Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Me. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are called upon in these appeals to resolve several questions arising out of a conflict between the asserted taxing power of the State of Montana and the immunity claimed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (Tribe) and its members living on the tribal reservation. Convened as a three-judge court, the District Court for the District of Montana considered separate attacks on the State’s cigarette sales and personal property taxes as applied to reservation Indians. After finding that the suits were not barred by the prohibition of 28 U. S. C. § 1341, the District Court entered final judgments which, with one exception, sustained the Tribe's challenges, and from which the State has appealed (No. 74-1656). The Tribe has cross-appealed from that part of the judgments upholding tax jurisdiction over on-reservation sales of cigarettes by members of the Tribe to non-Indians. We noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 and consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal. 423 U. S. 819 (1975). Concluding that the District Court had the power to grant injunctive relief in favor of the Tribe, and that it was correct on the merits, we affirm in both cases.
I
In 1855 an expanse of land stretching across the Bitter Root River Valley and within the then Territory of Washington was reserved for “the use and occupation” of the “confederated tribes of the Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians,” by the Treaty of Hell Gate, which in 1859 was ratified by the Senate and proclaimed by President Buchanan. 12 Stat. 975. Slightly over half of its 1.25 million acres is now owned in fee, by both Indians and non-Indians; most of the remaining half is held in trust by the United States for the Tribe. Approximately 50% of the Tribe’s current membership of 5,749 resides on the reservation and in turn composes 19% of the total reservation population. Embracing portions of four Montana counties — Lake, Sanders, Missoula, and Flathead — the present reservation was generally described by the District Court:
“The Flathead Reservation is a well-developed agricultural area with farms, ranches and communities scattered throughout the inhabited portions of the Reservation. While some towns have predominantly Indian sectors, generally Indians and non-Indians live together in integrated communities. Banks, businesses and professions on the Reservation provide services to Indians and non-Indians alike.
“As Montana citizens, members of the Tribe are eligible to vote and do vote in city, county and state elections. Some hold elective and appointed state and local offices. All services provided by the state and local governments are equally available to Indians and non-Indians. The only schools on the Reservation are those operated by school districts of the State of Montana. The State and local governments have built and maintain a system of state highways, county roads and streets on the Reservation which are used by Indians and non-Indians without restriction.” 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (1975).
Joseph Wheeler, a member of the Tribe, leased from it two tracts of trust land within the reservation whereon he operated retail “smoke shops.” Deputy sheriffs arrested Wheeler and an Indian employee for failure to possess a cigarette retailer’s license and for selling non-tax-stamped cigarettes, both misdemeanors under Montana law. These individuals, joined by the Tribe and the tribal chairmen, then sued in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State’s cigarette tax and vendor-licensing statutes as applied to tribal members who sold cigarettes within the reservation. That court by a divided vote held that our decision in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973), barred Montana’s efforts to impose its cigarette tax statutes on the Tribe’s retail cigarette sales with one exception: it may require a precollection of the tax imposed by law upon the non-Indian purchaser of the cigarettes.
In a later action, the Tribe and four enrolled members, all residents of the reservation, challenged Montana’s statutory scheme for assessment and collection of personal property taxes, in particular the imposition of such taxes on motor vehicles owned by tribal members residing on the reservation. The District Court, again by a divided vote, found its earlier decision interpreting Mc-Clanahan controlling in the Tribe’s favor. While recognizing, as did the Tribe, that a fee required for registration and issuance of state license plates for a motor vehicle could be exacted from Indians residing on the reservation, the court held that the additional personal property tax which was likewise made a condition precedent for lawful registration of the vehicle could not be imposed on reservation Indians.
II
The important threshold question in both cases is whether the District Court was prohibited from entertaining jurisdiction over these suits to restrain Montana’s taxing authority, inasmuch as Congress has provided that
“[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341.
By enacting this jurisdictional rule, Congress gave explicit sanction to the pre-existing federal equity practice: because interference with a State’s internal economy is inseparable from a federal action to restrain state taxation,
“ 'the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a state... tax is not in itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. If the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts, from which the cause may be brought to this Court for review if any federal question be involved.’ Matthews v. Rodgers, [284 U. S. 521, 525-526 (1932)].” Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 298 (1943).
This broad jurisdictional barrier, however, has been held by this Court to be inapplicable to suits brought by the United States “to protect itself and its instrumen-talities from unconstitutional state exactions.” Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358 (1966).
