Title: Kim v. Douval Corporation
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: 991092
State: Virginia
Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court
Date: April 21, 2000

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
YOUNG KEE KIM 
 
v. Record No. 991092  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   April 21, 2000 
DOUVAL CORPORATION, d/b/a WASH FAIR 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jane Marum Roush, Judge 
 
 
 
This appeal arises out of a motion for judgment 
seeking ejectment and a counterclaim alleging adverse 
possession.  Plaintiff Young Kee Kim sought to eject the 
defendant Douval Corporation, d/b/a Wash Fair (Douval), 
from a 414 square-foot tract of real estate owned by Kim 
and located in the Springfield area of Fairfax County.  In 
its counterclaim, Douval asserted that it had acquired 
title to the disputed parcel by virtue of its actual, 
hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous use and 
possession of the property for more than 15 years.  A jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Kim and awarded damages.  
However, the trial court granted Douval’s post-trial motion 
to set aside the verdict and entered judgment for Douval on 
its claim of adverse possession.  This appeal followed.  
Because we conclude that conflicting inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence with regard to the question whether 
Douval’s possession of the disputed property was under a 
claim of right, and because the jury resolved those 
inferences in favor of Kim, we will reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
FACTS 
 
The property at issue in this appeal is part of Parcel 
4-A of a subdivision known as the East Garfield Tract.  Kim 
purchased Parcel 4-A in 1994.  His predecessors-in-
interest, Jung Sik Kim (Jung) and Jung’s wife, had owned 
the property since 1983.  Kim’s parcel is adjacent to 
Parcel 4-E of the East Garfield Tract.  David N. and 
Loretta R. Bond purchased Parcel 4-E in 1984.  Since then, 
the Bonds have leased this parcel to Douval. 
 
Douval operates a car wash on Parcel 4-E under the 
trade name of Wash Fair.1  Wash Fair has run the car wash 
since 1961 pursuant to leases with the various owners of 
Parcel 4-E.  Mr. Bond was the manager of Wash Fair from 
1962 until 1977, when he and Mrs. Bond acquired all the 
shares of stock in Douval. 
The parties agree that the disputed property is a 
triangular-shaped tract bounded on one side by the property 
line between Parcels 4-A and 4-E, and on the other side by 
a concrete curb situated on Parcel 4-A.  The curb has been 
                     
1 Kim operates an auto body repair shop on Parcel 4-A. 
 
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in place since at least 1962, but the record does not 
disclose precisely when, or by whom, it was erected. 
According to Mr. Bond, Wash Fair has used the disputed 
property since 1962.  Initially, it utilized the triangular 
strip of Parcel 4-A as a “driveway” for cars entering and 
departing the car wash.  Wash Fair also erected a sign pole 
that abutted the concrete curb and placed asphalt on the 
disputed area over to the curb.  In 1969, Wash Fair 
installed outside lighting at the car wash by placing poles 
and concrete bases on the disputed property along the curb.  
In order to lay the electrical conduit for those lights, 
the asphalt had to be dug up.  After the installation of 
the lights was completed, Wash Fair paved the disputed area 
with asphalt again.  During the ensuing years, Wash Fair 
asphalted the area on several more occasions.  It also 
erected a fence at the rear of the disputed property in 
1969 and replaced the fence in 1982 or 1983.  Finally, Wash 
Fair painted the concrete curb at least twice each year and 
placed planters in the disputed area in 1990. 
Jung testified that Wash Fair installed vacuums on the 
disputed property approximately six or seven months after 
he purchased Parcel 4-A in 1983.  Jung did not give Wash 
Fair permission to install the vacuums, nor did Wash Fair 
request permission from him to do so.  Jung also testified 
 
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that he “didn’t mind” Wash Fair’s using part of his 
property because Wash Fair needed it.  Jung likewise did 
not object when Wash Fair paved the disputed property with 
new asphalt because the asphalt benefited his property. 
Mr. Bond admitted that Wash Fair used the disputed 
property even though he knew it was not part of Parcel 4-E.  
However, he asserted that no one instructed Wash Fair not 
to use or make improvements on the triangular strip of 
Parcel 4-A over to the curb.  Mr. Bond further testified 
that Wash Fair never received permission from any of the 
owners of Parcel 4-A to occupy and use the disputed portion 
of that parcel. 
 
