Title: State v. Jose A. Trujillo
Citation: 2005 WI 45
Docket Number: 2003AP001463-CR
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2005

2005 WI 45 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1463-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jose A. Trujillo,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 21, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
S. Michael Wilk   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent. 
BUTLER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Suzanne L. Hagopian, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
2005 WI 45 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP1463-CR 
(L.C. No. 
02 CF 468) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jose A. Trujillo,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 21, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. 
PATRICK 
CROOKS, 
J.   Petitioner 
Jose 
Trujillo 
(Trujillo) appeals an order of the court of appeals, affirming 
the 
circuit 
court's 
denial 
of 
his 
motion 
for 
sentence 
modification under 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h)(2001-02).1 
 The 
Kenosha County Circuit Court, Judge S. Michael Wilk presiding, 
held that a reduction in the maximum penalty for the crime of 
burglary, which resulted from the truth-in-sentencing provisions 
of 2001 Wis. Act 109 (TIS-II), does not amount to a new factor 
in regard to a sentence modification motion, where the original 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
2 
 
sentence was imposed in accord with 1997 Wis. Act 283 (TIS-I).  
Trujillo appeals this decision because he claims that the 
reduction of the maximum penalty permitted by TIS-II, from the 
sentence imposed on him on the basis of a higher permitted 
maximum in TIS-I, is highly relevant to the imposition of his 
original sentence and, thus, a new factor.     
¶2 
We agree with the State of Wisconsin (State) that TIS-
II's reduced maximum confinement for the same TIS-I felony does 
not constitute a new factor when a defendant moves for the 
modification of a sentence imposed under TIS-I.  The legislature 
has not mandated the retroactive application of the reduced 
penalties, but has provided an adequate remedy by enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195.2  We conclude that although Trujillo's 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195 states, in relevant part:  
(1g) 
Definition. 
 
In 
this 
section, 
"applicable 
percentage" means 85% for a Class C to E felony and 
75% for a Class F to I felony. 
 
(1r) Confinement in Prison.  (a) An inmate who is 
serving a sentence imposed under s. 973.01 for a crime 
other 
than 
a 
Class 
B 
felony 
may 
petition 
the 
sentencing court to adjust the sentence if the inmate 
has served at least the applicable percentage of the 
term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence.  
If an inmate is subject to more than one sentence 
imposed under this section, the sentences shall be 
treated 
individually 
for 
purposes 
of 
sentence 
adjustment under this section.  
 
(b) Any of the following is ground for a petition 
under par. (a):  
 
1. The inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress 
in rehabilitation, or participation and progress in 
education, treatment, or other correctional programs 
since he or she was sentenced.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3.  A change in law or procedure related to 
sentencing 
or 
revocation 
of 
extended 
supervision 
effective after the inmate was sentenced that would 
have resulted in a shorter term of confinement in 
prison or, if the inmate was returned to prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period 
of confinement in prison upon revocation, if the 
change had been applicable when the inmate was 
sentenced.   
 
4. The inmate is subject to a sentence of 
confinement in another state or the inmate is in the 
United States illegally and may be deported.  
 
5. Sentence adjustment is 
otherwise 
in the 
interests of justice.  
 
(c) Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. 
(a), the sentencing court may deny the petition or 
hold the petition for further consideration.  If the 
court holds the petition for further consideration, 
the court shall notify the district attorney of the 
inmate's petition.  If the district attorney objects 
to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days 
of receiving notification under this paragraph, the 
court shall deny the inmate's petition.   
 . . . . 
 
(g) Except as provided under par. (h), the only 
sentence adjustments that a court may make under this 
subsection are as follows:  
 
1. 
If 
the 
inmate 
is 
serving 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, a 
reduction in the term of confinement in prison by the 
amount of time remaining in the term of confinement in 
prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, 
and a corresponding increase in the term of extended 
supervision. 
 
2.  If the inmate is confined in prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a reduction in the 
amount of time remaining in the period of confinement 
in prison imposed upon revocation, less than up to 30 
days, and a corresponding increase in the term of 
extended supervision.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
4 
 
initial confinement time for burglary exceeded the TIS-II 
maximum, this change was not highly relevant to the imposition 
of his TIS-I sentence.  In so holding, "we continue to employ 
existing 'new factor' jurisprudence for TIS-I sentences," State 
v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶2, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524, 
and therefore we reaffirm rather than overrule this court's 
decision in State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 
(1983), and the court of appeals' decisions in State v. Torres, 
2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 N.W.2d 400, and State v. 
Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, 272 Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 534.  
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the court of appeals.   
I 
 
¶3 
Wisconsin 
shifted 
its 
sentencing 
scheme 
from 
indeterminate to determinate when TIS-I went into effect on 
December 31, 1999.  Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(1) and (2).  The use of 
indeterminate sentencing, prior to TIS-I, guaranteed that a 
convicted defendant would serve for a stated number of years, 
but that the parole board would determine how much of that 
sentence was served in prison.3  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 
¶28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.   
 
