Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Aside from an initial question of our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), this case requires us to decide whether a defendant charged with a felony under the District of Columbia Code may be tried by a judge who does not have protection with respect to tenure and salary under Art. Ill of the Constitution. We hold that under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, power to legislate for the District of Columbia, Congress may provide for trying local criminal cases before judges who, in accordance with the District of Columbia Code, are not accorded life tenure and protection against reduction in salary. In this respect, the position of the District of Columbia defendant is similar to that of the citizen of any of the 50 States when charged with violation of a state criminal law: Neither has a federal constitutional right to be tried before jhdges with tenure and salary guarantees.
I
The facts are uncomplicated. In January 1971, two officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department observed a moving automobile with license tags suggesting that it was a rented vehicle. Although no traffic or other violation was then indicated, the officer stopped the vehicle for a spot-check of the driver’s license and car-rental agreement. Palmore, the driver of the vehicle, produced a rental agreement from the glove compartment'of the car and explained why the car appeared to be, but was not, overdue. During this time, one of the officers observed the hammer mechanism of a gun protruding from under the armrest in the front seat of the vehicle. Palmore was arrested and later charged with the felony of carrying an unregistered pistol in the District of Columbia after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of the District of Columbia Code, §22-3204 (1967). He was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Under Title I of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473 (Reorganization Act), the judges of the Superior Court are appointed by the President and serve for terms of 15 years. D. C. Code Ann. §§ 11-1501 (a), 11-1502 (Supp. V, 1972). Palmore moved to dismiss the indictment against him, urging that only a court “ordam[ed] and establish [ed]” in accordance with Art. Ill of the United States Constitution could constitutionally try him for a felony prosecution under the District of Columbia Code. He also moved to suppress the pistol as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. The motions were denied in the Superior Court, and Palmore was convicted.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that under the plenary power to legislate for the District of Columbia, conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, Congress had “constitutional power to proscribe certain criminal conduct only in the District and to select the appropriate court, whether it is created by virtue of article III or article I, to hear and determine these particular criminal cases within the District.” 290 A. 2d 573, 576-577 (1972). Palmore filed a notice of appeal with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and his jurisdictional statement here, purporting to perfect an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). We postponed further consideration of our jurisdiction to review this case by way of appeal to the hearing on the merits. 409 U. S. 840 (1972).
II
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257 specifies the circumstances under which the final judgments of the highest court of a State may be reviewed in this Court by way of appeal or writ of certiorari. As amended in 1970 by § 172 (a)(1) of the Reorganization Act, 84 Stat. 590, the term “highest court of a State” as used in § 1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Appeal lies from such courts only where a statute of the United States is struck down, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (1), or where a statute of a State is sustained against federal constitutional attack, id., § 1257 (2). Because the statute at issue was upheld in this case, an appeal to this Court from that judgment lies only if the statute was a “statute of any state” within the meaning of § 1257 (2). Palmore insists that it is, but we cannot agree.
The 1970 amendment to § 1257 plainly provided that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals should be treated as the “highest court of a State,” but nowhere in § 1257, or elsewhere, has Congress provided that the words “statute of any state,” as used in § 1257 (2), are to include the provisions of the District of Columbia Code. A reference to “state statutes” would ordinarily not include provisions of the District of Columbia Code, which was enacted, not by a state legislature, but by Congress, and. which applies only within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is constitutionally distinct from the States, Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445 (1805); cf. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949). Nor does it follow from the decision to treat the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a state court that the District Code was to be considered a state statute for the purposes of § 1257. We are entitled to assume that in amending § 1257, Congress legislated with care, and that had Congress intended to equate the District Code and state statutes for the purposes of § 1257, it would have said so expressly, and not left the matter to mere implication.
Jurisdictional statutes are to be construed “with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes,” Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968); and we are particularly prone to accord “strict construction of statutes authorizing appeals” to this Court. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S. 41, 42 n. 1 (1970). We will not, therefore, hold that Congress intended to treat the District of Columbia Code as a state statute for the purposes of § 1257 (2). Cf. Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U. S. 104, 112-114 (1889).
