Title: People v. Henderson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 95043
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: March 18, 2004

Docket No. 95043-September 2003-Agenda 14.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							MELVIN HENDERSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed March 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal, we are asked to address an issue of first impression,
ostensibly ripe for review. The issue, as framed by the parties, is whether
the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the merits of
a "negotiated plea agreement" the parties purportedly presented after the
expiration of the court's plea cutoff deadline. However, having carefully
reviewed the record on appeal, we find nothing therein which would
indicate that the parties before the circuit court had actually reached an
agreement or that they ever attempted to present such an agreement to the
circuit court. Therefore, whether or not we believe that a court abuses, or
abdicates, its discretion when it refuses to consider a negotiated plea
agreement presented by the parties beyond a deadline set by the court, we
have no occasion in this case to address the issue. Consequently, without
reaching the issue the parties would have us address, we reverse the
judgment of the appellate court (334 Ill. App. 3d 290) and affirm that of
the circuit court of Rock Island County.

BACKGROUND
	On November 26, 1999, defendant, Melvin Henderson, was
charged by information with one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, in violation of section
401(c)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS
570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)). Specifically, the information stated that
"defendant knowingly possessed, with the intent to deliver to another, one
or more grams but less than fifteen grams of a substance containing
cocaine, a controlled substance." A violation of section 401(c)(2) is a
Class 1 felony.
	On January 18, 2000, defendant appeared in court and pled not
guilty to this charge. In a written order entered on January 18, the circuit
court set March 3, 2000, as the date for a pretrial conference, and March
20, 2000, as the date for defendant's trial. In this order, the court also set
March 16, 2000, as the "final day for presenting a negotiated plea."
	During the March 3 pretrial conference, defendant informed the court
that he wished to discharge his attorney and retain new defense counsel.
Defendant's new counsel appeared on defendant's behalf during this
hearing. He reported that he had just been retained by defendant and had
reviewed some of the discovery in the case. Defense counsel informed the
court that, during his examination of the case file, he had come across an
"offer letter" from the prosecutor, wherein the terms of a negotiated plea
of guilty were set forth. Defense counsel stated he was "not prepared to
accept the offer" because he was still investigating the case. The circuit
court then ruled that it would retain March 16 as the "final" plea date, but
would entertain a motion for continuance if defense counsel was not ready
for trial. On March 7, 2000, defendant's original attorney formally
withdrew from this case, and defendant's new counsel was substituted.
	The parties returned to court on March 16, 2000. The record reflects
that the circuit court stated, "this matter comes on today for a plea." In
open court, defendant stated that he did not wish to enter a plea and
demanded a trial by jury. During this hearing, defense counsel also
presented a motion for continuance, to which the State had no objection.
The circuit court granted the continuance, and set defendant's trial date for
April 17, 2000. The circuit court also set March 31, 2000, for a pretrial
hearing, and April 13, 2000, as the "final" date for consideration of a
negotiated plea.
	On April 13, the case was called for pretrial hearing; however,
defendant failed to appear. Defense counsel informed the court that the
parties had engaged in further plea negotiations and the prosecutor had
made a "viable" offer which defense counsel wanted to discuss with
defendant. The court adjourned the hearing until the afternoon.
	The hearing resumed in the afternoon with defendant present.
Defendant informed the court that he was dissatisfied with his attorney and
wanted to replace him with yet another attorney. Despite defendant's
continuing suggestions that he might retain a different attorney, he
ultimately proceeded through trial and sentencing without a change of
counsel.
	During the pretrial hearing, defense counsel informed the court that
he had been told by the prosecutor that the State intended to file an
amended information, reducing the charge against defendant from a Class
1 felony to a Class 4 felony. Counsel further informed the court that
negotiations were ongoing between the parties:
			"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Cooley [the prosecutor] and
I have done some talking, and we're working on negotiations,
also. The State at this time was going to file an amended charge
on this particular matter from a Class 1 to a Class 4.
* * *
			As far as the negotiations go, Mr. Cooley and I have
discussed relationship to the Class 4, be allowed a-Mr.
Henderson was mentioning was of the negotiation, that Mr.
Henderson has not accepted such negotiation. Gave me a
counteroffer I which [sic] presented to Mr. Cooley. Mr.
Cooley's offer that we talked about this morning-
			THE COURT: Mr. Henderson's not accepting that offer?
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: As of-Before we walked in the
courtroom, no."
