Title: Steven Greene et al. v. Jefferson County Commission and The General Retirement System for Employees of Jefferson County
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1070300
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: November 14, 2008

REL: 11/14/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1070300
_________________________
Steven Greene et al.
v.
Jefferson County Commission and the General Retirement
System for Employees of Jefferson County
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-07-900939)
SEE, Justice.
Steven Greene, Mark Persall, Larry Owen, Charles Horton,
James Phillips, and Cassie Bell, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, appeal from a summary judgment
in favor of the Jefferson County Commission and the General
Retirement System for Employees of Jefferson County.  We
1070300
Act No. 497 provides: "Except as herein otherwise
1
provided, every person becoming an employee of [Jefferson]
County subsequent to the effective date of this Act and
occupying a position subject to the civil service system
applicable to the County shall become a member of the system
on the date he enters the service of the County." 
2
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The General Retirement System for Employees of Jefferson
County ("the retirement system") was created in 1965 by the
enactment of Act No. 497, Ala. Acts 1965.   The retirement
1
system requires that each employee-member contribute six
percent of his or her regular gross salary to the retirement
system.  Employee-members are credited with one year of paid
service for each year they are employed by Jefferson County
and contribute their six percent to the retirement system.  In
return for an employee-member's six-percent contribution to
the retirement system, Jefferson County contributes six
percent in matching funds.  However, in order to ensure that
the 
retirement system 
remains 
actuarially 
sound, 
the
retirement system invests the contributed funds to compensate
for the difference between the total contributions and the
1070300
The pension an employee-member receives from the
2
retirement system is tied to the number of years of "paid
service" the employee-member has accumulated.  This is the
number of years the employee-member was employed by Jefferson
County and paid into the retirement system.  The years an
employee works for Jefferson County but does not make
contributions into the retirement system are referred to as
"unpaid service." 
3
actual pension payouts.2
At some point during the 1970s, approximately 238
Jefferson County sheriff's deputies voluntarily ceased
participating in the retirement system and withdrew their
contributions, with interest.  Those employees who opted out
of the retirement system had their years of paid service
reduced to zero, although they continued to receive one year
of unpaid service for each year they continued to work for
Jefferson County.     
In June 2003, the legislature passed Act No. 2003-343,
Ala. Acts 2003 (hereinafter "the Act"), allowing Jefferson
County employees who had opted out of the retirement system to
opt back in and to receive credit for prior periods of unpaid
service rendered to Jefferson County, the Jefferson County
sheriff's department, or any municipality in Jefferson County
"or other jurisdiction."  The Act also allowed Jefferson
1070300
Section 2, subsection (a), of the Act provides that
3
"[c]onversion of unpaid prior service to paid service shall be
limited to 20 years."
4
County employee-members who did not opt out and who were
contributing to the 
retirement 
system to convert 
prior 
periods
of unpaid service to paid service.   In order to convert
3
unpaid prior service to paid service, an employee-member must
contribute six percent of his or her current annual salary for
each year the employee-member wishes to convert.  The Act then
requires Jefferson County to contribute six percent in
matching funds and any further contributions that are
necessary to ensure that the retirement system remains
actuarially sound.
Subsequent to the passage of the Act, two groups of
Jefferson County employees filed separate class-action
lawsuits to enforce the provisions of the Act.  Sheriff Deputy
Jimmy Black brought one of the class-action lawsuits against
the pension board of the retirement system on behalf of other
deputies who had opted out of the retirement system and who
were seeking to enforce the provisions of the Act and to
rejoin the retirement system.  A second subclass in the first
class-action lawsuit consisted of employees who had sought a
1070300
5
hearing before a special master when Jefferson County did not
allow the employees to convert unpaid service to paid service
under the Act.  Employee-members who had not opted out of the
retirement system brought a separate lawsuit seeking to
invalidate 
the 
Act. 
 
The 
lawsuits 
were 
eventually
consolidated, and both Jefferson County and the retirement
system were named as defendants (the consolidated actions are
hereinafter referred to as "the Black litigation").
Judge Jerry Fielding was specially assigned to preside
over the Black litigation in the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Judge Fielding found that the Act was not unconstitutional on
the grounds asserted, and he ordered Jefferson County and the
retirement system to implement the provisions of the Act
allowing nonparticipating employees to opt back into the
retirement system.  None of the defendants appealed Judge
Fielding's decision.
