Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

GARDNER, Chief Judge.
This matter is before us on petition of the taxpayer to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States. On October 5, 1951, the Tax Court entered its decision, which so far as here pertinent reads as follows:
“Under written stipulation signed by counsel for the parties in the above-entitled proceeding and filed with the court on September 27, 1951, at St. Louis, Missouri, it is
“Ordered and Decided: That there are deficiencies in tax and penalties due from the petitioner as follows:
Deficiency Penalty
Tax 50% 25%
Year ended Jan. 31,1947
Income ..................... ...$ 513.35 None None
Personal Holding Co. Surtax .. .. 16,469.93 $ 8,234.97 $ 4,117.49
Year Ended Jan. 31,1948
Income ..................... None None
Personal Holding Co. Surtax .., ... 27,342.66 $13,671.33 $ 6,835.66!
On October 3, 1955, taxpayer filed its motion to withdraw stipulation and revise this decision dated October 5, 1951. In support of this motion it was alleged that it had paid the amounts of the deficiencies as determined by the Tax Court’s decision; that thereafter taxpayer ascertained that in truth and in fact for the said taxable years 1947 and 1948, and for some three years thereafter, its business and affairs were under the active supervision and control of its president, Vernon F. Neubauer; that the tax returns for said years were signed by him, and a stipulation prepared and signed by counsel employed by him stipulated as to the amount alleged to be due; that during the taxable years 1947 to and including 1951, the stockholders relied upon said Vernon F. Neubauer to manage and direct its operations and affairs, and relied upon the audit reports prepared and signed by Marion F. Langenberg, an independent certified public accountant who was employed by said Vernon F. Neubauer; that the tax returns and the report of the auditor employed by Vernon F. Neubauer were false and fraudulently made for the purpose of showing that under the direction and management of said Vernon F. Neubauer, its president, the company was making profits, whereas in truth and in fact, as later shown by correct audits, taxpayer had no taxable income for the said years. The showing made by taxpayer on its said motion went into quite elaborate details, the effect of which was that the said Vernon F. Neubauer, president, had, presumably for the purpose of showing that the company under his management was making profit, fraudulently reported taxable income.
On October 3, 1955, the Tax Court granted taxpayer permission to file its motion and to withdraw its stipulation. Thereafter, and on November 21, 1955, the motion was heard and submitted, the respondent agreeing, for the purpose of the hearing on the motion, that the facts alleged were true, but asserted in defense that the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the decision of October 5,1951, for the reason that same had become final under Section 1140, 26 U.S.C.A. On May 25, 1956, the Tax Court entered its decision on petitioner’s motion, denying the motion and holding that the taxpayer was not entitled to relief because of its laches. The Tax Court declined to rule on the question of its jurisdiction.
In seeking reversal the taxpayer contends in effect, among other things, that (1) the Tax Court had power and jurisdiction to grant relief on its motion to review its decision of October 5, 1951; (2) the extrinsic, after-discovered fraud present in this case which prevented petitioner from in fact having a real hearing presents a case within the exception to the general rule that final judgments are ordinarily immune from attack; (3) exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court is vested in the United States Court of Appeals and this court has power to vacate the fraud-infested decision of the Tax Court in this case and do justice between the parties.
The decision of the Tax Court of October 5, 1951, was entered on stipulation, the taxpayer agreeing to the amount of the deficiencies. The decision was not appealed from nor otherwise assailed until four years later when, on October 3, 1955, taxpayer interposed its motion to revise the decision. The Tax Court was of the view that the taxpayer had not acted promptly and that its delay amounted to laches. It, however, had before it the claim of the respondent that the decision entered October 5, 1951, had become final and could not be assailed by the proffered motion. All intendments are in favor of the validity of the decision attacked and if it is correct it should be sustained x'egardless of the grounds on which the Tax Court based its decision.
