Title: State v. Schwensen
Citation: 237 Or. 506, 392 P.2d 328
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: May 20, 1964

Reversed and remanded May 20, 1964.
*508 Carl R. Neil and Charles V. Elliott, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for the appellant.
Oscar D. Howlett, Portland, specially appointed counsel, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George Van Hoomissen, District Attorney, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN and LUSK, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PERRY, J.
The defendant was convicted of a felony-murder, constituting murder in the first degree. The verdict did not contain any recommendation as to the sentence to be imposed and, pursuant to lawful requirement, the death penalty was imposed. From the judgment entered the defendant has appealed.
Mrs. Jean R. Bussey resided in Portland with her husband. She was 29 years of age and the mother of a child four or five years of age. On September 15, 1961, Mr. Bussey left Portland for Ilwaco, Washington, expecting to return in his boat on Monday, the *509 18th, which he did. On Sunday, September 17, Mrs. Bussey went to the family's houseboat and did considerable cleaning therein. She remarked to a neighbor at that time that she did not feel very well. At about 7 o'clock that evening Mrs. Bussey left her son with her mother and went to a movie, expecting to return and pick up her son the following morning about 10:30 a.m. About 11:00 p.m. on this 17th day of September, Mrs. Bussey arrived at Carmens Cactus Room, a bar located on N.E. Sandy boulevard and 39th avenue in Portland. Mrs. Bussey had been in the bar on other occasions, either alone or with other women, and was known to the bartender.
On this evening, Mrs. Bussey sat alone at the bar and ordered "VO" and water. About 11:30 p.m. the defendant entered the bar and ordered "Scotch on the rocks." He also had been at this bar on other occasions and was known to the bartender. The defendant and Mrs. Bussey engaged in conversation, and the bartender estimated that before they departed from the Cactus Room at approximately 2:45 a.m. Mrs. Bussey had consumed four or five drinks and the defendant ten to twelve. The defendant in his statements to the police made an estimate of four to seven drinks by Mrs. Bussey and ten or eleven by himself. Mrs. Bussey offered the defendant a ride home from the Cactus Room and the two left the bar together.
Mrs. Bussey did not return to pick up her son the next morning and a search for her whereabouts was commenced by her relatives and the police. On Monday, September 25, 1961, a policeman discovered the Bussey car parked at S.E. 53rd street and Belmont street in Portland. The body of Mrs. Bussey was discovered in the car in a kneeling position on the *510 passenger side. Her face was on the cushion and her knees on the floor. One of her shoes was under the footbrake and on the floorboard was Mrs. Bussey's glasses. Her dress was up about the middle of her thighs, her outer coat was buttoned once, but the button was not in the proper corresponding buttonhole.
After photographs were taken, the body was taken to the city morgue for the purpose of an autopsy. Dr. W.L. Lehman performed the autopsy. His report and his testimony discloses the following further information as to the condition of the clothes worn by the deceased.
It was determined the blood alcohol in the body was .12 grams per 100 milliliters of whole blood at the time of autopsy, and Dr. Lehman in his report states "it is entirely likely that the level immediately prior to death was much higher." He also stated in his report that "[t]he right ventricle, opened under water, carries a significant amount of air, which may be due entirely to decomposition of the blood and this will be investigated later."
*511 On September 25, 1961, Dr. Lehman reached no conclusion as to the cause of death, but returned to the morgue on September 27, 1961, and made a further examination, reporting as follows:
*512 Dr. Lehman then concluded:
*513 Called as a witness, Dr. Lehman testified that in performing his autopsy he found lacerations and bruises in both the vaginal wall and rectum. That, without removing the heart from the body, he punctured the right ventricle of the heart and he saw "at least two large bubbles and possibly a third small one, but at least two large ones which were huge bubbles which came out of the opening in the heart in a rounded bubbly mass." He further testified as follows:
Thereafter he testified as follows:
Dr. Lehman then testified:
Dr. Lehman also testified that the injuries to the vaginal vault "altho minor are purely sufficient for the development of intake of air."
Dr. Joseph Beeman, a pathologist, in answer to a hypothetical question, containing these words: "multiple tears of the vagina and rectum," testified that in his opinion Mrs. Bussey's death was due to an air embolism. He further testified that in his opinion, due to the laceration of the vagina and also the rectum, the air embolism could have been caused either by rape or pederasty.
