Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether, because of an earlier illegal entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidence seized later from a private residence pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on information obtained by the police before the entry into the residence.
I
Resolution of this issue requires us to consider two separate questions: first, whether the entry and internal securing of the premises constituted an impermissible seizure of all the contents of the apartment, seen and unseen; second, whether the evidence first discovered during the search of the apartment pursuant to a valid warrant issued the day after the entry should have been suppressed as “fruit” of the illegal entry. Our disposition of both questions is carefully limited.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the war-rantless entry into petitioners’ apartment. That issue is not before us, and we have no reason to question the courts’ holding that that search was illegal. The ensuing interference with petitioners’ possessory interests in their apartment, however, is another matter. On this first question, we conclude that, assuming that there was a seizure of all the contents of the petitioners’ apartment when agents secured the premises from within, that seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we hold that where officers, having probable cause, enter premises, and with probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate pos-sessory interests in its contents and take them into custody and, for no more than the period here involved, secure the premises from within to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith, are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable seizures.
The illegality of the initial entry, as we will show, has no bearing on the second question. The resolution of this second question requires that we determine whether the initial entry tainted the discovery of the evidence now challenged. On this issue, we hold that the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers before the entry into the apartment need not have been suppressed as “fruit” of the illegal entry because the warrant and the information on which it was based were unrelated to the entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
II
In January 1981, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force received information indicating that petitioners Andres Segura and Luz Marina Colon probably were trafficking in cocaine from their New York apartment. Acting on this information, Task Force agents maintained continuing surveillance over petitioners until their arrest on February 12, 1981. On February 9, agents observed a meeting between Segura and Enrique Rivudalla-Vidal, during which, as it later developed, the two discussed the possible sale of cocaine by Segura to Rivudalla-Vidal. Three days later, February 12, Segura telephoned Rivudalla-Vidal and agreed to provide him with cocaine. The two agreed that the delivery would be made at 5 p. m. that day at a designated fast-food restaurant in Queens, N. Y. Rivudalla-Vidal and one Esther Parra, arrived at the restaurant at 5 p. m., as agreed. While Segura and Rivudalla-Vidal visited inside the restaurant, agents observed Colon deliver a bulky package to Parra, who had remained in Rivudalla-Vidal’s car in the restaurant parking lot. A short time after the delivery of the package, Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra left the restaurant and proceeded to their apartment. Task Force agents followed. The agents stopped the couple as they were about to enter Rivudalla-Vidal’s apartment. Parra was found to possess cocaine; both Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra were immediately arrested.
After Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra were advised of their constitutional rights, Rivudalla-Vidal agreed to cooperate with the agents. He admitted that he had purchased the cocaine from Segura and he confirmed that Colon had made the delivery at the fast-food restaurant earlier that day, as the agents had observed. Rivudalla-Vidal informed the agents that Segura was to call him at approximately 10 o’clock that evening to learn if Rivudalla-Vidal had sold the cocaine, in which case Segura was to deliver additional cocaine.
Between 6:30 and 7 p. m., the same day, Task Force agents sought and received authorization from an Assistant United States Attorney to arrest Segura and Colon. The agents were advised by the Assistant United States Attorney that because of the lateness of the hour, a search warrant for petitioners’ apartment probably could not be obtained until the following day, but that the agents should proceed to secure the premises to prevent the destruction of evidence.
At about 7:80 p. m., the agents arrived at petitioners’ apartment and established external surveillance. At 11:15 p. m., Segura, alone, entered the lobby of the apartment building where he was immediately arrested by agents. He first claimed he did not reside in the building. The agents took him to his third floor apartment, and when they knocked on the apartment door, a woman later identified as Colon appeared; the agents then entered with Segura, without requesting or receiving permission. There were three persons in the living room of the apartment in addition to Colon. Those present were informed by the agents that Segura was under arrest and that a search warrant for the apartment was being obtained.
Following this brief exchange in the living room, the agents conducted a limited security check of the apartment to ensure that no one else was there who might pose a threat to their safety or destroy evidence. In the process, the agents observed, in a bedroom in plain view, a triple-beam scale, jars of lactose, and numerous small cellophane bags, all accouterments of drug trafficking. None of these items was disturbed by the agents. After this limited security check, Colon was arrested. In the search incident to her arrest, agents found in her purse a loaded revolver and more than $2,000 in cash. Colon, Segura, and the other occupants of the apartment were taken to Drug Enforcement Administration headquarters.
Two Task Force agents remained in petitioners’ apartment awaiting the warrant. Because of what is characterized as “administrative delay” the warrant application was not presented to the Magistrate until 5 p. m. the next day. The warrant was issued and the search was performed at approximately 6 p. m., some 19 hours after the agents’ initial entry into the apartment. In the search pursuant to the warrant, agents discovered almost three pounds of cocaine, 18 rounds of.38-caliber ammunition fitting the revolver agents had found in Colon’s possession at the time of her arrest, more than $50,000 cash, and records of narcotics transactions. Agents seized these items, together with those observed during the security check the previous night.
Before trial in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of New York, petitioners moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from the apartment — the items discovered in plain view during the initial security check and those not in plain view first discovered during the subsequent warrant search. After a full evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted petitioners’ motion. The court ruled that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry into the apartment. Accordingly, it held that the entry, the arrest of Colon and search incident to her arrest, and the effective seizure of the drug paraphernalia in plain view were illegal. The District Court ordered this evidence suppressed as “fruits” of illegal searches.
The District Court held that the warrant later issued was supported by information sufficient to establish probable cause; however, it read United States v. Griffin, 502 F. 2d 959 (CA6), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1050 (1974), as requiring suppression of the evidence seized under the valid warrant. The District Court reasoned that this evidence would not necessarily have been discovered because, absent the illegal entry and “occupation” of the apartment, Colon might have arranged to have the drugs removed or destroyed, in which event they would not have been in the apartment when the warrant search was made. Under this analysis, the District Court held that even the drugs seized under the valid warrant were “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
On an appeal limited to the admissibility of the incriminating evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 663 F. 2d 411 (1981). It affirmed the District Court holding that the initial warrantless entry was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the evidence discovered in plain view during the initial entry must be suppressed. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument advanced by the United States that the evidence in plain view should not be excluded because it was not actually “seized” until after the search warrant was secured.
Relying upon its holding in United States v. Agapito, 620 F. 2d 324 (CA2), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 834 (1980), the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s holding requiring suppression of the evidence seized under the valid warrant executed on the day following the initial entry. The Court of Appeals described as “prudentially unsound” the District Court’s decision to suppress that evidence simply because it could have been destroyed had the agents not entered.
Petitioners were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846, and of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). On the subsequent review of these convictions, the Second Circuit affirmed, 697 F. 2d 300 (1982), rejecting claims by petitioners that the search warrant was procured through material misrepresentations and that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support their convictions. We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 1200 (1983), and we affirm.
Ill
At the outset, it is important to focus on the narrow and precise question now before us. As we have noted, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the initial warrantless entry and the limited security search were not justified by exigent circumstances and were therefore illegal. No review of that aspect of the case was sought by the Government and no issue concerning items observed during the initial entry is before the Court. The only issue here is whether drugs and the other items not observed during the initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day after the entry, under an admittedly valid search warrant, should have been suppressed.
The suppression or exclusionary rule is a judicially prescribed remedial measure and as “with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Under this Court’s holdings, the exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). It “extends as well to the indirect as the direct products” of unconstitutional conduct. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484 (1963).
Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. The question to be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained is “tainted” or is “fruit” of a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence was
“ ‘come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Id., at 488 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
It has been well established for more than 60 years that evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,” Nardone v. United States, supra, at 341. It is not to be excluded, for example, if police had an “independent source” for discovery of the evidence:
“The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others.” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S., at 392 (emphasis added).
In short, it is clear from our prior holdings that “the exclusionary rule has no application [where] the Government learned of the evidence ‘from an independent source.’” Wong Sun, supra, at 487 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra, at 392); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U. S. 463 (1980); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 242 (1967); Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265, 278-280 (1961).
> I — I
Petitioners argue that all of the contents of the apartment, seen and not seen, including the evidence now in question, were “seized” when the agents entered and remained on the premises while the lawful occupants were away from the apartment in police custody. The essence of this argument is that because the contents were then under the control of the agents and no one would have been permitted to remove the incriminating evidence from the premises or destroy it, a “seizure” took place. Plainly, this argument is advanced to avoid the Silverthorne “independent source” exception. If all the contents of the apartment were “seized” at the time of the illegal entry and securing, presumably the evidence now challenged would be suppressible as primary evidence obtained as a direct result of that entry.
We need not decide whether, when the agents entered the apartment and secured the premises, they effected a seizure of the cocaine, the cash, the ammunition, and the narcotics records within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. By its terms, the Fourth Amendment forbids only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Assuming, arguendo, that the agents seized the entire apartment and its contents, as petitioners suggest, the seizure was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Different interests are implicated by a seizure than by a search. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113, and n. 5, 122-126 (1984); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983); id., at 747-748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 13-14, n. 8 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51-52 (1970). A seizure affects only the person’s possessory interests; a search affects a person’s privacy interests. United States v. Jacobsen, supra, at 113, and n. 5; United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 13-14, n. 8; see generally Texas v. Brown, supra, at 747-751 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Recognizing the generally less intrusive nature of a seizure, Chadwick, supra, at 13-14, n. 8; Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 51, the Court has frequently approved warrantless seizures of property, on the basis of probable cause, for the time necessary to secure a warrant, where a warrantless search was either held to be or likely would have been held impermissible. Chambers v. Maroney, supra; United States v. Chadwick, supra; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979).
We focused on the issue notably in Chambers, holding that it was reasonable to seize and impound an automobile, on the basis of probable cause, for “whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search.” 399 U. S., at 51 (footnote omitted). We acknowledged in Chambers that following the car until a warrant could be obtained was an alternative to impoundment, albeit an impractical one. But we allowed the seizure nonetheless because otherwise the occupants of the car could have removed the “instruments or fruits of crime” before the search. Id., at 51, n. 9. The Court allowed the warrantless seizure to protect the evidence from destruction even though there was no immediate fear that the evidence was in the process of being destroyed or otherwise lost. The Chambers Court declared:
“For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding the car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 52 (emphasis added)
In Chadwick, we held that the warrantless search of the footloeker after it had been seized and was in a secure area of the Federal Building violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches, but neither the respondents nor the Court questioned the validity of the initial warrantless seizure of the footloeker on the basis of probable cause. The seizure of Chadwick’s footloeker clearly interfered with his use and possession of the footloeker — his possessory interest — but we held that this did not “diminish [his] legitimate expectation that the footlocker’s contents would remain private.” 433 U. S., at 13-14, n. 8 (emphasis added). And again, in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, we held that absent exigent circumstances a warrant was required to search luggage seized from an automobile which was already in the possession and control of police at the time of the search. However, we expressly noted that the police acted not only “properly,” but “commendably” in seizing the suitcase without a warrant on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contained drugs. 442 U. S., at 761. The taxi into which the suitcase had been placed was about to drive away. However, just as there was no immediate threat of loss or destruction of evidence in Chambers — since officers could have followed the car until a warrant issued — so too in Sanders officers could have followed the taxicab. Indeed, there arguably was even less fear of immediate loss of the evidence in Sanders because the suitcase at issue had been placed in the vehicle’s trunk, thus rendering immediate access unlikely before police could act.
Underlying these decisions is a belief that society’s interest in the discovery and protection of incriminating evidence from removal or destruction can supersede, at least for a limited period, a person’s possessory interest in property, provided that there is probable cause to believe that that property is associated with criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983).
The Court has not had occasion to consider whether, when officers have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity is on the premises, the temporary securing of a dwelling to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence violates the Fourth Amendment. However, in two cases we have suggested that securing of premises under these circumstances does not violate the Fourth Amendment, at least when undertaken to preserve the status quo while a search warrant is being sought. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), we noted with approval that, to preserve evidence, a police guard had been stationed at the entrance to an apartment in which a homicide had been committed, even though “[t]here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant.” Id., at 394. Similarly, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 (1980), although officers secured, from within, the home of a person for whom they had an arrest warrant, and detained all occupants while other officers were obtaining a search warrant, the Court did not question the admissibility of evidence discovered pursuant to the warrant later issued.
We see no reason, as Mincey and Rawlings would suggest, why the same principle applied in Chambers, Chadwick, and Sanders, should not apply where a dwelling is involved. The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed. But the home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants' possessory interests in the premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activities that take place within. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 615 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
As we have noted, however, a seizure affects only pos-sessory interests, not privacy interests. Therefore, the heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue. We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents. We reaffirm at the same time, however, that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search — such as that invalidated in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30, 33-34 (1970) — is illegal.
Here, the agents had abundant probable cause in advance of their entry to believe that there was a criminal drug operation being carried on in petitioners' apartment; indeed petitioners do not dispute the probable-cause determination. The agents had maintained surveillance over petitioners for weeks, and had observed petitioners leave the apartment to make sales of cocaine. Wholly apart from observations made during that extended surveillance, Rivudalla-Vidal had told agents after his arrest on February 13, that petitioners had supplied him with cocaine earlier that day, that he had not purchased all of the cocaine offered by Segura, and that Segura probably had more cocaine in the apartment. On the basis of this information, a Magistrate duly issued a search warrant, the validity of which was upheld by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and which is not before us now.
In this case, the agents entered and secured the apartment from within. Arguably, the wiser course would have been to depart immediately and secure the premises from the outside by a “stakeout” once the security check revealed that no one other than those taken into custody were in the apartment. But the method actually employed does not require a different result under the Fourth Amendment, insofar as the seizure is concerned. As the Court of Appeals held, absent exigent' circumstances, the entry may have constituted an illegal search, or interference with petitioners’ privacy interests, requiring suppression of all evidence observed during the entry. Securing of the premises from within, however, was no more an interference with the petitioners’ possessory interests in the contents of the apartment than a

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 取