Task: sc_issuearea

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.

Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-A.
Petitioner was sentenced to death for committing a kid-naping resulting in death to the victim. His sentence was imposed under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III). We are presented with three questions: whether petitioner was entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock; whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was led to believe that petitioner would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation; and whether the submission to the jury of two allegedly duplicative, vague, and overbroad nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless error. We answer “no” to the first two questions. As for the third, we are of the view that there was no error in allowing the jury to consider the challenged factors. Assuming error, arguendo, we think it clear that such error was harmless.
I
Petitioner Louis Jones, Jr., kidnaped Private Trade Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. He brought her to his house and sexually assaulted her. Soon thereafter, petitioner drove Private McBride to a bridge just outside of San Angelo, where he repeatedly struck her in the head with a tire iron until she died. Petitioner administered blows of such severe force that, when the victim’s body was found, the medical examiners observed that large pieces of her skull had been driven into her cranial cavity or were missing.
The Government charged petitioner with, inter alia, kid-naping with death resulting to the victim, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Exercising its discretion under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq., the Government decided to seek the latter sentencing option. Petitioner was tried in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas and found guilty by the jury.
The District Court then conducted a separate sentencing hearing pursuant to § 3593. As an initial matter, the sentencing jury was required to find that petitioner had the requisite intent, see § 3591(a)(2); it concluded that petitioner intentionally killed his victim and intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury resulting in her'death. Even on a finding of intent, however, a defendant is not death eligible unless the sentencing jury also finds that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors set forth at §3592. See § 3593(e). Because petitioner was charged with committing a homicide, the Government had to prove 1 of the 16 statutory aggravating factors set forth at 18 U. S. C. § 3592(c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (different statutory aggravating factors for other crimes punishable by death are set forth at §§ 3592(b), (d)). The jury unanimously found that two such factors had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt — it agreed that petitioner caused the death of his victim during the commission of another crime, see § 3592(c)(1), and that he committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner, see § 3592(c)(6).
Once petitioner became death eligible, the jury had to decide whether he should receive a death sentence. In making the selection decision, the Act requires that the sentencing jury consider all of the aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether the former outweigh the latter (or, if there are no mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors alone are sufficient to warrant a death sentence). §§ 3591(a), 3592, 3593(e). The Act, however, requires more exacting proof of aggravating factors than mitigating ones— although a jury must unanimously agree that the Government established the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, § 3593(e), the jury may consider a mitigating factor in its weighing process so long as one juror finds that the defendant established its existence by preponderance of the evidence, §§ 3593(c), (d). In addition to the two statutory aggravators that established petitioner’s death eligibility, the jury also unanimously found two aggravators of the nonstatutory variety had been proved: One set forth victim impact evidence and the other victim vulnerability evidence. As for mitigating factors, at least one juror found 10 of the 11 that petitioner proposed and seven jurors wrote in a factor petitioner had not raised on the Special Findings Form.
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury unanimously recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death. App. 57-58. The District Court imposed sentence in accordance with the jury’s recommendation pursuant to §3594. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence. 132 F. 3d 232 (1998). We granted certiorari, 525 U. S. 809 (1998), and now affirm.
II
A
We first decide the question whether petitioner was entitled to an instruction as to the consequences of jury deadlock. Petitioner requested, in relevant part, the following instruction:
“In the event, after due deliberation and reflection, the jury is unable to agree on a unanimous decision as to the sentence to be imposed, you should so advise me and I will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release....
“In the event you are unable to agree on [a sentence of] Life Without Possibility of Release or Death, but you are unanimous that the sentence should not be less than Life Without Possibility of Release, you should report that vote to the Court and the Court will sentence the defendant to Life Without the Possibility of Release.” App. 14-15.
In petitioner’s view, the Eighth Amendment requires that the jurors be instructed as to the effect of their inability to agree. He alternatively argues that we should invoke our supervisory power over the federal courts and require that such an instruction be given.
Before we turn to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment argument, a question of statutory interpretation calls for our attention. The Fifth Circuit held that the District Court did not err in refusing petitioner’s requested instruction because it was not substantively correct. See 132 F. 3d, at 242-243. According to the Court of Appeals, § 3593(b)(2)(C), which provides that a new jury shall be impaneled for a new sentencing hearing if the guilt phase jury is discharged for “good cause,” requires the District Court to impanel a second jury and hold a second sentencing hearing in the event of jury deadlock. Id., at 243. The Government interprets the statute the same way (although its reading is more nuaneed) and urges that the judgment below be affirmed on this ground.
