Task: sc_precedentalteration

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the opinion effectively says that the decision in this case "overruled" one or more of the Court's own precedents. Alteration also extends to language in the majority opinion that states that a precedent of the Supreme Court has been "disapproved," or is "no longer good law". Note, however, that alteration does not apply to cases in which the Court "distinguishes" a precedent.

Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We brought this case here to consider whether The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, in which this Court held in 1886 that maritime law does not afford a cause of action for wrongful death, should any longer be regarded as acceptable law.
The complaint sets forth that Edward Moragne, a longshoreman, was killed while working aboard the vessel Palmetto State in navigable waters within the State of Florida. Petitioner, as his widow and representative of his estate, brought this suit in a state court against respondent States Marine Lines, Inc., the owner of the vessel, to recover damages for wrongful death and for the pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his death. The claims were predicated upon both negligence and the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
States Marine removed the case to the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida on the basis of diversity of citizenship, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332, 1441, and there filed a third-party complaint against respondent Gulf Florida Terminal Company, the decedent’s employer, asserting that Gulf had contracted to perform stevedoring services on the vessel in a workmanlike manner and that any negligence or unseaworthiness causing the accident resulted from Gulf’s operations.
Both States Marine and Gulf sought dismissal of the portion of petitioner’s complaint that requested damages for wrongful death on the basis of unseaworthiness. They contended that maritime law provided no recovery for wrongful death within a State’s territorial waters, and that the statutory right of action for death under Florida law, Fla. Stat. § 768.01 (1965), did not encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. The District Court dismissed the challenged portion of the complaint on this ground, citing this Court’s decision in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588 (1959), and cases construing the state statute, but made the certification necessary under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) to allow petitioner an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals took advantage of a procedure furnished by state law, Fla. Stat. §25.031 (1965), to certify to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the state wrongful-death statute allowed recovery for unseaworthiness as that concept is understood in maritime law. After reviewing the history of the Florida Act, the state court answered this question in the negative. 211 So. 2d 161 (1968). On return of the case to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the District Court’s order, rejecting petitioner’s argument that she was entitled to reversal under federal maritime law without regard to the scope of the state statute. 409 F. 2d 32 (1969). The court stated that its disposition was compelled by our decision in The Tungus. We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 900 (1969), and invited the United States to participate as amicus curiae, id., at 952, to reconsider the important question of remedies under federal maritime law for tortious deaths on state territorial waters.
In The Tungus this Court divided on the consequences that should flow from the rule of maritime law that “in the absence of a statute there is no action for wrongful death,” first announced in The Harrisburg. All members of the Court agreed that where a death on state territorial waters is left remediless by the general maritime law and by federal statutes, a remedy may be provided under any applicable state law giving a right of action for death by wrongful act. However, four Justices dissented from the Court’s further holding that “when admiralty adopts a State’s right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the creating State has attached.” 358 U. S., at 592. The dissenters would have held that federal maritime law could utilize the state law to “supply a remedy” for breaches of federally imposed duties, without regard to any substantive limitations contained in the state law. Id., at 697, 599.
The extent of the role to be played by state law under The Tungus has been the subject of substantial debate and uncertainty in this Court, see Hess v. United States, 361 U. S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U. S. 340 (1960), with opinions on both sides of the question acknowledging the shortcomings in the present law. See 361 U. S., at 314-315, 338-339. On fresh consideration of the entire subject, we have concluded that the primary source of the confusion is not to be found in The Tungus, but in The Harrisburg, and that the latter decision, somewhat dubious even when rendered, is such an unjustifiable anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no longer be followed. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The Court's opinion in The Harrisburg acknowledged that the result reached had little justification except in primitive English legal history — a history far removed from the American law of remedies for maritime deaths. That case, like this, was a suit on behalf of the family of a maritime worker for his death on the navigable waters of a State. Following several precedents in the lower federal courts, the trial court awarded damages against the ship causing the death, and the circuit court affirmed, ruling that death by maritime tort “may be complained of as an injury, and the wrong redressed under the general maritime law.” 15 F. 610, 614 (1883). This Court, in reversing, relied primarily on its then-recent decision in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1878), in which it had held that in American common law, as in English, “no civil action lies for an injury which results in... death.” Id., at 756. In The Harrisburg, as in Brame, the Court did not examine the justifications for this common-law rule; rather, it simply noted that “we know of no country that has adopted a different rule on this subject for the sea from that which it maintains on the land,” and concluded, despite contrary decisions of the lower federal courts both before and after Brame, that the rule of Brame should apply equally to maritime deaths. 119 U. S., at 213.
