Title: Arkansas State Board of Arch. v. Bank Bldg. & E. Corp.
Citation: 286 S.W.2d 323
Docket Number: 5-794
State: Arkansas
Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court
Date: January 30, 1956

286 S.W.2d 323 (1956) ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTS, Appellant, v. BANK BUILDING &amp; EQUIPMENT CORP. OF AMERICA, Appellee. No. 5-794. Supreme Court of Arkansas. January 30, 1956. *324 Mehaffy, Smith &amp; Williams, B. S. Clark, Little Rock, for appellant. Harry S. Kramer, Jr., St. Louis, Mo, Rose, Meek, House, Barron &amp; Nash, Little Rock, for appellee. McFADDIN, Justice. The issue posed on this appeal is whether the appellee has engaged in the practice of architecture in violation of Act 270 of 1941 (now found in § 71-301 et seq, Ark.Stats.) Appellant, Arkansas State Board of Architects (hereinafter called "Board"), filed suit to enjoin[1] appellee, Bank Building &amp; Equipment Corporation of America (hereinafter called "Building Corporation"), from continuing to engage in certain activities which the Board alleged to be the practice of architecture and in violation of said Act 270. The Chancery Court held that the activities of the Building Corporation did not amount to the practice of architecture and dismissed the complaint; and from that decree the Board brings this appeal presenting the issue[2] as first stated above. The evidence established that the Building Corporation is domiciled in St. Louis, *325 Missouri and qualified as a foreign corporation in this State; but is not licensed to engage in the practice of architecture under Act 270 of 1941, § 71-301 et seq, Ark.Stats.; that the Building Corporation specializes in constructing bank buildings and planning and constructing the interiors thereof, and has an architectural department as an integral part of its business; that Mr. W. G. Knoebellicensed as an architect in Arkansasis the Chief Architect of the Building Corporation, and is the head of a staff of about two hundred persons in the architectural department of the Building Corporation; that none of these two hundredexcept Mr. Knoebel is licensed in Arkansas; that the general plan used by the Building Corporation, in obtaining and performing its contracts, is as follows: it solicits a bank that contemplates constructing a building or rearranging the interior thereof, and persuades the bank to sign a "survey agreement" in which the bank is designated as "owner" and the Building Corporation as "company"; and that the contract provides in part: Here are excerpts from the testimony of the President of the Building Corporation regarding its activities under the contract: Under the above testimony of its President, it is clear that the Building Corporation is contracting in this State to furnish architectural services for constructing banks and rearranging the interiors thereof; that it has a staff of about two hundred architects to perform such service; that only one of theseMr. Knoebel is licensed in Arkansas to practice the profession of architecture; that he works for the Corporation as an employee; and that he details the inspection and supervision work to his subordinates, none of whom is licensed under the Arkansas law. The Act 270 of 1941 provides in Section 2: The appellee, Building Corporation, does not come within any exemption provided in Subsection 2 of said Section 2 of the Act; and Subsection 3 of Section 2 of the Act provides: Thus the appellee, Building Corporation, as such, could not be authorized to practice architecture in this State, since Mr. Knoebel's name does not appear in the name of the Corporation. An architect is one whose occupation it is to form and devise plans and designs and draw up specifications for buildings or structures and to superintend their construction. In the case of McGill v. Carlos, Ohio Com.Pl, 81 N.E.2d 726, 729, one of the Ohio courts, in discussing the practice of architecture, used this pertinent language: The foregoing is exactly what the Building Corporation is doing under its contract and under the testimony of its President and it is, therefore, acting in violation of the Arkansas Legislative Enactment here involved. In answer to the appellant's contentions the appellee says: "We search the statute in vain for any language which would prohibit the appellee from agreeing to designate a qualified architect." In other words, the appellee contends that all it does is to designate Mr. Knoebel and that he is licensed. But the appellee, Building Corporation, is doing far more than a mere designation. It contracts with the "owner" to furnish plans and specifications (and it has a staff of two hundred employees in its architectural section to draw these plans); and then it provides the supervision of the construction. In short, the appellee, Building Corporation, is agreeing to have its own employees do the architectural work. The fundamental legal principle of agency"qui facit per alium, facit per se (he who acts through another acts by himself)"when applied here, proves that the Building Corporation is not merely "agreeing to designate a qualified architect": rather it is employing a staff of two hundred architects and it is engaged in the practice of architecture. The appellee, Building Corporation, cannot hide behind the mask, that it has one architect licensed to practice in Arkansas; because the evidence shows that Mr. Knoebel acts in an advisory capacity over a staff of two hundred persons in the architectural department, and that he designates some of themeach of whom is unlicensed to help fulfill the contracts that the appellee, Building Corporation, has in this State. We held in Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union National Bank, Ark, 273 S.W.2d 408, that if a bank should furnish the services of attorneys to its customers, the bank would be engaging in the practice of law. By the same token, appellee, Building Corporation, by furnishing the services of architects to its customers, is engaging in the practice of architecture. Appellee cites cases from other States to justify its activities in Arkansas. Some of these cases are: Joseph v. Drew, 36 Cal. 2d 575, 225 P.2d 504; Walter M. Ballard Corp. v. Dougherty, 106 Cal. App. 2d 35, 234 P.2d 745; Baer v. Tippett, 34 Cal. App. 2d 33, 92 P.2d 1028; Gastaldi v. Reutermann, 345 Ill.App. 510, 104 N.E.2d 115; and Continental Paper Grading Co. v. Howard T. Fisher &amp; Associates, 3 Ill.App. 2d 118, 120 N.E.2d 577. But each of these cases from another State is based on a Statute different from our own. For instance, the California Statute, on which the cases from that State were based, allows a corporation to be licensed as an architect (see Sec. 5535 of the Business and Professional Code of California). The California Code also allows an unlicensed person to draw plans, specifications and drawings, provided such unlicensed person informs the other party in writing that the unlicensed person is not an architect (see Sec. 5537, Business and Professional Code of California). Thus the cases from other States are of little value to us in passing on our particular Statute as it is not shown or claimed that our Statute was borrowed from any other State. It is not for this Court to consider the wisdom of the Arkansas Legislative Enactment in going as far as it did: since no constitutional question is urged hereand none raises itselfour duty is to measure the facts in the present case by the yardstick of the statutory language. *328 When so measured it is clear that the appellee, Building Corporation, is violating the Arkansas Statute. The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded for further procedure not inconsistent with this opinion. GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J, not participating. WARD, J, dissents. [1] Whether injunctive relief would be proper need not be considered because the parties have not reised the question and because the pleadings and record present a proper case for a declaratory judgment which could have brought the issue to a focus. See Culp v. Scurlock, Ark., 284 S.W.2d 851. [2] So far as our search discloses, this is the first case before us involving the said Act 270. Since neither side has reised any question concerning the constitutionality of the Act, we likewise by-pass that potentiality; but it is appropriate to mention that in 3 Am.Jur. 998, in discussing the licensing of architects, the text states the holdings of cases in these words: "In many States statutes are enforced which regulate architects in the practice of their profession * * *. It is well settled that the State may, in the exercise of the police power, thus regulate the profession * * *."