Title: Travis v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 200, 2013
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: June 26, 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOE L. TRAVIS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 200, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 30109075DI  
§                       
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: June 10, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 26, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 26th day of June 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Joe L. Travis, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s March 25, 2013 order denying his fourth motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
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Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that this appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in February 1992, Travis was 
found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Murder in the First Degree.  He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  This Court affirmed Travis’ conviction on 
direct appeal.2  Travis subsequently filed three postconviction motions 
pursuant to Rule 61, all of which were denied by the Superior Court.  This 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in Travis’ appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his first postconviction motion.3  Travis’ appeal 
from the denial of his second postconviction motion was dismissed as 
untimely.4  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment in Travis’ 
appeal from the denial of his third postconviction motion.5  Travis now 
appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his fourth postconviction motion. 
 
(3) 
In his appeal, Travis asserts several claims that may fairly be 
summarized as follows: a) his counsel’s initial failure to file a timely direct 
appeal and her subsequent filing of a postconviction motion on the ground of 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Travis v. State, 1993 WL 541923 (Del. Dec. 22, 1993).  Travis’ counsel initially failed 
to file a timely direct appeal.  However, after considering Travis’ counsel’s 
postconviction motion alleging her own ineffectiveness, the Superior Court resentenced 
Travis, permitting a timely appeal to be filed. 
3 Travis v. State, 1998 WL 171091 (Del. Mar. 23, 1998).      
4 Travis v. State, 2008 WL 836967 (Del. Apr. 21, 2008). 
5 Travis v. State, 2010 WL 2854133 (Del. July 21, 2010). 
 
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her own ineffectiveness prejudiced him; b) the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by deciding his postconviction motion and that of his co-
defendant in the same order; and c) the Superior Court decided his 
postconviction motion with a closed mind.  To the extent that Travis raised 
issues in his postconviction motion in the Superior Court that have not been 
fairly raised in this proceeding, all such issues are deemed to be waived.6 
 
(4) 
Prior to deciding the substantive merits of a postconviction 
motion, the Superior Court must consider whether the time and/or 
procedural bars of Rule 61 apply.7  In this case, the Superior Court correctly 
determined that Travis’ motion was time-barred pursuant to Rule 61(i) (1).  
As the Superior Court also correctly concluded, Travis’ claims were 
procedurally barred as repetitive pursuant to Rule 61(i) (2).   
 
(5) 
Nor is there any basis in the record to support Travis’ claim that 
his untimely motion should be considered in the interest of justice pursuant 
to Rule 61(i) (2) or of a constitutional violation that resulted in a miscarriage 
of justice pursuant to Rule 61(i) (5).  There is no support for Travis’ claim 
that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s postconviction motion alleging her 
own ineffectiveness.  There is likewise no support for his claim that the 
Superior Court violated his rights by deciding his and his co-defendant’s 
                                                 
6 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
7 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996). 
 
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claims in the same order or his claim that the Superior Court decided his 
motion with a closed mind.  The Superior Court’s decision reflects that both 
Travis’ and his co-defendant’s claims were fully and fairly considered, 
resulting in no prejudice to either of them.   
 
(6)  
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice