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However, as an adaptation of beliefs to feedback is likely to occur, we may expect in line with the adaptive conditional-cooperation conjecture (Neugebauer et al. 2009) that the contributions positively respond to the past continuation-payoff differential.

Thereafter, participants in this condition immediately moved on to the remainder of the study.

The very existence of a government that can promulgate and enforce regulations to deter free riding while acting as a faithful agent of its citizens depends on voluntary pro-social acts such as citizen scrutiny of politicians' actions, self-education about political issues, and making the effort to vote in elections.

This ''voice'' manipulation (Folger, 1977) is the most commonly used manipulation of procedural fairness in experimental studies.

Individually rational and selfish behavior thus leads to Pareto-suboptimal outcomes, rendering the one-shot PD a classic example of a social dilemma [1,2].

Because the profits of having a large herd accrued exclusively to the individual herdsman, whereas the costs in terms of exceeding the carrying capacity of the common were incurred collectively by all herdsmen, each herdsman could gain wealth by grazing increasingly large herds on the common.

Our study tests why discounting a belief in free will increases the likelihood of uncooperative behavior.

In the absence of external cooperative incentives, people often choose to rely selectively on others with whom they share a group membership (e.g., Brewer, 2000Brewer, , 2008;;Packer & Kugler, 2017).

They produce evidence to support the notion that a greater MPCR distance increases contribution by making the gains from cooperation in the social dilemma more salient for all group members. 18

The groups convened in separate adjacent classrooms to prevent communication between groups.

A possible explanation is that the cooperation norm is more salient in the former than in the latter, due to the fact that in "public," everyone observes punishments for norm violations.

The present findings complement this growing literature by showing that people are actually willing to forgive an incident of noise, as long as the partner communicates about noise and clarifies the actual (benign) intentions.

(E) BG-PD with low greed (0.10) and low fear (0.10).

Similarly, a pro-social subject (again defined by his decisions in the experimental choice set) would tend to make slower selfish decisions and faster pro-social decisions.

First, the higher the payoff foregone by a freerider when not receiving rewards, the more likely he/she is to act (more) cooperatively in the social dilemma game in order to attract rewards.

We speculate that when members of successful groups made their investment choices, they conformed to an inferred-but illusory-norm of "cooperativeness" within the group.

The correlation between contributions and other-team beliefs is lower (Spearman's = 0.31, p < 0.01), but still indicative of a positive relationship.

They might be willing to take a certain amount of risk by delaying an immediate benefit for a greater future prospect given what they make of the likelihood of success in a set of prevalent conditions.

The instructions are identical for all participants.

However, because condition SQ6 is played after the subject gains much experience with the task, and in particular after experiencing the fifth position in condition SQ5, we anticipate fewer violations of the model in condition SQ6 than in condition SQ in experiment 1. METHOD Subjects.

Using Campbell's (1958) concept of `entitativity', they also assume that the competitive discontinuity between individuals and groups is greater the more members Discontinuity or reciprocity?

These associations could explain why previous studies found an effect of Openness on PEB and the present study did not.

We study the evolution of cooperation in a population of 100 agents, each of which updates her strategy according to the myopic best response update rule.

The significant positive coefficient of Negative deviation of j in the first two regressions reveals that the greater the extent of free riding is, the greater is the likelihood and severity of altruistic punishment in the Baseline treatment.

It thereby seeks to define the social norm determining the amount to contribute (see e.g.

Applying regressions similar to those used for the take games reveals only weak effects, if at all.

A second and related implication is that when the CPR range ␤ Ϫ ␣ increases beyond a certain threshold, the individual requests will increase too.

Participants were advised that part of the experiment (T2 condition, see below) was not suitable for people with back or knee problems; any participants who said this would not be suitable for them were assigned to another condition.

Under naturally occurring circumstances, search costs and switching costs, as well as fluctuations in individual performance, tend to delay regrouping.

Berkowitz (1960) has demonstrated that unexpected frustrations produce more hostility than expected frustrations and, what is more important for the study reported here, that subjects who expect hostility and receive friendliness will reveal a greater trend toward friendliness than those subjects who have a reason to expect friendliness.

An example is the choice between alternative A: 500 points for self and 500 points for other; B: 560 points for self and 300 for other; and C: 500 points for self and 100 points for other.

As a matter of fact, subjects who spend most of the time in group B tend to cooperate quite a bit (52% in T0 and 54% in TP) of the time that they spend in group A. 18 This is a general observation.

We found that when people's mortality was not called to their attention, a need-focused appeal had more influence on their donation decisions than a bandwagon appeal.

All subjects who choose to contribute 0 in any case are classified as ''free riders''.

Those two are: 'I participate in all important meetings held in my hospital' and 'I usually take opportunities to discuss work related things in my work break with colleagues', measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).

Syntax for fitting the model for Study 1 in multifree

Longer cycles allow a better identification of strategies, so as cycle duration increases a larger strategy set is needed to fit a given number of observations.

Similarly, providing feedback on how one's energy use compares with one's neighbors had reduced consumption among American liberals but may have had the opposite effect among conservatives (80).

Evidence suggests that friendships are impaired by social anxiety disorder (SAD) (Rodebaugh, 2009).

Support for Result 1 can be found in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 (all numbers in tables and figures are in shanks).

The game, indeed, deserves special attention since it formalizes many experiences of everyday life.

The purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive capabilities of sportspersonship, moral competence, and emotional intelligence on cooperation in varying competitive conditions.

In the ten sessions, subjects punished other group members a total of 1,270 times; 84.3% of the subjects punished at least once, 34.3% punished more than ®ve times during the six periods, and 9.3% punished even more than ten times.

The rate of cooperation is 56% with time pressure and 54% without time pressure in the replication of Rand et al. 1 (Chisquare 5 0.11, P value 5 0.737).

These models suggest that one's desire to help another person depends on one's beliefs about how helpful that other person is.

Player A can then choose whether to 'take' from Player B. If A takes, then Player B loses 50 points while A gains 30 points (thus theft is inefficient, and it is socially optimal to not steal; this part of the game is analogous to a unilateral Prisoner's Dilemma).

Also, when all four fish approached the predator together, it became clear to the observer that they not only approached the predator as synchronized pairs but also initiated flight in pairwise synchronization.

This allowed them to condition their minimum proposal on the size of the coalition such that the internalization ratios a(k) may depend on the coalition size.

Once moved, a couple's overtly expressed desire for mutual cooperation will be a realistic option.

They are enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards (Kerr, 1995).

By contrast, in the Threshold Uncertainty and Impact-and-Threshold Uncertainty treatments, most (82 and 75%, respectively) contributed less than they pledged, indicating that pledges, like proposals, were used strategically.

The persistence of identity activation may depend on many things, including the strength and complexity of the initial activating cue and the presence of other identity-congruent cues in the environment.

and that perceived criticality significantly predicted knowledge sharing intentions (b 5 1.343, SE 5 .189,

Research on legitimacy of authorities has shown that perceived legitimacy, in particular a shared sense of legitimacy, creates voluntary compliance with norms (ZELDITCH and WALKER 1984;TYLER 1997).

No participant was informed about the identity and individual contribution decisions of his group members.

In other words, those subjects who showed a greater parochialism effect for contributing showed a greater self-interest illusion when the gain for their group was a loss for the other group.

How distracting was the memorization task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)?

Active doses were identical to placebo but contained 0.5 mg, 1.0 mg, or 2.0 mg alprazolam.

T = treatment (PG vs. few), P = game period (covariate), D = difference in the deviances of the compared models, df = difference in the number of parameters of the compared models, P = P-value associated with the observed D and df, calculated from the chi-square distribution.

The average age of the participants was 19.0 years.

Here we show that, unlike material sanctions, moral judgments do not result in cycles of recrimination and tend to "crowd in" interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity.

Previous research indicates that people who strongly identified with the in-group are more competitive toward the out-group (e.g., Chase, 1992).

This leads to a 'fairness' scenario in which the wealth of richer subjects is invested in their local network, allowing poorer neighbours to gain wealth.

Recently, there has been growing interest in the effect of retaliation on cooperative games with punishment [24,[34][35][36].

Figs. 1, 2, and Table 3 provide support for Results 1 and 2. Fig. 1 depicts the likelihood of punishment as a function of how much an individual's contribution deviated from the average contribution of his peers.

Other probabilities show that the predicted likelihood of pleading an aversion to needles (Y i = 2) is 0.087 higher for females than for males, 0.086 lower for divorced or widows than for singles and 0.051 lower for those who abstained in the 2004 election than for those who voted.

Allowing individuals to punish their peers for socially bad behavior can improve cooperation in groups and sometimes allow them to achieve more efficient outcomes in social dilemmas by instilling positive social norms (Ostrom 1990;Fehr and Gaechter 2000;Chaudhuri 2011 provides a recent survey).

Our results show that social ties between group members influence both cooperation and norm enforcement -creating substantial differences between M G and SG.