*516 The defendant made several statements to the police officers. In two of these he admitted having sexual intercourse with the deceased.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal based upon the failure of the state to establish the fact that the rape was the cause of the air embolism which resulted in the death. The overruling of this motion is assigned as error.
The state's case for murder in the first degree rests upon establishing that the deceased was killed by the defendant in perpetrating the crime of rape upon her.
1. The "* * * proximate relationship or connection between the assault and death must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 Warren on Homicide, perm ed, 285, § 277.
2. "Something more than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is necessary. It must appear that there was such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime committed or attempted that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it." 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson) 544, § 252.
3. It seems, therefore, to be well-established that to sustain a conviction for felony-murder the causal connection between the commission of the felony and the death must be clearly established. State v. Opher, 38 Del 93, 188 A 257; People v. Brengard, 265 NY 100, 191 NE 850; State v. Rounds, 104 Vt 442, 160 A 249; State v. Diebold, 152 Wash 68, 277 P 394.
4, 5. As stated by the court in State v. Rounds, supra, 104 Vt 442, 457, 160 A 249, 254:
and as stated by the court in People v. Brengard, supra, 265 NY 100, 108:
In a civil case, where the evidence required need only preponderate in favor of a party to sustain a civil verdict, we have said expert testimony as to a possibility of causal relation between a physical injury and injury or death is by itself insufficient to establish such relation. Henderson v. U.P.R.R. Co., 189 Or 145, 161, 219 P2d 170.
In the matter before us, the causal connection between the act of rape and death of the deceased rests upon the establishment of these facts: (1) that the vagina or rectum was ruptured in the act of establishing or during intercourse so that air entered the veins; (2) and reached the heart thus causing death.
There can be no question but that when Dr. Lehman punctured the right ventricle of the heart either air or gas, formed from decomposition of the blood, *518 came out. The serious question presented by the defendant's contention, that an air embolism was not established, is that no one can know with reasonable certainty whether it was air or gas that escaped from the heart.
Dr. Lehman satisfied himself that this was air and not a gas "by making numerous cuts in all organs. The liver is cut many, many times. The soft tissues, the fat and the muscles and so on are carefully searched and one listens for the crackling noises which is characteristic of gas." He did not make any analysis of the blood as to the state of decomposition, nor did he analyze that which escaped from the heart.
Dr. Charles P. Larson, a pathologist who appeared on behalf of the defendant, testified that in case of doubt as to whether air or gas exists in the heart post-mortem, the gas or air can be analyzed to establish the fact. He also testified:
There is no evidence that disputes Dr. Larson's statement, that an air embolism can be determined with reasonable certainty by the methods he outlines.
Dr. Lehman based his opinion upon his personal examination of the conditions he found in the vagina and rectum as sufficient to permit air into some vein, and the lack of formation of gas in the other organs of the body.
The substance of Dr. Larson's testimony is that the method used by Dr. Lehman would not establish the fact as to the substance.
While Dr. Larson's approach to the matter seems more plausible to us and would, in our opinion, more clearly prove or disprove the issue to be resolved, since we are not experts in this field, we cannot say with any degree of certainty that Dr. Lehman's examination and tests will not within the realm of possibility establish the fact. To disregard the opinion of Dr. Lehman, we would be required to hold that his method of determining air or gas in the heart was beyond the realm of good pathological practice, and this we cannot do.
6. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a directed verdict.
During the course of the trial the state introduced into evidence over the objection of the defendant a statement made by the defendant while in custody.
This statement contradicts a former statement. In the former statement the defendant had stated that the act of sexual intercourse was with the consent of the deceased. In the latter statement, the one objected *520 to by the defendant, he stated that he had sexual intercourse, not with her consent, but after she had "passed out or fainted."
As to this latter statement, the officer testified, because he did not believe the former statement of the defendant, that he gave the defendant a "sales pitch" to clear the good name of Mrs. Bussey:
The officer also recalled on cross-examination that he had told the defendant that "Ted Bussey had a record for having killed a man."
The officer was also asked: "* * * did you tell Richard Schwensen that this probably wasn't going to result in a murder charge anyway?" and he answered: *521 "That was my impression at the time. * * * I didn't think he was going to be charged."
It is quite clear from the record and the evidence above quoted, since the defendant had previously made the statement that Mrs. Bussey had been drinking with him and had consented to sexual intercourse, that the defendant could believe Mr. Bussey would reason that the information concerning these acts as carried in the newspapers originated with him and that Mr. Bussey would be as incensed at him as he was at the newspapers. Then when he was told by the officer that Mr. Bussey was angry and that he had killed a man, there would immediately arise in defendant's or any reasonable mind the thought of personal danger if some action was not taken. The only action defendant could take to avoid this danger was to change his previous statement and say Mrs. Bussey was not intoxicated and that she did not consent to the sexual act.
While the danger would not be as immediate, the officer's statement would lie in the same category as a statement that a mob would lynch a prisoner if he did not recant.
It would also appear from the officer's testimony, he held out to the defendant the false hope that if he changed his previous statement he would not be charged with murder, but only with rape.
7. The officer does not state unequivocally, in answer to the question, that he did tell the defendant there would not be a murder charge, but his answer is open to that interpretation. But whether or not we interpret the officer's answer as an admission that he held out this false hope to the defendant, we are convinced that a threat was used in obtaining the confession and it was error to permit its introduction as evidence.
*522 The statement offered in evidence was an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime of rape. The crime of felony-murder could not be established without proof of this crime.
8. While an admission of the commission of a felony, if death ensues, is not an acknowledgment of the crime of murder, it is such a necessary ingredient of the crime that in our opinion it should be governed by the same rule of law that governs confessions which are "actually or practically an acknowledgment of guilt."
9. The rule is well-established in this state that a confession of guilt is prima facie involuntary, and, therefore, a burden is placed upon the state to show that it was voluntarily made without the inducement of either fear or hope. State v. Nunn, 212 Or 546, 552, 321 P2d 356; State v. Henderson, 182 Or 147, 184 P2d 392, 186 P2d 519; State v. Linn, 179 Or 499, 173 P2d 305; State v. Howard, 102 Or 431, 203 P 311.
10. We have also stated that a trial court's preliminary finding on conflicting evidence that a confession was given voluntarily will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear that error was committed. But where there is no dispute as to the evidence, the question of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is a legal matter to be reviewed. State v. Nunn, supra; State v. Linn, supra; State v. Green, 128 Or 49, 273 P 381; State v. Garrison, 59 Or 440, 117 P 657.
There is no conflict in the evidence as to what occurred in obtaining the confession. State v. Ely, 237 Or 329, 390 P2d 348; State v. Garrison, supra.
11. The defendant also assigns as error the trial *523 court's failure to give his requested instruction, which is as follows:
The trial court instructed that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant * * * killed one * * * while in the commission of or attempt to commit rape. * * *"
In general, the trial court's instruction is a correct statement of the law, but under the facts of this case it was error to fail to limit the jury's consideration of the cause of death to an air embolism produced by the rape or attempted rape of the victim.
We previously have pointed out that in felony-murder the causal connection between the felony and the death must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
It will be noted that Dr. Lehman in his autopsy report stated that "asphyxiation deserves strong consideration as an additional" cause of death. This was the only intimation in the record of death by asphyxiation, and no witness testified this was the cause of death.
*524 12. The autopsy report was admitted on an offer by the defendant for purposes of impeachment and had no probative effect as evidence. State of Oregon v. Watts, 208 Or 407, 301 P2d 1035; Schluter v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 124 Or 560, 264 P 859; State v. Jarvis, 18 Or 360, 23 P 251; 133 ALR 1454.
The prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury stated:
Also, he referred to Dr. Lehman's autopsy report as follows:
The only cause of death shown by the evidence to be connected with the crime of rape was the lacerations of the vagina and rectum.
While no objection was made by the defendant to the state's argument, the requested instruction would have limited the jury's consideration to the evidence which was relevant to establish proof of the crime, and thus prevent the return of a verdict based upon speculation and conjecture.
In our opinion, it was error to fail to give the defendant's requested instruction.
13. The indictment under which the defendant was charged, so far as is material, is as follows:
To this indictment the defendant demurred. Error is assigned in the trial court's refusal to sustain the demurrer.
*526 The defendant's argument seems to be based upon the contention that if the cause of death is known to the grand jury and is not set forth in the indictment, then a demurrer thereto will lie.
This court has stated on numerous occasions that if the cause of death is unknown to the grand jury and it is so stated in the indictment, the indictment complies with the requirements of the constitution and statutes in stating a crime. State v. Sack, 210 Or 552, 300 P2d 427.
There is no merit in this assignment of error.
The defendant alleges numerous other assignments of error, but since it does not appear likely that they could reoccur on a retrial we will not comment upon them.
The judgment is reversed and remanded.