Task: songer_treat

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Your task is to determine the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below; i.e., how the decision below is "treated" by the appeals court. That is, the basic outcome of the case for the litigants, indicating whether the appellant or respondent "won" in the court of appeals.

Findings of Fact
1. Asserting that the transfer of shares amounting to 92 percent of the voting control of what is now American President Lines, Ltd., to the United States Maritime Commission, which occurred in 1938, was a pledge to secure indebtedness, and that, the indebtedness having been paid, the pledgors were entitled to have the pledged shares returned to them, the Dollar interests sued the then members of the Maritime Commission to recover possession.
The defense of the members of the Commission was that the 1938 transaction was an outright transfer to the United States and that they held the shares in their official capacities as officers of the government; that the suit was therefore one against the United States to which it had not consented.
The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional question depended upon the nature of the 1938 transaction: (a) if it was a pledge, the members of the Commission acted tortiously in retaining possession after the indebtedness secured thereby had been discharged, and so could be sued by the Dollar interests for a return of the property; (b) if it was a sale or other absolute transfer of title, the members of the Commission held the shares for the United States as the owner thereof and could not be sued for possession, absent the government’s consent. The Supreme Court directed, therefore, that the lower courts determine the nature of the 1938 transaction, pointing out, however, that, while the determination of the question would settle the issue of possession, a decree that the transaction was a pledge only would not prevent the United States itself from asserting title as the government was not a party to the possessory action. Land v. Dollar, 1947, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209.
Subsequently, on July 17, 1950, this court held the transaction of 1938 was a pledge of the shares and not a sale; that, when the indebtedness secured by such collateral had been paid in full with interest, the pledgors were entitled to have the shares returned to them. Dollar v. Land, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 184 F.2d 245.
Acting through Philip B. Perlman, Solicitor General, the former members of the Maritime Commission and their successor, Charles Sawyer, as Secretary of Commerce, petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review our holding. The Supreme Court denied the petition on November 13, 1950. Land v. Dollar, 340 U.S. 884, 71 S.Ct. 198.
We find as a fact, therefore, that since November 13, 1950, all the respondents here have known that a court of competent jurisdiction had finally adjudged that the transaction of 1938 was a pledge of the shares and that, if the members of the Maritime Commission or the Secretary of Commerce refused to surrender them to the pledgors after the indebtedness had been paid, they would hold them, not in their official capacities as agents of the United States, but as tort feasors acting in their individual capacities.
2. Respondent Charles Sawyer, acting on the advice of the Department of Justice respondents, continued nevertheless to hold possession of the shares and refused to surrender them to the pledgors, on the sole ground that the 1938 transaction was an outright transfer and not merely a pledge and that, therefore, Charles Sawyer in his official capacity was entitled to retain possession for the United States.
3. On December 11, 1950, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered an order on our mandate; and on December 15, 1950, notices of appeal to this court from that order were filed by the United States, the Secretary of Commerce, and the former members of the United States Maritime Commission. On January 31, 1951, we handed down an opinion in those appeals in which, as amended February 8, 1951, we directed the District Court to modify a portion of its judgment to read as follows:
“2. That plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the shares as against defendants,* and the defendants are ordered and directed to deliver forthwith to the plaintiffs the said shares. The possession to-which plaintiffs are entitled is an effective-possession of the shares. In so far as such, right requires action on the part of defendants in addition to physical delivery of the certificates, such action is hereby directed’ to be taken. Plaintiffs are entitled under this judgment to all rights belonging to-possessors of the shares. Plaintiffs are further entitled, as provided by Rule 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘to-a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk’ of this court, if such, writ becomes necessary.
“ * Plaintiff Dollar Steamship Line 2,-100,000 shares of the B stock and 2,075 shares of the A stock;
“Plaintiff R. Stanley Dollar 51,174 shares, of the A stock;
“Plaintiff The Robert Dollar Co. 37,722 shares of the A stock;
“Plaintiff H. M. Lorber 9,174 shares of the A stock.”
