Task: sc_respondent

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Me. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA), 86 Stat. 424, 33 U. S. C. § 1221 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and 46 U. S. C. § 391a (1970 ed., Supp. V), navigation in Puget Sound, a body of inland water lying along the northwest coast of the State of Washington, is controlled in major respects by federal law. The PWSA also subjects to federal rule the design and operating characteristics of oil tankers.
This case arose when ch. 125, 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st Extr. Sess., Wash. Rev. Code § 88.16.170 et seq. (Supp. 1975) (Tanker Law), was adopted with the aim of regulating in particular respects the design, size, and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound. In response to the constitutional challenge to the law brought by the appellees herein, the District Court held that under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which declares that the federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” the Tanker Law could not coexist with the PWSA and was totally invalid. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C-75-648-M (WD Wash. Sept. 24, 1976).
I
Located adjacent to Puget Sound are six oil refineries having a total combined processing capacity of 359,500 barrels of oil per day. In 1971, appellee Atlantic Richfield Co. (ARCO) began operating an oil refinery at Cherry Point, situated in the northern part of the Sound. Since then, the crude oil processed at that refinery has been delivered principally by pipeline from Canada and by tankers from the Persian Gulf; tankers will also be used to transport oil there from the terminus of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline at Valdez, Alaska. Of the 105 tanker deliveries of crude oil to the Cherry Point refinery from 1972 through 1975, 95 were by means of tankers in excess of 40,000 deadweight tons (DWT), and, prior to the effective date of the Tanker Law, 15 of them were by means of tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT.
Appellee Seatrain Lines, Inc. (Seatrain), owns or charters 12 tanker vessels in domestic and foreign commerce, of which four exceed 125,000 DWT. Seatrain also operates through a wholly owned subsidiary corporation a shipbuilding facility in New York City, where it has recently constructed or is constructing four tankers, each with a 225,000 DWT capacity.
On the day the Tanker Law became effective, ARCO brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. Seatrain was later permitted to intervene as a plaintiff. Named as defendants were the state and local officials responsible for the enforcement of the Tanker Law. The complaint alleged that the statute was pre-empted by federal law, in particular the PWSA, and that it was thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. It was also alleged that the law imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that it interfered with the federal regulation o'f foreign affairs. Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, a three-judge court was convened to determine the case.
The case was briefed and argued before the District Court on the basis of a detailed stipulation of facts. Also before the court was the brief of the United States as amicus curiae, which contended that the Tanker Law was pre-empted in its entirety by the PWSA and other federal legislation. The three-judge court agreed with the plaintiffs and the United States, ruling that all of the operative provisions of the Tanker Law were pre-empted, and enjoining appellants and their successors from enforcing the chapter. We noted probable jurisdiction of the State’s appeal, 430 U. S. 905 (1977), meanwhile having stayed the injunction. 429 U. S. 1035 (1977).
II
The Court’s prior cases indicate that when a State’s exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Under the relevant cases, one of the legitimate inquiries is whether Congress has either explicitly or implicitly declared that the States are prohibited from regulating the various aspects of oil-tanker operations and design with which the Tanker Law is concerned. As the Court noted in Rice, supra, at 230:
“[The congressional] purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 250 U. S. 566, 569; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439; Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U. S. 597; New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147; Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra.”
Accord, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U. S. 624, 633 (1973).
Even, if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute. A conflict will be found “where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility...,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state “law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 540-541. Accord, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (1976).
Ill
With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of each of the three operative provisions of the Tanker Law. We address first Wash. Rev. Code §88.16.180 (Supp. 1975), which requires both enrolled and registered oil tankers of at least 50,000 DWT to take on a pilot licensed by the State of Washington while navigating Puget Sound. The District Court held that insofar as the law required a tanker “enrolled in the coastwise trade” to have a local pilot on board, it was in direct conflict with 46 U. S. C. §§ 215, 364. We agree.
Section 364 provides that “every coastwise seagoing steam vessel subject to the navigation laws of the United States,... not sailing under register, shall, when under way,... be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the Coast Guard.” Section 215 adds that “[n]o State or municipal government shall impose upon pilots of steam vessels any obligation to procure a State or other license in addition to that issued by the United States.....” It goes on to explain that the statute shall not be construed to “affect any regulation established by the laws of any State, requiring vessels entering or leaving a port in any such State, other than coast-wise steam vessels, to take a pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of such State... (Emphasis added.) The Court has long held that these two statutes read together give the Federal Government exclusive authority to regulate pilots on enrolled vessels and that they preclude a State from imposing its own pilotage requirements upon them. See Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187 (1912); Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90 (1886). Thus, to the extent that the Tanker Law requires enrolled tankers to take on state-licensed pilots, the District Court correctly concluded, as the State now concedes, that it was in conflict with federal law and was therefore invalid.
While the opinion of the court below indicated that the pilot provision of the Tanker Law was void only to the extent that it applied to tankers enrolled in the coastwise trade, the judgment itself declared the statute null and void in its entirety. No part of the statute was excepted from the scope of the injunctive relief. The judgment was overly broad, for just as it is clear that States may not regulate the pilots of enrolled vessels, it is equally clear that they are free to impose pilotage requirements on registered vessels entering and leaving their ports. Not only does 46 U. S. C. § 215 so provide, as was noted above, but so also does § 101 (5) of the PWSA, 33 TJ. S. C.- § 1221 (5) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “require pilots on self-propelled vessels engaged in the foreign trades in areas and under circumstances where a pilot is not otherwise required by State law to be on board until the State having jurisdiction of an area involved establishes a requirement for a pilot in that area or under the circumstances involved....” Accordingly, as appellees now agree, the State was free to require registered tankers in excess of 50,000 DWT to take on a state-licensed pilot upon entering Puget Sound.
IV
We next deal with § 88.16.190 (2) of the Tanker Law, which requires enrolled and registered oil tankers of from 40,000 to 125,000 DWT to possess all of the following “standard safety features”:
“(a) Shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two and one-half deadweight tons; and “(b) Twin screws; and
“(c) Double bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid cargo compartments; and
“(d) Two radars in working order and operating, one of which must be collision avoidance radar; and
“(e) Such other navigational position location systems as may be prescribed from time fi> time by the board of pilotage commissioners....”
This section contains a proviso, however, stating that if the “tanker is in ballast or is under escort of a tug or tugs with an aggregate shaft horsepower equivalent to five percent of the deadweight tons of that tanker...,” the design requirements are not applicable. The District Court held invalid this alternative design/tug requirement of the Tanker Law. We agree insofar as we hold that the foregoing design requirements, standing alone, are invalid in the light of the PWSA and its regulatory implementation.
The PWSA contains two Titles representing somewhat overlapping provisions designed to insure vessel safety and the protection of the navigable waters, their resources, and shore areas from tanker cargo spillage. The focus of Title I, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1221-1227 (1970 ed., Supp. V), is traffic control at local ports; Title IPs principal concern is tanker design and construction. For present purposes the relevant part is Title II, 46 U. S. C. § 391a (1970 ed., Supp. V), which amended the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, Rev. Stat. § 4417a, as added, 49 Stat. 1889.
Title II begins by declaring that the protection of life, property, and the marine environment from harm requires the promulgation of “comprehensive minimum standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, and operation” for vessels carrying certain cargoes in bulk, primarily oil and fuel tankers. § 391a (1). To implement the twin goals of providing for vessel safety and protecting the marine environment, it is provided that the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is located “shall establish” such rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect to the design, construction, and operation of the covered vessels and with respect to a variety of related matters. § 391a (3). In issuing regulations, the Secretary is to consider the kinds and grades of cargo permitted to be on board such vessels, to consult with other federal agencies, and to identify separately the regulations established for vessel safety and those to protect marine environment. Ibid.
Section 391a (5) provides for inspection of vessels for compliance with the Secretary’s safety regulations. No vessel subject to Title II may have on board any of the specified cargoes until a certificate of inspection has been issued to' the vessel and a permit endorsed thereon “indicating that such vessel is in compliance with the provisions of this section and the rules and regulations for vessel safety established hereunder, and showing the kinds and grades of such cargo that such vessel may have on board or transport.” It is provided that in lieu of inspection under this section the Secretary is to accept from vessels of foreign nations valid certificates of inspection “recognized under law or treaty by the United States.”
Title II also directs the Secretary to inspect tank vessels for compliance with the regulations which he is required to issue for the protection of the marine environment. § 391a (6). Compliance with these separate regulations, which must satisfy specified standards, and the consequent privilege of having on board the relevant cargo are evidenced by certificates of compliance issued by the Secretary or by appropriate endorsements on the vessels' certificates of inspection. Certificates are valid for the period specified by the Secretary and are subject to revocation when it is found that the vessel does not comply with the conditions upon which the certificate was issued. In lieu of a certificate of compliance with his own environmental regulations relating to vessel design, construction, alteration, and repair, the Secretary may, but need not, accept valid certificates from foreign vessels evidencing compliance with rules and regulations issued under a treaty, convention, or agreement providing for reciprocity of recognition of certificates or similar documents. §391a(7)(D).
