Title: Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 18, 2020

Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc. Annotate this Case Justia Opinion Summary Pfizer’s Human Resources Department sent an e-mail to Pfizer employees at their corporate e-mail addresses announcing Pfizer’s five-page Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement (Agreement) and included a link to that document. The e-mail also included a included a link to a document that listed “Frequently Asked Questions,” including “Do I have to agree to this?” to which the response indicated, “The Arbitration Agreement is a condition of continued employment with the Company. If you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, it will be a contractual agreement that binds both you and the Company.” The “FAQs” document also encouraged any employee who had “legal questions” about the Agreement “to speak to [his or her] own attorney.” Pfize terminated Amy Skuse's employment in August 2017, and Skuse filed a complaint alleging that Pfizer and the individual defendants violated the Law Against Discrimination by terminating her employment because of her religious objection to being vaccinated for yellow fever. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. Skuse opposed the motion, contending that she was not bound by Pfizer’s Agreement, arguing that she was asked only to acknowledge the Agreement, not to assent to it, and that she never agreed to arbitrate her claims. The trial court dismissed Skuse’s complaint and directed her to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the Agreement. The Appellate Division reversed, identifying three aspects of Pfizer’s communications to Skuse as grounds for its decision: Pfizer’s use of e-mails to disseminate the Agreement to employees already inundated with e-mails; its use of a “training module” or a training “activity” to explain the Agreement; and its instruction that Skuse click her computer screen to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement in the event that she remained employed for sixty days, not to “agree” to the Agreement. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the Agreement was valid and binding, and held the trial court was correct in enforcing it. Read more Want to stay in the know about new opinions from the Supreme Court of New Jersey? Sign up for free summaries delivered directly to your inbox. Learn More › You already receive new opinion summaries from Supreme Court of New Jersey. Did you know we offer summary newsletters for even more practice areas and jurisdictions? Explore them here .This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. Amy Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc. (A-86-18) (082509)Argued February 3, 2020 -- Decided August 18, 2020PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court reviews the trial court’s decision dismissing plaintiff Amy Skuse’s complaint against her former employer, Pfizer, Inc., and ordering arbitration of her employment discrimination claims. Pfizer’s Human Resources Department sent an e-mail to Pfizer employees at their corporate e-mail addresses announcing Pfizer’s five-page Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement (Agreement) and included a link to that document. The following language appeared in bold font on the final page of the Agreement: You understand that your acknowledgement of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. If you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and you will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through your acceptance of and/or continued employment with the Company.The e-mail also included a included a link to a document that listed “Frequently Asked Questions,” including “Do I have to agree to this?” to which the response indicated, “The Arbitration Agreement is a condition of continued employment with the Company. If you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, it will be a contractual agreement that binds both you and the Company.” The “FAQs” document also encouraged any employee who had “legal questions” about the Agreement “to speak to [his or her] own attorney.” Additional e-mails assigned the “Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement and Acknowledgment” as part of Pfizer’s module-based training program, noting that agreement to individual arbitration was a condition of employment, and included a link to launch that module, which consisted of four slides. The first slide noted that agreement to individual arbitration was a condition of employment; the second contained 1 instructions for opening the Agreement; the third slide contained language similar to the final page of the Agreement (reproduced above); a box with an arrow pointing upward to that language instructed the employee to “CLICK HERE to acknowledge.” The fourth slide thanked the employee for reviewing the Agreement, provided an e-mail address for questions, and included a means to exit the “course.” Pfizer terminated Skuse’s employment in August 2017, and Skuse filed a complaint alleging that Pfizer and the individual defendants violated the Law Against Discrimination by terminating her employment because of her religious objection to being vaccinated for yellow fever. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. Skuse opposed the motion, contending that she was not bound by Pfizer’s Agreement, arguing that she was asked only to acknowledge the Agreement, not to assent to it, and that she never agreed to arbitrate her claims. The trial court dismissed Skuse’s complaint and directed her to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the Agreement. The Appellate Division reversed, identifying three aspects of Pfizer’s communications to Skuse as grounds for its decision: Pfizer’s use of e-mails to disseminate the Agreement to employees already inundated with e-mails; its use of a “training module” or a training “activity” to explain the Agreement; and its instruction that Skuse click her computer screen to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement in the event that she remained employed for sixty days, not to “agree” to the Agreement. 457 N.J. Super. 539, 555-61 (App. Div. 2019). The Court granted certification. 238 N.J. 374 (2019).HELD: Pfizer’s Agreement and related communications informed Skuse that if she remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty days from her receipt of that Agreement, she was deemed to assent to it. Those communications clearly and unmistakably explained the rights that Skuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with waiver- of-rights case law, and Pfizer’s delivery of the Agreement by e-mail did not warrant its invalidation. Pfizer’s use of the word “acknowledge” was appropriate in the circumstances of this case, given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other expressions of assent that immediately preceded that request. Pfizer should not have labeled its communication explaining its arbitration agreement a “training module” or training “activity,” but that is not a basis to invalidate the Agreement. The Agreement was valid and binding, and the Court concurs with the trial court’s decision to enforce it.1. Federal law specifically permits states to regulate contracts, including contracts containing arbitration agreements, under general contract principles. For any waiver-of- rights provision to be effective, the party who gives up rights must have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrender those rights. New Jersey case law requires that a waiver-of-rights provision be written clearly and unambiguously. In an employment setting, employees must at least know that they have agreed to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination. (pp. 18-23) 2 2. Applying those principles, Pfizer’s Agreement and its related communications clearly informed Skuse that by continuing to be employed for sixty days, she would waive her right to pursue employment discrimination claims against Pfizer in court. New Jersey contract law recognizes that in certain circumstances, conduct can constitute contractual assent. Pfizer informed employees, with the clarity that New Jersey’s waiver-of-rights law requires, that continued employment after the policy’s effective date would constitute acceptance of the Agreement’s terms. Further, as required by case law, Pfizer clearly explained to Skuse the rights that she would relinquish if she remained employed after the policy’s effective date and thereby assented to the Agreement’s terms. The Agreement’s language complied with the Court’s mandate in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 446 (2014), that a waiver-of-rights provision clearly and unambiguously state that the plaintiff is “waiving her right to sue or go to court to secure relief.” Pfizer’s communications also explained in general terms what arbitration, the agreed-upon method of dispute resolution, would entail, with no confusing references to mediation as in Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 323-26 (2019). Finally, Skuse’s LAD claim was indisputably included in the Agreement’s broad language describing the employment-related claims subject to arbitration, and it does not fall within the exceptions to that policy enumerated in the Agreement. (pp. 23-28)3. The Court next considers the method by which Pfizer chose to deliver its Agreement and accompanying communications to Skuse. Even if Skuse were to contend that she did not review Pfizer’s e-mails and their attachments because of the volume of e-mails addressed to her -- which she does not -- her failure to review Pfizer’s communications would not invalidate the Agreement. Under case law, any contention by Skuse that she completed Pfizer’s e-mailed module without reading its contents or the documents linked to it would have no impact on the analysis. Moreover, no principle of New Jersey contract law bars enforcement of a contract because that contract is communicated by e- mail, rather than by the transfer of a hard-copy document. And here, nothing in the e- mailed communications in this case concealed the Agreement or understated its importance. The Court does not share the Appellate Division’s view that Pfizer’s decision to communicate the Agreement and related materials to its employees by e-mail warrants invalidation of the Agreement. (pp. 28-33)4. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that Pfizer’s characterization of its slides summarizing the Agreement as “training” was a misnomer. When it disseminates an arbitration agreement, an employer may choose to use tools developed for its training program. The employer should not, however, label those communications as “training.” Although a reference to “training” in an employer’s communication of an arbitration policy might be regarded as misleading an employee in a different setting, however, Pfizer’s use of the term does not invalidate the Agreement in the circumstances here. (pp. 33-34) 3 5. This case is distinguishable from Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 305-07 (2003). Here, what Skuse was asked to “acknowledge” -- what she did “acknowledge” -- was her understanding that she “must agree” to the Agreement, and that whether or not she clicked the “acknowledge” button, she would be deemed to have “consented to, ratified and accepted” the Agreement through her continued employment at Pfizer. Although the word “acknowledge” could be vague or misleading in a different setting, it was an appropriate term as used here. (pp. 35-40) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the trial court’s order is REINSTATED. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring, is persuaded by the totality of the evidence that plaintiff clearly and unmistakably understood that she was agreeing to submit any disputed employment issue to an arbitrator rather than a court and notes that plaintiff has not raised the argument that the arbitration provision constituted an illicit, industry-wide contract of adhesion. Justice Albin cautions, however, that when every employment and consumer contract contains such a clause across an entire profession or industry, when employees and consumers have no choice but to waive their right to resolve their disputes in a judicial forum in order to get a job or buy a good, the Court will have to address a more profound question: Are such contracts of adhesion contrary to New Jersey’s most fundamental public policy -- the constitutional right to a civil jury trial -- and therefore unconscionable and unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act and its state counterpart? That is the great issue that will confront the Court, in Justice Albin’s view. In his concurrence, Justice Albin sets the stage for what is at stake. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting, notes that the Appellate Division decision carefully parses the online “training module” defendant Pfizer used and explains why the module lacks clear and unmistakable proof that Pfizer’s employees agreed to waive the right to have their day in court. Chief Justice Rabner fears that today’s opinion not only sanctions what took place but also ushers in a new day for arbitration agreements. Going forward, Chief Justice Rabner asks, what employer will ask an employee to agree to settle a dispute through arbitration and waive the right to proceed in court if it is enough simply to ask the employee to acknowledge she received a statement of company policy and deem consent from her continuing to show up for work? More is required to show clear and unmistakable assent in any context, Chief Justice Rabner explains, and more should be required before employees are asked to give up their constitutional and statutory rights to have their day in court.JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurrence. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 86 September Term 2018 082509 Amy Skuse, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Pfizer, Inc., John D. Witzig, Paul Mangeot, and Connie Corbett, individually, jointly, severally and/or in the alternative, Defendant-Appellants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 457 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2019). Argued Decided February 3, 2020 August 18, 2020Thomas A. Linthorst argued the cause for appellants (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Jackson Lewis, attorneys; Thomas A. Linthorst, Sam S. Shaulson, John M. Nolan, Carla D. Macaluso, and Timothy M. McCarthy, on the briefs).Alan H. Schorr argued the cause for respondent (Schorr & Associates, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr, on the briefs).David R. Kott argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey Business & Industry Association, Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey, and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce (McCarter & English, attorneys; 1 David R. Kott and Edward J. Fanning, Jr., of counsel and on the brief, and Steven H. Del Mauro, on the brief). Andrée P. Laney argued the cause for amicus curiae Employers Association of New Jersey (Ford & Harrison and Employers Association of New Jersey, attorneys; Mark A. Saloman, of counsel and on the brief, and Jeffrey A. Shooman, on the brief). William D. Wright argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (The Wright Law Firm, attorneys; William D. Wright and David T. Wright, on the brief). Richard M. Schall argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (Schall & Barasch, attorneys; Richard M. Schall, on the brief). Leah S. Robinson submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (Mayer Brown, attorneys; Leah S. Robinson, Archis A. Parasharami, of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Daniel E. Jones, of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief). Gavin J. Rooney submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (Lowenstein Sandler, attorneys; Gavin J. Rooney and Justin Corbalis, on the brief). JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision dismissing plaintiffAmy Skuse’s complaint against her former employer, Pfizer, Inc., and orderingarbitration of her employment discrimination claims. 2 In 2016, four years after it hired Skuse, Pfizer notified her of a newarbitration policy that would become a condition of her employment. Underthat policy, if an employee continued to work for Pfizer for sixty days afterreceiving a copy of Pfizer’s Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement(Agreement), that employee would be deemed to have assented to theAgreement, waived the right to litigate in court several categories ofemployment-related claims, and agreed to arbitrate those claims. Skuseopened e-mails that linked to the Agreement, completed a “training module”regarding the arbitration policy, and clicked a box on her computer screen thatasked her to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement as acondition of her continued employment after sixty days. Skuse continued to work for Pfizer for another thirteen months.Following a dispute between Pfizer management and Skuse as to whether sheshould be required to receive a particular vaccine, Pfizer terminated heremployment. Skuse filed this action against Pfizer and three of its employees,asserting claims based on the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1to -49 (LAD). Pfizer moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.The trial court enforced Pfizer’s Agreement, dismissed the complaint, andordered the parties to arbitrate Skuse’s claims. 3 The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s determination. It heldthat Pfizer’s communications to Skuse regarding the Agreement wereinadequate to ensure that she knowingly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrateher claims and waive her right of access to the courts. Skuse v. Pfizer Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 539, 561 (App. Div. 2019). The Appellate Division identifiedthree aspects of Pfizer’s communications to Skuse as grounds for its decision:Pfizer’s use of e-mails to disseminate the Agreement to employees alreadyinundated with e-mails; its use of a “training module” or a training “activity”to explain the Agreement; and its instruction that Skuse click her computerscreen to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement in the eventthat she remained employed for sixty days, not to “agree” to the Agreement.Id. at 555-61. We conclude that Pfizer’s Agreement and related communicationsinformed Skuse that if she remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty daysfrom her receipt of that Agreement, she was deemed to assent to it. We holdthat those communications clearly and unmistakably explained the rights thatSkuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with our waiver-of-rights case law. We further determine that Pfizer’s delivery of theAgreement by e-mail did not warrant its invalidation. We view Pfizer’s use ofthe word “acknowledge” -- in its request that Skuse click to “acknowledge” 4 her obligation to arbitrate disputes with her employer if she remained a Pfizeremployee sixty days later -- to be appropriate in the circumstances of this case,given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other expressions of assentthat immediately preceded that request. We concur with the AppellateDivision that Pfizer should not have labeled its communication explaining itsarbitration agreement a “training module” or training “activity,” but we do notview that as a basis to invalidate the Agreement. Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s determination andreinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and orderingarbitration. I. A. On May 5, 2016, Pfizer’s Human Resources Department sent an e-mailto Pfizer employees at their corporate e-mail addresses.1 The e-mailannounced Pfizer’s five-page Agreement and included a link to that document. The first section of the Agreement, entitled “Mutual ArbitrationAgreement,” provided:1 We derive our summary of the facts from the allegations of the complaint and the record presented to the trial court in connection with Pfizer’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. 5 Except as expressly set forth in section 3, titled, “Claims Not Covered by this Agreement,” all disputes, claims, complaints, or controversies (“Claims”) that you have now or at any time in the future may have against Pfizer and/or any of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, current and former officers, directors, employees, and/or those acting as an agent of the Company (which make up the definition of “Company”), or that the Company has now or at any time in the future may have against you, including claims relating to breach of contract, tort claims, wrongful discharge, discrimination and/or harassment claims, retaliation claims, claims for overtime, wages, leaves, paid time off, sick days, compensation, penalties or restitution, including but not limited to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”), the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law, arising out of and/or directly or indirectly related to your application for employment with the Company, and/or your employment with the Company, and/or termination of your employment with the Company (collectively “Covered Claims”), are subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by arbitration and NOT by a court or jury. THE PARTIES HEREBY FOREVER WAIVE AND GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO HAVE A JUDGE OR JURY DECIDE ANY COVERED CLAIMS. Either party to this Agreement may make application to a court for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief in aid of arbitration or for 6 the maintenance of the status quo pending arbitration, if the award to which the party may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such relief. The following language appeared in bold font on the final page of theAgreement: You understand that your acknowledgement of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. If you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and you will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through your acceptance of and/or continued employment with the Company. The May 5, 2016 e-mail stated that under the Agreement, “bothcolleagues and Pfizer agree that arbitration will replace state and federal courtsas the place where certain employment disputes are ultimately decided,” andthat “arbitrators will resolve the disputes, rather than judges or juries.” It alsoincluded a link to a document entitled “Mutual Arbitration and Class WaiverAgreement FAQs,” which listed “Frequently Asked Questions,” including: 4. Do I have to agree to this? The Arbitration Agreement is a condition of continued employment with the Company. If you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, it will be a contractual agreement that binds both you and the Company. 7 5. Can I change any parts of the agreement that I do not like? No, you cannot change any of the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. 6. Do I give up any rights under the Arbitration Agreement? Please review the Arbitration Agreement carefully to fully understand its terms and conditions. By agreeing to the Arbitration Agreement through continuing your employment with Pfizer, you are giving up the right to bring employment-related claims covered by the Agreement against Pfizer in a court of law. Instead, you are agreeing to arbitrate those claims before a neutral arbitrator. You are also agreeing to bring those claims on an individual basis and not on a class action, collective action, or representative action basis. Pfizer is also giving up the right to bring employment-related claims covered by the Agreement against you in court and is agreeing to bring any such claims on an individual basis in arbitration. The “FAQs” document informed employees that Pfizer “cannot provideyou with legal advice about the legal impact” of the Agreement. It stated thatPfizer encouraged any employee who had “legal questions” about theAgreement “to speak to [his or her] own attorney.” The “FAQs” documentalso explained the details of the arbitration proceedings contemplated by theAgreement. 8 On May 5 and 6, 2016, as part of Pfizer’s “Power2Learn” module-basedtraining program, Pfizer sent a second e-mail to approximately 28,540 Pfizeremployees at their Pfizer e-mail addresses. In that e-mail, Pfizer advised eachemployee that he or she had been “assigned the activity, Mutual Arbitrationand Class Waiver Agreement and Acknowledgment.” The e-mail stated thatthe employee had been assigned the training “activity” because “[a]s acondition of your employment with Pfizer, you and Pfizer agree to individualarbitration as the exclusive means of resolving certain disputes relating to youremployment.” The e-mail added “[t]his agreement is contained in the MutualArbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. It is important that you are aware ofthe terms of this Agreement.” In its second e-mail, Pfizer informed the employees that the due date forcompleting the “activity” was July 4, 2016, the date on which the Agreementwould become effective. The e-mail included a link by which the employee would launch the“Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement” module, choose to proceedin English or Spanish, and review the module. The module consisted of four slides. The first slide stated: As a condition of your employment with Pfizer, you and Pfizer agree to individual arbitration as the exclusive means of resolving certain disputes relating to your employment. This agreement is contained in 9 the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. It is important that you are aware of the terms of this Agreement. The next page contains the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. You will be able to review and print the Agreement. You will then be asked to acknowledge your receipt of the Agreement. The second slide instructed the employee to “[c]lick the 'Resources’ tabin the upper-right corner to review the Agreement” and identified that tab withan arrow. The slide instructed that after opening the “Resources” tab, theemployee “may print the Agreement and retain for your records.” It instructedthat after reviewing the Agreement, the employee should “close the window toreturn to this page.” The third slide stated: I understand that I must agree to the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement as a condition of my employment. Even if I do not click here, if I begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and I will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through my acceptance of and/or continued employment with the Company. Just below the language set forth above, a box with an arrow pointingupward to that language instructed the employee to “CLICK HERE toacknowledge.” 10 The fourth slide thanked the employee “for reviewing the MutualArbitration and Class Waiver Agreement.” It provided an e-mail address forthe employee to use if he or she had questions about the Agreement andinstructed the employee to “[c]lick 'Exit’ to exit this course.” B. In 2012, Pfizer hired Skuse to work as a flight attendant in its corporateaviation operations, based at its aviation facility in West Trenton. Skuse was an active Pfizer employee on May 5 and 6, 2016, when Pfizersent its two e-mails to employees announcing its arbitration Agreement.Pfizer’s records indicate that Skuse received both e-mails. On June 9, 2016,Pfizer sent Skuse an e-mail confirming that she had completed the MutualArbitration and Class Waiver Agreement training module at 7:33 p.m. on thatdate. The dispute that gave rise to this action concerned Pfizer’s policyrequiring its corporate aviation flight attendants to be vaccinated for yellowfever. Skuse, a practicing Buddhist who has adhered to a vegan diet all heradult life, refused the yellow fever vaccine on the ground that it containedanimal products. She states that during the first five years of her employmentat Pfizer, she was never asked or pressured to be vaccinated for yellow fever. 11 According to Skuse, in April 2017, the two managers to whom shereported gave her “an ultimatum to receive the yellow fever vaccination”within thirty days “or be terminated.” She asserts that her managers ignored aletter from her doctor and her requests for exemptions from the vaccinationrequirement on religious and medical grounds, and that they persistentlypressured her to be vaccinated or be terminated, prompting her to have a“breakdown from all of the threats.” Skuse contends that she was granted medical leave but was not permittedto return to work at the conclusion of that leave, and that Pfizer refused toreasonably accommodate her request to be exempted from the vaccinationrequirement. On August 11, 2017, Pfizer terminated Skuse’s employment. II. A. Skuse filed a complaint against Pfizer, the two managers to whom shereported and a Pfizer human resources executive. Skuse alleged that Pfizerand the individual defendants violated the LAD by terminating heremployment because of her religious objection to being vaccinated for yellowfever. She demanded compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, andother relief. 12 Invoking the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, and theNew Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, Pfizer and theindividual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to compelarbitration. Skuse opposed the motion, contending that she was not bound byPfizer’s Agreement. She asked the court to assume for purposes of the motionthat she “got the email and that she saw the screen that said, I acknowledgereceipt of this policy.” Skuse argued, however, that in Pfizer’scommunications on May 5 and 6, 2016, she was asked only to acknowledgethe Agreement, not to assent to it, and that she never agreed to arbitrate herclaims. Citing the FAA and the NJAA, the trial court granted the motion filed byPfizer and the individual defendants. The court noted that it was undisputedthat the Agreement covered Skuse’s LAD claims and that, if the Agreementwere held to be binding, the claims would be subject to arbitration. The trialcourt concluded that Skuse assented to the Mutual Arbitration and ClassWaiver Agreement module by clicking the “acknowledge” box that appearedon the module’s third slide. Citing Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP, 441 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. 2015), the court found that Skuse’s continuedemployment after the effective date of Pfizer’s arbitration policy constituted 13 assent to arbitration in accordance with Pfizer’s Agreement. Accordingly, thetrial court dismissed Skuse’s complaint and directed her to proceed toarbitration in accordance with the Agreement. B. Skuse appealed the trial court’s judgment. The Appellate Divisiongranted amicus curiae status to the National Employment Lawyers Associationof New Jersey, the Employers Association of New Jersey, and the New JerseyCivil Justice Institute. Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 551. The Appellate Division observed that under United States SupremeCourt jurisprudence applying the FAA, state-law contract principles governcontract formation in a dispute over the arbitrability of a claim. Id. at 552(citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011)). Thecourt recognized Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003), as the statelaw “guiding precedent” on mutual assent and knowing and voluntary waiverof rights in arbitration agreements between employers and employees. Id. at552-53. The Appellate Division noted a distinction between Leodori, in whichthe employer sought but did not obtain the employee’s physical signature onan “agreement” form, and this matter, in which the employer used a computertraining module “to communicate and impose the terms of its mandatory 14 arbitration policy.” Id. at 555. It concluded, however, that like the arbitrationagreement in Leodori, the arbitration agreement in this case was not agreed toand was thus unenforceable. Id. at 555-61. The Appellate Division viewed“the wording and method of Pfizer’s training module” to be “inadequate tosubstantiate an employee’s knowing and unmistakable assent to arbitrate andwaive his or her rights of access to the courts.” Id. at 561. It thereforereversed the trial court’s judgment. Ibid. C. We granted Pfizer’s petition for certification. 238 N.J. 374 (2019). Wealso granted amicus curiae status to the New Jersey Association for Justice, theNew Jersey Business & Industry Association, the Commerce and IndustryAssociation of New Jersey, the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, and theChamber of Commerce of the United States of America. The NationalEmployment Lawyers Association of New Jersey, the Employers Associationof New Jersey, and the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute continue toparticipate as amici curiae. III. A. Pfizer and the individual defendants argue that the trial court properlyenforced a valid and binding arbitration agreement between it and its 15 employee, Skuse. They cite Pfizer’s announcement of its arbitration policy inits May 5 and 6, 2016 e-mails, which provided a link to that Agreement.Pfizer and the individual defendants assert that when Skuse “acknowledged”the Agreement, she agreed to be bound by that Agreement, and that even ifSkuse’s completion of the module was not sufficient to bind her to theAgreement’s terms, her continued employment for thirteen months thereafterunambiguously effected a waiver of her rights. They argue that anyheightened standard imposed by New Jersey law for the waiver of rights in theemployment arbitration setting would diverge from the requirements imposedby state law on other types of contracts, thus contravening the FAA as appliedin Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 581 U.S.___, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). B. Skuse contends that the Appellate Division properly reversed the trialcourt’s determination. She states that New Jersey case law treats arbitrationcontracts as it treats any other contract and that, accordingly, this appeal doesnot implicate Kindred Nursing. Skuse argues that Pfizer did not ask her to“agree” to the Agreement, but only to acknowledge that she received theAgreement. To Skuse, that acknowledgement does not satisfy the standardprescribed by this Court in Leodori. 16 Skuse asserts that Pfizer’s notice to her that she would be “deemed tohave consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through [her]acceptance of and/or continued employment with the Company” was likewiseinadequate to express her individual assent to that Agreement. She urges thatwe hold that in the absence of an unambiguous agreement to arbitration, it isher subjective intent, not her assumed intent, that governs. C. Amici curiae New Jersey Business & Industry Association, Commerceand Industry Association of New Jersey, New Jersey Chamber of Commerce,Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, EmployersAssociation of New Jersey, and the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute urge thatwe reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment. Amici assert that to the extentthat state law would impose a more exacting test for assent in an arbitrationdispute than it does in other contractual settings, it would run afoul of the FAAand the Supreme Court’s decision in Kindred Nursing. Amici contend thatunder state contract law principles, Skuse assented to Pfizer’s Agreement whenshe clicked the box “acknowledging” her agreement and elected to remainemployed after the effective date of Pfizer’s arbitration policy. 17 D. Amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jerseyand New Jersey Association for Justice argue that the Appellate Divisiondecision should be affirmed. Amici assert that Pfizer failed to demonstrateSkuse’s assent to its Agreement because she did nothing more than receive andacknowledge that Agreement. They contend that the communications betweenPfizer and Skuse do not satisfy the contractual formation principles applied toall agreements under New Jersey law. IV. A. “Whether a contractual arbitration provision is enforceable is a questionof law, and we need not defer to the interpretative analysis of the trial orappellate courts unless we find it persuasive.” Kernahan v. Home WarrantyAdm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019). We review de novo the trialcourt’s determination that Skuse’s claims are subject to arbitration. See ibid.;Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 445-46 (2014). B. The FAA and the NJAA “enunciate federal and state policies favoringarbitration.” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440; see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339,346 (noting section 2 of the FAA reflects “a liberal federal policy favoring 18 arbitration” and “the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter ofcontract” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Martindale v.Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002) (recognizing “the affirmative policy ofthis State, both legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a mechanism forresolving disputes”). Pursuant to the FAA, courts must “place arbitration agreements 'onequal footing with all other contracts.’” Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1424(quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468(2015)); see also Arafa v. Health Express Corp., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slipop. at 18) (noting in the FAA, “Congress intended to place arbitrationagreements upon the same footing as other contracts” (internal quotationmarks omitted) (quoting Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 208(2019)). Thus, a state may not “subject an arbitration agreement to moreburdensome requirements than those governing the formation of othercontracts.” Leodori, 175 N.J. at 302. “An arbitration clause cannot beinvalidated by state-law 'defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derivetheir meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”Atalese, 219 N.J. at 441 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339). Notwithstanding the FAA’s preemptive effect, federal law “specificallypermits states to regulate contracts, including contracts containing arbitration 19 agreements under general contract principles.” Martindale, 173 N.J. at 85.New Jersey may “regulate agreements, including those that relate toarbitration, by applying its contract-law principles that are relevant in a givencase.” Leodori, 175 N.J. at 302. Accordingly, we look to state-law principlesgenerally applicable to contracts involving the waiver of rights as thegoverning law in this appeal. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 441. V. A. Guided by contract principles stated in our case law, we determinewhether Skuse assented to the arbitration of her LAD claims. In that inquiry, we first determine whether the terms of the Agreementitself and the language appearing in Pfizer’s explanatory materials satisfy NewJersey’s state law standard governing contractual waiver of rights. We nextconsider whether the Appellate Division correctly concluded that theAgreement was unenforceable because Pfizer chose “an inadequate way for anemployer to go about extracting its employees’ agreement” to arbitrate. Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 542. 20 B. 1. An arbitration agreement must be the result of the parties’ mutual assent,according to customary principles of state contract law. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. Thus, “there must be a meeting of the minds for an agreement to existbefore enforcement is considered.” Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 319. For any waiver-of-rights provision to be effective, the party who givesup rights must “have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrenderthose rights.” Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003). When the waiver ofrights is an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes, courts “require[] someconcrete manifestation of the employee’s intent as reflected in the text of theagreement itself.” Leodori, 175 N.J. at 300 (quoting Garfinkel v. MorristownObstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 135 (2001)). “Ourjurisprudence has stressed that when a contract contains a waiver of rights --whether in an arbitration or other clause -- the waiver 'must be clearly andunmistakably established.’” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 444 (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 132). In Atalese, we invalidated an arbitration clause in a consumer contractthat did not explain to the consumer that by signing the agreement, she waived 21 her right to pursue her statutory claims in court. Id. at 445-48. We observedthat [n]owhere in the arbitration clause is there any explanation that plaintiff is waiving her right to seek relief in court for a breach of her statutory rights. . . . The provision does not explain what arbitration is, nor does it indicate how arbitration is different from a proceeding in a court of law. Nor is it written in plain language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is waiving statutory rights. The clause here has none of the language our courts have found satisfactory in upholding arbitration provisions -- clear and unambiguous language that the plaintiff is waiving her right to sue or go to court to secure relief. [Id. at 446.] Emphasizing “that no prescribed set of words must be included in anarbitration clause to accomplish a waiver of rights,” we held that an arbitrationclause, “at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain thatthe plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a juryresolve the dispute.” Id. at 447. In Kernahan, we reviewed a provision in a consumer contract entitled“Mediation” that addressed two different methods of alternative disputeresolution -- arbitration and mediation -- in a contradictory and confusingmanner and identified the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial 22 Mediation Rules as the exclusive method of resolving the parties’ disputes. 236 N.J. at 323-26. We held that the provision’s “references to arbitrationcannot be harmonized with the title of the section and the intended use of theCommercial Mediation Rules in order to give rise to an enforceable agreementto arbitrate,” and that its “small typeface, confusing sentence order, andmisleading caption exacerbate the lack of clarity in expression.” Id. at 326.Given the “material discrepancies that call[ed] into question the essential termsof the purported agreement to arbitrate,” we found that there was no mutualassent and declined to compel arbitration. Id. at 327. Our case law thus requires that a waiver-of-rights provision be writtenclearly and unambiguously. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443; Leodori, 175 N.J. at 302.In an employment setting, employees must “at least know that they have'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employmentrelationship or its termination.’” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 447 (alteration inoriginal) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135). 2. Applying those principles, we conclude that Pfizer’s Agreement and itsrelated communications clearly informed Skuse that by continuing to beemployed for sixty days, she would waive her right to pursue employmentdiscrimination claims against Pfizer in court. The Agreement, the e-mails, the 23 “FAQs” document, and the module explained that an employee would assent toarbitration of covered disputes by virtue of his or her continued employmentfor sixty days. New Jersey contract law recognizes that in certain circumstances,conduct can constitute contractual assent. See, e.g., Martindale, 173 N.J. at 88-89 (“[I]n New Jersey, continued employment has been found to constitutesufficient consideration to support certain employment-related agreements.”);Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 436 (1992) (“An offeree maymanifest assent to the terms of an offer through words, creating an expresscontract, or by conduct, creating a contract implied-in-fact.”). Indeed, inJaworski, the Appellate Division enforced the employer’s agreement providingthat an employee “indicates his or her agreement to the Program [mandatingarbitration] and is bound by its terms and conditions by beginning orcontinuing employment” after a specific date. 441 N.J. Super. at 474-75. Pfizer unambiguously explained that an employee’s continuedemployment after the arbitration policy’s effective date would be deemed toconstitute his or her assent to the arbitration policy. The Agreement stated, inbold font, that the employee’s acknowledgement of the Agreement was notrequired for that Agreement to be enforced, and that the employee would be 24 “deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement” byaccepting or continuing employment with Pfizer after the effective date. That message was underscored by Pfizer’s additional communications.The May 5, 2016 e-mail explained that “[a]ll covered colleagues will be boundby the agreement as part of their continued employment at Pfizer.” The“FAQs” page linked to that e-mail provided that “[t]he [a]rbitration[a]greement is a condition of continued employment with the Company. If youbegin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of thisAgreement, it will be a contractual agreement that binds both you and theCompany.” In addition, the first of the four slides comprising the modulestated that “[a]s a condition of [the employee’s] employment with Pfizer,” theemployee agreed to “individual arbitration as the exclusive means of resolvingcertain disputes relating to your employment.” Pfizer thus informed employees, with the clarity that our waiver-of-rights law requires, that continued employment after the policy’s effective datewould constitute acceptance of the Agreement’s terms. It advised Skuse that ifshe remained employed by Pfizer after July 4, 2016, her conduct wouldconstitute assent to arbitration in accordance with the Agreement’s terms. Shehad the option to leave her employment if it was unacceptable to her that most 25 potential disputes between her and Pfizer would be arbitrated rather thanresolved by a jury or judge. Pfizer’s communications comported with our waiver-of-rights law in asecond critical respect. As our decisions in Atalese and Kernahan require,Pfizer clearly explained to Skuse the rights that she would relinquish if sheremained employed after the policy’s effective date and thereby assented to theAgreement’s terms. The Agreement provided that the claims affected wouldbe resolved by arbitration, not “by a court or jury,” and -- in capital letters --that the parties “forever waive and give up the right to have a judge or a jurydecide any covered claims.” Pfizer’s May 5, 2016 e-mail stated that under theAgreement, “arbitration will replace state and federal courts as the place wherecertain employment disputes are ultimately decided,” and that arbitrators,“rather than judges or juries,” would resolve the disputes. The Agreement’slanguage complied with our mandate in Atalese that a waiver-of-rightsprovision clearly and unambiguously state that the plaintiff is “waiving herright to sue or go to court to secure relief.” 