Task: sc_issue_8

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis.

Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans. That should come as no surprise, given that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is “an enormously complex and detailed statute,” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 262 (1998), and the plans that administrators must construe can be lengthy and complicated. (The one at issue here runs to 81 pages, with 139 sections.) We held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101 (1989), that an ERISA plan administrator with discretionary authority to interpret a plan is entitled to deference in exercising that discretion. The question here is whether a single honest mistake in plan interpretation justifies stripping the administrator of that deference for subsequent related interpretations of the plan. We hold that it does not.
I
As in many ERISA matters, the facts of this case are exceedingly complicated. Fortunately, most of the factual details are unnecessary to the legal issues before us, so we cover them only in broad strokes. This case concerns Xerox Corporation’s pension plan, which is covered by ERISA, 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. Petitioners are the plan itself (hereinafter Plan), and the Plan’s current and former administrators (hereinafter Plan Administrator). See § 1002(16)(A)(i); App. 32a. Respondents are Xerox employees who left the company in the 1980’s, received lump-sum distributions of retirement benefits they had earned up to that point, and were later rehired. See 328 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424 (WDNY 2004); Brief for Respondents 9-10. The dispute giving rise to this case concerns how to account for respondents’ past distributions when calculating their current benefits — that is, how to avoid paying respondents the same benefits twice.
The Plan Administrator initially interpreted the Plan to call for an approach that has come to be known as the “phantom account” method. 328 F. Supp. 2d, at 424. Essentially, that method calculated the hypothetical growth that respondents’ past distributions would have experienced if the money had remained in Xerox’s investment funds, and reduced respondents’ present benefits accordingly. See id., at 426-428; App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a. After the Plan Administrator denied respondents’ administrative challenges to that method, respondents filed suit in federal court under ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See 328 F. Supp. 2d, at 428-429. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Plan, applying a deferential standard of review to the Plan Administrator’s interpretation. See id., at 430-431, 439. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the Plan Administrator’s interpretation was unreasonable and that respondents had not been adequately notified that the phantom account method would be used to calculate their benefits. See 433 F. 3d 254, 257, 265-269 (2006).
The phantom account method having been exorcised from the Plan, the District Court on remand considered other approaches for adjusting respondents’ present benefits in light of their past distributions. See 472 F. Supp. 2d 452,456-458 (WDNY 2007). The Plan Administrator submitted an affidavit proposing an approach that, like the phantom account method, accounted for the time value of the money that respondents had previously received. But unlike the phantom account method, the Plan Administrator’s new approach did not calculate the present value of a past distribution based on events that occurred after the distribution was made. Instead, the new approach used an interest rate that was fixed at the time of the distribution, thereby calculating the current value of the distribution based on information that was known at the time of the distribution. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 147a-153a. Petitioners argued that the District Court should apply a deferential standard of review to this approach, and accept it as a reasonable interpretation of the Plan. See Defendants’ Pre-Hearing Brief Addressed to Remedies in No. OO-CV-6311 (WDNY), pp. 7-8; Defendants’ Pre-Hearing Reply Brief Addressing Remedies in No. OO-CV-6311 (WDNY), p. 2.
The District Court did not apply a deferential standard of review. Nor did it accept the Plan Administrator’s interpretation. Instead, after finding the Plan to be ambiguous, the District Court adopted an approach proposed by respondents that did not account for the time value of money. Under that approach, respondents’ present benefits were reduced only by the nominal amount of their past distributions— thereby treating a dollar distributed to respondents in the 1980’s as equal in value to a dollar distributed today. See 472 P. Supp. 2d, at 457-458. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part, holding that the District Court was correct not to apply a deferential standard on remand, and that the District Court’s decision on the merits was not an abuse of discretion. See 535 F. 3d 111, 119 (2008).
Petitioners asked us to grant certiorari on two questions: (1) whether the District Court owed deference to the Plan Administrator’s interpretation of the Plan on remand, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly granted deference to the District Court on the merits. Pet. for Cert. i. We granted.certiorari on both, 557 U. S. 933 (2009), but find it necessary to decide only the first.
