Task: songer_appel1_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from judgments of conviction against the defendants on one count of conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), and several substantive counts involving: (1) the transportation of stolen securities in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, (2) aiding and abetting the willful misapplication of the moneys, funds and credits of a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 656, and (3) aiding and abetting the making of false entries in the books, reports, or statements of such a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1005. For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Defendant Ronald Berkovitz met William Giova, a senior vice president in the commercial loan department of the First National Bank of Cicero (“FNBC”), a federally insured institution, in September or October of 1981. Berkovitz was a “loan broker,” that is, a person who would refer borrowers to lending institutions for a fee. Giova had authority to approve loans by FNBC of up to $50,000, and his compensation from FNBC was in part a commission on the amount of loans that he processed. After the meeting, Berkovitz began to refer a number of brokered loans to Giova. Giova would generally inform FNBC when he was processing a brokered loan. Such loans generally present a greater risk to the lending institution than ordinary loans due to the fact that the borrowers who use such arrangements are typically poorer credit risks.
In early December of 1981, FNBC decided that it would no longer accept loans from Berkovitz. Giova was informed of this decision and relayed it to Berkovitz. However, Berkovitz continued to submit loans to Giova, who continued to process them. He did not inform FNBC of Berkovitz’s involvement in the loans.
At about the same time, Giova decided to resign his position at FNBC and go into business with Berkovitz. In April of 1982, he tendered his resignation, effective June 15. He did not inform FNBC of his intention to work with Berkovitz. Giova processed a series of loans referred by Berkovitz in late 1981 and early 1982.
A. Brokered Loans
The first of these loans was to Ezekiel Lopez, the owner of Lopez Construction Company. In November of 1981, Mr. Lopez spoke with Edward Bontkowski about obtaining a business loan of $20,000. Bontkowski referred him to Berkovitz and requested that he borrow an additional $15,-000 to loan to Bontkowski. Berkovitz referred him to Giova for a loan of $45,000 ($10,000 of which was used to pay off a pre-existing mortgage on collateral used for the loan). Giova processed the loan, and on December 10,1981, Berkovitz called Giova to request that the proceeds be issued in several checks, including one for $4,500 and one for $15,000. After this was done, Lopez endorsed the $15,000 check and turned it over to Bontkowski and endorsed the $4,500 check and turned it over to Giova. The $4,500 check represented Berkovitz’s fee for arranging the transaction.
In February of 1982, the Taylor brothers, owners of a trucking concern, met with Berkovitz to try to obtain a $75,000 loan. Berkovitz referred them to Giova, with the understanding that they would pay Berkovitz $5,000 for the referral. Prior to processing the loans, Giova met with Berkovitz and informed him that the loans were above his lending limit and would thus require approval. Berkovitz suggested that Giova process two loans for less than $50,-000 each, totalling $75,000. Giova processed a $40,000 loan for the Taylors on March 4, 1982 and a $35,000 loan on March 20, 1982. A false, backdated memorandum was prepared by Giova, indicating the bank’s approval of a $75,000 line of credit for the Taylors. The Taylors used part of the proceeds to obtain a $5,000 cashier’s check payable to Berkovitz from another bank. Berkovitz had told them not to get the check from FNBC or otherwise use his name there. Giova did not inform FNBC of Berkovitz’s involvement in the transactions.
In December of 1981, Joseph Witkowski, a partner in Jordan-Whitney Construction Company (“Jordan-Whitney” or “the Company”), asked Ralph Rose, the owner of a currency exchange, whether Rose knew of anyone who could obtain a business loan for him. Rose referred Witkowski to Berkovitz. Witkowski and his partner, Rick Jordan, met with Berkovitz and asked him to obtain a $30,000-$35,000 loan. Berkovitz told them that they could get up to $100,000 if they wanted to, but they said that would be too much. Berkovitz gave them documents to complete and referred them to Giova. They met with Giova in early January, 1982, and signed a $33,000 note. As directed by Berkovitz, they deposited the proceeds of the loan in a newly opened checking account at FNBC and brought 10-15 signed, blank checks to Berkovitz. He wrote some of the checks to suppliers and retained the rest.