This statutory pattern shows that Congress, insofar as design characteristics are concerned, has entrusted to the Secretary the duty of determining which oil tankers are sufficiently safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters of the United States. This indicates to us that Congress intended uniform national standards for design and construction of tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state requirements. In particular, as we see it, Congress did not anticipate that a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary’s design and construction regulations and holding a Secretary’s permit, or its equivalent, to carry the relevant cargo would nevertheless be barred by state law from operating in the navigable waters of the United States on the ground that its design characteristics constitute an undue hazard.
We do not question in the slightest the prior cases holding that enrolled and registered vessels must conform to “reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures...” imposed by a State. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S. 265, 277 (1977), citing Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240 (1891); and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440 (1960). Similarly, the mere fact that a vessel has been inspected and found to' comply with the Secretary’s vessel safety regulations does not prevent a State or city from enforcing local laws having other purposes, such as a local smoke abatement law. Ibid. But in none of the relevant cases sustaining the application of state laws to federally licensed or inspected vessels did the federal licensing or inspection procedure implement a substantive rule of federal law addressed to the object also sought to be achieved by the challenged state regulation. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, for example, made it plain that there was “no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance...” there involved. Id., at 446. The purpose of the “federal inspection statutes [was] to insure the seagoing safety of vessels... to aifor[d] protection from the perils of maritime navigation,” while “[b]y contrast, the sole aim of the Detroit ordinance [was] the elimination of air pollution to protect the health and enhance the cleanliness of the local community.” Id., at 445.
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 (1937), involved a similar situation. There, the Court concluded that the Federal Motor Boat Act, although applicable to the vessels in question, was of limited scope and did not include provision for "the inspection of the hull and machinery of respondents’ motor-driven tugs in order to insure safety or determine seaworthiness...,” as long as the tugs did not carry passengers, freight, or in.fla.mmable liquid cargo. Id., at 8. It followed that state inspection to insure safety was not in conflict with federal law, the Court also holding that the limited federal regulations did not imply an intent to exclude state regulation of those matters not touched by the federal statute.
Here, we have the very situation that Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit and Kelly v. Washington put aside. Title II aims at insuring vessel safety and protecting the marine environment; and the Secretary must issue all design and construction regulations that he deems necessary for these ends, after considering the specified statutory standards. The federal scheme thus aims precisely at the same ends as does § 88.16.190 (2) of the Tanker Law. Furthermore, under the PWSA, after considering the statutory standards and issuing all design requirements that in his judgment are necessary, the Secretary inspects and certifies each vessel as sufficiently safe to protect the marine environment and issues a permit or its equivalent to carry tank-vessel cargoes. Refusing to accept the federal judgment, however, the State now seeks to exclude from Puget Sound vessels certified by the Secretary as having acceptable design characteristics, unless they satisfy the different and higher design requirements imposed by state law. The Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the contrary state judgment.
Enforcement of the state requirements would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the evident congressional intention to establish a uniform federal regime controlling the design of oil tankers. The original Tank Vessel Act, amended by Title II, sought to effect a “reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ship construction...,” H. R. Rep. No. 2962, 74th. Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936); and far from evincing a different purpose, the Title II amendments strongly indicate that insofar tanker design is concerned, Congress anticipated the enforcement of federal standards that would pre-empt state efforts to mandate different or higher design requirements.
That the Nation was to speak with one voice with respect to tanker-design standards is supported by the legislative history of Title II, particularly as it reveals a decided congressional preference for arriving at international standards for building tank vessels. The Senate Report recognizes that vessel design “has traditionally been an area for international rather than national action,” and that “international solutions in this area are preferable since the problem of marine pollution is world-wide.” Senate Report 23. Congress did provide that the Secretary’s safety regulations would not apply to foreign ships holding compliance certificates under regulations arrived at by international agreement; but, in the end, the environmental protection regulations were made applicable to foreign as well as to American vessels since it was thought to be necessary for the achievement of the Act’s purposes.
