Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Frank G. Spisak, Jr., the respondent, was convicted in an Ohio trial court of three murders and two attempted murders. He was sentenced to death. He filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, claiming that constitutional errors occurred at his trial. First, Spisak claimed that the jury instructions at the penalty phase unconstitutionally required the jury to consider in mitigation only those factors that the jury unanimously found to be mitigating. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988). Second, Spisak claimed that he suffered significant harm as a result of his counsel’s inadequate closing argument at the penalty phase of the proceeding. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The Federal Court of Appeals accepted these arguments and ordered habeas relief. We now reverse the Court of Appeals.
I
In 1983, an Ohio jury convicted Spisak of three murders and two attempted murders at Cleveland State University in 1982. The jury recommended, and the judge imposed, a death sentence. The Ohio courts denied Spisak’s claims, both on direct appeal and on collateral review. State v. Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d 80, 521 N. E. 2d 800 (1988) (per curiam); State v. Spisak, No. 67229, 1995 WL 229108 (Ohio App., 8th Dist., Cuyahoga Cty., Apr. 13, 1995); State v. Spisak, 73 Ohio St. 3d 151, 652 N. E. 2d 719 (1995) (per curiam).
Spisak then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. Among other claims, he argued that the sentencing phase of his trial violated the U. S. Constitution for the two reasons we consider here. The District Court denied his petition. Spisak v. Coyle, Case No. 1:95CV2675 (ND Ohio, Apr. 18, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 95a. But the Court of Appeals accepted Spisak’s two claims, namely, his mitigation instruction claim and his ineffeetive-assistance-of-counsel claim. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F. 3d 684, 703-706, 708-711 (CA6 2006). The Court of Appeals consequently ordered the District Court to issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus forbidding Spisak’s execution. Id., at 715-716.
The State of Ohio then sought certiorari in this Court. We granted the petition and vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Hudson v. Spisak, 552 U. S. 945 (2007). We remanded the case for further consideration in light of two recent cases in which this Court had held that lower federal courts had not properly taken account of the deference federal law grants state-court determinations on federal habeas review. Ibid.; see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 (2006); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U. S. 465 (2007). On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its earlier opinion. Spisak v. Hudson, 512 F. 3d 852, 853-854 (2008). The State again sought certiorari. We again granted the petition. And we now reverse.
II
Spisak’s first claim concerns the instructions and verdict forms that the jury received at the sentencing phase of his trial. The Court of Appeals held the sentencing instructions unconstitutional because, in its view, the instructions, taken together with the forms, “require[d]” juror “unanimity as to the presence of a mitigating factor” — contrary to this Court’s holding in Mills v. Maryland, supra. 465 F. 3d, at 708. Since the parties do not dispute that the Ohio courts “adjudicated” this claim, i. e., they considered and rejected it “on the merits,” the law permits a federal court to reach a contrary decision only if the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). Unlike the Court of Appeals, we conclude that Spisak’s claim does not satisfy this standard.
The parties, like the Court of Appeals, assume that Mills sets forth the pertinent “clearly established Federal law.” While recognizing some uncertainty as to whether Mills was “clearly established Federal law” for the purpose of reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion, we shall assume the same. Compare Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 390 (2000) (Stevens, J., for the Court) (applicable date for purposes of determining whether “Federal law” is “established” is when the “state-court conviction became final”), with id., at 412 (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (applicable date is “the time of the relevant state-court decision”); see State v. Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d 80, 521 N. E. 2d 800 (decided Apr. 13, 1988), cert. denied, 489 U. S. 1071 (decided Mar. 6, 1989); Mills v. Maryland, supra (decided June 6, 1988).
A
The rule the Court set forth in Mills is based on two well-established principles. First, the Constitution forbids imposition of the death penalty if the sentencing judge or jury is “‘“precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” ’ ” 486 U. S., at 374 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110 (1982), in turn quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Second, the sentencing judge or jury “ ‘may not refuse to consider or he prechided from considering “any relevant mitigating evidence.” ’ ” Mills, 486 U. S., at 374-375 (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), in turn quoting Eddings, supra, at 114).
Applying these principles, the Court held that the jury instructions and verdict forms at issue in the case violated the Constitution because, read naturally, they told the jury that it could not find a particular circumstance to be mitigating unless all 12 jurors agreed that the mitigating circumstance had been proved to exist. Mills, 486 U. S., at 380-381, 384. If, for example, the defense presents evidence of three potentially mitigating considerations, some jurors may believe that only the first is mitigating, some only the second, and some only the third. But if even one of the jurors believes that one of the three mitigating considerations exists, but that he is barred from considering it because the other jurors disagree, the Court held, the Constitution forbids imposition of the death penalty. See id., at 380, 384; see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U. S. 433, 442-443 (1990) (“Mills requires that each juror be permitted to consider and give effect to... all mitigating evidence in deciding... whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances... ”). Because the instructions in Mills would have led a reasonable juror to believe the contrary, the Court held that the sentencing proceeding violated the Constitution. 486 U. S., at 374-375.
