Title: Jimenez v. Corr
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 140112
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: October 31, 2014

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 
Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
NANCY C. JIMENEZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 140112 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                  October 31, 2014 
LEWIS S. CORR, JR., 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS EXECUTOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF NORMA F. CORR 
AND TRUSTEE OF THE NORMA F. CORR 
REVOCABLE TRUST, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider whether shares of stock, which 
would otherwise be conveyed to an inter vivos trust by way of a 
pour-over provision set forth in a shareholder's will, must 
instead be bequeathed in a manner set forth in a shareholders' 
agreement entered into by that shareholder several years after 
executing her estate planning documents. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the disposition of 
shares of stock in a family held business after the death of 
that business's founding generation.  Six people are central to 
this dispute as it comes to us on appeal.  Lewis S. Corr, Sr. 
("Mr. Corr") and Norma F. Corr were married prior to their 
deaths.  Mr. Corr and Norma had three children: Lewis S. Corr, 
Jr. ("Lewis"), Patricia Corr Williams, and Nancy Corr Jimenez.  
Patricia is married to Thomas M. Williams. 
 
2 
Mr. Corr established Capitol Foundry of Virginia ("Capitol 
Foundry" or "Company") in 1970 as a broker and reseller of 
castings of heavy infrastructure.  Capitol Foundry was 
incorporated in 1976 with Mr. Corr initially as the sole 
shareholder.  Lewis joined the business when it incorporated 
and later, in 1981, Mr. Corr allowed Lewis to purchase 5 newly 
issued shares of Capitol Foundry stock.  That same year, Nancy 
joined the business. 
In 1999, Mr. Corr passed away, and all of his outstanding 
shares in Capitol Foundry were transferred outright to his wife 
Norma.  In 2002, Norma conveyed 5 of her shares to Nancy.  At 
the time of Norma's death in 2012, Norma owned 95 shares of 
Capitol Foundry stock, Lewis owned 5 shares of Capitol Foundry 
stock, and Nancy owned the remaining 5 shares of Capitol 
Foundry stock. 
After Norma's death, Nancy filed suit in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Virginia Beach against Lewis, the executors of 
Norma's estate, and Capitol Foundry.  Nancy alleged that Norma, 
Lewis, and Nancy entered into an agreement (the "Shareholders' 
Agreement") which required Norma's executors to make Norma's 95 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock available for purchase by 
Capitol Foundry, and required Capitol Foundry to purchase those 
shares. 
 
3 
The defendants countered that Norma's estate planning 
documents, and not the Shareholders' Agreement, controlled 
disposition of Norma's 95 shares of Capitol Foundry stock.  
Therefore, in accordance with the estate planning documents, 
those shares were to go into an inter vivos trust rather than 
being subject to purchase under the Shareholders' Agreement. 
Nancy then amended her complaint.  In her amended 
pleading, Nancy sought (1) declaratory judgment relief in the 
form of the court declaring that the Shareholders' Agreement, 
and not Norma's estate planning documents, governed disposition 
of Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock, and (2) specific 
performance relief in the form of Norma's executors making her 
95 shares of Capitol Foundry stock available for purchase by 
Nancy and Capitol Foundry. 
While this litigation was ongoing, the parties entered 
into an agreement that permitted Capitol Foundry to purchase 
64.4 shares of Norma's Capitol Foundry stock so that Norma's 
estate would obtain tax benefits under Internal Revenue Code 
§ 303 (the "Stock Redemption Agreement").  The disposition of 
Norma's remaining 30.6 shares of Capitol Foundry stock remained 
at issue subsequent to this purchase. 
After a two day trial, the circuit court entered a final 
order in this matter.  The circuit court held that the relevant 
portions of the Shareholders' Agreement were not applicable to 
 
4 
Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock, and therefore those 
shares were to pass to the inter vivos trust established by 
Norma's estate planning documents.  Moreover, because those 
estate planning documents permitted Lewis to exercise an 
exclusive option to purchase all Capitol Foundry stock which 
passed into the inter vivos trust, Lewis properly exercised 
such an option when he executed and delivered the document 
called for under the terms of Norma's estate planning documents 
(the "Exercise of Option"). 
Nancy timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  
We granted eight assignments of error and one assignment of 
cross-error.  These assignments and cross assignment direct us 
to address two issues: 
1. How do Norma's estate planning documents and the 
Shareholders' Agreement operate to dispose of Norma's 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock upon her death? 
2. Did the parties sufficiently plead the issue of 
whether Lewis effectively exercised his exclusive 
option to purchase Capitol Foundry stock held in the 
inter vivos trust, so as to allow the circuit court to 
rule on that issue? 
In light of our determination of how the various documents 
operate, which resolves this appeal, we do not reach this 
second issue.  Gardner v. Commonwealth, __ Va. __, __ n.3, 758 
S.E.2d 540, 542 n.3 (2014). 
 
