Title: Brecher v. Cutler
Citation: 396 Pa. Super. 211, 578 A.2d 481
Docket Number: N/A
State: Pennsylvania
Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Date: July 30, 1990

396 Pa. Superior Ct. 211 (1990) 578 A.2d 481 David BRECHER and Janice Brecher, his Wife, Appellants, v. Jack CUTLER and Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 7, 1990. Filed July 30, 1990. *213 David N. Rosen, Philadelphia, for appellants. Murray S. Levin, Philadelphia, for Searle, appellee. Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and CERCONE, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: Appellants David Brecher and Janice Brecher, his wife, bring this appeal from the Order dated December 4, 1989, granting summary judgment to appellee Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (now merged into and known as G.D. Searle &amp; Co.), one of two defendants in the case. Appellants instituted this action on May 10, 1985 to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained as a consequence of Mrs. Brecher's use of the Cu-7 copper contraceptive IUD, (Cu-7), manufactured by Searle. The basis of appellants' complaint was that Mrs. Brecher had been unable to become pregnant as a result of pelvic infection and adhesions caused by the Cu-7. The facts which gave rise to this appeal may be summarized as follows from the Opinion of the trial court: (Slip Op., Lawrence, J., 1/25/89, pp. 1-2.) The basis of appellants' suit against Searle was, first, Searle failed to adequately warn Dr. Cutler of the hazards associated with the use of the Cu-7 or, in the alternative, their aggressive promotion of the contraceptive overrode the warnings, and second, Searle failed to warn Mrs. Brecher directly of the possible complications she could suffer from using the Cu-7. The trial court, following the "learned intermediary" doctrine, found Searle owed no duty to Mrs. Brecher and it had provided Dr. Cutler with both the physician's insert and the patient brochure as required by federal regulations, stating the appropriate warnings and precautions. Appellants contend the court erred in granting summary judgment to Searle because the record indicates there is a *215 genuine issue of material fact for the jury, as factfinder, to decide. They argue the court repeatedly refers to the lack of "evidence" and that the court, in essence, is admitting there is something to submit to a jury. They go on to say, "[i]t is not the function of the summary judgment to eliminate Appellant's right to try the case if it can show or argue successfully the negligence or culpability of the Appellee. Thus, it is conceivable that literature not yet produced because that is "evidence" will support Appellant's claim. . . ." (Brief of Appellants, p. 8.) For the reasons that follow, we disagree with appellants and affirm the Order granting summary judgment to appellee. The pertinent sections of Pa.R.C.P. 1035, Motion for Summary Judgment, are as follows: While appellants are not required to present their entire case in opposing a motion for summary judgment, they cannot rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings but must present depositions, affidavits, or other acceptable documents which show there is a genuine issue of material fact to submit to the factfinder and the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Bold unsupported assertions of conclusory accusations cannot create genuine issues of material fact." McCain v. Pennbank, 379 Pa.Super. 313, 318, 549 A.2d 1311, 1313-14 (1988). Green v. K &amp; K Insurance Co., 389 Pa.Super. 73, 74, 566 A.2d 622, 623 (1989) (citations omitted). This is not the first time a plaintiff has argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because certain evidence could have been brought out at trial. In Roland v. Kravco, Inc., 355 Pa.Super. 493, 513 A.2d 1029 (1986), plaintiff fell in defendants' parking lot and commenced an action in trespass to recover for her injuries. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment claiming plaintiff did not set forth facts showing the parking lot was in a dangerous condition at the time of her fall. The trial court granted the motions and plaintiff appealed. This Court reviewed the deposition of plaintiff which was the only evidence as to how the accident occurred. We agreed with *217 the trial court that plaintiff failed to present facts showing there was a genuine issue for a jury to consider and defendants were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id., 355 Pa.Superior Ct. at 500-01, 513 A.2d at 1033-34 (footnote omitted). In the instant case, the trial court found appellants failed to present facts to support their contention the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply and, therefore, Searle was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the doctrine controls liability in cases such as this. The foundation of the doctrine was propounded in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971), where the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the duty of drug manufacturers to warn of potentially dangerous side effects of their products and to whom the warning must be given. In reference to prescription drugs, the Court said, "[s]ince the drug was available only upon prescription of a duly licensed physician, the warning required is not to the general public or to the patient, but to the prescribing doctor." Id. at 285, 282 A.2d at 220. This Court discussed the rationale of the rule from Incollingo in Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa.Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973): Id., 224 Pa.Superior Ct. at 431, 307 A.2d at 457. Thus, the information supplied by the drug manufacturer is only one source a physician must consult and he is expected to make an independent medical judgment in determining whether a given drug is appropriate for a particular patient. *219 More recently, this Court was faced again with the question of who has the duty to warn the user of a prescription drug and whether the manufacturer may be liable. Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 361 Pa.Super. 589, 596, 523 A.2d 374, 378 (1987). The line of cases setting forth the learned intermediary doctrine make it clear that summary judgment in favor of Searle was appropriate, absent facts by appellants raising the question of whether Searle adequately warned Dr. Cutler. A manufacturer will be held liable only if he fails to exercise reasonable care to inform the one for whose use the product is supplied of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. White v. Weiner, 386 Pa.Super. 111, 562 A.2d 378 (1989). Although all the cases cited herein concern prescription drugs, we hold that the law is equally controlling in cases such as this where a doctor prescribes a contraceptive. Therefore, appellants could not rely on unsupported allegations in response to Searle's motion for summary judgment but were required to introduce facts tending to show Searle failed to exercise reasonable care in informing Dr. Cutler of the dangers of the Cu-7. *220 The trial court found there was no dispute that Searle sent and Dr. Cutler received the physician's insert for each Cu-7 he prescribed for Mrs. Brecher. The pertinent language of the insert is as follows: (Slip Op. at p. 7.) Dr. Cutler stated he was aware of the possible side affects and that he did read Searle's insert and it was *221 consistent with his understanding from other sources of the risks involved with the use of the Cu-7. See Slip Op. at p. 8. (Slip Op. at p. 10.) Although appellants argue the physician's insert was insufficient to warn of the risks of pelvic infection and infertility, the deposition testimony of Dr. Cutler compels us to find the warnings were adequate. Furthermore, appellants failed to factually support their assertion that the aggressive promotion of the Cu-7 nullified the warnings as to Dr. Cutler, therefore, appellants' arguments against entry of summary judgment must fail. Order affirmed.