Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the pre-emptive scope of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (CWA or Act). The question presented is whether the Act pre-empts a common-law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont law, when the source of the alleged injury is located in New York.
I — I
Lake Champlain forms part of the border between the States of New York and Vermont. Petitioner International Paper Company (IPC) operates a pulp and paper mill on the New York side of the lake. In the course of its business, IPC discharges a variety of effluents into the lake through a diffusion pipe. The pipe runs from the mill through the water toward Vermont, ending a short distance before the state boundary line that divides the lake.
Respondents are a group of property owners who reside or lease land on the Vermont shore. In 1978 the owners filed a class action suit against IPC, claiming, inter alia, that the discharge of effluents constituted a “continuing nuisance” under Vermont common law. Respondents alleged that the pollutants made the water “foul, unhealthy, smelly, and... unfit for recreational use,” thereby diminishing the value of their property. App. 29. The owners asked for $20 million in compensatory damages, $100 million in punitive damages, and injunctive relief that would require IPC to restructure part of its water treatment system. The action was filed in State Superior Court, and then later removed to Federal District Court for the District of Vermont.
IPC moved for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, claiming that the CWA pre-empted respondents’ state-law suit. With the parties’ consent, the District Judge deferred a ruling on the motion pending the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a similar case involving Illinois and the city of Milwaukee. In that dispute, Illinois filed a nuisance action against the city under Illinois statutory and common law, seeking to abate the alleged pollution of Lake Michigan. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F. 2d 403 (1984) (Milwaukee III), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1196 (1985). The Court of Appeals ultimately remanded the case for dismissal of Illinois’ claim, finding that the CWA precluded the application of one State’s law against a pollution source located in a different State. The decision was based in part on the court’s conclusion that the application of different state laws to a single “point source” would interfere with the carefully devised regulatory system established by the CWA. 731 F. 2d, at 414. The court also concluded that the only suits that were not pre-empted were those alleging violations of the laws of the polluting, or “source,” State. Id., at 413-414.
IPC argued that the holding in Milwaukee III was dispos-itive in this case. The Vermont District Court disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss. 602 F. Supp. 264 (1985). The court acknowledged that federal law normally governs interstate water pollution. It found, however, that two sections of the CWA explicitly preserve state-law rights of action. First, § 510 of the Act provides:
“Except as expressly provided..., nothing in this chapter shall... be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.” 33 U. S. C. § 1370.
In addition, § 505(e) states:
“Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief_” 33 U. S. C. § 1365(e).
The District Court held that these two provisions (together, “the saving clause”) made it clear that federal law did not pre-empt entirely the rights of States to control pollution. Therefore the question presented, said the court, was which types of state suits Congress intended to preserve. It considered three possibilities: first, the saving clause could be construed to preserve state law only as it applied to waters not covered by the CWA. But since the Act applies to virtually all surface water in the country, the District Court rejected this possibility. Second, the saving clause might preserve state nuisance law only as it applies to discharges occurring -within the source State; under this view a claim could be filed against IPC under New York common law, but not under Vermont law. This was the position adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III. The District Court nevertheless rejected this option, finding that “there is simply nothing in the Act which suggests that Congress intended to impose such limitations on the use of state law.” 602 F. Supp., at 269.
The District Court therefore adopted the third interpretation of the saving clause, and held that a state action to redress interstate water pollution could be maintained under the law of the State in which the injury occurred. Ibid. The court was unpersuaded by the concern expressed in Milwaukee III that the application of out-of-state law to a point source would conflict with the CWA. It said there was no interference with the procedures established by Congress because a State’s “imposition of compensatory damage awards and other equitable relief for injuries caused... merely sup plement the standards and limitations imposed by the Act.” 602 F. Supp., at 271 (emphasis in original). The court also found that the use of state law did not conflict with the ultimate goal of the CWA, since in each case the objective was to decrease the level of pollution. Ibid.
The District Court certified its decision for interlocutory appeal, see 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) (1982 ed., Supp. III), and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Court. 776 F. 2d 55, 56 (1985) (per curiam). We granted certiorari to resolve the circuit conflict on this important issue of federal pre-emption. 475 U. S. 1081 (1986). We now affirm the denial of IPC’s motion to dismiss, but reverse the decision below to the extent it permits the application of Vermont law to this litigation. We hold that when a court considers a state-law claim concerning interstate water pollution that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply the law of the State in which the point source is located.
II
A brief review of the regulatory framework is necessary to set the stage for this case. Until fairly recently, federal common law governed the use and misuse of interstate water. See, e. g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110 (1938) (water apportionment); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496 (1906) (water pollution). This principle was called into question in the context of water pollution in 1971, when the Court suggested in dicta that an interstate dispute between a State and a private company should be resolved by reference to state nuisance law. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 499, n. 3 (1971) (“[A]n action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under state law”) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)).
