Title: State v. Ferman-Velasco
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S46172
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2002

Filed:  February 28, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
CARLOS ROBERTO FERMAN-VELASCO,
	Petitioner on Review.
(C952773CR; CA A95127; SC S46172)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 7, 2000.
	Mary M. Reese, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for petitioner on review.  Also on the petition and brief 
was David E. Groom, Public Defender for Oregon, Salem.
	Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  Also on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General, Salem.
	Emily Simon, Portland, filed a brief of amicus curiae for
Juvenile Rights Project, Inc. 
	David T. McDonald, Portland, filed a brief of amicus curiae
for Parents Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	CARSON, C.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
    *Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Mark Gardner, Judge. 157 Or App 415, 971 P2d 897 (1998).
   **Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ.,
did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.	
		CARSON, C.J.
In this criminal case, defendant claims that his
mandatory minimum sentences, which the trial court imposed under
ORS 137.700 (popularly known as Ballot Measure 11 (1994)), (1)
offend certain provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 
He also argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to
pay some of the prosecution's witness fees.  A divided Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, rejected all defendant's arguments. 
State v. Ferman-Velasco, 157 Or App 415, 971 P2d 897 (1998).  For
the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.


I.  BACKGROUND
		In 1996, defendant was convicted of second-degree rape
and first-degree sexual abuse for acts that he committed in the
summer of 1995.  The trial court sentenced defendant under ORS
137.700 to two concurrent, mandatory minimum sentences of 75
months' imprisonment and a post-prison supervision period of 10
years, less time served. (2)  The trial court also ordered defendant
to pay witness fees totaling $25 for two of the prosecution's
witnesses.
		Defendant appealed, arguing that his Measure 11
sentences violated the proportionality clause of Article I,
section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, because those sentences
exceeded penalties imposed for crimes that the legislature had
deemed to be more serious than defendant's crimes.  Defendant
also argued that his Measure 11 sentences violated his federal
constitutional rights to equal protection, allocution, and
counsel; the federal constitutional guarantee to a republican
form of government; and his federal constitutional right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishments.  Finally, defendant
claimed that the trial court was not statutorily authorized to
order him to pay the prosecution's witness fees.
		A majority of the Court of Appeals held that
defendant's challenges were without merit.  Ferman-Velasco, 157
Or App at 418, 424.  Three members dissented, concluding that
defendant's sentence violated the proportionality clause of
Article I, section 16.  Id. at 424-25, 444 (Warren J.,
dissenting, joined by Armstrong and Wollheim, JJ.).  
		We allowed review to address defendant's state and
federal constitutional challenges, and to determine whether the
trial court had statutory authority to order defendant to pay the
prosecution's witness fees. 
II.  OREGON CONSTITUTION
		We address defendant's state constitutional challenge
first.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316
(1983) (court generally resolves questions of state law before
reaching federal constitutional arguments).  Before addressing
defendant's argument respecting Article I, section 16, however,
we discuss the relevant statutes and rules that underlie the
issue presented in this case.
A.	Sentencing Guidelines and Measure 11
		In Oregon, the Oregon Felony Sentencing Guidelines
(sentencing guidelines) serve as the primary means through which
courts determine an offender's sentence for felony offenses.  The
cornerstone of the sentencing guidelines is the concept that
sentences be based upon a consideration of two factors:  the
seriousness of the crime and the defendant's criminal history.  
		That concept has yielded the 99-block Sentencing
Guidelines Grid.  This court has described that grid and its
operation as follows: 
	"A 'Crime Seriousness Scale' serves as the vertical
axis of the grid.  Most felonies fall within one of the
11 categories on the Crime Seriousness Scale.  A
'Criminal History Scale' serves as the horizontal axis
of the grid.  The Criminal History Scale is made up of
nine categories, ranging from 'minor misdemeanor or no
criminal record' to 'multiple (3+) felony person
offender.'  The appropriate sentence for a given felony
conviction is determined by (1) locating the
appropriate category for the crime of conviction on the
Crime Seriousness Scale; (2) locating the appropriate
category for the convicted offender on the Criminal
History Scale; and (3) locating the grid block where
the two categories intersect.  Each grid block contains
what is called a 'presumptive sentence' * * *."
State v. Davis, 315 Or 484, 487, 847 P2d 834 (1993) (footnote
omitted).  For 46 of the 99 grid blocks, the presumptive sentence
is a term of probation.  OAR 213-005-0007(1). (3)  For the remaining
grid blocks, the presumptive sentence is a range of months of
imprisonment.  OAR 213-005-0001(1).  The "dispositional line"
separates those blocks that set probation and those that set
imprisonment.  OAR 213-003-0001(7).
		Once a trial court has determined the presumptive
sentence, the sentencing guidelines allow the court to depart
either upward or downward from the presumptive sentence if there
are "substantial and compelling" reasons in aggravation or
mitigation.  OAR 213-008-0001.  The degree to which a trial court
may depart from the presumptive sentence is limited, however. 
See, e.g., OAR 213-008-0003 (setting upward durational departure
for single conviction at double presumptive maximum); State v.
Langdon, 330 Or 72, 74-76, 999 P2d 1127 (2000) (describing
departure limits for consecutive sentences).   
		Unlike the sentencing guidelines, which set out a
multi-factor methodology for determining sentences, Measure 11
sets mandatory minimum sentences for certain felony offenses. 
Measure 11, codified at ORS 137.700, provides, in part:
		"(1)  When a person is convicted of one of the
offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section
and the offense was committed on or after April 1,
1995, * * * the court shall impose, and the person
shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment
listed in subsection (2) of this section.  The person
is not, during the service of the term of imprisonment,
eligible for release on post-prison supervision or any
form of temporary leave from custody.  The person is
not eligible for any reduction in * * * the minimum
sentence for any reason whatsoever under ORS 421.121 or
any other statute.  The court may impose a greater
sentence if otherwise permitted by law, but may not
impose a lower sentence than the sentence specified in
subsection (2) of this section." 
(Emphasis added.)
		All the offenses covered by ORS 137.700(2)(a) (Measure
11 crimes) also are governed and ranked by the sentencing
guidelines.  For some Measure 11 crimes, the Measure 11 mandatory
minimum sentence is less than the maximum sentence that is
possible under the sentencing guidelines.  See State ex rel
Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 604, 932 P2d 1145 (1997)
(noting same when departure considered).  For a Measure 11 crime
that carries a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is
less than the maximum sentencing guidelines sentence, Measure 11
allows the trial court to impose the sentencing guidelines
sentence.  See ORS 137.700 ("The court may impose a greater
sentence if otherwise permitted by law * * *.").
		For other Measure 11 crimes, however, the Measure 11
mandatory minimum is greater than the maximum sentencing
guidelines sentence for that particular defendant.  See
Huddleston, 324 Or at 604 (so noting).  For offenders who commit
Measure 11 crimes that carry a mandatory minimum sentence that is
greater than the maximum sentencing guidelines sentence (such as
defendant), Measure 11 requires the trial court to set the
defendant's sentence at the Measure 11 mandatory minimum.  See
ORS 137.700(1) ("court * * * may not impose a lower sentence than
the sentence specified"). (4)
		A consequence of that situation -- in which the Measure
11 sentence is greater than the maximum sentencing guidelines
sentence -- is that the Measure 11 sentence might be greater than
the sentence that the sentencing guidelines assign to crimes with
an equal, or even greater, crime-seriousness ranking.  It is that
disparity in sentences -- between Measure 11 crimes and non-Measure 11 crimes that carry the same or greater crime-seriousness rankings -- that defendant claims violates the
proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16.  
B.	Discussion
		With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the merits of
defendant's argument that his Measure 11 mandatory minimum
sentences violate Article I, section 16.  Article I, section 16,
provides, in part:
		"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed.  Cruel and unusual punishments
shall not be inflicted, but all penalties shall be
proportioned to the offense. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant asserts his challenge under the
emphasized "proportionality" requirement of that provision. 
Adopting the dissent's reasoning from the Court of Appeals'
decision, defendant argues that the proportionality clause
requires the legislature to set approximately equal sentences for
crimes of equal severity and to set greater sentences for more
serious crimes than those sentences set for less serious crimes. 
See Ferman-Velasco, 157 Or App at 426-39 (Warren, J., dissenting)
(setting out reasons for that conclusion).  Because his sentences
under Measure 11 are greater than the presumptive sentence
assigned to crimes ranked equally and more serious on the crime-seriousness scale of the sentencing guidelines, defendant claims
that his Measure 11 sentences violate the proportionality
requirement of Article I, section 16. (5)
		We begin our analysis by examining a necessary
statutory premise of defendant's argument.  He assumes that the
crime-seriousness rankings of the sentencing guidelines remained
unchanged by the adoption of Measure 11 and that the sentencing
guidelines represent an accurate, contemporary measure of the
seriousness of his crimes for purposes of any constitutional
proportionality analysis. (6)  According to defendant,
	"* * * Measure 11 does not by its plain terms either
amend the alphabetical or numerical classifications
already assigned to the covered felonies nor does it
invent entirely new classifications for them.  On its
face, the statute focuses on punishment and it simply
does not deal with niceties such as the classification
of the crimes being punished."  
Therefore, defendant submits, the crime-seriousness rankings for
his crimes were unchanged by Measure 11.
		Defendant is correct that Measure 11 does not adjust
expressly the crime-seriousness ranking of the crimes that it
covers.  Nonetheless, it does not follow from that observation
that Measure 11 simply superimposes a new set of sentences onto
the sentencing guidelines sentences without having any effect
upon the existing sentencing structure.  What defendant has
failed to consider -- which we address below -- is whether the
laws governing the creation, adoption, and alteration of the
sentencing guidelines require reclassification in light of
subsequent legislative enactments, such as Measure 11.
  		In 1985, the legislature created the Oregon Criminal
Justice Council (Commission) (7) to develop the sentencing
guidelines.  Or Laws 1985, ch 558, § 2.  The legislature later
codified the sentencing guidelines in 1989.  Or Laws 1989, ch
790, § 87.  That legislation (approving the sentencing guidelines
as statutory law) provided:
		"* * * [A]fter adjournment sine die of the
Legislative Assembly, the [Commission] shall review all
new legislation that creates new crimes or reclassifies
existing crimes.  The [Commission] shall make any
necessary modifications to the crime seriousness scale
of the guidelines to reflect the actions of the
Legislative Assembly."
Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 84 (emphasis added). (8)  
		That legislation directs the Commission to modify the
crime-seriousness scale "after adjournment sine die of the
Legislative Assembly," so as to "reflect" (emphasis added)
legislative actions.  It is clear from those provisions that the
Commission must amend the crime-seriousness scale to reflect any
subsequent legislative enactments that pertain to the seriousness
of a crime. (9)  Stated differently, the crime-seriousness scale
does not, as defendant contends, set an absolute measure of crime
seriousness to which all subsequent enactments must comply;
rather, the scale serves to reflect legislation regarding the
seriousness of particular crimes, which can and does change over
time.  
		In addition, we note that Oregon Laws 1989, chapter
790, section 84 directs the Commission to modify the guidelines
to reflect legislative "actions" (emphasis added), not just
specific enactments pertaining to the crime-seriousness scale. 