B
In evaluating the Court of Appeals’ determination here, we have examined the jury instructions and verdict forms at issue in Mills and compared them with those used in the present case. In the Mills sentencing phase, the trial judge instructed the jury to fill out a verdict form that had three distinct parts. Section I set forth a list of 10 specific aggravating circumstances next to which were spaces where the jury was to mark “yes” or “no.” Just above the list, the form said:
“Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that each of the following aggravating circumstances which is marked ‘yes’ has been proven... and each aggravating circumstance which is marked ‘no’ has not been proven....” Id., at 384-385 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Section II set forth a list of eight potentially mitigating circumstances (seven specific circumstances and the eighth designated as “other”) next to which were spaces where the jury was to mark “yes” or “no.” Just above the list the form said:
“Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked ‘yes’ has been proven to exist... and each mitigating circumstance marked ‘no’ has not been proven....” Id., at 387 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Section III set forth the overall balancing question, along with spaces for the jury to mark “yes” or “no.” It said:
“Based on the evidence we unanimously find that it has been proven... that the mitigating circumstances marked ‘yes’ in Section II outweigh the aggravating circumstances marked ‘yes’ in Section I.” Id., at 388-389 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
Explaining the forms, the judge instructed the jury with an example. He told the jury that it should mark “ ‘yes’ ” on the jury form if it “ ‘unanimously’ ” concluded that an aggravating circumstance had been proved. Id., at 378. Otherwise, he said, “‘of course you must answer no.’” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). These instructions, together with the forms, told the jury to mark “yes” on Section IPs list of mitigating factors only if the jury unanimously concluded that the particular mitigating factor had been proved, and to consider in its weighing analysis in Section III only those mitigating factors marked “yes” in Section II. Thus, as this Court found, the jury was instructed that it could consider in the ultimate weighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence only the mitigating factors that the jury had unanimously found to exist. See id., at 380-381.
The instructions and jury forms in this case differ significantly from those in Mills. The trial judge instructed the jury that the aggravating factors it would consider were the specifications that the jury had found proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase of the trial — essentially, that each murder was committed in a course of conduct including the other crimes, and, for two of the murders, that the murder was committed with the intent to evade apprehension or punishment for another offense. 8 Tr. 2967-2972 (July 19, 1983).
He then explained the concept of a “mitigating factor.” After doing so, he listed examples, including that “the defendant because of a mental disease or defect... lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” Id., at 2972-2973. The court also told the jury that it could take account of “any other” mitigating consideration it found “relevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.” Id., at 2973. And he instructed the jury that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Id., at 2965.
With respect to “the procedure” by which the jury should reach its verdict, the judge told the jury only the following:
“[Y]ou, the trial jury, must consider all of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and testimony received in this hearing and the arguments of counsel. From this you must determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating circumstances, which [Spisak] has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in this case.
“If all twelve members of the jury find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance in each separate count outweighs the mitigating factors, then you must return that finding to the Court.
“On the other hand, if after considering all of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and the testimony received at this hearing and the arguments of counsel, you find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which [Spisak] has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts outweigh the mitigating factors, you will then proceed to determine which of two possible life imprisonment sentences to recommend to the Court.” Id., at 2973-2975.
The judge gave the jury two verdict forms for each aggravating factor. The first of the two forms said:
“ We the jury in this case... do find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance... was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in this case.
“ ‘We the jury recommend that the sentence of death be imposed....’” Id., at 2975-2976.
The other verdict form read:
“‘We the jury... do find that the aggravating circumstances... are not sufficient to outweigh the mitigation factors present in this case.
‘“We the jury recommend that the defendant... be sentenced to life imprisonment....’” Id., at 2976.
The instructions and forms made clear that, to recommend a death sentence, the jury had to find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances. But the instructions did not say that the jury must determine the existence of each individual mitigating factor unanimously. Neither the instructions nor the forms said anything about how — or even whether — the jury should make individual determinations that each particular mitigating circumstance existed. They focused only on the overall balancing question. And the instructions repeatedly told the jury to “considefr] all of the relevant evidence.” Id., at 2974. In our view the instructions and verdict forms did not clearly bring about, either through what they said or what they implied, the circumstance that Mills found critical, namely,
“a substantial possibility that reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge’s instructions in this case, and in attempting to complete the verdict form as instructed, well may have thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance.” 486 U. S., at 384.