5 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
We review de novo the circuit court's determination of 
"the legal effect of [the] written document[s]" pertinent to 
this appeal.  Jones v. Brandt, 274 Va. 131, 135, 645 S.E.2d 
312, 314 (2007). 
B. 
Norma's Estate Planning Documents 
When construing a particular legal instrument, if other 
documents were "executed at the same time or contemporaneously 
between the same parties, in reference to the same subject 
matter" as the legal instrument, then all such documents "must 
be regarded as parts of one transaction, and receive the same 
construction as if their several provisions were in one and the 
same instrument."  Bailey v. Town of Saltville, 279 Va. 627, 
633, 691 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Norma's Last Will and Testament ("Norma's 
Will") and the Norma F. Corr Revocable Trust document (the 
"Trust Document") were both executed on July 17, 1992, were 
both executed by Norma, and reference one another.  We 
therefore consider these two documents together "as parts of 
one transaction."  Id. 
1. 
Norma's Last Will and Testament 
Norma's Will nominated and appointed Lewis and Joseph L. 
Lyle, Jr. as co-executors of the will, and named Thomas as co-
 
6 
executor in the event that Joseph became unwilling or unable to 
serve as executor.  The parties agree that, at the time of 
Norma's death, Lewis and Thomas were co-executors. 
Norma's Will contains numerous specific bequests and 
devises.  Article VII of the Will governs disposition of the 
residue of Norma's estate: 
All the rest, residue, and remainder of my 
property of every kind and description, and wherever 
located, including any lapsed or void legacy or 
devise, after satisfying all the bequests and devises 
hereinabove set out and after the payment or provision 
for payment of all administrative expenses and all 
death taxes as hereinabove directed, I give, devise, 
and bequeath to the Trustee of a trust agreement 
between me as Grantor and as Trustee dated July 17, 
1992, which is now in existence, to be held, 
administered, and distributed in accordance with its 
terms. 
In the event any such property given, devised or 
bequeathed to the Trustee of such trust agreement is, 
under the terms of such trust agreement, to be 
distributed immediately to any beneficiary thereof, 
outright and free of trust, then such property may be 
transferred directly to such beneficiary by my 
Executor, without the necessity of passing through 
such trust. 
Article VII is a pour-over provision.  "[S]ituations in 
which the testator devises or bequeaths property according to 
the terms of an inter vivos trust that is in existence and 
properly referred to at the time the will is executed[,] but 
which is subject to a reserved power of amendment in the 
settlor of the trust[,] are most frequently referred to as 
pour-over provisions."  2 William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, 
 
7 
Page on the Law of Wills § 19.27, at 60-61 (2003).  Article VII 
operates to gather up the entirety of what remained of Norma's 
estate after all debts, bequests, and devises had been settled, 
and "pours over" that residuary estate into a trust which was 
already existing and created by Norma. 
One exception to this pour-over provision is supplied by 
the terms of Article VII.  This exception allows for property 
to go directly to a beneficiary of the trust, without first 
passing through the trust, if that beneficiary would 
immediately receive such property under the terms of the Trust 
Document.  We will return to this exception later in order to 
explain its relevance to the parties' arguments on appeal. 
2. 
The Norma F. Corr Revocable Trust Document 
The trust into which Norma's residuary estate was poured 
was created by the Trust Document and was titled "Trust A."  
The Trust Document named Lewis and Joseph L. Lyle, Jr. as 
successor co-trustees in the event that Norma became unable to 
serve as trustee, and named Thomas as a successor co-trustee in 
the event that Joseph became unwilling or unable to serve as 
trustee.  The parties agree that, at the time of Norma's death, 
Lewis and Thomas were co-trustees. 
Because Norma's husband predeceased her, Article IV, 
Sections (B)(3) through (B)(6) of the Trust Document governed 
disposition of the trust's assets.  Sections (B)(4) and (B)(5) 
 
8 
of Article IV are not relevant to this appeal, and we need only 
review Sections (B)(3) and (B)(6). 
Article IV, Section (B)(3) of the Trust Document provides: 
3. To the extent not appointed by [Norma's] husband, 
upon the death of [Norma's] husband, the then 
remaining trust assets, if any, shall be divided, per 
stirpes, into equal shares, one share for each child 
of [Norma] then living and one share for each child of 
[Norma] then deceased with surviving issue. 
Each living child of [Norma] shall then be entitled to 
request and receive, outright and free of trust, his 
or her entire share.  Prior to final distribution, the 
Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of each 
of [Norma's] living children the entire income of his 
or her respective share and so much of the principal 
as the Trustee deems appropriate for his or her 
support, maintenance, education (including college and 
graduate school), and medical care.1 
Section (B)(3) provides that any property poured over into 
Trust A shall be divided per stirpes2 among the total number of 
Norma's living children or, if deceased, Norma's children who 
had living issue at the time of the per stirpes division.  
Norma had three children, all living, when Norma's residuary 
estate poured over into Trust A and became subject to the per 
                     