As such, any legislation that suggests a change in the
seriousness of a crime -- including the increase or decrease in
the penalty for that crime -- warrants a corresponding amendment
to the sentencing guidelines. (10)
		Therefore, we conclude that the fact that defendant's
Measure 11 sentences are greater than those imposed for other
crimes that carry the same or greater crime-seriousness rankings
under the sentencing guidelines does not create the
constitutional violation that defendant asserts.  That is so,
because the discrepancy among such sentences is due to the
Commission's failure to amend the crime-seriousness scale to
reflect the greater penalties that Measure 11 imposes for crimes
such as defendant's, and that failure does not create a
constitutional violation.  Put differently, Measure 11 is not
contrary to the legislature's crime-seriousness classification;
rather, it represents the most recent legislative enactment
demonstrating the seriousness with which the legislative branch
views Measure 11 crimes, including defendant's crimes.  
		In light of the foregoing conclusion, the premise for
defendant's proportionality argument -- that the crime-seriousness rankings of the sentencing guidelines remained
unchanged by the adoption of Measure 11 and, therefore, represent
an accurate measure of the seriousness of his crimes for
proportionality purposes -- is without foundation.  We therefore
reject defendant's challenge under Article I, section 16.
III.  UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
		We turn to defendant's federal constitutional claims. 
Before this court, defendant argues that Measure 11 violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the right to
allocution under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
under the Eighth Amendment; the right to assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment; and the Guarantee Clause of Article
IV, section 4.
		Defendant concedes in his petition and briefing that,
in Huddleston, 324 Or 597, this court rejected a number of state
and federal facial constitutional challenges to the propriety of
sentencing under Measure 11.  Nonetheless, defendant presents his
federal constitutional arguments to this court to ensure
exhaustion of his state remedies for the alleged violations of
his federal constitutional rights.  See Duncan v. Henry, 513 US
364, 365-66, 115 S Ct 887, 130 L Ed 2d 865 (1995) (to preserve
claims for federal habeas corpus review, defendant must raise
claims in state direct appeal).
		Defendant is correct that this court previously has 
considered and rejected challenges to Measure 11 based upon the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Guarantee Clause.  Huddleston 324 Or at 626, 630.  We will not
revisit those holdings here.
		Defendant is mistaken, however, respecting this court's
disposition of his remaining federal claims.  Although this court
has decided challenges to Measure 11 under some of the similar
provisions in the Oregon Constitution, this court has not
considered fully whether Measure 11 violates the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to allocution, or the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. (11)  We address each of
those contentions below. 
A.	Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishments
		We begin with defendant's argument that Measure 11
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments, (12) as incorporated and applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 US
238, 239-40, 92 S Ct 2726, 33 L Ed 2d 346 (1972) (Eighth
Amendment applicable to states through Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).  Defendant contends that Measure 11 is
cruel and unusual because it denies him the opportunity to seek a
reduction  of his sentence.  Defendant relies upon United States
Supreme Court cases that hold that death-penalty sentencing
schemes that do not afford a meaningful opportunity for
consideration of mitigating evidence violate the Eighth
Amendment.  See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 319-28, 109
S Ct 2934, 106 L Ed 2d 256 (1989) (remanding for resentencing
with jury instructions, if requested, that give jury opportunity
to consider mitigating evidence of defendant's background and
character or circumstances of crime).
		The Supreme Court specifically has limited its holdings
concerning the importance of mitigating evidence to capital
cases.  See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 US 957, 995, 111 S
Ct 2680, 115 L Ed 2d 836 (1991) ("Our cases creating and
clarifying the 'individualized capital sentencing doctrine' have
repeatedly suggested that there is no comparable requirement
outside the capital context, because of the qualitative
difference between death and all other penalties."); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 US 280, 304, 96 S Ct 2978, 2991, 49 L Ed 2d
944 (1976) (prevailing practice of individualized sentencing
determinations reflects enlightened policy, rather than
constitutional imperative; however, when inflicting death
penalty, consideration of offender's character and record and
circumstances of offense are constitutionally indispensable). 
Because this is not a capital case, and Measure 11 does not
address capital crimes, we reject defendant's argument under the
Eighth Amendment.
B.	Fourteenth Amendment Right to Allocution
		Defendant next argues that Measure 11 violates his
right to allocution under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (13)  According to defendant, that right
"primarily aims to provide the defendant an opportunity to plead
for mitigation of the sentence."  Defendant submits that, in
Green v. United States, 365 US 301, 304, 81 S Ct 653, 5 L Ed 2d
670 (1961), the Supreme Court recognized that "[n]one of [the]
modern innovations [respecting criminal procedure that have
evolved since the seventeenth century] lessens the need for the
defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the
court his plea in mitigation."  Because Measure 11 would not
allow the court to impose a sentence below his mandatory minimum
sentence, defendant argues that Measure 11 denied him a
meaningful right to allocution under the Due Process Clause.
		In Huddleston, this court arguably addressed a similar
federal allocution argument in the course of rejecting a
defendant's federal equal-protection challenge to Measure 11. 
See 324 Or at 628 (citing earlier state allocution analysis as
basis for concluding that Measure 11 did not infringe upon any
federal right of allocution and therefore rejecting federal
equal-protection challenge).  Although the sweep of that
conclusion is sufficiently broad to include defendant's argument
here, the analysis that underlies that conclusion largely is
indirect and reliant primarily -- if not entirely -- upon the
