Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge.
Winger was indicted in May, 1955, on two counts involving counterfeiting of money. The first count charged that he participated in a counterfeiting conspiracy with three others: Hallak, Shire (a printer) and Opitz. The second count charged that Shire made the counterfeit money and that Winger “did counsel, induce and procure the commission of said offense.” A jury was waived.
After the trial, the district court found Winger guilty on both counts. Sentence was ordered on the first count (conspiracy) to be five years imprisonment and on the second count to be seven years, the sentences to commence simultaneously and run concurrently.
Winger has appealed on both counts. If the conviction is valid on count two, the term of imprisonment thereon exceeding the concurrent sentence on count one, we need hot review count one. Should we find the conviction on count two ill-founded, then it would be incumbent to turn to count one and investigate it.
In our judgment, the conviction on count two is fully justified. The making of the counterfeit money by Shire is proved beyond doubt. Any evidence of direct person to person contact between Winger and Shire, although they were not strangers, is rather flimsy—by itself certainly insufficient to uphold a conviction.
But there is evidence of Winger counselling with the intermediary Opitz in contemplation of the securing of counterfeit money. Shortly thereafter a plan goes forward for production of counterfeit money in which Opitz is conferring and plotting with Shire, the printer. Then the money is printed by Shire. All are close enough in time that a trier of fact was entitled circumstantially to conclude that the money was manufactured according to the plan in which Winger originally counselled. An accessory before the fact can work through an intermediary as well as with him who ultimately commits the principal crime.
We do not hold the conspiracy conviction improper. We just do not reach it.
The judgment is affirmed.
. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17, 63 L.Ed. 1173; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Doan v. United States, 9 Cir., 202 F.2d 674; Goldbaum v. United States, 9 Cir., 204 F.2d 74.
. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(a) An accessory before the fact is a principal.
. Turner v. United States, 9 Cir., 202 F.2d 523; Collins v. United States, 5 Cir., 65 F.2d 545; Morei v. United States, 6 Cir., 127 F.2d 827; Russell v. United States, 4 Cir., 222 F.2d 197.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A