Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Kokesh v. SEC, 581 U. S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1635, 198 L.Ed.2d 86 (2017), this Court held that a disgorgement order in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action imposes a "penalty" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the applicable statute of limitations. In so deciding, the Court reserved an antecedent question: whether, and to what extent, the SEC may seek "disgorgement" in the first instance through its power to award "equitable relief " under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5), a power that historically excludes punitive sanctions. The Court holds today that a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under § 78u(d)(5). The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for the courts below to ensure the award was so limited.
I
A
Congress authorized the SEC to enforce the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and to punish securities fraud through administrative and civil proceedings. In administrative proceedings, the SEC can seek limited civil penalties and "disgorgement." See § 77h-1(e) ("In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the Commission may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement"); see also § 77h-1(g) ("Authority to impose money penalties"). In civil actions, the SEC can seek civil penalties and "equitable relief." See, e.g., § 78u(d)(5) ("In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws,... any Federal court may grant... any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors"); see also § 78u(d)(3) ("Money penalties in civil actions" (quotation modified)).
Congress did not define what falls under the umbrella of "equitable relief." Thus, courts have had to consider which remedies the SEC may impose as part of its § 78u(d)(5) powers.
Starting with SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (CA2 1971), courts determined that the SEC had authority to obtain what it called "restitution," and what in substance amounted to "profits" that "merely depriv[e]" a defendant of "the gains of... wrongful conduct." Id., at 1307-1308. Over the years, the SEC has continued to request this remedy, later referred to as "disgorgement," and courts have continued to award it. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (CA2 1978) (explaining that, when a court awards "[d]isgorgement of profits in an action brought by the SEC," it is "exercising the chancellor's discretion to prevent unjust enrichment"); see also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (CA5 1978) ; SEC v. Washington Cty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (CA6 1982).
In Kokesh, this Court determined that disgorgement constituted a "penalty" for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations for "an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture." The Court reached this conclusion based on several considerations, namely, that disgorgement is imposed as a consequence of violating public laws, it is assessed in part for punitive purposes, and in many cases, the award is not compensatory. 581 U. S., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1643-1644. But the Court did not address whether a § 2462 penalty can nevertheless qualify as "equitable relief " under § 78u(d)(5), given that equity never "lends its aid to enforce a forfeiture or penalty." Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146, 149, 21 L.Ed. 121 (1873). The Court cautioned, moreover, that its decision should not be interpreted "as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings." Kokesh, 581 U. S., at ----, n. 3, 137 S.Ct., at 1642 n. 3. This question is now squarely before the Court.
B
The SEC action and disgorgement award at issue here arise from a scheme to defraud foreign nationals. Petitioners Charles Liu and his wife, Xin (Lisa) Wang, solicited nearly $27 million from foreign investors under the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program (EB-5 Program). 754 Fed.Appx. 505, 506 (CA9 2018) (case below). The EB-5 Program, administered by the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, permits noncitizens to apply for permanent residence in the United States by investing in approved commercial enterprises that are based on "proposals for promoting economic growth." See USCIS, EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program, https://www.uscis.gov/eb-5. Investments in EB-5 projects are subject to the federal securities laws.
Liu sent a private offering memorandum to prospective investors, pledging that the bulk of any contributions would go toward the construction costs of a cancer-treatment center. The memorandum specified that only amounts collected from a small administrative fee would fund " 'legal, accounting and administration expenses.' " 754 Fed.Appx. at 507. An SEC investigation revealed, however, that Liu spent nearly $20 million of investor money on ostensible marketing expenses and salaries, an amount far more than what the offering memorandum permitted and far in excess of the administrative fees collected.
262 F.Supp.3d 957, 960-964 (CD Cal. 2017). The investigation also revealed that Liu diverted a sizable portion of those funds to personal accounts and to a company under Wang's control. Id., at 961, 964. Only a fraction of the funds were put toward a lease, property improvements, and a proton-therapy machine for cancer treatment. Id., at 964-965.
