Title: State v. Reed
Citation: 248 Kan. 506, 809 P.2d 553
Docket Number: 61958
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: April 12, 1991

809 P.2d 553 (1991)
248 Kan. 506
STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Stephen Dean REED, Appellant.
No. 61958.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
April 12, 1991.
*554 Lucille Marino, Asst. Appellate Defender, argued the cause, Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, and Benjamin C. Wood, former Chief Appellate Defender, were with her on the briefs, for appellant.
Edwin A. Van Petten, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued the cause, Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Stacie Kennon, Legal Intern, were with him on the brief, for appellee.
McFARLAND, Justice.
Stephen Dean Reed appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere to first-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-3401) and the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration.
As the underlying facts are significant to the determination of the issues, they must be set forth in some detail. On March 17, 1986, Jimmy Ray Vanderlinden was found dead in his residence near Galena, Kansas. The victim had been bound hand and foot and had been shot three times in the back of the head. As a result of the ensuing investigation, multiple felony charges were filed against Susan Diane Vanderlinden (the victim's wife), Luke Patrick Callihan, and the defendant herein. It was the State's theory that the wife had hired Callihan to kill her husband. Callihan, in turn, had subcontracted the job to the defendant. Callihan, pursuant to a plea bargain, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder (a class C felony) in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and his testimony against Mrs. Vanderlinden and the defendant herein.
At the Vanderlinden trial, Callihan testified he had been hired by her to kill her husband; he had then hired defendant to kill the victim; he had transported defendant to the area of the victim's residence on the night in question; and the following day defendant advised him he had killed the victim by shooting him three times in the back of the head. Dennis Orton, a friend of Callihan, testified that Callihan and the defendant had come to his home the morning after the murder where Callihan advised him defendant had committed the murder and obtained money from Orton so defendant could leave town. Two weeks later, defendant returned and advised Orton that he had killed the victim. There was evidence certain property was taken from the victim's person and from his residence at the time of the killing.
Defendant's attorney sat in on the Vanderlinden jury trial and became familiar with the evidence. Mrs. Vanderlinden was found guilty on all counts: first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and solicitation to commit first-degree murder. Her convictions were subsequently affirmed in an unpublished opinion of this court (case No. 60,995, filed July 8, 1988).
Defendant's jury trial was scheduled to commence on March 9, 1987. On that morning, defendant entered his plea of nolo contendere to first-degree murder. As a part of the plea bargain, the State dismissed the balance of the charges, removed the allegation that a firearm had been used, and agreed to arrange for defendant and Callihan to be incarcerated in different institutions. Sentencing was set for April 23, 1987. The sentencing was ultimately rescheduled. On April 30, 1987, defendant filed his motion to withdraw his plea. On May 4, 1987, the matter came before the district court for hearing on the motion and for sentencing. The motion was denied and a life sentence was imposed. Defendant filed this appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Later, the *555 case was remanded to the district court for hearing of defendant's motions for reconsideration and for rendition of out-of-state witnesses. Both motions were denied. Issues relative to each of these motions are also before us.
For his first issue, defendant contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea.
K.S.A. 22-3210 sets forth the procedures for acceptance and withdrawal of guilty or nolo contendere pleas as follows:
We described the procedure for accepting a plea of nolo contendere in State v. Dillon, 242 Kan. 410, 413, 748 P.2d 856 (1988), as follows:
Prior to accepting the plea herein, the district court went through an extensive explanation of the results of the plea and what rights defendant would be foregoing. The district court carefully questioned the defendant in all pertinent regards. Defendant's responses to all questions were appropriate and consistent with his expressed desire to enter a nolo contendere plea of the Alford variety (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 [1970]) (to be discussed later). Defendant does not complain that the procedure and format utilized relative to the plea were defective or deficient in any way. Rather, he contends the plea was not voluntary as he was under stress, suffering from a migraine headache, and under the influence of aspirin, muscle relaxants, and valium. He also asserts his below average *556 intelligence may have made him unable to understand the plea. He also alleges he was under pressure to accept the plea.
