Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Per Curiam.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), we held that a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal judge finds that “upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 324. A Nevada jury convicted respondent of rape; the evidence presented included DNA evidence matching respondent’s DNA profile. Nevertheless, relying upon a report prepared by a DNA expert over 11 years after the trial, the Federal District Court applied the Jackson standard and granted the writ. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown v. Farwell, 525 F. 3d 787 (CA9 2008). We granted certiorari to consider whether those courts misapplied Jackson. Because the trial record includes both the DNA evidence and other convincing evidence of guilt, we conclude that they clearly did.
I
Around 1 a.m. on January 29, 1994, 9-year-old Jane Doe was brutally raped in the bedroom of her trailer. Respondent Troy Brown was convicted of the crime. During and since his trial, respondent has steadfastly maintained his innocence. He was, however, admittedly intoxicated when the crime occurred, and after he awoke on the following morning he told a friend “ ‘he wished that he could remember what did go on or what went on.’ ” App. 309.
Troy and his brother Travis resided near Jane Doe in the same trailer park. Their brother Trent and his wife Raquel lived in the park as well, in a trailer across the street from Jane Doe’s. Both Troy and Trent were acquainted with Jane Doe’s family; Troy had visited Jane Doe’s trailer several times. Jane did not know Travis. The evening of the attack, Jane’s mother, Pam, took Jane to Raquel and Trent’s trailer to babysit while the three adults went out for about an hour. Raquel and Trent returned at about 7:30 p.m. and took Jane home at about 9:30 p.m. Pam stayed out and ended up drinking and playing pool with Troy at a nearby bar called the Peacock Lounge. Troy knew that Jane and her 4-year-old sister were home alone because he answered the phone at the bar when Jane called for her mother earlier that evening.
Troy consumed at least 10 shots of vodka followed by beer chasers, and was so drunk that he vomited on himself while he was walking home after leaving the Peacock at about 12:15 a.m. Jane called her mother to report the rape at approximately 1 a.m. Although it would have taken a sober man less than 15 minutes to walk home, Troy did not arrive at his trailer until about 1:30 a.m. He was wearing dark jeans, a cowboy hat, a black satin jacket, and boots. Two witnesses saw a man dressed in dark jeans, a cowboy hat, and a black satin jacket stumbling in the road between the two trailers shortly after 1 a.m.
The bedroom where the rape occurred was dark, and Jane was unable to conclusively identify her assailant. When asked whom he reminded her of, she mentioned both Troy and his brother Trent. Several days after the rape, she identified a man she saw on television (Troy) as her assailant but then stated that the man who had sent flowers attacked her. It was Trent and Raquel who had sent her flowers, not Troy. She was unable to identify Troy as her assailant out of a photo lineup, and she could not identify her assailant at trial. The night of the rape, however, she said her attacker was wearing dark jeans, a black jacket with a zipper, boots, and a watch. She also vividly remembered that the man “stunk real, real bad” of “cologne, or some beer or puke or something.” Id., at 172-173.
Some evidence besides Jane’s inconsistent identification did not inculpate Troy. Jane testified that she thought she had bitten her assailant, but Troy did not have any bite marks on his hands when examined by a police officer approximately four hours after the attack. Jane stated that her assailant’s jacket had a zipper (Troy’s did not) and that he wore a watch (Troy claimed he did not). Additionally, there was conflicting testimony as to when Troy left the Peacock and when Pam received Jane’s call reporting the rape. The witnesses who saw a man stumbling between the two trailers reported a bright green logo on the back of the jacket, but Troy’s jacket had a yellow and orange logo. Finally, because Jane thought she had left a night light on when she went to bed, the police suspected the assailant had turned off the light. The only usable fingerprint taken from the light did not match Troy’s, and the police did not find Troy’s fingerprints in the trailer.
Other physical evidence, however, pointed to Troy. The police recovered semen from Jane’s underwear and from the rape kit. The State’s expert, Renee Romero, tested the former and determined that the DNA matched Troy’s and that the probability another person from the general population would share the same DNA (the “random match probability”) was only 1 in 3 million. Troy’s counsel did not call his own DNA expert at trial, although he consulted with an expert in advance who found no problems with Romero’s test procedures. At some time before sentencing, Troy’s family had additional DNA testing done. That testing showed semen taken from the rape kit matched Troy’s DNA, with a random match probability of 1 in 10,000.
