Task: songer_direct1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision, coded as "liberal" or "conservative". Consider liberal to be  for the defendant. Consider the directionality to be "mixed" if the directionality of the decision was intermediate to the extremes defined above or if the decision was mixed (e.g., the conviction of defendant in a criminal trial was affirmed on one count but reversed on a second count or if the conviction was afirmed but the sentence was reduced). Consider "not ascertained" if the directionality could not be determined or if the outcome could not be classified according to any conventional outcome standards.

PELL, Circuit Judge.
On September 24, 1975, a seven-count indictment was returned in the Southern District of Illinois, charging thirteen individuals with violations of the federal statutes relating to illegal gambling and racketeering. The twelve appellants have filed timely notices of appeal from final judgments of convictions on Counts I, II, III, VI and VII of the indictment. These consolidated appeals present for review approximately fourteen issues, demonstrating once again the direct relationship between the proliferation of parties and issues in a conspiracy case.
The factual and procedural context of these appeals is both complicated and subtle. No useful purpose will be served by setting forth factual details which are germane only to issues which our disposition of the case eliminates from formal consideration. Accordingly, this opinion will refer only to those facts pertinent to our adjudication of the case.
Additionally, we must note that the Government and several appellants have interpreted the conspiracy count of the indictment as charging an offense which in its literal language it does not clearly state. Our summation of the indictment will set forth the theory of the indictment advanced by the Government, but in a subsequent part of the opinion we will discuss more fully the legal problems engendered by the parties’ confusion regarding the criminal charge actually made in that conspiracy count.
We turn to the indictment. Count I charged that from approximately September 1, 1974, to May 19, 1975, appellants Nerone, Seppi, Marvin “Pete” Hornstein, Gentry, Donald Hornstein, Bradley, Capies, Jamerson, and Heifer had participated in the operation of an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Count II charged that appellants Seppi, Vieth, Gentry, Schellinger, and both Horn-steins had participated in the use of extortionate means to collect a gambling debt in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. Count III charged that Marvin “Pete” Hornstein had used a deadly weapon in a forcible assault upon a federal law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 1114. Count VI charged that appellants Nerone and Seppi had conducted the affairs of Maple Manor, Inc., doing business as Cottonwood Cove Estates Mobile Home Park, an enterprise engaged in and the activities of which affected interstate commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity and/or through collection of an unlawful debt, in violation of, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Finally, as stated in the Government’s brief to this court, Count VII charged all of the appellants with conspiracy to conduct the affairs of Maple Manor, Inc., an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
Testimony adduced at trial revealed that Robert Fox had conducted a weekend “casino gambling operation” involving dice and card games in the basement of his modular home. This particular mobile home was located on Lot 2 of the Cottonwood Cove Estates Mobile Home Park, which was operated by Maple Manor, Inc. The president and major stockholder of the corporation was Blanche Fox, mother of Robert Fox. The secretary of the corporation was appellant Seppi. The board of directors was composed of Blanche Fox, Seppi, and Ner-one. Appellant Nerone had signed a form purchase agreement on April 21,1973, for a three-bedroom Regent mobile home, manufactured in Indiana, from Mobile World, Inc., whose offices were located in Springfield. The purchase agreement bore the notation “For Resale,” set forth a tax and a dealer number, and indicated that Nerone had executed the agreement on behalf of Maple Mobile Home Sales. Cash payment of the total sum mentioned in the purchase agreement was made two days later, and the Regent mobile home presumably was placed on Lot 88 of Cottonwood Cove. Many other residents of Cottonwood Cove had likewise purchased mobile homes manufactured in states other than Illinois.
The trial testimony established that the weekend dice and card games conducted in Fox’s basement were conducted, with three exceptions, every Saturday and Sunday from early September 1974 to May 1975. The gambling in Fox’s basement was discontinued in May 1975 because the Fox home was under surveillance by local law enforcement officials. Appellants Donald and Marvin Hornstein conducted a weekend card and dice gambling operation under the name “Where Else” at the Palmer Hotel at Fifth and Jefferson on two weekends in May 1975. It was raided on May 19, 1975. The appellants admitted at trial that the weekend games were illegal under Illinois law.
