Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

PER CURIAM:
Respondent, a minuscule sportswear manufacturer, having had at times as few as four employees, was a member of Infants’ and Children’s Novelties Association, Inc., which bargained with two locals of International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union on behalf of about 200 members. The 1964-67 contract was due to expire on May 31, 1967. On December 22, 1966, the Union gave notice of intent to negotiate a new contract; bargaining began in February 1967; the negotiators reached agreement on May 26; the Association’s directors ratified it in mid-June; and a new 3-year contract was executed in September. Beginning in February 1967 Paskesz failed to pay his $20 per month dues to the Association. On May 1 it advised him that he would be suspended unless he paid up within five days. He did not and was suspended on May 15. Learning of this, the Union advised him that under the terms of the current contract he must post cash security with it and that, for the future, he must do the same and sign the same agreement as the Association, unless he regained status therein. He refused, and a strike followed. In July Paskesz indicated to the Union that he would “straighten out” with the Association if the Union would relieve him of a requirement in the contract that he considered burdensome; the Union declined. On these facts the Board found Paskesz had violated §§ 8 (a) (5) and (1) by repudiating the new contract negotiated by the Association and ordered him to adopt it.
In light of our decision in NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005, 87 S.Ct. 711, 17 L.Ed.2d 544 (1967), respondent does not dispute the validity of the rule, announced in Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958), that, absent union consent or “unusual circumstances,” a member of a multiemployer bargaining group may not withdraw therefrom after bargaining for a new contract has begun. See also NLRB v. John J. Corbett Press, Inc., 401 F.2d 673 (2 Cir. 1968). Apart from his claim of union consent, which is manifestly unmeritorious, his defense lies in a distinction between voluntary withdrawal and suspension. We need not consider whether a suspension for reasons beyond a member’s control would constitute “unusual circumstances” requiring a dispensation from the Retail Associates rule either under its own terms or on more basic grounds. See NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 381-382 (2 Cir. 1967); U. S. Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1968), 67 L.R.R.M. 1482 [bankruptcy predating withdrawal from negotiations held to be an unusual circumstance]. The Board was warranted in finding that Paskesz could have paid the $80 of arrearages and that he allowed himself to be suspended because he did not wish to be bound by the new contract. The Board was also justified in refusing to recognize any significant distinction between such a suspension and a voluntary withdrawal.
Enforcement granted.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A