Source: http://book.wolterskluwer.pl/x_C_I__PT_40110400__LL_0__PZTA_0E__UPT_40482064.html
Timestamp: 2020-06-02 14:57:15
Legal References Found: art. 23
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Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Prawa Własności Intelektualnej - Zeszyt 135
Kod: KAM-6003:201701 Ilość w paczce: 0
Aleksandra Gruca-Nowak
Infografika jako przedmiot ochrony prawa autorskiego
Data mining jako problem prawa autorskiego
Przesyłanie plików za pośrednictwem sieci peer-to-peer a rozpowszechnienie utworu w rozumieniu prawa autorskiego
Cytat w muzyce - o potrzebie reinterpretacji przesłanek
Problem warstwowości utworu artystycznego ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem relacji utworu do jego fundamentu bytowego
Czy w prawie polskim dopuszczalne jest zadośćuczynienie pieniężne za śmierć zwierzęcia?
Costly but effective and proportionate?: a few remarks on website blocking injuctions
The evolution of the copyright exhaustion doctrine in the European Union: limitations and controversy in the digital age
Obecnie obserwujemy niezwykle dynamiczny rozkwit dziedzin związanych z projektowaniem graficznym, ponieważ funkcjonowanie w społeczeństwie informacyjnym znacznie obciąża nasze struktury poznawcze, a poruszanie się w przestrzeni "nadmiaru" informacji wymaga wysokiego poziomu alfabetyzmu funkcjonalnego. Mając powyższe na uwadze, w artykule poruszyłam ważny problem ochrony infografiki na tle prawa autorskiego, jakkolwiek ze świadomością trudności związanych z całościową oceną tej problematyki. W pierwszej kolejności podjęłam próbę opisu samego zjawiska, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem czynności, które składają się na cały proces jej powstawania. To z kolei przybliżyło mnie do możliwości wytyczenia zakresu "twórczych wyborów", a to w kontekście poszukiwania zobiektywizowanych kryteriów prawnoautorskiej ochrony. Rozważania w przedmiocie ustalania koniecznych cech utworu na przykładzie projektowania infograficznego prowadziłam na podstawie założenia, zgodnie z którym normatywne cechy utworu: twórczość i indywidualność mogą być naturalizowane poprzez takie ich deskryptywne dopracowanie przez naukę prawa, które będzie zgodne z wiedzą współczesnych nauk o człowieku, w szczególności psychologii eksperymentalnej i neurobiologii.
Na styku rozwoju informatycznego i ochrony praw twórców dochodzi stale do sytuacji granicznych, co otwiera dyskusję na temat konieczności całościowego przemodelowania struktury instytucji dozwolonego użytku bądź wprowadzenia kolejnych postaci tej instytucji prawnej. Tolerancja dla nowych form eksploatacji utworów jest zazwyczaj względna, w tym sensie, że uprawnieni z tytułu praw autorskich doszukują się możliwości wkraczania w ich sferę prerogatyw majątkowych. Niepokój budzą przypadki korzystania z dóbr niematerialnych na masową skalę, relatywnie łatwe, jeśli dysponuje się stosownym oprogramowaniem. Wśród takich działań specyfi czny charakter mają operacje związane z analizą danych, w tym zawartych m.in. w utworach, określane zbiorczo jako data mining. Ich wyjątkowość polega na skupieniu się na warstwie informacyjnej, która nie jest przedmiotem ochrony prawa autorskiego. W związku z tym powstaje pytanie, jak dalece prawo autorskie powinno ingerować w dopuszczalność tego typu praktyk. Niniejszy artykuł skupia się na zasadniczych problemach związanych z automatyczną analizą danych, które to problemy postrzegane są wyłącznie przez pryzmat prawa autorskiego.