The District Court, citing Department of Employment and cases from other' courts, concluded:
“While the exceptions to § 1341 have been expressed most often in terms of the Federal instrumentality doctrine, we do not view the exceptions as limited to cases where this doctrine is clearly applicable. It seems clear [that § 1341] does not bar federal court jurisdiction in cases where immunity from state taxation is asserted on the basis of federal law with respect to persons or entities in which the United States has a real and significant interest.” 392 F. Supp., at 1303 (emphasis added).
In its brief the State argues that any reliance on the federal-instrumentality doctrine, either as such or as expanded by the District Court, for purposes of finding jurisdiction in these cases is contrary to the substantive decisions of this Court which “cut to the bone the proposition that restricted Indian lands and the proceeds from them were — as a matter of constitutional law— automatically exempt from state taxation.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 150 (1973). See McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 170 n. 5; Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943).
We have indeed recently declined “the invitation to resurrect the expansive version of the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine that has been so consistently rejected” in this kind of case. Mescalero, supra, at 155. While the concept of a federal instrumentality may well have greater usefulness in determining the applicability of § 1341, Department of Employment v. United States, supra, than in providing the touchstone for deciding whether or not Indian tribes may be taxed, Mescalero, supra, we do not believe that the District Court’s expanded version of this doctrine, quoted above, can by itself avoid the bar of § 1341.
The District Court, however, also relied on a more recent jurisdictional statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1362, which provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Sections 1341 and 1362 do not cross-reference each other. Since presumably all actións properly within the jurisdiction of the United States district courts are authorized by one or another of the statutes conferring jurisdiction upon those courts, the mere fact that a jurisdictional statute such as § 1362 speaks in general terms of “all” enumerated civil actions does not itself signify that Indian tribes are exempted from the provisions of § 1341.
Looking to the legislative history of § 1362 for whatever light it may shed on the question, we find an indication of a congressional purpose to open the federal courts to the kind of claims that could have been brought by the United States as trustee, but for whatever reason were not so brought. Section 1362 is characterized by the reporting House Judiciary Committee as providing “the means whereby the tribes are assured of the same judicial determination whether the action is brought in their behalf by the Government or by their own attorneys.” While this is hardly an unequivocal statement of intent to allow such litigation to proceed irrespective of other explicit jurisdictional limitations, such as § 1341, it would appear that Congress contemplated that a tribe’s access to federal court to litigate a matter arising “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties” would be at least in some respects as broad as that of the United States suing as the tribe’s trustee.
That the United States could have brought these actions, by itself or as coplaintiff, seems reasonably clear. In Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), the United States sued to cancel numerous conveyances by Cherokee allottees-grantors, who were not parties, as vio-lative of federal restrictions upon the Indians’ power of alienation. In the course of concluding that the United States had the requisite interest in enforcing these restrictions for the Indians’ benefit, the Court discussed United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903), which upheld the right of the Government to seek injunctive relief against county taxation directed at improvements on and tools used to cultivate land allotted to and occupied by the Sioux Indians. Of Rickert, the Court in Heckman stated:
“But the decision [that the United States had the requisite interest] rested upon a broader foundation than the mere holding of a legal title to land in trust, and embraced the recognition of the interest of the United States in securing immunity to the Indians from taxation conflicting with the measures it had adopted for their protection.” 224 U. S., at 441.
Here the United States could have made the same attack on the State’s assertion of taxing power as was in fact made by the Tribe. Heckman v. United States, supra. We think that the legislative history of § 1362, though by no means dispositive, suggests that in certain respects tribes suing under this section were to be accorded treatment similar to that of the United States had it sued on their behalf. Since the United States is not barred by § 1341 from seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a state tax law, Department of Employment v. United States, supra, we hold that the Tribe is not barred from doing so here.
Ill
In McClanahan this Court considered the question whether the State had the power to tax a reservation Indian, a Navajo, for income earned exclusively on the reservation. We there looked to the language of the Navajo treaty and the applicable federal statutes “which define the limits of state power.” 411 U. S., at 172. Reading them against the “backdrop” of the Indian sovereignty doctrine, the Court concluded “that Arizona ha[d] exceeded its lawful authority” by imposing the tax at issue. Id., at 173. In Mescolero, the companion case, the import of McClanahan was summarized:
“[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra, lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.” 411 U. S., at 148.
