Task: songer_numresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MARKEY, Chief Judge,
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
The district court granted defendants’ (Kentucky) motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. In denying plaintiffs’ (Mrs. Smith) motion for summary judgment, the court held that Kentucky’s thirty-day period was a reasonable measure of the parental “continued absence from the home * * *” required for eligibility to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). We affirm.
Background
On February 3, 1974, Mrs. Smith and her minor children returned to Kentucky from Texas where her husband remained. Three days later Mrs. Smith sought to apply for AFDC benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (Social Security Act). Though granted immediate and continuing emergency assistance, Mrs. Smith was originally informed that she was “ineligible to apply” for AFDC benefits. She was, however, subsequently permitted to file an application bearing the date on which she first sought to apply, i. e., February 6, 1974. Though Mrs. Smith’s application was accepted and processed, her eligibility for AFDC benefits was delayed under Kentucky regulations, until her husband’s “continued absence from the home” had endured for thirty days.
Because the federal legislation creating AFDC does not define “continued absence from the home” in terms of a fixed time period, Mrs. Smith challenged Kentucky’s thirty-day requirement as being repugnant to the federal legislation. The district court held that the state interests in efficient administration of AFDC, and in insuring that limited AFDC funds be disbursed to those “genuinely incapacitated and most in need,” permitted state determination of what constitutes a parent’s “continued absence.” After noting that parental absence could last from minutes to years in desertion and abandonment cases, the court stated:
The only way the defendant can be reasonably sure that the abandonment or desertion will interrupt the parent’s functioning as a provider of maintenance, etc., in such a way as to make it a continuous, uninterrupted absence, is to require that the absence be for a reasonable length of time. Certainly, it is within the legitimate field of state administration for the defendants to take reasonable measures to insure eligibility to receive assistance funded by the taxpayers.
Issues
The sole issue before us is whether Kentucky’s thirty-day period of absence is a reasonable interpretation of the AFDC provision basing eligibility on “continued absence” and is directed toward a legitimate state interest.
OPINION
The paramount goal of AFDC is protection of dependent children. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). For AFDC purposes a “dependent child” is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) as:
* * * a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason oí the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent * * *. (emphasis added).
Death, physical incapacity, or mental incapacity are readily ascertainable evidence of a child’s deprivation of parental support. When parental absence from the home is caused by penal incarceration, deportation, or military service, the “continued” nature of that absence is reasonably assured from the beginning of the absence. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352 (1972).
Voluntary parental absence from the home, however, is within the absent parent’s control. That parent is free to return home at any time and the continuing nature of the absence may not be readily apparent. Mere absence cannot from its onset establish that it will be continued. It is only in relation to such voluntary parental absence that Kentucky insists on a thirty-day duration by which to measure the “continued” nature of the absence for AFDC eligibility.
Mrs. Smith argues that because the Social Security Act does not require that an absence be for a definite time before it may be considered a “continued absence,” Kentucky’s thirty-day definition violates the intent and purpose of that Act and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We cannot agree. For AFDC purposes, federal regulation 45 C.F.R. § 233.-90(c)(l)(iii) states the definition of “continued absence from the home” as:
Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent’s functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the child, and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the parent's performance of his function in planning for the present support or care of the child. If these conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any reason, and he may have left only recently or some time previously.
We consider thirty days a duration of absence which may reasonably preclude “counting on the parent’s performance of his function in planning for the present support or care of the child” and, hence, as an appropriate measure of the parent’s “continued absence from the home.”
Sixty-day and ninety-day periods defining “continued absence” have been found unreasonable in other jurisdictions. Linnane v. Betit, 331 F.Supp. 868 (D.Vt.1971); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F.Supp. 614 (D.Minn. 1970). Though the court in Linnane found the sixty-day period to be unreasonable, it expressly declined to express an opinion on Vermont’s amended regulations replacing the sixty-day period with one of thirty days.
We agree with the court below that Kentucky has a valid state interest in insuring that only eligible persons receive AFDC benefits. When ineligible persons are permitted to draw benefits from the program, the available funds to aid eligible persons are reduced and accordingly, those most in need may be deprived of the aid to which the law entitles them. The district court committed no error in finding that Kentucky’s thirty-day absence requirement in voluntary absence cases of the type before us is a reasonable effort to meet that state interest.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1