Title: The Florida Bar v. Welch
Citation: 309 So. 2d 537
Docket Number: 45606
State: Florida
Issuer: Florida Supreme Court
Date: January 29, 1975

309 So. 2d 537 (1975)
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant,
v.
James D. WELCH, Respondent.
No. 45606.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 29, 1975.
Rehearing Denied March 18, 1975.
Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel, Wilson J. Foster, Jr., Asst. Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Alvin Capp, Fort Lauderdale, for complainant.
J. Ben Watkins, Watkins, Hill &amp; Marts, Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This is a disciplinary proceeding by The Florida Bar against James D. Welch. Respondent has filed a petition for review pursuant to Rule 11.09, Integration Rule.
The Florida Bar filed a two-count complaint against respondent. Following a hearing, the Referee recommended dismissal of Count Two. As to Count One, he found:
*538 Satisfied that these findings were supported by a clear and convincing preponderance of the evidence in the record, the Referee recommended:
Respondent has a prior disciplinary history. He had been disbarred in April, 1965, for misappropriation of clients' funds  the same offense of which he presently stands charged. The disbarment was approved by this Court in Welch v. The Florida Bar, 109 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1959).[1] He was subsequently reinstated[2] but was later publicly reprimanded by this Court and placed on three years probation in 1972. The Florida Bar v. Welch, 272 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972). We there found, based in part on respondent's own testimony, that he had fraudulently induced the complaining witness to deed her property to respondent's wife for a grossly inadequate cansideration. We stated:
Considering these past disciplinary actions, the Referee recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law in Florida.
In the present proceedings, respondent has contended that: (1) the punishment recommended by the Referee is grossly excessive; (2) he was deprived of due process because the Florida Bar followed the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar; (3) he was compelled to testify against himself relative to Count Two.
With regard to the alleged excessiveness of the punishment, we find this argument to be groundless in view of our previous admonitions to respondent. As to the alleged unfairness of the Bar proceedings, we have previously considered and rejected this argument in State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Grant, 85 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1956). Finally, concerning respondent's third contention, it is sufficient to note that the allegedly "compelled" testimony pertained solely to Count Two, which was ultimately dismissed.
After considering the nature of the present offense in light of respondent's past disciplinary history, we are of the unanimous opinion that the findings and recommendations of the Referee should be adopted. They are hereby approved, and the respondent is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in this state.
Execution for costs against respondent will be directed by subsequent order.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., ROBERTS, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., and RUDD, Circuit Court Judge, concur.
[1]  Affirming the order of the Circuit Court for Broward County in State v. Welch, Case No. L59,910A, November 8, 1959.
[2]  Welch v. Board of Governors, The Florida Bar, 173 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1965).