Task: sc_lcdisposition

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded.

Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases represent the latest stage of the litigation arising from the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads, which we upheld two Terms ago in the Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S. 486. A condition of that merger was Penn Central’s promise to take in the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as an operating entity — a promise that Penn Central fulfilled on December 31, 1968, 11 months after its own formation. The ultimate question presented by the cases now before us is the price Penn Central must pay for the assets of the New Haven.
I
1. The Penn Central. The proposed combination of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads first came under consideration by the parties and the Interstate Commerce Commission more than 12 years ago, a decade prior to its eventual consummation. The two railroads formally sought permission to merge under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., on March 9, 1962. On April 6, 1966, the Commission authorized the merger of the two roads. The union of the two carriers was the largest railroad merger in the history of the Nation, bringing together the companies that “dominate rail transportation in the Northeast.” In 1965 the component roads enjoyed a total operating revenue in excess of $1,500,000,000 and a net annual income of over $75,000,000. The two companies held some $72,000,000 in working capital and $1,242,000,000 in combined investments. With, about 19,600 miles of road “sprawling between the Great Lakes on the north... and the Ohio and Potomac Rivers on the south,” Penn Central was at its inception nearly twice the size of the next largest railroad system in the East and three times that of the third largest.
The predicted economies effected by the merger were likewise enormous; it was thought that within about eight years of the combination they would exceed $80,000,000 annually. Those savings represented a value, capitalized at 8%, of $1,000,000,000.
On June 9, 1967, after considerable litigation involving protective conditions for various affected railroad competitors, the Commission issued a modified order authorizing the Penn-Central merger. On October 19, 1967, a court of three judges, convened in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the Commission’s order pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 2284, and 2321-2325, upheld the Commission’s action. On January 15, 1968, this Court affirmed with minor modifications, and thereby sustained the validity of the merger. Two weeks later, on February 1, 1968, Pennsylvania and New York Central merged.
2. The New Haven. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is now an operating division of the Penn Central system. At the time of the merger, however, it was an independent Class I railroad operating some 1,500 miles of line in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York; as such, it was the sixth largest railroad in the northeast region and the largest in New England. With an operations area extending from Boston to New York and connecting with nine other Class I railroads, the New Haven served 12 cities of greater than 100,000 population, as well as a number of important defense establishments. In 1964 the railroad employed about 9,800 people and paid them annual wages amounting to $70,000,000. About 30,000 commuters used the line every day to reach work in New York City alone. As described by the Commission,
“The New Haven has both a large passenger and freight business. It is the fourth largest passenger carrying railroad in the United States, and has the second highest commuter revenue of all such roads.... The volume of its freight business... is substantially greater.... It is the largest freight railroad in New England and ranks tenth in freight traffic among all railroads in the eastern district.... Its freight service is considered to be of extreme importance to the industrial well-being of southern New England.”
The financial history of the New Haven was for decades a history of extreme vicissitudes. The company’s decline and fall, with passage into, out of, and back into railroad reorganization, have been chronicled elsewhere. It first went into reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205, on October 23, 1935. Due in large measure to the difficulties of including formerly-leased lines in the reorganized road, nearly 12 years elapsed from the filing of the debtor’s petition in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to that court’s eventual order approving consummation of the Commission’s plan of reorganization.
The railroad emerged from reorganization in 1947 with a vastly simplified debt structure in which only the most senior holders of secured interests survived. But in the following years the financial condition of the company again deteriorated, prompting it to seek at first partial and then total discontinuance of passenger service on the former Old Colony lines in Massachusetts. By 1959 the financial condition of the New Haven was such as to render the chance of surplus earnings “slight at best.” Through late 1960 and into early 1961 the company’s management expended great efforts to stave off bankruptcy by obtaining loans or grants from the Federal and State Governments. By the middle of 1961, current liabilities exceeded current assets by $36,310,000, and the company was losing cash at the annual rate of $18,000,000.
Finally, on July 7, 1961, the New Haven again petitioned for reorganization under § 77 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, a step that the court was later to find had been far too long delayed:
“[I]n the interest of its creditors, its employees and the public [the railroad] should have petitioned... long before it did. The grave problems which... beset the reorganization would have been much less acute and infinitely more manageable if bankruptcy had not been put off until its cash was almost entirely depleted, credit was practically gone, maintenance was down and in all other respects the bottom was out of the barrel.”