right to allocution under the Oregon Constitution.  For that
reason, we elect to entertain defendant's argument that Measure
11 violates a federal right to allocution under the Due Process
Clause.
		The right to allocution is rooted in the common law. 
Green, 365 US at 304.  Allocution is the defendant's formal
address to the trial court following a guilty verdict, wherein
the court asks the defendant if any reason exists why the court
should not impose the sentence.  See Paul W. Barrett, Allocution,
9 Mo L Rev 115, 115 (1944) (explaining historical roots of
allocution).  At common law, only four narrowly defined answers
could relieve the defendant of the sentence:
	"[T]he point of [allocution] was not to elicit
mitigating evidence or a plea for leniency, but to give
the defendant a formal opportunity to present one of
the strictly defined legal reasons which required the
avoidance or delay of sentencing:  he was not the
person convicted, he had benefit of clergy or a pardon,
he was insane, or if a woman, she was pregnant."
Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony,
81 Harv L Rev 821, 832-33 (1968) (footnote omitted; emphasis
added).  A defendant who could not establish one of those
strictly defined legal reasons nonetheless would "frequently
address[] the court in mitigation of his conduct * * * [and]
cast[] himself upon their mercy."  Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo L
Rev 115, 118 (1944) (quoting 1 Chit Creditor L, 700).  However,
even under those circumstances, "nothing more [was] done, but the
proper judge pronounce[d] the sentence."  Id.
		Many states have preserved the right to allocution in
various forms.  For example, although the Oregon Constitution
recognizes a right to allocution, the right "does not carry with
it a right to have the sentencing court necessarily be able to
reduce a sentence that otherwise applies."  Huddleston, 324 Or at
611 (emphasis in original).  We observe, however, that it is
uncertain whether and to what extent the right of allocution may
have a basis in the United States Constitution.  See State v.
Rogers, 330 Or 282, 303, 4 P3d 1261 (2000) (so stating).  
		As already noted, defendant cites Green to support his
argument that his Measure 11 sentence violates a federal
constitutional right to allocution under the Due Process Clause. 
The issue in Green, however, was whether the trial court had
violated Federal Criminal Rule 32(a), which then specifically
granted to a defendant in federal court the right to speak in
"mitigation" of his or her sentence.  365 US at 303, 303 n 1. 
Green was not based, as defendant suggests, upon any federal
constitutional guarantee.  Indeed, one year after deciding Green,
the Supreme Court held that
		"[t]he failure of a trial court to ask a defendant
represented by an attorney whether he has anything to
say before sentence is imposed is * * * an error which
is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional."
Hill v. United States, 368 US 424, 428, 82 S Ct 468, 7 L Ed 2d
417 (1962) (emphasis added).  Even respecting a defendant's right
to seek a reduction of a sentence during allocution, the Court
has stated that it has "not directly determined whether or to
what extent the concept of due process of law requires that a
criminal defendant wishing to present evidence or argument
presumably relevant to the issues involved in sentencing should
be permitted to do so."  McGautha v. California, 402 US 183, 218,
91 S Ct 1454, 28 L Ed 2d 711 (1971).
		Turning to the case at hand, we conclude that, even
assuming that a federal right to allocution exists under the Due
Process Clause, and that such a right includes the opportunity to
seek a reduction in sentence, defendant was not denied that right
here.  Defendant does not assert that the trial court denied him
the opportunity to make whatever statement he wished to make. 
Rather, he argues that Measure 11, by denying the trial court the
power to impose a sentence less than the mandatory minimum, has
rendered the right to allocution ineffective.  At bottom,
defendant contends that his right of allocution is violated
unless a court has authority to reduce a sentence as a defendant
requests.  
		Nothing, however, in either the United States
Constitution or in the Supreme Court's case law suggests that, in
a mandatory sentencing scheme, the right to allocution includes,
as a necessary result of that allocution, the ability of a trial
court to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence that otherwise
lawfully applies.  Not even the allocution provided for in the
rule at issue in Green affords the right that defendant claims
here.  Despite defendant's argument to the contrary, the Court in
Green did not suggest that Rule 32(a) included a right to any
particular range of sentences or to the consideration of any
particular sentencing factors; rather, the rule provided an
opportunity to address whatever factors the substantive law made
relevant.  The same can be said, we think, of any federal
constitutional right to allocution that might exist.  We
therefore reject defendant's allocution argument under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C.	Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
		Finally, defendant claims that Measure 11 violates his
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, (14) as incorporated and
applied to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 342-45, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d
799 (1963) (Sixth Amendment applicable to states through Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).  As we understand
defendant's argument, he does not contend that his counsel was
not present at sentencing; neither does he contend that his
lawyer prejudiced his case by failing to act according to
professional standards.  Rather, defendant essentially claims
that he constructively was denied the assistance of counsel
because Measure 11, which required a mandatory minimum sentence,
prevented his lawyer from advocating for a lesser sentence. 
		We begin, and end, our analysis by noting the
similarity between that argument and defendant's federal
allocution argument.  Specifically, both arguments rest upon the
notion that defendant, or someone in his behalf, has the right to
plead for and, more importantly, to obtain, a lesser sentence. 
As we already noted, however, the Supreme Court has not held that
there is a constitutional right to have an otherwise lawful
mandatory minimum sentence reduced based upon the defendant's
circumstances.  Because defendant, himself, was not entitled to
have his sentence reduced based upon his statement in allocution,
neither was he entitled to have the court reduce his sentence
based upon the statements of his lawyer.  Consequently, we reject
defendant's argument under the Sixth Amendment.

