Title: Vivid, Inc. v. Ronald R. Fiedler
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1996AP001900
State: Wisconsin
Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date: July 2, 1998

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1900 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Vivid, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ronald R. Fiedler, Secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation and Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation,  
 
Respondents-Appellants-Petitioners.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  215 Wis. 2d 320, xxx N.W.2d xxx 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997) 
 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
John H. Lussow 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., Steinmetz & Geske, J.J. join 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondents-appellants-petitioners the 
cause argued by Robert W. Larson, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief 
by Thomas S. Hornig, Marc T. McCrory and Brennan, Steil, Basting 
& MacDougall, S.C., Janesville and oral argument by Thomas S. 
Hornig. 
 
No.  96-1900 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1900 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Vivid, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald R. Fiedler, Secretary of the  
Wisconsin Department of Transportation  
and Wisconsin Department of  
Transportation,  
 
          Respondents-Appellants- 
          Petitioners.  
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   This case involves the 
question of the proper determination of just compensation for 
outdoor advertising signs, owned by Vivid, Inc. (Vivid), that 
the State of Wisconsin removed in 1989 in conjunction with a 
highway improvement project along Interstate 90.  Three issues 
are presented.  1) Does Wis. Stat. § 84.30 provide the exclusive 
remedy for just compensation for these signs?  We conclude it 
does.  2) Does just compensation for the taking of these signs 
include the value of the location of the signs?  We conclude it 
does.  3) What is the appropriate method for determining just 
compensation in this case?  Three of us conclude that the use of 
a Gross Income Multiplier (GIM) method, among other valuation 
No.  96-1900 
 
2 
methods, was appropriate.  Accordingly, although four justices 
concur in the result but disagree with the analysis regarding 
the GIM, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision on these 
issues.  However, the court of appeals also allowed attorney 
fees to Vivid.  Because § 84.30 does not allow for attorney 
fees, we reverse the court of appeals on that issue. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
This case has a long and complex history which 
warrants review in some detail.  Vivid is a company that owns 
outdoor advertising signs.  Typically, Vivid rents land adjacent 
to heavily traveled roads and highways.  Vivid then constructs a 
billboard on this rented land.  Although Vivid rents the land on 
which the billboard is located (the sign site), Vivid owns the 
sign itself.  Vivid contracts with businesses to display their 
advertising on the billboard for a certain term.   
¶3 
In 1988, the State Department of Transportation (DOT 
or State) notified Vivid that two signs, the “Antiques” sign and 
the “Trucks” sign, located next to Interstate 90 and the Avalon 
Road interchange near Janesville had to be removed as part of a 
highway improvement project.  Vivid had eight- and nine-year 
sign site leases left on the property and 36-month advertising 
contracts on the signs. 
¶4 
The State offered compensation to the owners of the 
land on which the signs were located.  The State also offered 
Vivid relocation benefits according to Wis. Stat. § 32.19 (1987-
No.  96-1900 
 
3 
88)1 and Wis. Admin. Code § ILHR 202.64.  The relocation benefits 
offered included reasonable expenses relating to moving the 
signs as well as actual or reasonable expenses not exceeding 
$1,000 per sign for searching for new sign sites.  The State 
informed Vivid that if the signs could not be moved, the State 
would reimburse Vivid for the actual, direct loss of its 
tangible personal property predicated on the lesser of the 
units’ depreciated in-place value or their estimated moving 
cost.  Vivid did not respond to either the State’s offer for 
Vivid to participate in the compensation offered to the 
landowners nor to the State’s offer for relocation assistance.  
The State removed the signs in April, 1989.   
¶5 
On June 2, 1989, Vivid filed a notice of injury and 
notice of claim with the State, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 893.80(1) and 893.82.  Vivid claimed that it suffered a total 
of $54,000 in damages, an amount Vivid claimed reflected the 
fair market value of the razed signs.  Vivid also requested 
interest and loss of revenues from April, 1989 when the signs 
were destroyed, as well as attorney fees.  The State did not 
respond to these notices.  On October 16, 1989, Vivid filed an 
action, requesting that inverse condemnation proceedings be 
commenced pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  With this action, 
Vivid requested just compensation under § 32.10 for the signs 
                     
1 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1987-88 
version unless otherwise noted.  
No.  96-1900 
 
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that the State removed and other costs and disbursements 
including attorney fees according to Wis. Stat. § 32.28.   
¶6 
The circuit court granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed Vivid’s petition for an inverse 
condemnation proceeding.  Vivid appealed.  
¶7 
The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s 
order granting the State summary judgment and remanded the cause 
for further proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  See Vivid, 
Inc. v. Fiedler, 174 Wis. 2d 142, 147, 497 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 
1993) (hereinafter referred to as Vivid I).  
¶8 
This court granted the State's petition for review.  
The issue presented was whether Vivid was entitled to just 
compensation for its signs.  The State argued that it need only 
pay Vivid relocation benefits under Wis. Stat. § 32.19.  Vivid 
argued that it was entitled to just compensation under a variety 
of theories, including Wis. Stat. § 84.30.  Like the court of 
appeals, this court concluded that the State had to pay Vivid 
just compensation and remanded to determine the amount of just 
compensation.  See Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 182 Wis. 2d 71, 73, 
512 N.W.2d 771 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as Vivid II).  
However, we relied solely on § 84.30 for our conclusion and 
specifically stated that we need not reach the other grounds 
raised by Vivid to support its argument that it was due just 
compensation.  See id. at 75 n.4, 80.   
¶9 
We concluded that “[t]he fact that the billboards were 
removed in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, rather 
than under sec. 84.30(5), which governs removal of nonconforming 
No.  96-1900 
 
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signs, is irrelevant.  The express language of sec. 84.30(6) 
requires payment of just compensation ‘regardless of whether the 
sign was removed because of this section.’”  Id. at 79 (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6)).  In remanding the case to the circuit 
court for determination of the amount of just compensation, this 
court directed the circuit court to “refer to section 84.30(7), 
Stats., which discusses the measure of just compensation and 
section 84.30(8), Stats., which discusses agreed price and adds 
that compensation is determined under section 32.05, Stats., if 
the DOT and the owner fail to reach agreement on the amount of 
compensation.”  Id. at 81 n.8. 
¶10 On remand, the Rock County Circuit Court, John H. 
Lussow, Judge, allowed Vivid to proceed as if the case were one 
for inverse condemnation under Wis. Stat. § 32.10.  Over the 
State’s objection, the circuit court allowed Vivid’s expert to 
testify about valuing the billboards using an income approach 
which considers the income of the sign before the taking and 
projected income after the taking, and a comparable sales or 
market approach which looks to comparable sales using a Gross 
Income Multiplier (GIM) to determine the amount of income 
produced by an individual sign.  The circuit court also allowed 
the State’s evidence regarding the cost approach which values 
the sign structure using cost-less-depreciation and then adds 
that to the leasehold value.  The jury determined that the two 
billboards had a fair market value of $37,800, an amount far 
exceeding the amount calculated under the State’s cost approach. 
 Vivid then filed a motion for judgment on the verdict.  The 
No.  96-1900 
 
6 
circuit court concluded that Vivid was entitled to judgment on 
the verdict of $37,800 as just compensation for the signs, 
interest on the judgment in the amount of $13,230 pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11)(b), and litigation expenses including 
attorney fees of $166,261 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28, for a 
total judgment of $217,292 together with statutory interest.   
¶11 The State appealed the circuit court’s order.  In an 
unpublished decision, Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, No. 96-1900, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1997) (hereinafter 
referred to as Vivid III), the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court’s order.  However, the court of appeals determined 
that the circuit court erred in allowing testimony regarding the 
GIM.  See id., unpublished slip op. at 13-14.  They determined 
that the income approach was the appropriate valuation method in 
this case.  See id., unpublished slip op. at 15.  The court of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
the 
error 
of 
admitting 
evidence 
regarding the GIM was harmless; therefore they concluded that 
they need not reverse and remand the judgment because the result 
would probably not be more favorable to the DOT under the income 
approach than the current jury verdictremand would not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties.  See id., unpublished 
slip op. at 19 (referring to Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)).   
No.  96-1900 
 
7 
¶12 This court granted the State’s petition for review of 
this second court of appeals decision, Vivid III, on December 
16, 1997.2 
JUST COMPENSATION AND BILLBOARD VALUATION 
¶13 The first issue presented is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30 provides the exclusive remedy for just compensation for 
the taking of Vivid’s signs.  Resolution of this issue requires 
interpretation 
of 
§ 84.30. 
 