Petitioner, however, reads the Act differently. In his view, whenever the jury reaches a result other than a unanimous verdict recommending a death sentence or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, the duty of sentencing falls upon the district court pursuant to § 3594, which reads:
“Upon a recommendation under section 3593(e) that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly. Otherwise, the court shall impose any lesser sentence that is authorized by law. Notwithstanding any other law, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense is life imprisonment, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.”
Petitioner’s argument is based on his construction of the term “[otherwise.” He argues that this term means that when the jury, after retiring for deliberations, reports itself as unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the sentencing determination passes to the court.
As the dissent also concludes, post, at 417-418, petitioner’s view of the statute is the better one. The phrase “good cause” in § 3593(b)(2)(C) plainly encompasses events such as juror disqualification, but cannot be read so expansively as to include the jury’s failure to reach a unanimous decision. Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.
To be sure, we have said that the Eighth Amendment requires that a sentence of death not be imposed arbitrarily. See, e. g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269, 275 (1998). In order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, it must perform a narrowing function with respect to the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry. Ibid. The instruction that petitioner requested has no bearing on what we have called the “eligibility phase” of the capital sentencing process. As for what we have called the “selection phase,” our cases have held that in order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a “broad inquiry” into all “constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.” Id., at 276. Petitioner does not argue, nor could he, that the District Court’s failure to give the requested instruction prevented the jury from considering such evidence.
In theory, the District Court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the consequences of deadlock could give rise to an Eighth Amendment problem of a different sort: We also have held that a jury cannot be “affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 9 (1994). In no way, however, was the jury affirmatively misled by the District Court's refusal to give petitioner’s proposed instruction. The truth of the matter is that the proposed instruction has no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing process. Rather, it speaks to what happens in the event that the jury is unable to fulfill its role — when deliberations break down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation. Petitioner’s argument, although less than clear, appears to be that a death sentence is arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence an individual juror's voting behavior. That contention has no merit. We have never suggested, for example, that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury be instructed as to the consequences of a breakdown in the deliberative process. On the contrary, we have long been of the view that “[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves.” Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 501 (1896). We further have recognized that in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has “a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 238 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We are of the view that a charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest.
We similarly decline to exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction on the consequences of deadlock be given in every capital ease. In drafting the Act, Congress chose not to require such an instruction. Cf. § 3593(f) (district court “shall instruct the jury that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be”). Petitioner does point us to a decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court requiring, in an exercise of that court’s supervisory authority, that the jury be informed of the sentencing consequences of nonunanimity. See New Jersey v. Ramseur, 106 N. J. 123, 304-315, 524 A. 2d 188, 280-286 (1987). Of course, New Jersey’s practice has no more relevance to our decision than the power to persuade. Several other States have declined to require a similar instruction. See, e. g., North Carolina v. McCarver, 341 N. C. 364, 394, 462 S. E. 2d 25, 42 (1995); Brogie v. Oklahoma, 695 P. 2d 538, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Calhoun v. Maryland, 297 Md. 563, 593-595, 468 A. 2d 45, 58-60 (1983); Coulter v. Alabama, 438 So. 2d 336, 346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Justus v. Virginia, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S. E. 2d 87, 92-98 (1980). We find the reasoning of the 'Virginia Supreme Court in Justus far more persuasive than that of the New Jersey Supreme Court, especially in light of the strong governmental interest that we have recognized in having the jury render a unanimous sentence recommendation:
“The court properly refused an instruction offered by the defendant which would have told the jury that if it could not reach agreement as to the appropriate punishment, the court would dismiss it and impose a life sentence. While this was a correct statement of law it concerned a procedural matter and was not one which should have been the subject of an instruction. It would have been an open invitation for the jury to avoid its responsibility and to disagree.” Id., at 979, 266 S. E. 2d, at 92.
In light of the legitimate reasons for not instructing the jury as to the consequences of deadlock, and in light of congressional silence, we will not exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction of the sort petitioner sought be given in every case. Cf. Shannon v. United States, 512 U. S. 573, 587 (1994).
B
Petitioner further argues that the jury was led to believe that if it could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation he would receive a judge-imposed sentence less severe than life imprisonment, and his proposed instruction as to the consequences of deadlock was necessary to correct the jury’s erroneous impression. Moreover, he contends that the alleged confusion independently warrants reversal of his sentence under the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Act itself. He grounds his due process claim in the assertion that sentences may not be based on materially untrue assumptions, his Eighth Amendment claim in his contention that the jury is entitled to accurate sentencing information, and his statutory claim in an argument that jury confusion over the available sentencing options constitutes an “arbitrary factor” under § 3595(c)(2)(A).
To put petitioner’s claim in the proper context, we must briefly review the jury instructions and sentencing procedures used at trial. After instructing the jury on the aggravating and mitigating factors and explaining the process of weighing those factors, the District Court gave the following instructions pertaining to the jury’s sentencing recommendation:
“Based upon this consideration, you the jury, by unanimous vote, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or sentenced to some other lesser sentence.
“If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the absence of any mitigating factors, that the aggravating factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death, you may recommend a sentence of death. Keep in mind, however, that regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, you are never required to recommend a death sentence.
“If you recommend the imposition of a death sentence, the court is required to impose that sentence. If you recommend a sentence of life without the possibility of release, the court is required to impose that sentence. If you recommend that some other lesser sentence be imposed, the court is required to impose a sentence that is authorized by the law. In deciding what recommendation to make, you are not to be concerned with the question of what sentence the defendant might receive in the event you determine not to recommend a death sentence or a sentence of life without the possibility of release. That is a matter for the court to decide in the event you conclude that a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release should not be recommended.” App. 43-44.
The District Court also provided the jury with four decision forms on which to record its recommendation. In its instructions explaining those forms, the District Court told the jury that its choice of form depended on its recommendation:
“The forms are self-explanatory: Decision Form A should he used if you determine that a sentence of death should not be imposed because the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the required intent on the part of the defendant or a required aggravating factor. Decision Form B should be used if you unanimously recommend that a sentence of death should be imposed. Decision Form C or Decision Form D should be used if you determine that a sentence of death should not be imposed because: (1) you do not unanimously find that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist; (2) you do not unanimously find that the aggravating factor or factors found to exist are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death where no mitigating factor has been found to exist; or (3) regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors you are not unanimous in recommending that a sentence of death should be imposed. Decision Form C should be used if you unanimously recommend that a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of release should be imposed.
"Decision Form D should be used if you recommend that some other lesser sentence should be imposed.” Id., at 47-48.
Petitioner maintains that the instructions in combination with the decision forms led the jury to believe that if it failed to recommend unanimously a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, then it would be required to use Decision Form D and the court would impose a sentence less than life imprisonment. The scope of our review is shaped by whether petitioner properly raised and preserved an objection to the instructions at trial. A party generally may not assign error to a jury instruction if he fails to object before the jury retires or to “stat[e] distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 30. These timeliness and specificity requirements apply during the sentencing phase as well as the trial. See 18 U. S. C. § 3595(e)(2)(C); see also Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 1, 54(a). They enable a trial court to correct any instructional mistakes before the jury retires and in that way help to avoid the burdens of an unnecessary retrial. While an objection in a directed verdict motion before the jury retires can preserve a claim of error, Leary v. United States, 895 U. S. 6, 32 (1969), objections raised after the jury has completed its deliberations do not. See Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 38 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 436 (1963); cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 238-239 (1940). Nor does a request for an instruction before the jury retires preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court. Otherwise, district judges would have to speculate on what sorts of objections might be implied through a request for an instruction and issue rulings on “implied” objections that a defendant never intends to raise. Such a rule would contradict Rule 30’s mandate that a party state distinctly his grounds for objection.
Petitioner did not voice the objections to the instructions and decision forms that he now raises before the jury retired. See App. 16-33. While Rule 30 could be read literally to bar any review of petitioner’s claim of error, our decisions instead have held that an appellate court may conduct a limited review for plain error. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U. S. 461, 465-466 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731-732 (1993); Lopez, supra, at 436-437; Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179, 190-191 (1963). Petitioner, however, contends that the Federal Death Penalty Act creates an exception. He relies on language in the Act providing that an appellate court shall remand a case where it finds that “the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.” § 3595(c)(2)(A). According to petitioner, the alleged jury confusion over the available sentencing options is an arbitrary factor and thus warrants resen-tencing even if he did not properly preserve the objection.
This argument rests on an untenable reading of the Act. The statute does not explicitly announce an exception to plain-error review, and a congressional intent to create snch an exception cannot be inferred from the overall scheme. Statutory language must be read in context and a phrase “gathers meaning from the words around it.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). Here, the same subsection that petitioner relies upon further provides that reversal is warranted where “the proceedings involved any other legal error requiring reversal of the sentence that was properly preserved for appeal under the rules of criminal procedure.” § 3595(c)(2)(C). This language makes clear that Congress sought to impose a timely objection requirement at sentencing and did not intend to equate the phrase “arbitrary factor” with legal error. Petitioner’s broad interpretation of § 3595(c)(2)(A) would drain § 3595(c)(2)(C) of any independent meaning.
