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Specifically, we expect authority contribution leaders to give more than randomly selected contribution leaders both because they recognize the positive influence that they can exert on others and because more of the mechanisms that make contribution leaders influential may be relevant when a local authority leads.

The points accrued during the experiment would be traded for lottery tickets with cash prizes between £10 ($20) and £30 ($60).

People may voluntarily contribute to a public good because they feel morally obligated to assist others in a common cause or because they realize that contributing will help the group as a whole.

Study 1 Mean and Standard Deviations by Experimental Condition

We aggregate the five classes into three categories: very satisfied (score four or five), followed by pretty satisfied (score three) and not satisfied (score one or two).

Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments captures this idea nicely with the notion that people evaluate their behavior in the view of an "impartial spectator".

In contrast, the Stranger and Computer condition showed only a trend toward a significant difference (t[92] = 1.73, p = .087),

Policies like the Pigouvian subsidy ignore these non-Nash behaviors, and the result is that inefficient under-extraction is exacerbated in our context.

In RIE3 and RIE5 this investment type accounts, respectively, for 67%, and 51.5% of all decisions; in IIE3 and IIE5, this type accounts, respectively, for 82.8% and 83.1%.

Thus, norms of interpersonal fairness and equality may not only inhibit the responsiveness of identifiable individuals, but also of identifiable group members.

w = 0.01, hypocritical punishment, ΔG 2 (1) = 0.20, p = .652,

When designing emotional agents we have shown how the addition of mood can be used to enhance the decision-making aspect of that agent.

Furthermore, we believe that participants who punish cheaters are those who espouse the state of mutual cooperation as a goal and thus might feel guilty for not punishing cheaters and thus failing to promote mutual cooperation.

Clearly, the salience of social categories may be important in order to create cooperation within groups (e.g.

Subjects were given an endowment of 10 tokens, worth 40 pence each. Contributions were doubled and divided equally between the seven subjects in a group.

This correction left' the distributions essentially unchanged.

Alternatively, motivational factors may diminish children's cooperative reasoning and actions in the face of personal costs.

Both effects should cause increase in public-good provision at least at level 1.

Of these, 14 failed an attention check or to complete the study, leaving a total of n ϭ 386 (133 females, M age ϭ 33.9).

In the absence of social interaction this graph should fluctuate around 0; instead we observe a very strong positive relationship between (c 1 i − c 2 i ) and (g 1 i − g 2 i ) with observations lying almost exactly on the 45 • line.

The presence of cross-village variability also cautions us when attempting to explain game results by ®tting just-so anecdotal stories that capture key cultural traits or behaviors.

Second, it was concluded that highly threatening situations minimize the effects of idiosyncratic motives, perhaps arousing a common defensive motive.

It is easy to conclude that we should want more trust.

om a game theoretic perspective, the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game is for all subjects to ccntribute $0.

In addition to the money that player i keeps, i receives a fixed percentage of the group's total contribution to the public account, α, where 0 < α < 1 < nα.

Using this and the fact that the gamma function (x + 1) = x! when x is an integer, the left-hand side of (2) could be rewritten as

ANOVA results in Table 2B showed a significant two-way interaction between level and basis of trust, F(2, 160) = 3.02, p = 0.05, h 2 = 0.04.

This was because, in the case of Colombia, their subsistence depends on the fishery, which is not ecologically productive.

It was concluded that the high degree of competitiveness typically found in PD game studies may be largely a function of the isolation imposed on the subjects by the experimenter.

Without data on both expectations and contributions, it can be difficult to identify the strategies adopted by participants in economic games, a necessary step to test fully theories of cooperation.

Large coalitions mean few outsiders but, at the same time, high free-rider benefits if the coalition members fully internalize their mutual benefits.

If there were no time value, then there would be no advantage to hiring an agent first (since the other party would respond by hiring an agent instantaneously), and therefore a prisoner's dilemma could not exist.

Second, the absence of an effect of Openness might also be driven by statistical reasons, due to the structure of the MPT model: Parameter e is defined conditional on non-selfish behavior, which leads to fewer trials per person (and hence a lower statistical efficiency) for the estimation of parameter e than for parameter s.

It is the product of an evolutionary game in which intragroup cooperation enhances one's reputation within the group (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008).

If participants in the Public Goods Game exhibit loss aversion, they will react more strongly to the prospect of being punished than to potential rewards; thus making punishment the more effective enforcement mechanism.

The probability of 0.2 is chosen conservatively, since this data generating process gives slightly more noisy classifications than we really have: 32% of the generated data points have two and 4% have three possible levels.

The interpretation of the relative sizes of these two effects, however, has to be made with caution, since effect sizes depend on the parameters used in the experiment, including the cost and benefit for cooperation and the cost and size of punishment.

-This test was developed on the present study sample and certainly needs cross-validating (now in progress).

Consequently, the payoffs of free-riders in SFI decrease and over the periods, participants in SFI experience the typically observed collapse of cooperation in repeated social dilemma interactions (Fig. 1).

ecause sacrifice increases the relative price of private production, it can screen freeriders from high-sacrifice groups while inducing the H-types to substitute towards more group investment.

The results of the present study constitute, in a way, a return to the idea that fairness judgments are not affected by dilemma type, although we now suggest that it is the presentation of decisions in the dilemma types that induces the focus.

DISCUSSION Our hypotheses were all confirmed.

Table 4 summarizes players' choices in the early and later trials.

Participants in this sample completed the 7-item DGS.

Of course, young and older adults were both likely to create an obstacle to their partner's goal when they interacted with friends than with strangers.

We find that in the presence of conditional cooperators, common knowledge does enhance efficiency mostly because the advice left in this treatment is more exhortative.

The game master read the instructions twice and I then demonstrated the play with a set of ten, ten shilling coins.

But many indicated an interest in having both players choose D (Table 6), which is closely related.

Further, as the game scenario of the current study equalled classical iterated Prisoner Dilemma Game (PDG) matrices, mentalizing performance was measured implicitly thereby circumventing socially desirable behaviour [18][19][20]24,25].

This improves the earnings for those groups but the lowest earnings are not too different and this pulls the overall average earnings down to look more similar across treatments.

In our study, because of the presence of a sanctioning system, it may have occurred to people that group members would defect if it were not for the sanctioning system.

Even though the level of regulation a facility faces does not depend on the overall size of a facility, the two factors are highly correlated.

The maintenance of social norms often depends on external enforcement, as in the absence of credible sanctioning mechanisms prosocial behaviour deteriorates quickly.

Our elicitation was very specific: beliefs about the other three players, paying for exact correctness, and beliefs were elicited before the decision.

Threat of revenge induce more deliberation on punishment and reduces other perverse punishment, which will have a positive impact on cooperation.

Specifically, we used three boxes of different sizes (small, medium, and big), each of which contained a different set of gifts.

An important consequence of this increase in average effort is that the aggregate monetary payoff increases by 40% even if one takes the payoff reductions that result from actual punishments into account.

There is a strong and significant correlation that those subjects who burn money tend to be also those who expect their counterpart to burn theirs.

Colors: Each person in your group has a color.

The t-test for significance of differences was T = 8.56 significant with a probability or error less than .0001.

Individual-scale variables like wealth and education may affect the costs of public goods provisioning or the benefits of short-term defection, and so wealthier and more educated individuals who can obtain resources more readily can expect to be more generous.

However, in environments where behavior is shifting, such estimation exercises must be treated with caution.

The upshot of these comments is that large churches as well as small churches must create a sense of belonging if they are to mitigate members' free riding tendencies and survive.

Wilcoxonsigned ranks test revealed that participants contributed significantly more in the bonus rounds (Mdn ¼ 7) than in the standard rounds (Mdn ¼ 6), z ¼ 21.66, p ¼ 0.048, one-tailed.

Findings suggest an individual-group continuity effect, rather than a discontinuity effect, within the context of repeated PDG interactions and communications between individuals and groups.

This result suggests that language activates group norms in a heterogeneous fashion: if different people's latent identities differ they can respond in very different ways to identical linguistic cues.

Thus, moral judgments were an effective and efficient mechanism for fostering cooperation, solidarity, generosity, trust, and trustworthiness.

The members of such societies have strong incentives to innovate and to make physical and human capital investments, thereby contributing to socio-economic prosperity and overall welfare.