 
1 In this opinion, paragraph breaks have been added to some 
quotations from the operative documents. 
 
2 "Per stirpes means proportionately divided between 
beneficiaries according to their deceased ancestor's share."  
Sheppard v. Junes, 287 Va. 397, 406 n.4, 756 S.E.2d 409, 413 
n.4 (2014) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 
9 
stirpes division:  Lewis, Nancy, and Patricia.  Thus, any such 
property would be divided equally into three shares. 
Article IV, Section (B)(6) of the Trust Document provides 
in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, upon 
the second to die of [Norma] and her husband, 
[Norma's] son, Lewis S. Corr, Jr., is hereby granted 
and given the exclusive right and option to 
purchase[:] 
(i) any or all shares of stock in Capitol Foundry of 
Virginia, Inc., or any successor entity thereto, which 
Trust A herein may own, and 
(ii) any or all interests Trust A may own in [certain 
real property]. 
. . . . 
The option shall be exercised by written notice 
delivered to the Trustee within ninety (90) days of 
the date of the second to die of [Norma] and her 
husband.  If not exercised by such date, the option 
shall then terminate and expire. 
Within sixty (60) days of such exercise, at a mutually 
acceptable date, time and place (the "Settlement 
Date"), the Trustee shall convey such property so 
elected to [Lewis] F. Corr, Jr. by stock certificate 
. . . in exchange for a downpayment equal to all cash 
or liquid assets distributable to him pursuant to the 
terms of Trust A created herein and delivery of an 
executed promissory note in form acceptable to the 
Trustee for the balance of the purchase price, to be 
paid in equal monthly payments of principal and 
interest amortizing the balance of the purchase price 
over ten years. 
Section (B)(6) of the Trust Document provides that, 
notwithstanding the per stirpes division of all property poured 
over into Trust A by operation of Section (B)(3) of the Trust 
 
10 
Document, Lewis has an exclusive right and option to purchase 
all shares of Capitol Foundry stock that Trust A might own.  To 
the extent shares of Capitol Foundry stock are owned by Trust 
A, this would allow Lewis to purchase and acquire those shares 
so that his siblings Nancy and Patricia, fellow beneficiaries 
of Trust A, would not be able to acquire those shares through 
the per stirpes distribution scheme set forth in 
Section (B)(3).  However, because Lewis's purchase of these 
shares would put money back into Trust A, that money would be 
subject to the per stirpes distribution.  Thus, Nancy and 
Patricia would ultimately receive the cash value of their 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock held by Trust A, just not the 
shares themselves. 
3. 
Norma's Estate Planning Documents and Disposition of 
Norma's Shares of Capitol Foundry Stock 
It is important to set forth the distribution scheme of 
Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock if only Norma's estate 
planning documents governed this case. 
The Trust Document does not provide what amount, if any, 
of Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock pour over into 
Trust A.  That document merely provides that if such property 
is owned by Trust A, it shall be subject to either a per 
stirpes division by operation of Article IV, Section (B)(3), or 
 
11 
Lewis's exclusive purchase option by operation of Article IV, 
Section (B)(6). 
On the other hand, Article VII of Norma's Will provides 
that her residuary estate shall pour over into Trust A.  This 
provision means that any shares of Capitol Foundry stock that 
Norma owned upon her death, not subject to debts, specific 
bequests, or devises, and therefore forming part of Norma's 
residuary estate, pour over into Trust A.  See Spinks v. Rice, 
187 Va. 730, 740, 47 S.E.2d 424, 428 (1948) ("The essential 
characteristic of a will is, that it operates only upon and by 
reason of the death of the maker." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Reading these two documents together, they operate so that 
pursuant to Article VII of her Will, Norma's shares of Capitol 
Foundry stock would pour over into Trust A upon Norma's death, 
and then, pursuant to Article IV, Section (B)(6) of the Trust 
Document, Lewis would be able to exercise his exclusive option 
to purchase those shares. 
However, the analysis does not end here because these are 
not the only two documents relevant to this appeal.  Norma also 
entered into the Shareholders' Agreement in December of 2002, 
subsequent to executing her estate planning documents in July 
of 1992.  This Shareholders' Agreement is a contract separate 
and distinct from Norma's Will.  Nonetheless, the Shareholders' 
 
