Title: State v. Anderson
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 125104
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: March 1, 2024

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 125,104 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TODGE ANTON ANDERSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
A district court's decision about whether to impose a sanction for a discovery 
violation, and which sanction to impose, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion so long 
as due process rights are not implicated. And generally, defendants do not have a due 
process right to have evidence excluded when a party violates a discovery order. An 
abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or if it is 
based on an error of law or fact. The party asserting error has the burden to establish an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
2.  
 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(a) requires that the prosecuting attorney permit the 
defense to inspect and copy certain evidence upon request by the defense. Thus, to 
establish a discovery violation under that statute, the record must show the defendant 
requested inspection or copies of the evidence at issue.  
 
3.  
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i) grants the district court discretion to impose 
sanctions for violations of the criminal discovery statutes. Such sanctions may include 
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allowing the opposing party to inspect any materials not previously disclosed, ordering a 
continuance, excluding any materials not disclosed, or other orders the district court 
deems just under the circumstances.  
 
4. 
The trial court has wide discretion in deciding which, if any, sanctions to impose 
for a discovery violation. In reaching this decision, the trial court should consider the 
reasons why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing 
party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant 
circumstances. The court may also consider whether there are recurring problems or 
repeated instances of intentional failure to disclose or to abide by the court's discovery 
rulings. Ordinarily, the court should impose the least drastic sanctions which are designed 
to accomplish the objects of discovery but not to punish. 
 
5. 
Prosecutors generally have wide latitude in crafting arguments and commenting on 
the weaknesses of the defense. But an argument attempting to shift the burden of proof is 
improper. A prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof by pointing out a lack of 
evidence to support a defense or to corroborate a defendant's argument regarding holes in 
the State's case. Likewise, when the defense creates an inference that the State's evidence 
is not credible because the State failed to admit a certain piece of evidence, the State may 
rebut the inference by informing the jury that the defense has the power to introduce 
evidence. But when discussing the defense's subpoena power, the State crosses the line 
when it suggests the defendant must disprove the State's case or offer evidence to support 
a finding of reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
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6.  
 
The identity of a controlled substance may be proven by circumstantial evidence if 
that evidence supports a reasonable inference that the defendant distributed or possessed 
the substance in question. 
 
7.  
If convicted, K.S.A. 22-4513 provides that the district court shall tax defendant 
with all expenditures made by the State Board of Indigents' Defense Services to provide 
counsel and other defense services. In determining the amount and method of payment, 
district courts must explicitly consider two circumstances on the record:  (1) the financial 
resources of defendant; and (2) the nature of the burden that payment of the award will 
impose. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; CHERYL A. RIOS, judge. Oral argument held September 12, 
2023. Opinion filed March 1, 2024. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. 
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Jennifer C. Bates, of 
the same office, was with him on the brief for appellant.  
 
Michael R. Serra, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Michael F. Kagay, district 
attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Todge Anton Anderson and two accomplices were involved in the 
robbery and murder of Christopher McMillon. Trial evidence showed Anderson had been 
dealing synthetic marijuana in the month before the murder. Anderson obtained his 
supply of synthetic marijuana from McMillon, but Anderson was in debt to McMillon for 
a certain quantity of this product. One evening, Anderson arrived at McMillon's home 
4 
 
 
 
with the two accomplices. Upon entering McMillon's home, Anderson fatally shot 
McMillon and directed the accomplices to take items of value from the residence.  
 
A jury convicted Anderson of first-degree felony murder, second-degree 
intentional murder (as a lesser-included offense of first-degree premeditated murder), 
aggravated robbery, distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance, and criminal possession of a weapon. Anderson was sentenced to a controlling 
term of life without the possibility of parole for 620 months and ordered to pay the State 
Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS) $5,000 in attorney fees. 
 
On direct appeal, Anderson raises four claims of error. First, Anderson argues the 
district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a recording of a jail call. In 
that recording, Anderson talked about getting shorted in a drug distribution operation. 
The State disclosed this recording days before the start of the trial. Anderson claims the 
State's late disclosure violated statutory rules of criminal discovery and the district court 
should have excluded the evidence as a sanction. But even assuming the late disclosure 
violated a discovery statute, the admission of the evidence was reasonable under the 
circumstances.  
 
 
Second, Anderson argues the prosecutor erred in closing argument by shifting the 
burden of proof to Anderson. During rebuttal, the State mentioned Anderson's subpoena 
power in conjunction with the reasonable doubt standard and explained that Anderson 
had failed to produce a specific piece of evidence relevant to his defense. Collectively, 
these comments obscured how the burden of proof applied to one particular argument, 
but the error did not affect the trial's outcome.  
 
