Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary question is whether the coverage of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act includes injuries in the nature of occupational disease, here silicosis, or is confined exclusively to injuries inflicted by accident. After having béen twice before the, Supreme Court of Missouri, the case is here'on certiorari, 335 U. S. 809, for, review of its final decision on the second appeal that recovery may not be had for other than accidental injuries; A statement/of the course taken by the proceedings in the state courts, hs well as of the facts, becomes necessary for resolving the issues presented.
In 1941 petitioner Tom Urie filed suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act against respondent Thompson, trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. According to petitioner’s allegations', h§ had been eimplQyed as a fireman on steam locomotives of the’ interstate Missouri Pacific for roughly thirty years. In lt)40 he had been forced, to cease work by a pulmonary disease diagnosed as silicosis.. This permanently disabling affliction had been caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust blown or sucked into the cabs of the locomotives on which he had worked. The injurious concentration of silica dust in the air breathed by petitioner arose from the railroad’s use in its locomotives’ sanding boxes of sand materials containing 80 to 90 per cent of silica or silicon dioxide and the emission by the locomotives’ faultily adjusted “sanders” of such sand materials in excessive amounts beyond those needed to provide traction for locomotive wheels. Respondent Thompson, trustee of the railroad since 1933, “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” of the danger of silicosis arising from the conditions of petitioner’s employment.
The trial court sustained respondent’s demurrer to the complaint. On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court held that the action could not be maintained by virtue of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act alone, for the reason that respondent could not have “anticipated plaintiff’s injury-, and... therefore... the petition does not stat'e facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act.” 352 Mo.- 211, 219. The court felt, however, that the claimed malfunctioning of the locomotives’ sanders was in substance an allegation of breach of § 2 of the Boiler Inspection Act and that, since proof of breach of the latter Act would support a recovery under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act without regard to respondent’s negligence, Lilly v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 317 U. S. 481, 485-486, petitioner had stated a cause of action. Furthermore, the court held that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act’s three-year statute of limitations, 45 U. S. C. § 56, did not bar petitioner’s claim since his “cause of action accrued in May,.1940, when he became incapacitated....” 352 Mo. at 222. Accordingly the court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for trial.
On remand petitioner amended his complaint to charge specifically violations of the Boiler Inspection Act. Section 2 of that Act, as amended, makes it “unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be used on its line any locomotive unless said locomotive, its boiler, tender, and all parts and appurtenances thereof are in proper condition and safe to.operate in the service to which the same are put, that the same may be employed in the active •service of such carrier without unnecessary peril to life or limb....” 45 U. S. C. § 23. The violations alleged were (1) that the sanders were broken or faultily adjusted so as to release too much sand and (2) that the locomotive decks and cabs were in a bad state of repair, admitting dust through various cracks and openings in the cab’s iloor and elsewhere which ought to have been sealed off.
.The' case was tried to a jury, under instructions that negligence was not in iss.ue and that petitioner should prevail if he proved that he had contracted silicosis by reason of respondent’s breach of an “absolute and continuing duty to have such locomotive engines and all their parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition and safe, to operate... without unnecessary peril to the life of Tom Urie....” The jury found for petitioner in the amount of $30,000.
Upon respondent’s appeal the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment entered.on this verdict. 357 Mo. 738. Noting that on the former review it did not “treat with a contention that'silicosis’ is not an evil at.which the Act is aimed,” id. at 746, the court concluded that the Boiler Inspection Act “is aimed at promoting safety from accidental injury, as distinguished from injury due to.the gradual inhalation of harmful.dusts.” Id. at 749r It was to review the state supreme court’s successive constructions of the Federal Employers’ Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts that our writ was issued.
I.
Two preliminary contentions first engage our attention. We are met at the outset by the question whether, without regard to the legal sufficiency of petitioner’s claim under either Act, that claim is barred, as to both Acts by operation of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act’s statute of limitations.
, Urie filed suit qxi November 25, 1941. • Under the terms of the then prevailing thrq -year statute' of' limitations, the court could not entertain the. claim if Urie’s “jsause of action accrued” before November 25, 1938. Respondent contends that Urie, having been exposed to silica dust since approximately 1910, must unwittingly have contracted silicosis long before 1938, and hence that his “cause of action” must be deemed to have “accrued” longer than' three years before the institution of this action. Alier-C natively it may be argued that each inhalation of silica/ dust was a separate tort giving rise to a fresh “cause of action,” and that Urie is therefore limited to a claim forj inhalations between November 25, 1938, and the spring day in 1940 when he became incapacitated.
In our view, however, neither of the outlined constructions of the statute of limitations can be sustained. For, if we assume that Congress intended to include occupational diseases in thé category of injuries compensable under the Federal Employers’ Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts, süch mechanical analysis of 'the “accrual” of petitioner’s injury — whether- breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the disease — can only serve to thwart the' congressional purpose.
