Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Kenneth R. Kratz
Citation: 2014 WI 31
Docket Number: 2011AP002758-D
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: June 6, 2014

2014 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2758-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kenneth R. Kratz, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Kenneth R. Kratz, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KRATZ 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 6, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
         
 
COUNTY: 
       
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2758-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kenneth R. Kratz, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth R. Kratz, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 6, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
suspended. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report of the referee, 
Reserve Judge Robert E. Kinney, recommending the court suspend 
Attorney Kenneth R. Kratz's license to practice law for a period 
of four months.  No appeal has been filed. 
¶2 
We approve and adopt the referee's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  We conclude that the seriousness of 
Attorney Kratz's misconduct warrants a four-month license 
suspension.  We require that Attorney Kratz pay the full costs 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
2 
 
of the proceeding, which totaled $23,904.10 as of August 20, 
2012. 
¶3 
Attorney Kratz has been licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin since 1985.  He was appointed District Attorney of 
Calumet County, Wisconsin, in 1992 and served in that position 
until he resigned in October 2010.  Before serving as the 
Calumet County District Attorney, Attorney Kratz served as an 
Assistant District Attorney in La Crosse, Wisconsin. 
¶4 
Attorney Kratz has no previous disciplinary history. 
¶5 
The disciplinary complaint before us, filed by the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) on November 30, 2011,1 involves 
allegations that Attorney Kratz sent inappropriate text messages 
to a domestic abuse crime victim, S.V.G., while serving as the 
prosecutor of the perpetrator of the domestic abuse crime.  The 
complaint further alleges that Attorney Kratz made inappropriate 
verbal statements to two social workers with the Calumet County 
Human Services Department, S.S. and R.H.  This course of 
behavior served as the basis of six counts of misconduct, to 
which Attorney Kratz has pled no contest. 
¶6 
The OLR's complaint included an additional five counts 
of misconduct.  One of those counts concerned Attorney Kratz's 
text messages to S.V.G.; the remaining four counts alleged that 
Attorney Kratz engaged in inappropriate behavior toward two 
additional women, J.W. and M.R.  The OLR moved for, and the 
                                                 
1 Because the OLR filed its complaint prior to January 1, 
2012, all references will be to the Supreme Court Rules in 
effect prior to January 1, 2012. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
3 
 
referee granted, the dismissal of three of these five counts on 
June 14, 2012, a few days before the start of the disciplinary 
hearing on June 19, 2012.  The OLR moved for, and the referee 
granted, the dismissal of the other two counts at the outset of 
the disciplinary hearing.  Attorney Kratz entered no contest 
pleas to the remaining six counts. 
¶7 
Of 
the 
six 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
to 
which 
Attorney Kratz pled no contest, three counts concern S.V.G.  
According 
to 
the 
OLR's 
complaint, 
on 
August 
12, 
2009, 
Attorney Kratz, 
while 
serving 
as 
Calumet 
County 
District 
Attorney, filed a felony criminal complaint against S.R.K. of 
Kaukauna, Wisconsin.  According to the complaint, S.R.K. beat 
and strangled S.V.G., a former live-in partner and mother of 
S.R.K.'s child.  The complaint charged one felony count of 
strangulation 
and 
suffocation 
(pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.235(1)) and one count of disorderly conduct (pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01). 
¶8 
Shortly after the preliminary hearing in this matter, 
S.V.G. met with Attorney Kratz alone in a conference room at the 
district attorney's office.  S.V.G. requested the meeting, 
exercising her right to consult with the district attorney 
"concerning the disposition of a case involving a crime of which 
he or she was a victim . . . ."  See Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(zm) 
(2009-10). 
¶9 
During 
the 
meeting, 
S.V.G. 
volunteered 
personal 
information to Attorney Kratz, stating that she did not have a 
current boyfriend, that she suffered from low self-esteem, that 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
4 
 
she lived with her mother, and that she was struggling as a 
single mother. 
¶10 According to S.V.G., she understood during her meeting 
with Attorney Kratz that he would be prosecuting S.R.K.  S.V.G. 
also relayed details of her relationship with S.R.K., and 
indicated that S.R.K. had previously abused her, including 
beatings and strangulation.  Attorney Kratz asked S.V.G. if she 
objected to reducing the felony charge to a misdemeanor.  S.V.G. 
objected to the suggestion.  At the conclusion of the meeting, 
Attorney Kratz and S.V.G. exchanged cell phone numbers. 
¶11 After 
S.V.G. 
left 
Attorney 
Kratz's 
office, 
Attorney Kratz began texting S.V.G. from his personal cell 
phone.  Attorney Kratz sent her three messages on October 20, 
2009, the same day they met, his last message stating, "I wish 
you weren't one of this office[']s clients.  You'd be a cool 
person to know!" 
¶12 On October 21, 2009, Attorney Kratz sent S.V.G. 19 
messages, including asking her: "Are you the kind of girl that 
likes secret contact with an older married elected DA . . . the 
riskier the better?  Or do you want to stop right know [sic] 
before any issues?" 
¶13 On October 22, 2009, Attorney Kratz sent S.V.G. eight 
more messages, telling her that she was "beautiful," "pretty," 
that "I'm the atty.  I have the $350,000 house.  I have the 6 
figure career. You may be the tall, young, hot nymph, but I am 
the prize!  Start convincing," and that "I would not expect you 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
5 
 
to be the other woman.  I would want you to be so hot and treat 
me so well that you'd be THE woman.  R U that good?" 
¶14 According 
to 
S.V.G., 
Attorney 
Kratz's 
personal 
overtures were unwelcome and offensive, and she was concerned 
that if she failed to respond to Attorney Kratz, he might take 
action with respect to the case against S.R.K. that could 
potentially adversely affect S.V.G. 
¶15 On October 22, 2009, S.V.G. reported Attorney Kratz's 
text messages to the Kaukauna Police Department. 
¶16 After photographing the text messages on S.V.G.'s 
telephone and taking S.V.G.'s statement, the Kaukauna Police 
Department referred the matter to the State of Wisconsin 
Department of Justice (DOJ). 
¶17 After reviewing the text messages and the report of 
the Kaukauna Police Department, the DOJ determined that there 
had 
not 
been 
any 
criminal 
activity. 
 
