Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SETH, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in which the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiffs was denied, and the action was dismissed.
The defendant-appellee was granted by the appropriate Forest Supervisor a Special Use Permit covering about three acres of forest land near Aspen, Colorado. The permit was sought and granted for the purpose of building and using a sewage treatment facility thereon in connection with its proposed use of an adjacent unpatented millsite claim. The use of the millsite was to include housing for defendant’s employees and for the employees of the ore truckers. Defendant’s mine is several miles from the millsite.
The plaintiffs allege that the use of the unpatented millsite for a trailer camp was an improper use of such a claim under the mining laws, that the national forest lands could not be used for a sewage treatment plant, and further that the trailer camp and its sewage plant was a nuisance. The initial plaintiffs owned adjacent or nearby land. The City of Aspen was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff upon its allegation that the facilities complained of were in the watershed from which it obtained its municipal water, and that they would be a nuisance.
The trial court heard evidence on the motion for a preliminary injunction and denied it. The trial court also granted the motions of the defendant to dismiss the complaints. None of the facilities complained of were completed or in use at the time the action was started.
As to the proposed use of the unpatented millsite claim for housing, the plaintiffs seek to have the propriety of such use decided by the courts before any administrative proceeding to challenge the use is commenced. It is not alleged or argued that proceedings to such end have been commenced before any Department of the Interior officials. The attempted challenge of the use of the claim goes to the nature of the location or entry. The plaintiffs assert that under such a millsite location housing is an improper use. This is a challenge to the entry as being contrary to 30 U.S.C. § 42 and the regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 3417.1 (§ 3844.1).
The question is then whether the challenge can be commenced in this manner. We must agree with the trial court that it cannot. Relief must first be sought before the administrative agency concerned. This is in accord with Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 83 S.Ct. 379, 9 L.Ed.2d 350; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 40 S.Ct. 410, 64 L.Ed. 659; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473, 19 S.Ct. 485, 43 L.Ed. 772, and Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372, 15 S.Ct. 635, 39 L.Ed. 737. The plaintiffs claim no possessory right contemplated by 30 U.S.C. § 53 which provides for judicial relief as to the right of possession.
In plaintiffs’ second cause of action relating to the Special Use Permit on the forest it appears from the pleadings and the argument before this court' that the administrative remedy commenced by the plaintiffs has not been completed. In 36 C.F.R. § 211.21 and following, the several steps on the administrative route are described. It appeared that when the appeal to this court was argued, an administrative appeal brought by plaintiffs was pending before the Secretary of Agriculture [36 C.F.R. § 211.28(c)]. Since there was no final disposition of the administrative proceedings, they were not the proper subject for judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704. Further there is demonstrated no need for any temporary relief to plaintiffs as no irreparable injury has been shown. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 312 F.2d 392 (10th Cir.).
As indicated above, intervenor, the City of Aspen, and the other plaintiffs asserted that the facilities constitute a nuisance per se and sought an injunction which was denied by the trial court. The trailer court was not built nor was the sewage plant at the time the action was started, and thus the injunction was sought against an anticipated nuisance. The case law of Colorado indicates that this may not be done under these circumstances.
Both facilities may be built and operated so as not to be a nuisance, and thus it cannot be held that at all times and under all circumstances they may be nuisances within the definition set out in Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P.2d 277. The propriety of injunctive relief against a threatened nuisance was considered by the Colorado Supreme Court many years ago in Haskell v. Denver Tramway Co., 23 Colo. 60, 46 P. 121. In the cited case the court considered also the public benefit there involved but held that the allegation of a threatened nuisance was not enough. See also 40 A.L.R.2d 1192. The plaintiffs rely on Seigle v. Bromley, 22 Colo.App. 189, 124 P. 191, which involved a proposed hog ranch. The court there did enjoin the feeding of offal and garbage and the bringing of other filth on the property. However the facts before us do not approach those in the cited case as relating to the inevitability of the nuisance. The denial of the relief sought in the trial court does not prevent the plaintiffs in the future from seeking an injunction in the event the facilities when in operation constitute a nuisance. We do not decide at this anticipatory stage whether the administrative determination relative to the special use permit is reviewable by the courts nor whether other remedies are available.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 2