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Increased average contributions with excludability are caused by significantly fewer free riders and more full contributors; see the last column of Tables B2.1 and B2.2 in the Appendix.

Note that nonrepresentative samples of certain cultures are not uncommon.

II it was predicted that Ss would exploit an egotistical opponent to a greater extent when future interaction was anticipated than when it was not, but that when the opponent was seen to be self-effacing Lhe reverse would be true.

The game will start when everybody finishes the quiz.

First, models of information signaling have shown that sequential giving can have beneficial effects for voluntary public good provision when the common value of the public good is uncertain.

However, we have to recognize that as the subjective probabilities go to zero, the economic impact of choices becomes weak.

Monetary rewards were emphasized as incentives for participation.

Threat was introduced by providing one or both subjects with a salient punitive capability in the form of a gate which could be closed by one subject to prevent access to the one-lane road.

Sullivan & Lyle questioned the effect of player-player anonymity, emphasizing that the imperfectness of the anonymity might have influenced play.

Further, because direct reciprocity was not possible in our experiments, sharing arrangements were not self-enforcing.

As to the control variables, the number of members is significant and negative, indicating that groups with more members are less likely to be in the zero delinquency category.

Materials for both settings were designed in a way that participants could easily enter into the dynamics of the simulations.

For cooperators, focused contrasts indicated that negative moods produced more cooperation (less competition) than either positive or control moods, ts( 77 In short, Study 2 provides further support for our ideas by assessing goals as they "naturally" occur, overcoming any potential limitations on varying goals via instructions.

Afterwards, participants were asked to indicate, privately, their individual solution to the task (item 2, Fig. 5a).

Participants could spread their money among four options in the CKTD condition, compared to three in the KTD condition; in order to control for this, the ''relative amount'' column shows the amounts participants kept and invested in taking and defense relative to the sum of investments in these three options.

Forty-five male undergraduates took part in Experiment 2, which varied the strategy of a simulated "other."

As is argued in the literature, the effects of these punishments are clear: cooperation is established and maintained Sefton, Shupp & Walker (2002).

We used this proportional measure of punishment rather than the raw amounts that participants spent for punishing each trader because the total amount that they spent for punishment varied among participants.

For the participant, the task involved choosing which distribution to accept.

We show that these rules induce behavior that has pro-social consequences even in cases where there are strong conflicts of interests among group members and where interactions with free information exchange fail.

That is, when there is no noise, there is an increase in cooperation over successive interactions (at least in the context of TFT and TFT ϩ 1 strategies).

In this section, we focus on the expectationchoice relationship to provide insight into the extent to which expectations influence own choice5 and how this relationship may depend on social value orientations and the personality descriptions of the partner.

All experiments were held at fatiofab -a computerized laboratory for interactive decision research.

Sequential contributions decrease to the predicted equilibrium level and fall below the greater-than-expected contributions in the simultaneous game.

The next two subsections provide tests of our hypotheses above.

But you should also be careful not to ask for too much, because if at the end of the study everyone's requests add up to more than the $1,000 that is in the pool, then nobody, including yourself, will receive anything.

Participants were told that, after filling out the questionnaire, they would be assigned to groups to participate in a decision-making experiment and that this might take a couple of days.

Thus, it is doubtful that social context operates via the social value of benevolence (or the other values) to shape group cohesion.

In scenarios B and P, almost all groups succeeded (10 of 12), and there is no significant treatment effect (H vs. L).

(2) When first in the commitment matrices, choose one in the A matrix.

Many studies have dealt with the efficacy of particular moves by one player in inducing conciliatory or cooperative behavior from another (Pilisuk & Skolnick, 1968;Rapoport & Chammah, 196S;Shure, Meeker, & Hansford, 1965).

Identifying the strategy employed by players engaged in an IPD could also have wider implications for understanding the determinants of social conflicts in general, and help to design effective methods for ameliorating these problems.

The individual payoff π i is the following:

Because of the partner design, this yields 18 independent observations for each treatment.

The original MGE had a strong effect because it involved allocation of tangible rewards; this implies that mere categorization produces discriminative behavior.

