Title: Threshermens Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert Page
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1995AP002942
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: May 5, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-2942 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Threshermens Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Dorothy Gross,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Robert Page, National Building Service  
and CNA Insurance Companies,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  212 Wis. 2d 1, 568 N.W.2d 1 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 5, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 2, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William D. Gardner 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by David M. Victor and Law Offices of Mark H. Miller, 
Brookfield and oral argument by David M. Victor. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
James C. Ratzel and Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb & Weir, S.C., 
Milwaukee and oral argument by James C. Ratzel. 
 
No.  95-2942  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-2942  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
Threshermens Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Dorothy Gross, 
 
 
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff- 
 
 
 
Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Robert Page, National Building Service and 
CNA Insurance Companies, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 5, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  We are faced with one question in 
this review: Whether the Worker's Compensation Act permits a 
worker's compensation insurer to assert a claim for an injured 
worker's pain and suffering in an action against a third party, 
when the employee has specifically declined to participate in 
the action?  The court of appeals reversed a circuit court order 
barring the compensation insurer from presenting evidence of the 
injured worker's pain and suffering.1  We conclude that the 
Worker's 
Compensation 
Act, 
specifically 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                     
1 Threshermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gross, 212 Wis. 2d 1, 568 
N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1997).  
No. 95-2942 
 
2 
§ 102.29(1)(1993-94),2 does not prohibit a worker's compensation 
insurer from seeking reimbursement from an alleged third-party 
tortfeasor for the payments it has or will make to the employee 
by claiming all of the worker's damages flowing from the work-
related injury including pain and suffering.  We therefore 
affirm the order of the court of appeals. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
On January 22, 1993, Dorothy Gross fell in her 
employer's parking lot and sustained injuries.  The parties do 
not dispute that Gross was injured in the course and scope of 
her employment and that Threshermens Mutual Insurance Company 
(Threshermens), the worker's compensation insurer, made payments 
to Gross for her injuries resulting from the fall.  On October 
21, 1994, Threshermens sued Robert Page, National Building 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29 Third party liability.  (1) The 
making of a claim for compensation against an employer or 
compensation insurer for the injury or death of an employe shall 
not affect the right of the employe, the employe's personal 
representative, or other person entitled to bring action, to 
make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party 
for such injury or death, hereinafter referred to as a 3rd 
party; nor shall the making of a claim by any such person 
against a 3rd party for damages by reason of an injury to which 
ss. 102.03 to 102.64 are applicable, or the adjustment of any 
such claim, affect the right of the injured employe or the 
employe's dependents to recover compensation.  The employer or 
compensation insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to pay 
a lawful claim under this chapter shall have the same right to 
make claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party 
for such injury or death. . . . However, each shall give to the 
other reasonable notice and opportunity to join in the making of 
such claim or the instituting of an action and to be represented 
by counsel. . . . If notice is given as provided in this 
subsection, the liability of the tort-feasor shall be determined 
as to all parties having a right to make claim.  
No. 95-2942 
 
3 
Service, 
and 
CNA 
Insurance 
Companies 
(collectively 
Page) 
claiming that Page was negligent and seeking to recover the 
amount of the payments Threshermens made or will make to Gross 
as a result of her injury.  
¶3 
Gross was notified of Threshermens' lawsuit against 
Page but declined to actively participate in it.  She did not 
file 
an 
independent 
action 
against 
Page. 
 
Consequently, 
Threshermens joined Gross as an involuntary plaintiff in its 
complaint, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29.  In the course of 
pre-trial 
preparation, 
Threshermens included 
Gross on its 
witness list filed with the circuit court on June 21, 1995. 
¶4 
On September 25, 1995, Threshermens filed a motion to 
amend its pleadings.  Page opposed the motion, viewing it as 
Threshermens' attempt to assert a cause of action on behalf of 
the involuntary plaintiff Gross for recovery of pain and 
suffering 
and 
other 
damages. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Threshermens' motion to amend its complaint, and precluded 
Threshermens from offering any argument or evidence regarding 
Gross's pain and suffering.  Threshermens appealed this non-
final order. 
¶5 
The court of appeals reversed.  The court of appeals 
concluded that because it is undisputed that an employee can 
recover pain and suffering from a third party, the worker's 
compensation insurer must also be permitted to seek this amount 
even if the insurer did not pay those damages to the employee.  
No. 95-2942 
 
4 
We accepted Page's petition for review of the court of appeals' 
determination.3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶6 
This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1), a provision of the Wisconsin Worker's 
Compensation Act, to a set of undisputed facts.  Interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law which appellate courts review 
independently, aided by the analysis of the circuit court.  See 
Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 35, 43, 532 N.W.2d 130 
(1995).  "Where the statutory language is clear, no judicial 
rule of construction is permitted, and we must arrive at the 
intent of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary 
and accepted meaning."  Guyette v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 102 
Wis. 2d 496, 501, 307 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1981) (citing City of 
West Allis v. Rainey, 36 Wis. 2d 489, 496, 153 N.W.2d 514 
(1967)).  In Berna-Mork v. Jones, 174 Wis. 2d 645, 651, 498 
N.W.2d 221 (1993), this court held that the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1) is clear and unambiguous.  The statute clearly 
                     
3 Throughout the litigation Page has disputed Threshermens' 
allegations of negligence.  The only question presently before 
this court concerns Threshermens' ability to make a claim for 
Gross's pain and suffering. 
In addition to its ruling on pain and suffering, the court 
of appeals also concluded that Threshermens was entitled to make 
a claim against Page for future medical expenses that Gross 
might have and for which Threshermens might be liable as a 
result of this accident.  Counsel for Threshermens admitted at 
oral argument that neither party is challenging the court of 
appeals' decision regarding future medical expenses. 
No. 95-2942 
 
5 
grants an insurer the same right as an injured employee to make 
a claim or to maintain an action in tort.  See id.  
¶7 
A compensation insurer must establish three elements 
to recover damages under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  As this court 
set forth in Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 45, (1) the action must be 
grounded in tort; (2) the action must be one for the employee's 
injury or death; and (3) the injury or death must be one for 
which the employer or its insurer has or may have liability.  
The court of appeals determined that Threshermens had satisfied 
all three elements.  See Threshermens, 212 Wis. 2d at 7. 
¶8 
The court of appeals dispensed with the first two 
elements briefly.  There was no dispute that Threshermens has 
satisfied 
the 
first 
element. 
 
Threshermens' 
claim 
for 
reimbursement under the compensation statute is an action 
grounded "in tort."  Threshermens' complaint alleges that Page  
negligently maintained the parking lot at Gross's workplace.  
Second, Threshermens' claim is a claim "for the employee's 
injury."  The compensation insurer's suit is predicated on 
Gross's underlying claim for the injuries she received when she 
fell in her employer's parking lot, and is not apart from that 
claim.  See id. 
¶9 
Addressing the third element, the court of appeals 
relied on Kottka v. PPG Indus., 130 Wis. 2d 499, 511-15, 388 
N.W.2d 160 (1986), to conclude that pain and suffering damages 
fall within the category of claims to which Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) applies.  See Threshermens, 212 Wis. 2d at 7.  The 
court of appeals observed that Threshermens had complied with 
No. 95-2942 
 
6 
the notice provisions of ch. 102, and because the statute 
specifically provided that "the liability of the tortfeasor 
shall be determined as to all parties having a right to make a 
claim, and irrespective of whether or not all parties join in 
prosecuting such claim," Threshermens was entitled to seek 
recovery of Gross's pain and suffering.  Id. 
I. 
¶10 To adequately interpret and apply the statute at issue 
here, some background is helpful.  Under Wisconsin's Worker's 
Compensation Act, the benefit to an injured employee, like the 
benefit for the work-related death of an employee, does not 
compensate only for lost earnings. 
 
Instead, the . . . benefit [for injury] is part of an 
all-pervasive legislative scheme which attempts to 
effect a compromise between the employer and the 
employee's competing interests by granting the worker 
a certain award in lieu of all common law remedies he 
may otherwise have had against the employer in 
exchange for abrogation of the employer's defenses.  
(Emphasis added.) 
Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d  at 48.  Likewise, the compromise abrogates 
any common law defenses, such as contributory negligence, that 
the employer or its insurer might raise.  
¶11 Under the compromise reached by the legislature, the 
sole liability of the employer or its insurer to the employee is 
liability under the Compensation Act.  Because the employer's 
liability is solely statutory, there is no common liability of 
the employer and a third-party tortfeasor to the injured 
employee, even though their concurring negligence may have 
No. 95-2942 
 
7 
caused the injury.  See Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Dean, 
275 Wis. 236, 241, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957). 
¶12 The statute also provides for claims against third 
parties when a person suffers a work-related injury.  The 
employee, the employer, the compensation insurer and/or any 
other representative of the injured employee can seek recovery 
against a third party. 
 
[T]he right of the employe, the employe's personal 
representative, or other person entitled to bring 
action, to make claim or maintain an action in tort 
against any other party for such injury or death . . . 
The employer or compensation insurer who shall have 
paid or is obligated to pay a lawful claim under this 
chapter shall have the same right to make claim or 
maintain an action in tort against any other party for 
such injury or death. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 102.29(1).  Once recovery is obtained from the 
third party, whether by settlement or court judgment, the 
statute dictates how the recovery is distributed.4 
¶13 The legislature enacted a distribution scheme that 
effects the original compromise underlying the Act.  See Nelson 
                     
4 The 
distribution 
formula 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) 
provides for the following calculation: 
After deducting the reasonable cost of collection, one-
third of the remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured 
employe or the employe's personal representative or other person 
entitled to bring action.  Out of the balance remaining, the 
employer, 
insurance 
carrier 
or, 
if 
applicable, 
uninsured 
employers fund shall be reimbursed for all payments made by it, 
or which it may be obligated to make in the future . . . Any 
balance remaining shall be paid to the employe or the employe's 
personal representative or other person entitled to bring 
action.  
No. 95-2942 
 
8 
v. Rothering, 174 Wis. 2d 296, 303, 496 N.W.2d 87 (1993).  The 
scheme 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) 
specifies 
a 
reasonable 
apportionment 
of 
proceeds 
between 
the 
parties 
involved.  
Specifically, the statutory formula ensures that the employee 
receives at least one-third of any third-party proceeds after 
costs of collection, and that "the compensation insurer be 
reimbursed as fully as possible from the remainder of the sum 
collected, with any balance going to the employee."  Id. 
¶14 Although the employer's or compensation insurer's 
recovery rights under the statute are often referred to as 
rights of subrogation, they are not.  We recognized in Nelson, 
174 Wis. 2d at 306, that reimbursement under the Act was not a 
matter of equity.  The court of appeals has commented on the 
differences between common law subrogation principles and the 
reimbursement avenues available to employers and insurers under 
the Act on several occasions.  See, e.g., Campion v. Montgomery 
Elevator Co., 172 Wis. 2d 405, 493 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1992), 
and Martinez v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 132 Wis. 2d 11, 390 N.W.2d 72 
(Ct. App. 1986).  In Campion, the court of appeals concluded 
that the rights granted by Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) are distinct 
from subrogation, and even though the employee must be given 
notice and opportunity to join the action, he or she is not a 
necessary party.  See 172 Wis. 2d at 412-13.  Accordingly, the 
joinder rules under Wis. Stat. § 803.03(2) apply to common law 
subrogation, but not to the statutory reimbursement under 
§ 102.29(1).  In Martinez, the court of appeals held that the 
common law rules of subrogation do not apply to worker's 
No. 95-2942 
 
9 
compensation.  See 132 Wis. 2d at 16.  In particular, the 
insurer's right of reimbursement under § 102.29(1) supersedes 
the employee's right to be "made whole" and is not contingent 
upon the size of the third-party settlement agreement.  See id. 
at 15-16. 
¶15 Page raises four arguments as to why Threshermens 
ought not be permitted to make a claim for Gross's pain and 
suffering in this third-party action, when Gross has declined to 
participate.  Those arguments can be summarized as follows: 1) 
Threshermens can only raise claims for damages for which it has 
legal liability under the Act; 2) Threshermens can only claim 
Gross's pain and suffering if Gross voluntarily participates in 
the lawsuit; 3) pain and suffering damages are personal to the 
injured employee and cannot be claimed in her absence; and 4) 
because the statute of limitations has run on any claim against 
Page that Gross might make, a claim for her pain and suffering 
is extinguished.5  We will address each argument in turn. 
II. 
                     
5 Page's briefs are confusing to the extent that they mix 
the terms "claim" and "recover" and "reimburse."  We do not take 
Page to dispute that Threshermens' ultimate reimbursement, 
regardless 
of 
the 
various 
damage 
categories 
Threshermens 
presents against Page, can never amount, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1), to more than Threshermens has paid or will pay 
Gross.  See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 4.  ("It (the Act) does 
not give the employer/workers compensation insurer the right to 
expand its claim, ostensibly for the benefit of someone else, 
with the real objective of increasing the possible award from 
which it can draw reimbursement . . ."  Petitioner's Brief at 3; 
see also, "the law forbids any recovery beyond the amount of 
such payments, because any such recovery would result in an 
unjust enrichment to the insurer.") 
No. 95-2942 
 
10
¶16 Page first argues that Threshermens cannot bring a 
claim for Gross's pain and suffering because a compensation 
insurer may only seek reimbursement for those amounts it has or 
had legal liability to pay.  Page contends that our statutory 
interpretations in Kottka and Johnson dictate this result.  Page 
asks us to limit Kottka, which allowed the surviving spouse to 
recover the employee's pain and suffering damages, to cases 
where pain and suffering claims are brought directly by the 
employee or his or her estate.  Page also asserts that Johnson 
explicitly restricted a compensation insurer's cause of action 
to reimbursement for payments it made or will make because of 
the liability imposed upon it by the Worker's Compensation Act. 
¶17 More specifically, Page argues that the statutory 
scheme for worker's compensation does not impose liability upon 
the employer or compensation insurer for the employee's pain and 
suffering.  Awards under the Act, according to Page, only 
compensate for medical bills and lost wages.  Page contends that 
there is no authority to suggest that the legislature intended 
to make payment for pain and suffering an element of the 
employer's or worker's compensation insurer's liability. 
¶18 Threshermens, however, asserts that an insurer is 
entitled to share in all claims flowing from the employee's 
compensable injury.  Because Gross's pain and suffering clearly 
flowed from her work-related injury, according to Threshermens, 
the worker's compensation insurer can also share in that claim. 
 Threshermens relies on Kottka and Nelson to support this 
assertion. 
No. 95-2942 
 
11
¶19 Threshermens 
regards 
as 
mere 
"semantics" 
Page's 
contention 
that 
recovery 
for 
pain 
and 
suffering 
is 
not 
contemplated by the worker's compensation statutory scheme.  
Threshermens points out that in a jury trial, the jury is not 
asked to award temporary total disability or permanent partial 
disability.  Those terms are particular to the worker's 
compensation system.  Instead, Threshermens asserts that the 
injured worker's loss for pain and suffering is encompassed 
within the worker's compensation indemnity award.  
¶20 To resolve this question, we look first to the 
language of the statute itself.  The language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) does not segregate claims against a third party 
which may only be asserted by the injured employee, and those 
which may be asserted by the employer or compensation insurer.  
"The employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid or is 
obligated to pay a lawful claim under this chapter shall have 
the same right to make claim or maintain an action in tort 
against any other party for such injury or death."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) (emphasis added).  The right to "make a claim or 
maintain an action in tort . . . for such injury or death" under 
this statute is afforded to both the employer or compensation 
insurer as well as to the "employe, the employe's personal 
representative or other person entitled to bring action."  Id.  
This particular provision, titled "Third party liability," 
affords rights to proceed in tort against a third party.  This 
subsection 
does 
not 
address 
the 
employer's 
or 
insurer's 
responsibility for compensation to the employee under ch. 102. 
No. 95-2942 
 
12
¶21 Further, we disagree with Page's attempt to partition 
out pain and suffering from Gross's other damages.  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
102.29(1) 
not 
only 
allows 
the 
insurer 
to 
seek 
reimbursement for what it has paid the injured employee, but is 
also designed to be the single opportunity to present claims 
arising 
from 
the 
employee's 
injury. 
 
Although 
insurer 
reimbursement under this statute is not subrogation in the 
common law sense, the principle that the tortfeasor should not 
escape liability for the damage he or she has caused still 
applies.  If we were to uphold Page's position, the alleged 
tortfeasor would benefit by avoiding any liability for Gross's 
pain and suffering simply because the compensation insurer, and 
not Gross, filed the lawsuit.  
¶22 One commentator agrees that this section of the Act 
"preserves to an employer or compensation insurer, the same 
right possessed by an employee to bring suit against a third-
party whose negligence caused injuries to the employee.  The 
employer and compensation insurer therefore, have the right to 
maintain an action where the employee fails or refuses to bring 
it."  Suel O. Arnold, Third Party Actions and Products 
Liability, 46 Marq. L. Rev. 135, 136 (1962). 
¶23 Case law is consistent with this plain language 
interpretation.  In Kottka, the wife of an employee who later 
died from his work-related injuries sought to exclude payment of 
her husband's pain and suffering damages from the allocable 
settlement amount.  The wife asserted that her husband's claim 
for pain and suffering "was not a 'claim' within the meaning of 
No. 95-2942 
 
13
Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) because it was not a 'claim for 
compensation against an employer' or a claim 'for injury or 
death.'"  Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 512.   
¶24 In Kottka, we did not read the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) to define a category of employee claims beyond the 
scope of that section.  See 130 Wis. 2d at 514.  In other words, 
that section does not segregate certain claims which the 
employee may make from those which the employer or its insurer 
may make against the third-party tortfeasor.  Some potentially 
confusing language in Kottka follows: "Our construction gives 
full 
effect 
to 
the 
legislative 
scheme 
of 
the 
Worker's 
Compensation Act because it permits all parties with an interest 
in employe tort claims related to workplace injury or death to 
prosecute these claims against third parties and to share in the 
proceeds, but does not permit employers or their insurers to 
invade claims which belong to the employe only."  Id.  Page 
asserts that the italicized language from Kottka demands that an 
insurer such as Threshermens cannot bring a claim for the 
injured employee's pain and suffering.  We disagree with this 
interpretation. 
¶25 That language from Kottka, when viewed in context with 
the language preceding and immediately following it, can only 
mean that the insurer is not permitted to recover pain and 
suffering damages awarded against a third party when that 
recovery would result in a reimbursement of more than the 
insurer paid or is liable to pay the injured employee as 
compensation under the Act.  There is no doubt of this 
No. 95-2942 
 
14
interpretation by the Kottka court, because it continued, 
"[C]onstruing sec. 102.29(1), Stats., in this manner comports 
with '. . . the prevailing rule in the United States [which] 
refuses to place an employee's third-party recovery outside the 
reach of the employer's lien on the ground that some or all of 
it was accounted for by damages for pain and suffering,'" citing 
2A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 74.35, p.14-476.  
Id. 
¶26 Our interpretation of the statute in Kottka is 
compatible 
with 
our 
holding 
in 
Nelson. 
 
In 
Nelson 
we 
concentrated on the types of damages which flow from the injury. 
 There, even though the insurer had originally denied coverage 
for the particular injury, the court determined that damages 
flowing from the compensable injury were recoverable against the 
tortfeasor, and subject to distribution under the Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1).  See Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 305. 
¶27 The rationale of Nelson can be applied to damages for 
pain and suffering.  Pain and suffering as a result of a work-
related injury clearly flow from that injury.  Page does not 
dispute that Gross herself would be entitled to claim pain and 
suffering as damages.  Nowhere does the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) distinguish between claims the injured employee can 
bring and claims that the employer or compensation insurer can 
bring.  Further, while the Act's scheme for payment of benefits 
following a work-related injury does not include "pain and 
suffering" as a specific item of compensation to the injured 
employee, the degree of physical pain  sustained by the injured 
No. 95-2942 
 
15
worker is certainly a factor in the determination of the level 
of disability and thus disability payments accorded the worker: 
 
EVALUATION OF PERMANENT DISABILITY  The evaluation of 
disability in an injured or ill worker is a necessary 
part of the patient's treatment, and as such is a 
combination of both art and science.  The final rating 
of the patient's disability should be the personal 
opinion of the doctor. . . .  Some elements of 
disability, such as range of motion, can be measured 
with some degree of objectivity. . . .  Other elements 
of disability are more subjective and less capable of 
being measured precisely.  Pain is a good example.  
There is no question that pain can be disabling.  Pain 
is not easily measured, and judgement (sic) is 
required. . . . 
Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Division, Dept. of Workforce 
Development Publication WKC-7761-P (R.01/96), How to Evaluate 
Permanent Disability, 1.6  The handbook goes on to cite 
guidelines in the evaluation of pain, at p.2: 
 
Grading of Pain as a Subjective Symptom . . . 
Moderate:  When the examination reveals the definite 
evidence of a pathological state of the involved 
structures that would reasonably produce the degree of 
pain indicated to be present.  This degree of pain 
might require treatment and could be expected to 
contribute in a minor degree to permanent physical 
impairment. 
The Wisconsin Administrative Code also refers to the place of 
pain in overall rating and compensation for workplace-derived 
disabilities: 
 
1.  The disabilities set forth in this section are the 
minimums for the described conditions.  However, 
findings of additional disabling elements shall result 
                     
6 This handbook was recently cited by this court in Hagen v. 
LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 12, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997).  
No. 95-2942 
 
16
in an estimate higher than the minimum.  The minimum 
also assumes that the member, the back, etc., was 
previously without disability.  Appropriate reduction 
shall be made for any preexisting disability.  Note:  
An example would be where in addition to a described 
loss of motion, pain and circulatory disturbance 
further limits the use of an arm or a leg.  A 
meniscectomy in a knee with less than a good result 
would call for an estimate higher than 5% loss of use 
of the leg at the knee.  The same principle would 
apply to surgical procedures on the back. 
Wis. Admin. Code DWD 80-32 (ILHR 180.32) (Dec. 1997).7 
¶28 Page also relies on Smith v. Long, 178 Wis. 2d 797, 
505 N.W.2d 429 (Ct. App. 
1993) 
for 
his 
assertion 
that 
Threshermens has no liability to Gross for her pain and 
suffering, and therefore cannot include those damages in its 
suit against Page.   Smith considered whether a compensation 
insurer could seek reimbursement from a settlement reached 
between the injured employee and a lawyer sued by the injured 
employee for legal malpractice for failure to bring a third-
party tort action in a timely manner. 
¶29 Smith actually lends support to our conclusion that 
Threshermens has met all three elements necessary to seek 
reimbursement from Page.  In Smith, the injured employee sought 
to recover from his lawyer not for the work-related injury, but 
for the lawyer's failure to protect Smith's legal rights.  
                     
7 See our conclusion in Shymanski v. Industrial Commission, 
274 Wis. 307, 314, 79 N.W.2d 640 (1956), that "[n]o allowances 
can be made in a compensation award for physical or mental 
suffering, however acute, which does not interfere with earning 
capacity," clearly indicating that compensation awards that take 
into account physical or mental suffering which does interfere 
with earning capacity are allowable under the Act.    
No. 95-2942 
 
17
Accordingly, the compensation insurer had no liability for legal 
malpractice claims.  What the compensation insurer must have, to 
satisfy the third element, is "liability for the injury."  
Smith, 178 Wis. 2d at 806.  There is no dispute that 
Threshermens has liability to Gross as a result of her work-
related injury.  Indeed, Threshermens has already made some 
payment to Gross based on the injuries she sustained in her 
employer's parking lot. 
¶30 Finally, just three years ago this court decided a 
case applying the three elements identified in Kottka.  A spouse 
of a decedent worker brought a wrongful death action against 
several third parties after recovering death benefits from her 
husband’s worker’s compensation insurer.  See Johnson, 193 
Wis. 2d 35.  The circuit court approved distribution of that 
portion of the settlement proceeds paid to the estate for pain 
and 
suffering, 
and 
burial 
expense, 
but 
did 
not 
approve 
distribution of those proceeds paid to the spouse for loss of 
consortium or pecuniary damages.  See id. at 40-41.  The insurer 
appealed, asserting that pecuniary damages recovered by a 
surviving spouse from a third-party settlement are subject to 
distribution.  See id. 
¶31 This court rejected the surviving spouse’s theory that 
her pecuniary damage claim against the third parties was not 
subject to allocation under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  See 193 
Wis. 2d at 46-47.  We held that all three Kottka elements were 
satisfied, because the compensation insurer paid a death benefit 
based upon the decedent employee’s wages and the statutory 
No. 95-2942 
 
18
payment formula under the Act.  This payment satisfied the third 
element, namely, that the insurer had liability for the 
employee’s death.  See id. at 47.  We reached this conclusion, 
despite the surviving spouse’s argument that the compensation 
insurer did not have liability for a “wrongful death” claim.  
See id.  In order to receive reimbursement from a third-party 
tortfeasor, the employer or compensation insurer need only have 
liability under the Act.  Specific liability under another 
statute, 
or 
common 
law 
claim, 
is 
not 
necessary 
for 
reimbursement.  See id. at 47-48, explaining Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d 
at 515. 
¶32 The plaintiff spouse in Johnson tried to parse the 
elements of recovery under the Act as distinct from elements of 
recovery available in a civil suit for personal injury or 
wrongful death.  See Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 48-49.  Mrs. 
Johnson argued that the statutory death benefit used only the 
deceased employee’s earnings as a factor, and thus the insurer 
only had liability for those lost earnings, and similarly could 
only be reimbursed from amounts she recovered from the third 
party for lost earnings.  We disagreed, concluding that the 
statutory death benefit does not compensate only for lost 
earnings, but is part of an overall scheme, effecting “a 
compromise between the employer and the employee’s competing 
interests by granting the worker a certain award in lieu of all 
common law remedies he may otherwise have had against the 
employer in exchange for abrogation of the employer’s defenses  
Id. at 48 (citations omitted). 
No. 95-2942 
 
19
¶33 Similarly, Threshermens had liability under the Act 
for Gross's injuries.  Even though amounts awarded under the Act 
are labeled “total temporary disability” or “permanent partial 
disability,” those awards do not only compensate for lost 
earnings.   Instead, those awards are part of the scheme by 
which the injured worker receives an award “in lieu of all 
common law remedies.”  Id. at 48.  
¶34 The rationale behind Kottka, Nelson, and Johnson 
convinces us that despite the historical musings of the dissent, 
our opinion today in no way undermines the original policy 
decisions reached in enacting the Worker's Compensation Act.  
Our conclusion does not recognize any new category of liability 
of the employer or insurer under the Act.  We simply recognize 
that an injured employee's physical pain has always been a 
factor in calculating the rating level of disability, upon which 
impairment of earning capacity is established. 
III. 
¶35 Page asserts that it makes a difference whether or not 
Gross, the injured employee, participates in the suit against 
Page.  Page points to Nelson, Holmgren v. Strebig, 54 Wis. 2d 
590, 196 N.W.2d 655 (1972), and Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, 
Inc., 260 Wis. 341, 51 N.W.2d 53 (1952), as supporting recovery 
for pain and suffering only where the injured worker directly 
participates in the third-party lawsuit.  Because Gross has 
declined active participation in Threshermens' suit, Page argues 
that Threshermens is precluded from claiming as damages Gross's 
pain and suffering.  Page admits that had Gross filed the suit, 
No. 95-2942 
 
20
or agreed to participate in Threshermens' suit, a claim for her 
pain and suffering would be proper. 
¶36 Threshermens reads both Kottka and Johnson to mean 
simply that if the worker has or at one time had a claim against 
a third-party tortfeasor, the compensation insurer can share in 
any award or settlement resulting from the worker's claim.  If 
there are claims for which the compensation insurer has no 
liability because they are outside the worker's compensation 
statutory context, such as a spouse's claim for loss of 
consortium, the insurer may not recover.  See Kottka, 130 
Wis. 2d at 521; Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 46.  Threshermens also 
contends that both parties share in the damages recovered from a 
third party, regardless of their joinder.   See Employers Mut. 
Liability Ins. Co. v. Icke, 225 Wis. 304, 309, 274 N.W. 283 
(1937).  
¶37 The court of appeals has answered the question 
presented here, though without lengthy analysis.  In Employers 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 2d 540, 
541, 388 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1986), the question presented was 
whether the employer's compensation carrier had standing to 
bring an action on behalf of injured employees in a third-party 
suit under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  Based on a plain reading of 
the statute, the court held that the compensation insurer had 
the same right as the employees to make a claim against the 
third party for the employees' injury or death.  See id. at 542. 
 The court of appeals was not dissuaded by the fact that the 
employees did not join in the prosecution of the action, or 
No. 95-2942 
 
21
declare an intent to share in the proceeds before the statute of 
limitations would have expired.  See id. at 543.  Because the 
insurer had authority to file the claim on behalf of the 
employees and the action was timely filed, the court concluded 
that the other eligible parties could share in the recovery 
according to the statutory formula.8  
¶38 The statute allows the employer, or its compensation 
insurer, to seek reimbursement from the third-party tortfeasor 
when either the injured employee or his or her representative 
files suit against the tortfeasor, or when the employer or 
insurer commences such an action.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).9 
                     
8  Although not specifically referenced in the opinion, the 
complaint upheld by the court of appeals included claims for the 
injured employees' pain and suffering following an explosion and 
fire at the workplace.  See Defendant-Appellant's  Brief at App. 
106, Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 131 
Wis. 2d 540, 388 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1986). 
9 The dissent laments as "inequitable" the fact that an 
injured employee who has accepted worker's compensation benefits 
but has declined to bring a third-party action "is forced to 
join [this] action and parade her pain and suffering so that the 
insurance company can be reimbursed from that pain and suffering 
award . . ."  Dissenting op. at 9-10.  The dissent states that 
even without the injured worker as a party, however, the insurer 
can still maintain an action for reimbursement for benefits 
which it paid under the Act. See id.  This is certainly true.  
But the dissent overlooks the nature of proof at trial on a tort 
claim: whatever the categories of damages sought by the insurer 
or employer, that plaintiff will have to prove the existence of 
a duty, a breach of duty, causation, and damages.  Gross's 
testimony, whether or not she is a party, is relevant not just 
to damages but to other elements of the negligence claim against 
Page.  Accordingly, Threshermens included Gross on its witness 
list 
filed 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
three 
months 
before 
Threshermens sought to amend the complaint to add a claim for 
pain and suffering.    
No. 95-2942 
 
22
IV. 
¶39 Next, Page asserts that a claim for pain and suffering 
is personal to the employee.  Because such damages are personal, 
Page asserts that no one but the employee can claim them.  
Citing Kottka, Page contends that there are some damages for 
which the insurer or employer cannot seek reimbursement, because 
the statute "does not permit employers or their insurers to 
invade claims which belong to the employee only."  130 Wis. 2d 
at 514.  As discussed earlier, we do not read Kottka to prevent 
an employer or its insurer from making a claim for the injured 
employee's pain and suffering.  Kottka only prevents the 
employer or insurer from recovering any more than its statutory 
compensation liability, even when there is recovery against the 
third party for pain and suffering.10 
V. 
¶40 During the course of this appeal, the statute of 
limitations11 ran on any claim Gross herself could have made to 
                     
10 The dissent mistakenly concludes that employers or 
compensation insurers may 
not 
independently 
pursue 
claims 
against third-party tortfeasors for the injured employee's pain 
and suffering based on equitable principles.  Dissenting op. at 
9-10.  As already noted, however, reimbursement under the 
Worker's Compensation Act is not a matter of equity, but a 
matter of statutory right.  See Nelson v. Rothering, 174 Wis. 2d 
296, 306, 496 N.W.2d 87 (1993).    
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.54 Injury to the person.  The 
following actions shall be commenced within 3 years or be 
barred: 
(1) An action to recover damages for injuries to the 
person.  
No. 95-2942 
 
23
recover her pain and suffering damages from Page.  Page thus 
asserts that only Gross could have made a claim for her pain and 
suffering, and because the statute of limitations has expired, 
Gross's cause of action for pain and suffering is completely 
extinguished.  Page cites Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 
211 N.W.2d 834 (1973) as support for this restriction.  The 
Heifetz court stated that "[i]n Wisconsin the running of the 
statute of limitations not only bars recovery but it completely 
extinguishes the party's cause of action."  61 Wis. 2d at 124.  
Page contends that the term "full amount of the employe's 
damages" as used in Nelson, refers only to those causes of 
action the employee actually owns and has asserted.  Here, Gross 
has not only not asserted a claim for her pain and suffering, 
but she is now foreclosed from doing so by her own inaction and 
by declining to join Threshermens' suit.  According to Page, 
Gross's only remaining right is the statutory right under Wis. 
Stat. § 102.29(1), to share in the proceeds of the money 
recovered by Threshermens for claims for which Threshermens has 
or may have liability under the Act.  
¶41 As part of this argument, Page contends that to allow 
Threshermens to subvert the statute of limitations on Gross's 
claim for pain and suffering would be unfair to alleged third-
party tortfeasors.  Such subjective damages are harder to prove, 
and defending parties need formal and seasonable notice of the 
claims against them.  Page also asserts that the employee, who 
waived her opportunity to sue for these damages, would be 
No. 95-2942 
 
24
unjustly enriched if the insurer could obtain those damages for 
her.  
¶42 A similar argument was rejected by the court of 
appeals in Guyette, 102 Wis. 2d 496.  In Guyette, the court of 
appeals held that an injured employee's filing of suit tolled 
the statute of limitations on the compensation insurer's claim. 
 See id. at 501.  The compensation insurer had already provided 
the employee with notice of its intent to participate in any 
proceeds the employee recovered from the tortfeasor.  The 
Guyette court, interpreting the plain meaning  of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1), held that the statute required that an employer or 
compensation insurer be reimbursed from proceeds obtained from a 
third party, even when the employer or insurer has not joined 
the action or filed their own lawsuit.  See id.  To hold 
otherwise would eviscerate that part of the statute because 
employers and compensation insurers would be forced to file or 
join 
a 
lawsuit 
to 
protect 
their 
statutory 
right 
to 
reimbursement.  See id.12   
¶43 Threshermens asserts that the liability of a third-
party tortfeasor should not be reduced merely because the 
injured worker has chosen not to participate in the suit, when 
                     
12  The court in Guyette v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 102 
Wis. 2d 496, 307 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1981) also endorsed a law 
review article, concluding that the decision in Heifetz v. 
Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973) was not 
controlling on this question.  Heifetz was distinguishable on 
its facts because it involved common law subrogation rights, and 
not 
the 
statutory 
distribution 
formula 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.29(1). 
No. 95-2942 
 
25
the alleged tortfeasor has received adequate notice of the 
claim.  No language in the statute evinces a legislative intent 
to preclude such liability of the alleged tortfeasor, based upon 
the worker's refusal to participate.  In fact, the statutory 
language  providing that "liability of the tortfeasor shall be 
determined as to all persons having a right to bring a claim, 
irrespective of whether they joined suit" on its own, imposes no 
timeliness restriction on any person "having a right to bring a 
claim" other than the named plaintiff.  Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1). 
¶44 Further, the statutory notice "is the only condition 
precedent to participation in the distribution" of proceeds in 
an action under Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  Employers Mut., 131 
Wis. 2d at 540 n.1.  As the Employers Mut. court observed, the 
required notice did not have to be provided prior to the running 
of any statute of limitations.  See id. at 544.  Some 
commentators have read Employers Mut. to mean that "[b]y the 
express terms of section 102.29(1), when the requisite notice is 
timely given, the entire cause of action against the third party 
is considered and resolved."  Donald H. Piper and David M. 
Victor, Problems in Third-Party Action Procedure Under the 
Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Act – An Update, 77 Marq. L. 
Rev. 489, 498 (1994). 
¶45 We agree that such a rationale naturally includes 
presentation of the claim for pain and suffering.  There is no 
dispute that Gross received notice of Threshermens' lawsuit 
against 
Page. 
 
