Task: songer_appbus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denying a motion which sought payment of attorneys’ fees and other expenses by attorneys for two corporations which were in receivership and for their sole stockholder— which fees were sought to be paid as administration expenses out of the assets in receivership.
The present action involves four corporations whose intertwined history may be briefly stated. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corporation and Lebandale Mills, Inc., New Hampshire corporations, were operating textile mills, located in Lebanon, New Hampshire. All of the stock of these companies was owned by Bernard Goldfine until November 18, 1958. Sometime before this date Solomon Goldfine, a son of Bernard, organized two Massachusetts corporations under the names of Lebanon Woolen Mills, Inc. and Lebandale Woolen Mills, Inc. On or about November 18, 1958 Bernard Goldfine caused substantially all of the assets of the New Hampshire corporations to be transferred and conveyed to the newly formed Massachusetts corporations for an asserted consideration of $575,000. Only $75,000 was paid at the time of the transfer and the balance of $500,000 was secured by a mortgage. All of the stock of the Massachusetts corporations is owned by Solomon Goldfine.
On January 24, 1962 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue made assessments for substantial amounts of unpaid federal taxes against the New Hampshire corporations. Two days later, on January 26th, the District Director of Internal Revenue made notice and demand upon the New Hampshire corporations and upon the Massachusetts corporations, as transferees, for the payment of the taxes which were due. These notices and demands were refused and the District Director then filed notices of liens for the taxes.
On January 26, 1962 the United States also initiated an action in the United • States District Court for the District of New Hampshire for the foreclosure of liens, temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, collection of taxes and appointment of a receiver, naming as defendants the New Hampshire corporations, the Massachusetts corporations, Bernard Goldfine, Solomon Goldfine and others. On that same date a temporary restraining order was entered enjoining all defendants from, among other things, disposing of their assets pending a hearing on the appointment of a receiver.
In the complaint filed in the district court, the government took the position, inter alia, that the transfer of assets from the New Hampshire corporations to the Massachusetts corporations was in fraud of creditors (including the United States) and that the subject assets should either be regarded as still belonging to the transferors, or that the Massachusetts corporations should be liable for the taxes, as transferees, to the extent of the value of the assets transferred.
Following a hearing on February 14, 1962 the district court appointed a receiver under Section 7403(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for Lebanon Woolen Mills, Inc. and for Lebandale Woolen Mills, Inc., (the Massachusetts corporations), and the receiver has been acting in that capacity continuously since that time.
The Massachusetts corporations and Solomon Goldfine answered the government’s complaint denying all substantial allegations and moved for dismissal on the ground that the United States had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
On April 11, 1962 the Massachusetts corporations and Solomon Goldfine (appellants here), through their attorneys, filed a motion in the district court requesting that the receiver be authorized to pay counsel fees and other expenses of defending the action brought by the United States and that such payments be paid as administration expenses out of the assets in receivership. Following a hearing this motion was denied.
Appellants contend that, outside the assets held by the receiver, they have no funds available to defend the action of the United States. They argue that unless the district court allows the payment of fees as administration expenses out of the assets now under the control of the receiver, they will be compelled to submit to the loss of their property by default. In appellants’ words, “The Constitutional safeguards of the Fifth Amendment should therefore be applied to prevent the seizure of the transferees’ property by default at the hands of the tax collector. Such must be the inevitable result unless the assets of the transferees possessed by the Receiver may be used for the purpose of obtaining the services of competent counsel to defend the lawsuit.”
We do not believe that it is necessary for us to consider appellants’ asserted constitutional objections to the action of the district judge nor to consider whether, under any circumstances, a district, court might properly entertain a motion such as that filed by appellants. Rather,, as we view the record, there is a distinct absence of probative evidence showing Solomon Goldfine’s property or his inability to obtain funds to defend the government’s action. Fauci v. Hannon, 283 F.2d 114 (1st Cir., 1960) (per curiam).
Solomon Goldfine filed no statement of his financial condition nor did he personally execute an affidavit on this question. After the government opposed the appellants’ motion, counsel for the appellants executed an affidavit which contains the statement that “Mr. Goldfinehas repeatedly advised me that he was and is without assets with which to compensate counsel in this action.” This hearsay statement is all that appears in the record concerning the financial condition of Solomon Goldfine and this, in-our view, is an insufficient predicate to-establish grounds for the relief which appellants seek here. Cf., Frost v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 11 F.R.D. 195 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951).
There is another reason why, on this record, we cannot accept appellants’ contention that the subject property will go to the government by default if funds under the control of the receiver are not released to appellants to defend the action.
The record indicates that the appellant-corporations owe an amount in excess of one million dollars to creditors, both secured and unsecured. All of these creditors are, of course, beneficially interested in the instant litigation and would come ahead of Solomon Goldfine in any determination as to who is ultimately entitled to the corporations’ assets. Cf., Hartman Corporation of America v. United States, 304 F.2d 429 (8th Cir., 1962). There is no showing that these creditors are without funds. Indeed, we were informed at oral argument that all of the creditors have counsel, and this is undisputed by appellants.
For the above reasons, we believe that the order of the district judge should be affirmed.
Judgment will be entered affirming the order of the district court.
. The New Hampshire corporations and Bernard Goldfine filed similar motions.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 3