219 N.J. at 446. Pfizer’s communications also explained in general terms whatarbitration, the agreed-upon method of dispute resolution, would entail, withno confusing references to mediation as in Kernahan. Its Agreement,summarized on the “FAQs” page, briefly described an arbitration proceeding, 26 defined the arbitrator’s role, explained the effect of an arbitrator’s decision,identified a specific arbitration organization as the administrator of itsprogram, and designated that organization’s employment arbitration rules asthe governing rules for the proceeding. Those communications informedSkuse “that there is a distinction between resolving a dispute in arbitration andin a judicial forum,” Atalese, 219 N.J. at 445, and made clear that if sheassented, arbitration would be “the only means of dispute resolutionpermitted” to her, see Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 325-26. Finally, Skuse’s LAD claim was indisputably included in theAgreement’s broad language describing the employment-related claims subjectto arbitration, and it does not fall within the exceptions to that policyenumerated in the Agreement. In sum, the terms of the Agreement, supported by the explanatorydocuments that accompanied it, met the standard of clarity that our decisionsimpose in all respects. Those communications informed Skuse that byremaining employed at Pfizer, she would give up the right to pursue her LADclaims in court and would instead be required to submit those claims toarbitration as described in the Agreement. And the Agreement and Pfizer’sother communications left no question that Skuse’s continued employmentwould be deemed to constitute her assent, thus ensuring that her potential 27 employment discrimination claims against her employer would be resolved byarbitration. C. We next consider the method by which Pfizer chose to deliver itsAgreement and accompanying communications to Skuse. The Appellate Division premised its reversal of the trial court’s decisionon three aspects of Pfizer’s communications with Skuse: its use of e-mail toconvey important information to employees overwhelmed by too manyworkplace e-mails, Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 555-57; its labeling of its slidessummarizing the Agreement as a “training module” or training “activity,” id.at 557; and its choice of the term “acknowledge,” rather than the term “agree”in the “click box” at the presentation’s end, id. at 558-59. We consider each inturn. 1. The Appellate Division observed that employees who work in offices are“inundated” with incoming e-mails and that they “send out a large number oftheir own e-mails.” Id. at 556. The court took judicial notice that in order todeal with the volume of e-mails that they receive, “people frequently skim (orscroll through without reading) written material sent to them digitally,” such as 28 computer applications downloaded online, or “impersonal messages orannouncements from organizations.” Ibid. The Appellate Division held that the terms used in Pfizer’s e-mails in“assigning” the “training module” actually “dilute[d] the legal significance andnecessary mutuality of the contractual process.” Id. at 557. It expressed doubtthat all Pfizer employees took the time to read the Agreement linked to themodule. Id. at 558. It viewed Pfizer’s use of e-mail as a factor warrantinginvalidation of the Agreement. Id. at 555-58. We concur with the Appellate Division that many of our State’sresidents receive large volumes of e-mails in the workplace, and that it is notalways feasible for a given employee to scroll through and carefully read eachof the e-mails that he or she receives. We do not share the AppellateDivision’s view, however, that this indisputable challenge faced by manyworkers invalidates the Agreement. See ibid. Even if Skuse were to contend that she did not review Pfizer’s May 5and 6, 2016 e-mails and their attachments because of the volume of e-mailsaddressed to her -- which she does not -- her failure to review Pfizer’scommunications would not invalidate the Agreement. As the AppellateDivision has observed, “[a]s a general rule, 'one who does not choose to read acontract before signing it cannot later relieve himself of its burdens.’ The onus 29 was on plaintiff to obtain a copy of the contract in a timely manner to ascertainwhat rights it waived by beginning the arbitration process.” RiversideChiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 238 (App. Div.2008) (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386(1960)); see also Goffe, 238 N.J. at 212 (“[T]he argument that [a] plaintiff didnot understand the import of the arbitration agreement and did not have itexplained to her by the dealership is simply inadequate to avoid enforcementof [the] clear and conspicuous arbitration agreement[] [she] signed.”). Anycontention by Skuse that she completed Pfizer’s e-mailed module withoutreading its contents or the documents linked to it would have no impact on theanalysis. See Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 386. Moreover, no principle of New Jersey contract law bars enforcement of acontract because that contract is communicated by e-mail, rather than by thetransfer of a hard-copy document. If we were to adopt such a rule, it wouldinvalidate contracts that have been negotiated and transmitted electronicallyfor decades. We decline to do so here. Indeed, our contract law recognizes that an electronic communicationmay be a clear and effective method of communicating proposed contractterms. Rejecting the contention that an online agreement containing a forumselection clause should be viewed differently from a forum selection clause on 30 a cruise ticket that the United States Supreme Court had upheld, the AppellateDivision observed that [t]he scenario presented here is different because of the medium used, electronic versus printed; but, in any sense that matters, there is no significant distinction. The plaintiffs in [Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)] could have perused all the fine-print provisions of their travel contract if they wished before accepting the terms by purchasing their cruise ticket. The plaintiffs in this case were free to scroll through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before clicking their agreement. [Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 118, 125 (App. Div. 1999)]. As the Appellate Division there noted, “[w]e discern nothing about thestyle or mode of presentation, or the placement of the provision, that can betaken as a basis for concluding that the forum selection clause was profferedunfairly, or with a design to conceal or de-emphasize its provisions.” Id. at125-26. It accordingly enforced the disputed clause. 2 Ibid. But see Hoffman2 Contracts that require “that a user consent to any terms or conditions by clicking on a dialog box on the screen in order to proceed with the internet transaction” are sometimes called “clickwrap” agreements. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007). “Even though they are electronic, clickwrap agreements are considered to be writings because they are printable and storable.” Ibid. Such agreements are “routinely enforced by the courts.” HealthPlanCRM, LLC v. AvMed, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (W.D. Pa. 2020) (slip op. at 38); see Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (clickwrap agreements are valid and routinely enforced); Hancock v. AT&T Co., Inc., 701 F.3d 1248, 1258 (10th Cir. 2012) 31 v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., LLC, 419 N.J. Super. 596, 611 (App. Div. 2011)(holding the disputed forum selection clause presumptively unenforceablebecause it was concealed from offeree in “a submerged portion of thewebpage” and was not clearly presented, in contrast to the provision in Caspi). As in Caspi, and in contrast to Hoffman, nothing in the e-mailedcommunications in this case concealed the Agreement or understated itsimportance. To the contrary, Pfizer highlighted that Agreement in two e-mailsto the employees concerned. Each e-mail provided a conspicuous link to theAgreement itself. The first prominently announced and explained Pfizer’s newarbitration policy and linked to the “FAQs” page discussing the import of theAgreement and suggesting that an employee might seek to review it withcounsel. The second launched the module summarizing the Agreement.Moreover, contrary to the Appellate Division’s suggestion that an employeecould easily miss the Agreement because it was sent by e-mail, thesecommunications could not be ignored because every employee was required to(same); Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 235-38 (enforcing clickwrap agreement); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 , 594-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that “[t]he few courts that have had occasion to consider click- wrap contracts have held them to be valid and enforceable,” but invalidating the agreement at issue because “the user [did not] need [to] view any license agreement terms or even any reference to a license agreement, and [did not] need [to] do anything to manifest assent to such a license agreement other than actually taking possession of the product.”), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 32 access and complete the module by a stated deadline. Pfizer presented its newarbitration policy as an important development and emphasized itsconsequences. Accordingly, we do not share the Appellate Division’s view that Pfizer’sdecision to communicate the Agreement and related materials to its employeesby e-mail warrants invalidation of the Agreement. 2. The Appellate Division viewed Pfizer’s description of its four-slidesummary of the Agreement as a “training module” and “activity” in its trainingprogram to be misleading. Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 559. We agree thatPfizer’s characterization of its slides summarizing the Agreement as “training”was a misnomer. When an employer instructs an employee about an aspect of his or herjob or mandates that an employee review and agree to abide by the policiesthat it expects the employee to honor in the workplace, it is “training” theemployee. When an employer informs an employee that it has adopted anarbitration policy and that his or her continued employment will constituteassent to arbitrate potential disputes, “training” is not the most accurate wordto describe what transpires. 33 When it disseminates an arbitration agreement, an employer may chooseto use tools developed for its training program, such as e-mail notice toemployees, mandatory review of an agreement along with other relevantdocuments within a prescribed period, and digital confirmation that theemployee has reviewed the materials provided. Those techniques mayhighlight the importance of the arbitration materials to the employee andensure that the communications were received and reviewed. The employershould not, however, label those communications as “training.” In our view, however, Pfizer’s use of the term “training” in itscommunications does not invalidate the Agreement. By virtue of their contentand tone, Pfizer’s communications could not be misconstrued as a routinecomponent of a training program. In its May 5 and 6, 2016 e-mails and theirattachments, Pfizer signaled a fundamental change in the manner in whichpotential disputes would be resolved. Pfizer plainly informed employees thatthey needed to understand and act on the new policy, and that they should seekthe advice of counsel if they had legal questions about it. Although a referenceto “training” in an employer’s communication of an arbitration policy might beregarded as misleading an employee in a different setting, Pfizer’s use of theterm does not invalidate the Agreement in the circumstances here. 34 3. Finally, the Appellate Division held that because Pfizer requested thatSkuse “CLICK HERE to acknowledge” at the end of its module, instead ofasking that she click to “agree,” she did not assent to the Agreement’s terms.Id. at 558-61. Relying on this Court’s decision in Leodori, the AppellateDivision deemed it “vital that this momentous segment of the module make'unmistakably’ clear that the employee is voluntarily agreeing to thearbitration policy, and not simply acknowledging it.” Id. at 559. In Leodori, we considered an employer’s decision to require eachemployee to sign a specific form as an expression of his or her intent to agreeto the employer’s arbitration policy. 175 N.J. at 303-07. There, the employerissued to all employees a handbook that set forth the company’s arbitrationpolicy and identified that policy as “a term and condition of [the employee’s]continued employment.” Id. at 296. It issued two separate forms with itshandbook: an “acknowledgement” form that included a space for theemployee to acknowledge that he or she had received the handbook butincluded no details on the arbitration policy, and a form entitled “EmployeeHandbook Receipt and Agreement,” to be signed by the employee, stating thatany claims other than worker’s compensation or unemployment compensationclaims would be subject to arbitration. Id. at 297-98. The plaintiff signed the 35 “acknowledgment” form but declined to sign the “Receipt and Agreement”form; on the latter, “[t]he signature line in [the] plaintiff’s copy was leftblank.” Id. at 298. We held that because the plaintiff did not sign the “Receipt andAgreement” form, he did not assent to arbitration. Id. at 305. We observedthat the acknowledgment form that plaintiff did sign would have sufficed as concrete proof of a waiver had it stated that the employee had agreed to the more detailed arbitration provision contained in the handbook. (The acknowledgment form states only that plaintiff had “received” the handbook, not that he had “agreed” to its terms.) We assume that even large employers presently require their employees to sign similar forms as a routine part of the handbook-distribution process. Thus, with minimal effort, employers can revise the language to include an indication that the recipient has received and agreed to an arbitration policy. The acknowledgment form need not recite that policy verbatim so long as the form refers specifically to arbitration in a manner indicating an employee’s assent, and the policy is described more fully in an accompanying handbook or in another document known to the employee. [Id. at 307.] The communications at issue in this case differ fundamentally fromthose at issue in Leodori. 36 First, the employer in Leodori designated the employee’s signature onthe “Employee Handbook Receipt and Agreement” form -- not his signature onthe “acknowledgement” form or any other conduct -- as the method by whichthe employee would assent to the arbitration agreement. Id. at 305-06. Wecited Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 60 (Am. Law Inst. 1981), whichprovides that “[i]f an offer prescribes the place, time or manner ofacceptance[,] its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to createa contract.” See id. at 306. Based on that provision, we held that “[o]urcontract law does not permit defendant to contemplate or require plaintiff’ssignature on an agreement and then successfully to assert that the omission ofthat signature is irrelevant to the agreement’s validity.” Ibid. As we noted, theemployer’s “own documents contemplated plaintiff’s signature as a concretemanifestation of his assent.” Ibid. We concluded that “[a]bsent plaintiff’ssignature here, we cannot enforce the waiver provision unless we find someother unmistakable indication that the employee affirmatively had agreed toarbitrate his claims.” Id. at 307. This appeal raises no such considerations. No form intended to confirmthe employee’s assent was left unsigned, as was the case with the plaintiff’s“Review and Agreement” form in Leodori. No writing -- paper or digital --was designated by the employer to be the employee’s expression of assent, let 37 alone refused by Skuse. Instead, the prescribed form of assent here was theemployee’s decision to remain employed after the effective date of thearbitration policy. As the Appellate Division observed in Jaworski, [h]ere, unlike Leodori, where the employer’s “own documents contemplated [the employee’s] signature as a concrete manifestation of assent,” [the employer’s] ADR policy provided: “An Employee indicates his or her agreement to the Program and is bound by its terms and conditions by beginning or continuing employment with [the employer] after July 18, 2007 (the 'Effective Date’).” Not only did [the employee] continue with [the employer] after the Effective Date, thus manifesting his intent to be bound pursuant to the unambiguous and specifically [] emphasized terms of the Program, he did so for an additional five years until his termination in 2012. [Jaworski, 441 N.J. Super. at 474 (second alteration in original) (emphasis and citation omitted).] Here, as in Jaworski, the employee assented to the Agreement inaccordance with Pfizer’s designated method of expressing assent -- hercontinued employment for an additional sixty days after she received theAgreement. Second, there are stark distinctions between the “acknowledgement”form signed by the plaintiff in Leodori and the page containing the “CLICKHERE to acknowledge” button in Pfizer’s arbitration module. 38 In Leodori, the “acknowledgement” form only generally mentioned theemployee handbook and did not “refer specifically to arbitration”; only the“Receipt and Agreement” form that the plaintiff refused to sign specificallyaddressed arbitration. Leodori, 175 N.J. at 295-97. Moreover, the“acknowledgement” form made no reference to any agreement. Id. at 297. Itconfirmed only that the employee had “received a copy” of the employeehandbook; that he understood that the handbook included “information ondivision policies and programs” that he was “responsible for knowing”; andthat he understood that the policies and programs were “subject to change atthe discretion of senior management and that the handbook and its contents arenot a contract of employment.” Ibid. On its face, the form was thusuntethered to the question of arbitration. Ibid. Pfizer’s use of the word “acknowledge” on the third page of the module,in contrast, was plainly tied to the arbitration provision at issue. 3 That pagewas entitled “Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement andAcknowledgement,” and the Agreement’s full title was also mentioned on thefirst line of that page. It is evident from the language of that page that the3 The module’s first slide, previewing the slides that followed, imprecisely stated that the employee would be asked to “acknowledge [his or her] receipt” of the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. As the third slide makes clear, the acknowledgement that appears on that slide entails much more than the employee’s mere “receipt” of the Agreement. 39 “CLICK HERE to acknowledge” button directly relates to Pfizer’s arbitrationpolicy, as set forth in that Agreement. Significantly, the language immediately preceding “CLICK HERE toacknowledge” used several other terms that denote assent. What Skuse wasasked to “acknowledge” -- what she did “acknowledge” -- was herunderstanding that she “must agree” to the Agreement, and that whether or notshe clicked the “acknowledge” button, she would be deemed to have“consented to, ratified and accepted” the Agreement through her continuedemployment at Pfizer. As she clicked the “CLICK HERE to acknowledge”button, Skuse was reminded yet again that if she remained employed at Pfizerfor an additional sixty days after receiving the Agreement, she would bedeemed to have agreed to that Agreement’s terms. Although the word“acknowledge” could be vague or misleading in a different setting, it was anappropriate term as used here. D. In sum, Pfizer’s Agreement explained to Skuse in clear andunmistakable terms the rights that she would forego if she assented toarbitration by remaining employed at Pfizer for sixty days. Although Pfizer’s“training module” was not an optimal method of conveying to Skuse heremployer’s arbitration policy, Pfizer’s May 5 and 6 e-mails, the link to the 40 Agreement contained in those e-mails, the “FAQs” page, and the summariesthat appeared on the four pages collectively explained, with the clarity that ourlaw requires, the terms of the Agreement to which Skuse agreed by virtue ofher continued employment. Accordingly, we hold that the Agreement was valid and binding, and weconcur with the trial court’s decision to enforce it. VI. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the trial court’sjudgment dismissing the complaint and ordering the parties to arbitrate theirdispute is reinstated. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurrence. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate. 41 Amy Skuse, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Pfizer, Inc., John D. Witzig, Paul Mangeot, and Connie Corbett, individually, jointly, severally and/or in the alternative, Defendant-Appellants. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I concur with the majority opinion because, despite any displeasure Imay have with the online waiver-of-rights procedure used by the employer, thetotality of the evidence persuades me that plaintiff clearly and unmistakablyunderstood that she was agreeing to submit any disputed employment issue toan arbitrator rather than a court. In this appeal, plaintiff has not raised theargument that the arbitration provision in her employment agreementconstituted an illicit, industry-wide contract of adhesion.11 “[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without opportunity for the 'adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.” See Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992). 1 The arbitration cases that have come before our Court have generallyaddressed whether employees or consumers had clearly and unmistakablywaived their right to seek relief in a judicial forum for a breach of contract or astatutory violation. In that respect, this case is no different. But soon employers and corporations will develop the perfect,unassailable arbitration clause. When every employment and consumercontract contains such a clause across an entire profession or industry, whenemployees and consumers have no choice but to waive their right to resolvetheir disputes in a judicial forum in order to get a job or buy a good, we willhave to address a more profound question. Are such contracts of adhesioncontrary to New Jersey’s most fundamental public policy -- the constitutionalright to a civil jury trial -- and therefore unconscionable and unenforceableunder the Federal Arbitration Act and its state counterpart? That is the greatissue that will confront the Court. I will not attempt to resolve that issue here,for this is not the time or the case. But I do want to set the stage for what is atstake. I. Alternative dispute resolution suggests a choice -- an alternative. Whenan entire industry or profession inserts in employment and consumer contractsarbitration provisions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the public has no real 2 choice. The option of rejecting an arbitration provision and foregoing either ajob offer or access to medical services or the opportunity to purchase a car isnot a choice. Most consumers who purchase goods and services and most jobseekers who search for employment have no bargaining power to demand theremoval of an arbitration clause. That is the reality of the marketplace. A. The benefits of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution forum aremany, and when parties freely contract for arbitration, those agreements -- likeall valid agreements -- must be enforced. Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc., 134 N.J. 275, 281-82 (1993). To be sure, arbitration provides an informal,“efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution.”Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 , 58 (1974); see also Kernahanv. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 324 (2019). Whenentered into freely, arbitration agreements give the parties what they bargainedfor -- the opportunity to choose a skilled and experienced arbitrator in aspecialized field to preside over and decide a dispute in a forum out of thepublic glare. Diverting cases from our overburdened civil justice system,moreover, allows more matters to be brought to a swifter conclusion. Significantly, “[t]he Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16,and the nearly identical New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 3 2A:23B-1 to -32, enunciate federal and state policies favoring arbitration.”Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 440 (2014) (citingAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 339 (2011); Hojnowski v.Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 342 (2006); Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002)). Arbitration agreements, however, are governed undergeneral state contract principles. Id. at 441. Although the FAA and NJAArequire that a court “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing withother contracts,” ibid. (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339), those Actspermit a court to invalidate an arbitration provision, like any other provision,“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of anycontract,” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Martindale, 173 N.J. at 85. General state contract principles authorize courts to invalidate contractsthat contain terms that are unconscionable and in violation of public policy.Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 127 N.J. 344, 356 (1992).Consistent with those principles, on a number of occasions, we have exercisedour authority to strike down unconscionable contract terms on public-policygrounds. See, e.g., Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 247, 255-56(2017); Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1, 15-16,22 (2006); Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86, 104-05 (1980); 4 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 554-56 (1967). Industry-widecontracts of adhesion -- contracts that are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-- that impose unconscionable terms will not be enforced by our courts. Theclassic example for this proposition is the landmark case of Henningsen v.Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 385-408 (1960). In Henningsen, we struck down on public-policy grounds the terms of aconsumer contract for the purchase of an automobile that waived almost allwarranties concerning the merchantability of the vehicle. Id. at 404, 408. Theplaintiffs sued an automobile manufacturer and dealership for personal injuriesand consequential damages after the purchased vehicle crashed as a result of amanufacturing defect in the car. Id. at 364-65. The manufacturer anddealership disclaimed liability for the personal injuries caused by the defectiveautomobile, relying on the contract’s warranty-waiver provision. Id. at 367,404. The consumer contract “limit[ed] the manufacturer’s liability toreplacement of defective parts, and . . . disclaim[ed] all other warranties,express or implied.” Id. at 386. The warranty-waiver provision waseffectively an exculpatory clause. See id. at 372-73. This Court recognized that the entire automobile industry had adoptedsimilar exculpatory contract terms, giving consumer’s “no real freedom ofchoice.” Id. at 390-91, 404. The absence of freedom of contract was central to 5 our holding that the warranty-waiver provision violated public policy andtherefore was invalid. Id. at 391, 408. We stated that [t]he gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition among the car makers in the area of the express warranty. Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better protection? Such control and limitation of his remedies are inimical to the public welfare and, at the very least, call for great care by the courts to avoid injustice through application of strict common-law principles of freedom of contract. [Id. at 391.] The basic public policy at issue in Henningsen was the right of apurchaser to sue for defects in the manufacture of a vehicle, despite theautomobile industry’s form-contract disclaimers. Id. at 377, 403-04. When anentire profession or industry includes in an employment or consumer contract aprovision that all statutory or common law disputes must be resolved only byarbitration, the public policy at risk is the freedom to choose a judicial forumand to exercise the constitutional right to a civil jury trial. B. The right to trial by jury in civil cases is deeply rooted in New Jersey’shistory and “predates the founding of our Republic.” Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v.Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 134, 139-41 (2015). In seventeenth-century New Jersey,then divided into the provinces of West and East Jersey, the right to a jury trial 6 was codified in two separate enactments. Id. at 139; see Charter orFundamental Laws of West New Jersey ch. XXII (1676), http://www.njstatelib.org/wp-content/uploads/slic_files/imported/Research_Guides/Historical_Documents/nj/NJ05A.html; Fundamental Constitutions for theProvince of East New Jersey in America art. XIX (1683), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj10.asp. On July 2, 1776, New Jerseyratified its first Constitution, which declared “that the inestimable right of trialby jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law of this colony, withoutrepeal for ever.” N.J. Const. of 1776 art. XXII. New Jersey’s 1844 and 1947Constitutions both reaffirmed that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remaininviolate.” N.J. Const. of 1844 art. I, ¶ 7; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9. The civil jury trial has historically played a preeminent role in ourconstitutional system of justice -- a system that places “trust in ordinary menand women of varying experiences and backgrounds, who serve as jurors, torender judgments concerning liability and damages.” Cuevas v. WentworthGrp., 226 N.J. 480, 499 (2016) (quoting Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J. 256,279 (2007)). A jury trial is the ultimate example of self-government in ademocratic society. Lajara, 222 N.J. at 134. To many, a verdict rendered by ajury has greater currency than a judgment coming from any single individual,whether a special master, an arbitrator, or even a judge. 7 Today, industry-wide employment and consumer contracts of adhesionwith compelled arbitration provisions and forced waiver-of-rights clauses arerendering the right to a civil jury an anachronism. In considering the public-policy implications of this phenomenon, we must take account of what will belost with the demise of the civil jury trial. A trial by a jury of one’s peers -- representing a cross-section and thediversity of society -- is infused with community values. See ibid. Thoughmistakes are unavoidable in any human enterprise, six jurors deliberating-- examining the evidence and testing one another’s theories in the crucible ofdebate -- may be less prone to err than a solitary person whose views are notsubject to challenge. The right to a public trial ensures transparency that is absent from aclosed arbitration proceeding. Transparency of court proceedings allows thepublic and the press to serve as watchdogs over our justice system and to beeducated about how it functions. In an open judicial system, where grievancesare aired in a public forum, citizens can learn the identities of companies thatmanufacture dangerous products; the identities of employers who sexuallyharass their employees or discriminate on the basis of nationality or religion;the identities of landlords who turn away renters on the basis of race; theidentities of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals who repeatedly engage 8 in malpractice; the identities of home-improvement companies that engage inunconscionable practices; and much more. That valuable information thatbenefits an informed citizenry is kept under a veil of secrecy in arbitrationproceedings. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 Nev.L.J. 427, 431 (2018) (“[I]ndustry-wide arbitration replaces a court’s publicbenefit with secrecy. Because the public lacks meaningful oversight overarbitration, it cannot be assured that the process operates fairly. Importantly,arbitration also often removes the frequency, type, and result of disputes fromthe public eye, undercutting reputation’s ability to police market behavior .”(footnote omitted)). Public accountability leads to corrective actions: procedures toeliminate discrimination in the workplace, safer products, safer medicalprocedures, and heightened integrity in consumer transactions. Additionally,arbitration typically does not provide comparable civil-trial discovery that maybe needed to uncover well-concealed wrongdoing or negligence. Withoutaccess to civil trials and appellate review, there is no opportunity for theinterpretation of complex legal principles in legislative schemes or for thedevelopment and refinement of our common law. 9 For those who freely choose the many benefits of arbitration, the trade-off is fair. They can voluntarily and knowingly waive their rights to access thecourts through arbitration agreements. See Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. But for those who are herded into arbitration agreements throughindustry-wide employment and consumer contracts of adhesion, theadmonitions in Henningsen are worthy of thoughtful consideration. In strikingdown the industry-wide waiver of warranties in Henningsen, this Courtacknowledged the unequal bargaining power between consumers andautomobile manufacturers and the potential harm to the public good posed byexculpatory clauses. 32 N.J. at 384. The Henningsen decision undoubtedlyprodded the automobile industry to produce safer cars and therefore reducedthe number of injuries caused by defective vehicles. New Jersey’s four-century-old commitment to the civil jury trial-- inscribed in all three of our State Constitutions -- is a self-evidentexpression of a paramount public policy. Viewed through the prism of generalcontract principles, industry-wide arbitration agreements in contracts ofadhesion that compel an employee or consumer to waive his or herconstitutional right to a civil jury trial and accept arbitration, arguably, wouldbe unconscionable and violative of public policy. An arbitration agreementvoided on that non-discriminatory basis would not appear to offend either the 10 FAA or NJAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Martindale, 173 N.J. at 85; Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 384-408. That issue is for another day and is not raised in the appeal before us. For the present, I concur in the majority opinion. 11 Amy Skuse, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Pfizer, Inc., John D. Witzig, Paul Mangeot, and Connie Corbett, individually, jointly, severally and/or in the alternative, Defendant-Appellants. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting. I respectfully dissent largely for the reasons stated in Judge Sabatino’sthoughtful opinion in Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div.2019). The decision carefully parses the online “training module” defendantPfizer used. It also explains why the module lacks clear and unmistakableproof that Pfizer’s employees agreed to waive the right to have their day incourt. I. Basic contract principles apply to arbitration agreements. Kernahan v.Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 307 (2019). To begin with,both sides must agree to any contract. If only one side consents, there is no“meeting of the minds” and no “legally enforceable agreement.” Atalese v. 1 U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014) (quoting Morton v. 4Orchard Land Tr., 180 N.J. 118, 120 (2004)). In short, “[a]n agreement toarbitrate, like any other contract, 'must be the product of mutual assent.’”Ibid. (quoting NAACP of Camden Cty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt., 421 N.J. Super. 404, 424 (App. Div. 2011)). Beyond that, an arbitration agreement is a contract under which bothsides agree to waive the right to proceed in court to resolve their disputes.Ibid. (citing Foulke, 421 N.J. Super. at 425). For a waiver to be valid, theparties must knowingly and voluntarily give up their rights. Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003). Courts therefore look to the language of anywaiver-of-rights provision to see if it “clearly and unambiguously” sets forthan agreement “to arbitrate the disputed claim.” Leodori v. Cigna Corp., 175 N.J. 293, 302 (2003); see also Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443-44, 448; Garfinkel v.Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001). In light of those unremarkable principles, a valid waiver requires “anexplicit, affirmative agreement that unmistakably reflects the employee’sassent.” Leodori, 175 N.J. at 303 (emphases added). In short, there must be(1) a provision that plainly alerts the parties they are giving up a right -- in thiscase, the right to litigate in court, and (2) clear and unmistakable proof thatboth parties agreed to the provision. 2 Application of those basic principles under state contract law does notrun afoul of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See First Options of Chi., Inc.v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 , 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the partiesagreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts generally . . . should applyordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”); see also9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of anycontract”); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415(2019) (citing First Options and observing that “courts may ordinarily” enforcearbitration agreements “by relying on state contract principles”). II. The documents Pfizer provided to its employees plainly called forarbitration of employment-related disputes. This appeal instead turns on thesecond of the above two elements: whether there is clear and unmistakableproof that Pfizer’s employees assented or agreed to arbitration. Here, neitherthe “acknowledgment” of company policy that Pfizer elicited from itsemployees, nor a one-sided declaration that consent would be deemed bydefault, met that standard. Pfizer first sent its employees an email that announced and outlined itsarbitration policy. The message, by itself, could not and did not establish that 3 a recipient agreed to the policy. Pfizer suggests that assent can be found fromthe language of the training module it emailed the next day. That is not thecase, however. The first screen of the training module states that arbitration is acondition of employment with Pfizer and then adds, in clear language, “Thenext page contains the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. Youwill be able to review and print the Agreement. You will then be asked toacknowledge your receipt of the Agreement.” (emphasis added). Words matter, and the words Pfizer used told its employees they wouldbe asked to acknowledge they had received the Agreement. Not that theyreviewed and agreed with it, or “consented to, ratified and accepted” theAgreement. Just that they had received it. Yet later in the training module,Pfizer used the very words “consented to, ratified and accepted” as a way to“deem” assent. The second screen provides a way for employees to review and print theAgreement. That leads into the third screen, which reads as follows: [1] I understand that I must agree to the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement as a condition of my employment. [2] Even if I do not click here, if I begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and I will be deemed to have consented to, 4 ratified and accepted this Agreement through my acceptance of and/or continued employment with the Company.Immediately below, the following critical language appears: “CLICK HEREto acknowledge.” 1 The first part of the third screen contains a statement of company policy:arbitration is a condition of employment to work for Pfizer. Pfizer can set andenforce company policies that do not run afoul of “a clear mandate of publicpolicy.” See Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71-72 (1980); accordWoolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 291-92 (1985). But Pfizercannot declare that its employees agree with a policy and agree to waive theirrights. Only the employees can speak for themselves. As with any contract,one side cannot simply declare that the other agrees; clear and unmistakableproof of assent on both sides is needed. The module alternatively states that employees “will be deemed to haveconsented to, ratified and accepted this Agreement” if they continue to workfor sixty days. But one side deeming consent by default suffers from the sameflaw: it does not show clear and unmistakable proof that the other partyagrees. As the Appellate Division correctly observed, Pfizer’s “unilateral1 For purposes of Pfizer’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, plaintiff Amy Skuse, who worked for Pfizer before the company terminated her employment, did not dispute that she saw the screen. 5 declaration” of consent “is an attempt to bypass” elementary principles ofcontract law. Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 563. The cases cited by the majority do not compel a different outcome. Seeante at ___ (slip op. at 23-24). In Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., the Courtupheld an arbitration agreement set forth in an employment application. 173 N.J. 76, 81-82 (2002). Unlike here, the parties “executed a written agreementto arbitrate all claims against” the employer. Id. at 86. Similarly, in Jaworskiv. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP, all three plaintiffs in the case signed and assentedto at least one arbitration agreement. 441 N.J. Super. 464, 471, 473 (App. Div.2015). Amy Skuse never did. Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 562-63. And in Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, the Court rejected a real estatebroker’s claim that a developer had agreed to pay the broker a ten-percentcommission. 128 N.J. 427, 438-40 (1992). In the course of reviewing thebroker’s claim for breach of contract, the Court recounted a general principlethat words or conduct can sometimes manifest assent and create an implied-in-fact contract. Id. at 436 (citing 1 Williston on Contracts § 91 (3d ed. 1957)and other sources). The Court then provided examples, such as “when anofferee accepts the offeror’s services without expressing any objection to theoffer’s essential terms,” and “when a party confers a benefit with a reasonable 6 expectation of payment.” Id. at 436-37. Those situations are not instructivehere. The final page of Pfizer’s training module likewise fails to offer clearand unmistakable proof of assent. It “thank[s]” employees for “reviewing theMutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement.” (emphasis added). Again,the module makes no mention of “agreeing” or “consenting” to the Agreement,just “reviewing” it. III. Assent or agreement can easily be established through an online modulethat is emailed or a written document sent in the mail.2 Employers mustsimply use words of their own choosing that convey “the recipient hasreceived and agreed to an arbitration policy.” Leodori, 175 N.J. at 307. Thatwas not done here. There is no reason not to hold Pfizer to the words it chose: employeeswere expressly told they would be asked “to acknowledge . . . receipt of theAgreement” after having a chance to read it -- no more and no less. (emphasisadded).2 The Appellate Division noted an obvious fact of modern-day life -- that employees can be inundated with emails at work, which they “frequently skim.” Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 556. Nowhere, however, did the court rest its decision on Pfizer’s use of email to convey its arbitration policy. See id. at 555-58. But see ante at ___ (slip op. at 28-33). 7 Consider a related example. The majority today plainly upholds the useof the online training module in this case. I received and reviewed the opinionand acknowledge the majority’s position. Does that mean I agree with it? Ofcourse not -- because “acknowledge” and “agree” do not necessarily mean thesame thing. See Skuse, 457 N.J. Super. at 559 n.7 (citing Merriam-Webster’sCollegiate Dictionary 11 (11th ed. 2003)). To establish clear and unmistakableproof of assent requires more than an acknowledgment. The Court in Leodori made that clear. In that case, an employee signedan acknowledgment form that noted he “received” and “reviewed” theemployer’s handbook; the handbook contained a purported agreement toarbitrate. 175 N.J. at 297. The employee did not, however, sign a second formthat stated he “agreed” to the arbitration policy. Id. at 298. The Court foundthe waiver invalid because it could not conclude the employee “clearly hadagreed to it.” Id. at 295. As in this case, there was proof an employee understood and received acompany’s arbitration policy -- not that he agreed to it. Had he signed thesecond form, there would have been clear proof of assent. Id. at 307. That did not mark the end of the Court’s analysis, though. As the Courtexplained, without a signature on the latter form, the arbitration provisioncould not be enforced unless there was “some other explicit indication that the 8 employee intended to abide by that provision.” Id. at 305 (emphasis added).There was none, just as there is no explicit indication of assent in this case. Finally, to the extent language in Pfizer’s agreement is open to anotherinterpretation -- that employees not only received but also “agreed” in someway to Pfizer’s waiver-of-rights policy -- the Agreement “should be construedagainst the drafter,” who “'chose the words . . . susceptible to differentmeanings.’” Roach v. BM Motoring, LLC, 228 N.J. 163, 174 (2017) (quotingKieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 224 (2011)). In any event, an ambiguousagreement, by definition, cannot establish clear and unmistakable proof ofassent. IV. Many employers will understandably prefer the training module Pfizerused in this case. It is simpler to have employees click a screen andacknowledge they received a document, or to deem their consent by default,than it is to ask whether they agree to waive their right to resolve disputes incourt. The module eliminates the need to follow up with individuals whodisagree or fail to respond. But straightforward legal principles require bothsides to assent to form a contract. It is not enough to “acknowledge” astatement of policy or to deem consent by default. 9 The majority rightly criticizes some of the language defendant used. Seeante at ___ (slip op. at 33-34, 39 n.3, 40). Yet by upholding the so-calledtraining module, I fear that today’s opinion not only sanctions what took placebut also ushers in a new day for arbitration agreements. Going forward, whatemployer will ask an employee to agree to settle a dispute through arbitrationand waive the right to proceed in court if it is enough simply to ask theemployee to acknowledge she received a statement of company policy anddeem consent from her continuing to show up for work? More is required to show clear and unmistakable assent in any context.More should be required before employees are asked to give up theirconstitutional and statutory rights to have their day in court. For thosereasons, I respectfully dissent. 10