Title: In the Matter of Timothy V. Clark
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 49S00-0309-DI-422
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 2005

ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT 
Gregory H. Coleman 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Secretary 
Dennis K. McKinney, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S00-0309-DI-422 
 
IN THE MATTER OF 
 
 
 
 
TIMOTHY V. CLARK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
________________________________ 
 
Disciplinary Action 
________________________________ 
 
 September 16, 2005 
 
Per Curiam, 
 
Today, we find that respondent’s repeated failures, in two separate cases, to respond in a 
timely manner to lawful demands for information from the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 
Commission violated Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 8.1(b) and warrant respondent’s suspension 
from the practice of law for ninety (90) days. 
 
These proceedings commenced with the Commission’s filing of a two count verified 
complaint against respondent on September 23, 2003. Pursuant to Ind. Admission and Discipline 
Rule 23, Section 11(b), we appointed a hearing officer to hear this matter on October 31, 2003, 
and he heard the case on April 29, 2004. The hearing officer filed his Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Recommendation of Sanction, on May 31, 2005. The Commission filed its Brief 
on Sanction, June 27, 2005. The time for respondent to reply has expired and this matter is now 
before us for final determination. Respondent’s admission to the practice of law in this state in 
1982 confers this Court with jurisdiction in this matter. 
When, as here, the hearing officer's disciplinary findings are unchallenged, it has been the 
practice of this Court to accept and approve the findings subject to our final determination as to 
misconduct and sanction. In re Williams, 764 N.E.2d 613, 614 (Ind.2002); In re Puterbaugh, 716 
N.E.2d 1287, 1288 (Ind.1999); Matter of Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 552 (Ind.1996).  The com-
plaint filed by the Commission alleged that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(b), which re-
quires a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions about the representation. The hearing officer found that the Commis-
sion failed to establish a violation of this provision by clear and convincing evidence. The Com-
mission has not challenged this finding and we therefore adopt the hearing officer’s finding in 
this regard. The complaint also charged that respondent, in two separate cases, violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b), which requires a lawyer to respond timely to lawful demands for informa-
tion made by the Commission. The hearing officer found that the Commission established these 
two violations and we accept the hearing officer’s unchallenged findings in this regard. 
We find the following facts relevant to our decision concerning the discipline to impose 
in this case: On July 23, 2001, the Commission received a “Request for Investigation” alleging 
professional misconduct by respondent. The Executive Secretary of the Commission issued a 
letter on July 31, 2001, to respondent’s business address notifying him of the filing of the griev-
ance and demanding a written response within twenty days of receipt of the letter. When respon-
dent failed to respond, the Executive Secretary issued a second letter, on September 21, 2001, to 
respondent’s home and business addresses, again demanding a written response within twenty 
days of receipt of the letter. These letters were delivered on September 22 and 24, 2001, respec-
tively. Again, respondent failed to respond, so on December 7, 2001, the Executive Secretary 
filed a Verified Petition to Show Cause Why Respondent Should Not Be Suspended For Failure 
to Cooperate with the Disciplinary Process. Matter of Clark, 49S00-0112-DI-623. This Court 
issued the Order to Show Cause on December 19, 2001, giving respondent ten days after service 
to explain why we should not suspend him for failing to cooperate. Between the filing of the 
Verified Petition and the issuance of the Order, respondent, on December 11, 2001, finally filed 
a response and we dismissed the Order to Show Cause as moot on January 7, 2002.  
 