In response to Judge Fielding's order requiring Jefferson
County to implement the provisions of the Act, the County
passed Resolution JUN-7-2006-683 ("the resolution").  The
resolution provides that eligible employees of Jefferson
County who convert unpaid service to paid service under the
1070300
Jefferson County enacted the Sick Leave Retirement
4
Conversion Program in 1993.  This program allows employees of
Jefferson County to conserve their paid sick-leave benefits.
A retiring employee with at least 15 years of employment with
Jefferson County who has opted to save his or her sick-leave
time is eligible to receive a credit whereby the retiring
employee uses the accumulated sick-leave time to remain on the
Jefferson County payroll as an off-duty employee until the
employee's actual retirement date.    
6
Act forfeit any claim to retirement benefits under both the
Jefferson County Retiree Health Insurance Plan and the
Jefferson County Sick Leave Retirement Conversion Program.4
Jefferson County defended the resolution as a necessary
measure to preserve the economic stability of the County.  The
actuary for Jefferson County estimated that if all eligible
employees availed themselves of the provisions of the Act,
Jefferson 
County's 
obligation 
to 
contribute 
matching 
funds 
and
to compensate for investment earnings that would have been
realized 
if 
the 
employees 
had 
been 
making 
ongoing
contributions to the retirement system would cost the County
$64 million.  The resolution also stated that one of its
express purposes is to allow Jefferson County to "fulfill its
statutory financial obligations."
On June 19, 2006, the plaintiffs in the Black litigation
moved for supplemental relief in the form of a preliminary
1070300
Section 43 provides: "In the government of this state,
5
except in the instances in this Constitution hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted, the legislative department
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a
government of laws and not of men."
7
injunction  enjoining Jefferson County from enforcing the
provisions of the resolution.  The Jefferson County
Commission, the pension board of the retirement system, and
the retirement system challenged the motion, arguing, among
other things, that the plaintiffs had failed to post an
injunction bond.  The plaintiffs responded by requesting that
the trial court consolidate the hearing on the preliminary
injunction with the trial on the permanent injunction.  
Judge Fielding denied the plaintiffs' motion for
supplemental relief, finding that there was no justiciable
issue in the motion because the court could not enjoin the
enforcement of the resolution.  He held that to do so would
violate Article III, § 43, Alabama Constitution 1901.   Judge
5
Fielding also found that "the issues presented in the
plaintiffs' challenge to the Resolution are completely
separate and involve different facts, issues, and theories
1070300
Each of these individuals was a member of one of the
6
several plaintiff subclasses in the Black litigation.
8
than the previous action challenging [the Act]."  The
plaintiffs in the Black litigation did not appeal Judge
Fielding's denial of the motion for supplemental relief.
On November 21, 2006, Judge Fielding certified his
judgment in the Black litigation as final pursuant to Rule
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The judgment specifically states that
"[t]his Final Judgment entered under Ala. R. Civ. P. 54
together with the previous orders entered by this Court in
these matters disposes of all claims for relief made by any
party."  Neither side to the dispute in the Black litigation
appealed Judge Fielding's judgment.
On May 18, 2007, Steven Greene, Mark Persall, Larry Owen,
Charles Horton, James Phillips, and Cassie Bell,  on behalf of
6
themselves 
and 
all 
others 
similarly 
situated 
(hereinafter 
"the
Greene parties"), 
sued the 
Jefferson 
County 
Commission and 
the
retirement 
system 
(collectively 
"the 
County") 
in 
the 
Jefferson
Circuit Court.  The Greene parties sought a judgment declaring
that the Jefferson County Commission, by passing the
resolution, "retaliated [against] and/or administered unequal
1070300
Section 6-5-20(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
7
"An action must not be commenced against a county
until the claim has been presented to the county
commission, disallowed or reduced by the commission
and the reduction refused by the claimant."
9
treatment" 
to 
Jefferson County employees 
who sought to convert
unpaid service to paid service under the Act.  The Greene
parties also sought a permanent injunction to prevent the
County from enforcing the resolution, as well as other
equitable relief to eliminate the effects of the resolution.