These findings, coupled with the fact that there is widespread mis-reporting of token values are suggestive of why groups are unable to use the 'token revelation' stage for much gain in efficiency.

In addition, results from the laboratory experiments reveal that subjects donate less when they are aware that an individual could have announced support but chose not to do so.

For example, one study showed that when perceived moral levels were lower than participants' actual moral levels, the moral licensing effect resulted in reduction of the frequency of ethical behaviors, and when participants perceived higher moral levels, they showed an increase in ethical behavior [47].

The strategies played by the computer agents included the straightforward strategies always-cooperate and always-defect, the classic strategy tit-for-tat (which repeats its opponent's most recent move), plus two more elaborate strategies that change behavior depending on whether or not they are in power.

Unconditional contribution impacts negatively the probability of being leader, but this result is not robust and is significant only at the 10 % level. 14

Tukey's procedure of multiple comparisons revealed significant differences over 100 trials between Groups I and III (p < .01),

After verbally stating the contingencies described by the various examples, the experimenter said:

SES ¼ socioeconomic status of a coplayer; Fairness ¼ probability for coplayer cooperation.

In the standard symmetric independent private values model in which ω i (d i ) = 0, Myerson's (1981) revenue equivalence result shows that, given that the charity never keeps the prize, it maximizes its revenue if it always allocates the prize to the donor with the highest marginal revenue.

Due to random encounters, this initial defection will spread at random throughout the economy.

Of course, second graders also shift to A2 or B2 choices, and as soon as one player does so, the chances are high for retaliation on the part of the other.

The public goods game itself went as follows.

Cooperative behavior is essential for the success of both individuals and groups.

Online Appendix C contains the list of the variables that were coded.

Due to the missing information on individual evasion of other group members, there is no potential for a contagion effect in the baseline treatment.

Information enables players to decide whether to trust the others in the group and cooperate, once they are aware that cooperation can achieve a superior outcome.

Liebrand (1984) and Liebrand and van Run (1985) found that Social value orientation has received considerable attention from social psychologists and has been shown to noncooperators harvested more than cooperators only during the first few trials when the resource was plenti-influence cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g., Kramer, mcclintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand, 1984; Lie-ful. 1 Nevertheless, Liebrand's (1984) and Liebrand and van Run's (1985) results were similar to Loomis et al. brand & van Run, 1985;Liebrand, Wilke, Vogel, & Wolters, 1986;Loomis, Samuelson, & Sell, 1995;Parks, (1995): all subjects significantly reduced their harvests over trials.

No such adjustments can be expected for proself persons.

Odds Ratio = 1.31, 95% CI [0.28,6.13]).

For example, past research has shown that individual differences in social value orientation (SVO), a measure of concern for both self and others outcomes in interdependent social interactions (Messick & mcclintock, 1968), is able to predict contribution to public goods (e.g., Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005. cf. Parks, 1994), even when defection is objectively the most economical course of action (Komorita & Parks, 1996).

Each instruction was given by a tape recorder to minimize the interaction between subjects and experimenters.

The amount of communication allowed in a game thus appears to be a decisive factor in clarifying and specifying the contradictory evidence on sex differences in cooperation.

Each repeated game began with a sequence of 20 games.

In the information treatment (hereafter INFO), subjects received information feedback about the payoffs from the public goods game, broken up to the sum of partners' contributions, and from the guessing task after each period.

Namely, the sequential ordering of the choices that are available to and exercised by interdependent actors, including who makes the opening move, can markedly influence subsequent social decisions.

At the same time, campaigns for blood donation might benefit from clarification about who is eligible to donate and from efforts to reduce fear of the process of drawing blood.

As one can see, accounting for the treatment effect of the incentives inherent in these jobs further reduces the differences in the job category point estimates.

These questions highlight the necessity to investigate communicated emotion in social dilemmas.

Previous research has shown that behavior aligns with self-interest only when self-interest is salient.

Similar results have been obtained when comparing the IPD and the IPD-MD games in a repeated-game setting, even after an artificially created "history of conflict", in which only the between-group pool was available for a certain number of repetitions before the within-group pool was introduced as a third option (Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012).

Windfall gains (e.g., winning the lottery) may lead to greater altruism, but wealth attained through participation in a market economy may not, since as Melvin Lerner and James Meindl (1981:219) note, "coming to the aid of a person in need and sensitivity to their deservingness will occur if such responsiveness does not pose a threat to the actor's own deservingness."

Taken together, our results illustrate the importance of equality as a normative criterion and how the efficacy of communication is reduced in the presence of normative conflict.