Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
The question for decision is whether or not appellee, the insurer, is liable under the terms of its employer’s liability policy to reimburse the insured, appellant, for monies expended by it in a prudent and good-faith settlement of a claim for damages resulting from lead poisoning. Our decision turns upon whether or not the injury sustained was accidentally suffered. The trial court submitted the question to a jury, which returned a verdict for the ap-pellee.
The contract indemnified the insured against liability resulting from personal injuries accidentally suffered, or alleged to have been suffered by reason of accident, by any of insured’s employees. While the policy was in force, one Knowles was employed by appellant to scrape the lead sheathing of certain underground cables in Miami, Florida. Knowles and his helper performed this work in underground manholes in which the ventilation was very poor. In most of these manholes, the workers were equipped with a blower, propelled by an electric motor, which forced out the foul air and drew in the pure air; but no electricity was available to propel the blowers in the series of manholes where the injury was sustained, and, equipped only with ineffective masks, the men worked for almost three weeks in atmosphere so laden with lead that their clothing became coated with films of lead dust, and quantities of it were absorbed into their systems through the skin and lungs. Frequently during each day they climbed out to obtain fresh air, but, despite this precaution, each suffered several attacks of acute lead poisoning, and was taken to the hospital in a serious condition before the work was completed.
These facts were promptly communicated to the insurer, which declined either to make any investigation thereof or to defend the subsequently filed suit, in accordance with the terms of the policy, on the ground that the injuries sustained were no): indemnified. Thereafter, the insured settled the claim and filed this suit on the insurance contract to enforce reimbursement. The denial of liability by the insurer is based upon two grounds. It contends that the lead poisoning is an occupational disease, and, if not an occupational disease, still it was not accidentally caused. It offered no evidence on the trial below, and the material facts are not in dispute.
We agree with appellant that the lead poisoning, so contracted, was not an occupational disease. These were the first cases of lead poisoning among appellant’s employees, although the lead conduits required scraping at regular intervals. During a period of three years, these workmen suffered no ill effects from the performance of their duties in manholes where proper working conditions prevailed, and there is no evidence to show that such duties, so performed, normally result in lead poisoning.
The chain of causation began, not with the commencement of the work on the cables, but with the performance of that work in the dangerous atmosphere of the unventilated manholes. The cause of the malady was not the occupation per se; it was the failure of the company to use reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place in which to pursue that occupation, or reasonably safe appliances with which to work. This disease was not the usual and necessary incident to the work done, or a gradual development under ordinary working conditions, which are essential characteristics of an occupational disease. Was the injury accidentally sustained? Did it happen by chance or unexpectedly, not according to the usual course of things? Was it undesigned and unintended? Webster’s New International Dictionary; Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third Revision; United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121, 9 S.Ct. 755, 31 L.Ed. 60.
A disease which is not the ordinary result of an employee’s work, not reasonably to be anticipated as a consequence of pursuing same, but contracted by reason of unusual circumstances connected therewith, is an accidental injury. Todd Dry Docks v. Marshall, 9 Cir., 61 F.2d 671. Also, it is an accidental injury if it occurs unexpectedly, not in the course of natural events, and is capable of being traced to a definite time, place, and cause. Salinas v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 67 F.2d 829; Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York v. Neas, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 137.
In this case, the disease promptly followed an unusual manner of performing the work, without the intervention of any other known cause. For three yeab449-15rs, two workmen pursued their occupation under normal conditions; no illness resulted. For less than three weeks, the same workmen pursued the identical occupation under unusual conditions; both contracted lead poisoning. Thus the line of demarcation in this case is unmistakable, and the disease is directly traceable to a definite time, place, and cause. Cf. Taylor Dredging Company v. Travelers Insurance Company, 2 Cir., 90 F.2d 449. The testimony in behalf of appellant that the injury was unforeseen and unexpected by it is uncpntradictcd, and the inference is clear that the workmen anticipated no such result. The only reasonable inference that can fairly be drawn from the evidence is that the disease resulted from an injury accidentally suffered within the coverage of the policy. The peremptory instruction requested by the appellant should have been granted.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Salmas v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 67 F.2d 829; Cf. Cannella v. Gulf Refining Company, La.App., 154 So. 406.
Cf. Horrell v. Hickok, 57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N.E.2d 358.
Cf. Johnson Oil Refining Company v. Guthrie, 167 Okl. 83, 27 P.2d 814, 90 A.L.R. 616; Barron v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 464; Cannella v. Gulf Refining Company, supra; Dailey v. River Raisin Paper Company, 269 Mich. 443, 257 N. W. 857.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1