It is strenuously urged by the respondent that when a decision of the Tax Court becomes final the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set the decision aside. Section 1142 of the Internal Revenue Code, 1939, 26 U.S.C.A., § 1142, fixes a time limitation after which a petition for review by a Court of Appeals may not be filed, and Section 1140 of the Internal Revenue Code, 1939, expressly indicates the time when a decision of the Tax Court shall become final, and as indicated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Company, 320 U.S. 418, 64 S.Ct. 184, 88 L.Ed. 139, the mainspring of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction is not general equitable principles but the Internal Revenue Code. The authority to act must be determined, not on equitable principles, but upon statutory provisions fixing the limitations of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction. Section 1140, Title 26 U.S.C.A. provides in part:
“The decision of the Tax Court shall become final—
“(a) Petition for review not filed on time. Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time; * *. "
Manifestly, the decision of the Tax Court here involved had become final before petitioner sought to have it revised; in fact, it had stood without challenge for four years. Lasky v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 235 F.2d 97; Lasky v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 1027, 77 S.Ct. 594, 1 L.Ed.2d 598; Helvering v. Northern Coal Co., 293 U.S. 191, 55 S.Ct. 3, 79 L.Ed. 281; R. Simpson & Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 225, 64 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed. 688. In Lasky v. Commissioner, 9th Cir., 235 F.2d 98, supra, some four months after the entry of the Tax Court’s decision, on motion of the taxpayer the Tax Court vacated its decision. On petition for rehearing, in the course of a well considered opinion Judge Denman, speaking for the court, among other things said:
“Some four months after the decision, on August 23, 1954, the petitioners moved the Tax Court to vacate the decision of April 8, 1954, on the ground of excusable neglect, a power formerly in the federal courts’ equity jurisdiction, cf. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 1937, 300 U.S. 131, 57 S.Ct. 382, 81 L.Ed. 557, and now contained in Rule 60(b), F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C., which by Rule 1 is confined to the United States District Court and not applicable to executive agencies.
“Though not a court at all but merely an administrative agency it assumed the power of a district court and in December, 1954, it granted petitioners’ motions to vacate its decision of April 8, 1954, and for the taking of additional evidence. * * *
* * * •» * *
“Obviously if the Supreme Court lacks the power to reconsider because the decision of the Board has become ‘final’, a fortiori such an agency as the Tax Court likewise lacks the power by the words of Section 1140 that ‘The decision of the Tax Court shall become final * * * upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time’.
“Counsel for the Laskys, ignoring the Congressional definition of it as an executive agency, contend that the Tax Court is Tike other courts’ and hence as a court has the ‘inherent power to control, amend, open and vacate its decisions.’
*•»*•***
“Both the Sixth Circuit and counsel here cite the case of La Floridienne J. Buttgenbach & Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 1933, 63 F.2d 630, where the court held solely that on the stipulation of the parties the Board of Tax Appeals could set aside its final order more than three months after its rendition. Here there is no such stipulation. More important still, the Buttgenbach case was decided in 1933, the year before the Supreme Court rendered its Northern Coal Co. decision in 1934 [Helvering v. Northern Coal Co., 293 U.S. 191, 55 S.Ct. 3, 79 L.Ed. 281], determining that where the statutes make final the action of the taxing agency, no jurisdiction exists after such finality to set the decision aside. * * * ”
It is, however, insisted that this case is of the exceptional nature not governed by the prescribed rules of procedure in that by reason of the fraud of its president petitioner was denied its day in court, but as pointed out in the Lasky case, the power to vacate a decision on equitable grounds, after it has become final, “is confined to the United States District Courts and not applicable to executive agencies.” It is argued by respondent that such relief could not here be granted because the fraud was not the fraud of the parties to the litigation. There is confessedly much authority in support of this doctrine but we prefer to rest our decision on the proposition that the Tax Court did not have such equitable jurisdiction. It is a creature of the statute of limited jurisdiction and the statute here definitely limits its jurisdiction to the time when its decision shall have become final. That period had long passed before its jurisdiction was invoked by the present proceeding.
It is urged by petitioner that this court has jurisdiction to consider the issues sought to be presented to the Tax Court. After the decision has become final neither the Tax Court nor this court can grant relief however meritorious the claim may be. The petition for review is therefore dismissed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0