Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MOORMAN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant listed in Leslie county, Ky., for taxation, 50 tracts of land, aggregating more than 60,000 acres, at $12 an acre, and 6 tracts of mineral rights, aggregating more than 900 acres, at $6 an acre. The county tax commissioner valued the 60,000 acres at $15 an acre, and the 900 acres at $7 an acre. An agent for appellant appeared before the county board of supervisors, at its first meeting, and protested against these values fixed by the commissioner. The board, at its second meeting, for which the statute provides, increased the valuation of the 60,000 acres from $15 to $16 an acre. It did not change the valuation of the 900 acres. Notice of the $1 increase made by the board was posted on only one of the tracts to which it was intended to apply. The lower court held that the increase was valid as to that tract, but was invalid as to the others. See (C. C. A.) 2 F.(2d) 708. It also held that $15 an acre for the other tracts constituting the 60,000 acres and $7 an acre for the 900 acres of mineral rights were the assessed values of those properties. This latter ruling, of which appellant'complains, was based on the ground that the action of the tax commissioner was an assessment, and that appellant either had or waived the notice required by section 4053, Kentucky Statutes.
Respecting the notice, we observe that section 4053 of the Statutes declares that, “if the value fixed by the assessor [the tax commissioner has the same authority as the assessor had under the old statute] be greater than that fixed by the taxpayer, it shall be the duty of the assessor to notify the taxpayer, at the time of the assessment, the amount of such increase, and of the time and place of the meeting of the board of supervisors.” The purpose of this notice, as has been held by the courts of Kentucky, is to give the taxpayer an opportunity to appear before the board and protest the action of the eommis-. sioner. If the taxpayer does in fact appear and protest, the assessment made by the commissioner ought not to be invalidated because formal notice was not given; and as an agent of appellant protested in this instance, there is no doubt, we think, that the action of the commissioner is to be given the same effect as if statutory notice thereof had been given.
The remaining question is: What is the authority of the commissioner under the statutes? Appellant contends that he cannot assess property; that only the taxpayer and the bbard of supervisors can do that. Section 4053 provides that the tax commissioner “shall fix the value upon all the estate listed with him for taxation at its fair cash value, * * * and enter the same in his tax book”; that in arriving at what is the fair cash value he shall consider what he knows about the property, the statement of the person listing it, and “such other evidence as he may be able to obtain upon oath of witnesses sworn by him.” In section 4120, which deals with the duties of the board of supervisors, it is said that the board may “reduce or raise any assessment”' appearing upon the assessor’s books, but shall not do so unless “the evidence is clear and unmistakable that the valuation is not a fair cash value”; that where the property “has not been correctly valued they [the board] shall fix the value thereof, and correct the assessor’s books so as to show the true value.” After the board has done this, and notice has been given to the taxpayers whose lists -have been increased or assessed (“assessed” evidently refers to omitted property), the board must hold another meeting, at which those-who have received such notices may appear and protest against the proposed increases.
As we interpret these statutes, it is the duty of the commissioner to “fix the value” of the taxpayers’ property, and, if the board of supervisors does not change the values fixed by the commissioner, his action as. to those values stands as the assessment. This was assumed to be the result of the commissioner’s action by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Negley v. Henderson Bridge Co., 107 Ky. 414, 54 S. W. 171, and Ward v. Wentz, 130 Ky. 712, 113 S. W. 892. In the Ward Case it was said: “Under our statute, the assessor has the power to obtain information from other sources, and to make an assessment without reference to the list given in by the taxpayer.” It is plain from this language that the action of the commissioner in valuing the 60,000 acres at $15 an aere and the 900 acres at $7 an acre was a binding assessment in so far as it was not changed by the board of supervisors.
The plaintiff’s bill prayed an injunction against collection of the tax increases. The decree below, denying the injunction, except as stated, is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0