The jury found Troy guilty of sexual assault and sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after 10 years. On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered Troy’s claim that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, analyzing “whether the jury, acting reasonably, could have been convinced of [Troy’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brown v. Nevada, 113 Nev. 275, 285, 934 P. 2d 235, 241 (1997) (per curiam). The court rejected the claim, summarizing the evidence of guilt as follows:
“Testimony indicated that Troy left the bar around 12:15 a.m., that Troy lived relatively close to the bar, and that Troy lived very close to Jane Doe. Troy had enough time to get from the bar to Jane Doe’s house and to assault Jane Doe before she made the telephone call to her mother at approximately 1:00 a.m. While Jane Doe could not identify her assailant, her description of his clothing was similar to what Troy was wearing; she also said that her assailant smelled like beer or vomit and testimony indicated that Troy had been drinking beer and had vomited several times that night. Furthermore, testimony indicated that Troy got home at approximately 1:30 a.m., which gave him enough time to assault Jane Doe. Additionally, [witnesses] testified that they saw someone resembling Troy in a black jacket and black hat stumbling in the road near Jane Doe’s house at 1:05 a.m. Troy also washed his pants and shirt when he got home, arguably to remove the blood evidence from his clothes. Finally, the DNA evidence indicated that semen collected from Jane Doe’s underwear matched Troy’s and that only 1 in 3,000,000 other people had matching DNA (the second DNA test indicated that 1 in 10,000 people had matching DNA).” Ibid., 934 P. 2d, at 241-242.
Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the DNA evidence was reliable. The court found respondent had not raised this issue in the trial court and concluded there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing. Id., at 284, 934 P. 2d, at 241.
In 2001, respondent sought state postconviction relief, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the DNA evidence. He argued that there were a number of foundational problems with the DNA evidence, and that if trial counsel had objected, the evidence would have been excluded or at least its importance diminished. He noted that because trial counsel “totally failed to challenge the DNA evidence in the case,” counsel “failed to preserve valid issues for appeal.” App. 1101. The state postconviction court denied relief, id., at 1489-1499, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, judgt. order reported at 119 Nev. 797, 130 P. 3d 673 (2003).
Respondent thereafter filed this federal habeas petition, claiming there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the sexual assault charges and that the Nevada Supreme Court’s rejection of his claim was both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Jackson. He did. not bring a typical Jackson claim, however. Rather than argue that the totality of the evidence admitted against him at trial was constitutionally insufficient, he argued that some of the evidence should be excluded from the Jackson analysis. In particular, he argued that Romero’s testimony related to the DNA evidence was inaccurate and unreliable in two primary respects: Romero mischaracterized the random match probability and misstated the probability of a DNA match among his brothers. Absent that testimony, he contended, there was insufficient evidence to convict him.
In support of his claim regarding the accuracy of Romero’s testimony, respondent submitted a report prepared by Laurence Mueller, a professor in ecology and evolutionary biology (Mueller Report). The District Court supplemented the record with the Mueller Report, even though it was not presented to any state court, because “the thesis of the report was argued during post-conviction.” Brown v. Farwell, No. 3:03-cv-00712-PMP-VPC, 2006 WL 6181129, *5, n. 2 (D Nev., Dec. 14, 2006).
Relying upon the Mueller Report, the District Court set aside the “unreliable DNA testimony” and held that without the DNA evidence “a reasonable doubt would exist in the mind of any rational trier of fact.” Id., at *7. The court granted respondent habeas relief on his Jackson claim.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 525 F. 3d 787. The court held the Nevada Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Jackson. 525 F. 3d, at 798; see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court of Appeals first reasoned “the admission of Romero’s unreliable and misleading testimony violated Troy’s due process rights,” so the District Court was correct to exclude it. 525 F. 3d, at 797. It then “weighed the sufficiency of the remaining evidence,” including the District Court’s “catalogue] [of] the numerous inconsistencies that would raise a reasonable doubt as to Troy’s guilt in the mind of any rational juror.” Ibid. In light of the “stark” conflicts in the evidence and the State’s concession that there was insufficient evidence absent the DNA evidence, the court held it was objectively unreasonable for the Nevada Supreme Court to reject respondent’s insuffieieney-of-the-evidence claim. Id., at 798.
