Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider here the standards which should guide a federal court in deciding whether to grant a hearing on a motion of á federal prisoner under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Under that statute, a federal.prisoner who claims that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States may seek relief from the sentence by filing a motion in the sentencing court stating the facts supporting his claim. “[A] prompt hearing” on the motion is required “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief....” The section further provides that “[t]he sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.”
The petitioner is serving a 15-year sentence for robbery of a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2113 (a). He filed two motions under § 2255. The first alleged no facts but only bare conclusions in support of his claim. The second, filed eight months after the first, alleged facts which, if true, might entitle him to relief. Both motions were denied,'without hearing, by the District Court for the' Northern District of California. On appeal from the denial of the second motion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 297 F. 2d 735. We granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and cer-tiorari. 370 U. S. 936.
On January 19, 1959, petitioner was brought before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, and was handed a copy of a proposed information charging him with the robbery. He appeared without counsel. In response to inquiries of the trial judge, petitioner stated that he. wished t<? waive assistance of counsel and to proceed by information rather than indictment; he signed a waiver of indictment, and then pleaded guilty to the charge in the information. On February 10 he was sentenced. Before sentence was pronounced, petitioner said to the judge: “If possible, your Honor, I would like to go to Springfield or.Lexington for addiction. cure. I have been using narcotics off and on for quite a while.” The judge replied that he was “willing to recommend that.”
On Jánuary 4, 1960, petitioner, appearing pro se, filed • his first motion.. He alleged no facts but merely the conclusions that (1) the “Indictment” was invalid, (2) “Appellant was denied adequate assistance of Counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,” and (3) the sentencing court had “allowed the Appellant to be intimidated and coerced into filtering [sic] a plea without Counsel, and any knowledge of the charges lodged against the Appellant.” He filed with the motion an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring the. prison authorities to produce him before the court to testify in support of his motion. On February 3 the District Court denied both the motion and the application. In a memorandum accompanying the denial, the court explained that the motion, “although replete with conclusions, sets forth no facts upon which such conclusions can be founded. For this reason alone, this motion may be denied without a hearing.” Nevertheless, the court stated further that the motion “sets forth nothing but unsupported charges, which are completely refuted by the files and records of this case. Since the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, no hearing on the motion is necessary.” No appeal was taken by the petitioner from this denial.
On September 8 petitioner, again appearing pro se, filed his second motion. This time he alleged that, at the time of his trial and sentence he was mentally incompetent as a result of narcotics administered to him while he was held in the Sacramento County Jail pending trial. He stated in a supporting affidavit that he had been confined in the jail from on or about January 16, 1959, to February 18, 1959; that during this period and during the period of his “trial” he had been intermittently under the influence of narcotics; and that the narcotics had been administered to him by the medical authorities in attendance at the jail because of his being a known addict. The District Court denied the motion without hearing, stating: “As there is no reason given, or appárent tó this Court, Why petitioner could not, and should hot, have raised the issue of mental incompetency at the time of his first motion, the Court will refuse, in the exercise of its statutory discretion, to entertain the present petition.” (Footnote omitted.) The court also' stated that “petitioner’s complaints are without merit in fact.” On appeal from the order denying this motion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 297 F. 2d 735 (1961). The Court of Appeals said in a per curiam opinion: “Where, as here, it is ápparent from the record that at the time of filing the first motion the movant knew the facts on which the second motion is based, yet in the second motion set forth no reason why.he was previously unable-to assert the new ground and did not allege that he had previously been unaware of the significance of the relevant facts, the district court, may, in its discretion, decline to entertain the second motion.” 297 F. 2d, at 736-737.
We reverse. We hold that the sentencing court should, have granted a hearing oh the second motion.
I.
The statute in'terms requires that a' prisoner shall be granted a hearing on a motion which alleges sufficient facts to support a claim for relief unless the motion and the files and records of the case “conclusively show” that the claim is without merit. This is the first case in which'we have been called upon to determine what significance, in deciding whether to grant a hearing, the. sentencing court should attach to. any record of proceedings on prior '.motions for relief which may be among the files and records of the case, in light of the provision that: “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion-, for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.” This provision has caused uncertainty in the District Courts, see Bistram v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 501 (D. C. D. N. Dak.), aff’d, 283 F. 2d 1 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1960), and has provoked a conflict between circuits: with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the instant case, compare, e. g., Juelick v. United States, 300 F. 2d 381 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1962); Smith v. United States, 106 U. S. App. D. C. 169, 270 F. 2d 921 (1959). We think guidelines to the proper construction of the provision are to be found in its history.
