Title: In re Stauffer
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S43698
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 9, 1998

Filed:  April 9, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re:

	Complaint as to the Conduct of

	DAVID W. STAUFFER,

		Accused.

(OSB 93-63; SC S43698)

	On review of a decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board.

	Argued and submitted April 30, 1997.

	David W. Stauffer, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs in propria persona.

	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

	PER CURIAM

	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two-years commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

	*Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		PER CURIAM

		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charges that the accused violated Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rules (DR) 1-102(A)(4)
(conduct prejudicial to administration of justice), DR 5-105(C)
(former client conflicts of interest), DR 5-101(A) (lawyer's
self-interest conflict of interest), DR 2-106(A) (charging
clearly excessive fee), and DR 7-102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing
claim unwarranted under existing law).(1)  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 5-105(C), DR 5-101(A), and DR 2-106(A), but not DR
7-102(A)(2), and imposed a 120-day suspension.  The matter comes
before us pursuant to ORS 9.536(2) and Bar Rules of Procedure
(BR) 10.1 and 10.4.

		On review, the accused seeks the reversal of all
findings of ethical violations.  The Bar contends that the trial
panel erred in finding that the accused did not violate DR 7-102(A)(2) and recommends at least a one-year suspension.  This
court reviews the trial panel's decision de novo.  ORS 9.536(3);
BR 10.6.  The Bar has the burden of establishing misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 5.2.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 5-105(C), DR 5-101(A), DR 2-106(A), and DR 7-102(A)(2).  We further conclude that the appropriate sanction is
a two-year suspension.

FINDINGS OF FACT

		We find the following facts.  In 1986, John Smith, the
sole owner of an insurance agency, Corbett-Smith, Inc. (CSI),
died intestate.  CSI became the major asset of his probate estate
(the Estate).  The Estate's remaining assets consisted of
personal property valued at $10,000, two jointly held cars valued
at $5,000, and a one-half interest (net value $17,000) in a house
owned as tenant in common with Esther Smith (Smith), John Smith's
widow.  In July 1987, the original inventory valued the total
Estate at $132,000.  Smith, the sole beneficiary of the Estate,
was appointed personal representative of the Estate.  Smith was
61 years old when her husband died.  Lawyer Clayton Morrison
represented Smith as personal representative.  

		Initially, the Oregon Bank filed the only claim against
the Estate, in the amount of $9,291.33.  Because of insufficient
cash in the Estate, that claim was not discharged immediately.  	

	In March 1987, Smith, in her capacity as personal
representative of the Estate, sold CSI's business assets to Roger
and Joyce Atkins (the Atkinses) on contract for $5,000 down and
monthly payments of $1,600 for four years.  The Estate retained
ownership of CSI's stock.  Morrison represented Smith as personal
representative in the sale.  After making one payment, the
Atkinses defaulted on the contract.

		In August 1987, Smith executed a written retainer
agreement with the accused to represent her personally in
connection with "[d]isputes with Roger and Joyce Atkins, under
the AGREEMENT FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF BUSINESS ASSETS OF
CORBETT-SMITH, INC., * * * dated March 6, 1987."  Smith agreed to
pay the accused $100 per hour and to pay him at least $150
monthly.  Smith paid the accused $1,000 toward his retainer at
that time.  The retainer agreement specifically stated that
"[Smith] is personally responsible for the payment of fees and
costs incurred."  The accused billed her each month for his
services.  Over the course of several years, Smith paid the
accused about $6,000 under the 1987 retainer agreement.  In
September 1987, the accused informed the Atkinses by letter that
Smith had retained him to represent her in the contract dispute.

		Smith and the accused thereafter orally agreed that he
also would represent her in her capacity as personal
representative of the Estate.  See In re Phelps, 306 Or 508, 517,
760 P2d 1331 (1988) (the personal representative, not the estate
or beneficiary, is the client).  The accused did not advise Smith
about any actual or likely conflict of interest in his
representing her personally and in representing her as personal
representative of the Estate, nor did Smith consent to any actual
or likely conflict of interest.(2) 

		In September 1987, the accused filed a complaint on
behalf of the Estate and CSI against the Atkinses for breach of
contract.  The accused did not seek to have a receiver appointed
to protect the Estate's and CSI's interests in CSI's business
assets.

		In November 1987, Smith resigned as personal
representative of the Estate and George Birnie was appointed in
her place.(3)  The accused billed Smith personally for an
outstanding balance of $1,494 in November 1987, $2,499 in
December 1987, and $4,589 in January 1988.  

		By May 1988, Smith was behind in her monthly payments
to the accused.  The accused told Smith that he needed money to
bring the Atkins case to trial.  When Smith tried to borrow
against the house, the bank refused, because the Estate owned a
one-half interest in the property and, therefore, Smith did not
have clear title.  Smith then asked the accused to transfer the
Estate's interest in the house to her so that she could refinance
it and use the proceeds to pay his attorney fees and to finance
the up-coming Atkins litigation.  The accused checked with Birnie
and then prepared a personal representative's deed conveying the
Estate's interest to Smith, which Birnie signed.(4)  Neither Birnie
nor the accused obtained the probate court's approval for that
transfer to Smith.(5)  Birnie's 1988, 1989, and 1990 interim
accountings to the probate court did not disclose the transfer. 
The accused billed Smith personally for preparing and recording
the deed.  The accused requested by letter that Smith send him
$1,000 "to cover trial costs."  He reminded her that she was
seven months behind on her retainer agreement payments, adding "I
am confident that, as you have told me, your recent re-financing
of your house will provide you with adequate funds to make the
above payments."  Smith then refinanced the house and paid the
accused $1,400.  The accused continued to represent Smith
personally, as well as representing the personal representative
and CSI.  

