Title: Milner v. State
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 43, 2023
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 28, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THEODORE MILNER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 43, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. N2010011141 
§                       
§ 
 
Submitted: December 22, 2023 
Decided: 
February 28, 2024 
 
Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) 
During a search of a vehicle driven by the appellant, Theodore Milner, 
police found two handguns in a locked glove box.  The Superior Court denied 
Milner’s motion to suppress that evidence, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial 
on two counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”).  The 
jury found Milner guilty of one count of PFBPP and not guilty of the other count.  
In this direct appeal, Milner challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motions to 
suppress and for judgment of acquittal.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 
 
2 
(2) 
On the morning of October 23, 2020, New Castle County Police Officer 
Roberto Ieradi observed a black Nissan Armada turn left from Governor Printz 
Boulevard onto Rysing Drive.  Although the driver activated the turn signal before 
reaching the intersection, he did not do so at least 300 feet before the turn, as required 
by 21 Del. C. § 4155, nor did he activate the turn signal before moving into the left-
turn lane.1  Officer Ieradi conducted a traffic stop in the parking lot of a convenience 
store; his partner, who was working in a separate patrol vehicle, joined him in the 
parking lot.  Milner was the driver and sole occupant of the Armada. 
(3) 
Officer Ieradi activated his body-worn camera before he exited his 
patrol vehicle and approached the Armada.  At the suppression hearing, the State 
presented to the court—and Officer Ieradi provided testimony regarding—the 
portion of the video depicting the events from the time that the officer activated the 
camera until he began searching the Armada.  In its decision denying Milner’s 
motion to suppress,2 the Superior Court made the following factual findings 
regarding what happened during that time period: 
 
1 See 21 Del. C. § 4155(a) (“No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection unless the vehicle is 
in proper position upon the roadway as required in § 4152 of this title, or turn a vehicle to enter a 
private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left 
upon a roadway or turn so as to proceed in an opposite direction unless and until such movement 
can be made with safety without interfering with other traffic.  No person shall so turn any vehicle 
without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.”); id. § 4155(b) (“A signal 
of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less 
than the last 300 feet or more than ½ mile traveled by the vehicle before turning.”). 
2 State v. Milner, 2022 WL 2069309 (Del. Super. Ct. June 8, 2022). 
 
3 
In the video, the officer initially approached the passenger side of the 
Nissan Armada.  The Defendant partially lowered the vehicle’s 
passenger side window to speak to the officer, and a short time later, 
upon a request of the officer, Defendant fully lowered the passenger 
side window.  Within approximately three minutes, Defendant 
produced his license, vehicle registration and insurance paperwork.  
Based upon the registration documentation, the officer asked the 
Defendant, a Delaware resident, why the vehicle had Pennsylvania 
temporary tags.3  Less than a minute later, the officer asked Defendant 
the following questions: Was there a reason the vehicle smelled like 
weed?  Did the defendant smoke marijuana?  Did the Defendant’s 
friends smoke marijuana in the vehicle?  These questions were based 
on the officer’s conclusion that marijuana had been consumed in the 
vehicle. 
The Defendant told the officer he had just smoked a “black and 
mild” cigar.  The officer told Defendant he was not asking about 
someone smoking a “black and mild” cigar, and noted a distinction 
between the smell of burnt marijuana and the odor of a burnt cigar.  The 
officer told the Defendant he asked about marijuana consumption 
because the vehicle “smells like weed.”  The officer suggested to 
Defendant that perhaps the odor of marijuana could have come from 
somebody else sitting in the car.  In response, Defendant flatly denied 
that the vehicle smelled like marijuana and denied smoking marijuana.  
Based on the context of the interaction between the officer and the 
Defendant up to this point, which took less than five minutes, the officer 
was asking Defendant about an odor of burnt marijuana (i.e., someone 
consuming marijuana in the vehicle) emanating from the vehicle. 
The officer returned to his patrol vehicle, expressing concern 
over the legitimacy of the Pennsylvania temporary registration tag.  
Shortly thereafter, the officer returned to Defendant’s vehicle, 
informing the Defendant that the odor of marijuana was probable cause 
to search the vehicle.  Defendant then admitted he possessed marijuana, 
and Officer Ieradi recovered a bag of suspected marijuana from 
 
3 In a footnote, the Superior Court added:  “Based upon a review of the bodycam video, Defendant 
had a Delaware driver’s license, but the vehicle had Pennsylvania temporary tags and was 
registered to Defendant at a Pennsylvania address.  Under the circumstances, the officer questioned 
the legitimacy of the temporary tag on the vehicle.”  Id. at *4 n.18.  The video also reflects that 
between the officer’s questions concerning the temporary tag and his questions concerning the 
smell of marijuana, the officer asked, “is there anything inside the car I should be concerned about, 
guns, drugs, knives, anything like that,” to which Milner responded “no.”  
 