Although not acceding to the request of those who thought that foreign vessels should be completely exempt from regulation under Title II, Congress did not abandon the effort to achieve international agreement on what the proper design standards should be. It wrote into Title II a deferral procedure, requiring the Secretary at the outset to transmit his proposed environmental protection rules and regulations with respect to vessel design to the appropriate international forums for consideration as international standards. § 391a (7)(B). In order to facilitate the international consideration of these design requirements, Title II specified that the rules and regulations governing foreign vessels and United States vessels engaged in foreign trade could not become effective before January 1, 1974, unless they were consonant with an international agreement. §391a(7)(C). As noted by the Senate Report, this requirement demonstrated the “committee’s strong intention that standards for the protection of the marine environment be adopted, multilaterally if possible, but adopted in any event.” Senate Report 28.
Congress expressed a preference for international action and expressly anticipated that foreign vessels would or could be considered sufficiently safe for certification by the Secretary if they satisfied the requirements arrived at by treaty or convention; it is therefore clear that Title II leaves no room for the States to impose different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international accord. A state law in this area, such as the first part of § 88.16.190 (2), would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards and is thus at odds with “the object sought to be obtained by [Title II] and the character of obligations imposed by it... Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 230. In this respect, the District Court was quite correct.
V
Of course, that a tanker is certified under federal law as a safe vessel insofar as its design and construction characteristics are concerned does not mean that it is free to ignore otherwise valid state or federal rules or regulations that do not constitute design or construction specifications. Registered vessels, for example, as we have already indicated, must observe Washington's pilotage requirement. In our view, both enrolled and registered vessels must also comply with the provision of the Tanker Law that requires tug escorts for tankers over 40,000 DWT that do not satisfy the design provisions specified in §88.16.190 (2). This conclusion requires analysis of Title I of the PWSA, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1221-1227 (1970 ed., Supp. Y).
A
In order to prevent damage to vessels, structures, and shore areas, as well as environmental harm to navigable waters and the resources therein that might result from vessel or structure damage, Title I authorizes the Secretary to establish and operate “vessel traffic services and systems” for ports subject to congested traffic, as well as to require ships to comply with the systems and to have

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?
年. attorney general of the United States, or his office
数. specified state board or department of education
日. city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
的. state commission, board, committee, or authority
月. county government or county governmental unit, except school district
用. court or judicial district
成. state department or agency
名. governmental employee or job applicant
时. female governmental employee or job applicant
件. minority governmental employee or job applicant
一. minority female governmental employee or job applicant
请. not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
中. retired or former governmental employee
据. U.S. House of Representatives
码. interstate compact
不. judge
新. state legislature, house, or committee
文. local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
下. governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
分. state or U.S. supreme court
入. local school district or board of education
人. U.S. Senate
功. U.S. senator
上. foreign nation or instrumentality
户. state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
为. state college or university
间. United States
号. State
取. person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
回. advertising business or agency
在. agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
页. airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
字. airline
有. distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
个. alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
作. American Medical Association
示. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
出. amusement establishment, or recreational facility
是. arrested person, or pretrial detainee
失. attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
表. author, copyright holder
除. bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
加. bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
败. establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
生. water transportation, stevedore
信. bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
类. brewery, distillery
置. broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
理. construction industry
本. bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
息. business, corporation
行. buyer, purchaser
定. cable TV
改. car dealer
市. person convicted of crime
期. tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
以. chemical company
修. child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
元. religious organization, institution, or person
方. private club or facility
录. coal company or coal mine operator
区. computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
单. consumer, consumer organization
位. creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
型. person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
法. defendant
县. debtor
存. real estate developer
品. disabled person or disability benefit claimant
前. distributor
称. person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
注. drug manufacturer
值. druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
输. employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
建. employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
能. electric equipment manufacturer
大. electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
例. eleemosynary institution or person
度. environmental organization
始. employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
到. farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
面. father
载. female employee or job applicant
点. female
密. movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
动. fisherman or fishing company
果. food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
图. foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
提. franchiser
发. franchisee
式. lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
国. person who guarantees another's obligations
登. handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
错. health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
者. heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
认. hospital, medical center
误. husband, or ex-husband
接. involuntarily committed mental patient
关. Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
重. insurance company, or surety
第. inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
地. investor
如. injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
设. juvenile
目. government contractor
开. holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
事. magazine
可. male
要. medical or Medicaid claimant
代. medical supply or manufacturing co.
小. racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
选. minority female employee or job applicant
标. manufacturer
明. management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
编. military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
求. mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
列. mother
网. auto manufacturer
万. newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
最. radio and television network, except cable tv
器. nonprofit organization or business
所. nonresident
内. nuclear power plant or facility
体. owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
通. shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
务. tender offer
此. oil company, or natural gas producer
商. elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
序. out of state noncriminal defendant
化. political action committee
消. parent or parents
否. parking lot or service
保. patient of a health professional
使. telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
次. physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
机. public interest organization
对. physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
量. pipe line company
查. package, luggage, container
部. political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
性. indigent, needy, welfare recipient
和. indigent defendant
更. private person
后. prisoner, inmate of penal institution
证. professional organization, business, or person
题. probationer, or parolee
确. protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
格. public utility
了. publisher, publishing company
于. radio station
金. racial or ethnic minority
公. person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
午. racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
円. realtor
片. journalist, columnist, member of the news media
空. resident
态. restaurant, food vendor
管. retarded person, or mental incompetent
主. retired or former employee
天. railroad
自. private school, college, or university
我. seller or vendor
全. shipper, including importer and exporter
今. shopping center, mall
来. spouse, or former spouse
正. stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
说. retail business or outlet
意. student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
送. taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
容. tenant or lessee
已. theater, studio
结. forest products, lumber, or logging company
会. person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
段. trucking company, or motor carrier
计. television station
源. union member
色. unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
時. union, labor organization, or official of
交. veteran
系. voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
过. wholesale trade
电. wife, or ex-wife
询. witness, or person under subpoena
符. network
未. slave
程. slave-owner
常. bank of the united states
条. timber company
当. u.s. job applicants or employees
情. Army and Air Force Exchange Service
口. Atomic Energy Commission
合. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
车. Department or Secretary of Agriculture
实. Alien Property Custodian
组. Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
版. Board of Immigration Appeals
周. Bureau of Indian Affairs
址. Bonneville Power Administration
记. Benefits Review Board
二. Civil Aeronautics Board
同. Bureau of the Census
业. Central Intelligence Agency
权. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
其. Department or Secretary of Commerce
进. Comptroller of Currency
试. Consumer Product Safety Commission
验. Civil Rights Commission
料. Civil Service Commission, U.S.
传. Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs
述. Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
集. Drug Enforcement Agency
多. Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
无. Department or Secretary of Energy
员. Department or Secretary of the Interior
报. Department of Justice or Attorney General
他. Department or Secretary of State
無. Department or Secretary of Transportation
服. Department or Secretary of Education
线. U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
这. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
制. Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
将. Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
处. Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
高. Federal Bureau of Prisons
子. Farm Credit Administration
道. Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
章. Federal Credit Union Administration
手. Food and Drug Administration
库. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
三. Federal Energy Administration
从. Federal Election Commission
支. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
家. Federal Housing Administration
长. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
付. Federal Labor Relations Authority
秒. Federal Maritime Board
路. Federal Maritime Commission
完. Farmers Home Administration
象. Federal Parole Board
则. Federal Power Commission
现. Federal Railroad Administration
京. Federal Reserve Board of Governors
转. Federal Reserve System
辑. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
限. Federal Trade Commission
力. Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
学. General Accounting Office
外. Comptroller General
调. General Services Administration
项. Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
北. Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
工. Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
笑. Interstate Commerce Commission
监. Indian Claims Commission
任. Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
相. Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
微. Information Security Oversight Office
册. Department or Secretary of Labor
联. Loyalty Review Board
平. Legal Services Corporation
增. Merit Systems Protection Board
听. Multistate Tax Commission
解. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
等. Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy
得. National Credit Union Administration
收. National Endowment for the Arts
安. National Enforcement Commission
价. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
藏. National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
命. National Mediation Board
应. National Railroad Adjustment Board
看. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
索. National Security Agency
资. Office of Economic Opportunity
产. Office of Management and Budget
串. Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
布. Office of Personnel Management
原. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
知. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
级. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
水. Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
击. Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
好. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
物. U.S. Public Health Service
放. Postal Rate Commission
亿. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
经. Renegotiation Board
模. Railroad Adjustment Board
之. Railroad Retirement Board
台. Subversive Activities Control Board
州. Small Business Administration
配. Securities and Exchange Commission
画. Social Security Administration or Commissioner
统. Selective Service System
共. Department or Secretary of the Treasury
连. Tennessee Valley Authority
海. United States Forest Service
节. United States Parole Commission
退. Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
間. United States Sentencing Commission
比. Veterans' Administration
问. War Production Board
至. Wage Stabilization Board
备. General Land Office of Commissioners
你. Transportation Security Administration
黑. Surface Transportation Board
或. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.
与. Reconstruction Finance Corp.
影. Department or Secretary of Homeland Security
话. Unidentifiable
视. International Entity
Answer:

Answer: 生