Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

PER CURIAM:
The judgment below is affirmed on the basis of the District Court’s memorandum opinion, annexed.
AFFIRMED.
HENRY TURNER v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY a/b/a FIRESTONE STORES OF NEW ORLEANS, INC.
Civ. A. No. 75-878.
United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana.
Dec. 16, 1975.
CASSIBRY, District Judge.
This cause came on for hearing on September 24, 1975 on motions by plaintiff Henry Turner for summary judgment and on motion by defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for summary judgment. The motions were briefed by counsel for the respective parties and the cause was submitted.
Whereupon, and upon consideration thereof;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion by plaintiff Henry Turner for summary judgment be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion by defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for summary judgment be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
REASONS
Both parties agree that there are no disputed issues of material fact in this case and that the only issue is whether the disclosure statement provided Henry Turner by defendant Firestone Tire and Rubber Company violated the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. 226.1 et seq.
Plaintiff Turner argues that the disclosure statement provided him by defendant Firestone was legally inadequate in two respects. First, in the opening disclosure statement defendant Firestone failed to disclose a description or identification of the type of security interest which it retained or acquired in any property to secure the payment of any credit extended on the account. Turner argues that this failure violated the provisions of section 226.7(a)(7) of Regulation Z.
Second, plaintiff Turner argues that the opening disclosure statement and each monthly statement sent thereafter was in violation of section 226.4(a)(5) of Regulation Z. The basis for this charge is the failure of defendant Firestone to fill in the relevant blank which was provided on its opening disclosure statement stating to plaintiff Turner the cost for the optional credit life insurance coverage he requested. Plaintiff alleges that each subsequent periodic statement sent to him constitutes a separate transaction and each periodic statement violated the Truth in Lending Act in that each periodic statement had a separate charge for credit life insurance rather than including the amount in the finance charge as required by section 226.4(a)(5).
Since I find that defendant Firestone has violated the Truth in Lending Act for its failure to disclose the cost of credit life insurance in the opening disclosure statement and including such costs in the finance charge on each monthly statement, it is unnecessary to consider whether Firestone also violated the Truth in Lending Act by its failure to disclose that under Louisiana Law it may have held a vendor’s lien on plaintiff’s automobile to secure the payment of plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff is entitled to only a single recovery where there is a multiple failure to disclose any information required to be disclosed to him. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(g).
Defendant Firestone agrees that it failed to fill in the relevant blank on the opening disclosure statement which would have disclosed to the plaintiff the costs of acquiring the credit life insurance but has argued that 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) provides a defense against liability in this case. This section, the so-called clerical error defense, provides that:
“A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under this section for a violation of this part if the creditor shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”
The defendant has provided no factual evidence, by way of affidavit or otherwise, that the failure to fill in the cost of credit life insurance was a bona fide error. The statute clearly places this burden on the defendant creditor. Even if it were noted that this type of mistake is the typical clerical error at which the statute was aimed, the defendant has not produced any evidence or even pleaded that defendant Firestone has any “procedure reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c). While the error committed here is one that is easy to commit, it is also the type of error that can be easily detected by implementation of an inexpensive screening procedure. Insofar as the defendant has failed to prove that the mistake in question was not intentional and that it maintained a procedure reasonably adapted to avoiding such errors, the clerical error defense provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) is unavailable to defendant Firestone.
Having failed to make out the clerical error defense, defendant Firestone must be found to have violated section 226.4(a)(5) of Regulation Z for failing to include the costs of the credit life insurance in the amount of the finance charge as required by that section. Firestone does not fall within the exception provided in that section where the credit life insurance is optional and not mandatory because section 226.4(a)(5)(ii) requires that:
“(ii) any customer desiring such insurance coverage gives specifically dated and separately signed affirmative written indication of such desire after receiving written disclosure to him of the cost of such insurance.”
Here, although the credit life insurance coverage was optional and this was disclosed in writing to the plaintiff, the cost of the insurance was not disclosed to the plaintiff.
Having decided liability, the issue of damages must be decided. Plaintiff urges that each separate monthly statement sent him constituted a separate transaction for which he could collect the statutorily prescribed minimum $100.00. Plaintiff cites the case of Thomas v. Myer-Dickerson, 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973) as being determinative of the issue.
Defendants, however, claim the subsequent amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(g), legislatively overruled the holding in the Thomas case. The defendants contend that this section of the Act limits the plaintiff to a single recovery even though the plaintiff was sent a number of monthly statements. Neither counsel have cited any cases interpreting this section nor have I found any. The legislative history of the section is devoid of any explanation of its intended meaning or effect.
The. language of § 1640(g) reads as follows:
“The multiple failure to disclose to any person any information required under this chapter to be disclosed in connection with a single account under an open end consumer credit plan, other single consumer credit sale, consumer loan, or other extension of consumer credit, shall entitle the person to a single recovery under this section but continued failure to disclose after recovery has been granted shall give rise to rights to additional recoveries.”
The section limits multiple recoveries on a single account to the very narrow situation of a continued failure to disclose after a recovery has been granted. The single account recovery limitation is in direct conflict with the provisions of § 1640(a) as interpreted by the Thomas case. In the Thomas case, the Court found that each periodic statement sent to the plaintiff was a separate “transaction” for which he could recover the statutory minimum damages prescribed under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a), 479 F.2d 746-747. Under the Thomas rationale, a single credit account could, and usually would, constitute more than one “transaction ” as each separate periodic statement sent out on the account would in itself constitute a transaction for the purposes of § 1640(a). The amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(g), then limits the plaintiff to a single recovery on his account even though numerous periodic statements were sent out on that account.
The issue of amount of damages and award of attorney’s fees will be referred to a Magistrate for his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0