Title: Sheboygan County v. M.W.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 2021AP000006
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 10, 2022

2022 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP6 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of M.W.: 
 
Sheboygan County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
M.W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 398 Wis. 2d 632, 962 N.W.2d 275 
 (2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 8, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan   
 
JUDGE: 
Kent R. Hoffmann   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, JJ., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Christopher B. Logel and Pinix Law, LLC, Milwaukee. 
There was an oral argument by Christopher B. Logel.  
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief filed by 
Kyle C. Lepak, assistant corporation counsel. There was an oral 
argument by Kyle C. Lepak, assistant corporation counsel.  
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, 
assistant state public defender and Kelli S. Thompson, state 
public defender for the Office of the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender.  
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 40 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2021AP6 
(L.C. No. 
2006ME163) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of M.W.: 
 
 
 
Sheboygan County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
M.W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, M.W., seeks 
review of an unpublished, authored decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's order extending her 
involuntary commitment and remanding to the circuit court for 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
2 
 
further proceedings.1  She argues that the court of appeals erred 
by remanding to the circuit court, and that outright reversal is 
the proper remedy. 
¶2 
We are circumscribed in our review by the narrow issue 
presented.  In Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 
Wis. 2d 231, 
942 
N.W.2d 277, 
this 
court 
announced 
a 
new 
directive that "going forward circuit courts in recommitment 
proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference 
to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on 
which the recommitment is based."  The court of appeals here 
determined that the circuit court failed to make such findings 
and Sheboygan County (the County) has not requested review of 
that determination.  What remains for our review is an issue of 
remedy.  In D.J.W., we did not specify the remedy to be 
implemented when the circuit court runs afoul of the D.J.W. 
directive. 
¶3 
M.W. contends that outright reversal is the proper 
remedy for a D.J.W. violation.  In contrast, the County asserts 
that it is more appropriate to remand the case to the circuit 
court for it to make the missing findings. 
                                                 
1 Sheboygan County v. M.W., No. 2021AP6, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2021) (reversing and remanding the 
order of the circuit court for Sheboygan County, Kent R. 
Hoffman, Judge).  The appeal was decided by one judge, Judge 
Mark Gundrum, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(d) (2019-20). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
3 
 
¶4 
We conclude that the recommitment order at issue here 
has expired and as a consequence the circuit court lacks 
competency to conduct any proceedings on remand.  Therefore, 
reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.2 
I 
¶6 
M.W. has been under ch. 51 mental health commitment 
orders since 2006.  In August of 2020, the County again filed a 
petition to extend her commitment.3  Additionally, it sought an 
order for involuntary medication and treatment. 
¶7 
The circuit court held a hearing on the County's 
petition, at which three witnesses testified.  Those witnesses 
called by the County were Dr. Marshall Bales, who examined M.W., 
and Emilee Sesing, a case worker assigned to M.W.  Additionally, 
M.W. testified on her own behalf. 
¶8 
Ultimately, the circuit court granted the County's 
petition to extend M.W.'s commitment and entered an order for 
                                                 
2  The County did not file a petition for cross-review of 
the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court violated 
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 
N.W.2d 277, and we thus leave that conclusion of the court of 
appeals undisturbed.  See Betchkal v. Willis, 127 Wis. 2d 177, 
183 n.4, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985) (explaining that where an issue 
"was not raised in the . . . petition for review and no cross-
petition was filed . . . the issue is not before us").  We 
reverse the court of appeals on the issue of remedy only. 
3 Throughout this opinion, we use the terms "extension of a 
commitment" and "recommitment" interchangeably, as does Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20.  See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶1 
n.1, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
4 
 
involuntary medication and treatment.  It determined that M.W. 
suffers from a mental illness, is a proper subject for 
treatment, and that M.W. would be a proper subject for 
commitment if treatment were withdrawn. 
¶9 
The circuit court further concluded that M.W. is 
dangerous to herself or others.  It supported this determination 
by referring to M.W.'s statement to Dr. Bales that she would not 
pursue treatment absent recommitment and to a recent incident 
where M.W. left a group home and traveled to New Mexico without 
her belongings or medications. 
¶10 M.W. appealed the circuit court's recommitment order.  
She argued, among other things, that the circuit court failed to 
adhere to D.J.W.'s directive that it make specific factual 
findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.4 
¶11 The court of appeals agreed with M.W. on this point 
and reversed the recommitment order.  Sheboygan County v. M.W., 
No. 2021AP6, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2021).  
It observed that "the record shows, and the County acknowledges 
that the circuit court failed to state the subdivision paragraph 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. 
on 
which 
it 
based 
M.W.'s 
recommitment."  Id., ¶10.  Additionally, "in its ruling, the 
[circuit] court failed to clearly track the necessary elements 
                                                 
4 M.W. additionally contended that the County did not 
present sufficient evidence that she is dangerous and that the 
County failed to provide notice of the standard of dangerousness 
under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which it was proceeding.  
M.W., No. 2021AP6, at ¶5. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
5 
 
of any particular subdivision paragraph and state how the 
evidence satisfied those elements."  Id. 
¶12 Finding "clarity and specificity . . . lacking in the 
[circuit] court's ruling in this case," the court of appeals 
refused to "engage in guesswork to determine whether the County 
provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the dangerousness 
requirement of [Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.]"  Id.  It further 
reasoned:  "D.J.W. made it clear that it is not the job of an 
appellate court to try to piece together court comments like 
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle in an effort to figure out what the 
picture is."  Id., ¶11. 
¶13 After determining that a D.J.W. violation occurred, 
the court of appeals moved to briefly address the remedy for 
that violation.  Citing a prior unpublished court of appeals 
opinion dealing with a similar issue, the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to 
follow the directive of D.J.W.  Id., ¶14 (citing Rock Cnty. 
Dep't of Human Servs. v. J.E.B., No. 2020AP1954-FT, unpublished 
slip op., ¶27 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2021)).  Further following 
the lead of the J.E.B. court, the court of appeals added: 
If, on remand, and after further review of the 
evidence, D.J.W., and the five dangerousness standards 
in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e., the circuit court 
again determines that the County has met its burden of 
showing current dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2., 
then the court must "make specific factual findings 
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is 
based" as required by D.J.W. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
6 
 
M.W., No. 2021AP6, at ¶14 (quoting J.E.B., No. 2020AP1954-FT, at 
¶27). 
¶14 M.W. petitioned for this court's review of the remedy 
issue only.  The County did not file a petition for cross-review 
of the court of appeals' conclusion that the circuit court 
violated D.J.W. and accordingly that issue was not presented to 
this court. 
II 
¶15 We are called upon to resolve a question of appellate 
remedy.  The selection of the proper remedy on appeal is a 
question of law that we review independently.  See State v. 
Lentowski, 212 Wis. 2d 849, 853, 569 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1997). 
III 
¶16 We begin with the necessary background regarding 
recommitment proceedings and the directive established by this 
court in D.J.W.  Subsequently, we address the question raised in 
the petition for review, i.e. the proper appellate remedy for a 
D.J.W. violation. 
A 
¶17 In order to involuntarily commit a person pursuant to 
ch. 51, the petitioner must demonstrate that three elements are 
fulfilled:  the subject must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or 
others.  Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 
Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.  In 
an initial commitment proceeding, the "dangerousness" element 
can be proven through any of five standards set forth by 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
7 
 
statute.  State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶14, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 
647 N.W.2d 851; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.5 
                                                 
5 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2., an individual is 
"dangerous" if any of the following is fulfilled: 
(1) Evidences a substantial probability of physical 
harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence 
of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious 
bodily harm.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. 
(2) Evidences a substantial probability of physical 
harm to other individuals as manifested by evidence of 
recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or by 
evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of 
violent behavior and serious physical harm to them, as 
evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat to 
do serious physical harm.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. 
(3) Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested by 
evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, 
that there is a substantial probability of physical 
impairment or injury to himself or herself or other 
individuals.  § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. 
(4) Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts or 
omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is 
unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical 
care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate 
treatment so that a substantial probability exists 
that death, serious physical injury, serious physical 
debilitation, 
or 
serious 
physical 
disease 
will 
imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt 
and adequate treatment for this mental illness.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 
(5) For an individual, other than an individual who is 
alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally 
disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of 
and alternatives to accepting a particular medication 
or treatment have been explained to him or her and 
because 
of 
mental 
illness, 
evidences 
either 
incapability of expressing an understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication 
or treatment and the alternatives, or substantial 
incapability of applying an understanding of the 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
8 
 
¶18 Upon 
the 
impending 
expiration 
of 
an 
initial 
commitment, a petitioner may seek to extend the commitment for a 
period not to exceed one year.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1., 
(13)(g)3.; D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶31.  To prevail in a 
recommitment proceeding, the petitioner must demonstrate the 
same three elements necessary for the initial commitment.  
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶20, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 
N.W.2d 783.  
¶19 However, in a recommitment Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) 
provides an additional manner of proving dangerousness not 
available in the initial commitment.  "Because an individual's 
behavior might change while receiving treatment, Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(am) 
provides 
a 
different 
avenue 
for 
proving 
dangerousness if the individual has been the subject of 
treatment for mental illness immediately prior to commencement 
                                                                                                                                                             
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or 
her mental illness in order to make an informed choice 
as to whether to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment; and evidences a substantial probability, as 
demonstrated 
by 
both 
the 
individual's 
treatment 
history and his or her recent acts or omissions, that 
the individual needs care or treatment to prevent 
further disability or deterioration and a substantial 
probability that he or she will, if left untreated, 
lack services necessary for his or her health or 
safety 
and 
suffer 
severe 
mental, 
emotional, 
or 
physical harm that will result in the loss of the 
individual's ability to function independently in the 
community or the loss of cognitive or volitional 
control 
over 
his 
or 
her 
thoughts 
or 
actions.  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e. 
D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶30. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
9 
 
of extension proceedings . . . ."  Portage County v. J.W.K., 
2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 
¶20 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am): 
If the individual has been the subject of inpatient 
treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior 
to commencement of the proceedings as a result 
of . . . a commitment or protective placement ordered 
by 
a 
court 
under 
this 
section . . . or 
if 
the 
individual 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
outpatient 
treatment for mental illness . . . immediately prior 
to commencement of the proceedings as a result of a 
commitment ordered by a court under this section, 
. . . the requirements of a recent overt act, attempt 
or threat to act under par. (a)2.a. or b., pattern of 
recent acts or omissions under par. (a)2.c. or e., or 
recent behavior under par. (a)2.d. may be satisfied by 
a showing that there is a substantial likelihood, 
based on the subject individual's treatment record, 
that the individual would be a proper subject for 
commitment if treatment were withdrawn. 
This pathway to a recommitment "recognizes that an individual 
receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent overt acts 
or omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment 
ameliorated such behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, 
there may be a substantial likelihood such behavior would 
recur."  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶19. 
¶21 D.J.W. arrived at this court for our review of a 
recommitment order.  D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶23.  In that 
case, D.J.W. argued that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conclusion that he was "dangerous" within the meaning 
of Wis. Stat. § 51.20.   
¶22 The court approached the legal issues by first 
observing that "[t]he statutory basis for D.J.W.'s commitment in 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
10 
 
this case has been somewhat of a moving target."  Id., ¶36.  
Indeed, "It was not clear at either the initial commitment 
hearing or the extension hearing on which subdivision paragraph 
of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment was based."  Id. 
¶23 With the parties and the record in the case providing 
no guideposts for the court's review, the D.J.W. court announced 
a new directive for circuit courts.  Id., ¶40.  Namely, the 
court stated "that going forward circuit courts in recommitment 
proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference 
to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the 
recommitment is based."  Id. 
¶24 Such a directive is "manifest in the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(am)," and serves two distinct purposes.  Id., 
¶¶41-42.  "First, it provides clarity and extra protection to 
patients regarding the underlying basis for a recommitment."  
Id., ¶42.  Concerns about a fair process are paramount when any 
deprivation of liberty, such as a civil commitment, is at issue.  
Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).  
"With 
such 
an 
important 
liberty 
interest 
at 
stake, 
the 
accompanying protections should mirror the serious nature of the 
proceeding."  Id., ¶43.  Accordingly, the directive of specific 
factual findings connected to a standard of dangerousness 
"provides increased protection to patients to ensure that 
recommitments are based on sufficient evidence."  Id.; see also 
Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶31, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 
N.W.2d 590 (detailing ch. 51's "many provisions designed to 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
11 
 
offer procedural and substantive protections to the person 
subject to commitment"). 
¶25 Second, the D.J.W. directive was intended to "clarify 
issues raised on appeal of recommitment orders and ensure the 
soundness of judicial decision making, specifically with regard 
to challenges based on the sufficiency of the evidence."  
D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶44.  The court explained that "[a] 
more substantial record will better equip appellate courts to do 
their job, further ensuring meaningful appellate review of the 
evidence presented in recommitment proceedings."  Id. 
B 
¶26 We turn now to the legal issue raised by the petition 
for review, i.e. the proper remedy for a D.J.W. violation.6  In 
the time since this court issued the D.J.W. opinion, the court 
of appeals has been presented with a number of appeals raising 
the issue of whether the circuit court violated D.J.W.'s 
directive.  When the court of appeals has determined that such a 
violation occurred, the remedy ordered has not been consistent.  
In some cases, the court of appeals has remanded to the circuit 
court, while in others it has reversed outright with no remand. 
¶27 The court of appeals in this case reversed and 
remanded for the circuit court to, in essence, fill in the 
                                                 
6 As the concurrence aptly explains, the dissent goes well 
outside the bounds of the narrow remedy issue raised in this 
case.  Concurrence, ¶43.  The merits of the commitment are not 
before us because the County did not ask us to review them.  See 
supra, ¶5 n.2.  We thus do not further address the dissent's 
assertion of harmless error. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
12 
 
missing findings.  M.W., No. 2021AP6, at ¶14.  In doing so, the 
court of appeals referenced J.E.B., No. 2020AP1954-FT, at ¶27.  
In 
J.E.B., 
despite 
an 
uncontested 
argument 
for 
outright 
reversal, the court of appeals ordered a remand to the circuit 
court.  Its reasoning included precious little in the way of 
analysis of the remedy other than to say that "the more 
appropriate course of action is to remand this matter to the 
circuit court with directions to follow the dictates of D.J.W. 
discussed above."  Id. 
¶28 In contrast, other opinions by the court of appeals 
have indicated that outright reversal with no remand is the 
appropriate remedy.  See, e.g., Outagamie County v. L.C.E., No. 
2021AP324, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 
2021); Shawano County v. S.L.V., No. 2021AP223, unpublished slip 
op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2021); Eau Claire County v. 
J.M.P., No. 2020AP2014-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 22, 2021).  In these cases, the court of appeals' 
rationale has focused on the circuit court's competency to 
conduct proceedings on remand and the lack of meaningful relief 
that would be afforded to a committed person in the event of a 
remand. 
¶29 For example, the court in J.M.P. observed that 
"[a]lthough the circuit court held a hearing on the County's 
petition to extend [J.M.P.'s] commitment before [the expiration 
of the previous commitment], the court failed to enter a valid 
order 
extending 
[J.M.P.'s] 
commitment 
before 
his 
prior 
commitment order expired."  J.M.P., No. 2020AP2014-FT, at ¶21.  
No. 
2021AP6   
 
13 
 
Accordingly, "when the prior commitment order expired, the court 
lost competency to conduct further proceedings on the County's 
petition to extend [J.M.P.'s] commitment."  Id.  The court 
further referenced the purposes of the D.J.W. directive, 
determining that remanding to the circuit court for factual 
findings would cause the "clarity" and "extra protection" D.J.W. 
sought to engender to come "far too late to be meaningful."  
Id., ¶22. 
¶30 Similarly, in S.L.V., the court of appeals wrote that 
a remand would serve no purpose because the circuit court lacked 
competency: 
Here, the circuit court held a final hearing on the 
County's petition to involuntarily commit [S.L.V.] 
within the statutory time limits, but it failed to 
comply with its obligations under D.J.W. during that 
hearing, and it therefore failed to enter a valid 
commitment order.  At this point, the statutory time 
limits for holding a final commitment hearing have 
long since passed, and, as a result, the court now 
lacks competency to conduct further proceedings on the 
County's petition.  A remand for the court to comply 
with its obligations under D.J.W. would therefore 
serve no purpose, as the court now lacks competency to 
do so. 
S.L.V., No. 2021AP223, at ¶20.   
¶31 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
in 
L.C.E. 
additionally 
highlighted in its analysis a remand's effect on the right to a 
meaningful appeal:  "Because the recommitment order was entered 
almost a year ago, [L.C.E.] has not been afforded the clarity 
and additional protections guaranteed by D.J.W. for that entire 
period, and remedying the violation now would be far too late to 
be meaningful."  L.C.E., No. 2021AP324, at ¶10 (quotation 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
14 
 
omitted).  It further explained:  "The remedy of reversal also 
ensures that [L.C.E.] is not deprived of her right to a 
meaningful appeal, as it would be almost impossible for [L.C.E.] 
to appeal from the results of a new hearing, if necessary, 
before her current recommitment order likely becomes moot."  Id. 
¶32 The County urges us to follow the former set of cases, 
including the court of appeals' decisions in this case and 
J.E.B.  In the County's view, a D.J.W. violation is a "minor 
procedural violation" akin to a failure to adhere to "magic 
words" or to provide a simple statutory citation.  Such a 
procedural failing is not, according to the County, a reason to 
disregard the evidence that was presented at the hearing and 
risk releasing to the community a person who should properly be 
committed. 
¶33 On the other hand, M.W. argues that the latter court 
of appeals cases arrived at the correct result, contending that 
outright reversal is the only way to ensure a meaningful appeal 
of a recommitment order where a D.J.W. violation is alleged.  
M.W. asserts that the result of remanding would consistently be 
that the circuit court merely rearticulates its previous 
conclusion in different terms, thereby delaying resolution of 
the appeal and rendering the protections offered by D.J.W. 
completely illusory.  Further, M.W. argues that the purposes of 
the D.J.W. directive, as set out in that opinion, are best 
served 
by 
an 
outright 
reversal 
rather 
than 
a 
remand.  
Alternatively, 
M.W. 
asserts 
in 
passing 
that 
remand 
is 
inappropriate because the circuit court lacks competency to 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
15 
 
proceed on remand.  This argument is much more fully fleshed out 
by the State Public Defender as amicus.  Having been raised, we 
cannot ignore such a fundamental concern as competency.   
¶34 We agree with M.W. that outright reversal is the 
appropriate remedy.  Our reasoning in reaching this conclusion 
focuses on the circuit court's lack of competency to conduct 
proceedings on remand. 
¶35 A court's competency refers to the court's power to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case.  
City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶7, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 
882 N.W.2d 738.  Unlike a court's subject matter jurisdiction, 
which is established by the Wisconsin Constitution,7 competency 
may be affected by noncompliance with statutory requirements 
pertaining to the invocation of that jurisdiction in individual 
cases.  Id. 
¶36 In the specific area of ch. 51 commitments, our 
precedent establishes the premise that "[t]he circuit court must 
hold a hearing on the petition for extension before the previous 
order expires or it loses competency to extend the commitment."  
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶20.  An example of this principle in 
practice is provided by Rock County v. G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d 629, 
631, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989).  There, the circuit court 
erroneously concluded that G.O.T. was not entitled to a jury 
trial.  The court of appeals accordingly reversed and determined 
that "G.O.T. was entitled to a jury trial, but that the court 
                                                 
7 See Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8. 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
16 
 
lost competency by failing to hear and decide the petition 
before the commitment had expired."  Id.; see also id. at 633 
(explaining that "the trial court must hold the extension 
hearing before the initial commitment expires to determine 
whether the defendant is, in the words of sec. 51.20(13)(g)3., 
'a proper subject for commitment'").  Consequently, the court 
simply 
vacated 
the 
recommitment 
order 
and 
remanded 
with 
directions to dismiss the petition.  Id. at 631. 
¶37 This court recently applied the same principle when 
addressing the remedy for a violation of a ch. 51 patient's 
right to a jury trial.  See E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶40 n.10.  
In E.J.W., we explained: 
We simply reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
rather than remanding for a jury trial because the 
specific recommitment at issue in this case has 
expired and accordingly the circuit court has lost 
competency to act.  See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 631 
(determining 
that 
person 
subject 
to 
commitment 
extension was entitled to jury trial but that the 
circuit court lost competency by failing to hear and 
decide the petition before the commitment had expired 
and 
that 
as 
a 
result 
the 
petition 
should 
be 
dismissed); J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶20 (explaining 
that "[t]he circuit court must hold a hearing on the 
petition for extension before the previous order 
expires 
or 
it 
loses 
competency 
to 
extend 
the 
commitment").  This determination does not affect the 
validity of any subsequent extensions of commitment.  
J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶21 (setting forth that the 
reversal of a commitment order "does not retroactively 
deprive the circuit court that issued a subsequent 
commitment order of competency"). 
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶40 n.10. 
¶38 Likewise here, the recommitment order from which M.W. 
appealed has expired, as will often be the case.  See J.W.K., 
No. 
2021AP6   
 
17 
 
386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶29 (acknowledging that "a recommitment order 
will likely expire before appellate proceedings conclude").  
Indeed, the recommitment order from which M.W. appealed expired 
in October of 2021.  We therefore conclude that the recommitment 
order at issue here has expired and as a consequence the circuit 
court lacks competency to conduct any proceedings on remand.  
This conclusion flows directly from the decisions in G.O.T., 
J.W.K., and E.J.W., which contain language on point to the 
situation at hand.  Therefore, reversal is the appropriate 
remedy in this case. 
¶39 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2021AP6.bh 
 
1 
 
¶40 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (concurring).  The court today 
answers a narrow question:  Is remand appropriate when (1) the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concludes 
the 
circuit 
court 
committed 
reversible error by failing to comply with the requirements we 
articulated in D.J.W., and (2) the commitment order that is the 
subject of the appeal has already expired?  I join the majority 
because it correctly answers this question, holding that remand 
is not warranted because the circuit court lacks competency to 
rule on an expired commitment order.  I write separately to 
address the dissent's contention that we should decide more than 
the narrow question presented. 
¶41 To begin, it is helpful to reiterate what D.J.W. 
requires.  In Langlade County v. D.J.W., we directed that 
"circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific 
factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based."  
2020 WI 41, ¶3, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  We explained 
that this requirement would "clarify issues raised on appeal" 
and "better equip appellate courts to do their job."  Id., ¶44.  
Thus, a circuit court can fall short of our D.J.W. directive by 
failing to make specific factual findings or by failing to state 
which dangerousness standard the recommitment is based on. 
¶42 Although the parties frame this case as addressing the 
appropriate "remedy for a D.J.W. error," we do not purport to 
answer that question in the broad strokes this framing suggests.1  
                                                 
1 In briefing, M.W. described the issue before the court as 
follows:  "Whether the remedy for a D.J.W. error is outright 
reversal of the underlying orders, rather than a reverse and 
No.  2021AP6.bh 
 
2 
 
This is in part because not all failures to follow our D.J.W. 
directive are created equal.  A circuit court might, for 
example, neglect to explicitly reference the standard of 
dangerousness on which the recommitment is based, even as the 
transcript makes abundantly clear which standard was relied on.  
Other times, the transcript might fail to shed any light on 
which standard the circuit court employed.  Alternatively, 
D.J.W.'s instructions could be violated by failing to make 
specific factual findings on a small or large scale.  All of 
these "D.J.W. errors" technically violate our directive.  Yet 
today's decision does not answer whether these warrant reversal, 
nor does it prescribe a universal remedy for even a reversible 
D.J.W. defect. 
¶43 What we have before us is a remedy question regarding 
an already reversed commitment order.  The County did not appeal 
the determination that reversal was necessary.  Thus, the 
dissent inappropriately reviews the decision to reverse; this is 
not before us.  And the dissent's further worry that the court 
is disregarding other judicial tools that may be applicable, 
such as harmless error, is grounded in a misunderstanding of the 
procedural posture of this case.  The dissent's broader 
arguments, which have some force, should await a properly 
postured case.  For now, the majority determines——rightly in my 
                                                                                                                                                             
remand?"  The County agreed with this characterization, framing 
the issue this way:  "What is the proper remedy when, in a 
Chapter 51 recommitment proceeding, the circuit court fails to 
make specific factual findings with reference to the statutory 
basis for its determination of dangerousness as required by 
Langlade County v. D.J.W.?"  (Citation omitted.) 
No.  2021AP6.bh 
 
3 
 
view——that when a case is reversed for a D.J.W. error, and the 
commitment order is expired, the circuit court loses competency 
to rule on the expired order.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
court of appeals in this case reversed a mental recommitment 
which was supported in the record by substantial medical 
evidence and expert testimony, and it did so because the circuit 
court failed to use "magic words."  We do not require courts to 
use 
magic 
words. 
 
In 
the 
process 
of 
overturning 
this 
recommitment, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
avoided 
any 
material 
discussion of the facts.  Instead, it relied heavily on the lack 
of citation or quotation to specific statutory language in the 
circuit court transcript.  Our case law does not require such 
specificity.  It instead recognizes the reality of how these 
proceedings are factually individualized and our need to review 
the record.  The court of appeals did not, and now our court 
does not, afford the deference due to the record and the circuit 
court's determinations.  The majority errs in not only this 
regard but also in failing to engage in a harmless error 
analysis.  As a result, I dissent. 
¶45 Stated differently, our court misapplies the law.  
Just two years ago, we decided Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 
WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.  D.J.W. provided 
guidance to lower courts to ensure clear and effective judicial 
decision-making in recommitment hearings.  D.J.W. was consistent 
not only with recommitments, but also with historical practice 
and court proceedings in criminal and other civil contexts.  The 
court in D.J.W. did not hold that a circuit court's failure to 
cite a statutory reference is enough to overturn a valid mental 
health commitment.  D.J.W. did not hold that appellate courts 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
2 
 
can 
evade 
their 
own 
responsibilities. 
 
When 
reviewing 
recommitment orders on appeal, more than a swift and uncritical 
review is required.  This is a textbook example of this court 
now requiring magic words.  I would not depart from the court's 
duty to conduct a thorough review of the record, and I disagree 
with this court's adoption and adaptation of form over substance 
in now requiring magic words.  At most, this record demonstrates 
harmless error.  Again, the court errs in not conducting a 
harmless error analysis. 
¶46 In line with precedents, statutes, and traditional 
judicial practice, appellate courts must examine the record as a 
whole and apply a harmless error analysis even when a D.J.W. 
error is found.  The majority avoids discussion of these issues, 
but in doing so, it invites confusion and further litigation.  
Processes for valid Chapter 51 recommitments may be thrown into 
uncertainty, and committees may have their needed treatments 
interrupted or cut short due to circuit courts' procedural 
mistakes.  Effective judicial administration will also be a 
casualty, along with common respect for the law.  Ultimately, it 
is the individuals, families, and victims directly affected by 
severe mental illness who will bear the burden of the 
uncertainty created by this decision.  
¶47 As the majority indicates, the issue we are asked to 
decide in this case is what "the proper appellate remedy for a 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
3 
 
D.J.W. violation" is.1  Majority op., ¶16.  Justice Hagedorn's 
concurrence asserts that, given procedural limitations, the 
court cannot fully decide that issue.  The concurrence explains 
that the majority opinion stands only for the proposition that 
"when a case is reversed for a D.J.W. error, and the commitment 
order is expired, the circuit court loses competency to rule on 
the expired order."  Concurrence, ¶43.  The concurrence does not 
foreclose review in future cases on "whether [D.J.W. errors] 
warrant reversal," whether there is a "universal remedy for even 
a 
reversible 
D.J.W. 
defect," 
or 
whether 
"other 
judicial 
tools . . . such as harmless error" may be applicable.  Id., 
¶¶42-43.   
                                                 
1 In the petition for review to this court, M.W. stated on 
the first page of her analysis:  "Issue Presented:  Proper 
Remedy for a D.J.W. error."  In the petition, M.W. asserted 
"[o]nly one aspect of her appeal is the subject of this 
petition:  the proper remedy for a D.J.W. error."  In briefing, 
M.W. reiterated that "[t]he issue presented concerns the proper 
remedy for an error arising under the rule that this Court 
announced in [D.J.W.]."  Sheboygan County described the issue 
presented in a similar manner:  "What is the proper remedy when, 
in a Chapter 51 recommitment proceeding, the circuit court fails 
to make specific factual findings with reference to the 
statutory basis for its determination of dangerousness as 
required by [D.J.W.]?" 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
4 
 
¶48 The majority affirms the court of appeals' decision to 
reverse M.W.'s recommitment order.2  In addition, the majority 
reverses the court of appeals' decision to remand M.W.'s case to 
the circuit court for further proceedings.  An appellate court 
cannot reverse a Chapter 51 recommitment on the basis of a 
D.J.W. error without first examining the record.  The majority 
undertakes no such analysis here.  In addition, the harmless 
error doctrine applies to D.J.W. errors.  Because the court of 
appeals did not examine the record or apply a harmless error 
analysis, I would reverse the court of appeals' decision in 
full.  M.W.'s recommitment should stand.  The majority fails to 
adequately defer to the well-supported decision of the circuit 
court.   
 
I.  MENTAL HEALTH COMMITMENTS, APPELLATE REVIEW,  
AND HARMLESS ERROR 
¶49 It has been the law in Wisconsin for over a century 
that, when a circuit court enters a final judgment or order in a 
civil case, it must state its findings of facts and conclusions 
of law.  See Wallis v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Wis. 533, 535, 145 
                                                 
2 The majority unambiguously agrees with the court of 
appeals' decision to reverse the recommitment order.  The 
majority repeatedly asserts in its opinion that "reversal is the 
appropriate remedy in this case."  Majority op., ¶¶4, 34, 38.  
Undoubtedly, the court of appeals' decision to reverse the 
recommitment order is not reversed by the majority opinion.  
Therefore, the majority mislabels its mandate as a reversal of 
the court of appeals' decision in full.  In reality, the 
majority affirms the court of appeals' decision to reverse the 
recommitment order, and the majority reverses the decision to 
remand the case for rehearing.  I disagree with the majority's 
reasoning, the lack of deference it provides to circuit court 
decision making, and the mischaracterized mandate.  To be clear, 
the circuit court order should stand.  
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
5 
 
N.W. 195 (1914) (explaining that a trial court must issue a 
decision "embodying its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
before judgment is entered").  This is embodied in Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.17(2), which states that for all civil actions "tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall 
find 
the 
ultimate 
facts 
and 
state 
separately 
its 
conclusions of law thereon."  We have long required lower courts 
to articulate their reasoning in decisions in order to "protect 
the rights of the litigants and to facilitate review of the 
record by an appellate court."  Hochgurtel v. San Felippo, 78 
Wis. 2d 70, 85, 253 N.W.2d 526 (1977).  
¶50 However, for just as long as we have required circuit 
courts to explain their reasoning, we have also refused to 
reverse valid judgments outright when such reasoning is not 
provided.  Wallis, 155 Wis. at 536 ("The failure to make either 
findings of fact or conclusions of law is not reversible error, 
where 
the 
judgment 
shows 
that 
the 
necessary 
facts 
and 
conclusions must have been found in favor of the prevailing 
party and the evidence supports the judgment.").   We have 
understood that outright reversal of a decision well supported 
by the record on the lack of circuit court findings would be 
draconian and would effect a miscarriage of justice.  It would 
also undermine the respect due to circuit court judgments. 
Therefore, we have established three possible alternatives when 
reviewing a circuit court decision with incomplete findings.  
Appellate courts may "(1) affirm the judgment if clearly 
supported 
by 
the . . . evidence, 
(2) 
reverse 
if 
not 
so 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
6 
 
supported, or (3) remand for the making of findings and 
conclusions."  Kraemer v. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d 319, 320, 227 
N.W.2d 61 (1975) (collecting cases); accord State v. Margaret 
H., 2000 WI 42, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475; Wallis, 
155 Wis. at 535-36.   
¶51 This is in line with an equally storied principle in 
civil 
jurisprudence:  harmless 
error. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.18(1) (explaining that civil judgments cannot be reversed 
absent a finding of an error that "affect[s] the substantial 
rights of the adverse party"); Harran v. Klaus, 79 Wis. 383, 
387, 48 N.W. 479 (1891) ("[T]he court [shall], in every stage of 
an action, [] disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the 
adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by 
reason of such error or defect."); Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 
113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698 ("The appellate court 
must conduct a harmless error analysis to determine whether the 
error affected the substantial rights of the party." (quotations 
omitted)); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 982 (2022) ("[I]t is a 
fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a party cannot 
assign as error that which is not prejudicial to him or her.").  
The harmless error doctrine ensures finality, respect for 
judicial decisions, and fairness for all litigants.  Rose v. 
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) ("Reversal for error, regardless 
of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the 
judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it." 
(quotations 
omitted)); 
5 C.J.S. 
Appeal 
and 
Error, 
supra 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
7 
 
(explaining that the harmless error doctrine ensures "the 
orderly administration of justice and . . . the avoidance of 
useless expense to litigants").  In all, appellate courts do not 
reverse civil judgments in favor of one party simply because the 
circuit court failed to follow proper procedure.   
¶52 These basic principles of appellate review in civil 
cases are applicable to Chapter 51 recommitments.  See Milwaukee 
County  v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, ¶¶11-13, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 
N.W.2d 581 (explaining that Chapter 51 commitments are "civil 
proceedings"); Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) (stating that Chapter 
51 proceedings are governed by the rules of evidence and 
procedure in civil cases).  Under § 51.20(13), absent a jury 
demand, the circuit court overseeing a Chapter 51 commitment 
proceeding must make factual findings and determine whether as a 
matter of law an individual is "mentally ill," "a proper subject 
for treatment," and dangerous.  § 51.20(1)(a).  This is in kind 
with all civil cases tried and decided by a judge.  Accordingly, 
we recognized in Marathon County v. D.K. that it is best 
practice for circuit courts to state and explain their factual 
and legal conclusions.  2020 WI 8, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 
N.W.2d 901.  Every member of the court in D.K. agreed that the 
circuit court in the first instance must provide explicit and 
cogent analysis to facilitate appellate review.  Id., ¶55 
(Ziegler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., and Hagedorn, J.) 
("[T]he circuit court could have made more detailed and thorough 
factual findings and clarified its legal conclusions."); id., 
¶68 n.4 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring, joined by 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
8 
 
Kelly, J.) ("[C]ircuit courts must expressly make independent 
factual findings on the record, separate from any legal 
conclusions."); id., ¶86 (Dallet, J., dissenting, joined by Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
J.) 
("[Chapter 
51 
proceedings] 
cannot 
be 
perfunctory under the law.").   
¶53 It was in this legal environment that the court in 
D.J.W. held that circuit courts must state their recommitment 
findings on the record.  Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), an 
individual already subject to commitment can be recommitted if 
there is a finding that "the individual would be a proper 
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."  Prior to 
D.J.W., there was confusion as to whether this was a standalone 
basis for recommitment, or if a circuit court was required to 
cite back to one of the initial bases for committing mentally 
ill individuals along with § 51.20(1)(am).  See § 51.20(1)(a)2.  
This confusion was in no small part due to the language used in 
our prior opinions to describe recommitment and subsection (am).  
See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 
927 N.W.2d 509 ("[T]he County may, as an alternative to the 
options outlined in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e, prove dangerousness" 
under the recommitment pathway of § 51.20(1)(am)).  D.J.W. 
clarified that, when an individual is recommitted, the circuit 
court must state its factual findings with reference to one of 
the initial commitment pathways, in addition to § 51.20(1)(am).  
D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶40 ("[W]e determine that going forward 
circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
9 
 
factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based."). 
¶54 In D.J.W., the circuit court did not cite one of the 
five pathways for initial commitment when it recommitted the 
individual at issue.  Id., ¶45.  Further, in oral arguments 
before the court, the county cited a different dangerousness 
pathway for recommitment than what was used to obtain the 
committee's initial commitment six months prior.  Id., ¶¶38-39.  
Nonetheless, we examined the record to determine if recommitment 
was appropriate, and it was apparent that the county had failed 
to present the requisite proof.  The strongest evidence in favor 
of 
commitment 
was 
testimony 
that 
without 
treatment 
the 
individual would be "unable to maintain a job, hav[e] to rely on 
disability for income, and liv[e] with family."  Id., ¶51.  We 
noted that this was a far cry from a "'substantial probability' 
that 
'death, 
serious 
physical 
injury, 
serious 
physical 
debilitation, or serious physical disease' would ensue if 
treatment were withdrawn" under the fourth pathway, Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d. 
 
Id., 
¶53. 
 
Under 
the 
third 
pathway, 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c., we explained that "schizophrenia, by itself, 
does not demonstrate the requisite 'substantial probability of 
physical impairment.'"  Id., ¶57.   
¶55 Thus, D.J.W. stands for the well-accepted proposition 
that circuit courts, as in all civil proceedings, must explain 
their factual findings and legal conclusions to facilitate 
effective 
appellate 
review. 
 
D.J.W. 
clarified 
that, 
in 
recommitment proceedings, these circuit court statements must be 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
10 
 
made in reference to both an initial commitment pathway and Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).  Nowhere in D.J.W. did we state that 
appellate courts would reverse any and all recommitment orders 
that, on a cursory review, lack citation to an initial 
commitment pathway.  And nowhere in D.J.W. did the court 
indicate that traditional appellate review of lower court 
decisions would be amended or abrogated.  In fact, D.J.W. stands 
for the proposition that any error is not reversible error if 
the record supports the recommitment or if the error is 
harmless. 
¶56 When there are inadequate lower court findings in 
civil proceedings, we must "(1) affirm the judgment if clearly 
supported 
by 
the . . . evidence, 
(2) 
reverse 
if 
not 
so 
supported, or (3) remand for the making of findings and 
conclusions."  Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret H., 234 
Wis. 2d 606, ¶37.  D.J.W. did not change this law when the civil 
proceeding happens to be under Chapter 51.  Here, the majority 
concludes that the court of appeals cannot remand the case for 
further findings and conclusions, citing the lack of competence.  
Majority op., ¶4.  That leaves either affirming the judgment on 
the available evidence or reversing if the evidence is not 
available or apparent.  Id.  The majority conspicuously does not 
discuss this issue; it simply concludes "reversal is the 
appropriate remedy."  Id.  Although the majority provides no 
reasoning on the topic, the apparent result is an outright 
reversal without any discussion of the record.  But no such 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
11 
 
remedy 
has 
ever 
been 
recognized 
in 
Wisconsin 
for 
civil 
proceedings. 
¶57 In addition to this conflict with law and precedent, 
the majority fails to even mention harmless error in its 
analysis.  In line with standard civil procedure, harmless error 
applies 
to 
Chapter 
51 
proceedings. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(c) unambiguously states that "in every stage of an 
action, [the court shall] disregard any error or defect in the 
pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the substantial 
rights of either party."  This language is regularly interpreted 
as requiring harmless error review.  See Martindale, 246 
Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51, ("The 
reviewing court must disregard error, in every stage of the 
action, which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
party complaining.").  Both this court and the court of appeals 
have recognized that harmless error applies to Chapter 51 
proceedings.  See S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 
338-39, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991) (noting that an admission of 
evidence on dangerousness was harmless); D.S. v. Racine County, 
142 Wis. 2d 129, 135-36, 416 N.W.2d 292 (1987) (reviewing a 
Chapter 51 commitment, holding that the petition failed to 
comply with procedural drafting requirements, and explaining 
that "[t]here must be a further showing that this defect misled 
or 
caused 
prejudice 
before 
noncompliance 
with 
procedural 
statutory requirements may result in reversal" (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) (1987-88)); see, e.g., Rock County v. 
J.J.K., No. 2020AP2105, unpublished slip op., 2021 WL 1803745, 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
12 
 
at *8-9 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2021) (reviewing a circuit court 
transcript 
that 
failed 
to 
identify 
or 
cite 
the 
correct 
dangerousness pathway, concluding that any D.J.W. error was 
"harmless" because the record and the circuit court's analysis 
fit well within the fourth pathway, and reasoning that D.J.W. 
was not intended "to put form over substance in a manner that 
would require reversal on this record").  
¶58 D.J.W. in no way implied that harmless error review 
was inapplicable to circuit courts' explanations of fact and 
law.  To do so would mark a stark departure from established 
civil procedure (Wis. Stat. § 805.18; Harran, 79 Wis. at 387, 
Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, 
supra ¶51) from statutes governing mental health commitments 
(Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c)), and from our Chapter 51 precedents 
(S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39, D.S., 142 Wis. 2d at 135-36).  
Moreover, it would place transcript clarity above some of our 
most cherished constitutional rights. 
¶59 Criminal proceedings experience the same, if not 
greater 
constitutional 
scrutiny 
than 
civil 
commitments.  
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-31 (1979) (comparing the 
due process implications of criminal prosecutions and civil 
commitments; stating that civil commitments are not "punitive,"; 
they rely on medical expert opinion not the judgments of 
laypeople; 
the 
costs 
imposed 
on 
committees 
if 
they 
are 
wrongfully released can be substantial; and civil commitments by 
their nature involve less certainty).  Nonetheless, in criminal 
cases, we have routinely applied harmless error to uphold valid 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
13 
 
circuit court judgments, even where the defendant's fundamental 
rights were abridged.  As we stated in State v. Nelson, even in 
the most flagrant cases of error, Wisconsin "accords a 'strong 
presumption' that an error is subject to a harmless-error 
review."  2014 WI 70, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 
(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).  
"Accordingly, most constitutional errors can be harmless, and 
only a very limited class of cases require automatic reversal."  
Id. (quotations omitted). 
¶60 We have applied harmless error to jury instructions 
that violated a criminal defendant's due process rights, State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189; 
violations of criminal defendant's right to testify to her own 
behalf, State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶101, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 
N.W.2d 10; Miranda violations, State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶44, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270; and breaches of a criminal 
defendant's right to confrontation, State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, 
¶59, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; to name a few.3  Only a 
limited number of circuit court errors are subject to automatic 
                                                 
3 Any argument that applying harmless error to D.J.W. would 
make nonexistent D.J.W.'s holding is completely at odds with 
harmless error jurisprudence.  No reasonable jurist actually 
contends that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments cease to 
exist simply because judgments are affirmed despite violations 
of those amendments.  A circuit court or litigant who 
intentionally and knowingly violates the law, relying on the 
fact that harmless error applies on appeal, would be engaging in 
the unethical practice of law.  See SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) (an 
attorney cannot "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law"); SCR 60.04(1)(hm) ("A judge 
shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of 
judicial office fairly and impartially.").   
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
14 
 
reversal.  These "structural errors" are constitutional in 
nature, affect the "entire conduct of the trial from beginning 
to end," and on appeal, the impact of the error on the trial 
cannot be readily determined.  State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶49, 
356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207.  Certainly, the failure of a 
circuit court to state factual conclusions upon review of an 
established 
record 
and 
the 
failure 
to 
cite 
a 
statutory 
subsection are not structural errors in line with the "complete 
denial of the right to counsel."  Id., ¶50.  Appellate courts 
are more than capable of reviewing a record, party arguments, 
and circuit court reasoning to determine if a dangerousness 
pathway has been met.  In addition, the failure of a circuit 
court to be precise in its reasoning does not infect the entire 
recommitment proceeding with a constitutional violation.4    
¶61 Our precedents in the criminal sentencing context also 
support the conclusion that automatic reversal for D.J.W. 
violations 
would 
be 
improper. 
 
When 
sentencing 
criminal 
                                                 
4 The fact that Wisconsin appellate courts have, for over a 
century, examined the record when the circuit court's findings 
are inadequate and have applied harmless error analyses is proof 
positive that review of the record when there is a D.J.W. 
violation is both practical and administrable.  Kraemer v. 
Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d 319, 320, 227 N.W.2d 61 (1975); State v. 
Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475; 
Harran v. Klaus, 79 Wis. 383, 387, 48 N.W. 479 (1891); 
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698.  If the record and the circuit court findings do not 
allow the appellate court to reasonably determine what pathway 
of dangerousness is supported by the record, the appellate court 
can reverse the recommitment order.  This result would align 
with D.J.W.'s purpose in ensuring clarity and factual support in 
recommitment orders while also protecting the finality of valid 
circuit court judgments.   
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
15 
 
defendants, we have held that circuit courts must, "by reference 
to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's 
component parts promote the [statutorily required] sentencing 
objectives." 
 
State 
v. 
Gallion, 
2004 
WI 
42, 
¶46, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  This standard is very similar to 
D.J.W.'s requirement that circuit courts link their factual 
findings to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.'s dangerousness pathways.  
However, unlike determinations of dangerousness for Chapter 51 
proceedings, sentencing determinations are largely left to the 
discretion of circuit courts.  Compare D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶18 
("[O]ur review of statutory dangerousness requires us to apply 
the facts to the statutory standard and presents a question of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently."), 
with 
Gallion, 
270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶18 ("[Appellate courts] follow[] a consistent and 
strong policy against interference with the discretion of the 
trial court in passing sentence." (quotations omitted)).  It is 
therefore of special import that sentencing courts explain their 
reasoning so litigants, the public, and appellate courts can 
have confidence that the circuit court properly exercised its 
wide discretion.   
¶62 Nonetheless, even in the sentencing context, we have 
made clear that circuit courts are not required to use "magic 
words."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶49.  We do not reverse 
convictions simply because a circuit court failed to explicitly 
quote or reference sentencing factors, even if that method would 
facilitate appellate review.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 
280-81, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  Instead, "[i]f the facts are 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
16 
 
fairly inferable from the record, and the reasons indicate the 
consideration of legally relevant factors, the sentence should 
ordinarily be affirmed."  State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶33, 302 
Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364.   
¶63 If D.J.W. errors result in automatic reversal, without 
any consideration of the record as a whole or harmless error, we 
will transform Chapter 51 appeals into contests over magic 
words.  Appellate courts would put aside any consideration of 
the merits.  Instead, the driving focus would become whether the 
circuit court cited or quoted a subdivision paragraph of Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  This would create horrible incentives for 
litigants.  If a commitment can be overturned on mere citations 
and 
labels, 
the 
opportunities 
for 
gamesmanship 
would 
substantially increase.  Specifically, committees and their 
representatives will have no incentive to assist circuit courts 
in complying with D.J.W.  Even in cases where the record 
overwhelmingly 
supports 
commitment 
and 
the 
individual 
desperately needs treatment, if a circuit court mistakenly fails 
to 
cite 
a 
subdivision 
paragraph 
of 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2., 
the 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
17 
 
committee can remain silent and overturn his or her commitment 
on appeal.5   
¶64 D.J.W. reiterated the long-established principle that 
circuit 
courts 
must 
explain 
their 
reasoning 
and 
legal 
conclusions when they decide civil cases.  391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶40; 
D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶¶55, 68 n.4, 86; Wallis, 155 Wis. at 535-
36.  When circuit courts fail to do so, we must examine the 
record and determine whether their decision should be affirmed 
or reversed.  Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret H., 234 
Wis. 2d 606, ¶37.  In all legal proceedings, civil and criminal, 
                                                 
5 Even if we create a new rule mandating automatic reversal 
of Chapter 51 commitments, for sake of basic judicial integrity, 
we must apply the forfeiture doctrine to D.J.W. violations.  See 
Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 
N.W.2d 140 (reasoning that a Chapter 51 committee did not object 
to the sufficiency of the evidence and had thus forfeited the 
issue on appeal); Wis. Stat. § 805.11(1), (3) (stating that 
"[a]ny party who has fair opportunity to object before a ruling 
or order is made must do so in order to avoid waiving error" and 
reiterating 
that 
"[e]xceptions 
shall 
never 
be 
made").  
Committees and their counsel must have some incentive to 
encourage D.J.W. compliance.  See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 
¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 ("The purpose of the 
'forfeiture' rule is to enable the circuit court to avoid or 
correct any error with minimal disruption of the judicial 
process, eliminating the need for appeal."). Otherwise, D.J.W. 
will become nothing more than a tripwire to easily overturn 
commitments, 
not 
a 
means 
to 
ensure 
effective 
court 
administration.  Notably, there is no record here that M.W. 
objected to any lack of clarity on which statutory basis the 
recommitment was supported, nor at the time of the recommitment 
was she left unaware of possible dangerousness pathways under 
which she could be recommitted.  At the hearing, M.W.'s counsel 
objected to an alleged lack of pre-hearing notice on the part of 
the County, but then directly addressed and opposed application 
of the fifth dangerousness pathway before the circuit court.  
After the circuit court provided its reasoning in favor of 
recommitment, 
the 
circuit 
court 
gave 
M.W.'s 
counsel 
an 
opportunity to comment or object. 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
18 
 
appellate courts apply harmless error.  Wis. Stat. § 805.18; 
Harran, 79 Wis. at 387; Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 
C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51; Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 
¶29; Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶49.  And the harmless error 
doctrine extends to Chapter 51 commitments.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(c); S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39; D.S., 142 Wis. 2d 
at 135-36. 
¶65 D.J.W. correctly reversed a Chapter 51 commitment that 
was woefully lacking in factual support or a clear connection to 
a dangerousness pathway under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶38-39, 51, 53, 57.  The case did not remake 
appellate practice and procedure in this state.  It did not 
create a judge-made structural error standard, nor did it 
mandate the use of magic words.  In line with our historical 
practice, precedents, and statutes, we cannot reverse wholesale 
any and all Chapter 51 commitments when there is a D.J.W. error.  
If the commitment is supported by the evidence and the law, it 
must be affirmed.  In addition, the County must be given the 
opportunity to argue for harmless error.   
¶66 The stakes are high in Chapter 51 commitments.  
Although we hold the County to rigorous standards and safeguard 
committees' 
rights 
to 
fair 
and 
honest 
treatment, 
civil 
commitment ultimately ensures that mentally ill individuals 
receive the treatment they need before someone gets hurt.  
Automatic reversal of commitment orders solely due to the lack 
of precise wording on the part of a judge ignores substance and 
makes 
form 
paramount. 
 
And 
the 
potential 
costs 
would 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
19 
 
significantly outweigh any intended benefits.  Even the most 
suicidal or homicidal individuals may have their commitments 
overturned on the basis of a circuit court's procedural error.  
This would be a grave disservice to the fair and proper 
administration of justice.  More significantly, it would 
symbolize a failure of the judiciary to the many victims of 
severe mental illness, who rely on Chapter 51 for safety and 
protection.  In cruel irony, unjustified reversal will harm 
civil committees the most.  Addington, 441 U.S. at 430 ("Such 
'freedom' for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high 
price.").   
 
II.  THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND THE MAJORITY OPINION 
¶67 Here, the court of appeals examined the circuit court 
transcript and determined that the circuit court did not quote 
or cite a dangerousness pathway under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.  
Shebogyan County v. M.W., No. 2021AP6, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶10, 12 (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2021).  The court of appeals 
reversed M.W.'s commitment, but remanded the case for the 
circuit court to clarify its findings.  Id., ¶14.  This is in 
line with established practice for reviewing circuit court 
findings in civil cases.  Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320 (explaining 
that appellate courts may "remand for the making of findings and 
conclusions"); 
accord 
Margaret 
H., 
234 
Wis. 2d 606, 
¶37.  
However, the court of appeals did not consider whether the 
record supported M.W.'s recommitment notwithstanding any D.J.W. 
error.  The court of appeals also did not review M.W.'s 
recommitment under the harmless error doctrine, despite the 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
20 
 
County arguing explicitly in its court of appeals brief that 
harmless error applied:  "Since the Court's ruling can easily be 
determined upon review, M.W. is not substantially prejudiced by 
the 
lack 
of 
specific 
statute 
number" 
(citing 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(c)).  
¶68 If the court of appeals examined the record or applied 
harmless error, it would not have reversed the recommitment 
order in this case.  There was substantial evidence to support 
the fifth pathway on dangerousness, and both medical experts and 
the County argued for application of that pathway before the 
circuit court.   
¶69 The record strongly favored recommitment.  M.W. was 
initially committed in 2006 after attempting suicide at least 20 
times.  She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, with acute 
psychotic symptoms, and has since received treatment in a stable 
environment.  A registered psychiatrist with over 25 years of 
experience 
attempted 
to 
interview 
M.W. 
telephonically 
to 
determine the need for recommitment.  M.W. hung up on the doctor 
during the examination, but the doctor observed in that time 
that M.W. was "manic, paranoid, angry, dysphoric, not rational, 
[and] making delusional comments."  The doctor noted that M.W. 
eloped from her outpatient facility during the height of the 
COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020) without medication, money, or any 
sort of plan.  Reviewing M.W.'s complete treatment record and 
applying his professional judgment, the doctor explained that 
M.W. 
has 
shown 
a 
"complete 
disregard 
for 
the 
need 
to 
get . . . help."  The doctor stated "standard five" for mental 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
21 
 
health commitment was "exactly how [M.W.] would be dangerous" if 
she were not recommitted.  A trained behavior health manager who 
had worked directly with M.W. for months, provided testimony 
supporting the doctor's account.  The manager described M.W. as 
erratic, unable to receive care outside commitment, and hostile 
to medication and non-pharmaceutical treatment.  The only 
evidence presented against recommitment was testimony from M.W. 
herself, who described herself as independent, stable, and 
medication compliant.  During the hearing, M.W. also became 
agitated and interrupted witnesses and the circuit court in 
unsolicited outbursts.  In closing arguments, the County argued 
for application of the fifth dangerousness pathway.   
¶70 The 
circuit 
court 
findings 
further 
supported 
recommitment.  The circuit court quoted the recommitment pathway 
(D.J.W. had been decided only six months prior) and cited in 
detail the doctor's testimony.  The court stated that M.W. "can 
become so psychotic . . . she doesn't take care of herself and 
that endangers her" and explained that, without treatment, "she 
is going to lack the services necessary for her health and 
safety." 
 
Finally, 
the 
circuit 
court 
reasoned 
that 
the 
advantages of medication had been explained to M.W., but she was 
not competent to understand those advantages to make informed 
decisions.  The court clearly did not find M.W.'s testimony 
credible.  See State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, ¶32, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 
698 N.W.2d 776 ("When . . . the trial court acts as the finder 
of fact it is the ultimate arbiter of both the credibility of 
the witnesses, and the weight to be given to each witness' 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
22 
 
testimony." 
(quotations 
omitted)); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.17(2) 
(stating that findings of fact from a trial court are reviewed 
with "due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses").  In all, if the court 
of appeals examined the record as a whole and the circuit 
court's statements, M.W.'s recommitment would have been affirmed 
under the fifth dangerousness pathway. 
¶71 After the court of appeals reversed the recommitment 
order and remanded for further proceedings, M.W. appealed to 
this court challenging the court of appeals' chosen remedy for a 
D.J.W. violation.  In the process, the County did not appeal the 
determination that D.J.W. was not adequately followed.  The 
majority states that remand is not possible in this case because 
the circuit court lost competency.  Majority op., ¶4.  That is 
not true of all cases, and the majority opinion does not state 
that it is applying a categorical rule.  See id., ¶4 ("As a 
consequence, reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case" 
due to the lack of competency).  As members of a competent and 
well-trained 
judiciary, 
appellate 
courts 
should 
prudently 
analyze each case and determine the proper remedy case-by-case, 
as is done in all civil cases with inadequate circuit court 
findings.  In cases where the circuit court still retains 
competency and can efficiently correct any D.J.W. errors, 
appellate courts must be permitted to consider remand to correct 
any D.J.W.-specification errors.  The concern in D.J.W. was the 
lack of clarity in circuit court decisions; if a circuit court 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
23 
 
can effectively resolve the uncertainty on remand, appellate 
courts should facilitate that result.  
¶72 In holding that remand is not an available remedy in 
this case, the majority makes no effort to describe if, when, or 
how appellate courts can review whether the record supports 
commitment and affirm a circuit court's judgment even where 
there is a D.J.W. violation.  The majority simply concludes 
"reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case."  Majority 
op., ¶4.  Harmless error is not mentioned once in the analysis.  
This is all despite the fact that the County thoroughly examined 
the evidence in support of M.W.'s commitment, asserted that M.W. 
should be recommitted under the fifth dangerousness pathway, and 
claimed that the only error in this case was a "procedural 
violation" whereby "the circuit court did not make its findings 
clear enough as to what standard it was basing its decision on."  
It was abundantly clear in its arguments that the County 
believed reversal in this case solely on the basis of a D.J.W. 
violation would be inappropriate given that the merits so 
strongly supported recommitment.  Furthermore, M.W. argued 
"action in the court of appeals," in which the court of appeals 
would 
affirm 
the 
recommitment 
notwithstanding 
a 
D.J.W. 
violation, could be a possible remedy in this case.  We have 
been asked to determine what the appropriate remedy is when a 
D.J.W. violation has been found; the issue is squarely before 
us.  Affirming a recommitment on appeal upon review of the 
record is a remedy that can and should be used.  And if that 
remedy were applied in this case, M.W.'s recommitment would be 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
24 
 
affirmed.  The failure of the majority to address the record and 
the circuit court's reasoning deprives the circuit court 
decision of the deference it is due.  
¶73 This is a profound and extraordinarily important legal 
issue for this state.  If D.J.W. requires automatic reversal of 
civil commitments for the lack of correct wording on the part of 
the circuit court, without any showing of structural error or 
prejudice, the court will be creating a remedy never before 
recognized in this state.  It would cast aside over a century of 
appellate practice and precedents, and it would ignore explicit 
and on-point statutory language in favor of novel, judicially 
devised law.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) ("[I]n every stage of an 
action, [the court shall] disregard any error or defect in the 
pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the substantial 
rights of either party."); Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret 
H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶37; Wis. Stat. § 805.18; Harran, 79 Wis. 
at 387; Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error, supra ¶51; Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶29; Pinno, 356 
Wis. 2d 106, ¶49; S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39; D.S., 142 Wis. 2d 
at 135-36. 
¶74 While bearing the appearance of a limited decision, 
the majority opinion in this case has potentially significant 
consequences.  The majority refuses to provide guidance to 
future courts as to how they should actually deal with D.J.W. 
errors.  Can appellate courts review the record to determine if 
commitment is supported, despite a circuit court's failure to 
cite or reference a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
25 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.?  Can appellate courts apply harmless error, or 
must they reverse as a matter of course all mental commitments, 
even those with overwhelming support in the record and in 
circuit court findings?  The majority opinion leaves lower 
courts and Chapter 51 litigants in the dark.  In so doing, 
today's decision practically guarantees further litigation and 
confusion.  It may very well be that in the process, valid and 
necessary commitments are reversed for the lack of magic 
references 
to 
subdivision 
paragraphs 
of 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.  
Appellate courts can cite the majority's rejection of remand 
procedures in this case, its conclusion that "reversal is the 
appropriate remedy," and its conspicuous silence on other 
methods of review.  Majority op. ¶4.  They can observe that 
M.W.'s recommitment was reversed without any examination of the 
record.  Other appellate courts, by contrast, may look to how 
every other civil and criminal appeal operates, and how every 
other Chapter 51 error is reviewed, and affirm valid commitments 
supported by the record and the circuit court's findings.  
Inconsistent standards and legal uncertainty work only to the 
detriment of those subject to Chapter 51 commitment proceedings.   
¶75 By relying on a procedural error, and conducting no 
other analysis, the majority's decision avoids significant 
determinations that are due the state of Wisconsin and M.W.  
There is a time and place for avoiding extraneous legal issues, 
and there is a time and place for this court to provide clarity 
for 
Wisconsin's 
legal 
system. 
 
See 
Cook 
v. 
Cook, 
208 
Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) ("The purpose of the 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
26 
 
supreme court is to oversee and implement the statewide 
development of the law." (quotations omitted)).  By taking this 
case, but refusing to fully address the issues presented, the 
most 
consequential 
result 
of 
the 
majority's 
decision 
is 
increased legal uncertainty.  If this court believes any and all 
Chapter 51 commitments should be reversed if the circuit court 
fails to reference a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)2., the court should make that clear.  If the court 
does so, the legislature would at least have the opportunity to 
consider legislation to avoid the manifest injustice such a 
decision would engender.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶27 The majority affirms the court of appeals' decision to 
reverse M.W.'s recommitment order.  In addition, the majority 
reverses the court of appeals' decision to remand M.W.'s case to 
the circuit court for further proceedings.  An appellate court 
cannot reverse a Chapter 51 recommitment on the basis of a 
D.J.W. error without first examining the record.  The majority 
undertakes no such analysis here.  In addition, the harmless 
error doctrine applies to D.J.W. errors.  Because the court of 
appeals did not examine the record or apply a harmless error 
analysis, I would reverse the court of appeals' decision in 
full.  M.W.'s recommitment should stand.  Hopefully, this court 
will have the opportunity to properly address the issues 
identified in Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, including the 
appropriate appellate remedy for D.J.W. errors, in future 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
27 
 
appeals.  See concurrence, ¶¶42-43.  The majority's conclusions 
in this case fall short of what is required.    
¶76 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
No.  2021AP6.akz 
 
 
 
1