Title: State v. Feinstein
Citation: 338 N.W.2d 244
Docket Number: C7-83-530
State: Minnesota
Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: September 16, 1983

338 N.W.2d 244 (1983) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Claude David FEINSTEIN, Appellant. No. C7-83-530. Supreme Court of Minnesota. September 16, 1983. *245 Robert G. Davis, Jr., Minneapolis, for appellant. Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. AMDAHL, Chief Justice. This is a sentencing appeal that raises the issue of whether Minn.Stat. § 609.346, subd. 1 (1982), mandates not only the imposition but also the execution of a 3-year minimum term in the case of a second or subsequent sex offender under sections 609.342 to 609.345. The trial court concluded that it had no choice but to execute the sentence in such a case even though the court believed that the defendant was particularly unamenable to imprisonment and particularly amenable to treatment in a probationary setting. See State v. Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461 (Minn.1981). However, the court felt that there was enough doubt about the issue that it stayed execution of the sentence pending appeal on the understanding that during the pendency of the appeal defendant would be confined at St. Peter and would participate in the Intensive Therapy Program for Sexual Offenders. We hold that the statute in question mandates only the imposition, not the execution, of a 3-year minimum term and we therefore remand for resentencing. In interpreting minimum sentence statutes, the presumption is that probation is an authorized dispositional alternative. State v. Childers, 309 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. 1981). One case illustrating this point is State v. Zaitz, 254 N.W.2d 381 (Minn.1977). In that case the statute in question, Minn. Stat. § 609.11 (1971), read as follows: Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1 (1971), then read as follows: In holding that probation was an authorized dispositional alternative, we stated, "This statute did not specifically exclude defendant from consideration for probation, and Minn.Stat. § 609.135 authorizes the trial court to stay imposition or execution of sentence in all cases except when life imprisonment is required by law." 254 N.W.2d at 382. *246 In State v. Moose, 266 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1978), the issue was whether the 1976 version of section 609.11 barred the court from placing a defendant on probation. We held that it did not. Section 609.11 at that time set forth the mandatory minimum term and then said that persons sentenced to such a term "shall not be eligible for parole until [they] shall have served the full minimum sentence herein provided, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 242.19, 243.05, 609.12 and 609.135." We ruled that section 609.11 did not bar the trial court from considering probation pursuant to section 609.135. Subsequently, section 609.135 was amended to bar the trial court from considering probation in cases covered by section 609.11. In State v. Jonason, 292 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1980), we ruled that as a result of the amendment trial courts were no longer free to stay execution of minimum terms mandated by section 609.11. In State v. Childers, 309 N.W.2d 37 (Minn.1981), the issue was whether execution of sentence was mandated by Minn. Stat. § 152.15, subd. 1(2) (1980), which states that a person who commits a second drug offense "shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years or a fine not more than $30,000, or both." We noted that Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1 (1980), which was amended in 1977 to specifically prohibit probation in certain cases for which section 609.11 provides minimum terms, read: Following the approach of the Zaitz and Moose cases, we concluded that the trial court had discretion to place the defendant on probation. We said: Finally, in State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn.1982), we held that the current version of section 609.11 which allowed for sentencing in certain cases without regard to the mandatory term law if the prosecutor moved for it violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. We conceded that the power to prescribe punishment for violation of the criminal laws rests with the legislature. We also conceded that if the legislature mandates a minimum sentence without a stay of execution or imposition, the courts have no authority to stay execution or imposition. However, we distinguished the present version of section 609.11 and ruled that the legislature, having granted authority to the courts to sentence without regard to the mandatory minimum term provisions of section 609.11 in certain situations, could not condition that authority on a discretionary act of the prosecutor. In the instant case the minimum terms statute, section 609.346, subd. 1, reads as follows: Section 609.135 provides: Section 609.346, subd. 1, requires that the trial court "commit the defendant to the Commissioner of Corrections" for a minimum term of 3 years. When a trial court sentences a defendant to 3 years in prison and then stays execution of sentence, the court has fully complied with the requirement of this section. This interpretation is consistent with the rule that in interpreting minimum sentence statutes the presumption is that probation is an authorized dispositional alternative. It is also consistent with our decisions in Zaitz, Moose and Childers. In conclusion, then, we interpret section 609.346, subd. 1, as requiring only the imposition, not the execution, of the minimum term in question. Remanded for resentencing.