Task: sc_issue_5

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether an injunction that places restrictions on demonstrations outside abortion clinics violates the First Amendment. We uphold the provisions imposing “fixed bubble” or “fixed buffer zone” limitations, as hereinafter described, but hold that the provisions imposing “floating bubble” or “floating buffer zone” limitations violate the First Amendment.
I
Respondents include three doctors and four medical clinics (two of which are part of larger hospital complexes) in and around Rochester and Buffalo in upstate New York. These health care providers perform abortions and other medical services at their facilities. The eighth respondent is Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to maintaining access to family planning and abortion services.
On September 24, 1990, respondents filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of New York against 50 individuals and 3 organizations — Operation Rescue, Project Rescue Western New York, and Project Life of Rochester. The complaint alleged that defendants had consistently engaged in illegal blockades and other illegal conduct at facilities in the Western District of New York where abortions were performed. (For convenience, we refer to these facilities as “clinics” throughout.) The complaint alleged one federal and six state causes of action: conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions or other family planning services of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3); discrimination against and harassment of women seeking abortions and other family planning services, in violation of N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c (McKinney 1992) and N. Y. Exec. Law §296 (McKinney 1993); trespass; tortious interference with business; tortious harassment; false imprisonment; and intentional infliction of emotional harm. The complaint alleged that a large blockade was planned for September 28, and requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) to stop it. The complaint also sought a permanent injunction and damages.
Before the complaint was filed, the clinics were subjected to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters would march, stand, kneel, sit, or lie in parking lot driveways and in doorways. This conduct blocked or hindered cars from entering clinic parking lots, and patients, doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees from entering the clinics.
In addition to these large-scale blockades, smaller groups of protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations. Protesters trespassed onto clinic parking lots and even entered the clinics themselves. Those trespassers who remained outside the clinics crowded around cars or milled around doorways and driveway entrances in an effort to block or hinder access to the clinics. Protesters sometimes threw themselves on top of the hoods of cars or crowded around cars as they attempted to turn into parking lot driveways. Other protesters on clinic property handed literature and talked to people entering the clinics — especially those women they believed were arriving to have abortions — in an effort to persuade them that abortion was immoral. Sometimes protesters used more aggressive techniques, with varying levels of belligerence: getting very close to women entering the clinics and shouting in their faces; surrounding, crowding, and yelling at women entering the clinics; or jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving women as they attempted to enter the clinics. Male and female clinic volunteers who attempted to escort patients past protesters into the clinics were sometimes elbowed, grabbed, or spit on. Sometimes the escorts pushed back. Some protesters remained in the doorways after the patients had entered the clinics, blocking others from entering and exiting.
On the sidewalks outside the clinics, protesters called “sidewalk counselors” used similar methods. Counselors would walk alongside targeted women headed toward the clinics, handing them literature and talking to them in an attempt to persuade them not to get an abortion. Unfortunately, if the women continued toward the clinics and did not respond positively to the counselors, such peaceful efforts at persuasion often devolved into “in your face” yelling, and sometimes into pushing, shoving, and grabbing. Men who accompanied women attempting to enter the clinics often became upset by the aggressive sidewalk counseling and sometimes had to be restrained (not always successfully) from fighting with the counselors.
The District Court found that the local police had been “unable to respond effectively” to the protests, for a number of reasons: the protests were constant, overwhelming police resources; when the police arrived, the protesters simply dispersed and returned later; prosecution of arrested protesters was difficult because patients were often reluctant to cooperate for fear of making their identity public; and those who were convicted were not deterred from returning to engage in unlawful conduct. In addition, the court found that defendants harassed the police officers verbally and by mail, including the deputy police chief. Also harassed were people who testified against the protesters and “those who invoked] legal process against” the protesters. This, testified the deputy police chief, “made it more difficult for him to do his job.” Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. v. Project Rescue-Western N. Y., 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1426-1427 (WDNY 1992). See also id., at 1431 (“[Tjhere has been substantial uneontradicted evidence that defendants’ activities are intended, and do in fact, prevent and hinder local police from protecting the right of women to choose to have an abortion”).
On September 27, 1990, three days after respondents filed their complaint and one day before the scheduled large-scale blockade, the District Court issued a TRO. The parties stipulated that the TRO might remain in force until decision on respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In pertinent part, the TRO enjoined defendants from physically blockading the clinics, physically abusing or tortiously harassing anyone entering or leaving the clinics, and “demonstrating within 15 feet of any person” entering or leaving the clinics. As an exception to this 15-foot “buffer zone” around people, the TRO allowed two sidewalk counselors to have “a conversation of a nonthreatening nature” with individuals entering or leaving the clinic. If the individuals indicated that they did not want the counseling, however, the counselors had to “cease and desist” from counseling.
