Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

BIGGS, Circuit Judge.
Katherine Kraft, the petitioner and taxpayer, in 1930 and 1932 by indentures created five separate trusts for named beneficiaries. One of these was Clarance Conk-lin and the indenture creating the trust in his favor is typical. The second paragraph of that indenture provides in part that the taxpayer and grantor “* * * shall have the right by an instrument in writing executed under her hand and seal and personally served on the Trustees * * * at least five days before the expiration of any calendar year, to revoke this trust, in whole or in part, after the end of any such calendar year; the intent hereof being that the trust * * * shall continue from year to year unless the [grantor] revokes the same, in whole or in part, after the end of any such year, but that said power of revocation shall not exist or be in the [grantor] at any time during any calendar year and that same shall arise and come into existence only after the end of any such calendar year, nor shall there be power to revest in the [grantor] any part of the corpus of this trust during any such calendar year, but that the latter power shall arise and come into existence only after the end of any such calendar year * * *
The third paragraph provides that upon the termination of the trust all property and securities constituting the corpus shall belong absolutely to and shall vest immediately in. the grantor. The indenture also provides that if the grantor does' not exercise her powér of revocation the trust shall terminate upon the death of Conklin if he shall predecease the grantor, or upon the death of the grantor if she shall predecease Conklin.
The taxpayer gave no notice of revocation of any of the trusts prior to or during the calendar year 1933.- The trusts were in force during the whole of the calendar year 1934 and the beneficiaries received the income from the trusts during that year. The Commissioner contends that the income from the trusts for the taxable year 1934 was attributable and taxable to the taxpayer by virtue of the provisions of Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934, c. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 729, 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev.Acts, page 727.
Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934 provides:
“Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested—
“(1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, or
“(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then the income of such part of the trust shall be included in' computing the net income of the grantor.”
It will be observed that the power to revest the grantor with title to the corpora of the trusts is in her alone; that the power to revest is to be exercised at the time specified in the indentures, namely within the preceding calendar year (except for the last five days thereof); and that therefore the trusts are within the literal provisions of Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934. It is also clearly apparent that the income from the trusts for any years subsequent to 1934 would be taxable to the taxpayer, for if she has failed to take the necessary steps in 1934 to revoke the trusts for the year 1935 she must be deemed to have elected not to avail herself of the income. The taxpayer points out, however, that Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 840, and Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 221, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, pages 543, 727, in effect when the trusts respectively were created and continuing until the 1934 Act came into effect, contain the phrase “during the taxable year” placed directly after the phrase “at any time” and that the phrase first referred to was omitted from Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934. The taxpayer points out that she has not had the opportunity, with knowledge that the income from the trusts for the year 1934 would be taxable to her, to avail herself of the income from the trusts since to do this she would have had to have exercised her power of revocation prior to December 26, 1933. She contends that since the Revenue Act of 1934 became effective on May 10, 1934, the Commissioner in taxing the income from the trusts to her gives retroactive effect to the provisions of Section 166, depriving her of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We are of the opinion, however, that the decision of the Supreme Court in Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 175, 53 S.Ct. 570, 77 L.Ed. 1109, disposes of this contention for reasons which we will now state.
In the Reinecke case as in the case at bar, the taxpayer contended that the exaction was not based upon the taxpayer’s income or income from the taxpayer’s property, but upon income which had accrued to others upon property belonging to others. In the Reinecke case the taxpayer at all times retained the power to repossess the corpora. In the instant case the taxpayer at any time possessed the power to repossess the corpora. In the Reinecke case as in the case at bar, the income sought to be taxed to the grantor had already been received by the cestuis and was not recoverable by the grantor. The measure of control retained by the grantor over the corpora of the trusts is within the literal language of Section 166 and we hold the application of the Section by the Commissioner to have been constitutional. '
The case at bar might be decided upon the authority of Helvering, Commissioner, v. Clifford, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. -, by holding the income from the trusts to be includable within the “gross income” of the taxpayer within the purview of Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 686, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev. Acts page 669. Two reasons dissuade us from this course, however. First, a family relationship between the settlor and the cestuis has not been proved though such might be inferred from some of the surnames appearing in the indentures. Second, the assessment of the deficiency by the Commissioner was based entirely upon Section 166 and the Board also bottomed its decision upon that Section. We do likewise. Helvering v. Wood, 60 S.Ct. 551, 84 L.Ed. —.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0