IV.  WITNESS FEES
		We turn to defendant's final assignment of error, which
raises the issue whether the trial court had authority to order
defendant to pay some of the prosecution's witness fees.  Both
parties rely upon the interplay (or lack thereof) between two
statutes -- ORS 136.602(1) and ORS 161.665(1) -- to support their
conflicting contentions respecting the trial court's order.  ORS
136.602(1) provides, in part:
		"Except as otherwise specifically provided by law,
the per diem fees and mileage and any expenses allowed
[by statute] due to any witness in a grand jury
proceeding, or any prosecution witness in a criminal
action or proceeding in a circuit * * * court * * *
shall be paid by the county in which the grand jury
proceeding or criminal action or proceeding is held. 
Payment shall be made upon a claim verified by the
witness, showing the number of days attended and the
number of miles traveled, and a certified statement   
* * * showing the amounts due the witness."
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 161.665(1) provides, in part:
		"* * * [T]he court, only in the case of a
defendant for whom it enters a judgment of conviction,
may include in its sentence thereunder a provision that
the convicted defendant shall pay as costs expenses
specially incurred * * * in prosecuting the defendant. 
Costs include a reasonable attorney fee for [court-appointed] counsel * * *.  Costs shall not include
expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally
guaranteed jury trial or expenditures in connection
with the maintenance and operation of government
agencies that must be made by the public irrespective
of specific violations of law."
(Emphasis added.)
		Defendant contends that our analysis should begin with
ORS 136.602(1), which, as set out above, requires that the county
in which the trial is held pay the prosecution's witness fees,
"[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by law."  In
defendant's view, the trial court had authority to impose payment
of those fees upon defendant only if ORS 161.665(1), which allows
such an imposition of costs (with certain exceptions), qualified
as an exception to ORS 136.602(1).  Defendant concludes that,
because ORS 161.665(1) does not "specifically provide[]" that a
convicted defendant can be held responsible for payment of the
prosecution's witness fees, that statute does not qualify as an
exception to a particular county's absolute responsibility for
such fees under ORS 136.602(1).
		The state responds that ORS 136.602(1) and ORS
161.665(1) serve different purposes and apply at different points
during a criminal proceeding.  In the state's view, ORS
136.602(1) imposes initial financial responsibility (unless
otherwise "specifically provided by law") for the prosecution's
witnesses upon the county in which the trial is held, while ORS
161.665(1) provides that, upon conviction, a defendant may be
ordered to provide reimbursement of certain expenses, which could
include the prosecution's witness fees.  In the state's view, the
prosecution's witness fees qualify as costs that a trial court
may impose upon a convicted defendant under ORS 161.665(1),
unless such fees constitute "expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial," ORS 161.665(1), thereby
falling within the statutory exception set out in ORS 161.665(1).
		Resolution of the parties' dispute requires that we
construe ORS 136.602(1) and ORS 161.665(1).  Accordingly, we
begin by examining the text and context of the statutes, to
ascertain the legislature's intent.  See PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993)
(describing methodology).
		As noted, ORS 136.602(1) provides, in part, that per
diem fees, mileage, and statutory expenses "due to * * * any
prosecution witness in a criminal action * * * shall be paid by
the county" in which that action is held, "[e]xcept as otherwise
specifically provided by law."  That statute further provides
that payment shall be made "upon a claim verified by the witness"
and a "certified statement" setting out certain information
required for payment.  The textual references to fees, mileage,
and expenses "due to any witness" (emphasis added), as well as to
payment made "upon a claim" (emphasis added) verified by a
witness suggest that ORS 136.602(1) concerns the initial payment
of monies directly to a prosecution witness, at the time when the
witness requests payment.  That is, as the state contends, the
text appears to assign responsibility for fees, mileage, and
expenses associated with the prosecution's witnesses at the time
when those costs become due and owing.  Nothing in the context of
ORS 136.602(1) contradicts that reading of the statute.  
		Under the foregoing reading of ORS 136.602(1), the
introductory phrase "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided
by law" refers to any statutory provision that imposes initial
responsibility for the prosecution's witness expenses upon an
entity other than the county in which the trial is held.  That
phrase does not, as defendant suggests, refer to a statute (such
as ORS 161.665(1), as explained below) that might allow a trial
court to order reimbursement of such expenses.
		Turning to ORS 161.665(1), that statute authorizes a
trial court to impose responsibility for the prosecution's
expenses generally upon a convicted criminal defendant, as part
of that defendant's sentence.  See ORS 161.665(1) ("the court   
* * * may include in its sentence * * * a provision that the
convicted defendant shall pay as costs expenses specially
incurred * * * in prosecuting the defendant" (emphasis added)). 
Nothing in that statute conflicts with the requirement in ORS
136.602(1) that a particular county must pay fees, mileage, and
expenses "due" to a prosecution witness upon the filing of a
claim by that witness; indeed, the fact that ORS 161.665(1)
speaks to costs already "incurred" suggests, as the state
contends here, that that statute authorizes a trial court to
order a convicted defendant to provide reimbursement for certain
prosecution expenses (such as witness fees) already paid.
		In sum, we agree with the state that the trial court
had authority under ORS 161.665(1) to require defendant to pay,
as costs, the prosecution's witness fees, provided that such fees
did not fall within the statutory exception set out in ORS
161.665(1).  That exception provides:
"Costs [that a defendant may be ordered to pay upon
conviction] shall not include expenses inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial or
expenditures in connection with the maintenance and
operation of government agencies that must be made by
the public irrespective of specific violations of law."
(Emphasis added.)  Defendant contends that, because he has a
constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face, (15) expenses
associated with such witnesses fall within that statutory
exception.  The state responds that the statutory exception does
not include any expenses such as the prosecution's witness fees.
		To determine the intended scope of the phrase "expenses
inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial"
in ORS 161.665(1) (emphasis added), we begin by setting out
various constitutional rights afforded in criminal prosecutions
under the state and federal constitutions.  Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution, provides, in part:
	"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in
the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor[.]"