 
Third, Anderson argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 
for distributing synthetic marijuana or possessing synthetic marijuana with intent to 
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distribute in an amount less than 25 grams. But the trial evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the State, supports his conviction. 
 
Finally, Anderson argues the district court erred by ordering him to pay $5,000 in 
BIDS attorney fees. Before imposing this obligation on a defendant, Kansas law requires 
that the district court explicitly consider on the record the nature of the burden such 
payment would impose on the defendant. See K.S.A. 22-4513(b); State v. Robinson, 281 
Kan. 538, 546, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). Here, the record confirms the district court did not 
explicitly consider this factor.  
 
Thus, we affirm Anderson's convictions, vacate the order assessing attorney fees 
against Anderson, and remand for reconsideration on that issue. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On the morning of October 3, 2020, McMillon was found dead in his home. He 
had been shot two times, with at least one of the gunshot wounds being fatal.  
 
 
During their investigation, police obtained video surveillance footage from one of 
McMillon's neighbors. The video showed a man and two women entering McMillon's 
home around 12:33 a.m. on October 3 and leaving about seven minutes later. One of the 
women was carrying a TV on the way out. Police identified the two women in the video 
as Tishara Moran and Latrelle Praylow. And Moran and Praylow both identified the man 
as Anderson.  
 
 
At trial, Moran and Praylow explained the events surrounding McMillon's murder. 
Moran testified she met and began dating Anderson in early September 2020. During 
their time together, Anderson sold synthetic marijuana, also known as K2 or tookie. 
McMillon was Anderson's supplier. McMillon would front K2 to Anderson, and 
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Anderson would repay McMillon after selling the supply. About a week before 
McMillon's murder, someone robbed Anderson, taking the K2 that McMillon had 
supplied to Anderson.  
 
Anderson and Moran went to McMillon's home around 8:30 p.m. on the night of 
the murder and stayed for about 30 minutes. During that time, McMillon told Anderson 
several times that "I need my money," and Anderson responded, "I know." Moran 
believed they were talking about the money Anderson owed McMillon for the stolen K2. 
 
 
About an hour or two before the murder, Praylow and Tony Hunter were in an 
SUV parked in an alley. They were met by Anderson and Moran, who were in Moran's 
car. Anderson got into the SUV with Praylow and Hunter. Praylow overheard Anderson 
say he knew where to get tookie, and Hunter said he wanted some. Praylow then got out 
of the SUV, leaving behind her bookbag which contained a .22 caliber gun. 
 
Praylow got into Moran's car, and she and Moran smoked PCP in the car and 
talked for about 20 or 30 minutes. Anderson then returned to Moran's car and got in the 
driver's seat. The three of them returned to McMillon's.  
 
 
Upon entering McMillon's home, McMillon greeted Praylow with a hug. 
Anderson then reached over Praylow's shoulder and shot McMillon. Praylow recognized 
the gun in Anderson's hand as the one from her bookbag. Anderson, Moran, and Praylow 
then went upstairs. Anderson ordered the women to look for items to steal. Praylow  
grabbed a TV and took it out to the car. Anderson drove them back to the alley where 
they had met up earlier that evening and dropped Praylow off. Anderson and Moran then 
went to a hotel with the TV still in Moran's car.  
 
 
The next morning, Moran overheard Anderson talking on the phone in the 
bathroom. He kept saying he was "so sorry" and that he "fucked up." Moran said she had 
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little memory of what happened after smoking PCP the previous night. When she asked 
Anderson what had happened, he told her to tell the police he did it. She said she only 
later discovered that "it" was McMillon's murder.  
 
 
After leaving the hotel, Anderson and Moran left the TV behind a dumpster. They 
then stopped at a sporting goods store and a pawn shop because Anderson kept saying he 
needed .22 caliber ammunition. At the pawn shop, Anderson pulled a gun out of his 
pocket. Moran later dropped Anderson off at a location in Topeka.  
 
 
Moran was pulled over and arrested on a highway near Lawrence a few days after 
the murder. Two or three weeks later, Praylow flew to Washington under a different 
name and was eventually arrested in Seattle. Anderson was apprehended in Omaha, 
Nebraska in early January 2021.  
 
 
Police found three .22 caliber casings in the living room of McMillon's home and 
one .22 caliber casing in the backseat of Moran's car. Forensic testing confirmed all four 
casings were fired from the same gun. But that gun was never recovered.  
 
 
The week before Anderson's trial, Detective Victor Riggin with the Topeka Police 
Department discovered a recorded phone call Anderson made from jail in May 2021. 
During that call, Anderson talked about not getting a fair cut from drug sales and  
compared the listener's job frustrations to getting shorted in a drug deal. But Anderson 
made no reference to McMillon specifically. The recording was later admitted into 
evidence at trial. 
 