If Urie were held barréd from prosecuting this action because he must be said, as a matter of law, to have contracted silicosis prior to November 25, 1938, it would be clear that the federal legislation -afforded Urie only a delusive remedy. It would mean that at some past moment, in time, unknown and inherently unknowablé even in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of his lungs; under this view Urie’s failure to; diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery-and disability.
Nor can we accept the theory that each intake of dusty breath is a" fresh “cause of action.” In the present case, for example, application of such a rule would, arguably, limit petitioner’s damages to that aggravation of his progressive injury traceable to the last eighteen months of his employment. Moreóver petitioner would have been wholly barred from suit had he left the railroad, or merely been transferred to work involving no exposure to silica dust, more than three years before discovering the disease with which he was afflicted.
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. Nor do we think those consequences can be reconciled with the traditional purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights. The record before us is clear that Urie became too ill to work in May of 1940 and that diagnosis of his condition was accomplished in the following weeks. There is no suggestion that. Urie should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date. “It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequéhtly the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves....” Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381. The quoted language, used in a state workmen’s compensation case, seems to us applicable in every relevant particular to the construction of the federal statute of limitations with which we are here, concerned. Accordingly we agree with the view expressed by the Missouri Supreme Court on the first appeal of this case, that Urie’s claim, if otherwise maintainable, is not barred by the statute of limitations.
We may readily dispose of another preliminary question concerning the issues which are now properly before us. Respondent argues, somewhat surprisingly, that the sufficiency of petitioner’s original claim for negligence involved in the first appeal is not properly here, since it. was neither raised nor considered on the second appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court. The short answer is that petitioner has brought the claim to this Court at' his first opportunity; and it was not necessary for him to relitigate that claim a second, time through the state courts in order to preserve it for our consideration on review of the final judgment rendered in the cause.
From the opinions of the state supreme court we know judicially that its judgment negating the general claim for negligence was coupled with its subsequently repudiated conclusion that petitioner had stated a cause of action under the Boiler Inspection Act and that, consequently, the court remanded the cause for trial, not for dismissal. The judgment therefore was not final; it was interlocutory and not reviewable here within the meaning of our jurisdictional statute. 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b) [now § 1257 (3)].
Although the Missouri Supreme Court’s disposition of the first appeal precluded review here at that time of the ruling adverse- to petitioner, Urie did not waive that question by amending his complaint, in conformity with the court’s mandate, to state his claim more specifically in terms of the Boiler Inspection Act or by proceeding with trial on that theory. As the case then stood, this was his only remaining chance for success unless he was to waive it; ask fof final judgment to be entered against him bn the general negligence issue, and.rely solely upon securing review of that judgment and reversal by this Court:
Whatever the effect of the state supreme court’s ruling for further proceedings in the state courts, it could not impose such an alternative upon petitioner. Local rules of practice cannot bar this Court’s-independent consideration of- all- substantial federal questions actually determined in earlier stages of the litigation by the court whose final adjudication is brought here for. review. Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 225 U. S. 445, 454; Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444. Even so, We think sound practice would see to it that such questions were expressly. preserved in the later stages of review. But, as this -Court has had occasion heretofore to observe; its power to probe issues disposed of on appeals prior to the one under review is", in the last analysis, a “necessary correlative” of the rule which limits it to the examination of final judgments. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99, 102.
Accordingly, even if it should be held that petitioner has stated no claim under the Boilér Inspection Act, the judgment now in review cannot starid unless the Missouri ■Supreme 'Court rightly concluded, on the first appeal, that petitioner’s original complaint stated no cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Lia-, bility Act, considered apart from any effect of the Boiler Inspection Act. That question is properly presented and-to'it we now turn.
II.
Section 1 of the. Federal Employers’ Liability Act provides:'
“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging5 in commerce... shall be liable in damages to any' person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce...' for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from, the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any'defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.” 45 U. S. C. § 51. (Emphasis added.)
The section does not define negligence, leaving that question to be determined, as the Missouri Supreme Court said, “by the common law principles as established and applied in the federal courts.” 352 Mo. at 218. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, has no. application. What constitutes negligence for the statute’s purposes is á federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws fór other purposes. Federal decisional- law formuláting and applying the concept governs. Hence the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on the first appeal, that the complaint did not state a cause of action for negligence, is subject to our independent review and ^s not to be taken as governed conclusively by the state court decisions which alone were cited in support of the determination.
