Title: Ezrina Shim v. Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-32-06
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: June 14, 2007

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 32 September Term 2006 EZRINA SHIM, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RUTGERS-THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 29, 2007 Decided June 14, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 385 N.J. Super. 200 (2006). Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for appellant (Lowenstein Sandler PC, attorneys; Mr. Rooney and Kathleen A. Walsh, on the briefs). H. Justin Park argued the cause for respondent (Schnader Harrison Segal &amp; Lewis LLP, attorneys). JUSTICE LONG delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2003, eighteen-year-old Ezrina Shim applied for admission to Rutgers University (Rutgers) for the fall term. At the time, she had lived in New Jersey for four years and therefore was presumed, under N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4, to be a domiciliary for the purpose of in-state tuition. Under Rutgers administrative regulations, N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1(f), Shim was subject to a counter-presumption of non-domiciliary status solely because of her financial dependence on her out-of-state parents. Rutgers only considered evidence bearing on that financial dependence in deciding Shim's case. Because Shim could not establish that she was financially independent of her parents, her application for in-state tuition was denied. Shim appealed and the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case to Rutgers for reconsideration of all of the evidence to determine whether the presumption of non-domicile had been overcome and whether she, in fact, established that she was domiciled here. We now affirm, although on different grounds. We hold that, pursuant to the legislative scheme of N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4, a student who has lived in New Jersey for twelve months prior to enrollment is presumed to be a domiciliary for tuition purposes. If that student is, in fact, dependent on out-of-state parents, that dependence creates a genuine issue regarding domicile and the presumption in her favor is neutralized. However, that does not give rise to the contrary presumption that she is a non-domiciliary. Rather, she is neither presumed a domiciliary nor presumed a non-domiciliary. Rutgers must then fully, fairly, and dispassionately consider all submitted evidence, including but not limited to evidence of the student s dependence on out-of-state parents. If a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the student s domicile is in New Jersey then it must classify her as a domiciliary for in-state tuition purposes. [N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4.] The Senate Education Committee statement to the bill that became N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 identified its core purpose: Present law requires that a student be a resident for 12 months prior to enrollment. The State Board of Higher Education cannot make an exception to this regulation. This penalizes individuals who have moved to New Jersey and established legal domicile less than a year prior to a student s enrollment in college. Under this bill, the State Board of Higher Education could make an exception for individuals who can demonstrate that they are legally domiciled in New Jersey. [Senate Education Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1387, at 1 (February 20, 1979).] That legislative history is critical to any analysis of the statute. It underscores that in enacting N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4, the Legislature had no intention of making it more difficult for a student who had actually resided here for a year prior to enrollment to establish in-state status for tuition purposes. Instead, that statute was enacted to broaden the class of students who might qualify for in-state tuition by softening the prior bright line rule of twelve-months residency. It is against that backdrop that we must interpret the statute. 1. Copies of the student s New Jersey income tax return or evidence of withholding of New Jersey income tax, and/or copies of the parent s(s ) or legal guardian s (s ) income tax return or evidence of withholding of income tax. 2. Evidence of ownership of or a long-term lease on a permanent residence in this State by the student or the student s parent(s) or legal guardian(s). (b) A student may present and/or an institution may require supplementary evidence of being domiciled in New Jersey, which may include the following: 1. A New Jersey driver s license; 2. A New Jersey motor vehicle registration; 3. A New Jersey voter registration card; 4. A sworn, notarized statement from the student and/or his or her parent(s) or legal guardian(s) declaring domicile in New Jersey; 5. Any other supplementary evidence that the institution deems necessary to support the student s claim of domicile in New Jersey, including, but not limited to, evidence regarding the domicile of a student s parent(s) or legal guardian(s) for students whose domicile is determined by the institution to be with their parent(s) or legal guardian(s). (c) If primary evidence of domicile is not available due to the loss or destruction of records or other unusual circumstances, the institution may make a determination based exclusively on supplementary evidence. (d) In every instance, the institution shall keep with the student s records copies of the evidence it used in determining domicile pursuant to this section. [N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.2.] However, the mere fact that a student has been challenged does not negate the presumption of domicile. Nothing in the statutory language suggests, even obliquely, that the mere existence of a challenge by an institution vitiates that presumption. The student remains clothed in the presumption until evidence is adduced that is sufficient to overcome it. Once it is overcome, the student bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact, without the benefit of the presumption and on the basis of all the evidence, that her true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment is in New Jersey and whenever . . . she is absent, . . . she has the intention of returning. See N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1(a) (defining domicile). That is the paradigm for our inquiry. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RUTGERS-THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, is a statutorily defined public institution[] of higher education[,] N.J.S.A. 18A:62-1, that traces its lineage to a royal charter dated November 10, 1766. N.J.S.A. 18A:65-2. From that genesis, its special position in New Jersey s system of public higher education has been cemented as an institution impressed with a public trust for higher education of the people of the state of New Jersey; and which is the instrumentality of the state for the purpose of operating the state university. Ibid. In furtherance of Rutgers s mission, the Legislature has declared to be the public policy of the State of New Jersey that . . . resources be and continue to be . . . appropriated by the State adequate for the conduct of a State university with high educational standards[.] N.J.S.A. 18A:65-27.I.b. Recognizing Rutgers s taxpayer-funded status, the Legislature also has provided for a two-tiered system of tuition whereby out-of-state student[s are] subject to significantly higher tuition than that accorded New Jersey students. Lipman v. Rutgers The State Univ. of N.J., 329 N.J. Super. 433, 436 (App. Div. 2000). In its narrowest sense, this appeal requires that we examine Rutgers s determination that plaintiff Ezrina Shim was not domiciled in New Jersey, thereby denying her in-state tuition status. In doing so, we must first determine whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff has met the statutory predicates for domicile and, hence, eligibility for in-state tuition status; I conclude that she did not. Further, even if plaintiff did meet those predicates, a plain language reading of the applicable statute with the regulations of the Commission on Higher Education governing the determination of whether a student is eligible for state-resident tuition yields two core conclusions: that they are harmonious with each other and with the Legislature s mandate; and that Rutgers s determination that plaintiff failed to qualify for in-state tuition status pursuant to those regulations was neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor unreasonable, and therefore must be sustained. That backdrop requires that I reach the following conclusions. To the extent the majority concludes that an appeal from a final decision by [Rutgers] in respect of a student s domicile must lie in the Appellate Division pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2)[,] ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 9 n.4), and that the standard of review of Rutgers s domicile decisions is the same as that applied to all other administrative agencies, ante at ___ (slip op. at 10-11), I concur with the majority s views. However, to the extent that, in this peculiar instance, the majority improperly conflates residency and domicile, and to the extent the majority leapfrogs over the plain language of the statute and instead starts its analysis with the statute s legislative history, I respectfully dissent. In the parallel context of a free public high school education of a minor, it has been held that the domicile of an unemancipated child is the domicile of the parent, custodian or guardian. P.B.K. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Tenafly, 343 N.J. Super. 419, 427 (App. Div. 2001). See also Pieretti v. Pieretti, 13 N.J. Misc. 98, 102 (Ch. Ct. 1935) (holding that the domicile of a legitimate unemancipated minor, whose will cannot concur with the fact of residence, is, if his father be living, the domicile of the father; that a minor cannot change his domicile of his own will ); Renner v. Renner, 13 N.J. Misc. 749, 765 (Ch. Ct. 1935) (same); Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 94 N.J. Eq. 14, 21 (Ch. Ct. 1922) (same); Hess v. Kimble, 79 N.J. Eq. 454, 457 (Ch. Ct. 1911) (holding that [i]t is an undisputed position of all jurists . . . that, of his own accord, proprio marte, the minor cannot change his domicil (citing Phillimore on Domicil, at 37)); Blumenthal v. Tannenholz, 31 N.J. Eq. 194, 197 (Ch. Ct. 1879) (same). The governing principle is clear: It is the general rule that an unemancipated infant cannot of its own volition acquire a new domicile. In re Adoption of Susan --, an infant, 22 N.J. Misc. 181, 185 (Orphans Ct. 1944) (citing In re Estate of Russell, 64 N.J. Eq. 313 (Prerog. Ct. 1902); Van Matre v. Sankey, 36 N.E. 628 (Ill. 1893); Sudler v. Sudler, 88 A. 26 (Md. 1913)). Because plaintiff offered no proofs of emancipation, she was legally barred from establishing a domicile different from that of her parents until she reached the age of majority. The application of that principle leads to two separate but consistent results: all proofs tendered by plaintiff in respect of her residency in New Jersey prior to reaching her eighteenth birthday were legally irrelevant; and, as of the time she applied for admission to Rutgers, was accepted, matriculated and started classes there, and applied for in-state tuition status -- most importantly, at the statutorily defined time of the period of 12 months prior to enrollment[,] N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 -- plaintiff plainly was unable, as a matter of law, to satisfy the twelve-month residency requirement giving rise to a presumption of domicile under N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4. Therefore, as a threshold matter, plaintiff does not qualify for in-state tuition status under N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 Our task, then, is to determine whether the applicable regulations are inconsistent with the statute it purports to interpret so that under the guise of interpretation Rutgers does not give the statute any greater effect than its language allows. Ibid. Those regulations appear initially at N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1. N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1(a) defines domicile consistent with black-letter law: Domicile is defined as the place where a person has his or her true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he or she is absent, he or she