The testimony of Government witnesses also established that from September 1974 to May 1975 appellants Nerone and Seppi worked in Fox’s basement dealing blackjack, running the dice game, and collecting and paying out money. Appellant Jamerson throughout this period also assisted the operation of the games by working at the dice game and by running errands. Appellant Bradley ran the dice game for most of the time when Fox’s casino operation was functioning, and appellants Capíes and Heifer each dealt blackjack and played poker for a few months while the illegal gambling was in operation. Appellant Gentry never gambled or operated any games in Fox’s basement but did on two or three occasions open an inside door in Fox’s basement in order to let people enter. Appellants Donald and Marvin Hornstein were not shown to have been actively involved in the casino when it was operated at Fox’s basement, but there was circumstantial evidence, discussed hereinafter, which the Government utilized to support its theory that the “Where Else” gambling enterprise actually operated as an integral part of the Fox casino.
Law enforcement officers began investigating Fox’s gambling operation in late 1974, and by early 1975 Steven Salmieri, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was working on the investigation. On February 13, 1975, he met with Donald Nance, who was to meet with Fox that morning to pay off a four hundred dollar gambling debt. Fox and Nance had had several telephone discussions concerning the debt, in one of which Fox threatened Nance, who thereupon said he would meet Fox “[a]t the Attorney General’s Office.” At 10:00 a. m. that morning, Salmi-eri and Nance went to the latter’s health spa, where they awaited the planned meeting with Fox.
At approximately 10:15 a. m. Fox, together with the six men charged in Count II, arrived at the health spa in two cars. Appellants Schellinger and Seppi, who were the drivers, remained outside the spa. Fox, the Hornsteins, Gentry, and Vieth went inside. Upon entering the inner room where Salmieri and Nance were waiting, Fox said, in reference to Nance’s earlier telephonic comment, “what was all this about the Attorney General?” Marvin Hornstein then asked Salmieri why the latter’s hand was in his pocket. Hornstein then took a revolver from his belt and held it close to Salmieri’s head. Fox threw Salmieri against a wall and “frisked” him, finding a gun that Agent Salmieri was carrying. Salmieri and Nance proclaimed that they wanted to pay Fox. As Salmieri approached a desk drawer, Fox said that if Salmieri went near the drawer Fox would kill him. When Salmieri later put his hand in his pocket to get a cigar, Fox said “Put your hands down or I’ll knock your teeth out.” After Fox swung at Salmieri with a gun and missed, Marvin Hornstein hit him in the ribs.
Fox inquired as to Salmieri’s identity and the fact that he was carrying a gun. The agent told Fox that he was a friend of Nance’s from St. Louis. Fox then told Nance to “forget the money.” Except on the occasions when Salmieri and Nance brought up the subject, nothing was said during the entire encounter regarding the collection of the debt. During the entire incident, none of the appellants asked Nance for any money. On each occasion that agent Salmieri brought up the topic of paying the money, those appellants who had come into the back room responded that the money didn’t make any difference and that they didn’t want it. Fox then told Nance that they were going to take Salmieri “for a ride.”
As Salmieri began to walk out of the back room of the health spa, Fox became excited and shouted, “Shoot him, shoot him. Leonard [Vieth], grab him.” At that point the agent was going out the front door and Vieth was with him. As Salmieri went out, he put his hands up. Vieth then said, “Come on, we better go back inside.” Vieth then grabbed the agent by the arm. After going back in, the agent was told to spread out on the floor. Nance and his. business partner were also in the front on the floor. After Fox told them to walk out of the health spa but before they had a chance to get out, Marvin Hornstein came to the front of the room where Salmieri remained on the floor, cocked the gun, put it to the agent’s head, and said he was going to “blast” him. Salmieri and Nance were then taken outside, but Fox and his confederates left without them. Salmieri and Nance then returned to the health spa.
At 11:45 the same morning, Fox telephoned Nance and apologized for the incident at the health spa. He asked Nance to come out to the Cottonwood Cove, with Salmieri, to repay the debt. That afternoon, Nance and Salmieri visited Fox’s mobile home. Appellants Donald Hornstein, Nerone, Seppi, Capíes, Jamerson, and Gentry were present. Nance paid Fox, and Fox showed Salmieri his basement casino and invited him to return to gamble. When Salmieri requested the return of his gun, Fox replied that Marvin Hornstein had it and that they would try to get it back.