At common law, the denial by a court or judge of an application for habeas corpus was not res' judicata. King v. Suddis, 1 East 306, 102 Eng. Rep. 119 (K. B. 1801); Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East 1, 90, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 535 (K. B. 1811); Ex parte Partington, 13 M. & W. 679, 153 Eng. Rep. 284 (Ex. 1845); Church, Habeas Corpus (1884), § 386; Ferris and Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1926), § 55. “A person detained in custody might thus proceed from court to court until he obtained his liberty.” Cox v. Hakes, 15 A. C. 506, 527 (H. L., 1890) That this was a principle of our law of habeas corpus as well as the English was assumed to be thé case from the earliest days of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.. Cf. Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448 (Chief Justice Marshall). Since then,, it has become settled in an unbroken line of decisions. Ex parte Kaine, 3 Blatchf. 1, 5-6 (Mr. Justice Nelson in Chambers); In re Kaine, 14 How. 103; Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 65 (Cir. Ct. S. D. Cal. 1889) (Mr. Justice Field); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 334; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224, 230; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101; United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, 263, n. 4; Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415, 420 (opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart) (dictum); Powell v. Sacks, 303 F. 2d 808 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1962). Indeed, only the other day we remarked upon “the familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 423.
It has been suggested, see Salinger v. Loisel, supra, at 230-231, that this principle derives from the fact that at common law habeas corpus judgments were not appeal-able. But its roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged. If “government... [is] always [to] be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s imprisonment,” Fay v. Noia, supra, at 402, access to the courts on habeas must not be thus impeded. The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas, then, is inherent in the very role and function of the writ.
A prisoner whose motion Under § 2255 is denied will often file another, sometimes many successive motions. We are aware that in consequence the question whether to grant a hearing on a successive motion can be troublesome — particularly when the- motion is prepared without the assistance of counsel and contains matter extraneous to the prisoner’s ease. But the problem is not new, and our decisions under habeas corpus have identified situations where denial without hearing is proper even though a second or successive application states a claim for relief. One such situation is that involved in Salinger v. Loisel, supra. There, a first application for habeas corpus had been denied, after hearing, by one District Court, and the denial was affirmed by the Court, of Appeals. The prisoner then filed subsequent applications, all identical to the first, in a different District Court. We indicated that the subsequent applications might properly have been denied simply on the basis that the first denial had followed a full hearing on the merits. We there announced a governing principle; while reaffirming the inapplicability of res judi-cata to habeas, we said: “each application is to be dis.-posed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought.Among the matters which may be considered, and even given controlling weight, are.... a prior refusal to discharge on a like application.” 265 U. S., at 231. The Court quoted approvingly from Mr. Justice Field’s opinion in Ex parte Cuddy, supra, at 66: “ ‘The action of the court or justice on the second application will naturally be affected to some degree by the character of the court or officer to whom the first application was made, and the fullness of the consideration given to it.’ ” 265 U. S., at 231-232. The petitioner’s successive applications were properly denied because he sought to retry a.claim previously fully considered and decided against him. Similarly, nothing in § 2255 requires that •& sentencing court grant. a hearing on a successive motion alleging a ground for-relief already fully considered on a prior motion and decided against the prisoner.
Another such situation is that which was presented in Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U. S. 239. In Wong Doo the prisoner in his first application for habeas corpus tendered two grounds in support of his position. A hearing was held but the petitioner offered no proof of his second ground, even though the return to the writ had put it in issue..Relief was denied and the denial affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Later, he filed a second application relying exclusively on the second ground. Relief was denied. We upheld the denial: “The petitioner had full opportunity to offer proof of,. [the second ground] at the hearing on the first petition; and, if he was intending to’rely on that ground, good faith required that he produce the proof then. To reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ of' habeas corpus. No reason for not presenting the.proof at the outset is offered. It has not been embodied in the record, but what is said of it there and in the briefs shows that it was accessible all the'time.” 265 U. S., at 241. Similarly, the prisoner who on a prior motion under' § 2255 ’ has deliberately withheld a ground for relief need not be heard if he asserts that ground in a successive-motion; his action is inequitable — an abuse of the remedy — and the court may in its discretion deny him a hearing.
The interaction of these, two principles — a successive application on a ground heard and denied on a prior application, and abuse of the writ — was elaborated in Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 287-293. The petitioner had for the first time in his fourth application alleged the knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution.. But the Court held that regardless of the number of prior applications, the governing principle announced in Salinger v. Loisel could not come into play because the fourth application relied on a ground not previously heard and determined. Wong Doo was distinguished on the ground that-there the proof had been “accessible at all times” to’the petitioner, which demonstrated his bad faith, 334 U. S., at 289; in Price, by contrast, for aught the record disclosed petitioner might have been justifiably ignorant of newly alleged facts or unaware of their legal significance. The case also decided an.important procedural question • with regard to abuse of remedy as justification for denial of a hearing, namely, that the burden is on the Government to plead abuse of the writ. “[I]f the Government chooses hot to deny the allegation [of knowing use of perjured testimony] or to question its sufficiency and de-' sires instead to claim that the prisoner has abused the writ of habeas corpus, it rests with the Government to make, that claim.with clarity and particularity in its return to. the order to show cause.” Id., at 292. The Court reasoned that it would be unfair to- compel the habeas applicant, typically unlearned in the law and unable to procure legal assistance in drafting his application, to plead an elaborate negative.
