Task: sc_issue_1

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement made by respondent, because the statement was obtained by police before they read respondent his “Miranda rights.” That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari, 461 U. S. 942 (1983), and we now reverse. We conclude that under the circumstances involved in this case, overriding considerations of public safety justify the officer’s failure to provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a. m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, N. Y., when a young woman approached their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name “Big Ben” printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just entered an A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun.
The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted respondent, who matched the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer, respondent turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a drawn gun. When respondent turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of respondent, ordered him to stop and put his hands over his head.
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach respondent. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, “the gun is over there.” Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded.38-caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Respondent indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without an attorney present. Officer Kraft then asked respondent if he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Respondent answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Fla.
In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal possession of a weapon, the judge excluded the statement, “the gun is over there,” and the gun because the officer had not given respondent the warnings required by our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), before asking him where the gun was located. The judge excluded the other statements about respondent’s ownership of the gun and the place of purchase, as evidence tainted by the prior Miranda violation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed without opinion. 85 App. Div. 2d 936, 447 N. Y. S. 2d 84 (1981).
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed by a 4-3 vote. 58 N. Y. 2d 664, 444 N. E. 2d 984 (1982). It concluded that respondent was in “custody” within the meaning of Miranda during all questioning and rejected the State’s argument that the exigencies of the situation justified Officer Kraft’s failure to read respondent his Miranda rights until after he had located the gun. The court declined to recognize an exigency exception to the usual requirements of Miranda because it found no indication from Officer Kraft’s testimony at the suppression hearing that his subjective motivation in asking the question was to protect his own safety or the safety of the public. 58 N. Y. 2d, at 666, 444 N. E. 2d, at 985. For the reasons which follow, we believe that this case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Miranda this Court for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by the police. 384 U. S., at 460-461, 467. The Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit all incriminating admissions; “[ajbsent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions.” United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 (1977) (emphasis added). The Miranda Court, however, presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights. The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974); see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Requiring Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation provides “practical reinforcement” for the Fifth Amendment right. Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 444.
In this case we have before us no claim that respondent’s statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341, 347-348 (1976); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737 (1966). Thus the only issue before us is whether Officer Kraft was justified in failing to make available to respondent the procedural safeguards associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda.
The New York Court of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in deciding that the facts of this case come within the ambit of the Miranda decision as we have subsequently interpreted it. We agree that respondent was in police custody because we have noted that “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest,” California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). Here Quarles was surrounded by at least four police officers and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place. As the New York Court of Appeals observed, there was nothing to suggest that any of the officers were any longer concerned for their own physical safety. 58 N. Y. 2d, at 666, 444 N. E. 2d, at 985. The New York Court of Appeals’ majority declined to express an opinion as to whether there might be an exception to the Miranda rule if the police had been acting to protect the public, because the lower courts in New York had made no factual determination that the police had acted with that motive. Ibid.
We hold that on these facts there is a “public safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft’s position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives — their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. The Miranda decision was based in large part on this Court’s view that the warnings which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the station house. 384 U. S., at 455-458. The dissenters warned that the requirement of Miranda warnings would have the effect of decreasing the number of suspects who respond to police questioning. Id., at 504, 516-517 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting). The Miranda majority, however, apparently felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply have to be borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’ position might well be deterred from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft’s question about the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibilty of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them. ■
In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case, we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that rule. At least in part in order to preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to sanction attempts to expand our Miranda holding. See, e. g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 (1984) (refusal to extend Miranda requirements to interviews with probation officers); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979) (refusal to equate request to see a probation officer with request to see a lawyer for Miranda purposes); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976) (refusal to extend Miranda requirements to questioning in noncustodial circumstances). As we have in other contexts, we recognize here the importance of a workable rule “to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 213-214 (1979). But as we have pointed out, we believe that the exception which we recognize today lessens the necessity of that on-the-scene balancing process. The exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that distinction and an officer’s ability to recognize it. Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising respondent of his rights. It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun. The exception which we recognize today, far from complicating the thought processes and the on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the public safety.