The SEC brought a civil action against petitioners, alleging that they violated the terms of the offering documents by misappropriating millions of dollars. The District Court found for the SEC, granting an injunction barring petitioners from participating in the EB-5 Program and imposing a civil penalty at the highest tier authorized. Id., at 975, 976. It also ordered disgorgement equal to the full amount petitioners had raised from investors, less the $234,899 that remained in the corporate accounts for the project. Id., at 975-976.
Petitioners objected that the disgorgement award failed to account for their business expenses. The District Court disagreed, concluding that the sum was a "reasonable approximation of the profits causally connected to [their] violation." Ibid. The court ordered petitioners jointly and severally liable for the full amount that the SEC sought. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It acknowledged that Kokesh "expressly refused to reach" the issue whether the District Court had the authority to order disgorgement. 754 Fed.Appx. at 509. The court relied on Circuit precedent to conclude that the "proper amount of disgorgement in a scheme such as this one is the entire amount raised less the money paid back to the investors." Ibid. ; see also SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1113, 1114 (CA9 2006) (reasoning that it would be "unjust to permit the defendants to offset... the expenses of running the very business they created to defraud... investors").
We granted certiorari to determine whether § 78u(d)(5) authorizes the SEC to seek disgorgement beyond a defendant's net profits from wrongdoing. 589 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 451, 205 L.Ed.2d 265 (2019).
II
Our task is a familiar one. In interpreting statutes like § 78u(d)(5) that provide for "equitable relief," this Court analyzes whether a particular remedy falls into "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity." Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) ; see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 439, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011) ; Montanile v. Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan, 577 U. S. 136, 142, 136 S.Ct. 651, 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016). The "basic contours of the term are well known" and can be discerned by consulting works on equity jurisprudence. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002).
These works on equity jurisprudence reveal two principles. First, equity practice long authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains, with scholars and courts using various labels for the remedy. Second, to avoid transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restricted the remedy to an individual wrongdoer's net profits to be awarded for victims.
A
Equity courts have routinely deprived wrongdoers of their net profits from unlawful activity, even though that remedy may have gone by different names. Compare, e.g., 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(5), p. 611 (1993) ("Accounting holds the defendant liable for his profits"), with id., § 4.1(1), at 555 (referring to "restitution" as the relief that "measures the remedy by the defendant's gain and seeks to force disgorgement of that gain"); see also Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51, Comment a, p. 204 (2010) (Restatement (Third)) ("Restitution measured by the defendant's wrongful gain is frequently called 'disgorgement.' Other cases refer to an 'accounting' or an 'accounting for profits' "); 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 101, p. 112 (4th ed. 1918) (describing an accounting as an equitable remedy for the violation of strictly legal primary rights).
No matter the label, this "profit-based measure of unjust enrichment," Restatement (Third) § 51, Comment a, at 204, reflected a foundational principle: "[I]t would be inequitable that [a wrongdoer] should make a profit out of his own wrong," Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 207, 26 L.Ed. 975 (1882). At the same time courts recognized that the wrongdoer should not profit "by his own wrong," they also recognized the countervailing equitable principle that the wrongdoer should not be punished by "pay[ing] more than a fair compensation to the person wronged." Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 145-146, 8 S.Ct. 894, 31 L.Ed. 664 (1888).
Decisions from this Court confirm that a remedy tethered to a wrongdoer's net unlawful profits, whatever the name, has been a mainstay of equity courts. In Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332 (1946), the Court interpreted a section of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 that encompassed a "comprehensiv[e]" grant of "equitable jurisdiction." Id., at 398, 66 S.Ct. 1086. "[O]nce [a District Court's] equity jurisdiction has been invoked" under that provision, the Court concluded, "a decree compelling one to disgorge profits... may properly be entered." Id., at 398-399, 66 S.Ct. 1086.
Subsequent cases confirm the " 'protean character' of the profits-recovery remedy." Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 668, n. 1, 134 S.Ct. 1962, 188 L.Ed.2d 979 (2014). In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987), the Court described "disgorgement of improper profits" as "traditionally considered an equitable remedy." Id., at 424, 107 S.Ct. 1831. While the Court acknowledged that disgorgement was a "limited form of penalty" insofar as it takes money out of the wrongdoer's hands, it nevertheless compared disgorgement to restitution that simply "'restor[es] the status quo,' " thus situating the remedy squarely within the heartland of equity. Ibid. In Great-West, the Court noted that an "accounting for profits" was historically a "form of equitable restitution." 534 U.S. at 214, n. 2, 122 S.Ct. 708. And in Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 135 S.Ct. 1042, 191 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), a " 'basically equitable' " original jurisdiction proceeding, the Court ordered disgorgement of Nebraska's gains from exceeding its allocation under an interstate water compact. Id., at 453, 475, 135 S.Ct. 1042.