12 
Agreement could affect the operation of Norma's Will because, 
even though these two documents were not executed 
contemporaneously, a will and a contract are instruments that 
both can relate to the same subject matter – the disposition of 
property upon death of the owner – and simultaneously embody 
the testator's intent on that subject.  See McAfee v. Brewer, 
214 Va. 579, 581, 203 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1974) (valid contract 
must have mutual assent of the parties); Roller v. Shaver, 178 
Va. 467, 472, 17 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1941) (valid will expresses 
the testator's intent). 
Further, it is clear from the substance of Norma's Will 
and the Shareholders' Agreement that these two documents 
operate in harmony.  That is, Norma's Will created a general 
provision – Article VII - governing the disposition of the 
general residue of Norma's estate upon her death.  The 
Shareholders' Agreement, in turn, created a specific provision 
– Section 3 - governing the particular disposition of Norma's 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock upon her death.  Norma's shares 
are property that would fall into Norma's residuary estate 
because they were not otherwise specifically devised or 
bequeathed in Norma's Will.  Although the general provision set 
forth in Norma's Will still has effect, the scope of its 
operation is necessarily limited to the extent it would govern 
disposition of Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock, which 
 
13 
is instead governed by the more specific provision set forth in 
the Shareholders' Agreement. Cf. Condominium Servs., Inc. v. 
First Owners' Ass'n of Forty Six Hundred Condominium, Inc., 281 
Va. 561, 573, 709 S.E.2d 163, 170 (2011) ("[A] specific 
provision of a contract governs over one that is more general 
in nature."). 
It is thus necessary to construe the Shareholders' 
Agreement to determine how it affects disposition of Norma's 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock, and whether that instrument is 
valid and enforceable. 
C. 
The Shareholders' Agreement 
The Shareholders' Agreement was executed by Norma, Lewis, 
and Nancy as shareholders of Capitol Foundry.  Section 3, 
titled "Mandatory Sale and Purchase of Stock," provides in 
relevant part: 
(a) Death of an Agreeing Shareholder.  Subject to 
subparagraph (d) hereof, on the death of an Agreeing 
Shareholder, all of the Shares of Stock owned by such 
Agreeing Shareholder shall be sold by his personal 
representative and shall be purchased by the Company 
or the remaining Shareholders for the purchase price 
and under the terms set forth in Section 4.  Such 
offer shall be deemed made and accepted on the 
ninetieth (90th) calendar day following the date of 
death, whether actually made and accepted or not. 
. . . . 
(d) An Agreeing Shareholder shall have the right to 
convey or bequeath his/her shares to a member of such 
Agreeing Shareholder's immediate family.  Such right 
shall apply during such Agreeing Shareholder's 
 
14 
lifetime and shall also apply subsequent to the demise 
of such Agreeing Shareholder, and then be applicable 
to such Agreeing Shareholder's executor or 
administrator.  The term "immediate family" shall be 
defined as children, spouses, parents and siblings of 
such Agreeing Shareholder. 
In light of the parties' arguments, we address these 
paragraphs separately. 
1. 
Section 3, Paragraph (d) 
We first turn to the exemption provision of Section 3, 
Paragraph (d) of the Shareholders' Agreement.  To exempt her 
shares from the mandatory purchase scheme of Section 3, 
Paragraph (a), Norma was able to "convey or bequeath [her] 
shares to a member of [her] immediate family."  The term 
"immediate family" is defined within this paragraph as Norma's 
"children, spouses, parents and siblings." 
a. 
Bequest of Norma's Shares by Trust 
The parties agree that Paragraph (d) allowed Norma to 
bypass the mandatory purchase scheme of Paragraph (a) by 
bequeathing her Capitol Foundry stock to her children.  The 
parties disagree whether Paragraph (d) permitted Norma to do so 
by way of the pour-over provision in Norma's Will, which, as 
discussed, would convey Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock 
to Trust A for the benefit of Norma's children. 
Resolving this dispute requires ascertaining the nature of 
an inter vivos trust.  An inter vivos trust is not like a 
 
15 
corporation, which is "a legal entity entirely separate and 
distinct from the shareholders or members who compose it."  
Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 234 Va. 207, 212, 
360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987).  So, for example, because a 
corporation "is a legal person, separate and distinct from the 
persons who own it," it is "the corporation, as the . . . owner 
and operator of [a] business, [who] is the person entitled to 
[the business's] profits."  Keepe v. Shell Oil Co., 220 Va. 
587, 591, 260 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1979). 
In contrast, an inter vivos trust is inseparable from the 
parties related to it, and the trust does not have separate 
legal status.  Indeed, the term "trust" refers not to a 
separate legal entity but to "a fiduciary relationship with 
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to 
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the 
property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a 
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."  
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959).  When such a trust 
exists, it is not a separate legal entity being referred to, 
 
16 
but a fiduciary relationship between already existing parties, 
be they real persons or other legal entities.3 
Those parties have specific titles to denote their various 
roles within the trust relationship.  There is the "settlor," 
or the "person who creates a trust," the "trustee," or the 
"person holding property in trust," and the "beneficiary," or 
the "person for whose benefit property is held in trust."  
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 3 (1959); see also Code 
§ 64.2-701.  Because there is no trust entity which retains 
title over property held in trust, a settlor who will not also 
be a trustee must convey title of trust property to another 
party in order for a trust to be created.  Code § 64.2-719(1).  
In most trusts,4 the trustee acquires legal title to the trust 
property, while "[t]he beneficiary is the equitable owner of 
trust property, in whole or in part."  Fletcher v. Fletcher, 
                     
 
3 We note that the type of trust we refer to in today's 
opinion – that is, a fiduciary relationship – is different in 
kind from a business trust.  A business trust under the 
Virginia Business Trust Act, Code § 13.1-1200 et seq., is a 
separate legal entity like a corporation.  See Code § 13.1-1201 
(defining "[b]usiness trust"); see also Code § 1-231 ("Whenever 
the term 'person' is defined to include both 'corporation' and 
'partnership,' such term shall also include 'business trust and 
limited liability company.'"). 
 
4 Nancy invokes the legal principle that, to create a land 
trust, the settlor must convey "both equitable and legal title 
in the [trust] property to the trustee."  Austin v. City of 
Alexandria, 265 Va. 89, 95, 574 S.E.2d 289, 292 (2003).  
Trust A is not a land trust, and therefore this principle does 
not apply to the facts of this case. 
 
17 
253 Va. 30, 35, 480 S.E.2d 488, 491 (1997); see also Curtis v. 
Lee Land Trust, 235 Va. 491, 494, 369 S.E.2d 853, 854 (1988).  
Thus, legal and equitable ownership of property entered into 
Trust A in this case is split between the trustees and 
beneficiaries. 
It would be incorrect, then, to adopt Nancy's argument 
that because a trust is not defined in Paragraph (d) as a type 
of "immediate family," Paragraph (d) prevented Norma from 
bequeathing her shares of Capitol Foundry stock by way of 
Trust A.  Trust A, like all inter vivos trusts, is simply a 
method to transfer property to another party including, 
potentially, members of Norma's "immediate family."  The 
question is thus whether Trust A constitutes a mechanism by 
which Norma bequeathed her Capitol Foundry stock to persons who 
qualify as members of Norma's "immediate family."  If so, 
disposition of Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock by way 
of Trust A was permitted by Paragraph (d) as an alternative to 
the mandatory purchase scheme of Paragraph (a). 
In undertaking this inquiry, we must determine whether 
both the trustees and the beneficiaries of Trust A qualified as 
members of Norma's "immediate family."  This is because both a 
trustee and a beneficiary have a substantial ownership interest 
in trust property. 
 
18 
On the one hand, a beneficiary's equitable title permits 
the beneficiary to enforce the terms of the trust and to seek 
judicial remedy in the event of a breach.  See Code § 64.2-
792(B) (setting forth methods for a court to "remedy a breach 
of trust that has occurred or may occur"); Miller v. Trevilian, 
41 Va. (1 Rob.) 1, 24 (1843) (holding that, when a trustee, as 
the legal owner, has "failed to perform his duty," the party 
retaining equitable ownership has the power to seek redress in 
a court of equity). 
On the other hand, a trustee's legal interest is more than 
nominal.  A trustee, though "a mere representative," must 
"attend to the safety of the trust property and . . . obtain 
its avails for the beneficiary in the manner provided by the 
trust instrument."  Fletcher, 253 Va. at 35, 480 S.E.2d at 491.  
A trustee's legal title in trust property allows him to utilize 
and, if appropriate, dispose of trust property so as to 
effectuate his duty to administer the trust.  See Code § 64.2-
763.  In fact, unless limited by the terms of the trust, a 
trustee may exercise "[a]ll powers over the trust property that 
an unmarried competent owner has over individually owned 
property."  Code § 64.2-777(A)(2)(a).  And, specifically, 
"[w]ith respect to stocks" such as Norma's shares, a trustee 
has the power to "exercise the rights of an absolute owner."  
Code § 64.2-778(A)(7). 
 
19 
In light of the substantial nature of both a beneficiary's 
and trustee's ownership interest in trust property, disposing 
of property by trust is a method of conveying such property to 
both the trustee and beneficiary.  As such, although the 
Shareholders' Agreement did not outright prevent Norma from 
bequeathing her Capitol Foundry stock by way of Trust A, the 
Shareholders' Agreement prevented Norma from bequeathing her 
Capitol Foundry stock by way of Trust A if both the trustees 
and beneficiaries do not qualify as Norma's "immediate family." 
In this case, at the time Norma's shares of Capitol 
Foundry stock were to pour over into Trust A, all the 
beneficiaries of Trust A qualified as members of Norma's 
"immediate family" because each beneficiary – Lewis, Nancy, and 
Patricia – is either Norma's son or daughter, and therefore 
qualify as Norma's "children." 
However, at the time Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry 
stock were to pour over into Trust A, all the trustees of Trust 
A did not qualify as members of Norma's "immediate family."  
Lewis and Thomas were co-trustees of Trust A at the time of 
Norma's death.  Thomas, being Patricia's husband, is Norma's 
son-in-law.  Because a son-in-law is not one of Norma's 
"children, spouses, parents [or] siblings," Thomas is not a 
member of Norma's "immediate family" as that term is defined in 
Paragraph (d).  We therefore hold that, because Norma's method 
 
20 
of bequeathing her shares by way of Trust A did not satisfy the 
terms of Paragraph (d), Paragraph (d) did not exempt those 
shares from the mandatory purchase scheme of Paragraph (a). 
b. 
Bequest of Norma's Shares Free of Trust 
It is now necessary to construe the exemption in Section 
VII of Norma's Will.  As previously stated, that exemption 
permits property that would otherwise pass into Trust A to 
instead pass directly to the trust beneficiaries if such 
property would be "distributed immediately to any beneficiary" 
under the terms of the Trust Document.  Appellees argue that 
this exemption applies to Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry 
stock because the beneficiaries of Trust A will "immediately" 
receive all of Norma's shares.  Consequently, the argument 
goes, because Section VII of Norma's Will permits Norma's 
shares to bypass Trust A and be distributed directly to the 
beneficiaries, and because all the beneficiaries are members of 
Norma's "immediate family," the disposition of Norma's shares 
in accordance with the terms of Norma's Will actually falls 
within the scope of Paragraph (d). 
We find this argument unconvincing because it stretches 
the term "immediate" beyond its ordinary meaning.  "The 
language of the will itself must be relied on as the chief 
guide [to understanding how the will operates].  If that 
language be ordinary and popular, its meaning is to be 
 
21 
construed according to its usual acceptation."  Senger v. 
Senger, 81 Va. 687, 696 (1886).  Immediate means "[o]ccuring 
without delay" and "instant."  Black's Law Dictionary 866 (10th 
ed. 2014).  We thus disagree with the appellees because Norma's 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock could not be instantly 
distributed to any beneficiary under the terms of the Trust 
Document. 
Unlike most other property poured over into Trust A, which 
automatically underwent a per stirpes division under Article 
IV, Section (B)(3) of the Trust Document, Norma's shares were 
first subject to Lewis's exclusive purchase option under 
Article IV, Section (B)(6) of the Trust Document.  Lewis's 
exclusive purchase option thus prevented every beneficiary from 
"immediately" having their per stripes division of Norma's 
shares "distributed" to them.  And Lewis himself could not 
"immediately" have Norma's shares "distributed" to him pursuant 
to that exclusive option because he was required to first 
determine how many of the shares he wanted to acquire, purchase 
such shares, arrange or make payment under a specified payment 
plan, and act within a set schedule as established by the terms 
of Section (B)(6).  This is not the type of automatic and 
instant distribution contemplated by the term "immediate" as 
that term would apply to most property poured over into 
Trust A. 
 
22 
In sum, Lewis's exclusive purchase option prevented 
Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock from simply passing 
through Trust A and being "distributed immediately" to any 
beneficiary.  The exemption provision of Section VII of Norma's 
Will does not apply to Norma's shares, and those shares were 
required to pass through Trust A by the terms of Norma's Will 
and the Trust Document.  This argument therefore does not alter 
our conclusion that Norma's estate documents failed to bequeath 
Norma's shares in a manner consistent with Section 3, Paragraph 
(d) of the Shareholders' Agreement. 
2. 
Section 3, Paragraph (a) 
As the exemption of Section 3, Paragraph (d) of the 
Shareholders' Agreement does not apply, we must construe the 
mandatory purchase scheme of Section 3, Paragraph (a) of that 
agreement.  We find the language of Paragraph (a) to be clear 
and unambiguous, and therefore "the intention of the parties 
must be determined from what they actually say [in the 
contract] and not from what it may be supposed they intended to 
say."  McCarthy Holdings LLC v. Burgher, 282 Va. 267, 274, 716 
S.E.2d 461, 465 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
That is, we give effect to Paragraph (a), being the intended 
"expression of the parties' agreement," the meaning derived 
from the plain language of that contract provision.  White v. 
Boundary Ass'n, Inc., 271 Va. 50, 55, 624 S.E.2d 5, 8 (2006). 
 