The County moved for a summary judgment, arguing (1) that the
Greene parties' claims are barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) that Art. III, § 43,
Ala. Const. 1901, prevents the trial court from hearing the
Greene parties' challenge to the resolution; (3) that Alabama
law does not recognize an equal-protection challenge; and (4)
that the Greene parties' claims are due to be dismissed
because the Greene parties did not present their claims to the
Jefferson County Commission before commencing their action
and, thereby, violated § 6-5-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.7
Judge Vance of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered a
summary judgment in favor of the County.  His order states,
1070300
Section 12-24-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent
8
part:
"If the action is assigned to ... a circuit judge
who has received more than two thousand dollars
($2,000) based on the information set out in any one
certificate of disclosure, then, within 14 days
after all parties have filed a certificate of
disclosure, any party who has filed a certificate of
disclosure setting out an amount including all
amounts contributed by any person or entity
designated in subsection (b), below the limit
applicable to the justice or judge, or an amount
above the applicable limit but less than that of any
opposing party, shall file a written notice
requiring recusal of the justice or judge or else
such party shall be deemed to have waived such right
to a recusal.  Under no circumstances shall a
justice or judge solicit a waiver or participate in
the action in any way when the justice or judge
knows that the contributions of a party or its
attorney exceed the applicable limit and there has
been no waiver of recusal."
10
in its entirety:
"For 
the 
reasons 
stated 
therein, 
the 
defendants'
motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED.
Neither the named class representative nor any
member of the putative class may maintain the claims
raised in the complaint." 
Twenty-two days later in a postjudgment motion, the Greene
parties moved Judge Vance to recuse himself because, the
Greene parties argued, Judge Vance and counsel for the County
had violated § 12-24-2, Ala. Code 1975,  by failing to notify
8
the Greene parties that counsel for the County had contributed
1070300
11
more than $2,000 to Judge Vance's election campaign.  The
Greene parties also moved the trial court for a new trial or,
in the alternative, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment or
for relief from judgment.  Judge Vance denied the Greene
parties' recusal motion and also denied the Greene parties'
motion for a new trial and other postjudgment relief.  The
Greene parties now appeal.
Standard of Review
"'We review the trial court's grant or denial of
a summary judgment motion de novo.'  Smith v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala.
2006) (citing Bockman v. WCH, L.L.C., 943 So. 2d 789
(Ala. 2006)).  A summary judgment is proper if there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  If the movant meets
this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present 'substantial evidence' of a
genuine issue of material fact.  Ex parte Alfa Mut.
Gen.  Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999).
Substantial evidence is 'evidence of such weight and
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d
870, 871 (Ala. 1989); see also § 12-21-12(d), Ala.
Code 1975.  In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, this Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant and resolves all reasonable doubts in
favor of the nonmovant.  Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632
So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala. 1993).  'The trial court's
ruling on a question of law carries no presumption
of correctness, and this Court reviews de novo the
1070300
In addition to the arguments addressed below, the Greene
9
parties also argue that Judge Vance was required to recuse
himself from this case pursuant to § 12-24-2(c), Ala. Code
1975.  The Greene parties are precluded from seeking Judge
Vance's recusal on this ground, however, because they raised
this issue for the first time in their posttrial motion.
Alabama courts have held: "If a party has knowledge of a judge
or master's partiality and that information may support a
recusal, the party may not lie in wait and raise the issue of
recusal after learning the outcome of the proceeding." Adams
v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of South Alabama, 676 So. 2d 1326,
1328 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).  Campaign contributions are a
matter of public record; therefore, the Greene parties are
deemed to have 
constructive knowledge 
of 
the alleged 
violation
of §§ 12-24-1 and -2.  See Ex parte Kenneth D. McLeod Family
Ltd. P'ship XV, 725 So. 2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1998) (denying the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial because the defendant's
campaign contribution "along with all other contributions
received by the trial judge in her campaign, was a matter of
public record," and therefore the plaintiff was "on notice
that grounds for a recusal motion might exist"). See also
Brackin v. Trimmier Law Firm, 897 So. 2d 207, 233-34 (Ala.
2004) (Brown, J., statement of nonrecusal) (noting that "the
12
trial court's conclusion as to the appropriate legal
standard to be applied.' Dunlap v. Regions Fin.
Corp., 983 So. 2d 374, 377 (Ala. 2007) (citing Ex
parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997))."
McCutchen Co. v. Media Gen., Inc., 988 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Ala.
2008).