		Also, in May 1988, the accused wrote to Smith advising
her that there was a probability that the Atkins claim could be
settled.  He suggested that Smith should try to create a
"settlement offer" in which the Atkinses would give CSI's
business assets back to the Estate and also pay an additional sum
of money to Smith, "such as the cost of [her] attorney fees."  In
October 1988, the accused billed Smith personally for $24,614.

		In October 1988, the accused advised Smith of a
tentative settlement offer from the Atkinses.  Smith rejected the
offer.  In a letter confirming their discussion, the accused
acknowledged that Smith was the president of CSI.

		The breach of contract case was tried in December 1988. 
A jury returned a verdict for CSI, awarding CSI $50,000 in actual
damages, less $10,444.53 on the Atkinses' counterclaim, and
judgment was entered against the Atkinses accordingly.  The
Atkins contract provided for an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party, and the accused claimed $47,820.  In his
affidavit on attorney fees, the accused stated that "plaintiffs"
Smith, as personal representative of the Estate, and CSI, had
"entered into a written contract with me and agreed to pay $100
per hour for my attorney services."  The written contract in the
record refers only to Smith, but does not identify her as
personal representative for the Estate or as president of CSI. 
Early in January 1989, the accused billed Smith personally for
$44,134.14.  In large measure, this billing was duplicative of
the attorney fees that the accused had claimed in the Atkins
litigation on behalf of the Estate and CSI.  

		On January 24, 1989, the Atkinses filed a petition for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  On January 28, 1989, the trial court in
the Atkins breach of contract case entered an amended judgment
awarding the Estate and CSI attorneys fees of $25,000. 
Representing the bankruptcy trustee in the Atkins bankruptcy
case, the accused claimed, unsuccessfully, that the Atkinses had
made a preferential transfer of about $33,000 to their lawyers.(6) 

		In February 1989, Smith retained lawyer Marvin Nepom,
on a contingent fee basis, to file a legal malpractice claim
against Morrison, claiming that Morrison had prepared the
contract for the sale of CSI's business assets to the Atkinses
negligently.  Smith's claim asserted that Morrison had failed to
advise and provide CSI with appropriate security interests in
CSI's business assets or to advise and provide for the
appointment of a receiver in the event that the Atkinses
defaulted on the contract.  At that time, Morrison's lawyer
raised with the Professional Liability Fund (PLF) the possibility
that the accused also may have been negligent, because as lawyer
for the personal representative, the accused had not sought to
have a receiver appointed when the Atkinses first defaulted on
the contract and when their lawyer suggested that they might file
for bankruptcy, thereby allowing the Atkinses to run CSI into the
ground so that there was no money remaining to pay CSI's judgment
against them.

		The accused asked Nepom to include his attorney fees as
part of the claim against Morrison.  In August 1989, in response
to Nepom's request, the accused contended in writing that Smith
owed him $48,000 for his services in the Atkins case.  The
accused added that, in his opinion, Smith "would probably not
have incurred my attorney fees if the contract had been properly
drafted [by Morrison]."  The accused also advised Nepom that he
was going to start imposing a 1.5% monthly interest charge on the
amount that he claimed Smith owed him.  That same day, the
accused notified Smith personally, Smith as president of CSI, and
Birnie, as personal representative of the Estate, that he
intended to start charging interest on the attorney fees that he
claimed were due him from Smith personally, and from the Estate,
and from CSI.  That was the first time that the accused sought to
charge the Estate and CSI for his services.  Before that time, he
had billed only Smith personally for his attorney fees. 
Meanwhile, the Estate remained open.  

		In August 1990, the PLF settled the malpractice claim
against Morrison for $39,000.	 Although the accused was not named
as a party in the Morrison malpractice claim, the PLF insisted
that the settlement include any potential malpractice claim that
Smith, the personal representative, or CSI might have against the
accused.  However, Nepom preserved Smith's right to assert the
accused's alleged malpractice in the Atkins case as an
affirmative defense to any claim that the accused might bring
against her personally to recover attorney fees.  Birnie approved
the Morrison settlement for the Estate and Smith approved it for
herself.  Nepom kept $9,649.71 as his contingent fee and $401.15
as costs, paid Birnie, as personal representative, $1,500, and
gave the balance, $27,449.14, to Smith.  Neither the Morrison
settlement, nor the formula for its distribution, was submitted
to the probate court for approval by Birnie or by the accused. 
At the disciplinary hearing, the Bar's expert witness suggested
that the accused may have acquiesced in the distribution of more
than $27,000 to Smith, because Smith then would have been able to
pay the accused's attorney fees from the Atkins litigation.  Had
that money been paid to the Estate, the accused would have had to
petition the probate court for approval of the payment of his
attorney fees.  At that time, the accused was looking only to
Smith to pay his attorney fees and Nepom's payment to Smith would
have enabled her to pay the accused immediately.

		In September 1990, the accused wrote to Smith, telling
her that she now owed him $57,360 ($48,000 in attorney fees and
$9,360 in interest).  He suggested that Smith should sell her
house to him, retaining a life estate for herself.  In his
letter, the accused explained to Smith that he was not writing in
his capacity as her lawyer, but was negotiating with her about
his attorney fee claim.  He recommended that she retain
independent legal counsel.  On Smith's behalf, Nepom
"unequivocally denied" the accused's claim, notifying him that
Smith would assert his alleged malpractice in the Atkins case as
a defense to his claim.  Nepom also warned the accused that, if
he sued Smith for attorney fees, Nepom would ask for sanctions
and attorney fees against the accused.  The accused responded to
Nepom by letter that he resigned as Smith's lawyer and that Smith
then owed him $60,700.70.  The accused continued to represent the
personal representative and CSI, billing them in excess of
$20,000 thereafter for additional attorney fees.  

