Title: Joe Elton Nixon v. State of Florida
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC07-953
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 22, 2009

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-953 
____________ 
 
JOE ELTON NIXON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[January 22, 2009] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Joe Elton Nixon appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief 
filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and 3.203.  Because 
the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, we have 
jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.  For 
the reasons expressed below, we affirm both the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief and its finding that Nixon is not mentally retarded.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Joe Elton Nixon was charged, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1984 
murder of a Tallahassee woman.  On direct appeal, we affirmed the conviction and 
sentence.  See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990) (Nixon I).1  The United 
States Supreme Court denied Nixon’s petition for a writ of certiorari.  See Nixon v. 
Florida, 502 U.S. 854 (1991).  Subsequently, Nixon filed with the trial court a 
motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The trial court 
denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Nixon appealed the trial court’s 
summary denial to this Court.  See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000) 
                                          
 
 
1.  Nixon raised seven claims in connection with the guilt phase of the trial 
and eight claims in connection with the penalty phase.  See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 
2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 1990) (Nixon I).  We discussed the following guilt-phase 
claims:  (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel, 
without his record approval, conceded his guilt and sought leniency; (2) during 
closing argument the prosecutor made an impermissible “Golden Rule” argument 
when he told the jury “‘we have an obligation to make you feel just a little bit . . . 
of what [the victim] felt’”; (3) his absence during critical proceedings throughout 
the trial required a reversal; (4) the admission of an “unnecessarily large number of 
inflammatory photographs” of the victim in a charred state resulted in a 
fundamentally unfair proceeding; and (5) the trial court erred when it failed to 
establish the competency of a juror who was excused from jury service during the 
penalty phase of the trial due to emotional problems.  See id. at 1338-43.  We 
discussed the following penalty-phase claims:  (1) Nixon’s statement after his 
arrest concerning the removal of victim’s underwear was inadmissible because it 
was given without the full benefit of warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966); (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mitigating 
factors under sections 921.141(6)(b) and (6)(f), Florida Statutes (1985); (3) the trial 
court impermissibly refused to consider the mitigating evidence presented; and (4) 
the trial court erred when it refused to give a requested instruction informing the 
jury of the maximum sentences for kidnapping, robbery, and arson.  See Nixon I, 
572 So. 2d at 1343-45. 
 
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(Nixon II).2  Additionally, Nixon filed with this Court a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  See id.3 
In Nixon II, the dispositive issue was whether Nixon was denied effective 
assistance of counsel when his lawyer conceded guilt without his consent.  See 758 
So. 2d at 624.  Ultimately, we held that if Nixon could establish that he did not 
consent to counsel’s strategy, then the Court would find counsel to be per se 
ineffective under the standard espoused in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 
(1984).  See Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 624.  Accordingly, we remanded the case to 
the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Nixon 
consented to trial counsel’s strategy.  See id.  On remand, an evidentiary hearing 
was held.  After the hearing, the trial court denied relief and found that Nixon 
consented to counsel’s strategy.  See Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003) 
(Nixon III).  On appeal, we found Nixon had not consented to counsel’s strategy.  
We then applied the per se ineffective assistance of counsel standard from Cronic, 
found counsel ineffective, and remanded for a new trial.   
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this Court’s 
decision in Nixon III and held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based 
                                          
 
 
2.  Nixon raised seven issues on appeal.  See Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 
1009, 1014 n.2 (Fla. 2006) (listing issues).   
 
3.  Nixon raised three issues in his habeas petition.  We did not address those 
issues in Nixon II because we reversed based on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.   
 
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on counsel’s concession of guilt to the crime charged, even without the defendant’s 
consent, are to be analyzed under the principles enunciated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).   
On remand, we determined all of Nixon’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
under the Strickland standard and addressed the other issues raised in Nixon’s 
3.850 appeal and habeas petition.  We affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief, and we denied habeas relief.  See Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 
1009 (Fla. 2006). 
Pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.203(d)(4) and 3.851, 
Nixon filed a timely motion claiming that his conviction and sentence of death are 
contrary to the reasoning and holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(establishing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the mentally 
retarded).  Moreover, Nixon contended that section 921.137, Florida Statutes 
(2002), as interpreted in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla.), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 490 (2007), violates both the United States Constitution and the Florida 
Constitution. 
The Evidentiary Hearing 
The trial court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on Nixon’s mental 
retardation claim.  At the hearing, the defense presented the expert testimony of 
Dr. Denis Keyes.  The State presented the expert testimony and report of Dr. 
 
