Title: LARSON v BURNETT
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 12021
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: January 12, 1972

No. 12021 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1971 R O B E R T LARSON, a/k/a BOB LARSON, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, GUY P. B U R N E T T and M A R T H A E. BURNETT, h i s wife, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana. Robert E. Sheridan, Jr. argued, Missoula, Montana. Sherman V. Lohn appeared, Missoula, Montana. For Respondent : Tipp, Haven and Brault, Missoula, Montana. Raymond P. Tipp argued, Missoula, Montana. Submitted : December 3, 1971 Decided : ~ ~ l 1 2 1972 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by defendants, Guy P. Burnett and Martha E. Burnett, h i s wife, from a f i n a l judgment of the d i s t r i c t court of Missoula County following t h a t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of defendants' exceptions and motion t o amend t h e findings of f a c t and conclu- s i o n s of law. The case was t r i e d by t h e court without a jury. Judgment was entered wherein t h e court found t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f , Robert Larson, had acquired a nonexclusive easement f o r road pur- poses over c e r t a i n land owned by defendants. Further, t h e court ordered t h a t p l a i n t i f f f o r a period of one year should be e n t i t l e d t o the continued use of a c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g roadway across portions of defendants' land and a l s o p l a i n t i f f should have a period of one year t o complete t h e construction of the roadway on h i s easement. The sequence of events leading up t o t h i s a c t i o n can be summarized i n t h i s manner: I n 1966 p l a i n t i f f purchased property located i n Missoula County, Montana, s i t u a t e d d i r e c t l y north and adjoining two pieces of property owned by defendants; p l a i n t i f f ' s property abuts t h e B i t t e r r o o t River on t h e south. It was s t i p u l a t e d by counsel f o r both p a r t i e s t h a t t h e r e was no w r i t t e n g r a n t of any i n t e r e s t o r easement i n t h e 1966 conveyance t o p l a i n t i f f . After purchasing t h e property, p l a i n t i f f i n order t o gain access t o h i s property made s e v e r a l attempts t o procure an easement over adjoining properties owned by others. When defendants o r i g i n a l l y purchased t h e i r two adjoining pieces of property i n 1962, road access t o p l a i n t i f f ' s property was accomplished by use of a road running i n a north-south d i r e c t i o n through t h e westerly t r a c t owned by defendants. This road w i l l be referred t o a s t h e "old road". From the outset defendants had advised p l a i n t i f f he did not have access t o h i s property by way of the "old road" through t h e i r property. The record i s replete with testimony of defendants f l a t l y t e l l i n g p l a i n t i f f he could not a v a i l himself of access t o h i s property by way of t h e i r s . In addition, "No res spas sing" signs were placed every few f e e t and a lock was placed on the gate where t h e "old road" entered defendants' westerly t r a c t . It was a t t h i s point t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s began. P l a i n t i f f cut the lock and went on defendants' property. The "NO Tres- passing" signs were e i t h e r broken or torn down by p l a i n t i f f o r h i s son. A t about t h i s time, defendants entered i n t o negotiations with a third. party, one Koessler, t o s e l l t h e i r westerly t r a c t over which the "old road" runs. Deiendants, i n order t o gain access t o t h e i r remaining e a s t e r l y t r a c t , then b u i l t a road running i n a north-south direction across the lower one-third portion of t h e i r remaining easterly t r a c t , s o t h a t it would not be necessary t o use the road on the westerly t r a c t being sold. In the meantime the dispute between p l a i n t i f f and defendants intensified u n t i l on May 1, 1968, the p a r t i e s f i n a l l y entered i n t o a written agreement, the f u l l t e x t of which follows: "I Guy P. Burnett, agree t o l e t Bob Larson go thru m y property i f high water is on h i s entrance road and he cannot g e t thru. This agreement expires July 1, 1968. After t h a t permission must be obtained from new owners t o pass thru property. "/s/ Bob Larson Bob Larson "/s/ Emanuel Rohrbach Witness "/s/ Guy P. Burnett Guy P. Burnett "/s/ Emanuel Rohrbach witness" The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n adjudicating t h i s matter, was unable t o find s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o warrant the establishment of an easement by adverse use. Nevertheless, the d i s t r i c t c o u r t did g r a n t p l a i n t i f f a "non-exclusive" easement