Title: People v. Belk
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 92937
State: Illinois
Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court
Date: January 24, 2003

Docket No. 92937-Agenda 20-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								JOHN BELK, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2003.
	 
	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
	The sole issue in this case is whether aggravated possession
of a stolen motor vehicle can be considered to be a forcible felony
for purposes of the felony-murder rule. The defendant, John Belk,
stole a van and, while being pursued by police at a high rate of
speed, crashed into another vehicle, killing both occupants.
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Belk
was convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count of
aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the felony-murder statute was not
intended to apply in situations where the defendant's conduct was
only reckless. 326 Ill. App. 3d 290. We granted the State's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow,
we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
	The relevant facts are as follows. On the evening of May 14,
1998, Belk, age 16, and another person broke into a van and stole
it. Residents in a nearby apartment complex heard the sound of
breaking glass and observed two men breaking into the van and
called police. Sergeant Craig Kincaid of the Blue Island police
department was on duty that night. Upon receiving a radio
dispatch regarding an automobile theft in progress and a
description of the vehicle, Kincaid activated his emergency lights
and siren on his patrol vehicle and drove toward the location of the
crime.
	As Kincaid was approaching the intersection of 127th Street
and Vincennes, he observed a van matching the description of the
stolen vehicle heading towards him. Kincaid made a U-turn and,
with his lights and siren still activated, began pursuing the van.
The van continued west on 127th Street at about 60 miles per hour
for one block, then made a sharp right turn into a Walgreen's
parking lot. The van sped through the pharmacy drive-through
lane, around the Walgreen's building, then proceeded north on
Western Avenue.
	Once on Western Avenue and with police still in pursuit, the
van increased its speed. As it approached 115th Street, the van was
traveling at over 100 miles per hour. The posted speed limit in that
area was 30 miles per hour. This section of Western Avenue had
numerous restaurants and other establishments that were still open
for business. Kincaid testified that there was other vehicular traffic
present on Western Avenue and that there were pedestrians on the
sidewalk. The other vehicles were pulling over to the side of the
road and the van was passing them.
	At the intersection of 111th Street and Western Avenue, the
van crashed into the rear of the victims' car, propelling it 375 feet
from the point of impact. The victims, Tom and Joanna Peragine,
died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash.
	The van flipped over and landed 330 feet from the point of
impact, where it caught fire. Belk crawled out of the van and
attempted to flee on foot, but was tackled by a police officer. Belk
began kicking the officer, but the officer subdued him and placed
him under arrest. Belk was taken to the emergency room of a
nearby hospital for treatment of his injuries. While there, a
toxicology test was performed. The test revealed that Belk's
blood-alcohol level was 0.19.
	The trial court found Belk guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of two counts of felony murder and one count of aggravated
possession of a stolen motor vehicle, determining that Belk's
commission of the felony of aggravated possession of a stolen
motor vehicle proximately caused the death of the victims. The
court sentenced Belk to a term of natural life.
	Belk appealed, arguing that because aggravated possession of
a stolen motor vehicle was not an enumerated forcible felony
under the felony-murder statute or a forcible felony threatening
violence against individuals, his conviction should be reduced to
reckless homicide. The appellate court agreed, holding that the
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that while Belk acted
recklessly, his actions did not fall within the purview of the felony-murder statute. Specifically, the appellate court held that the
evidence did not support an inference that Belk contemplated
violence or acted intentionally when his vehicle struck that of the
victims, or that he intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to
anyone who got in his way. The appellate court concluded that
while the evidence clearly demonstrated that Belk was determined
to elude capture and that he drove the van in a reckless manner, it
did not show that he intended to kill anyone during the course of
his attempt to escape. The appellate court reduced Belk's
conviction to reckless homicide, vacated his sentence of natural
life, and remanded the cause for resentencing.
	On appeal, the State argues that the appellate court erred in
holding that the felony-murder rule did not apply because Belk's
conduct was merely reckless and he did not intend to kill the
victims. The State contends that the felony-murder rule does not
require an intent to kill and that an intent to kill is irrelevant to the
determination of whether a felony qualifies as a forcible felony.
	The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Richardson,
196 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (2001). Legislative intent is best ascertained
by examining the language of the statute itself. People v.
Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). Where the language is clear
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to aids of statutory
construction. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Because
the construction of a statute is a question of law, review is de
novo. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 228.
	Aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle is a Class 1
felony and occurs when "a person *** who is the driver or
operator of a vehicle and is not entitled to the possession of that
vehicle and who knows the vehicle is stolen or converted *** who
has been given a signal by a peace officer directing him to bring
the vehicle to a stop, to willfully fail or refuse to obey such
direction, increase his speed, extinguish his lights or otherwise flee
or attempt to elude the officer." 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7) (West
1996). Belk does not dispute that he was guilty of this offense.
	Section 9-1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code)
provides that "[a] person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts
which cause the death *** he is attempting or committing a
forcible felony other that second degree murder." 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Under the felony-murder statute, a felon
is responsible for the direct and foreseeable consequences of his
actions. People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 470 (1997). The
purpose behind the felony-murder statute is to limit the violence
that accompanies the commission of forcible felonies, so that
anyone engaged in such violence will be automatically subject to
a murder prosecution should someone be killed during the
commission of a forcible felony. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301,
322 (1998), citing People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 (1998).
	Section 2-8 of the Code defines "[f]orcible felony" as
"treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential
burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping,
kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or
permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which
involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any
individual." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 1996).
	Because aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle is
not one of the felonies specifically enumerated in section 2-8, the
question becomes whether, under the facts of this case, Belk's
aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle involved the use
or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.
	In People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398 (1965), we held that
nonviolent felonies could serve as the predicate offense for felony
murder. In Golson, the defendants purchased a gun and set out to
steal from automobiles. Unable to find any automobiles from
which to steal, they stole two mail sacks from a loading dock.
Shortly after leaving the dock, the defendants were stopped by two
postal inspectors, whom they shot and killed.
	On appeal, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the felony-
murder doctrine applied only in cases where the conspirators had
conspired to commit a forcible felony, which by its nature is
dangerous to human life, and that their theft by stealth of two mail
sacks was a nonforcible felony that would not ordinarily involve
any danger to human life. We rejected the defendants' argument,
holding that "the test to be applied in determining whether the
felony-murder doctrine is applicable is not whether the felony is
normally classified as non-violent, but is whether, under the facts
of a particular case, it is contemplated that violence might be
necessary to enable the conspirators to carry out their common
purpose." (Emphasis added.) Golson, 32 Ill. 2d  at 407-08. After
examining the record, we concluded that there was "sufficient
evidence from which the jury could infer that the conspirators
intended to forcibly resist any attempt to arrest them, either during
the course of the crime or in an attempt to escape from the scene.
Such a plan comes within the doctrine of felony-murder, since it
was contemplated that violence might be necessary to enable the
conspirators to carry out their common purpose." Golson, 32 Ill. 2d  at 408-09.
	In reaching our decision in Golson, we relied upon our
previous decision in People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171 (1934). In
Bongiorno, the defendants were in the process of committing an
armed robbery when a police officer entered. The defendant's
companion escaped out a window, but the defendant was caught
and arrested. As the defendant was being escorted down a hallway,
his companion shot the officer in the back. On appeal, the
defendant argued that he was not guilty of murder because
approximately five minutes had elapsed after the robbery had been
completed and because the evidence did not show a previous plan
or design to kill. We upheld the murder conviction, reasoning that
the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that the defendants
planned to commit robbery by using a deadly weapon to intimidate
the victims and to escape with the proceeds. We noted that "[a]
plan to commit robbery would be futile if it did not comprehend
an escape with the proceeds of the crime. These factual
circumstances are inseparable. Unless the plan of robbery is to
terrify the victim, and, if occasion requires, to kill any person
attempting to apprehend them at the time of or immediately upon
gaining possession of the property, it would be inane and child-like." Bongiorno, 358 Ill.  at 174.
	In Bongiorno, we affirmed the defendant's conviction for
murder because the facts demonstrated that perpetrators' plan to
commit robbery contemplated an escape with the proceeds and the
use of deadly force against anyone attempting to apprehend them.
