Task: sc_caseorigin

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York.

Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case focuses on the 1984 version of a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard promulgated by the Department of Transportation under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,80 Stat. 718,15 U. S. C. §1381 et seq. (1988 ed.). The standard, FMVSS 208, required auto manufacturers to equip some but not all of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. We ask whether the Act pre-empts a state common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant auto manufacturer, who was in compliance with the standard, should nonetheless have equipped a 1987 automobile with airbags. We conclude that the Act, taken together with FMVSS 208, pre-empts the lawsuit.
I
In 1992, petitioner Alexis Geier, driving a 1987 Honda Accord, collided with a tree and was seriously injured. The car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts which Geier had buckled up at the time. The car was not equipped with airbags or other passive restraint devices.
Geier and her parents, also petitioners, sued the car’s manufacturer, American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its affiliates (hereinafter American Honda), under District of Columbia tort law. They claimed, among other things, that American Honda had designed its car negligently and defectively because it lacked a driver’s side airbag. App. 3. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit. The court noted that FMVSS 208 gave ear manufacturers a choice as to whether to install airbags. And the court concluded that petitioners’ lawsuit, because it sought to establish a different safety standard — i. e., an airbag requirement — was expressly preempted by a provision of the Act which pre-empts “any safety standard” that is not identical to a federal safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(d) (1988 ed.); Civ. No. 95-CV-0064 (D. D. C., Dec. 9, 1997), App. 17. (We, like the courts below and the parties, refer to the pre-1994 version of the statute throughout the opinion; it has been recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 30101 et seq.)
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s conclusion but on somewhat different reasoning. It had doubts, given the existence of the Act’s “saving” clause, 15 U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.), that petitioners’ lawsuit involved the potential creation of the kind of “safety standard” to which the Safety Act’s express pre-emption provision refers. But it declined to resolve that question because it found that petitioners’ state-law tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of FMVSS 208’s objectives. For that reason, it found that those claims conflicted with FMVSS 208, and that, under ordinary pre-emption principles, the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. 166 F. 3d 1236,1238-1243 (CADC 1999).
Several state courts have held to the contrary, namely, that neither the Act’s express pre-emption nor FMVSS 208 preempts a “no airbag” tort suit. See, e. g., Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 92 N. Y. 2d 35, 43-53, 699 N. E. 2d 376, 379-386 (1998); Minton v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 80 Ohio St. 3d 62, 70-79, 684 N. E. 2d 648, 655-661 (1997); Munroe v. Galati, 189 Ariz. 113, 115-119, 938 P. 2d 1114, 1116-1120 (1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N. E. 2d 327, 330-339 (Ind. 1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140 N. H. 203, 206-207, 665 A. 2d 345, 347-348 (1995). All of the Federal Circuit Courts that have considered the question, however, have found pre-emption. One rested its conclusion on the Act’s express pre-emption provision. See, e.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 1410, 1413-1415 (CA9 1997). Others, such as the Court of Appeals below, have instead found preemption under ordinary pre-emption principles by virtue of the conflict such suits pose to FMVSS 208’s objectives, and thus to the Act itself. See, e. g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F. 3d 1414, 1417 (CA10 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F. 2d 1116, 1121-1125 (CA3 1990); Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F. 2d 816, 825-827 (CA11 1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 412-414 (CA1 1988). We granted certiorari to resolve these differences. We now hold that this kind of “no airbag” lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208, a standard authorized by the Act, and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.
In reaching our conclusion, we consider three subsidiary questions. First, does the Act’s express pre-emption provision pre-empt this lawsuit? We think not. Second, do ordinary pre-emption principles nonetheless apply? We hold that they do. Third, does this lawsuit actually conflict with FMVSS 208, hence with the Act itself? We hold that it does.
II
We first ask whether the Safety Act’s express pre-emption provision pre-empts this tort action. The provision reads as follows:
“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment[,] any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 15 U. S. C. § 1892(d) (1988 ed.).
