Title: Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12082
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: February 14, 2017

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12082 
 
CARDNO CHEMRISK, LLC  vs.  CHERRI FOYTLIN & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2016. - February 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 16, 2014. 
 
 
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Edward P. 
Leibensperger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John H. Reichman, of New York (James E. Grumbach also 
present) for the defendants. 
 
Megan L. Meier, of Virginia (Samuel Perkins also present) 
for the plaintiff. 
 
Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Jeffrey J. Pyle, & Sarah R. Wunsch, 
for American Civil liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Karen Savage. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  On April 20, 2010, an oil rig operated by British 
Petroleum (BP), known as Deepwater Horizon, suffered a 
catastrophic explosion causing approximately 4.9 million barrels 
of oil to flow into the Gulf of Mexico, some forty miles off the 
coast of Louisiana.  Three and one-half years after the oil 
spill, and during the ensuing multidistrict Federal litigation 
in New Orleans regarding BP's liability for it, the defendants, 
both environmental activists, contributed an article appearing 
in the Huffington Post, an Internet Web site.  That article, 
also known as a "blog posting," contained criticism of the 
plaintiff, Cardno ChemRisk, LLC (ChemRisk), a scientific 
consulting firm that BP had retained to assess the toxic effects 
of the oil spill on cleanup workers.  ChemRisk maintains that 
certain of these criticisms constitute actionable defamation. 
 
ChemRisk brought claims for defamation against both 
defendants, in Massachusetts and in New York.2  The defendants 
filed a special motion to dismiss the Massachusetts suit under 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the "anti-SLAPP" statute.  A Superior Court 
judge denied the motion, concluding that insofar as the Internet 
blog posting at issue did not concern or seek to advance the 
defendants' own interests, but rather those of the cleanup 
workers, the defendants had not met their threshold burden of 
                     
 
2 The Huffington Post, at the time, was incorporated in and 
had its principal place of business in New York. 
3 
 
 
showing that the suit was based exclusively on the "exercise of 
[their] right of petition under the [C]onstitution," as that 
phrase has been interpreted in our case law.  G. L. c. 231, 
§ 59H.  We conclude, to the contrary, that the defendants were 
engaged in protected petitioning activity, which was the sole 
basis of the plaintiff's defamation claim, and therefore they 
have met their threshold burden.  On the record before us, the 
plaintiff cannot show, as it must in order to defeat the special 
motion, that such petitioning was devoid of reasonable factual 
support or arguable basis in law.  We accordingly reverse.3 
 
1. 
Background.  The pertinent facts taken from the 
pleadings and affidavits of record are these.4  ChemRisk is a 
scientific consulting company that produces reports and provides 
expert testimony for clients concerning the environmental risks 
of their products.  In one such report, ChemRisk scientists 
examined the extent to which cleanup workers responding to the 
Deepwater Horizon spill had been exposed to the chemicals 
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene (collectively known 
as BTEX).  ChemRisk concluded that such exposure was 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
 
4 See G. L. c. 231, § 59H (in ruling on anti-SLAPP special 
motion, "the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting 
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the 
liability is based"). 
4 
 
 
substantially below permissible limits set by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. 
 
Defendant Cherri Foytlin, a life-long resident of the 
affected region, works full time as an environmental activist.  
Defendant Karen Savage also participates in environmental 
advocacy.  Since the occurrence of the oil spill in 2010, both 
defendants have devoted substantial time to exploring its 
environmental consequences, particularly its effects on cleanup 
workers, and to advocating on behalf of those adversely 
affected.  One of their efforts in this regard was to write a 
piece entitled "ChemRisk, BP and Purple Strategies:  A Tangled 
Web of Not-So-Independent Science" that appeared on the 
Huffington Post's "Green Blog," in which they challenged 
ChemRisk's BTEX report.  The "Green Blog" described itself as 
"[f]eaturing fresh takes and real-time analysis," and the 
article appeared there on October 14, 2013, under the byline 
"Cherri Foytlin, Gulf Coast based author and journalist," along 
with a note that "Karen Savage contributed to this article." 
 
The article begins by discussing then-ongoing Federal 
litigation against BP taking place in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which, among 
other things, BP's experts contested the extent of the damages 
5 
 
 
caused by the spill.5  The article asserts that BP and the 
environmental experts it employs do "not exactly have a 
reputation for coming clean on the facts." 
 
