Title: Smith v. Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Ctr.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 990164
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: January 14, 2000

Present:  All the Justices 
 
A. DALE SMITH, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 990164     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 14, 2000 
CHESTERFIELD MEADOWS SHOPPING 
CENTER ASSOCIATES, L.P., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 
William R. Shelton, Judge 
 
 
A. Dale Smith and Richard M. Allen appeal the trial 
court's judgment sustaining  a demurrer dismissing their bill 
of complaint seeking to have a restrictive covenant declared 
null and void.  Finding that the pleadings were sufficient to 
state a cause of action, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
In 1979, Allen owned approximately 5.5 acres of land on 
the north side of Centralia Road at its intersection with 
State Route 10 in Chesterfield County.  He sought and obtained 
a rezoning of the parcel to Agricultural (A) with a 
conditional use permit to build an office complex.  Ernest P. 
Gates and Virginia Y. Gates (the Gates) owned a 5.5-acre tract 
on the south side of Centralia Road at that intersection.  The 
Gates' home, known as "Wrexham," was located on their 
property. 
 
On July 14, 1980, Allen and the Gates executed a 
restrictive covenant affecting Allen's property.  Under the 
covenant, Allen's land was to be "used only for the purposes 
mentioned and allowed by the Special Conditional Use Permit 
granted by the Board of Supervisors on November 28, 1979, in 
case #79S101A for an office complex as reflected in the 
official minutes of the meeting."  The covenant was to run 
with the land for a period of sixty years from the date of the 
covenant and it was recorded in the land records of 
Chesterfield County. 
 
The Wrexham structure subsequently was relocated, the 
Gates' property was rezoned to "Commercial" use, a portion was 
sold to Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center Associates, L.P., 
and Ukrop's Super Markets, Inc. (collectively "Chesterfield"), 
and the Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center was constructed 
on the property.  Allen's property was subsequently rezoned 
from Agricultural (A) to "Neighborhood Business" and a portion 
of the tract was sold to Smith. 
 
On June 24, 1998, Smith and Allen filed a bill of 
complaint in the court below, pursuant to Code § 55-153, 
seeking to have the restrictive covenant declared void.  
Chesterfield filed a demurrer, which the trial court sustained 
by order entered on October 1, 1998.  Smith and Allen were 
given 21 days from the date of entry of the order to amend 
their bill of complaint.  On October 29, Allen and Smith filed 
a motion for nonsuit which the trial court granted on November 
2, 1998.  Chesterfield filed a motion to vacate the court's 
 
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order of nonsuit, which was granted on November 23, 1998, 
based on the court's finding that it "lost jurisdiction on 
October 22, 1998 because no Amended Bill of Complaint had been 
filed or other Order entered."  We awarded Smith and Allen 
this appeal. 
 
Smith and Allen argue that the trial court erred in 
sustaining Chesterfield's demurrer because their bill of 
complaint adequately stated a cause of action.  In a cause of 
action to have a restrictive covenant declared void, a party 
must prove that changed conditions have defeated the purpose 
of the restrictions, and the change must be "so radical as 
practically to destroy the essential objects and purposes of 
the agreement."  Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 
148, 49 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1948).  Smith and Allen assert that 
the allegations contained in the bill of complaint that "[t]he 
restriction was intended to protect the historical nature of 
Wrexham," that the Wrexham structure had been relocated, and 
that the entire property upon which Wrexham was located is now 
zoned commercial and a shopping center has been built on the 
property, were sufficient to state a cause of action for 
declaring a restrictive covenant void. 
 
Chesterfield responds first that our holding in Ward's 
Equipment, Inc. v. New Holland North America, Inc., 254 Va. 
379, 493 S.E.2d 516 (1997), bars consideration of Smith and 
 
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Allen's allegations that the purpose of the restrictive 
covenant was to protect the Wrexham structure.  In Ward's 
Equipment, we held that factual allegations contradicted by 
the terms of authentic, unambiguous documents that are a part 
of the pleading may be disregarded by a court in considering a 
demurrer.  Id. at 382, 493 S.E.2d 518.  Chesterfield argues 
that the restrictive covenant, which was attached to the 
pleading, stated that "it is the desire of the parties hereto 
to restrict the land containing 5.523 acres in accordance with 
conditions imposed by the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield 
County in case #79S101A."  This statement, according to 
Chesterfield, is an unambiguous statement of the purpose of 
the restrictive covenant.  Therefore, Chesterfield contends, 
Smith and Allen's argument that the purpose of the covenant 
was to preserve the Wrexham structure is a factual allegation 
in contradiction of the unambiguous covenant document, and is 
barred by the doctrine recognized by Ward's Equipment.  We 
disagree. 
 
The language quoted above from the restrictive covenant 
does not address the purpose of the covenant.  Rather, the 
language describes the actual restriction that was imposed 
upon the land.  The purpose of the covenant, namely, the 
reason why the parties chose to impose the restriction on the 
land, is not set forth in the document itself.  Because the 
 
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document is silent as to the purpose of the restrictive 
covenant, the rule in Ward's Equipment does not prohibit the 
introduction of evidence on that subject, since such evidence 
would not be considered a factual allegation contradicted by 
the terms of the document. 
 
Next, relying on Hechler Chevrolet v. General Motors 
Corp., 230 Va. 396, 337 S.E.2d 744 (1985), Chesterfield 
asserts that the introduction of evidence that the covenant 
was created to protect the Wrexham structure is barred by the 
parol evidence rule.  In Hechler, parol evidence was not 
allowed to show prior dealings between the parties because 
there was no allegation that the contract in question was 
incomplete or ambiguous.  Id. at 403, 337 S.E.2d at 749.  In 
the instant case, Smith and Allen allege that the purpose of 
the restrictive covenant was not contained within the 
document, and that extrinsic evidence is needed to determine 
the reason for imposing restrictions on the land.  In light of 
these allegations, we hold that the parol evidence rule does 
not bar extrinsic evidence of the purpose of the covenant in 
this case. 
 
Finally, Chesterfield argues that the bill of complaint 
fails to allege sufficiently changed circumstances to support 
nullification of the restrictive covenant.  According to 
Chesterfield, allegations that an historical house has been 
 
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relocated and a shopping center has been constructed in its 
place alone are insufficient to establish the type of change 
which would "destroy the essential objects and purposes" of 
the restrictive covenant. 
 
Considering these allegations in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs, which we must when considering a demurrer, 
W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Chesterfield County, 252 Va. 377, 384, 
478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996), we cannot say they are 
insufficient as a matter of law.  The fact that the pleadings 
discuss changes to only a single property does not defeat the 
cause of action at the demurrer stage in the proceedings. 
 
For the above reasons, we conclude that Smith and Allen's 
bill of complaint stated a cause of action.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer 
and remand the case for further proceedings.*  
Reversed and remanded.
                     
* Because we are reversing the trial court's order 
sustaining the demurrer, we do not reach the remaining 
assignments of error pertaining to nonsuit. 
 
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