Task: songer_respond2_8_2

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous". Your task is to determine which of the following categories best describes the litigant.

STONE, Circuit Judge,
This is an appeal by G. A. Buder (surviving trustee) and Arthur U. Simmons, administrator, C.T.A. of the estate of Gustav A. Franz (deceased co-trustee) from a judgment surcharging the trustees for several items in the total sum of $421,425.-73. This judgment was predicated upon exceptions filed to an accounting of the administration of the trust prepared by Ernst & Ernst, accountants appointed by the Court.
This appeal is the latest appearance in this Court of the long litigation concerning the estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz. To understand what the present appeal is about, it is advisable to set forth some matters from this prolonged series of contests in the courts.
Ehrhardt D. Franz died in February, 1898, testate, leaving a widow (Sophie) and ten children (Gustav A. Franz, Minna Franz Kleinschmidt, Walter G. Franz, Ernst H. Franz, Amanda Franz Wheeler, Henrietta Franz Holdoway, Johanna Franz Fiske, Adelaide Franz Zimmerman, Ehr-hardt W. Franz, and Otto B. Franz). His will devised the residue of his property to Sophie for life and thereafter to the ten children, their heirs and assigns in equal shares.
A daughter, Minna Franz Kleinschmidt, died several years later leaving as heirs her husband Sherman H. Kleinschmidt and two daughters, hielen and Eleanor (a minor). Thereafter, January 30, 1909, this trust was created by Sophie. The trustees were G. A. Buder and Gustav A. Franz. The trust estate consisted of all of Sophie’s right, title and interest, whether owned as her absolute property or as life tenant under the above will, to certain described bonds and stocks and to “any and all other assets, securities,” etc. “received, acquired, held or owned” by her under the above will. The trustees were given broad powers in handling the estate. From the income, the trustees were to pay Sophie $1000 quarterly and, thereafter, pay each of the children $625.00 quarterly — the payment to Sherman H. Kleinschmidt to be made "in behalf and for account of Helen and Eleanor Kleinschmidt.” On the death of Sophie, the trustees were to hold the trust estate “for account of the estate of said Sophie Franz, to he administered by the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, in accordance with the last will and testament of said Sophie Franz * * *.” The trustees were required to employ the firm of Buder & Buder as counsel and attorneys. The trustees were empowered to pay from the trust funds all “attorneys’ fees, outlays, compensation, charges and costs of administration.” Semi-annual statements from the trustees to Sophie were required.
Thereafter, Ehrhardt W. Franz (a son of Ehrhardt D. Franz) brought a suit in the state court against the other beneficiaries (under the will of Ehrhardt D. Franz) and G. A. Buder. By a decree (June 16, 1910), that Court determined that Sophie had conveyed to the trust merely a life estate in the property coming from her husband and the absolute estate in such property as she owned outright; that the beneficiaries had ratified the trust; and that the trustees should continue administration of the trust property in accordance with the trust instrument. See Franz v. Buder, 8 Cir., 11 F.2d 854, 855.
March 5, 1924, Ehrhardt W. Franz brought against G. A. Buder a suit, in which, the present controversy is the most recent eruption. In that action, Ehrhardt alleged that these trustees had exclusive possession, management and control of the property in which he and the other children of his father held an estate in remainder; that he had demanded of the trustees information concerning, and an account of, the nature, condition, extent, and value of the property; that the trustees had refused; and that they asserted that he no longer had any remainder interest in such property. Three results of this litigation were (1) to bring in both trustees, Sophie, and all of the children (or their heirs) of Ehrhardt D. Franz; (2) to es-fablish the rights of the remaindermen; and (3) to retain, in the District Court, control of the administration of the trust.
