Datasets:
Tags:
License:
text
stringlengths 37
665
| label
int64 0
1
|
|---|---|
Permitting continuous rather than binary ''all-or-nothing'' contributions significantly increases contributions and facilitates provision. | 1 |
Another point worth noting is that the common resource dilemma paradigm we used was a single-trial setting. | 0 |
Outcome Matrix Applied to Each Round of the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game | 0 |
It is thus necessary to control for individuals' attitudes toward risk. 3 | 0 |
Conversely, when switching from short games to long games, participants immediately begin to cooperate at a high level. | 1 |
Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation (11), but in a fixed social network cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of "social viscosity," even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity (1,2). | 1 |
In two villages, which had high success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were reciprocity, while in three other villages, which had moderate to low success in JFM, villagers' social preferences were commitment. | 0 |
The resulting increase in group distinctiveness can be expected to affect group perceptions (Spears et al., 1985;Acorn et al., 1988;fcfonnell et al., 1994) and ingroup favoritism should generally increase with salience of the ingroup (see the meta-analysis by Mullen et al., 1992). | 1 |
The intuition is that in that case there always exist strategy combinations in which a single (pivotal) player's investment in monitoring causes an increase of the MPCR above 1, transferring the public into a private good and making the investment profitable and, as a consequence, making positive investments in monitoring individually rational. | 1 |
Marginal effects are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. | 0 |
Two sample trials were also provided to help illustrate the purpose and rules of the game. | 0 |
Secondly, the experience of conflict may create or deepen ingroup identity, strengthening other-regarding preferences toward in-group members and making it more attractive to cooperate within groups. | 1 |
Thus, they understand that they need to cooperate among themselves if they want to earn money. | 1 |
Likewise, in model 4 the net effect of the minimum contribution to the public good in the first round (minf1) remains significantly negative even in the final period. 8 | 0 |
Each figure presents a specific communication and voting scenario. | 0 |
If the goal-transformation hypothesis is correct, then the behavior of proselfs should be affected more strongly by the type of identity that is salient (personal vs. group). | 1 |
high contributors" is negative and differs significantly from zero (at a 1%-level), again. | 0 |
In the game, a leader usually emerged and the leader's pleadings for cooperation were harder to ignore because all the players had experienced the results of greedy play. | 1 |
Moreover, all previous studies employed repeated prisoner's dilemmas in which conditional cooperation is the most profitable strategy; none have used one-shot dilemmas, in which non-cooperation is the most profitable strategy (but which nevertheless elicit substantial levels of cooperation in general-population participants). | 0 |
Our experiments have led us to conclude that cooperation rates can be radically affected by one factor in particular.. . . | 1 |
The presence of such a leader tends to increase coordination. | 1 |
An examination of histograms of scores for each condition suggests that people tended to lapse into either full cooperation or full defection in the no communication condition, which greatly increases the variance of the condition. | 1 |
Participants who have the first turn invest significantly more than participants in downstream positions, using Mann-Whitney tests. | 0 |
Thus, we compare people who hold the evoked identity to people who are familiar with, but who do not hold, that identity: if identity is important in the current effects, those who do not hold the evoked identity will not be affected by identity-salience manipulations. | 1 |
The group's average contribution across periods 1-16 ("Contribution P1-16") has a significantly positive impact on the probability of appointing a leader in period 17 and in period 21. | 1 |
At the opposite, people do not have a strong adverse reaction to external regulation and follow the elected rules because there is a general and specific trust that others will also follow the rules. | 1 |
The youngest and oldest subject groups displayed higher levels of voluntary cooperation than the middle group which is believed to face more competitions. | 0 |
The payoff of the lottery ticket depended on the result of a toss of a fair coin with "heads" resulting in a payoff of two dollars and "tails" resulting in no payoff. | 1 |