Aligning itself with the dissenting opinion below, the State first seeks to avoid McClanahan on two grounds: (1) the manner in which the Flathead Reservation has developed to its present state distinguishes it from the Navajo Reservation; (2) there does exist a federal statutory basis permitting Montana to tax.
The State pointed below to a variety of factors: reservation Indians benefited from expenditures of state revenues for education, welfare, and other services, such as a sewer system; the Indians had the right to vote and to hold local and state office; and the Indian and non-Indian residents within the reservation were substantially integrated as a business and social community. The District Court also found, however, that the Federal Government “likewise made substantial payments for various purposes,” and that the Tribe’s own income contributed significantly to its economic well-being. 392 F. Supp., at 1314. Noting this Court’s rejection of a substantially identical argument in McClanahan, see 411 U. S., at 173, and n. 12, and the fact that the Tribe, like the Navajos, had not abandoned its tribal organization, the District Court could not accept the State’s proposition that the tribal members “are now so completely integrated with the non-Indians... that there is no longer any reason to accord them different treatment than other citizens.” 392 F. Supp., at 1315. In view of the District Court’s findings, we agree that there is no basis for distinguishing McClanahan on this ground.
As to the second ground, we note that the State does not challenge the District Court's overall conclusion that the treaty and statutes upon which the Tribe relies in asserting the lack of state taxing authority “are essentially the same as those involved in McClanahan.” We agree, and it would serve no purpose to retrace our analysis in this respect in McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 173-179. The State instead argues that the District Court failed to properly consider the effect of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, and a later enactment in 1904, 33 Stat. 302, applying that Act to the Flathead Reservation. Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 349, provides in part:
“At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside...
The State relies on Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146 (1906), where the Court, applying the above section, rejected the claim of an Indian patentee thereunder that state taxing jurisdiction was not among the “laws” to which he and his land had been made subject. Building on Goudy and the fact that the General Allotment Act has never been explicitly “repealed,” the State claims that Congress has never intended to withdraw Montana’s taxing jurisdiction, and that such power continues to the present.
We find the argument untenable for several reasons. By its terms § 6 does not reach Indians residing or producing income from lands held in trust for the Tribe, which make up about one-half of the land area of the reservation. If the General Allotment Act itself establishes Montana’s jurisdiction as to those Indians living on “fee patented” lands, then for all jurisdictional purposes — civil and criminal — the Flathead Reservation has been substantially diminished in size. A similar claim was made by the State in Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), to which we responded:
“ [The] argument rests upon the fact that where the existence or nonexistence of an Indian reservation, and therefore the existence or nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in order to determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government.” Id., at 358.
We concluded that “[s]ueh an impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction,” ibid., was contrary to the intent embodied in the existing federal statutory law of Indian jurisdiction. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 554-555 (1975).
The State’s argument also overlooks what this Court has recently said of the present effect of the General Allotment Act and related legislation of that era:
“Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted and the trust expired, the reservation could be abolished. Unallotted lands were made available to non-Indians with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction between the races and of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways. See § 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 390....” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 496 (1973).
“The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, now amended and codified as 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seg.” Id., at 496 n. 18.
The State has referred us to no decisional authority— and we know of none — giving the meaning for which it contends to § 6 of the General Allotment Act in the face of the many and complex intervening jurisdictional statutes directed at the reach of state law within reservation lands — statutes discussed, for example, in McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 173-179. See also Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). Congress by its more modem legislation has evinced a clear intent to eschew any such “checkerboard” approach within an existing Indian reservation, and our cases have in turn followed Congress’ lead in this area.
A second, discrete claim advanced by the State is that the tax immunity extended by the District Court in applying federal law constitutes an invidious discrimination against non-Indians on the basis of race, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is said that the Federal Government has forced this racially based exemption onto Montana so as to create a state statutory classification violative of the latter’s duty under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We need not dwell at length on this constitutional argument, for assuming that the State has standing to raise it on behalf of its non-Indian citizens and taxpayers, we think it is foreclosed by our recent decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974). In reviewing the variety of statutes and decisions according special treatment to Indian tribes and reservations, we stated, id., at 552-555:
“Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations... single [s] out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U. S. C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.
“On numerous occasions this Court specifically has upheld legislation

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 大