¶4 
TIS-I was the first of two truth-in-sentencing acts 
passed by the Wisconsin Legislature.  The second act, TIS-II, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 According to Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1), an inmate would be 
entitled to release after serving two-thirds of his or her 
sentence.  Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(b) states that an 
inmate becomes eligible for parole after serving one-quarter of 
his or her sentence.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
5 
 
became effective on February 1, 2003, and has modified TIS-I.  
Under TIS-I, "a circuit court was required to impose a 
bifurcated sentence consisting of a term of confinement in 
prison followed by a term of extended supervision whenever it 
sentence[d] a person to 'imprisonment in the Wisconsin state 
prisons.'"  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1)).4  Additionally, TIS-
I provided that those serving a bifurcated sentence were not 
eligible for parole, and eliminated the possibility for a 
reduction 
in 
confinement 
time 
for 
good 
behavior.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(4) and (6).5  "With limited exceptions, 
§ 973.01 removed all statutory provisions that might serve to 
reduce 
an 
inmate's 
confinement 
based 
on 
the 
inmate's 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(1) provides, in relevant part:  
Bifurcated Sentence Required.  Except as provided in 
sub. (3), whenever a court sentences a person to 
imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons for a 
felony committed on or after December 31, 1999, the 
court shall impose a bifurcated sentence that consists 
of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term 
of extended supervision under s. 302.113. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(4) states, in relevant part: "No 
good time; extension or reduction of term of imprisonment.  A 
person sentenced to a bifurcated sentence under sub. (1) shall 
serve the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence 
without reduction for good behavior. . . ."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(6) states: "No Parole.  A person 
serving a bifurcated sentence imposed under sub. (1) is not 
eligible for release on parole under that sentence." 
 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
6 
 
rehabilitation."  State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, ¶7, 258 
Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242 (footnote omitted).    
 
¶5 
After TIS-I was drafted, the legislature established 
the 
Criminal 
Penalties 
Study 
Committee 
(CPSC) 
to 
make 
recommendations and to propose additional TIS legislation.  In 
order to give the CPSC enough time to complete its task, the 
legislature created an 18-month window between the date the 
legislature passed TIS-I and the date it was to go into effect.  
Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶41; see also Michael B. Brennan, Thomas 
J. Hammer, Donald V. Latorraca, Fully Implementing Truth-in-
Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 11; see also 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Information Memorandum 98-11, LRB-
3154/1 (June 24, 1998).  Although the CPSC finished its report 
on the necessary supplementation of TIS-I, the legislature did 
not enact these suggestions until after TIS-I became effective.  
Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶41 (citing Brennan, Fully Implementing 
Truth-in-Sentencing, at 12).   
 
¶6 
TIS-II adopted many of the proposals from the CPSC 
report.  Notably, TIS-II included the recommendation that 
"provisions in criminal statutes establishing minimum sentences 
(presumptive or otherwise) or mandatory consecutive sentences be 
repealed."  Criminal Penalties Study Comm., Final Report on 1997 
Wisconsin Act 283, Truth In Sentencing, at 63 (Aug. 31, 1999).  
CPSC stated that the reason for the change was "to allow courts 
'maximum sentencing discretion to deal with the multitude of 
offenders who commit crimes and the multitude of ways in which 
they do so.'"  Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶42 (citing Criminal 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
7 
 
Penalties Study Comm., at 63).  The effect of TIS-II was that 
many of the statutory classifications of felonies were revised 
in order to reduce the maximum sentences.  The result caused by 
the delay between the enactment of TIS-I and TIS-II was that 
defendants convicted of felonies between December 31, 1999, and 
February 1, 2003, generally serve longer periods of confinement 
than the maximum provided for in TIS-II.              
 
¶7 
On April 9, 2002, Trujillo was charged with four 
crimes: second degree sexual assault of an unconscious victim, 
fourth-degree sexual assault, criminal trespass to a dwelling, 
and disorderly conduct.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Trujillo 
pled guilty to the crimes of burglary, a Class C felony, and 
fourth-degree sexual assault, a Class A misdemeanor, on July 22, 
2002.  The circuit court sentenced Trujillo to a term of eight 
years of confinement and five years of extended supervision for 
the felony burglary conviction, and a consecutive incarceration 
term of nine months for the misdemeanor sexual assault. 
¶8 
Before TIS-I, burglary was a Class C felony with a 
maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment.  Under TIS-I, burglary 
remained a Class C felony, but the maximum penalty was increased 
to 15 years of imprisonment, of which up to ten years could be 
ordered as initial confinement.  TIS-II made burglary a Class F 
felony with a maximum penalty of 12.5 years.  Under this penalty 
scheme, the term of initial confinement may not exceed seven 
years and six months.  Thus, under TIS-I, Trujillo was sentenced 
to six months more initial confinement than was possible for the 
same offense under TIS-II. 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
8 
 
¶9 
 Trujillo brought a postconviction motion on April 8, 
2003, seeking modification of his burglary sentence pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(h).6  At a hearing for such relief on May 
14, 2003, the circuit court denied the motion, and determined 
that this court's decision in Hegwood controlled, and that "the 
change in the statute does not effect the penalties created by 
the former statute unless the legislature specifically and 
expressly abrogates the penalties and indicated that it would 
relate back in some fashion."  Trujillo appealed that decision 
to the court of appeals, where the decision of the circuit court 
was summarily affirmed.  In a brief order, the court of appeals 
held that, based upon its prior decision in Torres,7 "the 
reduction in the criminal penalty for an offense affected by the 
truth-in-sentencing provisions contained in TIS-II, does not 
constitute a new factor. . . ."  We accepted review and now 
affirm.       
 
                                                 
6 In his postconviction motion, Trujillo asked the circuit 
court to modify only the confinement time of his burglary 
sentence.  Therefore, we do not address his confinement time for 
sexual assault.       
7 State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 
N.W.2d 400, raised the same issue that was before the court of 
appeals in this case——whether a reduction in the maximum penalty 
for a TIS-II crime constitutes a new factor for the circuit 
court to consider during a hearing on a sentence modification 
motion concerning a TIS-I crime.  The court of appeals did not 
issue its order in this case until after we decided on the 
petition for review in Torres.  Upon our denial of review in 
Torres, the court of appeals in this case affirmed the circuit 
court's denial of sentence modification.     
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
9 
 
II 
 
¶10 It is well established that a circuit court has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
modify 
a 
sentence. 
 
