Task: songer_genresp1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

DYER, Circuit Judge:
Johnson appeals his jury conviction for violating 18. U.S.C.A. § 1001 by providing a materially false affidavit to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the course of an investigation of criminal tax fraud. We affirm.
In May, 1971, the IRS began a field audit of Johnson’s tax returns for 1969. During this audit, discrepancies were found between the amount of Johnson’s bank deposits and the amount of income that he reported to the Service in 1969 and 1970. Johnson was confronted with the discrepancies, but was unable to identify all the non-income deposits. As a result, a criminal tax fraud investigation was begun by the Service.
During the investigation, IRS agents met with Johnson on various occasions, advising him of his constitutional rights three different times. Following these meetings the agent responsible for the investigation recommended to his superi- or on August 24, 1973, that Johnson be prosecuted for willfully attempting to evade personal income taxes for the taxable years 1967 through 1970.
About two months later, two attorneys representing Johnson met with counsel from the Criminal Tax Section of the IRS Regional Counsel’s office. During this conference, one of Johnson’s attorneys stated that during the taxable years in question, Johnson had received gifts which would explain the inconsistencies in the tax audit. He further stated that he wished to produce affidavits from the various donors to identify the amounts and dates of the gifts.
On November 7, 1973, Johnson met with E. A. Isakson and asked him to submit an affidavit stating that he had made gifts to Johnson in 1969 and 1970 in the amount of $5,000 even though Isakson had never made such donations. Two weeks after this meeting Isakson told his attorney of Johnson’s request. The attorney notified the United States Attorney who then contacted the special IRS agent in charge of the criminal investigation.
On November 29, 1973, Isakson signed an affidavit furnished to him by Johnson which stated that he had made cash gifts to Johnson in varying amounts in 1969. Four days later, an attorney representing Johnson delivered this and five other affidavits to the IRS Regional Counsel’s office. These six affidavits were turned over to the Intelligence Division of the IRS which then conducted a supplemental investigation.
On May 7, 1974, Johnson was indicted. In Counts I — IV he was charged with filing false and fraudulent tax returns for the years 1967 through 1970. In Count V he was charged with the § 1001 violation as a result of the submission of the Isakson affidavit.
Counts I and II were withdrawn by the government after the district court severed them from the trial on the other counts. Johnson was acquitted on Counts III and IV, but was found guilty on Count V. This appeal ensued.
Johnson first argues that the false affidavit was not material to the IRS investigation because it was not intrinsically capable of influencing the decision to prosecute. He reasons that since the affidavit contained no statement of the amount of the gift, it could not have affected the net worth calculations made by the Service in the investigation. He further argues that the decision to prosecute was “final for all practical purposes” when the investigating agent submitted his report on August 24, 1973; therefore, the Isakson affidavit was immaterial to the decision to prosecute. This is especially true, Johnson says, because the Service knew that it had been solicited and that, according to the affiant Isakson, its contents were false.
We disagree. The natural and probable tendency of the affidavit to influence the decision to be made must be judged by the content of the document itself and not by any special knowledge possessed or acquired by the Service. Had the Isakson affidavit been true, the discrepancies between income reported and alleged income received might have disappeared, Johnson’s tax liability for 1969 might have been reduced or eliminated, and no prosecution would have occurred. That no amount was specified in the affidavit does not mean that the affidavit was not material; to the contrary, it gave Johnson the greatest leeway to explain the source of his income. Finally, the decision to prosecute was not made final until sometime after the affidavits were submitted to the Regional Counsel’s office on December 3 and a supplemental investigation was conducted.
Johnson next contends that the submission of the affidavit falls within the “exculpatory ‘no’ ” exception to Section 1001. United States v. Bush, 5 Cir. 1974, 503 F.2d 813; Paternostro v. United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 311 F.2d 298. While it is true that Section 1001 does not apply to mere answers, including untruthful ones, to investigators’ questions, this is not such a case. The IRS did not solicit the affidavit; Johnson took the initiative in proffering it through his attorney. Johnson knew of the criminal investigation and had been given Miranda warnings on several occasions. Nonetheless, he affirmatively and voluntarily misrepresented a material fact in order to convince the Service not to prosecute. On these facts, the exception is unavailable.
Finally, Johnson argues that Count V of the indictment was insufficient to state an offense under Section 1001. We find this argument to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
. Section 1001 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined n0^ more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
. Although the second clause of § 1001 does not contain a materiality requirement, we have held that one exists. Rolland v. United States, 5 Cir. 1953, 200 F.2d 678.
. Materiality for § 1001 purposes has been defined to mean “whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.” Weinstock v. United States, 1956, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02.
. The affidavit, of course, was not used at trial to refute the alleged 1969 tax liability. But that does not destroy the materiality of the statement had it been true at a point in time when the IRS was attempting to decide whether to prosecute Johnson.
. If Johnson’s argument that the decision to prosecute was made on August 24, were true, it is curious that his counsel bothered to meet with IRS counsel after that date and why the Isakson affidavit and the five accompanying it were solicited and submitted.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: C