Our analysis of the history of the common-law rule indicates that it was based on a particular set of factors that had, when The Harrisburg was decided, long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that had never existed in this country at all. Further, regardless of the viability of the rule in 1886 as applied to American land-based affairs, it is difficult to discern an adequate reason for its extension to admiralty, a system of law then already differentiated in many respects from the common law.
One would expect, upon an inquiry into the sources of the common-law rule, to find a clear and compelling justification for what seems a striking departure from the result dictated by elementary principles in the law of remedies. Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death. On the contrary, that rule has been criticized ever since its inception, and described in such terms as “barbarous.” E. g., Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88, 94 (1873) (Lord Bramwell, dissenting) ; F. Pollock, Law of Torts 55 (Landon ed. 1951); 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 676-677 (3d ed. 1927). Because the primary duty already exists, the decision whether to allow recovery for violations causing death is entirely a remedial matter. It is true that the harms to be assuaged are not identical in the two cases: in the case of mere injury, the person physically harmed is made whole for his harm, while in the case of death, those closest to him — usually spouse and children — seek to recover for their total loss of one on whom they depended. This difference, however, even when coupled with the practical difficulties of defining the class of beneficiaries who may recover for death, does not seem to account for the law’s refusal to recognize a wrongful killing as an actionable tort. One expects, therefore, to find a persuasive, independent justification for this apparent legal anomaly.
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial basis for the rule at common law is a feature of the early English law that did not survive into this century— the felony-merger doctrine. See Pollock, supra, at 52-57; Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431 (1916). According to this doctrine, the common law did not allow civil recovery for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony. The tort was treated as less important than the offense against the Crown, and was merged into, or pre-empted by, the felony. Smith v. Sykes, 1 Freem. 224, 89 Eng. Rep. 160 (K. B. 1677); Higgins v. Butcher, Yel. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K. B. 1606). The doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was the death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his property on which to base a civil action. Since all intentional or negligent homicide was felonious, there could be no civil suit for wrongful death.
The first explicit statement of the common-law rule against recovery for wrongful death came in the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, sitting at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did not cite authority, or give supporting reasoning, or refer to the felony-merger doctrine in announcing that “[i]n a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.” Ibid. Nor had the felony-merger doctrine seemingly been cited as the basis for the denial of recovery in any of the other reported wrongful-death cases since the earliest ones, in the 17th century. E. g., Smith v. Sykes, supra; Higgins v. Butcher, supra. However, it seems clear from those first cases that the rule of Baker v. Bolton did derive from the felony-merger doctrine, and that there was no other ground on which it might be supported even at the time of its inception. The House of Lords in 1916 confirmed this historical derivation, and held that although the felony-merger doctrine was no longer part of the law, the rule against recovery for wrongful death should continue except as modified by statute. Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika, [1917] A. C. 38. Lord Parker’s opinion acknowledged that the rule was “anomalous... to the scientific jurist,” but concluded that because it had once found justification in the doctrine that “the trespass was drowned in the felony,” it should continue as a rule “explicable on historical grounds” even after the disappearance of that justification. Id., at 44, 50; see 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 676-677 (3d ed. 1927). Lord Sumner agreed, relying in part on the fact that this Court had adopted the English rule in Brame. Although conceding the force of Lord Bramwell’s dissent in Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Ex. 88, 93 (1873), against the rule, Lord Parker stated that it was not “any part of the functions of this House to consider what rules ought to prevail in a logical and scientific system of jurisprudence,” and thus that he was bound simply to follow the past decisions. [1917] A. C., at 42-43.
The historical justification marshaled for the rule in England never existed in this country. In limited instances American law did adopt a vestige of the felony-merger doctrine, to the effect that a civil action was delayed until after the criminal trial. However, in this country the felony punishment did not include forfeiture of property; therefore, there was nothing, even in those limited instances, to bar a subsequent civil suit. E. g., Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawanna & West. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. 317, 319-320, 13 A. 233, 234 (1888); Hyatt v. Adams. 16 Mich. 180, 185-188 (1867); see W. Prosser, Law of Torts 8, 920-924 (3d ed. 1964). Nevertheless, despite some early cases in which the rule was rejected as “incapable of vindication,” e. g., Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 23 F. Cas. 368, 371 (No. 13,599) (C. C. Neb. 1874); Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); cf. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794), American courts generally adopted the English rule as the common law of this country as well. Throughout the period of this adoption, culminating in this Court’s decision in Brame, the courts failed to produce any satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country.
Some courts explained that their holdings were prompted by an asserted difficulty in computation of damages for wrongful death or by a “repugnance... to setting a price upon human life.” E. g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 272-273 (1856); Hyatt v. Adams, supra, at 191. However, other courts have recognized that calculation of the loss sustained by dependents or by the estate of the deceased, which is required under most present wrongful-death statutes, see Smith, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N. C. L. Rev. 402, 405-406, nn. 17, 18 (1966), does not present difficulties more insurmountable than assessment of damages for many nonfatal personal injuries. See Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386, 388 (No. 6,625) (D. C. Md. 1879); Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 28 Barb. 9, 17-18 (N. Y. 1858).
It was suggested by some courts and commentators that the prohibition of nonstatutory wrongful-death actions derived support from the ancient common-law rule that a personal cause of action in tort did not survive the death of its possessor, e. g., Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R. Co., 53 Ky. 204, 206 (1853); and the decision in Baker v. Bolton itself may have been influenced by this principle. Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. Rev. 431, 435 (1916). However, it is now universally recognized that because this principle pertains only to the victim’s own personal claims, such as for pain and suffering, it has no bearing on the question whether a dependent should be permitted to recover for the injury he suffers from the victim’s death. See ibid.; Pollock, supra, at 53; Win-field, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 Col. L. Rev. 239-250, 253 (1929).
The most likely reason that the English rule was adopted in this country without much question is simply that it had the blessing of age. That was the thrust of this Court’s opinion in Brame, as well as many of the lower court opinions. E. g., Grosso v. Delaware, Lackawanna & West. R. Co., supra. Such nearly automatic adoption seems at odds with the general principle, widely accepted during the early years of our Nation, that while “[o]ur ancestors brought with them [the] general principles [of the common law] and claimed it as their birthright;... they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.” Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.); The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 571-574 (1875); see R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 93-97 (1938); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 450 (tent. ed. 1958). The American courts never made the inquiry whether this particular English rule, bitterly criticized in England, “was applicable to their situation,” and it is difficult to imagine on what basis they might have concluded that it was.