Hegwood, 
113 
Wis. 2d at 546.  This inherent power can be used to prevent the 
continuation of unjust sentences and must be exercised within 
defined parameters.  Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶¶11-12.  One 
such parameter to modify a sentence is through the showing of a 
new factor.8  Id., ¶13.   
 
¶11 Whether a new factor exists is a question of law, 
which we review de novo.  State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 
424, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  "The existence of a new factor does 
not, however, automatically entitle the defendant to relief."  
Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 546.  The question of whether the 
sentence warrants modification is left to the discretion of the 
circuit court.  Id. We will not overrule that decision unless 
the court's discretion was erroneously exercised.  Lechner, 217 
Wis. 2d at 424.   
¶12 We also address issues regarding the interpretation of 
TIS legislation and Wis. Stat. § 973.195.  Our analysis of such 
issues also involves a question of law which we review de novo.  
In Meriter Hospital Inc. v. Dane County, 2004 WI 145, 277 
Wis. 2d 1, 69 N.W.2d 627, we stated:  
                                                 
8 Additional parameters found by this court: "'[A] court has 
the power to correct formal or clerical errors or an illegal or 
a void sentence at any time.'  Also, a court has the inherent 
authority to modify a sentence if  . . . the sentence is 'unduly 
harsh or unconscionable.'"  State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12,  
273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524 (citations omitted).     
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
10 
 
The 
interpretation 
of a 
statute 
presents 
a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  State v. 
Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996).  
Although we consider this question independent of the 
decisions of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, we nevertheless benefit from their analyses.  
Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 
N.W.2d 339 (1999).   
When 
interpreting 
a 
statute, 
the 
primary 
objective "is to determine what the statute means so 
that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 662, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Knowing this, the court's analysis should begin with 
the plain language of the statutory text.  Id., ¶45.  
If the language of the statute is clear on its face, 
the court should apply the statute using the common 
and generally accepted meanings of the terms.  Fox v. 
Catholic Knights Ins. Soc., 2003 WI 87, ¶19, 263 
Wis. 2d 207, 219, 665 N.W.2d 181.  With an unambiguous 
statute, the court need not consult extrinsic sources 
of interpretation.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
Meriter, 277 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 12-13. 
¶13 We first address the issue of new factors.  We define 
a new factor as "an event or development which frustrates the 
purpose of the original sentence," Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 
¶4, and recognize it to be more than a change in circumstances 
since the time of sentencing.  Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶14.  
Specifically, we have held:   
[T]he phrase "new factor" refers to a fact or set of 
facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, 
but not known to the trial judge at the time of 
original sentencing, either because it was not then in 
existence or because, even though it was then in 
existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the 
parties.   
Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975) 
(emphasis added).  As previously noted, to qualify for a 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
11 
 
sentence modification based on a new factor, the defendant must 
show: (1) a new factor exists; and (2) the new factor warrants 
modification of his sentence.  State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 
8, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989).         
 
¶14 Case law governing sentence modification based on a 
new factor is well settled.  Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶4.  
Wisconsin courts have reached the conclusion that many of the 
circumstances presented were not sufficient to establish a new 
factor.9  See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶15.  While there have 
been some cases where new factors have been identified,10 there 
                                                 
9 Courts in Wisconsin have not found a new factor to be any 
of the following:  
[A]n inmate's desire to testify at a post-conviction 
hearing regarding his side of the story, Rosado, 70 
Wis. 2d at 
288; 
the 
introduction 
of 
sentencing 
guidelines recommending a different sentence than the 
one a convicted defendant received, State v. Macemon, 
113 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983); disparity 
in sentencing between co-defendants, State v. Toliver, 
187 Wis. 2d 346, 361-62, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 
1994); an inmate's progress or rehabilitation while 
incarcerated, State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 563 
N.W.2d 468 
(1997) 
and 
State 
v. 
Krueger, 
119 
Wis. 2d 327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984); an 
inmate's response to treatment while incarcerated, 
State 
v. 
Prince, 
147 
Wis. 2d 134, 
136-37, 
432 
N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1988); an inmate's shorter-than-
normal life expectancy, State v. Ramuta, 2003 WI App 
80, ¶21, 261 Wis. 2d 784, 661 N.W.2d 483; or an 
inmate's post-sentencing declining health, Michels, 
150 Wis. 2d at 99-100 [State v. Michels, 150 Wis. 2d 
94, 99-100, N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1989)]. 
State v. Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶15 (footnote omitted).   
10 New 
factors 
for 
sentence 
modification 
have 
been 
identified in the following situations:  
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
12 
 
have been no cases involving TIS legislation where the reduction 
in penalties has been considered highly relevant to the 
imposition of sentence and, thus, a new factor.     
 