Problematyka przesyłania plików za pośrednictwem sieci peer-to-peer (p2p) została już omówiona w licznych monografiach i artykułach z zakresu prawa autorskiego. Z uwagi na specyfikę pakietów danych przesyłanych za pośrednictwem p2p powstają istotne wątpliwości dotyczące oceny legalności tego działania zarówno na tle prawnoautorskich przepisów cywilnych, jak i karnych; wątpliwości i trudności interpretacyjne dotyczą zarówno pojęcia "utworu", jak i pojęcia "rozpowszechniania". Autorzy publikacji poświęconych tej tematyce wskazują na problemy związane z wykładnią pojęcia "utworu", które wynikają z tego, że treści, które są przesyłane w czasie korzystania z p2p, mają marginalny zakres - stanowią wyłącznie pochodną korzystania z systemu informatycznego i nie noszą cechy indywidualnej twórczości. W literaturze przedmiotu wielokrotnie mierzono się także ze zdefi niowaniem pojęcia "rozpowszechniania", w przypadku którego trudności wywołuje określenie, w którym momencie (jeżeli w ogóle) następuje publiczne udostępnienie utworu. Niniejszy artykuł różni się od istniejących opracowań tym, że większy nacisk kładzie na przeanalizowanie i opisanie procesów technologicznych, które towarzyszą udostępnianiu i przesyłaniu plików przy wykorzystaniu sieci p2p. Uzyskane informacje zostały wykorzystane w celu wykazania, że przesyłanie plików za pośrednictwem p2p niekoniecznie musi się wiązać z naruszaniem prawa autorskiego. Do takiego wniosku można dojść w sytuacjach, w których ma miejsce symultaniczne pobieranie i przesyłanie fragmentów pliku przez podmiot, który nie dysponuje kompletnym plikiem, co ma miejsce w znacznej części przypadków korzystania z p2p. Z uwagi na obszerność i wysoki stopień skomplikowania omawianych zagadnień, opracowanie zostało ograniczone niemal wyłącznie do problematyki udostępniania i przesyłania plików i jedynie w niezbędnym zakresie odnosi się do ich pobierania. Dodatkowo pragnę podkreślić, że rozważania przedstawione poniżej w najmniejszym stopniu nie mają na celu usprawiedliwiania bądź propagowania piractwa, a jedynie unaocznienie problemów, które są wywoływane nieprzystosowaniem regulacji prawnoautorskiej do świata nowych technologii.
Cytat artystyczny - obejmujący również omawiany w niniejszym opracowaniu cytat w muzyce - to jedna z podstawowych kategorii wypowiedzi twórczej. Ta strategia intertekstualna ma długą tradycję twórczą, bo działalność kreacyjna człowieka jest generalnie zanurzona w tym, co zastane. W muzyce zaś cytat pełni istotną funkcję komunikacyjną, ponieważ, szczególnie gdy chodzi o instrumentalny, asemantyczny jej wycinek, pozwala na wywoływanie pozamuzycznych asocjacji. Zaskakuje więc, że jest on wciąż postrzegany przez prawo z pewną, można by rzec, nieufnością czy ostrożnością. Niekiedy można odnieść wrażenie, że stoi za tą postawą strach przed uelastycznieniem granic cytatu, dostosowaniem ich do panujących zwyczajów, a także, jak się może wydawać, literackie pojmowanie zjawiska. W rezultacie więc, zamiast nadążać za zmieniającymi się technologiami i sposobami wykorzystania utworów, regulacja ta pozostaje niejako obok praktyki artystycznej. Innymi słowy, zamiast wyznaczać pewne granice, ustalać - elastyczne wprawdzie - dopuszczalne ramy eksploatacji cudzych utworów, cytat jest wciąż objaśniany przez pryzmat literacko-naukowych intuicji i pozostaje w pewnym sensie regulacją "martwą" dla innych dziedzin kreacyjnych.
Czym jest utwór? Jakie znaczenie dla prawa autorskiego ma estetyka? Jak kształtuje się relacja utworu do jego fundamentu bytowego? Od kiedy możemy mówić o powstaniu dzieła chronionego prawem autorskim? Czym jest oryginał utworu? Czy utwór plastyczny lub architektoniczny można wykonać? Czy istnieje możliwość posłużenia się rękami osoby trzeciej przy ustalaniu utworu? Wobec wielu nieostrych pojęć prawa autorskiego niniejszy artykuł poszukuje odpowiedzi na te oraz inne pytania związane z jego istotą. Artykuł jest streszczeniem pracy magisterskiej, powstałej z inspiracji monografią prof. Andrzeja Kopffa, napisanej pod kierunkiem prof. Ryszarda Markiewicza.
