the right to show that appellee was satisfied to live on his disability compensation.
' The only issue involved in this case is whether or not appellee was totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the war risk insurance contract within thirty-one days after the expiration of the period for which the last insurance premium was paid.
Dr. Homer Little, one of appellee’s medical witnesses, was permitted to testify that appellee was permanently and totally disabled without qualifying’ him as to the meaning of total and permanent disability when used in connection with this question and to state his opinion of appellee’s condition at the time in question upon a consideration of the history of appellee’s ease taken by the doctor after suit had been commenced and but a few days before the trial. Appellee was not shown to he a patient of Dr. Little.
Appellee testified fully and in detail as to the time and place of the two abdominal surgical operations — one in France while in the service and the second after his discharge; the adhesions due to the operations which incapacitated him from the performance of substantial labor; the many government and private hospitals which he had visited in his effort to find relief and restitution; and all of the accompanying, intimate facts concerning his condition up to the time of the trial. Dr. Little testified in detail as to his physical examination of appellee, made after ho had taken the history of the ease, and admittedly based his conclusions upon those two sources of information. There was nothing either in the examination of appellee or the examination of Dr. Little which in any way tended to identify the facts disclosed in the history given for his consideration. In our opinion the fact background was not sufficient to permit of export opinion and it was prejudicial error to permit Dr. Little’s testimony to go to the jury. Delaware, L. & W. Co. v. Roalefs (C. C. A.) 70 F. 21; United States v. Hielde (C. C. A.) 60 F.(2d) 372; United States v. Frank Tyrakowski (C. C. A.) 50 F.(2d) 766; Greinke v. Chicago City Railway Co., 234 Ill. 564, 85 N. E. 327.
It was error to permit the medical witnesses of appellee to testify that he was totally and permanently disabled without qualifying them with a knowledge of the meaning of total and permanent disability in a suit upon a war risk insurance policy. Prevette v. United States (C. C. A.) 68 F.(2d). 112, 113; United States v. Sauls (C. C. A.) 65 F. (2d) 886, 887. What has been said with reference to the testimony of Dr. Little does not entirely apply to the other medical expert witness, Dr. Holden. The latter based his deductions upon a physical examination of appellee and eliminated the history which he had taken of appellee’s ease from consideration in reaching his opinion. His opinion, however, was largely based upon the fact that no corporation or organization would hire a man with a potential hernia which, of course, is not the tost.
The effort of counsel on behalf of appellee to get before the jury the fact that appellee was being paid disability compensation by the government was so persistent and prejudicial as to have fully warranted the trial court in declaring a mistrial and resetting the case. However, appellant here cannot complain of the rulings of the court upon this question because the government also sought to get the same evidence before the jury for the purpose of showing that the reason appellee had worked practically not at all since his discharge from the Army was because he was receiving disability compensation which was amply sufficient for his maintenance and that he did not want to work although physically capable.
In a suit upon a war risk insurance policy the issues involved arise out of a purely contractual relation and have no connection with, nor analogy to, disability compensation. The awarding of the latter involves entirely different legal principles. The mere fact that the government has awarded a soldier disability compensation proves nothing in a suit of this character, which must he disposed of entirely upon the contractual rights of the respective parties. Chrisman v. United States (C. C. A.) 61 F.(2d) 673.
The judgment is reversed and cause remanded, with direction to grant a new trial.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0