Title: Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: January 10, 2019

Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Plaintiff Amanda Kernahan purchased a “home service agreement” from defendants Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., and Choice Home Warranty. When she became dissatisfied, she filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking statutory and common law relief. Plaintiff claimed that the agreement misrepresented its length of coverage and that the deceptively labelled “MEDIATION” section of the agreement failed to inform her that she was waiving her right to a jury trial and would be deterred from seeking the additional remedies of treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice in favor of arbitration, citing the "mediation" provision. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable. The court found the provision both ambiguous and noncompliant with Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), “in either its form or its function.” The court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration, rejecting defendants’ argument that language stating that all claims will be resolved “exclusively” by arbitration would or should have adequately informed plaintiff that she is waiving her right to proceed in court, as opposed to use of other available dispute resolution processes. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint, and the New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUSThis syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Amanda Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. (A-15-17) (079680)Argued September 12, 2018 -- Decided January 10, 2019LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses whether parties to a consumer contract intended to create an agreement to arbitrate through the insertion of language within an alternative dispute resolution provision. Plaintiff Amanda Kernahan purchased a “home service agreement” from defendants Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., and Choice Home Warranty (collectively, defendants). When she became dissatisfied, she filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking statutory and common law relief. Plaintiff claimed that the agreement misrepresented its length of coverage and that the deceptively labelled “MEDIATION” section of the agreement failed to inform her that she was waiving her right to a jury trial and would be deterred from seeking the additional remedies of treble damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice in favor of arbitration, citing the alternative dispute resolution provision. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the arbitration provision is unenforceable. The court found the provision both ambiguous and noncompliant with Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), “in either its form or its function.” The trial court reasoned that the provision does not contain clear language that would inform the consumer she is agreeing to arbitrate all disputes and that she is waiving her right to a jury trial. The court cited the provision’s failure to convey unambiguously to a consumer that there is a difference between resolving a dispute in court and resolving it in arbitration. The court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration, rejecting defendants’ argument that language stating that all claims will be resolved “exclusively” by arbitration would or should have adequately informed plaintiff that she is waiving her right to proceed in court, as opposed to use of other available dispute resolution processes. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint, and this Court granted certification. 231 N.J. 334 (2017).HELD: The so-called “arbitration agreement” within this consumer contract fails to support a finding of mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. The provision’s language is debatable, confusing, and contradictory -- and, in part, misleading. The “arbitration 1 agreement” is also obscure when this consumer contract is viewed as a whole. The provision does not fairly convey to an ordinary person that arbitration would be the required method of dispute resolution. Accordingly, this arbitration agreement is not enforceable.1. Federal and state law governing arbitration agreements guide this matter. Both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, and the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, value the benefits from arbitration of disputes and encourage enforcement of arbitration agreements. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized the FAA’s “equal-treatment principle,” stating that the FAA not only preempts any state rule that facially discriminates against arbitration but also “displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. L.P. v. Clark, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). The Court cautioned that state court decisions that rest on general principles may violate the FAA if they implicitly “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as [their] basis.” Ibid. (pp. 2-3, 16-18)2. New Jersey codifies its own hospitable approach toward arbitration in the New Jersey Arbitration Act, using terms nearly identical to those of the FAA. The statutory policies of the FAA and New Jersey law are in synchronicity. In this state, when called on to enforce an arbitration agreement, a court’s initial inquiry must be -- just as it is for any other contract -- whether the agreement to arbitrate all, or any portion, of a dispute is “the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. And, equivalent to federal law, parties may not be compelled “to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.” Ibid. (pp. 19-20)3. In Atalese, this Court relied on mutuality of assent as its animating principle when considering the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate in a consumer contract for debt- adjustment services. 219 N.J. at 442. At bottom, the judgment in Atalese, which declined to enforce the arbitration provision at issue, is rooted in the notion that mutual assent had not been achieved because the provision did not, in some fashion, explain that it was intended to be a waiver of the right to sue in court. Id. at 436. Because the provision could not be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to sue in court, a meeting of the minds did not occur. Id. at 435, 447. The consumer context of the contract mattered. (pp. 20-21)4. Here, the Court again reviews consumer contract language to determine whether there was mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. But, unlike in Atalese, the question in this case is whether mutuality of assent is achieved when a provision confusingly and unpredictably shifts between the terms “arbitration” and “mediation” and the procedures for those proceedings. The parties and amici disagree on whether the term arbitration is self- defining. The Court examines the use of the word “arbitration” in the context of the contract to determine if its meaning is apparent, and whether it can supply the mutual assent required for the provision to constitute a meeting of the minds. In this matter, the meaning of the provision is not apparent from the manner in which it relayed information to the consumer who signed the contract. Although the Court does not expect a specific recitation of words to effect a meeting of the minds to create an agreement to arbitrate, the construct and wording 2 of the instant provision are too confusing and misleading to meet simple plain wording standards demanded by the public policy of this state for consumer contracts. (pp. 21-23)5. Atalese stands for the proposition that an arbitration agreement is clearly enforceable when its terms affirmatively state, or unambiguously convey to a consumer in a way that he or she would understand, that there is a distinction between agreeing to resolve a dispute in arbitration and in a judicial forum. 