Part of the district court's questioning of the defendant was as follows:
Defendant's attorney, Edward Dosh, then engaged in the following colloquy with his client:
A defendant, while maintaining his or her innocence, may, for a variety of reasons, wish to enter a plea of nolo contendere.
In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, the penalty for which was death unless the jury recommended *557 life imprisonment. Defendant claimed he was innocent. He agreed, however, to plead guilty to second-degree murder because he was otherwise faced with the threat of a death penalty if the case went to trial. There was substantial evidence that indicated Alford's guilt. He was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the guilty plea was involuntary because of the defendant's fear motivation. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, holding, inter alia, there was no constitutional error in accepting a guilty plea which contained a protestation of innocence when the defendant intelligently concluded that his interest required entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contained strong evidence of actual guilt. The Court said:
In the case before us, the defendant and his counsel had the opportunity of knowing exactly what the State's evidence would consist of as the Vanderlinden trial had already been held. The outcome of the Vanderlinden trial was also known.
It is not surprising that the defendant felt he was under stress. It would be an unusual person who would not feel stressful when confronting a trial involving charges of the magnitude herein. There is really nothing in the record, other than defendant's testimony at the hearing on his motion some two months later, to support his claims that the plea was not free and voluntary. The record supports the finding that the plea was his free and voluntary act.
In Noble v. State, 240 Kan. 162, 727 P.2d 473 (1986), defendant contended his plea was not voluntary because, inter alia, tests indicated his mental competency was in the dull to normal intelligence range. We rejected this argument. 240 Kan. at 167-69, 727 P.2d 473. The test for mental competency in a trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree *558 of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960). The transcript of the plea proceedings indicates that defendant met the requirements of the test and was mentally competent to make the plea.
The standard for a judicial abuse of discretion, the allegation lodged herein, is as follows:
There is simply no showing that the district court herein acted arbitrarily, fancifully, or unreasonably. The plea transcript underscores the court's ruling that the plea was freely entered and properly accepted and does not support defendant's contention that the plea was entered in haste, confusion, fear, and resignation. Clearly, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would take the view of the trial court.
Likewise, there is little merit in defendant's contention that the district court lacked a factual basis for the plea. The factual basis was stated succinctly by the prosecutor prior to the acceptance of the plea. Further, the trial court took judicial notice of the evidence in the Vanderlinden case, which included devastating testimony of defendant's guilt. When a prosecutor presents the evidence to the court, and that evidence shows that all elements of the crime are present, a factual basis for a plea has been reached. See State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 93, 661 P.2d 781 (1983).
We find no abuse of judicial discretion in this issue.
We turn now to defendant's second issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration?
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Dr. Robert Schulman, a clinical psychologist, testified that an aggregate of factors, including defendant's poor comprehension skills, stress, medication, and lack of sleep rendered defendant unable to make voluntary statements on the day of his plea agreement, March 9, 1987.
Defendant testified that he regretted the plea agreement within hours after making it and did not understand what a nolo contendere plea really was.
The court, on February 12, 1990, overruled defendant's motion. In arriving at its decision the court stated:
It should be noted that the same district judge presided at the Vanderlinden trial and all pertinent stages of the proceedings herein. He was familiar with the evidence, questioned the defendant at the time of the plea and the hearing on the motions, heard his responses to questions, and observed his demeanor.
Applying the previously stated standard for appellate review of claims involving alleged abuse of judicial discretion, we find no merit in this issue.
For his third issue, defendant contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for rendition of two out-of-state witnesses. K.S.A. 22-4210 allows for rendition of prisoners confined in another state for a criminal proceeding in Kansas. The sought-for witnesses were Kenny Heistand and Richard Sanders.
Prior to trial, defendant had filed a notice of intention to present an alibi defense and had listed the names of 17 witnesses to support his defense that he was in Arkansas at the time of the murder. Defendant concedes in his brief that "the strength of a proposed defense is not of paramount importance to a court which is considering a motion to withdraw a plea."
The argument on this issue treats the rendition motion as essentially a motion to withdraw a plea based upon newly discovered evidence. This is an original format. A great deal of hearsay is involved but presumably the evidence would be to the effect Callihan had hired someone else to commit the murder.
Based upon the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the rendition motion.
The judgment is affirmed.