Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the "use... of physical force." § 921(a)(33)(A). The question presented here is whether misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless (as contrasted to knowing or intentional) conduct trigger the statutory firearms ban. We hold that they do.
I
Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) some 20 years ago to "close [a] dangerous loophole" in the gun control laws. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1409, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426, 129 S.Ct. 1079, 172 L.Ed.2d 816 (2009) ). An existing provision already barred convicted felons from possessing firearms. See § 922(g)(1) (1994 ed.). But many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies, notwithstanding the harmfulness of their conduct. See Castleman, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1408-1409. And "[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination." Hayes, 555 U.S., at 427, 129 S.Ct. 1079. Accordingly, Congress added § 922(g)(9) to prohibit any person convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" from possessing any gun or ammunition with a connection to interstate commerce. And it defined that phrase, in § 921(a)(33)(A), to include a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, committed by a person with a specified domestic relationship with the victim, that "has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force."
Two Terms ago, this Court considered the scope of that definition in a case involving a conviction for a knowing or intentional assault. See Castleman, 572 U.S., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1409-1415. In Castleman, we initially held that the word "force" in § 921(a)(33)(A) bears its common-law meaning, and so is broad enough to include offensive touching. See id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1409-1410. We then determined that "the knowing or intentional application of [such] force is a 'use' of force." Id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1415. But we expressly left open whether a reckless assault also qualifies as a "use" of force-so that a misdemeanor conviction for such conduct would trigger § 922(g)(9)'s firearms ban. See id., at ----, n. 8, 134 S.Ct., at 1413-1414, n. 8. The two cases before us now raise that issue.
Petitioner Stephen Voisine pleaded guilty in 2004 to assaulting his girlfriend in violation of § 207 of the Maine Criminal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A). Several years later, Voisine again found himself in legal trouble, this time for killing a bald eagle. See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a). While investigating that crime, law enforcement officers learned that Voisine owned a rifle. When a background check turned up his prior misdemeanor conviction, the Government charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
Petitioner William Armstrong pleaded guilty in 2008 to assaulting his wife in violation of a Maine domestic violence law making it a misdemeanor to commit an assault prohibited by § 207 (the general statute under which Voisine was convicted) against a family or household member. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 207-A(1)(A). A few years later, law enforcement officers searched Armstrong's home as part of a narcotics investigation. They discovered six guns, plus a large quantity of ammunition. Like Voisine, Armstrong was charged under § 922(g)(9) for unlawfully possessing firearms.
Both men argued that they were not subject to § 922(g)(9)'s prohibition because their prior convictions (as the Government conceded) could have been based on reckless, rather than knowing or intentional, conduct. The District Court rejected those claims. Each petitioner then entered a guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal the District Court's ruling.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the two convictions, holding that "an offense with a mens rea of recklessness may qualify as a'misdemeanor crime of violence' under § 922(g)(9)." United States v. Armstrong, 706 F.3d 1, 4 (2013) ; see United States v. Voisine, 495 Fed.Appx. 101, 102 (2013) (per curiam ). Voisine and Armstrong filed a joint petition for certiorari, and shortly after issuing Castleman, this Court (without opinion) vacated the First Circuit's judgments and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of that decision. See Armstrong v. United States, 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1759, 188 L.Ed.2d 590 (2014). On remand, the Court of Appeals again upheld the convictions, on the same ground. See 778 F.3d 176, 177 (2015).
We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 386, 193 L.Ed.2d 309 (2015), to resolve a Circuit split over whether a misdemeanor conviction for recklessly assaulting a domestic relation disqualifies an individual from possessing a gun under § 922(g)(9). We now affirm.
II
The issue before us is whether § 922(g)(9) applies to reckless assaults, as it does to knowing or intentional ones. To commit an assault recklessly is to take that action with a certain state of mind (or mens rea )-in the dominant formulation, to "consciously disregard[ ]" a substantial risk that the conduct will cause harm to another. ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 35(3) (Supp. 2015) (adopting that definition); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (noting that a person acts recklessly only when he disregards a substantial risk of harm "of which he is aware"). For purposes of comparison, to commit an assault knowingly or intentionally (the latter, to add yet another adverb, sometimes called "purposefully") is to act with another state of mind respecting that act's consequences-in the first case, to be "aware that [harm] is practically certain" and, in the second, to have that result as a "conscious object." Model Penal Code §§ 2.02(2)(a)-(b) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, §§ 35(1)-(2).
Statutory text and background alike lead us to conclude that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under § 922(g)(9). Congress defined that phrase to include crimes that necessarily involve the "use... of physical force." § 921(a)(33)(A). Reckless assaults, no less than the knowing or intentional ones we addressed in Castleman, satisfy that definition. Further, Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) in order to prohibit domestic abusers convicted under run-of-the-mill misdemeanor assault and battery laws from possessing guns. Because fully two-thirds of such state laws extend to recklessness, construing § 922(g)(9) to exclude crimes committed with that state of mind would substantially undermine the provision's design.
