Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2 (1984), we repeated the well-settled proposition that “if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power.” Id., at 16. This presumption of market power, applicable in the antitrust context when a seller conditions its sale of a patented product (the “tying” product) on the purchase of a second product (the “tied” product), has its foundation in the judicially created patent misuse doctrine. See United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U. S. 38, 46 (1962). In 1988, Congress substantially undermined that foundation, amending the Patent Act to eliminate the market power presumption in patent misuse eases. See 102 Stat. 4676, codified at 35 U. S. C. § 271(d). The question presented to us today is whether the presumption of market power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law. We conclude that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a presumption.
I
Petitioners, Trident, Inc., and its parent, Illinois Tool Works Inc., manufacture and market printing systems that include three relevant components: (1) a patented piezoelectric impulse ink jet printhead; (2) a patented ink container, consisting of a bottle and valved cap, which attaches to the printhead; and (3) specially designed, but unpatented, ink. Petitioners sell their systems to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who are licensed to incorporate the print-heads and containers into printers that are in turn sold to companies for use in printing barcodes on cartons and packaging materials. The OEMs agree that they will purchase their ink exclusively from petitioners, and that neither they nor their customers will refill the patented containers with ink of any kind.
Respondent, Independent Ink, Inc., has developed an ink with the same chemical composition as the ink sold by petitioners. After an infringement action brought by Trident against Independent was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, Independent filed suit against Trident seeking a judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of Trident’s patents. In an amended complaint, it alleged that petitioners are engaged in illegal tying and monopolization in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
After discovery, the District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on the Sherman Act claims. Independent Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1177 (CD Cal. 2002). It rejected respondent’s submission that petitioners “necessarily have market power in the market for the tying product as a matter of law solely by virtue of the patent on their printhead system, thereby rendering [the] tying arrangements per se violations of the antitrust laws.” Id., at 1159. Finding that respondent had submitted no affirmative evidence defining the relevant market or establishing petitioners’ power within it, the court concluded that respondent could not prevail on either antitrust claim. Id., at 1167, 1173, 1177. The parties settled their other claims, and respondent appealed.
After a careful review of the “long history of Supreme Court consideration of the legality of tying arrangements,” 396 F. 3d 1342, 1346 (2005), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision as to respondent’s § 1 claim, id., at 1354. Placing special reliance on our decisions in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947), and Loew’s, 371 U. S. 38, as well as our Jefferson Parish dictum, and after taking note of the academic criticism of those cases, it concluded that the “fundamental error” in petitioners’ submission was its disregard of “the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them.” 396 F. 3d, at 1351. We granted certiorari to undertake a fresh examination of the history of both the judicial and legislative appraisals of tying arrangements. 545 U. S. 1127 (2005). Our review is informed by extensive scholarly comment and a change in position by the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws.
II
American courts first encountered tying arrangements in the course of patent infringement litigation. See, e. g., Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (CA6 1896). Such a case came before this Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1 (1912), in which, as in the case we decide today, unpatented ink was the product that was “tied” to the use of a patented product through the use of a licensing agreement. Without commenting on the tying arrangement, the Court held that use of a competitor’s ink in violation of a condition of the agreement — that the rotary mimeograph “ ‘may be used only with the stencil, paper, ink and other supplies made by A. B. Dick Co.’” — constituted infringement of the patent on the machine. Id., at 25-26. Chief Justice White dissented, explaining his disagreement with the Court’s approval of a practice that he regarded as an “attempt to increase the scope of the monopoly granted by a patent... which tend[s] to increase monopoly and to burden the public in the exercise of their common rights.” Id., at 70. Two years later, Congress endorsed Chief Justice White’s disapproval of tying arrangements, enacting § 3 of the Clayton Act. See 38 Stat. 731 (applying to “patented or unpatented” products); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 517-518 (1917) (explaining that, in light of. §3 of the Clayton Act, A. B. Dick “must be regarded as overruled”). And in this Court’s subsequent cases reviewing the legality of tying arrangements we, too, embraced Chief Justice White’s disapproval of those arrangements. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U. S. 293, 305-306 (1949); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U. S. 661, 664-665 (1944).
In the years since A. B. Dick, four different rules of law have supported challenges to tying arrangements. They have been condemned as improper extensions of the patent monopoly under the patent misuse doctrine, as unfair methods of competition under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. §45, as contracts tending to create a monopoly under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 14, and as contracts in restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. In all of those instances, the justification for the challenge rested on either an assumption or a showing that the defendant’s position of power in the market for the tying product was being used to restrain competition in the market for the tied product. As we explained in Jefferson Parish, 466 U. S., at 12, “[ojur cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”
Over the years, however, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished. Rather than relying on assumptions, in its more recent opinions the Court has required a showing of market power in the tying product. Our early opinions consistently assumed that “[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.” Standard Oil Co., 337 U. S., at 305-306. In 1962, in Loew’s, 371 U. S., at 47-48, the Court relied on this assumption despite evidence of significant competition in the market for the tying product. And as recently as 1969, Justice Black, writing for the majority, relied on the assumption as support for the proposition “that, at least when certain prerequisites are met, arrangements of this kind are illegal in and of themselves, and no specific showing of unreasonable competitive effect is required.” Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U. S. 495, 498-499 (Fortner I). Explaining the Court’s decision to allow the suit to proceed to trial, he stated that “decisions rejecting the need for proof of truly dominant power over the tying product have all been based on a recognition that because tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie.” Id., at 503.