Analysis
The Greene parties provide several reasons why, they
contend, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment
in favor the County.   First, the Greene parties argue that
9
1070300
fact that it is questionable whether §§ 12-24-1 and -2, Ala.
Code 1975, which have not yet obtained 'preclearance' from the
United States Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, are even enforceable has been well documented by this
Court").   
13
the County failed to carry its summary-judgment burden
because, they say, the County failed to include a narrative
summary of undisputed facts as required by Rule 56(c)(1), Ala.
R. Civ. P.  Second, the Greene parties argue that the doctrine
of res judicata does not apply in this case because, they
argue, the Black litigation involved different parties and
issues.  The Greene parties further argue that even if the
doctrine of res judicata applies in this case, the County
should be judicially estopped from asserting that defense
because, they say, the County's position in the Black
litigation is inconsistent with the position it asserts in
this action.  Finally, the Greene parties argue that this case
does not implicate a separation-of-powers issue under § 43,
Ala. Const. 1901, because the resolution was not a valid
exercise of the County's legislative power.
A. The County's Summary-Judgment Burden
A summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
1070300
Rule 56(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a motion
10
for a summary judgment
 
"shall be supported by a narrative summary of what
the movant contends to be the undisputed material
facts; that narrative summary may be set forth in
the motion or may be attached as an exhibit.  The
narrative summary shall be supported by specific
references to pleadings, portions of discovery
materials, or affidavits and may include citations
to legal authority."
The County also argues that the Greene parties have not
11
preserved for appellate review the issue of its failure to
provide a narrative summary of the undisputed facts with its
14
judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then
shifts to the nonmovant to present "substantial evidence" of
a genuine issue of material fact.  Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen.
Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999).  The Greene parties
argue that the burden never shifted to them to present
substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact
because, the Greene parties say, the County did not include a
narrative summary of undisputed facts with its summary-
judgment motion as required by Rule 56(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.10
However, the County argues that it did support its
summary-judgment motion with a narrative summary of the
undisputed facts.
  The County's brief in support of its
11
1070300
summary-judgment motion because, the County says, the Greene
parties did not raise this argument in the trial court.  In
support of this argument, the County cites Copeland v. Samford
University, 686 So. 2d 190 (Ala. 1996).  In Copeland, this
Court held that the Copelands did not preserve for appellate
review 
the 
argument 
that 
Samford 
University's 
summary-judgment
motion did not include a narrative summary of undisputed facts
because they "made no objection on this basis at any time
before the court ruled on the motion for summary judgment."
686 So. 2d at 196.  Our decision in Horn v. Fadal Machining
Centers, LLC, 972 So. 2d 63 (Ala. 2007), however, calls into
question whether this aspect of our holding in Copeland
remains good law.  We need not decide this question because we
conclude that the County did include such a narrative summary.
15
summary-judgment motion contains a statement of facts with
references to materials that are attached to the brief as
exhibits.  Those exhibits include the stipulations regarding
class 
certification 
of 
the 
plaintiffs 
in 
the 
Black 
litigation,
the Black plaintiffs' motion for supplemental relief, Judge
Fielding's order denying the Black plaintiffs' motion for
supplemental relief, Judge Fielding's final judgment, and a
memorandum sent by the County to all Jefferson County
employees regarding conversion of unpaid service to paid
service under the terms of the resolution.  The County
contends that the statement of facts contained in its brief
and the references to the attached exhibits satisfy the
requirement of Rule 56(c)  that a motion for a summary
1070300
16
judgment include a narrative summary of undisputed facts.  We
agree.
In Cashion v. Torbert, 881 So. 2d 408 (Ala. 2003), this
Court addressed a similar situation.  In Cashion, Torbert
moved for a summary judgment based upon the affirmative
defense of res judicata.  The summary-judgment motion provided
"a detailed history relevant to the defense of res judicata,
attaching numerous supporting affidavits." Cashion, 881 So. 2d
at 420.  The supporting documents attached by Torbert included
copies of "Cashion's report of insolvency filed in the probate
court; her brief filed in support of that report"; and a copy
of the trial judge's order on final settlement. Cashion, 881
So. 2d at 420.  This Court held that Torbert's "motion was
adequately supported and adequately presented the undisputed
issues of fact material to the defense of res judicata."
Cashion, 881 So. 2d at 420.
