Task: songer_method

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to determine the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for the case, that is, the legal history of the case, indicating whether there had been prior appellate court proceeding on the same case prior to the decision currently coded. Assume that the case had been decided by the panel for the first time if there was no indication to the contrary in the opinion. The opinion usually, but not always, explicitly indicates when a decision was made "en banc" (though the spelling of "en banc" varies). However, if more than 3 judges were listed as participating in the decision, code the decision as enbanc even if there was no explicit description of the proceeding as en banc.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge:
Before us are numerous motor carrier petitioners and certain intervenors who protest the validity of the rules for motor carrier applications promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (the Commission) in response to the Congressional enactment of The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA). The petitioners contend that the rules are invalid since they were promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because:
(i) the Commission did not comply with the notice (§ 553(b) and (d)) and comment (§ 553(c)) requirements;
(ii) although denominated as procedural, the rules are not entitled to that exemption (§ 553(b)(A)) since the rules have an adverse substantive impact on carriers and carrier applicants; and
(iii) the Commission did not have or adequately find good cause for its finding that notice and public comment were impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest (§ 553(b)(B)).
Petitioners also seem to contend that even if promulgated properly the rules substantively are invalid under the MCA. Staunchly defending its authority to make the necessary changes in its procedures to effectuate the expressed will of Congress in enacting the MCA, the Commission urges that it was empowered to issue the rules and that their promulgation meets the bounds of both the APA and the MCA. In support of its position, the Commission urges that these rules are a procedural mechanism for control of its own calendar requiring no notice and comment. In any event, the Commission maintains it had found good cause for not following the notice and comment called for by the APA. Insofar as a substantive challenge is really made, the rules, the Commission contends, were reasonable and statutorily well founded. Because we find that the Commission had good cause (see (iii) above) and the rules adequately pass substantive muster, we uphold the determination by the Commission that its rules are valid and their issuance comports with the provisions of both the APA and the MCA. This makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether these are procedural rules entitled to the § 553(b)(A) exception (see (ii) above) or the in-between variety of rules that have substantial impact on the applicants as recognized by our much criticized declaration in Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir.1979).
The Genesis of the Rules The Genesis of MCA
Looking for the Genesis of the Rules under attack is simple: they came from the MCA. The more basic inquiry is what is the Genesis of the MCA?
The MCA became effective July 1, 1980. It was the most comprehensive piece of legislation affecting the surface non-rail transportation industry since 1935. But what brought on the MCA is a mixture of a number of factors. Primarily it was the dissatisfaction of Congress — then well into its new era of deregulation — with the delays which it regarded as interminable and unreasonable in the Commission’s processes in motor carrier matters, such as: the granting or broadening of operating rights, or the elimination or addition of traditional but costly restrictions as to commodities, gateways, routes or dead backhauls. These delays were, so Congress legitimately thought, the result if not the cause of traditional practices likening many motor carrier applications to the now “Big” District Court case with applications, protests, witnesses, hearings, briefing, formal arguments, proposed reports, exceptions, briefs, rearguments, issuance of final reports, petitions for reconsideration, motions for stay and, at the end, a petition for review to either the former three-judge District Court and later to a Court of Appeals.
Added to this were the Commission’s substantive, significant changes lessening restrictions and liberalizing standards, especially for entry into the business of a certificated motor carrier.
Prior to the changes just detailed, the Commission took other serious steps to further streamline its procedures. For example, the Commission required persons seeking operating authority to submit with their applications sufficient information to support grants of such authority if those applications were not opposed. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 25), 42 Fed.Reg. 62486 (December 1, 1977). The Commission also adopted rules restricting the right of intervention in motor carrier licensing cases. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 26), 48 Fed.Reg. 50908 (November 1,1978) aff’d sub nom American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313 (D.C.Cir.1980).
As a result of these changes liberalizing entry into certificated motor carrier status, the number of motor carrier cases increased drastically. As though this flood of new cases was not enough, the Commission suffered not an inadequate increase in staff, but actually a decrease.