The Mississippi Valley Trust Company, as administrator of the estates of two of the children (Ernst H. Franz and Walter G. Franz), and Earl F. Nelson, as guardian ad litem of Eleanor (the minor child of Minna Franz Kleinschmidt) intervened praying much the same relief as the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the interveners represented three and 'one-third of the interests of the ten children (remaindermen) of Ehrhardt D. Franz. The other six living children and two of the three heirs of Mrs. Kleinschmidt' (Sherman H. Kleinschmidt and Helen Kleinschmidt) made up the remaining six and twó-thirds of such interests The six and two-thirds interests, Sophie, and the trustees opposed the action. Buder & Buder represented the trustees, Sophie and the six and two-thirds interests in this litigation up to 1935 — when five of the six and. two-thirds interests employed other counsel.
Sophie died April 14, 1930, leaving a will bequeathing her estate, in equal parts, to nine of her children or their representatives — the child excluded being Walter G. Franz who had theretofore died without children.
In May, 1930, the six and two-thirds interests filed petitions for distribution of the trust estate. June 1, 1930, the Court ordered a “final” accounting by the trustees. Ón June 22, 1931, such report was filed, prepared by Cornell & Company. No exceptions were filed by any of the six and two-thirds interests. Exceptions were filed by Ehrhardt W. Franz,. the Mississippi Valley Trust Company (in behalf of the estates of Ernst H. Franz and of Walter G. Franz, both deceased), and 'by Nelson as guardian ad litem for the minor, Eleanor. The Court ruled these exceptions in an order, April 1, 1932, which adjudged distribution of one-tenth of the “net estate” of the “property and assets comprising the corpus of the estate of E. D. Franz in the possession” of the trustees to Ehrhardt W. Franz (less an item not pertinent here), onertenth to the Trust Company as administrator of Walter G. Franz, one-tenth to the Trust Company as administrator of Ernst H. Franz, one-thirtieth to Eleanor Klein-schmidt Berger, and the remaining six and two-thirds to Gustavus A. Buder, Sr. as executor of the estate of Sophie Franz.
Distribution was made to Ehrhardt W. Franz and the Trust Company under the order. The six and two-thirds interests appealed from that part of the judgment requiring their interests to be turned over to the executor of the estate of Sophie instead of being turned over to each of them directly. This appeal was dismissed to await the outcome of litigation in Missouri courts as to liability of these interests to state inheritance taxes as part of the estate of Sophie. Fiske et al. v. State of Missouri, 8 Cir., 69 F.2d 683. The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the six and two-thirds interests in the remainder of the Ehrhardt D. Franz estate were not parts of the estate of Sophie, deceased, and therefore not subject to state inheritance taxes. In re Franz’ Estate, 344 Mo. 510, 127 S.W. 2d 401. Rehearing was denied by that Court on April 20, 1939. In this State action, only one and two-thirds (G. A. Franz, Sherman H. and Helen Kleinschmidt) of the six and two-thirds interests had been represented by Buder & Buder — employment of Buder & Buder by the other five interests having been terminated in 1935 or 1936.
May 12, 1939, these five interests filed a motion attacking the allowance of five per centum to the trustees as commissions against the six and two-thirds entire remainder interests as contained in paragraph “5” of the foregoing order of distribution of April 1, 1932. After full hearing, the motion was denied December 17, 1940. An appeal resulted in reversal “with directions to enter an order sustaining appellants’ motion.” Fiske et al. v. Buder et al., 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841, 849.
About two months after such determination by this Court, the trial court, “of its own motion,” entered an order directing the surviving trustee to employ Erast & Ernst, as accountants, to prepare and file an audit and final accounting of the estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz “from June 22, 1931, to the date of filing the same.” The report of these accountants was filed August 25, 1942. To this report, exceptions were filed by the five interests and by Ehrhardt W. Franz. July 23, 1946, the Court ruled upon the exceptions after full hearing. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and an order entered upon that date, D.C., 82 F.Supp. 388. June 5, 1947, nunc pro tunc modifications affecting the figures of several items, were made in the findings, conclusions and order. Some of the exceptions were denied. Four exceptions were sustained and the trustees surcharged for the amounts determined in connection therewith. Also, the surcharged amounts were made subject to participation by the ten re-maindermen. August 2, 1946, joint motion for new trial was filed by G. A. Buder (surviving trustee) and Arthur U. Simmons, administrator, C.T.A. of G. A. Franz (deceased trustee) and denied on March 17, 1947. Later, the same parties filed a joint motion for leave to file a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, which was denied on April 18, 1947.