¶15 With the above principles in mind, we turn to 
Trujillo's argument.  He contends that a post-sentencing 
reduction in the maximum penalty for a TIS-II crime should be 
considered a new factor by the circuit court for the purpose of 
a TIS-I sentence modification motion.  Trujillo argues that the 
penalties 
under 
TIS-I 
did 
not 
adequately 
measure 
the 
legislature's intent as to the gravity and appropriate maximum 
sentence for a crime.  He claims that the legislature's new 
assessment of crimes in TIS-II should be considered highly 
relevant to the imposition of his TIS-I sentence and, therefore, 
considered a new factor.  As a result, Trujillo asks this court 
                                                                                                                                                             
[T]he 
untreatable 
nature 
of 
an 
inmate's 
mental 
condition is such that it "frustrated" a primary 
condition of his sentence, State v. Sepulveda, 119 
Wis. 2d 546, 560-61, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984); a potential 
conflict of interest of the mental health professional 
who 
conducted 
the psychological 
assessment 
of 
a 
convicted defendant for the sentencing court, State v. 
Stafford, 2003 WI App 138, ¶17, 265 Wis. 2d 886, 667 
N.W.2d 370; 
and 
a 
convicted 
defendant's 
post-
sentencing voluntary submission to revocation of his 
parole based on erroneous advice from his probation 
agent, State v. Norton, 2001 WI App 245, ¶16, 248 
Wis. 2d 162, 635 N.W.2d 656.  
Id., ¶16.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
13 
 
to distinguish our holding in Hegwood and overrule the court of 
appeals' decision in Torres.11     
¶16 The State, conversely, argues that the new factor 
analyses 
in 
Hegwood, 
Torres, 
and 
Longmire 
are 
directly 
applicable.  Based on these cases, the State argues that it is 
clearly established that the reduction in maximum confinement 
cannot be considered a new factor by the circuit court for the 
purpose of sentence modification. 
¶17 We agree with the State's reliance on these holdings.  
First, in Hegwood, which predates TIS legislation, the defendant 
moved for a sentence modification of his 25-year sentence for a 
rape conviction and ten-year sentence for a conviction for armed 
robbery.  When the legislature repealed the rape statute and 
created a sexual assault statute that redefined the crime and 
lessened the maximum penalty to 20 years, Hegwood argued that it 
constituted a new factor that the circuit court should consider.  
The circuit court and court of appeals denied his claim.   
¶18 We decided in Hegwood that "[t]he reduction in the 
maximum penalty . . . is not highly relevant to the imposition 
of sentence and, therefore, does not constitute a 'new factor.'"  
                                                 
11 Justice Butler's dissent wants us to go one step further 
and overrule Hegwood, Torres, and Longmire.  We hold, however, 
that Hegwood and its progeny were correctly decided.  We 
therefore apply the holding in those cases to the issues before 
us.       
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
14 
 
Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 547.  We also cited Wis. Stat. § 990.0412 
for the proposition that "the repeal of a statute shall not 
remit, defeat, or impair any criminal liability for offenses 
committed prior thereto unless such criminal liability is 
specifically 
and 
expressly 
remitted 
or 
abrogated 
by 
the 
repealing statute."  Id.  Because the defendant's criminal 
liability under the old statute was not expressly remitted by 
the statute's repeal, we held that "retroactive application of 
the reduced maximum penalty for sexual assault under the new 
statute is precluded."  Id. at 548.      
¶19 In Torres, the court of appeals applied the rationale 
from 
Hegwood, 
and 
extended 
it 
to 
cases 
involving 
TIS 
legislation. 
 
There, 
the 
defendant 
moved 
for 
sentence 
modification of his TIS-I conviction based on the post-
sentencing reduction of the maximum penalty in TIS-II.  Torres 
was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's 
consent, 
a 
Class 
E 
felony, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3).  He was sentenced to two years of 
initial confinement and two years of extended supervision.  
Under TIS-I, the crime had a maximum initial confinement time of 
two years.  When he brought a motion for sentence modification 
after the enactment of TIS-II, however, the same crime had been 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.04 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
"Actions pending not defeated by repeal of statute.  The repeal 
of a statute hereafter shall not remit, defeat or impair any 
civil or criminal liability for offenses committed, penalties or 
forfeitures incurred or rights of action accrued under such 
statute before the repeal thereof. . . ." 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
15 
 
changed to a Class I felony, and the maximum initial confinement 
was reduced to one year and six months.   
¶20 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
holding 
of 
Hegwood 
applied 
to 
the 
circumstances 
presented 
in 
Torres. 
 
In 
regard 
to 
TIS 
legislation, the court of appeals held that "a change in the 
classification of a crime, which would result in a shorter 
sentence 
if 
the 
defendant 
were 
convicted 
under 
the 
new 
classification, is not a 'new factor' under our traditional 
model for sentence modification."  Torres, 267 Wis. 2d 213, ¶7.  
In doing so, the court of appeals refused to distinguish 
Hegwood.   It held: "Torres is in the same situation as Hegwood—
—there is no mandatory retroactive application of the lower 
penalty——so the Hegwood rule applies and the change in penalty 
is not a new factor."  Id., ¶12.      
¶21 We are not persuaded by Trujillo's attempt to convince 
us to distinguish Hegwood and overrule Torres.  We agree with 
the court of appeals in Torres that the holding in Hegwood 
should be applied to sentence modification motions involving TIS 
legislation.  Trujillo does not present a sufficient reason as 
to why the legislature’s two-stage implementation of TIS should 
be considered a new factor, especially since we have never held 
that the reduction of maximum penalties was a new factor in any 
other 
case, 
where 
the 
legislature 
has 
not 
mandated 
the 
retroactive application of the lower penalties.    
¶22 We also conclude that Trujillo's argument, that we 
should hold that there is a new factor here, is not consistent 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
16 
 