A 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is a question of law which this court reviews de 
novo.  See Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 
978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).  Our primary goal in statutory 
interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent.  See id. 
(citing Scott v. First State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 
N.W.2d 152 (1990)).  This court ascertains that intent by first 
examining the plain language of the statute.  See Anderson v. 
                     
2 At the outset, Vivid argues that the State waived its 
right to appellate review and remand for a new trial because it 
failed to file motions after the jury verdict.  “’Motions after 
verdict must state with particularity the alleged error so as to 
apprise the trial court of the alleged error and give it an 
opportunity to correct it, thereby avoiding a costly and time-
consuming appeal.’”  Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 
487, 497, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975) (quoting Kobelinski v. Milwaukee 
& Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 504, 517, 202 N.W.2d 415 
(1972)). 
 
Although 
failure 
to 
file 
post-verdict 
motions 
“limit[s] the issues that may be asserted as a matter of right 
on the appeal.  . . .  [T]he appeals court has jurisdiction over 
a timely appeal and may in its discretion conclude that, in the 
interest of justice, the issues not assertable as a matter of 
right may nevertheless be reviewed.”  Hartford Ins. Co. v. 
Wales, 
138 
Wis. 2d 
508, 
510-11, 
406 
N.W.2d 
426 
(1987).  
Accordingly, in the interest of justice, we review all issues 
raised by this case.   
No.  96-1900 
 
8 
City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 25, 559 N.W.2d 563 (1997) 
(citations omitted).  If the plain language is ambiguous, we 
then turn to the scope, history, context, subject matter and 
purpose of the statute to determine legislative intent.  See 
Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 978 (citing Scott, 155 Wis. 2d at 612). 
A. 
¶14 In Vivid II, this court determined that Vivid was 
entitled to just compensation under Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6).  See 
Vivid II, 182 Wis. 2d at 81.  "[W]e have concluded that just 
compensation is statutorily required by sec. 84.30(6).  Our 
determination is based entirely on the statute and does not 
involve the just compensation provision contained in article I, 
section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Id. at 80.   In 
determining that Vivid was entitled to just compensation under 
§ 84.30, we failed to make clear what we now explicitly 
conclude: § 84.30 is Vivid’s exclusive remedy for recovering 
just compensation.   
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 84.30 is the Wisconsin adaptation of 
the federal Highway Beautification Act (HBA), 23 U.S.C. § 131.  
The Wisconsin legislature adopted a state counterpart to the 
federal act to avoid a reduction in federal highway funding.  
“If Wisconsin does not act, it will lose about $6.7 million in 
federal aid highway funds.”  Robert W. Larsen, Outdoor Sign 
Regulation in Eden and Wisconsin, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 153, Note at 
164 (citing Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 28, 1971, at 22, col. 3, 
part 1).   
No.  96-1900 
 
9 
¶16 Vivid argues that although Wis. Stat. § 84.30 provides 
that Vivid is due just compensation, it may proceed under either 
§ 84.30 or Wis. Stat. § 32.10 for determination of just 
compensation because the action is an eminent domain proceeding. 
 We disagree.  The language and framework of § 84.30 indicate 
that 
it 
is 
the 
exclusive 
remedy 
for 
determining 
just 
compensation for removed signs that meet the criteria of 
§ 84.30(6). 
¶17 As 
noted 
above, 
we 
discern 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature by first turning to the plain language of the 
statute.  See Anderson, 208 Wis. 2d at 25.  The plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 84.30 models 23 U.S.C. § 131 and sets forth the 
overall framework for recovering just compensation.  Subsection 
(6) (reprinted below)3 sets forth the criteria for the types of 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6) provides as follows: 
(6) JUST COMPENSATION.  The department shall pay just 
compensation upon the removal or relocation on or 
after March 18, 1972, of any of the following signs 
which are not then in conformity with this section, 
regardless of whether the sign was removed because of 
this section: 
(a) Signs lawfully in existence on March 18, 1972. 
(b) Signs lawfully in existence on land adjoining 
any highway made an interstate or primary highway 
after March 18, 1972. 
(c) Signs lawfully erected on or after March 18, 
1972. 
 
Any sign that is visible from the main-traveled way of any 
interstate or federal-aid highway and maintained or erected in 
any area adjacent to and within 660 feet of an interstate or 
highway after March 18, 1972 or outside this area after June 11, 
1976 is not in conformity with Wis. Stat. § 84.30 except the 
following: 
No.  96-1900 
 
10
signs for which just compensation is allowed.  Subsection (7) 
(reprinted below)4 provides the measure of just compensation if a 
sign meets the criteria of subsection (6).  Subsection (8) 
(reprinted below)5 sets forth the procedure for recovering just 
                                                                  
(a) directional or other official signs; (b) signs 
advertising sale or lease of property upon which they 
are 
located; 
(c) 
signs 
advertising 
activities 
conducted on the property on which they are located; 
(d) signs located in business areas on March 18, 1972; 
(e) signs erected in business areas subsequent to 
March 18, 1972, which will comply with 84.30(4); (f) 
signs located in urban areas outside the adjacent area 
(footnote omitted); (g) landmark signs; (h) signs 
outside the adjacent area not erected for the purpose 
of being read from the main traveled way; (i) signs on 
farm buildings that promote a Wisconsin agricultural 
product.  (footnote omitted).  Vivid's signs are 
nonconforming under sec. 84.30 because they do not fit 
within any of these categories. 
 
Vivid II, 182 Wis. 2d at 78 (referring to Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(3)). 
 
4  Wis. Stat. § 84.30(7) provides as follows: 
(7) MEASURE.  The just compensation required by sub. 
(6) shall be paid for the following: 
(a) The taking from the owner of such sign, all 
right, title and interest in and to the sign and his 
leasehold 
relating 
thereto, 
including 
severance 
damages to the remaining signs which have a unity of 
use and ownership with the sign taken, shall be 
included in the amounts paid to the respective owner, 
excluding 
any 
damage 
to 
factories 
involved 
in 
manufacturing, erection, maintenance or servicing of 
any outdoor advertising signs or displays. 
(b) The taking of the right to erect and maintain 
such signs thereon from the owner of the real property 
on which the sign is located. 
(c)  
5 Wis. Stat. § 84.30(8) provides as follows: 
No.  96-1900 
 
11
compensation.  The signs in question in this case meet the 
criteria of § 84.30(6)they were nonconforming signs lawfully in 
existence on March 18, 1972.  Therefore, following the framework 
of § 84.30, just compensation must be measured under subsection 
(7) and recovered following the procedure under subsection (8). 
  