Reflecting a changing view of tying arrangements, four Justices dissented in Fortner I, arguing that the challenged “tie” — the extension of a $2 million line of credit on condition that the borrower purchase prefabricated houses from the defendant — might well have served a legitimate purpose. Id., at 510 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 520 (opinion of Fortas, J.). In his opinion, Justice White noted that promotional tie-ins may provide “uniquely advantageous deals” to purchasers. Id., at 519. And Justice Fortas concluded that the arrangement was best characterized as “a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of financing.” Id., at 522.
The dissenters’ view that tying arrangements may well be procompetitive ultimately prevailed; indeed, it did so in the very same lawsuit. After the Court remanded the suit in Fortner I, a bench trial resulted in judgment for the plaintiff, and the case eventually, made its way back to this Court. Upon return, we unanimously held that the plaintiff’s failure of proof on the issue of market power was fatal to its case— the plaintiff had proved “nothing more than a willingness to provide cheap financing in order to sell expensive houses.” United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U. S. 610, 622 (1977) (Fortner II).
The assumption that “[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,” rejected in Fortner II, has not been endorsed in any opinion since. Instead, it was again rejected just seven years later in Jefferson Parish, where, as in Fortner II, we unanimously reversed a Court of Appeals judgment holding that an alleged tying arrangement constituted a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 466 U. S., at 5. Like the product at issue in the Fortner cases, the tying product in Jefferson Parish — hospital services — was unpatented, and our holding again rested on the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to prove sufficient power in the tying product market to restrain competition in the market for the tied product — services of anesthesiologists. 466 U. S., at 28-29.
In rejecting the application of a per se rule that all tying arrangements constitute antitrust violations, we explained:
“[W]e have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special ability — usually called ‘market power’ — to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market....
“Per se condemnation — condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions — is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable. Thus, application of the per se rule focuses on the probability of anticompetitive consequences....
“For example, if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power. United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U. S., at 45-47. Any effort to enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power it confers to restrain competition in the market for a second product will undermine competition on the merits in that second market. Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item on condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product from the patentee is unlawful.” Id., at 13-16 (footnote omitted).
Notably, nothing in our opinion suggested a rebuttable presumption of market power applicable to tying arrangements involving a patent on the tying good. See infra, at 44; cf. 396 F. 3d, at 1352. Instead, it described the rule that a contract to sell a patented product on condition that the purchaser buy unpatented goods exclusively from the patentee is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Justice O’Connor wrote separately in Jefferson Parish, concurring in the judgment on the ground that the case did not involve a true tying arrangement because, in her view, surgical services and anesthesia were not separate products. 466 U. S., at 43. In her opinion, she questioned not only the propriety of treating any tying arrangement as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, id., at 35, but also the validity of the presumption that a patent always gives the patentee significant market power, observing that the presumption was actually a product of our patent misuse cases rather than our antitrust jurisprudence, id., at 37-38, n. 7. It is that presumption, a vestige of the Court’s historical distrust of tying arrangements, that we address squarely today.
Ill
Justice O’Connor was, of course, correct in her assertion that the presumption that a patent confers market power arose outside the antitrust context as part of the patent misuse doctrine. That doctrine had its origins in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917), which found no support in the patent laws for the proposition that a patentee may “prescribe by notice attached to a patented machine the conditions of its.use and the supplies which must be used, in the operation of it, under pain of infringement of the patent,” id., at 509. Although Motion Picture Patents Co. simply narrowed the scope of possible patent infringement claims, it formed the basis for the Court’s subsequent decisions creating a patent misuse defense to infringement claims when a patentee uses its patent “as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article.” Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 490 (1942); see also, e. g., Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U. S. 27, 31 (1931).
Without any analysis of actual market conditions, these patent misuse decisions assumed that, by tying the purchase of unpatented goods to the sale of the patented good, the patentee was “restraining competition,” Morton Salt, 314 U. S., at 490, or “securing] a limited monopoly of an unpatented material,” Mercoid, 320 U. S., at 664; see also Carbice, 283 U. S., at 31-32. In other words, these decisions presumed “[t]he requisite economic power” over the tying product such that the patentee could “extend [its] economic control to unpatented products.” Loew’s, 371 U. S., at 45-46.