We also noted that Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, had asserted in the District Court that he “holds custody of the stock which is the subject of this action” and with respect to him we said in the opinion:
“ * * * The District Court is directed to enforce obedience to its order, as herein modified, whether effective process is against the present named defendants or is against another official, or other officials, against whom the order might be lawfully enforced if he or they were a. party or parties to the suit. If the Secretary of Commerce now has custody or possession of the shares, he obviously acquired such custody or possession since the beginning of this action, indeed since the order of June 11, 1947. Obedience to the order about to be entered pursuant to this opinion is, therefore, enforceable against him, and he is liable, under Rule 71, supra, to the same process for enforcing obedience to that order as if he were a party.”
On February 14, 1951, Emory S. Land, et al., former members of the United States Maritime Commission, and Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review our judgment of January 31, 1951. The Supreme Court denied that petition on March 12, 1951. Land v. Dollar, 340 U.S. 948, 71 S.Ct. 198.
On March 16, 1951, the District Court entered an order in the language which was prescribed by us, and implemented it by adding thereto the following:
“1. Said Charles Sawyer shall endorse each of said stock certificates in blank by signing thereon in the place provided for endorsement ‘United States Maritime Commission, by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce.’ And shall forthwith deliver them to the plaintiffs. Such delivery may be made to Moses Lasky, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
“2. If said Charles Sawyer delivers said certificates to plaintiffs or to said Moses Lasky, without having endorsed them, the clerk of this Court shall, at the request of any of the attorneys of the plaintiffs, ■ endorse each of said certificates in blank, signing them ‘United States Maritime Commission, by Harry M. Hull, Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,’ and shall attach to each of said certificates a certified copy of this order and a certified copy of the above order on mandate modifying final judgment and shall forthwith return said certificates to the plaintiffs through their attorneys.
“3. Said Charles Sawyer shall also forthwith by telegram instruct American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary.and directors to transfer all the B stock, and 100,145. shares of the A stock of American President Lines, Ltd., to the plaintiffs in the amounts specified in the above mentioned order on mandate, and to make such transfers of record prior to said annual meeting.
“4. In the event the said Charles Sawyer fails by 9:00 A. M., on March 17, 1951, to give to the clerk and to plaintiffs’ attorneys at Room 432 Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C., proof satisfactory to said attorneys that he has complied with the. provisions of paragraph 3 above, the clerk of this Court shall forthwith give American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary and directors at 311 California Street, San Francisco 4, California, the following instructions and advice:
■ “That said American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary and directors are instructed to transfer all said shares of stock of record to the plaintiffs in the amounts specified in the said order on mandate, and to do so prior to the annual meeting of American President Lines, Ltd., on Monday, March 19, 1951; and
“The clerk shall give said advices and instructions by telegram or teletype so that they may. reach their destinations prior to the said annual meeting on March 19, 1951. The clerk may give said instructions and advices by sending to American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary and directors by telegram or teletype a copy of said order on mandate and a copy of this order together with a statement that the instructions commanded to be given by this paragraph 4 of this order shall be deemed thereby to have been given.”
4. During the period beginning in December, 1950, and extending into March, 1951, the Department of Justice respondents (other than respondent Perlman), acting pursuant to the directions of the Attorney General, caused to be delivered to American President Lines, Ltd., to Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Company, and Joseph A. Tognetti, as transfer agents of the stock of American President Lines, Ltd., and to appellees, written notices and demands on behalf of the United States that the United States is the true and lawful owner of said stock, that said stock not be transferred on the books of American President Lines, Ltd., in the names of ap-pellees, and that for any action taken by the persons to whom said notices were delivered in derogation of the title of the United States to said stock and certificates, said persons would be held strictly accountable to the United States.
. Respondent Clapp, actually gave such written notices and demands by telegraph and by letter pursuant to the decision so to do made by the Department of Justice respondents. Those respondents thereby caused the company and its transfer agents to refuse to transfer on the company’s books the certificates held by the Dollar interests endorsed by the clerk of the District Court.
5. The Department of Justice respondents advised respondent Sawyer that no more could properly be required of him in order to deliver effective possession of the shares to the Dollar interests “than for him to deliver physical possession of the stock certificates and, possibly, to endorse the certificates in his own name in his individual capacity (but not to endorse them in his official capacity as ‘Secretary of Commerce’).”
