Title: Commonwealth v. Thompson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-11623
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 10, 2014

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SJC-11623 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WALTER THOMPSON. 
 
 
 
November 10, 2014. 
 
Controlled Substances.  "School Zone" Statute.  Statute, 
Amendment, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
After a jury trial, Walter Thompson was convicted of 
distributing cocaine and doing so in a school zone.  While his 
appeal was pending in the Appeals Court, the school zone 
statute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, was amended to reduce the radius 
of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet.  St. 2012, 
c. 192, § 30.  In an unpublished decision, a panel of the 
Appeals Court ruled that this amendment did not have retroactive 
effect, rejected Thompson's other claims of error, and affirmed 
the convictions.  Commonwealth v. Thompson, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
1135 (2013).  We granted Thompson's application for further 
appellate review.  467 Mass. 1101 (2014).  We now affirm the 
convictions, on somewhat different grounds. 
 
 
Evidence.  We review the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  On July 31, 2008, at 
approximately 10 P.M., Cambridge police Detectives Kevin Branley 
and Ed Liberacki were conducting patrols in Cambridge.  From 
their parked, unmarked vehicle, they observed (Branley using 
binoculars) Michael Benoit and Lori Quigley sitting on a curb in 
the parking lot of a convenience store on the corner of Prospect 
Street and Broadway.  Both detectives were experienced in 
detecting street-level narcotics sales and were familiar with 
this parking lot from previous narcotics investigations.  Benoit 
and Quigley were counting change in their open hands and looking 
furtively in all directions.  Quigley stood and made a call at a 
pay telephone attached to the side of the convenience store.  
2 
 
After about twenty seconds, she hung up the telephone and 
returned to the curb, where she and Benoit continued looking up 
and down the streets.  Quigley paced as she did so.  After about 
ten minutes, Thompson approached on bicycle on Broadway from the 
direction of Harvard Square.  He rode through the parking lot 
and, without stopping, exchanged a few words with Quigley.  
Thompson, with Quigley following him at a hurried pace, 
continued on Prospect Street and stopped at a nearby house.  As 
Quigley approached him, they looked back and forth at each other 
and all around in all directions.  Quigley extended her hands 
toward Thompson, with one palm open and facing up, and the other 
in a closed fist.  Thompson did the same, extending a closed 
fist toward Quigley's open hand and an open hand to her closed 
fist.  Their hands made contact briefly, in a manner consistent 
with exchanging items between them.  This exchange took place 
approximately 500 feet from school property.  Quigley continued 
pacing, acting as though she was nervous.  She returned to where 
Benoit was sitting at the curb.  Quigley and Benoit walked at a 
quickened pace across the parking lot and onto Broadway toward 
Harvard Square.  As they walked behind a fence at a nearby 
house, Thompson got back on his bicycle and rode down Prospect 
Street toward Central Square. 
 
 
The detectives radioed a description of Thompson and pulled 
into the driveway of the house.  They got out of their car and 
walked up the driveway alongside the house.  They found Quigley 
and Benoit behind the house in an area that was well lit with 
floodlights.  Benoit had in his hand an object that turned out 
to be a small plastic bag containing "crack" cocaine, and he was 
opening the bag.  The detectives identified themselves and 
displayed their badges.  Benoit quickly extended his hand over a 
fence and dropped the bag.  The detectives detained them and 
radioed for backup.  Once backup arrived, Liberacki retrieved 
the bag from where Benoit had dropped it.  It was the cut-off 
corner of a plastic sandwich bag, consistent with packaging of 
approximately one-half gram of crack cocaine, which was 
typically valued between forty and sixty dollars.  The 
detectives arrested Benoit and Quigley and read them the Miranda 
warnings.  Both Benoit and Quigley were searched; among other 
things, a glass tube of the type used to smoke crack cocaine was 
found on Quigley's person. 
 
 
Other officers stopped Thompson in an area between the 
store and his home.  Branley arrived shortly thereafter and read 
Thompson the Miranda warnings.  Thompson said that he understood 
his rights and wished to speak to the detective.  In response to 
Branley's question, Thompson stated politely that he was coming 
3 
 
from a friend's house in Charlestown.  Thompson was searched, 
resulting in the discovery of two folds of cash, one containing 
forty-five dollars and the other containing forty dollars, a 
cellular telephone and charger, a pack of cigarettes, and a 
cigarette lighter. 
 
 
Sufficiency of evidence.  Based on the foregoing evidence, 
it is clear that the jury had ample basis to convict Thompson of 
distributing cocaine.  Contrary to Thompson's argument, the 
evidence does not equally suggest that Benoit was in possession 
of the cocaine at all times.  In particular, the officers 
observed a hand-to-hand transaction between Thompson and 
Quigley, after which Thompson was found with no drugs on his 
person, but with folds of cash, and Quigley's companion Benoit 
was found with drugs (which he quickly discarded) having roughly 
the value of either cash fold found on Thompson.  Together with 
the participants' furtive behavior, Thompson's arrival within 
minutes after Quigley made the telephone call, and the glass 
tube found on Quigley's person, this evidence requires no leap 
of conjecture to conclude that Thompson sold the crack cocaine 
to Quigley. 
 
 
Retroactivity of St. 2012, c. 192, § 30.  In Commonwealth 
v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 561 (2013), we ruled that the recent 
amendment to the school zone statute, St. 2012, c. 192, § 30, 
applies retroactively to "all cases alleging a school zone 
violation for which a guilty plea had not been accepted or 
conviction entered as of" the effective date of the amendment.  
Thompson now argues that we should extend this rule to his case, 
where he had been tried and convicted before the effective date, 
but his direct appeal was pending on that date.  We disagree. 
 
 
As we discussed in Bradley, supra at 555, "the Legislature 
did not clearly express an intention that § 30 apply 
retroactively."  We nonetheless concluded, after considering the 
legislative purpose of the statute, that limiting § 30 to 
prospective application would be inconsistent with that purpose, 
or in the words of G. L. c. 4, § 6, "repugnant to the context of 
the same statute."  Bradley, supra at 555-561.  As § 30 "was 
enacted to diminish the unfair disparate impact of the prior 
statute on urban and minority residents," id. at 559, we 
concluded that failing to apply it to charges that were pending 
in the trial court on the effective date would wrongly prolong 
that unfair disparate impact. Id. at 561. 
 
 
The situation is different, however, where the charges were 
already resolved with a trial and conviction that occurred 
4 
 
before the effective date of the amendment.  Applying § 30 
retroactively in such cases would necessitate new trials on 
convictions that had been entered before the Legislature acted 
to change the school zone statute.  While it is inconsistent 
with the Legislature's purpose not to grant defendants the 
benefit of § 30 in trials that take place after the effective 
date, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to grant 
new trials to defendants who already had been convicted.  
Accordingly, we hold that St. 2012, c. 192, § 30, does not 
entitle Thompson to a new trial on his conviction of a school 
zone violation where his conviction was entered prior to August 
2, 2012.1 
 
 
Other issues.  Finally, Thompson raises two additional 
claims of error:  first, that certain photographs were wrongly 
admitted and, second, that the judge gave an improper response 
to a question from the deliberating jury.  He objected to 
neither alleged error at trial.  We have carefully reviewed the 
record and agree with the Appeals Court that there was no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
Matthew C. Harper-Nixon for the defendant. 
 
Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                     
1 We leave for another day the question whether St. 2012, 
c. 192, § 30, would apply on retrial if a defendant's conviction 
of a school zone violation, entered before August 2, 2012, were 
subsequently reversed on other grounds.  Because we affirm 
Thompson's convictions, we need not decide that issue today.