Title: In Re Interest of Wise
Citation: 291 So. 2d 727
Docket Number: 47734
State: Mississippi
Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court
Date: March 11, 1974

291 So. 2d 727 (1974) In re In the Interest of William WISE, a child. No. 47734. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 11, 1974. Rehearing Denied April 8, 1974. Firnist J. Alexander, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Karen Gilfoy, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. ROBERTSON, Justice: William Wise, a minor 13 years of age, was found to be a delinquent child and was committed to the Columbia Training School "until such time as said institution feels that said child has been reformed and rehabilitated," by the Youth Court of Choctaw County. The Petition on which the court acted was prepared and sworn to by the District Attorney and the County Attorney. In the Petition, Wise was charged with using "vulgar, profane, indecent, obscene, and insulting language over a telephone by calling and talking with a young girl". The Petition stated the exact language used and the time as being between 3:00 and 3:15 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon, February 14, 1973. After a full hearing at which William Wise, the minor; his natural mother, Mary Annice Lee; his stepfather, Shirley Lee; and his attorney, Firnist J. Alexander, Jr. were present and participating in his defense, the Chancellor as Youth Court Judge found Wise to be a delinquent and committed him to Columbia Training School. *728 Wise has assigned as error: Errors 1 and 5 will be discussed together. The petition to adjudge William Wise a delinquent was filed on February 22, 1973. The petition stated that William Wise was a resident of Choctaw County and lived with his mother, Mary Annice Lee, and his stepfather, Shirley Lee. The petition, after stating the exact words used, alleged that this conversation originated and was transmitted in Choctaw County, Mississippi. The petition prayed that summons issue for William Wise, the minor, his said mother, Mary Annice Lee, and his said stepfather, Shirley Lee, commanding each of them separately and individually: Summons was issued by the Chancery Clerk of Choctaw County, Mississippi, on February 26, 1973, to the Sheriff of Choctaw County. The summons recited: The sheriff's returns showed that he personally served a separate copy of the summons on William Wise, Mary Annice Lee, and Shirley Lee, on March 1, 1973. *729 The hearing was held at 9 o'clock A.M. on Monday, March 12, 1973, at the Choctaw County Courthouse in Ackerman, Mississippi, in strict accord with the summons. After the hearing the Chancellor took the matter under advisement and entered a decree on March 21, 1973. Among other things the Chancellor found and adjudged: Personal service of process was had on William Wise, the minor, his natural mother and his stepfather, eleven days before the time set for hearing. We are of the opinion that this was adequate and timely notice and afforded the minor, his parents, and his attorney full time to prepare for the hearing. The record fully supports the finding and adjudication of the Chancellor that the Youth Court of Choctaw County had venue and jurisdiction. The appellant contends that the court erred in failing to suppress his statements because at the time he made them he had been deprived "of his privilege against self-incrimination". Choctaw County Sheriff Joe Jones testified that he talked with William in front of his home and that before questioning him he advised him of all of his Constitutional rights. The record clearly reflects that Wise was advised of all of his Constitutional rights required under Miranda. On cross-examination by Wise's attorney, the sheriff further testified: On direct examination, the sheriff testified: The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140 (1971), stated the general rule, with reference to whether a minor can *730 waive his right against self-incrimination, in these words: "A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because the person making it is a minor." After mentioning the "totality of circumstances" rule, the Court continued, quoting from People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967): See Also 87 A.L.R.2d 624 (1963). It is our opinion that Wise fully understood his rights and that his statement was freely and voluntarily made after his Constitutional rights were explained to him. Appellant also contends that he was denied due process of law because the accusing witness, a young girl, was not present at the hearing and did not testify. Appellant also contends that aside from Wise's confession, that Sheriff Jones' testimony was hearsay as to the exact words used. Even though appellant was represented at the hearing by counsel of his own choosing, no objection to the testimony, as being hearsay, was made; neither was a request of any kind made for Kathy Wells to testify. No objection or statement of any kind was made that the appellant was being denied the right of confrontation or cross-examination. This Court said in Brewer v. State, 233 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1970): 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1009, has this to say with reference to the waiver of the right to confrontation: This rule of waiver is based on sound reasoning. It might be that it was a part of defense counsel's trial strategy or tactics not to ask for confrontation. In any event, appellant and his counsel cannot ambush the trial judge and contend in this Court for the first time that the trial judge was in error for something that he was not given a chance to rule on or correct. In addition to a valid confession from the appellant, Mary Annice Lee, his mother, who was the only witness offered for the defense, testified, on direct examination by defense counsel: We think that the appellant waived his right to confrontation by the accusing witness, a young girl, by making no mention *731 or request of any kind for her personal appearance at the hearing. The Youth Court Judge was justified in finding from the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt that William Wise was a delinquent and in committing him to Columbia Training School until he is rehabilitated. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed. Affirmed. GILLESPIE, C.J., and SMITH, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.