Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties. See 28 U. S. C. § 2679(b)(1). When a federal employee is sued for wrongful or negligent conduct, the Act empowers the Attorney General to certify that the employee “was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.” § 2679(d)(1), (2). Upon the Attorney General’s certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employee. The litigation is thereafter governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 60 Stat. 842. If the action commenced in state court, the case is to be removed to a federal district court, and the certification remains “conclusiv[e]... for purposes of removal.” § 2679(d)(2).
In Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U. S. 417, 420 (1995), we held that the Attorney General’s Westfall Act scope-of-employment certification is subject to judicial review. Today, we address three further questions regarding the Westfall Act’s operation: (1) Is Attorney General certification proper when a federal officer denies the occurrence of the tortious conduct alleged by the plaintiff; (2) does § 2679(d)(2), by rendering the Attorney General’s certification “conclusiv[e]... for purposes of removal,” bar remand even if the federal court determines that the United States should not be substituted as defendant in place of the federal employee; and (3) does 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review of remand orders override §2679(d)(2)’s direction that, for purposes of removal, the Attorney General’s certification is conclusive. The first two questions were advanced in the petition for certiorari; in our order granting review, we asked the parties to address the impact of § 1447(d) on this case.
Pat Osborn, plaintiff-petitioner in the civil action now before the Court, sued federal employee Barry Haley in a Kentucky state court. She alleged that Haley tortiously interfered with her employment with a private contractor and conspired to cause her wrongful discharge. Osborn further alleged that Haley’s efforts to bring about her discharge were outside the scope of his employment. The United States Attorney, serving as the Attorney General’s delegate, countered Osborn’s allegations by certifying that Haley “was acting within the scope of his employment... at the time of the conduct alleged in [Osborn’s] complaint.” App. to Brief in Opposition 23 (hereinafter Luber App.). Based on this certification, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, as § 2679(d)(2) instructs.
In the federal forum, the United States Attorney denied the tortious conduct Osborn attributed to Haley, asserting that the wrongdoing she alleged never occurred. Accepting Osborn’s allegations as true, the District Court entered an order that rejected the Attorney General’s Westfall Act certification, denied the Government’s motion to substitute the United States as defendant in place of Haley, and remanded the case to the state court. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court’s order, and instructed that court to retain jurisdiction over the case.
We affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment. On the merits, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that the District Court, in denying substitution of the United States as defendant in lieu of Haley, misconstrued the Westfall Act. Substitution of the United States is not improper simply because the Attorney General’s certification rests on an understanding of the facts that differs from the plaintiff’s allegations. The United States, we hold, must remain the federal defendant in the action unless and until the District Court determines that the employee, in fact, and not simply as alleged by the plaintiff, engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment. On the jurisdictional issues, we hold that the Attorney General’s certification is conclusive for purposes of removal, £ e., once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to adjudicate the ease resides in the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the state court. We also hold that § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review of remand orders does not displace § 2679(d)(2), which shields from remand an action removed pursuant to the Attorney General’s certification.
I
Petitioner Pat Osborn worked for Land Between the Lakes Association (LBLA), a private company that contracted with the United States Forest Service to provide staff for the Land Between the Lakes National Recreation Area in Kentucky. While employed by LBLA, Osborn applied for a trainee position with the Forest Service. Respondent Barry Haley, a Forest Service officer, was responsible for the Service’s hiring process. At a meeting with LBLA employees, Haley announced that he had hired someone else for the job Osborn sought. Osborn asked why Haley did not inform her before the meeting, and she made a joke at Haley’s expense. After the meeting, Osborn’s supervisor told her to apologize to Haley; she refused.