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part:
	"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, * * * and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
		Although worded differently, both the state and federal
constitutions grant criminal defendants the right to a "public"
trial by an "impartial jury."  In light of the text of ORS
161.665(1), which refers to "expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" (emphasis added), we
think it is clear that, if nothing else, any expenses related to
the impartial, public "jury trial" itself -- such as juror fees 
-- fall within that statutory exception.
		The more difficult question is whether the statutory
exception set out in ORS 161.665(1) also encompasses those
expenses associated with a defendant's right to meet witnesses
face to face, such as the prosecution's witness fees (which
secure the appearance of and compensate witnesses against the
defendant).  In other words, the question is whether the
exception set out in ORS 161.665(1) encompasses certain expenses
associated with those constitutional rights that serve to protect
a defendant at trial, not only those directly associated with an
impartial, public jury trial.  When we consider the statutory
exception in context, it is apparent that the legislature, at the
least, did not intend that exception apply to expenses associated
with all constitutional rights that protect a defendant at trial. 
That is so, because ORS 161.665(1) specifically excludes from the
exception those expenses associated with payment of court-appointed counsel -- expenses that clearly are associated with
the right to assistance of counsel, which, like the right to meet
witnesses face to face, serves to protect a criminal defendant
during trial.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 22) (setting out
that part of ORS 161.665(1)).  Consequently, we cannot conclude,
at our first level of analysis, that the phrase "expenses
inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial"
necessarily encompasses expenses associated with the right to
meet witnesses face to face, when it specifically excludes
expenses associated with the right to assistance of counsel.
		Turning to the legislative history of ORS 161.665(1),
see PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (court examines legislative history if
legislature's intended meaning cannot be ascertained from
examining text and context of statute at issue), we first note
that statute was part of the revised Oregon Criminal Code that
the Criminal Law Revision Commission (Revision Commission)
prepared in 1970.  Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 80; Proposed Oregon
Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report, § 80, 76-77 (July 1970). (16) 
The Commentary to the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code does not
elaborate on the intended meaning of the phrase "expenses
inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial"
in what later became ORS 161.665(1).  However, the Commentary
does note that the section of the proposed code that eventually
became ORS 161.665(1) was derived from section 1525 of the
Michigan Revised Criminal Code (1967).  Proposed Oregon Criminal
Code, Final Draft and Report, § 80, Commentary at 77.
		The Commentary to section 1525 of the Michigan Revised
Criminal Code, in turn, cites the case of People v. Hope, 297
Mich 115, 297 NW 206 (1941), for the following proposition:
"the defendant cannot be assessed the expenses
attributable to use of the jury in the case against
him; the Constitution guarantees that right, and the
state cannot charge him for what he is guaranteed."
Michigan Revised Criminal Code, Final Draft, § 1525, Commentary
at 146 (September 1967) (emphasis added).  In Hope, the defendant
had challenged a cost order that included both witness fees and
juror fees, in addition to other costs.  The Michigan Supreme
Court invalidated the order respecting juror fees, reasoning that
the defendant could not be ordered to pay such fees because
"[e]very person charged with a criminal offense has a
constitutional right to a trial by jury."  Hope, 297 Mich at 118,
297 NW at 208 (emphasis added).  The court, however, upheld the
imposition of witness fees without comment.  Id. at 118-19, 297
NW at 208; see also People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich 372, 377, 25 NW
318, 320 (1885) (noting that defendants should not be ordered to
pay costs of jurors, because "it would be monstrous to establish
a practice of punishing persons convicted * * * for demanding
what the constitution of the state gives them, -- a trial by
jury").  
		As can be seen, the Michigan case law supporting
section 1525 of the Michigan Revised Criminal Code (1967), from
which ORS 161.665(1) was derived, supports the conclusion that,
in using the phrase "expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" (emphasis added), the
Oregon Legislature intended to encompass only expenses relating
to a defendant's jury trial itself, not expenses associated with
other constitutional rights that apply at the time of trial, such
as the right to meet witnesses face to face.
		The materials from the Oregon Revision Commission are
not as illustrative as the Michigan case law, but are helpful to
some extent.  In the course of deliberating the article of the
proposed Oregon Revised Criminal Code that included what later
became ORS 161.665(1), one Revision Commission member queried as
to the sort of expenditures that could not be imposed upon a
convicted defendant under the statutory exception.  The Executive
Director of the Revision Commission responded that, under the
exception as a whole, the following expenses could not be so
imposed:  "district attorneys' salaries, sheriffs' salaries,
jurors' fees, police investigations, etc."  Minutes, Criminal Law
Revision Commission, May 14, 1970, 28.  
		The foregoing reference to "jurors' fees" is consistent
with our reading of the case law surrounding section 1525 of the
Michigan Revised Criminal Code (1967), from which ORS 161.665(1)
was derived, that is, that the phrase "expenses inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial" encompasses
such fees.  As to the other types of expenses that the Executive
Director mentioned, it is evident that such expenses fall within
the second part of the statutory exception set out in ORS
161.665(1), that is, "expenditures in connection with the
maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be
made by the public irrespective of specific violations of law." 
We have reviewed the materials surrounding the 1971 Legislature's
subsequent deliberations and enactment of the revised Criminal
Code, and have found nothing that further assists our analysis.
		Taken as a whole, the legislative history of ORS
161.665(1) demonstrates that, in using the phrase "expenses
inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial"
in the statutory exception to imposition of costs upon a
convicted defendant, the legislature intended to except expenses
associated with a criminal defendant's jury trial itself, such as
juror fees.  Conversely, the legislature did not intend that
statutory exception to encompass expenses associated with a
defendant's constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face. 
Consequently, the trial court did not err when it ordered
defendant to pay the prosecution's witness fees under ORS
161.665(1). (17)
V.  CONCLUSION

