Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 992, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq., grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder." § 78aa(a). We hold today that the jurisdictional test established by that provision is the same as the one used to decide if a case "arises under" a federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I
Respondent Greg Manning held more than two million shares of stock in Escala Group, Inc., a company traded on the NASDAQ. Between 2006 and 2007, Escala's share price plummeted and Manning lost most of his investment. Manning blames petitioners, Merrill Lynch and several other financial institutions (collectively, Merrill Lynch), for devaluing Escala during that period through "naked short sales" of its stock.
A typical short sale of a security is one made by a borrower, rather than an owner, of stock. In such a transaction, a person borrows stock from a broker, sells it to a buyer on the open market, and later purchases the same number of shares to return to the broker. The short seller's hope is that the stock price will decline between the time he sells the borrowed shares and the time he buys replacements to pay back his loan. If that happens, the seller gets to pocket the difference (minus associated transaction costs).
In a "naked" short sale, by contrast, the seller has not borrowed (or otherwise obtained) the stock he puts on the market, and so never delivers the promised shares to the buyer. See " Naked" Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Release No. 34-58774, 73 Fed.Reg. 61667 (2008). That practice (beyond its effect on individual purchasers) can serve "as a tool to drive down a company's stock price"-which, of course, injures shareholders like Manning. Id., at 61670. The SEC regulates such short sales at the federal level: The Commission's Regulation SHO, issued under the Exchange Act, prohibits short sellers from intentionally failing to deliver securities and thereby curbs market manipulation. See 17 CFR §§ 242.203 -242.204 (2015).
In this lawsuit, Manning (joined by six other former Escala shareholders) alleges that Merrill Lynch facilitated and engaged in naked short sales of Escala stock, in violation of New Jersey law. His complaint asserts that Merrill Lynch participated in "short sales at times when [it] neither possessed, nor had any intention of obtaining[,] sufficient stock" to deliver to buyers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, Amended Complaint ¶ 39. That conduct, Manning charges, contravened provisions of the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), New Jersey Criminal Code, and New Jersey Uniform Securities Law; it also, he adds, ran afoul of the New Jersey common law of negligence, unjust enrichment, and interference with contractual relations. See id., at 82a-101a, ¶¶ 88-161. Manning chose not to bring any claims under federal securities laws or rules. His complaint, however, referred explicitly to Regulation SHO, both describing the purposes of that rule and cataloguing past accusations against Merrill Lynch for flouting its requirements. See id., at 51a-54a, ¶¶ 28-30;
75a-82a, ¶¶ 81-87. And the complaint couched its description of the short selling at issue here in terms suggesting that Merrill Lynch had again violated that regulation, in addition to infringing New Jersey law. See id., at 57a-59a, ¶¶ 39-43.
Manning brought his complaint in New Jersey state court, but Merrill Lynch removed the case to Federal District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (allowing removal of any civil action of which federal district courts have original jurisdiction). Merrill Lynch asserted federal jurisdiction on two grounds. First, it invoked the general federal question statute, § 1331, which grants district courts jurisdiction of "all civil actions arising under" federal law. Second, it maintained that the suit belonged in federal court by virtue of § 27 of the Exchange Act. That provision, in relevant part, grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction of "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a). Manning moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that neither statute gave the federal court authority to adjudicate his collection of state-law claims. The District Court denied his motion. See No. 12-4466 (D NJ, Mar. 18, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a-38a.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ordering a remand of the case to state court. See 772 F.3d 158 (2014). The Third Circuit first decided that the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, did not confer jurisdiction of the suit, because all Manning's claims were "brought under state law" and none "necessarily raised" a federal issue. 772 F.3d, at 161, 163. Nor, the court held, did § 27 of the Exchange Act make the district court the appropriate forum. Relying on this Court's construction of a nearly identical jurisdictional provision, the Court of Appeals found that § 27 covers only those cases involving the Exchange Act that would satisfy the "arising under" test of the federal question statute. See id., at 166-167 (citing Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court of Del. for New Castle Cty., 366 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 6 L.Ed.2d 584 (1961) ). Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction of Manning's suit under § 1331, so too it was not the exclusive forum under § 27.
