Task: sc_petitioner

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State of Arizona from sentencing respondent to death after the life sentence he had initially received was set aside on appeal. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), squarely controls the disposition of this case. Under the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause adopted in that decision, imposition of the death penalty on respondent would be unconstitutional.
I
An Arizona jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first degree murder. The trial judge, with no jury, then conducted a separate sentencing hearing to determine, according to the statutory scheme for considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 1983-1984), whether death was the appropriate sentence for the murder conviction. Petitioner, relying entirely on the evidence presented at trial, argued that three statutory aggravating circumstances were present. Respondent, presenting only one witness, countered that no aggravating circumstances were present but that several mitigating circumstances were. One of the principal points of contention concerned the scope of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp. 1983-1984), which defines as an aggravating circumstance the murder’s commission “as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.” Respondent argued that this provision applies only to murders for hire, whereas petitioner argued that it applies to all murders committed in order to obtain money.
Several days after the sentencing hearing, the trial judge, who imposes sentence without the assistance of a jury under the Arizona scheme, returned a “special verdict” setting forth his findings on each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The judge found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present. App. 53-58. In particular, with respect to the aggravating circumstance defined in § 13-703(F)(5), the trial judge found:
“5. The defendant did not commit the offense as consideration for the receipt or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value.
“In this regard, the Court does not agree with the State’s interpretation of A. R. S. 13-703(F)(5) and State v. Madsen filed March 26, 1980. The Court believes that when A. R. S. 13-703(F)(4) and (5) are read together that they are intended to apply to a contract-type killing situation and not to a robbery, burglary, etc.” App. 54-55.
Having found no aggravating circumstances, the trial court was statutorily barred from sentencing respondent to death. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1983-1984); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3. The court accordingly sentenced respondent to life imprisonment without possibility of parole-for 25 years, the sentence statutorily mandated for first degree murder when the death penalty is not imposed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(A) (Supp. 1983-1984). With respect to the armed robbery conviction, the court found that respondent had committed a “dangerous offense” involving use of a deadly weapon and that there was an aggravating circumstance not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance — respondent had “planned this robbery ... in order to obtain what [he] knew was only a few hundred dollars . . . .” App. 66. As authorized by Arizona law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-604 and 13-702 (1978 and Supp. 1983-1984), the court accordingly sentenced respondent to 21 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery. The prison terms for the two convictions were to run consecutively.
Respondent appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Arizona, arguing that imposition of consecutive sentences in his case violated both federal and state law. Under Arizona law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4032(4) (1978), respondent’s appeal permitted petitioner to file a cross-appeal from the life sentence; in that cross-appeal petitioner contended that the trial court had committed an error of law in interpreting the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance to apply only to contract killings. The State Supreme Court rejected respondent’s challenge to his sentence. It agreed with petitioner, however, that the trial court had misinterpreted § 13-703(F)(5): “theft committed in the course of a murder” could constitute an aggravating circumstance under that section. 130 Ariz. 427, 431, 636 P. 2d 1209, 1213 (1981). Because of the trial court’s misinterpretation, the State Supreme Court concluded, “the sentence of life imprisonment previously imposed will have to be set aside and the matter remanded for redetermination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and resentencing.” Id., at 432, 636 P. 2d, at 1214. The sentence for armed robbery was left undisturbed.
On remand the trial court held a new sentencing hearing. Neither petitioner nor respondent presented any new evidence, although they had the opportunity to do so. The court heard argument, however, both on the lawfulness of imposing the death penalty on resentencing and on the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Petitioner argued that neither federal nor state law barred sentencing respondent to death. Petitioner also urged the court to find the three statutory aggravating circumstances identified at the first sentencing, largely repeating the arguments it had made at the first proceeding. App. 78-94. Respondent argued that imposing the death penalty would violate Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.14, which implements the resentenc-ing principles of the Pearce case. With respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, respondent effectively conceded the presence of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance, thinking the issue foreclosed by a statement in the opinion of the State Supreme Court. See App. 104; 130 Ariz., at 431, 636 P. 2d, at 1213 (“In the instant case, the hope of financial gain was a cause of the murder . . .”). But respondent contended that this aggravating circumstance was outweighed by a statutory mitigating circumstance not among the five enumerated in the death sentencing statute: according to the testimony of the jury foreperson, the conviction for first degree murder was based on the felony-murder instruction, not on the premeditation instruction; thus, respondent contended, to regard the theft as an aggravating circumstance after using it to elevate second degree murder into first would be a form of double counting. App. 94-108.
Several days after the hearing, the trial court returned a special verdict reciting findings on each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances and on the one nonstatutory mitigating circumstance urged by respondent. The court found to be present only one of the seven statutory aggravating circumstances, namely, § 13-703(F)(5), concerning commission of the murder for pecuniary gain. The court also found that none of the five statutory mitigating circumstances was present and that the fact that the murder conviction was for felony murder, if a mitigating circumstance at all, was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. App. 118-124. Accordingly, as required under Arizona law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703(E) (Supp. 1983-1984), the court sentenced respondent to death.
In his mandatory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona, respondent argued that imposition of the death sentence on resentencing, after he had effectively been “acquitted” of death at his initial sentencing, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969). He also argued that the death sentence violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra. The Supreme Court of Arizona addressed only the first argument. It concluded that, under this Court’s decision in Bullington v. Missouri, supra, respondent’s sentence violated the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. 136 Ariz. 166, 665 P. 2d 48 (1983). The court therefore ordered respondent’s sentence for first degree murder reduced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years.
The State of Arizona filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 1038 (1983), and now affirm.
1 — 1
In Bullington v. Missouri this Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to Missouri’s capital sentencing proceeding and thus bars imposition of the death penalty upon reconviction after an initial conviction, set aside on appeal, has resulted in rejection of the death sentence. The Court identified several characteristics of Missouri’s sentencing proceeding that make it comparable to a trial for double jeopardy purposes. The discretion of the sentencer — the jury in Missouri — is restricted to precisely two options: death, and life imprisonment without possibility of release for 50 years. In addition, the sentencer is to make its decision guided by substantive standards and based on evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that formally resembles a trial. Finally, the prosecution has to prove certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a sentence of death. 451 U. S., at 438. For these reasons, when the Missouri sentencer imposes a sentence of life imprisonment in a capital sentencing proceeding, it has determined that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. Because the Court believed that the anxiety and ordeal suffered by a defendant in Missouri’s capital sentencing proceeding are the equal of those suffered in a trial on the issue of guilt, the Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from resentencing the defendant to death after the sentencer has in effect acquitted the defendant of that penalty.
The capital sentencing proceeding in Arizona shares the characteristics of the Missouri proceeding that make it resemble a trial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The sentencer — the trial judge in Arizona — is required to choose between two options: death, and life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. The sentencer must make the decision guided by detailed statutory standards defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances; in particular, death may not be imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance is found, whereas death must be imposed if there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The sentencer must make findings with respect to each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing hearing involves the submission of evidence and the presentation of argument. The usual rules of evidence govern the admission of evidence of aggravating circumstances, and the State must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703 (Supp. 1983-1984); 136 Ariz., at 171-172, 665 P. 2d, at 53-54. As the Supreme Court of Arizona held, these characteristics make the Arizona capital sentencing proceeding indistinguishable for double jeopardy purposes from the capital sentencing proceeding in Missouri. Id., at 171-174, 665 P. 2d, at 53-56.
That the sentencer in Arizona is the trial judge rather than the jury does not render the sentencing proceeding any less like a trial. See United States v. Morrison, 429 U. S. 1, 3 (1976) (Double Jeopardy Clause treats bench and jury trials alike). Nor does the availability of appellate review, including reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, make the appellate process part of a single continuing sentencing proceeding. The Supreme Court of Arizona noted that its role is strictly that of an appellate court, not a trial court. Indeed, no appeal need be taken if life imprisonment is imposed, and the appellate reweighing can work only to the defendant’s advantage. 136 Ariz., at 173-174, 665 P. 2d, at 55-56. In short, a sentence imposed after a completed Arizona capital sentencing hearing is a judgment like the sentence at issue in Bullington v. Missouri, which this Court held triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The double jeopardy principle relevant to respondent’s case is the same as that invoked in Bullington: an acquittal on the merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is final and bars retrial on the same charge. Application of the Bullington principle renders respondent’s death sentence a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because respondent’s initial sentence of life imprisonment was undoubtedly an acquittal on the merits of the central issue in the proceeding— whether death was the appropriate punishment for respondent’s offense. The trial court entered findings denying the existence of each of the seven statutory aggravating circumstances, and as required by state law, the court then entered judgment in respondent’s favor on the issue of death. That judgment, based, on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, amounts to an acquittal on the merits and, as such, bars any retrial of the appropriateness of the death penalty.
In making its findings, the trial court relied on a misconstruction of the statute defining the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. Reliance on an error of law, however, does not change the double jeopardy effects of a judgment that amounts to an acquittal on the merits. “[T]he fact that ‘the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles’ . . . affects the accuracy of that determination, but it does not alter its essential character.” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 98 (1978) (quoting id., at 106 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Thus, this Court’s cases hold that an acquittal on the merits bars retrial even if based on legal error.
United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332 (1975), held that the prosecution could appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered by the trial judge after the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. But that holding has no application to this case. No double jeopardy problem was presented in Wilson because the appellate court, upon reviewing asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated; no new factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant therefore would not be twice placed in jeopardy. By contrast, in respondent’s initial capital sentencing, there was only one decisionmaker and only one set of findings of fact, all favorable to respondent. The trial court “acquitted” respondent of the death penalty, and there was no verdict of “guilty” for the appellate court to reinstate. The Supreme Court of Arizona accordingly “remanded for redetermination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and resentencing,” 130 Ariz., at 432, 636 P. 2d, at 1214 — that is, for a second sentencing proceeding similar to the first. Whereas the defendant in Wilson was not to be subjected to a second trial after an acquittal at his first, that is precisely what has happened to respondent.
rH I — I l-H
Bullington v. Missouri held that double jeopardy protections attach to Missouri’s capital sentencing proceeding because that proceeding is like a trial. The capital sentencing proceeding in Arizona is indistinguishable for double jeopardy purposes from the proceeding in Missouri. Under Bullington, therefore, respondent’s initial sentence of life imprisonment constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty, and the State of Arizona cannot now sentence respondent to death on his conviction for first degree murder.
Petitioner has invited the Court to overrule Bullington, decided only three years ago. We decline the invitation. Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification. See, e. g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 116 (1965); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 (1944). Petitioner has suggested no reason sufficient to warrant our taking the exceptional action of overruling Bullington.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is therefore
Affirmed.

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 号