Task: songer_appfiduc

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is a taxpayer’s petition to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States. (44 T.C. 117.) The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7442. Our jurisdiction rests on 26 U.S.C. § 7482.
Petitioner is a dissolved corporation which formerly operated an orange grove. For its fiscal years 1958 and 1959 it had taxable income and paid the proper amounts of tax thereon.
During its fiscal year 1960 the petitioner adopted a plan of dissolution and sold its orange grove at a substantial gain. Under the provisions of section 337 the gain was properly not recognized as income to the petitioner. Prior to the sale of the grove, however, the petitioner expended certain sums of money to grow oranges in the grove, the unharvested crop being sold with the land.
In its income tax return for the fiscal year 1960, the petitioner deducted the amounts expended on the crop as ordinary and necessary business expenses. This gave rise to an operating loss which the petitioner carried back to 1959 and 1958, obtaining refunds of part of the taxes paid for those years.
Thereafter the Commissioner disallowed the deductions for 1960 and notified the petitioner of the deficiencies for 1959 and 1958 due to the refunds caused by the erroneous carryback claim. The petitioner sought redetermination by the Tax Court. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, and the petitioner has sought review here.
The sole basis for the Commissioner’s claim of deficiencies is in the deductibility of the expenses in developing the unharvested crop prior to the sale of the grove. The parties have stipulated that these expenses were the normal expenses of its business. The Commissioner’s reason for disallowing the deduction was section 268.
Section 268 provides:
“Where an unharvested crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 1231 as ‘property used in the trade or business’, in computing taxable income no deduction (whether or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.”
Petitioner contends that section 268 is not applicable because its unharvested crop was not “property used in the trade or business” under section 1231. The Commissioner contends that it was such property.
In general, section 1231 provides for capital gain-ordinary loss treatment on sales or exchanges of property used in a trade or business. We note particularly subsection (b), paragraph (4) of section 1231:
“(b) Definition of property used in the trade or business. — For purposes of this section' — ■
***** *
(4) Unharvested crop. — In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted) at the same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as ‘property used in the trade or business.’ ”
Since the petitioner’s crop and land were sold at the same time and to the same person, the petitioner would come within this provision. This being so, it would appear that the Commissioner’s application of section 268 was correct.
To prevent this conclusion, the petitioner has woven a web of worcjs, not reason. The petitioner tells us that no gain was recognized on the sale of the grove under section 337. It was so stipulated. Our attention is then directed to the functional paragraphs of section 1231 were only recognized gains are dealt with. The petitioner argues that the plain meaning of the provisions is that section 268 does not apply where, as here, no gain is recognized on the sale. We do not agree.
Subsection (a) of section 1231 deals with gains and losses; subsection (b) provides definitions of “property used in the trade or business”. Specifically among the definitions of subsection (b) is that of an unharvested crop as set out above. Section 268 directs us to section 1231 to find out which unharvested crops are “property used in the trade or business”. No reference to the gain or loss provisions of section 1231 is indicated. Put more simply, the reference of section 268 to section 1231 is to subsection (b) rather than to the entire section.
The legislative history of section 323 of the Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452, which enacted the predecessors of sections 268 and 1231(b) (4), removes any doubt as to the interpretation of the reference in section 268.
“Your committee believes that sales of land together with growing crops or fruit are not such transactions as occur in the ordinary course of business and should thus result in capital gains rather than in ordinary income. Section 323 of the bill so provides.
“* * * Therefore, your committee’s bill provides that no deduction shall be allowed which is attributable to the production of such crops or fruit, but that the deductions so disallowed shall be included in the basis of the property for the purpose of computing the capital gain.” S.Rep. No. 781, Part 2, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 42-43, 1951-2 Cum.BulI. 545, 574, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1951, p. 2018.
Petitioner’s reliance on our decision in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), is unwarranted. That case dealt with whether the fair market value of the unharvested crops was income to the corporation before transfer of the land and crops to a successor. No such argument has been raised here. In South Lake Farms the land and crops were transferred to a parent corporation during liquidation. Section 268 could not have been involved in South Lake Farms since section 268 applies only where the unharvested crop is sold. In the South Lake Farms case, majority opinion, §§ 268 and 1231(b) (4) are mentioned only to differentiate “the proceeds of the disposition of lands having growing crops upon them in another context, namely, a sale * * *. [Tjhere was no sale of the unharvested crop in this case.” Idem., p. 840. And see Watson v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 544, 73 S.Ct. 848, 97 L.Ed. 1232 (1953).
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.
. All references to sections are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise indi' cated.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0