Właściciele przywiązują się emocjonalnie do swoich zwierząt - to zjawisko, które można wiązać z czynnikami cywilizacyjnymi i kulturowymi. Coraz częściej zadawane jest pytanie, czy prawo cywilne powinno chronić więź człowieka ze zwierzęciem, a jeśli tak, to jakie powinny być tego podstawy? Odpowiedź zależy od ustalenia przyczyn, dla których porządek prawny uznaje określone wartości za dobra osobiste człowieka oraz zakresu podlegającej naprawieniu szkody niemajątkowej. Dlatego też niniejsze opracowanie obejmuje zagadnienie: a) zwierzęcia jako szczególnego dobra materialnego, b) przyczyn uznawalności i ochrony dóbr osobistych niewymienionych w art. 23 kodeksu cywilnego, c) podstaw zadośćuczynienia, oraz d) wartości sentymentalnej związanej z własnością zwierzęcia.
Costly but effective and proportionate?: a few remarks on website blocking injunctions
The structure of the Internet is quite complicated as there are multiple different actors involved in electronic communication, including the ones who create (content providers), the ones who receive (recipients, users), the ones who provide Internet connection (Internet connectivity providers) and the ones who intermediate in online communication by providing online services (Internet service providers, intermediaries). Due to the obvious fact that the Internet in the shape it has nowadays eases and speeds up online piracy, it has been 'cursed' (at least officially) by artists, creators, performers and producers. For the last three decades or so they have been on a hunt for a perfect remedy that could bring piracy to an end. One of the weapons they found and have frequently applied for are website blocking injunctions. The measure is not a perfect remedy to the online piracy problem, but it has potential to mitigate the phenomenon. Over the recent three years website blocking injunctions have become the most frequently asked for anti-piracy measure. Despite their unquestionable popularity, their legal structure is still a mystery. The aim of the paper is to dispel at least some of the considerable doubts the injunctions arouse. The article begins by explaining why rightholders claim for website blocking injunctions instead of searching for solutions among much quicker and straightforward measures such as notice-and-take-down or payment freezing. In order to do that the online-piracy problem is described given that historical, empirical and statistical evidence prove that the phenomenon is here to stay. Then, the article deals with contemporary concerns regarding the issuance and realization of injunctions, such as proportionality, interpretational and economic considerations. It discusses the most up-to-date judicial decisions on the subject and new regulations addressing website blocking injunctions directly.
The copyright exhaustion has traditionally been perceived as a legal mechanism protecting the equilibrium between the interests of the copyright holder and the society. It was meant to assure that the public benefi ted from access to works at more affordable prices and the copyright holder was prevented from accumulating gains resulting from further resales of the same copy. However, this more than a century old doctrine, developed in the case law and then transposed into a statutory form, faces an unknown future with the dawn of the new technology era and the widespread digitisation. Due to the fact that works in the digital format practically do not age and are easy to multiply at quasi not cost, the fears of piracy have withheld the EU legislator and the Courts to uniformly apply the exhaustion rule to all kinds of works, which has in turn caused the sense of legal uncertainty and the supersession of the ownership with the licensing model. This article attempts, by analyzing the historical background of the exhaustion doctrine, to answer the question whether accommodating its functioning to the nowadays' reality is the step forward that ought to be taken or whether the exhaustion of copyright has truly become an obsolete concept.
Infographic as an object of copyright protection
Data mining as a copyright law problem
Sending files via peer-to-peer networks and disseminating works within the meaning of copyright law
Quotes in music: on the need to reinterpret conditions
The problem of multiple strata of an artistic work, with special emphasis of the relationship between a work and its ontic foundation
Does the Polish law permit compensation for the death of an animal?