Further, even after the decision in Brame, it is not apparent why the Court in The Harrisburg concluded that there should not be a different rule for admiralty from that applied at common law. Maritime law had always, in this country as in England, been a thing apart from the common law. It was, to a large extent, administered by different courts; it owed a much greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on a particular subject matter, it developed general principles unknown to the common law. These principles included a special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 1-11, 253 (1957); P. Edelman, Maritime Injury and Death 1 (1960). These factors suggest that there might have been no anomaly in adoption of a different rule to govern maritime relations, and that the common-law rule, criticized as unjust in its own domain, might wisely have been rejected as incompatible with the law of the sea. This was the conclusion reached by Chief Justice Chase, prior to The Harrisburg, sitting on circuit in The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C. C. Md. 1865). He there remarked that
“There are cases, indeed, in which it has been held that in a suit at law, no redress can be had by the surviving representative for injuries occasioned by the death of one through the wrong of another; but these are all common-law cases, and the common law has its peculiar rules in relation to this subject, traceable to the feudal system and its forfeitures... and certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules.” Id., at 910.
Numerous other federal maritime cases, on similar reasoning, had reached the same result. E. g., The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886); The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1884); The E. B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C. C. E. D. La. 1883); The Garland, 5 F. 924 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1881); Holmes v. O. & C. R. Co., 5 F. 75 (D. C. Ore. 1880); The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (No. 14,109) (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1877); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D. C. Maine 1825) ; Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386 (No. 6,625) (D. C. Md. 1879). Despite the tenor of these cases, some decided after Brame, the Court in The Harrisburg concluded that “the admiralty judges in the United States did not rely for their jurisdiction on any rule of the maritime law different from that of the common law, but [only] on their opinion that the rule of the English common law was not founded in reason, and had not become firmly established in the jurisprudence of this country.” 119 U. S., at 208. Without discussing any considerations that might support a different rule for admiralty, the Court held that maritime law must be identical in this respect to the common law.
II
We need not, however, pronounce a verdict on whether The Harrisburg, when decided, was a correct extrapolation of the principles of decisional law then in existence. A development of major significance has intervened, making clear that the rule against recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the policies of modern American maritime law. This development is the wholesale abandonment of the rule in most of the areas where it once held sway, quite evidently prompted by the same sense of the rule’s injustice that generated so much criticism of its original promulgation.
To some extent this rejection has been judicial. The English House of Lords in 1937 emasculated the rule without expressly overruling it. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A. C. 826. Lord Atkin remarked about the decision in S. S. Amerika that “[t]he reasons given, whether historical or otherwise, may seem unsatisfactory,” and that “if the rule is really based on the relevant death being due to felony, it should long ago have been relegated to a museum.” At any rate, he saw “no reason for extending the illogical doctrine... to any case where it does not clearly apply.” Id., at 833, 834. Lord Atkin concluded that, while the doctrine barred recognition of a claim in the dependents for the wrongful death of a person, it did not bar recognition of a common-law claim in the decedent himself for “loss of expectation of life” — a claim that vested in the person in the interval between the injury and death, and thereupon passed, with the aid of a survival statute, to the representative of his estate. He expressed no doubt that the claim was “capable of being estimated in terms of money: and that the calculation should be made.” Id., at 834. Thus, except that the measure of damages might differ, the representative was allowed to recover on behalf of the heirs what they could not recover in their own names.
Much earlier, however, the legislatures both here and in England began to evidence unanimous disapproval of the rule against recovery for wrongful death. The first statute partially abrogating the rule was Lord Campbell’s Act, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93 (1846), which granted recovery to the families of persons killed by tortious conduct, “although the Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.”
In the United States, every State today has enacted a wrongful-death statute. See Smith, supra, 44 N. C. L. Rev. 402. The Congress has created actions for wrongful deaths of railroad employees, Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59; of merchant seamen, Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 688; and of persons on the high seas, Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. §§ 761, 762. Congress has also, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b), made the United States subject to liability in certain circumstances for negligently caused wrongful death to the same extent as a private person. See, e. g., Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1 (1962).