	The court then advised defendant that he had until the next day to
think about the State's offer. Apparently under the impression that the
reduction of the charge was part of the negotiations, the court told
defendant, "They're offering to reduce this to a Class 4 felony instead of
a Class 1." When defendant inquired whether he had to plead guilty in
order for the State to reduce the charge, the prosecutor intervened and
clarified the State's position: "I think regardless of what happens, him
getting another lawyer, whether he pleads or not, State intends [to] file this
motion to amend ***." When defendant stated that he had thought the
charge reduction was part of a negotiated plea, defense counsel stated,
"No, it wasn't." The court reset the matter for the following day, April 14.
	The next day, the parties again appeared and the State was granted
leave to formally amend the charge against defendant to simple
possession. The court advised defendant of the charge and the possible
penalties upon conviction. The court then asked if there was a negotiated
plea. Defense counsel responded, "There is an offer on the table, but it is
not-has not been accepted by Mr. Henderson." The court inquired as to
the nature of the offer. The prosecutor in attendance advised the court,
"Mr. Cooley offered a cap of four or two years DOC." The court asked
defendant, "And you don't want to consider that?" Defendant responded,
"No sir. No sir. Huh-uh." Defense counsel explained, "The counteroffer
was made, but Mr. Cooley did not accept that." The court then stated,
"Well, it's set for jury trial Monday. Will the State be ready next week?"
The prosecutor responded affirmatively.
	On April 19, defendant's jury trial commenced. Voir dire was
conducted and a jury was selected. Prior to the delivery of opening
statements, defendant expressed confusion with respect to his eligibility for
an extended-term sentence and asked the circuit judge in open court (but
outside the presence of the jury) to explain why he could be sentenced up
to six years. Immediately thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:
			"THE COURT: Well, you know, probably wasting our time
talking because I'm not going to accept any negotiated pleas. So,
even if you wanted to plead guilty I'm not going to accept it,
because we picked the jury, and you had until last Friday to
enter a negotiated plea. So, if you plead guilty you have to do it,
and its an open plea, and I can give you up to six years. I'm not
saying I'm going to do it. But, you have a right to plead guilty,
but I'm not going to negotiate it. It's not going to be for two or
three years. All right.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: You understand what's the Judge's
telling you?
			THE DEFENDANT: You want me to take an open plea of
six. If you do decide to plead it have to be an open plea of six.
			THE COURT: Right, and it's an open plea.
			THE PROSECUTOR: Not to six years.
			THE COURT: Then I could give you, if you plead guilty right
now I would order a pre-sentence report *** [a]nd then we
would set it for sentencing.
* * *
			THE DEFENDANT: And that's the only way you would be
willing to accept anything if I take an open? Nothing other than
that?
			THE COURT: No. It's too late. That's the policy I have.
			THE DEFENDANT: I know you said Friday. I thought when
you said Friday, not trying to change the word around, I
misunderstood. I understand you said Friday, that [the plea offer]
was two years I think Friday.
			THE COURT: I don't know what it was.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: That was Thursday.
			PROSECUTOR: I'm sure that was the offer on Thursday. I
don't recall what the offer was on Friday.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Friday was the same thing.
* * *
			THE COURT: You talk to [defense counsel]. If you want to
plead open with no cap then I'll take it. If you don't then we're
going to trial.
			DEFENDANT: I don't want a trial. I don't because I'm
already guilty. I can see already. I'm trying to get around a trial.
I'll be willing to cop out, but I'm saying, I mean I don't want a
trial. I do not want a trial. I do not want a trial I know I'm going
to lose.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Then you have to plead guilty to the
open charge, and then be separately sentenced where you face
potential up to six years. Okay? That's the whole thing right now.
			THE COURT: You talk to [defense counsel]. We'll be back
in 10 minutes.
			DEFENDANT: You won't take two years right now?
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge will not take it."
	After a brief recess, defense counsel informed the court that he had
again explained defendant's options to him. Defendant then commenced
an extended dialogue with the court, alternately asserting that he had been
confused about his situation, while trying to bargain with the court as to
what the court might accept as an appropriate sentence if defendant were
to plead guilty. During this dialogue, the prosecutor was silent. The State
did not offer to negotiate further, it did not ask the court for the
opportunity to do so or protest the deprivation of such an opportunity, and
it did not indicate that an offer was pending. Indeed, the State's
indifference is evident from the prosecutor's prior statement: "I don't recall
what the offer was on Friday." While the prosecutor stood by and said
nothing, defendant tried to negotiate with the trial judge, as the following
excerpts amply demonstrate:
			"THE COURT: And, did you tell [defense counsel] you
wanted to take two-
			THE DEFENDANT: I said I wanted to take year and a half.