Nonetheless, 
DOJ 
representatives strongly suggested to Attorney Kratz that he 
step aside from the prosecution of S.R.K. and self-report his 
conduct to the OLR. 
¶18 Attorney Kratz facilitated the appointment of a 
special prosecutor to take over the S.R.K. case.  Attorney Kratz 
also agreed to resign as chairman of the Wisconsin Crime 
Victims' Rights Board. 
¶19 In a December 4, 2009 letter to the OLR that included 
the transcribed messages to and from S.V.G., Attorney Kratz 
admitted that he sought a personal "friendship" with S.V.G.  He 
expressed regret and embarrassment for his conduct and admitted 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
6 
 
that he had violated S.V.G.'s trust.  Attorney Kratz also noted 
that he was undergoing therapy "to answer why a career 
prosecutor, with a spotless record and sterling reputation, 
would risk his professional esteem on such a disrespectful 
communication with a crime victim." 
¶20 On September 15, 2010, the Associated Press published 
a story regarding Attorney Kratz's text messages to S.V.G.  
Attorney Kratz issued a statement admitting that he sent the 
texts and was embarrassed at his lack of judgment. 
¶21 On September 17, 2010, the executive committee of the 
Wisconsin District Attorneys Association issued a letter to 
Attorney Kratz calling for his resignation. 
¶22 After then-Governor James Doyle initiated removal 
proceedings against him pursuant to Chapter 17 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, Attorney Kratz resigned his position as Calumet County 
District Attorney on October 4, 2010. 
¶23 Two 
counts 
of 
the 
OLR's 
complaint 
involve 
Attorney Kratz's verbal statements to S.S., a social worker with 
the Calumet County Human Services Department. 
¶24 In October of 2009, Attorney Kratz prosecuted a 
termination of parental rights case in which S.S. was a witness.  
Prior to testifying, S.S. commented to Attorney Kratz that she 
was nervous about testifying.  In response to S.S.'s concerns, 
Attorney Kratz stated to S.S. that he "won't cum in your mouth."  
Later that day Attorney Kratz remarked to S.S. that he wanted 
the trial to be over because he was leaving on a trip to 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
7 
 
Las Vegas, where he could have "big boobed women serve me 
drinks." 
¶25 One 
count 
of 
the 
OLR's 
complaint 
involves 
Attorney Kratz's verbal statement to R.H., also a social worker 
with the Calumet County Human Services Department.  During a 
court proceeding, Attorney Kratz commented in court to R.H. that 
a reporter had "big beautiful breasts." 
¶26 On the first day of the scheduled disciplinary hearing 
in this matter, Attorney Kratz entered pleas of no contest to 
six counts of misconduct stemming from his behavior toward 
S.V.G., S.S., and R.H.  The referee found that an adequate 
factual basis existed on each of the six counts, and accepted 
the no contest pleas. 
¶27 The referee concluded that, by seeking a personal 
relationship with S.V.G., a domestic abuse crime victim and 
witness, while serving as the prosecutor of the perpetrator of 
the domestic abuse crime, thereby creating a significant risk 
that the representation of the State of Wisconsin would be 
materially limited by his own personal interests, Attorney Kratz 
engaged in a concurrent conflict of interest in violation of 
SCR 20:1.7(a).2 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.7(a) states:  
 
Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation involves 
a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
 
(1) the representation of one client will be 
directly adverse to another client; or 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
8 
 
¶28 The referee also concluded that, by seeking a personal 
relationship with S.V.G., a domestic abuse crime victim and 
witness, and by sending her text messages carrying sexual 
overtones, while prosecuting the perpetrator of the domestic 
abuse crime, Attorney Kratz engaged in offensive personality, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(g)3 and SCR 40.15.4 
¶29 The 
referee 
also 
concluded 
that, 
by 
sending 
deliberate, unwelcome, and unsolicited sexually suggestive text 
messages to S.V.G., a domestic abuse crime victim and witness, 
while prosecuting the perpetrator of the domestic abuse crime, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
3 SCR 20:8.4(g) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "violate the attorney's oath; . . . ." 
4 SCR 40.15, "Attorney's oath," states, in pertinent part: 
 
The oath or affirmation to be taken to qualify 
for admission to the practice of law shall be in 
substantially the following form:  
 
. . . . 
 
 
I will abstain from all offensive personality and 
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation 
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice 
of the cause with which I am charged; . . . . 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
9 
 
Attorney Kratz harassed S.V.G. on the basis of her sex, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(i).5 
¶30 The referee also concluded that, by stating to S.S., a 
Calumet County social worker and witness in a termination of 
parental rights case, that he "won't cum in your mouth" and that 
he wished the trial to be over because he was traveling to 
Las Vegas where he could have "big boobed women serve me 
drinks," and by making these comments while acting in his 
capacity as Calumet County District Attorney, Attorney Kratz 
engaged in offensive personality in violation of SCR 20:8.4(g) 
and SCR 40.15. 
¶31 The referee also concluded that, by stating to S.S., a 
Calumet County social worker and witness in a termination of 
parental rights case, that he "won't cum in your mouth" and that 
he wished the trial to be over because he was traveling to 
Las Vegas where he could have "big boobed women serve me 
drinks," and by making these comments while acting in his 
capacity as Calumet County District Attorney, Attorney Kratz 
harassed S.S. on the basis of her sex, in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(i). 
¶32 Finally, the referee concluded that, by making a 
comment during a court proceeding to R.H., a Calumet County 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:8.4(i) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, 
creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual 
preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer's 
professional activities.  Legitimate advocacy respecting the 
foregoing factors does not violate par. (i)." 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
10 
 
social worker, that a reporter had "big beautiful breasts," and 
by making this comment while acting in his capacity as Calumet 
County District Attorney, Attorney Kratz engaged in offensive 
personality, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(g) and SCR 40.15. 
¶33 At the June 19, 2012 disciplinary hearing, the referee 
heard testimony and received exhibits on the issue of the 
appropriate discipline.  The referee also received post-hearing 
briefing on the subject. 
¶34 In its post-hearing brief, the OLR argued that 
Attorney Kratz's license should be suspended for six months.  
The OLR emphasized that Attorney Kratz's conduct involved 
multiple women, all of them in vulnerable or subordinate 
positions.  The OLR argued that Attorney Kratz did not intend to 
remove himself as prosecutor in the S.V.G. matter until DOJ 
officials asked him to do so after S.V.G. reported his actions 
to the police.  The OLR also argued that Attorney Kratz refused 
to take responsibility for his offensive statements to S.S. and 
R.H.  The OLR further argued that because Attorney Kratz blamed 
his misconduct on various addictions yet offered no competent 
medical testimony that he had recovered from his addictions, a 
six-month suspension would be appropriate given that it would 
require him to petition the court for reinstatement under 
SCR 22.28(3).6 
                                                 