G. A. Buder (surviving trustee) and Arthur U. Simmons, administrator C.T.A. of Gustav A. Franz (deceased trustee), bring this appeal from the above order, from denial of their joint motion for new trial, and from denial of the motion for leave to file motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The matters urged in this appeal have to do with each of four items of surcharge, with the right to participate given the three and one-third interests, and with the rejection of offered testimony upon submission of the joint motion for new trial. The denial of leave to file motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not presented but abandoned here.
The logical order for examination of these contentions is (I) the motion for new trial, (II) the items of surcharge, and (III) the participation of the three and one-third interests. If the Court erred in connection with the motion for new trial, we do not reach the other contentions. Unless all or some of the surcharged items are sustained, the right of participation of the three and one-third interests vanishes.
I. The Motion for New Trial.
The granting or the denial of a new trial is not an appealable order. Such determination may be challenged — on the ground of abuse of discretion — in an appeal from the final judgment Marshall’s U. S. Auto Supply, Inc., v. Cashman, 10 Cir., 111 F.2d 140, 141. The error urged here has to do with a claimed abuse of judicial discretion. The issue presented here is the rejection of testimony offered by appellants in connection with their joint motion for new trial filed August 2, 1946 and denied March 17, 1947.
When this motion was presented, the appellants proposed to offer evidence in connection therewith. It was expressly stated by appellants that this offer was not under “the rule as to newly discovered evidence” but was “additional evidence” tendered under “the discretionary power of the Court on such motion, to do all that is calculated to aid and accomplish the fundamental purpose of the new rules, namely to attain speedy and exact justice.” Appellants base this motion upon that portion of Rule 59(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., reading: “On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.”
Without examining the attacks by appellees upon the form and substance of the motion, we prefer, strictly for the purposes of this case, to assume that the motion is sufficient. We do this because we believe that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to hear the proffered evidence. Except a letter to Judge Moore and an extract from a trial brief of some of these exceptors, all of this evidence had been in possession of or known to appellants long before the hearing upon the exceptions to •the report. A lack of diligence in not offering it at that hearing seems quite clear. While we do not express any opinion as to whether lack of diligence is, in all situations, a bar to reopening a case under Rule 59(a), we do not doubt that it may well be a sufficient reason for a trial judge, in the exercise of judicial discretion, to refuse such evidence offered after judgment. In the situation here, we cannot hold that there was a clear abuse of judicial discretion in denying the offer of this evidence for the purposes for which it was offered,
II. The Surcharged Items
There are four of these items: (a) Six hundred rights to subscribe for stock in the Burroughs Adding Machine Company (value $45,000) retained by the trustees as 5% commissions for distribution by them of 12,000 such rights, (b) “advancements” to the remaindermen prior to the death of Sophie (principal sum, $100,795.46 and interest thereon of $98,410.32), (c) attorney fees of $115,000, and (d) interest ($7,957.-27) on funds of the corpus of the trust estate commingled with those of Buder & Buder.
(a) The Stock Rights
The estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz consisted of real and personal property inventoried as of a total value of $95,624.54. Included therein were 210 shares of stock in the American Arithmometer Company, valued at $21,000. Thereafter, that Company declared stock dividends of a like amount. This augmented stock was included in the residue of this estate turned over to Sophie on the close of the administration of the Ehrhardt D. Franz estate in 1900. In 1905, the Burroughs Adding Machine Company exchanged 4200 of its shares for these 420 shares in the Arithmometer Company. January 30, 1909, Sophie created the present trust estate, expressly including therein these shares of Burroughs stock.
By 1920, this Burroughs stock held in the trust had, through stock dividends, increased to 12,600 shares, standing in the name of Sophie Franz. For the purpose of increasing its capital, Burroughs declared “rights” to subscribe for new stock to the then stockholders. These rights were on the 'basis of one half share to each share of stock then held. Each new.,share was for $100 value and subscriptions were to be at par. Each right to subscribe (for one half share) had, at that time, a value of seventy-five dollars.
