Task: sc_adminaction

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its applicability to electoral changes and annexations made by the city of Rome, Ga.
I
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by appellant city of Rome, a municipality in northwestern Georgia, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seg. In 1970 the city had a population of 30,759, the racial composition of which was 76.6% white and 23.4% Negro. The voting-age population in 1970 was 79.4% white and 20.6% Negro.
The governmental structure of the city is established by a charter enacted in 1918 by the General Assembly of Georgia. Before the amendments at issue in this case, Rome’s city charter provided for a nine-member City Commission and a five-member Board of Education to be elected concurrently on an at-large basis by a plurality of the vote. The city was divided into nine wards, with one city commissioner from each ward to be chosen in the citywide election. There was no residency requirement for Board of Education candidates.
In 1966, the General Assembly of Georgia passed several laws of local application that extensively amended the electoral provisions of the city’s charter. These enactments altered the Rome electoral scheme in the following ways:
(1) the number of wards was reduced from nine to three;
(2) each of the nine commissioners would henceforth be elected at-large to one of three numbered posts established within each ward;
(3) each commissioner would be elected by majority rather than plurality vote, and if no candidate for a particular position received a majority, a runoff election would be held between the two candidates who had received the largest number of votes;
(4) the terms of the three commissioners from each ward would be staggered ;
(5) the Board of Education was expanded from five to six members;
(6) each Board member would be elected at large, by majority vote, for one of two numbered posts created in each of the three wards, with runoff procedures identical to those applicable to City Commission elections;
(7) Board members would be required to reside in the wards from which they were elected;
(8) the terms of the two members from each ward would be staggered.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires pre-clearance by the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of any change in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting,” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, made after November 1, 1964, by jurisdictions that fall within the coverage formula set forth in § 4 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b). In 1965, the Attorney General designated Georgia a covered jurisdiction under the Act, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897, and the municipalities of that State must therefore comply with the preclearance procedure, United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110 (1978).
It is not disputed that the 1966 changes in Rome’s electoral system were within the purview of the Act. E. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). Nonetheless, the city failed to seek preclearance for them. In addition, the city did not seek preclearance for 60 annexations made between November 1, 1964, and February 10, 1975, even though required to do so because an annexation constitutes a change in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” under the Act, Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971).
In June 1974, the city did submit one annexation to the Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General discovered that other annexations had occurred, and, in response to his inquiries, the city submitted all the annexations and the 1966 electoral changes for preclearance. The Attorney General declined to preclear the provisions for majority vote, numbered posts, and staggered terms for City Commission and Board of Education elections, as well as the residency requirement for Board elections. He concluded that in a city such as Rome, in which the population is predominately white and racial bloc voting has been common, these electoral changes would deprive Negro voters of the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The Attorney General also refused to preclear 13 of the 60 annexations in question. He found that the disapproved annexations either contained predominately white populations of significant size or were near predominately white areas and were zoned for residential subdivision development. Considering these factors in light of Rome’s at-large electoral scheme and history of racial bloc voting, he determined that the city had not carried its burden of proving that the annexations would not dilute the Negro vote.
In response to the city’s motion for reconsideration, the Attorney General agreed to clear the 13 annexations for School Board elections. He reasoned that his disapproval of the 1966 voting changes had resurrected the pre-existing electoral scheme and that the revivified scheme passed muster under the Act. At the same time, he refused to clear the annexations for City Commission elections because, in his view, the residency requirement for City Commission contained in the preexisting electoral procedures could have a discriminatory effect.
The city and two of its officials then filed this action, seeking relief from the Act based on a variety of claims. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973b (a) and 1973c, rejected the city’s arguments and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 472 F. Supp. 221 (DC, 1979). We noted probable jurisdiction, 443 U. S. 914 (1979), and now affirm.
II
We must first address the appellants’ assertion that, for two reasons, this Court may avoid reaching the merits of this action.
A
The appellants contend that the city may exempt itself from the coverage of the Act. To evaluate this argument, we must examine the provisions of the Act in some detail.