6 SCR 22.28(3) states, "The license of an attorney that is 
revoked or suspended for misconduct for six months or more shall 
be reinstated pursuant to the procedure set forth in SCR 22.29 
to 22.33 and only by order of the supreme court." 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
11 
 
¶35 In his post-hearing brief, Attorney Kratz argued that 
a public reprimand was warranted.  In support of his argument 
that a license suspension was not warranted, Attorney Kratz 
downplayed the seriousness of his misconduct toward S.V.G., 
S.S., and R.H. 
¶36 Regarding his texts to S.V.G., Attorney Kratz admitted 
they constituted wrongful behavior, but "disagree[d] with the 
OLR's characterization that the messages contained 'sexual 
overtones' (as no message included one single sexually explicit 
term, nor was any sexual conduct or sex act ever suggested)."  
Attorney Kratz also described his conduct upon learning that 
S.V.G. objected to his texts as praiseworthy.  He wrote: 
[U]pon even the hint of a conflict of interest, or 
reports of unsettling reaction by [S.V.G.], immediate 
steps were taken to eliminate even the perception of 
continued violation; timely self-report to the OLR for 
imposition of sanction (if required); and aggressive 
steps to ensure this stupidity never, ever repeated 
itself.  That is the attorney response that this Court 
should praise, rather than punish. 
¶37 Regarding his verbal comments to social worker S.S. 
that he "won't cum in [her] mouth" and looked forward to having 
"big boobed women serve [him] drinks," Attorney Kratz wrote that 
he "recognized the disrespectful phrase used, and apologized to 
the Social Worker at the first opportunity." 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
12 
 
¶38 Regarding his statement to social worker R.H. that a 
"reporter"7 had "big beautiful breasts," Attorney Kratz wrote in 
his post-hearing brief that this comment "never occurred."  
Attorney Kratz argued that "the reporter referred to, although 
admittedly beautiful, does NOT have large breasts . . . this 
single important factor has been relied upon by Respondent to 
conclude the comment never was made, or at the very least, [was] 
misinterpreted by [R.H.]."  Attorney Kratz conceded, however, 
that "given the posture of this case, the tribunal is free to 
include the facts of the [R.H.] comment, and provide it such 
weight in the sanctions recommendations as deemed necessary." 
¶39 As a mitigating factor, Attorney Kratz wrote in his 
post-hearing brief that at the time of the events in question, 
he "suffered from the combination of Sexually Compulsive 
Disorder (SCD) and prescription drug dependence"——conditions for 
which he has sought treatment.  He also claimed that he wanted 
"to settle the case" early in the disciplinary process, but the 
OLR refused to do so, in part because it is "apparently more 
concerned with how 'they look' in the zealous pursuit of an 
attorney 'pelt,' rather than what result 'should' be reached." 
                                                 
7 What kind of "reporter" Attorney Kratz was referencing was 
the source of some confusion in the proceedings before the 
referee.  In its complaint, the OLR referred to the reporter as 
a "court reporter."  Three weeks before the disciplinary 
hearing, the OLR moved to amend its complaint to refer to "a 
reporter," as opposed to a "court reporter."  The referee 
granted the OLR's motion to amend.  In his post-hearing brief, 
Attorney Kratz described the reporter in question as a "TV 
reporter." 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
13 
 
¶40 On July 30, 2012, the referee filed a report and 
recommendation.  In considering the appropriate discipline, the 
referee weighed various aggravating and mitigating factors. 
¶41 The 
referee 
noted 
as 
aggravating 
factors 
that 
Attorney Kratz acted with a selfish motive; that S.V.G. was a 
vulnerable victim; and that Attorney Kratz's misconduct was 
particularly inexcusable in light of his considerable legal 
experience and his previous leadership on issues pertaining to 
victims' rights. 
¶42 The 
referee 
assigned 
neutral 
weight 
to 
Attorney Kratz's self-report to the OLR of his misconduct 
involving S.V.G.  The referee wrote that "at the time of the 
respondent's self-report, the cat was already out of the bag, so 
to speak.  S.V.G. had gone to the police, the police had 
contacted the Wisconsin Department of Justice, and that agency 
urged the respondent to self-report to the OLR."  The referee 
found that these circumstances "significantly undercut any claim 
of virtuousness by self-reporting." 
¶43 The referee noted a variety of mitigating factors, 
which, in summary fashion, are as follows:  Attorney Kratz has 
no prior disciplinary history; he apologized to S.S. for his 
vulgar comment shortly after making it; he has never attempted 
to justify or defend his conduct toward S.V.G.; he cooperated 
with the disciplinary proceedings; he previously enjoyed a good 
professional reputation and engaged in significant volunteer 
activities within the legal profession; he has been diagnosed 
with and sought treatment for narcissistic personality disorder 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
14 
 
and sexual addiction; he was abusing the sleeping aid Ambien, 
the painkiller Vicodin, and the anti-anxiety drug Xanax at the 
time of the misconduct; he subsequently sought treatment for his 
substance abuse issues; he voluntarily obtained a mentor 
attorney through the State Bar's Wisconsin Lawyer Assistance 
Program 
(WisLAP), 
who 
reported 
being 
impressed 
with 
Attorney Kratz's character and commitment to recovery; and he 
had suffered substantial collateral consequences from his 
misconduct, including considerable negative publicity, the loss 
of his district attorney position, and significant financial 
difficulties. 
¶44 After 
weighing 
these 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors, the referee recommended that Attorney Kratz's license 
to practice law should be suspended for a period of four months.  
In support of his recommendation for a lighter sanction than 
that proposed by the OLR, the referee emphasized the number and 
weight of the mitigating factors in this case.  The referee also 
suggested that a four-month suspension was consistent with the 
discipline 
imposed 
in 
two 
cases 
that 
he 
believed 
were 
particularly 
analogous 
to 
this 
case. 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Beatse, 2006 WI 115, 297 Wis. 2d 292, 722 
N.W.2d 385 (assistant district attorney publicly reprimanded for 
having spent numerous hours viewing pornography on his work 
computer, lied about the source of the pornography and the 
extent of his viewing, used the state's e-mail system to send 
and 
receive 
sexually 
explicit 
e-mail 
messages, 
and 
made 
inappropriate 
comments 
to 
a 
county 
employee 
in 
a 
work 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
15 
 
environment); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ridgeway, 
158 Wis. 2d 452, 462 N.W.2d 671 (1990) (assistant state public 
defender suspended for six months for having initiated and 
engaged in sexual contact with a client he was representing as a 
public defender, and for having encouraged that client to 
violate the terms of her probation by providing her with 
alcoholic beverages). 
¶45 No appeal has been filed, so this matter is submitted 
to the court pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).8  We affirm a referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 
305 Wis. 2d 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  Id.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of 
each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶46 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the 
referee's factual findings are supported by the record, and we 
adopt them.  We also adopt the referee's conclusion that 
                                                 
8 SCR 22.17(2) states as follows: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
16 
 
Attorney Kratz committed the six counts of misconduct described 
above. 
¶47 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, 
we agree with the referee that a four-month suspension is 
necessary discipline for Attorney Kratz's misconduct in this 
matter.  Attorney Kratz's conduct toward S.V.G. was appalling.  
Through a series of wheedling text messages, Attorney Kratz 
attempted to convince S.V.G., a domestic abuse crime victim and 
witness, to enter into a sexual relationship with him while he 
was prosecuting the perpetrator of the domestic crime.  S.V.G. 
felt leveraged by Attorney Kratz's sexual entreaties; she feared 
that if she failed to respond to him, he might take action in 
her domestic abuse case that could potentially adversely affect 
her.  This was exploitative behavior, harassing behavior, and a 
crass placement of his personal interests above those of his 
client, the State of Wisconsin.  Attorney Kratz's comments to 
social worker S.S. while she served as a witness in one of his 
cases——that he "won't cum in [her] mouth" and looked forward to 
"big boobed women" serving him drinks in Las Vegas——crossed the 
line separating the unprofessional from the acutely offensive 
and harassing.  Attorney Kratz's statement to social worker R.H. 
during a court proceeding, in which he voiced approval of a 
reporter's "big beautiful breasts," was sufficiently boorish as 
to constitute misconduct.  In short, whatever his qualities and 
accomplishments as a lawyer, Attorney Kratz proved himself 
during the period in question to be sanctionably sophomoric. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
17 
 
¶48 Attorney Kratz has rationalized his poor behavior by 
confessing to various addictions:  to Ambien, to Vicodin, to 
Xanax, and to sex, though he fails to point to either medical 
records or expert medical testimony that would explain the exact 
nature and severity of his conditions, or how they may have 
affected his ability to conform his behavior to ethical rules.  
But regardless of how we view Attorney Kratz's behavior——as an 
involuntary byproduct of addiction, or as a willful blindness to 
professional standards——the ugly picture painted by the record 
remains the same.  The recommended four-month suspension is 
deserved.9  
¶49 We turn next to the issue of costs.  The OLR filed its 
statement of costs on August 20, 2012, listing $23,904.10 in 
costs.  Supreme Court Rule 22.24(2) required Attorney Kratz to 
file any objection to the OLR's statement of costs within 21 
days after service——or on or about September 10, 2012.  On 
November 
14, 
2012——over 
two 
months 
past 
the 
deadline——
Attorney Kratz filed an objection to the statement of costs, 
along with a motion asking the court to accept his late filing.  
                                                 
9 We note that the referee additionally recommended that 
Attorney Kratz's license to practice law in this state should be 
conditioned 
on 
his 
continued 
participation 
in 
a 
WisLAP 
monitoring program.  We further note that in April 2014, the 
WisLAP coordinator wrote to advise the court that Attorney Kratz 
had successfully completed a two-year voluntary monitoring 
contract with WisLAP.  In light of Attorney Kratz's successful 
completion of his WisLAP monitoring contract, we decline to 
order continued WisLAP monitoring. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
18 
 
Attorney Kratz offered no explanation for the lateness of his 
filing. 
¶50 We reject Attorney Kratz's unexcused late filing.  Our 
deadlines are not mere suggestions.  Filing documents with this 
court over two months late with no semblance of a reasonable 
excuse has its consequences.  As the Seventh Circuit has 
explained: 
We live in a world of deadlines.  If we're late 
for the start of the game or the movie, or late for 
the departure of the plane or the train, things go 
forward without us.  The practice of law is no 
exception.  A good judge sets deadlines, and the judge 
has a right to assume that deadlines will be honored. 
Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
¶51 Even if we were to consider Attorney Kratz's objection 
to costs on its merits, it falls well short of convincing us to 
impose 
anything 
other 
than 
full 
costs. 
 
If 
anything, 
Attorney Kratz's untimely objection to costs hurts more than it 
helps his cause. 
¶52 In his untimely objection, Attorney Kratz insists that 
he should pay no costs whatsoever.  The OLR asks us to impose 
full 
costs 
consistent 
with 
our 
standard 
practice 
under 
SCR 22.24(1m).10 
                                                 
10 SCR 22.24(1m)(effective from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 
2011) provides: 
 
The court's general policy is that upon a finding 
of misconduct it is appropriate to impose all costs, 
including the expenses of counsel for the office of 
lawyer regulation, upon the respondent.  In cases 
involving extraordinary circumstances the court may, 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
19 
 
¶53 The referee has recommended an equal split of the 
costs.  In his report, the referee stated that although the 
court's general policy is to impose all costs against a 
respondent upon a finding of misconduct, "[o]ne of the relevant 
factors set forth in SCR 22.24(1m) warrants deviation from the 
standard rule."  That factor, according to the referee, is 
SCR 22.24(1m)(a):  "[t]he number of counts charged, contested, 
and proven."  The referee noted that the OLR spent "more than 
the usual time and effort" in locating and arranging for the 
testimony of the two grievants, J.W. and M.R., whose claims 
formed the basis for four misconduct counts that the OLR 
dismissed at or shortly before the start of the scheduled 
disciplinary hearing.  The referee explained that although it is 
"not at all unusual" for the OLR to dismiss claims during the 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount 
of costs imposed upon a respondent.  In exercising its 
discretion regarding the assessment of costs, the 
court will consider the submissions of the parties and 
all of the following factors: 
 
(a)  The number of counts charged, contested, and 
proven. 
 
(b)  The nature of the misconduct. 
 
(c)  The level of discipline sought by the 
parties and recommended by the referee. 
 
(d)  The 
respondent's 
cooperation 
with 
the 
disciplinary process. 
 
(e)  Prior discipline, if any. 
 
(f)  Other relevant circumstances. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
20 
 
course 
of 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding, 
it 
"would 
seem 
unfair . . . to impose all the costs on the respondent." 
¶54 We disagree with both the referee and Attorney Kratz 
and impose full costs.  Under SCR 22.24, the court has the 
exclusive authority to decide the appropriate assessment of 
costs against a disciplined lawyer.  We note that at the time 
the referee filed his report recommending halving the costs 
normally assessable against Attorney Kratz, the referee was 
operating at an informational disadvantage.  Consistent with 
SCR 22.24(2), the OLR filed its statement of costs and an 
itemization of costs several weeks after the referee filed his 
report. 
¶55 Reviewing the costs issue de novo, we disagree with 
the referee's recommendation that the costs assessed against 
Attorney Kratz should be essentially proportional to the 
percentage of counts on which the OLR prevailed.  It is true, as 
the referee emphasized, that SCR 22.24(1m)(a) lists as a factor 
to consider in reducing costs the "number of counts charged, 
contested, and proven."  Our rules, however, require that to 
impose less than full costs on the lawyer disciplined, the court 
must first find "extraordinary circumstances."  SCR 22.24(1m).  
Only 
if 
and 
when 
the 
court 
finds 
that 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" exist in a particular case may the court consult 
the factors listed in SCR 22.24(1m)(a) through (f) to guide the 
court's imposition of costs. 
¶56 We do not find extraordinary circumstances present 
here.  To begin with, it is not extraordinary for the OLR to 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
21 
 
prosecute all misconduct counts for which the Preliminary Review 
Committee found cause to proceed.  And, in the words of the 
referee, it is "not at all unusual" for the OLR to dismiss 
claims during the course of a disciplinary proceeding, as was 
the case with the five misconduct counts dismissed here.11  As 
for who should pay the cost of litigating dismissed misconduct 
charges——the disciplined lawyer or the other attorneys in this 
state——this court has chosen the former, barring "extraordinary 
circumstances" which, by definition, we do not normally find.  
See SCR 22.24(1m); see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 460-61, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998) 
(rejecting objections to full assessments of costs based on an 
apportionment 
of 
the 
number 
of 
misconduct 
allegations 
established); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johnson, 
165 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 477 N.W.2d 54 (1991) (same). 
¶57 We 
also 
find 
nothing 
extraordinary 
about 
Attorney Kratz's claim, stridently advanced in his untimely 
objection to costs, that he was willing to conditionally admit 
some of the misconduct charges several months before the 
scheduled disciplinary hearing.  We reject the premise of 
Attorney Kratz's argument:  that he has been dragged through an 
                                                 
11 We note that as an appellate court, we know only what the 
record contains, and we do not know precisely why the OLR 
dismissed the counts that it did.  Nor should we:  this court's 
function is not to armchair quarterback the OLR's litigation 
decisions, but to review the record and determine whether the 
referee properly concluded that the respondent violated the 
ethics code by engaging in misconduct. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
22 
 
expensive disciplinary process while furiously waving the white 
flag of surrender from the very beginning.  This simply is not 
true. 
¶58 The primary basis for Attorney Kratz's claim that 
these disciplinary proceedings were unnecessary is a single e-
mail, dated about two weeks after the OLR filed its complaint, 
from Attorney Kratz to the OLR's counsel.  In this e-mail, 
Attorney Kratz stated his willingness to enter no contest pleas 
to some, but not all, of the counts to which he ultimately pled 
no contest.  He offered to enter no contest pleas to the three 
counts involving S.V.G. to which he ultimately pled no contest.  
He denied misconduct toward R.H.  He stated he had "no 
recollection" of making the vulgar remarks to S.S. and would 
"prefer not to admit to something I do not recall," and he 
denied that any "one-time crude remarks" could constitute 
harassment under SCR 20:8.4(i).  He stated that "[t]his count"——
presumably, the offensive personality count under SCR 20:8.4(g) 
and SCR 40.15 concerning S.S.——"could result in a 'no contest' 
plea if you want a 2nd 'incident' to hang your hat on, other 
than [S.V.G.]"  He stated that although he would accept a six-
month suspension, he wanted the suspension to take effect less 
than three weeks later, and to be given "credit" against his 
suspension for an over five-month period during which he had 
"removed [himself] from the practice of law."  We note that with 
his request for an over five-month credit against his proposed 
six-month suspension, Attorney Kratz was proposing that he 
receive a net suspension of about three weeks.  Attorney Kratz 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
23 
 
explained that he intended to move out of state, and his 
"opportunity to be licensed elsewhere requires my reinstatement 
here." 
¶59 In its reply to Attorney Kratz's untimely objection to 
costs, the OLR informs us that it chose not to accept the terms 
stated in Attorney Kratz's e-mail.  The OLR states that it did 
not agree with Attorney Kratz's suggestion that the time he 
allegedly refrained from practicing law should be "credited" 
against any imposed suspension.  The OLR also did not agree to 
starting the suspension period less than three weeks after the 
date of the e-mail.  The OLR further informs us that it reminded 
Attorney Kratz that this court prohibits parties in OLR cases 
from engaging in plea bargaining.  See, e.g., Inglimo, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, ¶85.  Finally, the OLR tells us that at the time of 
Attorney Kratz's e-mail, the OLR director "reconsidered the 
viability of each misconduct count and determined it would be 
inappropriate to drop the counts suggested by Attorney Kratz." 
¶60 We 
decline 
to 
equate 
Attorney 
Kratz's 
highly 
optimistic settlement offer with an extraordinary circumstance 
sufficient to justify a reduction in costs.  Although we have 
long allowed lawyers and the OLR to enter into stipulations of 
fact and law and jointly request the imposition of a justifiable 
level of discipline, we refuse Attorney Kratz's invitation to 
undertake the task of evaluating the parties' efforts to reach 
such a stipulation; i.e., to review the history of the parties' 
case discussions in order to determine who was willing to 
stipulate to what, when, and at what consequence; whether a 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
24 
 
stipulated outcome was reasonably achievable; and how much the 
SCR 22.24 costs totaled at the relevant point(s) in time. 
¶61 This is not to say that it is impossible for an 
attorney to limit, or even eliminate, the imposition of costs 
under SCR 22.24.  An attorney may entirely avoid paying the 
costs of a proceeding by entering into a comprehensive, court-
approved stipulation prior to the appointment of a referee.  
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Compton, 2010 
WI 112, ¶13, 329 Wis. 2d 318, 787 N.W.2d 831 (citing SCR 22.12).  
This was not done here.  After the appointment of a referee, an 
attorney may stop the running of SCR 22.24 costs by entering 
into a stipulation that eliminates the need for further 
litigation.  This was not done here. 
¶62 What was done here, according to the record, is that 
Attorney Kratz e-mailed a stipulation proposal written in self-
interested terms, and the OLR rejected it.  This is not an 
"exceptional circumstance":  to modify a familiar refrain, you 
can't always get what you want, or what you need. 
¶63 We do not find the costs incurred extraordinary 
either.  The costs consist of about $15,000 in fees and 
disbursements from the OLR's counsel; about $5,700 in referee's 
fees and mileage expenses; and about $2,900 in court reporting 
and other costs.  Attorney Kratz does not argue that these costs 
were in any way inflated.  He does not challenge the billable 
rates of the OLR's counsel or the referee, or the time spent by 
either on any particular task.  He does not challenge any 
disbursements or expenses as excessively high.  He does not do 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
25 
 
what SCR 22.24(2) instructs:  "explain, with specificity, the 
reasons for the objection [to costs] and . . . state what 
he . . . considers to be a reasonable amount of costs." 
¶64 In place of specificity Attorney Kratz resorts to 
hyperbole.  He writes in his tardy objection to costs: 
As 
this 
Court 
should 
by 
now 
have 
undeniably 
determined, there is nothing ORDINARY about this 
disciplinary case brought by the OLR against the 
Respondent, and the assessment of ANY costs against 
the Respondent, as a result of the OLR's insistence on 
a formal hearing, is unjust and borders on the 
intellectually insulting. 
[I]t 
was 
the 
Respondent 
himself 
who 
has 
done 
everything, since well before any formal grievance was 
filed with the OLR, to resolve this entire matter with 
professional 
humility, 
having 
immediately 
and 
consistently 
taken 
full 
responsibility 
for 
any 
possible Supreme Court Rule violation . . . . 
¶65 The record proves otherwise.  In every stage of these 
proceedings, Attorney Kratz has employed a tooth-and-nail 
litigation approach.  He denied all misconduct in his answer to 
the 
OLR's 
complaint 
and 
raised 
various 
constitutional, 
jurisdictional, and procedural defenses.  He accused the OLR of 
operating under a conflict of interest and of unethically 
leaking information.  He moved to dismiss the OLR's complaint on 
nine separate grounds; the referee later rejected the motion as 
"replete with bare assertions of fact" which were "not properly 
before the referee and may not be considered."  He engaged in 
vigorous discovery practice, including propounding over 125 
interrogatories, filing discovery motions, and attempting to 
compel the production of documents from third parties.  He 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
26 
 
raised 
arguments 
that 
ranged 
from 
the 
incredible 
(e.g., 
disputing 
his 
text 
messages 
to 
S.V.G. 
contained 
sexual 
overtones); to the hyper-technical (claiming the OLR complaint 
was barred by the civil doctrines of issue and claim preclusion 
because an OLR investigator initially declined to forward 
S.V.G.'s 
grievance 
for 
formal 
investigation); 
to 
the 
inconsistent (denying any recollection of making inappropriate 
comments to S.S. but claiming credit for having recognized their 
inappropriateness and apologized); to the puzzling (arguing that 
he could not have told R.H. that a reporter had "big beautiful 
breasts" because the reporter in question was beautiful, but not 
large breasted). 
¶66 It 
was, 
of 
course, 
Attorney 
Kratz's 
right 
to 
vigorously contest the misconduct charges.  But SCR 22.24(1m) 
makes clear that when a lawyer whom this court ultimately finds 
guilty of misconduct imposes costs on the disciplinary system, 
he or she must expect to pay.  And litigation, as every litigant 
knows, is not cheap.  We refuse to transfer the litigation costs 
that Attorney Kratz has generated to the other attorneys of the 
state who are innocent of any wrongdoing. 
¶67 In the end, there is nothing "extraordinary" here from 
a costs perspective.  Our general rule is to impose full costs 
upon a finding of misconduct, and we do so here.  See 
SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶68 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Kenneth R. Kratz to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of four 
months, effective July 11, 2014. 
No. 
2011AP2758-D   
 
27 
 
¶69 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kenneth R. Kratz shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶70 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Kenneth R. Kratz shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶71 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2758-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶72 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the per curiam opinion. 
¶73 The OLR disciplinary system is about 15 years old.  
Several anomalies and proposed amendments have been brought to 
the court's attention.  It is time for the court to institute a 
review of the system rather than to make piecemeal adjustments 
at this time.  See my writings in OLR v. Johns, 2014 WI 32, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; OLR v. Osicka, 2014 WI 33, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; and OLR v. Osicka, 2014 WI 34, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; of even date.   
¶74 I welcome Justice Prosser's support for an impartial, 
objective, thorough review of OLR practices and procedures, 
support he gave at the open rules petition conference in October 
2013.  For a history of a proposal for such a review, listen to 
the open rules petition conference of October 25, 2013, in 
connection with proposals for change in OLR's practices.     
¶75 The question of instituting such a review will come 
before the court again.  I hope it will get four votes. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
1 
 
¶76 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  From time to time every government agency would 
benefit from an impartial, objective review of the agency's 
practices and procedures.  There is increasing evidence of the 
need for such an evaluation of the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR).  This case highlights some of the problems facing the 
agency and why an objective review would be desirable. 
I 
¶77 It must be stated at the outset that the misconduct of 
Attorney Kenneth Kratz requires discipline.  I concur in the 
recommendation of the referee that Attorney Kratz receive a 
four-month suspension, which is the suspension approved by the 
court. 
¶78 OLR wanted a six-month suspension.  A six-month 
suspension would require Attorney Kratz to seek readmission from 
this court, a process that often takes the better part of a 
year. 
 
A 
suspension 
of 
that 
duration 
would 
have 
been 
unreasonable. 
¶79 OLR also asked that Attorney Kratz pay all costs of 
the proceeding, namely, $23,904.10, and the court approves these 
costs, contrary to the recommendation of the referee.  The 
exorbitant costs requested by OLR——and granted by this court——
require discussion and prompt this partial dissent. 
II 
¶80 OLR 
charged 
Attorney 
Kratz 
with 
11 
counts 
of 
misconduct.  The first four counts involved S.V.G.  One of these 
counts was later dismissed by OLR.  The counts involving S.V.G. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
2 
 
are the reason why Attorney Kratz requires discipline.  They are 
described in ¶¶7-22 of the Per Curiam opinion.   
¶81 Attorney Kratz's conduct was highly inappropriate and 
cannot 
be 
defended. 
 
What 
is 
important 
for 
this 
concurrence/dissent, however, is that the substance of these 
counts, including all text messages between Attorney Kratz and 
S.V.G., were self-reported by Kratz to OLR on December 4, 2009, 
making proof of ethical violations easy to accomplish.  Thus, 
one of the first issues to examine is why OLR did not file any 
charges against Attorney Kratz until November 30, 2011. 
¶82 It seems obvious, in retrospect, that Attorney Kratz 
suffered a serious breakdown of some sort by October 2009.1  He 
had been through considerable stress from 2005 through 2009 as 
                                                 
1 The referee in this case, former Oneida County Circuit 
Judge Robert E. Kinney, wrote the following in his "Report and 
Recommendation" to the court: 
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of this case is the 
seeming incongruity between some of the respondent's 
professional 
accomplishments 
and 
the 
inexplicable 
behavior which he engaged in which brings him before 
the Court now. . . .  
The respondent was appointed special prosecutor in the 
case of State v. Steven Avery.  This was a high-
profile case with state-wide media coverage. . . .  
During this time period, the respondent testified he 
had trouble sleeping and was prescribed the drug 
Ambien. . . .  Shortly thereafter, people observed a 
change 
in 
his 
behavior. . . .  
[T]he 
respondent 
testified that he had been prescribed Xanax for 
anxiety attacks, and was taking left-over Vicodin 
which had been prescribed earlier after he underwent 
surgery.  The respondent testified that he developed a 
dependency on Ambien and Xanax.  He testified that he 
believes the use of these drugs diminished his 
inhibitions 
and 
caused 
his 
speech 
to 
be 
more 
unfiltered. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
3 
 
special prosecutor in the high profile murder trials of Steven 
Avery and Brendan Dassey in Manitowoc County.  Post-conviction 
proceedings in Dassey's case were still pending in the fall of 
2009, culminating in a five-day hearing in 2010.  Attorney Kratz 
and his then-wife separated in October 2009, during this 
stressful period, and he began to abuse prescription drugs.  
Whether these stresses and difficulties contributed to Attorney 
Kratz's October conduct is speculative, but the stresses and 
difficulties are not speculative. 
¶83 Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are based on incidents that 
occurred during October 2009.  No date is given for the incident 
in Count 7. 
¶84 Attorney 
Kratz's 
unacceptable 
text 
messages 
with 
respect to S.V.G. took place over a period of three days in 
October 2009, approximately a week after separation from his 
wife.  On the third day S.V.G. took the matter to local police.  
Within two weeks, Kratz had removed himself from the criminal 
case in which S.V.G. was the victim.  After the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice (DOJ) was notified of Attorney Kratz's 
conduct, it pressured Attorney Kratz to resign as chair of the 
Wisconsin Crime Victims' Rights Board and to self-report his 
misconduct to OLR.  He did the latter on December 4, 2009, 
admitting his misconduct and expressing his embarrassment for 
it. 
¶85 When OLR received Attorney Kratz's communication, 
including all the text messages, it commenced an investigation.  
Thereafter, on February 4, 2010, OLR received a grievance from 
S.V.G.  On February 18 an OLR investigator wrote to S.V.G. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
4 
 
asking that she contact the investigator.  On March 5, having 
received no response from S.V.G., the investigator notified 
S.V.G. that the matter had been closed.  Attorney Kratz was 
notified of this action.  In sum, three months after it received 
all the information necessary to prosecute Attorney Kratz and 
barely a month after receiving the grievance from S.V.G., OLR 
closed the case. 
¶86 The record does not indicate why S.V.G. did not follow 
up on her grievance.  The record does not indicate why OLR 
closed the matter when it had ample evidence to proceed if it 
wished to do so.  OLR's letter to S.V.G. stated that Attorney 
Kratz's conduct "did not appear to involve possible professional 
misconduct." 
¶87 Six months later, Keith Sellen, director of the OLR, 
was contacted by Ryan Foley, a reporter for the Associated Press 
(AP).  Sellen later indicated in an affidavit that he had not 
been aware of the Kratz matter before the Foley inquiry. 
¶88 The following day, September 15, 2010, Foley wrote a 
news story based on information he obtained from a police report 
released by the Kaukauna Police Department.  Foley did not 
reveal how he learned about the police report describing 
Attorney Kratz's conduct. 
¶89 Foley's AP story triggered a political firestorm less 
than two months before the 2010 general election.  There were 
immediate calls for Attorney Kratz's resignation as Calumet 
County District Attorney.  When Attorney Kratz did not resign, 
Governor James Doyle initiated proceedings to remove him from 
office. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
5 
 
¶90 The Kratz matter became a political issue.2  Scott 
Hassett, the Democratic candidate for attorney general, accused 
his opponent, incumbent Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen, of 
knowing about the Kratz matter for nearly a year and doing 
"nothing about it."3  Democratic Party Chair Mike Tate accused 
Van Hollen of a "cover up" "after discovering the sexually-
harassing text messages fellow Republican and political ally Ken 
Kratz sent to a woman whose boyfriend he was trying for nearly 
strangling her to death."4 
¶91 Attorney General Van Hollen responded to these attacks 
with assertions that the DOJ pressured Kratz to resign from the 
Crime Victims Rights Board and advised him to self-report his 
conduct to OLR.  "There are no bones about the fact that the 
Office of Lawyer Regulation dropped the ball here," Van Hollen 
told the Post-Crescent newspaper in Appleton.5  He said he was 
surprised to learn that OLR had told S.V.G. that Attorney 
Kratz's conduct "did not appear to involve possible professional 
                                                 