Confirming and communicating this advice, on March 16, 1951, respondent Perl-man, then Acting Attorney General, advised respondent Sawyer by letter that 'he might deliver the stock certificates to the Dollars but that it would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States as owner of the stock for him to endorse the stock in the name of the Maritime Commission or to instruct American President Lines, Ltd., to transfer the stock on its books to the Dollars.
6. Accordingly on March 16, 1951, the Secretary of Commerce delivered the certificates of stock but did not endorse them and did not give the instructions to the American President Lines, Ltd., which the District Court had directed him to give. On the contrary, Charles Sawyer, as Secretary of Commerce, executed on March 16, 1951, a proxy appointing A. J. Williams, Paul D. Page, Jr., and Lloyd C. Fleming as proxies for him to vote the shares of stock (certificates for which he had just surrendered pursuant to the court’s order) at the annual meeting of stockholders of American President Lines, Ltd., to be held in San Francisco on March 19, 1951.
On March 18, 1951, another proxy was executed to the same three persons for use at the annual meeting of stockholders to be held on March 19, 1951, which was signed “United States Maritime Commission, by Philip B. Fleming, Acting Secretary of Commerce.”
7. On March 19, 1951, the Department of Justice respondents (other than respondent Perlman), at the direction and with the approval of the Attorney General, caused to be' filed in the action which had been instituted by the United States in the District Court for the Northern District of California a motion for a preliminary injunction “to enjoin the Dollars from asserting any rights as owners of the stock and to enjoin American President Lines and its transfer agents from recognizing the Dollars as owners by so registering them on its stock transfer books or otherwise.” This was done for the purpose of enjoining and preventing enforcement of the decision and mandate of this court herein by preventing the transfer of effective possession of said shares to the Dollar interests. Said California court has issued a preliminary injunction such as was sought by respondents.
8. The annual meeting of stockholders of American President Lines, Ltd., was held in San Francisco on March 19, 1951. Respondent Killion presided and respondents Page and MacGuineas were present. Attorneys for the Dollar interests were also present and read to the meeting excerpts from our opinion of January 31, 1951, 188 F.2d 629, and read in its entirety the District Court’s order on mandate entered March 16, 1951. They presented proxies executed by the Dollar interests and demanded the right to vote the shares formerly in pledge. The transfer agent had declined to transfer of record the certificates which had been delivered to the Dollar interests by respondent Sawyer and which had been endorsed for the Maritime Commission by the clerk of the District Court.
Respondent Page presented the proxies executed by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, and by the United States Maritime Commission by Philip B. Fleming, Acting Secretary of Commerce. Respondent MacGuineas stated that he and respondent Angelí appeared as attorneys for the United States. Inter alia, MacGuineas said: “On behalf of the United States I assert that the United States is the true and lawful owner of those shares and that it is lawfully entitled to vote those shares at this meeting, pursuant to the proxy given by the Secretary of Commerce, the duly authorized representative of the United States in that connection, and presented to your Secretary by Mr. Paul Page.” (P. 30 of transcript.)
After referring to the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by the United States in the California proceeding, Mac-Guineas said: “ * * * And therefore the United States feels assured of the vindication of its rights in that judicial proceeding and at this meeting asserts its right to vote the stock, the proxy of which [iic] has been submitted to you by Mr. Page.”
Counsel for the Dollar interests took exception to the acceptance of the proxies executed by Sawyer and Fleming. With respect to that the following colloquy occurred at the stockholders’ meeting:
“President Killion: Mr. Harrison, the officers and the directors of this corporation have been advised by our counsel, and in view of the conflict of orders which we have received we rely upon the District Court here for guidance and for instructions.
“Mr. Harrison: Rely upon whom, Mr. Chairman?
^ ;je % afc *
“President Killion: Upon the District Court in San Francisco.
“Mr. Harrison: And not the District of Columbia courts?
“President Killion: No. In San Francisco. For guidance and instructions. We have orders to do this and orders not to do it.
“Mr. Harrison: The orders not to are from the Attorney General’s office?
“President Killion: From the Attorney General’s office in Washington, D. C.
“Mr. Harrison: And the orders to do so are from the courts of the District of Columbia?