4 
Defendant’s pocket.  At this point, Defendant was detained, and the 
officer began to search the interior of vehicle.4 
 
When Milner exited the Armada, Officer Ieradi noticed that Milner’s belt was 
unfastened, and the right side had been removed from several belt loops. 
(4) 
During the search, Officer Ieradi found an empty gun holster in the 
center console.5  He showed the holster to Milner, who was standing with Officer 
Ieradi’s partner near the patrol vehicles, and asked whether there was a gun in the 
car.  Milner responded that “it shouldn’t be” and stated that his significant other 
“drives my car” and “owns two guns.”  Officer Ieradi asked whether the guns were 
in the car, to which Milner responded, “I don’t know.”  Officer Ieradi asked whether 
the guns had ever been in the car when Milner was driving, and Milner stated that 
they had not.  Milner then stated “we just Amazon flexed yesterday and I used her 
car and she used mine”6 and that he had picked up his significant other’s vehicle.  
Officer Ieradi asked whether Milner’s significant other “usually leaves [the guns] in 
the car,” to which Milner responded, “yeah, she drives around with them.” 
(5) 
Officer Ieradi then returned to the Armada and continued the search.  
Several minutes later, he attempted to open the glove compartment, which was 
 
4 Id. at *4. 
5 The bodycam video, including the portion depicting the search itself, was presented to the jury 
at trial.  The video was redacted for presentation to the jury, including to omit the discussion and 
discovery of marijuana.  
6 The video depicts what appear to be several Amazon packages in the vehicle and shows Officer 
Ieradi cutting open a labeled, taped Amazon box and removing packaging material to inspect the 
contents. 
 
5 
locked.  He then removed the key from the ignition and used a key from the keychain 
to open the glove compartment, where he observed two loaded firearms.  Officer 
Ieradi then arrested and handcuffed Milner and placed him in his patrol vehicle 
before returning to the Armada to continue the search.  In the trunk area, Officer 
Ieradi found a metal lockbox.  He used a key from the keychain to open the lockbox, 
which contained a gun magazine.  
(6) 
During a post-Miranda interview, Milner stated that he co-owned the 
Nissan Armada with his significant other, Amanda Grenardo.  When asked if his 
DNA or fingerprints would be found on the guns, Milner stated that he had touched 
the guns to show Grenardo how to handle them.7   
(7) 
Grenardo testified at trial that she had obtained the guns from First State 
Firearms in June 2020.  Store receipts and a trace report from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Firearms, and Explosives corroborated that testimony.  Grenardo testified that she 
and Milner shared the Nissan Armada and another vehicle, a Nissan Pathfinder, and 
that she typically drove the Armada in the course of her work delivering packages 
for Amazon, while Milner typically drove the Pathfinder.  Grenardo stated that she 
bought the guns for protection during deliveries and at home and that she usually 
 
7 An evidence detection officer processed the contraband for fingerprints and DNA.  Milner’s 
fingerprints were not found on the guns, ammunition, or magazines.  Officer Ieradi decided not to 
send the DNA swabs for testing because Milner had admitted to handling the firearms.  Officer 
Ieradi did not retain the holsters or the lockbox; the Superior Court gave a missing-evidence 
instruction as to the holsters. 
 