In this case, as in Cashion, the County included with its
motion a statement of facts relevant to the defense of res
judicata and attached to its brief in support of the motion
copies of relevant documents that provide the basis for the
County's assertion that this claim is barred by the doctrine
1070300
17
of res judicata.  In the narrative statement, the County
refers to, and attaches a copy of, the motion for supplemental
relief in the Black litigation, Judge Fielding's order denying
that motion, and stipulations regarding class certifications
in the Black litigation.  These documents form the basis for
the County's argument that the Greene parties' claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and are cited by the
County in its statement of facts in its summary-judgment
motion.  The County, like Torbert in Cashion, did provide "a
detailed history relevant to the defense of res judicata,
attaching numerous supporting affidavits." Cashion, 881 So. 2d
at 420.  Therefore, we conclude that the County sufficiently
complied with Rule 56(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., insofar as that
rule requires that a narrative summary of the undisputed facts
be included with a summary-judgment motion.   
B. The Doctrine of Res Judicata
The Greene parties contend that the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to bar their action because, they
argue, the judgment in the Black litigation was not a final
judgment on the merits and the Black litigation and this
action are different causes of action involving different
1070300
18
issues.  The County contends that Judge Fielding's denial of
the motion for supplemental relief in the Black litigation and
his final order incorporating all of his previous orders in
that litigation satisfies the elements of res judicata.
The elements of res judicata are "'(1) a prior judgment
on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties,
and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both
actions.'" Chapman Nursing Home, Inc. v. McDonald, 985 So. 2d
914, 919 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v.
Vinson, 723 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. 1998)).
1. Judgment on the Merits
First, we agree with the County that Judge Fielding's
denial of the motion for supplemental relief in the Black
litigation is a prior judgment on the merits.  In his order
denying the plaintiffs' motion for supplemental relief, Judge
Fielding stated:
"The 
Jefferson 
County 
Commission 
has 
been 
vested
with the responsibility for maintaining a balanced
budget for the County and funding and overseeing
vital public services for the citizens of the
County.  In adopting the Resolution, the Commission
did not abuse [its] vested discretion, and did not
engage in fraud.  This Court's inquiry must end
1070300
19
there, as the authority to determine the amount of
appropriations necessary for the performance of
government function is a legislative power, not a
judicial power.  In re R.B.J., 675 So. 2d 457, 458
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996).  This Court would infringe
upon the boundaries between our State's branches of
government delineated in Sec. 43 of the Alabama
Constitution if it were to enjoin this Resolution.
This Court also find[s] that the issues presented in
Plaintiff's 
challenge 
to 
the 
Resolution 
are
completely separate and involve different facts,
issues, and theories than the previous action
challenging Act 03-343.  Thus, the Court finds that
there is no justiciable issue involved in the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Relief." 
Judge Fielding denied the motion for supplemental relief,
finding that the resolution was a discretionary legislative
act by the Jefferson County Commission that implicated the
Commission's obligation to enact and maintain a balanced
budget.  Judge Fielding found that an injunction preventing
the enforcement of the resolution would violate the
separation-of-powers 
doctrine 
enshrined in § 
43 
of 
the Alabama
Constitution.  This was a judgment on the merits.  
On November 21, 2006, Judge Fielding entered his final
order, which incorporated all previous orders entered by the
trial court, including the order denying the motion for
1070300
Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides, in relevant
12
part:
"Except as otherwise provided herein, in all cases
in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right
to the supreme court or to a court of appeals, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6
weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or
order appealed from ...."
20
supplemental relief.  Under Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.,12
the plaintiffs in the Black litigation had 42 days from the
date of the entry of that final judgment to appeal the denial
of their motion for supplemental relief.  The plaintiffs did
not appeal.  Therefore, that judgment became final for res
judicata purposes after the time for filing an appeal had
elapsed. See Omega Leasing Corp. v. Movie Gallery, Inc., 859
So. 2d 421, 424 n.1 (Ala. 2003) (summarizing Faison v. Hudson,
243 Va. 413, 419, 417 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1992), as "stating that
'a judgment is not final for the purposes of res judicata ...
when it is being appealed or when the time limits fixed for
perfecting the appeal have not expired'").  