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a whole, make it clear that there is no present public policy against allowing recovery for wrongful death. The statutes evidence a wide rejection by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once have existed for a general refusal to allow such recovery. This legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established has become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of deci-sional law. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213, 226-227 (1934). Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking also for Chief Justice Taft and Justices Brandéis and McKenna, stated on the very topic of remedies for wrongful death:
“[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular cases may imply a policy different from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their scope. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32. Without going into the reasons for the notion that an action (other than an appeal) does not lie for causing the death of a human being, it is enough to say that they have disappeared. The policy that forbade such an action, if it was more profound than the absence of a remedy when a man’s body was hanged and his goods confiscated for the felony, has been shown not to be the policy of present law by statutes of the United States and of most if not all of the States.” Panama R. Co. v. Rock, 266 U. S. 209, 216 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
Dean Pound subsequently echoed this observation, concluding that: “Today we should be thinking of the death statutes as part of the general law.” Pound, Comment on State Death Statutes — Application to Death in Admiralty, 13 NACCA L. J. 188, 189 (1954); see Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207, 210 (1955).
This appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects the practices of common-law court's from the most ancient times. As Professor Landis has said, “much of what is ordinarily regarded as 'common law’ finds its source in legislative enactment.” Landis, supra, at 214. It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles — many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions.
The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general policies. By the terms of a statute, it also indicates its conception of the sphere within which the policy is to have effect. In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more than the dimensions of the particular problem that came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that the legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which the mischief is identical. This conclusion is reinforced where there exists not one enactment but a course of legislation dealing with a series of situations, and where the generality of the underlying principle is attested by the legislation of other jurisdictions. Id., at 215-216, 220-222. On the other hand, the legislature may, in order to promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe with particularity the compass of the legislative aim, erecting a strong inference that territories beyond the boundaries so drawn are not to feel the impact of the new legislative dispensation. We must, therefore, analyze with care the congressional enactments that have abrogated the common-law rule in the maritime field, to determine the impact of the fact that none applies in terms to the situation of this case. See Part III, infra. However, it is sufficient at this point to conclude, as Mr. Justice Holmes did 45 years ago, that the work of the legislatures has made the allowance of recovery for wrongful death the general rule of American law, and its denial the exception. Where death is caused by the breach of a duty imposed by federal maritime law, Congress has established a policy favoring recovery in the absence of a legislative direction to except a particular class of cases.
Ill
Our undertaking, therefore, is to determine whether Congress has given such a direction in its legislation granting remedies for wrongful deaths in portions of the maritime domain. We find that Congress has given no affirmative indication of an intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death to persons in the situation of this petitioner.
From the date of The Harrisburg until 1920, there was no remedy for death on the high seas caused by breach of one of the duties imposed by federal maritime law. For deaths within state territorial waters, the federal law accommodated the humane policies of state wrongful-death statutes by allowing recovery whenever an applicable state statute favored such recovery. Congress acted in 1920 to furnish the remedy denied by the courts for deaths beyond the jurisdiction of any State, by passing two landmark statutes. The first of these was the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U. S. C. §761 et seq. Section 1 of that Act provides that:
“Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State,... the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued.”
Section 7 of the Act further provides:
“The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this [Act]. Nor shall this [Act] apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State....”
The second statute was the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688, which, by extending to seamen the protections of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, provided a right of recovery against their employers for negligence resulting in injury or death. This right follows from the seaman’s employment status and is not limited to injury or death occurring on the high seas.
The United States, participating as amicus curiae, contended at oral argument that these statutes, if construed to forbid recognition of a general maritime remedy for wrongful death within territorial waters, would perpetuate three anomalies of present law. The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rule of The Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. As we have concluded, such a distinction is not compatible with the general policies of federal maritime law.
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limit — since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U. S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958) — but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims. The United States argues that since the substantive duty is federal, and federal maritime jurisdiction covers navigable waters within and without the three-mile limit, no rational policy supports this distinction in the availability of a remedy.
The third, and assertedly the “strangest” anomaly is that a true seaman — that is, a member of a ship’s company, covered by the Jones Act — is provided no remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute.