On February 22, 1975, Agent Salmieri arrived at Cottonwood Cove and went into the recreation hall, which was adjacent to Fox’s mobile home, where a party was in progress. There he found Gentry and told him that he had come for “a littlé action.” Gentry, remarking that “[tjhey’ve got a pretty good game,” took Salmieri next door to Fox’s mobile home. He knocked on a basement door containing a two-way mirror, and they were admitted. Inside Salmi-eri observed seventy to eighty people. Fox told him that the minimum bet was five dollars and the maximum was one hundred dollars, but that with approval a player could bet more, provided he remained at the higher level throughout the night. Salmieri got into a blackjack game in which appellant Nerone was the dealer. In the course of the evening the house took in between four and five thousand dollars at the blackjack table alone. Salmieri observed Fox approve loans of up to $700 for customers at the blackjack table, and cash a four or five hundred dollar check for another customer. Salmieri also observed appellants Seppi, Capíes, Bradley, and Jamerson working at the dice table. Throughout the night appellant Gentry was “watching” the door.
On March 9, 1975, Agent Salmieri returned to the casino with John Meduga, an agent of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation. They gambled for three or four hours, and during that period Salmieri observed twenty-five or thirty people in the casino. He also observed Fox lend five hundred dollars each to one customer who already owed him $3,000 and to another who was already $2,000 in debt. In the course of the night Nerone and Capíes dealt at the blackjack table, and Seppi, Capíes, Bradley, and Jamerson ran the dice game. On March 23, 1975, Salmieri and Meduga were again in the casino where they observed Nerone and Heifer dealing blackjack and Seppi and Bradley operating the dice table. On this occasion Marvin Hornstein was present in the basement.
The two agents returned once more to the casino on April 13, 1975. Appellant Heifer was dealing blackjack that night, and appellants Seppi and Nerone were operating the dice table. That evening Salmieri told Fox that earlier in the day he had wanted to place a bet on a baseball game but was not able to do so because he did now know any bookies in town. Fox replied that any time Salmieri wanted to get any action in, he should let him know and Fox would cover it. Fox then gave Salmi-eri a telephone number for placing bets, but warned him not to call the number from out of state because he did not want the FBI to get involved. Testimony of the Government witness Charles “Burrhead” Albright established that Nerone would take line information and accept bets on the telephone. Albright was also present during numerous conversations between appellants Nerone and Greco regarding line information, and he had heard Fox instruct Nerone to “lay-off” bets to Greco. Several weeks after Fox gave Salmieri the telephone number, the agent called and asked for Nerone. Salmieri attempted to place bets on a Spirits basketball and Cardinal baseball game, but Nerone would not accept the bets because he did not have “the line” on those games. However, Salmieri did place a bet on a National Basketball Association game between Washington and Buffalo. Nerone also gave Salmieri two additional telephone numbers.
On the evening of May 11, 1975, Agents Salmieri and Meduga went to the “Where Else” at the Palmer Hotel. Initially, they had gone to the recreation hall at Cottonwood Cove. There, they found a sign which read “call Bob [Fox] or John [Nerone]” and which listed a telephone number. Salmieri dialed the number and reached Nerone, who said “[t]here’s a little problem in the area. We have moved to the Palmer Hotel.” At the hotel, the agents observed Nerone, Sep-pi, Bradley, and Donald Hornstein take turns running the dice table. Appellant Heifer volunteered to start a blackjack game, and Marvin Hornstein was acting as a lookout at the door. The house took in roughly twenty-four hundred dollars that evening.
On May 17, 1975, there was some form of gambling at the Cottonwood Cove. Agent Nancy Lewis, working underground for the Illinois Bureau of Investigation, had been conducting a surveillance at the Cottonwood Cove since December 26, 1974. She kept memoranda of her observations. Her reports indicated that she had observed thirteen cars at Fox’s trailer at 1:40 a.m. on May 17. Almost five hours later, at 6:05 a.m., she observed that the cars of six individuals known to her were parked at Fox’s trailer. On May 18, 1975, law enforcement officers raided the “Where Else.” Agents Salmieri and Meduga were present on that evening and observed appellants Nerone, Seppi, Bradley, and the two Hornsteins take turns running the dice table at the hotel.
