Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether violations of the prohibition of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent order against “acquiring” other companies constituted single violations within the meaning of the applicable civil penalty statutes, 38 Stat. 734,.as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (?); 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (?), or whether such violations constituted a “continuing failure or neglect to obey” within the meaning of those statutes, authorizing imposition of daily penalties. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado interpreted the consent order to proscribe only the initial act of acquisition and held that therefore only a single penalty might be imposed. 1972 CCH Trade Cases ¶ 73,993, p. 92,127 (Aug. 2, 1971). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court to that extent, 485 F. 2d 16 (1973). A subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is in conflict, United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F. 2d 1259 (1974), cert. pending No. 73-1798. In interpreting a consent order worded in its pertinent terms similarly to that in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that acquisition is a continuing offense until it is undone, noting that the construction of “acquiring” as a single rather than continuing violation “ignores the crucial effects of an acquisition and would render nonacquisition orders virtually meaningless.” Id., at 1270.
We granted certiorari in order to resolve this conflict between Courts of Appeals concerning the proper application of the “continuing” violation clauses of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (?) and 45 (?) to wording employed in a large number of FTC consent orders. Since we interpret “acquiring” as used in the consent order in this case to mean both the initial transaction and the maintaining of the rights obtained without resale, we hold that violation of the consent order is a continuing violation subject to daily penalties, and reverse.
I
The FTC alleged in 1960 that Continental Baking Co. (Continental), a major producer of bread and other bakery products, had violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18, and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45, by various acquisitions which “may have the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly... Before any decision in the case, the parties agreed to a proposed consent order which was approved by the FTC in May 1962. The order, among other things, prohibited Continental for 10 years from “acquiring, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries or otherwise, the whole or any part of the stock, share capital, or assets of any concern, corporate or non-corporate, engaged in any state of the United States in the production and sale of bread and bread-type rolls unless the Commission, on petition for modification of this Section III of this order, permits such an acquisition... Alleging that Continental had acquired assets in three companies in violation of this order, the Government brought suit in the District of Colorado under § 11 (l) of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (l) and § 5 (l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Z), for civil penalties and other relief. The complaint prayed for penalties of $1,000 per day from the date of the contract of acquisition to the date of filing of the complaint on each of the three counts.
The District Court held that two of the three transactions were in fact in violation of the consent order. It declined, however, to order daily penalties, finding that “the terms of the consent order proscribe only the act of acquisition and that the violations of the consent order... did not constitute a 'continuing failure or neglect to obey' [15 U. S. C. §§21(l), 45 (i)] said order.... Once these two acquisitions were accomplished, the violations were complete.” 1972 CCH Trade Cases, at 92,129. The District Court therefore entered a judgment against ITT Continental for $5,000 for each of the two violations found.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court only insofar as it had held one of the three transactions not in violation of the consent order. It affirmed on the matter of daily penalties, holding that “whether the order was directed to the acquisition or to the acquisition and retention of assets or interests... [is] an interpretation of the consent order, and the result is in accordance with the prevailing standards.” 485 F. 2d, at 21. Remand to the District Court was ordered only for imposition of a penalty for the third violation.
II
The basic question before us is whether there has been a “continuing failure or neglect to obey” an FTC order within the meaning of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (l) and 45 (l).
The “continuing failure or neglect to obey” provision of § 45 (i) was added to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1950, and the like provision of § 21 (l) to the Clayton Act in 1959. Although the legislative history of these provisions is sparse, some examples of behavior intended to be covered by the “continuing” violation provisions do appear in the legislative history. These include continuing conspiracies to fix prices or control production, maintenance of a billboard in defiance of an order prohibiting false advertising, failure to dissolve an unlawful merger, and failure to eliminate an interlocking directorate. See letter from FTC General Counsel to Senator Fulbright, 96 Cong. Rec. 3026-3027 (1950); Hearings on H. R. 432, H. R. 2977, H. R. 6049, and S. 726 before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959). These violations share two discernible characteristics: the detrimental effect to the public and the advantage to the violator continue and increase over a period of time, and the violator could eliminate the effects of the violation if it were motivated to do so, after it had begun. Without these characteristics, daily penalties for such violations would probably have no greater deterrent effect than a single penalty and accumulating daily penalties would therefore be unfair.
The legislative history also makes clear that Congress was concerned with avoiding a situation in which the statutory penalty would be regarded by potential violators of FTC orders as nothing more than an acceptable cost of violation, rather than as a deterrence to violation. For example, Senator Aiken, chief proponent of the 1950 amendment, said that if daily penalties for certain violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act were not permitted, “the fine would amount to a license in the amount of $5,000 for misrepresentation, which would be a very cheap fine, indeed.” 96 Cong. Rec. 3025 (1950). Similarly, the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee said in its report on the 1959 amendments:
“Although the maximum penalty may be severe, in certain cases it would be appropriate. In the absence of the maximum penalty for a continuing offense, for example, commission and board orders with respect to mergers and interlocking directorships would be ineffective. In such cases, unless the maximum penalty applied and each day of a continuing violation considered a separate offense, an order dissolving an unlawful merger could be ignored after the mere payment of a $5,000 fine.” H. R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959).