The relatively high willingness to invest in local public goods with long-term benefits invites to rethink the optimal level of donor control on aid funds. | 1 |
Otherwise, if the accumulated gain explains the behaviour of the birds but the one trial gain does not, then the birds are making decisions based on the four trial reward and are playing a mutualism game. | 1 |
Hence, we propose that darkness should only promote cooperativeness when the interaction partner also cooperates. | 0 |
If it is considered 'fair' to contribute to a public good, perhaps because others are also doing so, then many people will be prepared to make voluntary contributions. | 1 |
For any k ∈ {2, 3}, λ > λ, and c ∈ (c * ck (λ), g], r(c) > 0, so that F ck (c, λ ) < F ck (c, λ), so (a) follows. | 0 |
Thus, a leader who dislikes disadvantageous inequality would tend to opt for NEG as an incentive scheme. | 1 |
After ensuring that the child was not acquainted with his opponent, the game was explained very carefully to each child. | 0 |
However, there are also reasons to think that the treatment will lead to low contributions, since the reaction to the comprehension/advice combination may be defensive. | 1 |
On one hand, these findings partially confirm our speculation vis-à-vis the role of risk taking: reciprocators were not necessarily cooperators under conditions of uncertainty, as some of them chose to cooperate because they could bear a high risk in anticipating the counterpart's goodwill. | 1 |
For example, resource dilemmas are best resolved when there is communication between group members (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988), when a sense of group identity or solidarity exists among group members (Brewer & Kramer, 1986), or when education is given regarding the long-term benefits of cooperation (Allison & Messick, 1985; for further reviews see Komorita & Parks, 1995or Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). | 0 |
An awareness of God may have also activated the fear of supernatural punishment as a consequence of defecting and not cooperating (Johnson 2005;Johnson and Kruger 2004;Johnson, Stopka, and Knights 2003). | 1 |
Sessions lasted approximately one hour, and subject earnings averaged £9.05 in the United Kingdom and $12.66 in the United States. 7 | 0 |
It is the combination of chronic, self-protective mistrust with hyperactivated affi liation that leads to inconsistency and increased decisional effort. | 1 |
Although we expected behaviour in the trustee role to be value-expressive, universalism was not a stronger predictor of behaviour in the trustee role than in the proposer, responder, or truster roles (all contrasts t(1079) < 1.48, all p > .1). | 0 |
We also found that institutions are associated with the marginal effects of diversity: Diversity reduces contributions to public goods as expected, but only when students come from segregated institutions. | 1 |
Liebrand et al. (1986) concluded that cooperators may place a higher value than individualists on how well an interaction satisfies personal or social behavioral standards. | 1 |
Because participants generally cooperate withand rarely defect againstcooperators in the iterated PDG, the resulting distribution of the number of rounds participants cooperate tends to be severely non-normal. | 1 |
For both these reasons, along with the frequently large size of the effects we observe, dynamic partner updating deserves to be considered among the most promising levers for eliciting cooperation between humans, especially in informal settings. | 1 |
We assign α i = 4.5 to these subjects. | 0 |
In sum, the content analysis of communication provides further evidence that conflict expenditures in OPEN are lower than in the other treatments because subjects discuss and successfully implement turn taking behavior between groups. | 1 |
Regardless of the sum of the fi ve numbers, there was a complete uncooperative behavior in the one-bad-apple condition (the eff ect of the bad apple). | 0 |
The results show that uncertainty per se lowers individual but not group contributions, lagged marginal incentives significantly predict contributions, and individuals significantly react to own-deviations from average group contributions. | 1 |
We characterize the relationship between our artifactual and framed field experiments as similar rather than identical because by necessity some differences exist in the two implementations. | 0 |
People who sacrifice on behalf of others like themselves are more prone to the self-interest illusion because they see the benefits as going to people who are like themselves in some salient way. | 1 |
Behavior in the experiment will support the hypothesis that moral opinions are conditional on the behavior of others if subjects report personal normative beliefs increasing in the average contribution level of group members. | 1 |
Any violations of sphericity assumptions were corrected for using the conservative Greenhouse-Geisser correction. | 0 |