with the plain language used by the legislature in the TIS-II 
enactments.  If the legislature wanted the reduced maximum 
penalties to be considered in TIS-I sentence modification 
hearings, it could have provided that the reduced penalties in 
TIS-II shall have retroactive application.  In effect, "the 
legislature had an opportunity to make the change retroactive, 
but chose not to do so."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶74.  We 
agree with the State that if the legislature had intended the 
reduced maximum penalties of TIS-II to apply to crimes committed 
under TIS-I, it could have chosen not to increase the maximum 
confinement terms in TIS-I, or simply not implement TIS-I at 
all.  Alternatively, the legislature could have inserted the 
TIS-II confinement terms into TIS-I, before TIS-I went into 
effect.    
¶23 The court of appeals in Torres carefully reviewed the 
TIS legislation.  The court noted that the reduced maximum 
penalties in TIS-II were not explicitly made applicable to TIS-I 
defendants in the act, thus indicating that it was giving 
deference to the legislature's authority to determine criminal 
behavior and the range of possible penalties.  See Jeffrey 
Kassel, Sentence Modification by Wisconsin Trial Courts, 1985 
Wis. L. Rev. 195, 216, discussing the Hegwood decision.  "This 
deference may explain why the court interpreted the legislative 
intent behind section 990.04 of the Wisconsin statutes to 
prohibit not only a mandatory retroactive application of [a] 
reduction 
in 
maximum 
penalty, 
but 
to 
also 
prohibit 
a 
discretionary retroactive application."  Id. (footnote omitted). 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
17 
 
We hold, in line with Hegwood and Torres, that the omission by 
the legislature of retroactive language in enacting TIS-II is 
significant, and we accord deference to that legislative 
decision.13  
¶24 The court of appeals in Torres also referenced another 
reason for rejecting the defendant's modification motion based 
on the claimed new factor.  It stated: "Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.195 reflects the legislature's intent to create a separate 
and specific statutory procedure for requesting a sentence 
reduction . . . whenever 'a change in law or procedure related 
to sentencing . . . effective after the inmate was sentenced 
that would have resulted in a shorter term of confinement' is 
the basis for the modification."  Torres, 267 Wis. 2d 213, ¶9 
(footnote omitted).     
¶25 Trujillo argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.195 applies to 
TIS-I offenders, but that the statute is not an adequate remedy, 
and that the court of appeals' decision in Torres was erroneous.  
We hold that the plain language of § 973.195 supports our 
determination here that new factor motions do not provide an 
appropriate method for dealing with TIS-II's reduction in 
maximum penalties.  We agree with the court of appeals which 
stated in Torres that § 973.195 is a remedy "which provides the 
                                                 
13 We 
emphasize 
that, 
by 
according 
deference 
to 
the 
legislative 
decisions 
in 
regard 
to 
TIS-I, 
TIS-II, 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195, 
this 
court 
is 
not 
recognizing 
any 
restriction on the inherent power of the court, but rather we 
conclude that the legislative decisions do not result in a new 
factor.   
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
18 
 
procedure for judicial review of a sentence when the law 
relating to sentencing changes," id., ¶7, and we hold that it is 
an adequate remedy to address the circumstances resulting from 
the reduction in penalties from TIS-I to TIS-II.    
¶26 The court of appeals has also held that the goal of 
TIS legislation is to create certainty of confinement at the 
time a sentence is imposed. Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶13.  In 
Champion, the defendant was sentenced under TIS-I and brought a 
sentence modification motion based on the claimed new factor 
that her rehabilitation was complete, and that with the 
elimination of parole there was no one else but the court to 
consider her early rehabilitation.  The court, in reviewing the 
legislative history of TIS-I, held that the legislature did not 
intend such a remedy.  Id.  Instead, "the legislature intended 
that truth-in-sentencing create certainty as to the duration of 
confinement at the time a sentence is imposed, something 
fundamentally inconsistent with the open-ended availability of 
sentence modification based on post-sentencing factors. . . ."  
Id.  In Crochiere, we discussed the reasoning in Champion with 
approval and concluded that we will "continue to employ existing 
'new factor' jurisprudence for TIS-I sentences . . ." while 
leaving open questions unique to TIS-I not yet identified.  
Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶¶2, 18-19. 
¶27 We now turn to the court of appeals' recent decision 
in Longmire.  There, the defendant brought a postconviction 
motion for sentence modification after being sentenced under 
TIS-I for felony theft by a contractor, a Class C felony 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
19 
 
punishable by no more than $2500 and a maximum bifurcated 
sentence of 15 years.  Longmire was sentenced to 14 months of 
confinement, ten years of extended supervision, and restitution.  
Because 
TIS-II 
made 
Longmire's 
crime 
a 
Class 
G 
felony, 
punishable by a maximum bifurcated sentence of only ten years, 
Longmire argued that both the reduction in maximum penalty and 
the rationale accompanying it, constituted new factors for the 
circuit court to consider.  The court of appeals concluded:  
[J]ust as a change in the classification and maximum 
sentence 
of a crime 
is 
not a 
new 
factor for 
traditional sentence modification purposes, neither is 
the rationale underlying the change.  The study 
committee's 
rationale 
for 
recommending 
to 
the 
legislature that certain maximum terms of extended 
supervision be reduced is not a "fact or set of facts" 
relevant to the imposition of Longmire's sentence.  
Rather, it is an opinion on an aspect of correctional 
policy held by a committee created to conduct a study 
and make recommendations regarding the implementation 
of the Truth in Sentencing Laws in Wisconsin. 
Longmire, 272 Wis. 2d 759, ¶46 (citing Criminal Penalties Study 
Comm., at 1).  We agree with the court of appeals that the 
rationale for post-sentencing changes by the legislature does 
not constitute a new factor for the purpose of sentence 
modification.  Id.    
¶28 We are also concerned about the possibility of opening 
the floodgates if we hold that the reduction in maximum 
sentences for TIS-II crimes constitutes a new factor.  Between 
the time that TIS-I was enacted on December 31, 1999, and the 
date of TIS-II's implementation on February 1, 2003, more than 
10,700 adults were admitted into Wisconsin's prison system with 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
20 
 
one or more TIS-I sentences.  See Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections, Truth in Sentencing, at 5 (July 22, 2004).  If we 
agree with Trujillo's new factor analysis, there is certainly 
the potential that most TIS-I offenders could seek a sentence 
modification 
on 
similar 
grounds. 
 
