Title: Ex parte Sabrina Johnson et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In ( 352 ) re: Champion Home Builders Company; Champion Homes of Boaz, Inc.; and Homes of Merit, Inc. v. Sabrina Johnson et al.)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1061760
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 16, 2008

rel:  05/16/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1061760
_________________________
Ex parte Sabrina Johnson et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Champion Home Builders Company; Champion Homes of
Boaz, Inc.; and Homes of Merit, Inc.
v.
Sabrina Johnson et al.)
(Dale Circuit Court, CV-07-900026)
_________________________
1061762
_________________________
The separate actions were assigned to the same trial
1
judge.
2
Ex parte Lamar Jenkins et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  CMH Manufacturing, Inc., and Clayton Homes, Inc.
v.
Lamar Jenkins et al.)
(Geneva Circuit Court, CV-07-900003)
On Applications for Rehearing
LYONS, Justice.
This Court's opinion of January 25, 2008, is withdrawn,
and the following is substituted therefor.  
Champion Home Builders Company; Champion Homes of Boaz,
Inc.; Homes of Merit, Inc.; CMH Manufacturing, Inc.; and
Clayton Homes, Inc., all mobile-home manufacturers and sellers
(hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "the
mobile-home companies"), instituted two separate declaratory-
judgment actions in separate judicial circuits  against
1
certain mobile-home owners who had previously instituted
arbitration proceedings before the American Arbitration
Association ("the AAA"), seeking to prevent the homeowners
1061760; 1061762
3
from proceeding with claims before the AAA brought on behalf
of other similarly situated mobile-home owners.  The
homeowners' AAA proceedings sought class arbitration in
Montgomery County for a class of Alabama mobile-home owners.
After filing the declaratory-judgment complaints in the
Dale Circuit Court and the Geneva Circuit Court, the mobile-
home companies asked the AAA and the law firm representing the
homeowners in the AAA proceedings to stay those proceedings,
which were being conducted in Montgomery County, pending the
disposition of the declaratory-judgment actions.  Those
requests were denied, and the mobile-home companies filed
motions in their separate declaratory-judgment actions asking
the trial judge to stay the AAA proceedings in Montgomery
County.  The trial judge granted the mobile-home companies'
motions, and the homeowners petitioned this Court for a writ
of prohibition or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus.  We
grant the petitions and issue the writs of mandamus.  
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Case no. 1061760
We first address the declaratory-judgment action brought
in the Dale Circuit Court by Champion Home Builders Company;
1061760; 1061762
4
Champion Homes of Boaz, Inc.; and Homes of Merit, Inc. ("the
Dale mobile-home companies").  
Sabrina Johnson, William Baker, Corine Crittenden, Albert
Fritzke, Faye Fritzke, Larry Hutto, Sheila Hutto, Huey Nelson,
and Cynthia Nelson ("the Dale homeowners") filed their
complaint in arbitration with the AAA on December 22, 2006,
asserting various claims relating to allegedly improper design
and manufacture of mobile homes they had purchased.  The Dale
homeowners requested that the AAA permit arbitration of claims
on behalf of a class of "thousands of [Alabama] homeowners who
unwittingly purchased manufactured homes built by [the mobile-
home companies] that were fundamentally defective for the
jurisdictions in which they lived," and they alleged that
"[t]he walls of their homes are literally rotting away as a
result of a pervasive defect in their construction that [the
mobile-home companies] have known about but failed to
correct."  Dale homeowners' petition at 6; arbitration
complaint at 2.  
On May 8, 2007, the Dale mobile-home companies commenced
their declaratory-judgment action in the Dale Circuit Court
against the Dale homeowners.  The Dale mobile-home companies
1061760; 1061762
5
asked the trial court to declare that the Dale homeowners must
individually 
arbitrate 
their 
previously 
instituted 
arbitration
claims in accordance with the arbitration provision of each
mobile-home company's contract, a provision that contains a
forum-selection clause that requires arbitration to take place
in the jurisdiction of the original retail sale of the mobile
home; to declare the Dale homeowners' previously instituted
class-action arbitration complaint to be contrary to Alabama
law, impermissible, and a breach of the contracts between the
Dale mobile-home companies and the Dale homeowners; and to
compel the Dale homeowners to arbitrate their claims
individually in the correct jurisdiction.  