		We reject defendant's challenge to Measure 11 under
Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.  We also
reject defendant's various challenges to Measure 11 under the
United States Constitution.  Finally, we reject defendant's
contention that the trial court had no statutory authority to
order defendant to pay the prosecution's witness fees. 
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.


1.      	Measure 11 was an initiative that the voters adopted at
the November 1994 general election.  It became effective on April
1, 1995, Or Laws 1995, ch 2, and was codified as ORS 137.700.  In
this opinion, we use the designations Measure 11 and ORS 137.700
interchangeably.

2.      	ORS 137.700 provides, in part:
		"(1) When a person is convicted of one of the
offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this section  
* * *, the court shall impose, and the person shall
serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment listed
in subsection (2) of this section. * * *
		"(2)  The offenses to which subsection (1) of this
section applies and the applicable mandatory minimum
sentences are:
		"(a)(A) * * *	
		"* * * * *
		"(K)	Rape in the second degree,  as defined in ORS 163.365 ...............75 months
		"* * * * *
		"(P)	Sexual abuse in the first  degree, as defined in ORS 163.427 ...............75 months"


3.      	The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, the agency
responsible for creating and updating the sentencing guidelines,
has renumbered the sentencing-guideline rules since defendant
committed his crimes.  We cite to the most recent version of
those rules.