¶18 Vivid argues that although the signs may meet the 
criteria of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6), this statute is not the 
exclusive remedy.  Vivid essentially asks this court to ignore 
statutory language.  At oral argument Vivid stated that the 
question in this case is whether the “little amendment that was 
grafted onto the end of § 84.30(6) makes an eminent domain case 
become magically a Highway Beautification Act removal case.”  
What Vivid characterizes as a “little amendment” that the 
legislature “grafted” onto the end of a statute is critical to 
determining legislative intent.  In 1978, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) was 
amended to add that just compensation must be paid for removed 
signs “whether or not removed pursuant to or because of this 
section.”  The Wisconsin legislature followed suit and amended 
                                                                  
(8) AGREED PRICE.  Compensation required under subs. 
(6) and (7) shall be paid to the person entitled 
thereto.  If the department and the owner reach 
agreement on the amount of compensation payable to 
such owner in respect to any removal or relocation, 
the department may pay such compensation to the owner 
and thereby require or terminate the owner’s rights or 
interests by purchase.  If the department and the 
owner do not reach agreement as to such amount of 
compensation, the department or owner may institute an 
action to have such compensation determined under s. 
32.05.  
(9)  
No.  96-1900 
 
12
§ 84.30(6) in 1979, adding the similar language: “regardless of 
whether the sign was removed because of this section.”  See Ch. 
253, Laws of 1979.  
¶19 By amending Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6) to add language that 
provides that the DOT shall pay just compensation “regardless 
whether the sign was removed because of this section,” the 
legislature provided that just compensation is paid for this 
type of sign whether the sign is removed because of eminent 
domain, the HBA, a local ordinance, or any other reason.  It 
does not matter why Vivid’s signs were removed.  Following the 
framework of § 84.30, if the signs meet the criteria of 
§ 84.30(6), just compensation must be paid as measured under 
§ 84.30(7) following the procedures of § 84.30(8).  
¶20 Additionally, if Vivid were allowed to rely on Wis. 
Stat. § 84.30(6) only for the determination that it is entitled 
to just compensation in the first place, but then turn to Wis. 
Stat. ch. 32 for determining the amount of just compensation, 
§ 84.30 would become, in essence, a nullity.  Every party whose 
signs meet the criteria of § 84.30(6) would nonetheless use 
chapter 32 for determining just compensation because that 
chapter allows for litigation expenses including attorney fees. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 32.28.  Section 84.30 does not provide for 
attorney fees and therefore, in all likelihood no one would rely 
on that statute. 
¶21 Accordingly, following the language and framework of 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30, we conclude that § 84.30 is the exclusive 
No.  96-1900 
 
13
remedy for determining just compensation for signs meeting the 
criteria of § 84.30(6).   
B. 
¶22 Having determined that Wis. Stat. § 84.30 provides the 
exclusive remedy for compensation for removed signs meeting the 
statutory requirements, the question remains: what constitutes 
appropriate just compensation?  Section 84.30(7) provides that 
“[t]he just compensation required by sub. (6) shall be paid for 
the following: (a) The taking from the owner of such sign, all 
right, title and interest in and to the sign and his leasehold 
relating thereto . . . .”  § 84.30(7).  Stated another way, the 
plain language of the statute requires that the sign owner be 
compensated for the value of all right in the sign, the value of 
the title, the value of the interest in and to the sign, and the 
value of the leasehold interest.  The plain language of the 
statute does not, however, define what constitutes the value of 
the “right, title and interest in and to the sign,” nor does it 
define what constitutes the value of the leasehold.  We 
therefore turn to extrinsic aids to determine the meaning of 
these terms and the interests compensable. 
¶23 “Just compensation” is the fair market value of the 
property.  “Fair market value, as in any other type of case, is 
ordinarily measured as the price that the aggregate assetthe 
lease, permit and signwould bring in the marketplace in a 
voluntary sale to a knowledgeable buyer, considering all 
relevant factors.”  8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04[1] at 
23-47 (footnote omitted) (3d ed. 1997).   
No.  96-1900 
 
14
¶24 The State argues that under Wis. Stat. § 84.30(6) and 
(7), the only compensable interests are the value of the sign 
structure and the value of the leasehold interest.  The State 
asserts that the value of the leasehold interest encompasses the 
value of the sign site.  Vivid, on the other hand, argues that 
the compensable value of an outdoor advertising sign is more 
than just the wood, nails, and paint that make up the sign 
structure.  “[A] sign built of teak and ebony is no more 
valuable 
to a sign company 
than 
one 
built 
from 
pine.”  
Respondent’s brief at 42.  
¶25 We agree with Vivid that the value of an outdoor 
advertising sign is more than just the sign structure and 
leasehold value of the land on which the sign sits.  An 
important aspect of outdoor advertising is the value of the 
location.  As Vivid argues, the materials of the sign do not 
influence 
its 
value. 
 
Rather, 
location 
is 
of 
paramount 
importance in outdoor advertising.   
 
[B]illboard 
locations, 
as 
compared 
to 
billboards 
themselves, are unique.  Depending upon the viewable 
distance in either direction, the amount of traffic 
passing the location, and the type of viewing public, 
a location of a particular billboard may have a value 
over and above its nuts and bolts value.  In this 
sense, in the billboard industry, it is virtually 
impossible to separate location from the structure.  
City of Scottsdale v. Eller Outdoor Advertising Co., 579 P.2d 
590, 598 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1978).  A sign located near Janesville 
and next to Interstate 90, a main east-west interstate highway, 
is certainly more valuable than a sign located near Janesville 
No.  96-1900 
 
15
but adjacent 
to County 
Highway A. 
 
In 
valuing outdoor 
advertising, the location has a value in and of itself.  See, 
e.g., Donald T. Sutte, MAI, The Appraisal of Outdoor Advertising 
Signs, Appraisal Institute (1994) ("[L]ocation is as important 
to a sign as it is to other types of real estate."  (at 17);  
"Signs 
are 
purchased 
for 
their 
locations, 
the 
signboard 
structures themselves, and the land leases that run with the 
sites on which the signs stand."  (at 18)). 
¶26 In sum, just compensation consists of the fair market 
value of the property taken.  In regard to outdoor advertising, 
we conclude that the value of the sign is derived largely from 
the location of the sign.  Therefore, “all right, title and 
interest in and to the sign and . . . leasehold relating 
thereto” must include not only the value of the sign structure 
and leasehold value, but also the value of the location. 
C. 
¶27 Having determined that the State must compensate Vivid 
not only for the sign structure and leasehold but also for the 
location of the sign, we now consider the valuation methods for 
determining such just compensation. 
¶28 There is nothing in the plain language, legislative 
history, scope, context or purpose of Wis. Stat. § 84.30 or its 
federal counterpart, 23 U.S.C. § 131, that restricts courts to a 
particular valuation method to determine just compensation.  
Ideally, as with any dispute, the parties can resolve their 
differences regarding just compensation without litigation.  
However, “[i]f the department and the owner do not reach 
No.  96-1900 
 
16
agreement as to such amount of compensation, the department or 
owner may institute an action to have such compensation 
determined under s. 32.05.”  Wis. Stat. § 84.30(8).   
¶29 In this case, the DOT and Vivid did not reach an 
agreement as to the amount of just compensation.  Accordingly, 
either party could institute an action under Wis. Stat. § 32.05 
for determination of just compensation.  Under § 32.05, the 
parties must comply with several procedural steps.  However, 
either party may ultimately appeal a determination of just 
compensation 
to 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(10)(a).  The issue of just compensation must be tried by 
a jury unless jury trial is waived by both parties.  See id.  
Generally, “any professionally accepted appraisal methodology . 
. . will be admissible in such cases with objections normally 
going to the weight, not the competency of the testimony.”  8A 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04 at 23-52 (footnote omitted). 
 See also Eller Outdoor Adver. Co., 579 P.2d at 598.  “The court 
shall enter judgment for the amount found to be due . . . .”  
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(10)(b).   
¶30 Like Wis. Stat. § 84.30, Wis. Stat. § 32.05 does not 
dictate 
a 
particular 
valuation 
method 
to 
determine 
just 
compensation.  Rather, § 32.05 requires that the issue of just 
compensation be determined by a jury.  We discern no authority 
in the statutes for the State’s assertion that just compensation 
must be determined using the cost approach. 
¶31 There are three recognized valuation methods for 
billboards: cost approach, income approach and market approach. 
No.  96-1900 
 
17
 See 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04[4] at 23-51 through 
23-59.  In the present case, the State presented evidence 
regarding the cost approach.  Vivid presented evidence regarding 
both the income and market approaches.  Admission of evidence is 
left to the discretion of the circuit court.  See Leathem Smith 
Lodge, Inc. v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 406, 409, 288 N.W.2d 808 
(1980).  Three of us conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting evidence from 
both the State and Vivid regarding different valuation methods 
for the jury to determine which method is more credible and more 
adequately reflects just compensation.6  
¶32 Under 
the 
cost 
approach 
to 
valuing 
billboards, 
advocated by the State, the sign structure and the leasehold 
interest in the sign site are first valued separately.  The sign 
structure is valued by using cost-less-depreciation which simply 
considers the cost of reproducing the sign as new (the wood, 
bolts, etc.) minus depreciation.  See, e.g., Soo Line R. Co. v. 
Dept of Revenue, 89 Wis. 2d 331, 350, 278 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 
1979) (regarding property tax assessment of railroad).  The 
value of the leasehold interest is the difference between the 
contractual rent that the sign company is paying to the land 
                     
6 The concurring opinion, which really should have been 
written as the majority opinion, reaches out and resolves an 
issue not before us: the appropriateness of the cost approach.  
This issue was neither raised, briefed nor argued by Vivid.  
Because Vivid did not challenge the admissibility of the State’s 
cost approach, the three of us would not determine whether the 
cost approach adequately compensates Vivid for the value of the 
location of the signs; neither should the concurrence.   
No.  96-1900 
 
18
owner and the market rent at the time of the appraisal.  See 23 
CFR § 750.303(c) (1989).  The value of the sign structure and 
the leasehold interest are then combined as the measure of just 
compensation.  The State put no value on the leasehold interest 
in this case because there was no difference between Vivid’s 
contractual rent and the market rent.  Thus, the State in effect 
valued only the sign structure.7   
¶33 Vivid offered testimony regarding both the market and 
income approaches.  The market approach uses the GIM to value 
the billboards by looking to the sale of reasonably comparable 
property.  See, e.g., Rosen v. Milwaukee, 72 Wis. 2d 653, 662, 
242 N.W.2d 681 (1976) (regarding property tax assessment) 
(quoting State ex rel. Enterprise Realty Co. v. Swiderski, 269 
Wis. 642, 645, 70 N.W.2d 34 (1958)).  A GIM is a unit of 
comparison.  It is determined by dividing the sales price of a 
group of signs by the annual gross rental income generated by 
those signs.  For an example of how the GIM generally works, see 
below.8  See 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04[4][c] at 23-
                     
7 Using the cost-less-depreciation method, the State’s 
appraiser valued the “Antiques” sign at $5,000 and the “Trucks” 
sign at $5,500.  He arrived at these figures by calculating the 
cost of reproducing the signs as new (the wood, bolts, etc.) 
minus 35% depreciation, plus an estimated value of the artwork 
at $1,000 minus 30% depreciation, plus $2,500 to compensate 
Vivid for its time and effort in looking for a new site for the 
sign.   
8 Example: Ten billboards generating $100,000 gross 
annual rental income are sold for $400,000.  The Gross 
Rent [Income] Multiplier, sales price divided by gross 
rental income, is four ($400,000 [/] $100,000 = 4).  
If the billboard being appraised generates $12,000 
No.  96-1900 
 
19
57-58.  For an analysis of how the GIM worked in this case, see 
below.9   
                                                                  
gross rental income per year, its value is $48,000, 
four times income (4 x $12,000 = $48,000). 
8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04[4] at 23-58.  
9 Vivid’s appraiser looked at a number of recent sales of 
signs and sign businesses and narrowed the comparable properties 
to four that, in his professional judgment, were the most 
comparable.  Within that group of four comparable sales, the 
appraiser used a “bracketing” method.  That is, he identified 
one of the four comparable sales as involving property that was 
better than the signs being appraised.  The GIM for that 
property set the high limit.  He also identified a comparable 
sale of property that was not as good as the signs being 
appraised and the GIM from that sale set the low limit.  Then, 
using his professional judgment, the appraiser determined that 
an appropriate GIM to use for the signs being appraised was 
between the high and low limits. 
No.  96-1900 
 
20
                                                                  
Specifically, the high limit GIM in this case was the sale 
of a group of well-maintained smaller signs near Rockford, 
Illinois which were well located.  Dividing the sales price of 
this group of signs of $125,000 by the annual gross rental 
income of $29,268, the GIM was 4.27.  The low limit GIM in this 
case was the sale of a group of older signs, some of which were 
on Interstate 43.  Dividing the sales price of $225,000 by the 
annual gross rental income of $80,820, the GIM for this sale was 
2.78.  A third comparable sale was the sale of an entire sign 
company in Madison, Wisconsin.  Dividing the sales price of 
$4,900,000 by the annual gross rental income of $1,338,890, the 
GIM for this sale was 3.38.  Because this sale of the entire 
sign business included some personal property assets, the 
appraiser testified that he would adjust down by 5 percent so 
the GIM would be 3.2.  Finally, the appraiser considered the 
sale of 71 signs, none of which were on interstate highways as 
were the signs being appraised.  Dividing the sales price of 
$550,000 by the annual gross rental income of $194,412, the GIM 
for this sale was 2.83.  Thus, the low limit GIM was 2.78 and 
the high limit GIM was 4.27.  Given the GIMs calculated from 
these comparable sales and his experience in the industry, the 
appraiser used his professional judgment to determine that an 
appropriate GIM in this case would be 3.5.  He testified that an 
average GIM for signs in a rural area would usually be 3 to 3.2. 
 However, because these signs, located on the interstate, bring 
a higher rent for the least amount of labor, the appraiser 
determined a GIM of 3.5 was more appropriate.  
The appraiser then applied the GIM of 3.5 to the signs 
being appraised by multiplying the gross rental income of the 
sign by the GIM.  Accordingly, he appraised the value of the 
“Antiques” sign as $21,000, calculated by multiplying the annual 
gross rental income of $6,000 by the GIM of 3.5.   
No.  96-1900 
 
21
¶34 Vivid argues that the GIM used in the market approach 
is a valid valuation method because it actually measures the 
fair market valuewhat a willing buyer would pay to a willing 
seller.  Three of us agree.  Vivid is entitled to just 
compensation, see Vivid II, 182 Wis. 2d at 73, and just 
compensation is the fair market value of the property taken, in 
this case, two billboards.  Fair market value is what a willing 
buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither being under 
compulsion.  See 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 23.04[1] at 23-
47.  Here there is ample evidence, not contradicted by the 
State, that the outdoor advertising industry uses the GIM to 
                                                                  