upon t h e "new road" over and across t h e lower portion of defendants' e a s t e r l y t r a c t . The judgment f u r t h e r grants p l a i n t i f f a period of one year t o complete construction of a road which would run along the upper two-thirds of defendants e a s t e r l y t r a c t , no road i n t h a t location presently being i n existence. The record a l s o indicates t h a t a t the time p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s property, no road was i n exis- tence along t h e upper two-thirds of defendants' e a s t e r l y t r a c t . O n appeal defendants r a i s e the following issues f o r review: 1. Does adverse use f o r l e s s than t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y period confer any i n t e r e s t upon the p l a i n t i f f ? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r i n admitting o r a l t e s t i - mony t o modify the w r i t t e n agreement dated May 1, 1968? 3 . Did t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r i n finding t h a t t h e w r i t t e n agreement dated May 1, 1968, granted an easement f o r roadway purposes t o p l a i n t i f f ? p l a i n t i f f ' s position is simply tha t t h e evidence submitted a t the t r i a l c l e a r l y supports t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings and judgment. P l a i n t i f f contends defendants bargained with him t o r e l o c a t e the easement and road. He r e l i e d on the bargain, changed h i s position, and gave valuable consideration. P l a i n t i f f f u r t h e r contends t h a t he i s therefore e n t i t l e d t o t h e relocated easement and road, and t o deny him such relocated easement and road, which he bargained f o r , would permit a gross i n j u s t i c e and wrong a t the hands of defendants who t o begin with created the condition. This Court has many times s t a t e d its function on appeal i n a nonjury case i s t o determine whether there i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support the findings of f a c t of the t r i a l court, and we w i l l not reverse such findings of f a c t unless there is a c l e a r preponderance of evidence against such findings . Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48, and cases therein c i t e d ; Smith v. Krutar, 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459. A general picture of the applicable legal precedents t o t h i s controversy appears desirable. It i s well established law in Montana t h a t a party claiming t o have acquired any easement o r -. i n t e r e s t by prescription must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the easement claimed f o r the f u l l statutory period. Scott v. Jardine Gold Min. & M i l l . Co., 79 Mont. 485, 257 P. 406; Cope v. Cope, M o n t . 2 - P.2d , 28 St.Rep. 1120. A n "exclusive'' use means t h a t the claimant's r i g h t t o use the right-of-way is independent of a l i k e right-of-way i n another. Scott v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 374 P.2d 91. Further, any use which i s permissive i n its inception cannot ripen i n t o a prescriptive r i g h t , there has been a d i s t i n c t and positive assertion by the claimant owner o i a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o the owner of the servient lands. Drew v. Burggraf, 141 Mont. 403, 378 P.2d 232. Finally, the presence of gates t h a t must be opened by the user i s generally considered t o be strong evidence of a mere personal license t o pass over the right-of-way. Peasley v. Trosper, 103 Mont. 401., 64 P.2d 109. In Montana, it is equally a s c l e a r t h a t any adverse use for l e s s than the f u l l s t a t u t o r y period of f i v e years can i n no way confer any rights o r i n t e r e s t whatsoever upon the person attempting t o establish such adverse use. Section 93-2507, R.C.M. 1947. This Court i n S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 560, 374 P.2d 91, s t a t e d : "To e s t a b l i s h the existence of an easement by prescription, the party s o claiming must show open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement f o r t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y period. * * * By 'continuous and un- interrupted' use i s meant use not interrupted by t h e a c t of t h e owner of t h e land o r by voluntary abandonment by t h e party claiming the r i g h t . I I (Emphasis supplied) Applying t h e foregoing general p r i n c i p l e s t o the relevant f a c t s here, t h e r e is no evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s determination t h a t p l a i n t i f f did have such i n t e r e s t s o a s t o c o n s t i t u t e v a l i d consideration f o r t h e a l l e g e d t r a n s f e r thereof t o t h e upper two-thirds of defendants' e a s t e r l y t r a c t . The d i s t r i c t court was unable t o find t h a t p l a i n t i f f had i n f a c t obtained an easement by