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Therefore, if the attribution of intentions turns out to be behaviorally important, the "consequentialism" inherent in standard utility models is also in doubt.

(1) PPD training was given only in the RAN and TFT conditions.

At the end of the round, subjects were informed of each other's choices and received a payoff corresponding to the action pair.

We use an experiment with multiple threshold public goods to show how increasing the number of public goods vying for funding can decrease both total contributions across all goods and the probability that any public good receives enough donations to succeed.

These two questions are closely related to the different fairness models.

In the context of the present experiment, the conjecture of "indecision by indifference" would imply that subjects that are quoted a monetary reward that is sufficiently close to their maximum willingness to pay would find the decision more difficult and therefore require more time for a decision.

Spurred by this theoretical explanation of the evolution of cooperation, many researchers looking for such signals in humans have focused on involuntary facial expressions of emotion (Boone & Buck, 2003;Brown & Moore, 2002;Frank, 1988;Krumhuber et al., 2007;Mehu, Little, & Dunbar, 2007;Oda, Yamagata, Yabiku, & Matsumoto-Oda, 2009;Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001;Trivers, 1971).

We suggest that the concept of 'spending' more on the environment could be extended to include spending more time through voluntary contributions, and thus we pay particular attention to this variable in the empirical section.

In the present study, we focus on the applied issue as to whether these dilemmas are effectively construed in a different way.

The type of prisoner's dilemma game influenced the strength of the observed correlation between discounting and cooperation.

The second probes the necessary features of a coordination task by testing two control tasks.

As such, people from different societies will tend to express different preferences and beliefs: one should be able to measure between-group variation.

If a game is to be played many times, consideration of the cooperative choice may increase, since players can attempt to influence their opponent's future behavior.

Using a theoretical model of heterogeneous reciprocity preferences, I derived hypotheses concerning the difference between contributions to in-group public goods in Harmony and Conflict and concerning the effects of general and specific trust, social preferences and in-group bias on these contributions.

For the present purposes, we opted against counterbalancing, due to the demands that this would have placed on the number of different sequential arrangements, as well as a balanced distribution of young and old girls and boys.

The larger this bias, the stronger the effect of ignorance on norm compliance.

A meta-analysis of sex differences in cooperation showed that both men and women's levels of cooperation are different in mixed dyads vs. same-sex dyads and, while it is often assumed that women are more cooperative, female-female interactions seem less cooperative than malemale interactions (Balliet et al. 2011).

This forwards the interesting and paradoxical hypothesis that inducing the unpleasant feeling of guilt in a fellow group member may in itself be beneficial because it actually allows one to build a reputation of being a cooperator (cf.

In all three models, the coefficient of the treatment dummy "last" is not significantly different from zero, indicating no differences in propensity to cooperate between cumu-lative and last.

Results show that tax publicity reduces both the number of evaders and the amount of tax evaded.

Thus even if the correlation between first-and second-mover choices is best explained by a consensus effect, a complete explanation of the data will require some preference element that rationalizes second-mover cooperation.

If a player died during a wave, the character would respawn during the next wave.

On average, all players, independently of the decision protocol, group size, and re-matching procedure, send positive amounts.

While less information leads to more equal contributions, subjects focus on group efficiency in case of full information.

The fothfun mechanism thus leads to less cooperation than in the baseline case with no punishment if the detrimental effect of retaliatory punishment is greater than the positive norm-enforcing effect of punishment.

Moreover, excluding incentives related to time preferences could result in an overestimation of investment levels in public goods with long-term benefits.

Each individual kept the remainder of the 80-franc endowment that he or she did not allocate to the public good.

In our research, we examined empirically several specific hypotheses drawn from our conceptual analysis.

Importantly, we found that the results of the two studies depart primarily because of differences in cooperation rates in settings with a known end round.

All p-values are calculated taking into account the lack of independence in the decisions of each subject (cluster robust standard errors).

However, on ratings of group performance, status and attitudinal similarity combined did lead to increased intergroup differentiation, again unaffected by goal relations.

After the punishment stage, players were informed about the number of points they received (but not from whom) and their final payoff. 4

This unpredicted interaction may have happened due to collectiveness created by the community title.

Considering the relatively smaller groups (4 and 10 persons), they find that size only matters when the return on the public good is low, in which case, contributions actually increase in large groups.

And the more a participant contributes, the less he or she earns.

Thus, because an elected leader refl ects the choice of the group and its members, an elected leader will feel strong support from the followers who will bestow on the leader a high sense of social responsibility ( Julian, Hollander, & Regula, 1969;Kenney et al., 1996).

The hypothesis of equal probability of upward and downward movement, given that movement exists,' can be rejected at the 0.0278 level of significance.

The resulting GLM swas corrected for temporal autocorrelation by using a first-order autoregressive model.

If so, a denomination's position on the church-sect continuum -which may also be represented by its theological position -may help to explain its members' giving patterns.

Ambiguity arises when a decision-maker finds it difficult or impossible to assign a subjective probability to an event.

More specifically, participants influenced by a charismatic leader (i.e., high in self-sacrifice) were found to contribute more money to a charity fund, and this pattern was mediated by perceptions of charisma.

3. These different views can be accounted for most simply in terms of the differential experience of the two types in their social interactions.

The paying taxes label should then lead to contributions comparable to those participants who do not spontaneously associate the public goods game with teamwork.

However, people seem unwilling to use a commitment mechanism if doing so exposes them to being free ridden.

In a competitive atmosphere, subjects are likely to be concerned with maximizing the 1.

A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted.

d = .92. 3 Due to the modest sample size for examining moderately highly correlated predictors in regression, we examined correlations to determine the most likely predictors of interest for future research.

Consistent with our second hypothesis, which predicts that relationship duration mediates the impact of tie strength on cooperation, we find that both the main effect of tie value and its interaction with the number of tie swaps are diminished, relative to Model 2. The main effect decreases by 64% (from −.069 to −.025), and the interaction with the number of tie swaps decreases by 65% (from .029 to .01).

I do not conserve energy because it benefits others at a cost to myself.

Other organizations and countries with different organizational structures and cultures must be included before a general theory of knowledge transfer can be written.

As a random-pairings session continues, some of these first-round cooperators get discouraged, and shift to defecting in the first round.

If papers have indicated the exchange rate at the time of the experiment, I have used the dollar equivalent.

This equilibrium arises because with more than one person contributing at least one contribution is wasted because that second person would be better off by not contributing.

Inversely, (2) when students have academic curricula with high levels of background knowledge related to the root causes of environmental problems and the related possible strategic options, the cooperative-competitive context does not matter.

, because we did not expect impressions to play an important role as an antecedent of cooperative decision-making and cooperative behavior is rather the result of the direct influence of SVO (Heon individuals) or primes (Leon individuals), we did not expect a systematic relationship between cooperative behavior and impressions (Hypothesis 6).

Namely, at the end of a repeated public good contribution game, if a surprise announcement is made that the same group of subjects will play another repeated game, contributions initially jump back to a relatively high level and then decrease again over time.

Subjects who did not see the pool size drop tended to vote against the elimination of free access to the commons, whereas subjects who did see their pool size drop voted to relinquish free access.

The game is dynamic as tomorrow's individual and societal capital stock is determined by the sum of the individual efforts today.

If both firms opt for the low Nash equilibrium price, though, market-level profits and wages will be minimized.

There is some experimental evidence that groups are better off when punishment is delivered by a central agency than when group members sanction each other (O'GORMAN et al. 2009).

A risk-averse sample item is "I don't like to put something at stake; I would rather be on the safe side."

While this combination of asymmetry and heterogeneity is relevant for real-world situations, particularly for international and global public goods, researchers have paid little attention to the potential that such heterogeneity can overcome the coordination problem of a best-shot social dilemma.

We also examine the notion that Invest is seen as the more cautious strategy, and discuss the link between subjective perceptions and choice.

An effect of matrices fly obtained on compliance to threats.

Contributions clearly increase in the leverage level of both institutions, irrespective of the treatment.

These variables should capture the economic circumstances of villages, particularly wealth.

Each marker gives you AND the other participant a payoff of 14 cents, irrespective of whether the markers comes from you or the other participant.

