Title: Croll v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 369, 2012
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: October 15, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PATRICK CROLL, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 369, 2012 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§ 
§  Cr. ID Nos. 0801001836 
§  and 0803007023 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: September 10, 2012 
 
Decided: 
October 15, 2012 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 15th day of October 2012, upon consideration of appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) The appellant, Patrick Croll, appeals from a Superior Court order 
denying his motion for correction of sentence.  The State of Delaware 
moved to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the 
face of Croll’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm.  
(2) The record reflects that Croll pled guilty in 2008 to Aggravated 
Menacing, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a 
 
2
Felony, Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree, and Endangering 
the Welfare of a Child.  The Superior Court sentenced Croll on February 6, 
2009 to a total of thirty-three years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
after serving nineteen years at decreasing levels of supervision.  As part of 
his sentence, Croll was required to register as a sex offender and 
successfully complete treatment programs addressing issues of domestic 
violence, anger management and parenting.  Croll also was ordered to 
receive a mental health evaluation and comply with all recommendations for 
treatment.  Croll’s direct appeal from his plea and sentence was dismissed as 
untimely.1  Croll then moved for postconviction relief, which the Superior 
Court by order denied.  We affirmed that order on appeal.2  
(3) Thereafter, Croll filed several motions seeking modification of 
his sentence to include a specific treatment program.  The Superior Court 
denied those motions.  On January 6, 2012, the Superior Court modified 
Croll’s sentence to require specifically that Croll receive sex offender 
treatment.  Croll did not appeal.  On May 16, 2012, Croll filed a document 
entitled, “Motion Ex Post Facto,” challenging the Superior Court’s 
January 6, 2012 modified sentencing order.  The Superior Court treated 
                                                 
1 Croll v. State, 2009 WL 1042172 (Del. Apr. 17, 2009). 
2 Croll v. State, 2011 WL 486615 (Del. Feb. 9, 2011). 
 
3
Croll’s document as a motion for correction of illegal sentence under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), and denied the motion on the basis that 
Croll’s sentence was legal and appropriate.  This appeal followed. 
(4) Croll’s opening brief on appeal is the identical memorandum of 
law that he filed in support of his Rule 35 motion in the Superior Court.  
Although it is not entirely clear, Croll appears to argue that the Superior 
Court’s modified sentencing order violates the ex post facto clause of the 
United States Constitution, because it added sex offender treatment as a 
condition of the sentence, to which Croll did not agree as part of his plea 
bargain.  Croll argues that his 2008 guilty plea, therefore, should be 
invalidated. 
(5) The ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution 
prohibits the retroactive application of a law that “imposes a punishment for 
an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed[,] or imposes 
additional punishment to that then prescribed.”3  As this Court previously 
has held, internal prison rehabilitation programs are not an element of 
punishment that attach to an inmate’s initial conviction.4  Thus, such 
                                                 
3 DiStefano v. Watson, 566 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. 1989). 
4 Id. 
 
4
programs do not implicate the ex post facto clause.5  Moreover, Croll’s claim 
that he is not receiving his choice of programs has no merit because an 
inmate has no constitutional right to participate in a specific prison 
program.6  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s denial of 
Croll’s motion for correction of sentence. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Justice 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Fatir v. State, 935 A.2d 255 (Del. 2007).