The 
Greene 
parties 
contend, 
however, 
that 
Judge
Fielding's statement -- that "the issues presented in
Plaintiff's challenge to the Resolution are completely
1070300
21
separate and involve different facts, issues, and theories
than the previous action challenging Act 03-343.  Thus, the
Court finds that there is no justiciable issue involved in the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Supplemental Relief." -- makes it
impossible for  the order to be a final judgment on the
merits.  The Greene parties argue that this is so because,
they argue, there can be no final judgment from a dispute that
contains no justiciable issues.  However, the Greene parties
do not cite any authority to support this argument.  "'"Where
an appellant fails to cite any authority, we may affirm, for
it is neither our duty nor function to perform all the legal
research for an appellant."'" McCutchen Co., 988 So. 2d at
1004 (quoting Henderson v. Alabama A & M Univ., 483 So. 2d
392, 392 (Ala. 1986), quoting in turn Gibson v. Nix, 460 So.
2d 1346, 1347 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)).  
The Greene parties also argue that Judge Fielding's
denial of the motion for supplemental relief in the Black
litigation was not a final judgment on the merits because,
they say, in denying that motion Judge Fielding denied the
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Greene
parties cite EB Investments, L.L.C. v. Atlantis Development,
1070300
Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:
13
"No ... preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in
such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment
of such costs, damages, and reasonable attorney fees
as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is
found 
to 
have 
been 
wrongfully 
enjoined 
or
restrained."
22
Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 510 (Ala. 2005), in which this Court
stated that the trial court's ruling on a motion for a
preliminary injunction is not a prior judgment for res
judicata purposes because it is "neither a final judgment nor
was it rendered on the merits" of the claims involved in the
action.  
The County, however, responds that in denying the motion
for supplemental relief, Judge Fielding was actually denying
a request for a permanent injunction rather than a request for
a preliminary injunction.  The County points out that the
plaintiffs in the Black litigation sought to convert their
motion for a preliminary injunction into a motion for a
permanent 
injunction 
because 
they 
failed 
to 
post 
a
preliminary-injunction bond as required 
by 
Rule 65(c), 
Ala. R.
Civ. P.  
13
In their response to the County's motion opposing the
1070300
23
motion for supplemental relief, the plaintiffs in the Black
litigation stated that their motion for supplemental relief
was "due to be granted in the form of a permanent injunction."
Thus, we agree with the County that the plaintiffs in the
Black litigation sought a permanent injunction and that when
Judge Fielding denied the motion for supplemental relief he
denied a motion for a permanent injunction.  The denial of a
motion for a permanent injunction can be a final judgment for
res judicata purposes. See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 356 (2004)
("[A]n interlocutory judgment granting or refusing an
injunction may be res judicata with respect to the right to a
permanent injunction, where the judgment on the application
for a preliminary injunction was based solely on a question of
law, or where the proof at the trial is substantially the same
as it was at the interlocutory hearing.").  Therefore, Judge
Fielding's denial of the motion for supplemental relief was a
final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.
2. Court of Competent Jurisdiction
Neither side disputes that Judge Fielding's denial of the
motion for supplemental relief and his final judgment in the
Black litigation was a decision rendered by a court of
1070300
24
competent jurisdiction. See AAA Mobile Home Movers, Inc. v.
Holmes, 607 So. 2d 236, 238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) ("Clearly,
the Jefferson County Circuit Court, which entered the summary
judgment denying the appellant's claims, was a court of
competent jurisdiction.").
3. Substantial Identity of Parties
The parties in the Black litigation are substantially
identical to the parties involved in this dispute.  Our
caselaw requires that "there is a substantial identity of
parties in the two actions." Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co.,
772 So. 2d 437, 440 (Ala. 2000).  Substantial identity
requires that the "'"parties be identical, sometimes referred
to as the mutuality of estoppel requirement."'" Stewart v.
Brinley, 902 So. 2d 1, 10 (Ala. 2004) (quoting McMillian v.
Johnson, 878 F. Supp. 1473, 1520 (M.D. Ala. 1995)).  "'An
exception is made to this requirement for parties in privity
with a party to the prior action.'" Stewart, 902 So. 2d at 10
(quoting McMillian, 878 F. Supp. at 1520) (emphasis omitted).
A party is deemed to be in privity with a party to a prior
action when there is "'"an identity of interest in the subject
matter of litigation."'" Stewart, 902 So. 2d at 11 (quoting
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25
Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1988), quoting in
turn Issue Preclusion in Alabama, 32 Ala. L. Rev. 500, 521
(1981)). 