6 
kept one gun locked in a safe at home and the other in the Armada.8  She testified 
that she put the guns in the Nissan Armada a few days before Milner’s arrest because 
she intended to visit a gun range.9  She then had surgery and forgot that she had left 
the guns in the vehicle.  Because of the surgery, she also had been unable to deliver 
some Amazon packages; she stated that Milner was driving the Armada on the day 
of his arrest because she had asked him to return the packages to Amazon for 
delivery by another carrier. 
(8) 
The guns were a SCCY 9 mm handgun and a Smith & Wesson .40 
caliber handgun.10  The SCCY gun was in a holster when Officer Ieradi found it in 
the glove compartment; the Smith & Wesson gun was not in a holster.11  The 
magazine that was located in the lockbox fit the Smith & Wesson gun.  The jury 
found Milner guilty of the PFBPP charge relating to the SCCY gun and not guilty of 
the charge relating to the Smith & Wesson.12  
(9) 
Milner moved for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal.  He argued 
that there was insufficient evidence that he knew that there was a firearm in the glove 
compartment of the Nissan Armada and that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.  The 
Superior Court denied the motions, concluding that the jury “reasonably concluded 
 
8 State v. Milner, 2023 WL 19080, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2023). 
9 Id.  
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *3. 
 
7 
there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Milner’s PFBPP conviction, i.e., he was 
indeed knowingly in possession or control of at least one of the two firearms when 
stopped by police.”13  The court later determined that Milner was subject to a five-
year minimum-mandatory sentence for PFBPP and sentenced him to fifteen years in 
prison, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision.   
(10) Although Milner was represented by counsel in the Superior Court, he 
requested to proceed pro se on appeal.  Following remand to the Superior Court for 
an evidentiary hearing under Supreme Court Rule 26(d)(iii), this Court granted 
Milner’s request.  On appeal, Milner argues that the Superior Court erroneously 
denied his motion to suppress and his motion for judgment of acquittal.   
(11) As to the motion to suppress, Milner contends that (i) Officer Ieradi’s 
testimony was inconsistent or insufficient to justify the initial traffic stop, or the stop 
was pretextual; (ii) Officer Ieradi impermissibly extended the traffic stop’s duration; 
and (iii) the odor of marijuana did not establish probable cause for the search.  We 
review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress for abuse of 
discretion.14  “The trial court’s formulation and application of legal concepts are 
reviewed de novo, as are constitutional claims.”15  When the trial court denies a 
 
13 Id.  
14 Houston v. State, 251 A.3d 102, 108 (Del. 2021). 
15 Juliano v. State, 254 A.3d 369, 376 (Del. 2020) (citing Jackson v. State, 990 A.2d 1281, 1288 
(Del. 2009); Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 383 (Del. 2011)). 
 
8 
motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing, we defer to the court’s factual 
findings if there was sufficient evidence to support those findings and they were not 
clearly erroneous.16  “Whether the established facts support the trial court’s 
probable-cause determination is a question of law subject to de novo review.”17 
(12) A traffic stop is a seizure of a vehicle and its occupants and is subject 
to constitutional limitations.18  “Specifically, the State must demonstrate that the stop 
and any subsequent police investigation were reasonable in the circumstances.”19  A 
police officer may stop and detain a motorist if the officer has reasonable suspicion 
that the driver has violated or is violating the law, including traffic laws.20  At the 
suppression hearing, Milner argued that Officer Ieradi lacked reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Milner had committed a traffic violation.  The Superior Court held 
otherwise, finding that the officer’s testimony established that “he had a clear view 
of the intersection when the Nissan Armada failed to signal before entering the left 
turn lane, and once the Defendant activated the left turn signal, the Defendant failed 
to exhibit his intention to [turn at least] 300 feet . . . prior to turning onto Rysing 
 
16 Diggs v. State, 257 A.3d 993, 1003 (Del. 2021). 
17 Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619, 626 (Del. 2021). 
18 Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045–46 (Del. 2001). 
19 Id. at 1046. 
20 Juliano, 254 A.3d at 387; Houston, 251 A.3d at 108-09; see also Juliano, 254 A.3d at 382 
(“[T]he temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the 
traffic laws is not an unreasonable seizure . . ., even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped 
the motorist absent another law enforcement objective.”); Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1046 (“First, the 
stop must be justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity . . . .”). 
 