Very shortly after the Price decision, as part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the Court’s statement in Salinger of the governing principle in the treatment of a successive application was given statutory form. 28 U. S. C. § 2244. There are several things to be observed about this codification.
First, it plainly was not intended to change, the law as -judicially evolved. ■ Not only does the Reviser’s Note disclaim-any sudh' intention, but language in the.original bill which would have injected res judicata into federal'habeas corpus was deliberately eliminated from the Act as finally passed. See S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9Moore, Commentary on the United States Judicial Code (1949), 436-438. Moreover, if. construed, to. derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ of habeas corpus, see pp. 7-8, supra, § 2244 might raise serious constitutional questions. Cf. Fay v. Noia, supra, at 406.
Second, even with respect to successive applications on which hearings may be denied because the ground asserted was previously heard and decided, as in Salinger, § 2244 is faithful to the Court’s phrasing of the principle in' Salinger, and does.not enact a rigid rule.' The judge is permitted, not compelled, to decline to entertain such an application, and.then only if he “is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served” by inquiring into the merits.
Third, § 2244 is addressed only to the problem of successive applications based on grounds previously heard and decided. It does.not cover a second or successive application containing a ground “not theretofore presented and determined,” and so does not touch the problem of abuse of the writ. In Wong Doo, petitioner’s second ground had been presented.but not determined on his prior application; § 2244 would be inapplicable in such a situation. On the other hand, § 2244 was obviously not intended to- foreclose judicial application of the abuse-of-writ principle as developed in Wong Doo and Price.
Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, under which the instant case arises, is of course also a product of the 1948 revision — enacted, in the language of the Reviser’s Note, to provide “an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences [of federal prisoners] without resort to habeas corpus.” It will be noted that although § 2255 contains a parallel provision to § 2244, there is an apparent verbal discrepancy. Undér § 2255, it is enough, in order to invoke the court’s discretion to decline to reach the merits, that the prisoner is seeking “similar relief” for the second time. This language might seem to empower the sentencing court to apply res judicata virtually at will,, since even if a second motion is predicated on a completely different ground from the first, the prisoner ordinarily will be seeking the same “relief.” Note, 59 Yale L. J. 1183, 1188, n. 24 (1950). But the language cannot be taken literally. In United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, the prisoner vigorously contended that § 2255 was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The Court avoided the constitutional question by holding that § 2255 was as broad as habeas corpus:
“This review of the history of Section 2255 shows that it was passed at the instance of the Judicial Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary, the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” 342 U. S., at 219. (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 511; Smith v. United States, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 80, 187 F. 2d 192 (1950); Heflin v. United States, 358. U. S. 415, 421 (opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart).
As we said just last Term, “it conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2265 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.” Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 427.
• Plainly, were the prisoner invoking § 2255 faced with the bar of res judicata, he would not enjoy the “same rights” as the habeas corpus 'applicant,, or “a remedy exactly commensurate with” habeas. Indeed, if he were subject to any substantial procedural hurdles which made his remedy under § 2255 less swift and imperative than féderal habeas corpus, the gravest constitutional doubts would, be engendered, as the Court in Hayman implicitly recognized. And cf. pp. 11-12, supra. We therefore hold that the “similar relief” provision of § 2255. is to be deemed the material équívalent of § 2244. See Smith v. United States, 106 U. S. App. D. C. 169, 173, 270 F. 2d 921, 925 (1959); Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F. R. D. 407, 424 (1953). We are helped to this conclusion by two further considerations.
. First, there is no indication in the legislative history to the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code that Congress intended to treat the problem of successive applications differently under habeas corpus- than under the new motion procedure; and it is difficult to see what logical or practical basis there could be for such' a distinction.
Second,’even assuming the constitutionality of incorporating res judicata in § 2255, such a provision wofild •probably prove to be completely ineffectual, in light of the further provision in the section that habeas corpus remains available to a federal prisoner if the remedy by motion is “inadequate or ineffective.”. A prisoner barred by res judicata would seem as a consequence to have an “inadequate or ineffective” remedy under § 2255 and thus be entitled to proceed in. federal habeas corpus — where, of course, § 2244 applies. See Smith v. United States, sura, 106 U. S. App. D. C., at 174, 270 F. 2d, at 926.
II.
We think the judicial and statutory evolution of the principles governing successive applications for federal habeas corpus and motions under § 2255 has reached the point at which the formulation of basic rules to guide the. lower federal courts is both feasible and desirable. Compare Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 310. Since the motion procedure is the substantial.equivalent of federal habeas corpus, we see no need to differentiate the two for present- purposes. It should be noted that these rules are not operative in cases where the second or successive application is shown, on the basis of the application, files, and records of the case alone, conclusively to be without merit. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2243, 2255. In such a case the application should be denied without a hearing.
A.'Successive Motions on Grounds Previously Heard and Determined.
Controlling weight may

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
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Answer: 型