Title: PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 127115
State: Michigan
Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court
Date: May 11, 2005

_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 11, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 127115 
JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
PER CURIAM 
This case concerns the constitutionality of a traffic 
stop. 
After stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding, a 
state trooper asked defendant routine questions about his 
travel plans and obtained his consent to search the 
vehicle. 
Cocaine and marijuana were discovered during the 
search. 
Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals 
determined, that his consent was invalid because his 
detention exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
held that the trial court should have suppressed the fruits 
of the search.1 
We conclude that the detention was reasonable and did 
not exceed the proper scope of a traffic stop. 
Because 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a 
result of the detention, his consent was valid. We reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case 
to the trial court for reinstatement of defendant’s 
convictions and sentences. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On February 14, 2003, Michigan State Police Trooper 
Jason Varoni observed defendant’s vehicle traveling eighty­
eight miles an hour on I-75 in Cheboygan County, where the 
posted speed limit was seventy miles an hour. 
He stopped 
defendant’s vehicle. 
Upon request, defendant produced his 
driver's license. Trooper Varoni told defendant why he had 
been stopped and asked defendant where he was going. 
Defendant answered that he was going to Cheboygan to visit 
friends and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn. 
Because Cheboygan does not have a Holiday Inn, Trooper 
Varoni was suspicious of this response and asked defendant 
to step from the vehicle to answer additional questions. 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 5, 2004
(Docket No. 249853). 
2  
 
                                                 
Defendant did so and, in response to further questioning, 
explained that he was coming from Detroit and that he 
intended to stay in Cheboygan for two days. No luggage was 
visible in the vehicle’s passenger compartment; when asked 
about this, defendant said that he brought no luggage on 
the trip. 
Trooper Varoni asked defendant if he had “been 
in trouble before,” and defendant disclosed that he had 
previously been arrested for a marijuana-related offense. 
Trooper Varoni then questioned the vehicle’s other two 
occupants 
about 
their 
own 
travel 
plans, 
but 
their 
inconsistent responses only increased his suspicions.2  This 
questioning was completed about five to eight minutes after 
the traffic stop occurred. 
Trooper Varoni then informed 
defendant that he had received conflicting stories from the 
occupants of the vehicle. He asked for defendant’s consent 
to search the vehicle, and defendant agreed. 
Trooper Varoni contacted the Tuscarora Township canine 
unit, and asked that a drug-detection dog be sent to the 
scene. 
The canine unit arrived within three minutes and 
the dog signaled the presence of narcotics in the backseat 
2 The front-seat passenger claimed that he did not know
where they were going or how long they would be gone; he
confirmed that he had no luggage. 
The backseat passenger,
defendant’s wife, told Trooper Varoni that they were going
shopping in Cheboygan and then Detroit. She said that they
had made no arrangements for accommodations. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
of the vehicle. 
Trooper Varoni did not find any narcotics 
in that area, and he asked defendant for consent to search 
the vehicle’s trunk. 
Defendant initially agreed, but then 
withdrew his consent. 
A warrant was obtained, and the 
police discovered substances that appeared to be marijuana 
and cocaine.3  Trooper Varoni wrote defendant a citation for 
speeding and two drug-related felonies, and arrested him. 
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to 
deliver fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams of a 
substance containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and 
possession 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
marijuana, 
MCL 
333.7401(2)(d)(iii). 
He moved to suppress evidence of the 
controlled substances seized from his vehicle, asserting 
that the search4 and seizure were predicated on an illegal 
detention. 
The trial court denied the motion. 
It 
concluded that the statements made by the occupants of the 
vehicle raised reasonable suspicions in Trooper Varoni’s 
mind. 
It further concluded that the delay caused by the 
3 This was confirmed through later testing. 
4 Defendant disputes the validity of the initial search
of the car; he does not separately challenge the validity
of the later search of the trunk, which was conducted after
Trooper Varoni obtained a search warrant and which led to
the discovery of the controlled substances. 
4  
 