The County argues that the Greene parties were all class
members of one of the subclasses in the Black litigation.  In
fact, Jim Phillips, one of the Greene parties involved in this
dispute, acted as a class representative in the Black
litigation for the subclass that filed the motion  challenging
the validity of the resolution.  The remaining Greene parties
who were not members of that particular subclass share that
same interest in the subject matter of the dispute, namely,
invalidating the resolution.  
This Court has stated: "'"'A person may be bound by a
judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the
parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests
as to be his virtual representative.'"'" Gonzalez, LLC v.
DiVincenti, 844 So. 2d 1196, 1203 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Green
v. Wedowee Hosp., 584 So. 2d 1309, 1315 (1991), quoting other
cases).  In the Black litigation, the subclass of Jefferson
County deputies and the subclass of Jefferson County employees
had an identical interest in seeking the invalidation of the
1070300
The Greene parties have also failed to comply with Rule
14
28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., because they have failed to
include in their brief any mention of relevant facts or legal
authority that could controvert the conclusion that the
substantial-identity-of-the-parties requirement is satisfied
in this case.  "Rule 28(a)(10) requires that arguments in
briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal
authorities that support the party's position.  If they do
not, the arguments are waived." White Sands Group, L.L.C. v.
PRS II, LLC, [Ms. 1070050, April 18, 2008] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
(Ala. 2008). 
26
resolution because, under the terms of the resolution, members
of both subclasses would have been required to forfeit certain
discretionary benefits in order to opt back into the
retirement system.  Therefore, the third element of res
judicata is met in this case because the parties in this case
are substantially identical to the parties involved in the
Black litigation.14
4. Same Cause of Action
The fourth and final element of res judicata –- that the
same cause of action be presented in both actions –- is also
met in this case.  "'Res judicata applies not only to the
exact legal theories advanced in the prior case, but to all
legal theories and claims arising out of the same nucleus of
operative facts.'"  Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So.
2d 922, 928 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Wesch v. Folsom, 6 F.3d 1465,
1070300
27
1471 (11th Cir. 1993)).  Two causes of action are the same for
res judicata purposes "'when the same evidence is applicable
in both actions.'"  Old Republic Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d at 928
(quoting Hughes v. Martin, 533 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 1988)).
In this case, the Greene parties seek a judgment
declaring that the sole purpose of the resolution is to punish
Jefferson County employees who convert unpaid service to paid
service under the Act and a permanent injunction to prevent
the County from enforcing the resolution.  The plaintiffs in
the Black litigation who filed the motion for supplemental
relief likewise sought to enjoin the County from enforcing the
resolution.  Because the claims in this litigation and those
in the Black litigation both seek to prevent the County from
enforcing the resolution, the claims in the two cases arise
out of the same nucleus of operative facts.  Additionally, the
Greene parties, in seeking to prevent the County from
enforcing the resolution, rely on the same evidence and
advance many of the same arguments raised in the plaintiffs'
motion for supplemental relief in the Black litigation.  
The Greene parties insist that this cause of action is
not the same as the cause of action in the Black litigation
1070300
28
because, they say, Judge Fielding recognized that there was no
justiciable dispute before him when he denied the motion for
supplemental relief.  To support this argument, the Greene
parties point to the following language in Judge Fielding's
denial of the motion for supplemental relief: "This Court also
find[s] that the issues presented in Plaintiff's challenge to
the Resolution are completely separate and involve different
facts, issues, and theories than the previous action
challenging Act 03-343.  Thus, the Court finds that there is
no justiciable issue involved in the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Supplemental Relief."  The Greene parties argue that "a claim
that is not properly before an earlier court could [not]
preclude the claim being properly presented in a subsequent
action." Greene parties' brief at 34-35.  However, as we noted
previously, this was an alternative holding.  Judge Fielding
based his denial of the motion for supplemental relief on the
fact that the granting of injunctive relief would violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine as established in § 43 of the
Alabama Constitution.  Therefore, we agree that the final
element of res judicata is met because this cause of action is
the same cause of action raised in the motion for supplemental
1070300
29
relief in the Black litigation.
The County has demonstrated that there was a prior final
judgment on the merits in the Black litigation, that that
judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
that the parties in the Black litigation and this action are
substantially identical, and that the cause of action was the
same in both disputes.  Thus, the four elements of res
judicata are met, and the claims raised by the Greene parties
are barred.