A few weeks later, Osborn filed a complaint with the United States Department of Labor, asking the Department to investigate whether the Forest Service, in its hiring decision, had given appropriate consideration to the veterans’ preference points to which she was entitled. The Department’s investigator, Robert Kuenzli, after interviewing Haley, concluded that the hiring procedure had been handled correctly. Kuenzli so informed Osborn, who then asked him to close her complaint. On the same day LBLA’s executive director, respondent Gaye Luber, summoned Osborn and demanded that she apologize to Haley for “not being a good Forest Service partner.” Complaint ¶ 18, Luber App. 4. Osborn again refused. Two days later, she was fired.
Osborn filed suit against Haley, Luber, and LBLA in a Kentucky state court. She alleged that Haley tortiously interfered with her employment relationship with LBLA and conspired to cause her wrongful discharge. Specifically, she charged that Haley maliciously induced Luber to fire her, and that Haley did so in retaliation for Osborn’s Department of Labor complaint requesting a veterans’ preference inquiry. Complaint ¶29, id., at 7. In response the local United States Attorney, invoking the Westfall Act, certified on behalf of the Attorney General that Haley “was acting within the scope of his employment with the U. S. Forest Service, at the time of the conduct alleged in [Osborn’s] complaint.” Id., at 23. As is customary, the certification stated no reasons for the determination.
In the Westfall Act, Congress instructed:
“Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal” 28 U. S. C. § 2679(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Citing this provision, as well as the federal officer removal statute, § 1442, the United States removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The United States Attorney notified the District Court that the United States should be substituted for Haley as defendant, and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Osborn had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the FTCA.
Osborn opposed the substitution and the motion to dismiss. She argued that Haley’s conduct was outside the scope of his employment, hence the Westfall Act afforded him no immunity. As support for her opposition, Osborn submitted a memorandum of understanding between LBLA and the Forest Service, which cautioned Forest Service employees against involvement in LBLA employment decisions.
Apparently under the impression that the United States, at that preliminary stage, did not dispute Osborn’s factual allegations, the District Court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Under Kentucky law, the court observed, if Osborn’s allegations were true, Haley had acted outside the scope of his employment. In the District Court’s view the closeness in time of Osborn’s request for a Department of Labor investigation, Kuenzli’s call to Haley, and Luber’s demand for an apology justified an inference that Haley interfered with Osborn’s employment in violation of the LBLA-Forest Service memorandum of understanding. So reasoning, the District Court overruled the Westfall Act certification and denied substitution. Under this ruling, the United States was no longer before the court. Furthermore, the parties were not of diverse citizenship and no federal law was at issue. The District Court therefore held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Invoking § 1447(c), the court concluded that the case must be remanded to the state court.
The United States moved for reconsideration, urging that, contrary to the District Court’s impression, the Government did contest Osborn’s factual allegations. Recalling that it had denied Osborn’s allegations in its answer to her complaint, the United States submitted sworn declarations from Haley and Luber. Haley’s stated that he was not in communication with Luber between the time of Kuenzli’s investigation and Osborn’s firing. Luber’s declaration stated that Osborn’s request for an investigation regarding her veterans’ preference points could not have had any bearing on Osborn’s termination, for Luber was unaware of the request at the relevant time. Absent contrary evidence, the Government maintained, these declarations sufficed to support the certification and the continuance of the United States as defendant in place of Haley. In the alternative, the Government sought discovery.
