Title: SAI Montgomery BCH, LLC v. Williams
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1180220
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: October 18, 2019

REL: October 18, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
_________________________
1180220
_________________________
SAI Montgomery BCH, LLC, d/b/a Classic Cadillac, and
Andrew Harper
v. 
Donald Williams and Mary E. Williams
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-18-900898)
STEWART, Justice.
SAI 
Montgomery 
BCH, 
LLC, 
d/b/a 
Classic 
Cadillac 
("Cadillac"), and Andrew Harper, general manager for Cadillac
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Cadillac
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defendants"), appeal from an order of the Montgomery Circuit
Court ("the trial court") denying their motions to compel
arbitration. Because we conclude that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to enter the order appealed from, we
dismiss the appeal.
Facts and Procedural History
In December 2016, Mary E. Williams leased and took
possession of a 2017 Cadillac XT5 automobile ("the XT5") from
Cadillac. Cadillac required Donald Williams, Mary's husband,
to cosign and provide his financial information as a
prerequisite to approving financing for the XT5. Donald and
Mary both executed the lease agreement, which contained an
arbitration 
agreement. 
In 
mid-January 
2017, 
Cadillac 
contacted
Donald requesting additional financial information, which
Donald provided. The day after Donald provided the requested
information, Cadillac left a message for Mary to return to
Cadillac's dealership with the XT5 on January 23, 2017. The
Williamses did not go to Cadillac's dealership as requested
and did not have any further contact directly with Cadillac.
The Williamses had submitted two lease payments. On January
26, 2017, Mary was contacted by a private investigator working
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for Cadillac who was attempting to locate the XT5. On January
27, 2017, Mary filed a consumer complaint against Cadillac
with the State of Alabama's Attorney General's Office. On
January 30, 2017, the Williamses complied with a request from
local law enforcement to come to the police station. The
Williamses provided copies of the bill of sale, tag receipt,
and leasing information for the XT5. The following day, law
enforcement seized the XT5. On February 1, 2017, the
Williamses arranged a meeting with law enforcement, but both
Donald and Mary were arrested for theft of property when they
arrived at the police station. A grand jury ultimately refused
to return an indictment on the charges. 
On May 15, 2018, the Williamses sued the Cadillac
defendants and fictitiously named defendants, asserting
against 
the 
Cadillac 
defendants 
claims 
of 
malicious
prosecution, slander, defamation, abuse of process, and
conversion and against Cadillac wanton hiring, training,
and/or supervision. On June 15, 2018, Cadillac filed a motion
seeking to compel arbitration and to stay the trial-court
proceedings, supported with an affidavit from Harper. On July
2, 2018, Harper, after being served, likewise filed a motion
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seeking to compel arbitration and to stay the trial-court
proceedings, expressly adopting and incorporating Cadillac's
previously filed motion. On July 5, 2018, the trial court
entered an order granting Cadillac's motion to compel
arbitration and to stay the proceedings.
On July 17, 2018, the Williamses filed a motion seeking
to vacate the July 5, 2018, order compelling arbitration. In
their motion, the Williamses identified the motion as being
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and
complained that they had not been notified that the case had
been reassigned to another judge.1 On October 11, 2018, the
trial court entered an order setting an October 30 hearing on
all pending motions. On October 23, 2018, the Williamses filed
a response in opposition to the Cadillac defendants' motions
to compel arbitration. The Cadillac defendants filed a reply
in which they asserted, among other things, that the
Williamses' July 17 motion had been denied by operation of law
1The 
case-action-summary sheet 
indicates 
that 
the 
case 
was
initially assigned to Judge Roman Shaul, who in June 2018 left
the bench to become General Counsel for the Alabama State Bar
Association. The order granting Cadillac's motion to compel
arbitration was entered by 
the presiding circuit judge, Johnny
Hardwick. On October 4, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge
Jimmy Pool. 
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pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., and that the trial
court was without jurisdiction to rule on the Williamses'
postjudgment motion.
On November 13, 2018, the trial court entered an order
purporting to deny the Cadillac defendants' motions to compel
arbitration.  On December 6, 2018, the Cadillac defendants
timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 
Discussion
The Cadillac defendants appeal from the November 13,
2018, order purporting to deny their motions to compel
arbitration. See Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P. ("An order
granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration is
appealable as a matter of right ...."). See also Bowater, Inc.
v. Zager, 901 So. 2d 658, 667 (Ala. 2004). As a threshold
matter, however, we must first determine whether the trial
court had jurisdiction to enter the order from which the
Cadillac defendants have appealed because "a void order or
judgment will not support an appeal." Gallagher Bassett
Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 991 So. 2d 697, 701 (Ala. 2008). 2
2We recognize that this Court has held that a mandamus
petition is the proper method for review of a trial court's
order entered after a postjudgment motion has been denied by
operation of law. See Ex parte Chmielewski, [Ms. 1171089, Dec.
