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However, if categorization does impact trust, why did S. L. Gaertner and Rust's (2000) study and our pilot studies fail to find a significant effect of categorization manipulations on PDG choices?

Observed individual differences in the resting cortisol levels and social memory performance under the social stress condition may be due to individual differences in HPA reactivity, personality traits, and the level of GR/MR expression in the hippocampus [10].

The fact that the cooperative robot always followed through with the stated intent should have enhanced the perception of it as trustworthy.

Therefore, these results suggest that as people interact during repeated social dilemmas, over time men become increasingly more cooperative than women.

The nature of these arrangements is a topic that will be addressed in depth in Chapter 4.

In contrast, in the treatments with punishment, LOW PUN and HIGH PUN, the payoff to group member i is given by

A linear regression with random effects with RT as the dependent variable shows a marginally significant effect of SVO (B ¼ À0.58, 95% CI [À1.27 to 0.11], P value ¼ 0.1), and a significant effect of trial number (B ¼ À0.01, 95% CI [À0.011 to À0.0091], P value < 0.001, Wald v 2 ¼ 413.20).

In each case, cooperation also seems to decay as the rounds progress, as all lines slope upward (except for the subsidy after the first baseline, in which case there essentially is no voluntary cooperation).

Andreoni argues that the comparison between these two provides a clean measure of confusion.

The proportion of contributors in Condition L was 0.560 (28 of 50) compared to 0.567 (17 of 30) in Condition S. Clearly, the difference between these two proportions is nonsignificant.

he mode of communication makes a significant difference.

Ostensibly, we were studying the effect of four factors on reactions to the exchange: whether the two participants in a session started with the same or a different number of tickets (balance of initial resources), whether exchange was required or optional (choice), whether the exchange was simultaneous or sequential (timing of exchange), and whether the exchange was face-to-face or indirect (form of interaction).

To predict behavior, we need to know how people psychologically transform these different outcomes into subjective utilities.

In our study, by perceiving the punishment executer to be human, we show that such a rule could emerge spontaneously because the rule benefits the punishment executers themselves.

The amount of the stake varied from ¥1 to ¥23.

Thus, two competing tendencies may be operating in this situation, namely, a tendency to maximize personal gain and a tendency to be considerate, fair, and understanding.

The results also reveal that the average harvest behavior in the baseline game positively and significantly affects the harvest behavior in the second game, suggesting some persistence of behavior over the two games.

This result is consistent with a previous study which suggests that behaving dishonestly leads to the forgetting of rules [24].

In such situations, therefore, each party should be interested in dissuading the other from making such a response.

The third factor had two levels: low or high threshold.

The initial resource location was a salient stimulus from which subjects could assess the similarity or difference between the two subgroups.

Situations requiring collective action take ma forms: systems for managing "common-pool resources," such as fisheries, water supplies managed through irrigation systems, or mountain meadows (Ostrom 1990); systems for con-trolling behavior, such as social norms that prchibit exploitative or predatory behavior (Ullmann-Margalit 1977); social changes like revolutions (Taylor 1988;Lindenberg 1989) or more modest changes of public policy (Opp 1989).

When the group boundaries are fixed, as they are in our research, jointness of supply has little direct effect on the provision of the public good.2

Specifically, Earnings from BLUE Group Account = 0.40 x (Total BLUE Group Allocation)

Thus, threats to a group generate increased solidarity (ee + ) within the threatened group, but also hostility (ee − ) against an opponent [72][73][74][75].

Conditional cooperation is markedly enhanced in IRS, where it arises directly from the monetary incentive structure.

REWARDS Two sets of matrix values were used, with one set having payoffs that were 10 times as great as the other (see Table 1).

We will refer to Players 1, 2, 3, and 4 as "dictators," "receivers," "third parties," and "bystanders," respectively, henceforth but note that the neutral terms Players 1-4 were used in experimental instructions (see Supporting Information).

R choice related significantly to a number of measures: M (-.29); Te (-.87); frequency of R choice following prediction of R (.86); frequency of B choice following prediction of B (-.43); R by the other following its prediction (.71 ) ; B by the other following its prediction (-.64); number of R predicted (.82); competitive- ness of strategy (questionnaire, -.47); in- correctness of analysis of optimum strategy ( questionnaire, -.32) ; frequency of R choice following R choice by the other (.79); and R choice by the other (.88).

Greed is felt when one lacks and wants something valuable, irrespective of what others have.

At the end of the experiment, the subjects use their keys to open lettered mailboxes that contain their monetary payoffs in sealed envelopes.

The individual -group discontinuity effect entails that in mixed-motive situations, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), intergroup interactions are more competitive than inter-individual interactions.

The public-goods literature finds that as groups increase in size individuals become more hesitant to cooperate and less able to coordinate actions (Franzen, 1995;Knez & Camerer, 1994).