At first, defendants complied with the TRO, holding a peaceful demonstration rather than the scheduled blockade. Subsequently, they stipulated that “physical blockades” could be enjoined, and they conducted no such blockades between the issuance of the TRO and the issuance of the preliminary injunction 17 months later. Defendants, however, continued to engage in protests that the District Court labeled “constructive blockades,” as well as sidewalk counseling. Constructive blockades consisted of “demonstrating and picketing around the entrances of the clinics, and... harassing patients and staff entering and leaving the clinics.” Id., at 1424. This included many of the protest elements described above, including attempts to intimidate or impede cars from entering the parking lots, congregating in driveway entrances, and crowding around, yelling at, grabbing, pushing, and shoving people entering and leaving the clinics. The purpose of constructive blockades was the same as physical blockades: “to prevent or dissuade patients from entering the clinic.” Ibid. Clinic volunteer escorts testified that the protests were much quieter, calmer, and smaller during the first month after the TRO issued, but that the protests returned to their prior intensity thereafter, including aggressive sidewalk counseling with occasional shoving and elbowing, trespassing into clinic buildings to continue counseling of patients, and blocking of doorways and driveways.
Alleging that Project Rescue and five individual defendants (including petitioner Schenck) breached the TRO on five separate occasions from late October 1990 through December 1990, respondents sought four contempt citations. A fifth contempt citation for a 1991 incident was sought against petitioner Schenck and another individual defendant. Throughout 1991 and into 1992, the District Court held 27 days of hearings in these contempt proceedings, and issued opinions concluding that five of the six incidents justified a finding of civil contempt.
In February 1992, after hearing 12 additional days of testimony, the District Court issued the injunction, parts of which are challenged here. The relevant provisions are set forth in the margin. Although the injunction largely tracked the TRO, there were significant changes. First, while the TRO banned “demonstrating... within fifteen feet of any person” entering or leaving the clinics, the injunction more broadly banned “demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances of such facilities” (fixed buffer zones), or “within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving such facilities” (floating buffer zones). In addition, the injunction clarified the “cease and desist” provision, specifying that once sidewalk counselors who had entered the buffer zones were required to “cease and desist” their counseling, they had to retreat 15 feet from the people they had been counseling and had to remain outside the boundaries of the buffer zones.
In its opinion accompanying the preliminary injunction, the District Court stated the relevant inquiry as whether respondents had established (i) that they would be irreparably harmed if the injunction was not granted and (ii) that they were likely to succeed on the merits. The court held that the irreparable harm requirement was met, because “those women denied unimpeded access to [the clinics] cannot be compensated merely by money damages. Injunctive relief alone can assure women unimpeded access to [the] clinics.” Id., at 1428. The court also held that respondents were likely to succeed on at least three of their claims. First, relying on New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F. 2d 1389 (CA2 1989), cert. denied, 495 U. S. 947 (1990), the court held that women seeking abortions constituted a protected class under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3), and that their constitutional right to travel between States and to choose to have an abortion was likely infringed by defendants, in violation of § 1985(3). Second, the court held that the same conduct that infringed this class of women’s constitutional rights under §1985(3) “clearly violates N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c.” 799 F. Supp., at 1431. Finally, the court held that in light of the “overwhelming evidence that defendants have repeatedly trespassed upon [the clinics’] property in the past and may continue to trespass in the future,” respondents had shown a likelihood of success on their trespass claim. Id., at 1432. Having already found likelihood of success on these claims, the court chose not to address respondents’ other four state-law claims. Id., at 1432, n. 11.
In analyzing defendants’ assertion that the injunction violated their First Amendment right to free speech, the court applied our standard “time, place, and manner analysis,” asking whether the speech restrictions in the injunction (i) were content neutral, (ii) were narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (iii) left open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Id., at 1432 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988)). The court held that the injunction was content neutral because “it merely restricts the volume, location, timing and harassing and intimidating nature of defendants’ expressive speech.” 799 F. Supp., at 1433. The court held that the injunction served three significant governmental interests— public safety, ensuring that abortions are performed safely, and ensuring that a woman’s constitutional rights to travel interstate and to choose to have an abortion were not sacrificed in the interest of defendants’ First Amendment rights.