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The Cadillac defendants argue that the Williamses' July
17, 2018, postjudgment motion was actually filed pursuant to
Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., not Rule 60(b), and, thus, that the
90-day time limitation imposed by Rule 59.1 operated to deny
the Williamses' motion by operation of law on October 15,
2018. As a result, the Cadillac defendants assert, the trial
court was without jurisdiction to enter the order on November
13, 2018, purporting to deny the Cadillac defendants' motions
to compel arbitration.
The Williamses argue that their motion was filed pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) and, that, therefore, it was not subject to
denial by operation of law under Rule 59.1.3  Rule 59(e)
permits a party to file a motion to alter, amend, or vacate a
judgment within 30 days of the entry of the judgment. It is
well settled that this Court looks to the essence of a motion
21, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2018). This appeal,
however, concerns an order purportedly denying motions to
compel arbitration, which is properly reviewable by appeal,
see Bowater, 901 So. 2d at 667.
3The 
Williamses further 
assert 
that, 
because 
review 
of 
the
grant of a Rule 60(b) motion is by a petition for a writ of
mandamus, the Cadillac defendants are precluded from raising
their arguments on appeal. The Cadillac defendants, however,
are appealing from an order purporting to deny their motions
to compel arbitration -– not from an order purporting to grant
a Rule 60(b) motion.
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and not to its title to determine how the motion is to be
considered under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Ex
parte Johnson, 715 So. 2d 783, 785–86 (Ala. 1998).  This Court
has held on several occasions that a motion filed within 30
days of the entry of a judgment seeking relief that is
available under Rule 59(e) should be treated as a Rule 59(e)
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, regardless of
how the motion is denominated. Id. See Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen.
Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1996); Sexton v. Prisock, 495
So. 2d 581 (Ala. 1986); Holt v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile,
372 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1979). Further this Court has repeatedly
construed a "motion to reconsider" a judgment, when it has
been filed within 30 days after the entry of a final judgment,
as a Rule 59(e) motion. Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23 (Ala.
1997). A Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment cannot be
substituted for a Rule 59 motion so as to avoid the operation
of Rule 59.1. See Matkin v. Smith, 531 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1988);
Ingram v. Pollock, 557 So. 2d 1199 (Ala. 1989).
Rule 60(b)(6) permits a trial court to relieve a party
from a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment."
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"The 'catch all' provision of clause (6) of Rule
60(b) allows a trial court to grant relief from a
judgment for 'any other reason justifying relief.'
Barnett v. Ivey, 559 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Ala. 1990).
'"Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for
extraordinary circumstances, and is available only
in cases of extreme hardship or injustice."'
Chambers County Comm'rs v. Walker, 459 So. 2d 861,
866 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Douglass v. Capital City
Church of the Nazarene, 443 So. 2d 917, 920 (Ala.
1983))." 
R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison, 641 So. 2d 225, 229 (Ala. 1994).
This Court has further explained:
"[U]nder Rule 60(b)(6), relief is granted only in
those extraordinary and compelling circumstances
when the party can show the court sufficient
equitable grounds to entitle him to relief, but
relief should not be granted to a party who has
failed to do everything reasonably within his power
to achieve a favorable result before the judgment
becomes final; otherwise, a motion for such relief
from a final judgment would likely become a mere
substitute for appeal and would subvert the
principle of finality of judgments."
Patterson v. Hays, 623 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Ala. 1993).
The Williamses argue on appeal that their motion
"centered on the manifest injustice resulting from the grant
of a dispositive motion without giving the non-moving party an
opportunity to be heard on the motion," which, they assert,
"falls squarely within the parameters of Rule 60(b)."
(Williamses' brief at 25-26.)
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The Williamses' postjudgment motion asserted as grounds
for relief that they had not received notice that the case had
been reassigned to another judge, that they did not know the
trial court was going to rule on the motion to compel, that
they were waiting for the trial court to set a date for them
to respond to the motion, and that they had meritorious
arguments, and they requested an opportunity to file a
response in opposition to the motions to compel arbitration.
The Williamses never alleged that they did not have notice of
the motions or otherwise allege the existence of a manifest
injustice. Their assertions amount to a request for the trial
court to vacate the order compelling arbitration because the
trial court entered the order while they were waiting for the
trial court to give them a deadline by which to respond to the
Cadillac defendants' motions to compel arbitration.4 The
Williamses did not allege any facts to support the
"extraordinary relief" envisioned by a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Accordingly, because the Williamses' motion was filed within
4Whether the trial court improperly entered the July 5,
2018, order compelling arbitration is not an issue before this
Court because the Williamses did not appeal from that order.
To seek further review of the decision to compel arbitration,
the Williamses were required to file a notice of appeal within
42 days of October 15, 2018.