In January, 1920, Sophie and nine of the ten remainder interests entered into a contract for distribution of these subscription rights by the trustees to these nine remain-dermen. This contract provided that, “the said Trusteees shall receive and may retain five per cent of all such rights received from said Burroughs Adding Machine Company on account of any distribution made to the parties hereto as their compensation and commissions, the same as if final distribution or transfer of such part thereof had been made to the executor or legal representative of said Sophie Franz, in accordance with the terms of said trust conveyance or any other distribution which may be effected by agreement under said trust agreement or the supplemental agreement above referred to.”
Under this contract provision, the trustees took 600 of these subscription rights of the then value of $45,000. The Court sustained the exceptions to this item and surcharged the trustees therefor. The basis of this action by the Court was that the trustees were not entitled to a commission; that G. A. Buder (one of the trustees and a member of the law firm of Buder & Bud-er, then counsel for Sophie, for the trustees, and for these five remaindermen) had represented to these remaindermen that the trustees were entitled to a commission; that these remaindermen had executed the contract relying upon such statement.
Appellants do not and cannot contend that they were, because of their position as trustees, entitled to a commission upon these “rights.” Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841, 847; Buder v. Franz, 8 Cir., 27 F.2d 101, 113 and see Missouri Central Building and Loan Ass’n v. Eveler, 237 Mo. 679, 141 S.W. 877, 879, Ann.Cas.l913A, 486. They rely upon this contract as establishing their right and upon other defenses (res judicata, splitting cause of action, laches, and waiver) as barring present challenge.
As to the contract, appellants contend: That Buder & Buder did not represent these exceptors at the time this contract was made; that the life tenant and her trustees were then at liberty to deal with the remaindermen at arm’s length; that the remaindermen could and did enter into a valid contract; that the contract was valid even though made under an erroneous view of the law; and that the law as to the status of such “rights” was then uncertain.
The testimony of Mr. Oscar Buder (a member of Buder & Buder) is clear that Buder & Buder considered themselves to be and acted as counsel for the remaindermen in matters concerning the trust estate and not requiring litigation. This relation was “from the very beginning of the trust agreement” in 1909 and continued after 1920 when this contract was executed. They regarded such services as covering “advice of all sorts to all the beneficiaries in the estate” and as coming within the annual retainer paid them under their employment in accordance with the provisions of the trust agreement. Also, the testimony supports the view that the remaindermen sought and received legal advice from them in matters affecting these estates.
In addition to this relationship, Mr. G. A. Buder was one of the trustees.
In this situation as to commissions on distribution of these stock rights, the interests of the trustees and of the remaindermen were clearly opposed. Also, Buder & Buder could not act as counsel for both the trustees and the remaindermen without fully informing the remaindermen, at least, of this status of opposition. Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 499-502, 25 L.Ed. 1065; and compare Sluggett v. Phillips, Mo.App., 178 S.W.2d 458, 462; Moffett Bros. Partnership Estate v. Moffett, 345 Mo. 741, 137 S.W.2d 507, 511, and Hoffman v. Hogan, 345 Mo. 903, 137 S.W.2d 441, 446. It is not material here whether the life tenant and her trustees might have dealt at arm’s length with the remaindermen nor that the remaindermen might have entered into a contract such as this. Nor is it material that the contract was entered into under an erroneous view of the law. Nor that the legal status of the “rights” was then uncertain. The crux is that Buder & Buder, as attorneys for all of these parties, did not inform the remaindermen of this opposition of interests and that there was this uncertainty in their rights so that they might have had opportunity to take a position to protect themselves. We need not impugn the motives of Buder & Buder in misleading all parties to believe a commission was legally due the trustees. It is enough to vitiate the contract that Buder & Buder, while acting as counsel for all, did not inform the remaindermen of this opposition of interests.