“President Killion: That is correct. * * *
5ft SfS * * * *
“President Killion: Well, as I said earlier, Mr. Harrison, this corporation was made a party to the suit filed in District ■Court here in San Francisco by the Department of Justice. Subsequently we received from the Attorney General in Washington, D. C. instructions that are contrary to the instructions received by [sic] the Clerk of the Court in Washington, D. C. So therefore, acting on advice of counsel here, the directors and the officers of this ■corporation proceeded to ask the court in San Francisco for guidance and for instruction. The United States government says on the one hand that if we act, we act at our peril; the Clerk of the District Court in Washington, D. C. requests us to take action which is diametrically opposite to the instructions or to the orders we received by [sic] the Department of Justice in Washington. In the meantime, you know of the action that has been taken here.”
Respondent Page nominated the slate of directors furnished by respondent Killion •and voted for them the shares under the Sawyer and Fleming proxies. He did this “pursuant to instructions from his superior •officers in the Department of Commerce, and respondent MacGuineas, pursuant to instructions given him by his superior officers, the other Department of Justice respondents (other than respondent Perl-man) * * *.” Respondent Killion declared Page’s nominees elected.
Respondent Killion and the other respondents present at the meeting did not •obtain guidance and instructions from the California court as to the conduct of the meeting, as Killion had said they would do, but proceeded with the meeting in accordance with instructions and orders of the Department of Justice respondents which were diametrically opposite to our decree and that of the District Court entered on our mandate.
9. From the foregoing it appears that, as charged in the order to show cause, the respondents asserted at the annual meeting of stockholders of the company on March 19, 1951, and still assert, that the Dollar interests are not entitled to the effective possession of said shares; and at the hearing in said United States District Court for the Northern District of California on the application for said preliminary injunction respondents Angelí and MacGuineas, speaking for themselves and all the respondents, declared orally and in writing that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the effective possession of said shares and that the decree of this court that they are so entitled was and is “a serious miscarriage of justice” and for that reason they have “declined to acquiesce” in it
10. The respondents had full power and opportunity to cause the effective transfer and possession of said shares to the Dollar interests pursuant to the decree of this court but, in violation and defiance of this court’s decree, respondents did not cause or attempt to cause the transfer of effective possession of said shares to the plaintiffs, but on the contrary actively and affirmatively prevented such transfer.
The by-laws of American President Lines, Ltd., provide that “the holder” of a certificate of stock which bears an authenticated endorsement is entitled to have the certificate transferred on the books of the corporation. Article VII, section 1, of the by-laws of American President Lines, Ltd., is in part as follows: “ * * * The shares of stock in the corporation shall be transferable on the books of the corporation by the holder thereof in person or by his attorney, upon surrender for cancellation of a certificate or certificates for the same number of shares, with an assignment and power of transfer endorsed thereon or attached thereto, duly executed, and with such proof of the authenticity of the signature as the corporation or its agents may reasonably require.”
11. From the foregoing findings it follows that, as charged in the order to show cause, respondents, on and after March 16, 1951, have asserted and stated on numerous occasions that respondent Charles Sawyer, as Secretary of Commerce, is lawfully entitled to maintain effective possession of said shares and to vote and exercise all of the rights of the possessor thereof, notwithstanding the decision of this court and the final judgment herein entered; and pursuant to said assertions respondent Sawyer has unlawfully maintained and continues to maintain an effective possession of said shares.
12. On March 19, 1951, the Dollar interests registered in the District Court for the Northern District of California the judgment entered March 16, 1951, by the District Court for the District of Columbia under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963. On March 21, 1951, the Dollar interests filed a petition in the California court for an order to show cause in civil contempt, specifying alleged contempts substantially similar to those specified in the show cause order entered by this court. The judge of the California court discharged the show cause order, holding there was no contempt. Respondents here contend that the dismissal of the contempt charges by the California District Court is binding and conclusive and constitutes a bar to the contempt proceedings now before us.