The 
Dale 
mobile-home 
companies 
state 
in 
their
declaratory-judgment complaint that the arbitration agreement
contained in the contracts executed by Johnson, Crittenden,
and the Nelsons ("the Dale contract 1") provides:
"ARBITRATION AND LIMITATION OF REMEDIES.  It is
agreed that any controversy, claim or dispute
between 
or 
among the Manufacturer, homeowner,
independent dealer, finance company or any other
person or entity arising from or relating to the
Manufactured Home, its sale, transportation, setup,
repair, installation, use, design, manufacture,
financing, insurance, any other condition, the
manufacturer's limited warranty, any contract or any
alleged 
promise, 
representation, 
agreement 
or
1061760; 1061762
The 
Dale 
mobile-home 
companies 
allege 
in 
their
2
declaratory-judgment complaint that the Dale homeowners never
made any attempt to mediate their disputes before they filed
their arbitration complaint.  The Dale homeowners state in
their petition for the writ of mandamus that the parties
participated in mediation after the declaratory-judgment
complaint was filed but that they were unable to resolve their
disputes.  
6
instrument relating to or delivered in connection
with the Manufactured Home, or any alleged breach
thereof, and any claim based on or arising from an
alleged tort or claim of any kind whatsoever,
including any claim relating to the validity of this
arbitration and limitation of remedies provision
[collectively 'Claim(s)'], and if the Claim(s)
cannot be resolved through direct discussion or
negotiations, the Claim(s) first shall be mediated
as 
administered 
by 
the 
American 
Arbitration
Association under its Commercial Mediation Rules
before 
resorting 
to 
binding 
arbitration.[ ]
2
Thereafter, any unresolved Claim(s) shall be settled
by binding arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association in accordance with its
Commercial Arbitration Rules, and any judgment on
the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be
entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.
...  All mediation or arbitration proceedings shall
be conducted in the jurisdiction of the original
retail sale or at any other place selected by
agreement of all parties."
The Dale mobile-home companies further state in their
declaratory-judgment complaint that "[t]he operative language
of the Arbitration Agreements provided to the remaining
defendants 
[Baker, 
the 
Fritzkes, 
and 
the 
Huttos] 
is
substantively the same [as the agreements provided to Johnson,
1061760; 1061762
7
Crittenden, and the Nelsons]."  Complaint at 5.  The materials
submitted in this mandamus proceeding by the Dale homeowners
and the Dale mobile-home companies include a document entitled
"Manufacturer's Limited Warranty & Arbitration Agreement."
Although the parties include this document as an exhibit
without identifying it further, it appears to be the
arbitration agreement provided to Baker, the Fritzkes, and the
Huttos ("the Dale contract 2").  This document provides:
"ARBITRATION AGREEMENT:  It is agreed that any
controversy, claim or dispute between or among the
Manufacturer, homeowner, 
independent 
dealer, 
finance
company or any other person or entity arising from
or relating to the Manufactured Home, its sale,
transportation, setup, repair, installation, use,
design, manufacture, financing, insurance, any other
condition, the manufacturer's limited warranty, any
contract or any alleged promise, representation,
agreement or instrument relating to or delivered in
connection with the Manufactured Home, or any
alleged breach thereof, and any claim based on or
arising from an alleged tort or claim of any kind
whatsoever, including any claim relating to the
validity of this arbitration and limitation of
remedies provision [collectively 'Claim(s)'], and if
the Claim(s) cannot be resolved through direct
discussion or negotiations,--and unless the parties
otherwise 
agree 
on 
a 
different 
mediation 
or
arbitration process--then the Claim(s) first shall
be 
mediated 
as 
administered 
by 
the 
American
Arbitration Association ('AAA') under its applicable
mediation 
Rules 
before 
resorting 
to 
binding
arbitration.  Thereafter, any unresolved Claim(s)
shall be settled by binding arbitration administered
by the AAA in accordance with its applicable
1061760; 1061762
8
arbitration Rules for such Claim(s), and any
judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s)
may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction
thereof.  The parties reserve their rights to
resolve the Claim(s) in an applicable small claims
court for disputes or Claim(s) within the scope of
the small claims court's jurisdiction.  ...  All
mediation 
or 
arbitration proceedings shall be
conducted in the jurisdiction of the original retail
sale or any other place selected by agreement of all
parties.  
"....
"A copy of the applicable Rules of the AAA is
available upon request by contacting the American
Arbitration Association [at an address or Web site
provided]."  
The Dale contract 1 specifically designates the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA as applicable to the pending
arbitration proceedings.  The Dale contract 2 designates "its
[the AAA's] applicable arbitration Rules" as applicable to the
pending arbitration proceedings.  None of the parties in case
no. 1061760 argues that the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the AAA do not apply to these proceedings.  
B. Case no. 1061762
We next address the declaratory-judgment action brought
in the Geneva Circuit Court by CMH Manufacturing, Inc., and
Clayton Homes, Inc. ("the Geneva mobile-home companies").   
1061760; 1061762
9
Lamar Jenkins, Patricia Jenkins, Robert Knighten, and
Sharon Tate ("the Geneva homeowners") filed their complaint in
arbitration with the AAA on December 22, 2006, asserting
various claims relating to allegedly improper design and
manufacture of mobile homes they had purchased.  Like the Dale
homeowners, the Geneva homeowners requested that the AAA
permit arbitration of claims on behalf of a class of
"thousands of [Alabama] homeowners who unwittingly purchased
manufactured homes built by [the mobile-home companies] that
were fundamentally defective for the jurisdictions in which
they lived," and they alleged that "[t]he walls of their homes
are literally rotting away as a result of a pervasive defect
in their construction that [the mobile-home companies] have
known about but failed to correct."  Geneva homeowners'
petition at 6; arbitration complaint at 1.  The Geneva
homeowners' initial arbitration complaint attached the wrong
contract and was rejected by the AAA, but on April 2, 2007,
the Geneva homeowners resubmitted the complaint with the
proper contract attached.  
On February 2, 2007, the Geneva mobile-home companies
commenced their declaratory-judgment action in the Geneva
1061760; 1061762
The Geneva homeowners filed with the AAA a notice of
3
dismissal without prejudice of their claims against Clayton
Homes, Inc., after the commencement of the Geneva County
action.  Clayton Homes states, however, in the response to the
Geneva homeowners' petition for a writ of mandamus, that it
has not yet been dismissed by the AAA.  
10
Circuit Court against the Geneva homeowners.  In the
complaint, Clayton Homes alleged that it was "making a special
appearance subject to and without waiving all objections as to
personal jurisdiction."   Declaratory-judgment complaint at 1.
3
The Geneva mobile-home companies asked the trial court to
declare that the arbitration provision in CMH's contracts with
the Geneva homeowners does not obligate them "to arbitrate
class claims"; to enjoin the Geneva homeowners from proceeding
with previously instituted class arbitration; to dismiss the
Geneva 
homeowners' 
previously 
instituted 
class-action
arbitration complaint; and to compel the Geneva homeowners to
proceed with individual arbitration according to the terms of
their contracts. 
The Geneva mobile-home companies state in their response
to the Geneva homeowners' petition that the arbitration
agreement contained in the contracts executed by the Geneva
homeowners ("the Geneva contract") provides:  
1061760; 1061762
11
"Any dispute or claim relating to your manufactured
home 
('Manufactured 
Home'), 
whether 
based 
in
contract, tort or otherwise, at the request of you
or CMH shall be resolved by BINDING ARBITRATION in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or any
more applicable or appropriate rules then in effect
and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et
seq.).  ...  All issues concerning whether or the
extent to which a dispute or claim is subject to
arbitration, 
including issues relating to the
enforceability of this section, shall be determined
by the arbitrator(s), or by a court of competent
jurisdiction without a jury.  If a dispute or claim
is not subject to arbitration, then such dispute or
claim shall be decided in a court of competent
jurisdiction WITHOUT A JURY.  ..."  
(Capitalization 
in 
original.) 
 
The 
Geneva 
contract
specifically designates the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the AAA as applicable to the pending arbitration proceedings.
None of the parties argues that the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the AAA do not apply to these proceedings, but the
Geneva mobile-home companies argue that the Geneva contract
does not exclusively incorporate the AAA rules. 
II. Standard of Review
The homeowners contend that the Dale Circuit Court and
the Geneva Circuit Court lack jurisdiction and authority to
stay the arbitration proceedings.  Consequently, they seek a
writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus
1061760; 1061762
This Court's standard of review applicable to a petition
4
for a writ of prohibition is similar to the standard of review
applicable to a petition for a writ of mandamus:
"'Like mandamus, prohibition is an
extraordinary writ, "and will not issue
unless there is no other adequate remedy."
Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.
Civ. 
App. 
1992) 
(citing 
Ex 
parte
Strickland, 401 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1981)).
"Prohibition is proper for the prevention
of a usurpation or abuse of power where a
court undertakes to act in a manner in
which 
it 
does 
not 
properly 
have
jurisdiction."  Ex parte K.S.G., 645 So. 2d
at 299.'
"Ex parte Sealy, L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 1230, 1232-33
12
from this Court directing the trial judge to vacate his orders
staying the arbitration proceedings and to dismiss the
declaratory-judgment actions brought by the mobile-home
companies.  Although the normal basis upon which this Court
reviews orders granting or denying arbitration is by way of
direct appeal, see Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., in this
proceeding, the homeowners' contention that the trial court
lacks 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
is 
appropriately 
reviewed 
by
way of a petition for a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte Flint
Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805 (Ala. 2000).  
This Court's standard of review applicable to a petition
for a writ of mandamus  is well settled:
4
1061760; 1061762
(Ala. 2004)."  
Ex parte Scrushy, 940 So. 2d 290, 293 (Ala. 2006). 
13
"'"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
and requires a showing that there is '(1)
a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"'  
"Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)."  
Ex parte Medical Assurance Co., 862 So. 2d 645, 649 (Ala.
2003).  
III. Analysis
The homeowners contend that because all the contracts in
these cases incorporate the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the AAA, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to decide
arbitrability in these cases.  A declaratory-judgment action,
they argue, must "settle a bona fide justiciable controversy,"
Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003),
and because these contracts incorporate the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA, thereby providing that questions
of arbitrability are reserved for the arbitrator, there is,
the homeowners contend, no case or controversy before the
1061760; 1061762
14
trial court.  The homeowners contend that the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA require that whether a dispute is
susceptible of class-action treatment must first be determined
by the arbitrator.  They state:  "An appropriate time to bring
an action to determine whether Alabama law prohibits class
arbitration is subsequent to an arbitrator's ruling that the
arbitration agreement does or does not allow class-wide
arbitration."  Dale homeowners' petition, p. 16; Geneva
homeowners' petition, p. 15.  
The Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA provide:
"R-1.  Agreement of Parties
"(a) The parties shall be deemed to have made
these rules a part of their arbitration agreement
whenever they have provided for arbitration by the
American Arbitration Association (hereinafter AAA)
under its Commercial Arbitration Rules or for
arbitration by the AAA of a domestic commercial
dispute without specifying particular rules.  These
rules and any amendment of them shall apply in the
form in effect at the time the administrative
requirements are met for a demand for arbitration or
submission agreement received by the AAA.  The
parties, 
by 
written 
agreement, 
may 
vary 
the
procedures set forth in these rules.  After
appointment of the arbitrator, such modifications
may be made only with the consent of the arbitrator.
"....
"R-7.  Jurisdiction
1061760; 1061762
15
"(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule
on his or her own jurisdiction, including any
objections with respect to the existence, scope or
validity of the arbitration agreement."
The Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations of the AAA
provide:
"3. Construction of the Arbitration Clause
"Upon 
appointment, 
the 
arbitrator 
shall
determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned,
partial final award on the construction of the
arbitration 
clause, 
whether 
the 
applicable
arbitration 
clause permits the arbitration to
proceed on behalf of or against a class (the 'Clause
Construction Award').  The arbitrator shall stay all
proceedings following the issuance of the Clause
Construction Award for a period of at least 30 days
to permit any party to move a court of competent
jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause
Construction Award.  Once all parties inform the
arbitrator in writing during the period of the stay
that they do not intend to seek judicial review of
the Clause Construction Award, or once the requisite
time period expires without any party having
informed the arbitrator that it has done so, the
arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration on the
basis stated in the Clause Construction Award.  If
any party informs the arbitrator within the period
provided that it has sought judicial review, the
arbitrator may stay further proceedings, or some
part of them, until the arbitrator is informed of
the ruling of the court.  
"In 
construing 
the 
applicable 
arbitration
clause, the arbitrator shall not consider the
existence of these Supplementary Rules, or any other
AAA rules, to be a factor either in favor of or
against permitting the arbitration to proceed on a
class basis."
1061760; 1061762
16
A. Case no. 1061760
The Dale mobile-home companies argue that as a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court has jurisdiction over
disputes involving the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts.  Rose v. Delaney, 576 So. 2d 232, 233 (Ala. 1991).
Relying on Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Wright, 897
So. 2d 1059, 1074 (Ala. 2004), they contend that this Court
"has specifically recognized declaratory judgment actions as
acceptable means for obtaining an order compelling arbitration
in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement."
Dale mobile-home companies' principal brief at 13.  They argue
that the trial court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce
the venue-selection clause in the arbitration agreements and
that the trial court, not an arbitrator, should decide whether
class arbitration is permitted under these agreements.  They
then argue that Alabama law prohibits class arbitration.  
We first address whether an arbitrator or a court is
authorized to decide the arbitrability of certain threshold
issues in this case, i.e., class-wide arbitration and the
effect of contractual provisions in the arbitration agreements
governing venue of individual arbitration claims in light of
1061760; 1061762
17
a contractual provision in those same agreements embracing
rules permitting class-wide arbitration.  This Court requires
a trial court to permit arbitration of the issue of
arbitrability "when the plain language of the agreement
unquestionably shows that the parties agreed to arbitrate the
issue of arbitrability."  Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.
2d 375, 379 (Ala. 2006).  We have held that "an arbitration
provision that incorporates rules that provide for the
arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability clearly and
unmistakably evidences the parties' intent to arbitrate the
scope of the arbitration provision."  CitiFinancial Corp.,
L.L.C. v. Peoples, 973 So. 2d 332, 340 (Ala. 2007).  
The Dale contract 1 specifically incorporates the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA; the Dale contract 2
incorporates the AAA's "applicable arbitration Rules" and, in
light of the absence of any argument to the contrary, we
construe the "applicable" AAA rules to be the Commercial
Arbitration Rules.  Consequently, both the Dale contract 1 and
the Dale contract 2 confer jurisdiction upon the AAA to make
an initial determination as to "whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on
1061760; 1061762
18
behalf of or against a class."  Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations of the AAA, Rule 3.  By agreeing to be bound by
the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules, the Dale homeowners
and the Dale mobile-home companies conferred upon the
arbitrator the authority to determine the scope of the
arbitration agreement as it relates to the availability of
class-wide arbitration.  
The Dale mobile-home companies contend that Rule 3 of the
AAA's Supplementary Rules applies only to purported class
members who signed their respective arbitration agreements
after October 8, 2003, the date upon which Supplementary Rule
3 was adopted.  They cite no authority for such a proposition;
moreover, the proposition conflicts with Rule 1(a) of the
AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules, which provides:  "These
rules and any amendment of them shall apply in the form in
effect at the time the administrative requirements are met for
a demand for arbitration or submission agreement received by
the AAA."  (Emphasis added.) 
The Dale mobile-home companies note that Supplementary
Rule 3 provides that, "[u]pon appointment, the arbitrator
shall determine ... whether the applicable arbitration clause
1061760; 1061762
See Gertz v. Allen, 376 So. 2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1979)
5
("Whether a provision in a contract is a condition precedent
is dependent, not upon formal words, but upon the intent of
the parties to be determined from the entire contract.");
Federal Ins. Co. v. I. Kruger, Inc., 829 So. 2d 732, 740 (Ala.
2002), quoting with approval Koch v. Construction Tech., Inc.,
924 
S.W.2d 
68, 
69 
(Tenn. 
1996) 
("'First, 
it 
is
well-established that condition precedents are not favored in
contract law, and will not be upheld unless there is clear
language to support them.'").  
19
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a
class."  They say, again without citation to authority, that
because no arbitrator has yet been appointed, Supplementary
Rule 3 is without a field of operation.  Assuming that the
appointment of an arbitrator creates a condition precedent to
be fulfilled rather than merely designates the stage of the
proceedings when the issue of class-wide arbitrability is to
be resolved,  the Dale mobile-home companies are estopped from
5
taking advantage of the fact that no arbitrator has yet been
appointed.  See World's Exposition Shows, Inc. v. B.P.O. Elks,
No. 148, 237 Ala. 329, 332, 186 So. 721, 724 (1939), in which
the Court quoted with approval 3 Williston on Contracts § 677:
"'It is a principle of fundamental justice that if a promisor
is himself the cause of the failure of performance, either of
an obligation due him or of a condition upon which his own
liability depends, he cannot take advantage of the failure.'"
