Title: State v. Ronald Schaefer
Citation: 2008 WI 25
Docket Number: 2006AP001826-CRAC
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 2, 2008

2008 WI 25 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1826-CRAC 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ronald Schaefer, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 2, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Ralph Ramirez   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and BUTLER, Jr., JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Kathleen 
B. Stilling, Jerome F. Buting, and Buting & Williams, S.C., 
Brookfield and oral argument by Kathleen B. Stilling. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Nicholas Chiarkas, 
state 
public 
defender, 
and 
Marla 
J. 
Stephens, 
director, 
appellate division, Office of the State Public Defender, 
Milwaukee; and Keith A. Findley, John A. Pray, and Byron 
Lichstein, University of Wisconsin Law School Frank J. Remington 
Center, Madison; on behalf of the Wisconsin Innocence Project, 
Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 25
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF621) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald Schaefer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 2, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a nonfinal order of the Circuit Court for 
Waukesha County, Ralph Ramirez, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1  It relates to an appeal 
from a nonfinal order of the Waukesha County Circuit Court, 
Ralph M. Ramirez, Judge.  Judge Ramirez granted the State's 
(State) motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum from defendant 
Ronald 
Schaefer 
(Schaefer) 
that 
sought 
to 
obtain 
police 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
2 
 
investigation reports in Schaefer's case before his preliminary 
examination. 
¶2 
After permitting Schaefer's interlocutory appeal, the 
court of appeals certified the following question to this court: 
"Does a criminal defendant have a subpoena right to obtain and 
copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials 
prior to the preliminary hearing?"    This question requires 
interpretation of several Wisconsin statutes as well as the 
constitutional 
rights to compulsory process and effective 
assistance of counsel. 
¶3 
We conclude that a criminal defendant does not have a 
statutory or constitutional right to compel production of police 
investigation reports and other nonprivileged materials by 
subpoena duces tecum prior to the preliminary examination.  A 
criminal defendant who employs the subpoena power in this manner 
is attempting to engage in discovery without authority in either 
civil or criminal procedure statutes and in conflict with the 
criminal discovery statutes.  Although a reasonable argument can 
be made for prosecutors to open their files to defendants at an 
early point in criminal prosecutions, this argument does not 
translate 
into 
an 
enforceable 
right 
to 
subpoena 
police 
investigation reports and nonprivileged materials before a 
preliminary examination.  Consequently, we affirm the order of 
the 
circuit 
court 
granting 
the 
State's 
motion 
to 
quash 
Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
3 
 
¶4 
The criminal complaint charged Schaefer with two 
counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2), for conduct that allegedly occurred in 
1990.  The complaint was signed by Detective Jennifer Toepfer 
(Toepfer) of the Brookfield Police Department who asserted that 
she took a statement about the alleged assaults from Kerry M., 
DOB: 4/6/76, in March 2006 and then conducted an investigation 
into Kerry's claims. 
¶5 
The complaint makes the following allegations: Ronald 
Schaefer was a teacher and basketball coach at a parochial 
school in Menomonee Falls.  Kerry was a student at the school.  
Schaefer was Kerry's basketball coach when she was in seventh 
grade.  During the 1988-89 school year, Schaefer began to focus 
attention on Kerry, complimenting her, telling her that she 
"looked nice," and giving her the nickname "Special K." 
¶6 
The next year, Schaefer became Kerry's eighth grade 
teacher.  Following his usual practice of picking an eighth-
grade student to serve as a babysitter for his children, 
Schaefer selected Kerry.  Toward the end of her eighth grade 
year and continuing into the summer——between March 1990 and 
August 1990——Kerry had a sexual relationship with Schaefer. 
¶7 
Kerry described both her social and sexual encounters 
with Schaefer over this time period.  She reported that Schaefer 
wrote her notes and poems, which she saved (and subsequently 
turned over to Detective Toepfer).  Schaefer kissed Kerry and 
told her that he loved her.  When the two called each other at 
their respective homes, Kerry would hang up if Schaefer's wife 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
4 
 
answered the telephone, and Schaefer would hang up if one of 
Kerry's parents answered.  Kerry considered Schaefer her first 
boyfriend.  Kerry said that in May 1990 she and Schaefer 
discussed running away together to Kentucky or Tennessee because 
"it was ok to get married younger there." 
¶8 
Kerry recounted how Schaefer touched her physically 
and sexually on several occasions during this period.  His 
touching included hugging, kissing, and performing oral sex on 
her.  On one occasion, after swimming, Kerry and Schaefer had 
sexual intercourse on a bed at his parents’ home in Brookfield.  
On another occasion, the pair had sexual intercourse in 
Schaefer’s bed while Kerry was babysitting his two children.  
Kerry had not attained the age of 16 years at the time of any of 
these incidents and thus could not legally consent. 
¶9 
In August 1990, the relationship between Kerry and 
Schaefer ended when Schaefer told Kerry that they could not see 
each other anymore because Kerry was starting high school.  
Kerry later told the detective that she was devastated because 
she thought Schaefer was her boyfriend. 
¶10 These allegations led the State to file a criminal 
complaint on May 25, 2006, charging Schaefer with two counts of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child.  The defendant made his 
initial appearance on June 1.  He posted bond and was advised to 
have no contact with the victim.  He made a second appearance on 
June 19.  At that time a preliminary hearing was scheduled for 
July 20, 2006, before Waukesha County Court Commissioner Martin 
O. Binn. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
5 
 
¶11 On July 10, Schaefer served a subpoena duces tecum on 
the "Chief of Brookfield Police Department or Designee," 
commanding the person to bring the following material before 
Commissioner Binn on July 13, 2006: "A complete copy of all 
reports, memorandums, witness interviews and any records related 
to the investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer on suspected 
criminal offenses relating to the alleged sexual assault of 
Kerry M. DOB 4/6/76 in 1990."  The subpoena duces tecum 
characterized the "Type of Proceeding" before Commissioner Binn 
as a "Return of Records." 
¶12 On July 11, the State moved to quash the subpoena.  At 
a hearing on July 13, Commissioner Binn granted the State's 
motion, indicating that after he reviewed Chapters 805, 885, 
970, 971, and 972 of the Wisconsin Statutes, he considered the 
defendant's subpoena a request for the circuit court to "re-
write the discovery statute, [Wis. Stat. §] 971.23."  He also 
noted that the preliminary examination is "not a mini-trial, and 
[ ] not a discovery proceeding." 
¶13 The defendant sought de novo review in circuit court.  
On July 18 Judge Ramirez conducted a hearing and concluded that 
there is no mechanism under state statute or the Wisconsin or 
federal constitutions that specifies that "discovery materials" 
shall be produced before the preliminary hearing. 
¶14 On July 19, 2006, Judge Ramirez entered an order 
granting the State's motion to quash Schaefer's subpoena duces 
tecum. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
6 
 
¶15 Schaefer filed a timely petition for leave to appeal, 
and the court of appeals stayed further proceedings pending 
appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.52. 
¶16 On December 27, 2006, the court of appeals certified 
the appeal to this court.  We accepted certification on February 
12, 2007.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This 
case 
involves 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation and constitutional law.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. 
Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶11, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155.  
Similarly, we review constitutional questions, both state and 
federal, de novo.  Custodian of Records for the Legislative 
Technology Services Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶6, 272 
Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 This 
is 
a 
discovery 
case, 
notwithstanding 
the 
defendant's protestations to the contrary.  Schaefer's appeal 
asks this court to approve the subpoena power to effect 
discovery 
in 
a 
criminal 
case 
prior 
to 
the 
preliminary 
examination.   
¶19 Schaefer does not claim to be seeking some specific 
piece of information missing from the complaint so that he can 
fully respond to the charges.  Rather, he is trying to force the 
State to disclose the evidence against him before it has had an 
opportunity to present any of that evidence in court.  In 
effect, Schaefer is asking this court to accommodate all felony 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
7 
 
defendants who wish to conduct discovery of the state's evidence 
before their preliminary examinations by vesting these criminal 
defendants with a new discovery tool.  Schaefer's arguments that 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions 
compel 
this 
result 
unreasonably stretch the boundaries of compulsory process and 
misapprehend 
the 
requirements 
of 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel. 
¶20 We acknowledge at the outset that the right of an 
accused to present a defense is fundamental.  Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).  It is embodied in the due 
process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and in 
the Sixth Amendment's command that the accused shall have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.2  Due 
process 
preserves 
an 
accused's 
right 
to 
challenge 
the 
prosecution's case by obtaining evidence tending to establish 
the 
accused's 
innocence 
or 
by 
casting 
doubt 
upon 
the 
persuasiveness of the prosecution's evidence.3   
¶21 There are several ways for a criminal defendant to 
gather information and evidence that may be used in his defense.  
First, a defendant may request information from the state and 
other sources on a voluntary basis.  A criminal defendant will 
often be given information voluntarily when the custodian has no 
objection to its release.  Second, a defendant may conduct his 
                                                 
2 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(a), 
at 469 (2d ed. 1999). 
3 Id. at 470. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
8 
 
own investigation of the case through interviews, record and 
data collection, and other lawful investigatory techniques.  In 
some situations, a person's investigation will begin even before 
the person is charged with a crime.  Third, a person may use 
information-gathering techniques such as open records requests 
that 
are 
available 
to non-litigants.  A person is not 
disqualified from using these familiar procedures simply because 
he becomes a criminal defendant.4  Fourth, a defendant may employ 
the subpoena power at pretrial hearings to litigate specific 
issues, such as the suppression of evidence, and may also use 
the subpoena power at trial.  Pretrial hearings will have a 
narrow focus; thus, the evidence sought must be relevant to the 
issue being litigated and is not likely to be admitted if it 
fails this test.  Finally, a defendant may exercise his 
discovery rights under the Wisconsin Statutes. 
¶22 Our legislature has codified specific discovery rights 
for criminal defendants.  See Wis. Stat. § 971.23 (listing 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin's open records law, see Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31—
19.39, does not preclude access to law enforcement records.  
However, the right to access law enforcement records is not 
unqualified.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 19.35(1)(am), 19.36(2) 
and (8), 905.09, and 905.10.  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.09 provides:   
Law enforcement records. The federal government 
or a state or a subdivision thereof has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose investigatory files, reports and 
returns for law enforcement purposes except to the 
extent available by law to a person other than the 
federal government, a state or subdivision thereof. 
The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate 
representative of the federal government, a state or a 
subdivision thereof. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
9 
 
mandatory disclosures for both the district attorney and 
defendant).  In theory, these criminal discovery rights attempt 
to level the playing field between the state and the accused.  
State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 353, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 
1993).  Clearly, a defendant has a right to obtain evidence in 
the state's possession when that evidence is material and 
exculpatory.  See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963).  The state must turn over material that tends to negate 
the guilt of the defendant or tends to reduce the defendant's 
punishment. 
 