		The Bar's complaint in this case does not charge the
accused with any ethical violation before October 1990.  

		In October 1990, the accused filed a $60,700.70 claim
against the Estate.  His claim included his attorney fees for the
Atkins litigation, plus about $10,000 in accrued interest.  The
accused informed Birnie that the accused should be listed as a
creditor of the Estate, that he had incurred $60,700.70 in fees
in the course of representing the Estate, and that, "[I]f any
assets have been distributed to any beneficiaries [i.e., to
Smith], I shall seek the return of those assets to the Estate." 
That same month, the accused wrote to Nepom demanding that Smith
"immediately pay the entire balance of the account, $60,700.70." 
The amount that the accused was claiming from the Estate was
duplicative of the amount that he also was claiming from Smith. 
In June 1991, the accused billed Smith for $67,801.70, which
included $16,640.01 in interest.

		In June 1991, Smith, represented by lawyer Thomas Renn,
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  Smith's petition recited
that the accused had an unsecured claim for $70,000 against her,
but that she disputed his claim.  The accused represented
himself, the personal representative, and CSI in Smith's
bankruptcy proceedings.  In September 1991, the accused,
representing himself, submitted claims asserting that Smith owed
him $67,801.70 for legal services performed from 1987 through
1990 and that Smith owed the Estate $44,000 (apparently the
$27,000 the accused believed Smith owed from the Morrison
settlement and the $17,000 net value of the Estate's interest in
the house that had been transferred to her).  In an affidavit
submitted to the bankruptcy court, the accused stated:  "I
believe I will be first in line to receive any money that those
entities [i.e., the Estate and CSI] might receive from any legal
actions that result in the collection of money by those
entities."

		During the next eighteen months, the accused
aggressively pursued his attorney fees claim against Smith in the
bankruptcy proceedings by asserting that she had failed to
declare, or had improperly transferred, assets.  Specifically, in
August 1991, and on subsequent occasions, the accused informed
the bankruptcy trustee about certain of Smith's assets (including
jewelry, vehicles, personal property, and settlement proceeds) of
which he had become aware during the course of his representing
her:

	"[D]ebtor [Smith] told me, several times, that she
owned jewelry worth $100,000.  Also, during our long
relationship, I observed such jewelry on several
occasions.  Much of it had great sentimental value to
the debtor * * *." 

The accused stated that he intended to purchase everything that 
Smith owned, including her house, and that her jewelry should be
made available to satisfy his attorney fees claim against Smith.

		In September 1991, the bankruptcy trustee decided to
recommend that Smith's case be considered a "no asset" case and
that she should receive a discharge.  When the trustee informed
the accused of his proposed recommendation to the bankruptcy
court and asked him, in his capacity as lawyer for the personal
representative of the Estate, to verify that no distribution of
Estate proceeds was expected, the accused responded that the
Estate could expect to receive $14,000 from the Atkinses
bankruptcy proceedings within 180 days due to his appeal of the
"preferential transfer" ruling in the Atkinses bankruptcy.  As
noted, the accused's challenge to that ruling later was
unsuccessful.  The accused made that response to the bankruptcy
trustee in order to prevent Smith from discharging his attorney
fees claim against her.  The bankruptcy trustee, however,
declined to approve the accused's claim against Smith.  The
accused then moved to have the trustee removed.  In response to
the accused's motion, the trustee resigned.  

		In October 1991, the bankruptcy court appointed a
successor trustee.  The accused immediately informed the
successor trustee of Smith's alleged undisclosed assets.  The
accused again offered to purchase Smith's house in an effort to
compel the sale of the house to pay his attorney fees claim
against her.

		In November 1991, Renn, Smith's bankruptcy lawyer,
wrote to the accused directing him "to immediately stop your
harassment of Mrs. Smith."  In response, the accused wrote to the
bankruptcy trustee, accusing Renn of libeling him and demanding a
written retraction and an apology.

		In December 1991, Smith dissolved CSI as an Oregon
corporation.

		In April 1992, the accused, on behalf of the personal
representative and CSI, made a claim on the PLF for $39,000 for
Nepom's alleged negligence in distributing part of the proceeds
of the Morrison settlement to Smith without court approval.  He
argued that the funds should have been paid to the Estate or to
CSI, so that the Estate's creditors, of which he was the largest,
could be paid.  The PLF responded, expressing puzzlement at the
accused's role as lawyer for the personal representative in
making a claim against Nepom while he was both another claimant
against the Estate and also represented the Oregon Bank, another
claimant against the Estate.  "That seems like an appearance of
conflict at the very least," the PLF advised the accused.

		In May 1992, the accused wrote to Smith's bankruptcy
lawyer and informed him that he intended to bid high enough for
Smith's house that the bankruptcy trustee would be required to
sell it.  Meanwhile, the accused continued to represent the
personal representative and CSI.  The accused continued to claim
that the Estate and CSI owed him the same attorney fees that he
also was claiming from Smith.  The annual accounting filed with
the probate court in July 1992 showed that the accused was
claiming $60,700 from the Estate for "legal services rendered to
this estate and to * * * Smith in her original capacity in
Executrix of this decedent's will."

		In July 1992, Birnie resigned as personal
representative and Mark Humphrey was appointed personal
representative.  The accused thereafter represented Humphrey as
personal representative.  The accused did not inform Smith of
Birnie's resignation or of Humphrey's appointment.