However, Kim, through his attorney William C. Thomas, 
offered Douval a license agreement to use the disputed 
strip of Parcel 4-A in 1995.  According to Thomas, Mr. Bond 
claimed at that time that he did not know about the 
encroachment on Parcel 4-A and asserted that he “had built 
entirely on the Wash Fair property.” 
 
Kim established his claim for ejectment by introducing 
evidence to prove his chain of title for Parcel 4-A and his 
damages resulting from Douval’s actions.  Kim also 
testified that he asked Douval to remove the vacuums from 
the disputed strip of Parcel 4-A and that it refused to do 
so. 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-430, a trial court can set 
aside the verdict of a jury in a civil action when the 
verdict is contrary to the evidence or is without evidence 
to support it.  However, the trial court’s authority to do 
so is limited by the following principles: 
If there is a conflict in the testimony on a material 
point, or if reasonable [persons] may differ in their 
conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or 
if the conclusion is dependent on the weight to be 
given the testimony, the trial judge cannot substitute 
his conclusion for that of the jury merely because he 
would have voted for a different verdict if he had 
been on the jury.  The weight of a jury’s verdict, 
when there is credible evidence upon which it can be 
based, is not overborne by the trial judge’s 
disapproval. 
 
Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 581-82, 260 S.E.2d 238, 240 
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 (1980) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. McNeely, 204 Va. 218, 222, 129 S.E.2d 687, 
689-90 (1963)). Accord Henderson v. Gay, 245 Va. 478, 480-
81, 429 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993).  In addition, “when 
conflicting inferences have been resolved by a jury and 
those necessarily underlying the conclusion reflected in 
the verdict are reasonably deducible from the evidence, a 
trial judge should not set the verdict aside.”  Lane, 220 
Va. at 582, 260 S.E.2d at 240. 
In reviewing the circuit court’s judgment, we are 
mindful of the fact that the trial judge disapproved the 
 
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jury verdict in this case.  Thus, that verdict is not 
entitled to the same weight as one that a trial judge has 
approved.  Deskins v. T.H. Nichols Line Contractor, Inc., 
234 Va. 185, 186, 361 S.E.2d 125, 125 (1987) (citing 
Cloutier, Adm’r v. Virginia Gas Distrib. Corp., 202 Va. 
646, 651, 119 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1961)).  Nevertheless, this 
Court must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Kim, who was the recipient of the jury 
verdict.  Deskins, 234 Va. at 186, 361 S.E.2d at 125 
(citing Neighbors v. Moore, 216 Va. 514, 515, 219 S.E.2d 
692, 694 (1975)). 
 
“To establish title to real property by adverse 
possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile, 
exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under a 
claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 years.”  
Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61-62, 400 S.E.2d 168, 170-71 
(1991) (citing McIntosh v. Chincoteague Volunteer Fire Co., 
220 Va. 553, 556-57, 260 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1979); Peck v. 
Daniel, 212 Va. 265, 268, 184 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1971); Leake v. 
Richardson, 199 Va. 967, 976, 103 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1958); 
Code § 8.01-236).  The claimant bears the burden of proving 
the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Calhoun v. Woods, 246 Va. 41, 43, 431 S.E.2d 
 
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285, 287 (1993); Matthews v. W.T. Freeman Co., Inc., 191 
Va. 385, 395, 60 S.E.2d 909, 914 (1950). 
 