Merrill Lynch sought this Court's review solely as to whether § 27 commits Manning's case to federal court. See Pet. for Cert. i. Because of a Circuit split about that provision's meaning, we granted certiorari. 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2938, 192 L.Ed.2d 975 (2015). We now affirm.
II
Like the Third Circuit, we read § 27 as conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction of the same suits as "aris[e] under" the Exchange Act pursuant to the general federal question statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The text of § 27 more readily supports that meaning than it does either of the parties' two alternatives. This Court's precedents interpreting identical statutory language positively compel that conclusion. And the construction fits with our practice of reading jurisdictional laws, so long as consistent with their language, to respect the traditional role of state courts in our federal system and to establish clear and administrable rules.
A
Section 27, as noted earlier, provides federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) ; see supra, at 1567. Much the same wording appears in nine other federal jurisdictional provisions-mostly enacted, like § 27, as part of New Deal-era regulatory statutes.
Merrill Lynch argues that the "plain, unambiguous language" of § 27 requires an expansive understanding of its scope. Brief for Petitioners 23. Whenever (says Merrill Lynch) a plaintiff's complaint either explicitly or implicitly "assert[s]" that "the defendant breached an Exchange Act duty," then the suit is "brought to enforce" that duty and a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. Id., at 22; Reply Brief 10-11; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7-8 (confirming that such allegations need not be express). That is so, Merrill Lynch contends, even if the plaintiff, as in this case, brings only state-law claims in his complaint-that is, seeks relief solely under state law. See Reply Brief 3-6. And it is so, Merrill Lynch continues, even if the plaintiff can prevail on those claims without proving that the alleged breach of an Exchange Act duty-here, the violation of Regulation SHO-actually occurred. See id., at 7-13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3 ("[T]he words 'brought to enforce' [do not focus] on what the court would necessarily have to decide").
But a natural reading of § 27's text does not extend so far. "Brought" in this context means "commenced," Black's Law Dictionary 254 (3d ed. 1933); " to" is a word "expressing purpose [or] consequence," The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1288 (1931); and "enforce" means "give force [or] effect to," 1 Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 725 (1927). So § 27 confers federal jurisdiction when an action is commenced in order to give effect to an Exchange Act requirement. That language, in emphasizing what the suit is designed to accomplish, stops short of embracing any complaint that happens to mention a duty established by the Exchange Act. Consider, for example, a simple state-law action for breach of contract, in which the plaintiff alleges, for atmospheric reasons, that the defendant's conduct also violated the Exchange Act-or still less, that the defendant is a bad actor who infringed that statute on another occasion. On Merrill Lynch's view, § 27 would cover that suit; indeed, Merrill Lynch points to just such incidental assertions as the basis for federal jurisdiction here. See Brief for Petitioners 20-21; supra, at 1567. But that hypothetical suit is "brought to enforce" state contract law, not the Exchange Act-because the plaintiff can get all the relief he seeks just by showing the breach of an agreement, without proving any violation of federal securities law. The suit, that is, can achieve all it is supposed to even if issues involving the Exchange Act never come up.
Critiquing Merrill Lynch's position on similar grounds, Manning proposes a far more restrictive interpretation of § 27's language-one going beyond what he needs to prevail. See Brief for Respondents 27-33. According to Manning, a suit is "brought to enforce" the Exchange Act's duties or liabilities only if it is brought directly under that statute-that is, only if the claims it asserts (and not just the duties it means to vindicate) are created by the Exchange Act. On that view, everything depends (as Justice Holmes famously said in another jurisdictional context) on which law "creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916). If a complaint asserts a right of action deriving from the Exchange Act (or an associated regulation), the suit must proceed in federal court. But if, as here, the complaint brings only state-created claims, then the case belongs in a state forum. And that is so, Manning claims, even if-contrary to what the Third Circuit held below-the success of the state claim necessarily hinges on proving that the defendant breached an Exchange Act duty. See Brief for Respondents 31.