Functioning in information society places a considerable burden on a person's cognitive structure, while navigating in a space of information 'overload' requires a high level of functional literacy. For this reason we are seeing nowadays an exceptionally dynamic rise of domains linked with graphic design. The article touches upon an important problem of protecting infographics on the basis of copyright law. Reflections concerning the determination of the necessary features of a work on the example of infographic design are based on the assumption that the normative features of a work: its creative and individual nature, might be naturalised by their such descriptive development by the science of law that will be consistent with the knowledge of contemporary sciences of man, especially experimental psychology and neurobiology. The search for the necessary features of a work, which still remain rather vaguely defined in the law - which is unlikely to change - in a society flooded by the so-called applied art, in order to avoid the objection of being arbitrary or being subjectively and objectively unverifiable, requires, especially at the stage of applying the law, understanding of the essence of the phenomenon: the process whose result possesses the necessary feature of a work or not. This does not mean looking for manifestations of creative activity of an individual character in the creative process itself, separately from its result, but verifying their existence in the work while being aware of the intellectual, mental or neuronal phenomena accompanying its creation. The example of difficulties in determining the scope of copyright protection shows clearly that the law remains open to naturalisation, while the latest scientific discoveries may shed new light on some problems that so far have remained unsolved. The intensity of the personal imprint on a work can be measured using contemporarily available research methods typical of experimental psychology or, in near future, in neuroscience, because at the stage of development of those domains we can already indicate tools to enable distinguishing an aesthetic response from another kind of emotional response. The approach presented in this paper may restrain a phenomenon, which is very dangerous from the point of view of copyright law, whereby any results of human intellectual work are protected, because in accordance with the assumptions suggested here the status of a work will be only granted to those objects that bear an imprint of the creator's personality to an extent which is capable of causing the recipient to have an intense experience, whose intensity can already be measured by methods used in empirical sciences.
Currently, computer software enables data processing for analytic purposes on a mass scale. The materials which are subject to practices of this kind include also materials protected under copyright law. The task this writer sets for himself it to describe the relationship between copyright law constructions and the so-called data mining. The exceptional nature of such actions consists in focusing on the information layer, which is not protected by copyright law. As a rule, the results of the analyses do not present fragments of works, but only certain regularities or links. Despite that, at earlier stages of the analytical processes, the works are reproduced and stored at least for the duration of the analysis. At present, attention is drawn to regulating the permissibility of data mining mainly through contractual provisions. In practice many publishers decide to restrictively determine the principles of such analyses.
Only in a few countries was the permissibility of such analyses regulated in copyright law, the most representative examples in the field being the UK and Japan. In EU law, there are currently no applicable constructions regulating the possibility of processing works as part of data mining. The sources of authorisation of automatic analysis of works can be found in the provisions of Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society concerning: temporary acts of reproduction (Art. 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC) and permitted use for the purposes of illustration for teaching or scientifi c research (Art. 5(3)(a) of the Directive). This, however, does not resolve all the problems that emerge in connection with mass copying and processing of copyrighted materials for analytic purposes.In the case of permitted use connected with temporary reproduction of works fundamental doubts arise as to whether indeed the copies created during the data mining process can be considered transient. In addition, in many cases fragments of works are removed at the stage of data processing before the analysis as such, which practice is inconsistent with the construction of Art. 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC. In the case of using works for teaching and scientific research the doubts focus on the fact that not every analysis of works is a scientific project. Hence it is necessary to revise the existing legal regulations so as to adjust them to the possibility of automatic data processing. In September 2016 a proposal of a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market was published; it aims to introduce a new construction of permitted use, directly connected with data mining. The issue of pivotal practical importance is the mandatory nature of this legal construction for all Member States. Art. 2(2) of the proposal introduced legal definitions of 'text and data mining' which means 'any automated analytical technique aiming to analyse text and data in digital form in order to generate information such as patterns, trends and correlations'. Pursuant to the proposed regulation, it is envisaged that a mandatory form of permitted use is to be introduced, connected with data analysis, in the field of reproducing and collecting data, undertaken by research institutions in order to explore texts and data contained in works and other protected material to which they have legal access, for the purposes of scientific research. The generally identified form of permitted use covers works and databases. The proposal introduces also the definition of a 'research institution', authorised to explore texts and data. In this context, it remains a major issue that there is no possibility to restrain or exclude the new form of permitted use by means of contractual provisions. This article presents the main issues connected with the proposed legal regulations, including the ones related to problems that arise against the background of applying technical security measures in the systems where the processed works are stored.