The presumption that a patent confers market power migrated from patent law to antitrust law in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947). In that case, we affirmed a District Court decision holding that leases of patented machines requiring the lessees to use the defendant’s unpatented salt products violated § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act as a matter of law. Id., at 396. Although the Court’s opinion does not discuss market power or the patent misuse doctrine, it assumes that “[t]he volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious.” Ibid.
The assumption that tying contracts “ten[d]... to accomplishment of monopoly” can be traced to the Government’s brief in International Salt, which relied heavily on our earlier patent misuse decision in Morton Salt. The Government described Morton Salt as “presenting] a factual situation almost identical with the instant case,” and it asserted that “although the Court in that case did not find it necessary to decide whether the antitrust laws were violated, its language, its reasoning, and its citations indicate that the policy underlying the decision was the same as that of the Sherman Act.” Brief for United States in International Salt Co. v. United States, O. T. 1947, No. 46, p. 19 (United States Brief). Building on its assertion that International Salt was logically indistinguishable from Morton Salt, the Government argued that this Court should place tying arrangements involving patented products in the category of per se violations of the Sherman Act. United States Brief 26-33.
Our opinion in International Salt clearly shows that we accepted the Government’s invitation to import the presumption of market power in a patented product into our antitrust jurisprudence. While we cited Morton Salt only for the narrower proposition that the defendant’s patents did not confer any right to restrain competition in unpatented salt or afford the defendant any immunity from the antitrust laws, International Salt, 332 U. S., at 395-396, given the fact that the defendant was selling its unpatented salt at competitive prices, id., at 396-397, the rule adopted in International Salt necessarily accepted the Government’s submission that the earlier patent misuse cases supported the broader proposition “that this type of restraint is unlawful on its face under the Sherman Act,” United States Brief 12.
Indeed, later in the same Term we cited International Salt for the proposition that the license of “a patented device on condition that unpatented materials be employed in conjunction with the patented device” is an example of a restraint that is “illegal per se.” United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 522-523, and n. 22 (1948). And in subsequent cases we have repeatedly grounded the presumption of market power over a patented device in International Salt. See, e. g., Loew’s, 371 U. S., at 45-46; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 608 (1953); Standard Oil Co., 337 U. S., at 304.
IV
Although the patent misuse doctrine and our antitrust jurisprudence became intertwined in International Salt, subsequent events initiated their untwining. This process has ultimately led to today’s reexamination of the presumption of per se illegality of a tying arrangement involving a patented product, the first case since 1947 in which we have granted review to consider the presumption’s continuing validity.
Three years before we decided International Salt, this Court had expanded the scope of the patent misuse doctrine to include not only supplies or materials used by a patented device, but also tying arrangements involving a combination patent and “unpatented material or [a] device [that] is itself an integral part of the structure embodying the patent.” Mercoid, 320 U. S., at 665; see also Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U. S. 176, 188-198 (1980) (describing in detail Mercoid and the cases leading up to it). In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that it could see “no difference in principle” between cases involving elements essential to the inventive character of the patent and elements peripheral to it; both, in the Court’s view, were attempts to “expan[d] the patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly.” Mercoid, 320 U. S., at 665.
Shortly thereafter, Congress codified the patent laws for the first time. See 66 Stat. 792, codified at 35 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III). At least partly in response to our Mercoid decision, Congress included a provision in its codification that excluded some conduct, such as a tying arrangement involving the sale of a patented product tied to an “essential” or “nonstaple” product that has no use except as part of the patented product or method, from the scope of the patent misuse doctrine. § 271(d); see also Dawson, 448 U. S., at 214. Thus, at the same time that our antitrust jurisprudence continued to rely on the assumption that “tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose,” Fortner I, 394 U. S., at 503, Congress began chipping away at the assumption in the patent misuse context from whence it came.
It is Congress’ most recent narrowing of the patent misuse defense, however, that is directly relevant to this case. Four years after our decision in Jefferson Parish repeated the patent-equals-market-power presumption, 466 U. S., at 16, Congress amended the Patent Code to eliminate that presumption in the patent misuse context, 102 Stat. 4676. The relevant provision reads:
“(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following:... (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.” 35 U. S. C. § 271(d)(5) (emphasis added).
The italicized clause makes it clear that Congress did not intend the mere existence of a patent to constitute the requisite “market power.” Indeed, fairly read, it provides that without proof that Trident had market power in the relevant market, its conduct at issue in this case was neither “misuse” nor an “illegal extension of the patent right.”
While the 1988 amendment does not expressly refer to the antitrust laws, it certainly invites a reappraisal of the per se rule announced in International Salt. A rule denying a patentee the right to enjoin an infringer is significantly less severe than a rule that makes the conduct at issue a federal crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison. See 15 U. S. C. § 1. It would be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not constitute “misuse.” Moreover, given the fact that the patent misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it would be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its foundation. Cf. 10 P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, & E. El

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 标