Task: songer_r_fed

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

MeCREE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court, entered on a jury verdict, dismissing appellant’s suit with prejudice. The questions presented are whether certain damage which occurred on April 22, 1960 to one of appellant’s electrical transformers is within the coverage of an insurance policy written by appellee and, if so, whether the District Court’s judgment must still be affirmed because the judge erred in holding that appellant had produced sufficient evidence to create a fact question for the jury, thus requiring his denial of appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. Jurisdiction is based on diversity and the law of Kentucky controls. Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
Appellant is a public utility serving Louisville and Jefferson Counties in Kentucky. The damage in question was caused by a malfunction within the transformer involving electrical arcing and resultant electromotive forces. Whether an explosion of some of the oil which was circulated through the transformer as an insulator and coolant also occurred is disputed.
Appellant instituted this action in the Jefferson County Circuit Court to recover appellee’s pro rata share of the liability for the loss. The cause was thereafter removed to the District Court and was tried before a jury. The District Judge instructed the jury that appellant could not recover under the policy unless it found that the electrical arcing was followed by an explosion which, apart from other causes, resulted in more than two hundred dollars damage. He then submitted to the jury the following interrogatory :
Did an ensuing explosion, following an electrical arc, occur in either the selector switch compartment or the main tank of the transformer, which was followed by some damage caused by the explosion in the compartment where it took place in excess of $200?
The jury answered this in the negative and pursuant to his further instructions, returned a verdict for appellee. Judgment was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the District Court’s charge to the jury was erroneous and that it is entitled to recover under the policy if the arcing caused an explosion and if the arcing and explosion together produced total damage in excess of two hundred dollars. We hold that the policy should be construed in this manner and that the judgment of the District Court should therefore be reversed.
The policy’s “explosion clause” provides: “This Company shall not be liable for any loss by explosion unless such loss (including loss, if any, by ensuing fire) exceeds $200 * * Although the total damage to the transformer in this case exceeded one hundred thousand dollars, most, if not all, of the damage was apparently caused by the arcing and electromotive forces. Whether damage of this type can be considered in determining that a “loss by explosion” in excess of two hundred dollars occurred requires consideration of another provision of the explosion clause which states:
The coverage of loss by explosion under this endorsement shall include direct loss by any artificial electrical disturbance immediately preceding and causing such explosion * * *.
We hold that this provision can reasonably be construed to define the term “loss by explosion” and, therefore, permits consideration of the damage from the electrical arcing for the purpose of determining whether the minimum insured loss was incurred by appellant.
The distinction, urged by appellee, between the “coverage of loss by explosion” (our emphasis) and the definition of such loss is neither clear nor obvious. It is just as reasonable to view these provisions as insuring against all covered losses, subject only to the condition that they exceed a minimum amount. So construed they would be analogous to the familiar deductible provisions of many automobile collision insurance policies. Although appellee may not have intended to provide this coverage when it issued the policy, it is clear that the language of the agreement must determine its legal consequences. Under Kentucky law, if two constructions of policy language are reasonable, the one favorable to the insured must be adopted. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, Mass. v. Heine, 141 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1944).
With regard to the second question presented, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. Appellee contends that a rupture in the transformer’s pressure relief device might constitute an explosion within the terms of the policy but that it is clear that mere vaporization and decomposition of oil does not. Although in a similar case, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 166 F.Supp. 703 (D.Maryland, 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 269 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1959), the jury seems to have accepted this proposition, we cannot say that it is true as a matter of law.
There is testimony in the record that the decomposition and vaporization of oil, which necessarily accompanies any arcing which occurs in the parts of the transformer through which this liquid is circulated, constitutes an explosion. It is for the jury to evaluate this testimony and to determine whether the occurrence of these phenomena in the instant ease was within the meaning of the term “explosion” as it is used in the explosion clause of the policy as defined by the court in its instructions.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
. Appellee is one of several companies which had insured the transformer.
. The explosion clause is contained within the Extended Coverage Endorsement of the policy and provides :
Provisions Applicable Only to Explosion : The coverage of loss by explosion under this endorsement shall include direct loss by any artificial electrical disturbance immediately preceding and causing such explosion and shall include direct loss resulting from the explosion of unfired pressure vessels or accumulated gases or unconsumed fuel within the firebox (or the combustion chamber) of any fired vessel or within the flues or passages which conduct the gases of combustion therefrom.
This Company shall not be liable for any loss by explosion unless such loss (including loss, if any, by ensuing fire) exceeds $200 and then only for this Company’s pro rata part of the amount of such excess; nor shall this Company be liable for loss by explosion, rupture or bursting of:
(a) steam boilers, steam pipes, steam turbines or steam engines; or
(b) rotating parts of machinery caused by centrifugal force; if owned by, leased by or actually operated under the control of the Insured.
The following are not explosions within the intent of meaning of these provisions :
(a) concussion unless caused by explosion,
(b) electrical arcing,
(c) water hammer,
(d) rupture or bursting of water pipes.
Any other explosion clause made a part of this policy is superseded by this endorsement.
. The parties agree that electrical arcing is an artificial electrical disturbance within the meaning of the terms of the explosion clause.
. Vaporization of oil, according to this testimony, can cause the volume which the oil occupies to increase rapidly by a factor as high as fifteen hundred, depending on conditions.
. We observe that it seems unlikely that this term was intended by the parties to include every instance of vaporization and decomposition caused by electrical arcing. Such a conclusion would render meaningless that part of the explosion clause which provides:
The following are not explosions within the intent or meaning of these provisions :
* * *
(b) electrical arcing * * *.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 0