4.      	Under Measure 11, defendant's mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment is 75 months for each of his crimes.  However, the
presumptive sentence for each of his crimes, given defendant's
criminal history "(H)" designation and the applicable crime-seriousness ranking of "(8)," is 19-20 months.  Therefore, the
maximum sentence that a court could impose upon defendant under
the sentencing guidelines, assuming that the circumstances of his
crimes warranted a full departure, would be 40 months for each
crime.

5.      	We note that defendant compares each of his sentences
(75 months) with the presumptive sentence assigned to crimes with
the same crime-seriousness ranking and same criminal-history
score (19-20).  The state argues that, to evaluate
proportionality under Article I, section 16, courts must compare
the actual sentence imposed to the maximum sentence allowed by
law for the comparative crime.  Because we dispose of defendant's
challenges upon other grounds, we do not address the state's
argument.

6.      	Defendant's argument also assumes that Article I,
section 16, allows this court to compare unrelated crimes for
purposes of proportionality.  Because we resolve this case by
rejecting the underlying premise of defendant's Article I,
section 16, argument, we do not address that issue.  Cf. Leo v.
Keisling, 327 Or 556, 560, 964 P2d 1023 (1998) (court does not
address constitutional issues when adequate statutory basis for
decision exists).  

7.      	The legislature later restructured the Council and
renamed it the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission.  Or Laws 1995,
ch 420, § 1.

8.      	The 1989 Legislature did not codify Oregon Laws 1989,
chapter 790, section 84; however, in 1997, the legislature passed
legislation with similar wording.  That legislation was codified
at ORS 137.667(1), which provides, in part:
		"The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission shall
review all new legislation that creates new crimes or
modifies existing crimes.  The commission shall adopt
by rule any necessary modifications to the crime
seriousness scale of the guidelines to reflect the
actions of the Legislative Assembly * * *."


9.      	Although the legislature used the term "Legislative
Assembly," the focus of Oregon Laws 1989, chapter 790, section 84
unquestionably was to direct the Commission respecting
fulfillment of its duties in respect of future legislative
enactments.  In that regard, we conclude that the legislation
also encompasses legislative enactments, such as Measure 11, that
the people adopt as a co-ordinate lawmaking body.  See generally
State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or 641, 644, 270 P 513 (1928)
(1902 amendment to Article IV, section 1, which created the
initiative and referendum process, also created "two law-making
bodies, the legislative assembly on the one hand and the people
on the other, which in the exercise of the legislative powers are
coequal and co-ordinate"). 

10.      	Indeed, the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation
Manual, 149 (Sept 1989), provides:
		"The sentencing guidelines system is based on
administrative rules adopted by the State Sentencing
Guidelines Board.  These rules were affirmatively
approved by the 1989 Legislative Assembly.  Section 87,
Chapter 790, Oregon Laws 1989.  While the guidelines
have been approved by the legislature, they retain
their status as administrative rules.  When those rules
conflict with statutes, the statutory provisions
control."

11.      	See State ex rel Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or 83, 93-95,
949 P2d 724 (1997) (rejecting challenge based upon Article I,
section 16, prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment);
Huddleston 324 Or at 611, 628 (rejecting challenge based upon
state right to allocution under Article I, section 11).  This
court has not decided whether Measure 11 violates the right to
counsel under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.

12.      	The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:  "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

13.      	The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides:  "No State shall * * *
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law * * *."

14.      	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."

15.      	We note that, for purposes of this opinion, we use the
phrase from Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
"meet the witnesses face to face," to refer to both the right to
meet witnesses under Article I, section 11, as well as the right
to "be confronted with the witnesses against [an accused in a
criminal prosecution]" under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

16.      	The 1971 Legislature generally adopted the proposed
revisions set out in the Proposed Criminal Code, including what
ultimately became ORS 161.665(1).  Or Laws 1971, ch 743; see also
State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 376 n 10, 938 P2d 756 (1997) (so
explaining).  The commentary that the Revision Commission
prepared was available to the legislature throughout its
deliberations on the proposed revision and is considered part of
the legislative history of the Oregon Criminal Code.  Chakerian,
325 Or at 376 n 10, 379.

17.      	We note that defendant did not raise -- and we do not
decide -- the issue whether either the state or federal
constitutions prevent the legislature from allowing a trial court
to impose costs associated with defendant's constitutional right
to meet witnesses face to face.