Regarding the “Trucks” sign, the appraiser testified that 
when he did the appraisal, he erroneously used an annual gross 
rental income for the sign of $9,480 which was $790 per month 
for 12 months.  He testified that this was in error, however, 
because the contract for the “Trucks” sign was for two sign 
faces and only one sign face was removed by the DOT.  
Accordingly, at the trial he testified that the gross monthly 
rental income attributable to the “Trucks” sign should be $550. 
 He arrived at that figure by looking to the rent for the 
“Antiques” sign which was directly across the interstate but 
facing the other direction.  He testified that the signs were in 
similar condition and size.  He testified that he attributed an 
extra $50 per month in rental income to the “Trucks” sign 
because it was illuminated which usually generates higher 
revenue.  Using this monthly gross rental income of $550 or an 
annual gross rental income of $6,600, the appraiser testified 
that the value of the “Trucks” sign was $23,100, calculated by 
multiplying the annual gross rental income of $6,600 by the GIM 
of 3.5.   
The total amount of just compensation for the two signs, 
using Vivid’s appraiser’s market/GIM approach was $43,100.  The 
jury awarded Vivid $37,800. 
No.  96-1900 
 
22
determine the value of signs in a transaction between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller. 
¶35 Because “in the market for the purchase and sale of 
billboards, buyers and sellers negotiate price as a function of 
the income the signs produce, . . . .” id. at 23-58, appraisers 
developed the gross income multiplier as the best means to 
determine the price a willing buyer would pay to a willing 
seller.  See id. 
 
The Gross . . . [Income] Multiplier approach appears 
particularly 
appropriate 
where 
the 
evidence 
establishes that the sign involved in the condemnation 
cannot be relocated onto the remaining property or 
elsewhere in the immediate area.  This approach best 
measures the value of the location inherent in the 
value of the aggregate asset of the lease, permit and 
billboard because it is predicated on income produced 
by the sign at the location, avoiding the shortcoming 
of the cost approach which ignores the location 
altogether. 
 
Id. at 23-59 (footnotes omitted).  A factor which weighs heavily 
in a court’s decision to admit evidence of the market approach 
and GIM is the assertion that the billboard cannot be relocated. 
 See, e.g., Eller Outdoor Adver. Co., 579 P.2d 590.   
¶36 As we discussed above, location is an extremely 
important part of valuing a billboard.  The market approach 
using 
the 
GIM 
takes 
the 
value 
of 
the 
location 
into 
consideration.  It reflects the fair market valuewhat a willing 
buyer would pay a willing sellerthe measure used by the outdoor 
advertising industry itself in actual practice.  Accordingly, 
three of us conclude that the market approach using the GIM is 
No.  96-1900 
 
23
an appropriate valuation method for the jury’s consideration.  
Certainly, given the nature of the billboard industry, a willing 
seller would set a price to reflect the value of the location.  
Three of us believe that questions regarding the appropriateness 
of what the appraiser uses as comparable sales to determine the 
GIM, and other questions such as the length of the leasehold 
interest, are factors for the jury to consider.   
¶37 The State argues that the GIM approach is an invalid 
valuation method as a matter of law because non-compensable 
business profits (explained below)10 are inextricably intertwined 
with the valuation.  The State relies in part on a 1993 
memorandum from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to 
regional FHWA administrators regarding guidance on valuation of 
billboards.  The FHWA stated that total reliance on the GIM or 
income approaches is not appropriate because it is difficult to 
separate out lost business profits which are not compensable.  
The FHWA did provide, however, that the GIM and income 
approaches could be used if components attributable to lost 
                     
10 Business profits are the profits attributable to the 
labor and skill of the business owner.  See Leathem Smith Lodge, 
Inc. v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 406, 412, 416, 288 N.W.2d 808 (1980). 
 Lost business profits are not compensable because they reflect 
the value attributable to the work, efforts, and skill of the 
property owner rather than the value attributable to the 
property.  See United State v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 
377-78 (1946) (“Since ‘market value’ does not fluctuate with the 
needs of the condemnor or condemnee but with general demand for 
the property, evidence of loss of profits, damage to good will, 
the expense of relocation and other such consequential losses 
are refused in federal condemnation proceedings.”) (citations 
omitted).  In other words, business profits are contrasted with 
the profits attributable to the value of the property.  
No.  96-1900 
 
24
business 
profits 
were 
documented 
and 
excluded 
from 
the 
valuation.  Three of us first note that the guidance from the 
FHWA is a memorandum, not regulations.  More importantly, three 
of us fail to discern what “business profits” are associated 
with an outdoor advertising sign once the sign is in place.  
Although the FHWA stated that the GIM is inappropriate because 
it is virtually impossible to separate the income attributable 
to the business, the FHWA failed to explain what constitutes 
income attributable to the business.   
¶38 The State also failed to indicate what constitutes 
lost business profits.  In contrast to a resort which requires 
day-to-day labor by the owners and employees, see, e.g., Leathem 
Smith, 94 Wis. 2d at 416, little if any labor is required to 
maintain a billboard, except for occasionally changing a light 
bulb.  With respect to outdoor advertising, three of us discern 
little if any profits attributable to the labor and skill of 
Vivid.  Profits are largely attributable to the location of the 
sign. 
¶39 Regardless of which approach the jury ultimately 
concludes 
reflects 
the 
proper 
determination 
of 
just 
compensation, the circuit court must instruct the jury to 
exclude any evidence of lost business profits or expected lease 
or contract renewals.  See Dusevich v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 
260 Wis. 641, 642, 51 N.W.2d 732 (1952) (regarding lost business 
profits); Reibs v. Milwaukee County Park Commission, 252 Wis. 
144, 148-49, 31 N.W.2d 190 (1948) (regarding expectation of 
No.  96-1900 
 
25
lease renewal).11  In the present case, the circuit court 
correctly instructed the jury that it could not consider lost 
business profits.  Using the GIM method, Vivid’s appraiser 
testified that the fair market value for the two signs was 
$43,100.  The jury returned a special verdict, awarding Vivid 
$37,800 as just compensation for both signs.  Although three of 
us believe that it is difficult to discern lost business profits 
in outdoor advertising valuation and the State has pointed to no 
particular lost business profits, the jury may have, in some 
measure, 
taken non-compensable 
lost 
business 
profits 
into 
consideration in awarding an amount lower than that resulting 
from the GIM calculation.   
¶40 Three of us conclude that the market approach to 
valuing outdoor advertising, using the GIM is an appropriate 
valuation method.  As the standard used in the industry for 
valuing signs, the GIM reflects fair market value.  While we 
agree that lost business profits are not compensable in 
determining just compensation, three of us discern no lost 
                     
11 The concurring opinion concludes that the GIM could 
improperly compensate for expectation of lease renewal.  See 
concurring op. at 6.  However, the concurring opinion determines 
that using the GIM in this case did not compensate for 
expectation 
of 
lease 
renewal 
because 
“[t]he 
GIM 
of 
3.5 
establishes the valuation for the billboard at the equivalent of 
3.5 years of earnings, but the ground leases on the signs in 
question had a term of at least eight more years.”  Concurring 
op. at 6.  The concurring opinion fails to recognize, however, 
that the remaining length of the lease is a consideration in 
choosing the proper comparable properties from which the GIM is 
determined.  See Donald T. Sutte, MAI, The Appraisal of Outdoor 
Advertising Signs, Appraisal Institute (1994), at 45-46. 
No.  96-1900 
 
