Task: songer_realresp

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
Your task is to determine whether or not the formally listed respondents in the case are the "real parties." That is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake? (e.g., in some appeals of adverse habeas corpus petition decisions, the respondent is listed as the judge who denied the petition, but the real parties are the prisoner and the warden of the prison) (another example would be "Jones v A 1990 Rolls Royce" where Jones is a drug agent trying to seize a car which was transporting drugs - the real party would be the owner of the car). For cases in which an independent regulatory agency is the listed respondent, the following rule was adopted: If the agency initiated the action to enforce a federal rule or the agency was sued by a litigant contesting an agency action, then the agency was coded as a real party. However, if the agency initially only acted as a forum to settle a dispute between two other litigants, and the agency is only listed as a party because its ruling in that dispute is at issue, then the agency is considered not to be a real party. For example, if a union files an unfair labor practices charge against a corporation, the NLRB hears the dispute and rules for the union, and then the NLRB petitions the court of appeals for enforcement of its ruling in an appeal entitled "NLRB v Widget Manufacturing, INC." the NLRB would be coded as not a real party. Note that under these definitions, trustees are usually "real parties" and parents suing on behalf of their children and a spouse suing on behalf of their injured or dead spouse are also "real parties."

PER CURIAM.
Appellant Donald Barfield brought suit against his former employer, Anheuser Busch, Inc., and against his former supervisor, Mike Parsons, claiming that they had discriminated against him by reason of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the actions against them were barred by the statute of limitations. 617 F.Supp. 32 (1985). Barfield appeals this judgment. We affirm the district court’s decision.
Barfield, a black employee of Anheuser Busch, was suspended from work on March 30, 1979 when he became involved in a fist fight with his supervisor. Anheuser Busch allegedly notified Barfield in April, 1979 that his employment had been terminated, although Barfield denies having received this notification. Barfield twice met with company officials in an attempt to gain reinstatement. When the company refused to reinstate him, Barfield’s ease was submitted to arbitration. On December 10, 1979, the arbitrator issued an opinion in favor of the company. Barfield brought this action in August, 1984.
The district court held that Barfield’s claim was barred by the applicable five year statute of limitations. The court found that Barfield was fired in April, 1979 thus causing his claim to accrue. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). (Limitations period commences when the employment decision is made and communicated to the plaintiff.) The court also determined that arbitration of Bar-field’s dispute did not toll the limitations period. See id. at 261, 101 S.Ct. at 505.
On appeal Barfield argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because a material fact was in issue. Barfield claims that it was not satisfactorily established in district court that his employment had been terminated in April, 1979 thereby causing his claim to accrue. We have carefully studied the record, including the district court’s opinion and the briefs of the parties. We conclude that the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and that no error of law exists. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s opinion. See 8TH CIR.R. 14.
. The Honorable Clyde S. Cahill, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Question: Are the formally listed respondents in the case the "real parties", that is, are they the parties whose real interests are most directly at stake?
A. both 1st and 2nd listed respondents are real parties (or only one respondent, and that respondent is a real party)
B. the 1st respondent is not a real party
C. the 2nd respondent is not a real party
D. neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondents are real parties
E. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A