Task: songer_appnatpr

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

SAMUEL P. KING, District Judge.
This appeal arises from an action for wrongful death brought by the wife and son of Antonio Balajadia Quichocho. Mr. Quichocho, while a patient in Guam Memorial Hospital, was electrocuted when he touched a metal water pipe while simultaneously touching a window frame which had a powerful electrical current passing through it. The current originated in an air conditioner which had been manufactured by defendant Kelvinator Corporation and was later installed by the Guam Memorial Hospital. The Hospital is not a part of this action.
The district judge refused to direct a verdict for either the plaintiffs or the defendants. The jury subsequently returned a verdict for defendants and the district judge refused to grant a judgment n. o. v. in favor of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s rulings on its motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment n. o. v.
The standards for determining whether a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for judgment n. o. v. should be granted are identical; in each case, the correct test is whether or not, viewing the evidence as a whole, “there is substantial evidence present that could support a finding, by reasonable jurors, for the nonmoving party.” See Chisholm Bros. Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 1974). With this standard as our guide, we review the evidence in the record.
There is no serious dispute that the capacitor in the air conditioner was defective and that but for the defective capacitor the electric current which killed Mr. Quichocho would not have done so. The key question for our purposes is whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have reasonably concluded that the defect arose after the air conditioner had been placed on the market and delivered to the hospital for installation, see Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 637 (8th Cir. 1972), or whether the evidence was such that the jury could reasonably have reached no other conclusion than that the defect was present before the manufacturer parted with the air conditioner. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A(l)(b), and comment g(19).
We recognize that a jury may ordinarily infer from circumstantial evidence that a product was defective at the time of sale and that direct evidence was not necessary. See Reader v. General Motors Corp., 107 Ariz. 149, 154, 483 P.2d 1388, 1393 (1971) and Wojciechowski v. Long-Airdox Division of Marmon Group, Inc., 488 F.2d 1111, 1116 (3d Cir. 1973). In this case, such an inference would have been permissible if only because the accident occurred a mere six weeks after the air conditioner was installed. That this inference was permissible, however, does not mean that the jury was bound to accept it. See Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., supra, 460 F.2d -at 640. Even if we were prepared to say that the proximity of the date of sale and the date of the accident shifted the burdens of going forward and persuasion to the defendants, the defendants in this case introduced credible evidence that environmental factors in Guam such as the exceptional salinity, dustiness and humidity of the air could have caused the defect in the capacitor within six weeks of installation. Viewing this evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the appellees, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for defendants. Therefore the district court’s ruling must be permitted to stand. See Cockrum v. Whitney, 479 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir. 1973).
Appellees also argue that the repetition in three instructions of the “unreasonably dangerous” language of § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts was unduly prejudicial. Since plaintiffs apparently concede that the district court’s adoption of the Restatement formulation was not error, we cannot say that the repetition of that formulation was reversible error. See Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231,240 (5th Cir. 1969).
. Appellees argue that the defective capacitor was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ decedent’s injury since the current would not have reached Mr. Quichocho’s body had there not been certain defects in the installation of the air conditioner. These other defects are at most concurrent, but not intervening, causes and cannot relieve defendants of any liability it might otherwise incur. See Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement, 44 Cal.2d 225, 234, 282 P.2d 69, 74 (1955).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.
Answer:

Answer: 2