Title: Wikoski v. Wikoski
Citation: 355 Pa. Super. 409, 513 A.2d 986
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 1986

355 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 (1986) 513 A.2d 986 Betty WIKOSKI v. Chester WIKOSKI, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted November 4, 1985. Filed July 31, 1986. Michael R. Lynn, Bloomsburg, for appellant. John J. Hovan, Tunkhannock, for appellee. Before BROSKY, POPOVICH and ROBERTS, JJ. BROSKY, Judge: This appeal is from a divorce decree. Appellant contends *410 that the Divorce Code provision allowing no-fault divorce[1] violates his freedom of religion under the Pennsylvania Constitution.[2] We disagree, and accordingly, affirm. Appellant contends that the grant of a divorce infringes on his religious beliefs as a Roman Catholic, in that that faith opposes divorce. His devotion to his faith is quite apparent. Such an infringement, he argues, works a violation of his rights under Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That Section states: The provision at issue is that providing for freedom of "the rights of conscience." There is no case on point in this Commonwealth. As a consequence, before turning to the cases interpreting our State Constitution, it will be useful to consider cases in other jurisdictions treating similar issues and the precise issue before us.[3] Three United States Supreme Court cases are worth noting. First, in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888), the high court held that marriage was a social relationship governed by the laws of the individual states under their police powers. Second, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d *411 965 (1963) the court reiterated the standard under which First Amendment infringements by state regulation are to be judged: "If, therefore, the decision . . . is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be . . . because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a `compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate. . . .' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 [, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405] . . ." The third, and final, United States Supreme Court case examined here is the earliest of them, from 1878. Reynolds v. United States, 8 Otto 145, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878), treated the question of whether freedom of religion made impermissible federal law prohibiting polygamy. A Mormon in the then territory of Utah was prosecuted under the federal law. Chief Justice Waite delivered the scholarly and eloquent opinion of the Court. Some brief exerpts from Reynolds are well worth quoting. Reynolds, supra 8 Otto 145, 98 U.S. at 165-6. A few of our sister states have had the occasion to treat the issue before us. The principal case of these is Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401 (Oklahoma 1975). Williams, supra, at 1403. Williams develops the point made in Reynolds and does so properly. A case out of Kansas presents a rather interesting analysis. Sharma v. Sharma, 8 Kan.App.2d 726, 667 P.2d 395, 396 (1983). Another point made in Reynolds is presented in a somewhat different manner in a Louisiana case treating an issue similar to the one before us. Appellant, the defendant in a divorce action, argued that the grant of a divorce violated the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. Scheppf v. Scheppf, 430 So. 2d 370, 372, n. 2 (Crt. of Appeal of Louisiana, 1983).[4] Persuasive though all these authorities may be, they could be inconsistent with interpretations of this Commonwealth's constitution.[5] A review of those interpretations is, therefore, in order. As would be expected, Section Three's rights of conscience are not unlimited. Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 141, 78 A. 68, 71 (1910). More succinctly, it has been held that, "while the adoption of a belief is absolutely protected, there exists only a qualified right to act on that belief." Morris v. Morris, 271 Pa.Super. 19, 26, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (1979). The dimensions of this qualified right are given in Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa.Super. 462, 469, 79 A.2d 134, 137 (1951), quoting the dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. &amp; R. 155, 160 (1828). This language in Lesher presages language in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. at 406, 83 S. Ct. at 1795, quoted in Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 335, 341 A.2d 105, 107-08 (1975). This is a most substantial test. Under even this stringent analysis, appellant's claim fails. The state's interests in regulating marriage and divorce are clearly paramount. That regulation is inconsistent with the recognition of a *415 unilateral right of a party to remove himself from its purview as a matter of conscience. The state has the power, properly exercised within constitutional limits guaranteeing freedom of religion, to grant divorces. Thus, whether granting appellee her divorce is viewed as not infringing upon appellant's freedom of religion, as in Williams, supra, or as interfering with the practice of his religion, as in Reynolds, supra, the result reached here would be the same. To whatever extent the issuance of a divorce decree interferes with the practice of appellant's religion, it does not violate an individual's right to freedom of conscience.[6] Legal and academic scholars may nod with approval, either wholly or halfheartedly, the decisions of the Courts in the cases cited herein to resolve a matter involving the church and state. Hopefully, the appellant will do likewise. If not, then we believe that the only authority best understood by appellant whose religious convictions are to be admired is to quote scripture. The appropriate passage appears in the New Testament in the Gospel of St. Matthew, Chapter 22, verse 15 to 22 which reads as follows: That says it all in response to the age old conflict between civil and spiritual spheres of authority. Order affirmed. POPOVICH, J., concurs in the result. [1] 23 Pa.C.S. § 201(d)(1)(ii). [2] Appellant also contends that there was insufficient evidence of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Upon review, we find this issue to be without merit. [3] While these non-Pennsylvania cases involve, for the most part, the First Amendment of our federal constitution, our holding herein is made only with respect to our state constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). [4] For other treatments of this issue by state courts see: Martian v. Martian, 328 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1983); Trickey v. Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47 (Tex.App. 1982). [5] It is true that it was stated in Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District, 457 Pa. 166, 174, 320 A.2d 362, 366-61 cert. den. 419 U.S. 967, 95 S. Ct. 231, 42 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1974) that: "The protection of rights and freedoms secured by this section of our Constitution, however, does not transcend the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." Except as applicable to the facts of that case and very similar facts, that can be only dicta. State constitutional provisions have the option of expanding upon federal protections. [6] It could also be concluded, as in Sharma, supra, that acceding to appellant's religious beliefs in this context would violate appellee's religious beliefs and work a violation of that portion of Section 3 which states: "no preference shall be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship." [7] It is not intended that the above quote from scripture be a legally binding precedent of this Court.