Immediately upon their taking over the New Haven, the trustees appointed by the reorganization court were obliged to borrow $8,000,000 to meet the payroll. The situation did not improve with the passage of time. “[I]n spite of spartan economies and a sizeable reduction in numbers of employees, the costs of operation... offset savings and eroded away the accumulated cash.” On July 6, 1964, the New Haven trustees petitioned the Commission, pursuant to § 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (2), for authority to discontinue suburban passenger train service in the Boston area. There followed a public hearing, an adjournment to afford Massachusetts authorities an opportunity — ultimately unavailing — to negotiate a contract with New' Haven for continuation of some service, and a motion by the New Haven for expedited disposition “by reason of the critical nature of New Haven’s finances, the irretrievable drain which the operations in question impose upon New Haven’s resources, and the increasing adverse effect which New Haven’s situation has upon the public interest and upon New Haven’s creditors... The Commission granted the trustees’ application, concluding that for a period beginning four years before the 1961 reorganization petition and continuing thereafter, New Haven’s financial condition had been “critical” and “drastically weak...
By 1965 it was evident that the New Haven was on the verge of collapse. Its year-end current assets amounted to $20,521,000, some $16,685,000 less than current liabilities plus long-term debt payments due within the coming year. The obligations payable after one year totaled $189,042,000. The retained income account showed a deficit of $81,672,000; the working capital account, a deficit of $16,700,000. For the year the net railway operating income showed a deficit of $16,000,000, with overall net income a deficit only $1,000,000 less. The company was in default in its payments of both principal and interest on its long-term debt. In the view of the trustees, New Haven was “absolutely faced with economic obsolescence if it continues as an independent, short-line, terminal railroad.”
On October 11, 1965, the New Haven notified the Commission, pursuant to § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), of its intention to discontinue all its interstate passenger trains effective March 1, 1966. If carried into effect, the proposed discontinuance would have drastically curtailed passenger train service in New York and Massachuetts, and ended it completely in Connecticut and Rhode Island. In the spring of 1966 the Commission, noting that over an 11-year period New Haven had experienced “an unending succession of reverses,” concluded that “[t]here now is totally lacking any hope or plan for future survival of this carrier, except that held out by its merger into a trunkline railroad.” The Commission acceded in part to the trustees’ notice of discontinuance, but invoked its statutory power to keep many of the trains in operation on the ground that “passenger as well as freight service by the N[ew] H[aven] is a national necessity and that termination of either would lead to distress in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and would severely damage New York City and the Nation generally.”
As 1966 gave way to 1967, the New Haven’s situation deteriorated still further. As of April 1967 the reorganization court thought “the prospect for the continued operation of the Railroad was very dim.” The road lacked even a current expense fund from which to satisfy the “six months” creditors, and the court thought it “highly unlikely that there ever will be one.” In July 1967 the reorganization court found that the New Haven’s situation had become “desperately critical”; its cash depletion was “so serious that, if the present rate of loss continues, there will be insufficient left by late September to meet the payroll of approximately $1,400,000 per week.”
As 1967 came to an end, so did the New Haven’s cash reserve. By August 31 the cash balance fell to $4,500,000 — a precarious condition for a company requiring $1,750,000 a week simply to meet current operating expenses. The trustees estimated that as of December 31, 1967, the balance would decline to $3,100,000 and two months later would fall to $850,000. The New Haven’s financial position had thus eroded to the point where its shutdown was “imminent....”
3. The inclusion negotiations. From the outset of the § 77 proceeding in 1961, the trustees of the New Haven and the reorganization court charged with conservation of the debtor’s dwindling assets recognized that “a merger with a large trunk line railroad would be the most promising and feasible means of continuing the viability of the New Haven’s transportation system... In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451, 456; cf. 281 F. Supp. 65. After Pennsylvania and New York Central filed their merger application before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1962, the New Haven trustees sought inclusion in the new company, both by private negotiations with the component roads and by a petition to the Commission filed June 26, 1962. See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d 635, 636; Merger Report, 327 I. C. C. 475, 480. As the reorganization court said, it was “apparent that the inclusion of the New Haven in the Penn-Central merger was the only salvation for the New Haven as an operating railroad....” In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp., at 456; see also In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793, 800.
The Commission, as we have noted, authorized the merger of the two roads in 1966. But in so doing, it found that “[wjithout some radical change in circumstances, even if this merger application were denied, N[ew] H[aven] would face a nearly insuperable task in bringing itself out of bankruptcy.” Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 522. The Commission concluded that the proposed Penn-Central combination, “without complete inclusion of N[ew] H[aven], would not be consistent with the public interest....” Id., at 524. Accordingly, it required “all the New Haven railroad to be included in the applicants’ transaction,” and conditioned its approval of the merger upon that inclusion, id., at 524, 527. In so doing, the Commission spelled out Penn Central’s obligation toward New Haven in unequivocal language. Condition 8 of the Merger Report stipulated as follows:
“The Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Company shall be required to include in the transaction all the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company... upon such fair and equitable terms as the parties may agree subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court and the Commission. Within 6 months after the date this report is served, the parties shall file with the Commission for its approval, a plan for such inclusion. In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement (and subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court) such inclusion shall be upon such fair and equitable terms and conditions as the Commission may impose.
“Jurisdiction is hereby reserved for such purposes. Consummation of the merger by applicants shall indicate their full and complete assent to these requirements.” 327 I. C. C., at 553.
Condition 16 of the Merger Report reiterated that
“Consummation of the transaction approved herein shall constitute on the part of The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central Railroad Company, their successors and assigns, acquiescence in and assent to the conditions stated in this appendix and in the attached report.” Id., at 555.
Having determined to require the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central as a condition of merger, the Commission remitted the parties to private negotiation of the terms of inclusion. Id., at 527. The New Haven trustees on the one side, and the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads on the other, had already been bargaining for some time, having drafted preliminary documents, dated December 22, 1964, and February 5, 1965, that provided for Penn Central’s assumption of New Haven’s freight operations. Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 386, 393; Interstate Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C. 151, 175 n. 6. On April 21, 1966, two weeks after the Merger Report, they executed a Purchase Agreement for the transfer of substantially all the New Haven assets to Penn Central. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S., at 508; see In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d, at 636. The Purchase Agreement provided for the transfer of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, with the consideration in exchange to consist in part of cash and in part of stocks and bonds of Penn Central.
In September 1966 the trustees filed a petition with the reorganization court reciting the background of the negotiations with Penn Central, the New Haven’s large and growing deficits, and the insufficiency of internally generated cash to meet operating demands. In the trustees’ view, inclusion in Penn Central afforded “the only practicable means for reorganization of the Debtor that is consistent with the best interest of the public and of all parties interested in the Debtor’s estate,...” They submitted that operations should continue so long as inclusion was possible, and that the court should grant them leave to press for inclusion on the basis of the Purchase Agreement. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d, at 637. On October 24, 1966, the reorganization court authorized the trustees to present the Agreement to the Commission, noting that the goal of preserving the New Haven operations “has been the policy from the beginning of these proceedings....” Three days later the trustees and the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads petitioned the Commission for approval of the New Haven’s inclusion on the terms of the Agreement.
On November 16, 1967, the Commission ratified the Purchase Agreement as the basis for the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central. Pennsylvania R. Co.—Merger—New York Central R. Co., 331 I. C. C. 643 (“Second Supplemental Report”). It looked upon the fact that the parties had been able to reach agreement as an indication that even though the New Haven trustees were selling properties having no value as an operating entity, they nevertheless had enjoyed a degree of bargaining power by virtue of the requirement that Penn Central take in New Haven as a condition of the merger. 331 I. C. C., at 657. “[WJhere a transaction is bargained at arm’s length,” said the Commission, “each side is presumably capable of determining its own best interest, and our primary function is to discover whether the transaction will be in the public interest.” Id., at 656. The Commission then undertook its independent analysis of the value of the New Haven properties. Although the Purchase Agreement “carrie [d] some probative force as to the values of the properties involved, it [was] by no means controlling.” Id., at 657. The Commission must still determine the price “on the basis of all the evidence pertaining thereto, not merely the agreement and supporting evidence.” Id., at 660 n. 12.
