Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like many federal statutes, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations. We held in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 660 (1987), that federal courts should apply “the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations” to claims based on asserted violations of § 1981. Three years after our decision in Goodman, Congress enacted a catchall 4-year statute of limitations for actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. 28 U. S. C. § 1658. The question in this case is whether petitioners’ causes of action, which allege violations of § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, are governed by § 1658 or by the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum State.
I
Petitioners are African-American former employees of respondent’s Chicago manufacturing division. On November 25,1996, petitioners filed this class action alleging violations of their rights under § 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act. Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chicago plant. Respondent sought summary judgment on the ground that petitioners’ claims are barred by the applicable Illinois statute of limitations because they arose more than two years before the complaint was filed. Petitioners responded that their claims are governed by § 1658, which provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.” Section 1658 was enacted on December 1, 1990. Thus, petitioners’ claims are subject to the 4-year statute of limitations if they arose under an Act of Congress enacted after that date.
The original version of the statute now codified at Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. It was amended in minor respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-169, n. 8 (1976), but its basic coverage did not change prior to 1991. As first enacted, § 1981 provided in relevant part that “all persons [within the jurisdiction of the United States] shall have the same right, in every State and Territory... to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 14 Stat. 27. We held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989), that the statutory right “to make and enforce contracts” did not protect against harassing conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract. Under that holding, it is clear that petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, and refusal to transfer claims do not state violations of the original version of §1981. In 1991, however, Congress responded to Patterson by adding a new subsection to § 1981 that defines the term “ ‘make and enforce contracts’ ” to include the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b). It is undisputed that petitioners have alleged violations of the amended statute. The critical question, then, is whether petitioners’ causes of action “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act or under § 1981 as originally enacted.
The District Court determined that petitioners’ wrongful termination, refusal to transfer, and hostile work environment claims arose under the 1991 Act and therefore are governed by §1658. Adams v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 149 F. Supp. 2d 459 (ND Ill. 2001). In its view, the plain text of § 1658 compels the conclusion that, “whenever Congress, after December 1990, passes legislation that creates a new cause of action, the catch-all statute of limitations applies to that cause of action.” Id., at 464. The 1991 amendment to § 1981 falls within that category, the court reasoned, because it opened the door to claims of postcontract discrimination that, under Patterson, could not have been brought under § 1981 as enacted. 149 F. Supp. 2d, at 464.
The District Court certified its ruling for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals reversed. 305 F. 3d 717 (CA7 2002). It concluded that § 1658 “applies only when an act of Congress creates a wholly new cause of action, one that does not depend on the continued existence of a statutory cause of action previously enacted and kept in force by the amendment.” Id., at 726. The 1991 amendment does not satisfy that test, the court explained, because the text of § 1981(b) “simply cannot stand on its own”; instead, it merely redefines a term in the original statute without altering the text that “provides the basic right of recovery for an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated.” Id., at 727.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that §1658 does not apply to a cause of action based on a post-1990 amendment to a pre-existing statute is consistent with decisions from the Third and Eighth Circuits. See Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F. 3d 220, 224 (CA3 2000); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F. 3d 780, 798 (CA8 2001). Conversely, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that § 1658 applies “whenever Congress, after December 1990, passes legislation that creates a new cause of action,” whether or not the legislation amends a pre-existing statute. Harris v. Allstate Insurance Co., 300 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (CA10 2002); accord, Anthony v. BTR Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc., 339 F. 3d 506, 514 (CA6 2003). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits, 538 U. S. 1030 (2003), and now reverse.
II
Petitioners, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, argue that reversal is required by the “plain language” of § 1658, which prescribes a 4-year statute.of limitations for “civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted after” December 1, 1990. They point out that the 1991 Act is, by its own terms, an “Act” of Congress that was “enacted” after December 1,1990. See Pub. L. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071. Moreover, citing our interpretations of the term “arising under” in other federal statutes and in Article III of the Constitution, petitioners maintain that their causes of action arose under the 1991 Act.
Respondent concedes that the 1991 Act qualifies as an “Act of Congress enacted” after 1991, but argues that the meaning of the term “arising under” is not so clear. We agree. Although our expositions of the “arising under” concept in other contexts are helpful in interpreting the term as it is used in § 1658, they do not point the way to one obvious answer. For example, Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that a case arises under federal law for purposes of Article III jurisdiction whenever federal law “forms an ingredient of the original cause,” Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), supports petitioners’ view that their causes of action arose under the 1991 amendment to § 1981, because the 1991 Act clearly “forms an ingredient” of petitioners’ claims. But the same could be said of the original version of § 1981. Thus, reliance on Osborn would suggest that petitioners’ causes of action arose under the pre-1991 version of § 1981 as well as under the 1991 Act, just as a cause of action may arise under both state and federal law. As the Court of Appeals observed, however, §1658 does not expressly “address the eventuality when a cause of action ‘aris[es] under’ two different Aets,’ one enacted before and one enacted after the effective date of §1658.” 305 F. 3d, at 724.
