Title: Fitzpatrick v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12937
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: May 21, 2021

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12937 
 
MEAGHAN FITZPATRICK  vs.  WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS OF 
NEW YORK, INC., & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2020. - May 21, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Argument by counsel, Mistrial, New trial. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 9, 2013. 
 
 
The case was tried before Heidi E. Brieger, J., and a 
motion for a mistrial was heard by her. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Matthew J. Fogelman for the plaintiff. 
 
Christopher A. Duggan for Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers 
of New York, Inc., & another. 
 
Myles W. McDonough, Laura Meyer Gregory, & Ryan B. 
MacDonald, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Brendan G. Carney, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & 
Patrick M. Groulx, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
 
1 JBS Souderton, Inc., and Willow Run Foods, Inc. 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendants in this personal injury suit 
moved for a mistrial after plaintiff's counsel purportedly made 
improper comments during his closing argument.  The judge chose 
to reserve decision on the motion until after the jury rendered 
their verdict.  When the jury found for the plaintiff, the judge 
allowed the motion and declared a mistrial due to the 
plaintiff's closing argument.  The plaintiff prevailed again at 
a second trial, but she was awarded significantly lower damages.  
She then appealed from the decision allowing the mistrial, on 
the ground that once the verdict had been returned, the motion 
for a mistrial became a motion for a new trial and should have 
been evaluated under that standard. 
 
Our prior case law does not directly address the question 
whether, in a civil action, a judge may reserve decision on a 
motion for a mistrial until after the jury renders a verdict.  
We conclude that, in civil cases, a motion for a mistrial must 
be decided when made, and that, after a jury verdict, the 
appropriate vehicle to be used in seeking to have a case tried 
again is through a motion for a new trial.2  As this requirement 
shall apply only prospectively, we conclude that, here, the 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association and the Massachusetts 
Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
3 
 
judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the motion for a 
mistrial. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the essential facts from the 
record at the first trial, supplemented where relevant with the 
records of the proceedings at the both trials. 
 
a.  The plaintiff's injury.  In 2011, the plaintiff 
purchased a plain hamburger from a fast food restaurant.  The 
hamburger meat contained a small piece of bone, less than one-
eighth inch in diameter.  When the plaintiff inadvertently bit 
down on the bone in the course of eating the hamburger, one of 
her upper molars split.  The plaintiff was thirty-four years old 
at the time of the injury.  Treating the injury required 
multiple medical procedures over the next two years, including 
two root canals, a gingivectomy, sinus elevation surgery, and a 
graft of bone from a cadaver.  In 2013, the plaintiff filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court against Wendy's Old Fashioned 
Hamburgers of New York, Inc. (Wendy's), which operated the 
restaurant, and JBS Souderton, Inc. (JBS), which produced the 
hamburger patty, for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability under G. L. c. 106, § 2-314, and violations of 
G. L. c. 93A.3 
 
 
3 Identical claims against the distributor of the hamburger, 
Willow Run Foods, Inc., and claims for negligence and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress against all three parties were 
4 
 
 
b.  Events at trial.  A jury trial was held in 2016 on the 
breach of warranty issue.  The four witnesses, all called by the 
plaintiff, were the Wendy's district manager, the plaintiff's 
dentist, a JBS employee who had been responsible for quality 
assurance, and the plaintiff herself.  The defendants did not 
dispute that the hamburger contained two hard fragments, or that 
the plaintiff had broken her tooth on one of them.  Rather, the 
defendants argued that previous issues with the same tooth had 
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.  The defense also 
sought to establish that JBS and Wendy's had exceeded government 
and industry standards and had met reasonable customer 
expectations for hamburger meat. 
 
After testimony concluded, counsel for the defense began 
his closing argument by telling the jury that, "in our society 
we entrust our citizens to come together, evaluate the truth, 
evaluate what has been put before you and to speak the truth."  
After reviewing the evidence, he concluded by urging that the 
jury's "speech of the truth" be that neither defendant committed 
a breach of the warranty of merchantability, and that in fact 
"both of these fine companies did precisely what we would want 
all of the companies in America to adhere to." 
 
voluntarily dismissed before trial.  The judge reserved decision 
on the G. L. c. 93A claim. 
5 
 
 
Plaintiff's counsel then began his closing by exhorting the 
jury to use their commonsense knowledge of "what consumers 
reasonably expect."  He emphasized that "[i]t's what we 
reasonably expect.  Us, the average people, not them."  He later 
referred to the defendants as "[o]ne of the largest fast food 
companies and one of the largest beef manufacture[r]s in the 
world," and said that "[w]hat we've heard for three days is a 
long list of excuses.  One after another.  Attempt to confuse 
things.  That's what they do, these big companies.  That's what 
they do."  Subsequently, he said: 
"But you know what, when Wendy's and JBS sells all 
those burgers, they are more than happy to take our 
money.  We pay for the burger.  It goes to them.  But 
when a burger hurts somebody, no responsibility.  No 
accountability.  Shame on them, honestly -- shame on 
them. 
 
"Are these important rules in our community?  Are we 
going to enforce them?  Are you going to enforce them?  
If the rules that we talked about here, the safety 
rules, if those are important you need to speak to 
that and your verdict needs to speak to that.  Your 
verdict will speak volumes echoing outside of this 
Courthouse.  If the rules are not important, if it's 
okay for them to serve burger with bone and someone 
gets hurt once in a while, and if they get injured, 
too bad for them.  Then you know what?  Give these 
guys a pass.  Give them a pass.  I don't think you 
can.  I don't think you can give them a pass." 
 
6 
 
He then suggested a range of damages for the plaintiff's pain 
and suffering of between $150,000 and $250,000.4  The plaintiff's 
counsel concluded with: 
"And this may be the kind of case that triggers 
something for you a month from now or a year from now.  
You might be eating a burger.  Maybe you'll read an 
article that someone else got hurt by a food product.  
Or you'll be telling your wife or your husband about 
the case.  That somebody ate a burger and they did not 
expect to get hurt.  And that safety rules were 
violated and that you helped to make a wrong right.  
You made it right and you held them responsible and 
accountable." 
 
 
Although defense counsel did not object during the 
plaintiff's closing, once the argument was finished, he 
immediately moved for a mistrial.5  A sidebar discussion was held 
in which the plaintiff's counsel protested that he had not 
"crossed any lines."  The judge responded, "I have not yet 
decided how close you were to that line but it was close.  I'm 
going to let it go to the Jury and we'll see what happens after 
that.  All right?"  The parties accepted this manner of 
proceeding.  Prior to the judge's final charge, only one request 
 
 
4 The plaintiff did not seek to recover her medical 
expenses, and all evidence relating to those amounts was 
excluded. 
 
 
5 During a hearing on the motion for a mistrial, defense 
counsel explained, "I hate objecting during closing arguments 
for a lot of obvious reasons.  Not the least of which is, if I 
had to object to every single improper statement in this closing 
argument, I would have made forty objections and it would have 
gotten us noplace." 
7 
 
was made for specific instructions; this was by the plaintiff's 
counsel, who sought an instruction concerning aggravation of a 
prior dental condition. 
 
In her final charge, the judge told the jurors that "the 
opening statements and the closing arguments of lawyers are not 
evidence," and that they should disregard any "matters" argued 
in closing that were not introduced in evidence.  She added: 
"I want to stress to you that it is not your job as a 
juror to send a message to anyone inside or outside of 
this Courtroom.  Your job is not to deter any conduct 
or to punish any party.  Your job is not to make any 
distinctions or hold any sympathies or prejudices 
based on whether a party is a big company or a small 
company or a buyer or a seller." 
 
The judge also explained that the damages the plaintiff was 
seeking were compensatory and their "object is not to punish 
anybody."  Neither side objected to the jury instructions or 
sought any modifications insofar as they touched on the closing 
arguments. 
 
The jury found that both defendants had committed a breach 
of the warranty of merchantability and thus had caused injury to 
the plaintiff.  They awarded $150,005.64 in damages (the low end 
of the range recommended by the plaintiff's counsel, plus the 
cost of the plaintiff's meal at Wendy's).  Once the verdict was 
announced, counsel for the defense immediately renewed his 
motion for a mistrial. 
8 
 
 
After a hearing on the motion and a review of the 
transcripts, the judge determined that the plaintiff's counsel 
had made a number of improper remarks in closing that went 
beyond a permissible response to statements by the defense.  In 
particular, the judge found that counsel had urged the jury to 
"depart from neutrality," and to decide the case based on an "us 
versus them" attitude with a bias against big corporations; 
encouraged the jury to act as the "voice of the community" and 
send a message by punishing the defendants; made "golden rule" 
arguments asking the jury to identify with the plaintiff; 
injected personal opinion by implying that incidents such as the 
one in which the plaintiff was injured were frequent; and used 
so-called "reptile" litigation tactics aimed at triggering in 
the jurors a fear of harm to their community.  The judge stated 
that no immediate curative instructions were given, that the 
curative instructions included in her final charge did not 
address the "golden rule" argument or the injections of personal 
opinion, and that her instructions relative to the "us versus 
them" arguments had not been forceful enough.  She noted that 
she had discretion to declare a mistrial when "emotional, 
inflammatory, or prejudicial elements" of a closing argument 
were "likely to affect the justice of the verdict."  Having 
"review[ed] the totality of the closing argument and the 
evidence presented at trial," the judge concluded that 
9 
 
"prejudicial aspects of the closing argument likely influenced 
the jury's verdict," and allowed the motion. 
 