Relying on Bongiorno, we held in Golson that the evidence
supported the inference that the perpetrators intended to forcibly
resist any attempt to arrest them, either during the course of the
crime or in an attempt to escape the scene. Because the evidence
demonstrated that they contemplated that the use of force or
violence against an individual might be necessary, the theft by
stealth of the mail sacks was a forcible felony for purposes of the
felony-murder statute. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d  at 408-09.
	The question before us, then, is whether, under the particular
facts of this case, there is any evidence which would give rise to
an inference that at some point during his attempt to elude the
police, Belk contemplated that escape might involve the use of
force or violence against an individual. After reviewing the record,
we conclude that there is not. The evidence shows that Belk was
intoxicated, that he stole a van, and that in an attempt to elude
capture, he drove at an excessive rate of speed through an area
where he was likely to encounter other vehicular or pedestrian
traffic. While this evidence would support an inference that Belk
acted recklessly and contemplated that in attempting to elude
police he was likely to cause death or great bodily harm, an
inference that clearly supports a conviction for reckless homicide
pursuant to section 9-3 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West
1996)), it does not support an inference that Belk contemplated
that the use of force or violence against an individual might be
necessary in order for him to accomplish his escape.
	The crucial distinction between the present case and
Bongiorno and Golson is that, in those cases, the surrounding
circumstances, particularly the fact that the perpetrators were
armed, gave rise to an inference that the perpetrators intended to
use force to escape. This necessarily implies that they
contemplated that the use of force or violence against an
individual might be involved and that they were willing to use
such force or violence in order to make their escape. It is the
contemplation that force or violence against an individual might
be involved combined with the implied willingness to use force or
violence against an individual that makes a felony a forcible felony
under the residual category of section 2-8.
	In the present case, there is no evidence that either Belk or his
accomplice was armed, and no evidence that they contemplated
and were willing to use force or violence against an individual to
make their escape. While it is true that a vehicle can be used as a
deadly weapon (see People v. Crocket, 13 Ill. App. 2d 255 (1957)
(abstract of op.)), there is no evidence in this case that Belk
contemplated using the van in such manner. Although Officer
Kincaid testified that there were pedestrians on the sidewalk, there
is no evidence that Belk contemplated that striking a pedestrian
with the van might be necessary to elude police. Likewise, there
is no evidence that Belk contemplated that striking another vehicle
might be necessary to accomplish his escape. Indeed, as can be
seen from the present case, a high-speed collision with another
vehicle would not only impede an escape attempt, it would present
a serious risk of death or bodily injury to the perpetrator.
	In support of its argument that aggravated possession of a
stolen motor vehicle should be considered a forcible felony under
the circumstances of this case, the State cites People v. Stevens,
324 Ill. App. 3d 1084 (2001), and People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App.
3d 914 (1994). In those cases, the defendants were fleeing police
in stolen motor vehicles when they were involved in accidents
which resulted in the victims' deaths. The defendants were
convicted of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(2) of
the Code, which provides that a person commits first degree
murder when he knows that his actions created a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2000).
The appellate court upheld the convictions in those cases, finding
that a jury could have concluded from the evidence that the
defendants knew that their actions created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm. These cases are inapposite. While a
defendant's knowledge that his actions create a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm is sufficient to support a conviction
for first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(2) of the Code, a
defendant's knowledge that his actions might involve the threat or
use of force or violence against an individual is not sufficient,
under Golson, to make a felony a forcible felony under section
2-8.
	As noted above, the State argues that the appellate court
erroneously held that Belk was not guilty of felony murder because
the evidence did not support an inference that it was Belk's intent
to kill or cause great bodily harm. While we do not interpret the
appellate court's opinion as requiring evidence of an intent to kill
in order to sustain a felony-murder conviction, other courts have
done so (see People v. McCarty, 329 Ill. App. 3d 969 (2002)) and
the dicta therein could easily give rise to such misunderstanding.
We therefore wish to reemphasize that whether the perpetrator
intended to kill the victim is irrelevant for purposes of the felony-murder statute. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d  at 322.
	In sum, we hold that under the facts of this case, aggravated
possession of a stolen motor vehicle is not a forcible felony for
purposes of the felony-murder statute because the evidence does
not support an inference that Belk contemplated that the use of
force or violence against an individual might be involved in
attempting to elude police.
	The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.