Task: songer_appfed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:
In this case, we affirm the district court and hold that a general consent to search a specific area for specific things includes the authority to open locked containers where those things may be found.
FACTS
On November 7, 1989, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and officers of the Broward County Florida Sheriff’s Department watched as Elsie Martinez, the appellant, and Alvero Alvarez went through a suspicious morning routine of car switching and circuitous driving. Later in the day, following continuous surveillance, the officers arrested Alvarez carrying one kilogram of cocaine in a suitcase. Because the officers had observed Martinez and Alvarez at a mini-warehouse complex earlier the same day, they proceeded to the residence of Elsie Martinez to obtain her permission to search a storage unit leased in her name.
When the officers arrived at Martinez’s residence, they waited outside a fenced yard that contained several large dogs. Remaining on the other side of the fence, the officers told Martinez that they had arrested Alvarez carrying a kilogram of cocaine, and asked Martinez for her permission to search the mini-warehouse unit where they had observed her and Alvarez earlier in the day. The officers explained that they were searching for narcotics. At no time did the officers draw their weapons or threaten Martinez with arrest.
Martinez became visibly upset when informed that Alvarez had been arrested and said that she did not know what to do regarding permission to search the storage unit. The officers encouraged her to contact her lawyer. Because Martinez could not decide whether to allow the search, the officers made several attempts to leave. Each time, Martinez called them back. She also reentered the house twice and returned to the yard to speak with the officers each time. Finally, tiring of Martinez’s indecisiveness, the officers returned to their vehicles and began to pull away from the house. Martinez “screamed” at the officers to return. When they returned, she signed a written consent authorizing the agents to search the mini-warehouse unit.
The officers went to the mini-warehouse unit and cut off the lock. Inside, they found a 1949 Dodge coupe surrounded by cardboard boxes. After a search of the boxes revealed no contraband, the officers began searching the passenger compartment of the automobile. Tilting the seat forward, the officers removed a board separating the passenger compartment from the trunk. A perforated metal plate continued to separate the passenger compartment from the trunk. Detective Derstine peered through the plate and into the trunk with the aid of a flashlight. He identified a cardboard box and a triple beam scale case. Using a piece of wire, he overturned the box, finding that it contained brick-sized packages. The officers then pried open the trunk. Inside they found four individually wrapped kilograms of cocaine and a triple-beam scale.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A grand jury charged Martinez on three counts of a four-count indictment with conspiracy, possession, and attempt to distribute cocaine. She moved to suppress the evidence seized from the trunk of the 1949 Dodge on the grounds that the officers coerced her into authorizing the search, and that even if she did consent to the search, the officers exceeded the scope of her consent. The district court rejected these contentions and held the evidence admissible. After a joint trial with Alvarez, the jury found Martinez guilty of conspiracy, but not guilty of the substantive possession and distribution counts.
CONTENTIONS
Martinez raises four contentions on appeal. First, she contends that her consent to the search of the mini-warehouse was coerced. Second, she contends that even if her consent was voluntary, the officers exceeded the scope of her consent when they opened the locked trunk of the automobile. Third, Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict her. Finally, she alleges that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence which failed to account for her minimal role in the drug conspiracy.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the search of the locked trunk did not exceed the scope of Martinez’s consent to a search of the mini-warehouse.
DISCUSSION
On these facts, Martinez’s consent to the search was voluntary. Thus, we turn our attention to the scope of that consent.
The district court’s denial of Martinez’s motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.1990). We review the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Its application of the law to those facts is subject to de novo review. Wilson, 894 F.2d at 1254.
The fourth amendment protects the people against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. A consensual search is manifestly reasonable so long as it remains within the scope of the consent. See Florida v. Jimeno, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991). This case presents the question of whether the search conducted was within the scope of the consent given.
The scope of a consensual search is determined by the terms of the actual consent. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir.1989). The terms of the consent govern the scope of the search in the same manner as the specifications in a warrant. Strickland, 902 F.2d at 941; Blake, 888 F.2d at 798. The government may not exceed the boundaries of the consent, and any evidence gathered beyond those boundaries must be excluded.
In this case, Martinez consented to a search of the mini-storage unit leased in her name. Neither the document she signed nor her oral statements to the police placed any limitations on the agents’ authority to search the mini-warehouse. The question thus becomes whether Martinez’s general consent included permission to search the locked trunk of the 1949 Dodge located therein.