II
A
This Court addressed the standard for reviewing the decisions of ERISA plan administrators in Firestone, 489 U. S. 101. Because ERISA’s text does not directly resolve the matter, we looked to “principles of trust law” for guidance. Id., at 109, 111. We recognized that, under trust law, the proper standard of review of a trustee's decision depends on the language of the instrument creating the trust. See id., at 111-112. If the trust documents give the trustee “power to construe disputed or doubtful terms,... the trustee’s interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable.” Id., at 111. Based on these considerations, we held that “a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Id., at 115.
We expanded Firestone’s approach in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U. S. 105 (2008). In determining the proper standard of review when a plan administrator operates under a conflict of interest, we again looked to trust law, the terms of the plan at issue, and the principles of ERISA— plus, of course, our precedent in Firestone. See 554 U. S., at 110-116. We held that, when the terms of a plan grant discretionary authority to the plan administrator, a deferential standard of review remains appropriate even in the face of a conflict. See id., at 115-116.
It is undisputed that, under Firestone and the terms of the Plan, the Plan Administrator here would normally be entitled to deference when interpreting the Plan. See 328 F. Supp. 2d, at 430-431 (observing that the Plan grants the Plan Administrator “broad discretion in making decisions relative to the Plan”). The Court of Appeals, however, crafted an exception to Firestone deference. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that a court need not apply a deferential standard “where the administrator ha[s] previously construed the same [plan] terms and we found such a construction to have violated ERISA.” 535 F. 3d, at 119. Under that view, the District Court here was entitled to reject a reasonable interpretation of the Plan offered by the Plan Administrator, solely because the Court of Appeals had overturned a previous interpretation by the Administrator. Cf. ibid, (accepting the District Court’s chosen method as one of “several reasonable alternatives”).
B
We reject this “one-strike-and-you’re-out” approach. Brief for Petitioners 51. As an initial matter, it has no basis in the Court’s holding in Firestone, which set out a broad standard of deference without any suggestion that the standard was susceptible to ad hoc exceptions like the one adopted by the Court of Appeals. See 489 U. S., at 111, 115. Indeed, we refused to create such an exception to Firestone deference in Glenn, recognizing that ERISA law was already complicated enough without adding “special procedural or evidentiary rules” to the mix. 554 U. S., at 116. If, as we held in Glenn, a systemic conflict of interest does not strip a plan administrator of deference, see id., at 115, it is difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different result.
Nor is the Court of Appeals’ decision supported by the considerations on which our holdings in Firestone and Glenn were based — namely, the terms of the plan, principles of trust law, and the purposes of ERISA. See supra, at 512. First, the Plan here grants the Plan Administrator general authority to “[c]onstrue the Plan.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 141a-142a. Nothing in that provision suggests that the grant of authority is limited to first efforts to construe the Plan.
Second, the Court of Appeals’ exception to Firestone deference is not required by principles of trust law. Trust law is unclear on the narrow question before us. A leading treatise states that a court will strip a trustee of his discretion when there is reason to believe that he will not exercise that discretion fairly — for example, upon a showing that the trustee has already acted in bad faith:
“If the trustee’s failure to pay a reasonable amount [to the beneficiary of the trust] is due to a failure to exercise [the trustee’s] discretion honestly and fairly, the court may well fix the amount [to be paid] itself. On the other hand, if the trustee’s failure to provide reasonably for the beneficiary is due to a mistake as to the trustee’s duties or powers, and there is no reason to believe the trustee will not fairly exercise the discretion once the court has determined the extent of the trustee’s duties and powers, the court ordinarily will not fix the amount but will instead direct the trustee to make reasonable provision for the beneficiary’s support.” 3 A. Scott, W. Fratcher, & M. Ascher, Scott and Ascher on Trusts § 18.2.1, pp. 1348-1349 (5th ed. 2007) (hereinafter Scott and Ascher) (citing cases; footnote omitted).
This is not surprising — if the settlor who creates a trust grants discretion to the trustee, it seems doubtful that the settlor would want the trustee divested entirely of that discretion simply because of one good-faith mistake.
Here the lower courts made no finding that the Plan Administrator had acted in bad faith or would not fairly exercise his discretion to interpret the terms of the Plan. Thus, if the District Court had followed the trust law principles set out in Scott and Ascher, it should not have “act[ed] as a substitute trustee,” Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N. H. 216, 218, 132 A. 10, 11 (1926), and stripped the Plan Administrator of the deference he would otherwise enjoy under Firestone and the terms of the Plan.