On the same night that the Palmer Hotel was raided, FBI agents, acting pursuant to a search warrant, raided Fox’s mobile home and found bookmaking records in the lining of one of Fox’s coats. These records pertained to the same transactions as did gambling papers found on Nerone in the raid at the hotel. In Fox’s home, the agents found baseball schedules of a type commonly distributed by bookmakers to their customers, a “baseball calculator” or device similar to a slide rule used by bookmakers to calculate the amount of payoffs in baseball parley bets, and dice which had been altered to increase the likelihood that certain sides would come to rest face up.
I
The first issue in this case pertains to the jurisdictional basis for Count I. Appellant Heifer argues that there was no proof that the weekend gambling in the Fox basement met the jurisdictional requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Heifer observes that the statute is directed at syndicated gambling having an effect upon interstate commerce and the national interest. He further contends that the gambling reflected in this record is not the type of gambling which falls within the purview of the statute and that the facts of this case illustrate an effort by the Federal Strike Force to create a federal offense from essentially local gambling activity. Heifer points to the Government’s use of such nomenclature as'“casino operation” the participants of which were denominated “employees” as constituting the substitution of objurgatory terminology for proof. He further insists that the Government found it necessary to confuse the long standing and continuous bookmaking of appellants Nerone and Greco with the games of chance in which the other nine appellants participated.
Heifer also claims, as a corollary to the jurisdictional argument, that his conviction on Count I must be reversed because of variance and erroneous instructions. Bookmaking was not alleged in Count I. Thus, Heifer sets out a straightforward argument invoking the concept of variance. He submits that the Government cannot charge ten defendants with games of chance, i. e., “cards and dice,” and then claim that instead they have proven bookmaking by two defendants to meet the statute’s jurisdictional requirements. Heifer asserts that the Government compensated for an obvious variance and absence of proof by submitting instructions, given by the court over the appellants’ objections, which directed the jury to consider the bookmaking activity to determine if the games of chance were in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days.
Putting aside for the moment the question of erroneous instructions, the core question as to all appellants convicted under Count I clearly relates to proof of “substantially continuous” operation in excess of the statutory period. On the present record, proof of the five-man requirement is sufficient to withstand attack. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we hold that Fox, Nerone, Seppi, Bradley and Capíes were clearly shown to have conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed or owned all or part of an illegal gambling business. If the evidence similarly establishes that the thirty-day requirement was met, the illegal gambling business disclosed by this record was subject to federal criminal prosecution.
We recognize that Congress “has placed strict limits on those gambling operations which warrant federal intervention.” Altese, supra at 109 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the purpose of § 1955 is to prohibit illegal gambling of such a size as would affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478 (5th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1976). Still, the purpose of § 1955 is not to subject almost any small gambling operation to federal regulation. See United States v. Bridges, 493 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 1974). We can readily agree with the Fifth Circuit that a broad construction of § 1955 would not always further the Congressional purpose, see id., and that “the contours of federal jurisdiction under § 1955 have not yet been fully delineated.” McCoy, supra at 1058. Congress, however, in final analysis, has made a judgment that gambling operations involving more than five people and operating in excess of thirty days affect interstate commerce. This court has no power to excise as trivial, an individual instance falling within the defined class which is within the reach of federal power. Cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,192-93, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968).
We agree with the Government that the thirty-day requirement was satisfied in this case. More accurately stated, we think that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the dice and card games in Fox’s basement were in “substantially continuous” operation for the statutory period. The evidence showed that, with but three exceptions, Fox’s casino was in operation every weekend between the beginning of September 1974 and early May 1975. The evidence thus showed an established pattern of operation at least two days every week for approximately eight months. Simple arithmetical calculations would support a jury inference that the games took place on more than thirty individual calendar days. Moreover, there was testimony that sometimes gambling commenced on Friday nights and continued into the succeeding Monday. Larry Dellomo, a salesman for Mobile World, Inc., testified that he had participated in gambling at Fox’s basement approximately fifteen times, usually on Saturday or Sunday nights, during the period charged in the indictment. William Roscetti, a dentist, also testified that he had gambled in Fox’s basement from five to eight times during the same period.
The appellants do not appear to controvert the inference that gambling occurred on more than thirty separate calendar days. Their argument touches instead on the requirement of continuity. We note, however, that Congress did not purport to require absolute or total continuity in the gambling operations. Thus, we agree with the Government’s contention that it would be unreasonable to construe the term “substantially continuous” as meaning every day.