A second trial was held before the same judge; the second 
jury again found in the plaintiff's favor, but awarded only 
$10,000 in damages.  The judge then ruled in favor of the 
defendants on the G. L. c. 93A claim, and also allowed the 
defendants' motion to recover costs, yielding net damages to the 
plaintiff of $5,964.52.  The plaintiff appealed; the sole focus 
of her appeal was the allowance of the defendants' motion for a 
mistrial at the conclusion of the first trial.  The Appeals 
Court concluded that the judge erred in applying the standard 
for granting a mistrial rather than for allowing a new trial 
when she ruled on the motion after the jury had returned their 
verdict.  Fitzpatrick v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of 
N.Y., Inc., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 427-430 (2019).  Accordingly, 
the court vacated the order allowing the mistrial and remanded 
the matter for reconsideration of the motion for a mistrial 
under the standard applicable to a motion for a new trial.  Id. 
at 432.  We allowed the defendants' application for further 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Mistrials in civil cases.  Although we 
have encouraged judges to reserve motions for mistrials until 
after the jury verdict in criminal cases, whether decisions on 
such motions may be similarly reserved in civil cases appears to 
10 
 
be a question of first impression in the Commonwealth.6  See 
Commonwealth v. Brangan, 475 Mass. 143, 148 (2016) (when "[a 
criminal] defendant's motion for a mistrial is brought during 
closing arguments and presents a close question," deferral 
"enhances judicial efficiency and preserves valuable judicial 
resources"); Commonwealth v. Murchison, 392 Mass. 273, 275 
(1984) ("The judge's decision to defer action on the defendant's 
motion for a mistrial until after the verdict was one of 
fairness and common sense").  We decline to extend this 
reasoning from a criminal context to civil trials, where the 
appropriate vehicle for a party to use in seeking to retry a 
case once the jury have reached a verdict is to file a motion 
for a new trial under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, 365 Mass. 827 (1974). 
 
In general, a mistrial is a "trial that the judge brings to 
an end without a determination on the merits because of a 
procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the 
proceedings" (emphasis added).  Black's Law Dictionary 1200 
 
 
6 The term "mistrial" does not appear in the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The plaintiffs point to the Appeals 
Court's decision in Holder v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 19 Mass. App. 
Ct. 214, 218 (1985), for the proposition that "[t]he time for 
declaring a mistrial [has] gone by" once the jury have been 
discharged and judgment has entered.  That case, however, 
involved a meaningfully different situation, as none of the 
parties made a motion for a mistrial.  Rather, an "irate" judge, 
annoyed with counsel, declared a mistrial sua sponte, two weeks 
after the jury returned their verdict.  Id. at 216.  Here, by 
contrast, the defendants initially submitted their motion for a 
mistrial well before the jury were charged. 
11 
 
(11th ed. 2019).  The allowance of a mistrial thus signifies 
that something has happened that is "likely to affect the 
justice of the verdict," and that there is "some circumstance 
indicating that justice may not be done if the trial continues."  
Curley v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 314 Mass. 31, 31–32 
(1943).  These specific precipitating events can occur at any 
point during the trial, for instance during cross-examination of 
a witness, Reid v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 333 Mass. 485, 487–
488 (1956), or even as early as during opening statements by 
counsel, Shea v. D. & N. Motor Transp. Co., 316 Mass. 553, 553-
554 (1944).  In both civil and criminal cases, a motion for a 
mistrial must be made immediately after the events prompting the 
motion occur, or as soon as the moving party learns of them.  
Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 387 (1977).  In sum, in 
deciding whether to allow a motion for a mistrial, a judge must 
make a prospective determination, in other words, a prediction, 
about the impact of specific events on a verdict that has yet to 
be reached. 
 