Witkowski later returned to Berkovitz and signed several FNBC judgment notes, which had been provided by Giova, for additional loans. Giova processed several loans from the judgment notes. Typically, he would receive a call from Berkovitz requesting an advance of a certain amount on the Jordan-Whitney line of credit. Giova would then process the loan using a signed, blank judgment note forwarded by Berkovitz. Berkovitz told Giova that the Company had contracts with the City of Chicago that would provide additional collateral for the loans, and that FNBC would be named as co-payee on contract disbursements to the company. In fact, no such contracts existed.
Several loans were obtained on the Jordan-Whitney account without the knowledge of the Company from February 5 through May 24,1982. These loans totaled over $170,000, and the bank was not adequately secured for this amount. Several of the Jordan-Whitney checks were also written and cashed without the knowledge of the Company. The bulk of the checks were written to a currency exchange, although some were written to James Adamczyk or to a printing business owned by Adamcyzk’s father. Giova never informed FNBC of Berkovitz’s involvement in the Jordan-Whitney loans, nor does Berkovitz’s name appear in the bank records in connection with the transactions. In all, the total debt of Jordan-Whitney to FNBC exceeds $200,000.
B. Loans Involving Stolen Securities
On February 25, 1982, Berkovitz called Giova and told him that Edward Bontkowski would be coming to the bank the following day to obtain a loan using bearer bonds as collateral. Part of the loan proceeds was to be used to pay chattel mortgage loans that Bontkowski had at FNBC, and the remainder was to be used to acquire property for Bontkowski’s business. Bontkowski signed a note for $370,000 and presented as collateral bearer bonds issued by the Industrial Development Corporation of Corpus Christi, which had a market value of approximately $480,000 (the “Corpus Christi Bonds”). On Berkovitz’s instructions, Giova disbursed $122,000 of the loan proceeds in the form of five cashier’s checks in amounts ranging from $20,000 to $35,000 and credited the remainder to Bontkowski’s account. Later that day, Berkovitz instructed Giova to make an additional advance of $100,000 against the bonds, and Giova did so.
The Corpus Christi Bonds had been stolen from Lewco Securities Corporation in New York on February 10, 1982. However, the theft of the bonds was not entered into the Securities Information Center database, a computerized registry for information concerning stolen stocks and bonds, until February 23, 1982. In early February, Berkovitz and Albert Rabin, who were both FBI informants, had separately reported to FBI agent Spinelli, their usual contact, that stolen bonds from New York were available in the Chicago area for 20-30% of their face value. Spinelli checked with the Securities Information Center about the Corpus Christi Bonds and informed Berkovitz and Rabin that the bonds had not been reported as stolen. On February 18, Berkovitz and Rabin informed Spinelli that the bonds were no longer available for sale.
C. Involvement of Defendant Bruun
In late 1981 or early 1982, Giova called David Bruun, an attorney he had dealt with since the 1970’s, and told him that he would like to introduce him to a potential “super-client,” i.e., Berkovitz. They met with Berkovitz at his apartment. Berkovitz described some of his business affairs and told Bruun to keep whatever services he might perform in the strictest confidence.
They met again and Berkovitz further described his current and potential business enterprises. He told Bruun that he and Giova would go into business together after Giova left FNBC. Berkovitz promised Bruun a retainer and annual fees of $60,000-$80,000 per year, which represented roughly a doubling of Bruun’s annual income. Berkovitz told Bruun that his first assignment would be to act as borrower for a loan against certain unidentified collateral that would be taken to FNBC. Berkovitz further admonished Bruun not to “advertise” the fact that he was representing Berkovitz or his companies.
