Task: songer_genresp1

What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Pollack, J., which affirmed an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Babitt, J., denying appellant’s motion for an order of contempt and sanctions against Robert B. Fiske, Jr., then United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. In the bankruptcy court, appellant claimed that the United States Attorney had failed to investigate or prosecute certain participants in the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, In re Hartford Textile Corp., 588 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1978).
Earlier, in the bankruptcy court, appellant’s counsel leveled charges of perjury and false document filing against an officer of the debtor corporation and his attorney and moved for an order of contempt against both men. On October 25, 1978, at a hearing on the contempt motion, the following occurred:
The Court: If there has been a perjury, I don’t believe contempt is sufficient, to begin with. I think you should refer the matter to the United States Attorney. I direct you to do so.
I have no jurisdiction over prosecution of a crime. I don’t believe contempt lies over that kind of a situation. I am going to direct that you refer the matter to the United States Attorney.
Mr. Shuffman: I will do so.
Appellant’s Br. at A7.
Appellant apparently interprets Judge Babitt’s remarks of October 25,1978, directing appellant’s counsel to refer his perjury and false document filing charges against debtor’s counsel to the United States Attorney, as a court order to the United States Attorney to investigate the corporate officer and his counsel. He reappeared in the bankruptcy court on February 27, 1980, with a motion for contempt. This time, however, he wanted the United States Attorney held in contempt for his failure to receive and review documentation pursuant to a direction of the bankruptcy court. See Appellant’s App. at 4-6; Supp.App. at 9. Judge Babitt’s statement did not constitute such a direction or order. In denying the motion for an order of contempt Judge Babitt stated that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to grant the relief requested, namely, ordering the United States Attorney to prosecute a particular case: “An application to the Bankruptcy Court to hold the United States Attorney in contempt for failure to discharge what the moving party thinks he should do is inappropriate in this Court. If it lies somewhere else, go to it.” Appellant’s App. at 17.
On appeal to the district court Judge Pollack correctly held that the motion in the bankruptcy court was without legal merit in that the United States Attorney was not a party to the underlying bankruptcy matter, there was no order by a court to the United States Attorney, and the United States Attorney did not violate any order of the court.
This appeal is frivolous. We consider it to be a continuation of the meritless and repetitious filings by appellant noted in In re Hartford Textile Corp., supra, 588 F.2d at 876 n.3 (Shuffman filed at least 25 motions, many of which were meritless and repetitious, increasing costs unreasonably and vexatiously), and In re Hartford Textile Corp., 613 F.2d 384, 386 (2d Cir. 1979) (Shuffman more than doubled previous output of meritless, frivolous filings including a motion for the appointment of a special prosecutor).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed and double costs are awarded to the appellee.
. Rose Shuffman also appeals from an order denying her motion for rehearing and reargument of the contempt motion. In view of our decision here, we affirm the order denying that motion without comment.
. On April 17, 1981, five days before the date set for oral argument of this appeal, appellant filed a motion for recusal of the panel and for a change of venue to the District of Columbia Circuit. The motion was frivolous and it was denied. On the same day appellant filed a motion for an order striking a supplemental appendix and for the appointment of a special prosecutor. This motion was also frivolous and was denied.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?
A. private business (including criminal enterprises)
B. private organization or association
C. federal government (including DC)
D. sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
E. state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
F. government - level not ascertained
G. natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
H. miscellaneous
I. not ascertained
Answer:

Answer: C