Despite the Commission’s serious efforts even with the insufficient employees to stem the tide, the result had to be the plague of ever-growing backlogs. Worse, the Commission’s backlog failed to disappear. Congress recognized this fact. See H.R.Rep. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2283, 2319: “To deal with [its case backlog] the Commission has made serious attempts to streamline its procedures within the confines of the present statute. However, the Commission’s backlog of cases has continued to grow.”
It was then obvious that if legislation— then in the offing — were passed making it even easier for applicants to obtain operating authority while simultaneously mandating procedural reform, the Commission would have to amend substantially its application rules to accommodate both the large number of new filings that could be expected and the new statutory time limits. Further, if such legislation were to become effective on or shortly after its enactment date, the Commission would have to revise its application procedures immediately or risk frustrating the intent of Congress that those reforms be implemented without delay.
Contemplating this eventuality, and constitutionally and organically unable to take official affirmative action prior to the passage of the legislation, the Commission did the next best thing. On June 6, 1980 it served an “Advance Warning to Prospective Applicants of Interim Application Procedures,” informing the public that if the proposed legislation were passed, interim rules and applications would be necessary and the public would have little advance notice of the change in procedures. The Commission also advised that it expected to have the necessary procedures in place and the forms available on the date the legislation became effective or shortly thereafter. 45 Fed.Reg. 39317 (June 10, 1980).
The Commission’s prescience was soon made good, for on July 1, 1980, the MCA was signed into law by the President. Immediately thereafter, on July 3, 1980, the Commission promulgated Interim Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority. These interim rules were effective upon date of their publication in the Federal Register. See Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 45534 (July 3, 1980).
Impact of MCA
The MCA revised and reduced the burden of proof on the applicant for operating authority. It eliminated altogether the traditional outset burden on the applicant to establish that issuance of the certificate was required by the public convenience and necessity. (See 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(1) (B).
By reducing the burden of proof on persons supporting an application, section 5 of the MCA makes it easier for (i) trucking companies to enter the market and (ii) existing companies to expand their operations. The new 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b) “creates a presumption that the grant of the application is consistent with the public convenience and necessity if the applicant demonstrates that the proposed service will serve a useful public purpose.” H.R.Rep. 1069, supra note 13, at 15 and 2297. Section 5 also limits which motor carriers can protest applications for operating authority, precluding all protestants but those with demonstrated and defined interests in such proceedings. See 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(7), (8).
Section 25 of the MCA makes it quite clear that the Congress deemed it “absolutely vital that the Commission be able to process these applications in a fair and expeditious manner.” See H.R.Rep. No. 1069, supra note 13, at 37-39 and 2319-20. Consequently, among the many changes enacted to accomplish this Congressional goal was the establishment of statutory deadlines for Commission action on motor carrier entry cases. See 49 U.S.C. § 10322. Section 10322 was amended to require that (i) in any case in which an oral hearing is held the Commission shall conclude evidentiary hearings within 180 days and issue an initial decision within 270 days, and even more important, (ii) in the great bulk of cases which will be handled under modified procedure (those without oral hearings), the Commission shall issue a written initial decision within 180 days. These time limitations are statutorily imposed and in extraordinary circumstances may be extended not more than 90 days.
Issuance of New Rules
Acting pursuant to the MCA and the Congressional demand for major reforms, the Commission, in keeping with its June 6, 1980 advisory alert, promulgated Interim Rules, effective on date of publication in the Federal Register. See Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 45534 (July 3, 1980). In its published notice of interim rules (see note 16 supra) the Commission made this critical statement:
These rules of practice and procedure will be'used by the Commission on an interim basis. They will apply to applications filed after the date of the Act’s effectiveness. The Commission is faced with a situation in which the due and timely required execution of the agency functions would be prevented by undertaking a rulemaking proceeding prior to the adoption of any rules. Thus, notice and comment for these interim rules are not required under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) and (B). Public comments are invited on these interim rules as a basis for final rules, however. We shall act as fast as possible in formulating final rules.
Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 45534 (July 3, 1980).
The Rules
Essentially, the interim rules govern two “procedural” areas: (a) form and content of motor carrier licensing applications and responses, and (b) the scheduled handling of such cases. Concerning the form-content of applications and responses, the interim rules provided that an application must contain all of the information upon which the applicant intended to rely in support of its proposal (“case-in-chief” format). Amendments that would change the scope of the operating authority sought in the application (“restrictive amendments”) were not permitted after the notice was published in the Federal Register.
As to the scheduled handling of licensing cases, the interim rules provided that the Commission would review an application for correctness and completeness and publish notice of the filing in the Federal Register. Persons wishing to oppose an application were to file protests within 45 days following the publication and such protests could include a request for oral hearings. Replies by the applicants to protests were due within 60 days of publication of the application in the Federal Register. In other words, an applicant had 15 days to reply to protests.
If an application was unopposed, a tentative grant would be published in the Federal Register. If an application was in fact opposed, the proceeding would be handled either on the written record alone or would be set for oral hearing.
The Final Rules
Responding to the Commission’s invitation to the public to make comments on the interim rules in preparation for final rules, many persons, including the petitioners here and certain of the intervenors, filed comments on the interim rules. After considering the comments received on the rules and its experience gained in using them for six months, the Commission issued a further decision modifying the interim rules, Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 80109 (December 3, 1980) and subsequently adopted final Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority. Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 86771 (December 31, 1980). Applications filed on or after February 9,1981, were affected by the new rules.
The final rules are substantially similar to the interim rules but contain some “minor” modifications. The modifications, according to the Commission, are to clarify the interim rules and to ease the paperwork burden on the public. Except in three particulars the relevant aspects of the interim rules, however, were retained. The final rules preclude amendments to an application after filing, rather than after publication. They eliminate the requirement that an applicant file financial information with its application. (The interim rules had prescribed that only the “fitness only” applications need not include the financial information.) The decision promulgating the final rules also specifically indicated that submission by an applicant of evidence of “operational feasibility” would not be mandatory.
Petitioners’ Attack
Petitioners protest that when the Commission published the Rules, it had neither previously given notice of proposed rules nor requested comment as required by § 553 of the APA. Further, the Commission’s reasons for obviating notice and comment requirements were “vague and unconvincing at best.”
Petitioners further argue that the changes which appeared in the final rules did not occur as a result of notice and comment efforts. And somewhat conversely they complain of the two changes in the interim rules as to which they had received no notice to comment before the final rules were promulgated. They assert that the elimination of the “financial fitness” requirement as a part of a motor carrier applicant’s case is statutorily erroneous and of such substantive importance that notice and right to comment should have been provided.
The petitioners also contend that the total elimination of the necessity for presentation by the applicant of evidence of “operational feasibility” was made without proper notice and comment. As a sort of catch all they contend that what the Commission has labeled as “interim rules” were, in fact, “final rules” in the first instance because the final rules are “substantially similar” to the interim rules. Thus, the argument continues, the lost opportunity to comment upon the interim rules prior to their issuance made the Commission’s invitation for comments hollow: by the time comments were solicited on the interim rules, the application rules were a fait accompli.
In Defense of Rules
Briefly, but vigorously, the Commission upholds the rules. First, the Commission found and had good cause for not giving notice with advance opportunity to comment. Second, the rules are procedural requiring no notice or comment. Third, the rules substantively are in keeping with both the APA and the MCA.
The Commission Had Good Cause
The critical question in determining the APA validity of the rules — save for substantive validity, discussed later — is whether the Commission had “good cause” under § 553(b)(B), see note 18 supra, for not giving notice and opportunity for public comments on its interim rules. The Commission in its Notice of Interim Rules (July 3, 1981), found
The Commission is faced with a situation in which the due and timely required execution of the agency functions would be prevented by undertaking a rulemaking proceeding prior to the adoption of any rules. Thus, notice and comment for these interim rules are not required under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) and (B).
Ex Parte No. 55, (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 45534, (July 3, 1980).
In our view, the statement regarding good cause was adequate. The procedural reforms mandated by section 25 of the MCA (see summary at note 15 supra) required that some rules be instituted in order effectively to carry out the business of the Commission. The MCA became immediately effective and provided no transition period for developing new procedures to implement the significant legislative changes. Our decision that the Commission had good cause not to follow the notice and comment requirement of the APA is based on the fact that the Commission’s promulgation of new rules was prompted by the radical revision of the Interstate Commerce Act. In its notice of interim rules and request for comments, the Commission emphasized that “the due and timely required execution of the agency functions would be prevented by undertaking a rulemaking proceeding prior to the adoption of any rules.” Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), 45 Fed.Reg. 45534 (July 3, 1981). The Commission stated in its Summary of the notice of interim rules and request for comments that the MCA had mandated several significant changes in the way motor carrier licensing proceedings were conducted, and, pursuant to those changes, it was required, among other things to alter the application forms, expedite procedures, and change entry standards.
Keen insight is not required to realize the quandary that the Commission faced. It could not issue rules before the legislation took effect. It was already bogged down with an intolerable backlog of cases. Applications pending on the effective date of the MCA were to be processed under vastly different procedures than applications filed after the new legislation took effect. Pending applications were not to be handled under the relaxed MCA entry standards, 45 Fed.Reg. 45537; instead applications on file as of the effective date of the new legislation were to be handled under existing procedures and entry standards. See Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 641 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1981) citing Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir.1979). It is obvious then that those parties with pending applications would expect the full panoply of procedural processes in effect prior to the MCA (i.e. oral hearings, restrictive amendments, duplication of application only to interested parties, and initial submission of overly broad applications).
Moreover, Congress anticipated that the new legislation with its relaxed entry standards would bring about more, not less, applications for operating authority. Obviously, regulations needed to be in place to handle this increased volume of applications. The House Committee on Public Works and Transportation predicted that “[w]ith the changes proposed by [the MCA] in [its] entry area,... a large number of new applications [would] be filed with the Commission.” H.R.Rep. No. 1069, supra note 13 at 37 and 2319. It therefore declared “it is absolutely vital that the Commission be able to process the applications in a fair and expeditious manner. This section of the bill establishes new Commission hearing and appellate procedures to govern all nonrail cases in order to meet that goal.” Id. at 37-38, 2319-20.
These two conditions (i.e., current backlog and future floodtide of cases) demonstrate the importance of the Commission having new rules in place immediately after the enactment of the MCA. Experience had proved that the existing procedures for processing applications nearly always resulted in delay. Without new interim rules, new applications filed during the period before final rules with notice and comment were promulgated would have to be considered under the old procedural rules creating even more delay. This would have frustrated Congress’ intent to reduce regulatory lag and red tape.
Furthermore, without interim rules before the final rules took effect, the Commission would have been deprived of useful knowledge and experience gained in observing how alternative procedures worked under the new MCA while considering other methods suggested by the public comments to the interim rules.
It must be remembered that the old rules would be outmoded, because the MCA brought about significant changes in both substance and procedure. There was, first, the elimination of the traditional burden of an applicant to establish present or future public convenience and necessity. Now, after establishing that it is fit, willing, and able, the applicant proves only that the proposed service “will serve a useful public service, responsive to a public demand or need.” H.R.Rep. No. 1069, supra note 13 at 14 and 2296; 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(1). What was the Commission to do with the expected flood of new entry applications? Was it to continue the use of old rules and old forms based on the traditional convenience and necessity structure? Or was it merely to mark time and do nothing until “final” final proposed rules were noticed and comment received? And what would the ordered annual Congressional Oversight Committees think of the new backlog of new applications backing up during such a 90 to 180 day period? And what would happen to the Congressionally mandated deadline of 180 days for decision in a modified application?
The answers to these queries are obvious: to make the new Act effective and to achieve the goals set by Congress, it was imperative that the Commission, in order to adapt its processes to the new order, adopt almost immediately new rules and procedures with as much notice as was practicable. This it did by issuance of interim rules with invited public input before final regulations were issued.
Fortunately, courts uphold the exercise of such practical wisdom by regulatory agencies. For example, in Council of the Southern Mountains Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court found that good cause existed for the Secretary of Labor to dispense with notice and comment due to the imminence of the deadline for implementing regulations requiring coal operators to equip all underground miners with self-contained self-rescuers (SCSR’s). Only two weeks before the final regulations were scheduled to take effect, the Secretary of Labor, without providing notice and comment, deferred implementation of the final regulations until June 21, 1981. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Secretary’s action as reasonable and with good cause. Id. at 575.
Other cases have found good cause to exist for an agency to bypass notice and comment procedures and issue final or interim regulations. See, National Federation of Federal Employees v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607 (D.C.Cir.1982) (the office of personnel management had good cause to postpone the “open season” during which federal employees were permitted to transfer freely from one health benefit plan to another and to issue interim regulations without prior notice and comment); Philadelphia Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877 (3d Cir.1982) (enactment of statute 49 days before the scheduled effective date provided the Department of Health and Human Services with good cause for avoiding notice and comment procedures in promulgating interim regulations); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir.1981) (imminent airline guide publication date justified abbreviated notice and comment processes for urgent Federal Aviation Administration regulation); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153 (D.C.Cir. 1981) (sudden need for new regulations pursuant to court injunction, where regulations provide necessary guidance to poultry industry and serious economic harm would result from absence of guidance constituted good cause); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Administration, 531 F.2d 1071, 1083 (Em. App.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976) (compelling situation justified making regulations effective immediately); Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Em.App.1975) (cost of living council had good cause to dispense with notice/comment where notice of crude oil price increases would have affected sales and deliveries adversely during a difficult period of supply); Arizona State Department of Public Welfare v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 449 F.2d 456, 481 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 945, 30 L.Ed.2d 789 (1972) (HEW had good cause to issue AFDC regulations without notice and comment because of the need to provide guidance prior to imminent hearings).
Nor do the cases pressed by petitioners compel a contrary result. They direct us to several decisions which state that section 553 of the APA should be narrowly construed. This Court has always been mindful of this admonition, United States Steel v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir.1979), and recognizes that the good cause exception “is an important safety valve to be used where delay would do real harm.” Id.
In United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.1979), we disapproved of the EPA administrator’s action in designating certain areas in the State of Alabama as nonattainment areas for suspended particulate pollution without first complying with the notice and comment requirements of the APA.
In rejecting the contention of good cause, we stated:
In short the Agency has simply failed to show strong enough reason to invoke the § 553(b)(B) exception. This exception should be read narrowly. American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, supra, 568 F.2d at 292. It is an important safety valve to be used where delay would do real harm.
* *
595 F.2d at 214 & n. 15. Although short deadlines alone are not enough, the Court made clear that the test is one of impracticability — which means analysis in practical terms of the particular statutory-agency setting and the reasons why agency action could not await notice and comment.
But the mere existence of deadlines for agency action, whether set by statute or court order, does not in itself constitute good cause for a § 553(b)(B) exception. American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 292 (CA3, 1977); Shell Oil Co. v. FEA, 527 F.2d 1243, 1248 (TECA 1975). The deadline is a factor to be considered, but the agency must still show the impracticability of affording notice and comment.
595 F.2d at 213. As an illustration of the analytical process the Court then pointed out steps or things the agency could have taken or done which it did not do which would have alleviated the shortness of time.
Here, for example, the EPA gives no explanation of why it could not at least have published the AAPCC’s initial list upon receipt and accepted comments during the time it was reviewing the list. This would have afforded petitioners some warning of the imminent designations and allowed them opportunity to influence the agency’s action.
Id.
In these steel cases (each involved the same issue but different geographic areas), the EPA was operating under a statutorily imposed deadline to promulgate lists of non-attainment areas. Without notice and pre-promulgation comments the EPA issued its final designations. Its “good cause” justification for doing so was the statutorily imposed deadline for action. We rejected this contention by observing that “[the] mere existence of deadlines for action... does not in itself constitute good cause.... ” U.S. Steel v. EPA, 595 F.2d at 213. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in State of New Jersey v. EPA, supra, followed ours; and the Third Circuit’s decision in Sharon Steel v. EPA, supra, preceded ours by a few days. Contra United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.1979) and Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 621 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.1980). The courts there stated that a statutorily imposed deadline represents good cause. E.g., United States Steel v. EPA, 605 F.2d at 287 (“[t]he ‘good cause’ exception may be utilized to comply with the rigors of a tight statutory schedule”), citing Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir.1972), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. National Cable Television Assn, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974).
These steel cases and other supporting cases are unlike our situation here. In enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress recognized the importance of making sure that “the air Americans breathe be clean,” State of New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1040, and directed the EPA to set air quality standards lest the “non-attainment of air quality standards in a wide and densely populated region... result in a phenomenal health impact, measured in terms of millions of days of aggravated disease, asthma attacks and lower respiratory disease episodes.” Id. citing H.R.Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 209, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code and Cong. & Ad.News 1077, 1288. Indeed, the regions which were designated “non-attainment” would face more stringent measures than those not so designated.
The states relied on the agency’s designations in preparing their several plans to submit to the EPA to meet air quality standards imposed by the Clean Air Act. The EPA was vested with power to approve or disapprove of the state’s plans. If a state’s plan was rejected, then the statute forbade the construction or modification of any facility in the area “when the emissions from such facility will cause or contribute to concentrations of any pollutant for which [an air quality standard] is exceeded.” 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (Supp. I 1977).
The statute set a deadline in which the EPA was to submit its list of designations for the benefit of the states in preparing their plans. Even after missing the statutory deadline by a full month, the EPA never solicited comments from the business public affected by the designations, which would have obvious and enormous substantive impact on the states and private industry.
An even greater distinction of the steel cases from our case is that the EPA never promulgated “proposed” designations nor solicited comments on the feasibility of the “proposed” designations as final designations. That this fact was significant is evidenced by our opinion: “The same guidance that was accomplished by the EPA's procedures could have been accomplished by issuing a proposed list... followed by final promulgation after notice and comment.” 595 F.2d at 214. In remanding, we specifically directed the EPA to give notice of the proposed designations and solicit comments before promulgating its final rules. Id. at 215. In State of New Jersey, supra, the D.C. Circuit agreed: “The Administrator could have reconciled the commands of the two acts [the APA and the Clean Air Act] by publishing the designations submitted to him by the states as proposed rules.” 626 F.2d at 1047 (emphasis added). In Sharon Steel, the Third Circuit concurred that this solution would have been an acceptable remedial measure. 597 F.2d at 380.
Finally, National Nutritional Foods Association v. Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1978), and American Iron and Steel Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.1977), are distinguishable from this case. In National Nutritional Foods, the Food and Drug Administration had published final substantive rules without any effort whatsoever to solicit comment on them. The FDA Commissioner unilaterally decided to ignore notice and comment procedures because he had determined that the public had “nothing more... to say” since Congress had spoken in a contemporaneous legislative enactment. Id. at 385.
That case involved the sustained efforts of the FDA to achieve better control of the identity and labeling of vitamins and mineral preparations. The regulations had been in the making for over fourteen years inside the FDA and had seen considerable legislative struggle. Thus, Judge Friendly, with considerable restraint, concluded “there was no basis for the Commissioner [to] believe that the public would not be ‘particularly interested’ in his next move.” Id.
Unlike that case, the Commission here expressly recognized that it would benefit from public comments on its proposed interim rules. It solicited comments on the proposed interim rules to be received before it promulgated its final rules.
In American Iron and Steel Institute, supra, the EPA had promulgated “interim final ” substantive regulations without providing opportunity for comment on substantial revisions from the proposed rules. The EPA merely indicated that it would consider petitions for reconsideration of permits issued under those regulations if the “final” regulations were substantially different. It is thus unlike our case where the Commission specifically requested comment on the proposed rules without regard to whether or not they would differ from the final rules. The Commission thus pointedly sought the input of the public before it promulgated the final rules.
The upshot is that, supported by adequate precedent and not inhibited by controlling precedent to the contrary, the Commission could properly find that there was good cause for finding that giving notice with opportunity to comment before the issuance of the interim rules was “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” § 553(b)(B).
Substantive Attack on the Rules
Although it is likely that several of the petitioners’ attacks on some specific rules are centered on the contention that they were really not exempt from the APA’s procedural rules because of the Brown adverse impact, we address each of the contentions as though each was a claim that substantively the rule was invalid. As near as we can discern, the attacks are directed at:
the case in chief format,
(ii) the elimination of restrictive amendments,
(iii) the restricted use of oral hearings in the application process,
(iv) the requirement that an applicant furnish copies of its complete application to anyone who requests it,
(v) the allocation of time between the parties to prepare and to present their case and the Commission to render its decision as exalting agency convenience above the parties’ need for adequate case preparation time in violation of § 554(b), and
(vi) the deletion of “financial fitness” and “operational feasibility” from the final rules as substantially improper and, in any event, made without proper notice.
As our review concluded that the manner of promulgation of the rules satisfies the APA, we must next determine the standard for review of the substantive validity of the rules.
We start with the decisive fact that authority to promulgate regulations was expressly conferred on the Commission. Courts have traditionally recognized that “When an agency exercises authority expressly delegated to it by Congress it is at the zenith of its powers. Its regulations are entitled to ‘more than mere deference or weight.’ ” American Tracking Association, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d at 1320 (D.C. Cir.1980) quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 at 426, 97 S.Ct. 2399 at 2406, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 at 457 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 at 16, 85 S.Ct. 792 at 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 at 625 (1965).
As a consequence, the scope of our review of the agency action in adopting these final rules is constricted. We are empowered to set aside the final application rules only if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); see also 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 7:8-7:12 (2d ed. 1979). Because our role is a limited one, we have held elsewhere that our review of agency action is “not to be exercised with the zeal of a pendantic schoolmaster who grades papers for a single correct answer, but with the respect that is due responsible and experienced government officials themselves charged with duties of national importance.” Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc pending).
We must now address the specific attacks on the substantive validity of the rules.
(i) Case in Chief Format
The protestants first challenge the validity of the case in chief format.
The new application rules require applicants to file their complete evidentiary cases with their applications for new authority. Such a filing is done before the identity or interest of opposing carriers is known. This new approach is known as the “case-in-chief” method. Its adoption represents a marked departure from the Commission’s former procedures for filing an application prior to the interim rules.
Under the old procedure, an applicant was not required to submit its initial evidence in any contested case prior to knowing the identity and interest of those in opposition. Hence, an applicant could prepare and present its evidence to meet the issues raised by the opposition. The casein-chief filing methodology eliminates or reduces this opportunity. The petitioners argue that since under the new rule an applicant cannot adduce any new evidence in its reply statement, it can never prepare and present evidence bearing upon its opposition beyond that which reb

Question: What is the nature of the proceeding in the court of appeals for this case?
A. decided by panel for first time (no indication of re-hearing or remand)
B. decided by panel after re-hearing (second time this case has been heard by this same panel)
C. decided by panel after remand from Supreme Court
D. decided by court en banc, after single panel decision
E. decided by court en banc, after multiple panel decisions
F. decided by court en banc, no prior panel decisions
G. decided by panel after remand to lower court
H. other
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A