 
 
 
additional questioning was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances presented. 
Defendant was convicted as charged following a bench 
trial, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 
seven to twenty years (for the cocaine conviction) and two 
to four years (for the marijuana conviction). 
Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals 
reversed. 
Concluding that the initial traffic stop had 
been lawful, the Court then determined that the trooper 
“unlawfully exceeded the initial stop when he asked 
defendant to step out of the vehicle” to answer questions 
about his travel plans while the officer possessed only a 
“generalized hunch” that criminal activity was afoot. 
The 
trooper’s questions had no relevance to the traffic stop, 
the Court held, and he had no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to warrant asking the questions. 
The 
Court concluded that Trooper Varoni was acting on a 
“hunch,” which is insufficient grounds for pursuing an 
investigatory stop. 
For these reasons, it reversed the 
trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. 
The prosecutor applied to this Court for leave to 
appeal. 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
This Court reviews a trial court’s findings at a 
suppression hearing for clear error. People v Jenkins, 472 
Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005); People v Custer, 465 Mich 
319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). 
But the application of 
constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to 
essentially 
uncontested 
facts 
is 
entitled 
to 
less 
deference; for this reason, we review de novo the trial 
court’s 
ultimate 
ruling 
on 
the 
motion 
to 
suppress. 
Jenkins, supra; People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 191-192; 627 
NW2d 297 (2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
We review here the Court of Appeals determination that 
the traffic stop escalated into an illegal detention in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering defendant’s 
eventual consent to search a nullity. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in
their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers 
and 
effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
Oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly 
describing 
the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.[5] 
5 US Const, Am IV. 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
In assessing the protections created by this amendment, the 
United States Supreme Court has “long held that the 
'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'” 
Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417; 136 L Ed 2d 
347 (1996) (citation omitted). 
Reasonableness is measured 
by examining the totality of the circumstances. 
Id. 
Because 
of 
“'endless 
variations 
in 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances'” 
implicating 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not 
lend itself to resolution through the application of 
bright-line rules. 
Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US 
491, 506; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983). 
In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we 
apply the standard set forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 
S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).6
 Under Terry, the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether 
the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 
whether 
it 
was 
reasonably 
related 
in 
scope 
to 
the 
6 Knowles v Iowa, 525 US 113, 117; 119 S Ct 484; 142 L
Ed 2d 492 (1998) (despite existence of probable cause, a
common traffic stop is more analogous to limited detention
authorized by Terry than to an arrest) (quoting Berkemer v 
McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317
[1984]). 
7  
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.”7 
Terry, supra at 20. 
In this case, there is no dispute that the initial 
traffic stop was occasioned by defendant’s speeding, and 
was therefore based on probable cause and was reasonable. 
Robinette, supra at 38. 
Under Terry, the remaining 
question 
is 
whether 
the 
subsequent 
detention 
was 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" of this 
case. Terry, supra at 20. We conclude that it was. 
As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when 
it agreed with defendant that the purpose of this traffic 
stop was fully effectuated when defendant handed Trooper 
Varoni his driver's license and other requested paperwork. 
This view of the essential nature of the traffic stop 
imposes an unreasonable restriction on an officer’s ability 
to investigate a violation of the law. 
A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is 
detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask 
reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and 
7 The reviewing court considers the objective facts
relating to the traffic stop; the officer’s subjective
state of mind is not relevant to the determination whether 
the detention was proper. Oliver, supra at 199. 
8  
  
   
 
 
                                                 
its context for a reasonable period.8
 The determination 
whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take 
into account the evolving circumstances with which the 
officer is faced. 
As we observed in People v Burrell, 417 
Mich 439, 453; 339 NW2d 403 (1983), when a traffic stop 
reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified 
in extending the detention long enough to resolve the 
suspicion raised.9 
It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an 
officer to ask reasonable questions in order to obtain 
additional information about the underlying offense and the 
circumstances leading to its commission. 
For example, in 
addition to asking for the necessary identification and 
paperwork, an officer may also ask questions relating to 
8 There is considerable discretion allowed an officer 
charged with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the
executive branch of government. 
This discretion can be 
exercised effectively only if an officer is allowed to ask
reasonable questions concerning the context of a traffic 
offense. 
To deny an officer the ability to ask 
reasonable questions, reasonably circumscribed in scope and
duration, is to deny the officer the ability to reasonably
exercise the officer's discretion. 
9 Put another way, when considering whether a detention
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the
case, 
a 
reviewing 
court 
must 
consider 
whether 
“the 
officer’s subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the
emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting 
the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer
learned, as the stop progressed.” 
United States v Chhien,
266 F3d 1, 6 (CA 1, 2001). 
9  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
the reason for the stop, including questions about the 
driver’s destination and travel plans. 
United States v 
Williams, 271 F3d 1262, 1267 (CA 10, 2001).10  Specifically, 
an officer may ask about the “purpose and itinerary of a 
driver’s trip during the traffic stop” in order to 
determine whether a “violation has taken place, and if so, 
whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest 
made.” 
United States v Brigham, 382 F3d 500, 508 (CA 5, 
2004). 
Such 
inquiries 
are 
“within 
the 
scope 
of 
investigation attendant to the traffic stop.” Id. 
Implicit in the authority to ask these questions is 
the authority to ask follow-up questions when the initial 
answers given are suspicious.11
 Likewise, there is no 
constitutional prohibition against asking similar questions 
of any passengers in the vehicle.12 
10 See also United States v Givan, 320 F3d 452, 459 (CA
3, 2003); United States v Linkous, 285 F3d 716, 719 (CA 8,
2002); United States v Hill, 195 F3d 258, 268 (CA 6, 1999);
United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357 (CA 8, 1995). 
11 United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357-358 (CA 8,
1995). 
12 Linkous, supra at 719 (an officer may question the
occupants of a vehicle to verify information provided by
the driver). 
10  
 