There was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that what was involved here was a gambling casino which operated substantially continuously by virtue of being open for business almost every weekend with consistent regularity. We do not read the Congressional intent as requiring proof of an operation occurring substantially around-the-clock but rather one that was operated upon a schedule of regularity sufficient to take it out of the casual non-business category. The proof here met the test.
We further agree that Heifer’s allegation that the Government used the bookmaking activity as a means of meeting the requirements of the statute is without substance. The evidence of continuity in Fox’s casino operation needed no assistance but was self-sufficient for the purpose. As to the claimed instruction error, the court’s definition of gambling as including “bookmaking” merely set forth a portion of the statutory language. See Appendix. We do not interpret the instruction as directing the jury to consider that particular form of illegal gambling in determining the substantial continuity of the casino operation. Indeed, a distinct instruction expressly left for the jury’s determination that significant factual question. Heifer’s argument that the instruction improperly bolstered the assertion of federal jurisdiction accordingly must be rejected. We affirm his conviction on Count I.
II
Appellants Gentry and the Horn-steins similarly contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions on Count I. The Government responds, as to Gentry, that his performance of the function of “doorman” demonstrated that he was part of the casino operation. In so arguing, the Government asserts that both Charles Albright and Agent Salmieri testified that Gentry “guarded” the door to the casino. As to the Hornsteins, the Government asserts that there was ample evidence that the Palmer Hotel was merely a new location for the casino operation which had been operating at ‘Cottonwood Cove. The Government specifies particularly the note listing a Palmer Hotel telephone number and Nerone’s assertion to Agent Salmieri that they had “moved” to the Palmer Hotel.
Close review of the trial transcript does not support the Government’s theory that Gentry guarded the casino door. Although Salmieri did give Gentry’s name when asked whether he had seen anyone “guarding” the door area, he never did state expressly that Gentry “guarded” the door, nor really, and more to the point in view of the conclusionary nature of the word “guard,” did he testify as to activities by Gentry which would appear to be guarding. Likewise, Albright’s testimony did not support that characterization. Albright, who was a star witness for the prosecution, stated that Gentry would “[t]ake care of the door a little bit” and that he might “have been a body guard, I don’t know.” Al-bright also made a reference to the fact that Gentry had opened both doors to Fox’s basement. The prosecutor interpreted this language as pertaining to a guarding function, going so far as to state in closing argument, mistakenly in our view, that Al-bright had stated, “Well, he guarded both of them [the doors].” (Emphasis supplied.) Our examination of the trial transcript discloses no such statement. Without regard to Gentry’s complaints about persistent prosecutorial misstatements of the evidence, we note that numerous witnesses established that Gentry never gambled or assisted in the operation of any of the games. Gentry usually sat in the bar area and tried to sell Indian jewelry. We are satisfied that the Government has failed to establish that he was an employee or a participant in the casino operation. Accordingly, his conviction on Count I of the indictment is reversed.
As to the Hornsteins, the Government concedes that they were not shown to have been actively involved in the casino when it was operated at Cottonwood Cove. The Government asserts, however, that the Hornsteins clearly worked for it at the Palmer Hotel. Apart from the note and Nerone’s statement, the Government pinpoints the evidence that Fox, Nerone, Sep-pi, Bradley and Albright “worked” at both locations and Agent Meduga’s testimony that the operation at the “Where Else” was “just about identical” to that at Fox’s mobile home. It also points to the evidence of Nerone’s bookmaking at the hotel, conceding, however, that this evidence was not used as evidence of the illegal gambling business charged in Count I. The Government discounts the significance of the considerable testimony that the Hornsteins owned the gambling operation at the Hotel, that the games there operated were “head-to-head” rather than “house” games (as in Fox’s basement), and that the Hornsteins themselves, without financial input from Fox and Nerone, were responsible for maintaining a sufficient reserve of funds to cover the losses which might occur at the “Where Else.” By discounting the evidence tending to show that the Hornsteins’ operation was separate and independent, of course, the Government adheres to its basic theory that the “Where Else” was operated for the approximate three week period in May 1975 in conjunction with, and as an “alternative gambling location” for, the illegal gambling business run by Fox and his associates.
