Title: Swensen v. Municipality of Anchorage
Citation: 616 P.2d 874
Docket Number: 
State: Alaska
Issuer: Alaska Supreme Court
Date: September 26, 1980

Swensen v. Municipality of Anchorage Annotate this Case 616 P.2d 874 (1980) Michael A. SWENSEN, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee. No. 4675. Supreme Court of Alaska. September 26, 1980. *876 C. Walter Ebell, Cole, Hartig, Rhodes, Norman & Mahoney, Kodiak, for appellant. Karen L. Russell, Municipal Prosecutor, Anchorage, for appellee. Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., CONNOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ., and DIMOND, Senior Justice. OPINION RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice. Michael Swensen contends that his guilty plea was accepted by the district court under procedures which did not comport with due process and Criminal Rule 11.[1] Appellant was arrested on January 8, 1976, for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (OMVI), a violation of Anchorage Ordinance 9.28.020(A). Swensen was arraigned in district court the following day and, unrepresented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. *877 On April 3, 1978, he moved to withdraw this guilty plea. The district court refused to hear the merits of the motion on the rationale that it was untimely. Swensen then appealed to the superior court, which ruled that the motion to withdraw his plea was timely but failed on its merits. Swensen now appeals to this court. Under our holding in Lewis v. State, 565 P.2d 846 , 850-51 (Alaska 1977), a person moving to withdraw a guilty plea under Criminal Rule 32(d) and moving for postconviction relief under Criminal Rule 35(b) need not show that the former motion has been made with "due diligence," as required by Criminal Rule 32(d)(1)(i). The municipality recognizes that Lewis is controlling, but asks us to reverse our decision in that case. We see no compelling reason to do so, and will hence examine the substantive claims raised by Swensen.[2] Swensen was arraigned en masse, along with a number of other misdemeanor defendants. The arraigning judge advised the group of various rights: to remain silent, to counsel, to have counsel appointed if indigent, to plead guilty, to compulsory process, to appeal, to a jury trial, to change of judge, and to bail. When Swensen was arraigned individually, the judge asked him if he understood his rights, read him the charge and asked if he understood it, advised him of the maximum sentence, and inquired if he desired counsel. Swensen then entered his plea of guilty. Swensen in effect attacks the en masse arraignment procedure as a denial of due process. He seems to contend that the recitation of rights to the group, followed by the questioning as to each defendant concerning whether he or she understood those rights, is insufficient to establish actual understanding. We cannot agree. The defendants as a group here were clearly apprised of their rights, and were told to ask the judge if there was something that needed further explanation. We see nothing in this procedure requiring us to hold it infirm per se. On the other hand, we do agree with Swensen that two facets of his arraignment were in violation of his rights. We find first that he did not make a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Under Criminal Rule 39(b)(3), which was in effect at the time of Swensen's arraignment, the court is required to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant "unless he demonstrates that he understands the benefits of counsel and knowingly waives the same." See Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 , 378-79 (Alaska 1976). Swensen apparently was not indigent at the time of arraignment, and so Criminal Rule 39(b)(3) did not apply to his case. It was governed instead by Criminal Rule 39(a): If the defendant appears for arraignment or trial without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to have counsel, and shall ask him if he desires the aid of counsel. We hold that Criminal Rule 39(a) must be interpreted consistently with Criminal Rule 39(b)(3) in order to avoid constitutional problems; i.e., the advice given to a nonindigent defendant concerning the right to counsel must also include at least a brief explanation of the "benefits of counsel."[3] In Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 , 379 (Alaska 1976) (footnote omitted), we stated: *878 Reason and reflection compel us to recognize that in our complex system of justice, many people brought before the court are unfamiliar with even the most basic legal concepts. Gregory's confusion at the hearing before the superior court with respect to legal terminology, particularly the terms lawyer, attorney, and public defender, is indicative of this fact. We also recognize that the trial court is obligated to be certain that each citizen, when involved in a criminal matter, is aware of the various rights guaranteed him by the Alaska and United States Constitutions. To insure that all defendants enjoy the right to counsel, it must be clear from the record that the person has been informed of the role of a defense attorney and the advantages of being represented by one in a criminal proceeding. Only after this information is placed before the accused can it be said that he has the capacity, in a legal sense, to make a knowledgeable waiver of his right to counsel under Rule 39(b)(3). A defendant's waiver of the right cannot be deemed valid absent this explanation.[4] Since the record indicates that Swensen was told only of his right to counsel, with no further explanation of that right, we must conclude that his subsequent waiver was not knowing and effective. This case is distinguishable from Williams v. State, 616 P.2d 881 (Alaska, 1980), in which the majority concluded that a knowing waiver had occurred. In Williams, the defendant was asked if he understood what an attorney could do, and he responded, "Yes." Even such minimal inquiry[5] did not occur in this case. *879 We also find that Swensen was not adequately apprised of his right to a jury trial and therefore a prerequisite to a knowing waiver was lacking.[6] During the group arraignment, the defendants were told that they had a right to trial by jury "if you could be sentenced to jail or suffer the loss of valuable license or suffer a heavy enough fine to incr- to indicate criminality." At his individual arraignment, Swensen was told he could receive a jail term for his offense. He thus had to determine for himself whether he had the right to a jury trial, presuming he drew the connection between his possible sentence and the previous advice on jury trials. We hold that in a group arraignment each defendant with a right to a jury trial must be individually apprised of that right.[7] The arraigning judge may not leave the defendants to figure out what rights they have.[8] In Lewis v. State, 565 P.2d 846 , 851 (Alaska 1977), we stated that failure to comply with Rule 11 plea procedures will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and we refused to adopt a rule of per se reversibility. Error must be sufficient to show that "withdrawal [of the plea] is necessary to correct manifest injustice," Alaska R.Crim.P. 32(d)(1), and must affect substantial rights and be evaluated like other nonconstitutional errors. 565 P.2d at 852. Thus, under Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 , 631 (Alaska 1969), we must be convinced that the error had a substantial influence on the result. The two errors in this case just discussed when considered together are not harmless under the Love standard.[9] Because of these errors at Swensen's arraignment, we must reverse the decision of the courts below in refusing to allow Swensen to vacate his guilty plea. In order to *880 assist the trial court if the state determines to proceed further upon remand, we will discuss the other points raised by Swensen. He alleges a violation of Criminal Rule 11(c)(1), barring acceptance of a guilty plea unless it is shown that the defendant understands the "nature of the charge." We discussed this rule in Larson v. State, 614 P.2d 776 , (Alaska, 1980), in which we concluded that Larson was not informed of the "nature" of assault with a dangerous weapon when he was not told that he had a possible defense of intoxication to the specific intent crime. In the case at bar, the offense, however, is not complex, and we believe that the court adequately explained its "nature" by reading the charge to Swensen and giving him an opportunity to ask any questions he might have.[10]See United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc). Swensen next argues that there was a failure to comply with Criminal Rule 11(c)(3) (requiring notice to the defendant of the permissible punishment before the plea is accepted), because the court told him that action "may" be taken on his driver's license, when a temporary revocation was in fact mandated by statute, with a limited discretionary exception for individuals whose ability to earn a livelihood would be severely impaired by license revocation.[11] We find this error too insignificant to constitute, in and of itself, a substantial violation of the rule warranting relief. Considered alone, this error is harmless; but a more decisive case of reversible error overall is made out when this error is considered in conjunction with the other errors which we have discussed. Swensen's final assertion of error is that there was a violation of Criminal Rule 11(f),[12] arising from the district court's failure to establish a factual basis for the plea. We hold that in the instant case, involving a simple offense and a quite specific charge, Rule 11(f)[13] was satisfied by the reading of the charge and Swensen's subsequent plea. United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S. Ct. 1080, 63 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1980), spoke of the "factual basis" provision of the identical federal rule: [N]o mechanical rules can be stated, and the more complex or doubtful the situation *881..., the more searching will be the inquiry dictated by a sound judgment and discretion... . [Amended Rule 11] retains its clear reference to the trial judge's subjective satisfaction, and we conclude that this remains the test for that judge.[14] See also State v. Sutherland, 483 P.2d 576, 578 (Ariz. App. 1971). The complaint here contained a sworn statement by the arresting officer that he saw Swensen weaving on the road, that Swensen's breath smelled strongly of alcohol, that his balance was poor, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. We believe that this sworn statement established an adequate factual basis for Swensen's plea. REVERSED. BOOCHEVER, J., not participating. BURKE, Justice, with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The instant case, in my opinion, is indistinguishable from Williams v. State, 616 P.2d 881 (Alaska, 1980). Accordingly, I would affirm Swensen's conviction. Mr. Justice Matthews has authorized me to state that he joins in my dissent.