13. All action by the Department of Justice respondents or any of them, here-inabove described, was done pursuant to the approval and directions of their respective superior officers in the Department of Justice, including respondent Ford. Respondent Sawyer did not surrender effective possession of the shares to the Dollar interests, as our decree ordered him to do. The failure to comply fully with our decree and to surrender effective possession of the shares, and the prevention of the transfer thereof of record, resulted from the several acts and omissions of various respondents hereinbefore described, and from the concerted action of the Department of Justice respondents in advising him and respondent Killion to disobey our decree, and of respondents Sawyer, Page and Killion in accepting such advice and acting in accordance therewith.
14. Respondent Perlman took no action in connection with the charges stated in the order to show cause other than to sign, as Acting Attorney General, the letter to Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, in which he advised the Secretary to surrender the certificates as ordered by the District Court but advised him to disobey the District Court’s order to endorse the certificates and to instruct American President Lines, Ltd., to transfer them of record. Accordingly, all references here to-the Department of Justice respondents are to be construed as including all such respondents except respondent Perlman.
Conclusions of Law and Order
1. The suit filed by the Dollar interests to recover possession of the shares of stock in question, which the members of the Maritime Commission held under the claim that they were owned by the United States, presented two basic justiciable issues. Those issues were whether the United States owned the shares, and whether the-Dollar interests were entitled to possession ;. and the answer to the latter depended upon the answer to the former.
Our decision of July 17, 1950, with respect to which certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, was that the shares were not owned by the United States, that the Secretary of Commerce therefore did not hold them in his official capacity, and that the Dollar interests were entitled to possession. This final decree was enforceable against the Secretary of Commerce under Rule 71, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. It then.became the duty of respondent Sawyer to surrender possession, and coercion to that effect should not have been necessary. Charles Sawyer as Secretary of Commerce could not and did not hold the shares after the pledge was discharged. Charles Sawyer, the private individual, never had the right to hold them.
The assertion of the respondents, and their action based on the assertion, after our decree of July 17, 1950, that the Secretary of Commerce had the right to retain possession of the shares, was disobedience of and resistance to that decree.
2. The respondents had the power to cause the certificates to be endorsed as directed, and to cause American President Lines, Ltd., to transfer the shares and to Issue certificates therefor to the Dollar interests, thus surrendering effective possession as our decree had ordered.
3. The acts of the respondents in causing the certificates to remain unendorsed hy the Maritime Commission or its successor, the Secretary of Commerce, and in causing American President Lines, Ltd., and its transfer agents to refuse to transfer the shares and to refuse to issue certificates to the Dollar interests, and their other acts described in the foregoing findings of fact, constituted disobedience of and resistance to our decree of January 31, 1951, as amended, and the District Court’s order on mandate entered March 16,1951.
4. The Dollar interests were entitled, under our decree, to complete and effective possession of the shares. Respondent Sawyer’s continued retention of possession was not and is not essential to the government’s maintenance of its suit to try title, and is not justified or excused by the respondents’ contention otherwise.
5. In its California suit to try title to the shares, the United States had no right to and no need for injunctive relief which would override and nullify our final decree. By seeking and obtaining a preliminary injunction with that purpose and effect, the respondents disobeyed and resisted our decree.
6. After the Secretary of Commerce had delivered the certificates of stock to the Dollar interests, even though unen-dorsed, he had no legal right to execute the proxy which he did execute with respect to such shares. Philip B. Fleming had no legal right to execute the proxy which he did execute with respect to such shares after the certificates therefor had been surrendered by the Secretary, endorsed by the clerk of the District Court, and delivered to the Dollar interests. Their acts in so doing were in disobedience of and resistance to the final decree of this court.
7. The fact that the District Court’s order on our mandate directed the clerk of that court to endorse the certificates if respondent Sawyer did not do so, and to give the prescribed instructions to American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary and directors, if respondent Sawyer had failed to do so by 9:00 a. m. on March 17, 1951, did not relieve respondent Sawyer of the affirmative duty of endorsing the certificates and of giving the prescribed instructions to American President Lines, Ltd., its president, secretary and directors, or of securing by other action the delivery of effective possession of the shares as he was directed to do by the court’s order.
8. The fact that only those shareholders whose shares had been of record on February 26, 1951, would be entitled to vote at the annual meeting of the stockholders on March 19, 1951, did not confer the legal right to vote at such meeting upon respondent Sawyer or his proxies because Sawyer was not legally in possession of the shares at the time of the annual meeting.
