Task: songer_r_bus

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

OPINION
Before CHAMBERS, CARTER and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges.
JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Statham attacks the constitutionality of the Homestead Laws of the State of Washington under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On August 16, 1970, appellant, a single man without dependents, recorded a declaration of homestead on real property in the State of Washington. The following day, August 17, 1970, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereafter he claimed the real property as exempt under Washington law. The Bankruptcy Act laws exemptions provided by State law, Section 6 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24.
The claim was disallowed by the trustee and the referee, and a petition for review was denied by the district court.
Statutes of the State of Washington permit a homestead to be selected by an unmarried person who is the head, of a family. R.C.W. 6.12.020. “Head of a Family” is defined as a person who has residing on the premises with him [or her] and under his [or her] care and maintenance various relations listed therein. R.C.W. 6.12.290(2) (a) through (e).
R.C.W. 6.12.290(1) lists as the head of a family:
“The husband or wife, when the claimant is a married person; or a widow or widower still residing upon the premises occupied by her or him as a home while married.”
Otherwise, a single person is not included as eligible for a homestead.
In the field of economics and social welfare, legislation does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if “the State’s action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (Aid for Dependent Children); accord McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-428, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (Sunday Blue Laws).
In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973) the Court held that “bankruptcy legislation is in the area of economics and social welfare. This being so, the applicable standard, in measuring the propriety of Congress’ classification, is that of rational justification.” (Citing Dandridge, supra, inter alia.) The Court also held there was no due process or equal protection right to a discharge in bankruptcy without payment of the required filing fees. The Court rejected Kras’ claim that bankruptcy involved a fundamental interest and represented the sole means of discharging one’s debts, at least for the poor. The Court said, “We see no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy.” Id. at 445, 93 S.Ct. at 638. And further, “There is no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one’s debt in bankruptcy.” Id. at 446, 93 S.Ct. at 638. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971) (Social Security Act).
We hold that the State of Washington, in its statutes concerning homesteads, had a rational basis for the legislation and its treatment of a single person without dependents. By reasonable inference from the scheme of the Washington statutes, they evince a legislative purpose to protect the “family” from loss of its homestead in case of economic distress. Appellant argues that the scheme instead exists to protect not only the family, but the individual debtor himself — including single debtors without dependents such as appellant. We cannot agree. The “head of a family” and his family are clearly the persons protected, defined broadly to include certain dependents not members of one’s immediate family.
Appellant points out that the statute does protect single persons without dependents, who also happen to be widow(er)s still living in the former marital domicile. We think that protection of the former family, one of whose members has died, from the loss of the homestead at such a tragic time, constitutes a rational basis for differentiating between widow(er)s and other single persons without dependents who by definition would not be subject to such a loss.
The judgment is affirmed.
. That classification does not endanger a fundamental personal right. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) (legitimacy).

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0