 
                                                 
Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a 
“one size fits all” rule of police investigation,13 much 
less one that restricts the officer to informing the driver 
of the nature of the infraction, and subsequently obtaining 
the information necessary to fill out a citation. 
The 
Fourth Amendment requires only that the detention be 
reasonable—that is, that it be reasonably restricted in 
light of all the facts available to the officer. 
See 
Robinette, supra at 39. 
That standard was satisfied here. 
Trooper Varoni 
introduced himself to defendant, explained the purpose of 
the stop, and obtained the necessary identification and 
paperwork in order to complete the citation for the civil 
infraction of speeding. 
In response to a routine question 
about his travel plans, defendant provided Trooper Varoni 
with an explanation that was implausible.14  Therefore, even 
before 
Trooper 
Varoni 
could 
resolve 
the 
matter 
of 
13 See Robinette, supra 
at 39 (“In applying this test
we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry.”). 
14 The Court of Appeals stated that there were 
“plausible” innocent explanations for the statements made
by the vehicle occupants. 
But the fact that such 
explanations can be imagined does not mean that Trooper
Varoni acted unreasonably in seeking to resolve the 
inconsistencies. See Oliver, supra at 204. 
11  
 
 
 
 
defendant’s violation of the traffic laws, he was presented 
with additional suspicious circumstances that warranted 
further investigation. 
Trooper Varoni acted on these new suspicions by asking 
defendant additional questions about his travel plans and 
whether he had been in trouble before, and by briefly 
speaking with the vehicle's occupants. None of the answers 
provided by defendant or his companions allayed Trooper 
Varoni’s suspicions. 
Moreover, the entire encounter took 
only five to eight minutes, at which time Trooper Varoni 
requested and obtained defendant’s consent to search the 
vehicle. 
After reviewing the facts and evaluating the totality 
of the circumstances, we conclude that the traffic stop 
here was reasonable in both scope and duration. 
It follows that defendant was not being unlawfully 
detained when he was asked to consent to the search. 
Consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be 
valid. 
People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 
NW2d 1 (1999); Royer, supra at 497. An investigatory stop, 
as occurred in this case, is not so inherently coercive 
that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop. 
Royer, supra at 501, 502; People v Acoff, 220 Mich App 396, 
12  
 
   
                                                 
 
 
400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996). 
There is no suggestion that 
defendant was coerced into giving his consent.15 
It is unnecessary to consider whether Trooper Varoni 
had an independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion 
that defendant was involved with narcotics, or even whether 
the Fourth Amendment might impose such a requirement under 
different circumstances.16
 The detention and search here 
were 
reasonable because: (1) the initial traffic stop was 
lawful, (2) Trooper Varoni’s questions about defendant’s 
travel plans, and his limited follow-up, were reasonable 
and did not exceed the proper scope and duration of the 
initial 
traffic 
stop, 
and 
(3) 
after 
Trooper 
Varoni 
concluded his questioning, defendant voluntarily consented 
to the search of the vehicle. 
All in all, rather than 
amounting to a constitutional violation, we find that 
15 Defendant’s own actions show that he understood that 
he could refuse the request. 
He later declined to consent 
to a search of the trunk. 
16 One aspect of an officer’s ability to conduct a drug
search without independent, articulable, and reasonable 
suspicion was addressed in Illinois v Caballes, 543 US ___;
125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005). 
Employing the
reasonableness standard of Robinette, the United States
Supreme Court held that, as long as the traffic stop is not
prolonged, an officer may use a drug-detection dog to sniff
a vehicle during the stop, even if the defendant does not
consent and the officer lacks reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are involved
with narcotics. 
13  
 
 
Trooper Varoni's work in this case amounted to excellent 
police work. 
The trial court properly denied defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances 
found during the search of his vehicle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the detention was reasonable and did not 
constitute a violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of 
defendant’s convictions and sentences. MCR 7.302(G)(1). 
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 127115 
JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court 
erred by denying defendant's motions to suppress and to 
strike the evidence provided by Trooper Jason Varoni. 
The 
trooper's questions of defendant were not reasonably 
related to the purpose of the traffic stop. Furthermore, 
defendant's statement to the trooper that he was staying at 
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan could not evoke a reasonable 
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. 
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Terry v Ohio 
Traffic stops are subject to the test established by 
the United States Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 
20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). According to 
Terry, an officer's investigation of a traffic stop must be 
 
 
 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." 
Id.
 A 
defendant may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so. Florida v 
Royer, 460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 
(1983). The scope of the detention must be carefully 
tailored to the justification for the stop. Id. at 500. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would 
find that the officer's questioning in this case exceeded 
the permissible legal scope of inquiry regarding a speeding 
offense. 
It was not reasonably related to defendant’s 
violation of the speed limit. 
Furthermore, I believe that 
the answers to the officer’s questions did not give rise to 
an articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 
Scope of the Stop 
Trooper Varoni detained defendant for driving in 
excess of the speed limit. 
An additional reason for the 
stop was that his vehicle had a cracked windshield. 
There 
was no reasonable articulable suspicion of any other 
offense. 
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the 
Michigan Supreme Court has ever ruled that questioning 
beyond the scope of a traffic stop is allowed. The Court of 
Appeals decision in this case accurately reflects Michigan 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
law. 
However, with this decision, the Court changes 
Michigan law to enlarge the permissible scope of an inquiry 
by a police officer during a routine traffic stop. 
Permissible Questioning 
The questions "Why the rush?" and "Where are you 
headed in such a hurry?" from a police officer may be 
reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding. 
They 
seek an admission of speeding. 
But questions about a driver's destination, purpose, 
length of stay, and with whom he will be staying are meant 
to inquire into issues beyond a speeding offense. Not only 
have they nothing to do with a speeding offense, they are 
not helpful to a police officer's decision to release the 
driver or to issue a citation or warning.1 Ante at 10. 
On direct examination, Trooper Varoni testified that 
he asked defendant where he was going and that defendant 
offered that "he was going into Cheboygan to visit friends 
and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn." 
However, it 
is apparent from the cross-examination of Trooper Varoni 
that defendant did not volunteer this information to the 
1 The majority cites several federal circuit court of
appeals cases for the proposition that questions about
travel plans are reasonably related to the scope of a
traffic stop. We are not bound by these decisions, and, as
noted above, I find their logic defective. 
3  
 
 
 
trooper in response to a general question. 
Instead, as 
Trooper Varoni admitted: 
A. Uh, it's—it's my practice to ask more
than 
just 
for 
those 
three 
pieces 
of 
uh,
documentation 
[referring 
to 
license,
registration, and insurance paperwork]. 
* * * 
Q. All right. And then you proceeded to
further this investigation by questioning Mr. 
Williams as to um, issues of where he was going
and what he was going to do when he was there, is
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And these questions weren't relevant to
how fast he was going, were they? 
A. I-I ask everybody I stop where they're
going to and where they are coming from. 
* * * 
Q. My question was; the question about where
he's going and how long he is staying is not
relevant to how fast he's going and the purpose
for your stop; is it? 
A. That's correct. 
Without 
question, 
the 
trooper 
asked 
defendant 
questions 
that 
exceeded 
the 
scope 
of 
legal 
inquiry 
regarding a speeding offense. The trooper evoked an answer 
regarding the location where defendant was planning to 
spend the night. 
He also asked defendant if defendant had 
any prior narcotics convictions. Trooper Varoni testified: 
Um, I asked him if he had been in trouble
before and uh, he told me that he had. I asked if 
4  
 