The defendants then discuss ChemRisk's BTEX report as an 
example of BP's experts not "coming clean," referring to the 
study as "independent" and "science" (both in quotation marks).  
The article goes on to claim, in the passage alleged to be 
defamatory, that ChemRisk, in connection with an unrelated 
scientific study unflattering to a different client, had engaged 
in deceptive tactics: 
 
"As it turns out, ChemRisk has a long, and on at least 
one occasion fraudulent, history of defending big polluters 
using questionable ethics to help their clients avoid legal 
responsibility for their actions. 
 
 
"One well known example is the case that became the 
basis for the movie Erin Brokovich, where the polluter and 
defendant Pacific Gas and Electric (PG & E) was found to 
have paid ChemRisk to discredit research done by Chinese 
scientist Dr. Jian Dong Zhang. 
 
 
"In an earlier study, Zhang had found strong links 
between chromium-6, which was found in Hinkley, 
California's drinking water, and cancer.  ChemRisk obtained 
Dr. Zhang's data, and without his knowledge, intentionally 
manipulated the findings to contradict his own earlier 
studies. 
 
 
"The erroneous data was then submitted to the Journal 
of Occupational and Environmental Medicine (JOEM) as though 
it had been re-worked by Dr. Zhang personally."6 
                     
 
5 In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the 
Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, U.S. Dist. Ct., MDL No. 2179 
(E.D. La.). 
 
6 
 
 
 
The article closes by asking whether "anyone will ever . . . 
make [things] right" in the Gulf Coast. 
 
In response to the blog posting, a ChemRisk representative 
wrote by electronic mail to the Huffington Post demanding a 
retraction, and an editor forwarded the message to Foytlin.  She 
responded that she did not believe the piece contained factual 
errors, and it remained posted on the site, where it drew 
comments from readers.  In April, 2014, six months after the 
article appeared, ChemRisk filed a defamation action in a New 
York State court against Foytlin and Savage.  In December, 2014, 
while that case was pending, ChemRisk filed another defamation 
suit, based on the same set of facts, in the Massachusetts 
Superior Court.  After a judge of the New York Supreme Court 
allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, ChemRisk amended its complaint in Massachusetts, 
and engaged in discovery. 
 
In August, 2015, the defendants filed a special motion to 
dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute,7 asserting that the claim 
against them was based solely on their exercise of the right to 
                                                                  
 
6 Other publications had made substantially similar 
allegations.  See note 17, infra. 
 
 
7 Both defendants also moved to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim, and Cherri Foytlin moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  Those motions were denied, and the 
defendants did not appeal from the denials. 
7 
 
 
petition, that they had a reasonable factual basis for their 
statements, and that they caused no injury.  See Duracraft Corp. 
v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 167-168 (1998) 
(Duracraft).  Relying on this court's decision in Fustolo v. 
Hollander, 455 Mass. 861 (2010), the judge determined that 
because the defendants were not seeking to redress a grievance 
of their own, they were not engaged in protected petitioning 
activity.  He therefore denied the motion without reaching the 
questions whether the defendants' statements had a reasonable 
basis in fact or whether they caused actual injury.  The 
defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, see Fabre v. Walton, 
436 Mass. 517, 521-522 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004), and we 
granted their application for direct appellate review.8 
 
2.  Discussion.  ChemRisk contends that the anti-SLAPP 
statute offers the defendants no protection.  Because their 
article did not address a grievance personal to them, ChemRisk 
argues that the defendants were not exercising their right to 
                     
 
8 After the defendants filed their notice of interlocutory 
appeal, they unsuccessfully moved to stay discovery in the 
Superior Court pending appeal; ChemRisk opposed the motion.  The 
defendants complied with the extant discovery order.  Shortly 
after direct appellate review was allowed, and ChemRisk's own 
discovery responses were due, ChemRisk indicated its intention 
voluntarily to dismiss the action pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
41 (a) (2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974).  The defendants opposed the 
dismissal.  The judge subsequently denied ChemRisk's motion, 
reasoning that the defendants' special anti-SLAPP motion seeking 
attorney's fees and costs constituted "for all intent[s] and 
purposes, a counterclaim that remains alive." 
8 
 
 
petition, as required by the statute.  We disagree.  Such a 
constrained view of the right of petition, a right the anti-
SLAPP statute exists to protect, is without basis in the United 
States or Massachusetts Constitution or in our case law. 
 