adverse use. Logically it would then follow t h a t p l a i n t i f f acquired no r i g h t t o a t r a n s f e r of a roadway easement when he had nothing t o begin with. To hold otherwise would confer upon a t r e s p a s s e r r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s which would place t h e owner a t a serious disadvantage and i n f r i n g e upon t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s accruing t o land ownership. Indeed, t h e reasoning behind p l a i n t i f t ' s argument would elevate a t r e s p a s s e r on land t o the unfair position of being a b l e t o demand compensation i n r e t u r n f o r a relinquishment of "interest" t h e t r e s p a s s e r had obtained by " p a r t i a l adverse use1', when the use had been f o r a period considerably s h o r t e r than t h e f i v e year required period prescribed by s t a t u t e . W e a r e c e r t a i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e never in- tended such r e s u l t , when enacting our adverse possession s t a t u t e . Our examination of t h e record c l e a r l y reveals t h e per- missive nature of p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o go across defendants' land. A t t h e o u t s e t when p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s property, he was i n no way t o l d by adjoining landowners o r by defendants t h a t he had a right-of-way over defendants' land; i n f a c t , it was only a f t e r p l a i n t i f f had been unsuccessful i n trying t o e s t a b l i s h a right-of- way across the lands o i other adjoining owners t h a t he began h i s attempts t o g e t an easement upon defendants' land. Finally, we hold the d i s t r i c t court erred i n admitting o r a l testimony modifying the written agreement dated May 1, 1968, between the p a r t i e s . A t the t r i a l p l a i n t i f f was allowed t o explain t o the court t h a t t h i s written agreement was intended t o give him access over the easterly t r a c t of defendants' property i n return for a termination of p l a i n t i f f ' s access over the westerly t r a c t , formerly owned by defendants. It is well established law i n Montana t h a t , subject t o c e r t a i n exceptions not pertinent here, written contracts cannot be varied, contradicted, nor a l t e r e d by parol or e x t r i n s i c evi- dence. P r i t c h e t t v. Jenkins, 52 Mont. 81, 155 P. 974; Leigland v. McGaffick, 135 Mont. 188, 338 P.2d 1037; Section 13-907, R.C.M. 1947. Our reading of the written agreement between the p a r t i e s c l e a r l y indicates there was no mistake, impe rfection, or ambiguity which would i n any way require parol testimony t o explain. The i n t e n t of the p a r t i e s i s c l e a r within t h e words of the agreement. Defendants were willing t o permit p l a i n t i f f t o use t h e i r easterly t r a c t Tor two months. After t h a t period of time, p l a i n t i f f no longer hdd access t o the defendants' property. A t best, p l a i n t i f f was granted a temporary permissive easement trom M a y 1, 1968 u n t i l July 1, 1968. In addition, i n conjunction with the question of the inadmissibility of par01 testimony t o vary the terms o t the parties written agreement, we hold the d i s t r i c t court erred i n finding t h a t the terms of the agreement could be interpreted t o grant an easement t o p l a i n t i f f . The d i s t r i c t court i n i t s findings s t a t e s , i n e r f e c t , t h a t the written agreement t o terminate the use of roads applied only t o t h a t piece of property which defendants were s e l l i n g , i . e . the westerly t r a c t , and not t o the road located on the e a s t e r l y t r a c t , s t i l l owned by defendants. Our review of the evidence indicates otherwise. The words "my propertyf' contained in the agreement can have but one reasonable meaning. A t the time of the execution o r the agreement, defendants had already sold t h e i r westerly t r a c t on contract, and they remained only t h e owners of the easterly t r a c t . The 1 1 phrase m y property" plainly and simply means t h a t property re- maining i n the defendants ' hands, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e i r e a s t e r l y t r a c t . Further, the terms of the agreement unequivocally s t a t e the agree- ment expires on July 1, 1968. For the d i s t r i c t court t o have found t h a t p l a i n t i f f had any r i g h t s a f t e r July 1, 1968, ignores the express language of the agreement. Accordingly, we find p l a i n t i i f ' s use t o be permissive i n nature and, since no easement was established by prescription, he had no r i g h t t o t r a n s f e r any easement upon any area of de- fendanti ' property. Judgment is reversed. Associate ~ u s t i c e I \ \ M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles, deeming himself disqualified, U o p a r t i n t h i s Opinion.