Title: Longshore v. City of Hoover
Citation: 454 So. 2d 954
Docket Number: N/A
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: July 13, 1984

454 So. 2d 954 (1984)
Leslie R. LONGSHORE and HBC Investments
v.
The CITY OF HOOVER, etc., et al.
82-728.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 13, 1984.
*955 Douglas Corretti of Corretti &amp; Newsom, Birmingham, for appellants.
Jack H. Harrison of Harrison &amp; Jackson, Birmingham, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This is a zoning case. Plaintiffs, Leslie R. Longshore and HBC Investments, filed a complaint in circuit court seeking a judgment holding that the actions of the City of Hoover and its city council, in denying a petition to rezone Longshore's property, were unconstitutional and invalid. After various proceedings, including a remand to the city council, the trial court denied relief.
Longshore owns, and HBC Investments has an option to purchase, a 1.3 acre parcel of real property located at the southwest corner of the intersection of Lorna Road and Woodmeadow Drive in the City of Hoover. Longshore and HBC (hereinafter Longshore)[1] applied to the Hoover Planning and Zoning Commission for a change in the zoning classification of the property from R-1 (single family residential) to C-P (preferred commercial). Longshore had plans to build an office building on the property.
The Commission denied the request on November 12, 1979. Longshore took his request to the city council, which held a public meeting on the question on February 4, 1980. A number of area residents were present and objected to the change. The request was tabled until March 17, when at another meeting of the city council there was more discussion and the council voted unanimously to deny the request. Longshore filed his complaint in circuit court on May 8, 1980.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the city council's refusal to rezone the property was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful, had "no conceivable relationship to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the City of Hoover, Alabama, or its inhabitants," constituted "a taking of the plaintiffs' property without due process of law," and that the zoning ordinance "in its application to plaintiff's [sic] property is, therefore, unconstitutional and confiscatory." It also alleged that the proposed use of the property as an office building "will not unduly and unreasonably change the present pattern of the surrounding neighborhood, nor create undue traffic burden or hazard."
Defendants, the City of Hoover and its mayor and council members, filed an answer denying the averments of the complaint and averring that the question of whether the property should be rezoned
The answer also stated that the testimony presented at the public hearings indicated that the rezoning "would, in fact, create a tremendous traffic burden and hazard."
The court held a trial without a jury, after which it entered an interim decree on August 17, 1981. That decree noted that evidence was presented to the court which was not before the city council. The decree continued,
The decree instructed the city council to elect whether to re-hear Longshore's petition and stated that if the council did so elect, notice should go out to adjoining property owners and Longshore should present substantially the same evidence as he did at trial. The city council elected to re-hear the petition and did so at its meeting on November 3, 1981. At that meeting there was substantial testimony for and against the proposed rezoning. The council adopted an ordinance rezoning the property to R-4 (multi-family use).
Longshore filed an amended complaint on October 8, 1982, challenging the council's decision to rezone the property to R-4. The city filed an answer to the amended complaint. Longshore then filed a second amended complaint, alleging that one of the council members who participated in the public hearing, Hank Blackmon, owned property near the subject property and was a leader of the opposition to the proposed rezoning. The city answered that Longshore had made no objection to Blackmon's participation.
The court entered a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, from which we quote at length:
The court found that the decision of the city council to rezone to R-4 instead of to C-P involved "a fairly debatable question and was, therefore, not arbitrary and capricious," and that Blackmon's participation was not grounds to invalidate the zoning change. The court adjudged that the rezoning to R-4 "was a lawful and valid exercise of the authority of the said City Council," and denied Longshore's claims for relief. The court denied Longshore's post-trial motion, and he appealed.
Zoning decisions are legislative in nature, and a court will not overturn a zoning ordinance unless it finds that the zoning authority has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. If a zoning question is fairly debatable, the decision of the zoning authority will not be disturbed. Woodard v. City of Decatur, 431 So.2d *958 1173 (Ala.1983); City of Gadsden v. Downs, 412 So. 2d 267 (Ala.1982); Jefferson County v. O'Rorke, 394 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1981); Allen v. Axford, 285 Ala. 251, 231 So. 2d 122 (1970).
Longshore argues that Jefferson County v. O'Rorke, supra, presents a strikingly similar factual situation in which this Court affirmed a finding by the trial court that the county commission's refusal to rezone O'Rorke's property was arbitrary and capricious. In that case, however, the trial court found from the evidence that the county commission's refusal to rezone had the effect of "relegating the use of Appellees' land ... to nothing more than a `buffer zone,' in view of its surroundings." Id., 394 So. 2d  at 940. The property was located at the intersection of Interstate Highway I-459 and U.S. Highway 280, a principal north-south route; on the other side of each highway, major commercial development was either scheduled or in progress; and the only issue put forth as making the question fairly debatable was the uncertainty as to the details of the proposed onsite sewage disposal system.
In this case, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Longshore's property has a reasonable, suitable or practical use under a multi-family classification. The neighboring lots on both Lorna Road and Woodmeadow Drive are in use as single-family residences. Across Lorna Road is a church, and the commercial uses on the other side of I-459 are much less intensive than the commercial uses involved in O'RorkeLorna Road just north of I-459 has a skating rink, a post office, and a convenience store. I-459 is 20 or 30 feet lower than Woodmeadow Drive, so the interference from it would be less than if it were at the same or a higher grade. Furthermore, a multi-family use is in accordance with existing development on Lorna Road south of I-459; for example, there is an apartment complex a short distance to the south of the subject property.
Under the facts of record, we cannot say that the Hoover City Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in changing the zoning classification of the subject property from R-1 (single family) to R-4 (multi-family). The trial court did not err in upholding the council's decision.
The quoted portions of the trial court's opinion disposing of the allegations of conflict of interest on the part of Councilman Blackmon adequately answer Longshore's contentions. The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  We omit reference to HBC Investments as a plaintiff and appellant for convenience. The proceedings below often refer solely to Longshore.