Manning's view of the text's requirements, although better than Merrill Lynch's, veers too far in the opposite direction. There is no doubt, as Manning says, that a suit asserting an Exchange Act cause of action fits within § 27's scope: Bringing such a suit is the prototypical way of enforcing an Exchange Act duty. But it is not the only way. On rare occasions, as just suggested, a suit raising a state-law claim rises or falls on the plaintiff's ability to prove the violation of a federal duty. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314-315, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) ; Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921). If in that manner, a state-law action necessarily depends on a showing that the defendant breached the Exchange Act, then that suit could also fall within § 27's compass. Suppose, for example, that a state statute simply makes illegal "any violation of the Exchange Act involving naked short selling." A plaintiff seeking relief under that state law must undertake to prove, as the cornerstone of his suit, that the defendant infringed a requirement of the federal statute. (Indeed, in this hypothetical, that is the plaintiff's only project.) Accordingly, his suit, even though asserting a state-created claim, is also "brought to enforce" a duty created by the Exchange Act.
An existing jurisdictional test well captures both classes of suits "brought to enforce" such a duty. As noted earlier, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal jurisdiction of all civil actions "arising under" federal law. See supra, at 1567. This Court has found that statutory term satisfied in either of two circumstances. Most directly, and most often, federal jurisdiction attaches when federal law creates the cause of action asserted. That set of cases is what Manning highlights in offering his view of § 27. But even when "a claim finds its origins" in state law, there is "a special and small category of cases in which arising under jurisdiction still lies."
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). As this Court has explained, a federal court has jurisdiction of a state-law claim if it "necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance" of federal and state power. Grable, 545 U.S., at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363 ; see Gunn, 568 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1064-1065 (framing the same standard as a four-part test). That description typically fits cases, like those described just above, in which a state-law cause of action is "brought to enforce" a duty created by the Exchange Act because the claim's very success depends on giving effect to a federal requirement. Accordingly, we agree with the court below that § 27's jurisdictional test matches the one we have formulated for § 1331, as applied to cases involving the Exchange Act. If (but only if) such a case meets the "arising under" standard, § 27 commands that it go to federal court.
Merrill Lynch objects that our rule construes "completely different language"-i.e., the phrases "arising under" and "brought to enforce" in § 1331 and § 27, respectively-"to mean exactly the same thing." Reply Brief 7. We cannot deny that point. But we think it far less odd than Merrill Lynch does. After all, the test for § 1331 jurisdiction is not grounded in that provision's particular phrasing. This Court has long read the words "arising under" in Article III to extend quite broadly, "to all cases in which a federal question is 'an ingredient' of the action." Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) (quoting Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) ). In the statutory context, however, we opted to give those same words a narrower scope "in the light of [§ 1331's] history[,] the demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959). Because the resulting test does not turn on § 1331's text, there is nothing remarkable in its fitting as, or even more, neatly a differently worded statutory provision.
Nor can Merrill Lynch claim that Congress's use of the new "brought to enforce" language in § 27 shows an intent to depart from a settled (even if linguistically ungrounded) test for statutory "arising under" jurisdiction. That is because no such well-defined test then existed. As we recently noted, our caselaw construing § 1331 was for many decades-including when the Exchange Act passed-highly "unruly." Gunn, 568 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1065 (referring to the "canvas" of our old opinions as "look[ing] like one that Jackson Pollock got to first"). Against that muddled backdrop, it is impossible to infer that Congress, in enacting § 27, wished to depart from what we now understand as the "arising under" standard.
B
This Court has reached the same conclusion before. In two unrelated decisions, we addressed the "brought to enforce" language at issue here. See Pan American, 366 U.S. 656, 81 S.Ct. 1303, 6 L.Ed.2d 584 ; Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996). Each time, we viewed that phrase as coextensive with our construction of "arising under."
Pan American involved § 22 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717u -an exclusive jurisdiction provision containing language materially indistinguishable from § 27's. The case began in state court when a natural gas purchaser sued a producer for breach of a contract setting sale prices. Prior to the alleged breach, the producer had filed those contractual rates with the Federal Power Commission, as the NGA required. Relying on that submission (which the complaint did not mention), the producer claimed that the buyer's suit was "brought to enforce" a liability deriving from the NGA-i.e., a filed rate-and so must proceed in federal court. See 366 U.S., at 662, 81 S.Ct. 1303. This Court rejected the argument.
Our decision explained that § 22's use of the term "brought to enforce," rather than "arising under," made no difference to the jurisdictional analysis. The inquiry, we wrote, was "not affected by want" of the language contained in the federal question statute. Id., at 665, n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1303. The "limitation[s]" associated with "arising under" jurisdiction, we continued, were "clearly implied" in § 22's alternative phrasing. Ibid. In short, the linguistic distinction between the two jurisdictional provisions did not extend to their meaning.
Pan American thus went on to analyze the jurisdictional issue in the manner set out in our "arising under" precedents. Federal question jurisdiction lies, the Court wrote, only if "it appears from the face of the complaint that determination of the suit depends upon a question of federal law." Id., at 663, 81 S.Ct. 1303. That inquiry focuses on "the particular claims a suitor makes" in his complaint-meaning, whether the plaintiff seeks relief under state or federal law. Id., at 662, 81 S.Ct. 1303. In addition, the Court suggested, a federal court could adjudicate a suit stating only a state-law claim if it included as "an element, and an essential one," the violation of a federal right. Id., at 663, 81 S.Ct. 1303 (quoting Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936) ). With those principles of "arising under" jurisdiction laid out, the Court held that § 22 did not enable a federal court to resolve the buyer's case, because he could prevail merely by proving breach of the contract. See 366 U.S., at 663-665, 81 S.Ct. 1303. Pan American establishes, then, that an action "brought to enforce" a duty or liability created by a federal statute is nothing more (and nothing less) than an action "arising under" that law.
Merrill Lynch reads Pan American more narrowly, as holding only that § 22 does not confer federal jurisdiction when a complaint (unlike Manning's) fails to reference federal law at all. See Brief for Petitioners 32-33, 38. But that argument ignores Pan American's express statement of equivalence between § 27's language and the federal question statute's: "Brought to enforce" has the same "limitation[s]" (meaning, the same scope) as "arising under." 366 U.S., at 665, n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1303. And just as important, Merrill Lynch disregards Pan American's analytical structure: The decision proceeds by reviewing this Court's "arising under" precedents, articulating the principles animating that caselaw, and then applying those tenets to the dispute at hand. Id., at 662-665, 81 S.Ct. 1303. The Court thus showed (as well as told) that "brought to enforce" jurisdiction mirrors that of "arising under."
As a fallback, Merrill Lynch claims that Pan American is irrelevant here because it relied on legislative history distinct to the NGA in finding § 22's "brought to enforce" language coterminous with "arising under." See Brief for Petitioners 38-39. The premise of that argument is true enough: In support of its holding, the Court quoted a Committee Report describing § 22 as conferring federal jurisdiction "over cases arising under the act." 366 U.S., at 665, n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1303. But we cannot accept the conclusion Merrill Lynch draws from that statement: that courts should give two identically worded statutory provisions, passed less than five years apart, markedly different meanings. Indeed, the result of Merrill Lynch's approach is still odder, for what of the eight other jurisdictional provisions containing "brought to enforce" language? See n. 3, supra. Presumably, Merrill Lynch would have courts inspect each of their legislative histories to decide whether to read those statutes as reproducing the "arising under" standard, adopting Merrill Lynch's alternative view,

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 地