As to narrow tailoring, the court explained that the 15-foot buffer zones “around entrances and... around people and vehicles seeking access... are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics will not be impeded, and will be able to determine readily where the entrances are located.” Id., at 1434. The court added that the buffer zones would also provide the benefit of “preventing] defendants from crowding patients and invading their personal space.” Ibid. The court explained the “cease and desist” provision — allowing two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones but requiring them to “cease and desist” their counseling if the counselee asked to be left alone — as “an exception” to the buffer zones and as “an attempt to accommodate fully defendants’ First Amendment rights.” Ibid. The court held that this provision was “necessary in order to protect the right of people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone.” Id., at 1435. Finally, the court held that the injunction left open ample alternative channels for communication, because defendants could still “picket, carry signs, pray, sing or chant in full view of people going into the clinics.” Id., at 1437. we held in
After the District Court Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 269 (1993), that “women seeking an abortion” were not a protected class under 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3). In light of Bray, the District Court dismissed respondents’ § 1985(3) claim, with leave to file an amended § 1985(3) cause of action. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y. v. Project Rescue Western N. Y., 828 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (WDNY 1993). The court then decided to exercise pendent jurisdiction over respondents’ remaining causes of action (the six state claims), regardless of the ultimate disposition of the § 1985(3) claim. In so deciding, the court noted that “the preliminary injunction is grounded not only on the § 1985(3) claim, but two state-law claims [the N. Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c claim and the trespass claim] as well.” Id., at 1026, n. 4. The court explained that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness all suggested that it keep the case, since it had expended substantial resources on the case and its involvement in the case was ongoing. Id., at 1028-1029 (citing the contempt motions filed by respondents in 1990 and 1991, criminal contempt charges brought against six individuals for protests in 1992, and civil and criminal contempt motions filed in 1993).
Petitioners, two individual defendants, appealed to Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While the case was on appeal, we decided Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994), a case which also involved the effect of an injunction on the expressive activities of antiabortion protesters. (We discuss Madsen in greater depth in Part II-A, infra.) We held that “our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous” when it comes to evaluating content-neutral injunctions that restrict speech. The test instead, we held, is “whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” 512 U. S., at 765.
Applying Madsen, a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in a split decision. 67 F. 3d 359 (1994). The Court of Appeals then heard the case en banc, and affirmed the District Court by a divided vote. 67 F. 3d 377 (1995). Each of two opinions garnered a majority of the court. Judge Oakes’ lead opinion, joined by eight other judges, affirmed for reasons that closely track the reasoning of the District Court. Id., at 388-392. A concurring opinion by Judge Winter, joined by nine other judges, affirmed primarily on the ground that the protesters’ expressive activities were not protected by the First Amendment at all, and because the District Court’s injunction was a “reasonable response” to the protesters’ conduct. Id., at 396, 398. We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1170 (1996).
1 — ( I-H
A
Petitioners challenge three aspects of the injunction: (i) the floating 15-foot buffer zones around people and vehicles seeking access to the clinics; (ii) the fixed 15-foot buffer zones around the clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances; and (iii) the "cease and desist” provision that forces sidewalk counselors who are inside the buffer zones to retreat 15 feet from the person being counseled once the person indicates a desire not to be counseled. Because Madsen bears many similarities to this case and because many of the parties’ arguments depend on the application of Madsen here, we review our determination in that case.
A Florida state court had issued a permanent injunction enjoining specified organizations and individuals from blocking or interfering with clinic access and from physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic. Six months after the injunction issued, the court found that protesters still impeded access by demonstrating on the street and in the driveways, and that sidewalk counselors approached entering vehicles in an effort to hand literature to the occupants. In the face of this evidence, the court issued a broader injunction that enjoined the defendant protesters from “ ‘physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting’ ” anyone entering or leaving the clinic; from “ ‘congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or private property within [36] feet of the property line of the Clinic’ from approaching anyone “ ‘seeking the services of the Clinic’ ” who is within 300 feet of the clinic, unless the person “ ‘indicates a desire to communicate’ and from making any noise or displaying any image which could be heard or seen inside the clinic. 512 U. S., at 759-760.
After determining that the injunction was not a prior restraint and was content neutral, id., at 762-764, we held that the proper test for evaluating content-neutral injunctions under the First Amendment was “whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest,” id., at 765. The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that the injunction was based on a number of governmental interests: protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting the medical privacy of patients whose psychological and physical well-being were threatened as they were held “captive” by medical circumstance. Id., at 767-768. We held that the combination of these interests was “quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction” to protect unimpeded access to the clinic by way of public streets and sidewalks. Id., at 768.
We held that some of the injunction’s provisions burdened more speech than necessary to serve these interests, and that others did not. We upheld the 86-foot buffer zone as applied to the street, sidewalks, and driveways “as a way of ensuring access to the clinic.” We explained that the trial court had few other options to protect access to the clinic: Allowing protesters to remain on the sidewalks and in the clinic driveway was not a valid option because of their past conduct, and allowing them to stand in the street was obviously impractical. In addition, we stated that “some deference must be given to the state court’s familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties even under our heightened review.” Id., at 769-770 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287, 294 (1941)).
We struck down the 300-foot no-approach zone around the clinic, however, stating that it was difficult
“to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches... regardless of how peaceful the contact may be_ Absent evidence that the protesters’ speech is independently proscribable (i. e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, see Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U. S., at 292-293, this provision

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 消