The key circumstantial evidence to support the inference that the games were moved to the Palmer Hotel as an accommodation to and to facilitate Fox’s operation was the fact that a note was found at the recreation hall at Cottonwood Cove telling Fox’s patrons to go downtown where some gambling was occurring. While downtown, various defendants, who were involved in Fox’s games, operated the “stick,” served liquor and performed other minor tasks at the Fifth Street location. However, there was substantial direct and circumstantial evidence presented both by the Government and the appellants which militates against any inference that there was a connection between the two gambling operations. Significantly, trial testimony, unrebutted by the Government and coming from its own witnesses, indicates that there was gambling at the Cottonwood Cove, including the playing of dice, two days before the raid on Fifth Street. The surveillance notes of IBI Agent Lewis showed the presence of a dozen or more cars around Fox’s establishment in the early morning hours. These automobiles belonged to persons who were known to frequent Fox’s basement for purposes of gambling. Such evidence, albeit circumstantial, undercuts the Government’s theory that the Palmer Hotel was an alternative location.
We shall have occasion hereinafter to comment upon the manner in which the Government has confused its theory of the case with inferences properly to be drawn from the evidence. At this point, we need only state that the trial testimony, measured in the light of the reasonable doubt standard and in conformity with Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), is not sufficient to convict the brothers Homstein of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Thus, we need not consider Marvin Hornstein’s claim that the trial court’s admission into evidence of his brother’s post-conspiracy statements to FBI agents prejudiced his defense to the § 1955 count.
Finding no reversible error as to the defendants convicted under Count I, with the exceptions noted of Gentry and the two Hornsteins, we affirm all other convictions under this Count.
Ill
Appellants Seppi, Vieth, Gentry, Schellinger, and the Hornstein brothers present a variety of arguments aimed at showing that the convictions on Count II must be reversed. Allowing for the variations in formulation, the essential thrust of the common sufficiency of the evidence argument is that the Government has not proved that these six appellants knowingly participated in the use of extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect a debt. The first prong of the argument is that the evidence abundantly shows that the sole reason for Fox’s visit to the health spa was to stop Nance from going to the Attorney General, so that the collection of Nance’s debt was not really involved in the incident. We think that the jury could properly infer that all the appellants went to the health spa for the purpose of attempting to collect a debt. The second prong of the argument relates to knowledgeable participation in the extortion episode. The Government conceded at oral argument that its case, in this respect, is dependent on Albright’s testimony.
According to that testimony, he had been in Fox’s mobile home at around ten o’clock. He further testified that Fox, Seppi, Vieth, Schellinger and Donald Hornstein were present. As Albright entered, Fox was calling Gentry on the phone. Albright heard Fox say that they were going down to the health spa to put muscle on a guy. After Gentry arrived, there was more conversation, which Albright heard. He stated that Fox had mentioned something to do with the reason they were going to put muscle on the guy. The record discloses this colloquy:
Q. What did he [Fox] say the reason was?
A. He [Nance] wasn’t going to pay off and he [Fox] was going down and tear the place up or get his money.
Immediately after this conversation, according to Albright, the appellants left for the health spa.
The appellants quarrel with Albright’s version of what happened in or around Fox’s mobile home on the morning of February 13, 1975. Nevertheless, the jury was entitled to credit Albright’s version. Moreover, there was a tape recording of the incident itself played at the trial. Although that recording does tend to show that Nance’s remark about the Attorney General and Salmieri’s possession of a gun were factors when the confrontation occurred, it also established that the $400 debt played an important role. Thus, the tape contains the statement, presumably that of Fox, to this effect:
We don’t care about the money now. I’m not forgetting. The money’s no object now. [Emphasis added.]
That Fox’s associates lost interest in collecting the money because of mounting anger arising from Salmieri and Nance being armed or because of Nance’s earlier remark does not mean that there was no attempt to collect an extension of credit. Albright’s testimony inculpated all of the appellants charged with the extortion. Absent a determination that Albright’s version was completely incredible, which we cannot make on the present record, there was ample evidence from which the jury could find a violation of § 894.
We note that the extortion incident was one of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy count of the indictment. We therefore consider at this point the problem of the claimed use of post-conspiracy admissions by the admission of the statements of Schellinger and Gentry which, speaking generally, indicated that they knew that the purpose of the visit to the health spa was to recover a debt owed by Nance to Fox. The Government’s assertion that the statements “implicated no one but themselves” may be arguably incorrect. Nonetheless, the statements did not directly implicate any of the other appellants charged in Count II. Therefore, any error of admitting the statements did not reach constitutional proportions under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). See United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968). Moreover, the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the limited purposes for which the Schellinger and Gentry statements could be used. Inasmuch as the jury was so instructed and in view of Albright’s testimony showing that the other appellants knew the purpose of the visit to the health spa, we conclude that any error in admitting the post-conspiracy statements was harmless.