			THE COURT: That's not two years.
			THE DEFENDANT: I'm saying he was supposed to ask
them, and they never said nothing to me about nothing else.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: That was an offer turned down by
Mr. Cooley Thursday.
			THE DEFENDANT: I seen him Tuesday. I asked him to get
a year and a day. That's what I talked to him about Tuesday,
and I asked him if he would ask the State's Attorney if they give
me a year and a day, and I never heard nothing else after that,
because I know what they offered me already cap of four and a
half, and they offered me two. I believe, Your Honor-
			THE COURT: It's too late right now. I mean the jury is sitting
there and I want to get started with the case.
			THE DEFENDANT: I'm willing. I'll take two today.
			THE COURT: No. That's not agreeable. It's too late to take
two.
* * *
			THE DEFENDANT: Take a cap of three.
			 THE COURT: No.
			THE DEFENDANT: You won't take two years?
			THE COURT: We're done negotiating. I don't know how
many times I can tell you.
			THE DEFENDANT: You won't give me time to think? It's
just like no offer. I know it's a cap of six now. I'm saying the
two they offered me it wasn't even an offer then.
			DEFENSE COUNSEL: You rejected it by giving a counter
offer.
			THE DEFENDANT: I never said I didn't want the two. You
heard me I didn't want to accept, nothing.* * *
			THE DEFENDANT: I said I'm willing to cop out if you're
going to be fair.
			THE COURT: What do you mean I'm going to be fair? I'm
not going to say I'm going to give you probation or two or three
years. I may give you six years.
* * *
			THE DEFENDANT: Not to no cap of six. Not for a cap of
six. That's too many.
			THE COURT: Okay. Bring the jury in."
	Thereafter, the jury trial proceeded and defendant was ultimately
convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The circuit
court set defendant's sentencing hearing for May 24, 2000.
	On May 17, 2000, defendant filed a posttrial motion, asserting two
grounds for error: (1) that the evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (2) that the circuit court erred in not granting a
pretrial suppression motion filed by defendant. The circuit court set a
hearing for this posttrial motion on May 24, 2000, the same date set for
sentencing.
	When the parties returned to court on May 24, the circuit court first
heard and denied defendant's posttrial motion. Thereafter, the circuit court
conducted a sentencing hearing. After listening to testimony in aggravation
and mitigation, the circuit court sentenced defendant to an extended term
of five years' incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections and
one year of mandatory supervised release. Defendant was also assessed
a statutory fine of $500. The sentencing order was entered on June 6,
2000.
	On July 5, 2000, defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration.
The motion alleged that the sentencing of defendant to a five-year term of
incarceration was excessive in light of the fact that he possessed less than
one-tenth of one gram of cocaine, which had been stipulated at the
sentencing hearing to have a street value of $20. No action was taken on
this motion.
	On November 13, 2000, defendant filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief. In that petition, defendant alleged that his trial
counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a motion for reconsideration,
thereby forfeiting defendant's appellate rights. Defendant also alleged that
his five-year, extended-term sentence was void under the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In an affidavit attached to
the petition, defendant asserted that he had been offered a two-year
sentence, but the circuit court had found he had "forfeited the opportunity
to enter that plea due to *** indecisiveness." Defendant's affidavit states:
"I tried to accept that plea right before my trial was to start, but the trial
court expressed that the plea would not be accepted and that I could only
plead at that point to conditions set up by the trial court, which was a
sentencing cap. I did not really understand the offer from the court, which
I recall as [sic] 'a cap of one to three years, extendable to six.' I did not
understand that, so I did not enter a plea of guilty at that time."
	On January 11, 2001, the same judge who presided over
defendant's trial summarily dismissed defendant's petition for
postconviction relief. As part of the dismissal order, the judge noted that
a motion for reconsideration had been filed but had not been heard. As
part of the dismissal order, the judge directed that the motion for
reconsideration be set for a status hearing so that it could be heard and
decided. The judge also found that defendant's Apprendi claim lacked
merit. Following the dismissal of defendant's petition for postconviction
relief, a notice of appeal was filed on February 13, 2001.
	On September 13, 2001, the circuit court held a hearing on
defendant's motion to reconsider. At that hearing, appointed counsel
represented defendant. The record reflects that the motion had not
previously been heard because defendant's trial counsel had been
suspended from the practice of law. The circuit court ultimately denied the
motion to reconsider. On September 14, 2001, defendant filed a notice
of appeal. On motion of defense counsel, the cases were consolidated on
appeal.
	With one justice dissenting, the appellate court reversed the judgment
of the circuit court and remanded this cause for further proceedings. 334
Ill. App. 3d 290. The appellate court held that the refusal of the circuit
court to consider defendant's "negotiated plea" based on timeliness alone
was an abuse of discretion. The court stated, "It does not appear from the
record that the State had ever withdrawn the plea offer and no objection
was made to defendant's attempt to plead following jury selection." 334
Ill. App. 3d at 292. We find it significant that the appellate court never
identified the terms of the "negotiated plea" purportedly presented to the
circuit court; nor did it explain how the State's failure to participate in, or
object to, defendant's dialogue with the circuit court after jury selection
equates to an agreement.
	In any event, the majority proceeded to address the issue of first
impression in Illinois. The majority observed that in decisions from other
jurisdictions which have addressed this issue, two lines of authority have
emerged. One line is represented by the Iowa Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 2001). In Hager, the court
reasoned that inflexible plea deadlines themselves eliminate the court's
exercise of discretion. The other line of authority is represented by People
v. Jasper, 17 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2001). There, the Colorado Supreme
Court reasoned that plea deadlines are an integral part of the court's case
management authority and may be enforced where the parties have actual
notice of the court's practice and where exceptions to the deadline are
permitted for good cause.
	After considering the reasoning of both lines of authority, the
appellate majority found the Hager decision to be more persuasive. The
majority held that "rejecting a guilty plea solely because it was not
tendered before the court-imposed deadline does not seem to be in the
best interests of justice or of public policy concerning resolution of cases."
334 Ill. App. 3d at 294. The appellate majority determined that strict
enforcement of court-imposed plea deadlines would defeat these interests.
334 Ill. App. 3d at 295.
	Under the circumstances of this case, the majority concluded that
defendant's "plea agreement" should have been considered on its merits.
The majority states: "We cannot discern, and the State has not presented,
any difference in added costs or taxing of resources that would justify
addressing an open plea and refusing to even consider one that has been
fully negotiated." 334 Ill. App. 3d at 295. Therefore, the majority
determined, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to "even
consider the negotiated plea solely on timeliness grounds." 334 Ill. App.
3d at 293.
	In a special concurrence, Justice Lytton stated that, because the
circuit court refused to entertain the plea, it did not exercise discretion, and
therefore no deference is owed to the circuit court on this issue. Justice
Lytton stated that "[w]hen a judge draws a strict time line after which he
will not accept a guilty plea, it is an arbitrary, not a discretionary, act." 334
Ill. App. 3d at 296 (Lytton, P.J., specially concurring).
	In dissent, Justice Holdridge disagreed with the majority. In his view,
docket management "is a legitimate concern resting within a trial judge's
sound discretion." 334 Ill. App. 3d at 296-97 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the circuit court properly
exercised discretion in refusing to consider defendant's untimely plea.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).

ANALYSIS
	There is no question that "[t]he disposition of criminal charges by
agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely
called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of
justice." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427,
432, 92 S. Ct. 495, 498 (1971). Like the United States Supreme Court,
this court has a firmly rooted view that the plea-bargaining process, and
the negotiated plea agreements that result from that process, are "vital to
and highly desirable for our criminal justice system." People v. Evans,
174 Ill. 2d 320, 325 (1996). 	Although it is well settled in our jurisprudence that plea bargaining is to be encouraged,
it is equally well established that a defendant does not have an absolute
right to have a guilty plea accepted by the circuit court. Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 433, 92 S. Ct.  at 498; People v. Peterson,
311 Ill. App. 3d 38, 45 (1999). A circuit court may reject a plea in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. Santobello, 404 U.S.  at 262, 30 L. Ed. 2d  at 433, 92 S. Ct.  at 498; Peterson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 45; see
also 134 Ill. 2d R. 402(d) (it is within the discretion of the circuit court to
approve or reject a defendant's guilty plea)). A decision of the circuit
court with respect to the acceptance or rejection of a negotiated plea is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and the judgment of the reviewing
court will not be substituted for that of the trial court. Peterson, 311 Ill.
App. 3d at 45.
	However, before we consider whether a court has abused its
discretion in refusing to accept a negotiated plea agreement, there must
actually be an agreement that the parties have tendered to the court. In
this case, the parties never tendered an agreement for the trial court's
consideration.
