Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM:
Appellant was convicted on ten counts contained in one indictment charging violations of the Federal Narcotic Laws. The transactions covered by the indictment allegedly occurred on November 4, 11 and 23, 1961, January 25, and April 26, 1962, on which last date appellant was arrested. A complaint covering the transactions attributed to the earlier dates had been issued April 24, 1962.
Appellant denied the transactions alleged to have occurred in November 1961 and January 1962. As to these he nevertheless requested an instruction on entrapment in the event the jury should find that, contrary to his testimony, the transactions did occur. Hansford v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 303 F.2d 219 (1962). The instruction was refused. We find no error in the refusal. The Government’s testimony that appellant participated in the transactions was accepted by the jury. The defendant’s evidence simply failed to establish the defense of entrapment, not even raising a possible jury question regarding it.
Error is also asserted in the instructions to the jury concerning count ten of the indictment. Since the sentence under this count was concurrent with that under counts the conviction of which is free of error, any inadequacy in these instructions would furnish no ground for reversal. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943).
On the issue of insanity, asserted as a defense by appellant, it is true that the court at one point mistakenly stated to the jury that to sustain this defense the jury must find that defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time in question and that such disease or defect caused the acts charged, that is, that they were the product of such disease or defect. But upon consideration of the instructions as a whole we think it clear that on the issue of insanity the jury understood that the burden was not upon appellant and that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had no mental disease or defect, or, if he did, that the acts charged were not the product of such disease or defect. The situation is distinguished from that which led to the reversal in Blocker v. United States, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 43, 288 F.2d 853, 855 (1951), Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 36-37, 284 F.2d 168, 170-171 (1960), and Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 233, 252 F.2d 608, 614 (1957).
Appellant had moved to dismiss the indictment because of the delay in the institution of the prosecution. The complaint, as we have said, was made April 24, 1962, nearly six months after the date of the first offense. It is contended the delay violated Rule 48(b), Fed.R. Crim.P., and also deprived appellant of a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. We think the denial of the motion by the District Court was not error. We rest this conclusion upon the facts of this case, which show a series of transactions over a considerable period of time, the last of which, prior to the issuance of the complaint and arrest in April 1962, was in January of the same year. See, on the general subject, Nickens v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 323 F.2d 808 (1963).
Finding no ground for reversal in the matters above referred to, or in other respects, including the instruction as to the testimony of a psychologist, the judgment is
Affirmed.
. Counts one, three, five and seven charged appellant with having transferred marihauna on November 4, 11, and 23, 1961, and January 25, 1962 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4742(a). Counts two, four, six and eight charged appellant with having obtained the marihauna transferred on the above four occasions without paying the necessary taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a). In count nine appellant was charged with having “purchased, sold, dispensed and distributed” on April 26, 1962, heroin hydrochloride not from the original stamped package in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). Count ten charged the appellant with having violated 21 U.S.C. § 174 by having facilitated the concealment and sale of the heroin involved in count nine. Appellant was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment on counts one, three, five and seven, three to ten years, on counts two, four, six and eight, three to ten years on count nine and twelve years on count ten, said sentences to run concurrently.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 1