Task: songer_appel1_7_5

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
Stanley Davis appeals the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. We affirm.
Davis, who was then confined in the Maryland House of Correction, filed a complaint by counsel on October 7, 1975, alleging that he had been denied essential medical treatment for a hip injury received before his incarceration. He sought damages and an injunction preventing further deprivations of his constitutional and statutory rights, and he immediately applied for a preliminary injunction.
When the district court heard the request for a preliminary injunction on October 17, 1975, the prison officials agreed to give Davis the necessary treatment. From that time forward, Davis was repeatedly scheduled for diagnostic examinations by specialists. He generally failed to cooperate with the doctors and the officials who were attempting to arrange treatment for his injury. In late 1976, the parties agreed that Davis would be operated upon by a private surgeon of his choice. However, Davis failed to make the arrangements for the operation. Again and again, the district court requested information, urged Davis’s counsel to proceed with his damages claim, and warned that the case would be dismissed unless the plaintiff took action. However, the case essentially lay dormant from January, 1976, until October 20, 1977. On that date, the district court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution.
The district court had authority under Rule 41(b) to dismiss the case with prejudice, on its own motion, for failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). The sole issue, therefore, is whether it abused its discretion. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976).
A dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction which should not be invoked lightly in view .of “the sound public policy of deciding cases on their merits.” Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974); 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2370, at 216-17. Against this policy, the district court must balance considerations of sound judicial administration, applying four criteria: (1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (2) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (3) the presence or absence of a “ ‘drawn out history’ of ‘deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion;’ ” and (4) the effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 (4th Cir. 1976).
Applying these standards, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case. Davis is not blameless. On November 10,1975, he refused to keep an appointment for diagnostic tests because he could not take his radio with him. Three days later he declined to discuss his condition with an orthopedist. This and other obstructive conduct on Davis’s part distinguishes this case from our decisions setting aside' dismissals on which Davis relies.
In addition, the record amply supports a finding that there was a long history of delay. The district court found that Davis’s counsel “steadfastly refused to take the initiative in this litigation.” For example, on several occasions, letters from the court to the attorney went unanswered, and the court found it necessary to make repeated requests for information. When information was finally given, it was incomplete. The district court held that the appellant could not shift the blame for these deficiencies to the prison officials, and this conclusion is fully supported by the evidence.
On appeal, counsel for Davis contends that he did not press the proceedings because he understood that they were to be suspended until after the surgery. This assertion is rebutted by the fact that the district court warned Davis’s counsel that the action would be dismissed if it were not promptly prosecuted. Moreover, ten days after Davis filed suit, he obtained full assurance of adequate medical treatment, and there has been no showing of bad faith in the implementation of that promise. The deprivation of Davis’s right to medical care, if any, came to a halt at that time, and there is no basis in the record for an assessment of damages beyond that point. Consequently, there was no justification for delaying trial of Davis’s damage claim for nearly two years to the detriment of the prison officials.
The United States District Court in Maryland has a crowded docket. Appropriate sanctions must be available to prevent its work from being impeded by the type of conduct disclosed by this record. Referring to involuntary dismissals, the Supreme Court recently observed in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976):
[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to- the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct, may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. Davis has since been released from custody.
. Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807 (4th Cir. 1978); McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976); Bush v. United States Postal Service, 496 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1974); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1974).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?
A. not ascertained
B. poor + wards of state
C. presumed poor
D. presumed wealthy
E. clear indication of wealth in opinion
F. other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy
Answer:

Answer: A