Section 5 of the Act requires that a covered jurisdiction that wishes to enact any “standard, practice,, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964/’ must seek preclearance from the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Section 4 (a) of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (a), provides that the preclearance requirement of § 5 is applicable to “any State” that the Attorney General has determined qualifies under the coverage formula of § 4 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (b), and to “any political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit.” As we have noted, the city of Rome comes within the preclearance requirement because it is a political unit in a covered jurisdiction, the State of Georgia. United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110 (1978).
Section 4 (a) also provides, however, a procedure for exemption from the Act. This so-called “bailout” provision allows a covered jurisdiction to escape the preclearance requirement of § 5 by bringing a declaratory judgment action before a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and proving that no “test or device” has been used in the jurisdiction “during the seventeen years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” The District Court refused to allow the city to “bail out” of the Act’s coverage, holding that the political units of a covered jurisdiction cannot independently bring a § 4 (a) bailout action. We agree.
In the terms of § 4 (a), the issue turns on whether the city is, for bailout purposes, either a “State with respect to which the determinations have been made under the third sentence of subsection (b) of this section” or a “political subdivision with respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate unit,” the “determinations” in each instance being the Attorney General’s decision whether the jurisdiction falls within the coverage formula of § 4 (b). On the face of the statute, the city fails to meet the definition for either term, since the coverage formula of § 4 (b) has never been applied to it. Rather, the city comes within the Act because it is part of a covered State. Under the plain language of the statute, then, it appears that any bailout action to exempt the city must be filed by, and seek to exempt all of, the State of Georgia.
The appellants seek to avoid this conclusion by relying on our decision in United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., supra. That decision, however, did not even discuss the bailout process. In Sheffield, the Court held that when the Attorney General determines that a State falls within the coverage formula of § 4 (b), any political unit of the State must preclear new voting procedures under § 5 regardless of whether the unit registers voters and therefore would otherwise come within the Act as a “political subdivision.” In so holding, the Court necessarily determined that the scope of §§ 4 (a) and 5 is “geographic” or “territorial,” 435 U. S., at 120, 126, and thus that, when an entire State is covered, it is irrelevant whether political units of it might otherwise come under § 5 as “political subdivisions.” 435 U. S., at 126-129.
Sheffield, then, did not hold that cities such as Rome are “political subdivisions” under §§ 4 and 5. Thus, our decision in that case is in no way inconsistent with our conclusion that, under the express statutory language, the city is not a “political subdivision” for purposes of § 4 (a) “bailout.”
Nor did Sheffield suggest that a municipality in a covered State is itself a “State” for purposes of the § 4 (a) exemption procedure. Sheffield held that, based on the structure and purposes of the Act, the legislative history, and the contemporaneous interpretation of the Attorney General, the ambiguities of §§ 4 (a) and 5 should be resolved by holding that § 5’s preclearance requirement for electoral changes by a covered “State” reached all such changes made by political units in that State. See 435 U. S., at 117-118. By contrast, in this ease the legislative history precludes any argument that § 4 (a)’s bailout procedure, made available to a covered “State,” was also implicitly made available to political units in the State. The House Commitee Report stated:
“This opportunity to obtain exemption is afforded only to those States or to those subdivisions as to which the formula has been determined to apply as a separate unit; subdivisions within a State which is covered by the formula are not afforded the opportunity for separate exemption.” H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965).
The Senate Committee's majority Report is to the same effect:
“We are also of the view that an entire State covered by the test and device prohibition of section 4 must be able to lift the prohibition if any part of it is to be relieved from the requirements of section 4.” S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 16 (1965).
See also id., at 21. Bound by this unambiguous congressional intent, we hold that the city of Rome may not use the bailout procedure of § 4 (a).
B
The appellants next argue that its electoral changes have been precleared because of allegedly tardy action by the Attorney General. On May 21, 1976, the city asked the Attorney General to reconsider his refusal to preclear the electoral changes and the 13 annexations. On July 13, 1976, upon its own accord, the city submitted two additional affidavits. The Attorney General denied the motion to reconsider on August 12, 1976.
