Title: Goode v. Goode
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 39, 2024
State: Delaware
Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court
Date: February 27, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DANIEL GOODE,1 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
SARINA GOODE, 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 39, 2024 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  File No. CN21-04778 
§  Petition Nos. 23-23476 
§                        23-17514 
§ 
 
Submitted: February 2, 2024 
Decided: 
February 27, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the notice and supplemental notice of appeal from an 
interlocutory order, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant (“Ex-Husband”) has petitioned this Court under Supreme 
Court Rule 42 to accept an appeal from the Family Court’s orders dated November 
30, 2023, and January 5, 2024, which (i) denied Ex-Husband’s motion to dismiss a 
petition for specific performance filed by the appellee (“Ex-Wife”) and (ii) 
addressed Ex-Husband’s motion for reargument of the denial of the motion to 
dismiss and provided the rationale for the denial of the motion to dismiss. 
 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
2 
(2) 
Ex-Husband filed for divorce in September 2021 and did not ask the 
Family Court to retain jurisdiction over ancillary matters.  The Family Court issued 
a final divorce decree on November 30, 2022.  In August 2023, Ex-Wife filed a 
motion to reopen ancillary matters, stating that she had not previously asked the 
court to resolve ancillary matters because the parties had reached their own 
agreement as to such matters.  She asserted that Ex-Husband had later stopped 
complying with the parties’ agreement, prompting her to seek court intervention.  
Ex-Husband opposed, and on September 12, 2023, a Family Court commissioner 
denied Ex-Wife’s motion to reopen the proceedings.  Ex-Wife did not file a request 
for review of the commissioner’s order. 
(3) 
On October 30, 2023, Ex-Wife filed a petition seeking specific 
performance of the purported separation agreement.  Ex-Husband moved to dismiss 
the petition, arguing that res judicata barred Ex-Wife from seeking specific 
performance because she had failed to request that relief in her motion to reopen.  
Ex-Wife responded that res judicata did not bar her petition because the court had 
not previously decided the issue of the enforceability of the separation agreement.  
The Family Court denied the motion to dismiss in an order that did not provide any 
reasoning. 
(4) 
Ex-Husband moved for reargument.  After briefing by the parties, the 
Family Court provided the reasoning for its decision in an order dated January 5, 
 
3 
2024.  The court determined that Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance was 
not barred by res judicata because Ex-Wife’s claim that the parties “had agreed to 
and performed under a valid and enforceable contract had not yet been litigated” and 
“the issue of enforceability of the parties’ separation agreement was not addressed 
or litigated” in connection with the motion to reopen.  Applying the five-prong test 
for res judicata set forth in LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp.,2 the court 
determined that Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance was “both legally and 
factually separate and distinct” from the motion to reopen.  The court further stated 
that denying Ex-Wife the opportunity to litigate the enforceability of the alleged 
separation agreement would contravene principles of equity and that the litigation 
would afford Ex-Husband the opportunity to assert “any and all defenses” to the 
validity or enforceability of the alleged agreement. 
(5) 
Ex-Husband sought certification of an interlocutory appeal.  He argued 
that the Family Court’s decisions decided a substantial issue of material importance 
because the issue raised—whether Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance 
should be dismissed—is potentially case dispositive.  Similarly, Ex-Husband argued 
that the potential benefits of interlocutory review outweigh the potential costs 
because if he prevails on appeal the parties will save the expense of further litigation.  
 
2 970 A.2d 185, 192 (Del. 2009) (quoting the “elements of res judicata” as “recently reiterated” in 
Dover Hist. Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del. 2006)). 
 
4 
Addressing the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors, Ex-Husband argued that (i) the Family 
Court’s decisions involve a question of first impression;3 (ii) the decisions sustained 
the jurisdiction of the Family Court;4 (iii) the “practical effect” of the decisions was 
to “set aside”5 or “vacate[] or open[]”6 a prior decision of the Family Court—
specifically, the resolution of the divorce proceedings without the court having 
addressed ancillary financial matters; (iv) Ex-Husband’s success on appeal would 
terminate the litigation;7 and (v) interlocutory review would serve considerations of 
justice.8  The Family Court adopted Ex-Husband’s proposed order certifying the 
interlocutory appeal. 
(6) 
We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.  
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this 
Court.9  Although interlocutory review of the Family Court’s decision might 
terminate litigation and therefore reduce the expense of litigation and promote 
certain considerations of justice,10 that is almost always true when a trial court denies 
 
3 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A). 
4 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(D) 
5 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(E). 
6 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(F). 
7 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G). 
8 Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(H). 
9 Id. R. 42(d)(v). 
10 A countervailing consideration of justice is the general preference that matters should be 
resolved on their merits. 
 
5 
a motion to dismiss.  But we conclude that the Family Court’s decision applying 
well-settled principles of res judicata, albeit in somewhat unusual or even unique 
circumstances, does not raise a legal question of first impression or satisfy the other 
factors for interlocutory review set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii)(A), (D), (E), or (F).11  
Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the Family 
Court’s decisions do not exist in this case,12 and the application for interlocutory 
review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 
42(b). 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is 
REFUSED.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
11 Ex-Husband did not contend that the factors set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii)(B) or (C) applied, and 
we agree that they do not. 
12 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(ii).