IV
Appellant Marvin Hornstein contends that the instructions pertinent to Count III, when taken together, were prejudicial to his theory of defense. His specific instruction challenges are somewhat “straw-grasping” in nature, but Hornstein presents a very substantial challenge to the manner in which all objections were handled. That matter deserves extended comment.
Hornstein concedes that the trial court informed the appellants of its proposed instructions prior to closing arguments, but contends that Rule 30, Fed.R.Crim.P., was violated in that the defense was not given an opportunity to inform the court of its objections or to request permission to withdraw instructions which they had originally tendered, prior to arguments to the jury and submission of the court’s instructions to the jury. Hornstein observes that the reviewing court sanctions the practice of promoting potential error in jury trials when it allows the trial courts to engage in a policy of denying the defendant the right to make objections to instructions prior to submission to the jury.
We agree with appellant Hornstein that both the letter and the spirit of Rule 30 were violated in this case. The record establishes that there was an informal instructions conference prior to argument but that the trial judge put off the formal statement of objections until after the jury began its deliberation. This court stated in United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535, 543 (7th Cir. 1977), as follows:
If, however, the judge conducts only an informal conference prior to the giving of the charge as to what requests will be granted or denied and what instructions the judge intends to give, a full opportunity must be given after the jury has been instructed, but before it begins to deliberate, for counsel to make a full record on their objections to the charge as given as well as to the denial of requests. Further... full opportunity must be given after the statement of the charge and before the retirement of the jury to state any additional objections which may have developed as a result of the giving of the charge. [Emphasis added.]
Applying that language to the instant case, it clearly appears that the trial judge’s handling of objections failed to comply with this circuit’s requirements.
However, this trial took place some months before the decision in Hollinger. The question thus becomes one of determining the consequences of refusing to allow counsel an opportunity to voice their objections to instructions before the jury retires. The language of the rule suggests the answer. A party who fails to make timely and specific objections to the jury charge loses the opportunity to assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom. When a trial judge prevents the party from complying with the rule, the remedy should be appellate consideration of the claimed errors in instruction. Our prior decisions are consistent with this approach. E. g., United States v. Lisowski, 504 F.2d 1268, 1272 (7th Cir. 1974); American National Bank and Trust Company v. Aetna Insurance Company, 447 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1971). We do not say that an outright reversal is beyond either our power or a distinct possibility. We merely state that appellate review of Hornstein’s contentions with respect to Instructions 31, 36, 37, and 38 suffices in the instant case.
Appellant Hornstein submits Instruction No. 31 as an apt illustration of why a conference on jury instructions should have been held prior to the submission of the case to the jury. The instruction purported to set forth what the charge was under Count III. Hornstein accurately observes that there was not a single bit of evidence in the record to indicate that he had used a.38 caliber super automatic weapon in the incident at the health spa. The evidence from the Government’s witness was that The weapon used by the appellant was a.357 magnum. Arguing that the appellant is entitled to a charge consistent with the indictment, Hornstein asserts that a technical compliance with a requirement that the jury can convict only on the basis “as charged” and as directed by the court warrants reversal of the conviction on Count III.
There is no question but that Instruction No. 31 is inaccurate. If the trial court had allowed formal objections at an earlier time, no doubt the incorrect reference to the particular weapon would have been corrected. However, we agree with the Government that the incorrect identification could have had no bearing on the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. Moreover, the judge allowed the jury to take the indictment into the jury room during its deliberations. Because the indictment made absolutely no reference to the type of weapon, Hornstein was not prejudiced by the court’s inaccurate summation. The factual mistake was more akin to a comment on the evidence, albeit inaccurate. Horn-stein implicitly admits the trivial nature of the mistake. We think that No. 31 posed no real possibility of prejudice, especially in view of the court’s instruction that the jury alone was the sole exclusive judge of the facts. Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 

Question: What is the ideological directionality of the court of appeals decision?
A. conservative
B. liberal
C. mixed
D. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: C