We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1152 (2009), to consider two questions: the proper standard of review for a Jackson claim on federal habeas, and whether such a claim may rely upon evidence outside the trial record that goes to the reliability of trial evidence.
II
Respondent’s claim has now crystallized into a claim about the import of two specific inaccuracies in the testimony related to the DNA evidence, as indicated by the Mueller Report. The Mueller Report does not challenge Romero’s qualifications as an expert or the validity of any of the tests that she performed. Mueller instead contends that Romero committed the so-called “prosecutor’s fallacy” and that she underestimated the probability of a DNA match between respondent and one of his brothers.
The prosecutor’s fallacy is the assumption that the random match probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of the DNA sample. See Nat. Research Council, Comm, on DNA Forensic Science, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 133 (1996) (“Let P equal the probability of a match, given the evidence genotype. The fallacy is to say that P is also the probability that the DNA at the crime scene came from someone other than the defendant”). In other words, if a juror is told the probability a member of the general population would share the same DNA is 1 in 10,000 (random match probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance that someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime scene (source probability), then he has succumbed to the prosecutor’s fallacy. It is further error to equate source probability with probability of guilt, unless there is no explanation other than guilt for a person to be the source of crime-scene DNA. This faulty reasoning may result in an erroneous statement that, based on a random match probability of 1 in 10,000, there is a 0.01% chance the defendant is innocent or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty.
The Mueller Report does not dispute Romero’s opinion that only 1 in 3 million people would have the same DNA profile as the rapist. Mueller correctly points out, however, that some of Romero’s testimony — as well as the prosecutor’s argument — suggested that the evidence also established that there was only a 0.000033% chance that respondent was innocent. The State concedes as much. Brief for Petitioners 54. For example, the prosecutor argued at closing the jury could be “99.999967 percent sure” in this case. App. 730. And when the prosecutor asked Romero, in a classic example of erroneously equating source probability with random match probability, whether “it [would] be fair to say... that the chances that the DNA found in the panties — the semen in the panties — and the blood sample, the likelihood that it is not Troy Brown would be.000033,” id., at 460, Romero ultimately agreed that it was “not inaccurate” to state it that way, id., at 461-462.
Looking at Romero’s testimony as a whole, though, she also indicated that she was merely accepting the mathematical equivalence between 1 in 3 million and the percentage figure. At the end of the colloquy about percentages, she answered affirmatively the court’s question whether the percentage was “the same math just expressed differently.” Id., at 462. She pointed out that the probability a brother would match was greater than the random match probability, which also indicated to the jury that the random match probability is not the same as the likelihood that someone other than Troy was the source of the DNA.
The Mueller Report identifies a second error in Romero’s testimony: her estimate of the probability that one or more of Troy’s brothers’ DNA would match. Romero testified there was a 1 in 6,500 (or 0.02%) probability that one brother would share the same DNA with another. Id., at 469, 472. When asked whether “that change[s] at all with two brothers,” she answered no. Id., at 472. According to Mueller, Romero’s analysis was misleading in two respects. First, she used an assumption regarding the parents under which siblings have the lowest chance of matching that is biologically possible, but even under this stingy assumption she reported the chance of two brothers matching (1 in 6,500) as much lower than it is (1 in 1,024 under her assumption). Second, using the assumptions Mueller finds more appropriate, the probability of a single sibling matching respondent is 1 in 263, the probability that among two brothers one or more would match is 1 in 132, and among four brothers it is 1 in 66. Id., at 1583.
In sum, the two inaccuracies upon which this case turns are testimony equating random match probability with source probability, and an underestimate of the likelihood that one of Troy’s brothers would also match the DNA left at the scene.
III
Although we granted certiorari to review respondent’s Jackson claim, the parties now agree that the Court of Appeals’ resolution of his claim under Jackson was in error. See Brief for Respondent 2-3; Reply Brief for Petitioners 1. Indeed, respondent argues the Court of Appeals did not decide his case under Jackson at all, but instead resolved the question whether admission of Romero’s inaccurate testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and then applied Jackson to determine whether that error was harmless.