As an immediate, on-the-spot response to a specific issue 
so serious that it warrants breaking off a trial that has begun, 
and may be close to concluding, a mistrial should not be granted 
lightly.  See Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 377–
378 (1985) (mistrial is "[a] drastic" response to "fundamental 
errors").  Indeed, in a civil case, a mistrial is "generally 
12 
 
regarded as the 'most drastic remedy and should be reserved for 
the most grievous error where prejudice cannot otherwise be 
removed.'"  Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co., 187 W. Va. 292, 309 
(1992), quoting Seabaugh v. Milde Farms, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 202, 
208 (Mo. 1991).  Counsel accordingly should not be given 
incentives to resort to such motions.  Allowing judges to 
reserve decisions on motions for mistrials in civil cases 
creates such an incentive by removing any risk for the party 
bringing the motion; the party need not weigh the risk of losing 
the case against the cost of having to try it again.  The 
important interest of "judicial efficiency" that we highlighted 
in Brangan, 475 Mass. at 148, generally is better served in a 
civil context by allowing a trial that already has begun to 
continue to a verdict.  At that point, the losing party may 
submit a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59.7 
 
In contrast to a mistrial, a new trial should be granted 
only when "on a survey of the whole case it appears to the judge 
that otherwise a miscarriage of justice would result."  Wojcicki 
v. Caragher, 447 Mass. 200, 216 (2006), quoting Spiller v. 
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 348 Mass. 576, 580 (1965).  See 
Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 295 
 
 
7 In as much as they require the motion to be made not later 
than ten days after the entry of judgment, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure clearly intend that a motion for a new trial will be 
made after a jury verdict.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (b). 
13 
 
(1978).  Rather than making a prediction about whether 
particular circumstances mean that justice may not be done if 
the trial continues, a judge considering a motion for a new 
trial is in a position (and indeed is required) to look back in 
time over the entire trial and to decide whether a miscarriage 
of justice in fact did occur.8  While "prejudicial misconduct of 
counsel that is not cured by the judge's instructions to the 
jury" may suffice to create such a miscarriage of justice, see 
Gath v. M/A-COM, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 492 (2003), the judge must 
evaluate the effect of this misconduct and the steps taken to 
cure it not in isolation, but rather "with reference to the 
entire case as it stood before the jury."  Salter v. Leventhal, 
337 Mass. 679, 698 (1958).  This includes taking into account 
the actual verdict itself.  See Gath, supra at 495. 
 
Our position in Brangan, 475 Mass. at 148, and Murchison, 
392 Mass. at 275, favoring reserving decisions on motions for 
mistrials until after the jury verdict, concerned, again, only 
criminal cases, where several decisive policy considerations are 
present that are absent in the context of civil litigation.  In 
general, because the "stakes in a criminal case are likely to be 
 
 
8 Rule 59 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that a new trial may be granted "for any of the reasons 
for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at 
law in the courts of the Commonwealth," thus making a 
determination of acceptable grounds for granting a new trial a 
matter of common law. 
14 
 
higher, jail or freedom, compared with gain or loss of property 
in a civil case," criminal proceedings involve stronger 
safeguards for defendants.  See Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. 
App. Ct. 163, 170 (1983).  In particular, criminal defendants 
are protected by the prohibition on double jeopardy found in the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Massachusetts common law.  See Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 
Mass. 278, 283 (1993).  This prohibition protects a criminal 
defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a 
particular tribunal."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 486 Mass. 469, 
483 (2020), quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671–672 
(1982). 
 
The allowance of a mistrial on a defendant's own motion 
removes this double jeopardy bar by consent.  See Pellegrine v. 
Commonwealth, 446 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2006).  Permitting or 
encouraging judges to reserve ruling on motions for mistrials 
thus allows criminal defendants to seek relief from serious 
trial errors without, by doing so, necessarily giving up their 
rights not to be tried twice for the same offense.  It would be 
unfair to require criminal defendants to rely solely on the 
postverdict motion for a new trial, as, unlike the declaration 
of a mistrial, the allowance of a motion for a new trial in a 
15 
 
criminal case may be appealed by the Commonwealth pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 28E.  See Brangan, 475 Mass. at 146.9 
 
In Brangan, 475 Mass. at 148, we did cite a civil case from 
Florida approving of the reservation of a motion for a mistrial 
until after jury deliberations.  See id., citing Companioni v. 
Tampa, 51 So. 3d 452, 455 (Fla. 2010).  Companioni itself relied 
on an earlier Florida case, Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 
So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1985) (Ricke), in which the Florida 
Supreme Court stated that "the trial court has the power to wait 
until the jury returns its verdict before ruling on a motion for 
a mistrial," and that the motion so reserved "is simply a motion 
for a mistrial."  The Ricke court explained the justifications 
for this rule as to "conserve judicial resources" and to 
forestall the tactic whereby a party whose case is going badly 
tries to force the other party to request a mistrial and thereby 
obtain a second chance to try the case.  Id.  For the reasons 
discussed, we view these justifications as unpersuasive. 
 
