Task: songer_r_fiduc

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

OPINION
JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge.
The issue in this appeal is the propriety of a warrantless search of appellant Gordon’s residence by his probation officer and policemen. We affirm.
On January 29,1973, Gordon was convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was at that time placed on probation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) for a period of three years on condition that he obey all laws, that he comply with all lawful rules of the Probation Department, that he not possess or use narcotics or associate with known users of or dealers in narcotics, that he not enter Mexico, and that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General to serve six months in a jail-type institution. It was further ordered that Gordon,
“shall submit to search of his person, home, or vehicle at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement or other authorized officer without their need for a search warrant, such condition to remain in effect until the defendant shall be duly discharged from probation.”
On December 20, 1974, Gordon was released from custody and placed under the supervision of Probation Officer Micelli. From about December 27,1974 onward, Micelli received information from a confidential informant on several occasions that Gordon was engaged in the distribution of amphetamines in the San Francisco Bay area. Micelli had contacts with the informant generally on a once-a-month basis. In mid-May 1975, Micelli was contacted by agents from the Narcotics Task Force, who stated that Gordon might be involved in dealing in controlled substances.
On May 28, 1975, Gordon saw Micelli for his periodic report. Gordon requested permission to travel to San Francisco. Micelli told Gordon to return the next day with details of his trip, and Micelli would give him a travel permit.
The next day Gordon reported to Micelli’s office. Micelli and two other probation officers, with the consent of Gordon, searched his car. They found nothing. At about 10:30 a. m., Micelli called Agent Becker of the San Diego Narcotics Task Force, advising Becker that he had in his office one of his (Micelli’s) probationers, Gordon, and that he (Micelli) wished assistance in going to Gordon’s residence for the purpose of searching for contraband.
Subsequent to this call Micelli, another probation officer, probationer Gordon, Agent Becker and another agent, all proceeded to Gordon’s residence. The actual search was conducted by the Narcotics Task Force agents. The agents found three firearms and a small amount of marijuana.
Gordon was convicted and sentenced on three counts of possession of firearms by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 844. Probation for the earlier offense was also revoked.
We hold that the search was proper pursuant to the guidelines set forth by this court en banc in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9 Cir. 1975). Consuelo-Gonzalez involved a probation condition similar to the condition in the case at bar, but the search in that case was conducted solely by police officers and without the participation or direction of appellant’s probation officer. The court found that “the only permissible conditions [on probation] are those that, when considered in context, can reasonably be said to contribute significantly both to the rehabilitation of the convicted person and to the protection of the public.” Id. at 264. In Consuelo-Gonzalez the conviction was reversed on the grounds that the search was not for the purpose of rehabilitation because it was conducted by police officers not under the immediate and personal supervision of probation officers.
However, the court specifically approved the type of search involved in the case at bar. Consuelo-Gonzalez at 267 states:
“Moreover, nothing said here is intended to preclude mutually beneficial cooperation between probation officers and other law enforcement officials. For example, a proper visitation by a probation officer does not cease to be so because he is accompanied by a law enforcement official. . . . However, under no circumstances should cooperation between law enforcement officers and probation officers be permitted to make the probation system ‘a subterfuge for criminal investigations.’ ”
There is nothing in the record in this case to suggest that this search was not a search conducted in a proper manner and for a proper purpose by Gordon’s probation officer. The Narcotics Task Force agents accompanied the probation officer for the sole reason to expedite the search. The search was initiated by the probation officer after the probation officer had received information that Gordon was violating the conditions of his probation. “Thus this case is not one in which the parole officer was a stalking horse for the police.” Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 247 (9 Cir. 1975). Compare United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289, 292 (3 Cir. 1966), and People v. Coffman, 2 Cal.App.3d 681, 689, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
Gordon also argues that the evidence should have been suppressed because the authorization for the search, which provided for a search by “any law enforcement officer”, was overbroad. We note that the terms of probation were fixed over two years prior to the holding in Consuelo-Gonzalez. That case established the proper language for future probation orders, but it did not invalidate prior, broader orders which would be narrowly and properly exercised. We hold that because the broad authorization was narrowly and properly exercised, the search in this case was proper.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0