Although both petitioners and respondent are now aligned on the same side of the questions presented for our review, the ease is not moot because “the parties continue to seek different relief” from this Court. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 446 (2009). Respondent primarily argues that we affirm on his proposed alternative ground or remand to the Ninth Circuit for analysis of his due process claim under the standard for harmless error of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993). The State, on the other hand, asks us to reverse. Respondent and one amicus have also suggested that we dismiss the case as improvidently granted, Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 27-28, but we think prudential concerns favor our review of the Court of Appeals’ application of Jackson. Cf. Pacific Bell, supra, at 447.
Respondent no longer argues it was proper for the District Court to admit the Mueller Report for the purpose of evaluating his Jackson claim, Brief for Respondent 35, and concedes the “purpose of a Jackson analysis is to determine whether the jury acted in a rational manner in returning a guilty verdict based on the evidence before it, not whether improper evidence violated due process,” id., at 2. There has been no suggestion that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict unless some of it was excluded. Respondent’s concession thus disposes of his Jackson claim. The concession is also clearly correct. An “appellate court’s reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is in effect a determination that the government’s ease against the defendant was so lacking that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U. S. 33, 39 (1988). Because reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is equivalent to a judgment of acquittal, such a reversal bars a retrial. See Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 18 (1978). To “make the analogy complete” between a reversal for insufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s granting a judgment of acquittal, Lockhart, 488 U. S., at 42, “a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court,” regardless of whether that evidence was admitted erroneously, id., at 41.
Respondent therefore correctly concedes that a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial when considering a Jackson claim. Even if we set that concession aside, however, and assume that the Court of Appeals could have considered the Mueller Report in the context of a Jackson claim, the court made an egregious error in concluding the Nevada Supreme Court’s rejection of respondent’s insuffieieney-of-the-evidence claim “involved an unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
Even if the Court of Appeals could have considered it, the Mueller Report provided no warrant for entirely excluding the DNA evidence or Romero’s testimony from that court’s consideration. The Report did not contest that the DNA evidence matched Troy. That DNA evidence remains powerful inculpatory evidence even though the State concedes Romero overstated its probative value by failing to dispel the prosecutor’s fallacy. And Mueller’s claim that Romero used faulty assumptions and underestimated the probability of a DNA match between brothers indicates that two experts do not agree with one another, not that Romero’s estimates were unreliable.
Mueller’s opinion that “the chance that among four brothers one or more would match is 1 in 66,” App. 1583, is substantially different from Romero’s estimate of a 1 in 6,500 chance that one brother would match. But even if Romero’s estimate is wrong, our confidence in the jury verdict is not undermined. First, the estimate that is more pertinent to this case is 1 in 132 — the probability of a match among two brothers — because two of Troy’s four brothers lived in Utah. Second, although Jane Doe mentioned Trent as her assailant, and Travis lived in a nearby trailer, the evidence indicates that both (unlike Troy) were sober and went to bed early on the night of the crime. Even under Mueller’s odds, a rational jury could consider the DNA evidence to be powerful evidence of guilt.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the non-DNA evidence departed from the deferential review that Jackson and § 2254(d)(1) demand. A federal habeas court can only set aside a state-court decision as “an unreasonable application of... clearly established Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), if the state court’s application of that law is “objectively unreasonable,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 409 (2000). And Jackson requires a reviewing court to review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” 443 U. S., at 319. Expressed more fully, this means a reviewing court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume— even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id., at 326; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 330 (1995) (“The Jackson standard... looks to whether there is sufficient evidence which, if credited, could support the conviction”). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, but the court’s recitation of inconsistencies in the testimony shows it failed to do that.
For example, the court highlights conflicting testimony regarding when Troy left the Peacock. 525 F. 3d, at 797. It is true that if a juror were to accept the testimony of one bartender that Troy left the bar at 1:30 a.m., then Troy would have left the bar after the attack occurred. Yet the jury could have credited a different bartender’s testimony that Troy left the Peacock at around 12:15 a.m. Resolving the conflict in favor of the prosecution, the jury must have found that Troy left the bar in time to be the assailant. It is undisputed that Troy washed his clothes immediately upon returning home. The court notes this is “plausibly consistent with him being the assailant” but also that he provided an alternative reason for washing his clothes. Ibid. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supports an inference that Troy washed the clothes immediately to clean blood from them.
To be sure, the court’s Jackson analysis relied substantially upon a concession made by the State in state postconviction proceedings that “absent the DNA findings, there was insufficient evidence to convict [Troy] of the crime.” App. 1180. But that concession posited a situation in which there was no DNA evidence

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 市