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Gregory A. Prichard.  In substantial part the evidence indicates that between 1974 
and 1992, various doctors administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children test (WISC) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test (WAIS) to 
Nixon.  Nixon’s IQ scores based on these tests were 88, 73, and 72. 
Dr. Denis Keyes 
In 1993, Dr. Denis Keyes, an Associate Professor of Special Education at the 
College of Charleston in South Carolina, examined Nixon on behalf of the defense.  
Dr. Keyes tested Nixon’s intellectual functioning by utilizing the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale test, Fourth Edition.  Dr. Keyes determined Nixon’s IQ to be 68.  
At the time Dr. Keyes examined Nixon there was no valid test of malingering.  
Based on Nixon’s test performance, Dr. Keyes opined that he performed at a 
significantly subaverage intellectual level.   
Dr. Keyes further concluded that there were known risks that Nixon was 
mentally retarded starting in early childhood.  These known risks included:  
Nixon’s mother’s drinking, diet, and infrequent visits to the doctor during her 
pregnancy; Nixon’s malnourishment and exposure to nicotine and pesticide during 
his childhood; Nixon’s social and practical deficiencies; and Nixon’s 
psychological, physical, and sexual abuse suffered at the hands of his family.   
Dr. Keyes also opined that there was extensive evidence of Nixon’s 
difficulty with adaptive skills.  He noted that Nixon had great difficulty in keeping 
 
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up with others and learning basic information as a child.  Dr. Keyes cited Nixon’s 
poor communication skills, difficulty in understanding basic mathematical 
concepts, poor achievement test results, repetitive behavior of making the same 
mistakes over and over, and the reports from Nixon’s prior teachers stating he 
should be placed in a special education program as evidence of Nixon’s 
subaverage intellectual functioning as a child.  From his testing and observations, 
Dr. Keyes concluded that the onset of Nixon’s low intellectual functioning and 
adaptive deficits occurred before age eighteen.  Therefore, Dr. Keyes concluded 
that Nixon was mentally retarded at the time of the crime and was currently (in 
2006) evidencing adaptive dysfunctioning.   
Dr. Gregory A. Prichard 
In 2006, Dr. Gregory Prichard, a clinical psychologist, examined Nixon for 
the State.  To determine Nixon’s intellectual functioning, Dr. Prichard 
administered the WAIS III and the Test for Memory Malingering, also known as 
the WRAT-3 or TOMM.  As a result of these tests, Dr. Prichard found Nixon’s full 
scale IQ to be 80.  He found no indication that Nixon was malingering.   
After reviewing Nixon’s 1974 intelligence test, which was conducted when 
Nixon was twelve or thirteen years old, Dr. Prichard stated the test indicated an IQ 
full scale score of 88.  Dr. Prichard found that there was no evidence that 
questioned the validity of the 1974 IQ score.  Thus, Dr. Prichard opined that Nixon 
 
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could not demonstrate onset of mental retardation before eighteen years of age.  
Based on his evaluations, Dr. Prichard concluded that Nixon is not mentally 
retarded.  He further indicated there was no need to address the adaptive behavior 
issue as part of his assessment because Nixon’s IQ did not fall within the mental 
retardation range. 
After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the trial court 
concluded that Nixon did not establish mental retardation under either the clear and 
convincing or the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Nixon appeals that 
decision, raising the issues discussed below. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Nixon makes the following arguments applicable to his mental retardation 
claim:  (1) this Court should reconsider its decision in Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 
702 (Fla. 2007); (2) the trial court’s fact-finding, which was infected by legal error, 
is entitled to no deference; (3) the trial court violated Atkins by adding a 
“culpability” test; (4) the trial court violated Atkins by using Nixon’s confession to 
find him not mentally retarded; (5) he is entitled to a remand for a legally proper 
hearing because there is ample evidence in the record to support his claim of 
mental retardation; and (6) this Court must require that the proceedings on remand 
be freed from several erroneous legal rulings previously made by the trial court.   
 
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In 2001, the Florida Legislature enacted section 921.137, Florida Statutes 
(2001), which barred the imposition of a death sentence on the mentally retarded 
and established a method for determining which capital defendants are mentally 
retarded.  See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001).  The following year, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 
holding that execution of mentally retarded offenders constitutes “excessive” 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  In response to Atkins and section 
921.137, we promulgated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which 
specifies the procedure for raising mental retardation as a bar to a death sentence.  
Pursuant to both section 921.137 and rule 3.203, a defendant must prove mental 
retardation by demonstrating:  (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of 
the condition before age eighteen.  See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.203(b). 
The trial court concluded that Nixon failed to establish that he is ineligible 
for the death penalty due to mental retardation.  We affirm the trial court’s 
determination that Nixon is not mentally retarded.  When reviewing mental 
retardation determinations, we must decide whether competent, substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s findings.  See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712 (citing 
Johnston v. State, 960 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2006)).  We do not “reweigh the evidence 
 
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or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”  
Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (citing Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 
1045, 1049 (Fla. 2006)).  However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de 
novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).   
Cherry Decision 
Nixon first argues that this Court’s interpretation of section 921.137 in 
Cherry, which requires a defendant to have an IQ score of 70 or below, violates 
Atkins.4  Nixon asserts that because the Supreme Court noted in Atkins that the 
consensus in the scientific community recognizes an IQ between 70 and 75 or 
lower, states are only permitted to establish procedures to determine whether a 
capital defendant’s IQ is 75 or below on a standardized intelligence test.  Nixon’s 
claim is without merit.5  In Atkins, the Supreme Court recognized that various 
sources and research differ on who should be classified as mentally retarded.  
Accordingly, the Court left to the states the task of setting specific rules in their 
statutes.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (“As was our approach in Ford v. 
                                          
 
4.  In Cherry, we noted that another jurisdiction considering a similar claim 
found that “fourteen of the twenty-six jurisdictions with mental retardation statutes 
have a cutoff of seventy or two standard deviations below the mean.”  959 So. 2d 
at 713 n.8 (citing Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 373-74 (Ky.) 
(upholding use of seventy IQ score cutoff), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1017 (2005)).   
 
5.  Nixon makes a number of assertions questioning this Court’s Cherry 
decision.  All of these arguments are versions of his main argument that an IQ of 
70 or below should not be the standard and that such a standard is unconstitutional. 
 
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Wainwright with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing 
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences.’”) (citations omitted).  This State in section 921.137(1) defines 
subaverage general intellectual functioning as “performance that is two or more 
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test 
specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.”  We have 
consistently interpreted this definition to require a defendant seeking exemption 
from execution to establish he has an IQ of 70 or below.  See, e.g., Jones v. State, 
966 So. 2d 319, 329 (Fla. 2007) (“[U]nder the plain language of the statute, 
‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning’ correlates with an IQ of 
70 or below.”); Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005) (finding that to be 
exempt from execution under Atkins, a defendant must establish that he has an IQ 
of 70 or below).   
Nixon further asserts that our interpretation of section 921.137 in  
Cherry creates an irrebuttable presumption that no one with an IQ over 70 is 
mentally retarded.  Nixon claims that we created an irrebuttable presumption 
because once we concluded that Cherry’s IQ score was 72 our inquiry terminated, 
i.e., we did not consider the two other prongs of the mental retardation 
determination.  See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 714.  We have consistently interpreted 
section 921.137(1) as providing that a defendant may establish mental retardation 
 
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by demonstrating all three of the following factors:  (1) significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning; (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and 
(3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen.  See, e.g., Jones, 966 So. 2d 
at 325; Johnston, 960 So. 2d at 761.  Thus, the lack of proof on any one of these 
components of mental retardation would result in the defendant not being found to 
suffer from mental retardation. 
Nixon further asserts that our interpretation of section 921.137(1) does not 
provide constitutionally adequate procedures to determine mental retardation.  
More specifically, Nixon claims that in Cherry, we interpreted section 921.137(1) 
to create fact-finding procedures that preclude a defendant from presenting 
relevant material.  Nothing in Cherry or section 921.137 precludes a defendant 
from presenting any evidence that is germane to the issues involved in a mental 
retardation claim.  Section 921.137(1) and rule 3.203 provide defendants with 
notice of the type of evidence that is relevant to the issues and that will be 
considered by a trial court.  In addition defendants are given an opportunity to 
present any relevant evidence to the court.  This procedure was followed in this 
case.  After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a final order that 
thoroughly explained its decision, finding that Nixon had not established that he 
should be excluded from the death penalty by reason of mental retardation.   
 
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The trial court informed Nixon of his opportunity to present his case, 
provided an evidentiary hearing, determined Nixon’s mental retardation claim on 
the basis of the examinations performed by two psychiatrists, and provided Nixon 
with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report 
and testimony of the court-appointed expert.  We find that Nixon was included in 
the truth-seeking process and had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence 
relevant to his mental retardation claim and to challenge the state-appointed 
psychiatrist’s opinions.  Because the statute, rule, and caselaw outline adequate 
procedures for the presentation of mental retardation claims, Nixon is not entitled 
to relief on this issue. 
Nixon further contends that this Court’s definition of mental retardation 
violates both the United States and Florida Constitutions because the definition of 
mental retardation in section 921.137, as construed in Cherry, is inconsistent with 
the constitutional bar on the execution of mentally retarded persons.  In Jones v. 
State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007), we found that Florida’s definition of mental 
retardation is consistent with the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic 
criteria for mental retardation.6  Moreover, in Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that 
                                          
 
6.  The American Psychiatric Association’s definition provides the following 
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation: 
A.  Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test 
 
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the statutory definitions of mental retardation throughout the country are not 
identical to the one outlined in Atkins but generally conform to the clinical 
definitions set forth in the case.  See 536 U.S. at 317 n.22.  Florida’s statutory 
definition of mental retardation is not identical but conforms to the one outlined in 
Atkins.  See id. at 309 n.3; § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007).  Nixon’s claim 
involving the definition of mental retardation is also without merit. 
Trial Court’s Factfinding 
Nixon contends that the trial court dismissed Dr. Keyes’s testimony based 
on this Court’s holding in Cherry.  Nixon argues that because Cherry does not set 
forth the governing legal standard, the trial court’s factual determinations were 
induced by an erroneous view of the law.  This argument is yet another attack on 
Florida’s definition of mental retardation and the trial court’s application of this 
definition to the facts of this case.  As we previously stated, the trial court followed 
                                                                                                                                        
(for infants, a clinical judgment of significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning).  
B.  Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning 
(i.e., the person's effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for 
his or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the 
following areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.  
C.  The onset is before age 18 years.  
Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326-27 (Fla. 2007) (quoting American Psychiatric 
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 49 (4th ed. 
2000)).   
 
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the correct procedure in determining Nixon’s claim.  Section 921.137(1) sets forth 
the governing legal standard and rule 3.203 outlines the procedural requirements 
for mental retardation claims.  The trial judge followed the statute, rule, and 
caselaw, then he carefully evaluated the testimony from the two experts.  He found 
the testimony of Dr. Prichard more credible than that of Dr. Keyes and concluded 
that Nixon was not mentally retarded.  Resolving all conflicts in the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s decision, we find there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that 
Nixon does not meet the criteria for mental retardation.   
Diminished Culpability 
Nixon next asserts that the trial court erred in considering his impulsiveness 
and suggestibility in making a mental retardation determination.  In Atkins, the 
Supreme Court addressed both impulsiveness and suggestibility as it relates to 
findings of mental retardation.  The Court said: 
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between 
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.  Because of their 
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities 
to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical 
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of 
others.  There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in 
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they 
often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and 
that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.  Their 
deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but 
they do diminish their personal culpability. 
 
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536 U.S. at 318 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  In this case the trial court 
was not using impulsivity and suggestibility to determine whether Nixon met the 
diagnostic criteria for mental retardation.  Instead, the court was simply addressing 
why impulsivity or suggestibility was not applicable to this case.  The trial court 
said that “[t]he record in Mr. Nixon’s case refutes any inference that impulsivity or 
suggestibility contributed in any way to Mr. Nixon’s crime.”  The court reasoned 
that impulsivity or suggestibility was not relevant in this case because the crime 
was not impulsive but was committed through a series of deceptions, with attempts 
to destroy any evidence of the crime, and by a lone perpetrator.  The trial court did 
not err in reviewing the role impulsivity or suggestibility played in Nixon’s crime. 
Confession 
Nixon argues the trial court erred by using his confession to find him not 
mentally retarded.  We disagree.  The trial court determined that Nixon was not 
mentally retarded by applying Atkins, section 921.137, rule 3.203, and this Court’s 
precedent on mental retardation.  In its order, the court simply noted that Nixon’s 
lengthy confession, given very soon after the crimes, also indicated a total absence 
of impulsivity and suggestibility.     
Trial Court’s Conclusion  
Nixon next argues that the record contains ample evidence in which a fact-
finder could determine that he is mentally retarded.  Thus, he argues that the trial 
 
