Task: songer_respond1_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

FRANK, Circuit Judge.
1. We think that a stay, pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, is not “substantive” within the meaning of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, and Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079. We so held, per Judge Learned Hand, in Murray Oil Products Company v. Mitsui & Company, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 381, 383, where we said: “Ai'bitration is merely a form of trial, to be adopted in the action itself, in place of a trial at common law: it is like a reference to a master, or an ‘advisory trial’ under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(c), 28 U.S.C.A.”
2. Section 3 applies whether or not the agreement is of a kind covered by Sec. 2, i. e., for purposes of Sec. 3, the agreement need not involve a maritime transaction or interstate or foreign commerce. The power to enact Sec. 3 derives from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. See, e. g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 297, 298, affirmed 293 U.S. 449, 55 S.Ct. 313, 79 L.Ed. 583; Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 854.
3. Plaintiff argues that Section 3 deals with a suit “brought in any of the courts of the United States” and therefore not with a removed suit. We cannot agree. Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., supra, was a removed suit; see also Parry v. Bache, 5 Cir., 125 F.2d 493, 495.
4. Section 1 of the Act provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” We need not in this case decide whether this clause is restricted in its application to those sections of the Act relating to interstate and foreign commerce or whether it applies to all sections, including Section 3. For assuming, arguendo, that the second interpretation is correct, we think the clause irrelevant here. The words “any other class of workers”, read in connection with the immediately preceding words, show an intention to exclude contracts of employment of a “class” of “workers” like “seamen” or “railroad employees.” Plaintiff was not hired as a “worker” but as a plant superintendent, at a salary of $15,000 a year, with managerial duties fundamentally different from those of “workers.”
The California arbitration statute excludes from its scope “contracts pertaining to labor.” Code Civ.Proc. § 1280. The California courts have held that this exclusion does not cover a contract with a sales manager, hired at a salary of $100 per week; Kerr v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2d 85, 59 P.2d 821; or one with a motion-picture actor to be paid $1,000 per week; Universal Pictures Corp. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.2d 490, 50 P.2d 500. See also Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770, 773, 129 A.L.R. 956. We think these decisions most persuasive.
Reversed.
. For a variety of conclusions as to the meaning and application of this clause, see, e.g., Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 3 Cir., 138 F.2d 3, 149 A.L.R. 271; Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 3 Cir., 151 F.2d 311; Amalgamated Association v. Greyhound Lines, 3 Cir., 192 F.2d 310; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Association, 3 Cir., 193 F.2d 327; Tenney Engineering Co. v. United Electrical R. & M. Workers, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 450; Shirley-Herman Co., Inc., v. International Hod-Carriers, 2 Cir., 182 F.2d 806, 809, 17 A.L.R.2d 609; Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. United States, 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 854; International Union v. Colonial Hardware Flooring Co., 4 Cir., 168 F.2d 33; Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 6 Cir., 142 F.2d 876; Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, D.C. S.D.N.Y., 95 F.Supp. 851; Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, D.C.Del., 108 F.Supp. 45.
. See discussion of the background of this clause in Tenney Engineering Co. v. United Electrical R. & M. Workers, 3 Cir., 207 F.2d 450, 452-453.
. Note, inter alia, the provision contemplating that plaintiff might perform services “as a member of the management committee” and might be “elected an officer or director.”

Question: This question concerns the first listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: A