There 
could 
be 
many 
defendants, like Trujillo, that have a TIS-I initial confinement 
term that exceeds the TIS-II maximum.  Additionally, there could 
be sentence modification motions from other inmates whose TIS-I 
confinement term did not exceed the TIS-II maximum.  An inmate 
could argue, for example, that if the sentencing court thought 
his crime required a sentence in the "middle range", that the 
same court may have applied a lesser confinement term if it were 
applying the TIS-II "middle range" rather than that of TIS-I.               
¶29 We reiterate that the decision to modify a sentence 
upon the finding of a new factor is left to the sound discretion 
of the circuit court.  Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 546.  We again 
note, however, that "[i]f a circuit court concludes that the 
facts shown are insufficient to constitute a new factor, as a 
matter of law, it need go no further in its analysis to decide 
the inmate's motion."  Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶24.  In this 
case, the circuit court explicitly stated that Trujillo did not 
prove the existence of a new factor.  In doing so, the circuit 
court did not have to go any further in denying Trujillo's 
motion for sentence modification.   
III 
¶30  In sum, we agree with the State that TIS-II's reduced 
maximum confinement time for the same TIS-I felony does not 
No. 
2003AP1463-CR   
 
21 
 
constitute a new factor when a defendant moves for modification 
of a sentence imposed under TIS-I.  The legislature has not 
mandated the retroactive application of the reduced penalties, 
but 
has 
provided 
an 
adequate 
remedy 
by 
enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195.  We conclude that although Trujillo's 
initial confinement time for burglary exceeded the TIS-II 
maximum, this change was not highly relevant to the imposition 
of his TIS-I sentence.  In so holding, "we continue to employ 
existing 
'new 
factor' 
jurisprudence 
for TIS-I 
sentences," 
Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶2, and therefore we reaffirm rather 
than overrule this court's decision in Hegwood, and the court of 
appeals' decisions in Torres and Longmire.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the order of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.                  
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶31 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Trujillo 
is asking the circuit court to consider whether his sentence 
pronounced under TIS-I, which exceeds the TIS-II maximum 
penalty, might, in the discretion of the circuit court, be 
modified in light of the reduced maximum penalties enacted under 
TIS-II.  The circuit court refused to even consider the request.  
The majority opinion affirms the circuit court.  I disagree.  I 
would hold that a penalty reduction in TIS-II below the sentence 
imposed under TIS-I is a new factor that permits, but does not 
require, the circuit court to modify the sentence. 
¶32 The 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
substantially 
changed 
sentencing in Wisconsin with the enactment of the Truth in 
Sentencing statutes.  Under indeterminate sentencing, which was 
in existence in this state for many years, a circuit court 
pronounced sentence and the parole board generally determined 
how much of the sentence was served in prison.14  With the advent 
of Truth in Sentencing, a circuit court still pronounces a 
sentence, but parole is no longer available for those serving a 
prison sentence. 
¶33 The effective date of the first Truth in Sentencing 
statute (TIS-I) was delayed to allow legislative change.  Truth 
in 
Sentencing 
remained 
a 
legislative 
work 
in 
progress.  
Unfortunately, the legislature delayed enacting TIS-II.  TIS-I 
                                                 
14 State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197. 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
went into effect December 31, 1999, even though everyone 
acknowledges that it was an unfinished work.15 
¶34 TIS-II, effective February 1, 2003, contained, among 
other provisions, a significant reduction of the maximum 
penalties for many crimes. 
¶35 Legislative penalties strongly influence a circuit 
court's sentencing decision; the statutory penalty is the 
legislature's gauge of the seriousness of the crime, and the 
legislature's gauge of the seriousness of the crime influences 
the sentence imposed by the court. 
¶36 That persons sentenced under TIS-I could, and did, 
receive harsher penalties than those sentenced for the same 
crime under prior or subsequent laws is not in dispute.  For 
example, Trujillo (as well as others who are governed by TIS-I) 
was sentenced to a greater prison term than those who committed 
the same crime but were sentenced under indeterminate sentencing 
or TIS-II.  Under the basic principle of equal justice under 
law, it seems unfair to sentence persons to higher sentences 
pursuant to TIS-I during a three-year interim period of an 
                                                 
15 Majority op., ¶¶4-6; Justice Butler's dissent, ¶53.  For 
discussions of TIS-I, TIS-II, and the transition, see, e.g., 
State of Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee Final 
Report 
(Aug. 
31, 
1999) 
(available 
at 
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/secy/index.asp); 
Thomas 
J. Hammer, 
The 
Long 
and 
Arduous 
Journey 
to 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
in 
Wisconsin, 15 Fed. Sent. R. 15 (2002); Michael B. Brennan et 
al., Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, 75 Wis. Lawyer 10 
(Nov. 2000); Michael B. Brennan & Donald V. Lattoraca, Truth-in-
Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin, 73 Wis. Lawyer 16 (May 2000); 
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1997 Assembly Bill 351; 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, Information Memorandum 98-
11 (June 24, 1998).  
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
unprecedented 
fluctuation 
in 
penalties, 
just 
because 
the 
legislature unfortunately (and unexpectedly) delayed enacting 
TIS-II and TIS-II's reduced penalties. 
¶37 A circuit court has inherent power to modify a 
sentence.16  The legislature may create means and methods for 
modification of sentences,17 but, as the majority opinion 
states,18 legislative enactments do not affect a court's inherent 
power to modify a sentence.  This court, not the legislature, 
sets the boundaries of the circuit court's inherent power to 
modify sentences.   
¶38 A circuit court's inherent authority to modify a 
sentence is a discretionary power exercised within boundaries 
set by this court.  This power is exercised to prevent the 
continuation of unjust sentences19 or sentences that are unduly 
harsh or unconscionable.20  A circuit court may correct formal or 
clerical errors or an illegal or void sentence.21  A circuit 
court has discretionary authority to modify a sentence on the 
basis of a "new factor."   
                                                 
16 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970), overruled in part by State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 
210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). 
17 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 973.19, .195. 
18 Majority op., ¶23 n.13. 
19 State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 434 N.W.2d 609 
(1989). 
20 Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 278 N.W.2d 850 
(1979). 
21 Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101, 175 N.W.2d 625 
(1970). 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶39 A legislative change in the penalty was not a new 
factor under indeterminate sentencing.  The court so decided in 
State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983), over 
my dissent.  The Hegwood interpretation of a circuit court's 
inherent power to modify sentences might have made sense under 
indeterminate sentencing.  In indeterminate sentencing, the 
executive branch could consider the legislative reduction of 
penalties and could release prisoners before they served their 
full time.   
¶40 Hegwood does not, however, make sense for sentencing 
under TIS-I when the legislature intended to reduce the maximum 
penalties (but did not), and additionally when the executive 
branch lost its power to modify prison sentences through parole. 
¶41 There is no need, however, to overrule Hegwood.  The 
Hegwood rule about a new factor can continue to apply to 
indeterminate sentences.  Hegwood should not, however, be 
extended to TIS-I.  I agree with Trujillo that Hegwood does not 
control the instant case because Hegwood presented a completely 
different fact situation.     
¶42 Wisconsin is in a new sentencing era.  This case 
demonstrates the court's need to reexamine a circuit court's 
inherent power to modify sentences.  The court got it right in 
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶26, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
N.W.2d 524:  "[T]here may be additional new factors unique to 
TIS-I that we have not previously identified."22    
¶43 The reduction of the maximum penalties in TIS-II is, I 
conclude, a new factor unique to TIS-I, because the legislature 
did not intend TIS-I to go into effect until TIS-II was adopted 
with reduced penalties.  The undisputed history of TIS-I and 
TIS-II demonstrates that the reduction of the penalties was 
highly relevant to the legislature and that the reduction was 
not known at the time of Trujillo's original sentencing.23   
¶44 A new factor does not automatically entitle a prisoner 
to modification of a sentence.  Whether the sentence warrants 
modification is left to the discretion of the circuit court. I 
                                                 
22 "In conclusion, we reaffirm that circuit courts have 
inherent authority to modify sentences on the basis of a new 
factor.  Additionally, we continue to employ existing 'new 
factor' jurisprudence, while noting there may be additional 
factors unique to TIS-I that we have not previously identified."  
State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶26, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 
N.W.2d 524. 
23 Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 
(1975). 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
conclude that a circuit court should, in its inherent power and 
discretion, determine whether Trujillo's TIS-I sentence should 
be modified in light of TIS-II reduction of penalty.24 
¶45 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶46 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
24 State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 
N.W.2d 400, and State v. 
Longmire, 
2004 WI 
App 90, 72 
Wis. 2d 759, 681 N.W.2d 534, 
holding 
otherwise, 
should be 
overruled. 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶47 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
concludes that TIS-II's reduced maximum confinement for the same 
TIS-I felony does not constitute a new factor when a defendant 
moves for a modification of a sentence imposed under TIS-I.  The 
majority reasons that the legislature has not mandated the 
retroactive application of the reduced penalties, but has 
instead provided an adequate remedy by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.195.  Accordingly, the majority reaffirms this court's 
decision in State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 
(1983).  Because Hegwood was wrongly decided, and because the 
change in the penalty structure from TIS-I to TIS-II could 
constitute a new factor, I respectfully dissent.  
¶48 This court in Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 102, 175 
N.W.2d 625 (1970), held that sound public policy favors the 
exercise by a trial court of its power to amend, modify, and 
correct a judgment of sentencing, even though the service of the 
sentence has been commenced.  The trial court's authority to 
change and modify its judgments was based on its "inherent 
power."  Id. at 101.  The court noted that the trial court 
should correct an unjust sentence within reasonable limits.  Id. 
at 101-03. The inherent power to modify a sentence "must be 
exercised within the limits of sound sentencing discretion."  
Id. at 106. 
¶49 The 
reasonable 
limits 
specified 
in 
Hayes 
were 
clarified by this court in State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 205 
N.W.2d 144 (1973), when this court adopted the American Bar 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and 
Procedures, Part VI, § 6.1 (approved draft, 1968).  That section 
provided: 
6.1 Authority to reduce: general. 
(a) It may be appropriate to authorize the sentencing 
court to reduce or modify a sentence within a 
specified time after its imposition or the final 
resolution of an appeal if new factors bearing on the 
sentence are made known. . . . 
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 581.  Thus, this court made clear that 
any modification of sentence could not be based on reflection 
alone but must be based on a new factor brought to the trial 
court's attention.25  Id. at 582. 
¶50 In Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 
(1975), this court defined "new factor" as "a fact or set of 
facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not 
known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, 
either because it was not then in existence or because, even 
though it was in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all 
                                                 
