Title: Hoy v. State
Citation: 353 So. 2d 826
Docket Number: 49448, 49449
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: December 2, 1977

353 So. 2d 826 (1977)
Darrell Edwin HOY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 49448, 49449.

Supreme Court of Florida.
December 2, 1977.
Rehearing Denied January 30, 1978.
*827 Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Steven H. Denman, Chief Asst. Public Defender, and David S. Bergdoll, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, and Patrick H. Doherty of Gross &amp; Doherty, Clearwater, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review by direct appeal judgments of guilty of murder in the first degree and sentences of death. Jurisdiction vests pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
The bodies of David Sawyer and Susan Routt (both teenagers) were discovered on the morning of August 27, 1975, on Dunedin Beach in Pinellas County. Appellant made several confessions as to his direct involvement in the murders and rape. He provided three versions of how the crimes were committed. It appears from the last version of the confession that appellant and one Jesse Lamar Hall went to Dunedin Beach where they saw the victims, David Sawyer and Susan Routt. They approached the victims' car, and Hall, with gun in hand, told the victims that appellant wanted to have intercourse with the girl. The victims' car was moved from the beach to a designated parking lot, and the boy and girl were forced at gunpoint to go with Hall and Hoy to a secluded area of the beach. With Hall guarding Sawyer, Hoy overcame Miss Routt's resistance and, ignoring her cries for help, sexually assaulted her. Attempting to break away from Hall to go to the girl's aid, Sawyer was shot in the face. After falling to the ground, he was shot twice more in the head. Hall then proceeded to take his turn in sexually assaulting Routt, both vaginally and anally. Hall shot her twice in the side of her head. Appellant then returned and assaulted her anally, after which he rolled her over and shot her in the forehead. Sawyer's wallet was then taken from his body by Hoy.
On September 27, 1975, appellant was charged by indictment with murder in the first degree of David Sawyer, with murder in the first degree of Susan Routt, with involuntary sexual battery of Susan Routt *828 and with robbery of David Sawyer. The public defender was appointed to represent him on September 7, 1975.
A motion to control pre-trial publicity was filed by appellant on September 11, 1975, declaring that, since his arrest, state and local officials had been quoted extensively concerning matters which directly or indirectly concerned the proceedings against him, and suggesting that quotations from public officials may exceed limits imposed by Disciplinary Rule 7-107, Code of Professional Responsibility. After hearing, this motion was denied by the trial court.
Appellant was arraigned October 10, 1975, and entered a written plea of not guilty. At that time, a trial date of December 15, 1975, was set. Motion for change of venue was filed on December 5, 1975, and an amended motion for change of venue was filed December 9, 1975. Therein, appellant alleged that a motion to control pre-trial publicity had previously been filed and denied and that, prior to and subsequent to the filing of that motion, appellant had received widespread prejudicial publicity, including, but not limited to, an article in the Clearwater Sun which concerned an alleged confession and reproduced portions thereof. Motion for continuance was filed by appellant on December 9, 1975, on the basis that, in view of the length and complexity of the case, the defense was unable to be ready for trial on December 15, 1975, and on the basis that a "cooling period" between the publication of extensive pre-trial coverage of his case and trial of the cause was necessitated. These motions were denied by the trial court on December 11, 1975.
The case proceeded to trial on December 15, 1975, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty of both charges of murder in the first degree and the charge of involuntary sexual battery. Judgment of acquittal had been entered as to the robbery charge, and a verdict of guilty was returned as to the lesser included charge of petit larceny. After sentencing hearing, a majority of the jury recommended life imprisonment. Prior to sentencing, the judge obtained a presentence investigation report and a psychiatric examination report. Upon considering and weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial judge determined that, under the circumstances presented, the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate on each charge of murder in the first degree.