We had occasion to address this issue in the first of two Supreme Court cases involving the dispute between Illinois and Milwaukee. In Milwaukee I, the State moved for leave to file an original action in this Court, seeking to enjoin the city from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972). The Court’s opinion in that case affirmed the view that the regulation of interstate water pollution is a matter of federal, not state, law, thus overruling the contrary suggestion in Wyandotte. 406 U. S., at 102, n. 3. The Court was concerned, however, that the existing version of the Act was not sufficiently comprehensive to resolve all interstate disputes that were likely to arise. Milwaukee I therefore held that these cases should be resolved by reference to federal common law; the implicit corollary of this ruling was that state common law was preempted. See id., at 107, n. 9; Milwaukee III, 731 F. 2d, at 407. The Court noted, though, that future action by Congress to regulate water pollution might pre-empt federal common law as well. 406 U. S., at 107.
Congress thereafter adopted comprehensive amendments to the Act. We considered the impact of the new legislation when Illinois and Milwaukee returned to the Court several years later. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II). There the Court noted that the amendments were a “ ‘complete rewriting’ ” of the statute considered in Milwaukee I, and that they were “ ‘the most comprehensive and far reaching’ ” provisions that Congress ever had passed in this area. 451 U. S., at 317-318 (citations to legislative history omitted). Consequently, the Court held that federal legislation now occupied the field, pre-empting all federal common law. The Court left open the question of whether injured parties still had a cause of action under state law. Id., at 310, n. 4. The case was remanded for further consideration; the result on remand was the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee III, discussed swpra.
One of the primary features of the 1972 amendments is the establishment of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), a federal permit program designed to regulate the-discharge of polluting effluents. 33 U. S. C. § 1342; see generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205-208 (1976) (describing NPDES system). Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a), generally prohibits the discharge of any effluent into a navigable body of water unless the point source has obtained an NPDES permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The permits contain detailed effluent limitations, and a compliance schedule for the attainment of these limitations.
The amendments also recognize that the States should have a significant role in protecting their own natural resources. 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b). The Act provides that the Federal Government may delegate to a State the authority to administer the NPDES program with respect to point sources located within the State, if the EPA Administrator determines that the proposed state program complies with the requirements set forth at 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). The Administrator retains authority, however, to block the issuance of any permit to which he objects. § 1342(d). Even if the Federal Government administers the permit program, the source State may require discharge limitations more stringent than those required by the Federal Government. See 40 CFR § 122.1(f) (1986). Before the Federal Government may issue an NPDES permit, the Administrator must obtain certification from the source State that the proposed discharge complies with the State’s technology-based standards and water-quality-based standards. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(1). The CWA therefore establishes a regulatory “partnership” between the Federal Government and the source State.
While source States have a strong voice in regulating their own pollution, the CWA contemplates a much lesser role for States that share an interstate waterway with the source (the affected States). Even though it may be harmed by the discharges, an affected State only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders. Before a federal permit may be issued, each affected State is given notice and the opportunity to object to the proposed standards at a public hearing. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a)(2); Milwaukee III, supra, at 412. An affected State has similar rights to be consulted before the source State issues its own permit; the source State must send notification, and must consider the objections and recommendations submitted by other States before taking action. § 1342(b). Significantly, however, an affected State does not have the authority to block the issuance of the permit if it is dissatisfied with the proposed standards. An affected State’s only recourse is to apply to the EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on interstate waters. § 1342(d)(2). Also, an affected State may not establish a separate permit system to regulate an out-of-state source. See § 1342(b) (State may establish permit system for waters “within its jurisdiction”) (emphasis added), Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of Coastal Corridor v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074-1075 (WD Pa. 1981), aff’d, 707 F. 2d 1392 (CA3), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 915 (1983); State v. Champion International Corp., 709 S. W. 2d 569 (Tenn. 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-57. Thus the Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a subordinate position to source States in the federal regulatory program.
H — 4 hH HH
With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the question presented: whether the Act pre-empts Vermont common law to the extent that law may impose liability on a New York point source. We begin the analysis by noting that it is not necessary for a federal statute to provide explicitly that particular state laws are pre-empted. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 713 (1985). Although courts should not lightly infer pre-emption, it may be presumed when the federal legislation is “sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.” Ibid, (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)). In addition to express or implied pre-emption, a state law also is invalid to the extent that it “actually conflicts with a... federal statute.” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). Such a conflict will be found when the state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 713 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)).
A
As we noted in Milwaukee II, Congress intended the 1972 Act amendments to “establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation.” 451 U. S., at 318. We observed that congressional “views on the comprehensive nature of the legislation were practically universal.” Id., at 318, n. 12 (citing legislative history). An examination of the amendments amply supports these views. The Act applies to all point sources and virtually all bodies of water, and it sets forth the procedures for obtaining a permit in great detail. The CWA also provides its own remedies, including civil and criminal fines for permit violations, and “citizen suits” that allow individuals (including those from affected States) to sue for injunctions to enforce the statute. In light of this pervasive regulation and the fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily a matter of federal law, Milwaukee I, 406 U. S., at 107, it is clear that the only state suits that remain available are those specifically preserved by the Act.
Although Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the saving clause negates the inference that Congress “left no room” for state causes of action. Respondents read the language of the saving clause broadly to preserve both a State’s right to regulate its waters, 33 U. S. C. § 1370, and an injured party’s right to seek relief under “any statute or common law, ” § 1365(e) (emphasis added). They claim that this language and selected portions of the legislative history compel the inference that Congress intended to preserve the right to bring suit under the law of any affected State. We cannot accept this reading of the Act.
To begin with, the plain language of the provisions on which respondents rely by no means compels the result they seek. Section 505(e) merely says that “[n]othing in this section,” i. e., the citizen-suit provisions, shall affect an injured party’s right to seek relief under state law; it does not purport to preclude pre-emption of state law by other provisions of the Act. Section 510, moreover, preserves the authority of a State “with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such Stat[e].” This language arguably limits the effect of the clause to discharges flowing directly into a State’s own waters, i. e., discharges from within the State. The savings clause, then, does not preclude pre-emption of the law of an affected State.
Given that the Act itself does not speak directly to the issue, the Court must be guided by the goals and policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact pre-empts an action based on the law of an affected State. Cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 199 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“We resort to legislative materials only when the congressional mandate is unclear on its face”). After examining the CWA as a whole, its purposes and its history, we are convinced that if affected States were allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a single point source, the inevitable result would be a serious interference with the achievement of the “full purposes and objectives of Congress.” See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., supra, at 713. Because we do not believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general saving clause, we conclude that the CWA precludes a court from applying the law of an affected State against an out-of-state source.
B
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law “stands as an obstacle” to the full implementation of the CWA, it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both federal and state law is to eliminate water pollution. A state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal. See Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U. S. 461, 477 (1984). In this case the application of Vermont law against IPC would allow respondents to circumvent the NPDES permit system, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully addressed by the Act.
By establishing a permit system for effluent discharges, Congress implicitly has recognized that the goal of the CWA — elimination of water pollution — cannot be achieved immediately, and that it cannot be realized without incurring costs. The EPA Administrator issues permits according to established effluent standards and water quality standards, that in turn are based upon available technology, 33 U. S. C. § 1314, and competing public and industrial uses, § 1312(a). The Administrator must consider the impact of the discharges on the waterway, the types of effluents, and the schedule for compliance, each of which may vary widely among sources. If a State elects to impose- its own standards, it also must consider the technological feasibility of more stringent controls. Given the nature of these complex decisions, it is not surprising that the Act limits the right to administer the permit system to the EPA and the source States. See § 1342(b).
An interpretation of the saving clause that preserved actions brought under an affected State’s law would disrupt this balance of interests. If a New York source were liable for violations of Vermont law, that law could effectively override both the permit requirements and the policy choices made by the source State. The affected State’s nuisance laws would subject the point source to the threat of legal and equitable penalties if the permit standards were less stringent than those imposed by the affected State. Such penalties would compel the source to adopt different control standards and a different compliance schedule from those approved by the EPA, even though the affected State had not engaged in the same weighing of the costs and benefits. This case illustrates the problems with such a rule. If the Vermont court ruled that respondents were entitled to the full amount of damages and injunctive relief sought in the complaint, at a minimum IPC would have to change its methods of doing business and controlling pollution to avoid the threat of ongoing liability. In suits such as this, an affected-state court also could require the source to cease operations by ordering immediate abatement. Critically, these liabilities would attach even though the source had complied fully with its state and federal permit obligations. The inevitable result of such suits would be that Vermont and other States could do indirectly what they could not do directly — regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources.
Application of an affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also would undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system. The history of the 1972 amendments shows that Congress intended to establish “clear and identifiable” discharge standards. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499. As noted above, under the reading of the saving clause proposed by respondents, a source would be subject to a variety of common-law rules established by the different States along the interstate waterways. These nuisance standards often are “vague” and “indeterminate.” The application of numerous States’ laws would only exacerbate the vagueness and resulting uncertainty. The Court of Appeals in Milwaukee III identified the problem with such an irrational system of regulation:
“For a number of different states to have independent and plenary regulatory authority over a single discharge would lead to chaotic confrontation between sovereign states. Dischargers would be forced to meet not only the statutory limitations of all states potentially affected by their discharges but also the common law standards developed through case law of those states. It would be virtually impossible to predict the standard for a lawful discharge into an interstate body of water. Any permit issued under the Act would be rendered meaningless.” 731 F. 2d, at 414.
It is unlikely — to say the least — that Congress intended to establish'such a chaotic regulatory structure.
Nothing in the Act gives each affected State this power to regulate discharges. The CWA carefully defines the role of both the source and affected States, and specifically provides for a process whereby their interests will be considered and balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation of authority represents Congress’ considered judgment as to the best method of serving the public interest and reconciling the often competing concerns of those affected by the pollution. It would be extraordinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 结