Task: songer_r_fiduc

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MOORE, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner, Vito Genovese, appeals from an order, denying his application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or, in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to vacate or modify his judgment of conviction and sentence thereunder. We affirm Judge Weinfeld’s denial of the relief sought.
Previous Proceedings
Indicted in July 1958, appellant and 16 other defendants were tried jointly for conspiring to violate sections 173 and 174 of Title 21 of the United States Code. In April 1959 appellant and 15 co-defendants by jury verdict were convicted. On direct appeal to this court, the judgment was affirmed. United States v. Aviles, 2 Cir., 274 F.2d 179; cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974, 80 S.Ct. 1057, 4 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1960). A motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence was denied, 197 F.Supp. 536 (D.C.1961); a second phase of the case involving the alleged failure of the Government to produce certain notes was decided adversely to appellant. 200 F.Supp. 711 (D.C. 1961), affirmed by this court, 315 F.2d 186, but vacated and remanded sub nom. Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32, 84 S.Ct. 24, 11 L.Ed.2d 106 (1963), again affirmed by this court, 337 F.2d 552 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906, 85 S.Ct. 885, 13 L.Ed.2d 794 (1965).
On September 14, 1965, appellant moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 or, in the alternative, under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., for an order vacating the judgment and sentence on the ground that there was no evidence against him of an essential element of the offense of conspiracy, namely, the element of knowledge of illegal importation of narcotics, and also on the ground that the court’s instructions never presented the issue of such knowledge before the jury. In the alternative, the appellant seeks to correct the sentence and modify the judgment to one for a lesser conspiracy offense supportable by the record.
The district court denied the petition to vacate or modify the judgment and sentence on the ground that there was more than ample evidence of constructive possession to permit a finding of knowledge of illegal importation of narcotics. It also concluded that the attack upon the instructions was without merit, apart from the fact that the objection was not available under Section 2255, distinguishing United States v. Massiah, 2 Cir. 1962, 307 F.2d 62 (reversed on other grounds, 1964, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246), cited by the appellant.
The Present Issue
Preliminarily, the issue raised here is whether the deficiencies in proof or errors of law charged by appellant are properly before this court under Section 2255. As a general principle, they cannot be considered collaterally upon a § 2255 application (Sunal v. Large, 1947, 332 U.S. 174, 178-179, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982; United States v. Sobell, 2 Cir. 1963, 314 F.2d 314, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 857, 83 S.Ct. 1906, 10 L.Ed.2d 1077) except to the extent that they may assume constitutional dimensions under the principles of Thompson v. City of Louisville, 1960, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, and Garner v. State of Louisiana, 1961, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207, which appellant claims are applicable here. In this connection, it is particularly significant to note that appellant has heretofore obtained on his direct appeal to this court an unsuccessful review of his claim of insufficiency of evidence to support his conviction. See, United States v. Aviles, 2 Cir. 1960, 274 F.2d 179, cert. denied, 1960, 362 U.S. 974, 80 S.Ct. 1057, 4 L.Ed.2d 1009. This determination necessarily adjudicated the sufficiency of the evidence as to the individual elements of the crime. Thus, the petitioner’s opportunity, which he took, to have the sufficiency of the evidence determined on direct appeal would normally foreclose, and does foreclose here, any attempt to raise the same issue collaterally. See United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641, 645-646 (2 Cir. 1967 (Waterman, J., concurring)). Since in Thompson and Garner there was (i) no previous review of the claim of evidentiary insufficiencies, and (ii) a complete lack of evidence to support the convictions, they are in-apposite.
Appellant predicates his contention of lack of evidence of knowledge of illegal importation upon the fact that there was no evidence of constructive possession permitting an inference of such knowledge. The indictment accused appellant of conspiring to commit the offenses set forth in Section 174, consisting, among other things, of knowingly importing or buying or selling narcotics imported or brought into the United States with knowledge of the illegal importation. Under 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 possession was sufficient to authorize conviction “unless the defendant explains "the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” No such explanation was forthcoming. As indicated in Judge Weinfeld’s able opinion, there was ample evidence of constructive possession from which the jury could have easily inferred knowledge of illegal importation and, in addition, independent evidence from which an inference of such knowledge was permissible. But appellant claims that the inference from possession was never invoked by the Government or judicially noticed by the court at the trial and there was no such finding by the jury. .He asserts that this inference cannot supply evidence of knowledge of illegal importation now missing from the record. The answer is that an inference never appears on the record as evidence but is left to the judgment of the jury. The permissibility of the inference was judicially invoked by the mere reading of Section 174 of Title 21 of the United States Code. Appellant is also foreclosed from raising the point at this late date because of his failure to request a specific instruction upon the point or to object to the instruction as given. Upon this record, the court finds no constitutional questions presented.
As to the charge, even if the attack upon the court’s instructions were available under Section 2255, it would be unsuccessful. The trial court instructed the jury on the essential elements of the crime including the relevant portions of Sections 173 and 174 of Title 21 of the United States Code and the five pertinent paragraphs of the indictment. Reading the charge as a whole, the conclusion follows that the trial court adequately informed the jury of the essential elements necessary to constitute the crime of conspiracy under 21 U.S. C.A. § 174. The trial court’s mistaken reference to 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 did not affect the substance of its charge under 21 U.S.C.A. § 174. United States v. Bentvena, 2 Cir. 1963, 319 F.2d 916, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940, 84 S.Ct. 345, 11 L.Ed.2d 271; United States v. Agueci, 2 Cir. 1962, 310 F.2d 817, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed. 2d 11.
The alternative relief based upon the theory that the evidence as to conspiracy could at most support only a conspiracy for distribution of narcotics without registration in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4724(b), or for distribution of narcotics without tax-paid stamps in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4704, both carrying a lesser penalty under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7237(a), or a conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, also carrying a lesser penalty, must be denied for the reasons above stated.
Affirmed.
. See, Brief of Yito Genovese, p. 17.
. See, 21 U.S.C.A. § 174.
. This included possession, trafficking and transportation of narcotics without registration and without proper stamps. See, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4704(a) and 4724.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0