Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The primary issue in this case is whether a district court order denying a motion to stay or dismiss an action when a similar suit is pending in state court is immediately appealable.
I
Petitioner Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and respondent Mayacamas Corporation entered into a contract under which respondent agreed to purchase an aircraft manufactured by petitioner. Respondent subsequently refused to make payments due, claiming that petitioner, by increasing the production and availability of its aircrafts, had frustrated respondent’s purpose in the transaction, which was to sell the aircraft when demand was high. Petitioner thereupon filed suit against respondent for breach of contract in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia. Respondent, declining to remove this action to federal court, filed both an answer and a counterclaim. In addition, approximately one month after the commencement of petitioner’s state-court suit, respondent filed a diversity action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. This action alleged breach of the same contract that formed the basis of petitioner’s state-court suit.
Petitioner promptly moved for a stay or dismissal of the federal-court action pursuant to the doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976). In Colorado River, we held that in “exceptional” circumstances, a federal district court may stay or dismiss an action solely because of the pendency of similar litigation in state court. Id., at 818; see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 13-19 (1983). Petitioner argued that the circumstances of this case supported a stay or dismissal of the federal-court action under Colorado River. The District Court disagreed. Finding that “the facts of this case fall short of those necessary to justify” the discontinuance of a federal-court proceeding under Colorado River, the District Court denied petitioner’s motion. See No. C 85-20658 RPA (ND Cal., Jan. 24, 1986).
Petitioner 'filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, alleging that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal under either 28 U. S. C. § 1291 or 28 U. S. C. § 1292(a)(1). Petitioner also requested the Court of Appeals, in the event it found that neither of these sections provided appellate jurisdiction, to treat the notice of appeal as an application for a writ of mandamus, brought pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, and to grant the application. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that neither § 1291 nor § 1292(a)(1) allowed an immediate appeal from the District Court’s order. 806 F. 2d 928, 929-930 (1987). The Court of Appeals then declined to treat petitioner’s notice of appeal as an application for mandamus on the ground that the District Court’s order would not cause “serious hardship or prejudice” to petitioner. Id., at 930. Finally, the Court of Appeals stated that even if the notice of appeal were to be treated as an application for mandamus, petitioner did not have a right to the writ because “[i]t was well within the district court’s discretion to deny” petitioner’s motion. Id., at 930-931.
We granted certiorari, 481 U. S. 1068 (1987), to resolve a division in the Circuits as to whether a district court’s denial of a motion to stay litigation pending the resolution of a similar proceeding in state court is immediately appealable. We now affirm.
II
Petitioner’s principal contention in this case is that the District Court’s order denying the motion to stay or dismiss the federal-court litigation is immediately appealable under § 1291. That section provides for appellate review of “final decisions” of the district courts. This Court long has stated that as a general rule a district court’s decision is appealable under this section only when the decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945). The order at issue in this case has no such effect: indeed, the order ensures that litigation will continue in the District Court. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), however, we recognized a “small class” of decisions that are appealable under § 1291 even though they do not terminate the underlying litigation. Id., at 546. We stated in Cohen that a district court’s decision is appealable under § 1291 if it “finally determine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Ibid. Petitioner asserts that the District Court’s decision in this case falls within Cohen’s “collateral order” doctrine.
Since Cohen, we have had many occasions to revisit and refine the collateral-order exception to the final-judgment rule. We have articulated a three-pronged test to determine whether an order that does not finally resolve a litigation is nonetheless appealable under § 1291. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978); see also, e. g., Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 431 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 375 (1981). First, the order must “conclusively determine the disputed question.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S., at 468. Second, the order must “résolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action.” Ibid. Third and finally, the order must be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of these requirements, it is not appealable under the collateral-order exception to § 1291.
This Court held in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983), that a district court order granting a stay of litigation pursuant to Colorado River meets each of the three requirements of the collateral-order doctrine and therefore is appealable under §1291. 460 U. S., at 11-13. In applying the collateral-order doctrine, we found that an order refusing to proceed with litigation because of the pendency of a similar action in state court satisfies the second and third prongs of the test. We stated that such an order “plainly presents an important issue separate from the merits” and that it would be “unreviewable if not appealed now” because once the state court has decided the issues in the litigation, the federal court must give that determination res judicata effect. Id., at 12 (footnote omitted). The Court gave more extended treatment to the first requirement of the collateral-order doctrine that the order “conclusively determine the disputed question.” We contrasted two kinds of nonfinal orders: those that are “ ‘inherently tentative,’” id., at 12, n. 14, quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, at 469, n. 11, and those that, although technically amendable, are “made with the expectation that they will be the final word on the subject addressed,” 460 U. S., at 12, n. 14. We used the order challenged in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, which denied certification of a class, as an example of the kind of order that is inherently tentative because a district court ordinarily would expect to reassess and revise such an order in response to events occurring “in the ordinary course of litigation.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., supra, at 13, n. 14. We then stated that an order granting a stay of litigation in federal court pursuant to the doctrine of Colorado River was not of this tentative nature. An order granting a Colorado River stay, we noted, “necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case” because a district court may enter such an order only if it has full confidence that the parallel state proceeding will “be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between the parties.” 460 U. S., at 28; see id., at 13. Given that a district court normally would expect the order granting the stay to settle the matter for all time, the “conclusiveness” prong of the collateral-order doctrine is satisfied and the order is appealable under § 1291.
Application of the collateral-order test to an order denying a motion to stay or dismiss an action pursuant to Colorado River, however, leads to a different result. We need not decide whether the denial of such a motion satisfies the second and third prongs of the collateral-order test — the separability of the decision from the merits of the action and the review-ability of the decision on appeal from final judgment — because the order fails to meet the initial requirement of a conclusive determination of the disputed question. A district court that denies a Colorado River motion does not “necessarily contemplate” that the decision will close the matter for all time. In denying such a motion, the district court may well have determined only that it should await further developments before concluding that the balance of factors to be considered under Colorado River, see n. 1, supra, warrants a dismissal or stay. The district court, for example, may wish to see whether the state-court proceeding becomes more comprehensive than the federal-court action or whether the former begins to proceed at a more rapid pace. Thus, whereas the granting of a Colorado River motion necessarily implies an expectation that the state court will resolve the dispute, the denial of such a motion may indicate nothing more than that the district court is not completely confident of the propriety of a stay or dismissal at that time. Indeed, given both the nature' of the factors to be considered under Colorado River and the natural tendency of courts to attempt to eliminate matters that need not be decided from their dockets, a district court usually will expect to revisit and reassess an order denying a stay in light of events occurring in the normal course of litigation. Because an order denying a Colorado River motion is “inherently tentative” in this critical sense— because it is not “made with the expectation that [it] will be the final word on the subject addressed” — the order is not a conclusive determination within the meaning of the collateral-order doctrine and therefore is not appealable under § 1291.
III
Petitioner argues in the alternative that the District Court’s order in this case is immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1), which gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions. An order by a federal court that relates only to the conduct or progress of litigation before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction and therefore is not appeal-able under § 1292(a)(1). See Switzerland Cheese Assn., Inc. v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., 385 U. S. 23, 25 (1966); International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 406 (CA2 1963) (Friendly, J.). Under the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, however, certain orders that stay or refuse to stay judicial proceedings are considered injunctions and therefore are immediately appealable. Petitioner asserts that the order in this case, which denied a motion for a stay of a federal-court action pending the resolution of a concurrent state-court proceeding, is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) pursuant to the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine.
The line of cases we must examine to resolve this claim began some 50 years ago, when this Court decided Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (1935). At the time of that decision, law and equity remained separate jurisprudential systems in the federal courts. The same judges administered both these systems, however, so that a federal district judge was both a chancellor in equity and a judge at law. In Enelow, the plaintiff sued at law to recover on a life insurance policy. The insurance company raised the affirmative defense that the policy had been obtained by fraud and moved the District Court to stay the trial of the law action pending resolution of this equitable defense. The District Court granted this motion, and the plaintiff appealed. This Court likened the stay to an injunction issued by an equity court to restrain an action at law. The Court stated:
“[T]he grant or refusal of... a stay by a court of equity of proceedings at law is a grant or refusal of an injunction within the meaning of [the statute. ] And, in this aspect, it makes no difference that the two cases, the suit in equity for an injunction and the action at law in which proceedings are stayed, are both pending in the same court, in view of the established distinction between ‘proceedings at law and proceedings in equity in the national courts....’
“It is thus apparent that when an order or decree is made... requiring, or refusing to require, that an equitable defense shall first be tried, the court, exercising what is essentially an equitable jurisdiction, in effect grants or refuses an injunction restraining proceedings at law precisely as if the court had acted upon a bill of complaint in a separate suit for the same purpose.” Id., at 382-383.
The Court thus concluded that the District Court’s order was appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
In Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U. S. 188 (1942), the Court reaffirmed the rule of Enelow, notwithstanding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had fully merged law and equity in the interim. The relevant facts of Ettelson were identical to those of Enelow, and the Court responded to them in the same fashion. In response to the argument that the fusion of law and equity had destroyed the analogy between the stay ordered in the action and an injunction issued by a chancellor of a separate proceeding at law, the Court stated only that the plaintiffs were “in no differenposition than if a state equity court had restrained them from proceeding in the law action.” 317 U. S., at 192. Thus, the order granting the stay was held to be immediately appeal-able as an injunction.
The historical analysis underlying the results in Enelow and Ettelson has bred a doctrine of curious contours. Under the Enelow-Ettelson rule, most recently restated in Balti more Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U. S. 176 (1955), an order by a federal court staying or refusing to stay its own proceedings is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) as thé grant or denial of an injunction if two conditions are met. First, the action in which the order is entered must be an action that, before the merger of law and equity, was by its nature an action at law. Second, the order must arise from or be based on some matter that would then have been considered an equitable defense or counterclaim. If both conditions are satisfied, the historical equivalent of the modern order would have been an injunction, issued by a separate equity court, to restrain proceedings in an action at law. If either condition is not met, however, the historical analogy fails. When the underlying suit is historically equitable and the stay is based on a defense or counterclaim that is historically legal, the analogy fails because a law judge had no power to issue an injunction restraining equitable proceedings. And when both the underlying suit and the defense or counterclaim on which the stay is based are historically equitable, or when both are historically legal, the analogy fails because when a chancellor or a law judge stayed an action in his own court, he was not issuing an injunction, but merely arranging matters on his docket. Thus, unless a stay order is made in a historically legal action on the basis of a historically equitable defense or counterclaim, the order cannot be analogized to a premerger injunction and therefore cannot be appealed under § 1292(a)(1) pursuant to the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine.
The parties in this case dispute whether the Enelow-Ettelson rule makes the District Court’s decision to deny a stay immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1). Both parties agree that an action for breach of contract was an action at law prior to the merger of law and equity. They vigorously contest, however, whether the stay of an action pending the resolution of similar proceedings in a state court is equitable in the requisite sense. Petitioner relies primarily on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Microsoftware Computer Systems, Inc. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F. 2d 531 (1982). That court held that a stay issued under Colorado River is based on the policy of avoiding “the unnecessary and wasteful duplication of lawsuits,” which is historically an equitable defense. 686 F. 2d, at 536. Respondent, on the other hand, urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in this case. In its decision, the court below drew a distinction between motions that raised equitable “defenses” and motions that raised equitable “considerations.” 806 F. 2d, at 929-930. The court held that a motion for a stay pursuant to Colorado River was based only on equitable considerations and that the Enelow-Ettelson rule therefore did not apply.
We decline to address the issue of appealability in these terms; indeed, the sterility of the debate between the parties illustrates the need for a more fundamental consideration of the precedents in this area. This Court long has understood that the Enelow-Ettelson rule is deficient in utility and sense. In the two cases we have decided since Ettelson relating to the rule, we criticized its perpetuation of “outmoded procedural differentiations” and its consequent tendency to produce incongruous results. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, supra, at 184; see Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U. S. 254, 257-258 (1949). We refrained then from overruling the Enelow and Ettelson decisions, but today we take that step. A half century’s experience has persuaded us, as it has persuaded an impressive array of judges and commentators, that the rule is unsound in theory, unworkable and arbitrary in practice, and unnecessary to achieve any legitimate goals.
As an initial matter, the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine is, in the modern world of litigation, a total fiction. Even when the rule was announced, it was artificial. Although at that time law and equity remained two separate systems, they were administered by the same judges. When a single official was both chancellor and law judge, a stay of an action at law on equitable grounds required nothing more than an order issued by the official regulating the progress of the litigation before him, and the decision tó call this order an injunction just because it would have been an injunction in a system with separate law and equity judges had little justification. With the merger of law and equity, which was accomplished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the practice of describing these stays as injunctions lost all connection with the reality of the federal courts’ procedural system. As Judge Charles Clark, the principal draftsman of the Rules, wrote:
“[W]e lack any rationale to explain the concept of a judge enjoining himself when he merely decides upon the method he will follow in trying the case. The metamorphosis of a law judge into a hostile chancellor on the other ‘side’ of the court could not have been overclear to the lay litigant under the divided procedure; but if now without even that fictitious sea change one judge in one form of action may split his judicial self at one instant into two mutually antagonistic parts, the litigant surely will think himself in Alice’s Wonderland.”' Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F. 2d 563, 565 (CA2 1942).
The Endow rule had presupposed two different systems of justice administered by separate tribunals, even if these tribunals were no more than two “sides” to the same court; with the abandonment of that separation, the premise of the rule disappeared. The doctrine, and the distinctions it drew between equitable and legal actions and defenses, lost all moorings to the actual practice of the federal courts.
The artificiality of the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine is not merely an intellectual infelicity; the gulf between the historical procedures underlying the rule and the modern procedures of federal courts renders the rule hopelessly unworkable in operation. The decisions in Enelow and Ettelson treated as straightforward the questions whether the underlying suit, on the one hand, and the motion for a stay, on the other, would properly have been brought in a court of equity or in a court of law. Experience since the merger of law and equity, however, has shown that both questions are frequently difficult and sometimes insoluble. Suits that involve diverse claims and request diverse forms of relief often are not easily categorized as equitable or legal. As one Court of Appeals complained in handling such a suit, “Enelow-Ettelson is virtually impossible to apply to a complaint... in which the averments and prayers are a purée of legal and equitable theories and of claims that had no antecedents in the old bifurcated system.” Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F. 2d 454, 456 (CA9 1973). Actions for declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equitable, and courts have therefore had to look to the kind of action that would have been brought had Congress not provided the declaratory judgment remedy. Thus, the rule' has placed courts “in the unenviable position not only of solving modern procedural problems by the application of labels which have no currency, but also of considering the nature of law suits which were never brought.” Diematic Manufacturing Corp. v. Packaging Industries, Inc., 516 F. 2d 975, 978 (CA2), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 913 (1975). The task of characterizing stays as based in either law or equity has proved equally intractable. In an early case applying the doctrine, for example, this Court held that a stay of an action at law pending arbitration is appealable as an injunction because “the special defense setting up the arbitration agreement is an equitable defense.” Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 452 (1935). But as one Court of Appeals has noted, a chancellor could not have enforced an arbitration agreement and, correlatively, could not have stayed a suit at law pending arbitration. See Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F. 2d 731, 735 (CA7 1986), citing, e. g., J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings § 804 (J. Gould 10th rev. ed. 1892). More recently, lower courts have differed as to whether a stay pending the completion of administrative proceedings is based on

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 行