Moreover, Florida appears to be alone among the States in 
allowing reserved motions for mistrials in civil cases to be 
decided under the mistrial standard.  See 88 C.J.S. Trial § 108 
(2020) (citing Ricke as sole authority for view that trial court 
 
 
9 In a civil context, an order allowing a motion for a new 
trial generally is not an immediately appealable final judgment.  
See Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468, 469-470 (1993). 
16 
 
can wait until jury returns verdict before ruling on motion for 
mistrial).  Other State courts to have considered this situation 
have concluded that, where a decision on a motion for a mistrial 
is reserved until after the verdict is rendered in a civil case, 
the motion should be treated as a motion for a new trial.  See, 
e.g., Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 118 N.H. 590, 593 (1978) 
("The court's order granting a mistrial after verdict was 
equivalent to an order setting aside the verdicts and ordering a 
new trial"); Smith v. Andreini, 223 W. Va. 605, 615 (2009) 
(order characterized as granting mistrial, in response to 
defense counsel's closing argument, in fact awarded plaintiff 
new trial); Klein v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 
507, 509–510 (1963) (treating postverdict allowance of motion 
for mistrial as in substance allowance of new trial).10  
 
Henceforth, in civil cases, judges may not reserve a motion 
for a mistrial until after the jury return their verdict.  
Rather, the trial judge must rule on a motion for a mistrial 
when it is made.  Any later postverdict motion for a new trial 
must be considered as a motion for a new trial under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 59 and decided under the applicable standard, i.e., 
 
 
10 We are aware of no Federal decision squarely confronting 
the question, although reserving motions for a mistrial in civil 
cases does appear to be a practice in some Federal courts.  See, 
e.g., Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 709 (3d Cir. 1993); Burnett 
v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 3d 369, 395 (D. Me. 2019). 
17 
 
whether a consideration of the whole case suggests that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred.11  This approach will best 
conserve judicial resources by discouraging counsel from 
resorting rashly to the most drastic remedy possible for trial 
errors. 
 
b.  Trial judge's order.  Here, the judge's postverdict 
order that overturned the result of the first trial was, both in 
form and in substance, the allowance of a mistrial.  It was 
characterized in this way both by the defendants when they 
submitted the motion as well as by the judge herself.  In her 
decision, the judge focused exclusively on the plaintiff's 
counsel's closing argument.  The decision gave at most nominal 
consideration to the evidence and the jury verdict before 
concluding that "prejudicial aspects of the closing argument 
likely influenced the jury's verdict."  The decision did not 
take a retrospective view of the entire trial in order to 
determine whether a miscarriage of justice in fact occurred, as 
required for the allowance of a motion for a new trial. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the new rule that we have set forth in 
this case, we do not disturb the outcome here.  When a decision 
is "not grounded in constitutional principles," we are free to 
 
 
11 Other State courts to have considered this issue, noted 
supra, have approved of judges reserving motions for a mistrial 
as long as the motion later was treated as the functional 
equivalent of a motion for a new trial. 
18 
 
make its effect only prospective.  See Eaton v. Federal Nat'l 
Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 588 (2012).  There is particular 
reason to do so when, as here, "prior law is of questionable 
prognosticative value."  Id., quoting Blood v. Edgar's, Inc., 36 
Mass. App. Ct. 402, 407 (1994).  Accordingly, the prohibition on 
reserving motions for a mistrial in civil cases will be 
prospective only. 
 
Apart from the issue of the propriety of reserving the 
motion, we review the allowance of a mistrial by the trial judge 
only for abuse of discretion.  Fialkow v. DeVoe Motors, Inc., 
359 Mass. 569, 572 (1971).  We agree with the judge that certain 
of the statements made by the plaintiff's counsel in closing 
involved an improper "appeal to the jurors' emotions, passions, 
prejudices, or sympathies."  Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b)(3)(C).  It 
was reasonable for the judge, moreover, to attempt to avoid the 
drastic remedy of a second trial.  Neither party objected at the 
time that the judge reserved decision.  Accordingly, we cannot 
say that the judge abused her discretion in allowing the motion 
for a mistrial after the jury returned their verdict, and thus 
the verdict from the second trial stands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order allowing motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  mistrial affirmed.