has the intention of returning. See footnote 10 The next four subsections of this regulation, N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1(b) to -1.1(e), separately repeat the four sentences of N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4. The next regulatory provision, the one most relevant here, states that: Dependent students as defined in the rules of the Higher Education Student Assistance Authority at N.J.A.C. 9A:9-2.6 are presumed to be domiciled in the state in which their parent(s) or legal guardian(s) is domiciled. Dependent students whose parent(s) or legal guardian(s) is not domiciled in New Jersey are presumed to be in the State for the temporary purpose of obtaining an education and presumed not to be domiciled in New Jersey. [N.J.A.C. 9A:5-1.1(f).] The Higher Education Student Assistance Authority regulations, N.J.A.C. 9A:9-2.6(c), define a dependent student as any student who does not meet any of the eligibility criteria listed . . . for independent student status[,] the very eligibility criteria Rutgers explicitly listed on its Residency Analysis Form and the precise questions plaintiff refused to answer for obvious reasons: plaintiff admittedly did not satisfy the criteria for independent student status set forth in N.J.A.C. 9A:9-2.6(a) or (b). Those regulations are entirely consonant with N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4. By its own terms, the statute delegates to the Commission on Higher Education the authority to define the scope of any challenge to a domicile determination. It is not claimed that there was any irregularity in the adoption of the relevant regulations; all that is alleged is that those regulations somehow exceed the scope of the statute. I cannot agree. Instead, those regulations sensibly and reasonably define what is necessary to overcome either a statutory presumption of non-domicile or a challenge to a statutorily presumed domicile, nothing more and nothing less. More importantly, those regulations are in harmony with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 and, therefore, cannot be voided as ultra vires. The application of those regulations to the proofs adduced demonstrates that Rutgers concluded, at least preliminarily, that plaintiff s presence in New Jersey before she enrolled at Rutgers may have entitled her to the statutory presumption of domicile. Rutgers, however, as explicitly authorized by the statute, challenged plaintiff s domicile. At that point, again, the statute requires that plaintiff -- not Rutgers -- demonstrate [her] domicile according to [the] rules and regulations established for that purpose by the Commission on Higher Education. N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff failed in meeting that burden. The majority, however, approaches this matter differently. Addressing first the statute s legislative history, the majority explains that N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 s legislative history is critical to any analysis of the statute. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 13). I disagree with that approach. The hierarchical analysis to be applied in construing a statute is well-settled: The Legislature s intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language. We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole. It is not the function of this Court to rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language. We cannot write in an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enactment, or engage in conjecture or surmise which will circumvent the plain meaning of the act. Our duty is to construe and apply the statute as enacted. A court should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation. On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. We may also resort to extrinsic evidence if a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result or if the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language. Our analysis, therefore, begins with the plain language of the statute. [DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted; emphasis supplied).] N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 is in no wise ambiguous. It states that one who has been a resident of this State for twelve months prior to enrollment at Rutgers is presumed to be a domiciliary and, hence, entitled to in-state tuition status. As a matter of law, plaintiff simply did not qualify as she could not have been a legal resident for domicile purposes while she was a minor. In any event, in unambiguous language N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4 addresses what is to be done if an applicant either (a) is presumed a domiciliary by reason of residency but that domicile is challenged by Rutgers, or (b) is not presumed to be a domiciliary by reason of residency: Persons presumed to be nondomiciled or persons who are presumed to be domiciled, but whose domiciliary status is challenged by the institution, may demonstrate domicile according to rules and regulations established for that purpose by the Commission on Higher Education. Here, Rutgers determined that plaintiff failed to demonstrate domicile according to rules and regulations established for that purpose by the Commission on Higher Education[,] N.J.S.A. 18A:62-4, a determination that must be sustained unless: (1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 10-11). In this record, it cannot be said that Rutgers s denial of in-state tuition status to plaintiff was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; based on our canons of statutory interpretation, it cannot be said that Rutgers s determination violated any legislative policies, whether express or implied; it cannot be said that this determination offended any constitutional provision; and it cannot be said that Rutgers s decision was not supported by the record evidence. In such an instance, our duty is clear: we are oath-bound to sustain the action of the administrative agency. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-32 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court EZRINA SHIM, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RUTGERS-THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 14, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto DISSENTING OPINION BY