2 Jim Collar, Fallout With Calumet County District Attorney 
Ken Kratz Takes On Political Tinge, Appleton Post-Crescent, 
September 21, 2010. 
3 Cf. Challenger Scott Hassett Says Attorney General J.B. 
Van Hollen Knew About District Attorney Sexting Case But Did 
Nothing About It, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 4, 2010 
(citing Scott Hassett email to supporters); see also Van Hollen, 
a pretty good AG?, Isthmus, October 8, 2010 at 6. 
4 Press Release, Democratic Party of Wisconsin, J.B. Van 
Hollen's Ken Kratz Coverup Continues, (Sept. 21, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
5 Jim Collar, Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen 
Criticizes Office of Lawyer Regulation For Its Handling of Case 
Involving Calumet County District Attorney Ken Kratz, Appleton 
Post-Crescent, Sept. 22, 2010). 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
6 
 
misconduct."  "I personally am very concerned with the fact that 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation determined that there was 
nothing wrong with this activity," he added.6 
¶92 OLR, having now received a letter from S.V.G.'s 
attorney, 
Michael 
Fox, 
reopened 
the 
Kratz 
investigation.  
Additional complaints came in.  More than 13 months later, OLR 
filed its complaint. 
III 
¶93 From all appearances, OLR was determined to make up 
for "dropping the ball."  It selected as outside counsel Thomas 
Basting, who filed 11 charges against Attorney Kratz, including 
seven counts related to four new matters.  In one of these 
charges, OLR essentially accused Attorney Kratz of sexual 
assault: 
 
After various phone conversations, Kratz asked to 
visit JW at her apartment.  JW asserts that Kratz 
arrived at her apartment and after threatening JW, 
forced her to have sex. . . .  
 
On 
September 
28, 
2010, 
JW 
provided 
the 
information about Kratz to her probation officer at 
the Department of Corrections (DOC).  The DOC reported 
the issue to the DOJ. 
 
The DOJ interviewed JW who provided a statement.  
The statement JW provided alleges that Kratz, while 
District Attorney of Calumet County, had forcible sex 
with an emotionally vulnerable woman after previously 
prosecuting the woman.   
                                                 
6 See interview by Dan Flannery, Executive Editor of 
Appleton Post-Crescent, with Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van 
Hollen 
at 
http://www.postcrescent.com/article/20100922/APC0101/9220673/Wis
consin-Attorney-General-J-B-Van-Hollen-criticizes-Office-Lawyer-
Regulation-its-handling-case-involving-Calumet-County-District-
Attorney-Ken-Kratz. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
7 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶94 In filing this sensational charge pertaining to 
alleged sexual assault, OLR not only discredited Attorney Kratz 
but also implicitly criticized the DOJ and local law enforcement 
authorities for failing to prosecute him.  It later quietly 
dismissed the charge. 
¶95 As noted above, OLR also asked that Attorney Kratz be 
suspended from the practice of law for six months. 
IV 
¶96 Looking backward, OLR forced Attorney Kratz to defend 
his law license to avoid being required to apply for readmission 
to the bar, and to defend himself against alleged criminal 
conduct.  Attorney Kratz admitted the S.V.G. counts but disputed 
that he should be suspended for six months because of them.  In 
time OLR dropped FIVE counts, including the alleged sexual 
assault count.  The only new charges on which OLR prevailed were 
three counts involving tasteless sexual comments that Attorney 
Kratz made to two co-workers.  The co-worker in Counts 5 and 6 
acknowledged 
that 
Attorney 
Kratz's 
comments 
were 
out 
of 
character and that Attorney Kratz apologized and told her his 
comments were inappropriate and he should not have made them.  
The co-worker in Count 7 also said Attorney Kratz's comment was 
out of character. 
V 
¶97 In the years following S.V.G.'s complaint to the 
Kaukauna police, Attorney Kratz was forced to resign as Calumet 
County District Attorney.  He went through a divorce.  He lost 
his home and his car.  He was sued by S.V.G. in the United 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
8 
 
States District Court and settled the lawsuit.7  He filed for 
bankruptcy.  It is unlikely that Attorney Kratz is in any 
position to pay $23,904.10 in court costs.  These extravagant 
costs will pose a serious hardship to Attorney Kratz, cannot be 
justified on the basis of the OLR prosecution, and are 
manifestly unfair. 
VI 
¶98 The Kratz case underscores the need for a thorough 
review of OLR practices and procedures. 
¶99 First, OLR closed the investigation against Attorney 
Kratz without the knowledge of the OLR director, Keith Sellen.  
How did that happen?8 
¶100 Second, after reopening the investigation, OLR took 13 
months to file a complaint against Attorney Kratz.  What is the 
justification for this lengthy delay? 
                                                 
7 Cf. S.V. v. Kratz, No. 10-C-919, 2011 WL 6151480 (E.D. 
Wis. Dec. 12, 2011).  See Sexting lawsuit against former 
prosecutor settled, Appleton Post-Crescent, February 13, 2013, 
at A3-4. 
8 Referee Kinney wrote: 
[T]he respondent's letter which self-reported the 
incident involving SVG was received by the OLR on 
December 8, 2009.  The matter was closed on March 5, 
2010 when the investigator received no response to her 
February 18, 2010 letter to SVG.  The respondent was 
advised that the matter was closed at that point.  It 
was then reopened by the OLR on September 24, 2010, 
more than 9 months after the respondent self-reported 
the SVG incident.  The case simply sat in limbo for 9 
months.  While reports of other violations were then 
received, the closing of the file in March was 
obviously a mistake. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
9 
 
¶101 Third, after a long investigation, OLR filed three 
sensational 
counts 
against 
Attorney 
Kratz 
that 
it 
later 
dismissed for lack of proof.  Why did OLR's Preliminary Review 
Committee permit these counts to be filed?  Is the Preliminary 
Review Committee serving its intended purpose of screening out 
improvident charges when it approves 98 percent of the OLR 
staff's recommendations?9 
¶102 Fourth, OLR expects Attorney Kratz to pay all costs 
related to the prosecution of its improvident charges and its 
harsh desired level of discipline.  Should a respondent attorney 
be expected to pay OLR's costs for charges that are not proven 
and a level of discipline sought but not imposed? 
¶103 Fifth, OLR appears to be unwilling or unable to drop 
charges it has filed unless it acknowledges that the charges 
cannot be proved.  It could likely have settled the Kratz matter 
much sooner if it had been able to bargain for something less 
than unconditional surrender.  Should OLR have the authority to 
plea bargain with respondents?  If so, under what conditions? 
¶104 No doubt other questions could be raised about OLR's 
handling of the Kratz case.  But apart from this single case, 
there are many reasons for this court to launch a thorough——
strictly objective——review of the agency.  If that review is 
undertaken, 
something 
useful 
may 
yet 
come 
out 
of 
this 
unfortunate tragedy. 
 
                                                 
9 A 98 percent approval rate is the percentage OLR Director 
Keith Sellen recently cited in his October 25, 2013, testimony 
on Rule Petition 13-04 before the supreme court. 
No.  2011AP2758-D.dtp 
10