This article describes the process of sending files using peer-to-peer networks and presents reflections on whether technological determinants of sending files enable classifying this measure as dissemination of a work within the meaning of copyright law. In the text, two sets of facts are distinguished which may occur when data sets are sent via p2p networks. In the first case, the user can have a complete file containing the work, in the second one, the user may have only part of the file, which does not permit getting to know the work or its part. Whereas in the former case there are no major interpretation problems and it may be treated as dissemination of the work, when the user providing the data does not have the work, significant doubts arise as to the classifi cation of this behaviour. It is doubtful whether a person who does not have the work can be regarded as disseminating it. This issue is analysed differently in the areas of criminal law and civil law. Pursuant to criminal provisions it seems incorrect to classify the behaviour of a user who does not have the work and is sending data sets not being a work as dissemination of the work within the meaning of Art. 116 of the Copyright Law. This conclusion is, firstly, a consequence of supremacy of literal interpretation and prohibition of broadening interpretation, as is the customary in criminal law, because the results of broadening would go far beyond the literal meaning of the terms used in the statute. For the above reasons, sending data sets which are not works, cannot be regarded as dissemination of the work. Secondly, in criminal law, due to the requirement to provide aid to an individualised group of persons, it is not permissible to apply the construction of aiding and abetting. Thirdly, although it is possible to apply the construction of a continuous act, due to the difficulties involved in proving which exactly fragments were sent and that they contributed to forming a whole that enabled getting to know the work or its fragment, this possibility seems purely theoretical. A different classification should be adopted in civil law. Firstly, the principles of interpretation of civil law permit applying functional interpretation, which allows to take into account the effet utile of the copyright law regulation and to avoid conclusions that would be contrary to the fundamental values of copyright law. If the data are sent via a peer-to-peer network, the conclusion that the work is not disseminated would be such a conclusion. After all, such reasoning would permit circumventing copyright provisions on a massive scale and would expose authors to huge losses. Secondly, as there is no strict requirement of having an individualised group of persons to whom aid is provided, it would be permissible to assume aiding and abetting in those situations when the user who downloaded the work had exceeded the limits of permitted use, while the person who aided and abetted could be held guilty. Apart from a description of the technological process occurring in peer-to-peer networks and a dogmatic analysis, this paper contains references to the Polish case law in this regard.
This article discusses the issue of quotes in music. The examined issue is the legal status of a musical quote par excellence, i.e. a graft of a piece of a musical work to another one. Quotation in other kinds of works (e.g. literary, audio-visual, fi lm works, etc.) is governed by the rules of their creative fi elds. Moreover, this article examines empirical quotation, which consists in literal transfer of somebody's creation to another person's work. All other dependencies in music (e.g. stylistic relatedness) fit within the sphere of independent creativity (at most we can speak of inspirations). This results from the ontic distinctiveness of musical works, in which the division into strata or the idea/expression dichotomy do not apply. Thus understood, quote in music is highly peculiar, which forces us to reinterpret the generally accepted conditions of a quotation. The Polish regulation on quotation belongs to a group of regulations with a broad spectrum, which permit e.g. artistic quotation. This is not, however, an obvious view due to the Polish legislator's peculiar formulation of the purposes of quoting. In addition to traditional purposes, such as explanation, teaching, critique, the Polish statute mentions also 'laws of the creative genre'. This formulation has caused controversies from the start. There were attempts at narrowing it down to only satirical genres, but this direction of interpretation is not supported by an analysis of the original legislative works, while after the 2015 amendments and separation of parody, pastiche and caricature in a separate provision, it is unjustified. Therefore, referring to the general definition of 'genre' and the special role of conventions and customs in specifying the frameworks of genres, this writer posits that the Polish regulation in fact refers to acceptable customs, like other regulations where quotation is defined broadly.
A broad definition of quotation only seemingly falls outside the narrow definition of quotation in InfoSoc Directive. After all, the directive only lists examples of purposes of quotation. Moreover, the aims of the directive mention generally establishing an exception in the form of quotation, and considering the remaining recitals of this legal instrument, an interpretation permitting a broad scope of quotation is justifi ed. It is also important that the Berne Convention defines quotation broadly, with references to customs. Consequently, this author assumes that the Polish statute permits artistic quotation, including quotation in music. This interpretation is consistent with widespread artistic practice with a long tradition.