Most recently, in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U. S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 954, 197 L.Ed.2d 292 (2017), the Court canvassed pre-1938 patent cases invoking equity jurisdiction. It noted that many cases sought an "accounting," which it described as an equitable remedy requiring disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. Id., at ----, 137 S.Ct, at. 964. This Court's "transsubstantive guidance on broad and fundamental" equitable principles, Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 206 L.Ed.2d 672 (2020), thus reflects the teachings of equity treatises that identify a defendant's net profits as a remedy for wrongdoing.
Contrary to petitioners' argument, equity courts did not limit this remedy to cases involving a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty. Brief for Petitioners 28-29. As petitioners acknowledge, courts authorized profits-based relief in patent-infringement actions where no such trust or special relationship existed. Id., at 29; see also Root, 105 U.S. at 214 ("[I]t is nowhere said that the patentee's right to an account is based upon the idea that there is a fiduciary relation created between him and the wrong-doer by the fact of infringement").
Petitioners attempt to distinguish these patent cases by suggesting that an "accounting" was appropriate only because Congress explicitly conferred that remedy by statute in 1870. Brief for Petitioners 29 (citing the Act of July 8, 1870, § 55, 16 Stat. 206). But patent law had not previously deviated from the general principles outlined above: This Court had developed the rule that a plaintiff may "recover the amount of... profits that the defendants have made by the use of his invention" through "a series of decisions under the patent act of 1836, which simply conferred upon the courts of the United States general equity jurisdiction... in cases arising under the patent laws." Tilghman, 125 U.S. at 144, 8 S.Ct. 894. The 1836 statute, in turn, incorporated the substance of an earlier statute from 1819 which granted courts the ability to "proceed according to the course and principles of courts of equity" to "prevent the violation of patent-rights." Root, 105 U.S. at 193. Thus, as these cases demonstrate, equity courts habitually awarded profits-based remedies in patent cases well before Congress explicitly authorized that form of relief.
B
While equity courts did not limit profits remedies to particular types of cases, they did circumscribe the award in multiple ways to avoid transforming it into a penalty outside their equitable powers. See Marshall, 15 Wall. at 149.
For one, the profits remedy often imposed a constructive trust on wrongful gains for wronged victims. The remedy itself thus converted the wrongdoer, who in many cases was an infringer, "into a trustee, as to those profits, for the owner of the patent which he infringes." Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716, 720, 23 L.Ed. 764 (1876). In "converting the infringer into a trustee for the patentee as regards the profits thus made," the chancellor "estimat[es] the compensation due from the infringer to the patentee." Packet Co. v. Sickles, 19 Wall. 611, 617-618, 22 L.Ed. 203 (1874) ; see also Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 480, 21 S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183 (1901) (describing an accounting as involving a " 'distribution of the trust moneys among all the beneficiaries who are entitled to share therein' " in an action against the governing committee of a stock exchange).