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30 days of the entry of the judgment and sought grounds for
relief appropriate under Rule 59(e), rather than Rule
60(b)(6), we construe the Williamses' motion as a Rule 59(e)
motion. Johnson, 715 So. 2d at 786 (explaining that construing
a Rule 59 motion as a Rule 60(b) motion "for the purpose of
avoiding the operation of Rule 59.1 ... would run afoul of the
intent of the Rules by substantially nullifying Rule 59.1 and
rendering the provisions of Rule 59 uncertain").
The Williamses also argue that, even if this Court
considered their motion as having been filed pursuant to Rule
59, the July 5, 2018, order granted only Cadillac's, not
Harper's, motion to compel arbitration, and, therefore, they
argue, the trial court retained jurisdiction to dispose of
Harper's motion to compel arbitration. Although the July 5
order does not specifically refer to Harper's motion, the
order compels arbitration and stays the proceedings; the order
does not stay the proceedings only as to Cadillac, and
Harper's motion consists of one paragraph adopting and
incorporating Cadillac's motion. 
At this stage in the proceedings, Harper is undisputedly
an agent of Cadillac. Under a long line of cases, this Court
has explained that an agent "'stands in the shoes' of his
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principal" and is covered under the terms of his principal's
arbitration agreement. Monsanto Co. v. Benton Farm, 813 So. 2d
867, 874 (Ala. 2001)(citing Ex parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250, 251
(Ala. 1996), McDougle v. Silvernell, 738 So. 2d 806 (Ala.
1999), Ex parte Isbell, 708 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 1997), and
Georgia Power Co. v. Partin 727 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1998)). In
Monsanto, this Court reversed a trial court's order denying an
agent-employee's motion to compel arbitration. We explained
that "the trial court ha[d] already ordered the plaintiffs to
arbitrate their claims against [the principal-employer], and
the plaintiffs did not appeal that order," and that
"[o]rdering [the principal's] agent to a trial on the same
facts and legal theories would be anomalous." 813 So. 2d at
874. Similarly, here, the trial court ordered the Williamses
to arbitrate their claims against Cadillac. "We presume that
trial court judges know and follow the law." Ex parte Atchley,
936 So. 2d 513, 516 (Ala. 2006) (citing Ex parte Slaton, 680
So. 2d 909, 924 (Ala. 1996)). Therefore, we presume that the
trial court knew that, by ordering the Williamses to arbitrate
their claims against Cadillac, the Williamses would be
required to arbitrate their claims against its agent, Harper.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we construe the July 5
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order as granting the motions of both Cadillac and Harper,
Cadillac's agent, to compel arbitration and to stay the
proceedings. See, e.g., Boykin v. Law, 946 So. 2d 838, 848
(Ala. 2006)(explaining that, when construing a trial court's
judgment, this Court is "free to review 'all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the judgment,' and 'the entire
judgment ... should be read as a whole in the light of all the
circumstances as well as of the conduct of the parties'"
(quoting Hanson v. Hearn, 521 So. 2d 953, 955 (Ala. 1988))). 
Because the Williamses' July 17, 2018, postjudgment
motion was filed pursuant to Rule 59, the 90-day time limit
imposed by Rule 59.1 was in effect and the Williamses' motion
was denied by operation of law on October 15, 2018. At that
point, the order compelling arbitration became final and
appealable. The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
modify that order. As this Court has explained, "an order
granting or denying arbitration is [not] interlocutory in the
sense that it remains 'within the breast of the court' subject
to revision at any time before final judgment, because it is
now established that unless an appeal is timely taken from the
order, the order is final." Bowater, 901 So. 2d at 666;
Alabama Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. Lazenby, [Ms. 1170856,
12
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June 21, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2019)(explaining that
a "'failure to take an appeal from [an order granting or
denying a motion to compel arbitration] within the 42–day time
period forecloses later appellate review'" (quoting Bowater,
901 So. 2d at 664)). See also Honea v. Raymond James Fin.
Servs., Inc., 240 So. 3d 550, 558 (Ala. 2017)("When a
postjudgment motion is denied by operation of law, the trial
court 'is "without jurisdiction to enter any further order in
[the] case after that date."'" (quoting Ex parte Limerick, 66
So. 3d 755, 757 (Ala. 2011), quoting in turn Ex parte
Davidson, 782 So. 2d 237, 241 (Ala. 2000))).
Accordingly, because the trial court, on October 15,
2018, lost jurisdiction to modify the order compelling
arbitration, the November 13, 2018, order purporting to deny
the Cadillac defendants' motions to compel arbitration is
void. "'Any order entered after the trial court loses
jurisdiction is void.'" Honea, 240 So. 3d at 558 (quoting
Limerick, 66 So. 3d at 757). See also Ex parte Jackson Hosp.
& Clinic, Inc., 49 So. 3d 1210, 1212 (Ala. 2010) ("The trial
court's order was void because it lost jurisdiction after the
running of the 90–day period prescribed by Rule 59.1."). "[A]
void order will not support an appeal." Beam v. Taylor, 149
13
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So. 3d 571, 577 (Ala. 2014). Accordingly, we must dismiss the
appeal.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, and Sellers, JJ., concur.
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