Another aspect of this situation is that this action of the trustees in insisting upon this compensation was detrimental to the remaindermen. Whether the trustees, as to these remaindermen, were trustees or quasi-trustees (as standing in the place of the life tenant, being trustees of an estate coated by her) their duty was to turn over tjhis corpus unimpaired by any act of theirs Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841, 847; Buder v. Franz, 8 Cir., 27 F.2d 101, 114; Warfield v. Bixby, 8 Cir., 51 F.2d 210, 213, 214; Collins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 178 Va. 501, 17 S.E.2d 413, 137 A.L.R. 1054. This contract does not defeat the surcharge.
The contentions of appellants as to res judicata and laches have been directly ruled against them by this Court in Fiske v. Buder, 125 F.2d 841, and (as to laches) see Bickel v. Argyle Inv. Co. 343 Mo. 456, 121 S.W.2d 803, 807.
The waiver urged here is one implied from alleged knowledge and delayed action. A necessary element of waiver is t!he intentional relinquishment of a known right. Masden v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 52 F.2d 75, 76, 79 A.L.R. 469; Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. DeParcq, 8 Cir., 66 F.2d 678, 686. While waiver may be implied by acts or a course of conduct from which an intention to waive may reasonably be inferred (56 Am.Jur. p. 117, § 17 and citations in footnote 8), yet such intention is a question of fact, Masden v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., supra, 52 F.2d page 76 with the burden of proof upon the party alleging waiver, Masden case, 52 F. 2d page 76, arid doubtful situations will not support waiver, 56 Am.Jur. p. 118, § 17. Here, the basis of the claim of waiver is knowledge and delayed action. Under the evidence here,- the ruling on laches, Fiske v. Buder, supra, even more strongly applies to implied waiver where intention to waive depends upon practically the same evidence as urged for laches.
The contention as to splitting of causes of action is based on the situation that the five of the 6% remainder interests sought to vacate the settlement order of 1932 only in so far ais a 5$> comrnission was allowed upon the entire remaindermen interests— another item- in the settlement than this stock, rights transaction which had occurred years before. This effort to vacate resulted in litigation reaching this Court. Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841.
Few problems of practice have produced the multiplicity of cases as have that of splitting of actions. The doctrine is in the nature of a rule of repose with the double purposes of protecting both the courts' and the litigants from the harassment of repetitious litigation. Examination of any good legal digest.will reveal the various difficulties which have ¡arisen in applying the rule. See 1 Am.Jur. pp. 480-502. Some guides have been recognized. One of these -is that the rule does not apply where the two -causes of action are separate, even though they might have been joined: in a single action. Woodbury v. Porter, 8 Cir., 158 F.2d 194, 195; Chamberlain v. Missouri-Arkansas Coach Lines, 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538, 539, 161 A. L.R. 204. Also, “One of the tests for determining whether the’cause of action asserted in a suit is the same as that prosecuted in'a prior suit is whether or not pro-of of the sariie facts will support both actions.” Woodbury v. Porter, supra, 158 F.2d at page 195.
It is true that the earlier proceeding and this proceeding each requires setting aside certain — though different— provisions of the order of 1932. However, the proof under each proceeding divides at that place and from there on is entirely different and has to do with items distinctly different in every essential.
Accumulative consideration iis here present in that this matter is concerned with the administration of a trust estate and, in proper cases, settlements of trustees’ accounts may be reopened and restated. Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841; 54 Am.Jur. p. 406, § 511; Seawell v. Greenway, 22 Tex. 691, 75 Am.Dec. 794. This is such a “proper case.” Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841. Also, it has been held that the rule against splitting actions will be liberally applied to accomplish justice. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 9 Cir., 55 F.2d 753, 776; State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 576, 261 P. 110.
The surcharge of this item is sustained.
(b) “Advancements” to Remaindermen
Mrs. Sophie Franz was a housewife without business aptitude or experience; F-or some months after the death of her husband, two of her sons looked after, her business affairs until they moved away fr.om St. Louis, where she then lived. Thereafter, these duties were assumed by a son-in-law, S. H. Kleinschmidt, under two successive powers of attorney, executed June 1, 1899, and June 13, 1905. This arrangement remained until the execution of the.trust instrument on January 30, 1909.
