Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM:
The Sheriff of the City of Charlottesville, Virginia, appeals from an order of the district court which declared Virginia’s disorderly conduct statute to be unconstitutional and granted Stephen Earl Squire a writ of habeas corpus.
At an ROTC review, Squire demonstrated against the Vietnam War by carrying a placard stating “In Vietnam we killed millions to avoid a bloodbath.” An official of the University ordered Squire to leave. When he refused, the official confiscated his sign, after a tussle in which no one was hurt. Squire demanded the return of his sign and again refused to leave. Police led him from the stadium without resistance and arrested him for disorderly conduct.
The state trial court instructed the jury that “disorderly conduct is such behavior as tends to disturb peace and good order.” It declined to give the following instruction which Squire offered:
“The peaceful display of the sign being held by the Defendant in this case at the time it was taken from his hands by [the University official] was protected conduct under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and therefore did not constitute disorderly conduct per se.”
Squire was sentenced to a term of four months in jail and to pay a fine of $600. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, which granted a writ of error to review his claim that the Municipal Court of Charlottesville lacked territorial jurisdiction but denied a writ to review the constitutionality of Virginia’s disorderly conduct statute. Squire v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 260, 199 S.E.2d 534 (1973).
Squire concedes he could have been prosecuted for criminal trespass. The Commonwealth, however, elected to try him for disorderly conduct, and thus the sole issue presented by this' appeal is the constitutionality of the Virginia disorderly conduct statute, Va.Code Ann. § 18.1-253.2 (Cum.Supp.1974). That statute provides in part:
“If any person behaves in a riotous or disorderly manner in any street, highway, public building, or any other public place, other than those mentioned in the preceding section ... or causes any unnecessary disturbance in or on any public conveyance, by running through it, climbing through windows or upon the seats, failing to move to another seat when lawfully requested to so move by the operator, or otherwise annoying passengers or employees therein, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
The Supreme Court of Virginia has construed the disorderly conduct statute to include speech, and it has approved a definition which describes the offense as conduct “of a nature to corrupt the public morals or to outrage the sense of public decency, whether committed by words or acts.” Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 890, 45 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1947). In dictum, the Court has also suggested that the statute may be violated by words having “a vicious or injurious tendency, offensive to good morals or public decency.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 214, 221, 46 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1948).
After carefully examining the issue, the district court concluded that the statute violated three constitutional values: (1) it did not inform a defendant what conduct is proscribed; (2) it allowed policemen, prosecutors, and courts to impose their own personal predilections in determining what should be permissible behavior; and (3) it could inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights because it has been construed to embrace speech, which, unaccompanied by acts, need do no more than outrage the sense of public decency. Squire v. Pace, 380 F.Supp. 269 (W.D.Va.1974). The district court’s judgment that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution rests on sound principles. See, e. g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0