Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.
The judgment from which this appeal was prosecuted was rendered on a verdict convicting appellant of maintaining a common nuisance under section 21, title 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 33).
The indictment charged him with maintaining a nuisance at the premises described, in that he there “did sell and possess for sale for beverage purposes, certain intoxicating liquors, to wit: * * * ”
The “Statement of Pacts” of the brief for the appellant sets out the propositions whereon the appeal is grounded, and the facts upon which they arise, as follows:
“The appellant, upon arraignment, pleaded ‘not guilty/ but, upon the calling of the case for trial, withdrew said plea and made his several motions to strike out the word ‘possess for sale’ ’ and ‘possessed for sale/ where they appeared in the indictment as surplusage both under the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. Upon the overruling of said motions, appellant renewed his plea of ‘not guilty’ but introduced no evidence, continuing to rely upon the objections originally interposed in the motions to strike, as aforesaid, which objections, differing only in form were renewed, 1st: on motion to discharge defendant at the close of the government’s case, 2nd: on motion to discharge defendant at the conclusion of all of the evidence, 3rd: on motion for arrest of judgment upon the coming in of the verdict of the jury and 4th: on motion for stay of execution. All of the foregoing motions were overruled and exceptions properly preserved.
“The propositions of law involved in the above motions and upon which this appeal is based, are 1st: That the Eighteenth Amendment does not prohibit the possession of alcoholic liquor and that the Volstead Act, insofar as it attempts to prohibit such possession, is unconstitutional. 2nd: That the Volstead Act in terms prohibits possession but does not include an aggravated form of possession, coupled with a wrongful intent, and that, by charging ‘possession for sale/ the indictment undertook to hold appellant to answer an offense unknown to the law.”
If, as staled in the motion, the assailed words “appeared in the indictment as surplusage,” then, as in any pleading, the “surplusage” would be disregarded the same as though not present at all. That is what is meant by “surplusage.” Black’s or Bouvier’s Law Dictionary. Or if, assuming the propriety in any event of a motion to strike out or otherwise amend an indictment, appellant’s motion to strike had been granted, it would have followed, both in ease of treating the words as surplusage, as vrell in the case of striking them out, .there would then have remained the charge of maintaining the premises as a common nuisance, in that the defendant “did sell for beverage purposes certain intoxicating liquor, to wit: * + * ” —a perfectly good indictment under section 21, of title 2, the relevant part of which is:
“Any room, house, building, boat, vehiele, structure, or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept, or bartered in violation of this chapter, and all intoxicating liquor and property kept and used in maintaining the same, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance, and any person who maintains such a common nuisance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. * * * ”
The indictment is not for the act of selling or possessing for sale, but for maintaining a nuisance through the several alleged means. The means are disjunctively stated in the statute. Any valid one of several mean's charged will, if proved, sustain the charge and uphold a conviction thereon. Sale of liquor upon premises as a means whereby an alleged nuisance was committed and maintained falls fully within section 21 as well as within the Eighteenth Amendment. An indictment charging the maintenance of a nuisance through sale is not subject to objection, for the reason that the same indictment alleges further means whereby the same nuisance was maintained, which neither the Eighteenth Amendment nor the statute recognize as means whereby a nuisance might be committed or maintained.
The bill of exceptions states that evidence was received and a verdict of guilty found by the jury, but it does not present the evidence, and we must conclusively presume there was evidence to sustain the allegation of selling as the means whereby the nuisance was maintained. This situation requires affirmance of the judgment, regardless of whether there is merit in appellant’s contention that neither the Eighteenth Amendment nor section 21 of title 2 authorizes the penalizing of mere possession of liquor.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: I