As can be inferred from Table 2, most of these relationships were rather weak (with 6 trivial and 15 small associations).

A player using this strategy cooperates initially, and then plays the same as his/her opponent did in the previous game.

First, the most notable feature of our results is that in all cases the treatment effects are smaller in the replication than in the original study.

Emotional energy is, thus, the result of both the euphoria of contagious public gatherings, the ecstasy of sexual encounters, the bonding of friendly exchanges, and it is an outcome of humiliating experiences, heated arguments, and violent episodes.

Violent media may cause viewers to perceive greater anger and less gratitude during a cooperative task and as such be less inclined to cooperate.

When the objective incentives remain identical, these studies showed that framing the dilemma in terms of "taking from" instead of "contributing to" increases cooperation (Brewer and Kramer, 1986).

This interpretation was supported by the results of Study 2, which directly tested subgroup reputation as a moderating influence on organizational identification.

We find differences in the behavior of our experimental participants across the three countries and we find that Hofstede's dimensions help to explain these differences.

Research also shows that when people adopt a more abstract or higher construal level (Trope & Liberman, 2010)-that is, they feel more psychological distance-they show more pro-self-orientation, leading them to engage in behaviors that fit with the social motivation they endorse (Giacomantonio, De Dreu, Shalvi, Sligte, & Leder, 2010).

Heart rate deceleration is a classic physiological index of the orienting response (Graham, 1979).

Although the intention behind this sanctioning system is to make garbage reduction relatively more attractive, the sanctioning system also may unintentionally cause dumping to become more attractive.

Once again, participants felt holier than thou, thinking they were more likely to cooperate (M = 75%) than their peers (M = 63%), paired t(50) = 3.69, p < .001.

Through such mechanisms, a deliberation treatment might increase cooperation in the second stage of a sequential prisoner's dilemma, contrary to the prediction of the SHH.

However, the non-monotonicity between observability and deterrence we observe is troubling, because it suggests that simply increasing the ability to monitor outside threats may not lead to better outcomes, and it leaves us unsure about what level of observability is required to generate better outcomes.

All your answers will be treated confidentially and anonymously.

Despite the interesting balance of incentives provided by introducing competition in the workplace -on one hand individual workers may exert more effort to win promotion or make more money while on the other overall production might suffer because of the lack of cooperation among workers -there has been remarkably little empirical work estimating the effect of competition on workplace cooperation.

La importancia de este problema crece ra ´pidamente debido a la creciente demanda de los escasos recursos en todo el mundo.

They were told that they would participate in a number of unrelated experiments and were brought to individual soundproof cubicles.

When everyone has made a choice, the outcome and the choices of the other members of your committee are revealed, and this determines your earnings for the match.

More specifically, the MCL may be higher in the VCM with real-time contributions simply because people tend to contribute more when they are observed, even if the observers' actions are not affected by this monitoring.

These were participants with little or no experience from economic games, because, according to the SHH, there will be a negative deliberation effect on cooperation only for subjects with limited experience from economic games and other "artificial lab environments" (Rand et al., 2014).

This earlier experience, we find, causes the players to update their expectations, leading more groups to choose the tipping game compared to the treatment in which groups lack this experience.

The negative trend in contributions in blue groups is substantial and statistically significant.

Acting for sacred values, collectively, provides a record of cooperative action and thus offers evidence of cooperative responses downstream.

In other words, acceptance would be more common if the subjects' expectations were met because, although a shared concept of fairness exists, fairness is sensitive to different factors (personal, situational, and social) that influence expectations and fairness perception.

Because the cooperate-cooperate outcome produces more wealth than any other, optional entry will increase social welfare.

Locus of control fosters cooperation for internals with high levels of cooperative education because those people are able to use their background as a means towards an end in that they believe that they can influence their desired outcomes.

In fecfun all citizens decide simultaneously over punishment p i→k with k ∈ D\{i}.

In an experiment where we alternated rounds of the indirect reciprocity game with rounds of the public goods game, the decisions in the public goods rounds were both directly observable and displayed as information in following indirect reciprocity rounds.

competitive individual) task led to less persistence on a subsequent task.

Because there is attention to the content of the choices, WCLD becomes an affective version of TFT rather than a mere mimic.

The eight games were played in different rooms to minimize sequential dependencies.