In early March, Giova told Bruun that the collateral had arrived and that he should come to FNBC to sign the necessary papers. Bruun went to FNBC on March 11, 1982, and Giova showed him the collateral, which consisted of 99 Intermountain Power Agency bearer bonds with a market value of approximately $488,750. Giova took Bruun to the office of Joseph Schuessler, the President of FNBC, and directed Schussler’s secretary to “check” the bonds. She returned and reported that the bonds were “okay.” Bruun signed a collateral receipt for the bonds and a judgment note for $325,000 secured by the bonds. The purpose of the loan was represented as speculation in the gold market.
Bruun opened a client-trust checking account entitled the “David Bruun Trust Account,” and the loan proceeds were credited to it. He drew three certified checks on the account on March 11 and 12. Two were to one Mrs. St. Angelo for a total of $45,000, and one was to himself for $20,-000. The checks to Mrs. St. Angelo were used to purchase a boat for Berkovitz and Giova.
A similar procedure was followed for other loans, which were secured by shares of common stock in the Coca-Cola company; Gelco Corporation; UAL, Inc.; and Xerox Corporation, by bearer bonds of the New Jersey Health Care Facilities Financing Authority, and by additional bonds of the Intermountain Power Agency. The value of the collateral and the principal amount of the loans eventually exceeded $1.3 million. On at least one occasion, Giova made a loan on the Bruun account and wrote checks against the proceeds, signing Bruun’s name to both the note and the checks.
Checks on the Trust Account totalling more than $1.3 million were written and endorsed by Bruun. These checks were typically cashed by Adamczyk, Paul Babian, Bontkowski, or Vic Falzone at currency exchanges where the owners did not report transactions in excess of $10,000. This non-reporting was in violation of federal law. The owners of the exchanges charged two to three times the maximum statutory fee allowed by Illinois law for cashing the checks.
Bruun himself received a total of $28,000 from the account, $10,000 of which was a loan. None of the money Bruun received from the Trust Account was recorded by him as legal fees. His net business income for 1982 was reported as $30,000.
On June 8, 1982, Berkovitz called Giova to say that he needed an additional advance of $150,000, which was to be secured by the assignment of bearer bonds and coupons. The transaction was to be handled by John Flynn, a director at FNBC, but Flynn did not want to make the loan to Bruun. In fact, FNBC wanted to eliminate the Bruun loans altogether because the large amount of the loans was impairing its liquidity. Giova told Flynn that Bruun had interest coupons redeemable at the end of June in an amount that would exceed the loan advance. Flynn agreed to talk with Bruun. In their meeting, Bruun told Flynn that the money was needed for a margin call. Although Flynn said that FNBC would release the collateral to allow Bruun to get a loan from another bank, Bruun told him that this procedure would require too much time. Flynn finally agreed to make the loan for twenty days. After he had made the loan, Flynn examined the collateral and noted the name of the transfer agent for the bonds. In a telephone conversation with the transfer agent, Flynn discovered that the bonds had been stolen. It was subsequently determined that all of the securities used to secure the Bruun loans had been stolen.
D. Indictment and Trial
Defendants Berkovitz and Bruun, along with Giova, Bontkowski, Rabin, Adamczyk, Babian and Wade, were indicted by a grand jury in a multi-count indictment charging conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and several substantive counts involving: (1) the transportation of stolen securities in interstate commerce, (2) misapplication of the moneys, funds and credits of a federally insured bank, and (3) the making of false entries in the books, records and statements of such a bank. Giova pled guilty to some of the counts and was not tried on the others. Berkovitz and Bruun were tried together, despite their motions for severance, which the district court continued until the close of the case and then denied. Additionally, both moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that it was duplicitous and stated multiple conspiracies in a single count. Bruun filed a motion in limine to exclude statements he had made to the FBI and an Assistant United States Attorney, which motion was also denied.