219 N.J. at 442-44. Here, the ambiguity that affects the mutuality of assent question focuses on the overall language of the provision and whether the plaintiff-consumer fairly should have known that by signing her contract, she was knowingly assenting to arbitration as an exclusive remedy. On a macro level, the contract fails to signal to consumers that it contains an arbitration provision affecting their rights because the alternative dispute resolution provision’s “arbitration agreement” is located within a section labeled “MEDIATION.” Even when located, the small size of the print makes the provision burdensome to read and appears to violate the font size requirements of the Plain Language Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-1 to -13. As for the substance of the provision, its terms are contradictory. Mediation and arbitration are distinct and different procedures. (pp. 23-27)6. Defendants initially petitioned asking the Court to hold that Atalese runs afoul of Kindred Nursing. However, defendants have abandoned that argument. Even if defendants maintained that argument, the Court would not need to address any perceived conflict between those cases because the threshold issue of whether the instant provision’s language contains sufficient clarity to form any agreement about arbitration is easily answered. This provision does not meet the rudiments for showing a mutual assent to have arbitration be the only means of dispute resolution permitted to plaintiff, necessarily foreclosing her from pursuing her right to bring an action in court. Reading the provision as a whole, the references to arbitration cannot be harmonized with the title of the section (“MEDIATION”) and the intended use of the Commercial Mediation Rules in order to give rise to an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Because the contract contains material discrepancies that call into question the essential terms of the purported agreement to arbitrate, mutual assent is lacking. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement is not enforceable. (pp. 27-31) AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. JUSTICE ALBIN, CONCURRING, agrees that the purported arbitration clause in this consumer contract case is unenforceable. However, Justice Albin would address the issue of whether Atalese runs afoul of Kindred Nursing and the FAA, and he is confident that, when presented with the issue, the Court will reaffirm the continued vitality of New Jersey’s long-established jurisprudence.CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ- VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 15 September Term 2017 079680 Amanda Kernahan, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. and Choice Home Warranty, Defendants-Appellants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 12, 2018 January 10, 2019Lori Grifa argued the cause for appellants (Archer & Greiner, attorneys; Lori Grifa, of counsel and on the briefs, and Michael J. Plata and Josiah Contarino, on the briefs).John E. Keefe, Jr., argued the cause for respondent (Keefe Law Firm and Law Office of Jonathan Rudnick, attorneys; Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., and Jonathan Rudnick, on the briefs).David R. Kott argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey Business and Industry Association, Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce (McCarter & English, attorneys; David R. Kott, Edward J. Fanning, Jr., and 1 Zane C. Riester, of counsel and on the briefs, and Steven H. Del Mauro, on the briefs). James A. Barry argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Locks Law Firm and Law Offices of Charles N. Riley, attorneys; James A. Barry, Michael Galpern, Andrew P. Bell and Charles N. Riley, on the brief). George W. Conk argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Robert B. Hille, President, of counsel and on the brief, and George W. Conk and Timothy E. Dinan, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we address whether parties to a consumer contractintended to create an agreement to arbitrate through the insertion of languagewithin an alternative dispute resolution provision. See Atalese v. U.S. LegalServs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 435 (2014) (observing that inclusion ofarbitration provisions in consumer contracts is now “commonplace”) . Both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, and theNew Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, value the benefits fromarbitration of disputes and encourage enforcement of arbitration agreements.See Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 173-74 (2017). In determiningwhether to give effect to the disputed alternative dispute resolution provisionhere, we are mindful that federal law requires that arbitration agreements be 2 placed “on equal footing with all other contracts.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. L.P.v. Clark, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v.Imburgia, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465 (2015)). Our case law recognizesthat obligation as well. See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440-41 (collecting cases). In dispensing even treatment to arbitration agreements, basic contractformation and interpretation principles still govern, for there must be a validlyformed agreement to enforce. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 , 478 (1989); Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & GynecologyAssocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001). We apply state law principles ofcontract formation in that analysis. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 , 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties agreed toarbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state -law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”). In this matter, plaintiff Amanda Kernahan entered into an agreementwith defendants for a home maintenance warranty. When she becamedissatisfied, she filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking statutory andcommon law relief. Defendants sought dismissal of the action, arguing thatthe contract’s alternative dispute resolution provision, labeled “MEDIATION,”contained language that required plaintiff to proceed with her claimsexclusively through arbitration. 3 The trial court refused to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, finding in thelanguage of the provision no mutuality of assent to have formed an agreementto arbitrate. The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted certification toreview defendants’ argument that an overly demanding review resulted in aprohibited hostility to arbitration. Defendants also contended that our recentdecision in Atalese, which examined a contract for mutuality of assent toarbitrate, thereby waiving one’s right to pursue claims in court, violated recentUnited States Supreme Court pronouncements in Kindred Nursing about FAArequirements. Because defendants have retreated from their argument that ourdecision in Atalese transgresses the FAA under Kindred Nursing, we do notaddress that contention. We will not address an argument that, at this time, isadvanced only by amici. In our de novo review of the pivotal provision at issue in the disputedcontract, we conclude that the so-called “arbitration agreement” within thisconsumer contract fails to support a finding of mutuality of assent to form anagreement to arbitrate. The provision’s language is debatable, confusing, andcontradictory -- and, in part, misleading. The “arbitration agreement” touted bydefendants is also obscure when this consumer contract is viewed as a whole.The provision does not fairly convey to an ordinary person that arbitrationwould be the required method of dispute resolution. 4 Accordingly, for the reasons expressed herein, we concur in the judgmentthat declined to enforce this provision as an understandable mutual agreementto arbitrate disputes, which, thereby, allowed plaintiff to proceed with herclaims in the action she filed in court. I. A. Because this appeal arises from a denial of a motion to dismiss, we recitethe facts as alleged in plaintiff’s November 30, 2015 putative class actioncomplaint. In the spring of 2015, plaintiff purchased a “home serviceagreement” from defendants Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc.,and Choice Home Warranty (collectively, defendants). The agreement wasessentially a consumer contract whereby defendants would pay for and arrangefor a certified contractor to repair or replace certain home appliances atplaintiff’s property in Orlando, Florida, in exchange for the contract term priceof $1050. Becoming dissatisfied, plaintiff cancelled the contract in June 2015 andreceived a refund of the purchase price. 1 In November 2015, she filed the1 Plaintiff secured that portion of her relief by notifying defendants of her claim, as the alternative dispute resolution provision requires. The defendants agreed to the cancellation and refunded plaintiff the full purchase price to her credit card a few days later. 