Title: State v. Cash
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 104180
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 14, 2011

1 
 
 
 
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,180 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOSHUA CASH, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Notwithstanding the overlap in the parole eligibility rules contained in K.S.A. 
2008 Supp. 22-3717(b)(2) and (b)(5), an inmate sentenced to an off-grid, indeterminate 
hard-25 life sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643 shall not be eligible for parole until that 
inmate has served the mandatory 25 years in prison. 
 
2. 
An inmate who has received an off-grid indeterminate life sentence can leave 
prison only if the successor to the Kansas Parole Board grants the inmate parole. 
Therefore, a sentencing court has no authority to order a term of postrelease supervision 
in conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence.  
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; THOMAS L. BOEDING, judge. Opinion filed October 14, 
2011. Sentence is affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
 
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Robbin L. Wasson, assistant district attorney, Jerome Gorman, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Joshua Cash appeals the sentences he received after pleading guilty 
to sex crimes covered by Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-4643. He contends that the controlling 
term of imprisonment should have provided for parole eligibility after 20 years and that 
the district court should not have ordered lifetime postrelease supervision for his off-grid 
convictions. We affirm the hard-25 life sentence but vacate that portion of the sentence 
imposing lifetime postrelease supervision.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW 
 
Cash confessed to having sexual contact with his 8-year-old stepdaughter and 
eventually pled guilty to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under 
the age of 14 years, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3). Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1)(C), the court imposed three concurrent life sentences, with a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years. Also, without any objection 
from the defense, the court included lifetime postrelease supervision in Cash's sentence. 
Cash timely appealed, and the matter comes directly to this court. See K.S.A. 22-
3601(b)(1).  
 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY 
 
Cash first points out that his parole eligibility fits within the statutory language of 
two provisions:  K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3717(b)(2) and K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3717(b)(5). 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Cash then argues that the rule of lenity dictates that he be sentenced to the shorter 
mandatory minimum. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Whether a sentence is illegal is an issue of statutory interpretation and subject to 
unlimited review as a question of law. State v. Chavez, 292 Kan. 464, 254 P.3d 539 
(2011). 
 
Analysis 
 
 
Cash acknowledges that he is raising this issue for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 938, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (issues not raised before trial 
court cannot be raised on appeal). However, Cash reminds us that appellate courts 
occasionally entertain new legal theories that have been asserted for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (enumerating 
exceptions to general rule of issue preservation). The State does not favor us with any 
argument on whether the parole eligibility issue is preserved for appellate review, so we 
will proceed to consider the merits. 
 
Parole eligibility is governed by K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3717, which provides in 
relevant part: 
 
 
"(b)(1) Except as provided by K.S.A. 21-4635 through 21-4638, and amendments 
thereto, an inmate sentenced to imprisonment for the crime of capital murder, or an 
inmate sentenced for the crime of murder in the first degree based upon a finding of 
premeditated murder, committed on or after July 1, 1994, shall be eligible for parole after 
serving 25 years of confinement, without deduction of any good time credits. 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
(2) Except as provided by subsection (b)(1) or (b)(4), K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4628 
prior to its repeal and K.S.A. 21-4635 through 21-4638, and amendments thereto, an 
inmate sentenced to imprisonment for an off-grid offense committed on or after July 1, 
1993, but prior to July 1, 1999, shall be eligible for parole after serving 15 years of 
confinement, without deduction of any good time credits and an inmate sentenced to 
imprisonment for an off-grid offense committed on or after July 1, 1999, shall be eligible 
for parole after serving 20 years of confinement without deduction of any good time 
credits. 
 
(3) Except as provided by K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4628 prior to its repeal, an 
inmate sentenced for a class A felony committed before July 1, 1993, including an inmate 
sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4618, and amendments thereto, shall be eligible for 
parole after serving 15 years of confinement, without deduction of any good time credits.  
 
(4) An inmate sentenced to imprisonment for a violation of subsection (a) of 
K.S.A. 21-3402, and amendments thereto, committed on or after July 1, 1996, but prior to 
July 1, 1999, shall be eligible for parole after serving 10 years of confinement without 
deduction of any good time credits.  
 
(5) An inmate sentenced to imprisonment pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643, and 
amendments thereto, committed on or after July 1, 2006, shall be eligible for parole after 
serving the mandatory term of imprisonment without deduction of any good time credits." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Cash was sentenced to a mandatory minimum 25-year prison term pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4643 for crimes committed in 2009. Under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3717(b)(5), 
Cash is parole eligible after serving the mandatory term of imprisonment, i.e., 25 years. 
However, Cash also fits the description of an inmate eligible for parole after serving 20 
years contained in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3717(b)(2), because he was sentenced to 
imprisonment for an off-grid offense committed on or after July 1, 1999, and he does not 
fit within the listed exceptions, e.g., subsections (b)(1) or (b)(4). "In other words, the 
parole eligibility rules of subsections (b)(2) and (b)(5) overlap." Chavez, 292 Kan. at 468. 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
Cash urges us to apply the rule of lenity as we did recently in State v. Horn, 288 
Kan. 690, 206 P.3d 526 (2009). In Horn, we noted that the "general application of the 
rule is that '"[c]riminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any 
reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the 
criminal statute."'" 288 Kan. at 693 (quoting State v. Rupnick, 280 Kan. 720, 735, 125 
P.3d 541 [2005]). 
 