Therefore, 
she 
may 
participate 
in 
the 
No. 95-2942 
 
26
distribution, including recovery of an amount for pain and 
suffering, if proven. 
¶46 We are not persuaded by Page's argument that because 
Gross is an involuntary plaintiff, her claim for her pain and 
suffering is  "extinguished."  Wisconsin Stat. 102.29(1) directs 
that Gross, as the injured employee, must receive a portion, and 
perhaps the majority, of any recovery Threshermens obtains from 
Page.  If Gross's claim were extinguished merely by her own 
inaction, Threshermens would have no obligation to share its 
recovery from Page with Gross.  Such a circumstance would 
clearly contravene the statutory language.  Further, we see no 
meaningful lapse of the statute of limitations.  Threshermens 
filed its original complaint, and moved to amend its complaint, 
within the limitations period for personal injury actions.  Even 
though Gross herself did not initiate suit, her claim for pain 
and suffering flowing from the work-related accident is not 
extinguished.  See Employers Mut., 131 Wis. 2d at 543-44: 
 
[T]he fact that the employees did not join in the 
prosecution of the action, or state their intent to 
share in the proceeds, within the period of the 
statute of limitations is inconsequential.  There is 
no question that the action was commenced within the 
limitation period, and . . . sec. 102.29(1), Stats. is 
silent on time limits for the employees to take action 
to join the action or lay claim to a share of the 
proceeds . . .  The employees' damage claims were 
advanced in an action which was properly and timely 
commenced by a party with the authority to do so.  As 
long as the action is filed within the appropriate 
limitation period, the other eligible parties may 
share in the recovery according to the statutory 
formula . . . as long as they give notice of their 
intention to do so prior to trial.  It is immaterial 
No. 95-2942 
 
27
that the statute of limitations may have run before 
they announce that intention.   
¶47 Page’s claims of lack of notice and unfairness are 
unwarranted and contrary to the plain language of the statute.  
Threshermens timely filed its motion to amend the pleadings to 
include pain and suffering.  The Nelson court, 174 Wis. 2d at 
306, reaffirmed the mandatory nature of the legislative formula 
for apportioning proceeds of a third-party settlement in a claim 
for reimbursement for worker's compensation payments: 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that applying sec. 102.29(1), 
Stats., does not require a determination of the 
equities 
involved 
but 
rather 
a 
mathematical 
application 
of 
the 
legislative 
formula 
for 
apportioning the settlement proceeds.  The legislature 
could have mandated a different result here had it so 
desired.  Absent such legislation, however, the courts 
of this state are not free to select a method they 
might consider to be the most equitable for allocating 
the proceeds of a particular third-party settlement. 
¶48 Our statements in Nelson, consistent with the court of 
appeals' discussions in Campion and Martinez, demonstrate that 
common law rules for equitable subrogation do not apply to 
third-party tort actions arising from worker's compensation 
claims.  
¶49 Page's arguments all seem to ignore the fact that 
under the distribution formula of Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1), even 
if a worker's compensation insurer makes a claim for the injured 
employee's pain and suffering, the insurer will never be 
reimbursed an amount above the amount it paid to the injured 
employee.  The ability to assert a claim for the injured 
employee's pain and suffering only means that the insurer may 
No. 95-2942 
 
28
come closer to receiving a full reimbursement for the amount it 
paid.  Any recovery by the insurer will not surpass its 
liability.  What the compensation insurer claims, and what it 
may recover under the statute are two different things. 
¶50 In light of our conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) 
permits the employer or compensation insurer to claim the 
injured employee's pain and suffering in an action against the 
third-party tortfeasor, we need not address Threshermens’ last 
argument.  Threshermens argues that it may claim Gross's pain 
and suffering because such damages are part of the "cushion" to 
which 
the 
worker's 
compensation 
insurer 
is 
entitled, 
particularly in cases where the insurer is liable for potential 
future medical expenditures of the injured worker.  Any need for 
a cushion, according to Page, is taken care of by the insurer's 
opportunity 
to 
prove 
such 
need 
at 
trial 
and 
to 
seek 
reimbursement for any such anticipated expenses from the third-
party tortfeasor.  See Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 515; Sutton v. 
Kaarakka, 168 Wis. 2d 160, 165-66, 483 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
¶51 While 
Page 
asserted 
at 
oral 
argument 
that 
the 
complaint contains no allegation of Gross's "personal claims," 
amending the complaint to permit Threshermens to seek pain and 
suffering is not the same as proving those damages.  That burden 
will continue to rest on Threshermens.  A claim for pain and 
suffering will not necessarily result in a "runaway" verdict, as 
Page asserted at oral argument.  Even if Threshermens alleges 
and proves that Gross endured a substantial amount of pain and 
No. 95-2942 
 
29
suffering, Threshermens will never recover more than it has paid 
or will be liable to pay Gross under the statute.  After costs 
and reimbursement of Threshermens' outlay, Gross herself will be 
the recipient of any supposed "runaway" amount of damages. 
¶52 Page suggested that if Threshermens is entitled to 
claim Gross's pain and suffering, that there will be no logical 
stopping point.  We disagree.  Under the statute, the employer 
or compensation insurer is entitled to assert those claims that 
the injured employee would be able to assert against the third-
party tortfeasor. The employer or compensation insurer cannot 
assert claims belonging to someone else.  See, e.g., Kottka, 130 
Wis. 2d at 521 (holding that claim for loss of consortium is 
"personal" to the injured employee's spouse). Thus, Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1) mandates that the "stopping point" is what the 
injured employee or his or her estate can claim. 
 
¶53 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Worker's 
Compensation Act does not prohibit a worker's compensation 
insurer from seeking reimbursement from an alleged third-party 
tortfeasor for the payments it has or will make to the employee 
by claiming all of the worker's damages flowing from the work-
related injury including pain and suffering. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
95-2942.awb 
 
1 
¶54 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).  As we celebrate 
the sesquicentennial of the statehood of Wisconsin and reflect 
upon the history of this state, I am reminded of the significant 
role that Wisconsin played in the development of worker's 
compensation law.  Wisconsin pioneered the development of that 
law and was one of the first states in the nation to enact such 
legislation.  This unique legislation represented a compromise 
between the worker and the employer. Because the majority's 
opinion 
changes 
the 
terms 
of 
that 
initial 
compromise, 
misinterprets case law and related statutory language, and 
arrives at an inequitable result, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶55 As 
the 
twentieth 
century 
began 
and 
industrial 
expansion accelerated, participants in the American workplace 
faced an  ongoing question: who should bear the financial burden 
attendant upon the injury or death suffered by a worker in the 
course of employment?  At that time the status quo answer was 
that the worker generally bore the burden.  While the employer 
might occasionally be exposed to liability, it could often 
escape, 
or 
at 
least 
significantly 
delay, 
financial 
responsibility through the use of common law doctrines such as 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 
¶56 However, 
starting 
in 
1910, 
the 
allocation 
of 
responsibility for industrial accidents began to change as 
Wisconsin and other states began passing worker's compensation 
legislation.  See, e.g., ch. 50, Laws of 1911, codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 2394 (1911).  As this court noted in 1911: 
 
95-2942.awb 
 
2 
The legislature, in response to a public sentiment 
which cannot be mistaken, has passed a law which 
attempts to solve certain very pressing problems which 
have arisen out of the changed industrial conditions 
of our time.  It has endeavored by this law to 
provide . . . a system by which every employee . . . 
may receive at once a reasonable recompense for 
injuries accidentally received in his employment under 
certain fixed rules, without a lawsuit and without 
friction . . . . [The employer] can never be mulcted 
in heavy damages, and will know whenever an employee 
is injured practically just what must be paid for the 
injury." 
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 337, 354, 133 N.W. 209 
(1911).  See also Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 
106, 110, 114-15, 171 N.W. 935 (1919).  Thus, the legislature 
imposed a compromise between the interests of the employer and 
those of the employee.  See Manitowoc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
273 Wis. 293, 77 N.W.2d 693 (1956); Nelson v. Rothering, 174 
Wis. 2d 296, 302, 496 N.W.2d 87 (1993). 
 
¶57 As part of the compromise, the worker's compensation 
law created a no-fault liability system in which injured 
employees 
are 
guaranteed 
"certain 
and 
speedy 
financial 
assistance," for economic loss and disability, even where the 
employer is not at fault.  Nelson, 174 Wis. 2d at 302.  In 
exchange for this guarantee, employers are exempted from the 
exposure to "heavy damages" and are subject only to the 
exclusive remedy requirements of the worker's compensation laws. 
 See Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W.2d 24 
(1952); Wis. Stat. § 2394-4 (1911); Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2)(1995-
96). 
95-2942.awb 
 
3 
¶58 Pain and suffering is one form of damages not included 
in the statutory financial responsibility placed upon the 
employers of injured workers.  See Wis. Stat. § 2394-9 (1911); 
Wis. Stat. § 102.42 (1995-96).  Accordingly, the worker's 
compensation law bars employees from asserting general claims 
for pain and suffering against their employers.  See Shymanski 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 274 Wis. 307, 314, 79 N.W.2d 640 
(1956)("No allowance can be made in a compensation award for 
physical or mental suffering, however acute, which does not 
interfere with earning capacity."); Kosak v. Boyce, 185 Wis. 
513, 522, 201 N.W. 757 (1925)(general pain and suffering "not 
compensable 
under 
the 
workmen's 
compensation 
act"); 
Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the 
Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers' 
Compensation Systems, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 865 (1992)("By the 
very 
nature 
of 
the 
workers' 
compensation 
compromise, 
compensation is not available for pain and suffering."). 
¶59 The majority opinion changes the terms of that initial 
compromise.  By citing to Shymanski, the majority states that 
pain and suffering which interferes with earning capacity is 
compensable under the Act.  Majority op. at 16 n.7.  However, it 
does not, because it cannot, cite to any authority which asserts 
that the general pain and suffering normally recoverable in a 
tort action is compensable under the Act.  Pain and suffering 
recoverable in this tort action includes "mental anguish, 
apprehension, discomfort or sorrow."  Wis. JI-Civil 1855.  
Compensating for suffering which includes apprehension and 
95-2942.awb 
 
4 
sorrow is a concept foreign to worker's compensation law.  
Indeed, limiting the exposure of the employer for such tort 
recoveries was part of the initial compromise which was the very 
foundation of worker's compensation law.  It is that part of 
this history and foundation which the majority opinion today 
negates. 
¶60 It is against this historical background that I 
conclude that the majority misinterprets our prior decisions and 
related statutory language.  If viewed in the absence of 
historical 
context, 
I 
acknowledge 
that 
the 
majority's 
interpretations 
may 
be 
reasonable. 
 
However, 
given 
the 
ambiguities of the language of the cases and the statute, there 
is an alternative interpretation that is more reasonable because 
it is consistent with the underpinnings of Wisconsin worker's 
compensation law. 
¶61 The majority concedes that Kottka v. PPG Industries, 
130 Wis. 2d 499, 388 N.W.2d 160 (1986), the primary case upon 
which it relies in arriving at its conclusion, contains "some 
potentially confusing language."  Majority op. at 13.  It is in 
the interpretation of that "potentially confusing language" 
where I part from the majority. 
¶62 In Kottka an injured worker brought a tort action, 
including a demand for pain and suffering, against a third-party 
tortfeasor.  His wife joined the suit alleging loss of 
consortium.  After the worker's death, his widow settled the 
claims.  In approving the settlement, the circuit court 
allocated the award between the wife and the employer contrary 
95-2942.awb 
 
5 
to the formula required by Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1).  Instead, the 
court distributed the loss of consortium award to the widow, but 
credited the remainder of the settlement, including the monies 
for pain and suffering, against the employer's liability for 
future payments under the worker's compensation law.  See id. at 
502. 
¶63 The widow appealed the inclusion of the pain and 
suffering award in the employer's credit.  After reversing the 
circuit court's failure to follow the statutory formula, this 
court applied Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) and stated that Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.29(1): 
 
does not define a category of employe claims which is 
beyond the scope 
of 
this section. . 
. 
. Our 
construction gives full effect to the legislative 
scheme of the Worker's Compensation Act because it 
permits all parties with an interest in employe tort 
claims related to workplace injury or death to 
prosecute these claims against third parties and to 
share in the proceeds, but does not permit employers 
or their insurers to invade claims which belong to the 
employe only. 
Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 514 (emphasis added). 
¶64 In interpreting Kottka, the majority concludes that 
this language:  
 
can only mean that the insurer is not permitted to 
recover pain and suffering damages awarded against a 
third party when that recovery would result in a 
reimbursement of more than the insurer paid or is 
liable to pay the injured employee as compensation 
under the Act. 
Majority op. at 13.  This part of the majority's interpretation 
is simply incorrect.  There is no potential for windfall to an 
95-2942.awb 
 
6 
insurer under Wis. Stat. § 102.29.  After the insurer is 
reimbursed for actual amounts paid, the employee receives the 
balance and it is from that balance that the employer is given a 
"cushion" or credit for future payments for which it may be 
liable.13 
¶65 I submit that the conflict inherent in the language of 
Kottka is resolved by reading the language of the case in the 
context of the case.  The court in Kottka addressed the 
circumvention of the required Wis. Stat. § 102.29 statutory 
distribution formula.  It was not a case where an employer filed 
an independent action.  Instead, the employer benefited from the 
lawsuit filed by the injured worker.  Thus, while Kottka states 
that the employer could receive a portion of the worker's pain 
and suffering award, Kottka and its statutory interpretation 
have a different starting point than the inquiry facing the 
court here. 
                     
13  Moreover, the majority's attempts to incorporate pain 
and suffering into a worker's actual disability award are 
unpersuasive.  It is true that when physicians are evaluating 
the degree of disability of an injured worker they consider the 
degree of physical pain and suffering sustained by the worker.  
See Wisconsin Worker's Compensation Division, Dep't of Workforce 
Development Publication WKC-7761-P (R.01/96), How to Evaluate 
Permanent Disability, 1.  The degree of disability of a worker 
is established by determining the level of physical impairment 
of 
function 
based 
on 
the 
physical 
injury 
as 
well 
as 
consideration of the extent pain prevents the full use of the 
damaged body part.  Thus, while pain and suffering is considered 
in 
the 
context 
of 
determining 
the 
degree 
of 
functional 
disability, the injured worker's actual pain and suffering is 
not compensated in the ultimate disability award. 
95-2942.awb 
 
7 
¶66 Viewing Kottka in this light, it is apparent that 
where injured employees are successful in suits against third-
party tortfeasors, there is no "category of employe claim which 
is beyond the scope" of the allocation formula.  However, where 
injured employees do not voluntarily bring suit asserting their 
pain and suffering, the statute will not allow employers "to 
invade claims which belong to the employe only."  Pain and 
suffering is a claim personal to the injured worker.  It is a 
claim for which the employer has no liability under the worker's 
compensation law.  The employer here should be barred from 
pursuing it absent the voluntary participation of the injured 
worker.  This proposition is apparent from the language of the 
statute. 
¶67 The majority begins its statutory analysis with the 
incorrect assumption that the language of Wis. Stat. § 102.29 is 
unambiguous for the purposes of this case, based on Berna-Mork 
v. Jones, 174 Wis. 2d 645, 651, 498 N.W.2d 221 (1993).  While 
Berna-Mork did declare Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) unambiguous, it 
did so in the context of evaluating whether the statute allowed 
contract claims by employers against third parties.  See Berna-
Mork, 174 Wis. 2d at 651.  Pointing to the language "an action 
in tort" in the statute, the Berna-Mork court correctly found 
Wis. Stat. § 102.29 unambiguous in its disallowance of contract 
actions.  See id. 
¶68 However, this case presents the court with a different 
question of statutory interpretation.  The court must consider 
whether the statute allows employers to bring pain and suffering 
95-2942.awb 
 
8 
actions against third-party tortfeasors on their own initiative 
when the employer has not been, and under the terms of the 
worker's compensation law cannot be, held responsible for the 
injured worker's pain and suffering.  Having reviewed the 
statute, I find it ambiguous in this regard and reach a result 
at odds with that of the majority. 
¶69 Wis. Stat. § 102.29(1) indicates in pertinent part: 
 
The making of a claim for compensation against an 
employer or compensation insurer for the injury or 
death of an employe shall not affect the right of the 
employe . . . to make a claim or maintain an action in 
tort against any other party for such injury or death 
. . . .  The employer or compensation insurer who 
shall have paid or is obligated to pay a lawful claim 
under this chapter shall have the same right to make 
claim or maintain an action in tort against any other 
party for such injury or death . . . . 
¶70 I part company with the majority in interpreting the 
word "claim" in the phrase "[t]he employer or compensation 
insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to pay a lawful 
claim under this chapter . . . ."  In essence, the difference is 
that I interpret the word "claim" more narrowly than does the 
majority.  In contrast, the majority implicitly, but without 
discussion, defines the word "claim" as used in this phrase to 
mean a general claim. 
¶71 A "lawful claim" under this chapter cannot be a claim 
for general pain and suffering.  The purpose of the statute is 
to allow the employer or compensation insurer to pursue 
reimbursement for claims which they were "obligated to pay."  As 
noted above, in worker's compensation law there is no claim for 
95-2942.awb 
 
9 
pain and suffering which includes mental anguish, apprehension, 
discomfort or sorrow that the employer or compensation insurer 
is "obligated to pay." 
¶72 Again, I acknowledge that if viewed in the absence of 
the historical context, the majority's interpretation may be 
reasonable.  However, both the language indicated above and the 
underpinnings of the Worker's Compensation Act convince me that 
the legislature did not intend to grant employers the right to 
sue third-party tortfeasors for pain and suffering absent 
voluntary participation of the injured worker.   
¶73 My conclusion that the majority misinterprets our 
prior decisions and related statutory language is buttressed by 
equitable principles.  If worker's compensation benefits are 
paid for permanent disability and a third party is held liable, 
it is equitable for the insurance company to be reimbursed for 
those benefits.  If worker's compensation benefits are paid for 
temporary disability and a third party is held liable, it is 
equitable that the insurance company be reimbursed for those 
benefits.  Likewise, if the insurer pays medical expenses or 
funeral expenses, it is equitable that it be reimbursed.  All of 
those benefits are claims "for which the employer or its insurer 
has or may have liability" under the Worker's Compensation Act. 
 Johnson v. ABC Ins. Co., 193 Wis. 2d 35, 45, 532 N.W.2d 130 
(1995). 
 
¶74 In Kottka the court concluded that where an injured 
party brings an action against a third party and receives a pain 
and suffering award, an employer may be reimbursed out of the 
95-2942.awb 
 
10
pain and suffering recovery.  See Kottka, 130 Wis. 2d at 514.  
Such a conclusion may be equitable.  But here, where the injured 
party declines to bring a third-party action and is forced to 
join an action and parade her pain and suffering so that the 
insurance company can be reimbursed from that pain and suffering 
award, it is not equitable. 
 
¶75 Even without the injured party, under the current law 
the insurance company is free to still maintain an action to 
seek reimbursement for benefits for which it had actual 
liability to pay under the Worker's Compensation Act.  However, 
under current law, the insurance company could not get dollar-
for-dollar reimbursement unless it was able to get reimbursement 
out of the plaintiff's pain and suffering award.  This result is 
the consequence of the Wis. Stat. § 102.29 formula which 
provides that the injured party receives one-third of the 
proceeds prior to any reimbursement to the insurer.  Perhaps 
what needs to be done is to enact legislation so that the 
insurance company has the ability to seek dollar-for-dollar 
reimbursement when the injured party declines to pursue a third-
party action.  That route is preferable to the avenue chosen by 
the majority. 
¶76 There are reasons why injured persons may not want to 
start a lawsuit.  Perhaps they do not want to sue the person who 
may be held liable.  Likewise, it may be undesirable for them to 
have to tell the details of their personal suffering to others. 
 Two examples illustrate the inequity of forced participation. 
95-2942.awb 
 
11
¶77 Consider the logger who borrows a chain saw from his 
father, who is not his employer.  The father modified safety 
features on the saw for ease of use and then fails to warn his 
son.  In the course of his employment the son injures himself 
because of the lack of safeguards on the saw and subsequently 
dies.  His wife receives death benefits.  She has no desire to 
sue her father-in-law for causing the death of his son.  Yet, 
she can be forced to participate in such an action so that the 
insurer can claim reimbursement out of the pain and suffering 
award. 
¶78 An injured worker may also lack the desire to bring a 
suit because he does not want to display the details of his 
personal suffering.  He sustains a work-related injury and as a 
result experiences severe depression.  As a consequence of that 
depression he receives in-patient psychiatric treatment and 
subsequently divorces his wife and is estranged from his 
children.  While the injured worker can be required to be a 
witness on liability issues, he may have little desire to parade 
the details of the most personal events of his life in front of 
a jury in the form of his pain and suffering claim.  Yet, under 
the majority's interpretation he can be forced to participate so 
that the insurer can receive reimbursement out of his pain and 
suffering. 
 
¶79 The majority forces surviving spouses to participate 
in lawsuits and compels injured workers to display pain and 
suffering so that the insurance company has the potential to 
obtain a hundred cents on the dollar reimbursement.  Such forced 
95-2942.awb 
 
12
participation 
is 
inequitable. 
 
It 
has 
the 
potential 
to 
revictimize the victim. 
¶80 In sum, two reasonable interpretations of case law and 
statutory authority are available in this case.  The majority's 
interpretation is inconsistent with the historical underpinnings 
of worker's compensation law, the second is not.  The majority's 
interpretation has the potential of revictimizing the victim, 
the other does not. 
¶81 I opt for the interpretation that continues the terms 
of that initial bargain reached in 1911.  That interpretation 
does not force unwilling parties into displaying pain and 
suffering in order to have the insurer get reimbursed out of an 
item of damages that it did not pay and was not legally 
obligated to pay.  Accordingly, I dissent.