Title: People v. McDavid
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S275940
State: California
Issuer: California Supreme Court
Date: April 29, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
WELDON K. MCDAVID, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S275940 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D078919 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCN363925 
 
 
April 29, 2024 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
S275940 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Penal Code section 12022.53 establishes a tiered system of 
sentencing enhancements for specified felonies involving the use 
of firearms.  (All statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  
Section 12022.53, subdivision (h) gives trial courts the discretion 
to strike those enhancements in the interest of justice pursuant 
to section 1385.  In People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 700 
(Tirado), we held that this discretion includes striking a section 
12022.53 enhancement and then imposing a lesser included, 
uncharged section 12022.53 enhancement when the facts 
supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true 
by the jury.  We explained that the statutory framework 
supported this conclusion.  (Tirado, at pp. 692, 700.)  We also 
noted that this conclusion was in line with the long-standing 
principle that “a court is not categorically prohibited from 
imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement so long as 
the prosecution has charged the greater enhancement and the 
facts supporting imposition of the lesser enhancement have 
been alleged and found true.”  (Id. at p. 697.) 
The question here is whether the same statutory 
framework permits a court, after striking a section 12022.53 
enhancement, to impose a lesser included, uncharged 
enhancement authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code — that is, 
outside of section 12022.53.  We hold that it does. 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
I. 
Defendant Weldon K. McDavid, Jr., was Diana Lovejoy’s 
shooting instructor when she was going through a contentious 
divorce from her husband Greg Mulvihill.  McDavid and Lovejoy 
began a romantic relationship and eventually hatched a plan to 
kill Mulvihill.  McDavid lured Mulvihill to a secluded location 
while McDavid hid in nearby bushes.  When Mulvihill arrived, 
McDavid shot him below his right armpit.  Mulvihill suffered 
severe injuries but survived, and McDavid and Lovejoy were 
prosecuted.   
In 2017, a jury convicted McDavid and Lovejoy of 
conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)) 
and attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 
189).  The jury also found true allegations that in committing 
each of those offenses, McDavid intentionally and personally 
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (d)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the 
victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). 
On January 31, 2018, the trial court sentenced McDavid 
to 25 years to life for conspiracy, consecutive to 25 years to life 
for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement.  
The court stayed the terms on the remaining count and its 
enhancements.  McDavid appealed.  He claimed, among other 
things, that the trial court abused its discretion because it was 
unaware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion under 
Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) 
(Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1), which became effective on January 1, 
2018, prior to McDavid’s sentencing hearing.  Senate Bill 620 
amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h) by granting trial 
courts the discretion to strike formerly mandatory section 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
12022.53 enhancements.  In full, subdivision (h) states:  “The 
court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 
and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement 
otherwise required to be imposed by this section.  The authority 
provided by this subdivision applies to any resentencing that 
may occur pursuant to any other law.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).)  
The Court of Appeal, agreeing with McDavid, vacated his 
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing “for the 
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its 
discretion as to whether to strike the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d) enhancements.”  On April 30, 2021, the trial 
court conducted a resentencing hearing and declined to strike 
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements.  McDavid 
again appealed. 
While the appeal was pending, we held in Tirado that a 
trial court has the discretion to strike a charged section 
12022.53 enhancement and impose a lesser included, uncharged 
section 12022.53 enhancement where the facts supporting that 
lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by the jury.  
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700.)  After requesting and 
reviewing briefing on the applicability of Tirado to McDavid’s 
case, the Court of Appeal held that under the reasoning of 
Tirado, when a trial court exercises its discretion to strike a 
section 12022.53 enhancement, it has authority to impose a 
lesser enhancement not only under section 12022.53 but also 
under other statutes such as section 12022.5 if the facts 
supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true 
by a jury. 
The Attorney General filed a petition for rehearing, which 
the Court of Appeal granted.  On rehearing, the Court of Appeal 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
reversed course and held that a trial court’s discretion to impose 
a lesser included, uncharged enhancement is confined to the 
enhancements in section 12022.53 and does not include 
enhancements specified in other statutes.  The court relied 
principally on section 12022.53, subdivision (j), which states:  
“For the penalties in this section to apply, the existence of any 
fact required under subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be alleged in 
the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant 
in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.  When an 
enhancement specified in this section has been admitted or 
found to be true, the court shall impose punishment for that 
enhancement pursuant to this section rather than imposing 
punishment authorized under any other law, unless another 
enhancement provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of 
imprisonment.” 
Justice Dato dissented.  Observing that Senate Bill 620 
sought to curb the rigidity of the original section 12022.53 
provisions, he would have held that once a court exercises its 
discretion under subdivision (h) to strike an enhancement, the 
restriction in subdivision (j) against applying lesser included 
enhancements from other statutes “plays no role at all” because 
otherwise the wording of that provision — “the court shall 
impose punishment for that enhancement” — would command 
the imposition of punishment even after the striking of a section 
12022.53 enhancement. 
We granted review on this issue, which has divided the 
Courts of Appeal.  (Compare People v. Fuller (2022) 83 
Cal.App.5th 394 (Fuller) [trial courts have discretion to impose 
a lesser included, uncharged enhancement from outside 
§ 12022.53] and People v. Johnson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
[same] with People v. Lewis (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 34 (Lewis) 
[contrary holding].)   
II. 
Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made 
through the exercise of informed discretion.  (People v. Gutierrez 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)  A court acting while unaware of 
the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.  
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 694.)  Here we consider whether 
a trial court, after striking a section 12022.53 enhancement, has 
discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement 
under a law other than section 12022.53.  This is a question of 
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  (People v. 
Ollo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 682, 687.) 
A. 
We begin with an overview of the statutory framework.  
“Section 12022.53 was first enacted in 1997 as part of the state’s 
‘Use a Gun and You’re Done’ law.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1 et 
seq., p. 3135.)  The statute sets out ‘sentence enhancements for 
personal use or discharge of a firearm in the commission’ of 
specified felonies.  [Citation.]  Section 12022.53, subdivision (a) 
lists the felonies to which the section applies.  Section 
12022.53(b) mandates the imposition of a 10-year enhancement 
for personal use of a firearm in the commission of one of those 
felonies; section 12022.53(c) mandates the imposition of a 20-
year enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a 
firearm; and section 12022.53(d) provides for a 25-year-to-life 
enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm 
causing great bodily injury or death to a person other than an 
accomplice.”  (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 694–695, italics 
and fns. omitted.) 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
Section 12022.53 is one of several statutes that provide for 
firearm enhancements in connection with certain crimes.  
Section 12022.53 provides the most severe schedule of 
enhancements in connection with the most serious offenses, 
such as murder, rape, robbery, and sex offenses against 
children.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (a).)  Section 12022.5, meanwhile, 
applies more broadly to the personal use of a firearm in the 
commission or attempted commission of any felony.  (§ 12022.5, 
subd. (a).)  It generally imposes an additional and consecutive 
term of three, four, or ten years (ibid.) or a term of five, six, or 
ten years if the firearm is an “assault weapon” or “machinegun” 
(id., subd. (b)).  Section 12022 establishes the least severe 
schedule of penalties, ranging from one to five years, and casts 
the widest net.  (§ 12022, subds. (a)–(d).)  It “regulates a wide 
range of unlawful activities involving firearms and other deadly 
weapons.”  (People v. Pitto (2008) 43 Cal.4th 228, 236; see, e.g., 
§ 12022, subd. (a) [one-year enhancement “appli[es] to a person 
who is a principal in the commission of a felony or attempted 
felony if one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, 
whether or not the person is personally armed with a firearm”].) 