25 Chief Justice Hallows believed that requiring new factors 
as a prerequisite to modifying a sentence is too restrictive of 
the power of a judge and a step backward in the criminal 
process.  State v. Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d 572, 585-86, 205 N.W.2d 
144 (1973) (Hallows, C.J. concurring).  According to Chief 
Justice Hallows, on reconsideration, if the trial court judge 
felt that he or she had been too harsh or had failed to give due 
weight to mitigating factors which should have been properly 
taken into account, then the judge should have the power to re-
examine the sentence and modify it accordingly.  Id. at 586.  
I respectfully disagree with Chief Justice Hallows, as I 
fully embrace the new factor concept as stated in Rosado v. 
State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975).  His sentiment is 
correct, however, when applied to Hegwood.   
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
of the parties."  A knowing failure to provide the information 
does not constitute a new factor.  Id. at 288. 
¶51 In Hegwood, this court decided that a reduction in the 
maximum statutory penalty is not a new factor justifying a 
modification of sentence.  The court's analysis, however, was 
incorrect.  The court based its decision on Moore v. State, 83 
Wis. 2d 285, 310-311, 265 N.W.2d 540 (1978), which correctly 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 990.04 precludes an automatic 
reduction of a sentence because of the change in the maximum 
penalty for a particular offense.  See Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 
548.  The court then jumped to the conclusion that since an 
automatic reduction was not authorized under the statute, "the 
reduction in the maximum penalty . . . shall not operate to 
reduce the sentence for a previously committed offense."  Id.  
But in Hegwood, the defendant was not asking for automatic 
reduction of his sentence.  He was arguing that the change in 
penalty structure constituted a new factor under Rosado. 
Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 549 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). By 
missing the point of the defendant's argument, the court arrived 
at an erroneous conclusion.  I would not follow Hegwood's 
precedent. 
¶52 Instead, I would conclude that whether a change in the 
statutory maximum constituted a new factor depends on whether 
the trial court determined that the change was "highly relevant" 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
to the imposition of the sentence.26  If it was not, then no new 
factor would be shown.  If it was, however, then the court would 
have to determine whether relief was appropriate.  There is no 
logical 
reason 
or 
overriding 
public 
policy 
concern 
that 
justifies restricting the trial courts' inherent power in this 
fashion.  As the court stated in Hayes, "[i]t is more important 
to be able to settle a matter right with a little uncertainty 
than to settle it wrong irrevocably."  Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 105. 
¶53 The Truth in Sentencing bill was originally planned as 
one package.  Michael B. Brennan, et al., Fully Implementing 
Truth-in-Sentencing, 75 Wisconsin Lawyer No. 11, 10-12 (Nov. 
2002). 
TIS-I 
went 
into 
effect 
on 
December 
31, 
1999. 
Unfortunately, TIS-II did not become effective until February 1, 
2003. TIS was not designed to increase the penalties for 
criminal offenses.  See id. at 10; Thomas J. Hammer, The Long 
and Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 15 Fed. 
Sent. R. 15 (2002); see also State of Wisconsin Criminal 
Penalties Study Committee Final Report, at 22 (August 31, 1999), 
available at http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=42 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2005).  Yet, during the TIS-I phase, 
penalties were indeed increased so that the period of initial 
confinement under TIS-I would approximate the maximum penalties 
under 
the 
old 
indeterminate 
structure. 
 
See 
Legislative 
Reference Bureau Analysis of 1997 Assembly Bill 351 at 4-5.  
                                                 
26 The second prong of the Rosado analysis would already be 
met in this situation, as a new penalty structure would not be 
in existence until after the effective date of the new law, 
after the sentence was imposed. 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
When TIS-II took effect, penalties were reduced to their 
appropriate level, based in large part on the work of the 
Criminal 
Penalties 
Study 
Committee 
(CPSC). 
 
Brennan, 
75 
Wisconsin Lawyer No. 11, at 12.  Defendants who were sentenced 
under TIS-I were thus subject to greater maximum penalties than 
those sentenced under either indeterminate sentencing laws or 
TIS-II, even though the parties agree that the purposes in 
adopting TIS did not include increasing the penalty structure 
for criminal offenses. 
¶54 People sentenced under TIS-I are not entitled to an 
automatic reduction of their sentences.  See Moore, 83 Wis. 2d 
at 310-11.  This is also true for people who were previously 
sentenced under indeterminate sentencing laws.  If the trial 
court in a TIS-I case determines, however, that the change in 
the penalty structure created by the passage of TIS-II is highly 
relevant to the imposition of a particular TIS-I sentence, then 
that court should, as part of its inherent power, have the 
opportunity to decide whether relief should be granted.  If, on 
the other hand, the trial court were to conclude that the change 
in penalties was not highly relevant to the imposition of a 
particular sentence, then it is not a new factor and not a basis 
for sentence modification.  I would overrule Hegwood and its 
progeny,27 and reverse and remand this action to the trial court 
for a determination of whether the change in penalty structure 
constitutes a new factor in this proceeding.  
                                                 
27 See, e.g., State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, 272 Wis. 2d 
759, 681 N.W.2d 534 and State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 
Wis. 2d 213, 670 N.W.2d 400. 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
¶55 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2003AP1463-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1