As noted, the jury convicted Anderson on several counts. And the district court 
sentenced him to a controlling term of life without the possibility of parole for 620 
months and ordered him to pay $5,000 in BIDS attorney fees.  
 
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Anderson appeals his convictions and the attorney fees order directly to our court. 
We heard oral argument on September 12, 2023. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4) (life sentence and off-grid crimes appeal directly to Supreme 
Court). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Exclude a 
Recording of the Jail Call as a Sanction for a Discovery Violation 
 
For his first issue on appeal, Anderson argues the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to exclude the recorded jail call as a sanction for the State's 
discovery violation. To resolve this issue, we first identify facts relevant to Anderson's 
challenge. Then, we identify the controlling legal framework governing the issue. Finally, 
we analyze the facts under that framework and conclude that Anderson has failed to carry 
his burden to show the district court abused its discretion.  
 
A. Relevant Facts 
 
 
Anderson's trial began in February 2022. On the first day of trial, defense counsel 
informed the district court that three days earlier, the State had disclosed a recording of 
the jail call Anderson made in May 2021. Defense counsel confirmed that he had listened 
to the call with Anderson the previous day. The defense objected to its admission based 
on relevance and late disclosure. The State argued the evidence was relevant because it 
captured Anderson complaining about his share of the proceeds from a drug operation. 
As for the timing of the disclosure, the State said Detective Riggin did not start listening 
to Anderson's jail calls until the week before trial. And there was no unfair surprise to 
Anderson because the recording contained his own statements.  
 
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After listening to the recording, the district court ruled that the call was relevant 
and admissible. Defense counsel again objected, arguing the late disclosure prevented 
him from finding and interviewing the other person on the call. The court overruled the 
objection, stating, "[T]hese are the statements of your client. And your client's statements 
are fully discoverable by you." Anderson now argues the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to exclude the call as a sanction for a discovery violation.  
 
B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework Governing This 
Discovery Issue 
 
"Generally, when a party challenges the admission or exclusion of evidence on 
appeal, the appellate court's first inquiry is relevance." State v. Miller, 308 Kan. 1119, 
1174-75, 427 P.3d 907 (2018). But here, Anderson does not dispute the relevance of the 
jail call. Instead, he argues only that the district court should have excluded this evidence 
as a sanction for the State's discovery violation.  
 
A district court's decision about whether to impose a sanction for a discovery 
violation, and which sanction to impose, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, so long as 
due process rights are not implicated. 308 Kan. at 1175. And generally, defendants do not 
have a due process right to have evidence excluded when a party violates a discovery 
order. State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 832, 190 P.3d 207 (2008). "An abuse of discretion 
occurs if the decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or if it is based on an error of 
law or fact." State v. White, 316 Kan. 208, 213, 514 P.3d 368 (2022). As the party 
asserting error, Anderson has the burden to establish an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Genson, 316 Kan. 130, 136, 513 P.3d 1192 (2022). 
 
 
Anderson argues the State violated the discovery provisions of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
22-3212. The statute requires that prosecutors permit defendants to inspect and reproduce 
certain types of evidence upon request, including recorded statements of the defendant 
10 
 
 
 
which are in the prosecution's "possession, custody or control" and which the prosecuting 
attorney knows about or might have learned about through the exercise of due diligence: 
 
"Upon request, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defense to inspect and 
copy or photograph the following, if relevant:  (1) Written or recorded statements or 
confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof, which are or have been in the 
possession, custody or control of the prosecution, the existence of which is known, or by 
the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the prosecuting attorney." K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 22-3212(a).  
 
"Discovery . . . must be completed no later than 21 days after arraignment or at such 
reasonable later time as the court may permit." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(h). 
 
 
The statute also obligates parties to produce newly discovered evidence previously 
requested or subject to a prior discovery order. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i). Failure to 
abide by this obligation may result in court-ordered sanctions. Such sanctions may 
include allowing the opposing party to inspect any materials not previously disclosed, 
ordering a continuance, or excluding any materials not disclosed: 
 
"If, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this section, and 
prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional material previously requested or 
ordered which is subject to discovery or inspection under this section, the party shall 
promptly notify the other party or the party's attorney or the court of the existence of the 
additional material. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this section or with an order 
issued pursuant to this section, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or  
inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order 
as it deems just under the circumstances." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i). 
 
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The district court has wide discretion in deciding which, if any, sanctions to 
impose. State v. Jones, 209 Kan. 526, 528, 498 P.2d 65 (1972); see also Johnson, 286 
Kan. at 832. In reaching this decision, the "trial court should take into account the reasons 
why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, 
the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant 
circumstances." Jones, 209 Kan. 526, Syl. ¶ 2. The court may also consider whether 
"there is a recurring problem or there are repeated instances of intentional failure to 
disclose or to abide by the court's discovery rulings." State v. Winter, 238 Kan. 530, 534, 
712 P.2d 1228 (1986)."Ordinarily, the court should impose the least drastic sanctions 
which are designed to accomplish the objects of discovery but not to punish." 238 Kan. 
at 534. 
 
C. Anderson Fails to Demonstrate the District Court Abused Its Discretion 
 
 
Anderson's claim of error is founded on the assumption that the State committed a 
discovery violation under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212. And, in turn, this purported 
violation authorized the court to impose sanctions. But we question whether any 
discovery violation can be established on the record before us. See Holmes v. State, 292 
Kan. 271, 280, 252 P.3d 573 (2011) (party asserting error has burden of furnishing record 
on appeal showing prejudicial error).  
 
The State's failure to produce the jail call sooner does not, on its own, violate 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212. The statute requires the State to allow inspection and 
reproduction of evidence "[u]pon request." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(a). It is the party's 
request for inspection that triggers the prosecutor's statutory discovery obligations.  
 
 
Anderson claims he entered a reciprocal discovery agreement with the State on 
May 26, 2021. But this agreement is not in the record on appeal. Nor does the record 
contain any other discovery request or order addressing the jail call. Without these 
12 
 
 
 
records, it is difficult to substantiate whether Anderson requested inspection or copies of 
the jail call or whether this evidence was otherwise subject to the district court's 
discovery orders.  
 
 
Likewise, the record does not reveal any applicable deadlines for discovery. 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(h) generally requires discovery to be completed no more 
than 21 days after arraignment, and Anderson waived formal arraignment on July 27, 
2021. But the statute also authorizes the district court to order discovery to be completed 
more than 21 days after arraignment if the deadline is reasonable. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-
3212(h). The parties may also independently reach agreement on the time, place, and 
manner of criminal discovery. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(f) (prosecuting attorney 
and defense "shall cooperate in discovery and reach agreement on the time, place and 
manner of making the discovery and inspection permitted"). And as previously noted, the 
criminal discovery statutes include a procedure for late discovery of information 
previously requested by a party. This statutory provision requires the discovering party to 
promptly notify the requesting party or the court of the newly discovered material. See 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i).  
 
Here, we know the jail recording was disclosed only days before the trial. But it is 
difficult to assess the State's compliance with K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212 without record 
access to the discovery requests, orders, and agreements in this case. For these reasons, 
we merely assume (without deciding) that the State's failure to permit Anderson to 
inspect the recording of the jail call at some earlier date constituted a discovery violation 
under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212. Even with this assumption, Anderson failed to carry 
his burden to show the district court abused its discretion.  
 
 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i) grants the district court discretion to determine 
the "just" sanction for a discovery violation. See Johnson, 286 Kan. at 832. The failure 
to comply with a discovery request, while not to be condoned, "does not require the 
13 
 
 
 
evidence to be automatically excluded." State v. Villa & Villa, 221 Kan. 653, 656, 561 
P.2d 428 (1977). Instead, a district court should normally impose the least drastic 
sanction needed to further the purpose of our discovery statutes—if the court imposes any 
sanction at all. See Winter, 238 Kan. at 534. The least drastic sanction contemplated 
under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i) is an order requiring the noncompliant party to 
allow discovery and inspection of the materials previously requested but not disclosed.  
 
Here, the district court's decision not to exclude the jail call recording from 
evidence was objectively reasonable. By the time the parties had raised the issue with the 
district court judge, the State had already produced a copy of the recording to Anderson, 
and he had reviewed it with counsel. In other words, the State had effectively imposed 
upon itself the least drastic sanction contemplated by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3212(i)—
permitting inspection.  
 
More severe or additional sanctions were not required to further the purposes of 
the criminal discovery statutes. There is no evidence suggesting the prosecutor acted in 
bad faith. Indeed, the State turned the recording over to Anderson shortly after learning of 
its existence. See Johnson, 297 Kan. at 216-17 (absence of bad faith and intentional 
violation of discovery mitigates against more severe sanctions). And the admission of this 
evidence produced no undue surprise or prejudice to Anderson. He made the phone call  
and had actual knowledge of the contents of the recording from the outset. See Jones, 209 
Kan. at 531 (absence of surprise weighed against imposing harsher sanctions for 
discovery violation).  
 
Under these circumstances, the district court reasonably decided not to exclude the 
recording of the jail call from evidence. Anderson has failed to demonstrate that the 
district court exceeded its wide discretion in resolving this issue.  
 
14 
 
 
 
II. The Prosecutor Committed Error During Rebuttal Closing Argument, but This Error 
Did Not Affect the Outcome of the Trial 
 
 
Second, Anderson argues the prosecutor committed error during closing argument 
by shifting the burden of proof. As with the prior issue, we first address the facts and 
controlling legal framework before outlining our rationale for concluding that any 
prosecutorial error was harmless.  
 
A. Additional Facts About the Closing Argument 
 
While in jail before Anderson's trial, Moran and Praylow exchanged several letters 
in which they discussed information related to the case. At trial, defense counsel elicited 
testimony from Detective Riggin that some of those letters appeared to contain more than 
one person's handwriting. This led Riggin to believe Praylow may have been forging 
letters to fabricate evidence, and Riggin sent an email informing the prosecutor of his 
suspicions. Riggin also said the letters mentioned Hunter—the man in the SUV with 
Praylow on the night of the murder. The allegedly forged letters were not admitted into 
evidence, though the State did admit two other letters written by Moran to Praylow.  
 
 
During closing argument, defense counsel argued the State's case relied heavily on 
assumptions and conjecture. Defense counsel highlighted weaknesses in the State's case, 
such as inconsistencies between Praylow's testimony and the physical evidence; the 
State's failure to identify a bystander depicted in the surveillance video; and the absence  
of Anderson's DNA in McMillon's home. Defense counsel argued the State was asking 
the jury to "fill in the blanks" or "read between the lines" despite a lack of evidence 
supporting the State's case.  
 
 
Defense counsel also challenged Moran's and Praylow's credibility. He pointed out 
the news had broadcast information about the investigation which Moran and Praylow 
15 
 
 
 
may have heard before they gave statements to police. He also emphasized that Moran 
and Praylow had exchanged information about the case through letters, and those letters 
mentioned Hunter. Defense counsel suggested Moran and Praylow may have simply 
pinned the murder on Anderson to help themselves or to help the real culprit evade 
responsibility.  
 
 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor made the following comments: 
 
"[T]here's been talk about letters throughout the course of this case. Well you guys were 
writing letters back and forth, right? These women were in the jail, they were writing 
letters, those letters mentioned [Hunter], didn't they? Now you haven't seen the letters, 
and this is another important point. 
 
 
"If there is a piece of evidence that would prove or would show that . . . there's a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the defendant has the same subpoena power 
that the State has. The defendant can call witnesses to come in here to bring in evidence 
and to show you things. And if there is some letter out there that indicates that these 
women are lying or if they—" (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
Defense counsel objected on the grounds of burden-shifting. The State responded, 
"What I have said has been recognized by the Kansas Supreme Court as an appropriate 
argument when the defense makes the argument that the State has failed to present some 
piece of evidence." The district court told the prosecutor, "I do believe you're going to get 
to burden shift. And at this point in time, I would ask that you just move on with this." 
The State did not return to this line of argument. 
 
 
On appeal, Anderson argues that the highlighted statements above improperly 
suggested Anderson had the burden to disprove the State's case or that a finding of 
reasonable doubt is contingent on production of evidence by the defense.  
 
16 
 
 
 
B. Standard of Review and Legal Framework for Prosecutorial Error 
 
To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, this court considers 
whether the challenged prosecutorial acts "fall outside the wide latitude afforded 
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that 
does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial." State v. Sherman, 305 
Kan. 88, 109, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016). If error is found, this court then determines whether 
that error prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial by considering whether the State 
can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. 305 
Kan. at 109. 
 
 
Prosecutors generally have wide latitude in crafting arguments and commenting on 
the weaknesses of the defense. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406, 486 P.3d 551 (2021); 
State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 934, 329 P.3d 400 (2014). But an argument attempting 
to shift the burden of proof is improper. 299 Kan. at 939. The challenge lies in identifying 
the line between a prosecutor's proper comments on a defense or defendant's evidence 
and improper burden-shifting.  
 
"[A] prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof by pointing out a lack of 
evidence to support a defense or to corroborate a defendant's argument regarding holes in 
the State's case." 299 Kan. at 940. Likewise, "[w]hen the defense creates an inference that 
the State's evidence is not credible because the State failed to admit a certain piece of 
evidence, the State may rebut the inference by informing the jury that the defense has the 
power to introduce evidence." State v. Blansett, 309 Kan. 401, 415, 435 P.3d 1136 
(2019). But when discussing the defense's subpoena power, the State crosses the line 
when it suggests the defendant must disprove the State's case or offer evidence to support 
a finding of reasonable doubt. 309 Kan. at 415; Williams, 299 Kan. at 939. 
 
17 
 
 
 
C. The Rebuttal Argument Fell Outside the Wide Latitude Afforded to 
Prosecutors, but the Error is Harmless 
 
 
The State maintains defense counsel's closing argument gave the prosecution 
leeway to comment on Anderson's subpoena power. That is, defense counsel's closing 
argument focused on evidence the State had failed to produce, so the State could 
permissibly argue that Anderson had the ability to produce any evidence favorable to 
him. But we disagree with the State's characterization of its rebuttal argument.  
 
The State did not simply point out that Anderson had the power to present 
evidence favorable to the defense. Rather, the State's argument coupled the defense's 
subpoena power with the reasonable doubt standard. It argued:  "If there is a piece of 
evidence that would prove or would show that . . . there's a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, the defendant has the same subpoena power that the State has." 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
This statement would have sent a mixed message to the jury regarding the burden 
of proof—it suggested Anderson had the burden to present evidence before the jury could 
find reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And the State's argument incorrectly faulted the 
defense for not producing "some letter . . . that indicates that [Moran and Praylow] are 
lying." Taken together, these comments suggested that Anderson had the burden to prove 
Moran and Praylow were not credible witnesses. And they further implied that Anderson 
had failed to carry this burden because he did not produce the allegedly forged letters.  
 
 
In other contexts, we have permitted the State to discuss the defense's failure to 
produce specific evidence. For example, in Blansett, defense counsel emphasized during 
closing argument that the State had introduced a recording of only one of the defendant's 
multiple interviews with police. Defense counsel suggested the State was hiding the 
recordings of the other interviews because they were favorable to the defense. In rebuttal, 
18 
 
 
 
the State argued the defense had the same power and ability to introduce those recordings 
into evidence. We held the State's response "fell within the wide latitude to refute the 
inference that it was hiding evidence from the jury, and it did not suggest the defense 
bore the burden to disprove the crimes charged." Blansett, 309 Kan. at 415.  
 
 
We have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances in other 
decisions. See State v. Pribble, 304 Kan. 824, 837-38, 375 P.3d 966 (2016) (prosecutor's 
comment that defendant could have called alibi witnesses was fair rebuttal to defense 
counsel's argument that State failed to call witnesses who could corroborate defendant's 
account); State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. 55, 64, 260 P.3d 86 (2011) (it was not improper for 
the State to respond to defense counsel's "purported inference" that the State refused to 
call a witness beneficial to the defense "by pointing out that if the [witness] would have 
been helpful to the defense, the defense could have subpoenaed him"). 
 
 
But "the line between permissible and impermissible argument is [often] context 
dependent." State v. Martinez, 311 Kan. 919, 923, 468 P.3d 319 (2020). And here, the 
context distinguishes Blansett, Pribble, and Naputi because defense counsel never faulted 
the State for failing to introduce the allegedly forged letters. Nor did defense counsel ask 
the jury to infer the letters would have been favorable to the defense because the State 
failed to present them. Thus, the State's comment regarding Anderson's failure to produce 
the letters cannot be characterized as fair rebuttal to any suggested inference.  
 
After considering the unique factual circumstances of this trial and placing both 
parties' closing arguments in context, we hold that the rebuttal argument fell just outside 
the wide latitude afforded prosecutors in arguing a case. The prosecutor's comments 
implied that the burden was on Anderson to rebut the State's witnesses and establish a 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Similarly, they suggested Anderson failed to carry this  
19 
 
 
 
burden because he did not subpoena the allegedly forged letters. So construed, the 
argument falls within the category of burden-shifting, which we have consistently 
deemed improper. See Blansett, 309 Kan. at 414; Williams, 299 Kan. at 939.  
 
 
Having concluded there was error, we must now consider whether that error was 
harmless—that is, whether it prejudiced Anderson's due process rights to a fair trial. State 
v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 905, 910, 468 P.3d 323 (2020). In doing so, we apply the traditional 
constitutional harmlessness standard identified in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109. Under this standard, 
"prosecutorial error is harmless if the State can demonstrate 'beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of 
the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the verdict.'" 305 Kan. at 109 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 
801 [2011]).  
 
 
The State has met its burden to show beyond reasonable doubt that this 
prosecutorial error did not affect the outcome of the trial. For one, the State's comments 
were isolated. See State v. Hirsh, 310 Kan. 321, 343, 446 P.3d 472 (2019) (prosecutorial 
error harmless in part because prosecutor's improper comment "was singular and 
isolated"). Defense counsel objected just after the prosecutor made the challenged 
remarks. The district court advised the prosecutor to move on because the argument 
sounded like burden-shifting. And the State complied with this admonishment. 
 
 
The State also acknowledged during rebuttal that the law places the burden of 
proof on the State, not the defendant:  
 
"In this case, the State has the burden of proof; that's the way he [sic] works a [sic] 
criminal cases. The defendant is not required to prove that he is innocent. The State must 
prove that the defendant is guilty." 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
And while the State's argument may have erroneously suggested Anderson carried 
the burden to prove Praylow and Moran were lying, the parties' closing arguments made 
clear the determination of those witnesses' credibility was ultimately up to the jury. The 
jury instructions reinforced this message. The court instructed jurors that "[i]t is for you 
to determine the weight and credit to be given the testimony of each witness." The jury 
also received an accomplice witness instruction, stating it "should consider with caution 
the testimony of an accomplice who may receive a benefit from the State for her 
testimony." We presume the jury followed these instructions. State v. Thurber, 308 Kan. 
140, 194, 420 P.3d 389 (2018). Thus, we hold that the prosecutorial error is harmless.  
 
III. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Anderson's Conviction for 
Distributing or Possessing with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance 
 
In his third issue on appeal, Anderson argues there was insufficient evidence to 
convict him of distributing K2 or possessing K2 with intent to distribute.  
 
A. The State's Evidence  
 
 
At trial, Moran testified Anderson was selling K2 often in September 2020. She 
explained K2 and tookie were the same substance—synthetic marijuana. She described 
its appearance as "green" and "kind of like a potpourri." She also explained the 
arrangement between Anderson and McMillon. McMillon would front K2 to Anderson, 
and Anderson would repay McMillon after selling it. She recalled being in the car with 
Anderson while he was delivering drugs in Topeka. And she once picked up some K2 
from McMillon's home and took it to Anderson in Kansas City. Moran testified that about 
a week before the murder, Anderson had been robbed of K2 that he received from 
McMillon. And, on the day of the murder, McMillon had repeatedly requested payment.  
 
21 
 
 
 
The State also presented a message sent from Moran's phone on September 21, 
2020, stating:  "[McMillon's address], please go to my cousin's spot and he'll give you 
some smoke for me. I told him you would pull up. Just video call me when you get 
there." Moran denied writing this message, explaining that Anderson sometimes had 
access to her phone. 
 
 
Another State's witness, Rachel Johnson, testified that "probably a month or two" 
before the shooting—that is, in August or September 2020—she bought K2 from 
McMillon, and Anderson had delivered the substance to her home. Johnson also went to 
McMillon's home to buy K2 the morning after the murder but left when nobody answered 
the door.  
 
Praylow testified she heard Anderson say he knew where to get some tookie while 
she was in the SUV with Anderson and Hunter on the night of the murder.  
 
 
Finally, during a search of McMillon's home following the murder, police found 
162.45 grams of marijuana and 168.73 grams of K2 in the kitchen along with some scales 
and plastic baggies. Chemical analysis confirmed the substances were marijuana and K2. 
 
B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, this court 
looks at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to decide whether a  
rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
doing so, we do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or reassess witness 
credibility. State v. Spencer, 317 Kan. 295, 302, 527 P.3d 921 (2023). 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Anderson was charged with distributing or possessing with intent to distribute 
marijuana or synthetic marijuana in an amount less than 25 grams under K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-5705(a)(4) and (d)(2)(A). The jury instructions told the jury that to convict for 
this offense the State must prove: 
 
"1. The defendant distributed or possessed with intent to distribute marijuana or an 
analog thereof, and/or synthetic marijuana also known as 'K2' or 'Tookie' also 
known as Methyl  2-{[1-(pente-1-yl)  –  1H-indazol-3-yl)  carbonyl]amino}  –  3,3-
dimethylbutanoate (MDMB-en-PINCACA) a controlled idazole-3 carboximide. 
 
"2. The quantity of 'K2' or 'Tookie' distributed or possessed with intent to distribute was 
less than 25 grams. 
 
"3. This act occurred on or about the 1st day of September through the 3rd day of 
October, 2020 in Shawnee County, Kansas."  
 
C. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Sustain a Conviction for Distribution of 
Less Than 25 Grams of Synthetic Marijuana 
 
 
Anderson first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the grounds that no 
witness testified he distributed K2 on a specific date. But Anderson was charged with 
distribution "[o]n or about the 1st of September, 2020 through the 3rd of October, 2020." 
Moran's testimony establishes she met Anderson in early September and was in a 
romantic relationship with him at least through the date of McMillon's murder on October 
3. She also detailed Anderson's extensive distribution activity during that time. This 
activity was corroborated by Johnson, who testified Anderson delivered K2 to her a 
month or two before the murder—that is, in August or September 2020. Any date 
discrepancy in this testimony would go to its weight, and we do not reweigh evidence 
when conducting sufficiency review. See Spencer, 317 Kan. at 302. This evidence is 
sufficient to establish that Anderson distributed K2 within the relevant date range.  
 
23 
 
 
 
 
Next, Anderson argues the State presented no evidence establishing the amount of 
K2 he distributed. The amount distributed is relevant because the severity level of the 
offense of distribution of marijuana or an analog of marijuana is graded by the quantity of 
material distributed. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(d)(2). But the lowest severity level 
of that offense involves distribution of less than 25 grams. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5705(d)(2)(A). And the State charged Anderson under subsection (d)(2)(A). Thus, 
evidence that Anderson distributed any quantity of K2 would suffice to establish this 
element. See, e.g., State v. Scheuerman, 314 Kan. 583, 592, 502 P.2d 502 (2022) 
(undisputed evidence of possession of greater quantity of controlled substance than 
charged crime encompasses is sufficient to establish possession of amount of charged 
crime). 
 
 
Finally, Anderson argues there is insufficient evidence to establish the substance 
he was distributing was K2. Anderson acknowledges the State may prove the identity of 
a controlled substance through circumstantial evidence if that evidence supports a 
reasonable inference that the defendant distributed or possessed the substance in question. 
See United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1989); State v. Northrup, 
16 Kan. App. 2d 443, 452-53, 825 P.2d 174 (1992). Such evidence may include:  
(1) evidence regarding the physical appearance of the substance; (2) evidence that the 
substance produced the expected affect when tested by someone familiar with the illegal 
drug; (3) evidence the substance was used in the same way as the illicit drug; 
(4) evidence that a high price was paid in cash for the substance; (5) evidence that 
transactions involving the substance were carried out in secrecy; and (6) evidence that the 
substance was called by the name of the illegal drug by the defendant or others in his 
presence. Baggett, 890 F.2d at 1096; Northrup, 16 Kan. App. 2d at 453. 
 
Anderson argues the circumstantial evidence at trial does not support an inference 
the substance he distributed was K2. Our review of the record convinces us otherwise. 
Moran testified Anderson distributed K2, which she explained was synthetic marijuana. 
24 
 
 
 
She also described the substance's appearance as consistent with synthetic marijuana. 
Johnson, an experienced consumer, testified Anderson delivered K2 to her. Praylow 
testified she heard Anderson say he knew where to get tookie, which Moran explained is 
another term for K2 or synthetic marijuana. Finally, the evidence showed McMillon was 
Anderson's supplier, and chemical analysis of substances recovered from McMillon's 
home confirmed they were marijuana and synthetic marijuana.  
 
 
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as we must under the 
controlling standard of review, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Anderson 
distributed less than 25 grams of synthetic marijuana on or about September 1 through 
October 3, 2020. We thus affirm his conviction for this offense.  
 
IV. The District Court Erred by Ordering Anderson to Pay $5,000 in BIDS Attorney 
Fees Without Expressly Considering the Nature of the Burden That Payment 
Would Impose 
 
Finally, Anderson argues the district court erred by failing to comply with K.S.A. 
22-4513 when imposing BIDS attorney fees. The statute provides that a district court 
shall tax a convicted defendant with all expenditures made by BIDS in providing counsel 
and other defense services. K.S.A. 22-4513(a). When determining the amount and 
method of payment, district courts must explicitly consider two circumstances on the 
record:  (1) the financial resources of defendant; and (2) the nature of the burden that 
payment of the award will impose. K.S.A. 22-4513(b); Robinson, 281 Kan. at 546. 
 
 
At sentencing, the State requested the district court require Anderson to reimburse 
BIDS attorney fees in the amount of $10,225 or to ask about Anderson's ability to pay 
those fees. The district court later asked if Anderson had any income from any source, 
and Anderson responded he did not. The court then imposed "a reduced attorney fee in 
the amount of $5,000 as opposed to [$]10,225 for indigency found."  
 
25 
 
 
 
 
The district court expressly considered Anderson's financial resources on the 
record. But both parties agree the district court did not expressly consider the nature of 
the burden that payment of the award would impose on Anderson. Thus, we vacate the 
district court's order assessing Anderson with BIDS attorney fees and remand for 
reconsideration on this issue. See State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 824, 441 P.3d 52 
(2019) (vacating BIDS attorney fees assessment and remanding for reconsideration of 
defendant's obligation). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
None of the issues Anderson raised on appeal warrant reversal of his convictions. 
The district court's decision to admit the jail call was reasonable under the circumstances. 
While the State's rebuttal closing argument fell outside the bounds of proper argument, 
that error was harmless. And sufficient evidence supports Anderson's conviction for 
distributing K2. We thus affirm all Anderson's convictions. 
 
But the district court erred by taxing Anderson with BIDS attorney fees without 
first expressly considering on the record the burden that payment would impose. We thus 
vacate that order and remand for reconsideration of the attorney fee issue.  
 
Judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.