More recently, Chavez addressed the exact issue that Cash presents here. We noted 
that the new parole eligibility provision of subsection (b)(5) was contained in the same 
house bill, 2006 Supp. H.B. 2576, that established the 25-year mandatory minimum 
prison term in K.S.A. 21-4643. Moreover, the section of the bill establishing the new 
parole eligibility provision specifically referred to the bill section that established the 25-
year mandatory prison term. See L. 2006, ch. 212, secs. 2, 19. Accordingly, we held that 
the general rule of strict construction of criminal statutes must give way to the constraint 
that statutory interpretation "must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design 
and intent," and that "the rule of lenity is subject to the existence of 'any reasonable 
doubt' as to the statute's meaning." Chavez, 292 Kan. at 468. Thus, we held: 
 
"Given the specific language of subsection (b)(5) as compared to the more general 
language of subsection (b)(2), together with the concurrent adoption of the mandatory 
minimum sentences in K.S.A. 21-4643 and the parole eligibility provision in K.S.A. 22-
3717(b)(5), there can be no reasonable doubt that the legislature intended for a person 
convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child to be parole eligible only after 
serving the mandatory minimum sentence specified in K.S.A. 21-4643." Chavez, 292 
Kan. at 468. 
 
Cash has not presented any argument that would persuade us to retreat from the 
holding in Chavez. We are particularly unmoved by the argument that the two 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
subsections can be read in harmony and, therefore, the rule that a specific statute prevails 
over a more general statute is inapplicable. The argument is based upon the rather curious 
assertion that "the fact that an inmate is eligible for parole after 25 years does not mean 
that the inmate is not also eligible after 20 years." But, of course, that is exactly what 
subsection (b)(5) means. An inmate who has served 20 years has not reached a point in 
time that is "after serving the mandatory term of imprisonment" of 25 years. K.S.A. 2008 
Supp. 22-3717(b)(5). In other words, an inmate who has served 20 years has not satisfied 
a requirement that the inmate serve at least 25 years. 
 
Based upon our decision in Chavez, we affirm Cash's hard-25 life sentence. 
 
LIFETIME POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION 
 
Cash complains that the district court imposed lifetime postrelease supervision, 
when he should be subject to parole for his indeterminate sentence. See K.S.A. 2008 
Supp. 22-3717(u) (inmate sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643 for crimes on or after 
July 1, 2006, shall be placed on parole for life). Cash did not object to the postrelease 
supervision in the trial court. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Courts are permitted to correct illegal sentences at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504(1); 
see, e.g., State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 695, 234 P.3d 761 (2010). Whether a sentence is 
illegal is an issue of statutory interpretation and subject to unlimited review as a question 
of law. Chavez, 292 Kan. at 465. 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
The State concedes that the district court erred and that Cash should be subject to 
lifetime parole rather than postrelease supervision. In State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 
1014, 218 P.3d 432 (2009), we explained that the terms "parole" and "postrelease" have 
separate meanings, stating: 
 
"The term 'parole' generally means 'the release of a prisoner to the community by the 
Kansas parole board prior to the expiration of such prisoner's term.' K.S.A. 2l-4602(d). 
Thus, 'parole' is a term of art that is limited to off-grid crimes, i.e., usually those receiving 
indeterminate sentences. . . . By contrast, the term 'postrelease supervision' generally 
means 'release of a prisoner to the community after having served a period of 
imprisonment or equivalent time served in a facility where credit for time served is 
awarded as set forth by the court, subject to conditions imposed by the Kansas parole 
board and to the secretary of correction's supervision.' K.S.A. 21-4703(p). This term has 
traditionally been applied to only grid crimes." 
 
In Ballard, the defendant received a departure sentence of a fixed number of 
months under the sentencing guidelines, and we held that "when [the defendant] 
completes his prison sentence, he will be placed on postrelease supervision, not parole." 
289 Kan. at 1014. Conversely, Cash received the off-grid, hard-25 indeterminate life 
sentence, which means that if he ever leaves prison it will be because the successor to the 
parole board has granted him parole, not because the sentencing court ordered postrelease 
supervision. Therefore, the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease 
supervision, and that portion of Cash's sentence is hereby vacated. 
 
Cash's sentence is affirmed in part and vacated in part.