		In September 1992, responding to the claim against
Nepom, the PLF asserted that the accused had a conflict of
interest in continuing to represent the Estate and CSI while at
the same time "continu[ing] to hound [Smith] in her bankruptcy." 
The PLF also noted the accused's personal interest in the outcome
of the malpractice claim against Nepom, the fact that the accused
was using the probate as a vehicle to collect the attorney fees
that he was claiming from Smith personally, and what the PLF
characterized as the accused's "grossly excessive" attorney fees
claim billed to the Estate.

		In September 1992, Smith complained to the Bar about
the accused's conduct.  In October 1992, the accused complained
to the Bar about the conduct of Smith's bankruptcy lawyer.

		Also in October 1992, the PLF settled the malpractice
claim against Nepom for $10,000.  As a condition of the
settlement, the PLF required that an authorized representative of
CSI execute the settlement document.  By that time, however,
Smith had dissolved CSI as an Oregon corporation and CSI had
ceased any active business operations.  Therefore, the accused
met with Humphrey to discuss the Nepom settlement conditions. 
They concluded that the Estate owned CSI.  The accused and
Humphrey characterized their meeting as a shareholders' meeting
wherein Humphrey appointed the accused as president of CSI for
the sole purpose of executing the Nepom settlement document.  The
accused then agreed to the Nepom settlement on behalf of CSI. 
The accused received $3,333.33 as his attorney fees for handling
the settlement (pursuant to a separate contingency fee agreement
with Humphrey), and the balance of the Nepom settlement was
deposited in the Estate's trust account.  Meanwhile, at the
accused's urging, the bankruptcy trustee decided that Smith's
house should be sold for the benefit of her creditors.  Faced
with a forced sale of her home, Smith dismissed her Chapter 7
bankruptcy case and filed in Chapter 13.  

		The accused immediately objected to Smith's Chapter 13
petition, arguing that Smith had understated her debts in order
to qualify under the Chapter 13 jurisdictional limit (at that
time, less than $100,000 in non-contingent, unsecured liquidated
debt).  To bolster his assertion that Smith had more than the
approximate $46,000 debt that she claimed in her petition, the
accused filed proofs of claim on behalf of the personal
representative and CSI, asserting that Smith owed them $27,000
and $44,000, respectively.  Those claims were duplicative, in
that they each included the amount that Nepom had paid Smith from
the Morrison settlement.  That claimed debt pushed Smith over the
$100,000 jurisdictional limit and disqualified her from Chapter
13 bankruptcy.  In late 1992 or early 1993, Smith voluntarily
dismissed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. 

		In December 1992, Smith, represented personally by
lawyer Ferris Boothe, moved the probate court to discharge
Humphrey and to appoint her as personal representative of the
Estate.  The accused opposed that motion, arguing that Smith had
a conflict of interest.(7)  In the alternative, the accused argued
that, if Smith were appointed personal representative, she should
be required to post a $100,000 bond.

		In February 1993, the accused submitted his attorney
fees claim to Humphrey, asserting that the Estate and CSI owed
him $101,968.23.  Of that amount, $81,672.32 represented attorney
fees for the Atkins litigation and interest thereon, an amount
for which, according to the accused, Smith personally was
"jointly and severally liable."  The remaining $20,295.91
consisted of attorney fees for the accused's efforts in pursuing
his own creditor's claim against Smith in her bankruptcy case, in
responding to the Bar's inquiries about Smith's ethical
complaints against him, and in complaining to the Bar about Renn,
Smith's bankruptcy lawyer.  Humphrey approved the accused's
claimed attorney fees in full.  Humphrey testified later that,
essentially, he merely checked the accused's arithmetic and the
particularity of the billing summaries; otherwise, he did not
question the claim.

		In February 1993, the accused billed Smith for $81,672
"for the successful attorney work I did for her, as of February
4, 1993."  The accused demanded that Smith return to the Estate
the one-half interest in the house that the personal
representative previously had transferred to her (at the
accused's direction) and the $27,000 in Morrison settlement funds
that Smith had received from Nepom.  

		In the probate court, the accused asserted that the
Estate's interest in the house had been transferred to Smith
improperly, was being held by her improperly, and should be
returned to the Estate.  In May 1993, the accused's demands for
return of the house and Smith's motion to discharge Humphrey as
personal representative were settled by agreement of the parties. 
Humphrey's May 1993 final accounting valued the Estate's total
assets at $72,619.

		Aaron Reuland replaced Humphrey as personal
representative, and Richard Perry was named as the lawyer for the
personal representative.(8)  In exchange for that substitution,
Smith reconveyed a one-half interest in the house to the Estate.(9) 
The accused resigned as lawyer for the personal representative
and CSI in March 1993.

		In May 1993, Reuland disallowed the accused's claim for
attorney fees, which Humphrey previously had approved, on the
grounds that the attorney fees were excessive and had improperly
billed the Estate for time that the accused had devoted to his
personal claims.(10) 

		In August 1993, the accused moved the probate court to
order Reuland to show cause why the accused's claimed attorney
fees should not be approved.  At a hearing on that motion, the
probate court heard testimony from Birnie, Humphrey, Reuland,
Nepom, Smith, and the accused.  The court ruled that the accused
was entitled to receive no more than the amount that he already
had received (about $6,000 previously paid by Smith and the
$3,333 contingent fee from the Nepom settlement).  The court
specifically noted that a large portion of the accused's attorney
fees claim against the Estate was related to his efforts to
recover attorney fees from Smith personally.  The accused's
appeal from the probate court's ruling was dismissed as having
been taken improperly from a nonfinal judgment.  Stauffer v.
Reuland, A82222, appeal dismissed by order (October 28, 1994).

		In April 1994, Smith made a claim on the Estate, in the
amount of $50,062.76, for her contribution to the maintenance of
the house (one-half of which was now an Estate asset), as well as
other expenses related to the Estate.  Reuland allowed that claim
to the extent of Estate assets, $6,504.87 (the net proceeds from
the Nepom settlement), leaving a balance of $43,557.89 owing to
Smith.  Reuland thereafter withdrew as personal representative,
and Richard Uffelman was appointed as the Estate's fifth personal
representative and lawyer Richard Perry was appointed as lawyer
for the personal representative.  

		In August 1994, the house was sold, to the Estate's net
benefit of about $4,000.  As of July 1996, the date of the
disciplinary hearing herein, the probate of the Estate was still
open, due largely to tax complications resulting from the fact
that, in the years that the probate had remained open, the
property had appreciated significantly in value from the stepped-up tax basis that it had acquired at Mr. Smith's death.  In
October 1995, personal representative Uffelman filed his final
account and petitioned for summary closure of the Estate,
reporting to the probate court that the Estate was "insolvent."

		We proceed to consider the disciplinary rules that the
accused was charged with violating.

APPLICATION OF THE DISCIPLINARY RULES

	A.	DR 1-102(A) provides in part:

		"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

		"* * * * *

		"(4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice[.]"

The term "conduct" in the disciplinary rule refers to doing
something that a lawyer should not do, or failing to do something
that a lawyer should do.  In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746, 801 P2d
818 (1990).  Conduct is "prejudicial" if the conduct either: (1)
is repeated, causing some harm to the administration of justice
or (2) involves a single act causing substantial harm to the
administration of justice.  Id. at 748.  DR 1-102(A)(4) focuses
on the effect of the lawyer's conduct, not on the lawyer's
intent.  In re Claussen, 322 Or 466, 482, 909 P2d 862 (1996). 
The Bar charges that the accused improperly used the probate
process against Smith, his former client, in an attempt to
collect the attorney fees that he claimed she owed him. 

		In 1987, when the accused began representing Smith in
her capacity as personal representative of the Estate, the
Estate's assets were valued at $132,000.  The only claim against
the Estate at that time was the Oregon Bank's claim for
$9,291.33, for which Smith was jointly liable.  There was
insufficient cash in the Estate to pay that claim immediately. 
If the Estate had been closed in 1989, the accused could not have
billed the Estate for the Atkins litigation, the Atkins
bankruptcy proceeding, and Smith's bankruptcy proceeding, Smith's
complaint against him to the Bar, or his complaint to the Bar
about Smith's bankruptcy lawyer.  The accused had a personal
financial interest in all those proceedings.  He manipulated the
probate court to try to advance his own financial interests. 
With the exception of advising Smith in September 1990 that his
pursuit of his attorney fees had become adversarial and she
should seek separate counsel, no disclosure of any actual or
likely conflict of interest was made by the accused to any
current or former client and no consent to any conflict was
sought or obtained by him. 

		The accused argues that there was no conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, because the Estate
could not have been closed earlier as, he asserts, is shown by
interim reports submitted to the probate court by personal
representative Birnie.  However, those reports only explain that
there was insufficient cash available to pay the Estate's
debts.(11)

		The accused further argues that the Estate could not
have been closed until the appeal from the Atkinses' bankruptcy
had been finalized and that, by that time, Smith had improperly
received an additional $27,449.14 from the Morrison settlement. 
Those arguments ignore the fact that the Estate should have been
closed long before the Atkins trial.  Had the Estate been closed,
the later Atkins bankruptcy and the Morrison settlement would
have been irrelevant to the Estate.  Instead, what should have
been a simple and short probate still was not closed as of the
date of the disciplinary hearing in 1996.

		The accused's attorney fee claims against Smith were
the basis for his asking the probate court to order Smith to
return a one-half interest in her house to the Estate that he had
negotiated, no doubt in anticipation of his receipt of some of
the proceeds.  The Estate, which had an original estimated value
of $132,000 and an estimated value of $72,619 in 1993, ended up
having five personal representatives and being charged over
$100,000 in attorney fees by the accused.  The accused's attorney
fee claims became the subject of protracted and acrimonious
communications and litigation among many of the accused's
clients, lawyers, and trustees, after which the probate court
ruled that the accused's attorney fees would be limited to about
$9,000.  What should have been a straightforward fee dispute
between the accused and Smith personally ended up involving both
the probate court and the bankruptcy court over a period of
almost ten years.(12)

		In summary, this case involves a staggering amount of
unnecessary litigation and the multi-year probate of an
essentially no-asset estate, which should have been closed
promptly.  The accused used the probate and bankruptcy courts as
mere tools in his efforts to pursue his attorney fees claims
against Smith.

		The Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by engaging in repeated
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.  

	B.	DR 5-105(C) provides in part:

		"Except as permitted by DR 5-105(D), a lawyer who
has represented a client in a matter shall not
subsequently represent another client in the same or a
significantly related matter when the interests of the
current and former clients are in actual or likely
conflict.  Matters are significantly related if either:

		"(1) Representation of the present client in the
subsequent matter would, or would likely, inflict
injury or damage upon the former client in connection
with any proceeding, claim, controversy, transaction,
investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other
particular matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the former client[.]"

The Bar charges that the accused violated DR 1-105(C)(1) by
representing his current clients, the personal representative and
CSI, against his former client, Smith, in matters significantly
related to his earlier representation of her.  The Bar argues
that, due primarily to the accused's machinations in pursuit of
his claimed attorney fees, Smith was attacked from all sides by
entities and lawyers that common sense told her (as the Estate's
sole heir) should not be her adversaries.