Initially, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue since pre-trial publicity regarding his case was extensive. He contends that his alleged confession was twice front page news in the local newspaper. Having considered this argument and carefully studied the record, including the jury voir dire, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow a change of venue. Appellant has failed to show that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial, i.e., that the setting of his trial was inherently prejudicial. Cf. Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976). In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, under the circumstances of that case where there had been pervasive pre-trial publicity, defendant was not denied a fair trial, and opined:
This court, in Dobbert v. State, supra, concluded that defendant had failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue and explained:
Sub judice, the trial court questioned each group of prospective jurors extensively as to their prior knowledge of appellant's case and their exposure to publicity about it. The transcript of the voir dire evidences that a great many of the prospective jurors had not even heard about the case, others had read brief accounts, but mostly in the St. Petersburg Times rather than the Clearwater Sun, and only had a vague recollection, if any, of the occurrences. The allegedly inflammatory articles to which our attention is directed by appellant were contained in the Clearwater Sun. Only six jurors were excused by the trial court due to a prior acquaintance with the cause. Eleven were excused by the State by peremptory challenge. The defense utilized only twenty-five peremptory challenges when permitted forty by the trial court. With only a very few exceptions, the prospective jurors stated that they could unreservedly render an impartial verdict.
The voir dire of the jury selected to hear the cause reveals that eight of them had no prior knowledge whatsoever of the cause prior to being called for jury duty. Of the remaining four, one heard that the murder had happened from a customer, but that was the extent of her exposure, and she knew nothing more about it. Another remarked that she only read something briefly about it in the St. Petersburg Times when the news was first released that the murders had occurred and that she had not *830 heard or read anything about it since that time nor had she discussed it with anyone. Another remembered having seen something in the St. Petersburg Times about the case, but it had made no impression with her. The fourth juror stated that she had read something about the case when it first started but could not recall any facts and had not discussed it with anyone. It is obvious from the record that defense was satisfied with the jury selected, all of whom were completely impartial and had in no way been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity. This is supported by the fact that the defense had by no means exhausted its available peremptory challenges.
We cannot say that there was a significantly inflammatory atmosphere in the community or courtroom. We are buttressed in this view by the voir dire of all of the prospective jurors by the judge and counsel for the defense and prosecution. In Murphy v. Florida, supra, the Supreme Court determined:
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976), opined that "... pre-trial publicity  even pervasive adverse publicity  does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial."
Appellant relies on Oliver v. State, 250 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1971), for the proposition that a denial of motion for change of venue where the fact that defendant has confessed to a crime and the gist thereof is published constitutes reversible error. Appellee submits that appellant has misconstrued Oliver, supra, and posits that Oliver, supra, announces a general rule as to the granting of motions for change of venue when a confession is featured in news media coverage; however, it does not preclude the possibility that change of venue could properly be denied under certain circumstances when the fact of a confession having been made is disclosed to the public through the news media. Oliver, supra, involved a situation where excerpts from the actual confession, in question and answer form, given by Oliver to the assistant state attorney, were featured in the sole daily newspaper published in the general Tallahassee area. In the published transcript of the confession, Oliver implicated himself and others and expressly stated that he had a motive for the crime and gave a description thereof. Under the facts of that case, where the actual transcript of the confession was featured, this court announced as a general rule that "... when a `confession' is featured in news media coverage of a prosecution, as here, a change of venue motion should be granted whenever requested; we also hold that in the case sub judice the voir dire process cannot cure the effect of a `confession' which has been given news media coverage." (Emphasis supplied.)
The facts before us relative to this issue are different from Oliver, supra. Sub judice, we had publication of a report based on the statement of a detective summarizing three differing and contradictory statements made by the appellant. Published with equal prominence in these articles contained in the Clearwater Sun was appellant's retraction of his confession. Further, as appears from the record, none of the jurors even read the articles in question. The area in which the trial took place was not dependent on a sole daily newspaper for information. In fact, a great many of the perspective jurors did not read the Clearwater Sun but, rather, read the St. Petersburg Times. In the instant case, the voir dire of the jury evidences no prior knowledge *831 on their part of the publications to which appellant directs our attention.
Although recognizing that the granting or denying of a continuance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to continue his case to allow a cooling period due to the allegedly prejudicial news reporting and to allow defense more time for effective preparation of appellant's case for trial. Viewing the totality of the circumstances present sub judice, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the continuance. As is apparent from the record, the news coverage in this case was not of such a nature that a cooling period was necessitated. Appellant's allegation of insufficient time for preparation of his case for trial was not sufficient to mandate the trial judge to grant the continuance.
In response to defendant's assertion that sufficient time had not been given to prepare for trial, that two months and four days from the date a person kills another is too short a time to prepare against the day when he will be called to the bar of justice to answer for his crime, this court, in Jarvis v. State, 115 Fla. 320, 156 So. 310, 312 (1934), held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the requested continuance, and explicated:
Denying the petition for rehearing therein, this court further emphasized:
Cf. Brown v. State, 224 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 1969), Kish v. State, 192 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3rd DCA, 1966).
We find no merit in appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously restricted his cross-examination of Dennis Bender, but rather, a review of the record supports appellee's assertion that appellant's counsel was not restricted in his cross-examination of Bender. In a side bar conference, the trial judge informed defense counsel that, if he cross-examined Bender as to his reasons for allowing Hoy to return to his home on the night he was questioned about the crimes, it would open the record to evidence of a polygraph examination. It was a tactical choice on the part of appellant's counsel to discontinue the line of questions.
Appellant urges that the trial court erred in restricting his cross-examination of witness Mills who had found the bodies on the beach. Appellee emphasizes that that which was sought to be elicited by appellant's line of question concerning this point was not relevant to the cause and was beyond the scope of direct. We find no error in the trial court's sustaining the State's objection to testimony regarding Mill's picture-taking activities.
*832 Appellant objected to evidence of comparisons of hair found on one of the victims with hair samples from Jesse Lamar Hall. He also objected to evidence of ownership and possession by Hall of a propane torch allegedly used to destroy Sawyer's wallet. We find appellant's argument that his right to confrontation was violated because Hall was not available for cross-examination to be likewise without merit.
Finally, with regard to the imposition of the sentence of death, appellant argues that the trial court failed to give full weight to the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes, and alleges that the capital felonies committed in this case were not especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. We cannot agree with appellant that, under the totality of the circumstances present in the instant cause, the death sentence was not warranted. The advisory recommendation of the jury is to be accorded great weight, but the ultimate decision as to whether the death penalty should be imposed rests with the trial judge. Cf. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1974), State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Since the trial judge did not delineate in detail each mitigating and aggravating circumstance present, this court entered an order for clarification advising the trial judge to submit amended findings setting out in more detail the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which he found to exist. He was further directed, pursuant to the mandate of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393, decided March 22, 1977, to inform this Court whether the psychiatric evaluation and presentence investigation reports were considered by the judge and, if considered, whether they were disclosed to the defendant.
In his original findings of fact, the trial judge explained:
The trial judge then concluded:
The clarification order discloses that the entire presentence investigation report which was considered by the court and report of Dr. Cosma were furnished appellant so that he had full opportunity to deny or explain anything or everything in either. *833 As to the appropriate and adequate clarification of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial judge explained:
This court, in State v. Dixon, supra, discussing what is meant by "heinous, atrocious or cruel," stated:
Sub judice, we have the commission of capital crimes accompanied by such additional acts as to set them apart from the norm of capital felonies. The facts before us supporting the sentence of death are clear and convincing.
We have listened carefully to oral argument, examined and considered the record in light of the assignments of error and briefs filed, and we have also, pursuant to Rule 6.16(b), Florida Appellate Rules, reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interests of justice require a new trial, with the result that we find no reversible error is made to appear and the evidence in the record before us does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial on the issue of guilt be awarded.
Accordingly, no reversible error appearing, the judgments and sentences of the trial court are hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
ENGLAND, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of Hoy's convictions, but I would follow the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment as the appropriate sentences. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).