Title: James D Eldridge v. Michael W Moore Correction
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC93-567
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: May 4, 2000

Supreme Court of Florida
  
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No. SC93567
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JAMES D. ELDRIDGE,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[April 13, 2000]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
James D. Eldridge petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus.  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
FACTS
In July and September 1990, Eldridge committed a number of offenses for
which he received true split sentences totaling twelve years in prison followed by
1 A true split sentence is a prison term of a number of years with part of that prison term
suspended, contingent upon completion on probation of the suspended term of years.  When a
defendant violates a true split sentence, the most severe sentence the trial court may impose on
resentencing is to "unsuspend" the previously suspended prison term.  That is, that the defendant
is reincarcerated and must actually serve the previously suspended term of years in prison.  See
also Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)(discussing various sentencing options including
the true split sentence).  After Poore was issued, the legislature provided for a number of
additional types of split sentences, including the probationary split sentence.  In this type of
sentence, if the defendant violates probation, the trial court may impose any sentence it might
have originally imposed.  See § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). 
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three years on probation.1  Eldridge actually served 1807 days (approximately five
years) incarcerated and the Department of Corrections (hereinafter the Department)
awarded him 2573 days (approximately seven years) of gain time.  Therefore, in this
manner Eldridge "satisfied" the twelve-year incarcerative portion of his sentence and
was released in 1995 to begin serving his probation.  
Eldridge violated his probation and the trial court revoked it.  The court then
resentenced Eldridge to a new sentence of fifteen years in prison and awarded all
prior unforfeited gain time.  The court later reduced the sentence to five years in
prison.  Due to the probation revocation, the Department forfeited the entire 2573
days of gain time it had originally awarded Eldridge.  Therefore, Eldridge was
informed that he had to actually serve the 2573 days of gain time previously
awarded in prison, in addition to his new five-year sentence (minus newly awarded
gain time on that sentence). 
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ARGUMENT
The Petitioner argues that under Singletary v. Whittaker, 23 Fla. L. Weekly
D1684 (Fla. 5th DCA July 17, 1998), withdrawn and superseded by  739 So. 2d
1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the Department does not have the authority to forfeit
Eldridge's gain time because to do so would essentially make his sentence longer
than the five years the trial court ordered that he serve.  In the 1998 decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal, the court held that while the Department has
statutory authority to forfeit gain time for violation of probation, the Department
may only do so if the trial court has already awarded the gain time which the
Department seeks to forfeit.  Since the trial court had not done so in Whittaker's
case, the Fifth District held that the Department could not forfeit Whittaker's gain
time.
The Department counters that in the Fifth District's initial decision in
Whittaker the court confused the trial court's sentencing powers (including the
authority to award credit for actual time served) with the Department's authority to
award and forfeit the credits it uses to encourage good behavior in prison and on
supervision, and that there is nothing in the gain time statutes that requires the court
to award any gain time before the Department can forfeit it.  
While this case was pending in this Court, the Fifth District withdrew its 1998
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decision and substituted its decision of July 17, 1999.  See Singletary v. Whittaker,
739 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  In the new decision the Fifth District held
that, regardless of the fact that the petitioner in that case had been resentenced to a
lesser term, since retention of gain time is statutorily conditional upon satisfactory
behavior both while in prison and while on probation, the Department may forfeit all
gain time, regardless of whether the trial court had decided not to do so.  For the
reasons set forth below, we agree with the Fifth District 's 1999 decision in
Whittaker.  
THE GAIN TIME FORFEITURE PROCESS
When an inmate is awarded gain time while in prison, the inmate's release
date is advanced and he or she is released earlier than would have been the case had
no gain time been awarded.  See § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).  When an inmate is
released due in part to the award of that gain time and placed on probation or
community control, the Department records a release date, or expiration of sentence
date, for that particular sentence.  See § 944.275(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).  If the trial
court finds that the inmate violated his or her probation or community control and
that it should be revoked, the inmate is returned to prison.  See generally § 948.06, 
Fla. Stat. (1999).  The Department, however, continues to maintain the original
expiration date of the previous sentence until a decision is made as to the previously
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awarded gain time.  See  § 944.275(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999).  That is, the previous
expiration date, which was determined in large part, by the gain time awarded, is
still on the Department's records and, at least on paper, the inmate retains his or her
previously awarded gain time.  
That gain time may be taken, however.  It may be taken if the trial court does
not check the box on the sentencing documents produced during the revocation
proceedings indicating that gain time should be retained.  See Forbes v. Singletary,
684 So. 2d 173, 173-75 (Fla. 1996).  If the trial court does not award that gain time,
it has been forfeited.  See State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 1989).  If the
trial court does check the box indicating that gain time is to be retained, the trial
court has essentially indicated that it is not forfeiting gain time.  The trial court,
however, is not the only entity with the authority to forfeit gain time.  The
Department has also been given the authority to forfeit gain time even if the trial
court chose not to.  See  Forbes, 684 So. 2d at 174.  However, neither the trial court
nor the Department may forfeit gain time upon probation or community control
revocation if the inmate's underlying criminal offense was committed prior to
October 1, 1989, which is when both the trial court and the Department were given
such statutory authority.  See Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla.
1998).  
2 Control Release was added effective September 1, 1990.  See ch. 89-526, § 6, at 2662; §
52, at 2690, Laws of Fla.
3 Similar statutory authority is provided for in section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes (1999).
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Both the petitioner in Whittaker and petitioner Eldridge committed their
underlying criminal offenses after that date.  Therefore, both the trial court and the
Department of Corrections had the authority to forfeit gain time.  With only minor
changes, since October 1, 1989, that legislation has provided:
If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency, conditional
release as described in chapter 947, probation or community control as
described in chapter 948, provisional release as described in s.
944.277, parole, or control release[2] as described in s. 947.146 granted
to the prisoner is revoked, the department may, without notice or
hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned according to the
provisions of law by such prisoner prior to such escape or his or her
release under such clemency, conditional release, probation,
community control, provisional release, control release, or parole.  
See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).3  There is nothing in the statute that requires that
the trial court must award the gain time before the Department is permitted to forfeit
it, and as discussed above, the inmate retains the previously awarded gain time until
it is forfeited.
The Fifth District's confusion in the initial decision was understandable,
however, due to the complexities involved in gain time law, and might have been 
caused, in part, by certain statements we made some ten years ago in State v. Green,
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547 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1989).
In Green, we stated that "accrued gain-time is the functional equivalent of
time served."  Id. at 926.  Nevertheless, we have more recently made clear that due
to subsequent statutory amendments, "Green [now] stands only for the proposition
that upon revocation of probation, community control or provisional release, an
inmate is entitled to credit for prior awarded gain time only if the underlying offense
was committed prior to October 1, 1989."  Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So. 2d 1052,
1054 (Fla. 1998) (footnote omitted).  That simply means that neither the trial court
nor the Department may forfeit or fail to credit gain time under those limited
circumstances.  
Even though the relevant statutory authority has been in effect for over ten
years, the concept that gain time is "the same thing" as time served still lingers. 
Thus, it appears that many judges assume that, like a jail time credit award, the trial
court must award gain time before it is applied to the inmate's sentence.  We wish to
make clear that gain time is no longer to be considered as time served for all
purposes.  While the award of gain time reduces an inmate's release date, just as
actual time spent incarcerated, it is clearly not synonymous with actual time served. 
On the contrary, gain time is time not served.  It is merely an incentive device used
by the Department for purposes of encouraging good behavior both in prison and on
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supervision.
There also seems to be another reason why the Fifth District, in its initial
decision, concluded that the Department could not forfeit Whittaker's gain time. 
When an inmate violates the probationary portion of a split sentence and the trial
court resentences the inmate to a lesser term than the court originally imposed, or
when the original sentence was a true split sentence, the district courts have
wrestled with the idea that forfeiting gain time would amount to countermanding the
will of the sentencing court.  It seems that the fear is that perhaps the trial court had
changed its mind about the previously imposed sentence and decided to reduce the
sentence for some reason or another, without realizing that gain time would be
forfeited. 
It seems to us that neither the district courts nor this Court should attempt to
"go beneath" the sentencing court's order and the gain time statutes in effect at the
time of the inmate's offense.  The courts should assume that the trial court knew and
understood the statutes affecting the inmate's final release date and apply the
statutes as they are, without trying to determine whether the final effect was what
the trial court had in mind.   
Furthermore, it was the Legislature that provided for the award of gain time in
the first place and it made the retention of that gain time conditional upon the
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satisfactory completion of the inmate's supervision.  See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat.
(1989-1999).  Therefore, when an inmate fails to satisfactorily complete his or her
supervision and it is revoked, the Department, as part of the executive branch,
merely executes or fulfills the legislative mandate that the previously awarded gain
time be forfeited;  thus the inmate must serve out his or her prior incarceration as a
penalty for the revocation of supervision.  See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1989-1999).  
Therefore, we conclude that upon resentencing in either a probationary split
sentence or a true split sentence, regardless of whether the trial court resentenced
the inmate to a lesser sentence, the Department’s statutory authority to forfeit “all
gain time” upon probation revocation should not be lessened.  See § 944.28(1), Fla.
Stat. (1989-1999).  In other words, the actual length of the new sentence imposed
after probation revocation is irrelevant to any forfeiture penalty exacted from the
gain time awarded during the prior incarceration.
Thus, even though we stated in Frankin v. State, 545 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1989), 
that when a court resentences an inmate after violating the probationary portion of a
true split sentence, “the total period of incarceration, including time served, may not
exceed the one-cell upward increase permitted by [the rules],” see 545 So. 2d at
852, since our opinion in Dowdy, “time served” does not include gain time, except
in limited situations.  Therefore, Franklin is not applicable to this case, and Eldridge
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is not entitled to credit for the gain time previously awarded because it was not time
served.  The Department originally awarded Eldridge 2573 days of gain time and it
has now properly forfeited 2573 days of gain time.   Accordingly, we deny
Eldridge’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED. 
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
James D. Eldridge, pro se, Madison, Florida,
for Petitioner
Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel, and Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent