Task: sc_issue_2

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Me. Justice Beennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act), 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V), requires that States, like Alabama, which are covered under § 4 of the Act, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (1970 ed., Supp. V), obtain prior federal approval before changing any voting practice or procedure that was in effect on November 1, 1964. The questions for decision in this case are (1) whether § 5 requires an Alabama city that has never conducted voter registration to obtain preclearance of a voting change and (2), if so, whether the failure of the Attorney General of the United States to object to the holding of a referendum election at which a change is adopted constitutes federal approval of that change.
I
The city of Sheffield, Ala. (City or Sheffield), was incorporated in 1885 by the Alabama Legislature. As incorporated, the City was governed by a mayor and eight councilmen, two councilmen being elected directly from each ■ of the City’s four wards. Sheffield retained this mayor-council government until 1912 when it adopted a system in which three commissioners, elected by the City at large, ran the City. This commission form of government was in effect in Sheffield on November 1, 1964.
Sometime prior to March 20, 1975, Sheffield decided to put to a referendum the question whether the City should return to a mayor-council form of government. On that date the president of the Board of Commissioners of Sheffield wrote the Attorney General of the United States to “give notice of the proposal of submitting to the qualified voters of the City, whether the present commission form of government shall be abandoned in favor of the Mayor and Alderman form of government.” On May 13,1975, before the Attorney General replied, the referendum occurred, and the voters of Sheffield approved the change.
On May 23, the Attorney Genearl formally responded to Sheffield that he did “not interpose an objection to the holding of the referendum,” but that “[s]inee voters in the City of Sheffield elected to adopt the mayor-council form of government on May 13, 1975, the change is also subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5.” The Attorney General’s letter also stated that in the event the City should elect to seek preclearance of the change from the Attorney General it should submit detailed information concerning the change, including a description of “the aldermanic form of government which existed in 1912 and the method by which it was elected, i. e., the number of aldermen, the terms and qualifications for the mayor and aldermen, whether the aldermen were elected at large or by wards, whether there were numbered post, residency, majority vote or staggered term requirements for the aldermanic seats, and whether single shot voting was prohibited.”
Thereafter the City informed the Attorney General that the proposed change would divide the City into four wards of substantially equal population, that each ward would have two council seats, that councilmen from each ward would be elected at large, and that candidates would run for numbered places. Subsequently the City furnished a detailed map showing ward boundaries, data concerning the population distribution by race for each ward, and a history of black candidacy for city and county offices since 1965. The City’s submission was completed on May 5, 1976.
On July 6, 1976, the Attorney General notified the City that while he did not “interpose any objection to the change to a mayor-council form of government... to the proposed district lines or to the at-large election of the mayor and the president of the council,” he did object to the implementation of the proposed at-large method of electing city councilmen because he was “unable to conclude that the at-large election of councilmen required to reside in districts will not have a racially discriminatory effect.”
Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s objection, the City scheduled an at-large council election for August 10, 1976. On August 9, the United States instituted this suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to enforce its § 5 objection. A temporary restraining order was denied. After the election was held, a three-judge court was convened and that court dismissed the suit. 430 F. Supp. 786 (1977). The District Court unanimously held that Sheffield was not covered by § 6 because it is not a “political subdivision” as that term is defined in § 14 (c) (2) of the Act, 79 Stat. 446, 42 U. S. C. § 19731 (c)(2), which provides that “ 'political subdivision’ shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” See 430 F. Supp., at 788-789 and 790-792. The court also held, one judge dissenting, that “by approving the referendum the Attorney General in fact approved the change to the Mayor-Council form of government [in which aldermen were elected at large] notwithstanding [his statement] to the City that the change was also subject to pre-clearance.” Id., at 789. The court reasoned that the approval of the referendum constituted clearance of those aspects of the proposed change that the Attorney General knew or should have known would be implemented if the referendum passed and that he should have known that Sheffield would be obliged to follow Ala. Code § 11-43-40 (1975) — formerly Ala. Code, Tit. 37, § 426 (Supp. 1973) — which requires the at-large election of aldermen in cities, like Sheffield, with populations of less than 20,000. 430 F. Supp., at 789-790. We noted probable jurisdiction. 433 U. S. 906 (1977). We reverse.
II
We first consider whether Congress intended to exclude from § 5 coverage political units, like Sheffield, which have never conducted voter registration. In concluding that Congress did, the District Court noted that § 5 applies to “a [designated] state or a [designated] political subdivision” and construed § 5 to provide that, where a State in its entirety has been designated for coverage, the only political units within it that are subject to § 5 are those that are “political subdivisions” within the meaning of § 14 (c)(2). Because § 14 (c) (2) refers only to counties and to the units of state government that register voters, the District Court held that political units like the City are not subject to the duties imposed by §5.
There is abundant evidence that the District Court’s interpretation of the Act is contrary to the congressional intent. First, and most significantly, the District Court’s construction is inconsistent with the Act’s structure, makes § 5 coverage depend upon a factor completely irrelevant to the Act’s purposes, and thereby permits precisely the kind of circumvention of congressional policy that § 5 was designed to prevent. Second, the language of the Act does not require such a crippling interpretation, but rather is susceptible of a reading that will fully implement the congressional objectives. Finally, the District Court’s construction is flatly inconsistent with the Attorney General’s consistent interpretations of § 5 and with the legislative history of its enactment and re-enactments. The language, structure, history, and purposes of the Act persuade us that § 5, like the constitutional provisions it is designed to implement, applies to all entities having power over any aspect of the electoral process within designated jurisdictions, not only to counties or to whatever units of state government perform the function of registering voters.
A
Although this Court has described the workings of the Voting Rights Act in prior cases, see, e. g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966), it is appropriate again to summarize its purposes and structure and the special function of § 5. Congress adopted the Act in 1965 to implement the Fifteenth Amendment and erase the blight of racial discrimination in voting. See 383 U. S., at 308. The core of the Act “is a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been the most flagrant.” Id., at 315. Congress resorted to these stern measures because experience had shown them to be necessary to eradicate the “insidious and pervasive evil of [racial discrimination in voting] that had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country.” Id., at 309. Earlier efforts to end this discrimination by facilitating case-by-case litigation had proved ineffective in large part because voting suits had been “unusually onerous to prepare” and “exceedingly slow” to produce results. And even when favorable decisions had been obtained, the affected jurisdictions often “merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees.” See id., at 313-314.
The structure and operation of the Act are relatively simple. Sections 4 (a) and 4 (b) determine the jurisdictions that are subject to the Act’s special measures. Congress, having found that there was a high probability of pervasive racial discrimination in voting in areas that employed literacy tests or similar voting qualifications and that, in addition, had low voter turnouts or registration figures, provided that coverage in a State is “triggered” if it maintained any “test or device” on a specified date and if it had voter registration or voter turnout of less than 50% of those of voting age during specified Presidential elections. When this formula is not met in an entire State, coverage is triggered in any “political subdivision” within the State that satisfies the formula. Since § 4 (c) of the Act defines “test or device” as a “prerequisite for voting or registration for voting,” 79 Stat. 438, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (c) (emphasis supplied), it is clear that the Attorney General, in making a coverage determination, is to consider not only the voter registration process within a jurisdiction, but also the procedures followed by the election officials at the polling places. A State or political subdivision which does not use literacy tests to determine who may register to vote but employs such tests at the polling places to- determine who may cast a ballot may plainly be covered under § 4 (b).
If designated under §4(b), a jurisdiction will become subject to the Act’s special remedies unless it establishes, in a judicial action, that no “test or device” was used to discriminate on the basis of race in voting.' Section 4 (a) is one of the Act’s core remedial provisions. Because Congress determined that the continued employment of literacy tests and similar devices in covered areas would perpetuate racial discrimination, it suspended their use in § 4 (a). Just as the actions of every political unit that conducts elections are relevant under § 4 (b), so § 4 (a) imposes a duty on every entity in the covered jurisdictions having power over the electoral process, whether or not the entity registers voters. That § 4 (a) has this geographic reach is clear both from the fact that a “test or device” may be employed by any oficial with control over any aspect of an election and from § 4 (a)’s provision that its suspension operates “in any [designated] State... or in any [designated] political subdivision.” (Emphasis supplied.) The congressional objectives plainly required that § 4 (a) apply throughout each designated jurisdiction. If it did not have this scope, the covered States, which in the past had been so ingenious in their defiance of the spirit of federal law, could have easily circumvented § 4 (a) by, e. g., discontinuing the use of literacy tests to determine who may register but requiring that all citizens pass literacy tests at the polling places before voting.
Although § 4 (a) is a potent weapon, Congress recognized that it alone would not ensure an end to racial discrimination in voting in covered areas. In the past, States and the political units within them had responded to federal decrees outlawing discriminatory practices by “resort [ing] to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination....” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 335. To prevent any future circumvention of constitutional policy, Congress adopted § 5 which provides that whenever a designated State or political subdivision wishes to change its voting laws, it must first demonstrate to a federal instrumentality that the change will be nondiscriminatory. By freezing each covered jurisdiction’s election procedures, Congress shifted the advantages of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.
The foregoing discussion of the key remedial provisions of the Act belies the District Court’s conclusion that § 5 should apply only to counties and to the political units that conduct voter registration. As is apparent from the Act, § 5 “was'structured to assure the effectiveness of the dramatic step that Congress had taken in § 4” and “is clearly designed to march in lock-step with § 4....” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S., at 584 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). Since jurisdictions may be designated under §4 (b) by reason of the actions of election officials who do not register voters, and since § 4 (a) imposes duties on all election officials whether or not they are involved in voter registration, it appears to follow necessarily that § 5 has to apply to all entities exercising control over the electoral processes within the covered States or subdivisions. In any case, in view of the structure of the Act, it would be unthinkable to adopt the District Court’s construction unless there were persuasive evidence either that § 5 was intended to apply only to changes affecting the registration process or that Congress clearly manifested an intention to restrict § 5 coverage to counties or to the units of local government that register voters. But the Act supports neither conclusion.
The terms of the Act and decisions of this Court clearly indicate that § 5 was not intended to apply only to voting changes occurring within the registration process. Section 5 applies to “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting....” Since the statutory definition of “voting” includes “all action necessary to make a vote effective in any... election, including, but not limited to, registration,... casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly...,” 79 Stat. 445, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Í (c)(1), § 5’s coverage of laws affecting voting is comprehensive.
The Court’s decisions over the past 10 years have given § 5 the broad scope suggested by the language of the Act. We first construed it in Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra. There our examination of the Act’s objectives and original legislative history led.us to interpret § 5 to give it “the broadest possible scope,” 393 U. S., at 567, and to require prior federal scrutiny of “any state enactment which altered the election law in a covered State in even a minor way.” Id., at 566. In so construing § 5, we unanimously rejected —as the plain terms of the Act would themselves have seemingly required — the argument of an appellee that § 5 should apply only to enactments affecting who may register to vote. 393 U. S., at 564. Our decisions have required federal preclearance of laws changing the location of polling places, see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), laws adopting at-large systems of election, ibid.; Fairley v. Patterson (decided with Allen, supra); laws providing for the appointment of previously elected officials, Bunton v. Patterson (decided with Allen, supra); laws regulating candidacy, Whitley v. Williams (decided with Allen, supra); laws changing voting procedures, Allen, supra; annexations, City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v. United States, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), summarily aff'd 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972); Perkins v. Matthews, supra; and reapportionment and redistricting, Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); see United. Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). In each case, federal scrutiny of the proposed change was required because the change had the potential to deny or dilute the rights conférred by § 4 (a).
Significantly, in several of these cases, this Court decided that § 5’s preclearance requirement applied to cities within designated States without ever inquiring whether the cities conducted voter registration. See Beer v. United States, supra; City of Richmond v. United States, supra; Perkins v. Matthews, supra. It is doubtful, moreover, that § 5 would have been held to be applicable in at least one of these cases if the District Court’s interpretation of § 5 were the law. Although the assumption of these decisions — that cities are covered whether or not they conduct voter registration — perhaps has little stare decisis significance — the issue not having been raised, but see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962) — these decisions underscore the obvious fact that, whether or not they register voters, cities can enact measures with the potential to dilute or defeat the voting rights of minority group members, and they further illustrate that Congress could not have intended § 5’s duties to apply only to those cities that register voters.
Because § 5 embodies a' judgment that voting changes occurring outside the registration process have the potential to discriminate in voting on the basis of race, it would be irrational for § 5 coverage to turn on whether the political unit enacting or administering the change itself registers voters. But quite apart from the fact that this cramped construction cannot be squared with any reasonable set of objectives, the District Court’s interpretation of § 5 would permit the precise evil that § 5 was designed to eliminate. Under it, local political entities like Sheffield would be free to respond to local pressure to limit the political power of minorities and take steps that would, temporarily at least, dilute or entirely defeat the voting rights of minorities, e. g., providing for the appointment of officials who previously had been elected, moving the polling places to areas of the city where minority group members could not safely travel, or even providing that election officials could not count the ballots of minority voters. The only recourse for the minority group members affected by such changes would be the one Congress implicitly found to be unsatisfactory: repeated litigation. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, supra, at 156. The District Court's reading of § 5 would thus place the advantages of time and inertia back on the perpetrators of the discrimination as to all elections conducted by political units that do not register voters, and, equally seriously, it would invite States to circumvent the Act in all other elections by allowing local entities that do not conduct voter registration to control critical aspects of the electoral process. The clear consequence of this interpretation would be to nullify both § 5 and the Act in a large number of its potential applications.
B
The terms of the Act do not require such an absurd result. In arriving at its interpretation of § 5, the District Court focused on its language “a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in [§ 4 (a)] based upon determinations made under [§4(b)] are in effect.” While § 5’s failure to use the phrase “in a [designated] State or subdivision” arguably provides a basis for an inference that § 5 ’was not intended to have the territorial reach of § 4 (a), the actual terms of § 5 suggest that its coverage is to be cotermin

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 区