9. That the respondents may have bélieved in good faith that our decrees were erroneous did not justify them in disobeying or resisting them. Those decrees, like any other final judicial order, were to be precisely and promptly obeyed by all against whom they were enforceable, no matter how erroneous they may have been. No person can make himself the judge of the validity of a final judicial decree and, by his own act of disobedience, set it aside. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 1947, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884; Howat v. Kansas, 1922, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S.Ct. 277, 66 L.Ed. 550; Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 418, 450, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797; In re Sylvester, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1930, 41 F.2d 231.
10. Effective possession of these shares of stock will have been delivered to the Dollar interests when those interests have been recorded in the books of the American President Lines, Ltd., as the holders of the shares, and certificates evidencing such stockholdings have been delivered to them.
11. The official status of the respondents does not immunize them from punishment for contempt. Government officials are bound to obey the judgment of a court just as are private citizens, and their belief that the judgment is wrong, no matter how great their good faith in entertaining such belief, cannot justify them in disobeying, or resisting enforcement of, the judgment unless and until it has been set aside or reversed on appeal. In re Sylvester, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1930, 41 F.2d 231.
12. Respondent Killion, who, as president of American President Lines, Ltd., was a creature of respondent Sawyer, deliberately chose to follow the orders and instructions of his co-respondents, and to disobey and resist the decree of this court. The fact that he was not a party to this suit does not justify or excuse his disobedience and resistance nor protect him from punishment therefor. Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 4 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 604; Harford Agr. & Breeders’ Ass’n v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 4 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 608, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 878, 71 S.Ct. 125, rehearing denied, 1950, 340 U.S. 898, 71 S.Ct. 237.
13. By virtue of 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 this court has summary power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, contempt of its authority when that contempt consists of “Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”
14. This court, having directed the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enter a judgment on mandate in terms prescribed by it, has the power to punish for contempt those who disobey or resist the order on mandate so entered by the District Court. Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Clay Center, 1911, 219 U.S. 527, 31 S.Ct. 295, 55 L.Ed. 320; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 1923, 261 U.S. 399, 43 S.Ct. 458, 67 L.Ed. 719.
15. Disobedience of or resistance to our decree constitutes contempt of this court, no matter where the act of contempt was committed. Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Co., 1932, 284 U.S. 448, 52 S.Ct. 238, 76 L.Ed. 389.
16. This court had jurisdiction to enter orally on April 6, 1951, its rule to show cause and to enter formally in writing on April 10, 1951, its rule to show cause.
17. The registration of the judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia in the District Court in California gave the latter court no power to-deal with the judgment except to enforce it. The decision of the California court, that the respondents here were not in contempt there could not and did not foreclose-this court from proceeding with the present contempt proceeding, and its judgment of no contempt is not res judicata here.
18. It is considered and adjudged that,, because of their acts and omissions described in the foregoing findings of fact,, the respondents, Charles Sawyer, Peyton Ford, Newell A. Clapp, Edward H. Hickey,. Donald B. MacGuineas, Philip B. Perlman, Philip B. Fleming, George L. Killion, Philip Angelí and Paul D. Page, Jr., are, and’ each of them is, guilty of civil contempt of this court.
19. Respondent Perlman may purge himself by rescinding his advice to-the Secretary of Commerce to disobey this-court’s decree and the implementing order of the District Court, and by advising the Secretary of Commerce to comply forthwith, fully and effectively, with the decree-
20. The other Department of Justice respondents may purge themselves by withdrawing the contemptuous advice and instructions which they have given to respondents Sawyer, Killion and Page, and to American President Lines, Ltd., its-secretary, directors and transfer agents,, and by advising and instructing that the-decree of this court be complied with immediately, fully and effectively; and by taking whatever steps are necessary to relieve American President Lines, Ltd., and its stock transfer agents of the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court in California which prohibits American President Lines, Ltd., and its stock transfer agents from transferring on the corporate records the shares represented by the certificates presented by the Dollar interests.