23 
Paragraph (a) applies to Norma, Lewis, and Nancy because, 
in executing the Shareholders' Agreement, they each are an 
"Agreeing Shareholder."  As an "Agreeing Shareholder," Norma 
bound her "personal representative[s]" to have "all" of Norma's 
shares of Capitol Foundry stock "sold."  Moreover, Norma's 
shares are required to "be purchased by the Company or the 
remaining [Agreeing] Shareholders for the purchase price and 
under the terms set forth in Section 4 [of the Shareholders' 
Agreement]."  Thus, Paragraph (a) requires Norma's personal 
representatives to sell all of her Capitol Foundry shares to 
either the Company or the remaining shareholders upon Norma's 
death.5 
Appellees argue that this provision of the Shareholders' 
Agreement is unenforceable because it contains an uncertain 
material term.  "It is well settled that a contract must be 
complete and certain[,] and that the essential elements . . . 
must have been agreed upon[,] before a court . . . will 
                     
 
5 Norma is deceased, and Lewis and Thomas are Norma's 
personal representatives as executors of her estate.  See 
Bartee v. Vitocruz, __ Va. __, __, 758 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2014).  
In administering Norma's estate, Lewis and Thomas must dispose 
of Norma's shares consistent with the Shareholders' Agreement, 
as such contractual obligations do not "involve any special 
skills or training" and therefore Norma's death "does not 
discharge [those] obligation[s]."  Firebaugh v. Whitehead, 263 
Va. 398, 405-06, 559 S.E.2d 611, 616 (2002); see also Code 
§ 64.2-514 ("Every personal representative shall administer, 
well and truly, the whole personal estate of his decedent."). 
 
24 
specifically enforce the contract."  Roles v. Mason, 202 Va. 
690, 692, 119 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1961).  Appellees argue that 
Paragraph (a) is uncertain when, as in this case, disagreement 
exists about which parties will purchase Norma's stock, as well 
as the quantities of stock each party would purchase. 
We reject this argument.  "The law does not favor 
declaring contracts void for indefiniteness and uncertainty, 
and leans against a construction which has that tendency."  
Reid v. Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 367, 527 S.E.2d 137, 143 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We do not "permit parties 
to be released from the obligations which they have assumed if 
this can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from language 
used, in light of all the surrounding circumstances."  Id.  
Such surrounding circumstances include other provisions of the 
contract, as we "construe [a] contract as a whole."  Schuiling 
v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 193, 747 S.E.2d 833, 836 (2013).  Thus, 
we review the entire Shareholders' Agreement to determine 
whether the contracting parties established a mechanism to 
provide certainty to this potentially indefinite term. 
Section 14 of the Shareholders' Agreement, titled 
"Survival of Benefits," establishes such a mechanism.  Section 
14 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
25 
Any covenant or agreement made by the Company herein 
shall also constitute a covenant and agreement by the 
Agreeing Shareholders to vote the Shares of the 
Company held by them to cause the Company to perform 
any such covenant or agreement. 
The Company, through its shareholders, agreed to purchase 
Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock upon her death in 
Section 3, Paragraph (a) of the Shareholder's Agreement.  By 
way of Section 14 of that agreement, Lewis, Nancy, and Norma, 
as "Agreeing Shareholders," have an overriding obligation to 
ensure that the Company performs that agreement.  Thus, in the 
event that the Company, Lewis, Nancy, and Norma's executors 
cannot agree as to who will purchase Norma's stock, and in what 
quantities, Section 14 obligates Lewis, Nancy, and Norma's 
executors to vote their respective shares of the Company so 
that the Company will perform its agreement by purchasing all 
of Norma's stock. 
In this manner, Section 3, Paragraph (a) of the 
Shareholders' Agreement is not uncertain as to who will 
ultimately purchase Norma's shares, and in what quantity.  
Paragraph (a) certainly allows for an array of options as to 
what might happen: either the Company, Lewis, or Nancy, or any 
combination thereof, may make such a purchase, and in whatever 
quantity they determine.  But Section 14 provides definiteness 
to this term in the event of disagreement by requiring the 
 
26 
Agreeing Shareholders to vote their shares to have the Company 
purchase all of Norma's stock. 
D. 
Proceedings on Remand 
The resolution of the dispositive issues in this appeal 
does not resolve the case itself.  Nancy's amended complaint 
sought relief in the form of an order compelling Norma's 
executors to tender Norma's 30.6 shares to Capitol Foundry and 
herself.  Today, although we agree with Nancy that the 
Shareholders' Agreement governs disposition of Norma's shares, 
we do not enter the relief Nancy seeks in light of how Section 
3, Paragraph (a) of that agreement actually operates. 
We note that Paragraph (a) allows for the parties to first 
attempt to come to an agreement how such a disposition shall 
occur.  We will remand this case to the circuit court so that 
the parties may, in the first instance, attempt to resolve who 
will purchase Norma's 30.6 shares, and in what quantities.  If 
the parties cannot reach such an agreement, Section 3, 
Paragraph (a) and Section 14 of the Shareholders' Agreement 
require the shareholders, including Norma's executors on 
Norma's behalf, to ensure that Norma sells all 30.6 of her 
shares to Capitol Foundry. 
III. Conclusion 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will reverse the 
circuit court's judgment that Norma's estate documents govern 
 
27 
disposition of Norma's shares of Capitol Foundry stock, and 
that Lewis properly exercised his exclusive purchase option 
under the Trust Document.  We hold that the Shareholders' 
Agreement governs disposition of Norma's shares of Capitol 
Foundry stock, and will remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
 
The majority opinion elevates form over substance to hold 
that Norma Corr's inter vivos trust violates the terms of the 
Shareholders' Agreement.  "The presumption in commercial 
contracts is that the parties were trying to accomplish 
something rational.  Common sense is as much a part of contract 
interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons."  
Fishman v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 
2001) (internal citation omitted). 
 
Under the terms of Section 3, Paragraph (d) of the 
Shareholders' Agreement, Norma could have bequeathed her 
Capitol Foundry of Virginia, Inc. (Capitol Foundry) stock to 
her three children, subject to an option to purchase by Lewis, 
by express provision in her will.  The majority opinion 
concludes that Norma nevertheless violated Section 3, Paragraph 
(d) of the Agreement by her efforts to accomplish that exact 
 
28 
result through execution of estate planning documents commonly 
used for transferring estate assets to the decedent's 
beneficiaries, i.e., a "pourover" will and inter vivos trust. 
 
The "apparent object of the parties" to the Shareholders' 
Agreement, as indicated in Section 3, Paragraph (d), was to 
limit ownership of Capitol Foundry stock to family members, as 
defined therein, which, of course, included Norma's three 
children.  Flippo v. CSC Assocs. III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 64, 
547 S.E. 2d 216, 226 (2001).  The Agreement, however, placed no 
restrictions on the method used for effecting such transfer of 
ownership.  Through her inter vivos trust, Norma provided for 
the transfer of actual ownership of her Capitol Foundry stock 
to her three children, subject to Lewis' option to purchase.  
Indeed, such a trust is "a device for making dispositions of 
property" to such beneficiaries, not trustees.  Collins v. 
Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 246, 24 S.E.2d 572, 579 (1943).  
Accordingly, at the time of the momentary interim transfer of 
the stock from Norma's estate (where it is being held) to the 
trust, the trustees would hold no more than "bare" legal title 
to the stock.  See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 42 cmt c 
(2003) ("[A] trustee . . . ordinarily takes only what is 
generally described as the 'bare' legal title to the trust 
property."); see also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 253 Va. 30, 35, 480 
S.E.2d 488, 491 (1997).  That is, at no time would the 
 
29 
trustees, solely in that capacity, possess any beneficial 
ownership interest in the stock.  See id.  (a trustee is a 
"mere representative whose function is to attend to the safety 
of the trust property and to obtain its avails for the 
beneficiary in the manner provided by the trust instrument" 
(quoting George G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 
961, at 2 (rev. 2d ed. 1983)). 
 
No part of this transaction, based on a reasonable reading 
of the Shareholders' Agreement, should be deemed a violation of 
the Agreement.  See Hairston v. Hill, 118 Va. 339, 342, 87 S.E. 
573, 575 (1916) ("[A]n unreasonable construction is always to 
be avoided.").  Therefore, I would affirm the circuit court's 
holding that the will, inter vivos trust and Shareholders' 
Agreement are not in conflict, and that the trust provision 
giving Lewis an option to purchase Norma's Capitol Foundry 
stock is thus enforceable. 
 
Because I reach this conclusion, I would proceed to 
address the additional question presented by appellant as to 
whether the "effectiveness" of Lewis' exercise of the option to 
purchase under the terms of the trust was properly before the 
circuit court.  I would answer that question in the 
affirmative.  In their counterclaim, the executors and trustees 
specifically requested that the circuit court "construe and 
interpret the [w]ill, the [t]rust, and the [Shareholders'] 
 
30 
Agreement so as to determine the rights of the parties named 
herein with regard to [Lewis'] [s]tock [o]ption and 
subparagraph 3(a) and 3(d) of the Agreement." 
 
For these reasons, I dissent.