Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue here is the constitutionality of subsection (a) of § 5 of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 1974 Pa. Laws, Act No. 209, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6605 (a) (Purdon 1977). This statute subjects a physician who performs an abortion to potential criminal liability if he fails to utilize a statutorily prescribed technique when the fetus “is viable” or when there is “sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.” A three-judge Federal District Court declared § 5 (a) unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and enjoined its enforcement. App. 239a-244a. Pursuant to 28 IT. S. C. § 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 435 U. S. 913 (1978).
I
The Abortion Control Act was passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature, over the Governor’s veto, in the year following this Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973). It was a comprehensive statute.
Section 1 gave the Act its title. Section 2 defined, among other terms, “informed consent” and “viable.” The latter was specified to mean “the capability of a fetus to five outside the mother’s womb albeit with artificial aid.” See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 160.
Section 3 (a) proscribed the performance of an abortion “upon any person in the absence of informed consent thereto by such person.” Section 3 (b) (i) prohibited the performance of an abortion in the absence of the written consent of the woman’s spouse, provided that the spouse could be located and notified, and the abortion was not certified by a licensed physician “to be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother.” Section 3 (b)(ii), applicable if the woman was unmarried and under the age of 18, forbade the performance of an abortion in the absence of the written consent of “one parent or person in loco parentis” of the woman, unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physician “as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.” Section 3 (e) provided that whoever performed an abortion without such consent was guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.
Section 4 provided that whoever, intentionally and willfully, took the life of a premature infant aborted alive, was guilty of murder of the second degree. Section 5 (a), set forth in n. 1, supra, provided that if the fetus was determined to be viable, or if there was sufficient reason to believe that the fetus might be viable, the person performing the abortion was required to exercise the same care to preserve the life and health of the fetus as would be required in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive, and was required to adopt the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, so long as a different technique was not necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. Section 5 (d), also set forth in n. 1, imposed a penal sanction for a violation of § 5 (a).
Section 6 specified abortion controls. It prohibited abortion during the stage of pregnancy subsequent to viability, except where necessary, in the judgment of a licensed physician, to preserve the life or health of the mother. No abortion was to be performed except by a licensed physician and in an approved facility. It required that appropriate records be kept, and that quarterly reports be filed with the Commonwealth’s Department of Health. And it prohibited solicitation or advertising with respect to abortions. A violation of § 6 was a misdemeanor of the first or third degrees, as specified.
Section 7 prohibited the use of public funds for an abortion in the absence of a certificate of a physician stating that the abortion was necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. Finally, § 8 authorized the Department of Health to make rules and regulations with respect to performance of abortions and the facilities in which abortions were performed. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, §§ 6601-6608 (Purdon 1977).
Prior to the Act’s effective date, October 10, 1974, the present suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging, on federal constitutional grounds, nearly all of the Act’s provisions. The three-judge court on October 10 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of a number of those provisions. Each side sought a class-action determination; the plaintiffs’, but not the defendants’, motion to this effect was granted.
The case went to trial in January 1975. The court received extensive testimohy from expert witnesses on all aspects of abortion procedures. The resulting judgment declared the Act to be severable, upheld certain of its provisions, and held other provisions unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (1975). The court sustained the definition of “informed consent” in § 2; the facility-approval requirement and certain of the reporting requirements of § 6; § 8’s authorization of rules and regulations; and, by a divided vote, the informed consent requirement of § 3 (a). It overturned § 3 (b) (i)’s spousal-consent requirement and, again by a divided vote, §3(b)(ii)’s parental-consent requirement; § 6’s reporting requirements relating to spousal and parental consent; § 6’s prohibition of advertising; and § 7’s restriction on abortion funding. The definition of “viable” in § 2 was declared void for vagueness and, because of the incorporation of this definition, § 6’s proscription of abortions after viability, except to preserve the life or health of the woman, was struck down. Finally, in part because of the incorporation of the definition of “viable,” and in part because of the perceived overbreadth of the phrase “may be viable,” the court invalidated the viability-determination and standard-of-care provisions of § 5 (a). 401 F. Supp., at 594.
Both sides appealed to this Court. While the appeals were pending, the Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976) ; Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976). Virginia State Board shed light on the prohibition of advertising for abortion services. Planned Parenthood had direct bearing on the patient-, spousal-, and parental-consent issues and was instructive on the definition-of-viability issue. Singleton concerned the issue of standing to challenge abortion regulations. Accordingly, that portion of the three-judge court’s judgment which was the subject of the plaintiffs’ appeal was summarily affirmed. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U. S. 901 (1976). And that portion of the judgment which was the subject of the defendants’ appeal was vacated and remanded for further consideration in the light of Planned Parenthood, Singleton, and Virginia State Board. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U. S. 901 (1976).
