Task: songer_othadmis

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile, (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless". 

PER CURIAM.
John Wesley Arnold appeals from a conviction in the Eastern District of Arkansas for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. After trial to a jury the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to three years imprisonment with two years and eight months suspended.
Arnold admits filling out an American Express Company credit card application using his mother’s name, Sutilla Arnold, as the primary applicant. He listed his own address, telephone number and social security number as his mother’s, and, in addition, gave false information as to his mother’s age, employment and yearly salary. He supplied as credit references the Farmers Bank, Hamburg, Arkansas, where his mother had an account, and other businesses where his mother traded. He requested that American Express send a supplementary credit card for an immediate member of Sutilla Arnold’s family, John Wesley Arnold. The application was signed, “Sutilla Arnold, 6-7-74.” However it is not disputed that the defendant signed his mother’s name.
Upon receiving the application, American Express checked Sutilla Arnold’s credit and issued the two cards requested. They made no check of John Wesley Arnold’s credit. In a short period of time the defendant and a friend ran up a total bill of $4,042.70. American Express refused the defendant’s offer to make monthly payments of $100. No payments have been made. The matter was referred to a postal inspector for investigation and this prosecution resulted.
On appeal the defendant claims that the government failed to prove specific intent to defraud: first, because Arnold’s scheme would not have resulted in loss to American Express, and American Express was not deceived as to John Wesley Arnold’s identity as a credit card holder and a credit risk; and second, because Arnold dealt with American Express in good faith. Intent to defraud, of course, is an essential element of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615, 618 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).
In reviewing the record we must sustain the verdict if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Direct evidence of willful intent is not required. The requisite intent may be inferred from the acts of the defendant. United States v. Porter, 441 F.2d 1204, 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 238, 30 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971), and cases cited therein. We find the government’s evidence sufficient to show that the application was made so as to deceive, was made with the intent to deceive, and did, in fact, deceive American Express.
One of the salient factors in weighing the sufficiency of the proof as to intent to defraud is the party’s use of material misrepresentations in carrying out the venture. United States v. Porter, supra, 441 F.2d at 1210. Here, although Arnold eventually informed his mother of the application, and she approved on the condition that he be liable for all bills incurred, there is no question that Arnold submitted an application, containing what he knew to be false information, in his mother’s name and without her knowledge, and that he offered the information so American Express would act favorably on the application. From this the jury could properly infer willful intent.
Good faith, of course, is a defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 16 S.Ct. 508, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896); Gold v. United States, 36 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1929). However, this defense must be weighed in light of the defendant’s misrepresentations and use of credit once received. We find support for the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: E