Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, commenced as a petition for an order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (Arbitration Act or Act), 9 U. S. C. §4, presents the question whether, in light of the policies of the Act and of our decisions in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), and Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978), the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina properly stayed this diversity action pending resolution of a concurrent state-court suit. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the stay. 656 F. 2d 933, rehearing denied, 664 F. 2d 936 (1981). We granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 937 (1982). We affirm.
I
Petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Hospital) is located in Greensboro, N. C. Respondent Mercury Construction Corp. (Mercury), a construction contractor, has its principal place of business in Alabama. In July 1975, Mercury and the Hospital entered into a contract for the construction of additions to the Hospital building. The contract, drafted by representatives of the Hospital, included provisions for resolving disputes arising out of the contract or its breach. All disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the construction work were to be referred in the first instance to J. N. Pease Associates (Architect), an independent architectural firm hired by the Hospital to design and oversee the construction project. With certain stated exceptions, any dispute decided by the Architect (or not decided by it within a stated time) could be submitted by either party to binding arbitration under a broad arbitration clause in the contract:
“All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof,... shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.” App. 29-30.
The contract also specified the time limits for arbitration demands.
Construction on the project began in July 1975. Performance was to be completed by October 1979. In fact, construction was substantially completed in February 1979, and final inspections were made that June.
• At a meeting in October 1977 (during construction), attended by representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the Architect, Mercury agreed, at the Architect’s request, to withhold its claims for delay and impact costs (i. e., claims for extended overhead or increase in construction costs due to delay or inaction by the Hospital) until the work was substantially completed. On this record, the Hospital does not contest the existence of this agreement, although it asserts that the Architect lacked authority to agree to a delay in presentation of claims or to entertain claims after the contract work was completed.
In January 1980, Mercury submitted to the Architect its claims for delay and impact costs. Mercury and the Architect discussed the claims over several months, substantially reducing the amount of the claims. According to the Hospital, it first learned of the existence of Mercury’s claims in April 1980; its lawyers assumed active participation in the claim procedure in May. The parties differ in their characterizations of the events of the next few months — whether there were “ongoing negotiations,” or merely an “investigation” by the Hospital. In any event, it appears from the record that lawyers for the Hospital requested additional information concerning Mercury’s claims. As a result, on August 12, 1980, Mercury gave a detailed presentation of its claims at a meeting attended by Mercury’s representatives and lawyers, the Hospital’s representatives and lawyers, and representatives of the Architect. Mercury agreed to send copies of its files to an expert hired by the Hospital, and the parties agreed to meet again on October 13.
On October 6, Mercury’s counsel telephoned the Hospital’s counsel to confirm that the scheduled meeting would go forward. The Hospital’s counsel said he would call back the next day. When he did, he informed Mercury’s counsel that the Hospital would pay nothing on Mercury’s claim. He also said that the Hospital intended to file a declaratory judgment action in North Carolina state court.
True to its word, the Hospital filed an action on the morning of October 8 in the Superior Court of Guilford County, N. C., naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants. The complaint alleged that Mercury’s claim was without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the statute of limitations. It alleged that Mercury had lost any right to arbitration under the contract due to waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for arbitration. The complaint also alleged various delinquencies on the part of the Architect. As relief, the Hospital sought a declaration that there was no right to arbitration; a stay of arbitration; a declaration that the Hospital bore no liability to Mercury; and a declaration that if the Hospital, should be found liable in any respect to Mercury, it would be entitled to indemnity from the Architect. The complaint was served on Mercury on October 9. On that same day, Mercury’s counsel mailed a demand for arbitration.
On October 15, without notice to Mercury, the Hospital obtained an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding Mercury to take any steps directed toward arbitration. Mercury objected, and the stay was dissolved on October 27. As soon as the stay was lifted, Mercury filed the present action in the District Court, seeking an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 4. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. On the Hospital’s motion, the District Court stayed Mercury’s federal-court suit pending resolution of the state-court suit because the two suits involved the identical issue of the arbitrability of Mercury’s claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38.
Mercury sought review of the District Court’s stay by both a notice of appeal and a petition for mandamus. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard argument in the case, but before the panel issued any decision, the court informed the parties that it would consider the case en banc. After reargument, the en banc court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. It reversed the District Court’s stay order and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions for entry of an order to arbitrate.