The article analyses also the conditions for permissibility of quotations. They are customarily built on the basis of intuitions and requirements from the field of literature. We can even say that those intuitions come from academic writing, because literature permits various forms of quoting and evoking somebody else's works. But once the broad Polish regulation is of universal character, it is not appropriate to approach quotation from the perspective of a single domain. Hence the conditions for quotation have to be reinterpreted in such a way that the regulation can take into account the distinctive features of various creative domains. First and foremost, this concerns the condition of recognisability, which this writer applies instead of 'proper designation' of a quote. This condition involves two elements: (1) separating the quote in the work so as to enable identifying the 'alienness' of the quoted part; (2) the ability to attribute authorship when quoting or post factum. A more nuanced approach is required, in the author's view, with respect to the size of the quote and the scope of its utilisation. The scale of acceptable quotation should be assessed with reference to its purpose, its function in the new work, context, the genre's framework and, additionally, also having regard to the size relations. Moreover, quotation cannot be seen as a one-off action, because depending on the facts it may become necessary to cite someone else's work multiple times for evocative purposes. This may also result from the formal rules of the work (structure with stanzas). But in general, the ability to cite something multiple times does not mean permission for constant parasitic exploitation of other people's intellectual activity. Finally, the condition of literal citation should be examined. It cannot be retained in the area of artistic quotation. In case of literary quotes it is not observed absolutely either. So the writer proposes that the condition of 'unchanged citation' should be replaced with the requirement of such a graft that does not distort the idea of the message, idea, views or artistic value of the citation. In other words, citation must be faithful to the original.
Two incidental conclusions follow from the presented reflections. The first concerns the borderline, hybrid genres, which combine elements of various categories of copyright law. This writer believes that considerable flexibility is advisable in classifying both the old - seemingly - problem of musical variations, and the relatively new phenomena: musical collage, sound installations, creative works based on electronic methods of processing sound materials. In those cases there can be no mention of fixed rules. They combine elements of inspirations, derivative works, quotes, pastiche or borrowings. Such complex intertextual strategies should be approached in a more nuanced manner, without, however, losing the whole picture from view. The general criterion that determines the classification should be the role of the cited (or possibly processed) material in the new creative work. If it derives its properties exclusively or mainly from another person's work, there should be no mention of any independence or permitted use. But if the value of the new work results from its independent features, while the elements taken over are only an addition, then the legal assessments should shift more towards inspiration or parody/pastiche in the broad sense. The second conclusion concerns the broadly discussed thread of permissibility of analogies and a broadening interpretation of provisions regulating permitted use. The question about the legal nature of this group of provisions is still open, especially in view of the global trend of perceiving copyright law not only from the point of view of rightholders, but also taking into account the needs and expectations of recipients-users. These reflections are well beyond the scope of this paper. Yet this writer believes that before even starting the discussion on greater interpretative flexibility or before considering other regulation models (implementation of fair use into EU law), it is necessary to begin with a proper explanation of the notions used in law, taking into account the achievements of various creative domains, as well as the historical perspective. It may turn out - as demonstrated by the Court of Justice judgement concerning parody, but also by the case of the musical quote in point - that the existing exceptions are much broader in meaning and that they can include a number of new creative phenomena.
This article, which is a summary of a Master's thesis written under the supervision of Prof. Ryszard Markiewicz, contains reflections on fundamental notions of copyright law. It touches upon the definition of the work, the relationship between the object of protection and the material media and to the idea, the time when a work comes into being or how it exists. The relationship between academic works, inventions and artistic works, is analysed in detail, while the particularities of each of the manifestations of man's intellectual activity are taken into account. Since the point of departure is an analysis of Prof. Andrzej Kopff's monograph 'Works of Figurative Arts and Their Creators in the Light of the Copyright Law' and Roman Ingarden's theories from the field of aesthetics, special emphasis is placed on the structure of representational works. As a result of analysis of the conceptual apparatus of aesthetics and copyright law, following A. Kopff's idea, works within the meaning of copyright law are equated with intentional objects as defi ned by R. Ingarden. The point of departure for the defi nition of a work proposed by the author is A. Kopff's definition, which, however, does not include inventions. The newly built defi nition enables quick identification of the strata that in are accorded copyright law protection a given kind of intellectual works: 'a work within the meaning of copyright law is either an original representation of objective content (academic works), or an original representation of original content (artistic works), or original content (inventions), exclusively when they are fixed in a form which enables their communication to third parties and when they meet the conditions of creativity and individuality'.
In the analysis of the moment when a work comes into being it is assumed that it comes into being upon the individualised image being transferred into a form of fixing via the form of representation. Even if the fixing means simply the work being dictated. In the discussion of the material medium, the topic of originals is taken up and their distinction from the medium on which they are just communicated. The widespread view that it is impossible to perform representational works is questioned. Because for ages in order to receive literature or music one had to possess adequate education, not required for simply looking at an image, the writer wonders if this view does not result from historical determinants. Attention is also drawn to the fact that, for instance, an image can be described to a blind person. However, since the problem concerns a relatively narrow social group, it has not been pointed out. It is also suggested that a possibility of a sort of dictation of visual works should be considered, especially in the context of the emerging digital art.
In the line of reasoning, it is suggested that the nomenclature of copies of works should be unified, including authors' original copies of visual works. For originals of visual works, A. Kopff proposed a separate term corporis vegetativi, which is questioned in this article. The suggested universal term is, also taken from Koppf, corpora communicativa - a copy communicating the work. Yet, noticing the particularities of the relationship between works of visual art and their original, usually author's copy, this particular fixation is referred to as corporis (not corpora) communicativi and extended protection is suggested for it. As the next step, it is also suggested that such extended protection should be accorded to every kind of works if only a single corporis remained from all the corpora of the work. Adopting the theory of an intentional object, the author focuses her refl ections on the role of intention as a factor necessary to create a work: an object which is underpinned by the author's consciousness on the one hand and by elements of the external world on the other hand. This enables taking a look at the essence of derivative rights.
Postulating, after A. Kopff, an extension of the protection to strata of the work, including its original content, the author suggests a broader understanding of the condition of 'mode of expression'. In case of artistic works and inventions it is suggested that the original content of the works should be protected. The stratum of individualised image is also ascribed to architectural works, in whose case A. Koppf denied the capacity of the architect's individualised image to be represented. A distinction is made between fi xed architecture: an actual building, and the object of copyright law protection: architecture in the broad sense. Once the individualised image is separated in architecture, it is suggested that strict copyright protection should be limited to that image only, limiting it also for the form of fixation as an actual three-dimensional building. The latter is treated as a copy of the work, which upon construction becomes in a way separate from the work.
As the scope of the concept of a work within the meaning of copyright law and within the meaning of aesthetics is very close, while the conceptual apparatuses of philosophy and aesthetics are very rich, it is also suggested that aesthetics should be treated as a domain supplementing the glossary of copyright terms.
The development of civilisation and industrial breeding methods made farm animals disappear from the view of an ordinary person. But on the other hand, more and more often, emotional and sentimental relationships are established with pets. An intensification of this phenomenon means that there are many voices for protecting the emotional bond between the owner and his/her animal by means of pecuniary compensation.
Yet protection of animals is not underpinned by people's non-property interests. Art. 1(1) of the Act on Animal Protection excludes animals from the category of things, since they are living creatures. The relationship between people and animals is not one of the reasons for protection or a motive for it. The law regulating animal protection does not provide legal grounds for claiming pecuniary compensation for lost animals.
Similarly, there are no grounds for recognising the attachment to an animal (the bond between a person and an animal) as a personal interest protected under Art. 23 of the Civil Code. This standpoint is support by case law and the vast majority of legal literature, where the emotional bond with an animal is not recognised as one of the values referred to in Art. 23 CC. This writer believes that a justification for this view should be sought in the fact that attachment to an animal cannot be linked with any values originating from within a human person, inherently connected with his/her needs shaped by the evolution.
But this does not mean that the Civil Code ignores the value that contact with nature and animals (especially pets) has for the society. The Polish case law permits, in exceptional cases, treating the death of an animal as an element of a broader set of facts in which the mental health of a person (usually the animal owner) is negatively impacted. Loss of an animal (as a tangible good) is different from the destruction of, or damage to, an 'ordinary thing'. But if such a classification is made, it is necessary to be careful when one uses the category of adequate cause-and-effect link (Art. 361(1) CC).
So the Polish law does not recognise or provide for pecuniary compensation for the very fact of losing an animal. However, its death and the circumstances in which it died are important for assessing an infringement of other personal interests.
Still, there are no grounds to take into account the sentimental value of the animal (pretium affectionis) in damages for a financial loss. This would mean introducing, by the back door or by other methods, a solution which is not provided for in applicable laws. The legislator's intention was to link the duty to redress non-fi nancial damage with the death of a person (Art. 446(4) CC), though not an animal.
ISSN: 1689-7080 , Format: B5 , 204
Kod: KAM-6003:201701 Miejsce wydania: Warszawa