Title: Ex parte Thomas F. Morgan and Holley S. Morgan. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: W.E. Butterworth III v. Thomas F. Morgan and Holley S. Morgan)
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 1080109
State: Alabama
Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court
Date: May 15, 2009

REL: 05/15/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1080109
____________________
Ex parte Thomas F. Morgan and Holley S. Morgan
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: W.E. Butterworth III
v.
Thomas F. Morgan and Holley S. Morgan)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-05-799;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2070141)
PER CURIAM.
1080109
2
The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied.  In
denying the petition for the writ of certiorari, this Court
does not wish to be understood as approving all the language,
reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals’
opinion.  Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So. 2d 155
(1973).  See Rules 39(a)(1)(D) and 39(d)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
WRIT DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Stuart, J., dissents.
1080109
3
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the decision of the Court to deny the
petition for the writ of certiorari.  I write separately to
explain my reason for concurring in the Court's citation of
Rules 39(a)(1)(D) and 39(d)(3), Ala. R. App. P., as grounds
for that denial and, as a corollary, to explain my reason for
concurring in the Court's caveat that it does not wish to be
understood as agreeing with all the reasoning and statements
of law in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion.  See Horsley v.
Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 782, 280 So. 2d 155, 156 (1973).  
With respect to the reliance on Rules 39(a)(1)(D) and
39(d)(3) for denying the petition, I note that, among other
things, the petition asserts a conflict between the decision
of the Court of Civil Appeals in the present case and its
decision in Arp v. Edmonds, 706 So. 2d 736 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997).  Rules 39(a)(1)(D)1. and 39(d)(3)(A) require that,
where it is feasible to quote that part of the opinion of the
Court of Civil Appeals alleged to be in conflict with a prior
decision, "the petition must quote that part of the opinion of
the court of appeals and that part of the prior decision the
petitioner 
alleges 
are 
in 
conflict." 
 
See 
also
1080109
4
Rules 39(a)(1)(D)2. and 39(d)(3)(B), Ala. R. App. P.
(explaining the procedure required when it is not feasible to
quote that part of the opinion of the court of appeals alleged
to be in conflict with the prior decision).  Although it
appears feasible to quote that part of the opinion of the
Court of Civil Appeals alleged to be in conflict with Arp, the
petition quotes neither that opinion nor the decision in Arp.
As to the substantive merits of this case, the opinion of
the 
Court 
of 
Civil 
Appeals succinctly summarizes 
the pertinent
facts and procedural history.  Butterworth v. Morgan,
[Ms. 2070141, June 13, 2008] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008).  On appeal, in their effort to persuade the Court
of Civil Appeals to uphold the judgment of the trial court,
Thomas F. Morgan and Holley S. Morgan argued, among other
things, that an implied easement to use the existing driveway
existed in their favor.  The Court of Civil Appeals rejected
their argument, however, on the ground that, "'[a]s a general
rule, the express grant of an easement negates an implied
grant of an easement of a similar character.'  25 Am. Jur. 2d
Easements and Licenses § 19 (2004)."  Butterworth, ___ So. 3d
at ___.  The Court of Civil Appeals also cited precedent from
1080109
5
other states in support of this general rule.  ___ So. 3d at
___.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it has also been noted
that
  
"[a] conveyance expressly providing for certain
easements warrants an inference that no other
easements are intended. However, such inference will
not override a clearly apparent intent to include
other easements, and it has been held that an
express provision for an easement is immaterial on
the question of implied easements."  
28A C.J.S. Easements § 76 (2008)(emphasis added); see also
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.12 cmt. h
(2000) ("Implication of a servitude under the rule stated in
this section is based on what the parties probably intended or
had reasonable grounds to expect.  The implication does not
arise if the facts or circumstances of the conveyance indicate
that the parties did not intend to create a servitude to
continue the prior use, or that the parties did intend to
create rights to terminate the existing utility arrangements.
...  Economic consequences to both parties may be relevant
indicators of their expectations.").
In their petition to this Court, the Morgans contend that
"holding or obtaining implied ... easements in addition to an
1080109
6
express easement is not legally inconsistent under Alabama
law."  Petition, at 5.  One of the cases relied upon by the
Morgans for this contention is the above-referenced case of
Arp v. Edmonds, 706 So. 2d 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
In their petition, the Morgans correctly describe Arp as
a case in which the Court of Civil Appeals "reversed a trial
court for refusing to find an implied easement over the
portion of [a dirt] road that was located outside the express
easement for the convenience of the parties."  Petition, at 5;
see Arp, 706 So. 2d at 738-39.  The trial court in Arp
determined that the "'old [dirt] 
road'" 
across the subservient
estate in that case "'did not follow the description set forth
in one or more deeds'" by which the subservient property had
been conveyed.  706 So. 2d at 737.  On appeal, the Arp court
noted:
"An easement by implication 'requires not only
original unity of ownership ... but also that the
use be open, visible, continuous, and reasonably
necessary to the estate granted.'  Helms[ v.
Tullis], 
398 
So. 
2d 
[253,] 
255 
[(Ala.
1981)](citations omitted).  Our supreme court has
held that the 'implication is that the parties
implied such an easement because the grantee, having
seen the use the grantor made of the property, can
reasonably expect a continuance of the former manner
of use.'  Id."
1080109
7
706 So. 2d at 738.  The Arp court then concluded:
"In 
this 
case 
the 
material 
facts 
were
undisputed.  The trial court did not find an
easement by implication.  Based on the record before
us, we conclude that the Arps presented substantial
evidence of unity of ownership, that the dirt road
was used openly and continuously since 1971, that
the easement was necessary to reach the Arps'
property, and that the trial court misapplied the
law to the facts.  Underwood v. Shepard, 521 So. 2d
1314 (Ala. 1988)."
706 So. 2d at 739.
The facts presented here are sufficient to indicate a
conflict between the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in
this case and the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in
Arp.  It is true, as noted by the Court of Civil Appeals in
this case, that the driveway that has been in actual use in
this case does not follow exactly the description of the
express easement in the deed conveying the servient estate.
This was also true with respect to the dirt road in Arp, yet
the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
court in that case for failing to find an implied easement
over that road.
In this case, both the property owned by the Morgans and
the property owned by W.E. Butterworth III were owned by
R. Michael Thompson and Patricia Thompson in 1985 (unity of
1080109
8
ownership), and the driveway at issue was in existence and in
open and continuous use at that time.  The express easement
was first described in the deed conveying the Butterworth
property from the Thompsons to a predecessor in title of
Butterworth in 1989, yet both before and after the reservation
of that easement the Thompsons continued to use the actual
driveway as their means of ingress and egress.  Likewise,
apparently, the language describing the express easement was
included in the deed by which the Butterworth property was
conveyed to Butterworth in 1993, and yet both before and after
that conveyance the Thompsons and their successors in title
continued to use the actual driveway as their means of ingress
and egress.   In short, notwithstanding the inclusion of the
express-easement language in more than one deed conveying the
Butterworth property to different parties since 1985, the
driveway has been in "open, visible, continuous, and
reasonably necessary" use by the owners of the Morgan property
as the means of ingress and egress to and from that property
1080109
Also, according to the Morgans' petition, (a) language
1
in 
a 
corrective 
deed 
executed 
in 
conjunction 
with
Butterworth's acquisition of the Butterworth property in 1993
made the conveyance of that property "expressly subject to
'[e]xisting paved drive not being completely located within
the 
above-described 
ingress, 
egress, 
and 
beach 
walk 
easement,"
and (b) the Butterworth property has physical characteristics
that make the use of the express easement impractical.
9
from at least 1985 to the filing of the instant action in
2005.  See Butterworth, ___ So. 3d at ___.   
1
Based on the foregoing, this is arguably a case in which
whatever inference is to be derived from the inclusion in
Butterworth's deed of the language of the express easement at
issue does not override the apparent intent and reasonable
expectations of the parties that the actual driveway would
continue to be used for the benefit of the Morgan property.