. Of course if silicosis caused by the employment is not an “injury” within the statute’s intended coverage, no cause of action could be stated for that injury under the statute, even though the allegations of fault and causation were wholly sufficient. The Missouri Supreme Court’s firs/ decision, however, assumed that silicosis fell within the statute’s broad term “injury,” and held that it would not “be reasonable to hold, under the facts- admitted by the demurrer, that defendant should have anticipated plaintiff’s injury....” 352 Mo. at 219. Accordingly, the court ruled that no cause of action for negligence under the Act had been stated.
Upon the assumption that silicosis when caused by the employment’is a compensable employee “injury,” the adequacy of petitioner’s claim turns solely on whether his original complaint alleged facts raising a triable issue of negligence. We think that under the standards heretofore set and followed by this Court the facts alleged in the complaint and taken as admitted by the demurrer clearly stated a cause of action for negligence.
Those facts have been briefly, though only partially, summarized above. They charged that respondent used in the locomotives’ sanders a sand material containing a very high percentage of silica or silicon dioxide; that often the material would come to the rails from the sanders in excessive and unnecessary quantities and would there be ground to dust; that the dust containing “such usual and unusual quantity of silican [sic] dioxide would come” into the engine cabs and, “frequently of.unusual quantity,” would be breathed by petitioner; and that, respondent “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” that the sand contained the high percentage of silicon dioxide; that “the dust would form and frequently of excessive quantity because of said sanders,” come into the cab and be breathed by petitioner; and that, over a period of time the breathing was “dangerous to the health and-life and would likely cause to the plaintiff the condition resulting to the plaintiff.” The complaint then stated the further allegations set forth in the margin, together with the following paragraph:
“Plaintiff further alleges that the sanding devices on said engines were all of the usual and customary type and used for the usual and customary purpose’ and if ordinary, care was exercised in keeping them adjusted such large quantities of such sandy silica material would not escape; that plaintiff does not know whether the same kind of sand containing such high quality of silica was used by other-railroads operating over or through such parts of the country of Missouri-; that such sanding devices operated in the same manner by the same means as devices on locomotives of other railroads, and if kept in normal and regular working condition, would not allow such large quantities of silica dust to form as above stated.”
• These and other allegations sufficiently charged.respondent with knowingly having used, in excessive quantitle's due in pait to faulty adjustment of the sanders and' respondent’s failure to use due'¿are in adjusting them, a dangerous sand material likely to cause silicosis ánd. in fact causing petitioner to contract it and become permanently disabled. This would seem to be clearly adequate for stating a cause of action for negligence resulting in injury within the nieaning of the statute and the applicable judicial standards to which we have referred. All the usual elements are comprehended, including want of due or ordinary care, proximate, causation of the injury, and injury within our assumption fqr present purposes of statutory coverage.'•,.
To. sustain the contrary view, however, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have ruled- as a matter of law that respondent had adhered to the customary standards of the tra,de, stressing the admission-in petitioner’s coin-plaint that the sanding devices alleged to have been faultily adjusted were of the kind ordinarily used throughout the railroad industry. Contrary to the court’s apparent conclusion, this obviously was not ap admission that respondent had complied with the usual standards of the trade. There was neither admission by petitioner nor evidence of anything more, than that respondent’s sanders were “all of the usual and customary type” which, if kept properly adjusted by ordinary care, would not have allowed such large and excessive quantities of silica dust to escape, concentrate in the cab, )and- be breathed by petitioner. There was no admission that other railroads generally or in the region customarily used suo'h high silica content materials for sanding purposes or that, if they did, they did not take steps to minimize potentially harmful effects. Moreover, assuming the premise that maintenance of trade standards negatives negligence, we cannot grasp its significance in this context, absent any indication that faultily adjusted sanding devices are the rule rather than the exception on American steam locomotives.
But wé-also reject’the premise, for-we think that negligence, within - the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, attached if respondent “knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,” that prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to protect. petitioner and similarly situated employees. Cf. Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U. S. 911, reversing 229 N. C. 236. See also Sadowski v. Long Island R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448, 456-457. Respondent’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the alleged inadequacies of the sanding equipment was a jury question. Whether petitioner was then or now would be able to shoulder the burden of proving respondent’s knowledge we need not surmise, though the evidence adduced by petitioner at trial under the Boiler Inspection Act — indicating that others besides petitioner had observed and reported defects in respondent’s locomotive equipment — underscores our insistence that issues of fact are matters for the jury.
Accordingly we think the state court’s ruling that the facts stated in the original complaint were insufficient to constitute a charge of negligence on respondent’s.part, within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act considered apart from the. effect of the Boiler Inspection Act, was wrong and must be overruled. What was said by the New York Court of Appeals in Sadowski v. Long Island R. Co., supra at 455-456, in sustaining a recovery for silicosis under the,Act, fits very closely the facts of this case and represents, in our opinion, the correct view:
“Ordinary care must be in proportion to the

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 来