Under Kleinschmidt, various amounts were paid out (always at the direction of Mrs. Franz) to the different children. Some of these payments were Christmas of birthday gifts; some were loans; and some were what are now involved. Of this last character, Kleinschmidt paid out in all to- each of five children $8700 and to each of'the other five $8800 or a total of $87,-500. Within less than two months after execution of the trust instrument, the trustees paid $5000 to each of the ten children, at direction of Mrs. Franz. The total of all such payments was $137,500.
Upon receipt of any payment, both under Klcinschmidt and the trustees, the recipient signed a receipt prepared by Rassieur and Buder (G. A. Buder) formerly attorneys for Mrs. Sophie Franz. This receipt was in form following:
“I, the undersigned, one of the children of Ehrhardt D. Franz, late of the City of St. Louis, deceased, hereby acknowledge that I have this day received of Sophie D. Franz, widow of said deceased, the sum of......Dollars, on account of my share in the assets of said estate, given to her for life, it being understood that this is to be treated as an advancement made to me at, the time the said estate is divided among the remaindermen, mentioned in last will of said E. D. Franz.
“Signed......”
In the Ernst & Ernst audit in 1942, it is stated “the records indicate that the cash advances shown above ($137,500.00) were ■obtained from the following sources:
Cash in the Estate of Ehrhardt
D. Franz $ 36,704.54
Cash originally advanced by Sophie Franz 100,795.46
$137,500.00”
The exceptions, at least of the Mississippi Valley Trust Company, claim these “advances” in the amount of $137,500 to be a part of the corpus of the estate of E. D. Franz to be proportionately shared by the remaindermen.
The Court made findings that, in December 1926, the trustees had received money from redemption of preferred stock belonging to the corpus of such estate; that, in January 1927, they had credited from such funds to themselves as trustees for Sophie Franz in “alleged” payment of “alleged advancements made by her the sum of $100,-795.46”; that “the evidence does not establish an intent upon the, part of Sophie Franz to create an indebtedness in her favor * * * ” for this amount and that this amount was not a loan by nor an indebtedness to her from the estate of E. D. Franz or from the remaindermen; that if there were any such claim by Sophie Franz, she had not included such in the trust instrument; that the claim of the trustees for credit for this sum is disallowed and the trustees surcharged therewith and interest (6%) thereon from April 15, 1930 (Mrs. Franz died April 14, 1930) ; and that charges for advancements was allowable only for the $36,704.54, “representing cash from the Estate of Ehrhardt D. Franz, deceased.”
Appellants contend (1) that the funds ($100,795,46) were taken by Sophie Franz from her personal estate and there was “an implied obligation” on the E. D. Franz Estate to repay this principal sum; (2) that the advancements were not gifts; (3) that she intended to and did include this claim in the trust estate created by her; (4) that she was entitled to reimbursement; (5) res judicata; (6) laches; (7) waiver or es-toppel.
The evidence convinces that these funds came from the personal estate of Sophie Franz. Whether the trust instrument by Sophie Franz conveyed any legal claim, if such claim existed, to these trustees covering the $87,500 received by the children before creation of the trust need not be and is not determined but, for the purposes of this opinion, is assumed.
The most serious matter in this issue as to “advancements” is whether these payments were gifts or were to be repaid. Appellants contend that they were not gifts but either there was an “implied obligation” to repay or that her estate was “entitled to” reimbursement. Appellees contend that they were gifts. Such contentions are as to facts to be resolved from the evidence. Every word of this record has been read and carefully considered. The evidence definitely supports the contention that these payments were unsolicited; were made by Mrs. Franz as gifts to her children; and were so received and regarded by them. This evidence is that of a good mother, of simple needs and desires, who found pleasure in giving to her children some of the flood of wealth which poured in upon her and for which she found no other use. The findings of the Court as to this matter are fully sustained.
Appellants’ contentions as to res judicata and laches are ruled adversely by Fiske v. Buder, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 841 and Bickel v. Argyle Inv. Co., 343 Mo. 456, 121 S.W.2d 803, 807.
The contention of waiver must be ruled against appellants. The basis of this contention in connection with “advancements” is, at least, no firmer than in connection with the “stock rights.”
The surcharge of this principal sum of $100,795.46 must be sustained as resting upon substantial evidence. Since these “advancements” were gifts to the remainder-men (even though they might possibly have to be reckoned with, as between the re-maindermen, in the final distribution of the estate of E. D. Franz among them), there arises a query as to whether she was entitled to any income from the above principal sum prior to her death. However, the interest allowed by the Court here is from her death. From that time, the re-maindermen were clearly entitled to the use of this money. The recovery accorded for such use is at the legal rate of interest and must be sustained.
(c) Attorney Fees
In connection with the accounting of the trustees of June 22, 1931, as amended to July 1, 1931, the trustees claimed credit for legal services by their counsel, Buder & Buder, in the sum of $210,000. Exceptions were filed to this item. In the 1932 order, the Court passed thereon and allowed $115,-000 to be charged in equal parts, against the interests of all of the remaindermen, with a provision that such allowance was without prejudice to “any further claim by Buder & Buder on account of said services against the estate of Sophie Franz.” The legal services covered by this claim and allowance were solely for services rendered in this series of Franz estate litigations in the United States Courts, which began in 1924.
In the trust instrument of 1909, it was provided that the trustees “shall employ the firm, of Buder & Buder, as their -counsel and attorneys in the management and administration” of the trust estate. The annual fee for such legal service began with $825 for the year 1909 and increased to $10,000 for 1920 and thereafter. The legal services apparently intended to be covered by this fee were all manner of service, such as advice to the trustees, Mrs. Sophie Franz and to the remaindermen as to matters connected with the trust and trust estate. These services covered all services except litigation. Shortly after creation of the trust, Ehrhardt W. Franz (one of the remaindermen) brought an action in the State Court which resulted in sustaining and construing the trust instrument. In 1922, Ernst H. Franz and Walter G. Franz (two of the remaindermen) died and The Mississippi Valley Trust Company was appointed as administrator of their properties in Missouri. In 1924, Ehrhardt W. Franz brought this action. After an appeal to this Court involving jurisdiction, Franz v. Bu-der, 8 Cir., 11 F.2d 854, and a modification of the decree thereon, 11 F.2d at page 858, all necessary parties were brought in. The alignment of the parties was as follows: The -estates of Ernst H. and of Walter G. Franz and a minor child of Mrs. Klein-schmidt (by guardian ad litem) with the plaintiff; the other remaindermen and Mrs. Sophie Franz with the trustees, as defendants. After mandate filed on the above appeal, all parties were brought in by an amended petition filed March 31, 1926. The same day, an ancillary bill was filed and an appealable order made thereon on April 8, 1926. Apparently, Buder & Buder began representing the 6% remainder -interests in this litgation shortly after the amended bill was filed. This representation continued until 1935 when these five out of the 6% remainder interests employed other counsel. The one and two-thirds interests still retained Buder & Buder.
May 16, 1930, the six and two-thirds interests each agreed individually to pay Buder & Buder $15,000 per interest for services in this litigation “heretofore” rendered- — a total of $100,000. No time for such payments was specified. In December, 1931, these amounts were paid under an understanding that such payments would, if paid at that time, also cover all future services to such remaindermen.
The claim involved here is for services, in this litigation, to the trustees as distinguished from the services to the before-stated remaindermen in the same litigation. Various contentions are advanced both by appellants and by appellees. Only such as are necessary to determine this matter will be set forth.
Appellees contend that these fees for legal services to the trustees cannot be charged against the remaindermen. This contention is well founded. The law as to whether remaindermen shall pay expenses of trustees, including proper counsel fees, depends primarily upon the intention of the creator of the trust. Walker v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 8 Cir., 12 F.2d 896, 903, 75 A

Question: This question concerns the second listed respondent. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous". Which of the following categories best describes the litigant?
A. fiduciary, executor, or trustee
B. other
C. nature of the litigant not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: A