Upon its independent review of the record, the Commission found that the asset value of the New Haven properties to be transferred to Penn Central and of the consideration to be given in exchange was $125,000,000. The Commission concluded that payment of that sum by Penn Central to the New Haven estate would be both “just and reasonable” as a condition of the merger under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and “fair and equitable” as part of a plan of reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Unwilling to defer the, merger until inclusion could take place but recognizing that the danger of an end to all New Haven operations was “very real,” 331 I. C. C., at 654, the Commission authorized financial aid from Penn Central to prop up the debtor during the interim period between merger and inclusion to ensure New Haven’s continued functioning until its acquisition by Penn Central. See Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S., at 509.
4. The inclusion litigations. At this juncture the Commission’s determination of the terms of inclusion was subjected to simultaneous judicial review in two separate forums. On January 23, 1968, eight days after this Court’s approval of the merger and eight days before the merger itself, the New Haven bondholders commenced five actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set aside the Commission’s order. The three-judge District Court reconvened to hear the actions and shortly thereafter consolidated the five cases into one. On March 29, 1968, the Commission certified the first step of its plan for the reorganization of the New Haven — the sale of its assets to Penn Central — to the reorganization court. Pursuant to § 77(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205(e), the New Haven bondholders filed their objections to the Commission’s plan following notice given by the reorganization court. Thus, the identical question of the price Penn Central would have to pay for the New Haven assets came at the same time before the three-judge District Court in New York and the single-judge District Court in Connecticut.
On July 10, 1968, the three-judge court, following extensive briefing and argument on the numerous issues underlying the price question, found itself unable to agree with the Commission in several major respects. It therefore vacated so much of the Commission’s order as found the terms of Penn Central’s acquisition of the New Haven’s assets to be just and reasonable and remanded the cause for further proceedings. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders’ Committee v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418. On August 13, 1968, also after extensive briefing and argument, the reorganization court independently returned the Commission’s plan for further proceedings. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451. On the overriding question of price, the two courts were in accord: by fixing the worth of the New Haven at $125,000,000, the Commission had substantially understated the value of the properties to be transferred. The three-judge court estimated the understatement to be on the order of $45,000,000 to $50,000,000; the reorganization court, $33,000,000 to $55,000,000. 289 F. Supp., at 440, 465.
Meanwhile, the continuing drain on the New Haven’s dwindling cash reserves called for — and received — drastic action. Upon remanding the Commission’s proposed plan under § 77, the reorganization court ruled that unless the Commission ordered inclusion by January 1, 1969, the court would entertain a motion to dismiss the reorganization proceedings, resulting in termination of all the New Haven’s train service. 289 F. Supp., at 459. The court recommended that the Commission direct the early inclusion of New Haven with a partial payment of the purchase price, deferring other issues to later resolution. Id., at 466.
On the remand, the Commission reopened the record for the reception of further evidence and briefing in accordance with the instructions of the two reviewing courts. Its revaluation of the New Haven properties, announced on November 25, 1968, resulted in an increase in total worth of some $37,700,000, yielding a new price of $162,700,000 for the properties to be transferred. Pennsylvania R. Co.—Merger—New York Central R. Co., 334 I. C. C. 25, 53 (“Fourth Supplemental Report”). But the Commission then invoked “other pricing considerations” not taken into account at the timé of its prior report. Application of the new considerations effected a reduction of $22,081,000 from the newly calculated asset value, leaving a net value of $140,600,000— $15,600,000 more than the Commission’s initial estimate, but $17,400,000 less than the lowest range of value suggested by either of the two District Courts. In addition, the Commission required Penn Central to pay $5,000,000 toward the New Haven’s interim operating expenses and, yielding to the directive of the reorganization court, ordered Penn Central to take over the New Haven properties by January 1, 1969. 334 I. C. C., at 74, 76.
The Commission certified its revised plan to the reorganization court on December 2, 1968. Within three weeks the bondholders filed their objections. On December 24, 1968, the reorganization court released the assets of the debtor’s estate to Penn Central without approving the price terms set by the Commission. The court reiterated that failure to include New Haven in Penn Central by January 1, 1969, would result in immediate termination of all New Haven train service. On December 31 the estate transferred its assets to Penn Central.