a.  Statutory background.  The object of a SLAPP9 suit is 
not necessarily to prevail, but rather, through the difficulty 
and expense of litigation, to discourage and intimidate 
individuals from exercising their constitutional right of 
petition.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161.  Although not 
limiting the statute to such cases, the Legislature enacted 
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, primarily to protect "citizens of modest 
means" who speak out against larger, more powerful entities.10  
See id.  The statute allows a defendant who believes he or she 
has been targeted in a SLAPP suit to file a special motion to 
dismiss that suit prior to completing discovery, thereby 
"provid[ing] a quick remedy" against the time and cost of 
otherwise protracted litigation.  Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 
Mass. 327, 331 (2005).  A defendant who prevails on the special 
                     
 
9 SLAPP is an acronym for "strategic lawsuits against public 
participation."  See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 
Mass. 156, 159-160 & n.7 (1998), (Duracraft).  See also G.W. 
Pring & P. Canan, SLAPPs:  Getting Sued for Speaking Out 3 
(1996). 
 
 
10 Foytlin is a mother of six supporting herself with modest 
monthly stipends; she lives in Louisiana less than fifty miles 
from the affected portion of the Gulf Coast shore.  Karen Savage 
is a single mother of four who, at the relevant time, worked as 
a middle school teacher in the Roxbury section of Boston. 
9 
 
 
motion to dismiss is to be awarded attorney's fees and costs.  
See G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
 
The special motion procedure employs a two-stage framework.  
See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168.  First, the special 
movants, here the defendants, must establish that the nonmoving 
party's claim is based solely on the special movant's protected 
petitioning activity.  If the special movant so establishes, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party.  To withstand the special 
motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the special movant's 
petitioning activity was devoid of any reasonable factual or 
legal support and that it caused the nonmoving party actual 
injury.  See Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. 543, 544 (2001); 
Duracraft, supra at 168; G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
 
The anti-SLAPP statute provides protection, by its terms, 
wherever "civil claims . . . against [a] party are based on said 
party's exercise of its right of petition under the 
[C]onstitution of the United States or of the [C]ommonwealth."  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  The statute defines the "exercise of [the] 
right of petition"11 to include 
                     
 
11 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects "the right . . . to petition the [g]overnment for a 
redress of grievances," along with the right to "free exercise" 
of religion, "freedom of speech," freedom "of the press," and 
"the right . . . peaceably to assemble."  Unlike similar 
statutes in other States, the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute 
10 
 
 
"[1] any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
any other governmental proceeding; [2] any written or oral 
statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; [3] 
any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration 
or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or 
judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; [4] any 
statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation 
in an effort to effect such consideration; or [5] any other 
statement falling within constitutional protection of the 
right to petition government." 
 
Id. 
 
While this definition is "very broad," Duracraft, 427 Mass. 
at 162, it has been limited by our construction of the statutory 
phrase "said party's exercise of its right of petition."  G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H (emphasis added).  We have taken this phrase to 
mean that one seeking the protection of the statute must show 
that he or she has "petition[ed] the government on [his or her] 
own behalf . . . in [his or her] status as [a] citizen."  
Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 332.  Put another way, the petitioning at 
issue must be of the kind contemplated by the United States and 
Massachusetts Constitutions.  See id. at 334; Fisher v. Lint, 69 
Mass. App. Ct. 360, 364 (2007).  Thus, to meet the threshold 
burden for its special motion dismiss, the special movant must 
show that its claimed petitioning activity falls within one or 
                                                                  
protects only the "right of petition," G. L. c. 231, § 59H, not 
all First Amendment rights.  See Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 
861 871, n.12 (2010), citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 
2004 & Supp. 2010). 
11 
 
 
more of the five statutorily enumerated categories; that such 
exercise was petitioning in the constitutional sense, i.e., 
undertaken as the exercise of the special movant's right of 
petition; and that it formed the sole basis of the nonmoving 
party's claim. 
 