In enacting section 12022.53, the Legislature sought to 
impose substantially longer prison sentences for the use of 
firearms in the commission of certain felonies.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 
503, § 1, p. 3135.)  “Before January 1, 2018, section 12022.53 
prohibited courts from striking its enhancements.  Former 
subdivision (h) of section 12022.53 provided:  ‘Notwithstanding 
Section 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not 
strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a 
person within the provisions of this section.’  (Stats. 1997, ch. 
503, § 3, p. 3137.)  Thus, if a section 12022.53 enhancement was 
alleged and found true, its imposition was mandatory.”  (Tirado, 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 695–696.)  Section 12022.53 was one of 
the “toughest gun-abuse control measure[s] in the nation.”  (Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended March 28, 
2017, p. 3.) 
Two decades later, the Legislature reconsidered the 
wisdom behind its statutory enactment and changed course.  
Recognizing that “[l]onger sentences do not deter crime or 
protect public safety” and that “research has found that these 
[firearm] enhancements cause problems,” such as exacerbating 
racial disparities in imprisonment and greatly increasing the 
prison population, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 620.  (Sen. 
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 15, 2017, p. 5.)  
This legislation amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to 
provide that “[t]he court may, in the interest of justice pursuant 
to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss 
an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this 
section.”  Senate Bill 620 also amended subdivision (h) of section 
12022.5 to do the same.  (See Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 
620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 95.) 
Meanwhile, section 12022.53, subdivisions (f) and (j) have 
remained substantively unchanged since section 12022.53’s 
enactment.  Subdivision (f) provides that “[i]f more than one 
enhancement per person is found true under this section, the 
court shall impose upon that person the enhancement that 
provides the longest term of imprisonment.”  And subdivision (j) 
provides that when a section 12022.53 enhancement is alleged 
and found true, “the court shall impose punishment for that 
enhancement pursuant to this section rather than imposing 
punishment under any other law” unless another enhancement 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
provides for a greater penalty.  The issue presented here — 
whether a court, after striking a section 12022.53 enhancement, 
has discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged 
enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53 — 
centers on the relationship between subdivisions (h) and (j). 
B. 
In Tirado, we affirmed the general rule that when an 
adjudicated enhancement has been dismissed, “imposition of an 
uncharged enhancement is permitted so long as the facts 
supporting its imposition are alleged and found true.”  (Tirado, 
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 699.)  We also recognized that a court’s 
discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement 
may be restricted by statute.  (Ibid.) 
In holding that section 12022.53 restricts a court’s options 
for imposing a lesser included enhancement, the Court of Appeal 
began and ended its inquiry with “the usual and ordinary 
meaning of the language of section 12022.53, subdivision (j),” 
which it considered “clear and unambiguous.”  The court 
explained that “[b]y its express provisions, section 12022.53, 
subdivision (j) provides that if a section 12022.53 enhancement 
has been alleged and found true by a trier of fact, a trial court 
may impose only an enhancement under section 12022.53 (i.e., 
§ 12022.53, subd. (b), (c), or (d)) and not an enhancement under 
any other statute (e.g., § 12022.5, subd. (a)).”  The court said this 
reading is consistent with Tirado, which identified subdivision 
(j) as the authority allowing courts to impose enhancements 
under section 12022.53.  The court in Lewis likewise reasoned 
that the “plain language” of subdivision (j) “foreclosed” a trial 
court’s imposition of a lesser included, uncharged enhancement 
under a different statute after a section 12022.53 enhancement 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
was found true.  (Lewis, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 40.)  
According to Lewis, “this is the only reading supported by the 
plain language of section 12022.53” and “poses no conflict” with 
Senate Bill 620.  (Lewis, at p. 41.) 
The text of section 12022.53, subdivision (j), however, 
cannot be parsed in that way.  The second sentence of the 
provision says:  “When an enhancement specified in this section 
has been admitted or found to be true, the court shall impose 
punishment for that enhancement pursuant to this section 
rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other 
law, unless another enhancement provides for a greater penalty 
or a longer term of imprisonment.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (j).)  