We review the instructions, then, for plain error. Under that review, relief is not warranted unless there has been (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights. Johnson, supra, at 467; Olano, supra, at 732. Appellate review under the plain-error doetrine, of course, is circumscribed and we exercise our power under Rule 52(b) sparingly. See United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1, 15 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 163, and n. 14 (1982); cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154 (1977) (“It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court”). An appellate court should exercise its discretion to correct plain error only if it “seriously affeet[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, supra, at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted); Young, supra, at 15; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157, 160 (1936).
Petitioner’s argument — which depends on the premise that the instructions and decision forms led the jury to believe that it did not have to recommend unanimously a lesser sentence — falls short of satisfying even the first requirement of the plain-error doctrine, for we cannot see that any error occurred. We have considered similar claims that allegedly ambiguous instructions caused jury confesión. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1 (1994); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990). The proper standard for reviewing such claims is “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way* that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, supra, at 72 (quoting Boyde, supra, at 380); see also Victor, supra, at 6 (applying reasonable likelihood standard to direct review of state criminal conviction).
There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions incorrectly. The District Court did not expressly inform the jury that it would impose a lesser sentence in case of deadlock. It simply told the jury that, if it recommended a lesser sentence, the court would impose a sentence “authorized by the law.” App. 44. Nor did the District Court expressly require the jury to select Decision Form D if it could not reach agreement. Instead, it exhorted the jury “to discuss the issue of punishment with one another in an effort to reach agreement, if you can do so.” Id., at 46.
Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit instruction on the consequences of nonunanimity, petitioner identifies several passages which, he believes, support the inference that the jury was confused on this point. He trains on that portion of the instructions telling the jurors that the court would decide the sentence if they did not recommend a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release. Petitioner argues that this statement, coupled with two earlier references to a “lesser sentence” option, caused the jurors to infer that the District Court would impose a lesser sentence if they could not unanimously agree on a sentence of death or life without the possibility of release. He maintains that this inference is strengthened by a later instruction: “In order to bring back a verdict recommending the punishment of death or life without the possibility of release, all twelve of you must unanimously vote in favor of such specific penalty.” Id., at 45. According to petitioner, the failure to mention the “lesser sentence” option in this statement strongly implied that, in contradistinction to the first two options, the “lesser sentence” option did not require jury unanimity.
Petitioner parses these passages too finely. Our decisions repeatedly have cautioned that instructions must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the entire charge. See, e. g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U. S. 184, 199 (1998); United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658, 674 (1975); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 107 (1926). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that when these passages are viewed in the context of the entire instructions, they lack ambiguity and cannot be given the reading that petitioner advances. See 132 F. 3d, at 244. We previously have held that instructions that might be ambiguous in the abstract can be cured when read in conjunction with other instructions. Bryan, supra, at 199; Victor, supra, at 14-15; Estelle, supra, at 74-75. Petitioner’s claim is far weaker than those we evaluated in Bryan, Victor, and Estelle because the jury in this case received an explicit in-. struction that it had to be unanimous. Just prior to its admonition that the jury should not concern itself with the ultimate sentence if it does not recommend death or life without the possibility of release, the trial court expressly instructed the jury in unambiguous language that any sentencing recommendation had to be by a unanimous vote. Specifically, it stated that “you the jury, by unanimous vote, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or sentenced to some other lesser sentence.” App. 43. Other instructions, by contrast, specified when the jury did not have to act unanimously. For example, the District Court explicitly told the jury that its findings on the mitigating circumstances, unlike those on the aggravating circumstances, did not have to be unanimous. To be sure, the District Court could have used the phrase “unanimously” more frequently. But when read alongside an unambiguous charge that any sentencing recommendation be unanimous and other instructions explicitly identifying when the jury need not be unanimous, the passages identified by petitioner do not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed that deadlock would cause the District Court to impose a lesser sentence.
Petitioner also relies on alleged ambiguities in the decision forms and the explanatory instructions. He stresses the fact that Decision Form D (lesser sentence recommendation), unlike Decision Forms B (death sentence) and C (life without the possibility of release), did not contain the phrase “by unanimous vote” and required only the foreperson’s signature. These features of Decision Form D, according to petitioner, led the jury to conclude that nonunanimity would result in a lesser sentence. According to petitioner, the instructions accompanying Decision Form D, unlike those respecting Decision Forms B and C, did not mention unanimity, thereby increasing the likelihood of confusion.