9 
Drive.”21  Milner challenges the court’s factual findings, arguing that Officer Ieradi’s 
testimony was unreliable because the officer could not recall his exact position in 
relation to the intersection or how far away he was when he first observed Milner’s 
vehicle.  The Superior Court considered and rejected that view of the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing.22  We conclude that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the court’s factual findings and that they were not clearly 
erroneous. 
(13) Milner also contends that Officer Ieradi impermissibly extended the 
duration of the traffic stop and that the odor of marijuana did not establish probable 
cause for the search of the Nissan Armada.  “Use or consumption of marijuana in a 
moving vehicle is a misdemeanor.”23  Under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution, police may 
lawfully search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe 
 
21 Milner, 2022 WL 2069309, at *3. 
22 See id. (“While Officer Ieradi, seventeen months after Defendant’s arrest, could not recall the 
specific location of his police vehicle when he saw the traffic violation, or recall whether he was 
in front of or behind the Nissan Armanda, the officer credibly offered specific testimony regarding 
his observations of the Defendant’s lane change, late activation of the turn signal, and the vehicle’s 
turn onto Rysing Drive.”). 
23 Valentine v. State, 2019 WL 1178765, at *2 (Del. Mar. 12, 2019) (citing 16 Del. C. § 4764(d)).  
Milner’s traffic stop occurred in 2020.  Use or consumption of marijuana in a moving vehicle 
remains a misdemeanor even following substantial amendments to Delaware’s marijuana laws in 
2023.  See 16 Del. C. § 4764(d) (effective Apr. 23, 2023, to present) (“Any person who knowingly 
or intentionally uses or consumes up to a personal use quantity of a controlled substance . . . 
classified in § 4719(d)(19) of this title in an area accessible to the public or in a moving vehicle, 
except as otherwise authorized by this chapter, shall be guilty of an unclassified misdemeanor . . . 
.); id. § 4714(d)(19) (effective June 30, 2022, to present) (identifying marijuana as a Schedule I 
controlled substance). 
 
10 
that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.24  Probable 
cause determinations are made by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.25  If 
an officer makes a valid traffic stop, the “duration and execution” of the stop is 
“limited by the initial purpose of the stop. . . .  [A]ny investigation of the vehicle or 
its occupants beyond that required to complete the purpose of the traffic stop 
constitutes a separate seizure that must be supported by independent facts sufficient 
to justify the additional intrusion.”26 
(14) Applying these principles, the Superior Court determined that Officer 
Ieradi had probable cause to believe that Milner had consumed marijuana while 
operating the vehicle and that “[t]o the extent the traffic stop was extended, . . . the 
police officer developed facts independent of the traffic stop to justify the additional 
intrusion and extension of the stop.”27  The Superior Court based its conclusions 
upon the evidence that Milner only partially lowered the vehicle’s window when 
Officer Ieradi approached, the dialogue concerning the odor, and the fact that Milner 
was the vehicle’s sole occupant.28  The court distinguished State v. Cornelius,29 in 
 
24 Pollard v. State, 284 A.3d 41, 46 (Del. 2022); Valentine, 2019 WL 1178765, at *2. 
25 Pollard, 284 A.3d at 46; Valentine, 2019 WL 1178765, at *2. 
26 Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1047; Juliano, 254 A.3d at 388–89 (discussing Caldwell). 
27 Milner, 2022 WL 2069309, at *4–5. 
28 Id. at *4–5.  The Superior Court also included within its analysis the fact that Milner admitted 
possessing marijuana.  We do not include that fact as supporting the probable-cause determination 
because the bodycam video reflects that Milner did not admit to possessing marijuana until after 
Officer Ieradi told Milner that he had probable cause to search the vehicle.  Thus, Milner’s 
admission could not have been a factor in Officer Ieradi’s probable-cause determination. 
29 2021 WL 2879889 (Del. Super. Ct. July 7, 2021). 
 
11 
which the Superior Court granted a motion to suppress, concluding that the decision 
in Cornelius was based on reliability and credibility issues that were not present in 
this case, in which the Superior Court found that Officer Ieradi’s testimony was 
“consistent,” “uncontroverted,” and “memorialized by bodycam video.”30 
(15) Milner contends that the State’s reliance on Valentine v. State, in which 
this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress, is misplaced 
because in Valentine the probable-cause determination was based on facts in 
addition to the odor of marijuana, including that the defendant was driving thirty-
two miles per hour over the speed limit at 1:00 a.m.  Milner posits that we should 
instead apply Juliano v. State, in which this Court determined, “under the totality of 
the circumstances . . . in [that] unusual case,” that a precipitous custodial arrest based 
on the odor of marijuana alone was unconstitutional.31  We conclude that, as in 
Valentine, the search of Milner’s vehicle was based on more than solely the odor of 
marijuana, including the fact that Milner was the driver and sole occupant of the 
vehicle; the dialogue regarding the smell; and the fact that Milner only slightly 
lowered the window when Officer Ieradi approached the vehicle.  In Juliano, in 
contrast, law enforcement officers arrested a vehicle’s driver and several passengers, 
including the juvenile defendant, immediately upon stopping the vehicle and 
 