26
business profits associated with outdoor advertising.  The value 
of billboards, once constructed and in place, is largely a 
function of the location, not the labor and skill of the sign 
company.  Three of us cannot say that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of 
the market approach using the GIM.12   
¶41 The State also challenges Vivid’s introduction of 
evidence regarding the income approach which values property on 
“the basis of the income prior to taking and projected income 
after the taking.”  Leathem Smith, 94 Wis. 2d at 411.  Vivid 
                     
12 The solution proposed by the three of us would bring an 
end to the problems guaranteed to result from the concurring 
opinion.  The concurring opinion creates more problems than it 
solves.  It will create confusion in the circuit courts as to 
how and when to apply the GIM.  Circuit courts will not know 
what to do with the court of appeals’ decision in this case 
regarding 
the 
valuation 
analysis. 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
will 
inevitably lead to future litigation.  We have had Vivid I, 
Vivid II, Vivid III, and today Vivid IV.  Vivid V will now 
surely follow.   
The concurring opinion tells circuit courts that the GIM is 
sometimes 
acceptable, 
sometimes 
not, 
but 
provides 
little 
guidance as to when to allow it.  This case may provide a good 
example of the concurring opinion’s failing.  Here, the State 
argues that the GIM is invalid because it may compensate for 
lost business profits.  The State fails, however, to provide any 
evidence to support its argument.  The State failed to introduce 
any evidence to show what portion of the revenue generated by 
the billboards in question is attributable to the efforts of the 
business rather than the location.  Similarly, the FHWA, in its 
memorandum, offered no explanation regarding what constitutes 
lost business profits.  While the three of us agree that 
business profits are not compensable, we are not persuaded that 
lost business profits are compensated under the GIM, especially 
when neither the State in support of its argument, the FHWA in 
support of its memorandum, nor the concurrence in this case, can 
provide any enlightening guidance to the contrary. 
No.  96-1900 
 
27
introduced this evidence, not as a valuation method for these 
signs, but as a check on the valuations determined using the 
market approach.  The income approach resulted in a valuation of 
the billboards of $39,300.   
¶42 As a general rule, income evidence is not admissible 
where there is evidence of comparable sales.  See id. at 413.  
There are, however, three exceptions: 1) profit is produced 
without 
the 
owner’s 
labor; 
2) 
profits 
derived 
from 
the 
property’s use are the chief source of its value; and 3) the 
property is so unique that comparable sales data is not 
available.  See id. at 414.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that valuation of billboards falls within the second exception: 
profits derived from the use of the billboard is the chief 
source of its value.  (Of course, as discussed above, in the 
billboard industry profits are determined largely by location.) 
  
¶43 Valuation of billboards may also fall within the third 
exception to introducing income evidence: the billboard is so 
unique that comparable sales data is not available.  However, as 
mentioned above, the question regarding the appropriateness of 
what the appraiser uses as comparable sales is a question for 
the jury.   
¶44 The income approach has been criticized as “a veiled 
attempt 
to 
recover 
non-compensable 
business 
damages.  
Nevertheless, nearly every court that has been confronted with 
this argument has held to the contrary and allowed the jury, in 
assessing just compensation, to consider the income generated by 
No.  96-1900 
 
28
the rental of the sign faces to the advertisers.”  8A Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, § 23.04[4] at 23-56 (citing State v. Waller, 395 
So. 2d 37, 41-42 (Ala. 1981); Arkansas State Highway Comm’n v. 
Cash, 590 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979); Eller Outdoor 
Adver. Co., 579 P.2d at 597-98; City of Norton Shores v. Hiteco 
Metrocom, 517 N.W.2d 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Weber-
Connelly, Naegele, Inc., 448 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989); National Adver. Co. v. State Dept. of Transp., 611 So. 2d 
566, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). 
¶45 In sum, three of us conclude that the circuit court 
properly allowed the parties to introduce evidence regarding 
different valuation methods for the jury to weigh in determining 
the appropriate just compensation for the signs.  The circuit 
court also correctly instructed the jury not to consider lost 
business profits.  
¶46 Finally, the State argues that the circuit court erred 
in excluding Vivid’s own testimony before the City of Reedsburg 
Board of Review.  The State wanted to cross-examine Vivid’s 
operations 
manager 
regarding 
testimony 
made 
by 
Vivid 
representatives at proceedings before the Board of Review using 
the cost-less-depreciation approach to value sign structures in 
Reedsburg for tax purposes.  The State also wanted to admit 
Vivid’s Statement of Personal Property which showed Vivid’s 
self-assessments of the values of signs using the cost-less-
depreciation valuation method for property tax purposes.  The 
State wanted to use these statements to impeach the witness and 
for the truth of the matter asserted.  The circuit court 
No.  96-1900 
 
29
excluded this evidence as irrelevant, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 
¶47 Questions of admissibility of evidence are questions 
within the circuit court’s discretion.  See Grube v. Daun, 213 
Wis. 2d 533, 541-42, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997) (citing State v. 
Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983)).  “Where 
this court is asked to review such rulings, we look not to see 
if we agree with the circuit court’s determination, but rather 
whether ‘the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance 
with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the fact of 
record.’”  Grube, 213 Wis. 2d at 542 (citing State v. Pharr, 115 
Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983)). 
¶48 We need not determine whether the evidence of Vivid’s 
testimony before the City of Reedsburg Board of Review or its 
self-assessments for its Statement of Personal Property was 
relevant.  Because the State had already introduced undisputed 
testimony regarding the value of the sign structure, using the 
cost 
approach, 
evidence 
of 
Vivid’s 
tax 
assessments 
was 
cumulative.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  We cannot say that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
excluded this evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
¶49 We must finally determine whether Vivid is allowed 
litigation expenses including attorney fees for this action.  
Vivid argues that using Wis. Stat. § 32.05 to determine the 
amount of just compensation converts the action into one under 
No.  96-1900 
 
30
Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  We disagree.  Wisconsin Stat. § 84.30(8) 
only authorizes parties and the court to use § 32.05 to 
determine the amount of just compensation when the parties 
cannot agree on a just compensation.  Using § 32.05 to determine 
the amount of just compensation does not make the action one 
under chapter 32.  The action is still governed by § 84.30.  
Accordingly, Wis. Stat. § 32.28, allowing litigation expenses 
including attorney fees for actions under chapter 32, is not 
applicable. 
¶50 Because we determine that Wis. Stat. § 84.30 provides 
the exclusive remedy when the State removes signs that meet the 
requirements of § 84.30, we must determine whether attorney fees 
are allowed under § 84.30.  No provision of § 84.30 authorizes 
an award of attorney fees either at the circuit court or on 
appeal.  Cf. Gottsacker Real Estate Co. Inc. v. State, 121 
Wis. 2d 264, 270, 359 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1984) (litigation 
expenses under Wis. Stat. § 32.28 are recoverable for costs 
incurred both at the circuit court and on appeal).  Accordingly, 
Vivid may not be awarded attorney fees.  The part of the court 
of appeals’ decision affirming the circuit court's judgment in 
Vivid's favor for litigation expenses pursuant to § 32.28 is 
reversed.  Therefore, we need not address the State’s argument 
that attorney fees and costs are barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
¶51 In sum, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 84.30 provides the 
exclusive remedy for determining just compensation when the 
No.  96-1900 
 