American Honda points out that a majority of this Court has said that a somewhat similar statutory provision in a different federal statute — a provision that uses the word “requirements” — may well expressly pre-empt similar tort actions. See, e. g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 502-504 (1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 503-505 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 509-512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Petitioners reply that this statute speaks of pre-empting a state-law “safety standard,” not a “requirement,” and that a tort action does not involve a safety standard. Hence, they conclude, the express pre-emption provision does not apply.
We need not determine the precise significance of the use of the word “standard,” rather than “requirement,” however, for the Act contains another provision, which resolves the disagreement. That provision, a “saving” clause, says that “[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 15 U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.). The saving clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law liability eases to save. And a reading of the express pre-emption provision that excludes common-law tort actions gives actual meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leaving adequate room for state tort law to operate — for example, where federal law creates only a floor, i. e., a minimum safety standard. See, e. g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21 (explaining that common-law claim that a vehicle is defectively designed because it lacks antilock brakes would not be pre-empted by 49 CFR §571.105 (1999), a safety standard establishing minimum requirements for brake performance). Without the saving clause, a broad reading of the express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt those actions, for, as we have just mentioned, it is possible to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as applying to standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as well as standards contained in state legislation or regulations. And if so, it would pre-empt all nonidentical state standards established in tort actions covering the same aspect of pei'-■formance as an applicable federal standard, even if the federal standard merely established a minimum standard. On that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any, potential “liability at common law” would remain. And few, if any, state tort actions would remain for the saving clause to save. We have found no convincing indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions, in such circumstances. Hence the broad reading cannot be correct. The language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes common-law actions. Given the presence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-emption clause must be so read.
HH f — 1 1 — 1
We have just said that the saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Does it do more? In particular, does it foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read statutes as preempting state laws (including common-law rules) that “actually conflict” with the statute or federal standards promulgated thereunder? Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Petitioners concede, as they must in light of Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280 (1995), that the pre-emption provision, by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) “any possibility of implied [conflict] pre-emption,” id., at 288 (discussing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517-518 (1992)). But they argue that the saving clause has that very effect.
We recognize that, when this Court previously considered the pre-emptive effect of the statute’s ianguage, it appeared to leave open the question of how, or the extent to which, the saving clause saves state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations promulgated under the Act. See Freightliner, supra, at 287, n. 3 (declining to address whether the saving clause prevents a manufacturer from “us[ing] a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state common-law liability”). We now conclude that the saving clause (like the express pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.
Nothing in the language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort actions that conflict with federal regulations. The words “Compliance” and “does not exempt,” 15 U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.), sound as if they simply bar a special kind of defense, namely, a defense that compliance with a federal standard automatically exempts a defendant from state law, whether the Federal Government meant that standard to be an absolute requirement or only a minimum one. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b), Comment ~e (1997) (distinguishing between state-law compliance defense and a federal claim of preemption). It is difficult to understand why Congress would have insisted on a compliance-with-federal-regulation precondition to the provision’s applicability had it wished the Act to “save” all state-law tort actions, regardless of their potential threat to the objectives of federal safety standards promulgated under that Act. Nor does our interpretation conflict with the purpose of the saving provision, say, by rendering it ineffectual. As we have previously explained, the saving provision still makes clear that the express pre-emption provision does not of its own force pre-empt common-law tort actions. And it thereby preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety than the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to provide a floor. See supra, at 867-868.
