Task: songer_numresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, Edward W. Bentz, appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On March 23, 1936 petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty years’ imprisonment for bank robbery by the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. He served his full term in the United States Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, less “good time” allowance of 2,720 days.
On October 10, 1948 petitioner was granted a conditional release from Alcatraz. He was discharged to the custody of a United States marshal on October 4, 1948 and delivered to the Massachusetts State Prison to serve a Massachusetts sentence. He was released from that prison March 12, 1953.
On June 14, 1954 petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Wisconsin State Prison for a crime committed in that state. As a result of the Wisconsin conviction, a warrant for the retaking of petitioner was issued by the United States Board of Parole bn the ground that petitioner had violated the conditions of his release from Alcatraz. This warrant was issued June 18, 1954 and was signed by James A. Johnson as a member of the Board of Parole. It was executed February 6, 1962, when petitioner was discharged from the Wisconsin State Prison.
The issue is whether James A. Johnson was a properly constituted member of the Board of Parole on June 18, 1954, when he signed the warrant for the retaking of petitioner.
Petitioner contends the warrant is invalid because Mr. Johnson was not appointed by the President as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4201 but was appointed by the Attorney General.
Mr. Johnson was appointed to the-Board by the then Attorney General,. Tom C. Clark, on October 13, 1948. This-appointment was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4201 which was enacted June 25, 1948 and which provided that, “A Board of Parole, consisting of five members,, shall be appointed by the Attorney General, at a salary of $7,500 each per annum.” Thus, unquestionably Johnson’s appointment in 1948 by the Attorney General was proper.
Petitioner’s confusion apparently stems from his failure to recognize that it was not until September 30, 1950 that Section 4201 was amended as follows:
“There is hereby created in the-Department of Justice a Board of' Parole to consist of eight members-to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of' the Senate. * * *”
There is no indication in the record' that Johnson’s membership on the Board of Parole was not continuous from October 13, 1948 until his death on September 6, 1954. Consequently, we hold that he was a properly constituted member of the Board on June 18, 1954, and accordingly the warrant for petitioner's retaking is valid.
Furthermore, it appears from an affidavit of a Department of Justice official' filed in the District Court, that Johnson was reappointed to the Board of Parole by President Eisenhower in accordance with the provisions of Section 4201, as amended, on August 5, 1953. This appointment followed confirmation by the Senate of Johnson’s nomination on August 1, 1953. 99 Cong.Rec. 10747 (1953).
According to the affidavit, Johnson’s reappointment by the President was for the term expiring September 30, 1953. No successor was appointed after the expiration of Johnson’s term and consequently he continued to serve as a Board member until his death September 6, 1954.
Thus, on June 18, 1954, when the warrant for retaking was signed, Johnson was a legally constituted member of the Board of Parole, whether his appointment is considered to have been by the Attorney General on October 13, 1948 or by the President on August 5, 1953.
The judgment of the District Court denying petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 provides that, “A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole, or a member thereof * *
. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 provides that, “Upon the expiration of his term of office, a member of the Board shall continue to act until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified.”
Johnson’s successor was appointed July 29, 1955.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1