Kim acknowledges that Douval’s possession of the 
disputed strip of Parcel 4-A has been open and notorious.  
However, he argues that there is a conflict in the evidence 
and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence with regard to the question whether Douval’s 
possession was “hostile” under a claim of right.  In fact, 
the circuit court noted in its letter opinion that this 
issue was the only genuinely disputed one at trial.2
It is well-established that a claimant’s possession is 
“hostile” if it is under “a claim of right and adverse to 
the right of the true owner.”  Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 
S.E.2d at 171 (citing Virginia Midland R.R. Co. v. Barbour, 
97 Va. 118, 123, 33 S.E. 554, 556 (1899)).  The phrase 
“claim of right,” when used in the context of adverse 
possession, refers to the intent of a claimant to use land 
as the claimant’s own to the exclusion of all others.  
Marion Inv. Co. v. Virginia Lincoln Furniture Corp., 171 
Va. 170, 182, 198 S.E. 508, 513 (1938).  The existence of a 
claim of right does not depend on the claimant having any 
                     
2 Kim also argued that there is a conflict in the 
evidence with regard to the issues whether Douval’s 
possession was “exclusive” and whether the possession was 
continuous for the requisite 15-year statutory period. 
 
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actual title or right to the property.  Id.  However, 
“[w]here the original entry on another’s land was by 
agreement or permission, possession regardless of its 
duration presumptively continues as it began, in the 
absence of an explicit disclaimer.”  Matthews, 191 Va. at 
395, 60 S.E.2d at 914.  Accord Alford v. Alford, 236 Va. 
194, 197, 372 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1988); Thompson v. Camper, 
106 Va. 315, 318, 55 S.E. 674, 675 (1906). 
As Kim notes, the record does not indicate the 
circumstances under which Wash Fair’s possession of the 
disputed strip of Parcel 4-A began.  Wash Fair commenced 
operating the car wash in 1961.  Mr. Bond testified that 
Wash Fair was using the disputed property in 1962. 
However, we do not know whether, at that time, Wash 
Fair’s landlord, who owned Parcel 4-E, obtained permission 
from the owner of Parcel 4-A for Wash Fair to utilize the 
disputed property.  Although Mr. Bond began managing Wash 
Fair in 1962 and testified that he had no knowledge of any 
agreement between Wash Fair’s landlord and the owner of 
Parcel 4-A with regard to Wash Fair’s use of the disputed 
property, he and Mrs. Bond did not become Wash Fair’s 
landlord until 1984 when they purchased Parcel 4-E.  Thus, 
he would not have been a party to any such agreement prior 
to 1984.  Mr. Bond admitted that some of the previous 
 
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owners are deceased and that he therefore could not confer 
with them about whether any such agreement existed before 
he and Mrs. Bond became Wash Fair’s landlord. 
In contrast, we know that Jung, a prior owner of 
Parcel 4-A, did not give Wash Fair permission to install 
the vacuums on the disputed strip of property in 1983, 
shortly after he purchased Parcel 4-A.  Also, Kim asked 
Douval to remove those vacuums in 1995, but Douval refused 
to do so. 
Relying on this Court’s decision in Marion Inv. Co., 
Douval argues that its actual occupation, use, and 
improvement of the disputed property as if it were in fact 
an owner establishes that its possession was under a claim 
of right.  We agree that a claim of right can be inferred 
from unequivocal conduct that is inconsistent with any 
other reasonable inference.  See Sims v. Capper, 133 Va. 
278, 287, 112 S.E. 676, 679 (1922).  However, whether the 
conduct relied upon is sufficient to establish a claim of 
right is generally a question for the jury.  Marion Inv. 
Co., 171 Va. at 182, 198 S.E. at 513-14. 
Upon reviewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Kim, we conclude that conflicting inferences 
can be drawn from the evidence with regard to the questions 
whether Wash Fair began its possession and use of the 
 
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disputed property under a claim of right, or with the 
permission of the owner of Parcel 4-A; whether, if Wash 
Fair’s possession started with permission from the owner of 
Parcel 4-A, the possession later changed to one under a 
claim of right; and whether any possession by Wash Fair 
under a claim of right has continued for the requisite 15-
year statutory period.  The jury resolved the conflicting 
inferences in favor of Kim, and the inferences “necessarily 
underlying the conclusion reflected in the verdict are 
reasonably deducible from the evidence.”  Lane, 220 Va. at 
582, 260 S.E.2d at 240.  Thus, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in setting aside the jury verdict. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, reinstate the jury verdict, and enter final 
judgment in favor of Kim.3
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
3 We do not need to address the remaining assignments 
of error. 
 
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