See also Hearings on H. R. 432, H. R. 2977, H. R. 6049, and S. 726, supra, at 30 (letter from FTC General Counsel).
Thus, the “continuing failure or neglect to obey” provisions of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (l) and 45 (J) were intended to assure that the penalty provisions would provide a meaningful deterrence against violations whose effect is continuing and whose detrimental effect could be terminated or minimized by the violator at some time after initiating the violation. It seems apparent that acquisition in violation of an FTC order banning “acquiring” certain assets could be such a violation. Any anticom-petitive effect of an acquisition continues as long as the assets obtained are retained, and the violator could undo or minimize any such effect by disposing of the assets at any time after the initial transaction. On the other hand, if violation of an order prohibiting “acquiring” assets were treated as a single violation, any deterrent effect of the penalty provisions would be entirely undermined, and the penalty would be converted into a minor tax upon a violation which could reap large financial benefits to the perpetrator. As we have seen, Congress added the continuing-penalty provisions precisely to avoid such a result.
Ill
Respondent insists, however, that the underlying FTC order was a consent order proscribing only the initial act of acquisition, and that therefore the imposition of daily penalties which might otherwise be mandated cannot be permitted. Its argument is that “acquiring” in the consent order unambiguously refers only to the initial transaction, and that to read it otherwise is to add the words “holding” or “retaining” assets to the literal language of the order. This addition to the language of the order, ITT Continental contends, violates the principle of a line of cases culminating in United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971), that any command of a consent decree or order must be found “within its four corners,” id., at 682, and not by reference to any “purposes” of the parties or of the underlying statutes. See United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). Respondent asks us to conclude that the “ac-quirings” prohibited by the consent order are not capable of persisting over time, and that therefore there can be no “continuing failure or neglect to obey” the order. The Government, on the other hand, contends that the parties meant “acquiring” to include both purchase and retention of assets, and that therefore it is unnecessary to depart from the “four corners” rule of Armour to conclude that there has been a continuing violation.
In Armour, it was first determined that the construction of the consent decree urged by the Government was inconsistent with the express terms of the consent decree it was seeking to enforce. The decree involved in Armour was the Meat Packers Consent Decree of 1920, entered in settlement of an antitrust case filed in District Court. Paragraph fourth of the decree enjoined Armour from engaging in certain businesses. The Greyhound Corporation, which was engaged in some of those businesses, acquired control of Armour. The Government claimed that this acquisition was in violation of the consent decree, contending that the purpose of the decree was structurally to separate the meatpackers from the retail food business entirely, and that the relationship between Armour and Greyhound was therefore prohibited.
The Court noted that the language of the decree “taken in its natural sense, bars only active conduct on the part of the defendants.... [T]he decree does not speak in terms of relationships in general, but, rather, prohibits certain behavior, and in doing so prohibits some but not all economic interrelationship between Armour and the retail food business.... In short, we do not find in the decree a structural separation such as the Government claims.... [T]he decree leaves gaps inconsistent with so complete a separation.” 402 U. S., at 678, 680. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in both Atlantic Refining and Hughes the Court first undertook to determine whether the language of the decree could support the construction urged by the Government and concluded that it could not. In Hughes, the decree provided that Hughes was either to dispose of his stock in a certain corporation or commit the voting rights of his stock to a trustee “until [he] shall have sold his holdings of stock.” 342 U. S., at 355 n. The Court said: “A reading of the either/or wording would make most persons believe that Hughes was to have • a choice of two different alternatives. Hughes would have no choice if the first 'alternative’ was to sell the stock and the second 'alternative’ was also to sell the stock.” Id., at 356. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, the Court concluded, the consent decree could not be construed, as the Government desired, to require Hughes to sell his stock.
In Atlantic Refining, the Court concluded that the construction urged by the Government was a “strained construction,” 360 U. S., at 22, inconsistent with the “normal meaning,” id., at 23, of the language used. It commented that if the parties had intended the meaning urged by the Government, “one can hardly think of less appropriate language.” Id., at 22.
In all three of these cases, it was only after concluding that the language, fairly read, could not support the Government’s construction that the Court turned to the contention that the restrictive reading was inconsistent with the purposes of the decree and of the antitrust laws assertedly violated. It was in this context that the Court noted that, because consent decrees are normally compromises in which the parties give up something they might have won in litigation and waive their rights to litigation, it is inappropriate to search for the “purpose” of a consent decree and construe it on that basis. “[T]he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.... [T]he instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.” Armour, 402 U. S., at 681-682. Thus, the basic import of Armour, Atlantic Refining, and Hughes is that, since consent decrees and orders have many of the attributes of ordinary contracts, they should be construed basically as contracts, without reference to the legislation the Government originally sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation.
We note that this case differs from Armour, Hughes, and Atlantic Refining in a most important respect. In each of those cases the question of whether or not the consent decree was violated was the question for decision; in this case respondent was found to have committed violations, and the issue before us affects only the manner of assigning penalties for each violation found. Thus, respondent is subject to some penalty, and there is no possibility as there was in Armour, Atlantic Refining, and Hughes that respondent will be penalized for behavior not prohibited at all by the order “within its four corners,” Armour, 402 U. S., at 682. Nothing in the consent order suggests that although the parties agreed that Continental would refrain from “acquiring,” they also agreed to limit the penalties which would otherwise apply if Continental did not refrain from that behavior. Such an agreement would be exceedingly odd, for it would undermine whatever prohibitions were imposed. As we have seen, Part II, supra, it is quite possible that under §§ 21 (1) and 45 (l) violation of an FTC adjudicated order against “acquiring” would be subject to daily penalties. It is not clear that Armour would require a different result merely because we are dealing with a consent order, since the parties reached no agreement at all concerning penalties to be applied in case of violation of the order.
We need not, however, determine whether §§ 21 (l) and 45 (l) would permit the imposition of daily penalties even if the consent order must be read as respondent maintains to proscribe only the initial act of acquisition. For we agree with the Government that the order “as it is written” does support an interpretation that the act of acquisition continues until the assets acquired are disgorged.
IV
Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the decree. Such reliance does not in any way depart from the “four corners” rule of Armour.
In this case, the consent order was part of an agreement between the parties entitled “Agreement Containing Consent Order to Divest and to Cease and Desist.” The agreement incorporates by reference an “appendix,” which sets forth at length the background leading to the complaint and the proposed order. In addition, the agreement provides that “[t]he complaint may be used in construing the terms of the order.” Since the parties' themselves so provided, both the appendix and the complaint are proper aids to the construction of the order and of the agreement of which it is part.
The complaint alleged that Continental had pursued “a continuous practice of acquiring various bakeries throughout the United States” (emphasis supplied), which were thereby “eliminated... as independent competitive factors in the manufacture, sale and distribution of bread and bread-type rolls....” If the “acquiring” against which the order and the complaint incorporated in it were directed were limited to the single transaction by which Continental obtained rights in another company, it is hard to see why the effect which the complaint alleged followed from acquisitions would necessarily occur. For if Continental had sold the companies acquired as soon as the initial transactions were completed to other, independent companies, the bakeries would not have been “eliminated... as independent competitive factors.”
Reference to the appendix also supports the conclusion that “acquiring” as used in the order means both the initial transaction granting Continental rights in an independent bakery and the maintaining of those rights without resale. The appendix notes: “One of the principal problems in the baking industry is the tendency towards concentration and the continuous growth of major baking companies through acquisition. Such ac-quisitional growth and tendency towards concentration places in the hands of a few large companies the means to set the pattern of competition.... If this order is adopted by the Commission, the respondent’s alleged continuous practice of acquiring companies baking and selling bread and bread-type rolls will be brought to a halt....” (Emphasis supplied.) It is apparent that the “acquisitional growth” referred to in the appendix cannot be achieved merely by discrete transactions without reference to what is done with the assets obtained after those transactions. If Continental were merely a speculator in baking companies, buying assets in them and selling them soon thereafter, it would not necessarily create “through acquisition” a “tendency towards concentration” giving it the “means to set the pattern of competition.” Thus, “acquiring” in both the appendix and the order, parts of the same agreement, must mean obtaining and retaining assets, not merely the former.
Even without the aid of these explanatory documents properly usable to construe this particular order, we would have to conclude that “acquiring” as used in an antitrust decree or order continues until the assets obtained are disgorged. As the foregoing analysis of the ancillary documents here illustrates, “acquiring” and related words do not, as respondent insists, unambiguously refer to a single transaction. Rather, as a matter of ordinary usage they can, and in the antitrust context they do, encompass the continuing act of obtaining certain rights and treating them as one’s own. We must assume that the parties here used the words with the specialized meaning they have in the antitrust field, since they were composing a legal document in settlement of an antitrust complaint.
We need not go beyond the Clayton Act itself to conclude that “acquisition” as used in § 7 of the Act means holding as well as obtaining assets. The Act provides that the FTC, if it finds a violation of § 7, can require a party to “divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 天