31
State takes or removes outdoor advertising signs that meet the 
statutory requirements of § 84.30, regardless of why the signs 
were removed.  In this case, Vivid meets the requirements of 
§ 84.30; therefore, this statute provides Vivid’s exclusive 
remedy for determination of just compensation for the signs 
removed by the State. 
¶52 We also conclude that all right, title, and interest 
in and to the sign and the leasehold interest includes not only 
the value of the sign structure itself and leasehold value, but 
also the value of the sign location.  Therefore, three of us 
conclude that the parties may introduce evidence, as they did in 
this case, regarding different valuation methods for the jury to 
weigh in determining the appropriate just compensation for the 
signs.   
¶53 Accordingly, we affirm that part of the court of 
appeals’ decision which upheld the jury verdict as to the value 
of the signs.  However, three of us modify the reasoning of the 
court of appeals.  Three of us disagree with the court of 
appeals that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of 
the GIM valuation method.  Although Wis. Stat. § 84.30 is the 
exclusive remedy, when the parties cannot agree on the amount of 
just compensation, determination of the just compensation is 
made by a jury after hearing evidence on various valuation 
methods, including the GIM. 
¶54 Finally, we determine that just compensation under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05 does not convert the action to one under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 32.  The action remains under Wis. Stat. § 84.30.  
No.  96-1900 
 
32
Because § 84.30 does not allow for litigation expenses, such 
expenses 
including 
attorney 
fees 
are 
not 
available.  
Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court of appeals’ 
decision which affirmed the circuit court’s entry of judgment 
for litigation expenses pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.28.  We 
remand the cause to the circuit court for entry of judgment 
eliminating the portion of the judgment which awarded Vivid 
litigation expenses. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed 
in 
part, 
reversed 
in 
part, 
and 
remanded 
with 
directions. 
 
 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
1 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   I agree with the 
lead opinion's determination that the legislature intended Wis. 
Stat. § 84.30 to provide the exclusive statutory means by which 
an advertising company may obtain just compensation for a 
billboard ordered removed.  I also agree with the lead opinion's 
determination that Wis. Stat. § 84.30 does not authorize an 
award of attorney's fees.  Nevertheless, I write separately 
because I do not subscribe to the lead opinion's carte blanche 
approval of the gross income multiplier (GIM) as a method of 
determining 
just 
compensation 
or 
to 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
interpretation of the cost approach method of valuation.13 
¶56 Just compensation is to compensate only for the value 
of the property, not for the value of the business.  Yet, in 
many 
cases 
the 
application 
of 
the 
GIM 
will 
result 
in 
compensation for loss of business profits and for the value of 
expectation of lease renewal.  Compensation for such items is 
specifically prohibited by our prior cases. 
¶57 At trial, Vivid offered the testimony of both an 
expert appraiser and Vivid's Chairman as to the proper valuation 
of the signs ordered removed by the Department of Transportation 
(DOT).  Both individuals offered valuations of the billboards 
                     
13  A concurrence which receives the support of a majority 
of participating justices on a particular issue becomes the 
opinion of the court on that issue.  See State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 
2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984); see also State v. Elam, 195 
Wis. 2d 683, 685, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995); State v. Outlaw, 108 
Wis. 2d 112, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982); Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 
589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975); State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 
555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996).  
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
2 
based on a valuation technique often used in sales between 
market participants, the GIM.  See 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
Sec. 23.04[4] at 23-52 (1997).  One offered a valuation of 
$50,400 based on a multiple of four, and the other offered a 
valuation of $44,100 based on a multiple of 3.5.  Valuations 
with the GIM are obtained by dividing the sales price of a 
"comparable" property or enterprise by the annual gross earnings 
of the property sold.  The resulting ratio is then multiplied 
against the annual earnings of the property that is being 
appraised.  See id. at 23-58.  Accordingly, the GIM is an 
earnings-dependent valuation technique.14  
¶58 The DOT strongly objected to Vivid's proffer of the 
GIM based valuations.  The DOT's objections to the GIM valuation 
were not novel, since states and advertising companies have been 
fighting over the merits of GIM valuations for years, with 
sporadic victories going to each side.  Compare National Adver. 
Co. v. State Dept. of Transp., 611 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1992) with State ex. rel. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Comm'n v. 
Quiko, 923 S.W.2d 489 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Whiteco Indus. v. 
City of Tucson, 812 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).  This 
court has never opined as to whether the GIM is an acceptable 
method of valuation of billboards in "just compensation" cases, 
despite the general use of the GIM in market transactions.   
                     
14 If we assume that earnings are constant, a GIM of 3.5 can 
be viewed as valuing a piece of property as equal to 3.5 times 
annual earnings.  
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
3 
¶59 The controversy surrounding the use of the GIM in this 
case exists in large part because the very foundation of the GIM 
is based on the sale of a business.  The initial calculation of 
the GIM is derived not from the sale of one billboard, an 
unlikely prospect as the lead opinion concedes, but rather from 
the sale of an entire advertising concern.  In such cases, it 
can be "virtually impossible to determine the amount of income 
that should be attributed to the billboard and which portion 
should be attributed to the marketing and other aspects of the 
business."  Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Memorandum and Attachment, Guidance on the 
Valuation of Billboards, Oct. 20, 1993.15     
¶60 The DOT and the court of appeals cite two significant 
legal justifications for their claim that use of the GIM in 
valuing Vivid's signs was improper.  First, the DOT argues that 
use of the GIM automatically gives Vivid compensation for the 
loss of "business profits."  Such a result is problematic 
because in Wisconsin, like other states, "just compensation" 
does not include compensation for the loss of "business 
profits."  See Dusevich v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 260 Wis. 
                     
