Title: Lindsey v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 65, 2004
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 7, 2004

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GERRON LINDSEY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 65, 2004 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. No. IN00-08-2081 
§  Cr. ID 002019767 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 29, 2004 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: June 7, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 7th day of June 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Gerron Lindsey, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief.  
The State has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground 
that it is manifest on the face of Lindsey’s opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Lindsey pled guilty but mentally ill in 
June 2002 to one count of first degree murder.  In exchange for his guilty 
 
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plea, the State agreed not to seek the death penalty and also agreed to 
dismiss numerous other charges, including another first degree murder 
charge and charges for attempted murder, robbery and weapon offenses.  
The Superior Court sentenced Lindsey to life imprisonment.  Lindsey filed a 
petition for postconviction relief in August 2002.  The Superior Court denied 
the motion, and this Court affirmed on appeal.1  Lindsey filed a second 
petition for postconviction relief, which the Superior Court denied. This 
appeal followed. 
(3) 
In his opening brief on appeal, Lindsey raises claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Lindsey asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate several aspects of his case prior to the 
entry of his guilty plea. Lindsey acknowledges that he did not raise these 
claims previously.  He argues, however, that consideration of his claims is 
warranted in the interest of justice.  The State, on the other hand, asserts that 
Rule 61(i)(2)2 required Lindsey to raise his claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in his first postconviction motion and that Lindsey has failed to 
                                                 
1 Lindsey v. State, Del. Supr., No. 531, 2002, Steele, J. (Jan. 7, 2003). 
2 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2) provides: “Any ground for relief that was 
not asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding, as required by subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule, is thereafter barred, unless consideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of 
justice.” 
 
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establish any exception under Rule 61(i)(5)3 to overcome the procedural bar 
of Rule 61(i)(2).  
 
(4) 
We agree.  In general, Rule 61(i)(2) requires a petitioner to 
raise all available grounds for relief in a first postconviction petition.  Claims 
that are not raised in a petitioner’s first postconviction motion will be 
deemed waived unless the petitioner can establish that consideration of the 
claim is warranted in the interest of justice or there is a colorable claim of a 
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental fairness of the 
proceedings leading to the final judgment.4  These exceptions are narrow 
and have been applied only in limited circumstances.5   
(5) 
Lindsey argues that he has established a colorable claim that, 
because of his attorney’s ineffectiveness, he was denied his constitutional 
right to counsel.  To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner 
must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable 
                                                 
3 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) provides:  “The bars to relief in 
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subdivision shall not apply to a claim that the court 
lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because 
of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, 
integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.” 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554-55 (Del. 1990). 
5 Id. at 555. 
 
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probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.6 
In the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must establish that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on 
going to trial.7  Although Lindsey contends that his attorney erred in this 
case, he does not even attempt to establish the necessary element of 
prejudice.8  Under the circumstances, we do not find that consideration of 
Lindsey’s claims of ineffective assistance are warranted in the interest of 
justice or under the fundamental fairness exception of Rule 61(i)(5).  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 58 (1985)). 
8 See id.