The District Court denied the Government’s reconsideration motion. The Haley and Luber declarations, the court said, clarified that the controversy centered on whether there had been any communication between Haley and Luber influencing Luber’s decision to fire Osborn. The Westfall Act would have shielded Haley, the Court suggested, had the United States admitted a Haley-Luber communication but defended its content as within the scope of Haley’s employment. Westfall Act certification was improper, the court concluded, because the United States did not admit, but instead denied, the occurrence of the event central to proof of Osborn’s claim. The District Court acknowledged disagreement among the Circuits on the availability of a Westfall Act certification when the United States “den[ies] the occurrence of the basic incident charged.” Wood v. United States, 995 F. 2d 1122, 1124 (CA1 1993) (en banc). Compare ibid, and McHugh v. University of Vermont, 966 F. 2d 67, 74-75 (CA2 1992) (prohibiting incident-denying certifications), with Heuton v. Anderson, 75 F. 3d 357, 360 (CA8 1996); Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F. 3d 1501, 1508 (CADC 1994); and Melo v. Hafer, 13 F. 3d 736, 746-747 (CA3 1994) (allowing incident-denying certifications). Choosing to follow the First Circuit’s opinion in Wood, the District Court adhered to its prior ruling that the Westfall Act certification in this case was invalid.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court’s order denying certification and substitution. 422 F. 3d 359, 365 (2005). The Court of Appeals, in accord with Heuton, Kimbro, and Melo, held that a Westfall Act certification is not improper simply because the United States denies the occurrence of the incident on which the plaintiff centrally relies. 422 F. 3d, at 364. Rather, the court held, where “the Attorney General’s certification is based on a different understanding of the facts than is refleeted in the complaint, including a denial of the harm-causing incident, the district court must resolve the factual dispute.” Ibid, (quoting Melo, 13 F. 3d, at 747).
The Sixth Circuit also vacated the District Court’s order remanding the ease to the state court. Section 2679(d)(2), the Court of Appeals stressed, instructs that the “certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.” The court read that instruction to proscribe shuttling cases back to state courts and, instead, to require district court adjudication of the controversy even when a Westfall Act certification is rejected and, correspondingly, substitution of the United States as defendant is denied. 422 F. 3d, at 365. On that issue too, the Court of Appeals noted a division among the Circuits. Compare Borneman v. United States, 213 F. 3d 819, 826 (CA4 2000); Garcia v. United States, 88 F. 3d 318, 325-327 (CA5 1996); and Aliota v. Graham, 984 F. 2d 1350, 1356 (CA3 1993) (holding that a district court lacks authority to remand a case removed under § 2679(d)(2)), with Haddon v. United States, 68 F. 3d 1420, 1427 (CADC 1995); and Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F. 2d 802, 814, n. 17 (CA1 1990) (holding remand proper when district court rejects the Attorney General’s certification). We granted certiorari. 547 U. S. 1126 (2006).
II
We consider first the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to review the District Court’s disposition of this case. We address in turn the questions whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to review (1) the order rejecting the Attorney General’s certification and denying substitution of the United States as defendant, and (2) the order remanding the case to the state court.
A
The District Court’s rejection of certification and substitution effectively denied Haley the protection afforded by the Westfall Act, a measure designed to immunize covered federal employees not simply from liability, but from suit. See § 2(a)(5), 102 Stat. 4563; Lamagno, 515 U. S., at 425-426; H. R. Rep. No. 100-700, p. 4 (1988). Under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), this ruling qualifies as a reviewable final decision within the compass of 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
Meeting the three criteria of Cohen, the District Court’s denial of certification and substitution conclusively decided a contested issue, the issue decided is important and separate from the merits of the action, and the District Court’s disposition would be effectively unreviewable later in the litigation. 337 U. S., at 546. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 525-527 (1985) (holding that district court rejection of a defendant’s qualified immunity plea is immediately appeal-able under the Cohen doctrine because suit immunity “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial” against the immune official). As cogently explained by the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F. 2d 128,133 (1990), retaining the federal employee as a party defendant
“effectively denie[s] [him] immunity from suit if [he] was entitled to such immunity under the Westfall Act. Under the Act, once the United States Attorney certifies that the federal employee acted within the scope of [his] employment, the plaintiff properly can proceed only against the United States as defendant. The federal employee remains immune from suit. By [rejecting the Attorney General’s certification], the district court subject[s] [the employee] to the burden of defending a suit..., a burden from which [the Westfall Act spares him].”