The MDD group contained 26 women (66.7%) and the control group included 11 women (55.0%).

It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection.

Because contributions exert a positive externality that is non-rival and non-excludable on anyone who cares about the provision of education material in the local school, we consider them a pure public good from the donor's perspective.

n their interpretation of the way affect functions to alter behavior, Rosenhan et al. comment: Negative affect by definition increases the psychological distance between self and other.

Thus, much like the real world, if harvesters mismanaged the resource during the early stages of the simulation, there was less available during the later stages.

As mentioned above, in condition II, participants had no risk of losing money, which eventually leads to greedy incentives for the participants.

In a first paper, we put Knack and Keefer's conjecture that inequality destroys "social capital" to a direct experimental test, but found no evidence whatsoever in support of it: the observed level of cooperation was independent of the implemented degree of inequality (Sadrieh and Verbon).

The greater are others' contributions, the less is one rewarded, ceteris paribus -perhaps because there is little scope for either punishing or rewarding in groups in which all are contributing close to the maximum.

But since the payoff for mutual defection is smaller than the payoff for mutual cooperation (fwo) the dilemma arises on what to choose if having in mind also the welfare of the society and not just personal interests.

This interpretation suggests that if the factors that weaken the case for the dominant or competitive choice were eliminated in the repeated-play PD, the prescriptive behavior would be obtained.

This conclusion is further supported by the results of a recent study by Evans and Crumbaugh (1966).

A possible transformation of material payoffs into an internal subjective game through the use of information about themselves, their group members, and the incentives of the repeated game may induce cooperative behaviour as a rational strategy in a collective-action setting.

The positive and negative changes in the payoff matrices are decreasing and symmetrical for both sets of matrices.

This effect operated via increased trust.

The males in the all-male dyads exceeded all the others in the use of a &dquo;tit-for-tat&dquo; strategy during the last 50 trials.

Thus, assuming that the second player is rational, she should choose D no matter what the first player chooses.

Here we consider only the net surplus creation, which means that we deduct the opportunity cost of investing.

Here the two-way analysis was performed on the averaged favorability of the six interpersonal attitude items.

Then the agents' prediction is a weighted sum of the outcomes of the closest patterns.

In China, a person's reputation is enhanced by establishing and maintaining a network of two-person dyadic relationships, known as ''guanxi,'' with more people who themselves have good reputations (17).

Some people hold a strong norm prohibiting helping one person through harming another (Baron, in press-b;Ritov & Baron, 1990;Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991, Experiment 3), even if the benefit outweighs the harm and even if unfairness is not at issue (e.g., when those to be harmed are determined randomly).

Moreover, the kibbutz pays for individual members' consumption of housing, food, utilities and transportation, among other goods.

While it is convenient to think of the contribution level c i as a continuous variable (e.g., allowing to interpret preference parameters in terms of the location and scale of well-known families of truncated density functions), the choices made by real-world players are necessarily discrete.

The following two subsections are devoted to explaining the virtuous cycle that reinforces the high contributions that arise throughout the ECP experimental sessions.

19 I focus on equilibrium actions and outcomes instead of equilibrium strategies, since in the experimental data we will not observe the latter.

It appears that, on the one hand, the average amount taken for self is not significantly greater in the 20-person groups than in the 7-person non-communicating groups.

In every session, 10 rounds were played with only punishment and 10 rounds with only reward; the order varied between sessions.

However, the practices underlying these subsistence strategies-and the cultural norms and values that inform them-have undergone dramatic transformations, first through Soviet-era collectivization and cultural construction, then later in response to post-Soviet privatization and Perestroika.

Thus, with the reputation mechanism, there is a clear increase in the level of cooperation, which increases with experience.

In both the minimum-effort game and the public goods game, social interaction implies that subjects' choices of numbers or contributions, respectively, are affected by the choices of their neighbors.

contribute when m=0, always contribute when m=1.5, and contribute 91% of the time when m=0.75.

PSP refers to the avoidance of social rejection, i.e. a protective self-presenter fears social disapproval if he or she does not manage to behave appropriately.

All if games were played for 10 consecutive days consisting of one daily session, of 20 trials each.