Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires that we decide a peculiar jurisdictional battle between the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Each court has adamantly disavowed jurisdiction over this case. Each has transferred the case to the other. And each insists that the other’s jurisdictional decision is “clearly wrong.” 798 F. 2d 1051, 1056-1057 (CA7 1986); 822 F. 2d 1544, 1551, n. 7 (CA Fed. 1987). The parties therefore have been forced to shuttle their appeal back and forth between Chicago and the District of Columbia in search of a hospitable forum, ultimately to have the merits decided, after two years, by a Court of Appeals that still insists it lacks jurisdiction to do so.
HH
Respondent Colt Industries Operating Corp. is the leading manufacturer, seller, and marketer of M16 rifles and their parts and accessories. Colt’s dominant market position dates back to 1959, when it acquired a license for 16 patents to manufacture the M16’s precursor. Colt continued to develop the rifle, which the United States Army adopted as its standard assault rifle, and patented additional improvements. Through various devices, Colt has also maintained a shroud of secrecy around certain specifications essential to the mass production of interchangeable M16 parts. For example, Colt’s patents conceal many of the manufacturing specifications that might otherwise be revealed by its engineering drawings, and when Colt licenses others to manufacture M16 parts or hires employees with access to proprietary information, it contractually obligates them not to disclose specifications.
Petitioner Christianson is a former Colt employee who acceded to such a nondisclosure agreement. Upon leaving respondent’s employ in 1975, Christianson established petitioner International Trade Services, Inc. (ITS), and began selling M16 parts to various customers domestically and abroad. Petitioners’ business depended on information that Colt considers proprietary. Colt expressly waived its proprietary rights at least as to some of petitioners’ early transactions. The precise scope of Colt’s waiver is a matter of considerable dispute. In 1983, however, Colt joined petitioners as defendants in a patent-infringement lawsuit against two companies that had arranged a sale of M16’s to El Salvador. Evidence suggested that petitioners supplied the companies with certain M16 specifications, and Colt sought a court order enjoining petitioners from any further disclosures. When the District Court declined the motion, Colt voluntarily dismissed its claims against petitioners. In the meantime, Colt notified several of petitioners’ current and potential customers that petitioners were illegally misappropriating Colt’s trade secrets, and urged them to refrain from doing business with petitioners.
Three days after their dismissal from the lawsuit, petitioners brought this lawsuit in the District Court against Colt “pursuant to Section 4... (15 U. S. C. § 15) and Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. § 26) for damages, injunctive and equitable relief by reason of its violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. §§ 1 & 2)....” App. 7. The complaint alleged that Colt’s letters, litigation tactics, and “[o]the[r]... conduct” drove petitioners out of business. In that context, petitioners included the following obscure passage:
“18. The validity of the Colt patents had been assumed throughout the life of the Colt patents through 1980. Unless such patents were invalid through the wrongful retention of proprietary information in contravention of United States Patent Law (35 U. S. C. § 112), in 1980, when such patents expired, anyone ‘who has ordinary skill in the rifle-making art’ is able to use the technology of such expired patents for which Colt earlier had a monopoly position for 17 years.
“19. ITS and anyone else has the right to manufacture, contract for the manufacture, supply, market and sell the M-16 and M-16 parts and accessories thereof at the present time.” Id., at 9.
Petitioners later amended their complaint to assert a second cause of action under state law for tortious interference with their business relationships. Colt interposed a defense that its conduct was justified by a need to protect its trade secrets and countersued on a variety of claims arising out of petitioners’ alleged misappropriation of M16 specifications.
Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment raised only a patent-law issue obliquely hinted at in the above-quoted paragraphs — that Colt’s patents were invalid from their inception for failure to disclose sufficient information to “enable any person skilled in the art... to make and use the same” as well as a description of “the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.” 35 U. S. C. § 112. Since Colt benefited from the protection of the invalid patents, the argument continues, the “trade secrets” that the patents should have disclosed lost any state-law protection. Petitioners therefore argued that the District Court should hold that “Colt’s trade secrets are invalid and that [their] claim of invalidity shall be taken as established with respect to all claims and counterclaims to which said issue is material.” App. 58.
The District Court awarded petitioners summary judgment as to liability on both the antitrust and the tortious-interference claims, essentially relying on the § 112 theory articulated above. In the process, the District Court invalidated nine of Colt’s patents, declared all trade secrets relating to the M16 unenforceable, enjoined Colt from enforcing “any form of trade secret right in any technical information relating to the M16,” and ordered Colt to disgorge to petitioners all such information. 613 P. Supp. 330, 332 (CD Ill. 1985).
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, after full briefing and argument, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring the appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See 28 U. S. C. § 1631. The Seventh Circuit, however, raising the jurisdictional issue sna sponte, concluded that the Federal Circuit was “clearly wrong” and transferred the case back. 798 F. 2d, at 1056-1057. 1062. The Federal Circuit, for its part, adhered to its prior jurisdictional ruling, concluding that the Seventh Circuit exhibited “a monumental misunderstanding of the patent jurisdiction granted this court,” 822 F. 2d, at 1547, and was “clearly wrong,” id., at 1551, n. 7. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit proceeded to address the merits in the “interest of justice,” id., at 1559-1560, and reversed the District Court. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 985 (1987), and now vacate the judgment of the Federal Circuit.
hH
As relevant here, 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(1) grants the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [28 U. S. C.] section 1338...,” Section 1338(a), in turn, provides in relevant part that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents....” Thus, the jurisdictional issue before us turns on whether this is a case “arising under” a federal patent statute, for if it is then the jurisdiction of the District Court was based at least “in part” on § 1338.
A
In interpreting § 1338’s precursor, we held long ago that in order to demonstrate that a case is one “arising under” federal patent law “the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction of these laws.” Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 259 (1897). See Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 16 (1912). Our cases interpreting identical language in other jurisdictional provisions, particularly the general federal-question provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”), have quite naturally applied the same test. See Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936) (the claim alleged in the complaint “must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another”) (citations omitted). A district court’s federal-question jurisdiction, we recently explained, extends over “only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,” Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U. S. 1, 27-28 (1983), in that “federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded... claims,” id., at 13. Linguistic consistency, to which we have historically adhered, demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction likewise extend only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims. See 822 F. 2d, at 1553-1556; 798 F. 2d, at 1059-1061.
The most superficial perusal of petitioners’ complaint establishes, and no one disputes, that patent law did not in any sense create petitioners’ antitrust or intentional-interference claims. Since no one asserts that federal jurisdiction rests on petitioners’ state-law claims, the dispute centers around whether patent law “is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded [antitrust] claims.” See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804, 813 (1986). Our cases, again mostly in the § 1331 context, establish principles for both defining the “well-pleaded... claims” and discerning which elements are “necessary” or “essential” to them. Under the well-pleaded complaint • rule, as appropriately adapted to § 1338(a), whether a claim “arises under” patent law “‘must be determined from "what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.’” Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 10 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76 (1914)). See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908). Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason alone, “arise under” patent law, “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 14. See also Merrell Dow, supra, at 808.
Nor is it necessarily sufficient that a well-pleaded claim alleges a single theory under which resolution of a patent-law question is essential. If “on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are... reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws] why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks,” Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S., at 26 (footnote omitted), then the claim does not “arise under” those laws. See id., at 26, n. 29. Thus, a claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories.
B
Framed in these terms, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case is straightforward. Petitioners’ antitrust count can readily be understood to encompass both a monopolization claim under §2 of the Sherman Act and a group-boycott claim under § 1. The patent-law issue, while arguably necessary to at least one theory under each claim, is not necessary to the overall success of either claim.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize....” 15 U. S. C. § 2. The thrust of petitioners’ monopolization claim is that Colt has “embarked on a course of conduct to illegally extend its monopoly position with respect to the described patents and to prevent ITS from engaging in any business with respect to parts and accessories of the M-16.” App. 10. The complaint specifies several acts, most of which relate either to Colt’s prosecution of the lawsuit against petitioners or to letters Colt sent to petitioners’ potential and existing customers. To make out a § 2 claim, petitioners would have to present a theory under which the identified conduct amounted to a “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 570-571 (1966). Both the Seventh Circuit and Colt focus entirely on what they perceive to be “the only basis Christianson asserted in the complaint for the alleged antitrust violation,” 798 F. 2d, at 1061; see Brief for Respondent 32 — namely, that Colt made false assertions in its letters and pleadings that petitioners were violating its trade secrets, when those trade secrets were not protected under state law because Colt’s patents were invalid under § 112. Thus, Colt concludes, the validity of the patents is an essential element of petitioners’ prima facie monopolization theory and the case “arises under” patent law.
We can assume without deciding that the invalidity of Colt’s patents is an essential element of the foregoing monopolization theory rather than merely an argument in anticipation of a defense. But see 822 F. 2d, at 1547. The well-pleaded complaint rule, however, focuses on claims, not theories, see Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 26, and n. 29; Gully, 299 U. S., at 117, and just because an element that is essential to a particular theory might be governed by federal patent law does not mean that the entire monopolization claim “arises under” patent law.
Examination of the complaint reveals that the monopolization theory that Colt singles out (and on which petitioners ultimately prevailed in the District Court) is only one of several, and the only one for which the patent-law issue is even arguably essential. So far as appears from the complaint, for example, petitioners might have attempted to prove that Colt’s accusations of trade-secret infringement were false not because Colt had no trade secrets, but because Colt authorized petitioners to use them. App. 9-10 (“Contrary to the permission extended to ITS to sell Colt parts and accessories and in violation of the anti-trust laws... Colt has embarked upon a course of conduct... to prevent ITS from engaging in any business with respect to parts and accessories of the M-16”). In fact, most of the conduct alleged in the complaint could be deemed wrongful quite apart from the truth or falsity of Colt’s accusations. According to the complaint, Colt’s letters also (1) contained “copies of inapplicable court orders” and “suggested] that these court orders prohibited [the recipients] from doing business with” petitioners; and (2) “falsely stat[ed] that ‘Colt’s right’ to proprietary data had been ‘consistently upheld in various courts.’” Id., at 10. Similarly, the complaint alleges that Colt’s lawsuit against petitioners (1) was designed “to contravene the permission previously given”; (2) was “[p]ursued... in bad faith by subjecting [petitioners] to substantial expense in extended discovery procedures”; and (3) was brought only to enable Colt “to urge customers and potential customers of [petitioners] to refrain from doing business with them.” Id., at 10-11. Since there are “reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes” of federal patent law why petitioners “may or may not be entitled to the relief [they] see[k]” under their monopolization claim, Franchise Tax Board, supra, at 26 (footnote omitted), the claim does not “arise under” federal patent law.