Tellingly, the Courts of Appeals are unanimous in holding that orders denying Westfall Act certification and substitution are amenable to immediate review under Cohen. See Woodruff v. Covington, 389 F. 3d 1117, 1124 (CA10 2004); Mathis v. Henderson, 243 F. 3d 446, 448 (CA8 2001); Borne-man, 213 F. 3d, at 826 (CA4); Lyons v. Brown, 158 F. 3d 605, 607 (CA1 1998); Taboos v. Mlynczak, 149 F. 3d 576, 579 (CA7 1998); Coleman v. United States, 91 F. 3d 820, 823 (CA6 1996); Flohr v. Mackovjak, 84 F. 3d 386, 390 (CA11 1996); Kimbro, 30 F. 3d, at 1503 (CADC); Aliota, 984 F. 2d, at 1354 (CA3); Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F. 2d 865, 873 (CA9 1992); McHugh, 966 F. 2d, at 69 (CA2); Carlson, 896 F. 2d, at 133 (CA5). We confirm that the Courts of Appeals have ruled correctly on this matter.
B
In our order granting certiorari we asked the parties to address, in addition to the issues presented in the petition, this further question: Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, notwithstanding 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d)’s declaration that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise”? In answering this question, we also resolve the second question presented in the petition for certiorari — whether the West-fall Act’s rule against remanding actions removed pursuant to § 2679(d)(2) applies when the federal court determines that the United States should not be substituted as defendant in place of the federal employee. Our disposition is informed by, and tracks, the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Aliota, 984 F. 2d, at 1354-1357.
We begin with the provision we asked the parties to address: § 1447(d). That provision states in relevant part: “An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise... In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), we held that the preceding subsection, § 1447(c), confined §1447(d)’s scope. Under § 1447(d), the Court explained, “only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the [mandatory] grounds specified therein — that removal was improvident and without jurisdiction — are immune from review.” Id., at 346. Thermtron had been properly removed to the federal court. The sole reason the District Court gave for remanding it was that court’s crowded docket. This Court held the remand order reviewable, observing that § 1447(c) could not sensibly be read to confer on the district courts' “carte blanche authority... to revise the federal statutes governing removal.” Id., at 351. See also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706 (1996) (holding abstention-based remand order immediately appealable). But see Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U. S. 723 (1977) (per curiam) (holding unreviewable a remand order purporting to rest on a ground within the scope of § 1447(c)).
The United States urges us to apply Thermtron and hold the remand order in this case reviewable because that order was not based on a ground specified in § 1447(c). To determine whether Thermtron controls, we must start with an examination of the Westfall Act’s design, particularly its prescriptions regarding the removal and remand of actions filed in state court.
As earlier noted, see supra, at 229-230, the Act grants the Attorney General authority to certify that a federal employee named defendant in a tort action was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time in question. § 2679(d)(1), (2). If the action is commenced in a federal court, and the Attorney General certifies that the employee “was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the [relevant] time,” the United States must be substituted as the defendant. § 2679(d)(1). If the action is launched in a state court, and the Attorney General makes the same certification, the action “shall be removed” to the appropriate federal district court, and again the United States must be substituted as the defendant. § 2679(d)(2). Of prime importance to our decision, § 2679(d)(2) concludes with the command: “Th[e] certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.” (Emphasis added.)
This directive markedly differs from Congress’ instruction for eases in which the Attorney General “refuse[s] to certify scope of office or employment.” § 2679(d)(3). In that event, the defendant-employee may petition the court in which the action was instituted to make the scope-of-employment certification. If the complaint was filed in a state court, the Attorney General may remove the case to the appropriate federal court, but he is not obliged to do so. Ibid. If the court, state or federal, issues the certification, “the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.” Ibid. If removal has occurred, and thereafter “the district court determines that the employee was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action... shall be remanded to the State court.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
The Act’s distinction between removed cases in which the Attorney General issues a scope-of-employment certification, and those in which he does not, leads us to conclude that Congress gave district courts no authority to return cases to state courts on the ground that the Attorney General’s certification was unwarranted. Absent certification, § 2679(d)(3) directs that the case must be remanded to the state court in which the action commenced. In contrast, when the Attorney General certifies scope of employment, his certificate “conclusively establish[es] scope of

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 载