Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider in this case what a mutual fund shareholder must prove in order to show that a mutual fond investment adviser breached the “fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” that is imposed by § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b) (hereinafter § 36(b)).
I
A
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C. §80a-l et seq., regulates investment companies, including mutual funds. “A mutual fond is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, and belonging to the individual investors holding shares in the fund.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 (1979). The following arrangements are typical. A separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual fond, which may have no employees of its own. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 93 (1991); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U. S. 523, 536 (1984); Burks, 441 U. S., at 480-481. The adviser selects the fond’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and provides other services. See id., at 481. Because of the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often “ ‘cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fond industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.’” Ibid, (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 5 (1969) (hereinafter S. Rep.)).
“Congress adopted the [Investment Company Act of 1940] because of its concern with the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing that the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser was “fraught with potential conflicts of interest,” the Act created protections for mutual fund shareholders. Id., at 536-538 (internal quotation marks omitted); Burks, supra, at 482-483. Among other things, the Act required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors could be affiliated with the adviser and that fees for investment advisers be approved by the directors and the shareholders of the fund. See §§ 10, 15(c), 54 Stat. 806, 813.
The growth of mutual funds in the 1950’s and 1960’s prompted studies of the 1940 Act’s effectiveness in protecting investors. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 537-538. Studies commissioned or authored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) identified problems relating to the independence of investment company boards and the compensation received by investment advisers. See ibid. In response to such concerns, Congress amended the Act in 1970 and bolstered shareholder protection in two primary ways.
First, the amendments strengthened the “cornerstone” of the Act’s efforts to check conflicts of interest, the independence of mutual fund boards of directors, which negotiate and scrutinize adviser compensation. Burks, supra, at 482. The amendments required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors be “persons who are interested persons,” e. g., that they have no interest in or affiliation with the investment adviser. 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a); §80a-2(a)(19); see also Daily Income Fund, supra, at 538. These board members are given “a host of special responsibilities.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482-483. In particular, they must “review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser” annually, id., at 483, and a majority of these directors must approve an adviser’s compensation, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c). Second, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, of the Act imposed upon investment advisers a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation received from a mutual fund, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b), and granted individual investors a private right of action for breach of that duty, ibid.
The “fiduciary duty” standard contained in § 36(b) represented a delicate compromise. Prior to the adoption of the 1970 amendments, shareholders challenging investment adviser fees under state law were required to meet “common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ or ‘shocking,’ ” and “security holders challenging adviser fees under the [Investment Company Act] itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 540, n. 12. Aiming to give shareholders a stronger remedy, the SEC proposed a provision that would have empowered the Commission to bring actions to challenge a fee that was not “reasonable” and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf of an investment company. Id., at 538. This approach was included in a bill that passed the House. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (1967); see also S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (as introduced May 1,1967). Industry representatives, however, objected to this proposal, fearing that it “might in essence provide the Commission with ratemaking authority.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 538.
The provision that was ultimately enacted adopted “a different method of testing management compensation,” id., at 539 (quoting S. Rep., at 5; internal quotation marks omitted), that was more favorable to shareholders than the previously available remedies but that did not permit a compensation agreement to be reviewed in court for “reasonableness.” This is the fiduciary duty standard in § 36(b).
B
Petitioners are shareholders in three different mutual funds managed by respondent Harris Associates L. P., an investment adviser. Petitioners filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to § 36(b) seeking damages, an injunction, and rescission of advisory agreements between Harris Associates and the mutual funds. The complaint alleged that Harris Associates had violated § 36(b) by charging fees that were “disproportionate to the services rendered” and “not within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” App. 52.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Harris Associates. Applying the standard adopted in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F. 2d 923 (CA2 1982), the court concluded that petitioners had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to “whether the fees charged... were so disproportionately large that they could not have been the result of arm’s-length bargaining.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. The District Court assumed that it was relevant to compare the challenged' fees with those that Harris Associates charged its other clients. Id., at 30a. But in light of those comparisons as well as comparisons with fees charged by other investment advisers to similar mutual funds, the court held that it could not reasonably be found that the challenged fees were outside the range that could have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining. Id., at 29a-32a.
A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on different reasoning, explicitly “disapprov[ing] the Gartenberg approach.” 527 F. 3d 627, 632 (2008). Looking to trust law, the panel noted that, while a trustee “owes an obligation of candor in negotiation,” a trustee, at the time of the creation of a trust, “may negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settlor or governance institution agrees to pay.” Ibid, (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, and Comment /). The panel thus reasoned that “[a] fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make foil disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. In the panel’s view, the amount of an adviser’s compensation would be relevant only if the compensation were “so unusual” as to give rise to an inference “that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.” Ibid.
The panel argued that this understanding of § 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the contemporary mutual fond market. Noting that “[tjoday thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that generally keeps fees low. Id., at 633-634. The panel faulted Gartenberg on the ground that it “relies too little on markets.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. And the panel firmly rejected a comparison between the fees that Harris Associates charged to the funds and the fees that Harris Associates charged other types of clients, observing that “[djifferent clients call for different commitments of time” and that costs, such as research, that may benefit several categories of clients “make it hard to draw inferences from fee levels.” Id., at 634.
The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote. 537 F. 3d 728 (2008) (per curiam). The dissent from the denial of rehearing argued that the panel’s rejection of Gartenberg was based “mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination.” 537 F. 3d, at 730 (opinion of Posner, J.). Among other things, the dissent expressed concern that Harris Associates charged “its captive funds more than twice what it charges independent funds,” and the dissent questioned whether high adviser fees actually drive investors away. Id., at 731.
We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals over the proper standard under § 36(b). 556 U. S. 1104 (2009).
II
A
Since Congress amended the Investment Company Act in 1970, the mutual fund industry has experienced exponential growth. Assets under management increased from $38.2 billion in 1966 to over $9.6 trillion in 2008. The number of mutual fund investors grew from 3.5 million in 1965 to 92 million in 2008, and there are now more than 9,000 open- and closed-end funds.
During this time, the standard for an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty has remained an open question in our Court, but, until the Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something of a consensus had developed regarding the standard set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg, 694 F. 2d 923. The Gartenberg standard has been adopted by other federal courts, and “[t]he SEC’s regulations have recognized, and formalized, GartenbergASke factors.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. See 17 CFR §240.14a-101, Sched. 14A, Item 22, par. (c)(ll)(i) (2009); 69 Fed. Reg. 39801, n. 31, 39807-39809 (2004), In the present case, both petitioners and respondent generally endorse the Gartenberg approach, although they disagree in some respects about its meaning.
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit noted that Congress had not defined what it meant by a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation but concluded that “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.” 694 F. 2d, at 928. The Second Circuit elaborated that, “[t]o be guilty of a violation of § 36(b),... the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining” Ibid. “To make this determination,” the court stated, “all pertinent facts must be weighed,” id., at 929, and the court specifically mentioned “the adviser-manager's cost in providing the service,... the extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be processed by the manager,” id., at 930. Observing that competition among advisers for the business of managing a fund may be “virtually nonexistent,” the court rejected the suggestion that “the principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee's fairness is the price charged by other similar advisers to funds managed by them,” although the court did not suggest that this factor could not be “taken into account.” Id., at 929. The court likewise rejected the “argument that the lower fees charged by investment advisers to large pension funds should be used as a criterion for determining fair advisory fees for money market funds,” since a “pension fund does not faee the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions throughout the nation which must be handled by [a money market fund].” Id., at 930, n. 3.
B
The meaning of § 36(b)'s reference to “a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” is hardly pellucid, but based on the terms of that provision and the role that a shareholder action for breach of that duty plays in the overall structure of the Act, we conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic formulation of what § 36(b) requires: To face liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.
1
We begin with the language of § 36(b). As noted, the Seventh Circuit panel thought that the phrase “fiduciary duty” incorporates a standard taken from the law of trusts. Petitioners agree but maintain that the panel identified the wrong trust-law standard. Instead of the standard that applies when a trustee and a settlor negotiate the trustee’s fee at the time of the creation of a trust, petitioners invoke the standard that applies when a trustee seeks compensation after the trust is created. Brief for Petitioners 20-23, 35-37. A compensation agreement reached at that time, they point out, “‘will not bind the beneficiary’ if either ‘the trustee failed to make a full disclosure of all circumstances affecting the agreement’” which he knew or should have known or if the agreement is unfair to the beneficiary. Id., at 23 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, Comment i). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the term “fiduciary” is not exclusive to the law of trusts, that the phrase means different things in different contexts, and that there is no reason to believe that § 36(b) incorporates the specific meaning of the term in the law of trusts. Brief for Respondent 34-36.
We find it unnecessary to take sides in this dispute. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939), we discussed the meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty in a context that is analogous to that presented here, and we also looked to trust law. At issue in Pepper was whether a bankruptcy court could disallow a dominant or controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt corporation. Dominant or controlling shareholders, we held, are “fiduciaries]” whose “powers are powers [held] in trust.” Id., at 306. We then explained:
“Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.... The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside.” Id., at 306-307 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1921) (standard of fiduciary duty for interested directors).
We believe that this formulation expresses the meaning of the phrase “fiduciary duty” in § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429. The Investment Company Act modifies this duty in a significant way: It shifts the burden of proof from the fiduciary to the party claiming breach, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)(l), to show that the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length bargaining would produce.
The Gartenberg approach fully incorporates this understanding of the fiduciary duty as set out in Pepper and reflects §36(b)(l)’s imposition of the burden on the plaintiff. As noted, Gartenberg insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account, see 694 F. 2d, at 929, as does § 36(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1429 (“[A]pproval by the board of directors... shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances” (emphasis added)). And Gartenberg uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s-length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.
2
Gartenberg’s approach also reflects §36(b)’s place in the statutory scheme and, in particular, its relationship to the other protections that the Act affords investors.
Under the Act, scrutiny of investment-adviser compensation by a fully informed mutual fund board is the “cornerstone of the... effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482. The Act interposes disinterested directors as “independent watchdogs” of the relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser. Id., at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). To provide these directors with the information needed to judge whether an adviser’s compensation is excessive, the Act requires advisers to furnish all information “reasonably... necessary to evaluate the terms” of the adviser’s contract, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c), and gives the SEC the authority to enforce that requirement. See §80a-41. Board scrutiny of adviser compensation and shareholder suits under § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, are mutually reinforcing but independent mechanisms for controlling conflicts. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 541 (Congress intended for § 36(b) suits and directorial approval of adviser contracts to act as “independent checks on excessive fees”); Kamen, 500 U. S., at 108 (“Congress added § 36(b) to the [Act] in 1970 because it concluded that the shareholders should not have to rely solely on the fund’s directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased disinterestedness of the board” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In recognition of the role of the disinterested directors, the Act instructs courts to give board approval of an adviser’s compensation “such consideration... as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.” § 80a-35(b)(2). Cf. Burks, supra, at 485 (“[X]t would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon [boards of directors as] ‘watchdogs' to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the ‘watchdogs’ have done precisely that, require that they be totally muzzled”).
From this formulation, two inferences may be drawn. First, a measure of deference to a board’s judgment may be appropriate in some instances. Second, the appropriate measure of deference varies

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 已