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly “decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.” United States v. Locke, ante, at 106-107; see American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227-228 (1998) (AT&T); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907). We find this concern applicable in the present ease. And we conclude that the saving clause foresees — it does not foreclose— the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre-empt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts. We do not imderstand the dissent to disagree, for it acknowledges that ordinary pre-emption principles apply, at least sometimes. Post, at 899-900 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
Neither do we believe that the pre-emption provision, the saving provision, or both together, create some kind of “special burden” beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emption principles — which “special burden” would specially disfavor pre-emption here. Cf. post, at 898-899. The two provisions, read together, reflect a neutral policy, not a specially favorable or unfavorable policy, toward the application of ordinary conflict pre-emption principles. On the one hand, the pre-emption provision itself reflects a desire to subject the industry to a single, uniform set of federal safety standards. Its pre-emption of all state standards, even those that might stand in harmony with federal law, suggests an intent to avoid the conflict, uncertainty, cost, and occasional risk to safety itself that too many different safety-standard cooks might otherwise create. See H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1966) (“Basically, this preemption subsection is intended to result in uniformity of standards so that the public as well as industry will be guided by one set of criteria rather than by a multiplicity of diverse standards”); S. Rep. No. 1301,89th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1966). This policy by itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, for the rules of law that judges and juries create or apply in such suits may themselves similarly create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different juries in different States reach different decisions on similar facts.
On the other hand, the saving clause reflects a congressional determination that occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing necessary compensation to victims. That policy by itself disfavors pre-emption, at least some of the time. But we can find nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that would favor one set of policies over the other where a jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal safety standard.
Why, in any event, would Congress not have wanted ordinary pre-emption principles to apply where an actual conflict with a federal objective is at stake? Some such principle is needed. In its absence, state law could impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal regulatory mandates, say, by premising liability upon the presence of the very windshield retention requirements that federal law requires. See, e. g., 49 CFR § 571.212 (1999). Insofar as petitioners’ argument would permit common-law actions that "actually conflict” with federal regulations, it would take from those who would enforce a federal law the very ability to achieve the law’s congressionally mandated objectives that the Constitution, through the operation of ordinary preemption principles, seeks to protect. To the extent that such an interpretation of the saving provision reads into a particular federal law toleration of a conflict that those principles would otherwise forbid, it permits that law to defeat its own objectives, or potentially, as the Court has put it before, to “‘destroy itself.’” AT&T, supra, at 228 (quoting Abilene Cotton, supra, at 446). We do not claim that Congress lacks the constitutional power to write a statute that mandates such a complex type of state/federal relationship. Cf. post, at 900, n. 16. But there is no reason to believe Congress has done so here.
The dissent, as we have said, contends nonetheless that the express pre-emption and saving provisions here, taken together, create a “special burden,” which a court must impose “on a party” who claims conflict pre-emption under those principles. Post, at 898. But nothing in the Safety Act’s language refers to any “special burden.” Nor can one find the basis for a “special burden” in this Court’s precedents. It is true that, in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280 (1995), the Court said, in the context of interpreting the Safety Act, that “[a]t bestS” there is an “inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption.” Id., at 289 (emphasis added). But the Court made this statement in the course of rejecting the more absolute, argument that the presence of the express pre-emption provision entirely foreclosed the possibility of conflict pre-emption. Id., at 288. The statement, headed with the qualifier “[a]t best,” and made in a case where, without any need for inferences or “special burdens,” state law obviously would survive, see id., at 289-290, simply preserves a legal possibility. This Court did not hold that the Safety Act does create a “special burden,” or still less that such a burden necessarily arises from the limits of an express pre-emption provision. And considerations of language, purpose, and administrative workability, together with the principles underlying this Court’s pre-emption doctrine discussed above, make clear that the express pre-emption provision imposes no unusual, “special burden” against pre-emption. For similar reasons, we do not see the basis for interpreting the saving clause to impose any such burden.