Section 5 of the Act provides that the Attorney General must interpose objections to original submissions within 60 days of their filing. If the Attorney General fails to make a timely objection, the voting practices submitted become fully enforceable. By regulation, the Attorney General has provided that requests for reconsideration shall also be decided within 60 days of their receipt. 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) (1979). If in the present case the 60-day period for reconsideration is computed as running continuously from May 24, the date of the initial submission of the reconsideration motion, the period expired before the Attorney General made his August 12 response. In contrast, if the period is measured from July 14, the date the city supplemented its. request, the Attorney General’s response was timely.
The timing provisions of both the Act and the regulations are silent on the effect of supplements to requests for reconsideration. We agree with the Attorney General that the purposes of the Act and its implementing regulations would be furthered if the 60-day period provided by 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) were interpreted to commence anew when additional information is supplied by the submitting jurisdiction on its own accord.
The logic of Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973), indicates that the Government’s approach fully comports with the Act and regulations. In that case, the Court examined a regulation of the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 51.18 (a), that provided that § 5’s mandatory 60-day period for consideration of original submissions is tolled whenever the Attorney General finds it necessary to request additional information from the submitting jurisdiction. Under the regulation, the 60-day period commences anew when the jurisdiction in question furnishes the requested information to the Attorney General. The Court upheld the regulation, holding that it was “wholly reasonable and consistent with the Act.” 411 U. S., at 541.
Georgia v. United States stands for the proposition that the purposes of the Act are furthered if, once all information relevant to a submission is placed before the Attorney General, the Attorney General is accorded the full 60-day period provided by law in which to make his “difficult and complex” decision, id., at 540. It follows, then, that when the submitting jurisdiction deems its initial submission on a reconsideration motion to be inadequate and decides to supplement it, as the city of Rome did in the present case, the 60-day period under 28 CFR § 51.3 (d) is commenced anew. A contrary ruling would mean that the Attorney General would, in some cases, be unable to give adequate consideration to materials submitted in piecemeal fashion. In such circumstances, the Attorney General might be able to respond only by denying the reconsideration motion. Such a result would run counter to the purposes of the Act and regulations, since it would penalize submitting jurisdictions that have legitimate reasons to file supplementary materials.
Ill
The appellants raise five issues of law in support of their contention that the Act may not properly be applied to the electoral changes and annexations disapproved by the Attorney General.
A
The District Court found that the disapproved electoral changes and annexations had not been made for any discriminatory purpose, but did have a discriminatory effect. The appellants argue that § 5 of the Act may not be read as prohibiting voting practices that have only a discriminatory effect. The appellants do not dispute that the plain language of § 5 commands that the Attorney General may clear a practice only if it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (emphasis added). By describing the elements of discriminatory purpose and effect in the conjunctive, Congress plainly intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and effect are absent. Our decisions have consistently interpreted § 5 in this fashion. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 372 (1975); Georgia v. United States, supra, at 538; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 387, 388 (1971). Furthermore, Congress recognized that the Act prohibited both discriminatory purpose and effect when, in 1975, it extended the Act for another seven years. S. Rep. No. 94 — 295, pp. 15-16 (1975) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep. No. 94^196, pp. 8-9 (1975) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).
The appellants urge that we abandon this settled interpretation because in their view § 5, to the extent that it prohibits voting changes that have only a discriminatory effect, is unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and congressional intent are plain, however, we are required to reject the appellants’ suggestion that we engage in a saving construction and avoid the constitutional issues they raise. See, e. g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 499-501 (1979); id., at 508-511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, we now turn to their constitutional contentions.
B
Congress passed the Act under the authority accorded it by the Fifteenth Amendment. The appellants contend that the Act is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’ power to enforce that Amendment. They claim that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination in voting, and that in- enforcing that provision pursuant to § 2, Congress may not prohibit voting practices lacking discriminatory intent even if they are discriminatory in effect. We hold that, even if § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in effect.
The appellants are asking us to do nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The Court in that case observed that, after making an extensive investigation, Congress had determined that its earlier attempts to remedy the “insidious and pervasive evil” of racial discrimination in voting had failed because of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution” in some parts of this country. Id., at 309. Case-by-case adjudication had proved too ponderous a method to remedy voting discrimination, and, when it had produced favorable results, affected jurisdictions often “merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees.” Id., at 314. In response to its determination that “sterner and more elaborate measures” were necessary, id., at 309, Congress adopted the Act, a “complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,” id., at 315.