5 instant complaint alleging that defendants violated the Consumer Fraud Act(CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20; the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty andNotice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18; and the implied covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing. She claimed that the agreement misrepresented itslength of coverage and that the deceptively labelled “MEDIATION” section ofthe agreement failed to inform her that she was waiving her right to a jury trialand would be deterred from seeking the additional remedies of treble damages,punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.2 Defendants filed a motion todismiss the complaint with prejudice in favor of arbitration, citing theagreement’s alternative dispute resolution provision. The alternative-dispute-resolution section of the agreement that is thefocus of this appeal appears on the fifth and last page of the contract, and itreads in full as follows: G. MEDIATION In the event of a dispute over claims or coverage You agree to file a written claim with Us and allow Us thirty (30) calendar days to respond to the claim. The parties agree to mediate in good faith before resorting to mandatory arbitration in the State of New Jersey. Except where prohibited, if a dispute arises from or relates to this Agreement or its breach, and if the dispute cannot be settled through direct discussions you agree that:2 We note that plaintiff filed an amended complaint before the trial court later during the proceedings, in which she alleged additional evidence of asserted wrongful conduct and harm suffered by plaintiff. 6 1. Any and all disputes, claims and causes of action arising out of or connected with this agreement shall be resolved individually, without resort to any form of class action.2. Any and all disputes, claims and causes of action arising out of or connected with this Agreement (including but not limited to whether a particular dispute is arbitrable hereunder) shall be resolved exclusively by the American Arbitration Association in the state of New Jersey under its Commercial Mediation Rules. Controversies or claims shall be submitted to arbitration regardless of the theory under which they arise, including without limitation contract, tort, common law, statutory, or regulatory duties or liability.3. Any and all claims, judgments and awards shall be limited to actual out-of-pocket costs incurred to a maximum of $1500 per claim, but in no event attorneys fees.4. Under no circumstances will you be permitted to obtain awards for, and you hereby waives [sic] all rights to claim, indirect, punitive, incidental and consequential damages and any other damages, other than for actual out-of-pocket expenses, and any and all rights to have damages multiplied or otherwise increased. All issues and questions concerning the construction, validity, interpretation and enforceability of this Agreement, shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New Jersey, U.S.A. without giving effect to any choice of law or conflict of law rules (whether of the State of New Jersey or any other jurisdiction), which would cause the application of the laws of any jurisdiction other than the State of New Jersey.[(bolded emphasis in original) (underlined emphases added).] 7 Before the trial court, defendants argued that the contract’s “arbitrationprovision” is valid and enforceable, containing several clauses that putplaintiff on notice that she is waiving her right to a jury trial, even though theprovision does not explicitly reference a jury trial. Defendants maintained thatthe provision satisfied this Court’s prior case law, including Atalese, becausethe provision’s language is “clear on [its] face” and without ambiguity. Plaintiff argued that the arbitration requirement is ambiguous and that itis not conspicuous in the written document. She further argued that thearbitration language in the alternative dispute resolution provision does notsatisfy the requirements for a knowing waiver of rights, citing Atalese andemphasizing the provision’s failure to convey what arbitration is or how it isdifferent from a court proceeding. Plaintiff maintained, in sum, that the failureto include language amounting to a knowing waiver coupled with the lack ofconspicuousness of the arbitration language, buried in this contract’s smallfont, precluded enforcement of defendants’ asserted “arbitration agreement.” The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss in an oral opinion,concluding that the arbitration provision is unenforceable. The court found theprovision both ambiguous and noncompliant with Atalese “in either its form orits function.” The trial court reasoned that the provision does not contain clearlanguage that would inform the consumer she is agreeing to arbitrate all 8 disputes and that she is waiving her right to a jury trial. The court cited theprovision’s failure to convey unambiguously to a consumer that there is adifference between resolving a dispute in court and resolving it in arbitration. Defendants filed for reconsideration, adding to their argument that theprovision adequately informs the consumer that she is waiving her right to acourt proceeding by stating that all claims will be resolved “exclusively” byarbitration. Plaintiff countered that the word “exclusively” was insufficient,alone, to clarify defendants’ desired message because the clause remainedambiguous. Plaintiff emphasized the provision’s confusing references tomediation and arbitration in discussing proceedings and rules of procedure. In a written opinion, the trial court denied reconsideration. Relying onAtalese, the court reasoned once again that the arbitration provision was notsufficiently clear to have created an agreement to arbitrate, thereby waivingthe right to proceed in court. The court noted ambiguities in the provisionbefore concluding that the provision’s language is not clear andstraightforward, is not satisfactorily conspicuous or distinguished from theother contract terms, and does not convey that there is a difference betweenarbitration and judicial proceedings. The court rejected the argument that theprovision’s placement of the word “exclusively” would or should have 9 adequately informed plaintiff that she is waiving her right to proceed in court,as opposed to use of other available dispute resolution processes. On appeal to the Appellate Division, see R. 2:2-3(a) (orders denyingarbitration appealable as of right as a final judgment), defendants again arguedthat the arbitration provision is enforceable. Plaintiff advanced largely thesame arguments that she did before the trial court. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trialcourt’s refusal to dismiss the complaint. Relying on Atalese, the panelreasoned that “[a]n arbitration provision that fails to 'clearly andunambiguously signal’ to parties that they are surrendering their right topursue a judicial remedy renders such an agreement unenforceable.” Thepanel determined the provision to be unenforceable because “[j]ust stating thatarbitration is the 'exclusive’ remedy . . . is not sufficient” to inform aconsumer that she is waiving her right to a jury trial. The panel added thatthere must be explanatory comment to notify an average member of the publicthat arbitration is a substitute for the right to adjudicate a claim in court. We granted defendants’ petition for certification. 231 N.J. 334 (2017).We also granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey State Bar Association(NJSBA); the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ); the New JerseyBusiness & Industry Association, the Commerce and Industry Association of 10 New Jersey, and the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce (collectively, “theIndustry Associations”). II. A. In their petition for certification, defendants asserted that Ataleserequires a valid arbitration clause to contain a “clear and unambiguous”statement that waives the right to proceed in court. Thus, according todefendants, Atalese was preempted by the FAA in light of the United StatesSupreme Court’s decision in Kindred Nursing.3 Kindred Nursing was decidedroughly one month before the Appellate Division’s decision in this matter. However, in oral argument before the Court, defendants clarified thattheir argument does not advance the position that Atalese is in conflict withKindred Nursing. In withdrawing from their earlier position, defendantsinstead note, expressly, that Atalese does not impose a requirement for the type3 As discussed infra in Section III. B. 1., in Kindred Nursing, the Supreme Court reviewed a Kentucky Supreme Court holding that required an explicit statement in a power of attorney agreement to the effect that the attorney-in-fact has authority to waive the principal’s state constitutional rights to access the courts and to a jury trial (its “clear-statement rule”). See generally Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1421-29. The Supreme Court concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s holding contravened the FAA because, by imposing an extra hurdle to enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the Kentucky ruling failed to keep arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts. Id. at 1426-27. 