In the terminal block of t,rials, nearly 87% of the choices were A, and B, in the original Both Display group while only 1.5% were A, and B, in the second experiment.

We deliberately avoid a market frame.

Through some mechanismperhaps biological (Trivers 1971) -cooperation on the part of one individual in a dilemma situation enhances the probability that others will cooperate later in that same situation or a similar one.

I felt proud of myself, because thanks to me my two friends talked, and solved their problem.

It was our expectation that news stories reporting events which were caused by human agents would temporarily influence a subject's beliefs about the surrounding social universe and hence affect his behavior toward and expectation of the presumed stranger with whom he was paired in the nonzero sum game.

Because you contributed ten (10) points, your kept income is zero (0) points and your total income = 0+7.2=7.2 points.

This effect is similar in magnitude to the treatment effect of moving from the VCM to the lotteries.

However, if the responder rejected the proposal, neither participant would earn any money.

It is asserted here repeated measures.

Results demonstrate that awareness tools providing information about highly cooperative group members encourage participants to trust one another and minimize the risk of being exploited.

Having said that, various features of our design work to inhibit the importance of an experimenter demand effect, including not using a senior PI as the experiment administrator and limiting social interactions between subjects and the administrator to those required to conduct the experiment.

The results of this study suggest that while it is true that people with an altruistic or cooperative orientation will participate more than those with an individualistic or competitive orientation, their participation is likely to be reduced if they observe other membersÕ defection behavior.

This study examined the flexibility of prediction and decision making in the face of a partner's differing level of theory of mind.

In particular, proposing a link and cooperating is never part of an equilibrium strategy, for any value of v.

Relying on the same measure of trust, Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that an increase in the level of trust positively affects the annual growth rate of per capita income.

The ability to voice opinions and concerns has also long been identified as a key element of feelings of fairness and justice in the workplace, in a process that has been termed the "voice effect" (Folger, 1977).

natives and the resulting payoffs may change in time) are interrelated in the sense that the changes in the reward structure and the sequence by which different conflicts are entered depend upon the way previous conflicts were resolved.

Note that allowing frequent network updates does not necessarily mean that the network structure actually changes frequently but only that the opportunity for change often exists.

Nonetheless, we feel that it is worthwhile showing that the extra step of instrumenting for received messages does not affect our main conclusion: there is a causal relationship between receiving an explicit threat and cheating on collusive agreements.

However, self-deception could also vary as a function of the situation and may be a facultative mechanism.

The uninformed player's payoff comes close to the theoretical prediction in most cases.

Self-conscious emotions do this in several ways.

In our opinion, the easiest and most parsimonious way to take them into account in our experiment is by asking directly about satisfaction with other players' behaviour in the CPRG and testing how much it matters vis-à-vis objective characteristics in the second TG.

When people perceive a relationship partner as highly agreeable, they feel more comfortable resolving conflicts (Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002) and are more inclined to solve conflicts through informal mechanisms (rather than including a third-party mediator; Morris, Leung, & Iyengar, 2004).

In the PC and DC conditions the subjects were given a chance to form a coalition.

Certainly, strong social bonds make visualizations of others easier, providing a firmer impetus for volunteering.

Impure altruism also resolves the contradictions observed by List and Bardsley if the amount given, G, and the amount not taken, N , are equivalent sources of warm glow.

sided Mann-Whitney U-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test; N = 28) and their standard deviation (4.0 in Lf vs. 5.3 in Lr; p N 0.15; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 28).

For each sex, two behavioral measures were compared between the PBO group and the two drug groups (OT and AVP): the total number of cooperate choices, and the probability of cooperating in the current round following unreciprocated cooperation in the previous round (pp/CD).

Then, the higher is the contribution of the human player required to achieve the non-cooperative optimum, the lower is the expected proportion of ambiguity averse choices.

Studies using the PDG have shown that emotional states and individual differences related to emotional traits influence cooperation.

We have calculated the relative abundance of extortioners, equalizers, and ZD strategies (i.e., the time spent in a δ-neighborhood) divided by the volume of the intersection of that neighborhood with the set of memory-one strategies (A), the average strategy of the population (B), and the average payoff (C).

Simulation results indicate the importance of ethical behavior on the long-term financial success of companies as well as the larger industries in which they participate.

Punishment is generally lower when the target was the highest contributor in the group and this effect is stronger for actual than for requested punishment.

In this paper, we neither attribute behavioral differences between the 'elite' and the rest of society to endowment differences nor to self selection (a positive correlation between selfishness and endowment); rather we hypothesize in line with Cote et al. (2015) and Heap et al. (2016) that the inequality in the society itself makes elite members more selfish and less generous.