1061760; 1061762
20
The Dale mobile-home companies' subjugation to the authority
of an arbitrator to resolve the issue of class-wide
arbitrability as provided through incorporation of the AAA's
Commercial 
Arbitration Rules 
or the AAA's "applicable
arbitration Rules" in the contracts between the parties has
not yet occurred because the mobile-home companies obtained a
stay of the proceedings, thereby preventing the appointment of
an arbitrator. 
For all that appears, the arbitrator, upon appointment,
will make a determination favorable to the mobile-home
companies.  Until such time as an arbitrator is appointed, any
attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment as to a hypothetical
future controversy is beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the circuit courts.  See Bedsole v. Goodloe, 912 So. 2d
508, 518 (Ala. 2005):
"The Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 6-6-220
through -232, Ala. Code 1975, 'does not "'empower
courts to ... give advisory opinions, however
convenient it might be to have these questions
decided for the government of future cases.'"'
Bruner v. Geneva County Forestry Dep't, 865 So. 2d
1167, 1175 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Stamps v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994)
(quoting in turn Town of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275
Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662 (1963)))
(emphasis added in Stamps).  This Court has
emphasized that declaratory-judgment actions must
1061760; 1061762
21
'settle a "bona fide justiciable controversy."'
Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Gulf South Conference v. Boyd,
369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979)).  The controversy
must be '"definite and concrete,"' must be '"real
and substantial,"' and must seek relief by asserting
a claim opposed to the interest of another party
'"upon a state of facts which must have accrued."'
Baldwin County, 854 So. 2d at 45 (quoting Copeland
v. Jefferson County, 284 Ala. 558, 561, 226 So. 2d
385, 387 (1969)). '"Declaratory judgment proceedings
will not lie for an 'anticipated controversy.'"'
Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing,
L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (quoting
City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., 738 So. 2d
903, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)).  Thus, if a
declaratory 
judgment 
would 
not 
terminate 
any
uncertainty or controversy, the court should not
enter such a judgment.  Bruner, 865 So. 2d at 1175.
"'"[J]usticiability 
is 
jurisdictional," 
Ex 
parte
State ex rel. James, 711 So. 2d [952,] 960 n.2 (Ala.
1998); hence, if necessary, "this Court is duty
bound to notice ex mero motu the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction."'  Baldwin County, 854 So. 2d
at 45 (quoting Stamps, 642 So. 2d at 945 n.2)."  
The United States Supreme Court recognizes a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration. 
"The [Federal] Arbitration Act establishes that, as
a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is
the construction of the contract language itself or
an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability."
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983) (footnote omitted).  That the contracts in
1061760; 1061762
22
this case call for an arbitrator to make the initial
determination "whether the applicable arbitration clause
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a
class" is ample reason for this Court to decline to rewrite
the agreements to suit the preference of one of the parties
for an immediate judicial determination.  Such indifference to
the unambiguous terms of a written agreement is contradictory
to settled principles of Alabama contract law.  See, e.g.,
Sloan Southern Homes, LLC v. McQueen, 955 So. 2d 401, 404
(Ala. 2006) ("'"A court may not make a new contract for the
parties or rewrite their contract under the guise of
construing it."'" (quoting Turner v. West Ridge Apartments,
Inc., 893 So. 2d 332, 335 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex
parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 35-36 (Ala.
1998))); Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. James River Corp. of
Virginia, 716 So. 2d 1172, 1178 (Ala. 1998) ("A broader
interpretation of the transaction would effectively rewrite
the contract to give the investors more than they bargained
for in an arm's-length transaction between sophisticated
parties."); and Ex parte Associates Commercial Corp., 423 So.
2d 195, 200 (Ala. 1982) ("The pivotal rule that lies at the
1061760; 1061762
23
core of this case is that which says no court can rewrite the
terms of a plain and unambiguous contract.").  We cannot
create unique rules of contract law applicable only to
arbitration agreements.  Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).  
The Dale mobile-home companies contend that a provision
in both of the Dale contracts limits the venue of any disputes
to the jurisdiction where the retail sale of the mobile home
occurred.  They insist that even if the trial court does not
have jurisdiction to make the initial determination as to
whether the arbitration may proceed on behalf of a class, the
trial court has jurisdiction to enforce the venue-selection
clause in the Dale contracts.  We note that Montgomery County
was the jurisdiction of the retail sale as to only two of the
nine Dale homeowners.  The Dale homeowners contend that the
venue provision is superseded by the availability of class-
wide treatment of the claims.  
