Task: songer_confess

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court conclude that a confession or an incriminating statement was improperly admitted? Consider only incriminating statements made by the defendant." Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless". 

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Coleman was a passenger in the car involved in the Sheriff Road robbery and killing. Facts are stated in our opinion in Jackson v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. -, 313 F.2d 572 (1962).
The police questioned Coleman on six or seven separate occasions, and as far as appears could have questioned him again at will, before they arrested him at 6:45 p. m. on January 17, 1961. They took him across town to a police station and locked him in a room. Between 7:30 and 8:00 p. m. he was interrogated and made a non-incriminatory statement about his whereabouts at the time of the crime. He was again locked up alone from 8:00 to about 8:45. Three officers then arrived who ha<J been called for the admitted purpose of questioning him. Questioning was resumed, and a “ ‘threshold’ ” confession was obtained at 8:50. From 9:10 to 10:50 p. m. it was reduced to writing. He was then “booked”. He was not brought before a magistrate until 10:00 a. m. the next day.
There was unnecessary delay. As long ago as 1946 we said that “both by law and practice” a prisoner may be brought before a committing magistrate “at any hour.” Akowskey v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354, 158 F.2d 649, 650. We recently said: “[N]ot only a magistrate, but an Assistant United States Attorney, are, and were * * * available to the police twenty-four hours a day.” Jones v. United States, 113 U.S. App.D.C. 256, 307 F.2d 397, 399 (1962). Cf. Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th Cir., 1960). If because of some extraordinary circumstance no magistrate were available, it would not follow that questioning could continue. The time between arrest and confession was not, as we said it was in the Heideman case, “consumed only by the questions * * * and by the preparing of papers, booking, photographing, fingerprinting and transportation * * Heideman v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 128, 131, 259 F.2d 943, 946 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959, 79 S.Ct. 800, 3 L.Ed. 2d 767 (1959). The delay was “of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession.” Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). Since the confessions were obtained during an unnecessary and therefore unlawful detention they should have been excluded. F.R.Crim.P. 5(a); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). Other cases are cited in our opinion in Tatum v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. -, 313 F.2d 579. Failure to exclude the confessions was prejudicial error and the judgment must be reversed. Jones v. United States, supra.
Since there must be a new trial, we consider claims of error based on the contention that there was no evidence that appellant aided or abetted in the shooting and that, therefore, he could not be guilty of murder in the second degree. These claims must be rejected. “All those who assemble themselves together with an intent to commit a wrongful act, the execution whereof makes probable in the nature of things a crime not specifically designed, but incidental to that which was the object of the confederacy, are responsible * * * for the acts of each, if done in pursuance of, or as incidental to, the common design.” Turberville v. United States, 112 U.S.App. D.C. 400, 402-403, 303 F.2d 411, 413-414 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946, 82 S.Ct. 1596, 1607, 8 L.Ed.2d 813 (1962). The jury could reasonably regard the shooting as incidental to the common design of robbery. The court did not instruct specifically on “common purpose”, but the general instructions on aiding and abetting were adequate and counsel for Coleman did not object to them.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. Quoting 1 Wharton, Criminal Law § 258 (12th ed. 1932).
1. “A confession [made] during a period of necessary delay in arraignment is not inadmissible because that period was followed by a period of unnecessary delay.” See Lockley v. United States, 106 U.S. App.D.C. 163, at 166, 270 F.2d 915, at 918 (1959).

Question: Did the court conclude that a confession or an incriminating statement was improperly admitted? Consider only incriminating statements made by the defendant.
A. No
B. Yes
C. Yes, but error was harmless
D. Mixed answer
E. Issue not discussed
Answer:

Answer: B