Task: songer_genresp2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed respondent. If there are more than two respondents and at least one of the additional respondents has a different general category from the first respondent, then consider the first respondent with a different general category to be the second respondent.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:
The district court, finding that Tolbert had failed to prosecute his legal malpractice suit, dismissed the action with prejudice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). We reverse.
Tolbert’s only offense was failing to appear at a status conference set for a date less than seven months after the complaint was filed. The record indicates that Leigh-ton and his attorney did not appear at the conference either. (Indeed, they apparently have not participated in the case in any way either in the district court or here.)
Sua sponte dismissals for failure to prosecute will be affirmed unless the district court abused its discretion. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). In Link, the Supreme Court upheld such a dismissal for failure to attend a pretrial conference in a case already six years old, where there was evidence that the plaintiff “had been deliberately proceeding in dilatory fashion.” Id. But the Court made clear that it was not deciding “whether unexplained absence from a pretrial conference would alone justify a dismissal with prejudice if the record showed no other evidence of dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiff.” Id. at 634, 82 S.Ct. at 1391.
The question that Link reserved is before us today. Other courts of appeals have held that such an absence, alone, does not justify the drastic sanction of dismissal. Moreno v. Collins, 362 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966) (counsel missed status call three months after complaint filed); Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963) (out-of-state plaintiff, pro se, missed pretrial conference three months after complaint filed); accord, Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.) (counsel twice failed to appear at or send prepared substitute to pretrial conferences, and was guilty of other delay, in case less than a year old; dismissal was abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928, 88 S.Ct. 2287, 20 L.Ed.2d 1387 (1968).
We agree that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a plaintiff’s case for failure to prosecute where (1) the only evidence of dilatoriness is his or his attorney’s failure to attend a pretrial conference; (2) the court has not warned that failure to attend will create a risk of dismissal; and (3) the case is still “young.”
Especially where one or more of these factors is present, before dismissing a case a district court must consider some of the less drastic alternative sanctions at its disposal. Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1976); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S.Ct. 715, 30 L.Ed.2d 731 (1972); see Industrial Building Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1970). There is no indication that the district court here did so; necessarily, then, the court failed to exercise any discretion in choosing among the alternatives.
Nothing in this opinion should deter district courts from entering orders of dismissal if, after weighing the applicable law and policies, the facts of the case, and the alternatives to dismissal, they determine in the exercise of their sound discretion that dismissal is warranted. See generally United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (preclusion order, equivalent to dismissal, entered under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) for violation of discovery orders); Citizens Utilities Co. v. AT&T, 595 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.) (dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 273, 62 L.Ed.2d 188 (1979). Under the present case’s circumstances, however, dismissal for failure to prosecute was an abuse of discretion.
REVERSED.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed respondent whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: I