Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether an abstention-based remand order is appealable as a final order under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and whether the abstention doctrine first recognized in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), can be applied in a common-law suit for damages.
r-H
Petitioner, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, was appointed trustee over the assets of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates (Mission companies) in 1987, after those companies were ordered into liquidation by a California court. In an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission companies, the Commissioner filed the instant action against respondent Allstate Insurance Company in state court, seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate’s alleged breach of certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate’s obligations under those agreements.
Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the District Court should abstain from hearing the case under Burford, supra, because its resolution might interfere with California’s regulation of the Mission insolvency. Specifically, the Commissioner indicated that Allstate would be asserting its right to set off its own contract claims against the Commissioner’s recovery under the contract, that the viability of these setoff claims was a hotly disputed question of state law, and that this question was currently pending before the state courts in another case arising out of the Mission insolvency.
The District Court observed that “California has an overriding interest in regulating insurance insolvencies and liquidations in a uniform and orderly manner,” and that in this case “this important state interest could be undermined by inconsistent rulings from the federal and state courts.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Based on these observations, and its determination that the setoff question should be resolved in state court, the District Court concluded this case was an appropriate one for the exercise of Burford abstention. The District Court did not stay its hand pending the California courts’ resolution of the setoff issue, but instead remanded the entire case to state court. The District Court entered this remand order without ruling on Allstate’s motion to compel arbitration.
After determining that appellate review of the District Court’s remand order was not barred by 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), see Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F. 3d 350, 352 (CA9 1995) (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976)), and that the remand order was appeal-able under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 as a final collateral order, see 47 F. 3d, at 353-354 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 (1983)), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The Ninth Circuit concluded that federal courts can abstain from hearing a case under Burford only when the relief being sought is equitable in nature, and therefore held that abstention was inappropriate in this case because the Commissioner purported to be seeking only legal relief. 47 F. 3d, at 354-356; App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-37a (order denying petition for rehearing because Commissioner had waived any argument that this case involved a request for equitable relief).
The Ninth Circuit’s holding that abstention-based remand orders are appealable conflicts with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, see Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 6 F. 3d 856, 865 (CA1 1993) (order not appealable); Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co., Ltd., 842 F. 2d 31, 34 (CA2 1988) (same); In re Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 54 F. 3d 475, 477, n. 7 (CA8 1995) (same); but see Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F. 3d 590, 593 (CA2 1994) (order appealable under collateral order doctrine), as does its determination that Burford abstention can only be exercised in cases in which equitable relief is sought, see Lac D’Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 864 F. 2d 1033, 1045 (CA3 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in case seeking declaratory relief); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F. 2d 1179, 1192, n. 17 (CA4 1988) (Burford abstention appropriate in action for damages); Wolfson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 51 F. 3d 141, 147 (CA8 1995) (same); but see Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F. 2d 878, 882 (CA1 1993) (federal court can abstain under Burford only if it is “sitting in equity”); University of Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F. 2d 265, 272 (CA3 1991) (same); Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmer’s Cheese Cooperative, 583 F. 2d 104, 111 (CA3 1978) (same). We granted certiorari to resolve these conflicts, 516 U. S. 929 (1995), and now affirm on grounds different from those provided by the Ninth Circuit.
II
We first consider whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear Allstate’s appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which confers jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions” of the district courts, and 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), which provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”
We agree with the Ninth Circuit and the parties that § 1447(d) interposes no bar to appellate review of the remand order at issue in this case. See 47 F. 3d, at 352; Brief for Petitioner 29-30; Brief for Respondent 13-14, n. 12. As we held in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, supra, at 345-346, and reiterated this Term in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127 (1995), “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” This gloss renders § 1447(d) inapplicable here: The District Court’s abstention-based remand order does not fall into either category of remand order described in § 1447(c), as it is not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal procedure.
Finding no affirmative bar to appellate review of the District Court’s remand order, we must determine whether that review may be obtained by appeal under § 1291. The general rule is that “a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated.” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have held that a decision is ordinarily considered final and appealable under § 1291 only if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945); see also Digital, supra, at 867 (quoting this standard). We have also recognized, however, a narrow class of collateral orders which do not meet this definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately appealable under § 1291 because they “ ‘conclusively determine [a] disputed question’ ” that is “ ‘completely separate from the merits of the action,’ ” “ ‘effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,’ ” Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U. S. 424, 431 (1985) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)), and “too important to be denied review,” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949).
The application of these principles to the appealability of the remand order before us is controlled by our decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., supra. The District Court in that case entered an order, under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976), staying a federal diversity suit pending the completion of a declaratory judgment action that had been filed in state court. The Court of Appeals held that this stay order was appealable under §1291, and we affirmed that determination on two independent grounds.
We first concluded that the abstention-based stay order was appealable as a “final decision” under § 1291 because it put the litigants “ ‘effectively out of court,’ ” 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713, 715, n. 2 (1962) (per curiam)), and because its effect was “precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court,” 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11. These standards do not reflect our oft-repeated definition of finality, see supra, at 712 (citing Catlin, supra, at 233); see, e. g., Digital, supra, at 867 (citing the Catlin definition); Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 497 (1989) (same); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 521-522 (1988) (same), but in Moses H. Cone we found their application to be compelled by precedent, see 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11 (“Idlewild’s reasoning is limited to cases where (under Colorado River, abstention, or a closely similar doctrine) the object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum”).
As an alternative to this reliance on Idlewild, we also held that the stay order at issue in Moses H. Cone was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 460 U. S., at 11. We determined that a stay order based on the Colorado River doctrine “presents an important issue separate from the merits” because it “amounts to a refusal to adjudicate” the case in federal court; that such orders could not be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the federal action because the district court would be bound, as a matter of res judicata, to honor the state court’s judgment; and that unlike other stay orders, which might readily be reconsidered by the district court, abstention-based stay orders of this ilk are “conclusive” because they are the practical equivalent of an order dismissing the case. 460 U. S., at 12.
The District Court’s order remanding on grounds of Bur-ford abstention is in all relevant respects indistinguishable from the stay order we found to be appealable in Moses H. Cone. No less than an order staying a federal court action pending adjudication of the dispute in state court, it puts the litigants in this case “‘effectively out of court,”’ Moses H. Cone, supra, at 11, n. 11 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra, at 715, n. 2), and its effect is “precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court,” 460 U. S., at 11, n. 11. Indeed, the remand order is clearly more “final” than a stay order in this sense. When a district court remands a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court’s docket.
The District Court’s order is also indistinguishable from the stay order we considered in Moses H. Cone in that it conclusively determines an issue that is separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism. See infra, at 716-717, 727-728. In addition, the rights asserted on appeal from the District Court’s abstention decision are, in our view, sufficiently important to Warrant an immediate appeal. See infra, at 716, 723-728 (describing interests weighed in decision to abstain under Burford); cf. Digital, 511 U. S., at 878 (review under collateral order doctrine limited to those issues “ ‘too important to be denied review’”) (quoting Cohen, supra, at 546). And, like the stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, the District Court’s remand order in this case will not be subsumed in any other appealable order entered by the District Court.
We have previously stated that “an order remanding a removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal.” Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S., at 352-353. Petitioner asks that we adhere to that statement and hold that appellate review of the District Court’s remand order can only be obtained through a petition for writ of mandamus. To the extent Thermtron would require us to ignore the implications of our later holding in Moses H. Cone, however, we disavow it. Thermtron’s determination that remand orders are not reviewable “final judgments” doubtless was necessary to the resolution of that case, see 423 U. S., at 352 (posing the question whether mandamus was the appropriate vehicle), but our principal concern in Thermtron was the interpretation of the bar to appellate review embodied in 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d), see supra, at 711-712, and our statement concerning the appropriate procedural vehicle for reviewing a district court’s remand order was peripheral to that concern. Moreover, the parties in Thermtron did not brief the question, our opinion does not refer to Catlin or its definition of “final decisions,” and our opinion nowhere addresses whether any class of remand order might be appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Indeed, the only support Thermtron cites for the proposition that remand orders are reviewable only by mandamus, not by appeal, is Railroad Co. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507 (1875), the superannuated reasoning of which is of little vitality today, compare id., at 508 (deeming a “writ of error to review what has been done” an inappropriate vehicle for reviewing a court of appeals’ “refusal to hear and decide”), with Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 10-11, n. 11 (holding that a stay order is appealable because it amounts to a refusal to hear and decide a case).
Admittedly, remand orders like the one entered in this case do not meet the traditional definition of finality — they do not “en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” Catlin, 324 U. S., at 233. But because the District Court’s remand order is functionally indistinguishable from the stay order we found appealable in Moses H. Cone, see supra, at 714, we conclude that it is appealable, and turn to the merits of the Ninth Circuit’s decision respecting Burford abstention.
III
A
We have often acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress. See, e. g., Colorado River, 424 U. S., at 821 (“[F]ederal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation... to exercise the jurisdiction given them'”); England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 415 (1964) (“ ‘When a federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction’”) (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 40 (1909)); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not”). This duty is not, however, absolute. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 422 (1932) (“[T]he proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true”). Indeed, we have held that federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise “‘exceptional circumstances,’” where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest, Colorado River, supra, at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 189 (1959)), for example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of “proper constitutional adjudication,” “regard for federal-state relations,” or “wise judicial administration,” Colorado River, supra, at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have thus held that federal courts have the power to refrain from hearing cases that would interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), or with certain types of state civil proceedings, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977); cases in which the resolution of a federal constitutional question might be obviated if the state courts were given the opportunity to interpret ambiguous state law, see Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); cases raising issues “intimately involved with [the States’] sovereign prerogative,” the proper adjudication of which might be impaired by unsettled questions of state law, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U. S. 25, 28 (1959); id., at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring); cases whose resolution by a federal court might unnecessarily interfere with a state system for the collection of taxes, see Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943); and cases which are duplica-tive of a pending state proceeding, see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935).
Our longstanding application of these doctrines reflects “the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted,” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U. S. 350, 359 (1989) (NOPSI) (citing Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 543, 570-577 (1985)). And, as the Ninth Circuit correctly indicated, 47 F. 3d, at 354, it has long been established that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it “is asked to employ its historic powers as a court of equity,” Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). This tradition informs our understanding of the jurisdiction Congress has conferred upon the federal courts, and explains the development of our abstention doctrines. In Pullman, for example, we explained the principle underlying our abstention doctrines as follows:
“... The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the injunction.... New public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of the criminal law, or the administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state. These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system, whereby the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers.” 312 U. S., at 500-501 (citations omitted).
Though we have thus located the power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts “sitting in equity,” we have not treated abstention as a “technical rule of equity procedure.” Thibodaux, supra, at 28. Rather, we have recognized that the authority of a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has discretion to grant or deny relief. See NOPSI, supra, at 359 (mandate of federal jurisdiction “does not eliminate... the federal courts’ discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief”). Accordingly, we have not limited the application of the abstention doctrines to suits for injunctive relief, but have also required federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over certain classes of declaratory judgments, see, e. g., Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297 (federal court must abstain from hearing declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of a state tax); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971) (extending Younger abstention to declaratory judgment actions), the granting of which is generally committed to the courts’ discretion, see Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U. S. 277, 282 (1995) (federal courts have “discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites”).
Nevertheless, we have not previously addressed whether the principles underlying our abstention cases would support the remand or dismissal of a common-law action for damages. Cf. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 202, and n. 6 (1988) (reserving the question whether Younger requires abstention in an action for damages); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689 (1992) (discussing, without applying, Burford abstention in damages action). To be sure, we held in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra, that a federal court should not entertain a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit for damages based on the enforcement of a state tax scheme, see 454 U. S., at 115, but we have subsequently indicated that Fair Assessment was a case about the scope of the § 1983 cause of action, see National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582, 589-590 (1995), not the abstention doctrines. To the extent Fair Assessment does apply abstention principles, its holding is very limited. The damages action in that case was based on the unconstitutional application of a state tax law, and the award of damages turned first on a declaration that the state tax was in fact unconstitutional. We therefore drew an analogy to Huffman and other cases in which we had approved the application of abstention principles in declaratory judgment actions, and held that the federal court should decline to hear the action because “[t]he recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a ‘declaration’ or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation.” Fair Assessment, supra, at 115.
Otherwise, we have applied abstention principles to actions “at law” only to permit a federal court to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of the dispute

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
年. U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
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组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 是