Under the Court of Appeal’s view, the phrase that channels and 
limits the court’s imposition of punishment — “pursuant to this 
section rather than imposing punishment authorized under any 
other law” (ibid.) — is dispositive of the question presented 
here.  But the full sentence begins:  “When an enhancement 
specified in this section has been admitted or found to be true, 
the court shall impose punishment for that enhancement . . . .”  
(Ibid., italics added.)  In other words, subdivision (j) mandates 
imposition of punishment for a section 12022.53 enhancement 
that has been admitted or found true.  It then specifies that the 
court must impose punishment for that enhancement “pursuant 
to this section rather than imposing punishment authorized 
under any other law” unless another enhancement provides for 
a longer sentence.  (Ibid.)  As Justice Dato observed, “[i]f a 
defendant was charged with both a section 12022.53 
enhancement and a different enhancement (e.g., § 12022.5) 
based on the same firearm use and the jury found both to be 
true, subdivision (j) [tells] the court it ha[s] to impose the 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
12022.53 enhancement because it provided a longer prison 
sentence.”   
The question here concerns the trial court’s sentencing 
discretion when, “in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 
1385,” it has decided to “strike or dismiss an enhancement 
otherwise required to be imposed by this section.”  (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (h), italics added.)  In this circumstance, section 12022.53, 
subdivision (j)’s requirement that “the court shall impose 
punishment for that enhancement” cannot and does not apply.  
As McDavid explains, “[i]t cannot be the case that a court 
invoking the power to eliminate the enhancement ‘in the 
interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385’ [§ 12022.53, 
subd. (h)] must then turn around and ‘impose punishment for 
that enhancement pursuant to this section’ [§ 12022.53, 
subd. (j)].”  (Italics added by McDavid.)  Or, as Justice Dato put 
it, “[i]t is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to grant 
judicial discretion in subdivision (h), only to have it taken away 
by subdivision (j).”  (Accord, Fuller, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 404 (conc. opn. of Ramirez, P. J.) [“subdivision (h) expressly 
overrides the second sentence of subdivision (j)” because 
“subdivision (j) requires the court to ‘impose punishment . . . 
pursuant to this section’ ” while subd. (h) “allows a court to 
‘strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be 
imposed by this section’ ”].) 
The Attorney General contends that it is not clear section 
12022.53, subdivision (j) does not apply when a court has 
decided to strike an enhancement under subdivision (h) because 
“in order to preserve the factual basis of the enhancement as 
specified in the first sentence of subdivision (j) — which would 
permit imposition of an uncharged enhancement under this 
Court’s reasoning in Tirado [citation] — it appears that a court 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
would strike only the punishment and not the enhancement 
itself.”  But subdivision (h) clearly refers to a court’s authority 
to “strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be 
imposed by this section.”  (Italics added.)  And we gave no 
indication in Tirado that striking or dismissing an enhancement 
that has been found true would somehow fail to preserve the 
factual basis of the enhancement for purposes of imposing a 
lesser included, uncharged enhancement.  Moreover, the 
Attorney General’s argument does not explain how subdivision 
(j)’s mandate that “[w]hen an enhancement specified in this 
section has been admitted or found to be true, the court shall 
impose punishment for that enhancement” (italics added) can 
apply when a court has exercised its discretion under 
subdivision (h) to strike that enhancement. 
Indeed, the Attorney General concedes that “it would be 
‘entirely illogical’ to require the trial court to impose a section 
12022.53 enhancement pursuant to subdivision (j), when 
subdivision (h) permits it to strike or dismiss that 
enhancement,” and that “[t]o the extent it is possible to read the 
‘shall impose’ portion of subdivision (j) in isolation, it is true that 
this part of subdivision (j) is inoperative since a court is no 
longer required under subdivision (h) to impose the section 
12022.53 enhancement.”  Yet the Attorney General insists that 
“the portion of subdivision (j) that prohibits substitution of an 
enhancement from a different section may be interpreted in a 
way that harmonizes with subdivision (h) and preserves its 
operation.” 