On remand, the parties entered into a stipulation which disposed of all issues except the constitutionality of §§ 5 (a) and 7. Relying on this Court’s supervening decisions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438 (1977), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), the District Court found, contrary to its original view, see 401 F. Supp., at 594, that § 7 did not violate either Tit. XIX of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 343, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 241a. The court, however, declared: “After reconsideration of section 5 (a) in light of the most recent Supreme Court decisions, we adhere to our original view and decision that section 5 (a) is unconstitutional.” Id., at 240a-214a. Since the plaintiffs-appellees have not appealed from the ruling with respect to § 7, the only issue remaining in this protracted litigation is the validity of § 5 (a).
II
Three cases in the sensitive and earnestly contested abortion area provide essential background for the present controversy.
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), this Court concluded that there is a right of privacy, implicit in the liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, that “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id., at 153. This right, we said, although fundamental, is not absolute or unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in the health of the pregnant woman and in the potential life of the fetus. “These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’ ” Id., at 162-163. For both logical and biological reasons, we indicated that the State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus reaches the compelling point at the stage of viability. Hence, prior to viability, the State may not seek to further this interest by directly restricting a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. But after viability, the State, if it chooses, may regulate or even prohibit abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman. Id., at 163-164.
We did not undertake in Roe to examine the various factors that may enter into the determination of viability. We-simply observed that, in the medical and scientific communities, a fetus is considered viable if it is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid.” Id., at 160. We added that there must be a potentiality of “meaningful life,” id., at 163, not merely momentary survival. And we noted that viability “is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.” Id., at 160. We thus left the point flexible for anticipated advancements in medical skill.
Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out. We indicated that up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention, “the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,” id., at 166, and we added that if this privilege were abused, “the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are available.” Ibid.
Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), underscored the importance of affording the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment. After the Court there reiterated that “a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand,” id., at 189, the Court discussed, in a vagueness-attack context, the Georgia statute’s requirement that a physician’s decision to perform an abortion must rest upon “his best clinical judgment.” The Court found it critical that that judgment “may be exercised in the light of all factors— physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age — relevant to the well-being of the patient.” Id., at 192.
The third case, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), stressed similar themes. There a Missouri statute that defined viability was challenged on the ground that it conflicted with the discussion of viability in Roe and that it was, in reality, an attempt to advance the point of viability to an earlier stage in gestation. The Court rejected that argument, repeated the Roe definition of viability, 428 U. S., at 63, and observed again that viability is “a matter of medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we preserved [in Roe] the flexibility of the term.” Id., at 64. The Court also rejected a contention that “a specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the point of viability.” Id., at 6-5. It said:
“In any event, we agree with the District Court that it is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.” Id., at 64.
In these three cases, then, this Court has stressed viability, has declared its determination to be a matter for medical judgment, and has recognized that differing legal consequences ensue upon the near and far sides of that point in the human gestation period. We reaffirm these principles. Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support. Because this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability — be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor — as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical point. And we have recognized no attempt to stretch the point of viability one way or the other.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented by the instant controversy.
Ill
The attack mounted by the plaintiffs-appellees upon § 5 (a) centers on both the viability-determination requirement and the stated standard of care. The former provision, requiring the physician to observe the care standard when he determines that the fetus is viable, or when “there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," is asserted to be unconstitutionally vague because it fails to inform the physician when his duty to the fetus arises, and because it does not make the physician’s good-faith determination of viability conclusive. This provision is also said to be unconstitutionally overbroad, because it carves out a new time period prior to the stage of viability, and could have a restrictive effect on a couple who wants to abort a fetus determined by genetic testing to be defective. The standard of care, and in particular the requirement that the physician employ the abortion technique “which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother,” is said to be void for vagueness and to be unconstitutionally restrictive in failing to afford the physician sufficient professional discretion in determining which abortion technique is appropriate.
The defendants-appellants, in opposition, assert that the Pennsylvania statute is concerned only with post-viability abortions and with prescribing a standard of care for those abortions. They assert that the terminology “may be viable” correctly describes the statistical probability of fetal survival associated with viability; that the viability-determination requirement is otherwise sufficiently definite to be interpreted by the medical community; and that it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether a viable but genetically defective fetus has a right to life. They contend that the standard-of-care provision preserves the flexibility required for sound medical practice, and that it simply requires that when a physician has a choice of procedures of equal risk to the woman, he must select the procedure least likely to be fatal to the fetus.
IV
We agree with plaintiffs-appellees that the viability-determination requirement of § 5 (a) is ambiguous, and that its uncertainty is aggravated by the absence of a scienter requirement with respect to the finding of viability. Because we conclude that this portion of the statute is void for vagueness, we find it unnecessary to consider appellees’ alternative arguments based on the alleged overbreadth of § 5 (a).