Palmore relies on Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298 (1922), where an enactment of the territorial legislature of Puerto Rico was held to be a statute of a State within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory provisions governing appeals to this Court. That result has been codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1258; but, even so, the Balzac rationale was severely undermined in Fornaris, where we held that a statute passed by the legislature of Puerto Rico is not “a State statute” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), and that it should not be treated as such in the absence of more definitive guidance from Congress.
We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction of the appeal filed in this case. Palmore presents federal constitutional issues, however, that are reviewable by writ of certiorari under § 1257 (3); and treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition limited to the question of whether Palmore was entitled to be tried by a court ordained and established in accordance with Art. Ill, § 1, of the Constitution. It is to this issue that we now turn.
III
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over” the District of Columbia. The power is plenary. Not only may statutes of Congress of otherwise nationwide application be applied to the District of Columbia, but Congress may also exercise all the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes. Congress “may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a State might exercise within the State; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United States.” Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 5 (1899). This has been the characteristic view in this Court of congressional powers with respect to the District. It is apparent that the power of Congress under Clause 17 permits it to legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that would exceed its powers, or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it under Art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 408 (1886).
Pursuant to its Clause 17 authority, Congress has from time to time enacted laws that compose the District of Columbia Code. The 1970 Reorganization Act amended the Code by creating the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the courts being expressly “established pursuant to article I of the Constitution.” D. C. Code Ann. § 11-101 (2) (Supp. V, 1972). See n. 2, supra. The Superior Court, among other things, was vested with jurisdiction to hear criminal cases involving alleged violations of the criminal laws applicable only to the District of Columbia, id., § 11-923; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear appeals in such cases. Id., § 11-721. At the same time, Congress exercised its powers under Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and Art. Ill to redefine the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id., §§ 11-301, 11-501, and 11-502. As the Committee on the District of Columbia said, H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, p. 44:
“This title makes clear (section 11-101) that the District of Columbia Courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia) are Article I courts, created pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, and not Article III courts. The authority under which the local courts are established has not been statutorily provided in prior law; the Supreme Court of the United States has not declared the local system to be either Article I or Article III courts, decisions having indicated that the District of Columbia courts are, in this respect, both fish and fowl. This expression of the intent of the Congress clarifies the status of the local courts.”
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted of violation of § 22-3204 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that prosecutions for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and salary protections provided by Art. III.
Palmore’s argument is straightforward: Art. III vests the “judicial Power” of the United States in courts with judges holding office during good behavior and whose salary cannot be diminished; the “judicial Power” that these courts are to exercise “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...”; the District of Columbia Code, having been enacted by Congress, is a law of the United States; this prosecution for violation of § 22-3204 of the Code is therefore a case arising under the laws of the United States, involves an exercise of the “judicial Power” of the United States, and must therefore be tried by an Art. III judge.
This position ultimately rests on the proposition that an Art. Ill judge must preside over every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense is based on an Act of Congress or a law made under its authority. At the very least, it asserts that criminal offenses under the laws passed by Congress may not be prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III. In our view, however, there is no support for this view in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice.
Article III describes the judicial power as extending to all cases, among others, arising under the laws of the United States; but, aside from this Court, the power is vested “in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The decision with respect to inferior federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was left to the discietion of Congress. That body was not constitutionally required to create inferior Art. III courts to hear and decide cases within the judicial power of the United States, including those criminal cases arising under the laws of the United States. Nor, if inferior federal courts were created, was it required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III. “[T]he judicial power of the United States... is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court)... and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.” Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236, 245 (1845). Congress plainly understood this, for until 1875 Congress refrained from providing the lower federal courts with general federal-question jurisdiction. Until that time, the state courts provided the only forum for vindicating many important federal claims. Even then, with exceptions, the state courts remained the sole forum for the trial of federal cases not involving the required jurisdictional amount, and for the most part retained concurrent jurisdiction of federal claims properly within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
It was neither the legislative nor judicial view, therefore, that trial and decision of all federal questions were reserved for Art. III judges. Nor, more particularly, has the enforcement of federal criminal law been deemed the exclusive province of federal Art. III courts. Very early in our history, Congress left the enforcement of selected federal criminal laws to state courts and to state court judges who did not enjoy the protections prescribed for federal judges in Art. III. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 545, 551-553, 570-572 (1925); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 293 (1927) ; Note, Utilization of State Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947). More recently, this Court unanimously held that Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide Emergency Price Control Act cases involving the enforcement of federal penal laws; the fact “that Rhode Island has an established policy against enforcement by its courts of statutes of other states and the United States which it deems penal, cannot be accepted as a ‘valid excuse.’” Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 392 (1947). Although recognizing the contrary sentiments expressed in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, 615-616 (1842), and other cases, the sense of the Testa opinion was that it merely reflected longstanding constitutional decision and policy represented by such cases as Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876), and Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
It is also true that throughout our history, Congress has exercised its power under Art. IY to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” by creating territorial courts and manning them with judges appointed for a term of years. These courts have not been deemed subject to the strictures of Art. Ill, even though they characteristically enforced not only the civil and criminal laws of Congress applicable throughout the United States, but also the laws applicable only within the boundaries of the particular territory. Speaking for a unanimous Court in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that the territorial courts of Florida, although not Art. III courts, could hear and determine cases governed by the admiralty and maritime law that ordinarily could be heard only by Art. III judges. “[T]he same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.” Id., at 546. This has been the consistent view of this Court. Territorial courts, therefore, have regularly tried criminal cases arising under the general laws of Congress, as well as those brought under territorial laws.