Other trust law sources, however, point the other way. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that “the court will control the trustee in the exercise of a power where he acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment.” 1 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187, Comment i, p. 406 (1957). Another treatise states that, after a trustee has abused his discretion, “[s]ometimes the court decides for the trustee how he should act, either by stating the exact result it desires to achieve, or by fixing some limits on the trustee’s action and giving him leeway within those limits.” G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees §560, p. 223 (2d rev. ed. 1980).
The unclear state of trust law on the question was perhaps best captured by the Texas Supreme Court:
“There is authority for ordering a dismissal of the case to afford the trustee an opportunity to exercise a reasonable discretion in arriving at the amount of payments to be made in the light of our discussion of the problem and after a proper consideration of the many factors involved. On the other hand, there is authority for remanding the case to the trial court to hear evidence and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to fix the amount of such payments. There is still other authority for remanding the case to the trial court to hear evidence and fix the boundaries of a reasonable discretion to be exercised by the trustee within maximum and minimum limits.” State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 54-55, 308 S. W. 2d 4, 11 (1957) (citations omitted).
While we are “guided by principles of trust law” in ERISA cases, Firestone, 489 U. S., at 111, we have recognized before that “trust law does not tell the entire story,” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489, 497 (1996); see ibid. (“In some instances, trust law will offer only a starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common-law trust requirements”); Brief for Respondents 50 (pressing same view as the dissent but concluding that the dispute over trust law “need not be resolved”). Here trust law does not resolve the specific issue before us, but the guiding principles we have identified underlying ERISA do.
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require employers to establish benefit plans in the first place. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U. S. 882, 887 (1996). We have therefore recognized that ERISA represents a “ ‘careful balancing’ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U. S. 200, 215 (2004) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 54 (1987)). Congress sought “to create a system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.” Varity Corp., supra, at 497. ERISA “induc[es] employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred.” Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U. S. 355, 379 (2002).
Firestone deference protects these interests and, by permitting an employer to grant primary interpretive authority over an ERISA plan to the plan administrator, preserves the “careful balancing” on which ERISA is based. Deference promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of benefits disputes through internal administrative proceedings rather than costly litigation. It also promotes predictability, as an employer can rely on the expertise of the plan administrator rather than worry about unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de novo judicial review. Moreover, Firestone deference serves the interest of uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork of different interpretations of a plan, like the one here, that covers employees in different jurisdictions — a result that “would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.” Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 11 (1987). Indeed, a group of prominent actuaries tells us that it is impossible even to determine whether an ERISA plan is solvent (a duty imposed on actuaries by federal law, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1023(a)(4), (d)) if the plan is interpreted to mean different things in different places. See Brief for Chief Actuaries as Amici Curiae 5-11.
Respondents and the United States as amicus curiae do not question that deference to plan administrators serves these important purposes. Rather, they argue that deference is less important once a plan administrator has issued an interpretation of a plan found to be unreasonable. But the interests in efficiency, predictability, and uniformity— and the manner in which they are promoted by deference to reasonable plan construction by administrators — do not suddenly disappear simply because a plan administrator has made a single honest mistake.
This case illustrates the point. Consider first the interest in efficiency, an interest that Xerox has pursued by granting the Plan Administrator authority to construe the Plan. On remand from the Court of Appeals, if the District Court had applied a deferential standard of review under Firestone, the question before it would have been whether the Plan Administrator’s interpretation of the Plan was reasonable. After answering that question, the case might well have been over. Instead, the District Court declined to defer, and therefore had to answer the more complicated question of how best to interpret the Plan.
The prospect of increased litigation costs inherent in respondents’ approach does not end there. Under respondents’ and the Government’s view, the question whether a deferential standard of review was required in this case turns on whether the Plan Administrator was interpreting the “same terms” or deciding the “same issue” on remand. See Brief for Respondents 43, 46-48, 53, and n. 13; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13-15, 23. Whether that condition is satisfied will not always be clear. Indeed, petitioners dispute that question here, arguing that the Plan Administrator confronted an entirely new issue on remand— how to interpret the Plan, knowing that specific provisions requiring use of the phantom account method could not be applied to respondents due to a lack of notice. See Brief for Petitioners 50-51. Respondents would force the parties to litigate this potentially complicated “same issue” or “same terms” question before a district court could even decide whether deference is owed to a plan administrator’s view. As we recognized in Glenn, there is little place in the ERISA context for these sorts of “special procedural rules [that] would create further complexity, adding time and expense to a process that may already be too costly for many of those who seek redress.” 554 U. S., at 116-117.
The position of respondents and the Government could interject other additional issues into ERISA litigation. For example, even under their view, the District Court here could have granted deference to the Plan Administrator; the court merely was not required to do so. See Brief for Respondents 43, 49-50, 52-53; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24. That raises the question of how a court is to decide between the two options; respondents’ answer is to weigh an indeterminate number of factors, which would only further complicate ERISA proceedings. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34, 40-45.
This ease also demonstrates the harm to the interest in predictability that would result from stripping a plan administrator of Firestone deference. After declining to apply a deferential standard here, the District Court adopted an interpretation of the Plan that does not account for the time value of money. 472 F. Supp. 2d, at 458; 535 F. 3d, at 119. In the actuarial world, this is heresy

Question: What is the issue of the decision?
年. involuntary confession
数. habeas corpus
日. plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise
的. retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)
月. search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)
用. search and seizure, vehicles
成. search and seizure, Crime Control Act
名. contempt of court or congress
时. self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)
件. Miranda warnings
一. self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution
请. right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)
中. cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)
据. cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)
码. line-up
不. discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)
新. double jeopardy
文. ex post facto (state)
下. extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous
分. extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence
入. extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom
人. extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)
功. extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)
上. extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance
户. extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)
为. extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity
间. confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)
号. subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error
取. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)
回. subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment
在. subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies
页. subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice
字. subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)
有. subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution
个. subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness
作. subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous
示. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
出. statutory construction of criminal laws: assault
是. statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery
失. statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)
表. statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody
除. statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)
加. statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)
败. statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms
生. statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud
信. statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling
类. statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951
置. statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)
理. statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)
本. statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes
息. statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol
行. statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice
定. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)
改. statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952
市. statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes
期. statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines
以. statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous
修. jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)
元. speedy trial
方. miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)
录. voting
区. Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus amendments
单. ballot access (of candidates and political parties)
位. desegregation (other than as pertains to school desegregation, employment discrimination, and affirmative action)
型. desegregation, schools
法. employment discrimination: on basis of race, age, religion, illegitimacy, national origin, or working conditions.
县. affirmative action
存. slavery or indenture
品. sit-in demonstrations (protests against racial discrimination in places of public accommodation)
前. reapportionment: other than plans governed by the Voting Rights Act
称. debtors' rights
注. deportation (cf. immigration and naturalization)
值. employability of aliens (cf. immigration and naturalization)
输. sex discrimination (excluding sex discrimination in employment)
建. sex discrimination in employment (cf. sex discrimination)
能. Indians (other than pertains to state jurisdiction over)
大. Indians, state jurisdiction over
例. juveniles (cf. rights of illegitimates)
度. poverty law, constitutional
始. poverty law, statutory: welfare benefits, typically under some Social Security Act provision.
到. illegitimates, rights of (cf. juveniles): typically inheritance and survivor's benefits, and paternity suits
面. handicapped, rights of: under Rehabilitation, Americans with Disabilities Act, and related statutes
载. residency requirements: durational, plus discrimination against nonresidents
点. military: draftee, or person subject to induction
密. military: active duty
动. military: veteran
果. immigration and naturalization: permanent residence
图. immigration and naturalization: citizenship
提. immigration and naturalization: loss of citizenship, denaturalization
发. immigration and naturalization: access to public education
式. immigration and naturalization: welfare benefits
国. immigration and naturalization: miscellaneous
登. indigents: appointment of counsel (cf. right to counsel)
错. indigents: inadequate representation by counsel (cf. right to counsel)
者. indigents: payment of fine
认. indigents: costs or filing fees
误. indigents: U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee
接. indigents: transcript
关. indigents: assistance of psychiatrist
重. indigents: miscellaneous
第. liability, civil rights acts (cf. liability, governmental and liability, nongovernmental; cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty)
地. miscellaneous civil rights (cf. comity: civil rights)
如. First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)
设. commercial speech, excluding attorneys
目. libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons
开. libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy
事. legislative investigations: concerning internal security only
可. federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes
要. loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)
代. loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)
小. loyalty oath: government employees
选. loyalty oath: political party
标. loyalty oath: teachers
明. security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements
编. conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service
求. campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):
列. protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees
网. free exercise of religion
万. establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)
最. parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools
器. obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment
所. obscenity, federal
内. due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code
体. due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)
通. due process: hearing, government employees
务. due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights
此. due process: impartial decision maker
商. due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)
序. due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property
化. privacy (cf. libel, comity: privacy)
消. abortion: including contraceptives
否. right to die
保. Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations
使. attorneys' and governmental employees' or officials' fees or compensation or licenses
次. commercial speech, attorneys (cf. commercial speech)
机. admission to a state or federal bar, disbarment, and attorney discipline (cf. loyalty oath: bar applicants)
对. admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court
量. arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)
查. union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity
部. union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation
性. Fair Labor Standards Act
和. Occupational Safety and Health Act
更. union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)
后. labor-management disputes: bargaining
证. labor-management disputes: employee discharge
题. labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature
确. labor-management disputes: representative election
格. labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction
了. labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute
于. labor-management disputes: right to organize
金. labor-management disputes: picketing
公. labor-management disputes: secondary activity
午. labor-management disputes: no-strike clause
円. labor-management disputes: union representatives
片. labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)
空. labor-management disputes: working conditions
态. labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute
管. miscellaneous union
主. antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)
天. mergers
自. bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)
我. sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death
全. election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things
今. liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.
来. liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages
正. liability, punitive damages
说. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)
意. state or local government tax
送. state and territorial land claims
容. state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)
已. federal or state regulation of securities
结. natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)
会. corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending
段. zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property
计. arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)
源. federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts
色. patents and copyrights: patent
時. patents and copyrights: copyright
交. patents and copyrights: trademark
系. patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes
过. federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad
电. federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat
询. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier
符. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)
未. federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline
程. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power
常. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power
条. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer
当. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer
情. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)
口. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)
合. federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)
车. federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company
实. miscellaneous economic regulation
组. comity: civil rights
版. comity: criminal procedure
周. comity: First Amendment
址. comity: habeas corpus
记. comity: military
二. comity: obscenity
同. comity: privacy
业. comity: miscellaneous
权. comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals
其. assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order
进. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules
试. judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures
验. mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)
料. venue
传. no merits: writ improvidently granted
述. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit
集. no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)
多. no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision
无. no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)
员. no merits: miscellaneous
报. standing to sue: adversary parties
他. standing to sue: direct injury
無. standing to sue: legal injury
服. standing to sue: personal injury
线. standing to sue: justiciable question
这. standing to sue: live dispute
制. standing to sue: parens patriae standing
将. standing to sue: statutory standing
处. standing to sue: private or implied cause of action
高. standing to sue: taxpayer's suit
子. standing to sue: miscellaneous
道. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts
章. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals
手. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)
库. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court
三. judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims
从. judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
支. judicial administration: review of non-final order
家. judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)
长. judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)
付. judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction
秒. judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)
路. judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)
完. judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts
象. judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal
则. judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata
现. judicial administration: interpleader
京. judicial administration: untimely filing
转. judicial administration: Act of State doctrine
辑. judicial administration: miscellaneous
限. Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction
力. miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction
学. federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)
外. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction
调. federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.
项. Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)
北. national supremacy: commodities
工. national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity
笑. national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support
监. national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
任. national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)
相. national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)
微. national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)
册. national supremacy: miscellaneous
联. miscellaneous federalism
平. boundary dispute between states
增. non-real property dispute between states
听. miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
解. incorporation of foreign territories
等. federal taxation, typically under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
得. federal taxation of gifts, personal, business, or professional expenses
收. priority of federal fiscal claims: over those of the states or private entities
安. miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. national supremacy: state tax)
价. legislative veto
藏. executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states
命. miscellaneous
应. real property
看. personal property
索. contracts
资. evidence
产. civil procedure
串. torts
布. wills and trusts
原. commercial transactions
Answer:

Answer: 说