Title: SABINE RIVER AUTHORITY OF TEXAS v. McNatt
Citation: 342 S.W.2d 741
Docket Number: A-7956
State: Texas
Issuer: Texas Supreme Court
Date: February 15, 1961

342 S.W.2d 741 (1961) SABINE RIVER AUTHORITY OF TEXAS, Petitioner, v. J. P. McNATT et al., Respondents. No. A-7956. Supreme Court of Texas. February 15, 1961. H. P. Kucera, City Atty., Dallas, N. Alex Bickley, 1st Asst., Dallas, Byron Tinsley, Lutcher Simmons, Orange, Allen Clark, Greenville, for petitioner. G. C. Harris, Greenville, H. B. Harrison, Paris, for J. P. McNatt and intervenor appellees T. C. Bell and others. O. P. McWhirter, and B. F. Lowrie, Greenville, for intervenor-appellees T. A. Chandler and others. STEAKLEY, Justice. Respondents by suit and pleas of intervention sought to enjoin Petitioner from exercising eminent domain proceedings in the manner and as authorized by Article 7880-126, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., as amended by the 42nd Legislature in 1931. Constitutionality of the statute was attacked on various grounds, and error was alleged in certain proceedings of Petitioner. The trial court declared the statute "void and unconstitutional for the reasons stated in Petitioner's petition," and in the pleas of intervention. The Court of Civil Appeals felt bound by the decision in White v. Maverick County Water Control and Improvement District, Tex.Com.App., 35 S.W.2d 107, "to hold that Section j, Art. 7880-126, Acts of 1931 continues as violative of due process," and affirmed on this basis alone. In other respects the Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute and upheld the proceedings of Petitioner as to which Respondents alleged error. 337 S.W.2d 325, 336. Writ of error was granted to review the due process question. Respondents rely primarily on the decision in White v. Maverick County Water Control and Improvement Dist. In 1925, the 39th Legislature set about to effectively implement Section 59 of Article XVI of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., which was adopted in 1917, and is known as the Conservation Amendment. Acts 1925, Ch. 25. Section 126 of the 1925 Act *742 conferred the right of eminent domain upon districts established under the Act. Amendments followed at the First Called Session of the succeeding Legislature. Acts 1927, 1 C.S., Ch. 107. The 41st Legislature in 1929, in turn, extensively amended the 1925 and 1927 Acts and recited the following in the emergency clause: Section 14 of the 1929 Act established a detailed procedure "for the proposes of condemning land, and other property, easements, and assessing damages * * *," and came under constitutional attack in White v. Maverick, etc., supra [35 S.W.2d 108]. The opinion of the Commission of Appeals delineated its decision as follows: At no point did the Court in White v. Maverick discuss or allude to due process; the criticism of the statutory procedure (which deferred hearing until after filing of the proposed report) related to and strengthened the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to create a court in the 1929 Act. Indeed, the White v. Maverick decision (as pertinent here) can be said to have turned altogether on the question of legislative intent: Following the decision in White v. Maverick, which was handed down February 4, 1931, the 42nd Legislature, which was then in session, curatively amended the 1925 and 1929 Acts with this declaration of intent in Section 2: It is apparent that the Legislature promptly met the decision in White v. Maverick in its continuing effort to provide more expeditious land acquisition procedures for Water Control and Improvement Districts; and we agree with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that: We differ from the Court of Civil Appeals in its interpretation of the decision in White v. Maverick as also holding the 1929 Act invalid as lacking in due process. As before noted, the Court pretermitted any consideration of due process (or other constitutional questions), and we come to the due process problem as an original question insofar as this decision is concerned. The mode of determination of the compensation to be awarded for the taking of property under the 1931 amendment may be summarized as follows: Interested persons are given notice of the institution of proceedings by the Authority by means of registered mail and newspaper publication, and at the time and place fixed by the District Judge for the hearing of the petition of the Authority for appointment of the Tribunal all interested persons have opportunity to show good cause why the District Judge should not appoint any or all of the persons nominated in the petition. [Sec. (c)] The Tribunal appointed by the District Judge is governed by Article 3265 of Title 52 (Eminent Domain) in "assessing the value of property sought to be condemned, damages and compensation benefits," and views, appraises and assesses damages which will justly compensate and liquidate all injuries to affected lands, easements or property rights. [Sec. (j)] The Tribunal prepares "a specific and detailed proposed report of their findings," and in the proposed report fixes "[the] times and places when and where they shall hear objections to their findings as reported." [Sec. (j)] The Secretary of the District gives notice "forthwith" by newspaper publication once a week for two consecutive weeks, and, in addition, mails written notice to each person whose land or other property is listed in the proposed report, or, in lieu thereof, personal notice may be executed and returned under oath. [Sec. (k)] Any owner of land or other property affected by the report of plans for improvements may file exceptions and a claim for damages at, or before, the hearing, and at the time and place named in the notice the Tribunal proceeds to hear evidence and determine objections and claims for damages, and, after determining all matters presented, enters final decree "to conform to the justice of each case under the facts presented." [Sec. (l)] A certified copy of the final decree is filed with the County Clerk as notice to all persons and is subject to appeal and judicial review in the manner of a trial de novo by the District Court without the intervention of a jury, the court to be "governed by the law and rules of procedure relating to trials and awards in damage suits" in considering "whether just compensation has been allowed, or whether any damages are lawfully recoverable," such review by the District Court being "as summary in character as is consistent with the doing of full and complete justice." [Sec. (l)] *744 After hearing "all evidence and argument offered, the Court in term time shall enter its final decree, either approving the decree of the Tribunal of Original Jurisdiction, modifying the same, or in any manner changing the same, so that the decree will in the Court's Judgment conform to the justice of each specific case." [Sec. (l)] Appeals may be taken as in other civil cases, and each appeal constitutes a separate cause upon the docket of the Court of Civil Appeals. [Sec. (l)] The Court of Civil Appeals held the statute unconstitutional as violative of due process in the fact that the provision for Tribunal hearing is after, and not before, the filing of the proposed report of the Tribunal. The sufficiency of notice under the statute is not here questioned. It is at once apparent that the proposed report and hearing before the Tribunal and the trial in the District Court are not unrelated but are parts of a comprehensive statutory plan beginning with the proceedings before the Tribunal and concluding in the courts. Persons affected have only to avail themselves of the opportunity to be heard before the Tribunal and, in turn, before the District Court. The term "proposed report" itself connotes an act which is tentative; it imports a preliminary finding for consideration and review which in its nature lacks finality unless found acceptable by those affected. This Court in Beyman v. Black, 1877, 47 Tex. 558, 571, speaking through Justice Gould, said: The Supreme Court of the United States in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 1924, 268 U.S. 276, 45 S. Ct. 491, 495, 69 L. Ed. 953, sustained against federal due process attack the procedure of a Wyoming statute for taking land for road construction. The issue pertinent here was drawn and decided by the Court in this manner: Bragg v. Weaver, 1919, 251 U.S. 57, 40 S. Ct. 62, 64, 64 L. Ed. 135, referred to above, was a suit to enjoin the taking of earth to be used in repairing a road. The owner urged the objection that the statute did not afford him an opportunity to be heard. The Court set forth the statutory procedure and its decision on due process as follows: Preliminarily, the Court stated the rule to be: The Supreme Court again in Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105, 24 L. Ed. 616, speaks of due process of law relating to the taking of property, as follows: It was observed by the same Court in Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708, 4 S. Ct. 663, 667, 28 L. Ed. 569, that "it is sufficient to observe here that by `due process' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected." The Supreme Court in Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis (Oregon Water Board), 241 U.S. 440, 36 S. Ct. 637, 640, 60 L. Ed. 1084, considered the constitutionality, against due process attack, of a statute of Oregon providing procedures for a distribution of waters among those entitled to their use, to be administered by the State Water Board. Proceedings before the Board were ex parte, and the Board was required to enter an order embodying findings and provisionally determining the relative rights of the several claimants. The evidence considered by the Board and a copy of the order were transmitted to the Circuit Court where exceptions could be presented, the Court pointing out that "In short, upon exceptions the court may reexamine the whole matter, and enter such decree as the law and the evidence may require, whether it be an affirmance or a modification of the board's order." The Court pointed out that the findings and order of the Court were prima facie final and binding until changed in some proper proceeding. The Court held in answer to the contention that the statute was repugnant to the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment: It was held by this Court in Buffalo Bayou, B. &amp; C. R. Co. v. Ferris, 1863, 26 Tex. 588, 599: See also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574, 17 S. Ct. 966, 976, 42 L. Ed. 270, in which the Court points out that "* * * it is the duty of the state, in the conduct of the inquest by which the compensation is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it." The principles announced in Buffalo Bayou, etc. v. Ferris, supra, were reaffirmed by this Court in Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation District v. Costello, 1940, 135 Tex. 307, 143 S.W.2d 577, 578, 580, 130 A.L.R. 1220: The statute under review discloses a fixed legislative purpose to secure timely notice to all affected persons of every material step in the proceeding, together with full opportunity to be heard. While the proposed report of the Tribunal is without hearing in the first instance, full opportunity is given before the Tribunal for reviewing its findings and for the introduction of evidence and examination of witnesses; and, thereafter, for a trial in the nature of a trial de novo before the District Court. Our system of jurisprudence knows no better opportunity to be heard than by trial in the District Court, with the right of appeal therefrom as in all civil cases. We are of the opinion that the legislative provisions in the statute under review afford Respondents effectual and reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard; and to have ultimately determined upon a trial in the District Court the fair and just damages which Respondents should be paid for the taking of their property by Petitioner. We *747 hold that due process of law is thus afforded Respondents. We have considered the other grounds of unconstitutionality urged by Respondents in the trial court and before the Court of Civil Appeals, together with the alleged errors in certain proceedings presented by Petitioner. As we are in agreement with the holdings of the Court of Civil Appeals on such points, we pretermit further discussion thereof. For the error pointed out, namely, the holding that Section (j) of Article 7880-126, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, is violative of due process, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are reversed, and this cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.