15 If GIMs in cases of this nature were derived through the 
use of comparable sales of individual signs with existing 
leases, I may give some credence to the lead opinion's reliance 
on the proposition that "the remaining length of the lease is a 
consideration in choosing the proper comparable . . . ."  
However, as the facts here demonstrate, that is not the case.  
Earnings multiples are at best an inexact method of valuation.  
Where it is apparent from the face of the evidence that the GIM 
compensates for something barred as a matter of law, the GIM 
must be rejected.  
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
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641, 51 N.W.2d 732 (1952).  "Business profits" is defined as 
those earnings attributable to the efforts and skill of the 
property owner in running the business, such as a program to 
increase sales, and not to the existence of the property itself. 
 See Leathem Smith Lodge, Inc. v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 406, 412, 
416, 288 N.W.2d 808 (1980). 
¶61 The court of appeals, however, rested its reversal of 
the circuit court not on a "business profits" problem, but 
rather on that court's belief that the GIM had an "Achilles 
Heel:"  the GIM compensates for the value of an expectation that 
a leasehold will be renewed.  Like business profits, the value 
of such expectations is not compensable.  See Riebs v. Milwaukee 
County Park Comm'n, 252 Wis. 144, 148-49, 31 N.W.2d 190 (1948). 
 Testimony in this case indicated that Vivid was "95% certain" 
that its leases on the two signs would be renewed. 
¶62 Vivid acknowledged in its brief that the "just 
compensation" concern of the court of appeals that the GIM may 
value the possibility of renewing a lease was "generally 
correct," but argued that such a concern did not exist in this 
case.  See Respondent's brief at 25.  Moreover, Vivid did not 
directly contradict the DOT's assertions that use of the GIM 
included 
compensation 
for 
Vivid's 
lost 
business 
profits.  
Vivid's only real response was that the record showed that "its 
business losses were significantly higher than what Vivid was 
seeking for just compensation."  See id. at 29.  Vivid 
apparently argues that because all of its business losses are 
not being compensated, the court should ignore the fact that 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
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some of its business profits are possibly being compensatedan 
untenable proposition.  
¶63 The lead opinion responds to the concerns raised by 
the DOT and the court of appeals both substantively and 
procedurally.  The lead opinion substantively dismisses the 
DOT's concerns over compensation for lost business profits by 
indicating that it "fail[s] to discern what 'business profits' 
are associated with an outdoor advertising sign once the sign is 
in place" and that "little if any labor is required to maintain 
a billboard, except for occasionally changing a light bulb."  
Lead op. at 23.  Thus, in the lead opinion's view, the value of 
the GIM in this case is "largely attributable to the location of 
the sign," and there is no compensation for lost business 
profits. 
¶64 The facts of this case, however, illustrate my concern 
that the use of the GIM in some cases may have the potential to 
compensate for lost business profits.  The Chairman of Vivid 
testified that Vivid is not merely a corporate entity which owns 
the physical structure of the billboards.  Rather, Vivid is a 
comprehensive advertising enterprise which actively markets the 
availability of its billboards, employs an artist to create the 
advertising copy for its clients, and creates the actual 
advertisement materials placed on the billboard.  The Chairman 
also testified that in some cases Vivid changes the artwork on 
its billboards on a monthly basis for the same client.  Thus, 
Vivid's involvement with its sign business also involves the 
skill and management of an ongoing concern. 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
6 
¶65 Next I consider the court of appeals' focus on the 
"Achilles' Heel" of the GIM, the potential compensation for 
lease renewal.  Vivid concedes that the use of the GIM in 
billboard cases generally requires close scrutiny since the 
valuation may include compensation for the value of an expected 
lease renewal.  Despite the court of appeals' concern in this 
case with such a problem, it appears from the facts of this case 
that no such problem exists here.  The GIM of 3.5 establishes 
the valuation for the billboard at the equivalent of 3.5 years 
of earnings, but the ground leases on the signs in question had 
a term of at least eight more years.  Thus, while the court of 
appeals was correct in theory in highlighting inherent problems 
with the GIM, the compensation problem it raised does not affect 
the outcome of this case because the earnings used in the 
valuation are not attributable beyond the terms of the present 
leases. 
¶66 Both of the concerns highlighted above demonstrate the 
potentially problematic nature of the GIM.  Although the GIM is 
generally used in the marketplace for valuation purposes, 
inherent in this earnings-dependent method of valuation are the 
same general concerns acknowledged by both of the parties as 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
7 
well as the court of appealscompensating for loss which cannot 
by law be included in just compensation.16 
¶67 Instead of addressing the potential for compensation 
beyond "just compensation" when using the GIM directly, the lead 
opinion determines that it is for the jury, not the court, to 
evaluate the acceptability of the GIM valuation.  Apparently 
acknowledging that there will be cases in which the GIM includes 
compensation for "business 
profits" 
and leasehold renewal 
expectancies, the lead opinion determines that all the circuit 
court need do is instruct the jury to avoid compensating Vivid 
for those uncompensable items.  This procedural resolution of 
the dilemma presented by GIM valuations misconstrues the proper 
role of the court and the trier of fact. 
¶68 The circuit court acts as the evidentiary gatekeeper 
at trial.  This court accordingly has recognized that circuit 
courts retain significant discretion in the admission of 
evidence at trial.  See Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 541-42, 
570 N.W.2d 851 (1997).  However, as this court has also 
repeatedly noted, a circuit court erroneously exercises that 
                     
16 This concurrence and the lead opinion adopt divergent 
solutions to this quandary.  I require the circuit court to 
consider the evidence on its face and uphold the law barring 
compensation for loss of business profits and the expectancy of 
renewing a lease, even in the face of technical valuation 
methods.  The lead opinion, on the other hand, allows the 
circuit court to abdicate its responsibility to prevent unlawful 
compensation, enhancing the prospect of additional appellate 
review.  Given a choice between the two positions, I chose the 
former. 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
8 
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard to the facts 
at hand.  See id. at 542. 
¶69 As noted above, compensation for lost business profits 
and the expectancy of leasehold renewal is improper as a matter 
of law.  See Dusevich, 260 Wis. at 642; Riebs, 252 Wis. at 148-
49.  If a circuit court can determine from the facts that a GIM 
valuation in a particular case includes components which are not 
otherwise compensable as part of "just compensation," then it is 
for the court, not the trier of fact, to bar the evidence.  To 
reach any other conclusion would allow circuit courts to 
abdicate responsibility for precluding the jury from being 
swayed by inadmissible evidence. 
¶70 Next, I address the lead opinion's misinterpretation 
of the cost approach.17  To further buttress its adoption of the 
GIM, the lead opinion indicates that the cost approach does not 
include any component of valuation for the location of the sign. 
 The lead opinion states, "[h]aving determined that the State 
must compensate Vivid not only for the sign structure and 
leasehold but also for the location of the sign."  The lead 
opinion additionally notes:  "[w]e also conclude that all right, 
title, and interest in and to the sign and the leasehold 
interest includes not only the value of the sign structure 
                     
17 Despite the lead opinion's interpretation of events to 
the contrary, I address this issue solely to respond to what I 
consider to be an attack on the cost approach used by the lead 
opinion to buttress its GIM analysis.  But for the lead 
opinion's use of this tactic, I need not write on this issue.    
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
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itself and leasehold value, but also the value of the sign 
location."  Lead op. at 15, 30.   
¶71 However, under the cost approach the value of location 
is already considered in the value of the leasehold.  The 
leasehold value is defined as the difference between the 
contractual rent that the sign company is paying to the 
landowner and the market rent at the time of the appraisal.  See 
23 CFR § 750.303(c) (1989). 
¶72 The amount of rent is affected by location.  The 
better the location, the higher the rent.  Thus, the lead 
opinion is incorrect when it suggests that location must always 
be considered in the cost approach in addition to the value of 
the sign and the leasehold value.  The value of the location is 
not in addition to the value of the leasehold but rather it is 
already included in the value of the leasehold because the value 
of the leasehold is determined by a comparison of rents.   
¶73 While the lead opinion's implicit dissatisfaction with 
the cost approach may be appropriate in this case, as a general 
proposition, the cost approach is also an accepted method of 
valuation.  Thus, to the extent the lead opinion disclaims it, 
that 
disclaimer 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
justification for continued use of the GIM--it is a generally 
accepted method of valuation. 
¶74 In sum, the lead opinion's carte blanche approval of 
the GIM fails to recognize that the GIM has certain inherent 
flaws which may call into question its use in particular cases. 
 In granting just compensation based on a GIM valuation, the 
No. 96-1900.awb 
 
10
State may actually be paying for items which are not compensable 
as a matter of law.   
¶75 While I do not believe remand on this issue is 
necessary in this particular case, as a general rule I would 
require circuit courts to first scrutinize proffers of GIM 
valuations to determine whether the GIM valuation includes 
compensation for items not compensable as a matter of law.  In 
such cases, the GIM valuation cannot go to the jury.  Moreover, 
I also emphasize that the cost approach is an acceptable method 
of valuation in most cases. 
¶76 While I write separately for the reasons discussed 
above, I join the lead opinion in declaring Wis. Stat. ch. 84 to 
be the exclusive statutory means of pursuing just compensation 
and join the lead opinion's determination that Vivid is not 
statutorily entitled to attorney's fees.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur.  
¶77 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, and Justice Janine P. 
Geske join this opinion. 
  
 
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