There is much force to the United States’ argument that these distinctions are so lacking in any apparent justification that we should not, in the absence of compelling evidence, presume that Congress affirmatively intended to freeze them into maritime law. There should be no presumption that Congress has removed this Court’s traditional responsibility to vindicate the policies of maritime law by ceding that function exclusively to the States. However, respondents argue that an intent to do just that is manifested by the portions of the Death on the High Seas Act quoted above.
The legislative history of the Act suggests that respondents misconceive the thrust of the congressional concern. Both the Senate and House Reports consist primarily of quoted remarks by supporters of the proposed Act. Those supporters stated that the rule of The Harrisburg, which had been rejected by “[ejvery country of western Europe,” was “a disgrace to a civilized people.” “There is no reason why the admiralty law of the United States should longer depend on the statute laws of the States.... Congress can now bring our maritime law into line with the laws of those enlightened nations which confer a right of action for death at sea.” The Act would accomplish that result “for deaths on the high seas, leaving unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to deaths on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the States.... This is for the purpose of uniformity, as the States can not properly legislate for the high seas.” S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 4 (1919); H. R. Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 4 (1920). The discussion of the bill on the floor of the House evidenced the same concern that a cause of action be provided “in cases where there is now no remedy,” 59 Cong. Rec. 4486, and at the same time that “the power of the States to create actions for wrongful death in no way be affected by enactment of the federal law.” The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S., at 593.
Read in light of the state of maritime law in 1920, we believe this legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ensure the continued availability of a remedy, historically provided by the States, for deaths in territorial waters; its failure to extend the Act to cover such deaths primarily reflected the lack of necessity for coverage by a federal statute, rather than an affirmative desire to insulate such deaths from the benefits of any federal remedy that might be available independently of the Act. The void that existed in maritime law up until 1920 was the absence of any remedy for wrongful death on the high seas. Congress, in acting to fill that void, legislated only to the three-mile limit because that was the extent of the problem. The express provision that state remedies in territorial waters were not disturbed by the Act ensured that Congress’ solution of one problem would not create another by inviting the courts to find that the Act pre-empted the entire field, destroying the state remedies that had previously existed.
The beneficiaries of persons meeting death on territorial waters did not suffer at that time from being excluded from the coverage of the Act. To the contrary, the state remedies that were left undisturbed not only were familiar but also may actually have been more generous than the remedy provided by the new Act. On the one hand, the primary basis of recovery under state wrongful-death statutes was negligence. On the other hand, the substantive duties imposed at that time by general maritime law were vastly different from those that presently exist. “[T]he seaman’s right to recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the ship was an obscure and relatively little used remedy,” perhaps largely because prior to this Court’s decision in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96 (1944), the shipowner’s duty was only to use due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship. Gilmore & Black, supra, at 315, 361; Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Cornell L. Q. 381, 392-393, 396 (1954). Nonseamen on the high seas could generally recover for ordinary negligence, but even this was virtually denied to seamen under the peculiar maritime doctrine of The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175 (1903). Congress in 1920 thus legislated against a backdrop of state laws that imposed a standard of behavior generally the same as — and in some respects perhaps more favorable than — that imposed by federal maritime law.
Since that time the equation has changed drastically, through this Court’s transformation of the shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy ship into an absolute duty not satisfied by due diligence. See, e. g., Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., supra; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U. S. 539 (1960). The unseaworthiness doctrine has become the principal vehicle for recovery by seamen for injury or death, overshadowing the negligence action made available by the Jones Act, see Gilmore & Black, supra, at 315-332; and it has achieved equal importance for longshoremen and other harbor workers to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended because they perform work on the vessel traditionally done by seamen. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946). The resulting discrepancy between the remedies for deaths covered by the Death on the High Seas Act and for deaths that happen to fall within a state wrongful-death statute

Question: Did the the decision of the court overrule one or more of the Court's own precedents?
A. Yes
B. No
Answer:

Answer: A