Petitioners argue that we should look not at Article III, but at how Congress has used the term “arising under” in federal legislation. They point in particular to the statutes in Title 28 that define the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. We have interpreted those statutes to mean that a claim arises under federal law if federal law provides a necessary element of the plaintiff’s claim for relief. Petitioners recognize that we have construed the term more broadly in other statutes, but argue that the placement of § 1658 in Title 28 suggests that Congress meant to invoke our interpretation of the neighboring jurisdictional rules. We hesitate to place too much significance on the location of a statute in the United States Code. But even if we accepted the proposition that Congress intended the term “arising under” to have the same meaning in § 1658 as in other sections of Title 28, it would not follow that the text is unambiguous. We have said that “[t]he most familiar definition of the statutory ‘arising under’ limitation” is the statement by Justice Holmes that a suit “ ‘arises under the law that creates the cause of action,’ ” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1983) (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916)). On one hand, that statement could support petitioners’ view that their causes of action arose under the 1991 Act, which created a statutory right that did not previously exist. On the other hand, it also could support respondent’s claim that petitioners’ causes of action arose under the original version of § 1981, which contains the operative language setting forth the elements of their claims. Justice Holmes’ formulation even could support the view that petitioners’ claims arose under both versions of the statute. Cf. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.) (“It has come to be realized that Mr. Justice Holmes’ formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended”). In order to ascertain Congress’ intent, therefore, we must look beyond the bare text of § 1658 to the context in which it was enacted and the purposes it was designed to accomplish.
Ill
In Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478, 483 (1980), we observed that Congress’ failure to enact a uniform statute of limitations applicable to federal causes of action created a “void which is commonplace in federal statutory law.” Over the years that void has spawned a vast amount of litigation. Prior to the enactment of § 1658, the “settled practice [was] to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it [was] not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 266-267 (1985). Such “[[limitation borrowing,” Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S., at 484, generated a host of issues that required resolution on a statute-by-statute basis. For éxample, it often was difficult to determine which of the forum State’s statutes of limitations was the most appropriate to apply to the federal claim. We wrestled with that issue in Wilson v. Garcia, in which we considered which state statute provided the most appropriate limitations principle for claims arising under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 471 U. S., at 268, 276-279 (resolving split of authority over whether the closest state analogue to an action brought under § 1983 was an action for tortious injury to the rights of another, an action on an unwritten contract, or an action for a liability on a statute). Before reaching that question, however, we first had to determine whether the characterization of a §1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes was an issue of state or federal law and whether all such claims should be characterized in the same way. Ibid. Two years later, in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., we answered the same three questions for claims arising under § 1981. 482 U. S., at 660, 661-662. Both decisions provoked dissent and further litigation.
The practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations also forced courts to address the “frequently present problem of a conflict of laws in determining which State statute [was] controlling, the law of the forum or that of the situs of the injury.” S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-6 (1955) (discussing problems caused by borrowing state statutes of limitations for antitrust claims). Even when courts were able to identify the appropriate state statute, limitations borrowing resulted in uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants, as a plaintiff alleging a federal claim in State A would find herself barred by the local statute of limitations while a plaintiff raising precisely the same claim in State B would be permitted to proceed. Ibid. Interstate variances of that sort could be especially confounding in class actions because they often posed problems for joint resolution. See Memorandum from R. Marcus, Assoc. Reporter to Workload Subcommittee (Sept. 1, 1989), reprinted in App. to Vol. 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports (1990), Doc. No. 5, p. 10 (hereinafter Marcus Memorandum). Courts also were forced to grapple with questions such as whether federal or state law governed when an action was “commenced,” or when service of process had to be effectuated. See Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F. 2d 229 (CA7 1986) (addressing those issues in the wake of our decision in Wilson). And the absence of a uniform federal limitations period complicated the development of federal law on the question when, or under what circumstances, a statute of limitations could be tolled. See 802 F. 2d, at 234-242 (discussing conflicting authority "on whether tolling was a matter of state or federal law); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S., at 485 (explaining that “ ‘borrowing’ logically included [state] rules of tolling”).
'Those problems led both courts and commentators to “cal[l] upon Congress to eliminate these complex cases, that do much to consume the time and energies of judges but that do little to advance the cause of justice, by enacting federal limitations periods for all federal causes of action.” Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F. 2d, at 246. Congress answered that call by creating the Federal Courts Study Committee, which recommended the enactment of a retroactive, uniform federal statute of limitations. As we have noted, § 1658 applies only to claims arising under statutes enacted after December 1, 1990, but it otherwise follows the Committee’s recommendation. The House Report accompanying the final bill confirms that Congress was keenly aware of the problems associated with the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations, and that a central purpose of § 1658 was to minimize the occasions for that practice.
The history that led to the enactment of § 1658 strongly supports an interpretation that fills more rather than less of the void that has created so much unnecessary work for federal judges. The interpretation favored by respondent and the Court of Appeals subverts that goal by restricting § 1658 to cases in which the plaintiff’s cause of action is based solely on a post-1990 statute that “ ‘establishes a new cause of action without reference to preexisting law.’ ” 305 F. 3d, at 727 (quoting Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F. 3d, at 225). On that view, § 1658 would apply only to a small fraction of post-1990 enactments. Congress routinely creates new rights of action by amending existing statutes, and “[altering statutory definitions, or adding new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of amending statutes.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 308 (1994). Nothing in the text or history of § 1658 supports an interpretation that would limit its reach to entirely new sections of the United States Code. An amendment to an existing statute is no less an “Act of Congress” than a new, stand-alone statute. What matters is the substantive effect of an enactment — the creation of new rights of action and corresponding liabilities — not the format in which it appears in the Code.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 1658 must be given a narrow scope lest it disrupt litigants’ settled expectations. The court observed that Congress refused to make §1658 retroactive because, “‘with respect to many statutes that have no explicit limitations provision, the relevant limitations period has long since been resolved by judicial decision,’ ” and “ ‘retroactively imposing a four year statute of limitations on legislation that the courts have previously ruled is subject to a six month limitations period in one [State], and a ten year period in another, would threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of... many parties.’” 305 F. 3d, at 725-726 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 101-734, p. 24 (1990)). Concerns about settled expectations provide a valid reason to reject an interpretation of § 1658 under which any new amendment to federal law would suffice to trigger the 4-year statute of limitations, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claim would have been available — and subject to a state statute of limitations — prior to December 1, 1990. Such concerns do not, however, carry any weight against the reading of § 1658 adopted by the District Court and urged by petitioners, under which the catchall limitations period applies only to causes of action that were not available until after § 1658 was enacted. If a cause of action did not exist prior to 1990, potential litigants could not have formed settled expectations as to the relevant statute of limitations that would then be disrupted by application of § 1658.
We conclude that a cause of action “aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted” after December 1,1990 — and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations — if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment. That construction best serves Congress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations while at the same time protecting settled interests. It spares federal judges and litigants the need to identify the appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to new claims but leaves in place the “borrowed” limitations periods for pre-existing causes of action, with respect to which the difficult work already has been done.
Interpreting § 1658 to apply whenever a post-1990 enactment creates a new right to maintain an action also is consistent with the common usage of the word “arise” to mean “come into being; originate” or “spring up.” Finally, that construction is consistent with our interpretations of the term “arising under” as it is used in statutes governing the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. By contrast, nothing in our case law supports an interpretation as narrow as that endorsed by the Court of Appeals, under which “arising under” means something akin to “based solely upon.” We should avoid reading § 1658 in such a way as to give the familiar statutory language a meaning foreign to every other context in which it is used.
IV
In this case, petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act in the sense that petitioners’ causes of action were made possible by that Act. Patterson held that “racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under § 1981.” 491 U. S., at 171 (emphasis added). The 1991 Act overturned Patterson by defining the key “make and enforce contracts” language in § 1981 to include the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b). In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., we recognized that the 1991 amendment “enlarged the category of conduct that is subject to § 1981 liability,” 511 U. S., at 303, and we therefore held that the amendment does not apply “to a case that arose before it was enacted,” id., at 300. Our reasoning in Rivers supports the conclusion that the 1991 Act fully qualifies as “an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1,1990]” within the meaning of §1658. Because petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims did not allege a violation of the pre-1990 version of § 1981 but did allege violations of the amended statute, those claims “ar[ose] under” the amendment to § 1981 contained in the 1991 Act.
While that conclusion seems eminently clear in this case, respondent has posited various hypothetical cases in which it might be difficult to determine whether a particular claim arose under the amended or the unamended version of a statute. Similarly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that applying §1658 to post-1990 amendments ’ could be problematic in some cases because “'the line between an amendment that modifies an existing right and one that creates a new right is often difficult to draw.’” 305 F. 3d, at 725 (quoting Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F. 3d, at 224). We are not persuaded that any “guess work,” 305 F. 3d, at 725, is required to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the relevant statute as it stood prior to December 1, 1990, or whether her claims necessarily depend on a subsequent amendment. Courts routinely make such determinations when dealing with amendments (such as the 1991 amendment to §1981) that do not apply retroactively. In any event, such hypothetical problems pale in comparison with the difficulties that federal courts faced

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 选