Result 3. The choice of receiving feedback about individual earnings rather than about individual contributions is associated with a decrease in one's contribution in the next period. | 1 |
When the subject is faced with positive contribution to the public good by the computer, cooperative behavior can also be driven by inequality aversion and conditional cooperation. | 1 |
Generational differences, maturation, and cultural shift imply that stereotype activation should not affect Millennial entitlement because the change in entitlement occurred in the past and is observed retrospectively. | 1 |
The upshot of this discussion is that any equilibrium with co # 0 implies using almost no communication (separation of types) in the first stage. | 0 |
In contrast, if the negativity bias argument applies to the VCM setting, then these two ratings may produce asymmetric levels of cooperation, as predicted by the hypothesis. | 1 |
Unless otherwise specified, all subjects who posted a hostage cooperated on the subsequent move, and all subjects who declined to post a hostage defected on the subsequent move. | 0 |
The similarity between single-player and multi-player versions of the IPD can provide a powerful research model as the reduction from two to one players reduces the number of uncontrolled and interacting variables involved in the prisoner's dilemma (Fantino, 2004). | 1 |
Because we use two observations per individual, we adjust the standard errors for clustering on individuals. | 1 |
The authors contributed equally to this research. | 0 |
Collectively, these informal sanctions provide a powerful mechanism for guiding social behavior. | 1 |
So, ceteris paribus, we expect that Flemish people will not become less but ratherif there is a difference at allmore cooperative in French language contexts: H2. | 0 |
However, when access is equally distributed, group members will be more willing to act in a way that advances the interests of the group rather than just their own (i.e., they will be more cooperative). | 1 |
The contextual effects caused by the mean, range, and rank of the distribution confirmed our expectations that these relativity effects are due to some general underlying cognitive mechanisms. | 1 |
The study adds to the existing literature on connection between real-life preferences and preferences in experiments. | 0 |
Since participants in these studies preferred an alternative that maximized the joint gain of both communities, the results obtained from Studies 3 and 4 also supported these predictions. | 0 |
Fourth, cooperation and trust are not related to affiliation tendencies, but strongly related to betrayal aversion. | 0 |
The reasoning is that in high-trust societies, most people already contribute to the public good: The belief that most others can be trusted renders punishment an unnecessary cost to encourage contributions. | 1 |
Their earnings from such a decision would depend not only on their individual extraction but also on the extraction levels that the other members of their group made in that round. | 0 |
Such patrols not only deter free riding in itself but also generate information needed for the punishment of free riders, which is determined by an executive committee on the group level chaired by the group leader. | 1 |
The gains or losses incurred by the players on each trial are dependent on choices made by both of them between two available behaviors. | 1 |
Depending on the parametrization, this new game can have egalitarian equilibria as well as asymmetric solutions, leaving one player worse off. | 1 |
t(94) ϭ 1.78, ns), a significant reduction (Z ϭ 1.98, p Ͻ .05). | 0 |
Subjects in the Generalized Reciprocity group always faced cooperators: first five Hindus, then five Muslims. | 0 |
Although the SSRIs are much more selective, chronic treatment with compounds such as fluoxetine and paroxetine, have been found to induce changes in noradrenergic transmission in both animal and human studies (see, for example, Lundmark et al. 1994;Redrobe et al. 1998). | 0 |
After completing the questionnaire, subjects were debriefed, thanked for participating, and excused. | 0 |
When players have the option of punishing each other after the contribution stage, the effect of the moral messages on contributions becomes persistent: punishments and moral messages interact to sustain cooperation. | 1 |
When numerical cheap talk was combined with a punishment option there were many cheap talk threats of punishment and cheap talk responses with higher cheap talk contributions. | 1 |
Based on this belief, the difference between public goods and common-pool resources has often been reduced to frames or different representations of one and the same game. | 0 |
We again found that social context, this time the level of competitiveness, did not fundamentally change the dynamics of cooperation. | 0 |
Consider Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal/expectation theory, which states that cooperation is more likely when trust is enhanced, but only if people also have a prosocial orientation (the goal to achieve mutual cooperation), if the trust explanation is true, then people with a prosocial orientation should contribute more when group identity is salient. | 1 |
It makes no sense to spend large amounts of money for summer salaries, secretaries, computer terminals and research assistants, and then motivate the subjects with microscopic amounts of money (quoted in Kollock 1998:207). 11 | 0 |
Second, deviation from the dominant strategy leads to a higher joint payoff for the group, and enough contributions produce an outcome that is Pareto superior to the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. | 1 |
Based on the above reasoning, we predicted that individuals who anticipate pride about acting fairly would be more likely to divide resources between themselves and another in a fair way, whereas those who anticipate regret about acting fairly would be less likely to do so. | 1 |
In the PD game the players simultaneously choose their moves -C (cooperate) or D (defect), without knowing their opponent's choice. | 0 |
Cooperative corporate culture can be nurtured by starting small, as Weber (2006) shows experimentally with a coordination game. | 1 |
Then ,Z t (x). is evaluated as an average of Z t k (x) over all the 26 couples. | 0 |
In models based on income differences, if responders care for the utility of the other responder, then in addition to receiving disutility because the take authority has a higher income than they do, they will also receive disutility because the take authority has higher income than their friend does. | 1 |
We did not obtain saliva samples from two participants because these two participants were short-termly recruited and not screened in advance for health and smoking absence (final N = 58). | 1 |
This study's null result is disappointing. | 0 |
Such a preference structure is consistent with a preference structure that resembles the payoff structure of the Prisoner"s dilemma, DC > CC > DD > CD. | 0 |
The effect of partner type did not differ across treatment groups for the probability of cooperating after a partner defection. | 0 |
Participants were told that a total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among all participants. | 0 |
In fact, a recent agent-based simulation also suggests that gossip-based partner selection increases cooperation, whereas the strategy to defect after knowing about free riders' reputation decreases cooperation 18 . | 1 |
When early humans used dogs as hunting partners, they most likely increased their intake of protein (Koster & Tankersley, 2012;Ruusila & Pesonen, 2004). | 1 |
Concerning the contributions in the mechanism treatment, Fig. 7 shows rather stable and marginally increasing contributions over the course of time. | 0 |
Due to this base rate, no conclusive verdict for a no-play option facilitation effect at high base rates can be drawn. | 0 |
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
Social Science Causal and non-causal claims dataset!
We manually curated a dataset aimed at understanding the use of causal language in social science literature based on The Cooperation Databank, a comprehensive collection of all papers dedicated to game theory applications within social science (Spadaro et al. 2022). From this dataset, 2,590 articles were converted into raw text using the Grobid library in Python and subsequently segmented at the sentence level (Lopez 2009). Following conversion, a post-processing stage corrected common errors arising during PDF-to-text translation. These errors typically involve misinterpretations of similar characters, such as “0” and “O”, “b” and “6” or incorrect joining or splitting of letters. One of the authors (RN) labeled sentences using the Doccano web annotation tool (Nakayama et al. 2018). Sentences were cataloged as either causal, non-causal, or ambiguous. Instances marked as ambiguous (117 of 1058 sentences; 11.05%) were subsequently reviewed by all authors. Inter-rater agreement was estimated using Fleiss’ Kappa index (Fleiss 1971), resulting in Kappa = 0.76, denoting a “substantial” agreement. A majority voting method was employed to finalize the labels for samples where consensus was elusive. Ultimately, a number of 529 causal and 529 non-causal sentences were curated. This dataset is balanced, and we divided it into 70 percent for training, 10 percent for validation, and 20 percent for testing.
How to cite this dataset:
@article{Norouzi2024,
author = {Norouzi, R. and Kleinberg, B. and Vermunt, J. and Van Lissa, C. J.},
title = {Capturing Causal Claims: A Fine-Tuned Text Mining Model for Extracting Causal Sentences from Social Science Papers},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.31234/osf.io/kwtpm}
}
For further information check the following repo:
- Downloads last month
- 0