Grammatically, it is hard to see how that can be so.  The 
phrase “pursuant to this section rather than imposing 
punishment authorized under any other law” in the second 
sentence of section 12022.53, subdivision (j) modifies the 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
immediately preceding phrase “the court shall impose 
punishment for that enhancement.”  McDavid is correct that the 
“pursuant to this section rather than . . . under any other law” 
phrase “governs how the court is to impose sentence on an 
enhancement that ‘has been admitted or found to be true’ when 
it ‘impose[s] punishment for that enhancement.’  That is, it 
establishes parameters on the discharge of that power, by 
regulating the punishment to be imposed for the enhancement 
found true or admitted during the criminal proceedings . . . .”  It 
does not impose “a freestanding limitation on the exercise of the 
court’s sentencing discretion” when the court, instead of 
“impos[ing] punishment for that enhancement” (§ 12022.53, 
subd. (j)), has decided to strike or dismiss that enhancement in 
the interest of justice (id., subd. (h)).  The Attorney General 
construes subdivision (j) as though it says:  “When an 
enhancement specified in this section has been admitted or 
found to be true, the court shall impose punishment for that 
enhancement pursuant to this section, to the extent it imposes 
punishment at all, rather than imposing punishment authorized 
under any other law . . . .”  But that is not what the statute says.  
The modifying phrase “pursuant to this section rather than . . . 
under any other law” has no applicability independent of the 
phrase 
“the 
court 
shall 
impose 
punishment 
for 
that 
enhancement” (id., subd. (j)), and the latter phrase has no 
applicability when the court has elected to “strike or dismiss an 
enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section” 
(id., subd. (h)). 
Suppose the prosecution were to explicitly charge, in 
connection with a single offense, an allegation under each of 
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).  If the jury found 
the charged allegations true and the trial court struck all three 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
enhancements, subdivision (j) would plainly become irrelevant.  
There would be no “punishment” to “impose” under section 
12022.53, and an enhancement found elsewhere in the Penal 
Code would necessarily be “a greater penalty” than none.  
(§ 12022.53, subd. (j); cf. Fuller, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 405 
(conc. opn. of Ramirez, P. J.) [“subdivision (h) authorizes a trial 
court 
to 
strike 
all 
section 
12022.53 
enhancements, 
notwithstanding the second sentence of subdivision (j)”].)  The 
same would be true in a case where the prosecution explicitly 
alleges only the subdivision (d) enhancement.  Charging a 
subdivision (d) enhancement implicitly charges the lesser 
included subdivision (b) and (c) enhancements as well.  (See 
Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 699.)  So long as the court 
determines that neither of the lesser section 12022.53 
enhancements is appropriate in the interest of justice, there 
remains no enhanced “punishment” to “impose” under section 
12022.53.  (§ 12022.53, subd. (j).)   
The Attorney General says this reading should be 
“disfavored” because it would “render[] a part of subdivision (j) 
inoperative. . . .  [¶] . . . Because subdivision (h) now permits a 
court to exercise its discretion to dismiss a section 12022.53 
enhancement, the court need not ever be constrained, under 
appellant’s reading, to impose that or any other section 12022.53 
enhancement instead of a lesser one.  In the event that the court 
decides it would rather impose a lesser enhancement under a 
different statute, it need only exercise its discretion under 
subdivision (h).  Subdivision (j)’s instruction that the court 
impose the section 12022.53 enhancement rather than a lesser 
enhancement under any other law would therefore serve no 
purpose, as the trial court would be able to circumvent it in 
every case in which a section 12022.53 enhancement is found.”  