b.  Defendants' threshold burden.  Thus, in order to 
prevail on the special motion to dismiss, Foytlin and Savage 
must show that the Huffington Post article qualifies as 
petitioning activity within one or more of the statutory 
definitions, that the article was an exercise of their own right 
of petition, and that there was no basis for ChemRisk's 
defamation claim other than the statements in the article.12 
 
i.  Statutory categories.  The Huffington Post blog posting 
falls within at least one of the enumerated definitional 
categories.  It formed part of the defendants' ongoing efforts 
to influence governmental bodies by increasing the amount and 
tenor of coverage around the environmental consequences of the 
spill,13 and it closes with an implicit call for its readers to 
                     
 
12 ChemRisk does not dispute that its complaint is based 
exclusively on the Huffington Post article.  Its single-count 
defamation complaint points only to the four paragraphs quoted 
supra. 
 
 
13 In addition to writing the blog posting at issue, the 
defendants have worked to raise awareness of the consequences of 
the spill by, among other things, marching from New Orleans to 
Washington, D.C.; drafting press releases; meeting with Federal 
officials; and corresponding with Federal agencies such as the 
12 
 
 
take action.  Given this, the article fits squarely within the 
second clause of G. L. c. 231, § 59H:  "any statement reasonably 
likely to enlist public participation." 
 
In addition, it was written against the backdrop of 
multidistrict litigation pending against BP, and referred to 
that litigation and to BP's efforts to limit its liability for 
the spill.  The article noted, specifically, the actions of one 
of BP's experts, ChemRisk.  Given this, it may fit within the 
second clause of G. L. c. 231, § 59H:  "any written . . . 
statement made in connection with an issue under . . . review by 
a . . . judicial body."  This language includes communications 
"closely and rationally related to the [judicial] proceedings,"  
Plante v. Wylie, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 159 (2005), that are 
"made to influence, inform, or at the very least, reach 
[judicial] bodies -- either directly or indirectly" (citation 
omitted).  North American Expositions Co. Ltd. Partnership v. 
Corcoran, 452 Mass. 852, 861 (2009). 
 
ii.  Defendants' exercise of their own right of petition.  
In three cases in our jurisprudence, Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 328, 
Fisher, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 361, and Fustolo, 455 Mass. at 861-
                                                                  
Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and the National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences. 
13 
 
 
862, activities that met at least one of the statutorily 
enumerated categories were nonetheless held not to be protected 
petitioning because such activities were not established to be 
the special movant's exercise of "its [own] right of petition."  
G. L. c. 231, § 59H.  Using the language of Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 
332, in each instance, the special movant was determined not to 
have petitioned on its "own behalf" or in its "status as [a] 
citizen[]."  Each such case involved circumstances not present 
here:  the special movants in those cases spoke in the capacity 
of either a contracted government expert witness, Kobrin, 443 
Mass. at 329; a government employee, Fisher, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 360; or a journalist charged with objectively reporting the 
news, Fustolo, 455 Mass. at 862.  In so doing, they were not 
speaking for themselves, but in a different capacity.  As such, 
they were not exercising their own constitutional right of 
petition, as they must in order to claim protection under the 
statute.  Nothing, however, in the history of the constitutional 
right to petition, or in those cases, suggests that the right of 
petition protected by the anti-SLAPP statute is limited to 
seeking redress of purely personal grievances. 
 
A.  Constitutional history.  The United States Constitution 
protects the right to petition to redress grievances whether 
those grievances be private or public in nature.  "[T]he 
right[] . . . to petition for a redress of grievances [is] among 
14 
 
 
the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of 
Rights."  United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Illinois State 
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).  It has been a fundamental 
aspect of liberty for the better part of 1,000 years:  first to 
petition the King, then Parliament, then the colonial 
Legislatures, and finally the institutions of our own 
government.  See generally Mark, The Vestigial Constitution:  
The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 
Fordham L. Rev. 2153 (1998).  Never in that time has the right 
been confined to petitions seeking to redress grievances that 
are either purely personal or purely public in nature.  See id. 
at 2166-2167, 2182, 2184, 2196, 2207, 2226-2228. 
 
In the first eighty years of this Republic, for example, 
petitions flooded Congress on many topics.  Among the most 
prominent were petitions regarding one matter of personal 
concern -- the payment of individual Revolutionary War 
pensions -- and those regarding one of public concern -- the 
abolition of slavery.  See Higginson, A Short History of the 
Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 
Yale L.J. 142, 158-165 (1986) (discussing abolitionist 
petitions); Keenan, Discretionary Justice:  The Right to 
Petition and the Making of Federal Private Legislation, 53 Harv. 
J. Legis. 563, 585-590 (2016) (discussing war pension 
petitions).  The absolute right to present these petitions 
15 
 
 
regardless of subject matter was never questioned.  See 
Higginson, supra at 159. 
 
B.  Case law.  Our cases recognize that the anti-SLAPP 
statute, like the constitutional right it safeguards, protects 
those looking to "advanc[e] causes in which they believe" 
(citation omitted), Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of 
Carpenters, 467 Mass. 587, 594 (2014), as well as those seeking 
to protect their own private rights.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. 
at 164.  This is so because it is the right of petition as such 
that the statute seeks to protect.  See, e.g., Hanover, 467 
Mass. at 594.  To meet its threshold burden, a party bringing a 
special motion to dismiss must be exercising his or her own 
constitutional right of petition, but need not be the 
beneficiary of the particular cause the party seeks to advance.  
See Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 332 n.8. 
 
In this light, we have held that the statute protects 
nonself-interested petitioning on behalf of the environment, 
much like the petitioning at issue here.  See Baker, 434 Mass. 
at 545-546 (biologist spoke to Federal and State agencies 
expressing her opinion that island in Plymouth Bay provided 
vital bird habitat and her hope that government agencies would 
protect site).  The Baker decision finds support in the fact 
that, as this court previously has acknowledged, the Legislature 
enacted the anti-SLAPP statute with antidevelopment activists in 
16 
 
 
mind, many of whom were focused on protecting natural 
resources.14  See Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 336, 337 n.11; Duracraft, 
427 Mass. at 161.  The decisions in Kobrin, Fisher, and Fustolo 
are not to the contrary. 
 
In Kobrin, 443 Mass. at 332 n.8, 340, we drew a distinction 
between people who engaged in petitioning activity "in their own 
right" and the defendant in that case, whom we classified as 
simply a "vendor[] of services."  One in the latter group does 
not exercise "its right to petition" (emphasis supplied).  G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H.  While holding that an expert witness retained to 
investigate and testify on behalf of the government could not 
claim the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, the court in 
Kobrin reiterated the principle that petitioners need not act in 
their own self-interest.  See id. at 339-340 (reaffirming 
holding in Baker despite those defendants' lack of personal 
stake).  The defendant in Kobrin fell outside the ambit of the 
statute because he was not exercising his own constitutional 
right, but instead had entered into a "mere[ly] contractual" 
relationship to vend his skills and knowledge to the government.  
Id. at 338.  The defendants here, far from having a "merely 
                     
 
14 The catalyst for the introduction of the anti-SLAPP 
legislation was an incident in 1991 in which a developer sued 
several residents of Rehoboth, who had engaged in petitioning 
activity concerning the developer's effects on wetlands that 
drained into the Palmer River.  See Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 161.  
The residents incurred more than $30,000 in legal fees prior to 
the suit's dismissal nine months later.  Id. 
17 
 
 
contractual" commitment to Gulf Coast cleanup, have the same 
type of independent interest in their cause that the Baker 
defendants did. 
 
In Fisher, the Appeals Court applied the reasoning of 
Kobrin to another case involving a witness speaking in his 
capacity as an employee of the government.  There, the court 
held that a police officer, ordered to investigate a fellow 
officer for an internal affairs hearing, was simply carrying out 
the duties of his job -- duties specifically assigned to him by 
his superior -- rather than exercising any constitutional right 
of his own.  See Fisher, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 364-365. 
 
Fustolo, on which the plaintiff places particular reliance, 
extends the logic of Kobrin and Fisher to a journalist carrying 
out a specific assignment.  In so doing, she, too, was not 
seeking to redress a grievance "of [her] own."  Fustolo, 455 
Mass. at 867.  The staff reporter in question in that case 
worked for a local newspaper, and was sued for defamation for 
reporting on proposed development projects at local properties 
owned by Fustolo.  The reporter was employed to write, and did 
write, impartial news articles, despite having personal views on 
the same subjects.  See id. at 862.  As we explained, the 
reporter 
"expressly stated in her affidavit that in writing all her 
articles, she was 'always careful to present an objective 
description of the subject matter, including the positions 
18 
 
 
of both sides where applicable,' and that while she had 
personal views on the issues she covered, 'they were not 
reflected in the articles [she] wrote.'" 
 