11 of formal waiver language stricken in Kindred Nursing. Therefore, defendantis no longer asking us to overturn Atalese in this appeal. Instead, defendants now maintain that the Appellate Division decisionworked an improper expansion of Atalese by imposing a requirement of formalwaiver language in arbitration agreements, in violation of Kindred Nursing andthe FAA. Defendants reason that, by finding that necessary waiver languagewas absent from the arbitration provision, the Appellate Division effectivelycreated a Kindred Nursing-prohibited clear-statement rule. Further, defendants argue that the Appellate Division should haverecognized that an arbitration provision that explicitly states that it is theexclusive remedy to resolve disputes satisfies clarity requirements, therebyplacing consumers on notice that their only remedy is arbitration. Defendantsassert that the Appellate Division erred in not reading the provision as a wholeand instead parsing the provision improperly by focusing on the word“exclusively.” B. Much of plaintiff’s argument involves responding to defendants’ initialposition. Suffice it to say that, in distinguishing Kindred Nursing fromAtalese, plaintiff points out that Atalese reflects “New Jersey’s long-standing 12 and neutral requirement” that contractual waivers of rights be contextuallyunderstandable to meet essential requirements for mutual assent. Further, plaintiff argues that the arbitration provision in her contract isambiguous. Because the provision failed to convey what she was agreeing toby signing a contract with that provision in it, plaintiff asserts that there wasno basis for mutual assent and understanding about arbitration. Plaintiff addsthat the provision neither distinguishes arbitration from a proceeding in court -- or, for that matter, from other dispute resolution mechanisms -- nor containsany waiver language. At the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss,plaintiff’s counsel also emphasized the “extraordinarily small font” of thearbitration provision. C. Amicus NJSBA urges that we affirm of the Appellate Division decisionbecause the arbitration provision contains misleading terms and lacks waiverlanguage. The NJSBA also distinguishes Kindred Nursing from our decisionin Atalese. The NJSBA warns that reversing Atalese will cause consumers tobe “presented with confusing and difficult to understand arbitration provisionsthat fail to place the consumer on notice that he or she is waiving aconstitutional or statutory right.” D. 13 The NJAJ urges that we affirm of the Appellate Division judgmentbecause the alternative dispute resolution provision fails to satisfy theprerequisites for the formation of a valid contract. The NJAJ asserts that nomeeting of the minds could have occurred here for three reasons: (1) theprovision at issue is misleadingly titled “MEDIATION,” “creating theimpression that the mechanism being established is non-binding settlementdiscussions”; (2) the provision lacks waiver language; and (3) the provisionuses “mandatory” language but does not address the right to go to court, thevery right the clause seeks to waive. The NJAJ points out that the “MEDIATION” provision fails to complywith New Jersey’s Plain Language Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-1 to -13 (PLA),applicable to all consumer contracts in this state as noted in Atalese, because“it is not written in a simple, clear, understandable, and easily readable way.”Amicus reasons that the arbitration provision in this consumer contract isburied in a section labeled “MEDIATION” and is printed in a smaller font-sizethan that required by the PLA. The NJAJ asserts that the provision is in size6. 5 Helvetica font 4 In other words, the provision fails the conspicuousnesstest. The NJAJ further agrees with the NJSBA’s position that Atalese is4 Defendants concede that the font is less than 10 point, as required by the PLA, but do not know its actual size and so cannot agree to the size asserted by the NJAJ. 14 distinguishable from Kindred Nursing because “New Jersey has long appliedits waiver of rights analysis to all contracts.” E. Amici, the Industry Associations, ask us to overrule Atalese even ifdefendants no longer advance that argument. They maintain that “[t]he sameimpermissible justifications used by the Kentucky Supreme Court were alsoused by this Court in Atalese . . . when it required that all arbitrationagreements contain 'clear and unambiguous language’ that an individual iswaiving her right 'to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve thedispute.’” The Industry Associations contend that the FAA preempts Atalesebecause, by requiring specialized language of waiver, the Atalese decisiondisregards “the fundamental characteristic of arbitration -- the waiver of theright to resolve a dispute in a court before a jury.” That, they contend, resultsin Atalese’s placing arbitration clauses on unequal footing with othercontracts. Here, the Industry Associations ask us to enforce the instant arbitrationprovision because they maintain that the provision clearly states that any andall claims will be resolved through arbitration. III. A. 15 De novo review applies when appellate courts review determinationsabout the enforceability of contracts, including arbitration agreements. Hirschv. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013). Whether a contractualarbitration provision is enforceable is a question of law, and we need not deferto the interpretative analysis of the trial or appellate courts unless we find itpersuasive. Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 302-03 (2016)(citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 445-46). B. Federal and state law governing arbitration agreements guide this matter. 1. In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA “to place arbitration agreementsupon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson LaneCorp., 500 U.S. 20 , 24 (1991). The FAA was intended, in part, to curb aperceived “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011); see also Epic Sys.Corp. v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (same). As statedfurther in Concepcion, the FAA’s “'principal purpose’ . . . is to 'ensur[e] thatprivate arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’” 563 U.S. at 344 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478) (alteration in original). 16 Section two of the FAA promotes those goals by prescribing thatarbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon suchgrounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”9 U.S.C. § 2. Section two’s savings clause “permits agreements to arbitrate tobe invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitrationor that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is atissue.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 , 687 (1996)). An arbitration agreement is valid only if the parties intended to arbitratebecause parties are not required “to arbitrate when they have not agreed to doso.” Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. Section four of the FAA requires courts to compelarbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement,” assuming that the“making of the arbitration agreement” is not in issue. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).5 The Supreme Court instructs that “[w]hendeciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts5 In light of sections three (providing for a stay of litigation pending arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement”) and four of the FAA, the Supreme Court has “held that parties may agree to limit the issues subject to arbitration, to arbitrate according to specific rules, and to limit with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 17 generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern theformation of contracts.