30 Milner, 2022 WL 2069309, at *5. 
31 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 622. 
 
12 
detecting an odor of marijuana.32  Moreover, Valentine examined the validity of a 
motor vehicle search that preceded the defendant’s arrest; in contrast, the State’s 
argument in Juliano was effectively that “the odor of marijuana, and nothing more, 
justifies a full custodial arrest for marijuana possession thus clearing the way for a 
strip search incident to that arrest.”33  We find no reversible error in the Superior 
Court’s denial of Milner’s motion to suppress. 
(16) Milner also challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  He argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to establish that he knowingly possessed or controlled a firearm.  The Superior Court 
rejected this argument, concluding that, “viewing the totality of the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable 
trier of fact could find Mr. Milner knew there was at least one firearm in his truck’s 
glovebox.”34  The court pointed to the evidence that Milner owned the Armada; was 
the only person in the vehicle when it was stopped; was within arm’s reach of the 
guns; possessed the key to the glove compartment where the guns were located; and 
 
32 Id. at 621, 623. 
33 Juliano, 260 A.3d at 630–31; see also id. at 622 (noting the defendant’s argument that “although 
the odor of marijuana may support the extension of a traffic stop or serve as a factor contributing 
to probable cause to search a person or vehicle, it does not, standing alone, authorize a full custodial 
arrest”). 
34 Milner, 2023 WL 19080, at *3. 
 
13 
stated that he had touched the guns when showing his significant other how to handle 
them.35   
(17) Milner further contends that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and that 
no rational trier of fact could find, from the evidence presented, that Milner knew 
that one gun, but not the other, was present.  The Superior Court rejected this 
argument as well, explaining that:  
[T]hat seeming inconsistency is easily understood considering Ms. 
Grenardo’s testimony that she was the listed purchaser of the two 
firearms and routinely kept one in the glovebox and the other in her 
home.  According to Ms. Grenardo, it was mere happenstance that both 
were there in the SUV at that given time.  So, the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that Mr. Milner knew there to be at least one 
firearm in the SUV’s glovebox—as that was the norm—but not both.36 
 
The court further concluded that, even if the result were inconsistent, it could be 
explained by jury lenity.37 
(18) After de novo review, we conclude that a rational trier of fact, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find Milner guilty of one 
count of PFBPP beyond a reasonable doubt.38  To establish PFBPP, the State was 
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted). 
37 Id. 
38 See Lum v. State, 101 A.3d 970, 971 (Del. 2014) (“We review an appeal from the denial of a 
motion for judgment of acquittal de novo to determine whether any rational trier of fact, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.  We do not distinguish between direct and 
circumstantial evidence in making our determination.” (citations omitted)). 
 
14 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Milner was a prohibited person and 
that he knowingly possessed, purchased, owned, or controlled a firearm.39  
Possession may be actual or constructive.40  To establish constructive possession for 
PFBPP, the State must show that the defendant knew the firearm’s location and had 
the ability and intent to exercise dominion and control over it.41   
(19) We agree with the Superior Court that a rational factfinder could find 
that Milner knowingly possessed a gun.  In addition to the evidence that the Superior 
Court highlighted in its order denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, the State 
also presented evidence that Milner’s belt was unfastened and removed from several 
belt loops when he exited the vehicle; there was an empty gun holster in the unlocked 
center console; and Milner knew that Grenardo owned two guns, “dr[ove] around 
with them,” and typically kept one in the vehicle that he was driving on the day of 
the traffic stop.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could conclude that Milner knowingly possessed one of the guns 
but not the other. 
 
 
 
39 11 Del. C. § 1448(b), (c). 
40 Lum, 101 A.3d at 971. 
41 Id. 
 
15 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice