Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

GEWIN, Circuit Judge.
This case is related to the case of Hardrives Co., Inc., et al. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., et al. No. 19864, 5 Cir., 329 F.2d 868, and the case of United States v. South Florida Asphalt Co., et al. No. 19635, 5 Cir., 329 F.2d 860, both decided this same date. The conduct about which complaint is made is the violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint of the City wherein an injunction and treble damages were sought.
The record is not clear, but apparently the trial judge dismissed the complaint because he considered that the goods and materials alleged to be involved came to rest in the state of ultimate consumption prior to the sale of the same to the parties who finally utilized them; and that such fact eliminated the “in commerce” character of the goods.
The allegations of the complaint in this case are substantially the same as in the Hardrives case. This Court has repeatedly held that complaints in civil cases should not be dismissed unless it clearly appears that under no theory can the plaintiff be entitled to relief. Des-Isles v. Evans, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 614; City of Daytona Beach v. Gannett, 5 Cir., 253 F.2d 771; Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction, etc., 5 Cir., 277 F.2d 370.
We think that this complaint alleges facts on which relief could be granted on two grounds, first this Court has held that contractors engaged in the construction of interstate highways and other facilities of interstate commerce are engaged “in commerce.” Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 5 Cir., 241 F.2d 663, 667, cert. denied 355 U.S. 825, 78 S.Ct. 33, 2 L.Ed.2d 39; Mitchell v. Hooper Equipment Co., 5 Cir., 279 F.2d 893. The Supreme Court has, of course, held likewise. Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 75 S.Ct. 860, 99 L.Ed. 1196. It is no argument to say that wage and hour cases are no authority for Sherman Act cases. Of course they are not necessarily authority to the extent> that they deny coverage. On the other hand, if they grant coverage on the basis of the employees actually being engaged in commerce then they are authority for what constitutes interstate commerce. Thus, we conclude that the allegation that the local conspiracy has artificially set prices for materials which its members sell or install for the construction of arteries of interstate commerce, is an adequate allegation of a conspiracy in interstate commerce.
Moreover, for the second point, we think the allegations of the manner in which the conspiracy, even though it be “local” in nature, affects commerce are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In United States v. Employing Plasterers Assoc. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186, 74 S.Ct. 452, 456, 98 L.Ed. 618, the Supreme Court said, in a criminal case:
“The complaint plainly charged several times that the effect of all these local restraints was to restrain interstate commerce. Whether these charges be called ‘allegations of facts’ or ‘mere conclusions of the pleader,’ we hold that they must be taken into account in deciding whether the Government is entitled to have its case tried.
“We are not impressed by the argument that the Sherman Act could not possibly apply here because the interstate buying, selling and movement of the plastering materials had ended before the local restraints became effective. Where interstate commerce ends and local commerce begins is not always easy to decide and is not decisive in Sherman Act cases. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 232 [68 S.Ct. 996, 1004, 92 L.Ed. 1328].”
We think that the conspiracy alleged in this case dealing with the type of business in which the appellees are engaged falls well within the reasoning vf this case.
See also United States v. Women’s Sportswear, 336 U.S. 460, 69 S.Ct. 714, 93 L.Ed. 805.
The judgment of dismissal was in error.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A