Both defendants moved for acquittal at the close of the government’s case, and these motions were denied. Also at the close of the government’s case, the government dismissed the stolen securities counts against Bruun. Bruun then presented a defense consisting of stipulations and live testimony, including his own. Berkovitz neither testified nor offered any other witnesses.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all remaining counts. The defendants filed motions for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. In these motions, they renewed the issue of governmental misconduct, which had been continued from their pretrial motions. Both posttrial motions were denied.
Bruun was sentenced to one year each on counts one (conspiracy), five (misapplication), and six (misapplication), to be served concurrently, and to two years probation on counts seven through nine (misapplication), to run concurrently with each other,
but consecutively to the one-year sentence on the other counts. Berkovitz was sentenced to serve five years each on count one (conspiracy), counts five through seventeen and nineteen (misapplication), and count twenty (false entries). He was also sentenced to ten years on each of counts two through four (interstate transportation of stolen securities). All of those sentences were to run concurrently. He also was sentenced in 82-CR-004-1, a case in which he had been convicted of a similar bank fraud and placed on probation by the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. His probation had been transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, and, subsequent to his conviction on the charges involved in this case, Judge Plunkett revoked his probation and sentenced him to five years, to run consecutively with the sentence imposed in this case. For reasons which will become obvious, we will analyze the defendants’ claims separately.
II. No. 85-1909
Defendant Berkovitz raises a number of challenges to his conviction. He claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions under the substantive counts. With regard to the conspiracy count, he claims that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and proof, that the count was duplicitous, and that there was a misjoinder under Fed.R. Crim.P. 8. Additionally, he contends that the district court’s refusal to grant a severance was an abuse of discretion in light of his and Bruun’s “mutually antagonistic” defenses. Finally, Berkovitz contends that his conviction must be reversed as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the government. We agree that there was insufficient evidence as to the counts involving interstate transportation of stolen securities, but we find his other contentions to be without merit. Therefore, we will reverse his convictions on counts two through four (interstate transportation of stolen securities), but we will affirm his convictions on count one (conspiracy), counts five through seventeen and nineteen (misapplication) and count twenty (false entries).
A. Interstate Transportation of Stolen Securities
Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment charged that Berkovitz “transported and caused to be transported” in interstate commerce certain securities on February 18, March 11, and March 26, 1982, “knowing the same to have been stolen, converted and taken by fraud,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Berkovitz argues that the evidence adduced at trial does not support his convictions on these counts. We agree.
The evidence was quite clearly enough to support a finding that Berkovitz knew that the securities he was using as collateral for the loans were stolen, but that is not sufficient to support a conviction for violating § 2314. Berkovitz was not indicted for knowing receipt or negotiation of stolen securities, which would have been punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 2315, but rather for transporting them, or causing their transportation in interstate commerce. The receiver of an item is not, by virtue of that fact alone, considered to have transported it in interstate commerce.
The government might have been able to provide the requisite causal link had it shown that Berkovitz brought or induced another to bring the securities to Chicago, but it did not do so. In fact, the government conceded at oral argument before us that no such proof was made. Nonetheless, the government contends that the fact that the securities were delivered in Chicago a short time after their theft in New York, along with Berkovitz’s knowledge that they were received from someone who did not hold valid title, supplies the missing proof. At oral argument, the government pressed the theory that, by providing a ready market for the stolen securities, Berkovitz “caused” their transportation. We cannot agree, for to do so would obliterate the distinction between § 2314 and § 2315. See United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1068 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973).
Furthermore, while interstate commerce has been broadly defined in other contexts, see, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), this is a criminal action, which calls for precision in terminology. An individual must be adequately informed of the nature of the offense. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that a conviction for transporting or causing the transportation of stolen securities was supported by evidence which, at best, showed knowing receipt of stolen securities. Therefore, Berkovitz’s convictions on counts 2, 3 and 4 are reversed.