Hypothesis 2: The presence of a threshold constraining participants' activities will lead participants to be less holistic in their cognitive orientations than when a threshold is not present.

In 2001, the Court ruled in United States v. United Foods, Inc. the mushroom checkoff program unconstitutional because it was a stand-alone checkoff advertising program and not part of a broader set of economic regulations.

In these experiments, which allow subjects to punish non-cooperators at a cost to themselves, the moderate levels of contribution typically observed in early play often rise in subsequent rounds to near the maximal level rather than declining to insubstantial levels, as in the case where no punishment is permitted.

The results suggest that remembering an experience of rejection can trigger anger and ruminating on being rejected can trigger indirect aggression.

Our main goals are to understand whether and when subjects play cooperatively, and also to get a sense of the sorts of strategies that they use.

Figure 2 reports the repeated-game data in a similar way.

Thus, we explore a non-parametric distribution-free estimation approach known as the Turnbull estimator, which has been applied in a number of recent CV studies (Carson et al., 1996;Habb and fcfonnell, 1997;Whitehead et al., 1998).

more compliant to threats than subjects in the deterrence condition (X -20.6).

On a more general level, the present study generates new insights into the relation between social uncertainty and environmental uncertainty by showing that the way in which people deal with social uncertainty is affected by the uncertainty people may experience regarding environmental information (cf.

The participant who is assigned the role of allocator makes a binary choice between Take All and Share Equally.

The presence of such an ''empowered" leader increases contributions, however, contributions are lower if the leader role is rotated among the group members compared to a situation when the leader is a fixed player.

Here A 1 incurs an investment cost of c but there is still a chance p that a loss will occur to A 2 so that A 1 's expected loss from damage from a negative externality is puff.

Since in ordinary papers on dictator games gender is not reported, meta-regression with all data would not be meaningful.

Subjects' reaction to punishment suggests that earnings feedback affects negatively their expectations about the contribution of their peers in the following period.

In total, we judged 22 groups with 79 members as accepting the equality norm, 8 groups with 26 members as accepting the equity norm, and 5 groups with 17 members as accepting no norm at all.

Specifically, when anticipated barriers lower the probability of successfully achieving one's interests, individuals should be more inclined to opt for the benefits of competitive actions.

The results of these groups show a crystal-clear picture: Participants overwhelmingly elected the best candidate in the absence of conflicts, but once competitive ''bribes'' were introduced, knowledge-sharing broke down, and the groups failed to pool information and to uncover the objectively best candidate, so an inferior candidate was elected in more than 80% of these elections.

Similar to the main effect of time, post-hoc Bonferroni tests (at p < .05)

We can once again interpret these data as demonstrating that in this context it is the social nature of information which influenced behavior toward others.

This impression was reinforced by pair-wise comparisons indicating that participants who underwent the TÀ treatment on study day 1, and who showed relatively reduced number of cooperative responses, significantly increased their cooperative responses after the T + treatment on study day 2, while participants who underwent the T + treatment on day 1 showed similarly high levels of cooperation on day 2.

Participants might honestly imagine that they would be generous in a certain situation with hypothetical rewards yet choose selfishly when real rewards are offered.

Numerous environmental policies are generally aimed at creating a variety of valuable public goods and/or maintaining existing resources (open-sea fisheries, ground water, and forest biodiversity) by reducing, for example, the negative externalities of farming such as water pollution.

We consciously chose this minimalistic way of asking for a reaction, since any more explicit request or even the use of the word "justification" we considered to be too leading15 .

These simulation results thus lend support to our claim that the strength of ties between actors can contribute to the evolution of cooperation in dynamic networks.

Fig. 2. The figure illustrates the set H y,y ∪ J y,y with n = 8, r * = 3, k = 2 where the black dots and the white dots have the same meaning as before.

Participants were allowed to discuss their decisions with the other group members for up to three-minutes, three times during the task, namely, prior to trials 1, 4, and 7. Communication among group members frequently occurs in real-work settings, and has been shown to promote cooperation in social dilemma situations (e.g., Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994;Komorita & Parks, 1995).

The difference between the group-representative and group-all condition was interpreted as consistent with a prediction that intergroup contact can reduce competitiveness even when there is conflict and the absence of norms requiring cooperative behavior.

First, despite the asymmetric nature of the best-shot provision technology, heterogeneity can help overcome coordination problems by providing focal points as a coordination tool.

As for the issue of sanctions, we noted earlier that due to trust based in the system, sanctions can increase expectations of cooperation.

It might be speculated that even greater manipulation of partner characteristics (perhaps established via pre-experiment communication with a stooge-partner) would affect the game strategies themselves.

Countless experiments suggest, however, that this is not an accurate description of punishment behavior in decentralized sanctioning institutions.

We find that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups.