Title: WILLIAMS v WELLMAN-POWER GAS INC
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13536
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: November 3, 1977

No. 13536 IN THE SUPRElIE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 TERRY N. WILLIAMS, Claimant and Appellant, -vs- WELLMAN-POWER GAS, INC., Employer, and HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: hlorkers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Greg J. Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent: Poore, McKenzie, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, Butte, Montana David J. Wing argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: October 7, 1977 Decided: B()v I 4 1 g n Filed: "UY . t t374f , . + - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : Claimant Terry N. Williams appeals from the finding, conclusions and order of the Workers' Compensation Court dis- missing h i s claim f o r benefits on the ground the claim was not timely f i l e d . Claimant, an employee of defendant Wellman-Power Gas, Inc., was injured i n the course and scope of h i s employment February 15, 1973, when he f e l l and struck h i s elbow. H e reported the accident t o h i s employer and was taken t o see D r . John P. Lacey, who took X-rays of the elbow. The X-rays were negative, but the doctor could f e e l broken c a r t i l a g e i n the injured area. He informed claimant the c a r t i l a g e was not l i k e l y t o give him trouble but there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of severe swelling, in which case surgery would be necessary. N o treatment was recom- mended o r administered and claimant returned t o work without any loss of wages. The employer was enrolled under Plan 11 of the workers' Compensation Act with insurance coverage provided by defendant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. A report of occupa- t i o n a l injury and disease was f i l e d with the Workers' Compensation Division February 20, 1973. The insurer paid the medical ex- penses f o r the i n i t i a l examination. On April 10, 1973, the division n o t i f i e d the insurer t o forward Form 54, Claim f o r Compensation, t o claimant. The Workers' Compensation Court found t h i s form was duly mailed t o claimant, along with a cover l e t t e r advising him t o f i l l out the form and return it f o r the insurer's f i l e s . Claimant d i s - putes t h i s finding and denies receiving the form. Claimant did not f i l e a claim and apparently had no more trouble with the elbow u n t i l the summer of 1975, when he began t o experience pain while working f o r a d i f f e r e n t employer i n Alaska. H e returned t o D r . Lacey i n Gctober 1975, and surgery was performed by a s p e c i a l i s t . Claimant f i l e d a claim f o r com- pensation with the division December 17, 1975.The division and the Workers' Compensation Court denied the claim. Claimant presents three issue f o r review: 1) Did the twelve month s t a t u t e of limitation under section 92-601,R.C.M. 1947, p r i o r t o amendment i n 1973, commence t o run only a f t e r the discovery of a l a t e n t injury? 2) Does the amendment t o section 92-601, e f f e c t i v e July 1, 1973, apply t o t h i s action? 3) Should the employer and insurer be found t o have waived and be estopped from asserting the s t a t u t e of limitation? Because of our disposition of Issue 2), it is unnecessary t o discuss Issues 1) and 3). On February 20, 1973, the date of the accident, section 92-601, provided: "Claims must be presented within what time. I n case of personal injury o r death, a l l claims s h a l l be for- ever barred unless presented i n writing under oath t o the employer, the insurer, o r the board, a s the case may be, within twelve months from the date of the hap- pening of the accident, e i t h e r by the claimant o r someone legally authorized t o a c t f o r him i n h i s behalf." On J u l y 1, 1973, an amendment t o section 92-601 became effective. The amendment did not change the twelve month limita- t i o n period but added t h i s paragraph: "The division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant of lack of knowledge of d i s a b i l i t y , waive the time requirement, up t o an additional twenty-four (24) months .I1 Claimant petitioned f o r an extension under t h i s paragraph, but the court concluded the amendment could not be applied r e t r o - actively t o give the division discretion t o allow the claim. A t the outset, we note t h a t the Workers' Compensation Act has always been l i b e r a l l y construed i n favor of the injured claimant. Section 92-838, R.C.M. 1947; Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, 166 Mont. 17, 530 P. 2d 433 (1975) ; S t a t e ex r e l . Romero v. D i s t r i c t Court, 162 Mont. 358, 513 P.2d 265 (1973); Ness v. Diamond Asphalt Co., 143 Mont. 560, 393 P.2d 43 (1964). W e a l s o note the 1973 amendment t o section 92-601 was passed t o a l l e v i a t e a condition t h a t was d i r e c t l y contrary t o the s t a t e d purposes and policies of the Workers' Compensation Act. Prior t o July 1, 1973, a claim was required t o be f i l e d within twelve months of the date of the accident, regardless of the circumstances. I f an injury did not manifest i t s e l f u n t i l more than twelve months a f t e r the date of the accident, the injured party had no recourse and simply was required t o bear the expenses of the injury. Criticism