Title: STATE v BALLARD
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 82-055
State: Montana
Issuer: Montana Supreme Court
Date: December 29, 1982

No. 82-55 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- FORREST STANLEY BALLARD, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Beaverhead, The Honor- a b l e Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Chester L. Jones, Virginia City, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Eonkana W. G. G i l b e r t , County Attorney, D i l l o n , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : September 16, 1982 Decided: December 29, 1982 Filed: DEC 2 9 2 3 8 2 Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e ilpinion of t h e Court. Defendant a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n on two c o u n t s of n e g l i g e n t homicide i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of beaverhead County. ive a f f i r m . O f f i c e r Stephen S h a f f e r of t h e D i l l o n p o l i c e f o r c e was on d u t y i n t h e e a r l y morning of February 1 4 , 1981. A t a b o u t 1:49 a.m. he r a d i o e d t o t h e p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r t h a t t h e r e was a p o s s i b l e drunk d r i v e r passed o u t i n t h e middle of Selway Drive on t h e edge of town. S h a f f e r had come upon a p i c k u p t r u c k o p e r a t e d by Benny Williams. Williams' t r u c k had stopped i n t h e southbound l a n e . S n a f f e r , l i k e w i s e h e a d e d s o u t h , s t o p p e d b e h i n d W i l l i a m s ' t r u c k and had h i s f l a s h i n g warning l i g h t s on. During t h e s t o p b o t h men were s t a n d i n g and t a l k i n g b e s i d e t h e i r v e h i c l e s . Defendant was d r i v i n g a p i c k u p headed n o r t h on Selway Drive. D e f e n d a n t ' s t r u c k s t r u c k t h e Williams v e h i c l e , h i t and k i l l e d both Williams and S h a f f e r , s t r u c k t h e l e f t f r o n t p a r t of t h e p o l i c e c a r and came t o r e s t i n a d i t c h o f f t h e e a s t edge of Selway Drive. On February 1 7 , 1981, d e f e n d a n t was charged w i t h two c o u n t s of n e g l i g e n t homicide. On February 24, 1981, t h e S t a t e gave n o t i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t of its i n t e n t t o have d e f e n d a n t d e s i g n a t e d a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r and t o s e e k i n c r e a s e d punishment based on d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n o f b u r g l a r y ( a f e l o n y ) on March 25, 1975, and t h e f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e imposed. Defendant was r e l e a s e d on p a r o l e on March 1 7 , 1976. The d e f e n d a n t , upon r e l e a s e from t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , was p a r o l e d and h e l d on f e d e r a l d e t a i n e r f o r p a r o l e violation after convicted of a car theft committed in 1970. Defendant was placed on a federal furlough program and was released from the program on July 28, 1977. On September 17, 1981, defendant filed a motion for change of venue and a motion to quash the State's notice of intent to seek increased punishment. The change of venue was denied after a hearing on September 23, and defendant's motion to quash was similarly denied. After a trial in early October, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count. At the sentencing hearing on November 2, 1981, the judge found defendant to be a persistent felony offender and sentenced him to twenty years on each count to run consecutively or a total of forty years. Defendant appeals and presents two issues for our review: 1. Did the District Court err in failing to grant defendant's motion for change of venue? 2 . Did the District Court err in applying the persis- tent felony offender statute to defendant? Appellant correctly refers us to State v. Link (1981), Mont. , 640 P.2d 366, 38 St.Rep. 982, as setting forth tne present test as to when a change of venue should be granted: "[T]he rule is that an accused is enti- tled to a change of venue when it appears there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prejudice alleged actually exists and that by reason of the preju- dice there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused cannot receive a fair and impartial trial. People v . Berry (1967), 37 I11.2d 329, 226 N.E.2d 591, 592-593." 640 P.2d at 368, 38 St.Rep. at 985. Appeilant argues that there was a reasonable apprehen- s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t would n o t r e c e l v e a fair t r i a l I n t h i s c a s e f o r t h r e e reasons. There was community upheaval about t h e double d e a t n i n c l u d i n g concern t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t brought t o an e a r l y t r i a l and t h a t d e f e n d a n t was s t i l l d r i v i n g a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . There was p r e j u d i c i a l knowledge i n t h e community r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i o r c r i m i n a l corlduct and testimony aaduced a t t h e venue h e a r i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was " a bad egg and had t r o u b l e h e r e i n town f o r y e a r s and y e a r s " and t h a t t h e county a t t o r n e y t o l d some p e o p l e i n q u i r i n g a b o u t d e f e n d a n t ' s p a s t conduct t o " g e t h i s record." F ~ n a l l y , t h e f a c t t h a t no l o c a l c o u n s e l c o u l d be o b t a i n e d t o r d e f e n d a n t f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t could n o t r e c e l v e a f a i r t r i a l i n D i l l o n . T h e s e a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l b a s e s of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s . A p p e l l a n t h a s n o t p r o v e n " r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e a l l e g e d a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and t h a t by reason of t h e p r e j u d i c e t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e apprehen- s i o n t h a t t h e accused c a n n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r l a l . " Link, s u p r a . While it is t r u e t h a t d e f e n a a n t ' s argument a c c u r a t e l y r e i l e c t s a p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e venue h e a r i n g , t n e r e was o t h e r testimony showing no p r e j u d i c i a l p r e d i s p o s i - t i o n o r " r e a s o n a b l e apprehension." There was testimony t h a t r h e community r e a c t l o n had s u b s i d e d s i g n i t i c a n t l y w i t h i n a few months a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t from two of d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t - n e s s e s and two of t n e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . The e d i t o r of t h e Dlllorl newspaper t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had heard nothing about d e f e n d a n t ' s p r l o r c r i m i n a l r e c o r d o r any s t a t e m e n t s about t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t o r innocence. Two o t h e r w i t n e s s e s , a l o c a l merchant and t h e county a t t o r n e y , t e s t i f i e d t h e y f e l t defendant could get a fair trial in Dillon. The county attorney further testified that a maximum of five people, other than police department employees, had remarked to him that they knew defendant had been in trouble with the law betore. Moreover, we note that, in denying defendant's motion for a change of venue, the District Court stated that the motion could be renewed at any time, including when the jury was empaneled. The motion for change of venue was never renewed. The voir dire portion of the transcript was not submitted on this appeal, and appellant does not address any comments in his brief alleging prejudice on the part of the jury members actually selected. The second issue revolves around the construction of section 46-18-501, MCA, which provides in part: "Definition of persistent felony offend- er. A 'persistent felony offender' is an - offender who has previously been convict- ed of a felony and who is presently being sentenced for a second felony committed on a different occasion than the first. An offender is considered to have been previously convicted of a felony if: "(1) the previous felony conviction was for an offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction for which a sen- tence to a term of imprisonment in excess of 1 year could have been imposed; "(2) less than 5 years have elapsed between the commission of the present offense and either: "(a) the previous felony conviction; or "(b) the offender 's release on parole or otherwise from prison or other commitment imposed as a result of the previous felony conviction; and "(3) the offender has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence and the con- viction has not been set aside in a post- conviction hearing." (Emphasis added.) "Felony" is d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-2-101(21), MCA: " ( 2 1 ) 'Felony' means an o f f e n s e i n which t h e s e n t e n c e imposed upon c o n v i c t i o n is d e a t h o r imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any term exceeding 1 year." A misdemeanor is an o f f e n s e where t h e s e n t e n c e imposed is imprisonment i n t h e county j a i l o r s t a t e p r i s o n f o r one y e a r o r l e s s . S e c t i o n 45-2-101(36), MCA. "Conviction" is d e f i n e d by s e c t i o n 45-2-101(15), MCA: " ( 1 5 ) ' C o n v i c t i o n ' means a judgment of c o n v i c t i o n o r s e n t e n c e e n t e r e d upon a p l e a of g u i l t y o r upon a v e r d i c t o r f i n d i n g o f g u i l t y o f a n o f f e n s e rendered by a l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d j u r y o r by a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n autho- r i z e d t o t r y t h e c a s e w i t h o u t a jury." A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of n e g l i g e n t homicide may be s e n t e n c e d t o a term n o t t o exceed t e n y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , s e c t i o n 45-5-184(2), MCA. Under Montana law an o f f e n s e is n o t c l a s s i f i e d a s a misdemeanor o r f e l o n y u n t i l t h e s e n t e n c e is imposed ( s e c t i o n 45-2-101(21), MCk, s u p r a ) . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e p e r - s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e s h o u l d n o t a p p l y t o defen- d a n t because whether d e f e n d a n t is c o n v i c t e d of a "second f e l o n y " ( r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-501, MCA, s u p r a ) on a n z g l i g e n t homicide c h a r g e depends on whether tlie D i s t r i c t Court s e n t e n c e s t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a term exceeding one y e a r i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n . Our n e g l i g e n t homicide s t a t u t e g i v e s tlie D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s c r e t i o n t o s e n t e n c e a c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t t o a term of l e s s t h a n one y e a r o r no time a t a l l , which would b r i n g t h e s c o p e o f t h e o f f e n s e w i t h i n t h e misde- meanor s t a t u t e . Thus, t h e i s s u e of whether t h e d e f e n d a n t w i l l be c o n v i c t e d of a "second f e l o n y " is n o t r e s o l v e d u n t i l t h e d e f e n d a n t is s e n t e n c e d and from t h i s d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t he was n o t " p r e s e n t l y being s e n t e n c e d f o r a second f e l o n y " under s e c t i o n 46-18-501, MCA, a t t h e t i m e h e was s e n t e n c e d f o r t h e n e g l i g e n t homicide c h a r g e s . Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e c h a r g e i n t h i s c a s e is n o t a c h a r g e of a f e l o n y and d o e s n o t become a f e l o n y u n t i l f o l l o w i n g t h e s e n t e n c i n g . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h a r g e remains a n " o f f e n s e " u n t i l s e n t e n c e is imposed. W e r e j e c t d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s a s being a hyper- t e c h n i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n which c o n t r a v e n e s t h e purpose of t h e persistent f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e . W e n o t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t does n o t q u e s t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t h e h a s been p r e v i o u s l y con- v i c t e d of a f e l o n y . The nub of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is a timing q u e s t i o n and, a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e r e must have imposed a s e n t e n c e i n e x c e s s of one year i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n b e f o r e t h e p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r s t a t u t e was triggered, a l l o w i n g t h e enhanced sen- tence. A s a r e s u l t , t h e f i n a l s e n t e n c e imposed was based on a second f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-18-501, PICA. S e c t i o n 4b-18-501(2), MCA, c l a s s i f i e s a p e r s o n a s a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r i f l e s s t h a n f i v e y e a r s have e l a p s e d between t h e commission of t h e p r e s e n t o f f e n s e and d e f e n d a n t ' s r e l e a s e on p a r o l e f o r t h e p r e v i o u s f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n . The p r e s e n t o f f e n s e o c c u r r e d on February 1 4 , 1981, and d e f e n d a n t was p a r o l e d from h i s p r e v i o u s f e l o n y c o n v i c t ~ o n ( b u r g l a r y ) on March 1 7 , 1976, c l e a r l y f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e f i v e - y e a r t i m e l i m i t . I t is c l e a r from t h e f a c e of t h e p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f i e n d e r s t a t u t e t h a t t h e purpose behind it was t o a l l o w a D l s t r i c t Court t o impose a n i n c r e a s e d s e n t e n c e f o r d e f e n d a n t who meets the flve-year criterion set iorth above. As stated earlier, there is no question raised as to defendant's first ieiony conviction. Here, the conviction on the two counts of negligent homicide involved the defendant, legally intoxicated, killing two people witn his pickup. Clearly defendant could have fallen within the classification of a dangerous offender in the legislative mandate that governs Title 46, Chapter 18 (wherein the persistent felony offender statute appears), i.e., that the chapter be liberally con- strued to the end that dangerous offenders be correctively treated in custody for long terms as needed. Section 46-18- 101, MCA. Defendant's attempt to avoid the consequences of his actions by hypertechnical statutory construction is not well taken. Persistence in crime and failure of earlier discipline to effectively deter or reform justify more drastic treat- ment. Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe (1937), 302 U.S. 51, 58 S.Ct. 59, 82 L.Ed. 43. Increasing the sentence of a persistent felony offender is entlrely consistent with the constitutional mandate that laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of prevention and reformation. Art. 11, Sec. 28, 1972 Mont. Const.; State v. Maldonado (1978), 176 Mont. 322, 578 P.2d 296. Affirmed. ~ ~ 4 . w c r c b , , & ~ Chief Justice We concur: