Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.
Appellants were convicted in separate trials of wilfully supplying false or fraudulent information to their employer with regard to their entitlement to withholding tax allowances, in violation of Title 26, U.S.C., § 7205. In this appeal they charge the trial court erred in not granting their respective motions for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the government failed to prove all the essential elements of the crime charged, viz., that defendants supplied “false or fraudulent” information. In the alternative they ask for new trials upon the grounds that the trial court’s instructions to the jury defining “false” and “fraudulent” were erroneous. We affirm.
The thrust of appellants’ contention on this appeal is that the trial court’s definitions of “fraudulent” and “false” are improper and insufficient as those terms should be defined under section 7205. We are asked to apply United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 650-55 (4th Cir. 1974), where the court stated:
[W]e hold that in order for a taxpayer to be convicted of supplying “false or fraudulent” information contrary to section 7205 the information must either be (1) supplied with an intent to deceive, or (2) false in the sense of deceptive — of such a nature that it could reasonably affect withholding to the detriment of the government.
In the instant cases the trial court instructed the jury that, among other things, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “3. [t]he defendant wilfully supplied false or fraudulent information” in the Internal Revenue Service form certifying certain information as to his entitlement to withholding allowances. The terms “wilfully,” “fraudulent,” and “false” were then defined as follows:
INST. NO. 8
The term “wilfully” as used in the statute in question means voluntary, purposeful, deliberate and intentional as distinguished from accidental, inadvertent or negligent.
Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to constitute wilfulness under the criminal law. To be wilful defendant’s acts must be voluntary and purposeful and done with the specific intent to fail to do what he knew the law required to be done; that is to say, with a bad purpose or evil motive to disobey or disregard what the law requires.
It is not necessary for the Government to show that defendant intended to defraud the Government or his employer or that the Government or his employer relied upon the false form or that the Government lost revenue as a result of the defendant’s action for defendant’s actions to be unlawful under this section.
On the other hand, defendant’s conduct is not wilful if you find that he acted out of negligence, inadvertence, accident or reckless disregard for the requirements of the law, or due to his good faith misunderstanding of the requirement of the law or prior court decision.
INST. NO. 9
A statement or claim or document is fraudulent if it was falsely made or caused to be made, with the intent to deceive.
INST. NO. 10
A statement is false if it was untrue when made, and was then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. “False” means more than merely “incorrect.”
Initially we note that none of the appellants objected to instructions 9 and 10 at the time of trial; therefore, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 appellants have waived their right to assign as error the instructions now attacked. United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1975). Neither do we find plain error affecting substantial rights of the parties since the instructions as a whole covered the essential elements of the crime correctly.
We are satisfied that the trial court properly defined the terms “false” and “fraudulent” as used in 26 U.S.C. § 7205. See United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973); United States v. Smith, 487 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 2396, 40 L.Ed.2d 767 (1974). The statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7205, which is stated in the disjunctive “false or fraudulent,” has been specifically construed to require that the government establish only that the taxpayer wilfully supplied false information. United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1566, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974). See also Malinowski, supra; United States v. Smith, supra, 487 F.2d 329.
We are not persuaded that “false in the sense of deceptive” as stated in Snider, supra, 502 F.2d at 655, is required under section 7205. In Snider the defendant claimed three billion allowances whereas defendants here claimed from thirty to fifty allowances, arguably not an inconceivable number in view of the fact that withholding allowances may be claimed both on the basis of family members and the amount of itemized deductions allowed by the statute. 26 U.S.C. § 3402. See Shea v. United States, 506 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1974).
Appellants, however, persist in their claim that judgments of acquittal should have been entered because intentional deception is a requisite of guilt under section 7205 and that the thirty to fifty claimed allowances could reasonably deceive no one. Assuming arguendo that the government was neither deceived nor likely to be misled by the claimed withholding allowances, the fact remains that each W-4 statement was false. It was untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person making it. The record discloses that each of the defendants wilfully filed his respective W-4 form with the intent to interfere with the withholding system and prevent the collection of taxes in the manner prescribed by law. Their guilt under Title 26, U.S.C., § 7205, was fully established. United States v. Smith, supra, 484 F.2d at 10.
Appellant Bernard Hinderman in a separate brief claims he was denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel of his own choosing. In this case appellant initially appeared with two unlicensed attorneys who, it appeared, either had been disbarred or had had their licenses to practice law revoked in Minnesota and had not been admitted to practice in any other state. The trial court, in accordance with Local Rule 5, prohibited them from appearing at counsel’s table and acting as counsel for appellant before the court. Appellant was not barred from consulting with them during recesses and at other times and places. The court did appoint other counsel to sit at counsel’s table with appellant to render such assistance as appellant might request. Appellant objected to this procedure and now claims he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. We reject appellant’s contention.
While a defendant in a criminal trial has a right to defend himself, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), he has no constitutional right to have an unlicensed attorney represent him in court proceedings. McKinzie v. Ellis, 287 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1951); see also Ginger v. Cohn, 426 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir. 1970). We have previously approved the procedure followed here where able counsel was appointed and made available for the use of the defendant throughout the trial. United States v. Sturgeon, 501 F.2d 1270, 1275 (8th Cir. 1974).
Affirmed in all respects.
. Originally seven defendants appealed, four of whom abandoned their appeals prior to submission.
. Defendant Bernard Hinderman was charged with claiming thirty allowances on his W-4 form when he was properly entitled to six; defendant Robert Hinderman claimed thirty allowances when entitled to six; and defendant Dennis Storlie claimed fifty allowances when entitled to two.
. The Honorable Edward J. McManus, Chief Judge, Northern District of Iowa.
. Although each of the defendants conducted much of his own defense, an experienced attorney was appointed by the court and was available for consultation at all times during the course of the trials. Failure to utilize the services of counsel does not excuse noncompliance with the rules. See generally United States v. Redfield, 197 F.Supp. 559, 589-90 (D.Nev.), aff’d, 295 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803, 82 S.Ct. 642, 7 L.Ed.2d 550 (1962).
. The court’s instruction on wilfulness met the more stringent standard of a bad purpose and evil motive to disobey or disregard what the law requires. See United States v. Pohlman, 522 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1975).

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1