A
Nothing in the word "use"-which is the only statutory language either party thinks relevant-indicates that § 922(g)(9) applies exclusively to knowing or intentional domestic assaults. Recall that under § 921(a)(33)(A), an offense counts as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" only if it has, as an element, the "use" of force. Dictionaries consistently define the noun "use" to mean the "act of employing" something. Webster's New International Dictionary 2806 (2d ed. 1954) ("[a]ct of employing anything"); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 2097 (2d ed. 1987) ("act of employing, using, or putting into service"); Black's Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) ("[a]ct of employing," "application"). On that common understanding, the force involved in a qualifying assault must be volitional; an involuntary motion, even a powerful one, is not naturally described as an active employment of force. See Castleman, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1415 ("[T]he word 'use' conveys the idea that the thing used (here, 'physical force') has been made the user's instrument" (some internal quotation marks omitted)). But the word "use" does not demand that the person applying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that it is substantially likely to do so. Or, otherwise said, that word is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.
Consider a couple of examples to see the ordinary meaning of the word "use" in this context. If a person with soapy hands loses his grip on a plate, which then shatters and cuts his wife, the person has not "use[d]" physical force in common parlance. But now suppose a person throws a plate in anger against the wall near where his wife is standing. That hurl counts as a "use" of force even if the husband did not know for certain (or have as an object), but only recognized a substantial risk, that a shard from the plate would ricochet and injure his wife. Similarly, to spin out a scenario discussed at oral argument, if a person lets slip a door that he is trying to hold open for his girlfriend, he has not actively employed ("used") force even though the result is to hurt her. But if he slams the door shut with his girlfriend following close behind, then he has done so-regardless of whether he thinks it absolutely sure or only quite likely that he will catch her fingers in the jamb. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10-11 (counsel for petitioners acknowledging that this example involves "the use of physical force"). Once again, the word "use" does not exclude from § 922(g)(9)'s compass an act of force carried out in conscious disregard of its substantial risk of causing harm.
And contrary to petitioners' view, nothing in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), suggests a different conclusion-i.e., that "use" marks a dividing line between reckless and knowing conduct. See Brief for Petitioners 18-22. In that decision, this Court addressed a statutory definition similar to § 921(a)(33)(A) : there, "the use... of physical force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 16. That provision excludes "merely accidental" conduct, Leocal held, because "it is [not] natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident." 543 U.S., at 9, 125 S.Ct. 377. For example, the Court stated, one "would not ordinarily say a person 'use[s]... physical force against' another by stumbling and falling into him." Ibid. That reasoning fully accords with our analysis here. Conduct like stumbling (or in our hypothetical, dropping a plate) is a true accident, and so too the injury arising from it; hence the difficulty of describing that conduct as the "active employment" of force. Ibid. But the same is not true of reckless behavior-acts undertaken with awareness of their substantial risk of causing injury (in our contrasting hypo, hurling the plate). The harm such conduct causes is the result of a deliberate decision to endanger another-no more an "accident" than if the "substantial risk" were "practically certain." See supra, at 2278 (comparing reckless and knowing acts). And indeed, Leocal itself recognized the distinction between accidents and recklessness, specifically reserving the issue whether the definition in § 16 embraces reckless conduct, see 543 U.S., at 13, 125 S.Ct. 377 -as we now hold § 921(a)(33)(A) does.
In sum, Congress's definition of a "misdemeanor crime of violence" contains no exclusion for convictions based on reckless behavior. A person who assaults another recklessly "use[s]" force, no less than one who carries out that same action knowingly or intentionally. The relevant text thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others with similar criminal records, from possessing firearms.
B
So too does the relevant history. As explained earlier, Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) in 1996 to bar those domestic abusers convicted of garden-variety assault or battery misdemeanors-just like those convicted of felonies-from owning guns. See supra, at 2276 - 2277; Castleman, 572 U.S., at ----, ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1408-1409, 1411 ; Hayes, 555 U.S., at 426-427, 129 S.Ct. 1079. Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdictions-34 States plus the District of Columbia-defined such misdemeanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of bodily harm. See Brief for United States 7a-19a (collecting statutes). That agreement was no coincidence. Several decades earlier, the Model Penal Code had taken the position that a mens rea of recklessness should generally suffice to establish criminal liability, including for assault. See § 2.02(3), Comments 4-5, at 243-244 ("purpose, knowledge, and recklessness are properly the basis for" such liability); § 211.1 (defining assault to include "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury"). States quickly incorporated that view into their misdemeanor assault and battery statutes. So in linking § 922(g)(9) to those laws, Congress must have known it was sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 256, 9 L.Ed. 113 (1835) (Story, J.) ("Congress must be presumed to have legislated under this known state of the laws"). And indeed, that was part of the point: to apply firearms restrictions to those abusers, along with all others, whom the States' ordinary misdemeanor assault laws covered.
