Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice O’Connor
delivered the opimon of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted of two counts of transporting a forged security in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2314. He challenges his conviction on the ground that the statute requires proof, concededly lacking at trial, that the securities had been forged before being taken across state lines. Because of a conflict among the Circuits on this issue of statutory construction, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 815 (1981). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the petitioner’s conviction.
HH
Petitioner Charles McElroy was indicted by a federal grand jury on three counts. Counts 1 and 3 charged that on two occasions the petitioner transported in interstate commerce falsely made and forged securities from Ohio to Pennsylvania in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2314, the National Stolen Property Act. Count 2 charged McElroy with transporting a stolen car in interstate commerce from Pennsylvania to Ohio in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 2312.
According to the proof at trial, several blank checks were stolen from Local 125 of the Laborers’ International Union in Youngstown, Ohio, in late March or early April 1977. After the Union discovered the theft, it closed the account on which the checks were drawn. Seventeen months later, in October 1978, the petitioner ordered a used Corvette from the Don Allen Chevrolet Agency in Pittsburgh, Pa., for $6,706. Using the name “William Jones,” the petitioner told the salesman that he lived in Warrenville Heights, Ohio, but worked in the Pittsburgh area. The petitioner returned the next day and paid for the car with one of the stolen Union checks, on which a signature had been forged. After learning the following day from the drawee bank in Ohio that the account had been closed, the dealership made no effort to negotiate the check. This transaction formed the basis for count 1 (transportation of a forged check in interstate commerce) and count 2 (transportation of a stolen vehicle, the Corvette, in interstate commerce) of the indictment.
. In December 1978, the petitioner sought to purchase a boat and trailer from the Rini Marine Sales Co. in Beaver Falls, Pa. Adhering to his previously successful scheme, he used the fictitious name “William Jones” and gave an Ohio address for his residence. One week after his initial inquiry he paid for a boat and trailer with one of the stolen Union checks, on which a signature had been forged. Too late, Philip Rini, the owner of Rini Marine Sales, became suspicious and telephoned the Youngstown, Ohio, bank only to learn that the check had been stolen and the signature forged. He, too, abandoned hope of negotiating the check, and turned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for help. Count 3 arose from this transaction.
At the conclusion of the Government’s case, the petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts on the ground that the Government had not submitted sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to an acquittal on count 2 because the Government failed to submit any evidence showing that the petitioner had transported the Corvette from Pennsylvania to Ohio, and on counts 1 and 3 because the Government had not adduced any evidence showing that the petitioner had caused the stolen checks to be brought through interstate commerce into Pennsylvania. The trial court denied these motions.
After the petitioner rested, the trial court instructed the jury that in order to find the petitioner guilty on counts 1 and 3, it must find that he transported the check in a forged condition in “interstate commerce,” and that such transportation could take place entirely within the State of Pennsylvania if it was a “continuation of the movement that began out of state.” Tr. 164A. The petitioner unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, contending that under § 2314 the Government had the burden of proving that the check was forged in Ohio before it was transported across the state line to Pennsylvania. Tr. 92A. The petitioner was convicted on all three counts, and sentenced to serve seven years on each of counts 1 and 3 and five years on count 2, the sentences on all three counts to run concurrently.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the judgment on count 2, holding that the Government had presented insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 644 F. 2d 274 (CA3 1981) (en banc). The court affirmed the judgment on counts 1 and 3, however, holding that the Government had presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury that the Government need not prove that the stolen checks had been forged before crossing state lines. “It is immaterial whether the signatures were forged in Ohio or in Pennsylvania. If at any point in the interstate movement the check was in a forged condition, the statute was satisfied.” Id., at 279. All but one judge agreed with the majority’s construction of the phrase “interstate commerce” as used in §2314.