B. Variance Between Indictment and Proof — Single vs. Multiple Conspiracies
Berkovitz’s essential contention is that there were multiple conspiracies, rather than a single, overall conspiracy. He claims that this resulted in a variance between the indictment and proof, which prejudiced him and rendered the joinder of the separate counts improper under Fed.R. Crim.P. 8. We disagree.
As an initial matter, it appears to us that there was in fact a single conspiracy, the object of which was to defraud FNBC. That the means used to accomplish this goal were varied does not change the result. The gist of a conspiracy is an agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense, attended by an act of one or more of them to effect the object of the conspiracy. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63 S.Ct. 99, 101, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940); see also United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 606-09 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Ras, 713 F.2d 311, 314-15 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-42 (7th Cir.1969), appeal after remand, United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1311, 31 L.Ed.2d 581 (1972). The scope of the agreement determines the scope of the conspiracy, Varelli, 407 F.2d at 742, and there may be a single conspiracy even though the commission of two or more offenses is contemplated. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 53, 63 S.Ct. at 102. The allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous. Id. at 54, 63 S.Ct. at 102; United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33, 39 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 239, 15 L.Ed.2d 157 (1965); United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 753 (7th Cir.1952), aff'd on other grounds, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953).
Proper joinder is determined from the face of the indictment. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 277, 88 L.Ed.2d 241 (1985); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 655 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1982). Therefore, if the indictment charged a single conspiracy, joinder was proper notwithstanding the fact that the evidence at trial showed multiple conspiracies. See United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1190 n. 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949, 991, 102 S.Ct. 1451, 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 663 (1981). We believe that such a single conspiracy was alleged by the indictment in the instant case, even if the government proved multiple conspiracies at trial.
More importantly, even if there were multiple conspiracies, Berkovitz has failed to show that either the variance between the indictment and proof, or the joinder of the counts prejudiced him in any way. It is clear that reversal for improper joinder is not required if the error was harmless. An error involving misjoinder requires retrial only if it results in actual prejudice because it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. United States v. Lane, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). Here, quite clearly, any erroneous joinder was harmless. Even if there were, as Berkovitz contends, multiple “wheel” conspiracies, the evidence showed clearly that he was at the hub of each. Cf. United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir.1977) (When unrelated transactions involving several defendants are joined together it cannot be said that all defendants would not be prejudiced.). We note that Levine adopted a per se prejudice standard for joinder errors, and thus has been effectively overruled by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lane.
Any variance between the indictment and proof was harmless for a similar reason. While the charging of one conspiracy where the evidence shows multiple conspiracies is error, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), the error is harmless where the defendant is shown to have been a member of each of the allegedly separate conspiracies. United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 63, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985); United States v. Chamley, 376 F.2d 57, 60 n. 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898, 88 S.Ct. 221, 19 L.Ed.2d 220 (1967); see also United States v. Lindsey, 602 F.2d 785, 787 (7th Cir.1979) (fact that defendant could not have been part of overall conspiracy charged did not require reversal unless he was prejudiced by submission of overall conspiracy theory to jury). As we have noted, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that, if separate conspiracies were involved, Berkovitz was at the hub of each. In such a situation, the error, if any, was harmless.
C. Refusal to Grant a Severance
A related, but distinct, issue is whether the district court should have granted Berkovitz’s motion for a severance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, in light of Bruun’s defense that he was merely following Berkovitz’s instructions and was unaware of any illegal activity, i.e., that he was “conned” by Berkovitz. A refusal to grant a severance will be disturbed on appeal only if it results in manifest and substantial prejudice; in other words, it is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1220 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 523, 88 L.Ed.2d 456 (1985); see also United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1001, 79 L.Ed.2d 233 (1984); United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1227-28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 2842, 61 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Such prejudice cannot be shown here.
Berkovitz argues that his defense and that of his codefendant were “mutually antagonistic.” However, such a claim will only justify severance if the defenses “conflict to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive,” Shively, 715 F.2d at 268 (quoting United States v. Crawford, 581 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir.1978)), so that “acceptance of one defendant’s defense will preclude the acquittal of the other defendant.” Gironda, 758 F.2d at 1220.
