Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Because Preap and Khoury created a split with four other Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's ruling that criminal aliens who are not arrested immediately upon release are thereby exempt from mandatory detention under § 1226(c). 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1279, 200 L.Ed.2d 468 (2018). We now reverse.
II
Before addressing the merits of the Court of Appeals' interpretation, we resolve four questions regarding our jurisdiction to hear these cases.
The first potential hurdle concerns § 1226(e), which states:
"The [Secretary's] discretionary judgment regarding the application of [ § 1226 ] shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the [Secretary] under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole." (Emphasis added.)
As we have held, this limitation applies only to "discretionary" decisions about the "application" of § 1226 to particular cases. It does not block lawsuits over "the extent of the Government's detention authority under the'statutory framework' as a whole." Jenningsv. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 841, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 517, 123 S.Ct. 1708 ). And the general extent of the Government's authority under § 1226(c) is precisely the issue here. Respondents' argument is not that the Government exercised its statutory authority in an unreasonable fashion. Instead, they dispute the extent of the statutory authority that the Government claims. Because this claim of authority does not constitute a mere "discretionary" "application" of the relevant statute, our review is not barred by § 1226(e).
Nor are we stripped of jurisdiction by § 1252(b)(9), which provides:
"Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter [including §§ 1225 and 1226 ] shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section." (Emphasis added.)
As in Jennings, respondents here "are not asking for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal [as opposed to the decision to deny them bond hearings]; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined. Under these circumstances," we held in Jennings, see 583 U.S., at ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 841, " § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar."
The Government raised a third concern before the District Court in Preap : that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), that court lacked jurisdiction to enter the requested injunction. As § 1252(f)(1) cautions:
"Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§ 1221-1232] other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated."
Did the Preap court overstep this limit by granting injunctive relief for a class of aliens that includes some who have not yet faced-but merely "will face"-mandatory detention? The District Court said no, but we need not decide. Whether the Preap court had jurisdiction to enter such an injunction is irrelevant because the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, and for independent reasons given below, we are ordering the dissolution of the injunction that the District Court ordered.
Finally, and again before the Preap District Court, the Government raised a fourth potential snag: mootness. Class actions are "[n]ormally... moot if no named class representative with an unexpired claim remain[s] at the time of class certification." United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1532, 1538, 200 L.Ed.2d 792 (2018). But that general norm is no hurdle here.
The suggestion of mootness in these cases was based on the fact that by the time of class certification the named plaintiffs had obtained either cancellation of removal or bond hearings. See 831 F.3d at 1197-1198 ; Khoury v. Asher, 3 F.Supp.3d 877, 879-880 (W.D. Wash. 2014). But those developments did not make the cases moot because at least one named plaintiff in both cases had obtained release on bond, as opposed to cancellation of removal, and that release had been granted following a preliminary injunction in a separate case. Unless that preliminary injunction was made permanent and was not disturbed on appeal, these individuals faced the threat of re-arrest and mandatory detention. And indeed, we later ordered that that injunction be dissolved. See Jennings, 583 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 852. Thus, in both cases, there was at least one named plaintiff with a live claim when the class was certified.
Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be moot because the fact that a class "was not certified until after the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot does not deprive us of jurisdiction" when, as in these cases, the harms alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (affirming jurisdiction over a class action challenging a county's failure to provide "prompt" determinations of probable cause for those subjected to warrantless arrest and detention). Respondents claim that they would be harmed by detention without a hearing pending a decision on their removal. Because this type of injury ends as soon as the decision on removal is made, it is transitory. So the fact that the named plaintiffs obtained some relief before class certification does not moot their claims.
III
Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits. Respondents contend that they are not properly subject to § 1226(c)'s mandatory-detention scheme, but instead are entitled to the bond hearings available to those held under the general arrest and release authority provided in § 1226(a). Respondents' primary textual argument turns on the interaction of paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 1226(c). Recall that those paragraphs govern, respectively, the "[c]ustody" and "[r]elease" of criminal aliens guilty of a predicate offense. Paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such alien "when the alien is released," and paragraph (2) forbids the Secretary to release any "alien described in paragraph (1)" pending a determination on removal (with one exception not relevant here). Because the parties' arguments about the meaning of § 1226(c) require close attention to the statute's terms and structure, we reproduce the provision in full below. But only the portions of the statute that we have highlighted are directly relevant to respondents' argument. Section 1226(c) provides:
"(c) Detention of criminal aliens
"(1) Custody
"The [Secretary] shall take into custody any alien who-
"(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
"(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
"(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
"(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, "when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
"(2) Release
"The [Secretary] may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the [Secretary] decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18 that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the [Secretary] that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense committed by the alien." (Emphasis added.)
Respondents argue that they are not subject to mandatory detention because they are not "described in" § 1226(c)(1), even though they (and all the other members of the classes they represent) fall into at least one of the categories of aliens covered by subparagraphs (A)-(D) of that provision. An alien covered by these subparagraphs is not "described in" § 1226(c)(1), respondents contend, unless the alien was also arrested "when [he or she was] released" from criminal custody. Indeed, respondents insist that the alien must have been arrested immediately after release. Since they and the other class members were not arrested immediately, respondents conclude, they are not "described in" § 1226(c)(1). So to detain them, the Government must rely not on § 1226(c) but on the general provisions of § 1226(a). And thus, like others detained under § 1226(a), they are owed bond hearings in which they can earn their release by proving that they pose no flight risk and no danger to others-or so they claim. But neither the statute's text nor its structure supports this argument. In fact, both cut the other way.
A
First, respondents' position runs aground on the plain text of § 1226(c). Respondents are right that only an alien "described in paragraph (1)" faces mandatory detention, but they are wrong about which aliens are "described in" paragraph (1).
Paragraph (1) provides that the Secretary "shall take" into custody any "alien" having certain characteristics and that the Secretary must do this "when the alien is released" from criminal custody. The critical parts of the provision consist of a verb ("shall take"), an adverbial clause ("when... released"), a noun ("alien"), and a series of adjectival clauses ("who... is inadmissible," "who... is deportable," etc.). As an initial matter, no one can deny that the adjectival clauses modify (and in that sense "describ[e]") the noun "alien" or that the adverbial clause "when... released" modifies the verb "shall take." And since an adverb cannot modify a noun, the "when released" clause cannot modify "alien." Again, what modifies (and in that sense "describe[s]") the noun "alien" are the adjectival clauses that appear in subparagraphs (A)-(D).
Respondents and the dissent contend that this grammatical point is not the end of the matter-that an adverb can "describe" a person even though it cannot modify the noun used to denote that person. See post, at 978 - 979 (opinion of BREYER, J.). But our interpretation is not dependent on a rule of grammar. The preliminary point about grammar merely complements what is critical, and indeed conclusive in these cases: the particular meaning of the term "described" as it appears in § 1226(c)(2). As we noted in Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1619, 1625, 194 L.Ed.2d 737 (2016), the term " 'describe' takes on different meanings in different contexts." A leading definition of the term is "to communicate verbally... an account of salient identifying features," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 610 (1976), and that is clearly the meaning of the term used in the phrase "an alien described in paragraph (1)." (Emphasis added.) This is clear from the fact that the indisputable job of the "descri[ption] in paragraph (1)" is to "identif[y]" for the Secretary-to list the "salient... features" by which she can pick out-which aliens she must arrest immediately "when [they are] released."
And here is the crucial point: The "when... released" clause could not possibly describe aliens in that sense; it plays no role in identifying for the Secretary which aliens she must immediately arrest. If it did, the directive in § 1226(c)(1) would be nonsense. It would be ridiculous to read paragraph (1) as saying: "The Secretary must arrest, upon their release from jail, a particular subset of criminal aliens. Which ones? Only those who are arrested upon their release from jail." Since it is the Secretary's action that determines who is arrested upon release, "being arrested upon release" cannot be one of her criteria in figuring out whom to arrest. So it cannot "describe"-it cannot give the Secretary an "identifying featur[e]" of-the relevant class of aliens. On any other reading of paragraph (1), the command that paragraph (1) gives the Secretary would be downright incoherent.
Our reading is confirmed by Congress's use of the definite article in "when the alien is released." Because "[w]ords are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them," A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012), the "rules of grammar govern" statutory interpretation "unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose," ibid. (citing Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 122-126, 84 S.Ct. 580, 11 L.Ed.2d 559 (1964) ). Here grammar and usage establish that "the" is "a function word... indicat[ing] that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005). See also Work v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U.S. 200, 208, 43 S.Ct. 580, 67 L.Ed. 949 (1923) (Congress's "use of the definite article [in a reference to "the appraisement"] means an appraisement specifically provided for"). For "the alien"-in the clause "when the alien is released"-to have been previously specified, its scope must have been settled by the time the "when... released" clause appears at the tail end of paragraph (1).
For these reasons, we hold that the scope of "the alien" is fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)-(D). And since only those subparagraphs settle who is "described in paragraph (1)," anyone who fits their description falls under paragraph (2)'s detention mandate-even if (as with respondents) the Secretary did not arrest them immediately "when" they were "released."