II
The question presented by this case is one of statutory construction. The petitioner claims that the language and legislative history of §2314 demonstrate congressional intent to limit the reach of that provision to those persons who transport forged securities across state lines. As a fallback position, the petitioner contends that §2314’s use of the expression “interstate commerce” is sufficiently ambiguous to require this Court to apply the principle of lenity and construe the provision in the petitioner’s favor,
A
Petitioner bases his initial argument on Congress’ use of the past tense “forged” in § 2314, from which he urges us to infer that Congress intended to prohibit only the transportation of securities that were forged before entering the stream of interstate commerce, that is, before crossing state lines. Fundamental to the petitioner’s argument is the unarticu-lated assumption that “interstate commerce,” as used in the section, does not continue after the security has crossed the state border. However, if subsequent movement of the check in the destination State constitutes interstate commerce, then a forgery of the check in the course of that movement involves transportation of a forged security in interstate commerce in violation of § 2314. Thus, the validity of the petitioner’s argument turns on whether the statutory phrase “interstate commerce” comprehends movement of a forged security within the destination State.
The paragraph of §2314 under which the petitioner was convicted prohibits the “transportation] in interstate or foreign commerce [of] any... forged... securities..., knowing the same to have been... forged.”. Title 18 U.S.C. § 10 provides that the “term ‘interstate commerce,’ as used in this title, includes commerce between one State... and another State.” On their face, these two provisions are not limited to unlawful activities that occur while crossing state borders, but seemingly have a broader reach. In particular, the language of § 10 suggests that crossing state lines is not the sole manifestation of “interstate commerce.”
The origin of the “interstate commerce” element of § 2314 was the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (Dyer Act),. 41 Stat. 324, which was enacted in 1919 to provide “severe punishment of those guilty of the stealing of automobiles in interstate or foreign commerce.” H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919). See S. Rep. No. 202, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (describing the bill as designed to “punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce”). Representative Dyer, the sponsor of the bill that was enacted, defended Congress’ authority to enact the proposed law, noting that the courts had upheld a variety of regulatory statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause, including a criminal statute declaring unlawful the “[ljarceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate commerce.” 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919). In response to a question from Representative Anderson concerning possible differences in the meaning of “interstate commerce” in §§2 and 4 of the Act, Representative Dyer replied:
“[I]f there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce.” Ibid.
Plainly, Representative Dyer, the chief sponsor of the bill, believed that the statutory meaning of “interstate commerce” could be found in previous Supreme Court decisions using the phrase to define the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. See also H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1919) (justifying Congress’ authority to enact the Dyer Act by reference to this Court’s decisions holding that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce).
Although the House Report accompanying the bill, as well as several Members of Congress during the debates, stated that the Act would prevent the transportation of stolen automobiles across state lines, Congress’ use of the more general phrase “interstate commerce” and its reliance on this Court’s constitutional decisions defining the scope of “interstate commerce” indicate that Congress intended the statutory phrase to be as broad as this Court had used that phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919. In those decisions, this Court had made clear that interstate commerce begins well before state lines are crossed, and ends only when movement of the item in question has ceased in the destination State. We conclude, therefore, that in § 2314 Congress intended to proscribe the transportation of a forged security at any and all times during the course of its movement in interstate commerce, and that the stream of interstate commerce may continue after a state border has been crossed. Consequently, the trial judge in this case correctly instructed the jury that McElroy’s transportation of the forged check within Pennsylvania would violate §2314 if the jury found that movement to be a “continuation of the movement that began out of state.” Tr. 164A.
Moreover, the purpose underlying § 2314 leads us to conclude that Congress did not intend to require federal prosecutors to prove that the securities had been forged before crossing state lines. In United States v. Sheridan, 329 U. S. 379, 384 (1946), this Court observed that in § 2314 Congress “contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize' the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state’s detecting and punitive processes impotent” (footnote omitted). Given this broad purpose, we find it difficult to believe, absent some indication in the statute itself or the legislative history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that purpose by hobbling federal prosecutors in their effort to combat crime in interstate commerce. Under the petitioner’s proposed construction, a patient forger easily could evade the reach of federal law, yet operate in the channels of interstate commerce. As the Government points out in its brief, moreover, the petitioner’s construction produces the anomalous result that no federal crime would have been committed in this case until the victims returned the forged checks to the out-of-state drawee bank for payment. Brief for United States 18, n. 11. While Congress could have written the statute to produce this result, there is no basis for us to adopt such a limited reading.
B
The petitioner argues alternatively that even if a reading of § 2314 does not clearly support his interpretation, the provision is ambiguous and the ambiguity should be resolved by reading the provision narrowly to require the checks to have been forged before crossing the state line. For support, the petitioner cites United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336 (1971), where this Court considered a challenge to a conviction under 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a), which prohibits a convicted felon from “receiv[ing], possessing], or transporting] in commerce or affecting commerce... any firearm.” The issue framed by the Court was whether “in commerce or affecting commerce” modified “possesses” as well as “transports,” since the respondent, a convicted felon, had been charged with possession of a shotgun, but the Government had made no effort to show that he had possessed the firearm “in commerce or affecting commerce.” The Court found both the language of the provision and its legislative history ambiguous on this question, and decided on two grounds to read the statute narrowly, that is, to read “in commerce or affecting commerce” as modifying “possesses” as well as “transports.” The Court reasoned that ambiguity concerning the reach of a criminal statute should be resolved by reading the statute narrowly in order to encourage Congress to speak clearly, thus giving the populace “fair warning” of the line between criminal and lawful activity, and in order to have the Legislature, not the courts, define criminal activity. Id., at 347-348. Also, absent a clear statement of purpose from Congress, the Court was unwilling to read a federal criminal statute in a way that would encroach on a traditional area of state criminal jurisdiction.
The present case, however, does not raise significant questions of ambiguity, for the statutory language and legislative history of the Dyer Act indicate that Congress defined the term “interstate commerce” more broadly than the petitioner contends. We hold that Congress intended to use the term “interstate commerce” as this Court had been using it in Commerce Clause cases before 1919. As we observed in United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, 509-510 (1955), although “criminal statutes are to be construed strictly... this does not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature” (footnote omitted).
r — ¶ HH HH
Through § 2314, Congress has sought to aid the States in their detection and punishment of criminals who evade state authorities by using the channels of interstate commerce. Based on this congressional purpose, the trial judge in the present case correctly instructed the jury that they could find the petitioner guilty of violating § 2314 if they found that the forgeries occurred during the course of interstate commerce, which includes a “continuation of a movement that began out of state,” even though movement of the forged checks was restricted to one State. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.
So ordered.
Title 18 U. S. C. §2314 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited..,.
“Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”
Title 18 U. S. C. §2312 provides:
“Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
Title 18 U. S. C. §2311 states that, as used in §§2311-2318, the term “[s]eeurities includes any... check.”
Tr. 68A-78A.
The petitioner introduced no evidence.
The entire instruction on this issue was as follows:
“Well, [interstate commerce] means any movement or transportation of these forged checks from one state into another, and it includes all continuing movements of said forged check while in the second state, in this case Pennsylvania, until the movement of said forged check has ceased.
“Now, the Government must show that the checks were transported in interstate commerce in a forged condition. However, the transportation within the destination state here, Pennsylvania, may be considered transportation in interstate commerce if it is a continuation of the movement that began out of state.
“The Government need not exclude every speculative possibility that the transportation may have been interrupted at some point, nor need the Government show each step in the security’s movement in interstate commerce.
“Now, if you believe that the Government has shown that the Defendant transported the checks while they were in a forged condition within the State of Pennsylvania, the requirements of the law are satisfied if that transportation was part of interstate commerce. In other words, the check had to originate at sometime in Ohio and had to have been transported at sometime in Pennsylvania in order to effect interstate commerce. So the Government must prove this Defendant transported the checks involved in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment in interstate commerce between Ohio and Pennsylvania, but need not prove the place in Ohio from which the checks started or from where the Defendant started.” Id., at 164A-165A.
After some discussion at the bench with the lawyers, the judge further instructed the jury:
“As to Counts 1 and 3, the Government must prove with evidence that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant caused the transportation of the two checks in question, that is, in Counts 1 and 3, the check to Rini, the check to Don Allen Chevrolet, in interstate commerce, from Ohio to Pennsylvania.” Id., at 181 A.
That part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment vacating the conviction on count 2 is not before this Court.
Judge Adams, joined by Chief Judge Seitz, concurred in the majority opinion on counts 1 and 3, but dissented from the court’s holding that the conviction on count 2 should be vacated. Although he agreed that the trial judge correctly had instructed the jury on counts 1 and 3, Judge Garth dissented from the affirmance on those counts, arguing that the Government had presented insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions. Judge Higginbotham concurred with the majority opinion on count 2, but dissented from its holdings on counts 1 and 3. He reasoned that § 2314 was ambiguous, and that consequently the principle of lenity required the court to construe the statute strictly against the Government and hold that the statute was violated only if the security had been forged before crossing state lines.
The petitioner concedes that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (which provides in part that “Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce... among the several States”), to enact a criminal statute prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of a security that was not forged until after crossing state lines. Consequently, the issue in the present case is the meaning that Congress ascribed to the phrase “interstate commerce” in § 2314.
Although the petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on counts 1 and 3 in his petition for writ of certiorari, this Court limited the grant of certiorari to, the statutory construction issue. Thus, we accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that “on each occasion [the petitioner] made a trip from Ohio to Pennsylvania, carrying with him a check that was forged either in Ohio or Pennsylvania.” 644 F. 2d 274, 279 (CA3 1981).
The predecessor of 18 U. S. C. § 10 was § 2(b) of the Dyer Act, which stated that the term “interstate commerce” “shall include transportation from one State... to another State.” 41 Stat. 325.
The Act provided in part:
“Sec. 2. That... :
“(b) The term ‘interstate or foreign commerce’ as used in this Act shall include transportation from one State... to another State....
“Sec. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.
“Sec. 4. That whoever shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.”
The Act was expanded in 1934 to cover other types of stolen property, see National Stolen Property Act, 48 Stat. 794, and in 1939 to cover forged securities. See Act of Aug. 3,1939, 53 Stat. 1178. Sections 3 and 4 were later codified as 18 U. S. C. §§ 2312 and 2313 respectively. None of the legislative Reports or debates concerning these amendments, however, contains any explanation of the “interstate commerce” requirement. See H. R. Rep. No. 1462, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (stating that the new Act was “designed to punish interstate transportation of stolen property, securities, or money,” and that it was “drafted to follow the language of the Dyer Act, the constitutionality of which has frequently been upheld in the Federal courts”); S. Rep. No. 538, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1934) (approving a Justice Department memorandum stating that the purpose of the Act is “to provide a penalty for knowingly transporting stolen property in interstate or foreign commerce”); H. R. Rep. No. 422, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1939) (stating that the bill “widens the scope of the National Stolen Property Act of 1934... by making its provisions applicable to embezzled property, securities and money”); S. Rep. No. 674, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1939) (approving a letter from the Attorney General stating in part that the “principal purposes of the pending bill are to extend the existing law to property that.has been embezzled, and also to forged or counterfeited securities”).
Obviously, Representative Dyer believed that a federal crime would be committed even though the larceny did not occur at the exact moment that the railroad car crossed a state line. It is fair to conclude from this example that he understood “interstate commerce,” as used in the Dyer Act, to have a broader meaning than transportation across state lines.
The entire colloquy between Representatives Dyer and Anderson is as follows:
“Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in section 2 as it meant in section 4?
“Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein it differs, I shall be glad.
“Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2 interstate commerce means transportation from one State to another, while if you refer to section 4 you find there you have a vehicle or motor car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely have a sensible section.
“Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that if there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I think it really is not necessary to put the definition in this bill. It was done at the request of some of the members of the committee. The Supreme

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 取