 
 
 
it had any—you know, related narcotics [sic], if
he'd ever been arrested for anything to do with
drugs and he told me that he had. I asked him for
what and he said marijuana. 
This question likewise was unrelated to the purpose of the 
traffic stop. Once defendant stated that he was staying at 
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan in response to a question about 
where he would spend the night, the purpose of the 
investigation 
changed. 
Trooper 
Varoni's 
subsequent 
questions, having nothing to do with the scope of the 
traffic stop, changed the fundamental nature of the stop. 
What began as a routine traffic stop became an all­
encompassing 
criminal 
investigation. 
Trooper 
Varoni 
admitted it: 
Q. Your purpose of the initial stop had
seized [sic]; you weren't investigating speeding
violation [sic] anymore were you? 
A. No, no I wasn't. 
Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity 
Even 
if 
Trooper 
Varoni's 
questions 
had 
been 
appropriate for a traffic stop, a second pertinent concern 
for the Court is whether defendant's answer provided a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. 
Trooper Varoni essentially admitted that he continued 
questioning the occupants of the vehicle on the basis of a 
hunch that something "wasn't quite right." 
5  
 
 
Q.  [Mr. Kwiatkowsi]: Is it possible that he
was in error as to where the Holiday Inn was? 
A. [Trooper Varoni]: That's possible, yes. 
Q. And the fact that someone misstates where 
they're staying um, you're saying that made you
suspicious of him, is that right? 
A. Uh, you—you can call it what you want, I
don't know about suspicious but, yeah, it made me
think twice about the statements he made. 
Q. All right, so you weren't suspicious? 
A. Yeah, I-I questioned his statements. 
Q. Well, now when you're talking about 
suspicion you understand suspicious of something,
right? Of some activity that's unlawful, right? 
A. Yes, that could be. 
Q. Well, what was it about that response
that you were suspicious of that was unlawful? 
A. I wasn't suspicious of any particular
thing that was unlawful. 
Q. So it was unparticularized suspicion is
that what you're saying? 
A. Um, I guess that could be. 
Q. Okay. Because you couldn't put your
finger on what it was you were suspicious of,
right? 
A. I was suspicious that something wasn't
quite right. 
Q. But you didn't know what it was, right? 
A. That's right. 
The trooper’s intuition that "something wasn't quite 
right" and his observation that no luggage was visible in 
6  
 
 
                                                 
the passenger compartment were the things that made him 
suspicious. 
The trooper admitted that it is not uncommon 
for people to carry luggage out of sight in the trunk. 
Therefore, the only valid reason for the trooper to be 
suspicious was defendant's statement that he was staying at 
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan. 
The fact that defendant answered with the name of a 
hotel chain that did not have a facility in Cheboygan 
hardly 
created 
a 
reasonable 
suspicion 
that 
criminal 
activity was afoot.2  The next question of defendant, once 
he had stepped out of the vehicle, was whether he had any 
prior conviction for drugs. 
It was likewise unrelated to 
the traffic stop. 
This question is a further indicator 
that the trooper was acting on a mere hunch. 
Where there is no articulable basis to suspect that a 
crime is being committed, the officer's questions amount to 
2 It is noteworthy that the explanations Mr. Williams
and his two passengers gave are not as inconsistent as the
prosecution would have the Court believe. Mr. Williams
indicated that they were going to Cheboygan to visit 
friends and would be there "about two days." They would be
staying at a Holiday Inn. His companion, Mr. King,
indicated that he was not sure how long they were going to
be 
gone. 
This 
is 
not 
inconsistent 
with 
defendant's 
statement. 
Mrs. Williams indicated that they were planning to do
some shopping in Cheboygan. She was not sure where they
were staying; they did not have reservations. This is also
not inconsistent with Mr. Williams's explanation. 
7  
 
 
 
 
nothing more than a fishing expedition. 
The questioning 
and the subsequent search in this case went beyond the 
scope of the traffic stop and were unsupported by any 
reasonable articulable suspicion. 
I agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the 
totality of the circumstances, the trooper had insufficient 
grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop and conducted 
his investigation based merely on a hunch. People v 
Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). I would 
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Marilyn Kelly 
8