The Cahill et al. (unpublished) and Patrick et al. (2010) studies relied on selfreport measures of anger.

In particular, participating in a low-payment choice before making a high-payment choice magnifies the scale of the utility received/payoff from the subsequent task.

In our experiment, we set d to unity.12

Although a principally exploitative relationship between owners and drivers does not necessarily improve intergroup relations, familiarity with intergroup economic ties may explain the lack of ethnic bias in the laboratory game.

Participants cooperated more when OP received higher rewards.

The point we try to make is that trust is relatively less important in the AG compared to the PG because the removal of the temptation to free ride in the former strengthens incentives to cooperate.

Subjects are divided into groups of size 5.

When such conditions exist, there is an intraclass correlation (ICC), and the assumption of independence of observations for regular regression is violated (Hox, 1998;Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998;Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).

The latter result is by no means self-evident.

Interestingly, another body of research concerns a situation wherein group discussion does not promote increased cooperative choice (Insko et al., 1987;1988).

The follow-up independent t-tests (Table 1) revealed that MAOA-L carriers exhibited significantly lower beliefs about others' contribution in stage one (P~0:013), stage two (P~0:037), and stage three (P~0:039), but not in stage four (P~0:421).

We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely and less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second-party punishment.

Thus, subjects with a stronger VTA response to CC outcomes at baseline experienced the largest OT-induced decrease in VTA response to CC outcomes.

However, it is important to note that the results from a survey of a nationwide representative sample of Swedish parents' attitudes toward child care (Biel et al., 1997) were successfully replicated in experiments similar to those reported here (Eek et al., 1998).

Result 3. The threat of inter-period feuds in LF reduces the frequency of altruistic punishment relative to the Baseline treatment.

An extension of the model in (1) by adding terms b ih jx hj À y hj j could capture such preferences.

We consider nondivisibility to be the more important factor in determining individual members' willingness to contribute to the provision of the public good, because it directly affects the value of the good to the individual.

To see this, take periods 1 and 2. In period 1 a subject can rely only on his or her intuitive ("home-grown") beliefs about others' contributions.

The 'degree of imperfection' of this information clearly increases with the size of the group, because it becomes increasingly difficult to decompose the responses of other subjects into their reactions to the simultaneous changes in the contributions of their counterparts.

The development of inequality aversion relatively early in childhood is particularly interesting in the light of ethnographic evidence that suggests a strong role of egalitarian "instincts" in human evolutionary history.

The increase in average contributions for the US region in RN (29.8) relative to ON (26.7) is due to the fact that, in ON, 64% of American participants opted for the principles of future polluter-pays and equal percentage reduction of current emissions, both of which are synonymous with the smallest public good contribution; conversely, in RN, 62% of Chinese participants selected the principles of equal per capita entitlement to emissions and historical polluter-pays, the equity principles that denote the largest contributions for the US region.

Fig. 3. Distribution of actual and expected transfers in the dictator game.

In contrast to experiments where reputation is information about behavior in previous periods of the game, our experiment contains an endogenous reputation system.

Our findings also showed that participants' scores on a Prosocial value domain derived from Rokeach's terminal values were indicative of their cooperation preferences in the PGGs.

To investigate this, we calculated for each participant the monetary consequences of his or her decision for the group (see also Table 1).

It may well be that if a group fails in establishing the public good, a self-sacrificing leader may be evaluated as poor since his or her efforts did not prevent the group from failing.

Payoff structure for the modified Iowa gambling card-selection task

Because we conjectured that the opportunity for punishing would have a larger impact if subjects could learn about the behaviour of other group members, we repeated the basic public goods gameÐwith and without punishment opportunity, depending on the treatmentÐfor six periods.

Consequently, emotional responses from past exchanges influences the behavior of actors in the future.

Our studies suggest that sometimes coordination can be easily promoted by simply pointing out to people that certain information is available to all people involved.

The analysis of variance further revealed that all subjects anticipate that with a leader the distribution of harvest outcomes over the group members will be more equitable than in the first part of the experiment.

Tooby & Cosmides (1996) propose that the establishment of stable and friendly relationships between group members favoured the exchange of help when needed and thus reduced the risks of the situation described by the banker's paradox.