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized the FAA’s “equal-treatment principle,” stating that the FAA not only preempts any state rule thatfacially discriminates against arbitration but also “displaces any rule thatcovertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh socoincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.” KindredNursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1426. The Supreme Court held that a KentuckySupreme Court ruling requiring specific authority for an attorney-in-fact towaive her principal’s right to a jury trial “singles out arbitration agreementsfor disfavored treatment . . . [and] violates the FAA.” Id. at 1425. The Courtcautioned that state court decisions that rest on general principles may violatethe FAA if they implicitly “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrateas [their] basis.” Ibid. (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341). 6 2.6 In reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court holding in Kindred Nursing, the Supreme Court concluded that Kentucky “did exactly what Concepcion barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement -- namely, a waiver of the right to go to court and receive a jury trial.” Id. at 1427. The Supreme Court called the Kentucky rule “too tailor- made to arbitration agreements -- subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to uncommon barriers -- to survive the FAA’s edict against singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.” Ibid. 18 New Jersey codifies its own hospitable approach toward arbitration inthe New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, using terms nearlyidentical to those of the FAA. See Roach, 228 N.J. at 173-74 (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440). The statutory policies of the FAA and New Jersey law are insynchronicity. In this state, when called on to enforce an arbitration agreement, acourt’s initial inquiry must be -- just as it is for any other contract -- whetherthe agreement to arbitrate all, or any portion, of a dispute is “the product ofmutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law.”Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And,equivalent to federal law, parties may not be compelled “to arbitrate when theyhave not agreed to do so.” Ibid. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478); see alsoGarfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132 (“[O]nly those issues may be arbitrated which theparties have agreed shall be.”) (quoting In re Arbitration Between Grover &Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 221, 228 (1979)). As a generalprinciple of contract law, there must be a meeting of the minds for anagreement to exist before enforcement is considered. See Johnson & Johnsonv. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 538 (1953) (“[A] contract does not comeinto being unless there be a manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to thesame terms . . . . [I]t is elementary that there can be no operative acceptance 19 by acts or conduct unless the offeree’s assent to the offer according to its termsis thereby unequivocally shown.”). In Atalese, this Court relied on mutuality of assent as its animatingprinciple when we considered the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate ina consumer contract for debt-adjustment services. 219 N.J. at 442. We wereguided essentially by twin concerns. First, the Court was mindful that aconsumer is not necessarily versed in the meaning of law-imbued terminologyabout procedures tucked into form contracts. Ibid. The decision repeatedlynotes that it is addressing a form consumer contract, not a contract individuallynegotiated in any way; accordingly, basic statutory consumer contractrequirements about plain language implicitly provided the backdrop to thecontract under review. Id. at 444. And, second, the Court was mindful thatplain language explanations of consequences had been required in contractcases in numerous other settings where a person would not be presumed tounderstand that what was being agreed to constituted a waiver of aconstitutional or statutory right. Id. at 442-44. At bottom, the judgment in Atalese, which declined to enforce thearbitration provision at issue, is rooted in the notion that mutual assent had notbeen achieved because the provision did not, in some fashion, explain that itwas intended to be a waiver of the right to sue in court. Id. at 436. Because 20 the provision could not be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to sue incourt, a meeting of the minds did not occur. Id. at 435, 447. The consumercontext of the contract mattered. Id. at 444 (referencing N.J.S.A. 56:12-2).That said, the decision imposes no talismanic recitations, acknowledging that ameeting of the minds can be accomplished by any explanatory comment thatachieves the goal of apprising the consumer of her rights. Id. at 445, 447. IV. A. In this matter, we again review consumer contract language to determinewhether there was mutuality of assent to form an agreement to arbitrate. But,unlike in Atalese, the question in this case is whether mutuality of assent isachieved when a provision confusingly and unpredictably shifts between theterms “arbitration” and “mediation” and the procedures for the two types ofproceedings. A court’s objective in construing a contract is to determine the intent ofthe parties. Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011). “In the quest forthe common intention of the parties to a contract the court must consider therelations of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they weretrying to attain.” Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957). In New Jersey,we have a Plain Language Act that imposes certain simple principles on 21 consumer contracts generally -- to wit, they must use plain language that iscommonly understood by the wide swath of people who comprise theconsuming public. By doing so, we then can confidently state that, even in theconsumer context, “[a] party who enters into a contract in writing, without anyfraud or imposition being practiced upon him, is conclusively presumed tounderstand and assent to its terms and legal effect.” Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist.Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992) (quoting Fivey v. Pa. R.R., 67 N.J.L. 627, 632 (E. & A. 1902)). A basic tenet of contract interpretation is that contract terms should begiven their plain and ordinary meaning. Roach, 228 N.J. at 174; M.J. Paquet,Inc. v. DOT, 171 N.J. 378, 396 (2002). Here, the parties and amici havevarying positions on whether the term arbitration is self-defining. Ataleserecognizes that “[b]y its very nature, an agreement to arbitrate involves awaiver of a party’s right to have her claims and defenses litigated in court.” 219 N.J. at 442 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, inthe context of that decision, we were unwilling to attribute knowledge of thatdefinition to consumers in part because “an average member of the public maynot know -- without some explanatory comment -- that arbitration is asubstitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in a court of law.” Ibid. 22 In this instance, we examine the use of the word “arbitration” in thecontext of the contract to determine if its meaning is apparent, and whether itcan therefore supply the mutual assent required for the provision to constitutea meeting of the minds. We find that the meaning of the provision is notapparent from the manner in which it relayed information to the consumer whosigned the contract. Although we are not expecting a specific recitation ofwords to effect a meeting of the minds to create an agreement to arbitrate, theconstruct and wording of the instant provision are too confusing andmisleading to meet simple plain wording standards demanded by the publicpolicy of this state for consumer contracts. B. Plaintiff has argued throughout these proceedings that the arbitrationagreement lacks sufficient clarity to be enforced. She points to the multipleambiguities and inconsistencies within the provision. She advances acompelling argument that “the arbitration provision’s inconspicuous locationand confusing, inconsistent and contradictory terms are unenforceable.” Wediscuss those points in turn. A consumer cannot be required to arbitrate when it cannot fairly beascertained from the contract’s language that she knowingly assented to theprovision’s terms or knew that arbitration was the exclusive forum for dispute 23 resolution. In light of that concern, Atalese stands for the proposition that anarbitration agreement is clearly enforceable when its terms affirmatively state,or unambiguously convey to a consumer in a way that he or she wouldunderstand, that there is a distinction between agreeing to resolve a dispute inarbitration and in a judicial forum. 