C. Judicial Estoppel
The Greene parties argue that even if the doctrine of res
judicata would apply to prevent them from raising their
claims, the County should be judicially estopped from raising
the doctrine of res judicata as an affirmative defense.  For
judicial estoppel to apply,
"'(1) "a party's later position must be 'clearly
inconsistent' with its earlier position"; (2) the
party must have been successful in the prior
proceeding so that "judicial acceptance of an
inconsistent position in a later proceeding would
create 'the perception that either the first or
second court was misled'" (quoting Edwards v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982));
and (3) the party seeking to assert an inconsistent
position must "derive an unfair advantage or impose
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
1070300
The County's third argument, that jurisdiction was not
15
proper in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, is not at issue in the Greene parties' judicial-
estoppel argument.
30
estopped." [New Hampshire v. Maine,] 532 U.S. [742,]
at 750-51, 121 S. Ct. 1808 [(2001)].  No requirement
of a showing of privity or reliance appears in the
foregoing statement of factors to consider in
determining the applicability of the doctrine of
judicial estoppel."
Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So. 2d 53, 60-61
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d
1236, 1244-45 (Ala. 2003), citing in turn New Hampshire v.
Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001)).
The County raised three arguments in response to the
motion for supplemental relief filed by the plaintiffs in the
Black litigation.  One of the arguments was that § 43 of the
Alabama Constitution deprived the court of jurisdiction to
entertain the plaintiffs' motion absent a showing of fraud or
abuse of discretion by the County.  The second argument was
that the trial court had no basis for hearing the motion,
because the subject matter of the resolution –- the Jefferson
County Retiree Health Insurance Plan and the Jefferson County
Sick Leave Retirement Conversion Program –- were unrelated to
the question of the validity of the Act.   The 
15
1070300
31
Greene parties argue that the first element of judicial
estoppel is met here because, they say, the County has
asserted inconsistent positions by successfully arguing "to
the court in the Black Litigation that the issue of the
Resolution's validity was not even before the court.  But, in
the instant case [the County] argue[s] the issue was before
the Black court and was decided in [the County's] favor."
Greene parties' brief at 36.
The 
County 
contends 
that 
its 
positions 
were 
not
inconsistent because, it says, it merely presented several
alternative arguments to support the denial of the motion for
supplemental relief.  The County argues that its "current
position in this proceeding that Judge Fielding issued a final
judgment on the merits that § 43 [of the Alabama Constitution]
bars review of the Resolution is clearly not inconsistent with
their prior position that argued for this exact result."
County's brief at 39. 
We agree with the County.  Judge Fielding found that the
resolution was a valid exercise of Jefferson County's
legislative power and that, in enacting the resolution,
Jefferson County did not engage in fraud or abuse its
1070300
32
discretion.  The County argued for this result in the Black
litigation and has maintained this position throughout this
action as well.  Judge Fielding's second conclusion –- that
the challenge to the resolution involved different facts,
issues, and theories then the challenge of the Act –- was an
alternative holding that was based upon the County's
alternative argument that the challenge to the resolution was
not at issue in the Black litigation.  The County raised
alternative arguments in seeking the denial of the motion for
supplemental relief in the Black litigation; however, the
County has consistently maintained in both actions the
position that judicial review of the resolution would violate
separation-of-powers principles.  The doctrine of judicial
estoppel "'applies to preclude a party from assuming a
position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one
previously asserted.'" Selma Foundry & Supply Co. v. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 598 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 1992) (quoting
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d
414, 419 (3d. Cir. 1988)). See also Astor Chauffeured
Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548
(7th Cir. 1990) (stating that in the context of judicial
1070300
Because we have determined that this action is barred by
16
the doctrine of res judicata, we need not address the § 43
issue.
33
estoppel "[t]he offense is not taking inconsistent positions
so much as it is winning, twice, on the basis of incompatible
positions").  Because the County's positions appear to be
consistent throughout both the Black litigation and these
proceedings, we conclude that the County is not judicially
estopped from raising the affirmative defense of res
judicata.16
Conclusion
We hold that the County's summary-judgment motion was
properly supported with a narrative summary of undisputed
facts and that the County was entitled to summary judgment on
the basis of res judicata.  We also hold that the County was
not judicially estopped from raising the affirmative defense
of res judicata.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. 
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.