Title: Lowe v. State
Citation: 242 Kan. 64, 744 P.2d 856
Docket Number: 59,746
State: Kansas
Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court
Date: October 30, 1987

242 Kan. 64 (1987)
744 P.2d 856
JAMES SALVATORE LOWE, Appellant.
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 59,746

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed October 30, 1987.
James F. Vano, of Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Bruce W. Beye, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and Dennis W. Moore, district attorney, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This case comes before the court on a petition for review of an unpunished decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. (See Lowe v. State, No. 59,746, filed June 4, 1987.) Appellant, James Salvatore Lowe, was originally charged with one count of burglary (K.S.A. 21-3715) and one count of misdemeanor theft (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 21-3701). He was convicted by a jury of the theft charge and that conviction was affirmed by this court in a direct appeal in State v. Lowe, 238 Kan. 755, 715 P.2d 404 (1986).
The facts leading to appellant's original conviction are fully set forth in State v. Lowe and need not be repeated here. Only the procedural aspects of the original trial are germane to the issue now before the court. In the original trial, the State rested its case late in the afternoon at which time motions were heard outside the presence of the jury in the court's chambers. The petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a renewal of an earlier motion for mistrial were both denied. *65 However, the court, on its own motion, dismissed the charge of misdemeanor theft, finding insufficient evidence to support the charge. The following morning, again in the court's chambers and outside the presence of the jury, the judge reversed his earlier ruling and reinstated the theft charge. Petitioner's counsel objected, arguing such reinstatement violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. The trial on both charges then resumed and the jury acquitted the petitioner on the burglary charge but found him guilty of theft.
In State v. Lowe, we affirmed the conviction and held the double jeopardy clause had not been violated, with Justice Herd dissenting. In that decision, rendered February 21, 1986, we stated:
We also found that the court's dismissal of the theft charge constituted an acquittal, stating:
Appellant's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and his appeal from the denial of that motion, are based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 106 S. Ct. 1745 (1986), decided May 5, 1986, subsequent to our decision in State v. Lowe.
In Smalis, a husband and wife, who owned a building housing a restaurant and apartment, were charged with various crimes in connection with a fire in the building. At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing a demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer, saying it was not satisfied there was sufficient evidence from which it could be concluded that either of the defendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The *66 issue was whether the State's attempt to appeal that decision would violate the double jeopardy clause. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania granted review, affirmed the trial court, and held the appeal was improper as it was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Com. v. Smalis, 331 Pa. Super. 307, 480 A.2d 1046 (1984). In a consolidated appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding no double jeopardy violation. Com. v. Zoller, 507 Pa. 344, 490 A.2d 394 (1985). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In Smalis, the Supreme Court found first that sustaining a demurrer is an acquittal under the double jeopardy clause. Second, the Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that resuming the trial following a reversal on appeal would simply constitute "continuing" jeopardy, and found an acquittal terminated the proceeding. The Court stated:
The key language in Smalis, that a postacquittal appeal is barred by the double jeopardy clause "if reversal would translate into `further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged'", is derived from United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370, 43 L. Ed. 2d 250, 95 S. Ct. 1006 (1975), and was quoted with approval in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570, *67 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 97 S. Ct. 1349 (1977). The Kansas Court of Appeals distinguished the instant case, stating:
We do not find the distinction valid. It appears clear Smalis requires that we overrule our decision in State v. Lowe and that we reverse the instant case. It is conceded that in the present case jeopardy had attached in the original trial and the dismissal constituted an acquittal of the theft charge. The reinstatement of the theft charge the next day and its submission to the jury constituted "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged" which, under Smalis, constituted a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Our decision in State v. Lowe, 238 Kan. 755, is overruled; the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the district court are reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with directions to set aside the appellant's conviction.