What is more, petitioners' reading risks rendering § 922(g)(9) broadly inoperative in the 35 jurisdictions with assault laws extending to recklessness-that is, inapplicable even to persons who commit that crime knowingly or intentionally. Consider Maine's statute, which (in typical fashion) makes it a misdemeanor to "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" injure another. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A). Assuming that provision defines a single crime (which happens to list alternative mental states)-and accepting petitioners' view that § 921(a)(33)(A) requires at least a knowing mens rea -then, under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), no conviction obtained under Maine's statute could qualify as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2283 (If a state crime "sweeps more broadly" than the federally defined one, a conviction for the state offense "cannot count" as a predicate, no matter what mens rea the defendant actually had). So in the 35 jurisdictions like Maine, petitioners' reading risks allowing domestic abusers of all mental states to evade § 922(g)(9)'s firearms ban. In Castleman, we declined to construe § 921(a)(33)(A) so as to render § 922(g)(9) ineffective in 10 States. See 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1412-1413. All the more so here, where petitioners' view would jeopardize § 922(g)(9)'s force in several times that many.
Petitioners respond that we should ignore the assault and battery laws actually on the books when Congress enacted § 922(g)(9). In construing the statute, they urge, we should look instead to how the common law defined those crimes in an earlier age. See Brief for Petitioners 13-15. And that approach, petitioners claim, would necessitate reversing their convictions because the common law "required a mens rea greater than recklessness." Id., at 17.
But we see no reason to wind the clock back so far. Once again: Congress passed § 922(g)(9) to take guns out of the hands of abusers convicted under the misdemeanor assault laws then in general use in the States. See supra, at 2276 - 2277, 2280. And by that time, a substantial majority of jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code's lead, had abandoned the common law's approach to mens rea in drafting and interpreting their assault and battery statutes. Indeed, most had gone down that road decades before. That was the backdrop against which Congress was legislating. Nothing suggests that, in enacting § 922(g)(9), Congress wished to look beyond that real world to a common-law precursor that had largely expired. To the contrary, such an approach would have undermined Congress's aim by tying the ban on firearms possession not to the laws under which abusers are prosecuted but instead to a legal anachronism.
And anyway, we would not know how to resolve whether recklessness sufficed for a battery conviction at common law. Recklessness was not a word in the common law's standard lexicon, nor an idea in its conceptual framework; only in the mid- to late-1800's did courts begin to address reckless behavior in those terms. See Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 J. Crim. L. & C. 133, 138-139 (1940). The common law traditionally used a variety of overlapping and, frankly, confusing phrases to describe culpable mental states-among them, specific intent, general intent, presumed intent, willfulness, and malice. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) ; Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comment 1, at 230. Whether and where conduct that we would today describe as reckless fits into that obscure scheme is anyone's guess: Neither petitioners' citations, nor the Government's competing ones, have succeeded in resolving that counterfactual question. And that indeterminacy confirms our conclusion that Congress had no thought of incorporating the common law's treatment of mens rea into § 921(a)(33)(A). That provision instead corresponds to the ordinary misdemeanor assault and battery laws used to prosecute domestic abuse, regardless of how their mental state requirements might-or, then again, might not-conform to the common law's.
III
The federal ban on firearms possession applies to any person with a prior misdemeanor conviction for the "use... of physical force" against a domestic relation. § 921(a)(33)(A). That language, naturally read, encompasses acts of force undertaken recklessly-i.e., with conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm. And the state-law backdrop to that provision, which included misdemeanor assault statutes covering reckless conduct in a significant majority of jurisdictions, indicates that Congress meant just what it said. Each petitioner's possession of a gun, following a conviction under Maine law for abusing a domestic partner, therefore violates § 922(g)(9). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting.
Federal law makes it a crime for anyone previously convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to possess a firearm "in or affecting commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" includes "an offense that... has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force... committed by [certain close family members] of the victim." § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). In this case, petitioners were convicted under § 922(g)(9) because they possessed firearms and had prior convictions for assault under Maine's statute prohibiting "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A) (2006). The question presented is whether a prior conviction under § 207 has, as an element, the "use of physical force," such that the conviction can strip someone of his right to possess a firearm. In my view, § 207 does not qualify as such an offense, and the majority errs in holding otherwise. I respectfully dissent.
I
To qualify as a "'misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,' " the Maine assault statute must have as an element the "use of physical force." § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Because mere recklessness is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 207, a conviction does not necessarily involve the "use" of physical force, and thus, does not trigger § 922(g)(9)'s prohibition on firearm possession.
A
Three features of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) establish that the "use of physical force" requires intentional conduct. First, the word "use" in that provision is best read to require intentional conduct. As the majority recognizes, the noun "use" means "the 'act of employing' something." Ante, at 2278 (quoting dictionaries). A "use" is "[t]he act of employing a thing for any... purpose." 19 Oxford English Dictionary 350 (2d ed. 1989). To "use" something, in other words, is to employ the thing for its instrumental value, i.e

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 市