	Although the application of contract law principles to plea agreements
may require "tempering in some instances" in order to satisfy concerns for
due process, plea agreements are nonetheless subject to traditional
principles of contract law absent such concerns. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d
at 326-27; People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246 (2002); Coleman
v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 759 n.1 (7th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Muzika, 986 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1993) (the existence of a plea
agreement is determined by ordinary contract principles of offer and
acceptance). Pursuant to traditional principles of contract, the legal effect
of a counteroffer is the rejection of a standing offer. Sharp Electronics
Corp. v. Deutsche Financial Services Corp., 216 F.3d 388, 395-96
(4th Cir. 2000), citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts §36 (1981). A
rejected offer cannot be revived by a later acceptance. See Sementa v.
Tylman, 230 Ill. App. 3d 701, 705 (1992); D'Agostino v. Bank of
Ravenwood, 205 Ill. App. 3d 898, 902 (1990); Sharp Electronics
Corp., 216 F.3d  at 396. When a defendant rejects a State offer, the
parties go "back to the drawing board." Coleman, 318 F.3d  at 759.
	Clearly, on the day of defendant's jury trial, there was no negotiated
plea agreement presented by the parties for the court's consideration. The
parties comments at the April 14 pretrial hearing, and their conduct on the
day of trial, amply illustrate this point.
	 When the court asked during the pretrial hearing if there was a
negotiated plea, defense counsel responded, "There is an offer on the
table, but it is not-has not been accepted by Mr. Henderson." When the
court inquired as to the nature of the offer, the prosecutor in attendance
advised the court, "Mr. Cooley offered a cap of four or two years DOC."
The court then asked defendant, "And you don't want to consider that?"
Defendant responded, "No sir. No sir. Huh-uh." Defense counsel then
explained, "The counteroffer was made, but Mr. Cooley did not accept
that." The court responded, "Well, it's set for jury trial Monday. Will the
State be ready next week?" The prosecutor responded affirmatively.
	Defendant's counteroffer operated as a rejection of the State's offer.
See Sharp Electronics Corp., 216 F.3d  at 395-96. Defense counsel
subsequently acknowledged as much on the day of trial when he told
defendant, "You rejected [the State's offer] by giving a counter offer."
The parties' comments on April 14, 2000, indicate that negotiations had
proved fruitless and the parties were ready to proceed to trial.
	On the date of trial, the prosecutor expressed no interest in further
negotiations with defendant. When defendant attempted to negotiate a
plea agreement with the trial court, the prosecutor expressed
indifference, stating only, "I don't recall what the offer was on Friday."
The prosecutor did not refer to the matter again. He did not ask the court
for an opportunity to engage in further negotiations with defendant or
indicate any willingness to do so. The prosecutor's silence during the
extended dialogue between the defendant and the court may have resulted
from a willingness to accept the trial court's deadline for a negotiated plea
and a calculation that defendant would eventually plead open, or it may
have indicated nothing more than readiness on the part of the prosecutor
to try a simple case rather than engage in further negotiations with a
difficult defendant. In either case, the point, for present purposes, is that
the parties were not, jointly, either indicating a desire to negotiate further
or presenting a negotiated agreement for the court's consideration. Given
the circumstances, the circuit court's statements regarding the expiration
of its deadline for accepting a negotiated plea are simply irrelevant.
	As the State noted in oral argument before this court, defendant was
still trying to negotiate a plea agreement (with the court) on the day of
trial, indicating that there was no agreement at that time. The point is well
taken. Defendant's counsel in oral argument before this court suggested
that the two-year offer the State had previously made to defendant
"arguably had not been withdrawn, at least not in the record." This
assessment of the record appears to be accurate; however, it is also
irrelevant, since the offer had been rejected by defendant himself. Finally,
we take note of the appellate court's observation that "no objection was
made to defendant's attempt to plead following jury selection." 334 Ill.
App. 3d at 292. Why would the State object? The circuit court was
offering defendant the option of entering an open plea of guilty or a jury
trial-a trial for which the State was fully prepared and for which a jury had
already been selected. The State apparently found either alternative
acceptable. Logically, there would be no objection unless the State
disagreed with the court's mode of procedure.
	We conclude that there was no negotiated plea agreement presented
by the parties for the court's consideration. Consequently, whether or not
we believe that a court abuses, or abdicates, its discretion when it refuses
to consider a negotiated plea agreement presented by the parties beyond
a deadline set by the court, we have no occasion in this case to address
the issue. The appellate court erred when it did so. For the foregoing
reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm that of
the circuit court.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.