Nelson 
v. 
State, 
59 
Wis. 2d 474, 
479, 
208 
N.W.2d 410 (1973).  
¶23 Traditionally, 
however, 
statutory 
discovery 
is 
designed to assure fairness at a criminal trial.  Discovery 
anticipates a trial at which a fact-finder determines guilt.  
The court of appeals has stated that "[p]retrial discovery is 
nothing more than the right of the defendant to obtain access to 
evidence necessary to prepare his or her case for trial."  
Maday, 
179 
Wis. 2d at 
354 
(citing 
Britton 
v. 
State, 
44 
Wis. 2d 109, 117, 170 N.W.2d 785, 789 (1969)) (emphasis added).  
"Providing 
a 
defendant with meaningful pretrial discovery 
underwrites the interest of the state in guaranteeing that the 
quest for the truth will happen during a fair trial."  Maday, 
179 Wis. 2d at 354-55 (emphasis added). 
¶24 A preliminary examination is not a trial.  State ex 
rel. Lynch v. County Ct., Branch III: Cleveland, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 
465-66, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978).  Its purpose is not to determine 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Anderson, 2005 WI 54, 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
10 
 
¶24, 280 Wis. 2d 104, 695 N.W.2d 731.  Its purpose is merely to 
determine if there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant has committed a felony.  Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1).  
Hence, when a defendant issues a subpoena with a broad demand 
for records before the preliminary examination, he is trying to 
expand the scope of statutory discovery and move it to a 
preliminary stage of the criminal proceedings.  At this early 
point, the state has not settled on final charges, may not have 
completed its investigation, and may not fully understand the 
complexities of its own case.  While the preliminary examination 
often affords the defendant new information and detail about the 
state's evidence, this new information is a byproduct, not the 
objective, of the preliminary examination.5 
¶25 This case presents an opportunity to address the 
relationship between pretrial discovery and the preliminary 
examination.  We begin with a discussion of the nature and 
purpose of discovery, as well as the purpose and scope of the 
preliminary examination.   
A. 
Discovery and the Preliminary Examination 
                                                 
5 4 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 14.1(b), 
at 115 (2d ed. 1999).  See also Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 
287, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967) (recognizing that the preliminary 
examination may be helpful to a criminal defendant and noting 
its "incidental fringe benefits"). 
For an excellent discussion of the principle that the 
preliminary examination should not be used for purposes of 
discovery, see Desper v. State, 318 S.E.2d 437, 441-42 (W.Va. 
1984). 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
11 
 
¶26 We begin with discovery because of the character of 
the information the defendant seeks.  Schaefer's "Subpoena and 
Certificate of Appearance" uses Form 126.  His document adds the 
words "Duces Tecum" under the form's heading.  The subpoena is 
issued to "Chief of Brookfield Police Department or Designee." 
(Emphasis added.)  It demands that the "witness" bring "[a] 
complete copy of all reports, memorandums, witness interviews 
and any records related to the investigation and arrest of 
Ronald Schaefer on suspected criminal offenses or relating to 
his alleged sexual assault of Kerry M. DOB 4/6/76 in 1990." 
¶27 The expansive swath of Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum 
and the subpoena's indifference regarding which person should 
appear 
with 
the 
requested 
information 
immediately 
raise 
questions about the subpoena's purpose.  Because Schaefer makes 
no showing of a particularized need of information for the 
preliminary examination, his demand to inspect law enforcement 
files amounts to generalized, unrestricted discovery.  This 
court decided in Lynch that giving defendants the right to 
compulsory 
inspection 
of 
the 
state's 
files 
before 
the 
preliminary examination will impede the orderly process of 
discovery 
prescribed 
by 
statute, 
unjustifiably 
delay 
the 
administration 
of 
justice, 
and 
needlessly 
complicate 
the 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
12 
 
relatively informal procedures of the preliminary examination.  
Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 466.6 
¶28 The 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
do 
not 
define 
the 
term 
"discovery."7  As a result, we must refer to other authority.   
                                                 
6 The facts in Lynch are instructive.  Seven persons were 
prosecuted in Dane County for feloniously delivering cocaine.  
State ex rel. Lynch v. County Ct., Branch III: Cleveland, 82 
Wis. 2d 454, 458, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978).  When the State's first 
witness was cross-examined at the preliminary examination, 
counsel for one of the seven defendants demanded receipt of any 
exculpatory material contained in reports prepared by the 
witness.  Id.  This demand came after defense counsel had been 
unsuccessful in efforts to persuade the court to order the 
witness to produce his reports on the incident, despite the fact 
that he had not relied on his notes or reports to refresh his 
recollection prior to his testimony.  Id.   
In response to this demand, the State offered to submit its 
files for each of the seven defendants to the county court for 
in camera inspection, thereby permitting the court to determine 
whether exculpatory evidence was present.  Id.  The county court 
responded that its review of the seven files would take too long 
and would delay the preliminary examination, and it ordered the 
district attorney to submit the files for inspection by defense 
counsel.  Id.  On appeal, the county court's order was 
prohibited by the circuit court, and this court upheld the 
circuit court.  Id.   
From our review of the Lynch decision and the Lynch briefs, 
it is obvious that defense counsel wanted access to the police 
investigation reports contained in the files of the seven 
defendants.  Assistant Attorney General William Gansner argued 
successfully in his brief that the defendants were not entitled 
to obtain the same reports via the county court's order that 
they were unable to obtain "by normal evidentiary or statutory 
discovery means." 
7 The Wisconsin Statutes describe the types of items subject 
to discovery and various methods for effecting discovery.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 804.01(1) ("Discovery methods"), 804.01(2) ("Scope 
of discovery"), 971.23 ("Discovery and inspection").  Materials 
subject 
to 
discovery 
in 
civil 
cases 
are 
outlined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 804.01(2)(a)-(d).  
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
13 
 
¶29 Black's Law Dictionary defines "discovery" as "[t]he 
act or process of finding or learning something that was 
previously unknown" and "[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's 
request, of information that relates to the litigation."  
Black's Law Dictionary 478 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).  The 
first definition is general; the second relates specifically to 
legal proceedings.  The California Supreme Court commented on 
the difference in Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 923 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 
1996), in a discussion of civil discovery: 
[The word "discover" can be used] in its general sense 
of 
finding 
something 
out 
by 
search 
or 
observation. . . .   
[D]iscovery also has a specific legal meaning, to 
wit, the formal exchange of evidentiary information 
and materials between parties to a pending action.  
The two meanings of the word are well recognized in 
the dictionaries.  Thus a leading legal dictionary 
first defines "discovery" to mean, "In a general 
sense, the ascertainment of that which was previously 
unknown; the disclosure or coming to light of what was 
previously hidden.". . .  (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 
1990) p. 466).  But the same work also defines the 
word ["discovery"] in its specifically legal sense, as 
"[t]he pre-trial devices that can be used by one party 
to obtain facts and information about the case from 
the other party in order to assist the party's 
preparation 
for 
trial," 
. . .  
Even 
nonlegal 
dictionaries draw this distinction . . . "3. Law.  
Data or documents that a party to a legal action is 
compelled to disclose to another party either prior to 
or during a proceeding."  (Am. Heritage Dict. (2d 
college ed. 1985) p. 403). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23(1) 
and 
971.23(2m), 
respectively, list disclosures required to be made by the 
district attorney and the defendant in a criminal proceeding. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
14 
 
¶30 Discovery, in the legal sense, is distinguishable from 
less formal information-gathering techniques.  Discovery is 
grounded in statute or court rule, is designed to avoid 
unfairness and surprise in litigation, and may be enforced by 
judicial orders and sanctions.  As a result, discovery, in the 
legal sense, is subject to reasonable terms and limitations as 
to 
timing, convenience, cost, methodology, privilege, and 
purpose.  This is especially true of discovery in criminal 
cases, for criminal discovery operates on different principles 
from civil discovery.  In criminal discovery, the stakes are 
different, the purposes are different, the procedures are 
different, and the disclosure of information is understandably 
not reciprocal. 
¶31 The essence of "discovery" for purposes of analysis 
here is "[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of 
information that relates to the litigation."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 478 (7th ed. 1999).  Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum 
seeks to compel a law enforcement agency to produce information 
and 
material 
"relate[d] 
to 
the 
litigation" 
before 
the 
preliminary examination.  Id.  Hence, Schaefer is using the 
subpoena duces tecum as a discovery tool. 
¶32 We turn now to the preliminary examination.  There is 
no constitutional right to a preliminary examination.  State v. 
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  The 
right to such an examination stems purely from statute.  State 
ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 369, 373, 151 N.W.2d 63 
(1967). 
 
As 
noted 
above, 
Wis. Stat. § 970.03 
provides 
a 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
15 
 
preliminary examination for the specific purpose of determining 
whether there is probable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed by the defendant.  Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1).   
¶33 The independent screening function of the preliminary 
examination serves as a check on the prosecutorial power of the 
executive branch.  An accused has the option to assure that the 
hearing is scheduled expeditiously so that he may be discharged 
quickly if the government cannot justify its right to go 
forward.  Klinkiewicz, 35 Wis. 2d at 373.   
¶34 We examined the scope of the preliminary examination 
in State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984).  We 
emphasized that a preliminary hearing as to probable cause is 
not a preliminary trial or a full evidentiary trial on the issue 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 396 (citing State v. 
Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 544, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981)).  Rather, 
the preliminary examination is "intended to be a summary 
proceeding 
to 
determine 
essential 
or 
basic 
facts 
as 
to 
probability."  Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 396-97.  "[A] preliminary 
hearing is not a proper forum to choose between conflicting 
facts or inferences, or to weigh the state's evidence against 
evidence favorable to the defendant."  Id. at 398.  The 
preliminary examination is not a mini-trial on the facts; its 
purpose is merely to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence that charges against a defendant should go forward.  
See id. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
16 
 
¶35 Significantly, a defendant may present evidence at a 
preliminary examination.  Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).8  He may call 
witnesses to rebut the plausibility of a witness's story and 
probability that a felony was committed.  See Dunn, 121 
Wis. 2d at 396-98.  In this regard, the defendant must have 
compulsory process to assure the appearance of his witnesses and 
their relevant evidence. 
¶36 However, a defendant's right to present evidence at a 
preliminary examination is not boundless.  In State v. Knudson, 
51 Wis. 2d 270, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971), we held that Knudson's 
attempt to call two witnesses——the victim’s mother and the chief 
of police——was an effort "to expose inconsistencies in the 
accounts 
given 
by 
the 
victim 
to 
various 
people" 
and 
impermissible at the preliminary examination.  Id. at 280-81.  
After the victim testified to the factual basis for the charge 
of child enticement, Knudson sought to impugn the victim's 
credibility and, in the process, "gain some valuable information 
for his defense" by presenting contradictory testimony.  Id. at 
281.  The court described this as pretrial discovery beyond the 
role of the preliminary examination.  Id.  See also State ex 
rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d 624, 630, 317 N.W.2d 458 
(1982) (observing that "possible weaknesses in [the witness's] 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 970.03(5) states: "All witnesses shall 
be sworn and their testimony reported by a phonographic 
reporter.  The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against the 
defendant, and may call witnesses on the defendant's own behalf 
who then are subject to cross-examination." 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
17 
 
identification 
are 
matters 
affecting . . . weight 
and 
credibility" and not subjects for the preliminary examination). 
¶37 Because the statutory purpose of the preliminary 
examination is narrowly focused upon a determination of probable 
cause, Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1), a defendant's right to present 
evidence at the hearing is limited to "essential facts as to 
probability" that the alleged offense occurred.  Knudson, 51 
Wis. 2d at 280 (citing State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 
Wis. 2d 223, 228, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968)).  This means that 
although a defendant may subpoena witnesses and evidence for the 
preliminary examination, see Wis. Stat. §§ 973.03(5), 972.11(1), 
and 885.01, his subpoena may be quashed, a witness may not be 
allowed to testify, or evidence may be excluded if the defendant 
is unable to show the relevance of the testimony or evidence to 
the rebut probable cause. 
¶38 When a defendant's subpoena duces tecum seeks all 
investigatory material in the possession of the police, and the 
subpoena is returnable before the preliminary examination, the 
subpoena is fishing for elements of the state's case, see 
Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d at 280, and is not proper.   
¶39 We do not see how Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum 
aimed 
at 
securing 
"[a] 
complete 
copy 
of 
all 
reports, 
memorandums, witness interviews and any records related to the 
investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer" can be viewed as a 
narrow attempt to secure essential information to rebut the 
State's showing of probable cause. (Emphasis added.)  It is 
plainly an attempt to effect discovery. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
18 
 
¶40 To summarize, we conclude that the purpose of a 
preliminary 
examination 
is 
limited 
to 
an 
expeditious 
determination of whether probable cause exists for the state to 
proceed with felony charges against a defendant.  The limited 
purpose of the preliminary examination does not permit a 
criminal defendant to compel discovery in anticipation of the 
hearing.  Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum in the instant case is 
an effort to effect discovery. 
B. 
Statutory Rights to Subpoena Evidence and to Discovery in a 
Criminal Proceeding 
¶41 Schaefer 
contends 
that 
the 
analysis 
above 
is 
inconsistent with the broad subpoena power in the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  We disagree.  Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum is 1) 
not authorized by our subpoena statutes, and 2) inconsistent 
with our criminal discovery statutes. 
¶42 The subpoena power is set out in multiple statutes.  
For instance:  
(A) Wisconsin Stat. § 757.01(1) provides that courts of 
record shall have power "[t]o issue process of subpoena, 
requiring the attendance of any witness,  . . . to testify in 
any matter or cause pending or triable in such courts."   
(B) Wisconsin Stat. § 885.01(1) 
authorizes 
a 
court 
to 
"require the attendance of witnesses and their production of 
lawful instruments of evidence in any action, matter or 
proceeding pending or to be examined into before any court, 
magistrate, officer, arbitrator, board, committee or other 
person authorized to take testimony in the state."  This statute 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
19 
 
provides a court with general power, at the behest of an 
attorney, to subpoena both witnesses and documents.  See 
Wiseman, et al., 9 Wisconsin Practice: Criminal Practice and 
Procedure § 24.11 (1996).   
(C) Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(1) 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
subpoena may also be issued by any attorney of record in a civil 
action or special proceeding to compel attendance of witnesses 
for deposition, hearing or trial in the action or special 
proceeding."  (Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(2)(a) 
states that "[a] subpoena may command the person to whom it is 
directed to produce the books, papers, documents or tangible 
things designated therein." 
¶43 As a general rule, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) makes civil 
procedure statutes part of the criminal code.  The subsection 
provides that the rules of evidence and practice in civil 
actions, including Wis. Stat. § 805.07, "shall be applicable in 
all criminal actions unless the context of a section or rule 
manifestly 
requires 
a different construction."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The subsection then adds:  "Chapter[] 885 . . . shall 
apply in all criminal proceedings."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). 
¶44 Considered broadly, courts and attorneys of record 
have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of evidence by subpoena in any proceeding.  But, 
unlike present Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07 appears to link the production of documentary evidence 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
20 
 
with the appearance and testimony of a witness.9  This is 
significant because Wis. Stat. § 805.07(1) authorizes a subpoena 
for the attendance of a witness "for deposition, hearing or 
trial."  Schaefer is asking this court to establish an 
additional proceeding, denominated by him as a "Return of 
Records," 
that 
will 
help 
the 
defendant 
prepare 
for 
his 
preliminary 
examination 
without 
requiring 
any 
witness 
to 
testify.  Our criminal procedure statutes do not contemplate a 
court 
proceeding 
to 
receive 
evidence 
preliminary 
to 
a 
preliminary examination, and our civil procedure statutes 
neither recognize nor compel such a proceeding.   
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 804.09, entitled "Production of 
documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and 
other purposes," is the civil procedure statute that most 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(2)(a) is based on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 45(b) as it existed circa 1975.  Patricia 
Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapters 
805-807, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 686 (1976).  At that time, Rule 
45 wedded the subpoena duces tecum with the subpoena ad 
testificandum——the subpoena for witness testimony.  David D. 
Siegel, Practice Commentaries Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 45, 28 
U.S.C.A at 355 ("Under Rule 45 as amended in 1991, a subpoena 
duces tecum seeking the production of documents (or other 
materials) from a nonparty may be used independently of the 
regular testimonial subpoena; the two are no longer wedded, as 
they were under the prior version of Rule 45.")(emphasis added). 
Wisconsin 
modified 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.07(2) 
in 
1995 
(effective January 1, 1996) to add third-party subpoenas for 
discovery purposes.  Supreme Court Order No. 95-09, 195 
Wis. 2d xiii (1996).  However, subsection (4) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.07, which creates the form for subpoenas and instructions 
on how to add a subpoena duces tecum, was not amended; and we 
find no evidence that the amended statute intended to break the 
linkage found in the text. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
21 
 
closely approximates what Schaefer is trying to accomplish in 
this case.  However, § 804.09(1) involves a "request," not a 
"command," and § 804.09(1) is located in the chapter on "Civil 
Procedure——Depositions and Discovery." (Emphasis added.)  In 
short, no subpoena statute authorizes Schaefer's action. 
¶46 Schaefer's attempt to utilize the general subpoena 
power for discovery prior to his preliminary examination also 
conflicts with Wis. Stat. §§ 971.31(5)(b) and 971.23.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.23 is the criminal discovery statute.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) provides explicitly that in felony actions, 
"motions 
under 
s. 
971.23 . . . shall 
not 
be 
made 
at 
a 
preliminary examination and not until an information has been 
filed."  (Emphasis added.)   
¶47 "[G]enerally where a specific statutory provision 
leads in one direction and a general statutory provision in 
another, the specific statutory provision controls."  Marder v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 2005 WI 159, ¶23, 286 
Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.  This principle of statutory 
interpretation aligns with the important qualification in Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(1) that a civil practice applies to criminal 
procedure "unless the context of a section or rule manifestly 
requires a different construction."  Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) 
(emphasis added). 
¶48 Schaefer's 
statutory 
argument 
is 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11 allows a criminal defendant access to the 
civil 
subpoena 
duces 
tecum 
power 
embodied 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 805.07(2).  He asserts that § 972.11 applies the 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
22 
 
general subpoena power in Wis. Stat. § 885.01 to criminal 
proceedings.  He further contends that the subpoena duces tecum 
constitutes a "judicial process independent of discovery rules."  
In view of this argument, if we were to conclude that Schaefer 
was not attempting to pursue discovery with his subpoena duces 
tecum, we might have difficulty concluding that his subpoena 
request was inconsistent with the timing limitation in Wis. 
Stat. § 971.31(5)(b).10  
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 
sets 
out 
the 
state's 
discovery obligations.  Subsection (1) provides in part: 
(1) What a district attorney must disclose to a 
defendant.  Upon demand, the district attorney shall, 
within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state[.] 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). 
 
¶50 Paragraphs (a) through (h) of the statute then outline 
the specific disclosures the district attorney must make: 
 
(a) Any written or recorded statement concerning 
the alleged crime made by the defendant, including the 
testimony of the defendant in a secret proceeding 
under s. 968.26 or before a grand jury, and the names 
of witnesses to the defendant's written statements. 
 
(b) A written summary of all oral statements of 
the defendant which the district attorney plans to use 
in the course of the trial and the names of witnesses 
to the defendant's oral statements. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(2)(b) refers specifically to 
"discovery" with respect to a third party. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
23 
 
 
(bm) Evidence obtained in the manner described 
under 
s. 
968.31(2)(b), if the district attorney 
intends to use the evidence at trial. 
 
(c) A copy of the defendant's criminal record. 
 
(d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses 
whom the district attorney intends to call at the 
trial.  This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal 
witnesses or those called for impeachment only. 
 
(e) Any relevant written or recorded statements 
of a witness named on a list under par. (d), including 
any audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a 
child under s. 908.08, any reports or statements of 
experts made in connection with the case or, if an 
expert does not prepare a report or statement, a 
written summary of the expert's findings or the 
subject matter of his or her testimony, and the 
results 
of 
any 
physical 
or 
mental 
examination, 
scientific test, experiment or comparison that the 
district attorney intends to offer in evidence at 
trial. 
 
(f) The criminal record of a prosecution witness 
which is known to the district attorney. 
 
(g) Any physical evidence that the district 
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial. 
 
(h) Any exculpatory evidence. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(a)-(h). 
¶51 These mandatory disclosures should be compared to 
Schaefer's subpoena demand: "A complete copy of all reports, 
memorandums, witness interviews and any records related to the 
investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer on suspected 
criminal offenses or relating to the alleged sexual assault of 
Kerry M. DOB 4/6/76 in 1990."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶52 The demands in the defendant's subpoena duces tecum 
clearly overlap the discovery materials outlined in Wis. Stat. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
24 
 
§ 971.23.  In some respects, the subpoena demands exceed the 
discovery materials authorized by the statute.  Because the 
mandatory 
disclosures 
outlined 
in 
§ 971.23(1) 
include 
information that is customarily found in police investigative 
reports or similar records,11 we are hard pressed to distinguish 
the defendant's subpoena duces tecum from a discovery demand 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). 
¶53 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) provides 
that 
"[i]n 
felony 
actions, 
motions . . . under 
s. 
971.23 . . . shall not be made at a preliminary examination and 
not until an information has been filed." (Emphasis added.) 
¶54 Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum arguably is governed 
by 
the 
limitation 
on 
pretrial 
discovery 
found 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b). 
 
Schaefer 
is 
seeking 
discovery 
materials (police records).  His subpoena satisfies some of the 
criteria of a "motion."  See Wis. Stat. § 971.30.  The police 
chief's failure to honor the subpoena would likely lead to "an 
application for an order" to comply.  Wis. Stat. § 971.30(1).  
                                                 
11 Professor LaFave has noted that materials contained in 
police reports equate with discovery: 
Police investigative reports may fall in one or more 
of several categories of discoverable material.  Where 
the report contains a recital of the comments of a 
defendant, 
codefendant 
or 
witness 
sufficiently 
complete to constitute a recorded statement of that 
person, that portion of the report may be subject to 
discovery under the appropriate provision for recorded 
statements. 
4 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 20.3(k), at 
879 (2d ed. 1999). 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
25 
 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "motion" as "A written or oral 
application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or 
order."  Black's Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed. 1999).  In effect, 
Schaefer has requested the circuit court to order, pursuant to 
its subpoena power, the Brookfield Chief of Police or designee 
to appear in court with the documents requested.  We think it 
makes little sense to disregard the timing limitations on 
discovery in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) simply because Schaefer 
does not rely on Wis. Stat. § 971.23, has tried to exceed the 
scope of discovery in § 971.23, and has not labeled his subpoena 
duces tecum as a "motion."  To say that Schaefer's subpoena 
duces tecum is not a "motion" elevates form over substance. 
¶55 This case requires us to interpret several statutes.  
"[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what 
the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper and 
intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
"[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
Statutes involving the same subject matter "must be construed in 
a manner that harmonizes them in order to give each full force 
and effect."  Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Wis., 2006 WI App 221, ¶15, 296 Wis. 2d 705, 725 N.W.2d 423. 
¶56 The plain truth is that if we permitted the general 
subpoena authority to effect discovery in a criminal case before 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
26 
 
the preliminary examination, there would be nothing left of the 
limiting conditions in Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23(1) and 971.31(5)(b).  
This would not be "harmonizing" the general subpoena statutes 
with the criminal discovery statutes. 
¶57 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1) 
requires 
a 
district 
attorney to disclose discovery material "within a reasonable 
time before trial."  Requiring the state12 to disclose discovery 
                                                 
12 Schaefer argues that the Brookfield Police Department and 
the district attorney are not a single entity; therefore, the 
prohibitions 
on 
discovery 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) 
are 
inapplicable.  This contention is not valid.  Although separate 
entities in fact, the Brookfield Police Department and the 
district attorney's office are related for considerations of the 
state's duty of disclosing evidence to criminal defendants.  
This court has stated that "[u]nder [Wis. Stat.] § 971.23, the 
State's discovery obligations may extend to information in the 
possession of law enforcement agencies but not personally known 
to the prosecutor."  State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶21, 252 Wis. 
2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480.  As a result, we are reluctant to treat 
the police department and the district attorney's office as 
separate entities before an information is filed if they are 
treated as inextricably linked for purposes of discovery after 
the information is filed.  Id.   
The court of appeals came to a similar conclusion.  In a 
case involving the state's loss of a tape-recording of a 
defendant, the court stated:   
We also reject the trial court's reasoning that 
the actions of the police authorities in losing the 
tape should not be visited upon the state as the 
prosecuting entity.  For purposes of the criminal 
discovery statutes, we view an investigative police 
agency which holds relevant evidence as an arm of the 
prosecution.  In most criminal cases, the evidence 
against the accused is garnered, stored and controlled 
by the investigating police agency.  Depending upon 
local practice, many courts and district attorneys 
entrust the custody and control of such material to 
the police even after it has been elevated to formal 
evidentiary status in a criminal proceeding.   
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
27 
 
material before the preliminary examination——before the court 
has even authorized a trial——is plainly at odds with the 
statutory scheme.  This conclusion about timing is reinforced by 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b) that discovery motions 
"shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an 
information has been filed." 
¶58 Equally important, Wis. Stat. § 971.23 does not 
require the state to turn over all the information in its 
possession.  For instance, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) requires 
the state to disclose "[a] list of all witnesses and their 
addresses whom the district attorney intends to call at the 
trial.  This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses or 
those called for impeachment only."  If Schaefer were entitled 
to obtain by subpoena duces tecum the names of all witnesses who 
                                                                                                                                                             
The trial court's reasoning would apparently 
sanction the loss of relevant evidence only if 
committed by the district attorney's office, but not 
by 
the 
principal 
investigative 
agency. 
 
This 
distinction is neither reasonable nor valid. 
State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 479 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (footnote omitted). 
More important than the link between police and prosecutor 
for discovery purposes is the reality that the principal 
documents of interest in the district attorney's file are the 
police 
reports. 
 
These 
documents, 
which 
constitute 
a 
comprehensive summary of law enforcement's investigation of the 
alleged crime, normally serve as the basis for the criminal 
complaint.  The district attorney has never been required to 
disclose the totality of law enforcement reports, only specific 
pieces of information, especially exculpatory evidence.  Here 
the defendant demands the totality of law enforcement records, 
putting his subpoena at odds with the criminal discovery 
statute. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
28 
 
have surfaced in the police reports as well as their statements, 
his need——and the need of all defendants——for § 971.23 discovery 
would be substantially reduced.  Section 971.23(1) would then be 
used primarily to make sure that the state discloses any new 
information that it obtains and reveals its trial strategy, 
i.e., what witnesses and physical evidence the state plans to 
present at trial and what evidence it has decided not to 
present. 
¶59 It must be noted that the limitations on the scope of 
discovery in Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) may not always prevail 
against a subpoena duces tecum after an information is filed.  
We have previously implied that a subpoena duces tecum may have 
to be honored if the defendant shows a "particularized need" for 
information in the possession of the state.  See Lynch, 82 
Wis. 2d at 466-68.  That is not the case here.  The defendant 
has no statutory subpoena right to obtain and copy police 
investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior to his 
preliminary examination. 
C. 
Constitutional Rights to Compulsory Process and Effective 
Assistance of Counsel 
¶60 Schaefer 
also raises challenges under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  First, he argues that 
the rights to compulsory process found in both of these 
constitutional provisions include the right to access and copy 
police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior 
to a preliminary hearing.  Second, he argues that his Sixth 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
29 
 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel cannot be 
satisfied without his attorney having access to these materials 
before the preliminary examination. 
¶61 We address these challenges in turn and conclude that 
Schaefer has no state or federal constitutional right to obtain 
and 
copy 
police 
investigation 
reports 
and 
nonprivileged 
materials by subpoena prior to his preliminary hearing. 
1. 
Right to Compulsory Process 
¶62 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that the accused in a criminal proceeding shall have 
the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor."13  U.S. const. amend. VI.  Similarly, the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process 
                                                 
13 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads as follows: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed; which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The language of the Sixth Amendment 
refers to "witnesses," but the Supreme Court has held that the 
Compulsory Process Clause also applies to documentary materials.  
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974).  See 
also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 54 (2000) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
30 
 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf[.]"  Wis. 
Const. art. 1, § 7.  Although this court has the prerogative to 
afford greater protection to a criminal defendant under a 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by an 
equivalent provision in the United States Constitution, State v. 
Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), the court tends 
to interpret and apply equivalent provisions in the same manner.  
See State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-81, 593 N.W.2d 427 
(1999) (stating that "[w]here . . . the language of the 
provision in the state constitution is 'virtually identical' to 
that of the federal provision or where no difference in intent 
is discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed the 
state constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's construction of the federal constitution").   
¶63 In Washington v. Texas (1967), the Supreme Court 
explained that the right to compulsory process is plainly "the 
right to present a defense[.]"  Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.  The 
Court reviewed a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge 
to two Texas statutes that prohibited persons charged or 
convicted as co-participants in the same crime from testifying 
for one another, even though there was no bar to their 
testifying for the state.  Id. at 16-17.  The Court held that 
this 
statutory 
scheme 
violated 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses at trial:   
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense, the right 
to present the defendant's version of the facts as 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
31 
 
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide 
where the truth lies.  Just as an accused has the 
right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the 
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the 
right to present his own witnesses to establish a 
defense. 
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).  Thus, compulsory process for 
securing favorable witnesses is "so fundamental and essential to 
a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. at 17-18.  "The right of an 
accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations.  The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been 
recognized 
as 
essential 
to 
due 
process." 
 
Chambers 
v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
¶64 Twenty years after Washington, the Court noted that it 
has "had little occasion to discuss the contours of the 
Compulsory Process Clause."14  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
39, 55 (1987).  In Ritchie, the Court reviewed Sixth Amendment 
claims of a criminal defendant convicted of various sexual 
offenses against his daughter.  Id. at 39.  The defendant, 
Ritchie, sought pretrial discovery——via subpoena——of ostensibly 
confidential records from Children and Youth Services (CYS), a 
                                                 
14 "This 
paucity 
of 
compulsory 
process 
rulings 
is 
attributable 
largely 
to 
the 
Court's 
decision 
to 
address 
initially 
under 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
claims 
that 
the 
government failed to assist in identifying or locating defense 
witnesses, or improperly interfered with the defense's use of 
subpoenas."  5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 24.3(a), at 470 (2d ed. 1999). 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
32 
 
Pennsylvania protective agency.  Id. at 43.  Ritchie claimed he 
was entitled to review CYS's file to discover information that 
might be useful in contradicting testimony favorable to the 
state.  Id. at 53.  Because it noted that defense counsel was 
able to cross-examine all trial witnesses fully, the Court 
determined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding 
that the failure to disclose the CYS file violated the 
Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 54. 
¶65 The Court then turned to the compulsory process claim.  
The Court acknowledged that Sixth Amendment applicability to 
discovery disputes was unsettled; hence, it utilized a due 
process analysis.  Id. at 56.  The Court said it had articulated 
"some of the specific rights" secured by the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  "Our cases establish, at a 
minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the 
government's 
assistance 
in 
compelling 
the 
attendance 
of 
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury 
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt."  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
¶66 The Court was reluctant to establish an unconditional 
discovery right under the Sixth Amendment.  Thus, it analyzed 
the case on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.  The Court 
concluded that the Compulsory Process Clause "provides no 
greater protections in this area than those afforded by due 
process."  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56.  Stated another way, unless 
due process requires defense access to specific evidence, the 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
33 
 
Compulsory Process Clause cannot provide substitute authority 
for such access.   
¶67 These comments by the Court point the compass of the 
Compulsory Process Clause toward a defendant's right to the 
compelled production of evidence in anticipation of trial, not 
in anticipation of a preliminary examination.  Professor LaFave 
has observed that "[t]he Compulsory Process Clause naturally 
suggests some constitutional entitlement to trial evidence."  5 
Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(a), at 469 
(2d ed. 1999) (emphasis added). 
¶68 Thus, our holding in Lynch, founded upon due process, 
applies here and circumscribes a criminal defendant's compulsory 
process right to access the state's files prior to his 
preliminary examination. 
¶69 In Lynch, we held that, under the Due Process Clause, 
a criminal defendant has no right to inspect the state's files 
for the existence of exculpatory evidence prior to a preliminary 
examination.  Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 465-68.  The constitutional 
right to such exculpatory material "is in the right to a fair 
trial guaranteed by [due process]."  Id. at 465 (citing United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).  We concluded: 
Inspection of the state's files by the defense at 
this early stage, where there has been no showing of 
particularized need for inspection, can serve only as 
an 
opportunity 
for 
generalized, 
unrestricted 
discovery, 
rather 
than 
as 
a 
device 
for 
the 
constitutionally 
mandated 
disclosure 
of 
specific 
exculpatory material.  Such discovery will impede the 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
34 
 
orderly processes of discovery prescribed by statute, 
see: 
secs. 
971.23 
to 
971.25, 
Stats., 
and 
will 
circumvent the legislative determinations reflected in 
those 
statutes; 
will 
unjustifiably 
delay 
the 
administration 
of 
justice; 
and 
will 
needlessly 
complicate 
the 
relatively 
informal 
procedures 
applicable at this early stage of a prosecution.  This 
harm is inherent in the order of the county court. 
Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 466 (footnote omitted).   
¶70 We conclude that Lynch controls the compulsory process 
challenge in the instant case.  There is no compulsory process 
right to subpoena police investigation reports and nonprivileged 
materials before the preliminary examination.   
¶71 Schaefer asserts that if Lynch applies, he has 
demonstrated a "particularized need" for access to police 
records because of a "sixteen year delay in charging and its 
consequent effect on memory."  We are not persuaded.  An 
extended period of time between commission of the alleged 
offense and the filing of a criminal complaint may provide 
justification 
for 
subpoena access to police investigatory 
records under extraordinary circumstances.  See Lynch, 82 
Wis. 2d at 466.  However, in Schaefer's case, the criminal 
complaint is sufficiently detailed to allow him to identify the 
complainant15 and the alleged circumstances of the charges and to 
prepare 
to 
rebut 
the 
plausibility 
of 
the 
complainant's 
accusations and probable cause.  The lengthy span of time since 
                                                 
15 At his initial appearance, Schaefer was admonished not to 
contact the victim listed in the complaint.  We have no record 
evidence that Schaefer claimed inability to comply with this 
condition because of uncertainty about the identity of the 
complainant. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
35 
 
the alleged offenses will not incapacitate this defendant from 
preparing for the preliminary examination, and it does not 
justify the unbridled access to police investigatory materials 
that the defendant seeks. 
¶72 We note that this court has also addressed compulsory 
process in the context of a circuit court's subpoena ordering 
two newspaper reporters to appear at a pretrial hearing 
regarding the identities of their sources for several stories 
they wrote about a murder.  State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper 
Co. v. Cir. Ct., Branch 1, Brown County, 113 Wis. 2d 411, 415-
16, 335 N.W.2d 367 (1983).  We concluded that the circuit court 
erred when it ordered in camera disclosure of the reporters' 
sources and held the reporters in contempt for refusing to 
disclose this information.  Id. at 429. 
¶73 Weighing the defendant's right to compulsory process 
for witnesses in his favor against the journalist's qualified 
nondisclosure 
privilege, 
we 
recognized 
that 
"a 
criminal 
defendant does not have an unqualified right to subpoena 
witnesses."  Id. at 420.  We observed that "[f]or the 
constitutional right to compulsory process to be invoked, a 
defendant must, if the subpoena is challenged, show there is a 
reasonable probability that the subpoenaed witnesses' testimony 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
36 
 
will be competent, relevant, material and favorable to his 
defense."  Id. at 420-21.16  
¶74 We went on to analyze the efficacy of the circuit 
court's order requiring in camera disclosure of reporter 
sources, concluding that the facts of the case did not suggest a 
need for such disclosure.  We outlined a procedure for the 
circuit court to evaluate compulsory process rights implicated 
by desired evidence based upon whether "the evidence is 
necessary to the defense."  Id. at 423.  "Information is 
necessary to the defense if it tends to support the theory of 
defense which the defendant intends to assert at trial."  Id. 
(emphasis added).   
¶75 The Green Bay Newspaper case evaluated compulsory 
process rights in terms of their relationship to trial evidence.  
Inasmuch as a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified 
right to require the appearance of any and all persons as 
witnesses for a trial, and a defendant's right to compulsory 
process at trial must satisfy certain standards, see id. at 420-
21, we conclude a fortiori that the compulsory process rights of 
a criminal defendant at a preliminary stage of the criminal 
proceedings also must be subject to reasonable restrictions.  
See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, (1998) ("A 
defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, 
                                                 
16 See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858, 867 (1982) (observing that a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment exists where the defendant is deprived of access to 
favorable evidence that is "relevant . . . material . . . and 
vital" to his defense) (citation omitted).   
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
37 
 
but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions.").  We have 
previously observed that "even though a defendant's right to 
present certain evidence is constitutionally protected, that 
right may have to 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process.'"  State v. Pulizzano, 155 
Wis. 2d 633, 653, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) (quoting Chambers, 410 
U.S. at 295).  In our view, there is a legitimate interest in 
preserving 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
that 
prescribes 
pretrial 
discovery 
limitations 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.31(5)(b) 
and 
971.23.  Therefore, we decline to expand a criminal defendant's 
compulsory process rights to encompass a right to subpoena 
police reports and other non-privileged investigatory materials 
for examination and copying in anticipation of a preliminary 
hearing. 
¶76 Schaefer suggests that we adopt a procedure in which 
Wisconsin circuit courts would review subpoena duces tecum 
materials prior to the preliminary examination to resolve 
disputes regarding privilege, relevance, and materiality.  He 
notes that Illinois has adopted such a procedure, see People ex 
rel. Fisher v. Carey, 396 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. 1979), and he urges 
Wisconsin to follow suit.   
¶77 We respectfully decline this invitation.  In Carey, 
the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that: 
Subpoenaed material should be sent directly to the 
court because the subpoena is a judicial process or 
court 
writ, 
whereas 
discovery 
is 
the 
parties' 
procedure, 
a 
distinguishable 
concept 
under 
our 
rules. . . .  The court then determines the relevance 
and materiality of the materials, and whether they are 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
38 
 
privileged, as 
well 
as 
whether 
the 
subpoena 
is 
unreasonable or oppressive.  The State's attorney, of 
course, must be fully aware of the records sought from 
the investigative agency by the subpoena in order for 
him to object. 
Carey, 396 N.E.2d at 19-20 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).17 
¶78 The underlined language implies that the Illinois 
court established a proceeding——before the preliminary hearing——
to hear objections and settle evidentiary disputes, even though 
Illinois rules at the time precluded the use of a subpoena to 
circumvent formal discovery (which was not scheduled to go into 
effect until "following indictment or information.").  Id. at 
19; see 58 Ill. 2d Rule 411, 65 Ill. 2d Rule 412(g).  The Carey 
court 
appears 
to 
have 
concluded 
that 
its 
ruling 
was 
constitutionally required. 
¶79 The Illinois Supreme Court's analysis is clearly 
supportive of Schaefer's position.  On the other hand, the 
Illinois 
Supreme 
Court's 
analysis 
does 
not 
square 
with 
subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, most 
notably Ritchie.  The analysis also conflicts with our decision 
in Lynch.  The Illinois court's heavy reliance on United States 
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807), is intriguing, but 
that decision has no precedential value for us because it is not 
a decision by the United States Supreme Court, and it predated 
modern discovery rules.   
                                                 
17 In Wisconsin, criminal "discovery" is not entirely the 
parties' procedure because the scope of discoverable materials 
is set out in statute and compliance with the statute will be 
enforced by the court. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
39 
 
¶80 In United States v. Nixon, one of only a handful of 
Supreme Court cases to discuss and apply Burr, the Court 
commented that the subpoena duces tecum "was not intended to 
provide a means of discovery for criminal cases[.]"  United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974).  The Court construed 
the federal subpoena duces tecum provision, Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c), as requiring, among other things, 
that "the application [be] made in good faith and [ ] not 
intended as a general 'fishing expedition.'"  Id. at 699.   
¶81 As an additional matter of public policy, Schaefer 
notes that at least one county in Wisconsin, Washington County, 
conducts a pretrial status hearing where discovery material is 
customarily exchanged prior to the preliminary examination.  We 
acknowledge the benefits that such an "open file" policy may 
produce in terms of an increased number of defense waivers of 
the preliminary examination as well as eventual guilty pleas.18  
As one commentator has observed, however, "[t]hough some 
prosecutors maintain an 'open file' policy, granting defenders 
access to the prosecution's case files, this is purely a policy 
choice on 
the prosecutor's part, not a legal right of 
                                                 
18 The 
preliminary 
examination 
sometimes 
serves 
as 
a 
valuable "educational process" for a defendant who is not 
persuaded by his counsel's opinion that the prosecution has a 
strong case and that, therefore, a negotiated plea is in the 
defendant's best interest.  4 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 14.1(e), at 123 (2d ed. 1999).  An "open file" may 
serve the same purpose, provided the state's investigation is 
relatively complete and persuasive.  Requiring the state to 
expose proof problems in its case is not the same as requiring 
it to turn over exculpatory evidence. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
40 
 
defendants."  David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 
Mich. L. Rev. 1729, 1738 (1993).  No existing state statute or 
compulsory process provision of either the United States 
Constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution commands the state to 
divulge the entirety of police investigatory files to an accused 
before an information has been filed against him.   
¶82 Accordingly, we hold that Schaefer has no right to 
subpoena police reports and other non-privileged investigatory 
materials prior to his preliminary hearing under either the 
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution or Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
2. 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
¶83 Finally, Schaefer contends that he is entitled to 
subpoena police reports and other investigatory materials to 
safeguard his right to effective assistance of counsel, which 
also is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.19   
¶84 A defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel 
at all critical stages of prosecution.  United States v. Wade, 
                                                 
19 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence."  This right to counsel has been 
applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963).  The right to counsel has been defined by the United 
States Supreme Court as the right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).   
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
41 
 
388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).  In State v. Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d 234, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995), we adopted the view of the 
Supreme Court that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in 
the criminal process.  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 252 (citing 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)).  Consequently, every 
defendant charged with a felony in Wisconsin is constitutionally 
entitled to the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing.  
Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 253.  We also observed, however, that 
"[a]lthough the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing is 
constitutionally guaranteed, the right to a preliminary hearing 
is purely statutory."  Id. at 253 n.11 (citing State v. Moats, 
156 Wis. 2d 74, 83, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990)).  This factor 
influences our analysis.   
¶85 In 
considering 
Schaefer's 
right 
to 
effective 
assistance of counsel at a preliminary examination, we must keep 
in mind the narrow purpose of the hearing.  "[T]he limited scope 
of the preliminary hearing compresses the contours of the sixth 
amendment."  Wiseman, et al., 9 Wisconsin Practice: Criminal 
Practice and Procedure § 8.12 (1996).  "In particular, the 
defendant's right to present evidence and cross-examine the 
state's witnesses is severely limited by the summary nature of 
the preliminary hearing."  Id.   
¶86 Schaefer's argument is somewhat unusual because he 
poses a prospective challenge to effective assistance of 
counsel.  Schaefer argues that his defense counsel cannot be 
effective at a future preliminary examination without access to 
police reports and other similar materials, not that his counsel 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
42 
 
was ineffective in the past for lack of access to such evidence.  
To address Schaefer's position on the merits would require this 
court to hypothesize, in the abstract, what actions by defense 
counsel are necessary to preserve a criminal defendant's right 
to effective assistance of counsel at a preliminary examination.  
To adopt Schaefer's position would require us to create a per se 
rule that defense counsel is ineffective when counsel fails to 
subpoena police reports and other similar materials prior to a 
preliminary examination. 
¶87 This court operates under the principles adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate that: 
(1) defense counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense so seriously as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687.   
¶88 The primary consideration on the first prong is 
whether a reasonable basis existed for the lawyer's conduct.  
State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 560, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).  On 
the second prong, counsel will not be deemed ineffective unless 
the defendant is prejudiced by the lawyer's action or failure to 
act.  State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 503, 329 N.W.2d 161 
(1983). 
 
Since 
Schaefer's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
challenge 
is 
prospective, he must demonstrate that he would be prejudiced per 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
43 
 
se by defense counsel's inability to subpoena police reports 
prior to the preliminary hearing.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984) (noting that prejudice is 
presumed where there is no "likelihood that any lawyer, even a 
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance" under a 
particular set of facts).   
¶89 Schaefer cites State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 557, 
205 N.W.2d 1 (1973), in which we said that effective counsel  
"must be equal to that which the ordinarily prudent lawyer, 
skilled and versed in criminal law, would give to clients who 
had privately retained his services."  In so holding, we 
expressly approved of the 1971 American Bar Association Project 
on Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The 
Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, as a means of 
evaluating counsel's performance.  See Harper, 57 Wis. 2d at 557 
n.8.  Schaefer places emphasis on ABA Standard 4.1:   
4.1 Duty to investigate.  It is the duty of the 
lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues 
leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt 
or penalty.  The investigation should always include 
efforts to secure information in the possession of the 
prosecution and law enforcement authorities.  The duty 
to investigate exists regardless of the accused's 
admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts 
constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead 
guilty. 
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d at 553 n.3 (emphasis added).  He argues that 
the Standard's use of the word "prompt," coupled with our 
comment that "[t]he lawyer who is ignorant of the facts of the 
case incapacitates himself to serve his client effectively," id. 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
44 
 
at 553, should persuade us to hold that police records must be 
provided to defense counsel before the preliminary examination 
to preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.   
¶90  We cannot adopt Schaefer's argument.  Harper can be 
distinguished by the fact the case concerned defense counsel's 
performance at trial, not his investigatory acumen prior to the 
preliminary examination.  Id. at 551.  ABA Standard 4.1, 
although calling for defense counsel to "explore all avenues" 
and "include efforts to secure information in the possession of 
the prosecution and law enforcement authorities," does not 
compel us to conclude that Schaefer's attorney would be 
ineffective if he failed to procure police investigative 
materials 
(including 
police 
reports) 
prior 
to 
Schaefer's 
preliminary examination.   
¶91 An 
attorney's 
performance 
at 
the 
preliminary 
examination does not define the level of performance expected of 
defense counsel at 
later stages of the proceeding.  A 
"preliminary hearing is not a full evidentiary trial and [ ] the 
purpose of a preliminary examination is only to determine 
whether further criminal proceedings are justified."  State v. 
Akins, 198 Wis. 2d 495, 512, 544 N.W.2d 392 (1996) (citing 
Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972)).  
Given 
the 
limited 
scope 
and 
purpose 
of 
the 
preliminary 
examination, a defendant's counsel may waive the hearing 
entirely, or deliberately decline to ask certain questions that 
would be relevant.  We cannot say that Schaefer's counsel would 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
45 
 
be hand-cuffed and rendered ineffective by failing to procure 
police reports prior to Schaefer's preliminary examination. 
¶92 Defense 
counsel 
is 
not 
barred 
from 
conducting 
significant investigation into the case before the preliminary 
examination to rebut the plausibility of a witness's story and 
probable cause.  This investigation would likely be based on the 
details in the complaint and information supplied by the 
defendant.  In this case, nothing prevents counsel from 
identifying 
and 
seeking 
to 
interview 
the 
complainant's 
classmates and teammates, as well as Schaefer's co-workers and 
family.  We note that the failure of classmates to corroborate 
the complainant's claim of sexual assaults would not undermine 
the plausibility of her story at the preliminary examination.  
Witness statements that do corroborate the complainant's claims 
are likely to be disclosed to the defendant before trial.    
¶93 Schaefer cannot reasonably argue that information 
contained in March 2006 police reports would offer indispensable 
information about the complainant's story that is not stated or 
implied in the May 2006 criminal complaint.  The principal 
benefits to be gained from review of the police investigation 
file would be to determine the names of additional persons whom 
the police interviewed and whether the police had uncovered 
corroborating evidence.  We cannot say that Schaefer's defense 
counsel will be ineffective at the preliminary examination 
without this information. 
¶94 Therefore, 
we 
hold 
that 
Schaefer 
has 
no 
Sixth 
Amendment right, based on effective assistance of counsel, to 
No. 2006AP1826-CRAC 
46 
 
subpoena police reports and other non-privileged materials prior 
to his preliminary examination. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶95 We conclude that a criminal defendant does not have a 
statutory or constitutional right to compel the production of 
police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials by 
subpoena duces tecum prior to the preliminary examination.  A 
criminal defendant who employs the subpoena power in this manner 
is attempting to engage in discovery without authority in either 
civil or criminal procedure statutes and in conflict with 
criminal discovery statutes.  Although a reasonable argument can 
be made for prosecutors to open their files to defendants at an 
early point in criminal prosecutions, this argument does not 
translate 
into 
an 
enforceable 
right 
to 
subpoena 
police 
investigation reports and nonprivileged materials before a 
preliminary examination.   
¶96 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
granting the State's motion to quash Schaefer's subpoena duces 
tecum. 
 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶97 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
The 
question presented is whether a criminal defendant has a 
subpoena right to obtain and copy police investigation reports 
prior to the preliminary hearing.1   
¶98 My answer to the question is "no," and I affirm the 
order of the circuit court.  My answer is the same as that 
reached by the majority opinion.  I reach this answer, however, 
by a shorter, more direct route than that taken by the majority 
opinion. 
 
My 
route 
avoids 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
case-
stretching, law-making, and almost entirely dicta-laden detour 
through the fields of discovery and preliminary examination in 
criminal cases.   
¶99 The majority opinion appears to be more interested in 
developing law about preliminary examinations and discovery 
(both before and after an information is filed) than in 
answering the question of law posed by the instant case.  I 
therefore do not join the majority opinion.   
¶100 I reason as follows:  
(A) No statute gives the defendant a subpoena right to 
obtain and copy police investigation reports prior to the 
preliminary hearing. 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5), the defendant has a 
statutory right to subpoena witnesses to appear and to produce 
relevant evidence at his preliminary examination.  This right to 
subpoena a witness at the preliminary examination is not the 
right the defendant is attempting to exercise in the instant 
case.  The defendant is using the subpoena power in the instant 
case to obtain evidence before the preliminary examination, not 
at the preliminary examination. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
2 
 
(B) The defendant's claimed constitutional rights of 
compulsory process and effective assistance of counsel do 
not support the defendant's right to a subpoena for police 
files under the circumstances of the instant case.  
(C) Although the defendant and the third-party brief 
of amici curiae (the Office of State Public Defender and 
the Innocence Project) raise serious questions about the 
reliability and fairness of preliminary examinations and 
trials when a criminal defendant is not given access to 
police records prior to the preliminary hearing, I am 
reluctant to conclude that this case is an appropriate one 
in which to rule, as a matter of the inherent or 
superintending powers of this court, that unless good cause 
exists, law enforcement should give an accused access to 
police reports before the preliminary examination.  The 
policy arguments of the defendant and the amici do, 
however, deserve further and serious attention, as the 
State's brief suggests, from this court in its rule making 
authority or from the legislature.  
¶101 I do not address the question whether the defendant 
may obtain the documents at issue by other means such as a 
request made under Wisconsin's open records law.  The open 
records law is not raised in the present case.  We should not 
pre-judge issues that are neither raised nor briefed and that 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
3 
 
may be pending in other cases.2  Unfortunately, in footnote 4, 
the majority opinion weighs in on this unbriefed and unraised 
issue, suggesting that the provisions of Wisconsin's open 
records law are qualified by several provisions, including Wis. 
                                                 
2 The responsibility of law enforcement under the public 
records law is not settled.  See, e.g., Portage Daily Register 
v. 
Columbia 
Co. 
Sheriff's 
Dep't, 
2008 
WI 
App 
30, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (no petition for review filed).  I 
do not cite this case for its holding or as precedent but as an 
example showing that the responsibility of law enforcement under 
the public record law is subject to dispute.  In Portage Daily 
Register, the court of appeals concluded that the sheriff's 
department had responsibility under the public records law 
independent of the responsibility of the district attorney.  The 
court 
of 
appeals 
further 
concluded 
that 
the 
sheriff's 
department's denial of a request to release a report on the 
ground that a copy of the report had been forwarded to the 
district attorney's office and was part of an open investigation 
did not state a sufficient legally specific policy under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.27 (2005-06).   
In State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 477 
N.W.2d 608 (1991), this court held that although there is a 
presumption that the public has a right to inspect public 
records unless an exception is found, "the common law provides 
an exception which protects the district attorney's files from 
being open to public inspection."  Foust, 165 Wis. 2d at 433-34.  
The decision in Foust did not address any question pertaining to 
records in the possession of law enforcement agencies.   
Recently, Assistant Attorney General Mary E. Burke advised 
the 
Brookfield 
Assistant 
Police 
Chief 
that 
the 
police 
department's policy of refusing to release any police files that 
have been forwarded to a prosecuting attorney is not permitted 
under Wisconsin's public records law.  The Brookfield Police 
Department has apparently rejected this advice.  See Amy Rinard, 
Police Files Get Limited Protection, State Says, Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
Online, 
Nov. 
23, 
2007, 
at 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=689460 (last visited 
March 20, 2008); Amy Rinard, Police Ignore Open Records Advice, 
Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel 
Online, 
Dec. 
7, 
2007, 
at 
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=694473 (last visited 
March 20, 2008).   
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
4 
 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 905.09.3 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
misreads 
§ (Rule) 905.09. 
 
Although 
§ (Rule) 905.09 
creates 
an 
evidentiary privilege regarding law enforcement records, the 
rule explicitly states that this privilege does not apply "to 
the extent" that law enforcement records are "available by law 
to a person other than the federal government, a state or 
subdivision thereof."4  The Judicial Council Committee's Note to 
the Supreme Court order establishing § (Rule) 905.09 explains 
that the evidentiary privilege for law enforcement records "is 
qualified by the phrase 'to the extent available by law' to 
preserve the supremacy of s. 19.21 permitting examination of 
public records and documents."5  See 59 Wis. 2d R1, R142-43 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶21 n.4.   
4 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 905.09 provides in full: 
The federal government or a state or a subdivision 
thereof 
has 
a 
privilege 
to 
refuse 
to 
disclose 
investigatory files, reports and returns for law 
enforcement purposes except to the extent available by 
law to a person other than the federal government, a 
state or subdivision thereof. The privilege may be 
claimed by an 
appropriate representative of the 
federal government, a state or a subdivision thereof. 
5 The Judicial Council Committee's Note reads as follows: 
This section has no direct parallel in the proposed 
Federal Rule 509.  A privilege for law enforcement 
files and records is established by this section.  
However, the privilege is qualified by the phrase "to 
the extent available by law" to preserve the supremacy 
of s. 19.21 permitting examination of public records 
and documents.  The burden is upon the person claiming 
the privilege to establish in a judicial determination 
that the public interest outweighs the right of a 
member of the public to have access to claimed 
privileged material in the fashion prescribed in State 
ex 
rel. 
Youmans 
v. 
Owens, 
28 
Wis. 2d 672, 
137 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
5 
 
(1973). 
 
It 
is 
the 
open 
records 
law 
that 
qualifies 
§ (Rule) 905.09, not the converse as the majority opinion 
implies.       
A 
¶102 The defendant relies upon Wis. Stat. § 885.01, a civil 
statute, to argue that his subpoena is a judicial process 
authorized by statute.  According to the defendant, the civil 
subpoena statute applies to his criminal proceeding under Wis. 
Stat. § 972.11(1).  Section 972.11(1) provides that the rules of 
evidence and practice in civil actions shall be applicable in 
criminal proceedings "unless the context of a section or rule 
manifestly requires a different construction."  Furthermore, 
§ 972.11(1) explicitly states, without any qualification about 
the context of a section or rule, that chapter 885 "shall apply 
in all criminal proceedings."6  The subpoena statute, § 885.01, 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.W.2d 470, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1965), and Beckon v. 
Emery, 
36 
Wis. 2d 510, 
153 
N.W.2d 501 
(1967).  
Normally, the "appropriate representative" to make the 
claim will be counsel, however, it is possible that 
disclosure of the privileged material will be sought 
in proceedings to which the government, state or 
subdivision, as the case may be, is not a party.  
Under these circumstances, effective implementation of 
the privilege requires that other representatives be 
considered "appropriate." 
6 Section 972.11(1) provides in relevant part as follows: 
Except as provided in subs. (2) to (4) [on which no 
one relies in the present case], the rules of evidence 
and practice in civil actions shall be applicable in 
all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different 
construction. . . . Chapters 
885 
to 
895 
and 
995, 
except ss. 804.02 to 804.07 and 887.23 to 887.26, 
shall apply in all criminal proceedings. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
6 
 
is part of chapter 885.  Even if one reads § 972.11(1) as 
applying chapter 885 "unless the context of a section or rule 
manifestly requires a different construction," the context of 
§ 885.01 
does 
not 
"manifestly 
require[] 
a 
different 
construction" in the instant case.  I therefore turn to 
§ 885.01. 
¶103 Statutory interpretation in the present case begins 
with the text of Wis. Stat. § 885.01.  Unfortunately, the 
majority opinion is fairly well along before it cursorily 
examines the subpoena statute at ¶¶41-44.  
¶104 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.01(1) provides that a subpoena 
may be issued to require the attendance of witnesses and their 
production of lawful instruments of evidence in "any action, 
matter or proceeding or to be examined into before [enumerated 
persons] or other person authorized to take testimony in the 
state."  Section 885.01(1) provides in full as follows:  
885.01. The subpoena need not be sealed, and may be 
signed and issued as follows: 
(1) By any judge or clerk of a court or court 
commissioner or municipal judge, within the territory 
in which the officer or the court of which he or she 
is the officer has jurisdiction, to require the 
attendance of witnesses and their production of lawful 
instruments of evidence in any action, matter or 
proceeding pending or to be examined into before any 
court, 
magistrate, 
officer, 
arbitrator, 
board, 
committee or other person authorized to take testimony 
in the state.7 
                                                 