There is another context in which criminal cases arising under federal statutes are tried, and defendants convicted, in non-Art. III courts. Under its Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” Congress has declared certain behavior by members of the Armed Forces to be criminal and provided for the trial of such cases by court-martial proceedings in the military mode, not by courts ordained and established under Art. III. Within their proper sphere, courts-martial are constitutional instruments to carry out congressional and executive will. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 82 (1857). The “exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in Art. III trials need apply,” O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, 261 (1969); and “the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military trials,” Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17 (1955).
“The same confluence of practical considerations that dictated the result in [American Ins. Co. v. Canter, supra], has governed the decision in later cases sanctioning the creation of other courts with judges of limited tenure,” Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 547 (1962), such as the Court of Private Land Claims, United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76, 85-86 (1894) ; the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445 (1899); Ex parte Joins, 191 U. S. 93 (1903); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S. 415 (1907); courts created in unincorporated districts outside the mainland, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 266-267 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S., at 312-313, and the Consular Courts established by concessions from foreign countries, In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464-465, 480 (1891).
IV
Whatever may be true in other instances, however, it is strongly argued that O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933), constrains us to hold that all of the courts of the District of Columbia must be deemed Art. Ill courts and that the judges presiding over them must be appointed to serve during their good behavior in accordance with the requirements of Art. III. O’Donoghue involved the question whether the judges of the District of Columbia’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were constitutionally protected from having their salaries reduced by an Act of Congress. This Court, over three dissents and contrary to extensive prior dicta, see Ex parte Bakelite Corp,, 279 U. S. 438, 450 (1929); Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50 (1884); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923); Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930), held that the two courts under consideration were constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United States and that the judges in question weremot subject to the salary reduction legislation as they would have been had they been judges of legislative courts.
We cannot agree that O’Donoghue governs this case. The District of Columbia courts there involved, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, had authority not only in the District, but also over all those controversies, civil and criminal, arising under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and having nationwide application. These courts, as this Court noted in its opinion, were “of equal rank and power with those of other inferior courts of the federal system... O’Donoghue, supra, at 534. Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court considered that Congress, by consistently providing the judges of these courts with lifetime tenure, had indicated a “congressional practice from the beginning [which] recognize [d] a complete parallelism between the courts of the District [of Columbia] and the district and circuit courts of appeals of the United States.” Id., at 549. Moreover, these courts, constituted as they were, and being closer to the legislative department, “exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general government and its various departments,” id., at 535, and were the only courts within the District in which District inhabitants could exercise their “right to have their cases arising under the Constitution heard and determined by federal courts created under, and vested with the judicial power conferred by, Art. III.” Id., at 540.
The case before us is a far cry from O’Donoghue. Here Congress has expressly created two systems of courts in the District. One of them is made up of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which are constitutional courts manned by Art. Ill judges to which the citizens of the District must or may resort for consideration of those constitutional and statutory matters of general concern which so moved the Court in O’Donoghue. The other system is made up of strictly local, courts, the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. These courts were expressly created pursuant to the plenary Art. I power to legislate for the District of

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 间