Task: songer_numresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM.
We find no reason to upset the findings of fact of the District Judge as to what happened on the night in question. While it seems indeed somewhat strange that the tide without the aid of any northwest wind should have swept the floats along the Brooklyn shore, nothing makes it impossible, and the issue was one on which the findings below should certainly prevail. Also as to the seamanship of the tug masters, the testimony being again conflicting, we are not disposed to intervene. The situation called for immediate action, and, if the tug masters did not choose the best course, it was at least the best as they supposed. They were men of experience, and their judgment then exercised is as likely to have been right as that of their f allows called at the trial, who spoke as experts and judged without the disturbing pressure of immediate danger. That the Marion Moran adopted a hazardous maneuver also appears to us true. There was no occasion for her to round the bows of the flotilla, drifting in the ebb, and apparently out of control. Had she waited till it had passed, she might safely have gone to her berth. Assuming with the judge that the collision happened on the flotilla’s way down stream, and that the floats were obviously near the shore, it was a hazard to moor the lighter so close to their path, and the tug became responsible for the resulting collision. Again, we are faced with a dispute of fact as to which we are not in as good position on the cold record as the judge who faced the witnesses.
We think that the Depew should be exonerated. A nice question is nearly though not quite raised; that is, whether, had the Moran moored the lighter at the pier end and left her, the Depew could have argued that the extravagance of the Moran’s negligence in so doing should excuse her. The duty being to all moored vessels, it might be argued that the foreseeability of the events which brought the lighter into that class was not relevant. But the Moran was still standing by; indeed, there is some doubt whether the lighter was in fact yet tied up. At any rate we see no reason to distinguish the situation from a collision in midstream while the Moran was crossing the end of the flotilla. The Depew had no reason to apprehend damage to ordinary vessels in tow; the flotilla was only adrift, and there was no relative motion between it and other craft. Perhaps she was called upon to consider the possibility that other tugs, faced with so large a floating mass, might be at fault in their own navigation. We may assume that in the event of ordinary faults she would be jointly liable with them. But the class to which her duty ran did not include those tows whose tugs disregarded every rule of prudence; at most she was bound to anticipate no more than those derelictions to which all men are prone. The fault of the Moran seems to us to go further than that, to be more extravagant than any one in the Depew’s place should be called upon to forecast. We do not therefore discharge her because of an intervening fault, but because of the unlikelihood that so unusual a fault should have intervened. The fact that it was a fault at all we may ignore; it is enough that the injury was to an interest which was beyond the horizon of ordinary foresight.
Decree modified by exonerating the Depew.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1