Task: songer_r_state

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from the district court dismissal of taxpayers’ complaint which sought to restrain appellees from enforcing assessments in California personal income taxes for the years 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954. The district court determined that it was compelled to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (sometimes called the Johnston Act). This section states:
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
We find the district court properly invoked this provision to dismiss appellants’ complaint.
The facts in this matter are undisputed. In 1955, the California Franchise Tax Board made an administrative determination that certain deductions taken by appellants in their tax returns for the years 1951 through 1954 should be disallowed. This decision was based upon former Revenue and Taxation Code Section 17359 (since renumbered Section 17297), disallowing deductions relating to certain designated illegal activities. This section provides:
“In computing taxable income, no deductions shall be allowed to any taxpayer on any of his gross income derived from illegal activities as defined in Chapters 9, 10 or 10.5 of Title 9 of Part 1 of the Penal Code of California; nor shall any deductions be allowed to any taxpayer on any of his gross income derived from any other activities which tend to promote or to further, or are connected or associated with, such illegal activities.”
Appellants entered a formal protest with the Franchise Tax Board challenging the proposed assessments. Upon denial of this protest, appellants exercised their right to an administrative appeal to the State Board of Equalization. This appeal also resulted in a decision adverse to the taxpayers. Appellants then proceeded to petition the State Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ enjoining the collection of the assessments on the ground that the Revenue and Taxation Code section authorizing the disal-lowance of deductions related to illegal activities violated the Federal Constitution. The California Supreme Court rejected appellants’ prayer for extraordinary relief, invoking the prohibitions against restraining orders contained in both the Personal Income Tax Law (Rev. & Tax.Code § 19081) and the State Constitution (Sec. 15, art. XIII). Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal.2d 177, 32 Cal.Rptr. 1, 383 P.2d 409 (1963). In declining to grant the requested injunctive relief, the State Supreme Court held that appellants’ pending petition for rehearing before the Equalization Board necessitated a finding that their prayer for judicial relief was premature. The Court noted, however, that the taxpayers’ proper course of action upon exhaustion of all administrative remedies was to pay the assessments and then initiate a refund action in a trial de novo in the state courts. The Court expressly stated that this refund procedure in no way infringed upon the rights of the taxpayers under the Federal Constitution. 60 Cal.2d at 179, 32 Cal.Rptr. 1, 383 P.2d 409. Taxpayers’ subsequent appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantia] federal question.
We find it necessary to consider only one of the number of alternative grounds urged by appellee for affirming the district court order of dismissal. The district court founded its dismissal on 28 U.S.C. § 1341 and, as indicated above, we find that reliance on that statutory provision was proper. It has consistently been held, without a single instance of deviation, that the refund action provided by California Personal Income Tax Law is a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” such as to invoke the restraints of 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The Supreme Court opinion in Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S.Ct. 217, 76 L.Ed. 447 (1932), was the first of a long series of cases to illumine the need, implicitly recognized in § 1341, for state independence in state fiscal matters. That case, just as the case at bar, involved an attempt to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts to restrain collection of tax assessments despite the presence of a state procedure for refund suits. In reaching the conclusion that federal equity jurisdiction should not intrude into state fiscal matters where plain, adequate and complete remedies were available at law, the Court articulated its oft-quoted philosophy as follows:
“The reason for this guiding principle is of peculiar force in cases where the suit, like the present one, is brought to enjoin the collection of a state tax in courts of a different, though paramount, sovereignty. The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it. Whenever the question has been presented, this Court has uniformly held that the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal tax is not in itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. If the remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state courts, from which the cause may be brought to this Court for review if any federal question be involved, Jud.Code § 237 (28 U.S.C.A. § 344), or to his suit at law in the federal courts if the essential elements of federal jurisdiction are present.” 284 U.S. at 525-526, 52 S.Ct. at 219-220.
The uniform adherence to the philosophy expressed by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Rodgers leads us to conclude that the district court correctly dismissed appellants’ complaint.
The case of Schaffer v. State Bd. of Equalization, 109 Cal.App.2d 574, 241 P. 2d 46 (1952), cited by both parties at oral argument, in fact refutes the very proposition which appellant seeks to advance. In that case, the taxpayer was permitted to indirectly enjoin the collection of a portion of a Sales and Use Tax assessment but only because his suit was a refund claim for the tax installment already paid. The court stated:
“We think the plaintiffs having made a payment on account, that payment having been accepted, and the plaintiffs’ claim for refund having been denied, the plaintiffs may bring an action to recover the amount so paid. * * * [T]he relief properly asked, that is, the recovery of the sum paid, may be granted and if, as an indirect result, matters are adjudicated which would be res judicata as between the parties hereto in any other proceedings wherein the validity of the tax was put in issue, that fact presents no obstacle to the granting of the relief which is properly asked and which the statute declares may be given.” 109 Cal.App.2d at 577, 241 P.2d at 48.
This case, therefore, does not authorize the injunctive relief requested by appellants.
The order of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 7