Id. at 867.  This objectivity was pivotal to the decision 
insofar as the reporter was not exercising her own 
constitutional right to petition when authoring the challenged 
articles.  See id. 
 
c.  Reasonable basis in fact.  Because they expressed their 
own opinions, speaking for themselves and at their own behest, 
Foytlin and Savage have established that they exercised their 
own right to petition when they wrote the article at issue.  
Having satisfied their threshold burden, the burden shifts to 
the nonmoving party, here ChemRisk, who, to defeat the special 
motion to dismiss, must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the allegations in the blog posting were devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law.15  See G. L. 
c. 231, § 59H.  It has not done so, having provided minimal 
evidence that the defendants lacked a reasonable basis in fact 
for the challenged statements.16 
                     
 
15 Although the motion judge did not perform this analysis, 
we reach the question because "only one conclusion is possible 
on this record."  See Adams v. Whitman, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 850, 
858 (2005). 
 
 
16 ChemRisk attached to its unverified complaint a letter 
apparently from Dr. Jian Dong Zhang, the author of the study 
that was the subject of the allegedly defamatory statements, 
suggesting that he agreed with ChemRisk's later analysis.  Given 
the defendants' verified submissions to the contrary, that 
19 
 
 
 
Foytlin and Savage, by contrast, offered verified support 
for their special motion to dismiss, each detailing in 
affidavits the basis for the challenged statements.  Foytlin, 
for example, referenced in and attached to her affidavit a 
series of articles appearing in scholarly journals and reputable 
newspapers, and other Internet blog postings.  These articles 
and blog postings provide factual support for the defendants' 
characterizations of ChemRisk's practices, and also contain 
assertions similar to those made by the defendants concerning 
those practices.17  Foytlin further averred that the journal that 
                                                                  
letter fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the challenged statements were "devoid of any reasonable 
factual support."  G. L. c. 231, § 59H. 
 
 
17 See Heath, Center for Public Integrity, How Industry 
Scientists Stalled Action on Carcinogen (Mar. 13, 2013); 
Egilman, Commentary:  Corporate Corruption of Science -- The 
Case of Chromium(VI), 12 Int'l J. Occup. Envtl. Health 169 
(2006); Waldman, Medical Journal to Retract Study:  Firm's 
Consultants Conducted Research, not Chinese Doctors, Wall St. J. 
(June 6, 2006); Waldman, Study Tied Pollutant to Cancer; Then 
Consultants Got Hold of It:  "Clarification" of Chinese Study 
Absolved Chromium-6; Did Author Really Write It?, Wall St. J. 
(Dec. 23, 2005); Chrome-Plated Fraud: The ChemRisk Documents, 
Environmental Working Group (Dec. 23, 2005), http://www.ewg. 
org/research/chrome-plated-fraud [https://perma.cc/B7WT-A9PW]; 
Michaels, A Chrome-Plated Controversy, The Pump Handle (Dec. 7, 
2006), https://thepumphandle.wordpress.com/2006/ 
12/07/a-chrome-plated-controversy [https://perma.cc/3EPD-D84M].  
See also Roe & Callahan, "Flat-out Deceptive": Distortion of 
Science Helped Industry Promote Flame Retardants, Downplay the 
Health Risks, Chicago Tribune (May 9, 2012) (Pulitzer Prize-
nominated article accusing ChemRisk of distorting different 
study on behalf of clients); Lane, Weakened Rules a Boon to 3 
Polluters:  Work of Scientist Paid by the Firms Viewed 
20 
 
 
had published the ChemRisk study, criticized by the defendants 
in their Huffington Post piece, later retracted the article.  
Given ChemRisk's failure to offer evidence that would establish 
the absence of any reasonable factual support for the challenged 
statements, it cannot withstand the defendants' special motion 
to dismiss ChemRisk's defamation suit brought against them.  
That motion must be allowed. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The denial of the special motion to 
dismiss is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion 
and for the award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  The 
defendants also may file an appropriate application for 
appellate fees and costs in this court, pursuant to Fabre v. 
Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10 (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                  
Skeptically by Other Experts, Newark Star-Ledger (Mar. 7, 2004) 
(reporting on ChemRisk's chromium research in other contexts).