B
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit thought that the very structure of § 1226 favors respondents' reading. In particular, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, each subsection's arrest and release provisions must work together. Thus, aliens must be arrested under the general arrest authority in subsection (a) in order to get a bond hearing under subsection (a)'s release provision. And in order to face mandatory detention under subsection (c), criminal aliens must have been arrested under subsection (c). But since subsection (c) authorizes only immediate arrest, the argument continues, those arrested later fall under subsection (a), not (c). Accordingly, the court concluded, those arrested well after release escape subsection (c)'s detention mandate. See 831 F.3d at 1201-1203. But this argument misreads the structure of § 1226 ; and in any event, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion would not follow even if we granted all its premises about statutory structure.
1
Although the Ninth Circuit viewed subsections (a) and (c) as establishing separate sources of arrest and release authority, in fact subsection (c) is simply a limit on the authority conferred by subsection (a).
Recall that subsection (a) has two sentences that provide the Secretary with general discretion over the arrest and release of aliens, respectively. We read each of subsection (c)'s two provisions-paragraph (1) on arrest, and paragraph (2) on release-as modifying its counterpart sentence in subsection (a). In particular, subsection (a) creates authority for anyone's arrest or release under § 1226-and it gives the Secretary broad discretion as to both actions-while subsection (c)'s job is to subtract some of that discretion when it comes to the arrest and release of criminal aliens. Thus, subsection (c)(1) limits subsection (a)'s first sentence by curbing the discretion to arrest: The Secretary must arrest those aliens guilty of a predicate offense. And subsection (c)(2) limits subsection (a)'s second sentence by cutting back the Secretary's discretion over the decision to release: The Secretary may not release aliens "described in" subsection (c)(1)-that is, those guilty of a predicate offense. Accordingly, all the relevant detainees will have been arrested by authority that springs from subsection (a), and so, contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, that fact alone will not spare them from subsection (c)(2)'s prohibition on release. This reading comports with the Government's practice of applying to the arrests of all criminal aliens certain procedural requirements, such as the need for a warrant, that appear only in subsection (a). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14.
The text of § 1226 itself contemplates that aliens arrested under subsection (a) may face mandatory detention under subsection (c). The second sentence in subsection (a)-which generally authorizes the Secretary to release an alien pending removal proceedings-features an exception "as provided in subsection (c)." But if the Court of Appeals were right that subsection (c)(2)'s prohibition on release applies only to those arrested pursuant to subsection (c)(1), there would have been no need to specify that such aliens are exempt from subsection (a)'s release provision. This shows that it is possible for those arrested under subsection (a) to face mandatory detention under subsection (c). We draw a similar inference from the fact that subsection (c)(2), for its part, does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested "pursuant to" subsection (c)(1) or "under authority created by" subsection (c)(1)-but to anyone so much as "described in" subsection (c)(1). This choice of words marks a contrast with Congress's reference-in the immediately preceding subsection-to actions by the Secretary that are "authorized under" subsection (a). See § 1226(b). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3262(b) (referring to "a person arrested under subsection (a)" (emphasis added)). These textual cues indicate that even if an alien was not arrested under authority bestowed by subsection (c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection (c)(2).
2
But even if the Court of Appeals were right to reject this reading, the result below would be wrong. To see why, assume with the Court of Appeals that only someone arrested under authority created by § 1226(c)(1) -rather than the more general § 1226(a) -may be detained without a bond hearing. And assume that subsection (c)(1) requires immediate arrest. Even then, the Secretary's failure to abide by this time limit would not cut off her power to arrest under subsection (c)(1). That is so because, as we have held time and again, an official's crucial duties are better carried out late than never. See Sylvain v. Attorney General of U.S., 714 F.3d 150, 158 (CA3 2013) (collecting cases). Or more precisely, a statutory rule that officials "'shall' act within a specified time" does not by itself "preclud[e] action later." Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d 653 (2003).
Especially relevant here is our decision in United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990). There we held that "a provision that a detention hearing'shall be held immediately upon the [detainee's] first appearance before the judicial officer' did not bar detention after a tardy hearing." Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 159, 123 S.Ct. 748 (quoting Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 714, 110 S.Ct. 2072 ). In that case, we refused to "bestow upon the defendant a windfall" and "visit upon the Government and the citizens a severe penalty by mandating release of possibly dangerous defendants every time some deviation from the [statutory] strictures... occur[red]." Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 720, 110 S.Ct. 2072. Instead, we gave effect to the principle that " 'if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.' " Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 159, 123 S.Ct. 748 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) ).
This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fixture of the legal backdrop when Congress enacted § 1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 209, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003) (relying on the "legal backdrop" against which "Congress legislated" to clarify what Congress enacted). Indeed, we have held of a statute enacted just four years before § 1226(c) that because of our case law at the time-never since abrogated-Congress was "presumably aware that we do not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency's power to get a mandatory job done merely from a specification to act by a certain time." Barnhart, 537 U.S. at

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 个