Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners, children of deceased worker Samuel Butler, sought death benefits under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, made applicable to the District of Columbia by D.C.Code § 36-501. The Act applies
in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs; except that in applying such provisions the term “employer” shall be held to mean every person carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, and the term “employee” shall be held to mean every employee of any such person.
An administrative law judge denied the claim on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements of the Act were not met, and the Benefits Review Board, United States Department of Labor, agreed with that conclusion.
We affirm the Board’s decision. The employment situation in this case did not bear any substantial connection to the District of Columbia. Therefore petitioners’ claim falls beyond the reach of the Act. See Director, OWCP v. National Van Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 972, 979-81 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 3049, 65 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1980) (citing and quoting Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476, 67 S.Ct. 801, 805, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947) (reach of the Act is limited to cases presenting “some substantial connection between the District and the particular employee-employer relationship”)).
Samuel Butler, the deceased worker, formerly resided in the District of Columbia. He was divorced in 1968 and left the District in 1970. From 1972 until his death in 1976, he resided in California. During the period of his residence in California, he was employed as a bus driver by Continental Western Lines, a division of Trailways, Inc., a Texas corporation. Butler’s employment as a driver for Continental did not bring him within 2,000 miles of the District of Columbia. He died on the job in Canyon City, Colorado. Trailways, Inc. did not, except through corporate subsidiaries, employ anyone in the District of Columbia. Butler was not employed by Trailways or any Trailways affiliate prior to his departure from the District.
Petitioners rely upon two factors to connect their claim to the District: three subsidiaries of the Trailways corporate family operate here; Butler’s children reside in the District and are the compensation claimants. The local operations of Trailways subsidiaries could not supply a legitimate basis for District of Columbia regulation of Butler’s west coast employment situation. Butler’s work for Continental never brought him east of the Mississippi and no aspect of his employment was supervised or managed from the District. Cf. Director, OWCP v. Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (D.C.Cir. 1976) (facts relevant to application of District of Columbia law summarized in Director, OWCP v. National Van Lines, Inc., supra, 613 F.2d at 982) (District Act applied, although deceased employee resided in California, where employer’s national headquarters were in the District and employee, occasionally came here on business relating to his employment).
Turning to the District residence of the claimants in this case, we find no authority for the suggestion that employers reasonably may be subjected to the compensation laws, and the obligation to insure, in any place in which their employees may have dependent children. Petitioners’ counsel stresses the clear interest the District has in the welfare of children living here. But counsel was unable to cite any reported case in which the residence of the claimants, when it differed from the residence of the deceased employee, was the connection successfully relied upon to invoke application of a workers’ compensation statute.
In sum, we do not think the District’s Compensation Act is so pliable that it can be interpreted to reach an employment relationship as distant from the District- as the one between Continental and Samuel Butler. But even if we could fit petitioners’ claim to the terms of the statute we would hesitate to ascribe to Congress a design to sweep this case within the governance of District of Columbia law, cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892), particularly in view, of the constitutional question such an extension of the District’s law would raise. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra.
For the reasons stated herein, we find no basis for disturbing the administrative decision on review. The order of the Benefits Review Board is accordingly
Affirmed.
. At argument, petitioners’ counsel confirmed that petitioners have filed a timely claim for workers’ compensation benefits in California.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 99