A
It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954), or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,” Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972), is void for vagueness. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (1972). This appears to be especially true where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Id., at 109; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603-604 (1967).
Section 5 (a) requires every person who performs or induces an abortion to make a determination, “based on his experience, judgment or professional competence,” that the fetus is not viable. If such person determines that the fetus is viable, or if “there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable,” then he must adhere to the prescribed standard of care. See n. 1, supra. This requirement contains a double ambiguity. First, it is unclear whether the statute imports a purely subjective standard, or whether it imposes a mixed subjective and objective standard. Second, it is uncertain whether the phrase “may be viable” simply refers to viability, as that term has been defined in Roe and in Planned Parenthood, or whether it refers to an undefined penumbral or “gray” area prior to the stage of viability.
The statute requires the physician to conform to the prescribed standard of care if one of two conditions is satisfied: if he determines that the fetus “is viable,” or “if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.” Apparently, the determination of whether the fetus “is viable” is to be based on the attending physician's “experience, judgment or professional competence,” a subjective point of reference. But it is unclear whether the same phrase applies to the second triggering condition, that is, to “sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable.” In other words, it is ambiguous whether there must be “sufficient reason” from the perspective of the judgment, skill, and training of the attending physician, or “sufficient reason” from the perspective of a cross section of the medical community or a panel of experts. The latter, obviously, portends not an inconsequential hazard for the typical private practitioner who may not have the skills and technology that are readily available at a teaching hospital or large medical center.
The intended distinction between the phrases “is viable” and “may be viable” is even more elusive. Appellants argue that no difference is intended, and that the use of the “may be viable” words k “simply incorporates the acknowledged medical fact that a fetus is 'viable’ if it has that statistical ‘chance’ of survival recognized by the medical community.” Brief for Appellants 28. The statute, however, does not support the contention that “may be viable” is synonymous with, or merely intended to explicate the meaning of, “viable.”
Section 5 (a) requires the physician to observe the prescribed standard of care if he determines “that the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable” (emphasis supplied). The syntax clearly implies that there are two distinct conditions under which the physician must conform to the standard of care. Appellants’ argument that “may be viable” is synonymous with “viable” would make either the first or the second condition redundant or largely superfluous, in violation of the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative. See United States v. Menasche, 348 TJ. S. 528, 538-539 (1955).
Furthermore, the suggestion that “may be viable” is an explication of the meaning of “viable” flies in the face of the fact that the statute, in § 2, already defines “viable.” This, presumably, was intended to be the exclusive definition of “viable” throughout the Act. In this respect, it is significant that § 6 (b) of the Act speaks only of the limited availability of abortion during the stage of a pregnancy “subsequent to viability.” The concept of viability is just as important in § 6 (b) as it is in § 5 (a). Yet in § 6 (b) the legislature found it unnecessary to explain that a “viable” fetus includes one that “may be viable.”
Since we must reject appellants’ theory that “may be viable” means “viable,” a second serious ambiguity appears in the statute. On the one hand, as appellees urge and as the District Court found, see 401 F. Supp., at 572, it may be that “may be viable” carves out a new time period during pregnancy when there is a remote possibility of fetal survival outside the womb, but the fetus has not yet attained the reasonable likelihood of survival that physicians associate with viability. On the other hand, although appellants do not argue this, it may be that “may be viable” refers to viability as physicians understand it, and “viable” refers to some undetermined stage later in pregnancy. We need not resolve this question. The crucial point is that “viable” and “may be viable” apparently refer to distinct conditions, and that one of these conditions differs in some indeterminate way from the definition of viability as set forth in Roe and in Planned Parenthood.
Because of the double ambiguity in the viability-determination requirement, this portion of the Pennsylvania statute is readily distinguishable from the requirement that an abortion must be “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health,” upheld against a vagueness challenge in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 69-72 (1971), and the requirement that a physician determine, on the basis of his “best clinical judgment/’ that an abortion is “necessary,” upheld against a vagueness attack in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 191-192. The contested provisions in those cases had been interpreted to allow the physician to make his determination in the light of all attendant circumstances — psychological and emotional as well as physical — that might be relevant to the well-being of the patient. The present statute does not afford broad discretion to the physician. Instead, it conditions potential criminal liability on confusing and ambiguous criteria. It therefore presents serious problems of notice, discriminatory application, and chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights.
B
The vagueness of the viability-determination requirement of § 5 (a) is compounded by the fact that the Act subjects the physician to potential criminal liability without regard to fault. Under § 5 (d), see n. 1, supra, a physician who fails to abide

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 号