The respondents will not be heard to say it is beyond their power to accomplish this. If it is necessary to do so in order to remove the restraint of the preliminary injunction, the Department of Justice respondents can dismiss without prejudice the suit to try title which they instituted in the name of the United States in the California District Court, and can then immediately re-file it.
21. Respondent Sawyer may purge himself by endorsing on the certificates “United States Maritime Commission, by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce,” and by causing respondent Killion, American President Lines, Ltd., and its transfer agents to transfer the shares to the Dollar interests on the corporate books and to issue certificates to them.
22. Respondent Killion may purge himself by causing American President Lines, Ltd., and its stock transfer agents to transfer the shares of record to the Dollar interests and to issue to them certificates therefor.
23. It is suggested in respondents’ brief that, since the issuance of the order to show cause herein, respondent Page has resigned from his position in the Department of Commerce and no longer has an official status. If that be made to appear by affidavit, respondent Page will be excused from purging himself of the civil contempt of which he is guilty, since he will have no power or authority to aid the other respondents in the effectuation of our decree.
24. The respondents will be given until 3:00 p. m., E. D. T., May 24, 1951, to purge themselves of the civil contempt of which they are guilty. They are hereby ordered to present themselves before this court in the courtroom of the United States Court of Appeals Building, 5th and E Streets, Northwest, Washington, D. C., at that hour and day, unless prior to that time they shall have presented to the court evidence that they have fully and effectively obeyed the decree and the court has found such evidence to be adequate. Or they may present at the time of their appearance evidence that they have fully and effectively obeyed the decree, which evidence the court will immediately examine for adequacy. If evidence of compliance is not presented to the court at or before the time thus fixed or, if presented, the evidence shall be found by the court to be inadequate, respondents will then be committed to custody to remain in confinement until they have fully and effectively complied with the decree.
Proof of compliance which does not show that American President Lines, Ltd., has issued and delivered to the Dollar interests certificates evidencing the shares in question will not be regarded as adequate.
Opinion.
PER CURIAM.
We have rendered four opinions upon various phases of this litigation. 1951, 88 U.S.App.D.C. -, 188 F.2d 629; 1951, 88 U.S.App.D.C. -, 190 F.2d 366; 1946, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 154 F.2d 307; 1950, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 184 F.2d 245. The question now before us is whether the respondents, Sawyer, et al., should be sub jected to punishment, for either criminal or civil contempt, for failure to comply with the decree of this court on the merits of the controversy. We are today filing our findings of fact and conclusions of law upon that question. We need not here repeat what we said there. But some contentions urged 'by respondents require further comment.
The decree of this court was entered January 31, 1951. 188 F.2d 629. Petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, 340 U.S. 948, 71 S.Ct. 533. Pursuant to our mandate the District Court, on March 16, 1951, entered the decree we had directed it to enter. On March 20th a petition that we impose sanctions for contempt was filed. Oral hearing was had on April 4th, at which time this court inquired whether respondents would then comply with the decree. Respondent Sawyer replied that he believed the decree had been fully complied with but that, if this court were of the view that he could and should take further action, he would so comply, in so far as he is able, with any mandate issued by this court; with the reservation that such action must be in his personal capacity, not as an officer of the United States. Respondents other than Sawyer replied, in respect to the California proceeding, that they respectfully maintained their right to apply for injunction against the transfer of the shares on the books and against the voting of the stock by the Dollars. Points of law were raised by respondents. Oral hearing was again had on April 6th. Respondents were asked, in open court, if they would take steps to suspend action in the District Court in California until this court could receive briefs and hear argument upon the legal points presented. Their counsel replied in effect that this would not be done. A rule to show cause was issued orally by this court on April 6th and formally in writing on April 10th, returnable April 12th. On that date oral hearing was again had, and an opinion stating in detail the reasons which impelled the court to issue the rule was read. At the suggestion of the Attorney General the return date was extended to

Question: What is the disposition by the court of appeals of the decision of the court or agency below?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied
C. reversed (include reversed & vacated)
D. reversed and remanded (or just remanded)
E. vacated and remanded (also set aside & remanded; modified and remanded)
F. affirmed in part and reversed in part (or modified or affirmed and modified)
G. affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. certification to another court
K. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: K