7 See also Wis. Stat. § 757.01(1) empowering courts of 
record of this state to issue "process of subpoena, requiring 
the attendance of any witness . . . ." 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶105 Section 885.02 prescribes the form of the subpoena, 
including a subpoena requiring the production of evidence. 
¶106 The defendant used the standard court form for 
subpoenas adopted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 971.025 by the 
Judicial Conference under § (Rule) 758.18(1).  The standard 
court form for subpoenas is substantially the same as the form 
for subpoenas prescribed in § 885.02.    
¶107 The subpoena was issued by the clerk of circuit court 
of Waukesha County.8  The subpoena requires the witness named 
(here the chief of police) to appear and give evidence at the 
type 
of 
proceeding 
described 
in 
the 
subpoena 
(here 
the 
proceeding was simply denominated a "Return of Records").9  A 
copy of the subpoena is attached.     
¶108 The 
defendant's 
subpoena 
does 
not 
satisfy 
the 
applicable statutes because the subpoena did not require the 
Brookfield police chief, in the words of Wis. Stat. § 885.01(1), 
to attend an "action, matter or proceeding pending or to be 
examined into before" the court.  The Return of Records 
proceeding set forth in the subpoena is not a proceeding known 
in this state and is not described in the subpoena or briefs.  
                                                 
8 Clerks of court may sign subpoenas in blank and deliver 
them to attorneys for completion.  Such a subpoena has the same 
force and effect as if perfected by the clerk.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.35. 
9 A box on the subpoena describing the subpoena as a third-
party subpoena under Wis. Stat. § 805.07(2) was not checked.  
Nevertheless, throughout his brief the defendant refers to the 
subpoena as a third-party subpoena to compel the production of 
police investigatory reports and to obtain copies of all non-
privileged material prior to the preliminary examination. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
8 
 
Defense counsel explained in the circuit court that rather than 
have the subpoenaed records delivered to her office (a procedure 
for which she cites no authority), she used the subpoena to 
raise before the circuit court the legal issue of whether she 
could obtain the records by subpoena and expected the State to 
move to quash the subpoena.   
¶109 The defendant does not cite any statute providing for 
any court proceeding in which a criminal defendant or his or her 
attorney receives a witness's testimony or documents in or out 
of court prior to the preliminary examination.  The defendant 
nevertheless argues that a witness or evidence may be subpoenaed 
for the sole purpose of producing documents prior to the 
preliminary examination.  I disagree with the defendant under 
the circumstances of the present case.  
¶110 The defendant's subpoena in the present case seeking 
documents from a potential witness does not command the witness 
"to attend an action, matter or proceeding pending or to be 
examined into before" the commissioner or court under Wis. Stat. 
§ 885.01(1) to be held on July 13, 2006.  No hearing was to take 
place on July 13, 2006.  Defense counsel obtained a return date 
for purposes of completing the subpoena form, but no hearing at 
which the witness was to appear and testify was scheduled.  The 
circuit court recognized this flaw in the subpoena demand, 
observing, "I am asked here today . . . to in essence create 
some type of new beast, some new creature not provided by the 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
9 
 
statute . . . whether we call it a return of records or a review 
of records or production of records."10 
¶111 No 
witness's 
testimony 
or 
lawful 
instrument 
of 
evidence, whether provided by the police chief or any other 
witness, was required in the Return of Records proceeding.  The 
court commissioner was not to consider any matter in respect to 
which the Brookfield police chief might have supplied relevant 
testimony or produced relevant evidence.  The sole apparent 
purpose of the Return of Records proceeding, according to the 
defendant, was to determine the validity of the defendant's 
demand that there be a transfer of information and documents 
from the Brookfield police chief to the defendant and to 
transfer the information and documents to the defendant if the 
court determined that the defendant's demand was valid.   
¶112 The majority opinion interprets the subpoena statutes 
as I do and concludes as I do:  "In short, no subpoena statute 
authorizes Schaefer's action."  Majority op., ¶45.11   
                                                 
10 The majority opinion explains the "Return of Records" 
proceeding similarly as follows: "Schaefer is asking this court 
to establish an additional proceeding, denominated by him as a 
'Return of Records,' that will help the defendant prepare for 
his preliminary examination without requiring any witness to 
testify."  Majority op., ¶44. 
11 Furthermore, 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 805.07(1) does not 
authorize the defendant's subpoena in the present case.  Section 
(Rule) 805.07(1) provides that "[a] subpoena may also be issued 
by any attorney of record in a civil action or special 
proceeding to compel attendance of witnesses for deposition, 
hearing or trial in the action or special proceeding . . . ."  
The subpoena in the present case was not issued by an attorney 
of record.  It was issued by the clerk of the circuit court. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶113 Nevertheless the majority opinion marches onward.  Not 
satisfied with its holding that the defendant has no statutory 
authority for the subpoena, the majority opinion embarks upon a 
confusing and ultimately fruitless discussion of the criminal 
discovery statutes, §§ 971.23 and 971.35(5)(b), declaring that 
the defendant's subpoena is "inconsistent with our criminal 
discovery statutes."  See majority op., ¶41. 
¶114 Interestingly, the defendant lays no claim to a 
discovery right under either the criminal discovery statute, 
§ 971.23, or the civil statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 804.01(2) and 
804.09, to obtain the materials demanded in his subpoena.  I 
agree with the defendant that neither the civil discovery 
statutes nor § 971.23, entitled "Discovery and inspection," 
applies in the present case to authorize the subpoena.  
¶115 Nevertheless the majority devotes almost one-half of 
its opinion to analyzing our criminal discovery statutes and the 
nature and purpose of discovery in general.  See majority op., 
¶¶18-40, 46-59.  The majority opinion's lengthy discussion of 
the criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23, in relation 
to the present case, ignores the text of § 971.23 and related 
statutes and will likely confuse the law.  
¶116 The text of Wis. Stat. § 971.23 is clearly not 
applicable to the instant case.  The defendant is clearly 
                                                                                                                                                             
In any event, the subpoena in the present case did not 
direct the police chief to appear to testify at a deposition, 
hearing, or trial.  The Return of Records was not a deposition, 
hearing, or trial at which the police chief's testimony was to 
be given. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
11 
 
correct in not trying to rely on § 971.23, and the majority 
opinion clearly errs in reaching out to apply the criminal 
discovery statutes to the present case.    
¶117 First, motions for discovery under § 971.23 may be 
made only after the information is filed.  See § 971.31(5)(b).  
The subpoena in the present case is not a motion (although the 
majority opinion at ¶54 nearly declares the subpoena a motion).12  
Moreover, no information has been filed in the present case.  
¶118 Second, Wis. Stat. § 971.23 governs discovery and the 
district attorney.  It governs what a district attorney shall 
disclose to a criminal defendant.13  The present case involves 
                                                 
12 "'Motion' means an application for an order."  Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 971.30(1). 
 
The 
defendant's 
subpoena 
is 
not 
an 
application for an order.  The subpoena made direct demands of 
the Brookfield police chief, ostensibly pursuant to statutory 
authority.  The subpoena did not request that a court make 
demands of the police chief.   
The majority opinion concedes that the defendant's subpoena 
satisfies only "some of the criteria of a 'motion.'"  Majority 
op., ¶54.  Yet even this weak assertion is plainly incorrect.  
The majority opinion does not actually identify any "criteria of 
a 'motion'" satisfied by the defendant's subpoena but instead 
notes only that "[t]he police chief's failure to honor the 
subpoena would likely lead to" a motion from the defendant.  
Majority op., ¶54. 
13 With the significant qualification that the holding 
applies only "where there has been no showing of particularized 
need for inspection," this court held in State ex rel. Lynch v. 
County Court, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 464-66, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978), 
that a defendant does not have a "general right to peruse the 
prosecutor's files" at the preliminary examination. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
12 
 
disclosure by a police chief to the defendant.  Nothing in the 
text of § 971.23 governs disclosure by law enforcement agencies 
to a criminal defendant.        
¶119 The majority opinion ignores the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23 governing district attorneys and toys with 
the idea of adding the words "law enforcement officers" to 
§ 971.23, asserting in a footnote that this court is "reluctant 
to treat the police department and the district attorney's 
office as separate entities" for purposes of § 971.23(1) because 
the police and the district attorney are "related" for purposes 
of this statute.14  The majority does not explain why the 
relationship between the two separate entities for purposes of a 
statutory provision does not mean simply that the two entities 
should be treated as separate but related entities for purposes 
of the statute.  
¶120 The 
majority 
opinion 
errs 
in 
musing 
that 
law 
enforcement and the district attorney perhaps may be treated as 
one.  In our system of government, law enforcement and the 
district attorney's office are two separate entities, with 
separate functions and subject to different codes of conduct, 
                                                                                                                                                             
During a 
preliminary examination for seven different 
defendants, defense attorneys in the Lynch case made a general 
demand for all exculpatory material in the possession of the 
district attorney.  Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 458.  The circuit court 
responded by permitting each defendant's attorney to review the 
district attorney's entire file regarding his or her client.  
Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 458.  The facts of Lynch did not involve, 
and the Lynch court did not address, the question of a 
defendant's right to obtain records from a law enforcement 
agency.   
14 Majority op., ¶57 n.12.   
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
13 
 
although the two often work together.15  TV's Law & Order gets it 
right: 
"In 
the 
criminal 
justice 
system, 
the 
people 
are 
represented by two separate yet equally important groups: the 
police, who investigate crime, and the district attorneys, who 
prosecute the offenders."  The legislature has treated these 
separate 
entities 
differently 
in 
the 
criminal 
discovery 
statutes, using Wis. Stat. § 971.23 to govern defendants' rights 
against district attorneys.  Section 971.23 does not govern the 
question of defendants' similar rights against law enforcement 
agencies.  This court should not, as the majority opinion 
appears to do, disturb the relationship of law enforcement and 
district attorneys in the Wisconsin criminal justice system.16   
                                                 
15 Law enforcement's task is to objectively gather all the 
evidence in pursuit of the truth, rather than to attempt to hone 
in early on a suspect and build a case against him or her.  
Tunnel 
vision 
by 
law 
enforcement, 
that 
is, 
incomplete 
investigation and premature concentration on one suspect, has 
been shown to lead to wrongful convictions.  See Keith A. 
Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel 
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291.   
For a chilling non-fiction description of non-objective 
police investigation resulting in an innocent person being 
convicted and sentenced to death, see John Grisham, The Innocent 
Man (2006). 
16 As 
a result of the majority opinion, are police 
departments as well as district attorneys obliged to turn over, 
upon a defendant's request after the information is filed, all 
the materials and information set forth in Wis. Stat. § 971.23?  
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority opinion cites State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶21, 
252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480, for the undisputed proposition 
that 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23, 
"the 
State's 
discovery 
obligations may extend to information in the possession of law 
enforcement 
agencies 
but 
not 
personally 
known 
to 
the 
prosecutor."  See majority op., ¶57 n.12.  The fact that 
§ 971.23(1) imposes upon the district attorney an obligation to 
disclose information in the possession of law enforcement 
agencies plainly does not mean that § 971.23(1) governs what law 
enforcement agencies must disclose to a defendant.  The DeLao 
court explained its decision as follows: "Put another way, under 
certain circumstances, the knowledge of law enforcement officers 
may be imputed to the prosecutor. . . .  The test . . . [is] 
whether by the exercise of due diligence [the prosecutor] should 
have discovered it."  State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶¶21-22, 252 
Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480 (quoted source omitted).  DeLao does 
not support the position that in referring to the "district 
attorney" in § 971.23, the legislature intended to refer to both 
the "district attorney" and "the police." 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶121 The majority opinion twists and bends to avoid the 
plain language of the discovery statute as the text of the 
statutes proves inconvenient to the majority's unclear theses 
about discovery in criminal cases.  Because the majority 
opinion's analysis is so badly at odds with the plain language 
of the criminal discovery statutes, the majority cannot bring 
itself to reach any actual holding regarding what the criminal 
discovery statutes mean and how they should be applied to the 
present case.  The majority opinion concludes not that the 
criminal discovery statutes actually apply to and forbid the 
                                                                                                                                                             
State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 479 N.W.2d 224 
(Ct. App. 1991), cited in DeLao and in n.12 in the majority 
opinion, does not support the position that the reference in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23 is a reference to both the district attorney 
and the police.  Martinez is a "good cause" case under the 
discovery statute.  In Martinez, the law enforcement agency, not 
the prosecutor, had control over a tape.  The court of appeals 
noted that many courts and district attorneys entrust the 
custody and control of evidence to the police even after it has 
been elevated to formal evidentiary status in a criminal 
proceeding.  The State had no explanation of how the tape that 
was requested by the prosecutor (in response to defense 
counsel's request for discovery) was lost after it was deposited 
at the front desk of the sheriff's department.  The State 
admitted that it had failed to advise defense counsel that the 
tape was awaiting him at the front desk.  Martinez stands for 
the proposition that when the State concedes that the requested 
information was lost, it has the burden under the criminal 
discovery statute to show that the State had good cause for its 
failure to produce the information.  Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 
258-59.  In Martinez the State did not meet its burden.  The 
court of appeals held (1) that the actions of law enforcement in 
losing the requested tape were visited on the State for purposes 
of requiring the State to prove "good cause"; and (2) that even 
if there was a distinction between a police agency that controls 
the evidence and the State as the prosecuting entity, for 
purposes of assessing good cause, the prosecutor was not without 
fault.  See Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 260 & n.7 (which the 
majority opinion fails to discuss). 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
16 
 
defendant's subpoena, but rather that the criminal discovery 
statutes are "inconsistent" with the subpoena;17 not that the 
subpoena is governed by Wis. Stat. § 971.31(5)(b), but rather 
that it is "arguably" governed by that provision;18 not that the 
subpoena is a "motion," but rather that it "satisfies some of 
the criteria of a 'motion'";19 and not that the district attorney 
and police department are a single entity for purposes of 
§ 971.31(5)(b), but rather that the two entities are "related" 
and "linked."20 
¶122 The majority opinion's lengthy analysis ultimately 
comes up empty.  In the face of the plain text of the criminal 
statutes, the majority opinion cannot hold that the criminal 
discovery statutes apply to the defendant's subpoena.   
¶123 The majority opinion's contortionist interpretation 
and slippery phrasing are unnecessary.  A straightforward, 
simple reading of the subpoena statutes demonstrates that the 
defendant's subpoena was properly quashed by the circuit court.  
As the majority opinion itself appears to conclude, the criminal 
discovery statutes do not govern the defendant's subpoena to law 
enforcement officers; the criminal discovery statutes are fully 
consistent with the subpoena statutes for purposes of the 
instant case; and the criminal discovery statutes need not be 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶41. 
18 Id., ¶54. 
19 Id. 
20 Id., ¶57 n.12. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
17 
 
discussed at all in the instant case.  The majority opinion 
fabricates a need to "harmonize" the two sets of statutes,21 but 
the majority opinion never identifies a single inconsistency 
between the two sets of statutes that needs harmonization.   
¶124 The majority opinion's interpretation of our criminal 
discovery statutes ignores the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.23 and 
§ 971.35(5)(b) and risks creating undue confusion in the law 
governing discovery and preliminary examinations in criminal 
cases in this state. 
¶125 For the reasons I have set forth, I conclude that no 
statute allows the defendant to have the benefit of the subpoena 
at issue in the present case.  I therefore conclude that the 
subpoena at issue is not authorized by any statute and is of no 
force and effect.   
B 
¶126 The defendant argues for access to the police chief's 
documents under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.22  Indeed, the constitutional argument is the major 
argument in his brief.  He argues that the right to compulsory 
process 
includes 
the 
right 
to 
access 
and 
copy 
police 
investigation reports prior to the preliminary examination as a 
                                                 
21 Id., ¶56. 
22 Under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the 
defendant also enjoys a constitutional right to present evidence 
on his behalf.  State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶14, 252 
Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
18 
 
matter of the right to defend and that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at the preliminary examination cannot be 
satisfied without the defense attorney having these materials 
before the preliminary examination. 
¶127 The defendant argues that the allegations in the 
present case are very stale and involve memories of events 
sixteen years earlier; that under these circumstances he needs 
the information subpoenaed to prepare for the probable cause 
preliminary examination; and that the subpoenaed documents are 
valuable tools that could be used to test the plausibility of 
witnesses' testimony at the preliminary examination, a critical 
phase of the prosecution.  I do not view this explanation as 
demonstrating a particularized need for inspection allowed under 
the Lynch case.    
¶128 I 
agree 
with 
the 
defendant 
that 
the 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
requires 
the 
time 
and 
ability 
to 
investigate and prepare.23  I conclude, however, that the 
defendant's inability to access full information prior to the 
preliminary examination in the instant case does not necessarily 
implicate the defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair 
preliminary examination and does not implicate the defendant's 
right to effective assistance of counsel in light of the purpose 
and scope of the preliminary examination and a defendant's 
limited rights at the preliminary examination.  
                                                 
23 See, e.g., State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 553, 205 
N.W.2d 1 (1973). 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶129 Although the records subpoenaed may be relevant to the 
probable cause determination, may enable defense counsel to 
fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examining the 
state's witnesses at trial, may preserve testimony favorable to 
the accused, or may allow preparation of a proper defense at 
trial, I am not convinced that the defendant's inability to 
obtain 
the 
subpoenaed 
information 
before 
the 
preliminary 
examination 
in 
the 
present 
case 
rises 
to 
a 
federal 
constitutionally protected claim.  As Professor Mary Prosser has 
detailed, the United States Supreme Court has limited the 
pretrial information required to be given to the defendant.24  
The 
Court 
has largely limited prosecutors' constitutional 
discovery obligations to exculpatory evidence and has focused on 
the adversarial nature of the relationship between the district 
attorney and defense counsel rather than on the question of the 
reliability of outcomes in criminal cases.25   
¶130 I cannot conclude that material in law enforcement 
files would be treated differently than material in the district 
attorney's files for federal constitutional purposes.  I do not 
explore whether the Wisconsin constitution grants the defendant 
a right to information before a preliminary examination.  
C 
                                                 
24 Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old 
Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 541, 
561. 
25 Prosser, supra note 24, at 561-64. 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶131 The office of the State Public Defender and the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project join in a non-party brief, often 
referred to as an amicus brief.  They argue (as the defendant 
does in his brief) that it is sound public policy to permit a 
criminal defendant access to police records prior to the 
preliminary hearing.  The amici assert that such a practice is 
used in other states and communities, and in the federal system.  
¶132 The amici contend that such a practice (1) would lead 
to fewer wrongful prosecutions and convictions by better 
equipping innocent defendants to challenge the State at the 
preliminary examination; (2) would help to reinforce the 
principle 
that 
police 
investigation 
should 
be 
viewed 
as 
objective and non-adversarial fact gathering; and (3) would 
render more fair the preliminary hearing, a proceeding in which 
the State currently wields an informational advantage, and the 
trial.   
¶133 The briefs of the defendant and amici advise the court 
that some district attorneys in Wisconsin already maintain an 
"open file" system permitting a defendant broad access to 
information 
in 
their 
possession 
and 
that 
some 
states, 
communities, and federal courts allow defendants access to 
information early in the process.   
¶134 Based on these policy arguments and the experience in 
other jurisdictions, the defendant and amici ask this court to 
establish a procedure allowing defendants access to non-
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
21 
 
privileged police records before the preliminary hearing to 
determine their relevance.26  
¶135 The State argues that any change in procedure should 
come "through the normal legislative process, or through this 
court's formal rule-making process."27  According to the State, 
"[i]t would be highly inappropriate for this court to use this 
lone appeal as the vehicle for creating such a radical change in 
criminal procedure."28   
¶136 The Wisconsin Constitution confers upon this court 
superintending authority over all Wisconsin courts.29  We have 
traditionally construed our superintending power broadly as 
authority 
to 
control 
litigation 
in 
the 
courts.30 
 
Our 
superintending authority, however, is not lightly invoked.31  
This court ordinarily has refused to modify rules of practice or 
procedure on appeal.32   
¶137 The defendant and the amici raise troubling questions 
about the reliability and fairness of preliminary examinations 
                                                 
26 The defendant suggests in camera inspection of police 
files.   
27 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State) at 27.   
28 Id.   
29 Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 3(1).   
30 See State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶¶61, 69, 283 
Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
31 Jerrell, 
283 
Wis. 2d 145, 
¶67 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
32 Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 334, 267 N.W.2d 349 
(1978).   
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
22 
 
and trials when a criminal defendant is not given access to 
police records and all non-privileged information early in the 
process.  The criminal justice system must be reliable to 
convict the guilty and to prevent wrongful conviction of the 
innocent.  The Innocence Projects across the country have 
demonstrated that wrongful convictions do occur, even in 
Wisconsin.33  The ideal in our legal system is that "[s]ociety 
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal 
trials are fair."34  Indeed, "the more we learn about the 
incidence of wrongful convictions, the less it makes sense to 
deprive a defendant of access to relevant evidence" at the 
earliest 
possible 
opportunity.35 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
acknowledges 
the 
wisdom 
of 
law 
enforcement 
and 
district 
attorneys adopting the practice proposed by the defendant.  See 
majority op., ¶81.   
¶138 The instant case presents, however, a question of 
first impression, not a question that this court has had 
occasion to consider or address previously.36  I am not convinced 
that this case is an appropriate one in which to rule, as a 
matter of the inherent or superintending power of this court, 
                                                 
33 See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or 
Systemic Problem?, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 739.   
34 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).   
35 See Prosser, supra note 24, at 614. 
36 The defendant himself acknowledges that "no reported 
Wisconsin case has considered the defense use of a subpoena 
duces tecum to the police for their investigative reports prior 
to a preliminary hearing . . . ."  Brief and Appendix of 
Defendant-Appellant at 13.   
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
23 
 
that unless good cause exists, law enforcement should give an 
accused 
access 
to 
police 
reports 
before 
a 
preliminary 
examination.  Under these circumstances, I therefore conclude 
that this court should not in the instant case invoke its 
superintending authority by establishing a procedure allowing 
defendants access to non-privileged law enforcement records 
prior to the preliminary hearing.      
¶139 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  My 
reasoning and conclusions can be summarized as follows:  
(A) None of the subpoena statutes and no other statute 
gives a subpoena right to the defendant to obtain and copy 
police investigation reports prior to the preliminary 
hearing. 
(B) The defendant's claim of a constitutional right to 
compulsory process or effective assistance of counsel do 
not support the defendant's right to a subpoena for police 
files under the circumstances of the instant case.  
(C) Although the defendant and the third-party brief 
of amici curiae (the Office of State Public Defender and 
the Innocence Project) raise serious questions about the 
reliability and fairness of preliminary examinations and 
trials when a criminal defendant is not given access to 
police records prior to the preliminary hearing, I am 
reluctant to conclude that this case is an appropriate one 
in which to rule, as a matter of the inherent or 
superintending powers of this court, that unless good cause 
exists, law enforcement should give an accused access to 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
24 
 
police reports before the preliminary examination.  The 
policy arguments of the defendant and the amici do, 
however, deserve further and serious attention, as the 
State's brief suggests from this court in its rule making 
authority or from the legislature.   
¶140 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP1826-CRAC.ssa 
 
 
 
1