Task: songer_genresp1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge;
The National Labor Relation Board (“Board”) petitions for enforcement of its order declaring that a provision in a union constitution violates section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). The provision at issue, found in the Sheet Metal Workers’ International and Local 16 union constitution, provides in part that:
No resignation shall be accepted if offered in anticipation of charges being preferred against [the union member], during the pendancy (sic) of any such charges or during a strike or lockout.
An administrative law judge held that the “mere maintenance of these resignation restrictions in the governing documents of the International and Local 16 coerces and restrains employee-members from exercising their Section 7 rights” in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). 274 N.L.R.B. 41, 43 (1985). The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its unfair labor practices by expunging the resignation restrictions from its constitution. Id. at 44. We enforce the Board’s order.
DISCUSSION
Section 7 of the Act grants employees “the right to refrain from any or all [concerted] ... activities_” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). This general right is implemented by section 8(b)(1)(A) which provides that unions commit unfair labor practices if they “restrain or coerce employees in the exercise” of their section 7 rights. 29 U.S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The union here does not challenge the Board’s determination that the restriction on resignations during a strike or lockout is an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). See Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3067, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985) (striking down fines imposed on employees who tendered resignations which were ineffective under a union constitution); Machinists Local 1327, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 773 F.2d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir.1985) (striking down fines imposed by a union against members who sought to resign their membership and return to work during a strike). The union’s failure to contest this holding constitutes a waiver of further argument, and the Board is therefore entitled to summary enforcement of this uncontested portion of its order. NLRB v. Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir.1981) (failure to object constitutes waiver).
The union does contest, however, the Board’s conclusion that the prohibition on resignations in anticipation of or during the pendency of union charges violates sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A). The union contends that Pattern Makers’ should be narrowly construed to bar only resignation restrictions during a strike or lockout — not in the context of union charges against a member. The union also asserts that, as a matter of policy, the Board is improperly intruding upon the union’s relationship with its members by enforcing the rule that “any ... restriction a union may impose on resignation” violates the Act. See International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 1414 (Neufeld Posche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1331 (1984). Finally, the union claims that the Board’s interpretation of the Act is inconsistent with legislative history.
We have not previously reviewed resignation restrictions in the context of pending charges against a union member. The Seventh Circuit, however, has squarely addressed the issue presented in this case. In NLRB v. Local 73, Sheet Metal Workers’Int’l Ass’n, 840 F.2d 501 (7th Cir.1988), the same constitutional provision at issue here was held to violate the Act. In addressing the identical union arguments, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged “room for debate about the precise scope and effect of the Pattern Makers’ holding,” but nonetheless could not “accept the ... implication that Pattern Makers’ is irrelevant to the instant case, or that the reasoning of the Court bears no resemblance to that of the Board in Neufeld.” Id. at 505.
Regarding the union’s policy arguments, the court stated:
No doubt the Unions have a significant and legitimate interest in holding their members accountable for their membership obligations. However, following the lead of Pattern Makers’ and acknowledging the deference due the Board’s construction of the Act, we must accept the NLRB’s conclusion that the Unions’ rule barring the resignations of members who resign in anticipation, or during the pendency, of charges of union misconduct restrains and coerces such members in the exercise of their section 7 rights.
Id. at 506-07. The court further noted that “unions are not stripped of their power to discipline members” because the NLRB has upheld “union efforts to discipline former members for their preresignation misconduct.” Id. at 507 (citing Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 31 (New York Times), 272 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984)).
Finally, the court agreed with Pattern Makers’ that the relevant legislative history was ambiguous. Id. at 508. The court reasoned that the “inconclusive historical evidence ... fall[s] short of showing that the NLRB’s interpretation of the Act is unreasonable.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit enforced the Board’s order requiring the union to expunge the provision from the union’s constitution. Id. Since Local 73, the Sixth Circuit has also enforced the Board’s order striking down similar union resignation restrictions. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 449 v. NLRB, 865 F.2d 791, 793 (6th Cir.1989). We see no reason to depart from these decisions. We agree with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ reasoning and thus hold that the union’s resignation restrictions at issue here violate section 8(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, we will enforce the Board’s order.
ENFORCED.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: B