The Dale mobile-home companies rely on Sterling Financial
Insurance Group, Inc. v. Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2004) ("[A] federal district court, pursuant to 9 U.S.C.
§ 4, has jurisdiction to enforce a forum selection clause in
1061760; 1061762
In proceedings 
before 
the 
arbitrator 
dealing 
with 
whether
6
class-wide arbitration is available in this case, the Dale
24
a valid arbitration agreement that has been disregarded by the
arbitrators.").  The Dale mobile-home companies also cite
Redman Home Builders Co. v. Lewis, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311
(S.D. Ala. 2007), in which the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama declined to limit
Sterling Financial to instances where an arbitrator has
previously disregarded the forum-selection clause.  This Court
is not bound by decisions of the United States Courts of
Appeals or the United States District Courts; moreover, we
conclude that Sterling Financial is distinguishable and that
the reasoning in Lewis is not persuasive.  Sterling Financial
authorizes a trial court to enforce a forum-selection clause
in an arbitration agreement if the clause has been disregarded
by an arbitrator, a situation that has not yet occurred, and
may not occur, in this case.  Lewis involved, as does this
case, a predicate issue, susceptibility to class-action
treatment, in which the venue issue is embedded, which issue
the parties have agreed to submit to an arbitrator initially
with a subsequent right of interlocutory review in a judicial
forum.   
6
1061760; 1061762
mobile-home companies can argue any inconsistency between the
venue provisions in the Dale contracts and the AAA's
Supplementary Rule 3 and then urge the supremacy of the venue
provisions in the arbitration agreements.  See Szuts v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831-32 (11th Cir. 1991).
25
Any attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the
venue provision in the Dale contracts is also a hypothetical
future 
controversy 
that 
is 
beyond 
the 
subject-matter
jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  See Bedsole v. Goodloe,
912 So. 2d at 518.   
B. Case no. 1061762
The Geneva mobile-home companies argue that the trial
court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, Ex
parte Textile Workers Union, 249 Ala. 136, 30 So. 2d 247
(1947), and that justiciable controversies exist here, i.e.,
whether the Geneva mobile-home companies are obligated to
arbitrate class claims and whether the court or an arbitrator
has the authority to decide the class-treatment issue.  The
Geneva mobile-home companies also argue that the Geneva
contract does not exclusively incorporate the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the AAA and that the Geneva contract
expressly provides for a trial court to interpret that
1061760; 1061762
26
contract.  They then argue that Alabama law prohibits class
arbitration.  
We first examine whether the Geneva contract incorporates
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.  The contract
provides that any "dispute or claim" is to be resolved by
arbitration "in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the
[AAA] or any more applicable or appropriate rules then in
effect."  The Geneva mobile-home companies argue that because
the Geneva contract does not incorporate the Commercial
Arbitration Rules exclusively, the parties "did not select in
advance the specific procedures that may be employed for their
arbitration."  Geneva mobile-home companies' principal brief
at 19.  The Geneva mobile-home companies do not suggest what
other "applicable or appropriate rules" might govern the
Geneva homeowners' dispute or claim.  They then argue:
"Although [the Geneva homeowners] may have chosen
the Supplemental Rules after a dispute arose, the
parties did not intend for those rules in particular
to apply when they entered into the [Geneva
contract].  Indeed, the Supplementary Rules did not
exist when Petitioner Sharon Tate entered into the
[Geneva contract].  They came into effect nearly
four months later."
Geneva mobile-home companies' principal brief at 19 (footnote
omitted).  
1061760; 1061762
27
As we pointed out in Section III.A. above, Rule 1(a) of
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA provides that the
AAA rules "and any amendment of them shall apply in the form
in effect at the time the administrative requirements are met
for a demand for arbitration ...."  We conclude that the
Geneva contract, by providing that any dispute or claim under
the Geneva contract is to be resolved by arbitration conducted
pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA "or
any more applicable or appropriate rules then in effect,"
incorporates the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules together
with the Supplemental Rules adopted on October 8, 2003.  We
have previously noted the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983).  That policy would not be served by
construing the Geneva contract as allowing some nebulous,
undefined, unnamed rules to govern instead of the specified
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA "then in effect."
Rule 1(a) does allow the parties, "by written agreement," to
"vary the procedures set forth in these rules."  No such
written agreement appears in the materials before us, and the
1061760; 1061762
28
Geneva mobile-home companies do not contend that any such
agreement exists.  
We view the reference to "any more applicable or
appropriate rules then in effect" as nothing more than an
acknowledgment of the parties' right to agree subsequently to
be bound by rules that they might later deem more applicable
or appropriate.  In the absence of any subsequent agreement,
we conclude that the Geneva contract specifically incorporates
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.  
The Geneva mobile-home companies also argue that the
Geneva contract "expressly provides that a party may choose a
court for the interpretation" of the contract.  Geneva mobile-
home companies' principal brief at 16.  Therefore, they argue,
they chose a "court of competent jurisdiction to determine
whether the class claims are subject to arbitration."  Geneva
mobile-home companies' principal brief at 17.  In insisting
that the Geneva contract allows either an arbitrator or a
court to interpret the contract, the Geneva mobile-home
companies rely on the following sentence in the Geneva
contract:  "All issues concerning whether or the extent to
which a dispute or claim is subject to arbitration, including
1061760; 1061762
29
issues relating to the enforceability of this section, shall
be determined by the arbitrator(s), or by a court of competent
jurisdiction without a jury."  This sentence is preceded by
the following sentence: 
"Any dispute or claim relating to your manufactured
home 
('Manufactured 
Home'), 
whether 
based 
in
contract, tort or otherwise, at the request of you
or CMH shall be resolved by BINDING ARBITRATION in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or any
more applicable or appropriate rules then in effect
and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et
seq.)."  
(Capitalization in original.)  Reading the two sentences in
context, the sentence upon which the Geneva mobile-home
companies rely simply allows the arbitrator or the court to
resolve disputes as to the extent to which the Geneva
homeowners' claims are subject to arbitration.  None of the
parties in this case dispute the susceptibility of the Geneva
homeowners' claims to arbitration.  The dispute here is
whether claims of other homeowners can be included in a class.
Consequently, the sentence in the Geneva contract that allows
an arbitrator or a court to determine whether a dispute or
claim is "subject to arbitration" simply does not support the
Geneva mobile-home companies' argument that the trial court,
1061760; 1061762
30
and not an arbitrator, is authorized to decide whether class-
wide arbitration applies to the Geneva homeowners' claims.  
Having concluded that the Geneva contract incorporates
the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA and that it does
not remove from an arbitrator the authority to decide the
issue of arbitrability, we hold that the Geneva contract, like
the Dale contracts, confers jurisdiction upon the AAA to make
an initial determination as to "whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on
behalf of or against a class."  Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations of the AAA, Rule 3.  For the reasons discussed in
Section III.A. above, the Geneva mobile-home companies and the
Geneva homeowners have conferred upon the arbitrator the
authority to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement
as it relates to the availability of class-wide arbitration,
and until such time as the arbitrator has made such a
determination, any attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment as
to a controversy is a hypothetical one that at this point is
beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court.
IV. Conclusion
1061760; 1061762
31
We express no opinion on the myriad defenses to class-
wide treatment of the claims and the venue of any such class-
wide proceeding pending before the AAA raised by the mobile-
home companies in the proceedings pending in the Dale and
Geneva Circuit Courts.  Such defenses must first be asserted
before the AAA pursuant to the arbitration agreements between
the parties.  The trial judge lacked jurisdiction to become
involved in this dispute over the susceptibility of the claims
to class-wide treatment in proceedings in Montgomery County in
the absence of a determination adverse to the mobile-home
companies in the proceedings before the AAA, an event that has
not, and may not, occur.  Because we hold that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction over these cases, they must be dismissed
rather than placed on the trial court's administrative docket,
as the mobile-home companies argue is more appropriate.  A
controversy that is not justiciable implicates subject-matter
jurisdiction, 
and 
a 
court 
that 
lacks 
subject-matter
jurisdiction has no power to take any action other than to
dismiss the action; any other action it takes is void.  Ex
parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., [Ms. 1060078, July 20, 2007]
___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007).  
1061760; 1061762
32
We conclude that under the facts of this case a writ of
mandamus is the appropriate remedy by which to order a vacatur
of the trial judge's void orders.  Because we have no basis on
which to conclude that the trial court will not comply with
our mandate, we decline to issue the alternative writs of
prohibition.  We direct the trial court to vacate its orders
staying the proceedings before the AAA and to enter an order
of dismissal in each action.  
1061760--APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF JANUARY 25,
2008, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT
ISSUED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
1061762--APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF JANUARY 25,
2008, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; PETITION GRANTED; WRIT
ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.