II
Before we address the propriety of the District Judge’s stay order, we must first decide whether that order was ap-pealable to the Court of Appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
Mercury sought appellate review through two alternative routes — a notice of appeal under § 1291, and a petition for mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Mercury expressly stated that its appeal was based only on § 1291, and not on 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (relating to interlocutory appeals). The Hospital contends that the order appealed from was not a “final decisio[n]” within § 1291. We disagree and hold that the stay order was final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 (1962), is instructive in this regard. There the plaintiff brought a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. The District Judge declined to convene a three-judge court and stayed the federal suit under the Pullman abstention doctrine. We held that the District Court’s action was final and therefore reviewable by the Court of Appeals, stating:
“The Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument that the order of the District Court ‘was not final and hence unappealable under 28 U. S. C. §§1291, 1292,’ pointing out that ‘[ajppellant was effectively out of court.’” 370 U. S., at 715, n. 2.
Here, the argument for finality of the District Court’s order is even clearer. A district court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds. Here, by contrast, the District Court predicated its stay order on its conclusion that the federal and state actions involved “the identical issue of arbitrability of the claims of Mercury Construction Corp. against the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-38. That issue of arbitrability was the only substantive issue present in the federal suit. Hence, a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the state suit meant that there would be no further litigation in the federal forum; the state court’s judgment on the issue would be res judicata. Thus, here, even more surely than in Idlewild, Mercury was “effectively out of court.” Hence, as the Court of Appeals held, this stay order amounts to a dismissal of the suit.
In any event, if the District Court order were not final for appealability purposes, it would nevertheless be appealable within the exception to the finality rule under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). The factors required to show finality under this exception have been summarized as follows:
“To come within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted).
There can be no dispute that this order meets the second and third of these criteria. An order that amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an important issue separate from the merits. For the same reason, this order would be entirely unreviewable if not appealed now. Once the state court decided the issue of arbitrability, the federal court would be bound to honor that determination as res judicata.
The Hospital contends nevertheless that the District Court’s stay order did not meet the first of the criteria, namely that it “conclusively determine the disputed question.” But this is true only in the technical sense that every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge. In this case, however, there is no basis to suppose that the District Judge contemplated any reconsideration of his decision to defer to the parallel state-court suit. He surely would not have made that decision in the first instance unless he had expected the state court to resolve all relevant issues adequately. See Part IV-E, infra. It is not clear why the judge chose to stay the case rather than to dismiss it outright; for all that the record shows, there was no reason other than the form of the Hospital’s motion. Whatever the reason, however, the practical effect of his order was entirely the same for present purposes, and the order was appealable.
hH I — I
We turn now to the principal issue to be addressed, namely, the propriety of the District Court’s decision to stay this federal suit out of deference to the parallel litigation brought in state court. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), provides persuasive guidance in deciding this question.
A
Colorado River involved the effect of the McCarran Amendment, 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666, on the existence and exercise of federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal water rights, 28 U. S. C. § 1345. The Amendment waives the Government’s sovereign immunity to permit the joinder of the United States in some state-court suits for the adjudication of water rights. In Colorado River, however, the Government proceeded in Federal District Court, bringing suit against some 1,000 nonfederal water users, seeking a declaration of the water rights of certain federal entities and Indian tribes. Shortly thereafter, a defendant in that suit sought to join the United States in a state-court proceeding for the comprehensive adjudication and administration of all water rights within the river system that was the subject of the federal-court suit. The District Court dismissed the federal suit, holding that the abstention doctrine required deference to the state-court proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the suit of the United States was within the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1345 and that abstention was inappropriate. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court dismissing the complaint.
We began our analysis by examining the abstention doctrine in its various forms. We noted:
“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. ‘The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.’ ”
After canvassing the three categories of abstention, we concluded that none of them applied to the case at hand. 424 U. S., at 813-817.
Nevertheless, we held that the District Court’s dismissal was proper on another ground — one resting not on considerations of state-federal comity or on avoidance of constitutional decisions, as does abstention, but on “considerations of ‘[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” We noted that “‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction,”’ and that the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” We continued:
“Given this obligation, and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention. The former circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless exist.” Id., at 818.
We declined to prescribe a hard-and-fast rule for dismissals of this type, but instead described some of the factors relevant to the decision.
“It has been held, for example, that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.... In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal in the event of an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, a federal court may also consider such factors as the inconvenience of the federal forum; the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determinative; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors counselling against that exercise is required. Only the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.” Id., at 818-819 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
As this passage makes clear, the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel state-court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. The weight to be given to any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of the case. Colorado River itself illustrates this principle in operation. By far the most important factor in our decision to approve the dismissal there was the “clear federal policy... [of] avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system,” id., at 819, as evinced in the McCarran Amendment. We recognized that the Amendment represents Congress’ judgment that the field of water rights is one peculiarly appropriate for comprehensive treatment in the forums having the greatest experience and expertise, assisted by state administrative officers acting under the state courts. Id., at 819-820. In addition, we noted that other factors in the case tended to support dismissal— the absence of any substantial progress in the federal-court litigation; the presence in the suit of extensive rights governed by state law; the geographical inconvenience of the federal forum; and the Government’s previous willingness to litigate similar suits in state court. Id., at 820.
B
Before discussing the application of Colorado River’s, exceptional-circumstances test, we must address the Hospital’s argument that that test was undermined by our subsequent decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U. S. 655 (1978). We find no merit in this argument for at least two reasons.
The Hospital relies on the opinion of Justice Rehnquist, announcing the judgment of the Court. The Hospital argues that Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, if not expressly overruling Colorado River, at least modifies its holding substantially. But it is clear that a majority of the Court reaffirmed the Colorado River test in Calvert. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion commanded only four votes. It was opposed by the dissenting opinion, in which four Justices concluded that the Calvert District Court’s stay was impermissible under Colorado River. 437 U. S., at 668-669, 672-674 (Brennan, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Marshall and Powell, JJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment, agreed with the dissent that Colorado River’s, exceptional-circumstances test was controlling; he voted to remand to permit the District Court to apply the Colorado River factors in the first instance. 437 U. S., at 667-668. On remand, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the four dissenting Justices and Justice Blackmun formed a majority to require application of the Colorado River test. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Will, 586 F. 2d 12 (CA7 1978).
Even on the basis of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, however, there is an obvious distinction between Calvert and this case. The key to Calvert was the standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1651. As Justice Rehnquist stressed, such extraordinary writs are used in aid of appellate jurisdiction only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed authority, or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. The movant must show that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable. 437 U. S., at 661-662, 664, 665-666 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Justice Rehnquist concluded that the movant in Calvert had failed to meet this burden. At the same time, he noted that the movant might have succeeded on a proper appeal. Id., at 665. In this case we have held that the Court of Appeals did have appellate jurisdiction; it properly exercised that jurisdiction to find that the District Court’s stay was impermissible under Colorado River.
The Hospital further contends that Calvert requires reversal here because the opinions of Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun require greater deference to the discretion of the District Court than was given by the Court of Appeals in this case. Under both Calvert and Colorado River, of course, the decision whether to defer to the state courts is necessarily left to the discretion of the district court in the first instance. Yet to say that the district court has discretion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed by this Court. In this case, the relevant standard is Colorado River’s exceptional-circumstances test, as elucidated by the factors discussed in that case. As we shall now explain, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court in this case abused its discretion in granting the stay.
HH <
Applying the Colorado River factors to this case, it is clear that there was no showing of the requisite exceptional circumstances to justify the District Court’s stay.
The Hospital concedes that the first two factors mentioned in Colorado River are not present here. There was no assumption by either court of jurisdiction over any res or property, nor is there any contention that the federal forum was any less convenient to the parties than the state forum. The remaining factors — avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums — far from supporting the stay, actually counsel against it.
A
There is no force here to the consideration that was paramount in Colorado River itself — the danger of piecemeal litigation.
The Hospital points out that it has two substantive disputes here — one with Mercury, concerning Mercury’s claim for delay and impact costs, and the other with the Architect, concerning the Hospital’s claim for indemnity for any liability it may have to Mercury. The latter dispute cannot be sent to arbitration without the Architect’s consent, since there is no arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Architect. It is true, therefore, that if Mercury obtains an arbitration order for its dispute, the Hospital will be forced to resolve these related disputes in different forums. That misfortune, however, is not the result of any choice between the federal and state courts; it occurs because the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement. Under the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement. If the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is arbitrable under the Act, then the Hospital’s two disputes will be resolved separately — one in arbitration, and the other (if at all) in state-court litigation. Conversely, if the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is not arbitrable, then both disputes will be resolved in state court. But neither of those two outcomes depends at all on which court decides the question of arbitrability. Hence, a decision to allow that issue to be decided in federal rather than state court does not cause piecemeal resolution of the parties’ underlying disputes. Although the Hospital will have to litigate the arbitrability issue in federal rather than state court, that dispute is easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.
B
The order in which the concurrent tribunals obtained and exercised jurisdiction cuts against, not for, the District Court’s stay in this case. The Hospital argues that the stay was proper because the state-court suit was filed some 19 days before the federal suit. In the first place, this argument disregards the obvious reason for the Hospital’s priority in filing. An indispensable element of Mercury’s cause of action under § 4 for an arbitration order is the Hospital’s refusal to arbitrate. See n. 27, infra. That refusal did not occur until less than a day before the Hospital filed its state suit. Hence, Mercury simply had no reasonable opportunity to file its §4 petition first. Moreover, the Hospital succeeded in obtaining an ex parte injunction from the state court forbidding Mercury to take any steps to secure arbitration. Mercury filed its §4 petition the same day that the injunction was dissolved.
That aside, the

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 认