The Court then turned to the question whether the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress to impose the rigors of the Act upon the covered jurisdictions. The Court examined the interplay between the judicial remedy created by § 1 of the Amendment and the legislative authority conferred by §2:
“By adding this authorization [in §2], the Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in § 1. 'It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress, is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil War]. amendments fully effective.’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345. Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.” 383 U. S., at 325-326 (emphasis in original).
Congress' authority under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, we held, was no less broad than its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). This authority, as applied by longstanding precedent to congressional enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, is defined in these terms:
“ 'Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the [Civil War] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.’ Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. [339,] 345-346.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 327.
Applying this standard, the Court held that the coverage formula of § 4 (b), the ban on the use of literacy tests and related devices, the requirement that new voting rules must be precleared and must lack both discriminatory purpose and effect, and the use of federal examiners were all appropriate methods for Congress to use to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 383 U. S., at 329-337.
The Court’s treatment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach of the Act’s ban on literacy tests demonstrates that, under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices that have only a discriminatory effect. The Court had earlier held in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959), that the use of a literacy test that was fair on its face and was not employed in a discriminatory fashion did not violate § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. In upholding the Act’s per se ban on such tests in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court found no reason to overrule Lassiter. Instead, the Court recognized that the prohibition was an appropriate method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment because for many years most of the covered jurisdictions had imposed such tests to effect voting discrimination and the continued use of even nondiscriminatory, fairly administered literacy tests would “freeze the effect” of past discrimination by allowing white illiterates to remain on the voting rolls while excluding illiterate Negroes. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 334. This holding makes clear that Congress may, under the authority of § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative of § 1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
Other decisions of this Court also recognize Congress’ broad power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), the Court held that legislation enacted under authority of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld so long as the Court could find that the enactment “ ‘is plainly adapted to [the] end’ ” of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and “is not prohibited by but is consistent with ‘the letter and spirit of the constitution,’ ” regardless of whether the practices outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S., at 651 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, at 421). The Court stated that, “[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 651. Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), the Court unanimously upheld a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, imposing a 5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar requirements for registering to vote in state and federal elections. The Court concluded that Congress could rationally have determined that these provisions were appropriate methods of attacking the perpetuation of earlier, purposeful racial discrimination, regardless of whether the practices they prohibited were discriminatory only in effect. See 400 U. S., at 132-133 (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 144^147 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216-217 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 231-236 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); id., at 282-284 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.).
It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are “appropriate,” as that term is defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880). In the present case, we hold that the Act’s ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335; Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 216 (opinion of Harlan,- J.). We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress’ considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing States from “‘undo[ing] or defeating] the rights recently won’ by Negroes.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S., at 140 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-397, p. 8 (1969)).
C
The appellants next assert that, even if the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act, that legislation violates principles of federalism articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). This contention necessarily supposes that National League of Cities signifies a retreat from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, where we rejected the argument that the Act “exceed [s] the powers of Congress and encroach [es] on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution,” 383 U. S., at 323, and determined that, “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting,” id., at 324. To the contrary, we find no inconsistency between these decisions.
In National League of Cities, the Court held that federal legislation regulating minimum wages and hours could not constitutionally be extended to employees of state and local governments. The Court determined that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress the authority to enact legislation “directly displacing] the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,” 426 U. S., at 852, which, it held, included employer-employee relationships in programs traditionally conducted by States, id., at 851-852.
The decision in National League of Cities was based solely on an assessment of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and we explicitly reserved the question “whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 852, n. 17. The answer to this question came four days later in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). That case presented the issue whether, in spite of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress had the authority to bring the States as employers within the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg., and to provide that successful plaintiffs could recover retroactive monetary relief. The Court held that this extension of Title VII was an appropriate method of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies,... are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 'by appropriate legislation’ the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra, at 456.
We agree with the court below that Fitzpatrick stands for the proposition that principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments “by appropriate legislation.” Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. National League of Cities, then, provides no reason to depart from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that “the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power,” 383 U. S., at 325, and that the Act is “an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities,” id., at 308.
