Title: State v. Stafford
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 39S04-1712-CR-749
State: Indiana
Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court
Date: August 7, 2019

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 39S04-1712-CR-749 
State of Indiana 
Appellant, 
–v– 
Pebble Stafford 
Appellee. 
Argued: May 9, 2019 | Decided: August 7, 2019 
Appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court 
No. 39C01-1307-FB-696 
The Honorable W. Gregory Coy, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 39A04-1705-CR-930 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 07 2019, 12:03 pm
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 39S04-1712-CR-749 | August 7, 2019 
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David, Justice. 
Today, our Court decided Rodriguez v. State, --- N.E.3d --- (Ind. 2019), a 
case interpreting the same statutory provisions at issue in the present 
dispute.  The law stated in that opinion is equally applicable to this case.   
Pebble Stafford was charged with one count Dealing a Controlled 
Substance, a Class B felony, on July 18, 2013.  Stafford also faced two 
additional charges under separate cause numbers.  Defendant entered into 
a plea agreement to resolve each of these cases, which resulted in fixed 
sentences of six years at the Department of Correction for the Class B 
felony charge and an additional thirty days at the Jefferson County Jail 
and four years at the Department of Correction with direct placement in 
Jefferson County Community Corrections for the other two offenses, all of 
which was to be served consecutively.  The plea agreement was accepted 
by the trial court on June 18, 2014, and Stafford was sentenced according 
to the terms of the agreement. 
Stafford petitioned to modify her Class B felony sentence on January 30, 
2017.  The State opposed Stafford’s petition, arguing the trial court was 
bound by the terms of the fixed plea agreement.  The court granted 
Stafford’s petition on April 12, 2017, and ordered Defendant released from 
imprisonment.  The State appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court, finding recent amendments to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 
indicated that a trial court was now permitted to modify a fixed sentence 
entered pursuant to a plea agreement.  State v. Stafford, 86 N.E.3d 190, 194 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017), vacated and remanded, 100 N.E.3d 696 (“Stafford I”).  
On transfer, our Court considered this and another case that involved 
similar questions over the interpretation of the sentence modification 
statute.  See Rodriguez v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), vacated 
and remanded, 100 N.E.3d 696 (“Rodriguez I”).  In light of 2018 amendments 
to the same statute, our Court issued an order remanding both this case 
and Rodriguez I to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.  State v. 
Stafford, 100 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. 2018).  
On remand, the Court of Appeals determined the statute was 
ambiguous and that subsequent amendments to the statute made clear 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 39S04-1712-CR-749 | August 7, 2019 
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trial courts were not authorized to modify a defendant’s sentence imposed 
by a plea agreement unless the agreement expressly contemplates 
modification.  State v. Stafford, 117 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).  
Accordingly, it reversed the trial court and remanded the matter.  Id. at 
626.  Judge Baker dissented, believing the legislature lacked authority in 
its 2018 amendments to “retroactively void a court order by statute” 
because to do so violated the Indiana Constitution’s Separation of Powers 
provision.  Id. at 628 (Baker, J., dissenting).  Stafford sought transfer, 
which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion.  Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A).  
In today’s companion case Rodriguez, we determined that the 
legislature’s amendments to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17 did not 
signify a shift from the long standing precedent of Pannarale v. State, a case 
in which our Court found “the sentencing court possesses only that 
degree of discretion provided in the plea agreement with regard to 
imposing an initial sentence or altering it later.” 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 
(Ind. 1994); Rodriguez, --- N.E.3d at --- (Slip Op. at 13).  Therefore, trial 
courts are bound by the terms of a plea agreement and may only modify a 
sentence in a way that would have been authorized at the time of 
sentencing.  Pannarale, 638 N.E.2d at 1249; Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e).  
Because Stafford’s plea agreement in the present case called for a fixed 
sentence, the trial court was bound by these terms and had no discretion 
to modify Stafford’s sentence. 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand for any additional 
proceedings necessary to resolve this case.1 
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
1 Prior to oral argument in this case, Stafford informed this Court that she had entered into a 
global plea agreement encompassing the Level 6 felony charge at the heart of this proceeding.  
It may be the case that this new plea agreement has resolved the present dispute. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 39S04-1712-CR-749 | August 7, 2019 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Ellen H. Meilaender 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLE E 
Jason J. Pattison 
Madison, Indiana