		The accused argues that he never represented Smith
personally.  The record, however, belies the accused's position.
First, there is the 1987 retainer agreement between the accused
and Smith identifying her alone to be the accused's client. 
Second, before October 1990, all of the accused's billings were
sent to Smith.  Third, the accused asserted in Smith's bankruptcy
cases that she was his client.  We conclude that the accused
represented Smith personally.

		The accused represented his current clients, the
personal representative and CSI, against Smith.  The accused
represented the personal representative on a motion in the
probate court, seeking to declare improper the transfer of the
Estate's one-half interest in the house to Smith and to require
her to return it to the Estate, notwithstanding that he himself
had facilitated that transfer.  The accused argued below and now
continues to assert that he represented only Birnie in the 1988
house transfer and, therefore, that his subsequent attempts to
force Smith to return the half-interest in the house could not
constitute a former client conflict.  That assertion is not
supported by any facts.  The accused testified at the
disciplinary hearing that he considered Smith to be his client at
that time and that he arranged for the transfer at Smith's
request.  The record reflects that the accused billed her for
almost five hours of his time spent working on the property
transfer.

		The accused also represented the personal
representative and CSI in Smith's bankruptcy proceedings, using
what he earlier had learned of Smith's possible income and assets
in an attempt to persuade the bankruptcy trustee to pursue those
assets.  The accused argues that it was not improper for him to
use such information to collect the attorney fees that he claims
that Smith owed him and to protect himself from her attempt to
discharge her debt to him in bankruptcy.(13)  However, the accused
was representing not only himself in the bankruptcy case; he also
was representing the Estate and CSI.  Thus, he represented
current clients against a former client in matters significantly
related to his earlier representation of her.  We reject the
accused's argument that his representations in the bankruptcy
proceedings were actions taken against the bankruptcy trustee
rather than against Smith personally.  The accused's selfish
conduct in pursuit of his attorney fees injured both his former
client and his current clients.

		The Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused violated DR 5-105(C) by representing his current
clients, the personal representative and CSI, against his former
client, Smith, in matters significantly related to his earlier
representation of her.

	C.	DR 5-101(A) provides in part:

		"Except with the consent of the lawyer's client
after full disclosure, 

		"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests."

The Bar charges that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by
continuing to represent the personal representative and CSI when
his professional judgment was or reasonably may have been
affected by his own financial interests.  The evidence in the
record in support of that charge is overwhelming, and need not be
recited here again.

		The Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by continuing his
representation of the personal representative and CSI after it
became apparent that the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of those current clients was or reasonably may
have been affected by his own financial or personal interests in
pursuing his attorney fees claims against Smith.  

	D.	DR 2-106(A) provides:

		"A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee."

The Bar charged that the accused violated DR 2-106(A) by charging
the Estate a clearly excessive fee. 

		According to the first inventory filed with the probate
court, the initial value of the Estate was $132,000. 
Notwithstanding that value, the accused ultimately billed the
Estate for $101,967.  There was expert testimony at the
disciplinary hearing that charging an Estate with assets of
$132,000 more than $100,000 for professional services is a
clearly excessive fee.  As noted, the probate court allowed only
about $9,000 of the amount that the accused claimed. 

		We find no evidence in the record that the personal
representative or Smith, as President of CSI, retained the
accused to pursue the Atkins litigation.  Rather, Smith
personally retained him in August 1987 for that purpose. 
Nonetheless, beginning in October 1990, the accused began billing
the Estate and CSI for his services.  

		At the disciplinary hearing, there was expert testimony
that the personal representative of an estate such as John
Smith's would not have hired a lawyer on an hourly basis to
pursue the Atkins matter, because the Estate lacked the funds
necessary to pay a lawyer on that basis.  This may explain why
the accused made his retainer agreement with Smith personally and
not with the personal representative or CSI.

		The accused also billed the Estate for the time that he
spent in bankruptcy court seeking to avoid the discharge of his
disputed claims against Smith, as well as for the time he spent
defending himself against Smith's complaints to the Bar about 
him and his complaints to the Bar about Smith's bankruptcy
lawyer.(14) 

		The Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the accused violated DR 2-106(A) by charging both the Estate
and Smith clearly excessive fees.

	E.	Finally, we consider whether the accused violated DR 7-102(A), which provides in part:

		"In the lawyer's representation of a client or in
representing the lawyer's own interests, a lawyer shall
not:

		"* * * * *

		"(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is
unwarranted under existing law except that the lawyer
may advance such claim or defense if it can be
supported by good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."

The Bar charges that the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) by using
the Estate and CSI to pursue his attorney fees from Smith.  

		We find that the accused's claims in Smith's bankruptcy
(purportedly on behalf of the Estate and CSI) were unwarranted
for another reason:  They were duplicative and were filed for the
clear purpose of disqualifying Smith from Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
Legal deceit involving duplicative claims violates DR 7-102(A)(2).  See In re White, 311 Or 573, 591, 815 P2d 1257 (1991)
(discussing issue).  

		The accused claimed that CSI was entitled to recover
the $27,000 in Morrison settlement funds which, he asserts, Nepom
improperly paid to Smith.  Simultaneously, the accused claimed
for the Estate (which owned all of CSI's stock and, therefore,
owned CSI's claim against Smith) the same $27,000, plus an
additional $17,000, representing half the value of the house.  If
the claims were valid at all, either CSI was entitled to the
money or the Estate (which owned CSI) was, but, obviously, both
the Estate and CSI could not collect the same $27,000 from Smith. 
As noted, the accused was motivated to make this duplicative
claim not for any legitimate reason but, instead, to make Smith's
unsecured debt look as large as possible in order to disqualify
her from pursuing Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

  		The accused's motive for the duplicative claims is
apparent at the bankruptcy proceedings.  In November 1992, the
accused made a motion to dismiss Smith's Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding.  The bankruptcy court indicated that it would not
consider the accused's claim (some $70,000) to be liquidated,
leaving Smith's total liquidated debt to be, at most, only half
the Chapter 13 limit.  In December 1992, the accused filed proofs
of claim for the Estate and CSI.  However, that portion of the
Morrison settlement amount paid by Nepom to Smith and the half-interest in the house conveyed to her by Birnie, with the
accused's cooperation, together totaled less than the $50,000
needed to exceed the jurisdictional limit.  To solve that
problem, the accused claimed the Morrison settlement amount
twice.  By means of those duplicative claims, the accused was
able to boost the claimed liquidated debt (exclusive of the
accused's claim, which the bankruptcy court already had
disallowed) to over $100,000, forcing Smith to dismiss her
Chapter 13 petition. 

		The Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the accused violated DR 7-102(A)(2) by knowingly advancing a
claim that was unwarranted under existing law.  

		In summary, we conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 5-105(C), DR 5-101(A), DR 2-106(A), and DR 7-102(A)(2).  We turn to the issue of the appropriate sanction.

SANCTION

		We now turn to a determination of the appropriate
sanction in this case.  We do so, recognizing that the purpose of
a sanction is not to penalize the accused, but to protect the
public and the integrity of the profession.  In re Bristow, 301
Or 194, 206, 721 P2d 437 (1986).  In considering the appropriate
sanction for the violations found, this court refers to the
American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and Oregon case law.  In re
Wyllie, 326 Or 447, 455, ___ P2d ___ on recons, ___ Or ___ (March
31, 1998).  The court considers four factors:  the duty violated,
the accused's mental state involved, the actual or potential
injury sustained, and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.  ABA Standard 3.0.

		1.	Duty violated

		In this case, the accused violated duties owed to his
former and current clients to avoid conflicts of interest.  ABA
Standard 4.3.  He also violated duties to the legal system to
avoid abusing the legal process, ABA Standard 6.2, and to the
profession to avoid excessive or improper fees.  ABA Standard
7.0.

		2.	Mental State

		The ABA Standards explain that an act is "intentional"
if it is done with a conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
a particular result.  ABA Standards at 17.  In this case, the
accused acted intentionally with respect to all the charges.  

		3. 	Injury sustained

		The purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect
the public.  ABA Standards at 25.  Smith, an elderly widow with a
limited education, was caused to suffer years of aggravation and
uncertainty and to incur substantial costs for attorney fees in
attempting to counter the accused's improper actions against her. 
The probate court's ability to manage its docket was harmed by
the accused's self-interest in keeping the probate open long
after it should have been closed in order to pursue his attorney
fees claims against Smith.  

		At this point, and without consideration of aggravating
or mitigating factors, the ABA Standards provide:

		"4.31  Disbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s):

		"(a) engages in representation of a client knowing
that the lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to the
client; or 

		"(b) simultaneously represents clients that the
lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to
benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or
potentially serious injury to a client; or 

		"(c) represents a client in a matter substantially
related to a matter in which the interest of a present
or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly
uses information relating to the representation of a
client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or
another, and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a client.

		"4.32  Suspension is generally appropriate when a
lawyer knows of the conflict of interest and does not
fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a
client.

		" * * * * *

		"7.2  Suspension is generally appropriate when a
lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation
of a duty owed to the profession and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system."

		That is, before considering any aggravating and
mitigating factors, the ABA Standards suggest that either
suspension or disbarment would be an appropriate sanction in this
case.

		4.	Aggravating and mitigating circumstances

		Aggravating factors present are:  a prior disciplinary
offense (the accused was admonished in 1985);(15) a dishonest or
selfish motive; a pattern of misconduct; multiple offenses;
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct (the
accused insists that he committed no ethical violation); a
vulnerable victim; substantial experience in the practice of law
(the accused was admitted to practice in 1983); and indifference
to making restitution.  ABA Standards 9.22(a) to (d), (g) to (j).
The only mitigating factor in this case is that the accused
cooperated with the disciplinary process.  ABA Standard 9.32(e). 
In sum, the aggravating factors greatly outweigh the mitigating
ones.

		The remaining consideration is this court's case law. 
We have found no Oregon case directly on point.  However, some
cases are instructive. 

		In Claussen, the accused lawyer engaged in a current
client conflict of interest in his representation of bankruptcy
clients.  He also engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice by making misrepresentations to the
bankruptcy court and by manipulating the bankruptcy process to
further the ends of his clients.  The lawyer was suspended for
one year.  However, this case involves a more prolonged abuse of
the probate and bankruptcy courts, for the self-interest of the
accused.  Here, the accused also charged a clearly excessive fee. 

		In In re Altstatt, 321 Or 324, 897 P2d 1164 (1995), the
accused lawyer represented the personal representatives of an
estate to which he owed a significant amount of money.  The court
found that the lawyer's self-interest affected his professional
judgment on behalf of his clients in violation of DR 5-101(A). 
During his representation, the lawyer claimed and obtained
attorney fees without court approval, which constituted a
collection of an illegal fee and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  Aggravating factors included a
selfish motive, indifference to making restitution, and
substantial experience in estate practice.  The lawyer was
suspended for one year.

		In White, the accused lawyer intentionally and
repeatedly violated his duty to the legal system during the
course of litigation.  He abused the legal system by filing a
multitude of vexatious actions on behalf of his client.  He
intentionally used the legal system as a tool to harass, rather
than to resolve his client's legitimate disputes.  He knowingly
made a false statement to the trial court.  His conduct wasted a
great deal of time and money for the courts, lawyers, and
litigants involved.  The lawyer was suspended for three years.

		In In re Miller, 310 Or 731, 801 P2d 814 (1990), the
accused lawyer kept an estate open for six years.  On several
occasions when the probate court inquired, the lawyer
misrepresented the status of the case.  In the final accounting,
the lawyer requested attorney fees of $5,962, which the court
found to be excessive when measured against the $12,500 value of
the estate.  The lawyer also was held to have violated DR 1-102(A)(3) 
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation), DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR
2-106(A) (charging an illegal or clearly excessive fee), and DR
6-101(B) (neglect of a legal matter) for failing to close the
estate promptly.  This court held that such conduct ordinarily
would justify a long suspension.  However, because the lawyer had
been found guilty of serious misconduct in two earlier
disciplinary cases, he was disbarred.  

		In this case, we agree with the trial panel's
characterization of the accused's conduct:

	"[The accused] engaged in multiple conflicts of
interest, attempted to use his representation of
current clients to obtain payment from Mrs. Smith, and
charged excessive fees to the Estate.  His conduct
focussed upon using the means available to him to force
Mrs. Smith to compensate him.  In his efforts to seek
payment from a client that he believed treated him
improperly he was blind to the restraints of the
Disciplinary Rules."

		While case-matching is an inexact science, we think
that it is fair to say that the enormity and duration of the
accused's overreaching in the case, the accused's blatant
misrepresentations to the probate and bankruptcy courts, and the
numerous aggravating factors make this set of violations of the
Disciplinary Rules more serious than those found in either
Claussen or Altstatt.  This case is more like White and Miller,
but without the history of other serious misconduct that led to
disbarment in Miller.  On balance, we find that a two-year
suspension is warranted in this case.

		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two-years commencing on the effective date of this
decision.

1. 	The Bar also charged the accused with violations of DR
7-104(A)(1) (communicating with person represented by counsel)
and DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation).  The trial panel concluded that the Bar
had failed to prove those charges by clear and convincing
evidence and dismissed them.  The Bar does not ask us to review
those charges and we, therefore, elect not to consider them.

2. 	The mere fact that a theoretical conflict of interest
exists that may develop into an actual conflict at some later
date is not sufficient for the disclosure and consent
requirements of DR 5-105.  See In re Samuels/Weiner, 296 Or 224,
230, 674 P2d 1166 (1983) (at time accused represented clients, no
evidence suggested either an existing conflict of interest or
that accuseds' independent professional judgment was or likely
would be adversely affected by the employment).

3. 	"A personal representative is a fiduciary who is under
a general duty to and shall collect the income from property of
the estate in the possession of the personal representative and
preserve, settle and distribute the estate in accordance with the
terms of the will and ORS chapters 111 [to] 117 as expeditiously
and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances."  ORS 114.265.  The representative's personal
interest in the estate is limited to receipt of a statutorily-authorized fee based on the value of the estate.  ORS 116.173.

4. 	Birnie apparently believed that the Smiths had owned
the house jointly with rights of survivorship and that the
interest in the house, therefore, had been included in the
Estate's initial inventory by mistake.  In fact, the Smiths had
purchased the house together before they were married, and the
deed to them created a tenancy in common with no right of
survivorship.  Accordingly, the probate inventory correctly
included a half-interest in the house as part of the Estate.

5. 	See ORS 116.013 (authorizing personal representative
with approval of probate court to make partial distribution of
estate property).

6. 	The Estate's and CSI's judgment against the Atkinses,
including the attorney fees award, ultimately was discharged in
bankruptcy in November 1991. 

7. 	The accused argued that Smith was unlikely to seek the
return of the $27,000 that Nepom had paid her from the Morrison
settlement or the half-interest in the house that Birnie had
conveyed to her with the assistance of the accused.

8. 	Lawyer Perry represented Smith personally in her fee
dispute with the accused.  In June 1994, Perry resigned as lawyer
for personal representative Reuland, because of an actual
conflict that had arisen between Reuland and Smith.

9. 	The accused received $3,452.50 from the Estate in the
settlement, which purportedly represented his one-third
contingency fee pursuant to a contract with the Estate for the
recovery of the Estate's interest in the house.  We find no
evidence in the record that any such contingency contract ever
existed.

10. 	See Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or
135, 843 P2d 442 (1992) (breach of fiduciary duty owed to client
may result in reduction or loss of attorney fees).

11. 	The reports do not explain why this essentially no-asset case should not have been closed earlier.  As noted, Smith
was liable personally on the debt to the Oregon Bank, the only
claim (other than attorney fees and costs of administration)
against the Estate.

12. 	A reader of this opinion familiar with Charles Dickens'
novel Bleak House might find the facts of this case reminiscent
of those found in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, although the duration of
the probate here was shorter.  In Bleak House, Dickens castigates
the High Court of Chancery, "most pestilent of hoary sinners,"
which devours the estates brought to it in lawsuits that drone on
for generations:

	"It's being ground to bits in a slow mill; it's being
roasted at a slow fire; it's being stung to death by
single bees; it's being drowned by drops; it's going
mad by grains."

13. 	The Bar did not charge the accused with a violation of
DR 4-101 (knowingly revealing confidences and secrets of a
client).  DR 4-101(C) provides that a lawyer may reveal
confidences or secrets necessary to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of a lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client
was involved, or to respond to allegations concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.

14. 	DR 2-106(B) lists several factors to be considered as
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee.  In a
particular case, other factors also may be relevant.  We believe
that the probate court's order awarding the accused only about
$9,000 out of a total of over $100,000 claimed supports a
conclusion that the accused tried to collect a clearly excessive
fee.

15. 	The record does not disclose the nature of the
accused's 1985 misconduct.