At once the bondholders pressed for judicial review of the Commission’s revised evaluation. With their objections to the plan of reorganization already pending before the reorganization court, representatives of holders of the debtor’s first and refunding mortgage 4% bonds commenced two separate actions against the United States and the Commission before the three-judge District Court in New York. The Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the Chase Manhattan Bank, trustees under other mortgage bonds, commenced two more actions against the same defendants. The three-judge court consolidated the four cases and granted intervention — to the New Haven trustees as parties plaintiff and to Penn Central, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York as parties defendant.
On May 28, 1969, the reorganization court again rejected the plan submitted by the Commission. Although it accepted the Commission’s determinations on some issues, the court overruled the Commission with respect to its valuation of the New Haven’s Harlem River and Oak Point freight yards and its added deductions introduced for the first time on the remand. The court also instituted its own “underwriting” plan to ensure equivalent value for the estate with respect to the Penn Central common stock given in partial consideration for the transferred New Haven properties. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793. An order implementing decision and remanding to the Commission was entered on July 28, 1969. 304 F. Supp. 1136.
On June 18, 1969, the three-judge court filed its opinion in the bondholders’ action. With one judge in dissent, the court upheld the Commission’s valuation of the freight yards and its added deductions on the remand. The court also adopted the underwriting plan devised by the reorganization court. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders’ Committee v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 1049. A decree fixing the terms of judgment followed on September 11, 1969.
With the two District Courts thus in agreement, after two rounds of judicial review, on many of the substantial issues that had come before them, but in disagreement on matters amounting to more than $28,000,000 in value, the bondholders took direct appeals to this Court from the judgment of the three-judge court. They also appealed from the order of the reorganization court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The United States, the Commission, and Penn Central took no appeals from the decree of the three-judge court but cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the reorganization court. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals from the reorganization court, and the parties then petitioned this Court to grant certiorari to the Court of Appeals in advance of its judgment, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1254 (1) and-2101 (e), and Rule 20 of this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals from the order of the three-judge court and, with respect to the judgment of the reorganization court, granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals before judgment, accelerating briefing and argument to permit disposition of these cases at the current Term. 396 U. S. 1056.
II
We first consider the dual review to which the District Courts in New York and Connecticut subjected the price determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. From the outset all the parties in the three-judge court recognized that the pricing questions presented in the litigation there were also destined to come before the reorganization court under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Confronted with the prospect of duplicate litigation, the New Haven bondholders asked the three-judge court to enjoin the Commission’s certification of its plan of reorganization to the District Court in Connecticut. Counsel urged that “if such certification is not restrained, the questions presented by the complaint herein under Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act will also be before the Bankruptcy Court under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act... The three-judge court denied the bondholders’ application for injunctive relief. In its view, “the balance of convenience tilt [ed] heavily in favor of allowing the Connecticut court to proceed to such extent as it is advised,” since the grant of such an injunction could delay the reorganization proceedings for a substantial time.
In this ruling the three-judge court was correct. The jurisdiction of the reorganization court was not open to question. Upon its approval of the New Haven’s petition for reorganization in 1961, that court had acquired “exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located....” Bankruptcy Act, § 77 (a), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (a). Subject to the court’s control, the trustees whom it appointed were empowered “to operate the business of the debtor.” Id., §77 (c)(2), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (c) (2). They were thus charged with the dual responsibility of conserving the debtor’s estate for the benefit of creditors and preserving an ongoing railroad in the public interest. Massachusetts v. Bartlett, 384 F. 2d 819, 821, cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1003; 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶77.02, at 469-470 (14th ed. 1969). With these goals in view, the statute bestowed a “broad and general” authority upon both the court and the trustees. Cf. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85. The provisions of § 77 “doubtless suffice[d] to confer upon the [reorganization court] power appropriate for adjusting property rights in the railroad debtor’s estate and, as to such rights, beyond that in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings.” Id., at 85-86; cf. 5 Collier, supra, ¶[ 77.11, at 498-499. Together, the court and the Commission “unquestionably” had “full and complete power not only over the debtor and its property, but also, as a corollary, over any rights that [might] be asserted against it.” Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S. 132, 147. One such power was precisely that which the Commission was about to propose that the reorganization court exercise — the power to confirm a plan of reorganization providing for “the sale of all... of the property of the debtor....” Bankruptcy Act, §77 (b)(5), 11 U. S. C. §205 (b)(5). To that end the Commission was required to certify its proposal to the court as a prerequisite to judicial approval. § 77 (d), 11 U., S. C. § 205 (d). Injunctive intervention by the three-judge court would thus have disrupted an essential statutory phase of the New Haven reorganization.
The United States also sought to avoid duplicate litigation — but by bypassing the New York rather than the Connecticut federal court. In a motion filed shortly after the commencement of the New Haven bondholders’ suit in the three-judge court, the Government moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In support of the motion it was argued that (1) until the Commission certified the terms of inclusion to the reorganization court, Condition 8 under which Penn Central had pledged to take in New Haven was not satisfied and the Commission’s order was not yet reviewable; (2) by virtue of the § 77 aspects of the case, the reorganization court had exclusive jurisdiction over the pricing questions sought to be presented to the three-judge court; and (3) even on the assumption that the three-judge court had jurisdiction, it should stay.its hand as a matter of equity to avoid an unnecessary interference with the proceedings before the reorganization court.
The Government’s motion to dismiss was opposed by Penn Central, the New Haven trustees, the State of New York, and the bondholders. Significantly, the Commission did not oppose the motion. Indeed, the Commission agreed with the United States that “most (and perhaps all) of the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this three-judge Court will be reviewable by the Reorganization Court,” conceded that “the resulting concurrent jurisdiction is awkward, at least in theory,” and concluded tentatively that “the scope of judicial review... in the Reorganization Court would, as a practical matter [,] be the same as in this three-judge Court.” The three-judge court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss. The bondholders’ actions, the court said, came within the letter of the statutes authorizing review of orders of the Commission. The court conceded there was “an area of overlap” between the work of the New York and Connecticut forums, but thought nothing in § 77 or decisional law superseded that dual arrangement. See 289 F. Supp., at 424 n. 3.
The three-judge court correctly observed that in ordering New Haven’s inclusion in Penn Central the Commission had properly exercised its authority under both § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act and § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that the New Haven was in reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act did not preclude the Commission from exercising its statutory power, in passing on the merger application of two railroads, to require the inclusion of a third. Interstate Commerce Act, § 5 (2)(d), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(d). “The Commission can undoubtedly carry on § 5 proceedings simultaneously with § 77 reorganization proceedings....” Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S., at 140. Here the transfer of the New Haven assets was as much a part of a merger under § 5 as it was a plan of reorganization under § 77.
Moreover, at the outset of the litigation, the jurisdiction of neither the New York nor the Connecticut court was “complete.” On the one hand, the reorganization court lacked coercive power over Penn Central: under § 77 it could neither approve nor disapprove the merger qua merger, and it could not compel Penn Central to purchase the New Haven assets. So far as § 77 was concerned, Penn Central stood in the position of a potential purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy the New Haven properties. Cf. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S., at 137; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 550; Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F. 2d 413, 434 n. 5 (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Protective Committee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 331 U. S. 858; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595, 619. On the other hand, the three-judge court could not by itself effect a conveyance of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, nor could it compel the debtor’s trustees to do so without the consent of the reorganization court.
Moved largely by the concern that neither court might have jurisdiction over the entire case, the three-judge court was of the opinion that matters should proceed simultaneously in both forums with a view to bringing the § 5 and § 77 aspects before this Court at the same time. Given the complexities of the jurisdictional question and the importance of an expedited determination of the merits, the three-judge court produced an understandable solution to the problem insofar as it ensured that the entire case would come before this Court without the risk that the parties might have spent an extensive period litigating in the wrong forum.
But the circumstances of the case did not inexorably command review in two separate courts. There was no danger that application of the “fair and equitable” test under §77 (e)(1) would yield results different from those to be produced by the “just and reasonable” test of § 5 (2) (b) for mergers or the “equitable” test for inclusions under § 5 (2) (d). See Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S., at 140. The reorganization statute mandates that any disposition of the debtor’s properties must not be “inconsistent with the provisions and purposes” of the Interstate Commerce Act, Bankruptcy Act, § 77 (f), 11 U. S

Question: What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed?
A. stay, petition, or motion granted
B. affirmed
C. reversed
D. reversed and remanded
E. vacated and remanded
F. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
G. affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded
H. vacated
I. petition denied or appeal dismissed
J. modify
K. remand
L. unusual disposition
Answer:

Answer: L