The defenses in this case show little antagonism at all, much less the sort of drastic conflict that would justify our interfering with the district court’s exercise of its sound discretion. Berkovitz contended that the government failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; Bruun contended that the guilt, if any, belonged to Berkovitz rather than him. In Gironda, we rejected a contention that a defense based on non-participation in a conspiracy was inconsistent with a defense that the government failed to prove its case, even if one defendant’s counsel made a remark in opening argument that implied the existence of a conspiracy. 758 F.2d at 1220 (citing United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.1983)). Those authorities are controlling here. While there was no doubt some hostility and finger pointing during the joint trial, this alone is insufficient to justify granting a severance. See United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1313 (7th Cir.1976); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 620-21 (7th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012, 90 S.Ct. 573, 24 L.Ed.2d 504 (1970).
Two defendants are rarely pleased to be prosecuted together. The incidents to which Berkovitz refers were isolated events during a three-week trial. The district court conducted the proceedings in a manner that minimized prejudice and jury confusion, giving proper limiting instructions to focus the jury’s attention on the proof that could be considered against one defendant, but not the other. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the refusal to grant a severance was an abuse of discretion.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Aiding and Abetting the Misapplication of Bank Funds
Berkovitz challenges his conviction on the misapplication counts (counts 5-17, 19), not because there was insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted Giova. Instead, he contends that there was insufficient evidence that Giova misapplied bank funds. This contention is without merit. As we have noted before, an appellant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury verdict of conviction bears a heavy burden; we may only overturn such a verdict where the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S.Ct. 2661, 81 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984) (citing United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir.1977), and Brandom v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391, 1400 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022, 91 S.Ct. 586, 27 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970)); see also United States v. Reynolds, 801 F.2d 952, 954 (7th Cir.1986) (evidence reviewed in light most favorable to government and verdict sustained if any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Berkovitz has not sustained this burden.
The evidence that Giova misapplied bank funds is, in a word, overwhelming. A bank officer misapplies funds when, inter alia, he converts funds to his own use or that of a third party, lends money to a fictitious borrower, causes a loan to be made to his own benefit while concealing his interest from the bank, or violates state law or bank policy. See, e.g., United States v. Mohr, 728 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 148, 83 L.Ed.2d 87 (1984); United States v. Shive ly, 715 F.2d 260, 265-66 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1001, 79 L.Ed.2d 233 (1984); United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 103 (3d Cir.1979); United States v. Twiford, 600 F.2d 1339, 1341 (10th Cir.1979). The evidence shows that Giova engaged in a continuing course of conduct involving several types of misapplication, with the aid and at the direction of Berkovitz.
The fact that Giova and Berkovitz continued to process brokered loans through FNBC long after the bank had instituted a policy of not taking such loans from Berkovitz, while taking steps to conceal this fact from the bank, would alone be sufficient to sustain the conviction. Additionally, however, Berkovitz actually suggested a scheme that would allow Giova to make loans above his lending limit. Giova also made loans from which he received a portion of the proceeds and loans to a business that he was planning to join, a per se misapplication. Shively, 715 F.2d at 265. Finally, although he did not cause the interstate transportation of the securities, Berkovitz clearly knew that they were stolen. Their use to obtain loans from the bank was clearly a misapplication of its funds, and one for which, ultimately, the bank will be out of pocket.
Berkovitz’s argument seems to be that, in spite of all of the above mentioned acts, Giova lacked the requisite intent to injure FNBC. However, the “intent to injure” required by § 656 is not a subjective desire that the bank be harmed. Rather, it is sufficient that the loan officer engaged in acts, the natural tendency of which would be to injure the bank. United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1174 (3d Cir.1979); United States v. Farrell, 609 F.2d 816 (5th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Angelos, 763 F.2d 859, 861 (7th

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: F