Title: New Jersey v. Pressley
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: April 19, 2018

New Jersey v. Pressley Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary The New Jersey Supreme Court found that counsel for both sides raised an intriguing question in this case: whether an identification made by a law enforcement officer should be tested by the same standards that apply to a civilian. The State presented strong evidence that defendant Dorian Pressley distributed cocaine. According to the testimony at trial, defendant sold two vials of cocaine directly to an undercover detective. At the end of the face-to-face exchange, defendant gave the detective his phone number and told her to store the number under the first three letters of his name. A second officer observed the transaction. Immediately after the sale, the undercover officer transmitted a description of defendant to a supervisor. The second officer also radioed information about defendant’s movements. About four blocks from where the sale took place, a third officer stopped defendant, who matched the description. The officer realized he knew the suspect and let him go to protect the ongoing undercover operation. Back at headquarters, the third officer printed a photo of defendant. The undercover detective also returned to headquarters. Within one hour of the transaction, she viewed the single photo of defendant and said she was certain that the individual in the picture had sold her the two vials. Defendant was arrested and convicted after trial of third-degree possession of heroin, third-degree distribution of cocaine, and third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have held a pretrial hearing to evaluate the reliability of the identification. After review, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that it could not determine whether part or all of the protections outlined in New Jersey v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011) should apply to identifications made by law enforcement officers: “Even if the trial judge in this case had held a pretrial hearing, though, it is difficult to imagine that the identification would have been suppressed. Although showups are inherently suggestive, ‘the risk of misidentification is not heightened if a showup is conducted’ within two hours of an event. Here, the identification took place within an hour. In addition, the trial judge gave the jury a full instruction on identification evidence, consistent with Henderson and the model jury charge.” The Court affirmed the Appellate Division and upheld defendant’s convictions. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here . SYLLABUS(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) State v. Dorian Pressley (A-52-16) (078747)Argued January 30, 2018 -- Decided April 19, 2018PER CURIAM Counsel for both sides raise an intriguing question: whether an identification made by a law enforcement officer should be tested by the same standards that apply to a civilian. See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 248- 72, 287-93 (2011). In this case, the State presented strong evidence that defendant Dorian Pressley distributed cocaine. According to the testimony at trial, defendant sold two vials of cocaine directly to an undercover detective on April 30, 2013. At the end of the face-to-face exchange, defendant gave the detective his phone number and told her to store the number under the first three letters of his name. A second officer observed the transaction. Immediately after the sale, the undercover officer transmitted a description of defendant to a supervisor. The second officer also radioed information about defendant’s movements. About four blocks from where the sale took place, a third officer stopped defendant, who matched the description. The officer realized he knew the suspect—as Dorian Pressley— and let him go to protect the ongoing undercover operation. Back at headquarters, the third officer printed a photo of defendant. The undercover detective also returned to headquarters. Within one hour of the transaction, she viewed the single photo of Dorian Pressley and said she was certain that the individual in the picture had sold her the two vials. Defendant was arrested and convicted after trial of third-degree possession of heroin, third-degree distribution of cocaine, and third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have held a pretrial hearing to evaluate the reliability of the identification, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in her summation. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Court granted certification. 229 N.J. 609 (2017).HELD: Based on the record, the Court cannot determine whether part or all of the protections outlined in Henderson should apply to identifications made by law enforcement officers. For the reasons expressed, the Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate Division and upholds defendant’s convictions.1. Defendant claims that “police officers are not more accurate eyewitnesses than civilians.” He relies on social science research and cites multiple published studies. The State and the Attorney General, in turn, submit that the risk of undue suggestiveness is remote when a trained officer is involved. They also rely on social science. (pp. 3-4)2. The Court is not aware of case law that has reviewed the social science evidence with care. The Court encourages parties in the future to make a record before the trial court, which can be tested at a hearing by both sides and then assessed on appeal. (pp. 5-6)3. Even if the trial judge in this case had held a pretrial hearing, though, it is difficult to imagine that the identification would have been suppressed. Although showups are inherently suggestive, “the risk of misidentification is not heightened if a showup is conducted” within two hours of an event. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 259. Here, the identification took place within an hour. In addition, the trial judge gave the jury a full instruction on identification evidence, consistent with Henderson and the model jury charge. (pp. 6-7)4. The Rule 104 hearing held in this case did not substitute for a pretrial hearing on the identification evidence. Although there are some references to the identification process, the hearing did not probe or assess the relevant system and estimator variables. Nor did this case involve a “confirmatory” identification, which is not considered suggestive. A confirmatory identification occurs when a witness identifies someone he or she knows from before but cannot identify by name. Here, the undercover detective first met defendant during the drug transaction. (pp. 7-8) 1 5. During summation, defense counsel commented on the Attorney General’s Guidelines for identification procedures and argued that “[t]here’s no exception in [them] for police officer witnesses.” In response, the prosecutor argued (a) that the “Guidelines for the most part do address the possible misidentification when there is a lay witness”—which was not untrue; (b) that the witness was “a law enforcement officer who’s trained to do what occurred here today”—which was also not untrue; and (c) that the officer made a “confirmatory identification.” The last comment misstated the law, but it does not appear that the jury received any instruction on the meaning of the term. The remark was not capable of producing an unjust result—particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. (pp. 8-9) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE ALBIN, CONCURRING, is prepared today to hold that, even in the case of police witnesses, whenever practicable, an identification procedure should be conducted by the showing of a photographic array rather than a single photograph. Highly suggestive identification procedures, such as the showing of a single photograph (a photographic “showup”) ordinarily should result in a Wade hearing, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), in Justice Albin’s view. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 2 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 52 September Term 2016 078747STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.DORIAN PRESSLEY, a/k/a JUSTIN BELTON, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 30, 2018 – Decided April 19, 2018 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Frank J. Pugliese, of counsel and on the brief). Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Erica M. Bertuzzi, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). Sarah E. Elsasser, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah E. Elsasser, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM In this case, the State presented strong evidence thatdefendant Dorian Pressley distributed cocaine. According to the 1 testimony at trial, defendant sold two vials of cocaine directlyto an undercover detective on April 30, 2013. At the end of theface-to-face exchange, defendant gave the detective his phonenumber for future use and told her to store the number in herphone under “D-O-R” -- the first three letters of his name. Asecond officer observed the transaction through binoculars fromabout twenty feet away. Immediately after the sale, the undercover officertransmitted a description of defendant to a supervisor. Sherelayed that he wore a red baseball hat, a red Adidas warm-upjacket, and khaki pants. The second officer also radioedinformation about defendant’s movements. About four blocks from where the sale took place, a thirdofficer stopped defendant, who matched the description. Theofficer realized he knew the suspect -- as Dorian Pressley --and let him go to protect the ongoing undercover operation.Back at headquarters, the third officer printed a photo ofdefendant. The undercover detective also returned to headquarters.Within one hour of the transaction, she viewed the single photoof Dorian Pressley and said she was certain that the individualin the picture had sold her the two vials. Defendant was arrested months later and proceeded to trial.During the trial, the judge conducted a Rule 104 hearing and 2 found that defendant’s statements to the undercover agent duringthe transaction were admissible. The jury convicted defendant of third-degree possession ofheroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree distribution ofcocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3); and third-degreedistribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, N.J.S.A.2C:35-7. The first charge related to defendant’s possession ofheroin at the time of his arrest. Defendant was sentenced to anaggregate term of ten years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court shouldhave held a pretrial hearing to evaluate the reliability of theidentification, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct inher summation. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’sconviction. We granted certification. 229 N.J. 609 (2017). Wealso granted the Attorney General leave to appear as amicuscuriae. I. Defendant argues that the trial court should have grantedhis request for a pretrial hearing, pursuant to United States v.Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208(2011), because he made a sufficient showing that theidentification procedure used in this case was impermissiblysuggestive. He claims that the identification was essentially ashowup and that an officer unfamiliar with the investigation 3 should have presented a photo array -- instead of a singlepicture -- to the undercover detective. The State and the Attorney General stress that policeofficers are “trained observers and trained witnesses” whose jobrequires them to remember details and faces when they conduct aninvestigation. They contend that when an officer “merelyconfirm[s] the identity of a suspect she was justinvestigating,” a photo array is unnecessary and no Wade hearingis required. Counsel for both sides raise an intriguing question:whether an identification made by a law enforcement officershould be tested by the same standards that apply to a civilian.See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 248-72, 287-93. Defendant claimsthat “police officers are not more accurate eyewitnesses thancivilians.” For support, he relies on social science researchand cites multiple published studies. The State and theAttorney General, in turn, submit that the risk of unduesuggestiveness is remote when a trained officer is involved.They also rely on social science articles, but for theproposition that “police officers are more accurate atremembering details of a crime than” members of the public.Collectively, counsel cite a half dozen publications for theCourt’s consideration. 4 We are not aware of case law that has reviewed the socialscience evidence with care. Defendant points to Manson v.Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), the seminal federal case onidentification evidence. Defendant correctly observes thatManson, in part, involved similar facts. One of theidentifications in that case related to an undercover officerwho bought narcotics from a dealer; two days later, anotherofficer showed the undercover agent a single photo to try toidentify the suspect. Id. at 100-01. The Supreme Court upheldthe identification but noted that, “[o]f course, it would havebeen better had” the undercover officer been presented “with aphotographic array” with “a reasonable number of persons” wholooked like the suspect. Id. at 117. Implicit in the ruling is a simple concept:identifications by law enforcement officers should be examinedto determine if an “impermissibly suggestive” identificationprocedure was used and to assess whether a defendant has proven“a very substantial likelihood of irreparablemisidentification.” Henderson, 208 N.J. at 238 (summarizingfederal law); State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223, 232 (1988) (same).To be sure, however, the Supreme Court did not address theprecise question this appeal presents. Nor did this Court’sdecision in Henderson. 5 In 1997, the Appellate Division in State v. Little touchedlightly on the issue when it observed that “[t]here can be nodispute that a trained undercover police officer has heightenedawareness of the need for proper identification of persons whoengage in drug purveyance.” 296 N.J. Super. 573, 580 (App. Div.1997). The opinion cites no sources and does not analyze anysocial science evidence. The same is true for the out-of-statedecisions that the Attorney General has brought to ourattention. Based on the record before us, we cannot determine whetherpart or all of the protections outlined in Henderson shouldapply to identifications made by law enforcement officers. Weencourage parties in the future to make a record before thetrial court, which can be tested at a hearing by both sides andthen assessed on appeal. See State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 201(2008) (declining to adopt new standard for admissibility ofidentification evidence without full record to review); State v.Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 501 (2006) (same). Even if the trial judge in this case had held a pretrialhearing, though, it is difficult to imagine that theidentification would have been suppressed. Although showups areinherently suggestive, “the risk of misidentification is notheightened if a showup is conducted” within two hours of anevent. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 259. Here, the identification 6 took place within an hour. In addition, the trial judge gavethe jury a full instruction on identification evidence,consistent with Henderson and the model jury charge. We do not find that the Rule 104 hearing held in this casesubstituted for a pretrial hearing on the identificationevidence. The hearing focused on whether defendant’s statementsto the undercover officer during the course of the drug salecould be admitted. Although there are some references to theidentification process, the hearing did not probe or assess therelevant system and estimator variables. Nor do we believe that this case involved a “confirmatory”identification, which is not considered suggestive. Aconfirmatory identification occurs when a witness identifiessomeone he or she knows from before but cannot identify by name.See, e.g., National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit:Assessing Eyewitness Identification 28 (2014) (“ConfirmatoryPhotograph: Police will, on occasion, display a singlephotograph to a witness in an effort to confirm the identity ofa perpetrator. Police typically limit this method to situationsin which the perpetrator is previously known to or acquaintedwith the witness.”); Sides v. Senkowski, 281 F. Supp. 2d 649 ,654 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (“parties knew each other previously”). Forexample, the person may be a neighbor or someone known only by astreet name. See Identifying the Culprit, at 22. Here, the 7 undercover detective first met defendant during the drugtransaction. II. We briefly address defendant’s argument that the prosecutorengaged in misconduct in her summation and deprived him of afair trial. Defendant first raised the argument on appeal.Because he failed to object at trial, we review the challengedcomments for plain error. See R. 2:10-2. Under that standard,an appellate court can reverse only if it finds that the errorwas “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” Ibid.;State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 458 (2017). Prosecutors can sum up cases with force and vigor, and areafforded considerable leeway so long as their comments are“reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented.”State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 587 (1999). In carryingout their duties, prosecutors must always have in mind thattheir obligation is to do justice, not to win cases. See Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78 , 88 (1935). A defendant’s allegation of prosecutorial misconductrequires the court to assess whether the defendant was deprivedof the right to a fair trial. State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394,407 (2012). To warrant reversal on appeal, the prosecutor’smisconduct must be “clearly and unmistakably improper” and “soegregious” that it deprived defendant of the “right to have a 8 jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.” State v.Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437-38 (2007) (quoting State v.Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000)). In general, when counseldoes not make a timely objection at trial, it is a sign “thatdefense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial”when they were made. State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 360 (2009). During summation, defense counsel attacked the State’switnesses and argued that “in this case we have some [officerswho] are not honest and upstanding.” Counsel also commented onthe Attorney General’s Guidelines for identification proceduresand argued that “[t]here’s no exception in [them] for policeofficer witnesses.” In response, the prosecutor argued (a) that the “Guidelinesfor the most part do address the possible misidentification whenthere is a lay witness” -- which was not untrue; (b) that thewitness was “a law enforcement officer who’s trained to do whatoccurred here today” -- which was also not untrue; and (c) thatthe officer made a “confirmatory identification.” The lastcomment misstated the law, but it does not appear that the juryreceived any instruction on the meaning of the term. We do notfind that the remark was capable of producing an unjust result-- particularly in light of the overwhelming evidence ofdefendant’s guilt. 9 III. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Divisionand uphold defendant’s convictions. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, concurring opinion. 10 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 52 September Term 2016 078747STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v.DORIAN PRESSLEY, a/k/a JUSTIN BELTON, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I concur with the Court’s per curiam judgment affirmingdefendant’s conviction in light of the overwhelming evidence ofhis guilt. The failure to conduct a pretrial identificationhearing and the prosecutor’s erroneous statement in summationwould not have changed the outcome of this case. Unlike my colleagues, however, I would not elide the issueof whether a suggestive identification procedure should triggera pretrial Wade hearing when a law enforcement officer is theeyewitness. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Theissue is too important and the answer too obvious to await aresolution in the indefinite future. The showing of a singlephotograph is inherently suggestive, whether the witness is alayperson or a police officer. Even if we accept that policeofficers have enhanced observational skills, common sense and 1 our jurisprudence tell us that exposing police officers tohighly suggestive identification procedures inevitably will leadto more misidentifications and more wrongful convictions. I am therefore prepared today to hold that, even in thecase of police witnesses, whenever practicable, anidentification procedure should be conducted by the showing of aphotographic array rather than a single photograph. Highlysuggestive identification procedures, such as the showing of asingle photograph (a photographic “showup”) ordinarily shouldresult in a Wade hearing. I. A. This Court has acknowledged that presenting an eyewitnesswith a single photograph is an “inherently suggestive”identification procedure. See State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208,259-61 (2011); State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 504 (2006). Whena police officer presents a witness with a single photograph ofa suspect, he is “conveying the suggestion to the witness thatthe one presented is believed guilty.” See Wade, 388 U.S. at 234. Even in a case involving an undercover police officer whowas shown a single photograph to identify the dealer from whomhe made a purchase, the United States Supreme Court stated thatthe suggestive procedure may have had a “corrupting effect.”Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 , 99-100, 114 (1977). 2 After Manson, courts appear to routinely conduct pretrialhearings when police witnesses are exposed to highly suggestiveprocedures, such as the single photographic showup. See, e.g.,United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2012)(noting district court’s finding that showing of singlephotograph to undercover law enforcement officer was“impermissibly suggestive”); United States v. Smith, 429 F. Supp. 2d 440, 449-50 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that use of“single-photo identification” in undercover agent’sidentification of arms dealer “was impermissibly suggestive”);State v. Martin, 595 So. 2d 592 , 595 (La. 1992) (concluding thatsingle photograph identification by undercover detective “wasboth suggestive . . . and unnecessary, because there was noemergency or exigent circumstance involved”). We do not need additional social science evidence to reachthe obvious conclusion that the showing of a single photographis as inherently suggestive to a police witness as it is to alay eyewitness. Although police officers will be betterprepared to remember an individual’s features in certaincircumstances, such as during undercover operations, there is noevidence that police officers as a class have enhanced orsuperhuman identification abilities. Their memory -- like allhuman memory -- will be subject to “vagaries” and“malleability.” See Henderson, 208 N.J. at 241-48, 283. There 3 is no reason to believe that the memory of a police officer,even one whose awareness is heightened during a criminalencounter, cannot be corrupted by a suggestive identificationprocedure. B. To obtain a pretrial Wade hearing, a defendant need onlyshow “some evidence of suggestiveness” in the identificationprocedure that could lead to a mistaken identification. Id. at288-89 (emphasis added). Law enforcement officers control the“system variables” -- the variables related to theidentification procedure -- and therefore they control theintegrity of the identification process. See id. at 218. In Henderson, we set forth a best practices model for afair identification procedure. An officer conducting aphotographic lineup should not know who the suspect is or wherethe suspect’s photograph is located in the lineup. Id. at 248.That approach removes the possibility that the officer, who isadministering the identification procedure, will suggest evenunconsciously which photograph the witness should select. Id.at 248-49. The photographic array should consist of at leastsix photographs, including one of the suspect. Id. at 251-52.Additionally, the witness should be told that the suspect may ormay not be in the lineup and not to feel compelled to make anidentification. Id. at 250. 4 We have taken exquisite measures to ensure that lawenforcement officers follow procedures that will enhance thefairness of eyewitness identifications. Surely, if thoseprocedures will minimize the potential for misidentification bylay witnesses, they will have the same beneficent effect whenapplied to police witnesses. To warrant a pretrial hearing, a defendant need only showthat one of the procedural variables under law enforcement’scontrol presented “some evidence of suggestiveness.” Id. at288. Law enforcement controls whether a witness is shown asingle photograph or an array of six photographs. The Stateshould bear the burden of presenting evidence that aphotographic showup was necessary because the production of anarray would have unreasonably delayed the identificationprocess. At the hearing, as always, the court will assess theoverall reliability of the identification, including in the caseof a police officer, his or her training and/or heightenedawareness for making an identification. II. The unnecessary use of inherently suggestive identificationprocedures, even in the case of a trained undercover detective,as here, cannot be squared with the logic of Henderson. Thesystem variables discussed in Henderson address the frailty ofhuman memory, not just a layperson’s memory, and Henderson lays 5 out a framework for using non-suggestive identificationprocedures that will reduce the likelihood of misidentification.That framework should apply across the board because amiscarriage of justice occurs whether a misidentification comesfrom a lay witness or a police witness. Certainly, there will be times when it is not practicableto prepare a photographic array for a police witness; on thoseoccasions the circumstances may necessitate showing only asingle photo. See id. at 261. Nothing in the record, however,indicates that the police were unable to generate a photographicarray without undue delay to present to the undercover detectivein this case. The showing of a single photograph to thedetective -- defendant’s photograph -- certainly signaled to thedetective that her police colleagues had “confirmed” defendantas the drug seller. In sum, the identification procedure used was sufficientlysuggestive to warrant a pretrial hearing. The State should havebeen required to demonstrate the reliability of theidentification despite the use of a single photograph. Additionally, going forward, when an officer makes anidentification from an inherently suggestive photographicshowup, the State should explain why it was not feasible to usea photographic array. If its response is unsatisfactory, thenthe court should consider giving a charge that would allow the 6 jury to draw an adverse inference from the State’s use of anunnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. This willprovide an inducement for the police to use non-suggestiveidentification techniques. The consistent use of reliableidentification procedures, such as photographic arrays, wheneverpracticable, is the best way to minimize the potential formisidentifications. III. For the reasons expressed, I believe the Court has passedup an important opportunity to apply the principles of Hendersonto police witness identifications and thus ensure greaterfairness in the criminal justice process. 7