of t h i s ' s i t u a t i o n i s well expressed i n 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 578.42(b), p. 15-104: "It i s odd indeed t o find, i n a supposedly beneficent piece of l e g i s l a t i o n , the survival of t h i s fragment of i r r a t i o n a l cruelty surpassing the most technical f o r f e i t u r e s of l e g a l s t a t u t e s of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory t h a t a man f o r f e i t s h i s r i g h t s only when he inexcusably delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses w i l l t o l l the running of the period. But h e r e no amount of vigilance i s of any help. The limitations period runs against a claim t h a t has not yet matured; and when it matures, it i s already barred. * * *" The 1973 amendment offered a solution t o t h i s problem by granting the division the authority t o extend the time period on a reasonable showing of lack of knowledge of the d i s a b i l i t y . In view of these circumstances, it is not unreasonable t o construe the amendment l i b e r a l l y t o give it broad application. .iowever, Jeienciallc . ~ S S ~ L is that t o so construe the .smeridnlent t o apply t o the i n s t a n t claim would be a retroactive application of the s t a t u t e , contrary t o section 12-201, R.C.M. 1347, which s t a t e s : "No law contained i n any of the codes o r other s t a t u t e s of Montana i s retroactive unless expressly 50 declared." This s t a t u t e should be read i n l i g h t of the long-standing def iriition of "retroactive", expressed i n Butte & Superior Mining Co. v. McIntyre, 71 Mont. 254, 263, 229 P. 730 (1924): "* >y > ? This i s but a r u l e of construction. A s t a t u t e which takes away o r impairs vested r i g h t s , acquired under existing laws, o r creates a new 2bligation, imposes a new duty o r attaches a riew d i s a b i l i t y , i n respect t o transactions already past, is deemed retroactive." See a1sd:City of Harlem v. S t a t e Highway Commission, 149 Mont. To apply the amendment t o claims not already barred a t +he tirne the amendment took e f f e c t would not require retro- a c ~ i v e application within the meaning of t h i s amendment. N o vested r i g h t s a r e taken away o r impaired. N o new duties o r J i s a b i l i t i e s a r e imposed. The amendment simply grants the Jivision the discretion t o extend the time period i n limited circumstances. The California Supreme Court i n Mudd v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 463, 183 P.2d 10, 13 (1947), considered an amendment which extended a s t a t u t e of limitations. The c o u r t ' s reasoning "It i s the s e t t l e d law of t h i s s t a t e t h a t an anlesldment which enlarges a period of limitation spplies t o pending matters where not otherwise expressly excepted. Such l e g i s l a t i o n a f f e c t s the cemedy and is applicable t o matters not already 'mrred, without retroactive e f f e c t . Because the speration i s prospective rather than retrospective, there is no impairment of vested r i g h t s . Moreover a party has no vested r i g h t i n the running of a s t a t u t e of limitation prior t o i t s expiration. He i s deemed t o s u f f e r no injury i f , a t the time of an amendment extending the period of limita- t i o n f o r recovery, he is under obligation t o pay. * * * Thus t r u e retroactive operation of a limita- tion s t a t u t e i s such a s would revive matters t h a t had already been barred by the lapse of time." This case i s therefore distinguishable from Penrod v. Hoskinson, M.D., Mont . , 552 P.2d 325, 33 St.Rep. 705 (1976), r e l i e d upon by defendants. This Court i n Penrod rejected an attempt t o retroactively apply a new s t a t u t e of limitation r e l a t i n g t o medical malpractice which would have limited p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o sue under the "discovery doctrine". There was no question i n Penrod t h a t defendant was asking f o r retroactive application of the new s t a t u t e , and we found no manifestation of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t it be so applied. The i n s t a n t case does not involve the retroactive application of the amendment but rather the exercise by the division of discretion which it had the power t o exercise while claimant was s t i l l e n t i t l e d t o f i l e h i s claim. W e hold the amendment applies t o a11 claims existing July 1, 1973, without retroactive e f f e c t . Claimant's action had not been barred by July 1, 1973, and therefore the division had the power t o consider h i s p e t i t i o n f o r ' a n extension of time. The workers' Compensation Court erred i n holding otherwise. While defendants argue the matter is s t i l l discretionary with the division and the division may refuse t o exercise i t s discretion, t h i s argument has no merit here. The division was obviously under the f a l s e impression it had no jurisdiction t o consider the matter, and refused t o exercise i t s discretion f o r t h a t reason. The judgment is reversed and the cause i s remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court for further proceedings consistent with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: > -- -7 ( / , / / & - - - ' ' 1 GI, chief Justice I Justices. ........................... M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell, specially concurring: I concur in the result in the foregoing Opinion. Just ice