Title: ERHART v GREAT WESTERN SUGAR CO
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 13130
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: March 8, 1976

No. 13130 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 L A W R E N C E W. ERHART, Claimant and Respondent, GREAT W E S T E R N S U G A R C O M P A N Y , a Corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Hutton, Sheehy and Cromley argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Brent R. Cromley argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Michael J. Whalen argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted : February 3, 1976 ,f,fiG - 4 ' " 7 . ' Decided : .,. ,.> , , j ~ b Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment entered in district court, Yellowstone County, reversing an order of the Workmen's Compensation Division denying compensation to claimant on the grounds no industrial accident or injury had occurred. Lawrence W. Erhart (claimant) was employed by Great Western Sugar Company in its Billings, Montana, plant. Claim- ant began work for Great Western in August, 1968, as a laborer. Due to his electronics background, he worked himself up to an instrument man performing technical work with electronic and automatic equipment. In 1969, Great Western began converting its older sugar conversion system to a computerized system operated pneumatically and electronically. Claimant was told by the company management he had the final responsibility to see that the new system worked. When outside engineers came to the plant to assist with the hook-up and explain the process to claimant, he would go home at night and make schematic drawings of the process. At this time claimant claims he worked twelve hour days for six to seven days a week. The new system was going to result in many employees being laid off, resulting in some animosity toward those working to put the system on line. Claimant alleges he was subject to taunts and insults, with suggestions of infidelity on the part of his wife. On December 9, 1970, claimant left work during the middle of the day. On December 15, 1970, claimant's wife called the plant manager to inform him claimant had suffered a mental and physical breakdown. Meanwhile, claimant had made his way to the Veterans Administration Hospital at Fort Harrison, seeking help. At the hospital he related a rather disjointed and bizarre story regarding h i s b e l i e f s a s t o why everyone was a g a i n s t him. Claimant w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e V. A. Hospital a t Sheridan, Wyoming f o r p s y c h i a t r i c treatment. H e w a s l a t e r t r e a t e d a t t h e F o r t Meade, South Dakota V. A. Hospital f o r t h e same schizophrenic c o n d i t i o n . Since t h e t i m e of h i s nervous breakdown, claimant has been unable t o perform p h y s i c a l o r mental l a b o r f o r more than two o r t h r e e hours without rest. The p s y c h i a t r i s t t r e a t i n g claimant a t Sheridan, Wyoming, a t t r i b u t e d c l a i m a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n t o stress a t work and t h e imm- i n e n t b i r t h of a n unplanned c h i l d . H e would n o t s t a t e whether t h e breakdown would n o t have r e s u l t e d i n t i m e a b s e n t t h e stresses. I n February, 1971, claimant f i l e d a Workmen's Compensa- t i o n c l a i m i n d i c a t i n g a complete mental and p h y s i c a l breakdown on December 9, 1970. Great Western r e f u s e d t h e claim, s t a t i n g no i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t was involved. I n September, 1971, claimant f i l e d s u i t i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t a g a i n s t Great Western and t h e p l a n t ' s group h e a l t h i n s u r - ance c a r r i e r f o r wrongful d e p r i v a t i o n of h i s job and d i s a b i l i t y insurance payments. The s u i t was s e t t l e d i n March, 1972, and claimant signed a r e l e a s e and s e t t l e m e n t agreement. The d i s - t r i c t c o u r t dismissed t h e s u i t w i t h p r e j u d i c e . I n January, 1973, c l a i m a n t s counsel requested a Workmen's Compensation hearing on t h e 1971 claim. A hearing w a s held i n March, 1973. Additional t i m e was allowed f o r t a k i n g of d e p o s i t i o n s of claimant (who was h o s p i t a l i z e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g ) , and t h e d o c t o r and p s y c h i a t r i c worker a t Sheridan, Wyoming. The m a t t e r was n o t deemed submitted u n t i l March, 1974. The claim was denied i n A p r i l , 1974, w i t h a r e h e a r i n g a l s o denied. I n J u l y , 1974, claimant appealed t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t which reversed t h e d e n i a l of t h e Division a f t e r a hearing on t h e c e r t i f i e d record of t h e Division w i t h a d d i t i o n a l testimony from c l a i m a n t ' s w i f e on h i s c o n d i t i o n a t t h a t t i m e . Great Western appeals from t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . Of t h e seven i s s u e s presented f o r review by t h i s Court, four main i s s u e s appear: 1. W a s t h e r e a n i n j u r y e n t i t l i n g claimant t o compen- s a t i o n under t h e Montana Workmen's Compensation Act? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n n o t according every presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s t o t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e Division? 3. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t have a u t h o r i t y t o c o n v e r t c l a i m a n t ' s award i n t o a lump sum? 4 . Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n a s s e s s i n g c o s t s of d e p o s i t i o n s t o Great Western? I n s e c t i o n 92-418(1), R.C.M. 1947, a n " i n j u r y " is defined, f o r workmen's compensation purposes, as: " * * * a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e from an unexpected cause, o r unusual s t r a i n , r e s u l t - ing i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l p h y s i c a l harm, and such physical c o n d i t i o n a s a r e s u l t therefrom and excluding d i s e a s e n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y * * *." W e have held a compensable i n j u r y under t h e Workmen's Compensation A c t must m e e t t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements of t h e s t a t u t e . Hurlbut v. V o l l s t e d t K e r r Company, Mont . , 538 P.2d 344, 346, 32 St.Rep. 752. I n Hurlbut w e s t a t e d : " * * * t h e r e a r e two elements i n t h e s t a t u t e [ s e c t i o n 92-418, R.C.M. 19471 which must be m e t (1) t h e r e must be a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e , and ( 2 ) t h i s must be shown t o be t h e cause of p h y s i c a l harm." Workmen's compensation c a s e s normally d e a l w i t h p h y s i c a l i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from an a c c i d e n t , as t h e t e r m i s used i n every- day language. When a shipping c r a t e f a l l s on a worker breaking a bone o r two, t h e c a u s a t i o n and t h e t a n g i b l e happening are e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . I n t h e p r e s e n t case w e a r e d e a l i n g with a nervous d i s a b i l i t y , which may o r may n o t be c a u s a l l y re- l a t e d t o t h e employment s i t u a t i o n . Section 92-418, R.C.M. 1947, was amended by Section 1, Chapter 270, Laws of 1967, adding "or unusual s t r a i n " t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a n i n j u r y . The f i r s t c a s e i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s t a t - u t e a s amended i n 1967 was Jones v . B a i r ' s Cafes, 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 923. I n Jones a w a i t r e s s picked up an unusually heavy t r a y of d i s h e s from t h e f l o o r and s u f f e r e d a back i n j u r y . This Court, i n s u s t a i n i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i n d i n g of a n i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t , s t a t e d : "Now, i n 1967, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e included t h e words ' o r unusual s t r a i n . ' What is t h e meaning? How do w e measure 'unusual s t r a i n . ' It seems c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o change and modify t h e James d e c i s i o n . [James v. V. K. V. Lumber Co., 145 Mont. 466, 401 P.2d 282; wherein compensation was denied f o r an i n j u r y due t o s t r a i n but n o t from a n unexpected cause.] By adding t h e s e p a r a t e d i s - t i n c t phrase, ' o r unusual s t r a i n , ' t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o cover j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n a s w e have here. There was no 'unexpected cause' but t h e r e was a n 'unusual s t r a i n ' ; t h u s t h e measure would seem t o be t h e r e s u l t of a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e which r e s u l t s i n p h y s i c a l harm, be it a r u p t u r e , a s t r a i n o r a s p r a i n . W e can o n l y r e l y on c r e d i b l e medical evidence t o determine it. Here w e have such medical evidence. " I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e c r e d i b l e medical evidence is n o t determinative of a n unusual s t r a i n , nor is it d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e cause of c l a i m a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n being an i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t o r i n j u r y . The p s y c h i a t r i s t who t r e a t e d claimant a t t h e Sheridan, Wyoming, V. A. Hospital was, a t b e s t , vague and u n c e r t a i n a s t o t h e cause of c l a i m a n t ' s schizophrenia. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t no one knows f o r s u r e t h e cause of schizophrenia and i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e it was n o t p o s s i b l e t o a t t r i b u t e t h e c o n d i t i o n t o any p a r t i c u l a r stress i n t h e l i f e of claimant. Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., This Court s a i d i n / 148 Mont. 13, 20, 417 P.2d 95: "Whenever a medical e x p e r t t e s t i f i e s t h a t a n a s s e r t e d cause o f d i s e a s e i s p o s s i b l e , t h i s alone is n o t t o be accepted a s reasonable medical proof. * * *" See a l s o , McAndrews v. Schwartz v. Glacier Gen. Assur. Co., 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379. Claimant c i t e s t h e e a r l i e r c a s e of Gaffney v. Ind. Acc. Board, 129 Mont. 394, 404, 287 P.2d 256, f o r t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t an injured workman may recover compensation i f t h e c a u s a l connection can be shown by d i r e c t , i n d i r e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence; a p o s i t i v e statement by a medical witness of a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i s unnecessary. The a c t u a l wording i n Gaffney is: " * * * The frank admission of t h e t e s t i f y i n g doctor t h a t he could not state p o s i t i v e l y one way o r another need n o t bar t h e claimant from recovery i f on t h e whole record it can be s a i d t h a t he i s e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o . * * *" I n t h e i n s t a n t case, t h e record a s a whole does not i n d i c a t e claimant i s e n t i t l e d t o compensation. I n Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 333, 485 P.2d 692, w e found compensable, a back i n j u r y received by a cook mopping a c a f e f l o o r when she l i f t e d a heavy p a i l of w a t e r . I n t h a t c a s e w e s t a t e d : " * * * The p r e p o s i t i o n ' o r ' preceding- t h e term 'unusual s t r a i n ' simply s i g n i f i e s a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic n a t u r e e i t h e r (1) from an unexpected cause, o r ( 2 ) from an unusual s t r a i n . Accordingly, a tan- g i b l e happening of an unexpected n a t u r e from an un- usual s t r a i n q u a l i f i e s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether t h e s t r a i n i s 'unusual' from t h e standpoint of cause o r e f f e c t . * * *" Not only must claimant show an unusual s t r a i n , but t h a t t h e s t r a i n must r e s u l t from a t a n g i b l e happening of a traumatic nature. Jones v. B a i r ' s Cafes, supra; Robins v. Ogle, supra. I n Love v. Ralph's Food S t o r e , 163 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598, w e s t a t e d t h a t Jones and Robins made t h i s r u l e c l e a r . See, a l s o , t h e e a r l i e r cases: Lupien v. Montana Record Publishing Co., 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455; James v. V. K. V. Lumber Co., supra; Miller v. Sundance Recreation, Inc., 151 Mont. 223, 4 4 1 P.2d 1 9 4 . A t a n g i b l e happening must be a p e r c e p t i b l e happening, Webster's Third New I n t e r n a t i o n a l Dictionary. Some a c t i o n o r i n c i d e n t , o r chain of a c t i o n s o r i n c i d e n t s , must be shown which may be perceived a s a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause of t h e r e s u l t - ing injury. This Court has found neuroses compensable, b u t a t a n g i b l e , r e a l happening must be a cause of t h e condition. O ' N e i l v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688; B e s t v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., 100 Mont. 332, 47 P.2d 656; Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 22 P.2d 157. Even i n Murphy v. Anaconda Company, 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094, while w e r e j e c t e d t h e common l a w unusual s t r a i n test, a t a n g i b l e happening (usual e x e r t i o n i n pushing a mail cart) w a s required before d e a t h from a pulmonary embolism could be found compensable. I n t h e r e c e n t case of Love where a gradual buildup of back pain was found compensable, t h i s Court emphasized two s p e c i f i c i n c i - d e n t s of s t r a i n w e r e p e r c e p t i b l e from t h e record. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, n e i t h e r claimant nor t h e medical witness were a b l e t o p o i n t t o one o r more t a n g i b l e , r e a l , per- c e p t i b l e happenings a s t h e s o l e o r c o n t r i b u t o r y cause of claim- a n t ' s mental condition. Claimant has f a i l e d t o c a r r y h i s burden of proof, thus precluding h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r b e n e f i t s under t h e s t a t u t e . A presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s e x i s t s f o r f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w of t h e Workmen's Compensation Division, i f supported by c r e d i b l e evidence. Mulholland v. Butte & Superior Min. Co., 87 Mont. 561, 289 P. 574; B i r n i e v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 133; Hurlbut v . V o l l s t e d t Kerr Co., supra. The r u l e t o be followed by t h i s Court on review of t h e s e types of c a s e s i s w e l l set o u t i n Hurlbut v. Vollseedt Kerr Company, Mont . , 538 P.2d 344, 346, 32 St.Rep. 752: "This Court has repeatedly held t h a t where t h e appeal t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s heard only on t h e D i v i s i o n ' s c e r t i f i e d record o r when t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t permits a d d i t i o n a l evidence t o be introduced and t h e a d d i t i o n a l evidence i s not important o r adds nothing t o t h e case, then t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t may not reverse t h e Division unless t h e evidence c l e a r l y preponderates a g a i n s t t h e findings of t h e Division." The a d d i t i o n a l evidence given by claimant's wife a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing only went t o claimant's condition a t t h e time of t h e hearing and events subsequent t o t h e Division hear- ing. This testimony shed no new l i g h t on t h e circumstances of claiment's nervous condition. W e find t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n reversing t h e Division a s no evidence on t h e record o r presented a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing c l e a r l y preponderates a g a i n s t t h e Division's findings. A s w e have determined t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n rever- sing t h e Division's findings, t h e lump sum award granted claimant by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t is a l s o n u l l i f i e d , therefore t h e i s s u e of t h e c o u r t ' s a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t such an award need not be examined. The d i s t r i c t court ordered t h a t claimant recover h i s c o s t s , including t h e c o s t s of t h e depositions taken a t Sheridan, Wyoming, and t h e copies thereof. Great Western argues these c o s t s w e r e not properly taxed t o it by t h e d i s t r i c t court. The r e p o r t e r , who took t h e depositions, s e n t t h e b i l l f o r t h e depositions t o claimant's attorney, who forwarded it t o t h e Division f o r payment. The Division refused payment, s t a t i n g t h e depositions w e r e not a t t h e request of t h e Division, but w e r e a t t h e request, and f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f , claimant. It appears t h e d i s t r i c t court taxed t h e c o s t s t o Great Western because claimant was t h e prevailing party. W e have held claimant s h a l l not p r e v a i l , therefore, t h e r a t i o n a l e of award- ing c o s t s t o the prevailing p a r t y i s absent. The depositions were taken a t t h e request of claimant a s he was unable t o a t t e n d t h e Division hearing (apparently due t o h i s medical condition) and because t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t and psy- c h i a t r i c worker d i d not wish t o attend t h e hearing, a l l being beyond t h e reach of t h e D i v i s i o n ' s subpoena power, s e c t i o n 92- 816, R.C.M. 1947, ( s i n c e repealed) . This Court has held t h a t d e p o s i t i o n s taken purely f o r one p a r t y ' s b e n e f i t cannot be charged a s c o s t s ; ~ a v i s v. Trobough, 139 Mont. 322, 363 P.2d 727; j u s t as a p a r t y who t e s t i f i e s f o r himself is not e n t i t l e d t o witness f e e s ; Isman v. Altenbrand, 4 2 Mont. 188, 1 1 1 P. 849. Claimant argues t h a t Davis does not apply here because t h e depositions were introduced i n t o evidence by t h e s t i p u l a t i o n of both p a r t i e s , thus they no longer w e r e f o r t h e s o l e b e n e f i t of claimant but f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e hearing o f f i c e r and both p a r t i e s . Claimant cites P f i z e r , Inc. v. Madison County, 161 Mont. 261, 505 P.2d 399, i n support of t h i s p o s i t i o n . I n ~ f i z e r , judg- ment w a s a g a i n s t t h e Board of Equalization and affirmed by t h i s Court, t h e question was what c o s t s of t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y should be taxed t o t h e Board, a s w e have reversed t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t h e P f i z e r holding i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on t h e f a c t s and t h e r e s u l t . Claimant's c o s t s , including t h e d e p o s i t i o n s and copies t h e r e o f , s h a l l not be allowed a g a i n s t Great Western. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s reversed and t h e order of t h e Workmen's Compensation Division i s affirmed and r e i n s t a t e d . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: J u s t i c e s - 9 -