219 N.J. at 442-44. Where Atalese discussed the distinction between resolving suits inarbitration versus a judicial forum, here, the ambiguity that affects themutuality of assent question focuses on the overall language of this provisionand whether the instant plaintiff-consumer fairly should have known that bysigning her contract, she was knowingly assenting to arbitration as anexclusive remedy. We think not. On a macro level, the contract fails to signal to consumers that itcontains an arbitration provision affecting their rights because the alternativedispute resolution provision’s “arbitration agreement” is located within asection labeled “MEDIATION.” Even when located, the small size of the printmakes the provision burdensome to read and appears to violate the font sizerequirements of the PLA. As for the substance of the provision, its terms are contradictory. Theinternal sentences refer to the use of the AAA’s Commercial Mediation Rules,which cannot be reconciled with arbitration. The provision’s terms cannot be 24 read to provide clarity to a consumer that she was agreeing to arbitration, orwhat that term, in the context of confusing references to mediation ormediation rules, actually meant. Indeed, mediation and arbitration are distinctand different procedures. Under N.J.S.A. 2A:23C-2, mediation is “a process in which a mediatorfacilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them inreaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.” As a facilitator, amediator does not reach a final decision on the matter. Instead, the mediator,albeit remaining neutral, encourages the participants to resolve theirdifferences and reach an agreement. See R. 1:40-2(c) (“'Facilitative Process,’which includes mediation, is a process by which a neutral third party facilitatescommunication between parties in an effort to promote settlement withoutimposition of the facilitator’s own judgment regarding the issues in dispute.”).Mediation sessions “are not conducted under oath, do not follow traditionalrules of evidence, and are not limited to developing the facts.” State v.Williams, 184 N.J. 432, 447 (2005) (quoting Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 , 162 (1998)). Mediation communications are privilegedunder N.J.R.E. 519 because honesty in communications is imperative in orderto reach a settlement. Public policy favors settlement of disputes in partbecause it “spares the parties the risk of an adverse outcome and the time and 25 expense -- both monetary and emotional -- of protracted litigation.”Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242, 253-54(2013) (citing Williams, 184 N.J. at 441). Of utmost importance, if mediationsessions fail, the parties can proceed in court to resolve their dispute. On the other hand, “[t]he object of arbitration is the final disposition, ina speedy, inexpensive, expeditious, and perhaps less formal manner, of thecontroversial differences between the parties.” Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006) (citation omitted). Arbitration involves a processthat results in an adverse outcome for one party. See Williams, 184 N.J. at 447(stating goal of both formal adjudication and arbitration “is to uncover andpresent evidence of claims and defenses in an adversarial setting”). Unless superseded by the parties’ agreement, the New Jersey ArbitrationAct prescribes the rules governing the conduct of the proceeding. See N.J.S.A.2A:23B-4; Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 469-70 (2009). The Act grants anarbitrator significant discretion over evidentiary matters in order to advancethe goal of quick and fair disposition of the parties’ dispute. See N.J.S.A.2A:23B-15. The “arbitrator’s role is evaluative, requiring the parties topresent their evidence for a final determination.” Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 144 (App. Div. 2013) (citing R. 1:40-2(b)(2)). Much like ajudicial factfinder, “[a]rbitrators essentially weigh evidence, assess credibility, 26 and apply the law when determining whether a party has proven his or herrequest for relief.” Ibid. In sum, mediation stands in “stark contrast” to formal adjudication andarbitration. Williams, 184 N.J. at 447. C. As noted, defendants initially petitioned asking this Court to hold thatour decision in Atalese runs afoul of Kindred Nursing -- an argument nowabandoned. Even if defendants maintained that argument, we would not needto address any perceived conflict between those cases because the thresholdissue of whether the instant provision’s language contains sufficient clarity toform any agreement about arbitration is easily answered. This provision doesnot meet the rudiments for showing a mutual assent to have arbitration be t heonly means of dispute resolution permitted to plaintiff, necessarily foreclosingher from pursuing her right to bring an action in court. “To be enforceable as a contractual undertaking, an agreement must besufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by eachparty can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” Borough of WestCaldwell v. Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 24-25 (1958) (citing Friedman v.Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 531 (1956)). The shortcomings of theprovision in issue here are, as noted, three-fold: (1) the inconspicuous location 27 of the agreement to arbitrate under a section labeled “MEDIATION”; (2) itssmall-font text and confusing ordering of sentences; and (3) the invocation ofthe Commercial Mediation Rules. As noted, mediation and arbitration are “distinctly differentproceedings.” Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 146. Yet, the provision’s termsblur any distinction. To the extent a lay reader perceives that there are twoprocedures being proposed through this confusing alternative disputeresolution provision labeled “MEDIATION,” the provision’s discussion of thearbitration process is misleading. An arbitration provision that purports toutilize mediation procedures is unenforceable because the parties cannot besaid to have reached a meeting of the minds on whether the proceeding willresult in a binding award. Here, if a court were to compel arbitration pursuantto the provision’s terms, there would be no binding resolution of the parties’disputes. Although arbitration by definition involves the issuance of a finalaward by a neutral third party, see R. 1:40-2(a)(1), the references to arbitrationin defendants’ provision lack sufficient clarity to preclude resort to judicialrelief should the parties’ good-faith settlement negotiations fail. Despite the title “MEDIATION,” the bold-faced text that followsprescribes a two-step dispute resolution process: “The parties agree to mediatein good faith before resorting to mandatory arbitration in the State of New 28 Jersey.” The provision does not next outline the scope of the proceedings, butinstead first includes a waiver of class proceedings. The provision thenprescribes that [a]ny and all disputes, claims and causes of action arising out of or connected with this Agreement (including but not limited to whether a particular dispute is arbitrable hereunder) shall be resolved exclusively through the American Arbitration Association in the state of New Jersey under its Commercial Mediation Rules. Controversies or claims shall be submitted to arbitration regardless of the theory under which they arise, including without limitation contract, tort, common law, statutory, or regulatory duties or liability. [(emphasis added).] The provision seemingly envisions the issuance of an award. In the thirdsubsection, the provision limits “[a]ny and all claims, judgments and awards”to “actual out-of-pocket costs incurred to a maximum of $1500 per claim.”(emphasis added). The final subsection dictates that “[u]nder nocircumstances will you be permitted to obtain awards for, and you herebywaive[],” any other form of damages and multiplied damages. (emphasisadded). Reading the provision as a whole, the references to arbitration cannot beharmonized with the title of the section and the intended use of theCommercial Mediation Rules in order to give rise to an enforceable agreement 29 to arbitrate. Should a diligent and prudent consumer read defendants’ formcontract in full, a reader could, and most likely would, reasonably understandsubsection two to prescribe that the Commercial Mediation Rules“exclusively” govern “any and all disputes.” The small typeface, confusingsentence order, and misleading caption exacerbate the lack of clarity inexpression. It is unreasonable to expect a lay consumer to parse through thecontents of this small-font provision to unravel its material discrepancies. Our Plain Language Act requires that more be done in the setting ofconsumer contracts to make them understandable for a lay person. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-10(b)(3) (prescribing, for consumer contracts, that“[c]onditions and exceptions to the main promise of the agreement shall begiven equal prominence with the main promise, and shall be in at least 10point type”); see also Morgan, 225 N.J. at 310 n.8 (noting that in judgingwhether consumer contract meets standard of being written in clear andunderstandable manner, “courts must 'take into consideration the guidelin esset forth in [N.J.S.A. 56:12-10]’” (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A.56:12-2)). Because the contract contains material discrepancies that call intoquestion the essential terms of the purported agreement to arbitrate, mutual 30 assent is lacking. Accordingly, we hold that this arbitration agreement is notenforceable. V. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 31 Amanda Kernahan, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc. and Choice Home Warranty, Defendants-Appellants. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I concur with my colleagues that the purported arbitration clause in thisconsumer contract case is unenforceable because its confusing andcontradictory provisions do not demonstrate that the parties mutually assentedto arbitrate their dispute. Unlike my colleagues, however, I would not sidestepthe issue on which this Court granted certification: whether Atalese v. U.S.Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2804 (2015), runs afoul of Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd.Partnership v. Clark, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017), and the FederalArbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16. Although defendants’ petition for certification contended that Atalesecould not be reconciled with Kindred Nursing, defendants conceded at oralargument that those two cases were not in conflict with each other. In 1 response to a question from the Court, “So your contention is that Atalese inand of itself does not violate Kindred Nursing but the Appellate Divisionoverread it,” defendants’ counsel replied, “Yes, absolutely.” Instead,defendants argued that the arbitration agreement did not violate Atalese. Defendants’ concession did not deprive this Court of its authority todecide the issue raised in defendants’ petition -- an issue argued forcefullyfrom different vantage points by the amici curiae before us. 1 That issue willnot go away. Tomorrow is not a better time to resolve an issue on whichcourts need emphatic guidance. In my view, our jurisprudence, includingAtalese, conforms to the FAA, and Kindred Nursing has not altered thatequation. Indeed, the Court reaffirms the fundamental principle animating Atalese-- an arbitration clause in a consumer contract is unenforceable unless thecontract’s language conveys in some manner “that there is a distinctionbetween agreeing to resolve a dispute in arbitration and in a judicial forum.”Ante at ___ (slip op. at 24) (citing Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442-44). The Courtalso acknowledges that mutual assent -- the basic element of a contract --1 “We have often declined . . . to dismiss a matter on grounds of mootness, if the issue in the appeal is an important matter of public interest.” Nini v. Mercer Cty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 105 n.4 (2010) (quoting Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 484 (2008)). 2 requires that consumers have an understanding that arbitration means theirdisputes will be resolved out of court in an alternative forum. Ante at ___ (slipop. at 20-21). If Kindred Nursing were antithetical to the simple precept thatconsumers have a right to know what they are signing, then much of thereasoning of today’s opinion would be rendered a nullity. But Kindred Nursing is not in conflict with Atalese and the state-lawjurisprudence on which Atalese is founded. I. The United States Supreme Court in Kindred Nursing applied the well-established FAA requirement that arbitration agreements must be placed “onequal footing with all other contracts.” 137 S. Ct. at 1424 (quoting DIRECTV,Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465 (2015)). In doing so, theCourt struck down a new rule adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Courtconcerning powers of attorney that singled out arbitration agreements fordisfavored treatment. Id. at 1429. In Kindred Nursing, a husband conveyed to his wife and a motherconveyed to her daughter powers of attorney granting them broad authority tomanage their loved ones’ affairs, including the legal right to enter intocontracts. Id. at 1425. The husband and mother were admitted as residentsinto a Kindred nursing home. Ibid. Exercising their powers as legal 3 representatives of their loved ones, the wife and daughter signed documents,including arbitration agreements, required by the nursing home. 2 Ibid. Later, they sued the nursing home for substandard care that they allegedcaused the deaths of their husband and mother. Ibid. The Kentucky SupremeCourt declared the arbitration agreements invalid because the powers ofattorney -- despite the broad grants of authority to the family-memberrepresentatives to act on behalf of their loved ones -- did not specificallyauthorize those representatives to enter arbitration agreements. Id. at 1425-26.That precise authorization was necessary, the Kentucky high court asserted,because arbitration denied the nursing home residents (and their estates) accessto the courts. Id. at 1426. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s newly adopted power-of-attorney “clear-statement rule” violated the FAA because it was “too tailor-made to arbitrationagreements” and singled out arbitration agreements “for disfavored treatment.”Id. at 1426-27. The United States Supreme Court observed that “[n]oKentucky court . . . ha[d] ever before demanded that a power of attorney2 Notably, the nursing home’s arbitration clause fully complied with New Jersey law because the clause explained that “[b]inding arbitration means that the parties are waiving their right to a trial, including their right to a jury trial, their right to trial by a Judge and their right to appeal the decision of the arbitrator(s).” See Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 317 (Ky. 2015) (alteration in original), judgment rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. 1421. 4 explicitly confer authority to enter into contracts implicating constitutionalguarantees.” Id. at 1427. Despite the Kentucky Supreme Court’s assertions,its clear-statement rule, in reality, applied only to arbitration agreements. Id.at 1427-28 (noting “the arbitration-specific character of the rule, much as if itwere made applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans”). For thatreason, “[t]he Kentucky Supreme Court specially impeded the ability ofattorneys-in-fact to enter into arbitration agreements,” and therefore its clear-statement rule did not pass muster under the FAA. Id. at 1429. Unlike the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Kindred Nursing, NewJersey case law does not disfavor or discriminate against arbitrationagreements. II. In Atalese, this Court reaffirmed principles long embedded in ourjurisprudence. Under the FAA, state courts may construe arbitrationagreements under general contract principles, provided arbitration agreementsare treated no differently from other agreements. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 441.Although the FAA promotes a national policy favoring arbitration, anarbitration agreement, like any other agreement, may be invalidated “uponsuch grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”Ibid. (quoting Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 85 (2002) (quoting, in 5 turn, 9 U.S.C. § 2)). The FAA “permits agreements to arbitrate to beinvalidated by generally applicable contract defenses,” so long as thosedefenses do not discriminate against arbitration. Ibid. (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 ,339 (2011)). Like all contractual agreements, an arbitration agreement must be theproduct of mutual assent. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. In turn, “[m]utual assentrequires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they haveagreed.” Ibid. Atalese wove together two interconnected strands of our state-lawjurisprudence in assessing the validity of an arbitration agreement -- both ofwhich applied neutral principles of state contract law. One strand involvescontracts in which individuals waive their statutory or constitutional rights.Our Court has consistently maintained that a person who enters into anarbitration agreement should understand that he is waiving his right toprosecute or defend his claim in a civil court or judicial forum. See Morgan v.Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 308-09 (2016) (“[W]hen a contractcontains a waiver of rights -- whether in an arbitration or other clause -- thewaiver must be clearly and unmistakably established.” (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444)); Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 6 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003) (“[A] waiver-of-rights provision must reflect that anemployee has agreed clearly and unambiguously to arbitrate the disputedclaim.”); Martindale, 173 N.J. at 95 (stating in reference to arbitrationagreements that “[t]he Court will not assume that employees intend to waive[their statutory rights] unless their agreements so provide in unambiguousterms” (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel v. MorristownObstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 135 (2001))); Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 136 (“[W]e will not assume that an employee intends to surrender[his] choice [of an administrative or judicial forum in an LAD case] in favor ofarbitration unless that intention has been 'clearly and unmistakablyestablished[.]’” (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Red Bank Reg’l Educ.Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 122, 140 (1978)));Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 282 (1993) (“A clausedepriving a citizen of access to the courts should clearly state its purpose. Thepoint is to assure that the parties know that in electing arbitration as theexclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue.”).33 Significantly, the United States Supreme Court uses the same language found in our State’s waiver-of-rights jurisprudence in determining whether parties have agreed to arbitrate the threshold question of arbitrability. In Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., the Court reaffirmed that “courts 'should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.’” 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (slip op. at 8) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 7 “The requirement that a contractual provision be sufficiently clear toplace a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a constitutional orstatutory right is not specific to arbitration provisions.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443. In Atalese, we catalogued a non-exhaustive list of non-arbitration casesinvolving a party’s waiver of statutory rights in which our courts have requiredthat the waiver be clear and unmistakable. Id. at 443-44 (citing examples). Inlight of the general applicability of this doctrine to the waiver-of-rights line ofcases, we emphasized in Atalese that “[a]rbitration clauses are not singled outfor more burdensome treatment than other waiver-of-rights clauses under statelaw.” Id. at 444. The other strand of our jurisprudence involves the modestacknowledgement that the term arbitration is not self-defining. Id. at 442.This Court has recognized that “[t]he meaning of arbitration is not self-evidentto the average consumer.” Morgan, 225 N.J. at 308. “[A]n average member ofthe public may not know -- without some explanatory comment -- thatarbitration is a substitute for the right to have one’s claim adjudicated in acourt of law.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. Notably, “[o]ne statistical studyconcluded 'that consumers have no idea what they are agreeing to when theyU.S. 938, 944 (1995)). In other words, in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence otherwise, the parties have not waived a court resolution of the issue. 8 enter into contracts containing arbitration clauses’ and that many consumersbelieve that access to 'court will be available to them, if only as a last resort.’”Morgan, 225 N.J. at 308 n.7 (quoting Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy LittleContracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis ofConsumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 Md. L. Rev. 1, 63(2015)).4 Underscoring the ambiguity about the precise meaning of arbitration arecourt-adopted schemes that allow for judicial review of an arbitrator’sdecision. For example, Rule 4:21A-1 requires parties to arbitrate automobilenegligence actions, other personal injury actions, and non-personal injuryactions. R. 4:21A-1(a)(1) to (3). Under Rule 4:21A-6, however, arbitrationmay be only the first step in the dispute resolution process. A partydisappointed with the result of arbitration can still have the dispute decided bya jury or the court. After an arbitration decision, “[a]n action in which atimely trial de novo has been demanded by any party shall be returned, as to all4 A “study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau similarly concluded that a majority of credit-card consumers whose agreements contained arbitration clauses did not understand that they could not file suit in court.” Morgan, 225 N.J. at 308 n.7 (citing Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), § 3 at 3 (2015), http://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress- 2015.pdf). 9 parties, to the trial calendar for disposition.” R. 4:21A-6(c). Under our courtrules, a mandatory arbitration proceeding does not necessarily result in abinding outcome. Ibid. Accordingly, nothing better illustrates that arbitration is not a self-defining term than our court rules. There is no reason to believe that theaverage consumer would understand that the term arbitration -- without someexplanation -- means that court review or relief is unavailable. Not only because of our waiver-of-rights case law, but also, separately,because of the uncertainty that may arise from the bare use of the termarbitration, this Court in Atalese came to the unremarkable conclusion that theparties to a consumer contract involving an arbitration clause “must know thatthere is a distinction between resolving a dispute in arbitration and in a judicialforum.” 219 N.J. at 445. An arbitration clause should at least be clear aboutits meaning; mutual assent is not achieved through ignorance. See Marchak, 134 N.J. at 282 (“A[n arbitration] clause depriving a citizen of access to thecourts should clearly state its purpose.”); see also N.J.S.A. 56:12-2 (“Aconsumer contract . . . shall be written in a simple, clear, understandable andeasily readable way.”). We have stressed that to accomplish the goal of allowing a consumer tomake an informed choice about the forum in which a dispute will be resolved, 10 no “magic words” or “prescribed set of words must be included in anarbitration clause.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 439, 447. “Our courts have upheldarbitration clauses phrased in various ways when those clauses have explainedthat arbitration is a waiver of the right to bring suit in a judicial forum. ” Id. at444-45 (citing examples); see also Morgan, 225 N.J. at 309. However anarbitration agreement is worded, it must simply make clear that the “consumeris choosing to arbitrate disputes rather than have them resolved in a court oflaw.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447. This sensible, neutral, nondiscriminatory application of our state lawdoes not burden legitimate arbitration agreements; it simply requiresreasonable notice to the consumer of the meaning of an arbitration agreement.Most arbitration agreements comply with the exceedingly low bar set byAtalese and inform consumers of what they need to know. The United States Supreme Court’s FAA precedents, such asConcepcion, are not hostile to an informed citizenry. Those cases do not baran undemanding state-law requirement that allows consumers a minimalunderstanding that in choosing arbitration they will not have access to ajudicial forum. Nothing in Kindred Nursing changes that landscape orundermines the efficacy of decades of our jurisprudence, including Atalese. III. 11 The Court today has bypassed the opportunity to put the issue on whichit granted certification to rest. I am confident, however, that the Court, whennext presented with this issue, will reaffirm the continued vitality of our long-established jurisprudence. In Atalese, we held, consistent with thatjurisprudence, that an arbitration clause must simply explain to the averageconsumer what it forecloses -- the right to a judicial forum for the resolution ofa dispute. Every contract must explain in some way its purpose. We do notdiscriminate against an arbitration agreement by requiring it to do the same.Kindred Nursing does not hold otherwise. 12