A “special burden” would also promise practical difficulty by further complicating well-established pre-emption principles that already are difficult to apply. The dissent does not contend that this “special burden” would apply in a case in which state law penalizes what federal law requires — i. e., a case of impossibility. See post, at 892-893, n. 6, 900, n. 16. But if it would not apply in such a ease, then how, or when, would it apply? This Court, when describing conflict preemption, has spoken of pre-empting state law that “under the circumstances of th[e] particular ease... stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” — whether that “obstacle” goes by the name of “conflicting; contrary to;... repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment;... interference,” or the like. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 526 (1977). The Court has not previously driven a legal wedge — only a terminological one — between “conflicts” that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a federal objective and “conflicts” that make it “impossible” for private parties to comply with both state and federal law. Rather, it has said that both forms of conflicting state law are “nullified” by the Supremacy Clause, De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 152-153; see Locke, ante, at 109; English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 78-79 (1990), and it has assumed that Congress would not want either kind of conflict. The Court has thus refused to read general “saving” provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility, see, e. g., AT&T, 524 U. S., at 228, and in “frustration-of-purpose” eases, see, e. g., Locke, ante, at 103-112; International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481, 493-494 (1987); see also Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 328-331 (1981). We see no grounds, then, for attempting to distinguish among types of federal-state conflict for purposes of analyzing whether such a conflict warrants pre-emption in a particular case. That kind of analysis, moreover, would engender legal uncertainty with its inevitable systemwide costs (e.g., conflicts, delay, and expense) as courts tried sensibly to distinguish among varieties of “conflict” (which often shade, one into the other) when applying this complicated rule to the many federal statutes that contain some form of an express pre-emption provision, a saving provision, or as here, both. Nothing in the statute suggests Congress wanted to complicate ordinary experience-proved principles of conflict pre-emption with an added “special burden.” Indeed, the dissent’s willingness to impose a “special burden” here stems ultimately from its view that “frustration-of-purpos[e]’’ conflict pre-emption is a freewheeling, “inadequately considered” doctrine that might well be “eliminate^].” Post, at 907-908, and n. 22. In a word, ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent, Hines, supra, at 67, apply. We would not further complicate the law with complex new doctrine.
IV
The basic question, then, is whether a common-law “no airbag” action like the one before us actually conflicts with FMVSS 208. We hold that it does.
In petitioners’ and the dissent’s view, FMVSS 208 sets a minimum airbag standard. As far as FMVSS 208 is concerned, the more airbags, and the sooner, the better. But that was not the Secretary’s view. The Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) comments, which accompanied the promulgation of FMVSS 208, make clear that the standard deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices. Those choices would bring about a mix of different devices introduced gradually over time; and FMVSS 208 would thereby lower costs, overcome technical safety problems, encourage technological development, and win widespread consumer acceptance — all of which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety objectives. See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984).
A
The history of FMVSS 208 helps explain why and how DOT sought these objectives. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 34-38 (1983). In 1967, DOT, understanding that seatbelts would save many lives, required manufacturers to install manual seatbelts in all automobiles. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415. It became apparent, however, that most occupants simply would not buckle up their belts. See 34 Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969). DOT then began to investigate the feasibility of requiring “passive restraints,” such as airbags and automatic seatbelts. Ibid. In 1970, it amended FMVSS 208 to include some passive protection requirements, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927, while making clear that airbags were one of several “equally acceptable” devices and that it neither “ 'favored’ [n]or expected the introduction of airbag systems.” Ibid. In 1971, it added an express provision permitting compliance through the use of nondetachable passive belts, 36 Fed. Reg. 12858, 12859, and in 1972, it mandated full passive protection for all front seat occupants for vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975, 37 Fed. Reg. 3911. Although the agency’s focus was originally on airbags, 34 Fed. Reg. 11148 (1969) (notice of proposed rule-making); State Farm, 463 U. S., at 35, n. 4; see also id., at 46, n. 11 (noting view of commentators that, as of 1970, FMVSS 208 was “ ‘a de facto airbag mandate

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?
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口. Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania
合. Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island
车. South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina
实. Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee
组. Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas
版. Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont
周. Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia
址. West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia
记. Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin
二. Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming
同. Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
业. Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska
权. Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado
其. Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington
进. Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho
试. Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana
验. Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah
料. South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota
传. North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota
述. Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma
集. Court of Private Land Claims
多. United States Supreme Court
Answer:

Answer: 信