We consequently conclude that the state court’s decision upholding these forms and instructions was not “contrary to, or... an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” in Mills. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
We add that the Court of Appeals found the jury instructions unconstitutional for an additional reason, that the instructions “require[d] the jury to unanimously reject a death sentence before considering other sentencing alternatives.” 465 F. 3d, at 709 (citing Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F. 3d 408, 416-417 (CA6 1999)). We have not, however, previously held jury instructions unconstitutional for this reason. Mills says nothing about the matter. Neither the parties nor the courts below referred to Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980), or identified any other precedent from this Court setting forth this rule. Cf. Jones v. United States, 527 U. S. 373, 379-384 (1999) (rejecting an arguably analogous claim). But see post, at 158-160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Whatever the legal merits of the rule or the underlying verdict forms in this case were we to consider them on direct appeal, the jury instructions at Spisak’s trial were not contrary to “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
III
Spisak’s second claim is that his counsel’s closing argument at the sentencing phase of his trial was so inadequate as to violate the Sixth Amendment. To prevail, Spisak must show both that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, and that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id., at 694.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that Spisak’s claim was “not well-taken on the basis of our review of the record.” State v. Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d, at 82, 521 N. E. 2d, at 802 (citing, inter alia, Strickland, supra). The District Court concluded that counsel did a constitutionally adequate job and that “[tjhere simply is not a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged errors, the jury would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Spisak v. Coyle, Case No. 1:95CV2675 (ND Ohio, Apr. 18, 2008), App. to Pet. for Cert. 204a. The Court of Appeals, however, reached a contrary conclusion. It held that counsel’s closing argument, measured by “‘an objective standard of reasonableness,’” was inadequate, and it asserted that “a reasonable probability exists” that adequate representation would have led to a different result. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F. 3d, at 703, 706 (quoting Strickland, supra, at 688). Responding to the State’s petition for certiorari, we agreed to review the Court of Appeals’ terse finding of a “reasonable probability” that a more adequate argument would have changed a juror’s vote.
In his closing argument at the penalty phase, Spisak’s counsel described Spisak’s killings in some detail. He acknowledged that Spisak’s admiration for Hitler inspired his crimes. He portrayed Spisak as “sick,” “twisted,” and “demented.” 8 Tr. 2896 (July 19, 1983). And he said that Spisak was “never going to be any different.” Ibid. He then pointed out that all the experts had testified that Spisak suffered from some degree of mental illness. And, after a fairly lengthy and rambling disquisition about his own decisions about calling expert witnesses and preparing them, counsel argued that, even if Spisak was not legally insane so as to warrant a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, he nonetheless was sufficiently mentally ill to lessen his culpability to the point where he should not be executed. Counsel also told the jury that, when weighing Spisak’s mental illness against the “substantial” aggravating factors present in the case, id., at 2924, the jurors should draw on their own sense of “pride” for living in “a humane society” made up of “a humane people,” id., at 2897-2900, 2926-2928. That humanity, he said, required the jury to weigh the evidence “fairly” and to be “loyal to that oath” the jurors had taken to uphold the law Id., at 2926.
Spisak and his supporting amici say that this argument was constitutionally inadequate because: (1) It overly emphasized the gruesome nature of the killings; (2) it overly emphasized Spisak’s threats to continue his crimes; (3) it understated the facts upon which the experts based their mental illness conclusions; (4) it said little or nothing about any other possible mitigating circumstance; and (5) it made no explicit request that the jury return a verdict against death.
We assume for present purposes that Spisak is correct that the closing argument was inadequate. We nevertheless find no “reasonable probability” that a better closing argument without these defects would have made a significant difference.
Any different, more adequate closing argument would have taken place in the following context: Spisak admitted that he had committed three murders and two other shootings. Spisak’s defense at the guilt phase of the trial consisted of an effort by counsel to show that Spisak was not guilty by reason of insanity. And counsel, apparently hoping to demonstrate Spisak’s mentally defective condition, called him to the stand.
Spisak testified that he had shot and killed Horace Rickerson, Timothy Sheehan, and Brian Warford. He also admitted that he had shot and tried to kill John Hardaway, and shot at Coletta Dartt. He committed these crimes, he said, because he was a follower of Adolf Hitler, who was Spisak’s “spiritual leader” in a “war” for “survival” of “the Aryan people.” 4 id., at 1343-1344, 1396 (July 5, 1983). He said that he had purchased guns and stockpiled ammunition to further this war. Id., at 1406-1408. And he had hoped to “create terror” at Cleveland State University, because it was “one of the prime targets” where the “Jews and the system... are brainwashing the youth.” Id., at 1426-1428.
Spisak then said that in February 1982 he had shot Rickerson, who was black, because Riekerson had made a sexual advance on Spisak in a university bathroom. He expressed satisfaction at having “eliminated that particular threat... to me and to the white race.” 5 id., at 1511 (July 7, 1983). In June he saw a stranger, John Hardaway, on a train platform and shot him seven times because he had been looking for a black person to kill as “blood atonement” for a recent crime against two white women. 4 id., at 1416 (July 5, 1983). He added that he felt “good” after shooting Hardaway because he had “accomplished something,” but later felt “[k]ind of bad” when he learned that Hardaway had survived. Id., at 1424-1425. In August 1982, Spisak shot at Coletta Dartt because, he said, he heard her “making some derisive remarks about us,” meaning the Nazi Party. Id., at 1432-1435. Later that August, he shot and killed Timothy Sheehan because he “thought he was one of those Jewish professors... that liked to hang around in the men’s room and seduce and pervert and subvert the young people that go there.” 5 id., at 1465-1466 (July 7,1983). Spisak added that he was “sorry about that” murder because he later learned Sheehan “wasn’t Jewish like I thought he was.” Ibid. And three days later, while on a “search and destroy mission

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 号