We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in excluding the statement, “the gun is over there,” and the gun because of the officer’s failure to read respondent his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon. Accordingly we hold that it also erred in excluding the subsequent statements as illegal fruits of a Miranda violation. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Although respondent has yet to be tried in state court, the suppression ruling challenged herein is a “final judgment” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3), and we have jurisdiction over this case. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975), we identified four categories of cases where the Court will treat a decision of the highest state court as final for § 1257 purposes even though further proceedings are anticipated in the lower state courts. This ease, which comes to this Court in the same posture as Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. S. 287 (1984), decided earlier this Term, falls within the category which includes “those situations where the federal claim has been finally decided... but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case.” 420 U. S., at 481. In this case should the State convict respondent at trial, its claim that certain evidence was wrongfully suppressed will be moot. Should respondent be acquitted at trial, the State will be precluded from pressing its federal claim again on appeal. See California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with Miranda v. Arizona).
The State originally charged respondent with rape, but the record provides no information as to why the State failed to pursue that charge.
We have long recognized an exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e. g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-300 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948). We have found the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment inapplicable in cases where the “ ‘exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978), quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 (1948). Although “the Fifth Amendment’s strictures, unlike the Fourth’s, are not removed by showing reasonableness,” Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 400 (1976), we conclude today that there are limited circumstances where the judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are inapplicable.
Miranda on its facts applies to station house questioning, but we have not so limited it in our subsequent cases, often over strong dissent. See, e. g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969) (defendant’s bedroom); Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968) (prison cell during defendant’s sentence for an unrelated offense); but see Orozco v. Texas, supra, at 328-331 (White, J., dissenting).
The dissent curiously takes us to task for “endors[ing] the introduction of coerced self-incriminating statements in criminal prosecutions,” post, at 674, and for “sanction[ing] sub silentio criminal prosecutions based on compelled self-incriminating statements.” Post, at 686. Of course our decision today does nothing of the kind. As the Miranda Court itself recognized, the failure to provide Miranda warnings in and of itself does not render a confession involuntary, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 457, and respondent is certainly free on remand to argue that his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards. Today we merely reject the only argument that respondent has raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that the statement must be presumed compelled because of Officer Kraft’s failure to read him his Miranda warnings.
Similar approaches have been rejected in other contexts. See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at 301 (officer’s subjective intent to incriminate not determinative of whether “interrogation” occurred); United States v. Men-denhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554, and n. 6 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (officer’s subjective intent to detain not determinative of whether a “seizure” occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236, and n. 7 (1973) (officer’s subjective fear not determinative of necessity for “search incident to arrest” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
The dissent argues that a public safety exception to Miranda is unnecessary because in every case an officer can simply ask the necessary questions to protect himself or the public, and then the prosecution can decline to introduce any incriminating responses at a subsequent trial. Post, at 686. But absent actual coercion by the officer, there is no constitutional imperative requiring the exclusion of the evidence that results from police inquiry of this kind; and we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require us to exclude the evidence, thus penalizing officers for asking the very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect themselves and the public.
Although it involves police questions in part relating to the whereabouts of a gun, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969), is in no sense inconsistent with our disposition of this ease. In Orozco four hours after a murder had been committed at a restaurant, four police officers entered the defendant’s boardinghouse and awakened the defendant, who was sleeping in his bedroom. Without giving him Miranda warnings, they began vigorously to interrogate him about whether he had been present at the scene of the shooting and whether he owned a gun. The defendant eventually admitted that he had been present at the scene and directed the officers to a washing machine in the backroom of the boardinghouse where he had hidden the gun. We held that all the statements should have been suppressed. In Orozco, however, the questions about the gun were clearly investigatory; they did not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.
Rhode Island v. Innis,

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 件