With respect to this aspect of petitioner’s argument, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that “[although the verdict forms standing alone could have persuaded a jury to conclude that unanimity was not required for the lesser sentence option, any confusion created by the verdict forms was clarified when considered in light of the entire jury instruction.” 132 F. 3d, at 245. The District Court’s explicit instruction that the jury had to be unanimous and its exhortation to the jury to discuss the punishment and attempt to reach agreement, App. 46, malee it doubtful that the jury thought it was compelled to employ Decision Form D in the event of disagreement.
Petitioner also places too much weight on the fact that Decision Form D required only the foreperson’s signature. Although it only contained a space for the foreperson’s signature, Form D, Like the others, used the phrase “We the jury recommend...,” thereby signaling that Form D represented the jury’s recommendation. Id., at 59. Moreover, elsewhere, the jury foreperson alone signed the jury forms to indicate the jury’s unanimous agreement. Specifically, only the jury foreperson signed the special findings form on which the jury was required to indicate its unanimous agreement that an aggravating factor had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 51-53. In these circumstances, we do not think that the decision forms or accompanying instructions created a reasonable likelihood of confusion over the effect of nonunanimity.
Even assuming, arguendo, that an error occurred (and that it was plain), petitioner cannot show that it affected his substantial rights. Any confusion among the jurors over the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation was allayed by the District Court’s admonition that the jury should not concern itself with the effect of such a recommendation. See supra, at 390 (quoting App. 44). The jurors are presumed to have followed these instructions. See Shannon, 512 U. S., at 585; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987). Even if the jurors had some lingering doubts about the effect of deadlock, therefore, the instructions made clear that they should set aside their concerns and either report that they were unable to reach agreement or recommend a lesser sentence if they believed that this was the only option.
Moreover, even assuming that the jurors were confused over the consequences of deadlock, petitioner cannot show the confusion necessarily worked to his detriment. It is just as likely that the jurors, loath to recommend a lesser sentence, would have compromised on a sentence of life imprisonment as on a death sentence. Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights. Cf. Romano, 512 U. S., at 14. In Romano, we considered a similar argument, namely, that jurors had disregarded a trial judge’s instructions and given undue weight to certain evidence. In rejecting that argument, we noted that, even assuming that the jury disregarded the trial judge’s instructions, “[i]t seems equally plausible that the evidence could have made the jurors more inclined to impose a death sentence, or it could have made them less inclined to do so.” Ibid. Any speculation on the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation, like the evidence in Romano, would have had such an indeterminate effect on the outcome of the proceeding that we cannot conclude that any alleged error in the District Court’s instructions affected petitioner’s substantial rights. See Park, 421 U. S., at 676; Lopez, 373 U. S., at 436-437.
III
A
Apart from the claimed instructional error, petitioner argues that the nonstatutory aggravating factors found and considered by the jury, see n. 2, supra, were vague, over-broad, and duplicative in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the District Court’s error in allowing the jury to consider them was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Eighth Amendment, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, see 132 F. 3d, at 250, permits capital sentencing juries to consider evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s family in deciding whether an eligible defendant should receive a death sentence. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991) (“A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated”). Petitioner does not dispute that, as a general matter, such evidence is appropriate for the sentencing jury’s consideration. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 15. His objection is that the two non-statutory aggravating factors were duplicative, vague, and overbroad so as to render their use in this ease unconstitutional, a point with which the Fifth Circuit agreed, 132 F. 3d, at 250-251, although it ultimately ruled in the Government’s favor on the ground that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id., at 251-252.
The Government here renews its argument that the non-statutory aggravators in this ease were constitutionally valid. At oral argument, however, it was suggested that this case comes to us on the assumption that the nonstatu-tory aggravating factors were invalid because the Government did not cross-appeal on the question. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. As the prevailing party, the Government is entitled to defend the judgment on any ground that it properly raised below. See, e. g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473, 479 (1999); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 364 (1994) (“A prevailing party need not cross-petition to defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below, so long as that party seeks to preserve, and not to change, the. judgment”). It further was suggested that because we granted certiorari on the Government’s rephrasing of petitioner’s questions and because the third question — “whether the court of appeals correctly held that the submission of invalid nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” — presumes error, we must assume the nonstatutory aggravating factors were erroneous. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-27. We are not convinced that the reformulated question presumes error. The question whether the nonstatutory aggravating factors were constitutional is fairly included within the third question presented — we might answer “no” to the question “[w]hether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the submission of invalid nonstatutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” 525 U. S. 809 (1998), by explaining that the Fifth Circuit was incorrect in holding that there was error

Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:

Answer: A