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
But what the Attorney General calls “circumvent[ion]” is simply 
the authority that the Legislature intended trial courts to have 
under subdivision (h).   
Nor does this come as a surprise.  The Legislature’s 
amendment of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) necessarily 
eclipsed other parts of section 12022.53.  The second sentence of 
subdivision (f) says that “[i]f more than one enhancement per 
person is found true under this section, the court shall impose 
upon that person the enhancement that provides the longest 
term of imprisonment.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (f).)  Although Senate 
Bill 620 did not modify the text of subdivision (f), it is clear that 
subdivision (f)’s directive has no applicability when a court has 
decided to strike the section 12022.53 enhancements that have 
been found true.  As the Attorney General acknowledges, Senate 
Bill 620’s effect on subdivision (f) “suggests that the Legislature 
may have anticipated that its amendment to subdivision (h) 
would have the same effect on other parts of section 12022.53.” 
This does not mean that section 12022.53, subdivision (j) 
“serves no purpose.”  Subdivision (j), like subdivision (f), 
operates as a default rule when a section 12022.53 enhancement 
has been alleged and found true; subdivision (h) gives courts 
discretion “in the interest of justice” to depart from what “this 
section,” including subdivision (j), “otherwise require[s].”  
Contrary to what the Attorney General contends, this reading 
does not render subdivision (j) surplusage, produce an absurd 
result, or fail to harmonize subdivisions (h) and (j). 
In rejecting this reading of the statute, the Court of Appeal 
quoted the following language in Tirado:  “Section 12022.53(j) is 
the subdivision that authorizes the imposition of enhancements 
under section 12022.53.  It provides that for the penalties in 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
section 12022.53 to apply, the existence of any fact required by 
section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d) must be alleged in the accusatory 
pleading and admitted or found true. . . .  [¶] . . . .  [¶] . . . When 
an accusatory pleading alleges and the jury finds true the facts 
supporting a section 12022.53(d) enhancement, and the court 
determines that the section 12022.53(d) enhancement should be 
struck or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may, 
under section 12022.53(j), impose an enhancement under 
section 12022.53(b) or (c).”  (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700.)  
Relying on these statements, the Court of Appeal reasoned that 
because subdivision (j) is the provision that authorizes the 
imposition of lesser included, uncharged enhancements, 
subdivision (j)’s limitation on sentencing options (“pursuant to 
this section rather than . . . under any other law”) dictates the 
answer to the issue here. 
But Tirado, in identifying section 12022.53, subdivision (j) 
as 
the 
provision 
that 
“authorizes 
the 
imposition 
of 
enhancements under section 12022.53” (Tirado, supra, 12 
Cal.5th at p. 700), was referring to the first sentence of 
subdivision (j), not the second sentence.  (See Fuller, supra, 83 
Cal.App.5th at p. 405 & fn. 2 (conc. opn. of Ramirez, P. J.).)  In 
the quoted passage, we said that where a court has decided to 
strike a subdivision (d) enhancement, subdivision (j) authorizes 
imposition of an uncharged enhancement under subdivision (b) 
or (c) “[w]hen an accusatory pleading alleges and the jury finds 
true the facts supporting a section 12022.53(d) enhancement” 
and “only . . . when a true finding under section 12022.53(d) 
necessarily includes a true finding under section 12022.53(b) or 
(c).”  (Tirado, at p. 700 & fn. 12.)  This is plainly a reference to 
the first sentence of subdivision (j):  “For the penalties in this 
section to apply, the existence of any fact required under 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be alleged in the accusatory 
pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or 
found to be true by the trier of fact.”  Similarly, in the same 
passage, we said the question presented “is whether section 
12022.53(j) authorizes the court to impose an enhancement 
under section 12022.53(b) or (c) after striking a section 
12022.53(d) enhancement.  To answer that question, we must 
determine whether the existence of facts required by section 
12022.53(b) and (c) were alleged and found true.”  (Tirado, at 
p. 700.) 
Because the main issue in Tirado was whether a court 
after striking a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement 
may impose a lesser included subdivision (b) or (c) enhancement 
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 692), we had no occasion to 
examine whether the second sentence of subdivision (j) 
precludes a court that has struck a section 12022.53 
enhancement from imposing a lesser included, uncharged 
enhancement under a law other than section 12022.53.  Indeed, 
Tirado did not analyze the second sentence of subdivision (j) at 
all. 
We now hold that when a court has exercised its discretion 
under subdivision (h) to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement 
and finds that no other section 12022.53 enhancement is 
appropriate, the second sentence of subdivision (j) is 
inapplicable and does not bar the court from imposing a lesser 
included, uncharged enhancement under a law other than 
section 12022.53.  The court thus has discretion to impose such 
an enhancement if it is supported by facts that have been alleged 
and found true.  (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 699 [absent 
a statutory prohibition, when an adjudicated enhancement has 
been dismissed, “imposition of an uncharged enhancement is 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are 
alleged and found true”].)   We disapprove People v. Lewis, supra, 
86 Cal.App.5th 34, which reached a contrary holding. 
C. 
Our holding today comports with the legislative history of 
section 12022.53.  As we recounted in Tirado, “the Legislature’s 
goal in enacting section 12022.53 was to protect Californians 
and deter violent crime by imposing ‘substantially longer prison 
sentences . . . on felons who use firearms in the commission of 
their crimes.’  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1, p. 3135.)  The 
Legislature created an escalating set of enhancements, based on 
the defendant’s conduct and the harm caused.  (§ 12022.53(b), 
(c), (d).)  It ensured that the harshest applicable punishment 
would be imposed in each case.  (§ 12022.53(f), (j).)  Former 
subdivision (h) of section 12022.53 reinforced those objectives by 
prohibiting courts from striking allegations or findings bringing 
a person within the statute’s coverage.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 3, 
p. 3137.)”  (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 701.)  “However, as 
Senate Bill 620’s legislative history shows, the enhancement 
scheme“ ‘caus[ed] several problems.’  (Sen. Com. on Public 
Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 
28, 2017, p. 3, boldface and underscoring omitted.)”  (Ibid.)  It 
“ ‘disproportionately increase[d] racial disparities in prison 
populations and . . . greatly increase[d] the population of 
incarcerated persons’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) 
as amended June 13, 2017, p. 5), and also exacted a significant 
toll on the state’s budget (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 
2017, p. 3). 
PEOPLE v. MCDAVID 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
To address these concerns, Senate Bill 620 aimed to 
“provide courts with discretion to strike a firearm enhancement, 
thereby providing relief ‘to a deserving defendant, while a 
defendant who merited additional punishment’ would still 
receive it.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 28, 2017, p. 7.)”  (Tirado, supra, 
12 Cal.5th at p. 701.)  In short, “the bill would allow judges ‘to 
impose sentences that fit the severity of the offense.’ ”  (Ibid.; see 
also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 28, 2017, p. 3 [prior to Sen. Bill 
620, “[i]f for some valid reason a court wanted to impose a lesser 
sentence they cannot”].)  Construing the statute to allow a trial 
court intermediate options between a 10-year enhancement 
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), the minimum available under section 
12022.53, and no enhancement at all is consistent with this 
stated purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We 
express no view on whether the trial court, with a proper 
understanding of its sentencing discretion, should strike 
McDavid’s section 12022.53 enhancements or impose a lesser 
included, uncharged enhancement. 
LIU, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. McDavid 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 7/14/22 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S275940 
Date Filed:  April 29, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Sim von Kalinowski 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
and Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. 
Natasha Cortina, Kelley Johnson and Alan L. Amann, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Raymond M. DiGuiseppe 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 10790 
Southport, NC 28461 
(910) 713-8804 
 
Alan L. Amann 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 645-2277