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court erred by not finding him mentally retarded.  As stated earlier, we review 
mental retardation issues to determine whether competent, substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s determination.  See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712 (citing 
Johnston, 960 So. 2d 757).  We have reserved to the trial court the determination of 
the credibility of witnesses.  See Trotter, 932 So. 2d at 1050 (citing Windom v. 
State, 886 So. 2d 915, 927 (Fla. 2004)).  The trial court found “Dr. Keyes’ 
historical cumulative average scoring approach is not persuasive and the 
persuasive effect of this approach is outweighed by Dr. Pritchard’s unrebutted 
testimony that Mr. Nixon scored 80 on a test validly administered last year.”  The 
trial court further found that Dr. Keyes’ score could have resulted from Nixon’s 
malingering, that Nixon’s historical scores were consistent with Dr. Prichard’s 
measurement of an IQ of 80, and that Dr. Keyes’ approach of rescoring and 
averaging the current and historical scores was inappropriate and inconsistent with 
both the plain language of section 921.137 and this Court’s precedent.  Thus, the 
trial court determined that Nixon did not meet the first prong of the mental 
retardation determination.  We affirm the trial court’s determination that Nixon 
does not satisfy the criteria for mental retardation. 
Burden of Proof 
Nixon argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to prove his mental 
retardation.  Nixon opines that the State is required to prove that he is not mentally 
 
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retarded beyond a reasonable doubt.  Contrary to this assertion, we have 
consistently held that it is the defendant who must establish the three prongs for 
mental retardation.  See, e.g., Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 711; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(e).  
Moreover, Nixon argues that if he bears the burden of showing his mental 
retardation, the appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence.  However, 
section 921.137(4) specifically states: 
At the final sentencing hearing, the court shall consider the findings of 
the court-appointed experts and consider the findings of any other 
expert which is offered by the state or the defense on the issue of 
whether the defendant has mental retardation.  If the court finds, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant has mental 
retardation as defined in subsection (1), the court may not impose a 
sentence of death and shall enter a written order that sets forth with 
specificity the findings in support of the determination. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  We need not address this claim because the circuit court held 
that Nixon could not establish his mental retardation under either the clear and 
convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard.  See 
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 329-30 (noting that we did not need to address the claim 
because the trial court found that “Jones did not present evidence sufficient to meet 
even the lesser standard of preponderance of the evidence”) (citing Trotter, 932 So. 
2d at 1049 n.5).  
Nixon also claims that under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), due 
process requires that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any facts that would 
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.  We have rejected this argument 
 
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and held that a defendant “has no right under Ring and Atkins to a jury 
determination of whether he is mentally retarded.”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 
25, 43 (Fla. 2005); see also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1267 (Fla. 2005); 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).   
The defendant contends the trial court erroneously rejected his argument that 
rule 3.203 does not provide a constitutionally adequate procedure for resolving 
mental retardation claims by persons whose death sentences were final before the 
Supreme Court decided Atkins.  More specifically, Nixon argues that rule 3.203 
extends due process and other constitutional guarantees only to those who have not 
yet been sentenced to death.  The claim is meritless.  Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.203 adopts the statutory definition of mental retardation and 
recognizes that Atkins applies to any defendant currently on death row.  See Fla. R. 
Crim. Pro. 3.203(d); Brown, 959 So. 2d at 147 n.1 (citing Phillips v. State, 894 So. 
2d 28, 39-40 (Fla. 2004)).  
Lastly, Nixon asserts that the trial court erroneously denied him a hearing on 
his claim that mental illness bars his execution.  We rejected this argument in 
Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2007), and Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 
852 (Fla. 2007).  In Lawrence, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires this Court to extend Atkins to the mentally ill.  See 969 
So. 2d at 300 n.9.  In Connor, we noted that “[t]o the extent that Connor is arguing 
 
- 18 -
that he cannot be executed because of mental conditions that are not insanity or 
mental retardation, the issue has been resolved adversely to his position.”  Connor, 
979 So. 2d at 867 (citing Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1151 (Fla.) cert. denied, 
127 S. Ct. 850 (2006) (indicating that neither the United States Supreme Court nor 
this Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to execution)).  
Accordingly, Nixon is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Nixon’s 
postconviction motion and the trial court’s determination that Nixon is not 
mentally retarded. 
 
It is so ordered.  
QUINCE, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and ANSTEAD, Senior 
Justice, concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Leon County,  
Jonathan Eric Sjostrom, Judge – Case No. 84-2324 
 
Eric S. O’Connor of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter and Hampton, LLP, New York, 
New York, Eric M. Freedman, New York, New York, and Armando Garcia of 
Garcia and Seliger, Quincy, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee