Title: State ex rel. State of Missouri, Relator, vs. The Honorable Paul Parkinson, Respondent.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SC89470
State: Missouri
Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court
Date: April 14, 2009

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
State ex rel. State of Missouri, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Relator 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89470 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
The Honorable Paul Parkinson, 
 
) 
Judge, Macon County, 
 
 
) 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
 
Opinion issued April 14, 2009. 
 
 
The Missouri Department of Corrections gave the attorney general notice, prior to 
the end of confinement of Richard Closser, that Mr. Closser may be a sexually violent 
predator (SVP).  The attorney general, relying on the assessments of the prosecutors’ 
review committee and the multidisciplinary team, determined that Mr. Closser may be an 
SVP and filed a petition to commit him as an SVP.  After a hearing, the trial court held 
there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Closser may be an SVP, and a later mental 
evaluation so found also.  
 
After six continuances and substantial discovery Mr. Closser moved to dismiss the 
petition, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because the licensed psychologist who 
authored an initial end-of-confinement report the department sent to the attorney general 
some three years earlier had not yet received his Missouri license at the time he filed the 
report. The trial court agreed that this deficiency deprived it of jurisdiction to proceed and 
dismissed the petition.  The attorney general sought extraordinary relief to prevent release 
of Mr. Closser, and this Court issued its preliminary writ. 
 
The writ of prohibition is made permanent.  The error in allowing the psychologist 
to issue his report before he received his Missouri license is just that, error.  Mere error 
does not deprive a court of jurisdiction it otherwise possesses.  For the reasons set out 
below, the error was neither prejudicial nor preserved.  Accordingly, the writ of 
prohibition is made absolute and the trial court is directed to vacate its order dismissing 
the petition.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
Richard Closser was convicted of sexual abuse in 1990.  In June 1997, he received 
two new convictions for child molestation and sexual misconduct, for which he received 
a suspended imposition of sentence and was placed on probation for five years.  His 
probation on the 1997 offenses was revoked in 2001 due to his failure to make adequate 
progress in required sexual offender treatment, and he proceeded to serve his sentence. 
He refused to participate in the Missouri Sex Offender Treatment Program [MOSOP] 
while in prison. 
 
Section 632.4831 is part of a statutory scheme to identify, commit and treat 
sexually violent predators.  It sets out the procedure for instituting commitment 
proceedings against currently incarcerated persons prior to their release and provides that 
the “agency with jurisdiction” (here the department) shall give written notice to the 
attorney general and a multidisciplinary team established pursuant to section 632.483.4 
                                             
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2003. 
that a person in the agency’s custody “may meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator 
….”  The statute further provides that with this notice, the department shall provide the 
attorney general and the multidisciplinary team with: 
(1) 
The person’s name, identifying factors, anticipated future 
residence and offense history; 
(2) 
Documentation of institutional adjustment and any treatment 
received or refused, including the Missouri sexual offender 
program; and  
(3) 
A determination by either a psychiatrist or psychologist as 
defined in section 632.005 as to whether the person meets the 
definition of a sexually violent predator. 
 
Sec. 632.483.2.  
 
The multidisciplinary team consists of no more than seven persons, including at 
least one from the department of corrections and the department of mental health.  That 
team is to review available records about the offender to assess whether it believes the 
person meets the definition of an SVP and to notify the attorney general of its assessment. 
Sec. 632.483.4. 
The statute also requires a five-member prosecutors’ review committee, composed 
of a cross-section of prosecutors from rural and urban counties, to review the referred 
person’s records.  The multidisciplinary team’s assessment shall be made available to the 
prosecutors’ review committee, which then “shall make a determination of whether or not 
the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator.”  Sec. 632.483.5. 
Only if it appears to the attorney general “that the person presently confined may 
be a sexually violent predator and the prosecutor’s review committee … has determined 
by a majority vote, that the person meets the definition” of an SVP, may the attorney 
general then file a petition “alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and 
 
3
stating sufficient facts to support such allegation.”  Sec. 632.486.  The statute requires the 
attorney general to attach to the petition a copy of the multidisciplinary team’s 
assessment.  Id.  Copies of the end-of-confinement report and the prosecutors’ review 
committee assessment are not required to be attached.  Id.  
Under section 632.489, upon the filing of the petition “the judge shall determine 
whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a 
sexually violent predator.”  If the judge so determines, the person is entitled to notice and 
a hearing within 72 hours at which he or she can “contest probable cause as to whether 
the detained person is a sexually violent predator.”  Sec. 632.489.2.2  At the hearing, the 
court shall verify the detainee’s identity and determine probable cause.  The detained 
person shall have a right to counsel, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and 
to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file.  Sec. 632.489.3. 
If – and only if – the court determines, based on the evidence at the hearing, that 
probable cause exists to believe the person is an SVP shall the court direct that the person 
be sent to a secure facility for an evaluation by a psychologist or psychiatrist as to 
whether the person is an SVP.  Sec. 632.489.4.  The court shall conduct a trial within 60 
days of the evaluation, but the trial may be continued at the request of either party and for 
good cause shown.  Sec. 632.492. 
 
In Mr. Closser’s case, shortly before he was to be released from prison, the 
department provided notice to the attorney general and to the multidisciplinary team that 
it appeared to the department that Mr. Closser was a person who may meet the criteria of 
                                             
 
2 All references to Section 632.489 are to RSMo 2000.  
 
4
a sexually violent predator.  Mr. Closser does not contest that the department attached to 
that notice, as required by statute, the information about Mr. Closser’s name, identifying 
factors, anticipated future residence and offense history, and documentation of 
institutional adjustment and treatment, including MOSOP, pursuant to section 
632.483.2(1) and (2).  He further concedes that the end-of-confinement report was 
prepared by a trained psychologist, Dr. Suire, and that it addressed whether he met the 
definition of an SVP as required by section 632.483.2(3), albeit prepared by a 
psychologist whose Missouri license had not been issued yet.  
The record also shows that the multidisciplinary team that assessed Mr. Closser  
determined, based on the materials provided it, that Mr. Closser did not meet the 
definition of an SVP and that it provided this assessment to the prosecutors’ review 
committee.  The committee unanimously determined that Mr. Closser did meet the 
definition of an SVP.  Both assessments were presented to the attorney general, who 
determined pursuant to section 632.486 that Mr. Closser may be an SVP and filed a 
petition for his civil commitment. As required, the attorney general attached the 
determination of the multidisciplinary team. Id. 
The court made a probable cause finding, ordered Mr. Closser detained, and held a 
probable cause hearing within 72 hours as required.  At that hearing, the state was 
entitled to rely on the petition and other documentary or live evidence, and Mr. Closser 
was entitled to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, to cross-examine 
witnesses, and to view copies of all petitions and reports in the court file.  As such, the 
court had available a copy of Dr. Suire’s report.  After the hearing, the court determined 
 
5
that probable cause existed to believe that Mr. Closser was an SVP.  
The court set this matter for trial six different times between June 2005 and May 
2008, with the case being continued the first three times at the request of Mr. Closser’s 
attorney and the final three times on the court’s own motion.  In May 2008, more than 
three years after the court’s initial probable cause determination, Mr. Closser’s counsel 
for the first time raised the issue that the state failed to follow proper statutory procedure.  
In particular, he noted that, at the time Dr. Suire prepared his end-of-confinement report 
in the fall of 2004, he had not yet been granted his Missouri psychologist license, 
although the record indicates that Dr. Suire did have a Texas psychologist license, and 
that his Missouri license was granted in March 2005.  Counsel alleged that this deprived 
the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed on the petition later filed by the attorney general. 
The attorney general countered that if this were a violation of the relevant statute, it was a 
technical one, not a jurisdictional defect, and was waived and was not prejudicial. 
On July 16, 2008, the trial court determined that Dr. Suire was not authorized to 
prepare the end-of-confinement report and that this error in permitting him to prepare the 
report the department submitted to the attorney general years earlier deprived it of 
jurisdiction to proceed to trial for determination of whether Mr. Closser was an SVP. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In this case, it is uncontested that the psychologist who prepared the end-of-
confinement report was not licensed in Missouri at the time he wrote the report.  The key 
issue before the court is the legal effect of this lack of Missouri licensure.  This Court’s 
review of the trial court’s finding of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
 
6
law.  “[W]here, as here, the facts are uncontested, a question as to the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of a court is purely a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.”  Missouri 
Soybean Ass’n v. Missouri Clean Water Com’n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003) 
(citations omitted). 
III. 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 632.483 ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL 
 
Mr. Closser argues the fact that the end-of-confinement report attached to the 
department notice was written by a psychologist before he obtained his Missouri license 
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that renders all subsequent proceedings against him 
void.    
 
“The essential bases of a court’s authority to adjudicate a controversy are its 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy and jurisdiction over the parties.”3  
In re Marriage of Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d 582, 587-88 (Mo. banc 2006). “Subject matter 
jurisdiction [is a matter of] the court’s authority to render a judgment in a particular 
category of case.”  J.C.W. v. Wyciskalla, --- S.W.3d ---, 2009 WL 186140, * 2 (Mo. 
banc 2009).  Hendrix distinguishes such a jurisdictional defect from mere error.  Mrs. 
Hendrix argued that the trial court’s decision to proceed on a stipulated record rather than 
hold a live evidentiary hearing violated the dissolution statute’s requirement of a hearing, 
and that such a failure to follow statutory requirements deprived the trial court of 
jurisdiction to continue with the dissolution proceeding.  This Court rejected that 
argument, holding that “the label ‘jurisdictional defect’ has no application to mere legal 
errors.”  Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d at 590.  The trial court had jurisdiction over the parties 
                                             
 
3 The court’s personal jurisidiction over Mr. Closser is not challenged. 
 
7
and authority to hear dissolution actions; accordingly, even were the failure to hold a 
hearing a failure to comply with the statute, it merely would be error, not a jurisdictional 
defect, and such errors can be waived, as they were in that case.  Id.  
 
Similarly, in J.C.W. this Court held that it would “rob[] the concept of subject 
matter jurisdiction of the clarity that the constitution provides” were any error in 
following a statute’s requirements considered to deprive a court of jurisdiction to decide a 
case.  J.C.W., 2009 WL 186140 at * 2.  To the contrary, “the courts of this state should 
confine their discussions of circuit court jurisdiction to constitutionally recognized 
doctrines of personal and subject matter jurisdiction ….”  Id.; see Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d 
at 590. 
These principles directly apply here. The petition to have Mr. Closser declared an 
SVP was filed in the probate division of the circuit court in which he was convicted or 
committed.  That court has personal jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction 
to determine SVP proceedings.  Secs. 632.486, 632.489, 472.020.4  Accordingly, the 
circuit court had jurisdiction to proceed.  Any failure by the department to comply with 
all statutory requirements in support materials provided with the notice it gave the 
attorney general is subject to analysis to determine whether that error caused a failure of 
proof, whether it was waived, whether it was prejudicial and similar issues. See, e.g., 
Hendrix, 183 S.W. 3d at 590 (error in failing to hold hearing did not deprive court of 
jurisdiction and was waived by acquiescence of parties in submitting case on stipulated 
record that adequately provided court with sufficient evidence to determine issues).   
                                             
 
4 RSMO 2000 
 
8
IV. 
THE LICENSING ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL AND WAS WAIVED 
 
Mr. Closser alternatively argues that even if the error is not jurisdictional, it is fatal 
to the success of the petition because, absent a properly prepared end-of-confinement 
report by a Missouri-licensed psychologist, a condition precedent to the court’s authority 
over the SVP proceeding is absent. 
 
A “condition precedent” is “one … which is to be performed before some right 
dependent thereon accrues ….”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (6th Ed. 1990).  Mr. 
Closser offers nothing to support his argument that having a report prepared by a 
Missouri-licensed psychologist is a condition precedent even to the attorney general 
filing a petition in the first instance, much less to the court determining the issues raised 
in the petition. While section 632.483 does state indirectly that the psychologist preparing 
the report “shall” have a Missouri license, “the use of ‘shall’ in a statute does not 
inevitably render compliance mandatory, when the legislature has not prescribed a 
sanction for noncompliance.”  State ex rel. Fischer v. Brooks, 150 S.W.3d 284 (Mo. 
banc 2004).  Depending on context, “shall” may prescribe a mandatory duty, as in State 
v. Teer, --- S.W.3d ----, 2009 WL 186154, *1 (Mo. banc 2009), but it may be considered 
only directory. Id.  “[D]etermining if the word ‘shall’ is mandatory or directory requires 
courts to review the context of the statute and to ascertain legislative intent.”  Id. 
 
Section 632.483 does not require that the end-of-confinement report even be filed 
with the court, much less that it is essential or its absence dispositive.  Indeed, unless and 
until the attorney general files a petition to have a person declared an SVP under section 
632.486, the matter is not a court proceeding.  And even when the pretrial requirements 
 
9
of section 632.483 are considered, it is the department’s statutory notice, not the content 
of the end-of-confinement report or the information in any of the other supporting 
documents to be provided with it, that begins the process of determining whether a 
petition will be filed in the first instance.  This report is just one of a number of pieces of 
information that section 632.483 states the department shall transmit to the attorney 
general and the multidisciplinary committee.  Among other matters to be transmitted are 
a list of identifying factors, anticipated future residence, offense history, documentation 
of treatment and similar matters. Sec. 632.483.2.  An error in transmitting the person’s 
address or various identifying factors, an error as to offense history, or a failure to include 
some piece of documentation regarding treatment, in submitting the initial notice to the 
attorney general, does not deprive a court of authority to proceed.  Yet, if a lack of 
Missouri licensing of the psychologist who made the end-of-confinement report had that 
effect, why would not other technical errors in compliance with the statute?   
This is not to suggest that such failures are not of importance and may not be 
prejudicial.  Those charged with duties under the statute should attempt to fulfill all such 
duties.  If they intentionally fail to do so, or if they fail to correct their error when it 
timely is brought to their attention, it would be appropriate to direct them to do so.  But 
that does not make every error in fulfilling pretrial – in this instance, even pre-filing – 
requirements a condition precedent to action on a petition, any more than errors in 
holding a preliminary hearing deprive a court of authority to conduct the trial, or errors in 
holding an evidentiary hearing deprive a court of authority to act in a dissolution 
proceeding. It simply means that the error may be waived, and if not waived the issue of 
 
10
prejudice becomes a factual one.  
Here, Mr. Closser failed to raise the issue of Dr. Suire’s license at the probable 
cause hearing or earlier, although a copy of the report was attached to the petition filed 
two months earlier.  In the course of many motions for continuance and other motions he 
filed in the succeeding three years, he failed to raise this preliminary issue.  Such conduct 
militates in favor of finding a waiver.5
Moreover, even if not waived, the Court cannot find that the licensing error was so 
prejudicial that it deprived the later actors of information necessary for a fair 
determination of Mr. Closser’s designation as an SVP.  Mr. Closser does not suggest that 
Dr. Suire was not otherwise qualified to render an opinion, and indeed he was licensed in 
Texas at the time of his report and received his Missouri license just a few months later.  
Further, after review of this report and the other information transmitted, the 
multidisciplinary committee determined that Mr. Closser was not an SVP and did not 
recommend that a petition be filed.  This certainly weakens any argument that the 
substance of the report unfairly prejudiced Mr. Closser. 
Equally importantly, neither a positive recommendation in the report nor by the 
multidisciplinary committee is essential even to the attorney general’s decision whether 
to proceed with the filing of a petition.  And the attorney general’s filing just begins the 
court process.  The court must hold a probable cause hearing, and if it finds probable 
                                             
 
5 See In Matter of Care and Treatment of Matthews, 550 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (S.C. 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002) (trial within 60 days of a probable cause 
hearing is mandatory but not jurisdictional; by not filing a motion to dismiss, detainee 
waived right to challenge the state’s noncompliance with the requisite time period). See 
 