As this court has noted: “When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather, it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass.” United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Strickland, 902 F.2d at 941). In conducting the reasonableness inquiry, the court must consider what the parties knew at the time to be the object of the search. Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. at 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d at 303; Harris, 928 F.2d at 1118. Permission to search a specific area for narcotics, for example, may be construed as permission to search any compartment or container within the specified area where narcotics may be found. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. at 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d at 303; Harris, 928 F.2d at 1118. On the other hand, general permission to search does not include permission to inflict intentional damage to the places or things to be searched. See Strickland, 902 F.2d at 941-42 (defendant’s permission to search automobile for contraband could not reasonably be construed to include permission to slash spare tire).
In this case, Martinez understood that the officers wanted to search the mini-warehouse unit for narcotics. Under the reasonableness inquiry, her permission to search the mini-warehouse could be construed as permission to search any compartment or container therein that might reasonably contain narcotics, including the 1949 Dodge. The difficulty in this case arises because the trunk of the car was locked. To positively identify and remove the items in the trunk, the police had to pry it open. Martinez argues that breaking the trunk lock exceeded the scope of her consent to the search, just as slashing the spare tire in Strickland was held to exceed the scope of the consent in that case.
As noted above, the limits of a consensual search are defined by the terms of the consent in the same way that the scope of a warrant search is defined by the specifications of the warrant. Strickland, 902 F.2d at 941; Blake, 888 F.2d at 798. Where a warrant has been issued, “a lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-71, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (footnote omitted). This court has held that a warrant to search a specific area for a certain class of things authorizes government agents to break open locked containers which may contain the objects of the search. See United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1420 (11th Cir.1991) (valid warrant to search defendant’s house for documents and currency authorized police to search locked briefcase found in house); United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (valid warrant to search defendant’s home for proceeds of bank robbery authorized search of locked jewelry box). These cases interpreting search warrants apply with equal force to the interpretation of general consents to search. Thus, we hold that a general consent to search a specific area for specific things includes consent to open locked containers that may contain the objects of the search, in the same manner that such locked containers would be subject to search pursuant to a valid warrant. In this case, the locked trunk was within the scope of Martinez’s consent because it was within the area authorized to be searched, and it was reasonably capable of containing the object of the search.
The result we reach today is supported by this court’s holding in United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845, 106 S.Ct. 135, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). In that case, the court held that the defendant’s sweeping consent to a search of his office authorized government agents to pick the lock on a closet door. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d at 1563-64. Martinez argues that the court in Milian-Rodriguez relied not on the defendant’s general consent to the search, but rather on his oral statement to the police that he could provide them with a key to the closet. A close reading of the opinion, however, reveals that the court relied primarily on the general nature of Milian’s consent to the search. The court focused on that issue first, referring to Milian’s oral statements about the closet key as merely “additional evidence” of his consent. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d at 1564.
Martinez also argues that the holding in United States v. Strickland requires suppression of the cocaine found in the trunk of the 1949 Dodge. In Strickland, the court held that a general consent to search the defendant’s automobile for contraband could not reasonably include permission to slash open the spare tire. 902 F.2d at 941-42. Similarly, Martinez argues, her general consent did not include permission to remove the panel separating the passenger compartment from the trunk, nor to pry open the trunk.
The officers’ actions in this case do not run afoul of Strickland. Removal of the panel involved no destruction to the car: it merely allowed the officers to see through a metal plate that remained in place. In Strickland, unbolting the spare tire and rolling it around to get a feel for what might be in it was unquestionably within the scope of the search. Strickland, 902 F.2d at 939, 943. In both cases, reasonable, nondestructive removal of impediments was necessary to search for contraband and to gain access to other areas or compartments within the scope of the search.
As to prying open the trunk, the record does not show, and Martinez does not allege, that it involved the same kind of damage to the automobile as “mutilation” of the spare tire in Strickland. 902 F.2d at 942. Indeed, as noted above, forcing open locked compartments or containers has been held to be within the scope of general warrant searches and consent searches. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d at 1420; Morris, 647 F.2d at 572-73. Milian-Rodriguez, 759 F.2d at 1563-64. None of these cases appear to have turned on the damage, or lack of it, inflicted in opening the locked container or compartment.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly found that the search of the locked automobile trunk was within the scope of the consent to search the mini-warehouse.
Because appellant’s other contentions are without merit, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Unit B are binding precedent in this circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Securities, 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir.1982).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0