Equity courts also generally awarded profits-based remedies against individuals or partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing, not against multiple wrongdoers under a joint-and-several liability theory. See Ambler v. Whipple, 20 Wall. 546, 559, 22 L.Ed. 403 (1874) (ordering an accounting against a partner who had "knowingly connected himself with and aided in... fraud"). In Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 24 L.Ed. 1000 (1878), for example, a city engaged contractors to install pavement in a manner that infringed a third party's patent. The patent holder brought a suit in equity to recover profits from both the city and its contractors. The Court held that only the contractors (the only parties to make a profit) were responsible, even though the parties answered jointly. Id., at 140 ; see also ibid. (rejecting liability for an individual officer who merely acted as an agent of the defendant and received a salary for his work). The rule against joint-and-several liability for profits that have accrued to another appears throughout equity cases awarding profits. See, e.g., Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 25-26, 16 S.Ct. 443, 40 L.Ed. 599 (1896) ("The defendants, in any such suit, are therefore liable to account for such profits only as have accrued to themselves from the use of the invention, and not for those which have accrued to another, and in which they have no participation"); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 148, 14 S.Ct. 295, 38 L.Ed. 103 (1894) (reversing profits award that was based not on what defendant had made from infringement but on what third persons had made from the use of the invention); Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch 2, 21, 2 L.Ed. 531 (1807) (holding that an order requiring restitution could not apply to "those who were not in possession of the thing to be restored" and "had no power over it") (citing Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 Dall. 54, 1 L.Ed. 507 (1795) (reversing a restitution award in admiralty that ordered joint damages in excess of what each defendant received)).
Finally, courts limited awards to the net profits from wrongdoing, that is, "the gain made upon any business or investment, when both the receipts and payments are taken into the account." Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 804, 19 L.Ed. 566 (1870) ; see also Livingston v. Woodworth, 15 How. 546, 559-560, 14 L.Ed. 809 (1854) (restricting an accounting remedy "to the actual gains and profits... during the time" the infringing machine "was in operation and during no other period" to avoid "convert[ing] a court of equity into an instrument for the punishment of simple torts"); Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 490, 14 L.Ed. 1024 (1854) (rejecting a blanket rule that infringing one component of a machine warranted a remedy measured by the full amounts of the profits earned from the machine); Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 649, 20 L.Ed. 860 (1872) (vacating an accounting that exceeded the profits from infringement alone); Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434-435, 1 S.Ct. 398, 27 L.Ed. 230 (1882) (explaining that an innocent trespasser is entitled to deduct labor costs from the gains obtained by wrongfully harvesting lumber).
The Court has carved out an exception when the "entire profit of a business or undertaking" results from the wrongful activity. Root, 105 U.S. at 203. In such cases, the Court has explained, the defendant "will not be allowed to diminish the show of profits by putting in unconscionable claims for personal services or other inequitable deductions." Ibid. In Goodyear, for example, the Court affirmed an accounting order that refused to deduct expenses under this rule. The Court there found that materials for which expenses were claimed were bought for the purposes of the infringement and "extraordinary salaries" appeared merely to be "dividends of profit under another name." 9 Wall. at 803 ; see also Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 663-664, 9 S.Ct. 177, 32 L.Ed. 547 (1888) (declining to deduct a defendant's personal and living expenses from his profits from copyright violations, but distinguishing the expenses from salaries of officers in a corporation).
Setting aside that circumstance, however, courts consistently restricted awards to net profits from wrongdoing after deducting legitimate expenses. Such remedies, when assessed against only culpable actors and for victims, fall comfortably within "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity." Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256, 113 S.Ct. 2063.
C
By incorporating these longstanding equitable principles into § 78u(d)(5), Congress prohibited the SEC from seeking an equitable remedy in excess of a defendant's net profits from wrongdoing. To be sure, the SEC originally endeavored to conform its disgorgement remedy to the common-law limitations in § 78u(d)(5). Over the years, however, courts have occasionally awarded disgorgement in three main ways that test the bounds of equity practice: by ordering the proceeds of fraud to be deposited in Treasury funds instead of disbursing them to victims, imposing joint-and-several disgorgement liability, and declining to deduct even legitimate expenses from the receipts of fraud. The SEC's disgorgement remedy in such incarnations is in considerable tension with equity practices.
Petitioners go further. They claim that this Court effectively decided in Kokesh that disgorgement is necessarily a penalty, and thus not the kind of relief available at equity. Brief for Petitioners 19-20, 22-26. Not so. Kokesh expressly declined to pass on the question. 581 U. S., at ----, n. 3, 137 S.Ct. at 1642 n.3. To be sure, the Kokesh Court evaluated a version of the SEC's disgorgement remedy that seemed to exceed the bounds of traditional equitable principles. But that decision has no bearing on the SEC's ability to conform future requests for a defendant's profits to the limits outlined in common-law cases awarding a wrongdoer's net gains.
The Government, for its part, contends that the

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
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口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 是