Title: Pike County v. Whittington
Citation: 81 So. 2d 288
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 12, 1955

81 So. 2d 288 (1955)
PIKE COUNTY
v.
Fannie Mae WHITTINGTON.
4 Div. 819.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 12, 1955.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1955.
*289 Oliver W. Brantley, Troy, for appellant.
W. R. Martin, Ozark, Gibson &amp; Byars and E. C. Orme, Troy, for appellee.
SIMPSON, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment granting a new trial in a condemnation proceeding.
United States Highway 231 runs through Pike County and in order to straighten the highway it has been relocated at various places in the county. The appellee is the owner of a five-acre tract, the eastern boundary of which was the old Highway 231 prior to its relocation. Facing and abutting the right of way were certain improvements consisting primarily of a combination residence, grocery store and filling station. When the highway was relocated, it traversed the western part of the five-acre tract and the new right of way required eight-tenths of an acre through a sedge field. The appellee could not agree with Pike County officials as to her compensation for the land taken and the County (appellant here) filed condemnation proceedings under the eminent domain statute. The commissioners awarded her the sum of $75 as compensation and she appealed to the circuit court. The jury fixed her compensation and damages at $200. She made a timely motion for a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that the verdict of the jury was inadequate and the court granted the motion "for the reason that the verdict is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence in the case and the damages inadequate taking into consideration all the evidence."
The evidence for the appellee, other than pictures and maps, consisted of testimony of six witnesses, who estimated a value of the tract before the taking of from $8,000 to $12,000 and a value after the taking of $2,000 to $4,000. Three of these witnesses estimated the value of the acreage actually taken for the new highway to be $40, $120 and $160. The only disinterested witness for appellee, the former president of a bank, who placed the before and after value at $10,000 and $4,000 respectively, testified as to the decrease in value as follows:
"Q. So it is based upon a lessening of traffic where her business was situated? A. That is correct. Q. That is the sole basis of your assumption? A. Yes."
While only one other witness, the gas distributor who serviced the gas pumps, testified that his appraisal was based upon a loss of traffic, it is evident that this was the main consideration upon which all of appellee's witnesses based their opinion as to the amount of damages suffered by appellee.
The only other evidence was given by two of the commissioners, who testified for the appellant and stated that the land taken was in their opinion worth $75.
The contention of the appellant is stated in brief as follows:
Appellee in answer to this contention says in brief:
It is agreed by both parties to this appeal that the appellee would be entitled to no compensation if the new right of way did not touch her land at any point.
This court has on numerous occasions enunciated the rule applicable to reviewing the propriety of the action of the trial judge in granting a motion for a new trial. We are committed to the rule that decisions granting new trials will not be disturbed unless the evidence plainly and palpably supports the verdict. Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738. Some of the most recent cases supporting this well-settled rule are: Williams v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 230 Ala. 438, 162 So. 95; Romano v. Thrower, 258 Ala. 416, 63 So. 2d 369; Morgan County v. Hart, 260 Ala. 418, 71 So. 2d 273; German-American Wholesale Optical Co. v. Rosen, 233 Ala. 105, 170 So. 211. We are unable to say that the verdict of the jury in this case was plainly and palpably supported by the evidence. We thus conclude that the order granting the motion for a new trial must be affirmed.
However, appellant in brief and oral argument stated that Pike County now has pending in the circuit court two more cases involving the identical substantive question presented here, which have been continued awaiting this court's pronouncement in this case as guidance in future trials. Both parties to this appeal argued the substantive question and we feel that we should indicate our views as aid to the court below on another trial.
In the case of McRea v. Marion County, 222 Ala. 511, 133 So. 278, 281, this court said:
Appellant insists that the McRea case is not in point because there is a question of access which causes it to differ from the instant case, but we have read the original record and we find no such distinction.
In Hatter v. Mobile County, 226 Ala. 1, 145 So. 151, 153, this court said:
In Morgan County v. Griffith, 257 Ala. 401, 59 So. 2d 804, 806, this court said:
The rule in this state has been reaffirmed recently in the case of Morgan County v. Hill, 257 Ala. 658, 60 So. 2d 838, 840, as follows:
These authorities point unwaveringly to the conclusion that the relocation of the highway, thereby diverting the flow of traffic from in front of appellee's place of business, is a circumstance to enter into the question of the amount of the condemnee's damage and this circumstance is one of which the jury should be informed and the question left to their ultimate decision.
All the Justices concur that the ruling of the trial court in granting the motion for a new trial must be affirmed. However, on the pivotal legal question last treated there is a divergence of view.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur in the views of the writer hereinabove expressed, but MERRILL and MAYFIELD, JJ., dissent.
GOODWYN, J., not sitting.
Affirmed.
MERRILL, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in the holding of the majority with reference to the action of the trial court on the motion for a new trial. My disagreement is with the conclusion reached on the substantive question.
The following illustrates the result reached by the majority. A and B could be adjacent landowners, each fronting 200 feet on a state highway. A's lot is 200 yards deep. B's lot is only 198 yards deep. Each has a filling station and grocery store facing the highway and do a comparable business. The highway is relocated so as to pass 199 yards behind their places of business. It thus takes one yard of A's property but takes none of B's. A would be entitled to compensation because the flow of traffic on the old highway was taken away from him while his neighbor B would, under practically all the decisions in all the states, be entitled to nothing. Pruett v. Las Vegas, Inc., 261 Ala. 557, 74 So. 2d 807. There is something about such a result which to me seems unfair and unjust. The Supreme Court of New Mexico in a unanimous decision in 1945 in the case of Board of County Com'rs of Santa Fe County v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.2d 859, 860, in dealing with the exact problem facing us said:
*295 "In speaking of what is the measure by which damages are to be determined when a portion, but not all, of one's property is so taken, the court in People v. Ricciardi, supra (23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799), citing Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505, pointed out that under no rule would recoverable damages accrue `for diminution of property value resulting from highway changes causing diversion of traffic, circuity of travel beyond an intersecting street, or other noncompensable items.'
The holding in the Slaughter case appears to me to enunciate a fairer, more practical and reasonable rule than that which the majority opinion states to be the law of this state.
MAYFIELD, J., concurs in the foregoing views.