The same analysis obtains as to petitioners’ group-boycott claim under §1 of the Sherman Act, which provides that “[e]very contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce... is declared to be illegal,” 15 U. S. C. § 1. This claim is set forth in the allegation that “virtually all suppliers of ITS and customers of ITS have agreed with Colt to refrain from supplying and purchasing M-16 parts and accessories to or from ITS, which has had the effect of requiring ITS to close its doors and no longer transact business.” App. 11. As this case unfolded, petitioners attempted to prove that the alleged agreement was unreasonable because its purpose was to protect Colt’s trade secrets from petitioners’ infringement and, given the patents’ invalidity under § 112, Colt had no trade secrets to infringe. Whether or not the patent-law issue was an “essential” element of that group-boycott theory, however, petitioners could have supported their group-boycott claim with any of several theories having nothing to do with the validity of Colt’s patents. Equally prominent in the complaint, for example, is a theory that the alleged agreement was unreasonable not because Colt had no trade secrets to protect, but because Colt authorized petitioners to use them. Once again, the appearance on the complaint’s face of an alternative, non-patent theory compels the conclusion that the group-boycott claim does not “arise under” patent law.
h — I I — I
Colt offers three arguments for finding jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit, notwithstanding the well-pleaded complaint rule. The first derives from congressional policy; the second is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b); and the third is grounded in principles of the law of the case. We find none of them persuasive.
A
Colt correctly observes that one of Congress’ objectives in creating a Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain patent cases was “to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of patent law.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 23 (1981). Colt might be correct (although not clearly so) that Congress’ goals would be better served if the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction were to be fixed “by reference to the case actually litigated,” rather than by an ex ante hypothetical assessment of the elements of the complaint that might have been dispositive. Brief for Respondent 31. Congress determined the relevant focus, however, when it granted jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over “an appeal from... a district court... if the jurisdiction of that court was based... on section 1338.” 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(1) (emphasis added). Since the district court’s jurisdiction is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case, the referent for the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction must be the same. The legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional provisions confirms that focus. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, supra, at 41 (cases fall within the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction “in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise under’ federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction”). In view of that clear congressional intent, we have no more authority to read § 1295(a)(1) as granting the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over an appeal where the well-pleaded complaint does not depend on patent law, than to read § 1338(a) as granting a district court jurisdiction over such a complaint. See Pratt, 168 U. S., at 259.
B
Colt suggests alternatively that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) we should deem the complaint amended to encompass a new and independent cause of action — “an implied cause of action under section 112 of the patent laws.” Brief for Respondent 28. Such a cause of action, which Colt finds in petitioners’ summary judgment papers, would plainly “arise under” the patent laws, regardless of its merit. See 822 F. 2d, at 1566 (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting).
We need not decide under what circumstances, if any, a court of appeals could furnish itself a jurisdictional basis unsupported by the pleadings by deeming the complaint amended in light of the parties’ “express or implied consent” to litigate a claim. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(b). In this case there is simply no evidence of any consent among the parties to litigate the new patent-law claim that Colt imputes to petitioners. Colt points to nothing in petitioners’ summary judgment motion expressly raising such a new cause of action, much less anything in its own motion papers suggesting consent to one. See App. 57-58. True, the summary judgment papers focused almost entirely on the patent-law issues, which petitioners deemed “[bjasic and fundamental to the subject lawsuit.” Id., at 57. But those issues fell squarely within the purview of the theories of recovery, defenses, and counterclaims that the pleadings already encompassed. Petitioners recognized as much when they moved the District Court to hold that their “claim of [patent] invalidity shall be taken as established with respect to all claims and counterclaims to which said issue is material.” Id., at 58. Thus, the patent-law focus of the summary judgment papers hardly heralded the assertion of a new patent-law claim. See, e. g., Quillen v. International Playtex, Inc., 789 F. 2d 1041, 1044 (CA4 1986); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493, p. 466 (1971). Moreover, the District Court never intimated that the patent issues were relevant to any cause of action other than the antitrust and intentional-interference claims raised expressly in the complaint; the court four times linked its judgment to “liability on Counts I and II,” without any reference to the hypothetical Count III that Colt imputes to petitioners. 609

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 我