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A similar set of circumstances makes up the basis for the second count in the Commis-
sion’s complaint. On April 8, 2002, the Commission received another “Request for Investiga-
tion” alleging professional misconduct by respondent. On April 11, 2002, the Executive Secre-
tary issued a letter to respondent’s business address informing him of the grievance and demand-
ing a written response within twenty days of receipt of the letter. On April 30, 2002, respondent 
requested an extension of time to reply and the Commission agreed to extend the deadline for a 
response to May 31, 2002. On May 30, respondent requested a second extension, which the 
Commission granted until July 1, 2002. On July 1, respondent requested a third extension, which 
the Commission granted until July 22. Receiving no response on July 22, the Executive Secretary 
issued a second letter, on July 31, 2002, demanding a written response within twenty days of re-
ceipt of the letter. Hearing nothing from respondent, on August 22, the Executive Secretary is-
sued a third letter to respondent demanding a written response to the grievance within twenty 
days of receipt of the letter. This letter was delivered to respondent’s business and home ad-
dresses on August 23 and 31, 2002, respectively. When respondent again failed to respond, the 
Commission on October 28, 2002, filed its Verified Petition to Show Cause Why Respondent 
Should Not Be Suspended For Failure to Cooperate with the Disciplinary Process. Matter of 
Clark, 49S00-0210-DI-531. On October 30, 2002, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause, 
giving respondent ten days after service of the Order to explain why we should not suspend him 
for failing to cooperate. On November 18, 2002, respondent finally filed a response to the griev-
ance, and we dismissed the Order to Show Cause as moot on December 30, 2002. 
The conduct set forth above clearly establishes violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b), which 
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information 
from a disciplinary authority. Here, respondent chose to repeatedly ignore the Commission’s re-
quests for information regarding grievances pending against him. Respondent has demonstrated 
an unwillingness to comply with even this basic professional obligation. The Commission went 
out of its way to give respondent the opportunity to comply with its requests before seeking ac-
tion from this Court. Despite the Commission’s generous grant of extensions and follow up let-
ters, which is was not required to send, respondent still did not provide timely responses to the 
Commission.  
 Having found misconduct, we must assess the appropriate discipline. In so doing, we ex-
amine the nature of the misconduct, the actual or potential injury flowing from the misconduct, 
the respondent's state of mind, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity of the profession, 
 
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the potential injury to the public in permitting the respondent to continue in the profession, and 
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.  Matter of Drozda, 653 N.E.2d 991(Ind.1995). A 
public reprimand may be an appropriate sanction for failure to respond to the Commission’s re-
quest for information. See, e.g., Matter of Layson, 798 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 2003). Layson received 
a public reprimand for failing to respond to three attempts by the Commission to obtain informa-
tion and also failing to respond to this Court’s order to show cause. Failing to cooperate, coupled 
with other misconduct, may result in the imposition of a suspension. For example, neglecting an 
unsupervised estate, failing to communicate with the client or return files, as well as failing to 
answer Commission demands for information in three separate cases, led us to impose a sixty-
day suspension on the offending lawyer. Matter of Tudor, 760 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 2001).  
In the present case, in addition to the circumstances described above, there are further ag-
gravating circumstances that justify a suspension. Respondent has previously been suspended by 
this Court for six months for failing to maintain adequate funds in his trust account to discharge 
obligations owed, collecting an undisclosed additional fee, neglecting clients’ cases and, not sur-
prisingly, failing to cooperate with Commission investigations into his alleged misconduct. Mat-
ter of Clark, 778 N.E.2d 1246 (Ind. 2002). Respondent’s automatic reinstatement from his six 
month suspension was delayed by thirty days as a result of respondent's failure to timely notify 
his clients of his suspension, to obtain each clients’ consent to substitute counsel, and his failure 
to file the affidavit required by Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 26(c). Matter of 
Clark, 792 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. 2003).  
Respondent has also been suspended twice for failure to meet his Continuing Legal Edu-
cation requirements. In this regard, we are particularly disturbed to learn from the hearing offi-
cer’s findings that while respondent was suspended from May 21, 2001 through July 7, 2003, for 
noncompliance with CLE requirements, he continued to practice law. With this history of disdain 
for the authority of the Commission and, by extension, the authority of this Court, we advise re-
spondent that he should be aware that future misconduct may warrant a sanction up to and in-
cluding disbarment. We also feel obliged to remind the bar in general that failure to cooperate 
with Commission requests for information may result not only in an order to show cause, but 
also a suspension from the practice of law. Ignoring the Commission’s efforts to assist this Court 
in carrying out its duty to protect the public and uphold the integrity of the profession will not be 
tolerated. 
 
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Given respondent’s repeated failure to respond in a timely manner to the Commission’s 
numerous requests for information and the disciplinary history cited above, the respondent, 
Timothy V. Clark, is suspended from the practice of law for ninety (90) days, effective Novem-
ber 14, 2005, with automatic reinstatement thereafter.  
Costs of these proceedings are assessed against the respondent.  
 
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