11
cause, as it did here, then the detained person undergoes a new psychological evaluation 
as to whether he is an SVP.  It is that evaluation, which was undertaken below and found 
Mr. Closser to fit the definition of an SVP, that supports further proceedings.  The faulty 
end-of-confinement report essentially now has been supplanted by the new evaluation. 
Any errors in it, so long as the prosecution does not attempt to admit it at trial, could not 
be prejudicial.  See sec. 632.489.4. 
V.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set out above, the lack of Missouri licensure by the psychologist 
who made the initial determination that Mr. Closser may meet the definition of an SVP 
did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed on the petition later filed by the 
attorney general, nor did that error otherwise deprive the court of authority to act. The 
writ of prohibition is made absolute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   LAURA DENVIR STITH, CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
Price, Teitelman, Russell, Breckenridge 
and Fischer, JJ., concur; Wolff, J., concurs 
in separate opinion filed.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
also Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d at 590 (alleged procedural improprieties are not jurisdictional 
defects; rather they are error, which the court will review for waiver or prejudice). 
 
12
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
State ex rel. State of Missouri, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Relator 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89470 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
The Honorable Paul Parkinson, 
 
) 
Judge, Macon County, 
 
 
) 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION 
 
 
I concur with the principal opinion.  
This case does, however, have two aspects that, taken together, may be 
worrisome.  The first is that the multidisciplinary team’s initial review of the 
records did not find that Closser fit the definition of a sexually violent predator.  
The second is that the state, for whatever reason, chose to use a psychologist not 
licensed in Missouri to do the crucial end-of-confinement evaluation.   
The function of the multidisciplinary team, I assume, is to provide an 
 
1
informed assessment based in part on the expertise of the team members.1  The 
team’s assessment can be overridden by the prosecutors’ committee, as it was in 
this case.2  On a practical level, an assessment by prosecutors can answer the 
question of whether the state can “win” a commitment of the suspected sexually 
violent predator.  This is an important assessment and – in light of the prosecutor’s 
overriding duty to do justice and not just to win cases – can and should be a check 
to safeguard the rights of individuals against overzealous experts. 
The expert’s report, prepared by Dr. Suire – who held a Texas license and 
was in the process of obtaining a Missouri license – was one piece of evidence on 
the way to a proceeding to commit Closser as a sexually violent predator.    
There is no indication whether Dr. Suire will be the state’s expert at the 
civil commitment trial or whether the state will find another expert.     
My concern is about what lawyers call “expert shopping.”  To be frank, 
lawyers often shop around for experts, not so much by what they know, but what 
they will say to support the theory of the case. Other professionals, especially 
medical professionals, can be heard to complain about the laxity of standards that 
allows for such expert shopping. 
I am not so provincial as to suggest that only Missouri-licensed experts can 
be used, but I would ask: With more than 1,700 psychologists licensed to practice 
in Missouri, why does the state need to go elsewhere to find an expert?  Perhaps 
                                             
 
1 Section 632.483.2, RSMo Supp. 2003. 
2 Section 632.483.5, RSMo Supp. 2003. 
 
2
there are experts around the country who can be relied upon to label – as sexually 
violent predators – sex offenders even where the evidence is thin or illusory.  But 
that is where the expert-shopping question becomes troubling.  The statute does 
not assume that every sex offender is a sexually violent predator.  But, in the 
choice of experts, perhaps the prosecutorial system is making that assumption.  
The stakes, after all, are about a person’s liberty and about the safety of our 
communities. These are not interests to be balanced, but are important values to be 
safeguarded.  
The state probably now will bring before a jury an expert to say that 
Closser – who has a history of convictions: sex abuse (1990), child molestation 
and sexual misconduct (1997) – is a sexually violent predator.  If the state does so, 
it is a fairly safe bet that Closser will not be seen at large anytime this century.   
That may well be fine, if the system accurately identifies those who are 
permanently a risk to the wellbeing of children and other potential sex-offense 
victims.  The statutes appear to be designed to protect against over-inclusion in the 
category of sexually violent predator.  But, in practice, do the statutes function as 
they apparently are designed? 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michael A. Wolff, Judge 
 
3