Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of two firearm offenses under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5861(i). Under Count I he received a 5-year sentence, but four and one-half years were suspended under 18 U.S.C. § 3651. A five-year probation period was also, imposed. With respect to Count II, defendant was placed on probation for five years concurrently with the probation imposed under Count I. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress a firearm which was found in the trunk of his car during an inventory search thereof.
The following facts were developed at the suppression hearing: On the evening of October 18, 1974, Indiana State Trooper Robert E. Seiffert was on a routine patrol heading east on the Indiana Tollway near the Burns Harbor Plaza. Seiffert was nearly run off the road by defendant’s 1975 Lincoln Continental which was weaving from lane to lane. Seiffert arrested the defendant driver for improper change of lanes. When defendant failed to produce a valid driver’s license, Seiffert ran a check over his police car radio and found that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended. Thereupon Seiffert advised defendant that he was under arrest for driving while his license was suspended and that Seiffert would have to impound the car and take defendant directly to court.
Seiffert’s radio call for a tow truck was overheard by Trooper Magranes, who drove to the scene to be of assistance. Seiffert asked Magranes to make an inventory of the car. Defendant gave Seiffert the keys to the car and Magranes then opened the trunk and found a sawed-off shotgun wrapped in a terrycloth towel.
Seiffert testified that when he learned that defendant’s license was suspended, he was required to take him directly to court. In accordance with custom, when a driver is removed from his vehicle, it is impounded and an inventory is performed to protect both the owner and the state police. Until he learned that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended, Seiffert had intended to release defendant for a future hearing before a justice of the peace and had planned to let defendant call his sister to remove the car.
After the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court handed down a memorandum opinion and order. The court cited Burns Aqn.Stat. § 47-2121 as authorizing the state trooper to remove the car to the nearest garage or place of safety and noted that under the policy of the Indiana State Police, the officer must protect the vehicle and property of the arrestee. Relying upon Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, the court held that this “caretaking” search was not unreasonable and denied the motion to suppress. We affirm.
The ultimate test of the legality of the search and seizure is the reasonableness of the police officer’s conduct. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, 413 U.S. at 435, 93 S.Ct. 2523. In this case it was unassailable. The Indiana State Police had probable cause to arrest defendant for his improper change of lanes and driving while his license was suspended. United States v. Bailey, 526 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir. 1975). Because of the defendant’s suspended driver’s license, it would have been improper to allow him to continue to drive his car, and Indiana law permitted the State Police to protect the vehicle by removing it from the roadway. Id. Furthermore, the Indiana State Police Training and Personnel Bulletin (April 1, 1960) authorized the impoundment of the car. The officer’s decision to seize the car was not unreasonable.
Under normal state procedure, defendant’s car was searched at the time of impounding. The police had a right to inventory the contents of the impounded car. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (per curiam); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730. The district court correctly held that in this situation it was unnecessary to obtain a search warrant. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (per curiam), 44 LW 3327; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589-590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1