The main aim of this article was to investigate to what extent groups use reputational information to assess the suitability of candidate members.

It is possible that people's ability to estimate the equal choice may decrease as the number of others with whom they are sharing a nonpartitioned resource increases.

The mixed-motive interdependence situation was presented to participants in the form of a decision-making task.

Virtually all instances of social exchange in the ancestral environment were likely face-to-face.

In other treatments, participants know the amount of the potential loss but have no information about the probability of the loss and its potential reduction through contribution.

Importantly, the minor differences we observe are not systematic.

It is important to keep in mind that a carefully drawn, well articulated theory is indispensable in drawing scientific conclusions from experimental observations.

Lastly, because greedy people are never satisfied with their current state of affairs, it is likely that this affects their wellbeing in a negative way.

The rationale for this finding is unclear.

The consequence of these two evolutionary forces is that in equilibrium strong reciprocators and purely selfish humans coexist.

which is ultimately an empirical question.

We find that contributions are 56.6% higher when group composition is different across both public goods dilemmas as compared to when composition is the same across the two public goods dilemmas (M 1 = 17.7,

The procedure in the leader treatment was similar except that in this treatment, one of the participants was selected to be the leader for all rounds to be played in that treatment.

Hypothesis 1b: In fragmented villages, there will be higher frequencies of cooperation in H-H/M-M than in H-M.

In the case of defaults, an endowment effect may be at work: people may perceive the default option as something they possess and, thus, place more value on it.

Thus, if the default effect is partly explained by information conveyance, we expect to find it less pronounced when the default contribution can be a randomly drawn number over the support of choices in the game.

If one (or more) of the players is "competitively oriented," he continues to exploit the other player or players until they must respond with self-protective noncooperation as well.

Rather than imitating an other who adopted a noncontingently cooperative strategy subjects exploited the simulated other.

Our results show that emotion-regulation knowledge is itself neither positive nor negative, but can facilitate the objectives of individuals whose interests are in doing harm as well as those interested in benefiting the greater good.

From the pool of 105 one-shot PDG players, we selected 64 players whose pictures were without photographic deficiencies; faces that were not entirely framed or faces that were partly covered by hair, garments, eyeglasses, or hands were excluded.

The deviation of actual from the predicted (minimum number of) s = 10 observations is (33 − 29)/33 = 12.1% which seems small enough to consider Hypothesis 1 reasonably accurate and, formally, we cannot reject that the share of subjects with β i > 0.5 is the same as the share of subjects offering s = 10 (p = 0.580, Fisher's exact test).

[nc The intelligent management of common resources (e.g., groundwater, fish, wildlife, forests) raises some thorny issues for social scientists.

First, the task of learning and familiarization was harder, since the first choice of rules occurred before subjects had any experience interacting in a VCM with or without punishment.

Thus, representatives successfully advanced the interests of their constituencies when bargaining with persons who did not have constituencies of their own.

One possible reason for the difference between these two studies is that learning effects are more likely to overwhelm the effects of pair IQ in longer games; this may be related to the finding that worker IQ is a stronger predictor of performance in the early months on a new job while IQ's predictive power for worker performance weakens after years spent in the same job (Hunt 1995).

Unconditional contributions by round and VCM round contribution type.

If imperfect information reduces the incentive to match others' contributions, both the matching rates of actors with relatively high marginal benefit functions and those with relatively low marginal benefit functions will tend to fall.

Thus, nobody will ever know what you have done.

Potlatches and other excessive public charitable displays suddenly begin to make sense when they are viewed as selfpresentation strategies (default, 1992).

Finally, looking at a group average measure of connectivity that we calculated, we find high correlation with individual cooperative behaviour.

This finding is reminiscent of Sniderman et al. (2004), which found that perceived threat to safety was the least important predictor of hostility towards immigrants in the Netherlands.

The inclusion of asynchrony allowed a player to act independently of his opponent; this provided an opportunity to double-cross him.

Variations on these early dominant strategy public goods games have been conducted in the laboratory under many different assumptions about utility functions and technology, different subject pools, asymmetric endowments and preferences, different information conditions, different public good mechanisms, variable group sizes, and so forth.