Task: songer_r_nonp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MILLER, Associate Justice.
Appellant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. She testified that she and Virginia Boxley, the complaining witness, had been friends for years; that about four o’clock p. m., on October 31, 1942, she and the complaining witness got into an argument because the latter’s little girl had called her names. About eight o’clock on the same date, the altercation was renewed when Virginia Boxley came running to her place and struck at her; when the Boxley woman hit her again she took a razor blade and “came down across her face”; that Virginia had something in her hand when she came at her; that she did not know what'she had in her hand; that she was pushed first but did not receive any injury; that she did not receive any injury at all. Dr. Clark, of Freedman’s hospital, testified that he examined Virginia Boxley during the evening of October 31, 1942, at which time she had a serious cut across the face, which necessitated more than fifty stitches. The wound extended from back of the left ear, across the lower cheek, to the chin.
On this appeal, the first question presented concerns the law of self-defense. It is contended that the trial court erred in permitting the District Attorney to ask appellant, on cross-examination: “If you believed the Boxley woman was going to do ' you some harm, and you saw a knife in her hand, why didn’t you run into the house to avoid trouble ? ” Appellant relies upon Brown v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held, among other things, that if a person reasonably believes he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant, he may stand his ground; and that, if, under such circumstances, he kills his assailant, he has', not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense. But the Supreme Court also said, in that case: “Rationally the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; * * *.” Appellant’s argument assumes, improperly, that the two propositions are mutually exclusive. What the Court said was in rebuttal of the old doctrine that one must retreat “to the wall,” whatever the circumstances may be, in order, successfully, to invoke self-defense. It explained that such illustrations, stated in the early law, “have had a tendency to ossify into specific rules without much regard for reason.” But the Court did not by any means repudiate the requirement that one must reasonably believe he is in immediate danger of death or of grievous bodily harm, in order to justify a deadly assault in self-defense. What appellant believed, concerning Virginia Boxley’s conduct, and how that belief affected her, was, consequently, of vital importance. The question, propounded by the District Attorney, was calculated to search for the nature and character of her belief, and was entirely proper to determine whether appellant went farther than she was justified in doing.
Closely related, and again involving the law of self-defense, is appellant’s assignment of error, based upon the court’s refusal to give the following prayer: “That if the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the complaining witness was about to inflict violence upon her and was coming at her with a knife in her hand in a menacing manner, she was justified in defending herself and didn’t have to retreat.” This prayer was fatally defective. One of the determining elements in self-defense is the belief of the accused, concerning the imminence of danger. While it is necessary, therefore, that he have reasonable grounds to believe, it is necessary, also, that his mind react to those grounds, to the extent of believing both that danger is imminent, and that force must be used to repel it. Consequently, there was no error in refusing to give the offered prayer. But there was another reason, equally good, for denying the prayer; namely, that the law relating to self-defense was adequately covered in the instructions which the trial court gave. Appellant’s obj ections thereto are without merit.
During his argument to the jury, the District Attorney stated: “From the testimony of the doctor, the wound was a serious one and if it had been an inch lower the defendant might be here for murder.” This was permissible argument upon the question whether the weapon used was a dangerous one and whether it was likely to produce death or great bodily injury. The circumstances of Berger v. United States, upon which appellant relies, do not resemble those of the present case in any way.
Appellant called two character witnesses, who testified as to her good reputation for peace and good order and for truth and veracity. On cross examination the District Attorney was permitted to ask these witnesses, over objection, if they had heard that the defendant had been arrested in 1940 for disorderly conduct. The prosecution may not initially attack the defendant’s character. After a defendant has attempted to show his good character in his own aid, however, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of his bad character. While evidence of good or bad character is restricted to general reputation, and does not extend to particulars, a witness to good character may be asked, on cross-examination, whether he has heard particular and specific charges, or rumors, against an accused, of acts inconsistent with the trait of character about which the witness has testified.
We have carefully examined all appellant’s contentions and find them without merit.
Affirmed.
D.C.Code 1940, § 22 — 502: “Every person convicted of an assault with intent to commit mayhem, or of an assault with a dangerous weapon, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years.”
256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65 L.Ed. 961, 18 A.L.R. 1276.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560, 15 S.Ct. 962, 967, 39 L.Ed. 1086.
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65 L.Ed. 961, 18 A.L.R. 1276.
Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 508, 18 S.Ct. 689, 42 L.Ed. 1116.
Hodge v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 126 F.2d 849.
See Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 443; Price v. United States, 51 App.D.C. 106, 108, 276 F. 628; Sacrini v. United States, 38 App.D.C. 371, 378; Kinard v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 250, 254, 96 F.2d 522, 526; Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466, 471, 16 S.Ct. 859, 40 L.Ed. 1039; Gourko v. United States, 153 U.S. 183, 191, 14 S.Ct. 806, 38 L.Ed. 680; Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 564, 15 S.Ct. 962, 39 L.Ed. 1086; Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 558, 17 S.Ct. 172, 41 L.Ed. 547; Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 508, 18 S.Ct. 689, 42 L.Ed. 1116; Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 65 L.Ed. 961, 18 A.L.R. 1276.
Tatum v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 393, 110 F.2d 555, and authorities there cited; Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 442: “The best evidence of its dangerous character, and of what it was capable of doing, was the injury actually inflicted by it.”
295 U.S. 78, 84-89, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314.
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 57, p. 456: “The rule, then, firmly and universally established in policy and tradition, is that the prosecution may not initially attack the defendant’s character.” Davila v. United States, 1 Cir., 54 F.2d 356; Mansbach v. United States, 3 Cir., 11 F.2d 221; Mercer v. United States, 3 Cir., 14 F.2d 281.
Borum v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 4, 56 F.2d 301, cert. denied sub nom. Logan v. United States, 285 U.S. 555, 52 S.Ct. 459, 76 L.Ed. 944; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 58.
Stewart v. United States, 70 App.D.C. 101, 104 F.2d 234; Clark v. United States, 57 App.D.C. 335, 23 F.2d 756; Jung Quey v. United States, 9 Cir., 222 F. 766, 771; Spalitto v. United States, 8 Cir., 39 F.2d 782; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 988.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0