D
The appellants contend in the alternative that, even if the Act and its preclearance requirement were appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in 1965, they had outlived their usefulness by 1975, when Congress extended the Act for another seven years. We decline this invitation to overrule Congress’ judgment that the 1975 extension was warranted.
In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged that, largely as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration had improved dramatically since 1965. H. R. Rep., at 6; S. Rep., at 13. Congress determined, however, that “a bleaker side of the picture yet exists.” H. R. Rep., at 7; S. Rep., at 13. Significant disparity persisted between the percentages of whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro elected officials had increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held statewide office, and their number in the state legislatures fell far short of being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority political progress under the Act, though “undeniable,” had been “modest and spotty,” extension of the Act was warranted. H. R. Rep., at 7-11; S. Rep., at 11-19.
Congress gave careful consideration to the propriety of readopting § 5’s preclearance requirement. It first noted that “[i]n recent years the importance of this provision has become widely recognized as a means of promoting and preserving minority political gains in covered jurisdictions.” H. R. Rep., at 8; S. Rep., at 15. After examining information on the number and types of submissions made by covered jurisdictions and the number and nature

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?
年. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
数. Atomic Energy Commission
日. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
的. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
月. Alien Property Custodian
用. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
成. Board of Immigration Appeals
名. Bureau of Indian Affairs
时. Bureau of Prisons
件. Bonneville Power Administration
一. Benefits Review Board
请. Civil Aeronautics Board
中. Bureau of the Census
据. Central Intelligence Agency
码. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
不. Department or Secretary of Commerce
新. Comptroller of Currency
文. Consumer Product Safety Commission
下. Civil Rights Commission
分. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
入. Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
人. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
功. Drug Enforcement Agency
上. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
户. Department or Secretary of Energy
为. Department or Secretary of the Interior
间. Department of Justice or Attorney General
号. Department or Secretary of State
取. Department or Secretary of Transportation
回. Department or Secretary of Education
在. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
页. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
字. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
有. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
个. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
作. Federal Bureau of Prisons
示. Farm Credit Administration
出. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
是. Federal Credit Union Administration
失. Food and Drug Administration
表. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
除. Federal Energy Administration
加. Federal Election Commission
败. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
生. Federal Housing Administration
信. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
类. Federal Labor Relations Authority
置. Federal Maritime Board
理. Federal Maritime Commission
本. Farmers Home Administration
息. Federal Parole Board
行. Federal Power Commission
定. Federal Railroad Administration
改. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
市. Federal Reserve System
期. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
以. Federal Trade Commission
修. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
元. General Accounting Office
方. Comptroller General
录. General Services Administration
区. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
单. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
位. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
型. Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
法. Interstate Commerce Commission
县. Indian Claims Commission
存. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
品. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
前. Information Security Oversight Office
称. Department or Secretary of Labor
注. Loyalty Review Board
值. Legal Services Corporation
输. Merit Systems Protection Board
建. Multistate Tax Commission
能. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
大. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
例. National Credit Union Administration
度. National Endowment for the Arts
始. National Enforcement Commission
到. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
面. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
载. National Mediation Board
点. National Railroad Adjustment Board
密. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
动. National Security Agency
果. Office of Economic Opportunity
图. Office of Management and Budget
提. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
发. Office of Personnel Management
式. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
国. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
登. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
错. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
者. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
认. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
误. U.S. Public Health Service
接. Postal Rate Commission
关. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
重. Renegotiation Board
第. Railroad Adjustment Board
地. Railroad Retirement Board
如. Subversive Activities Control Board
设. Small Business Administration
目. Securities and Exchange Commission
开. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
事. Selective Service System
可. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
要. Tennessee Valley Authority
代. United States Forest Service
小. United States Parole Commission
选. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
标. United States Sentencing Commission
明. Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
编. War Production Board
求. Wage Stabilization Board
列. State Agency
网. Unidentifiable
万. Office of Thrift Supervision
最. Department of Homeland Security
器. Board of General Appraisers
所. Board of Tax Appeals
内. General Land Office or Commissioners
体. NO Admin Action
通. Processing Tax Board of Review
Answer:

Answer: 间