Title: Commonwealth v. Niemic
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: SJC-12436
State: Massachusetts
Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court
Date: November 19, 2019

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SJC-12436 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JONATHAN NIEMIC. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 5, 2019. - November 19, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy.  Practice, 
Criminal, Double jeopardy, Verdict, Witness, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Capital case.  Evidence, 
Rebuttal, Impeachment of credibility, Medical report, 
Argument by prosecutor.  Witness, Impeachment.  Jury and 
Jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 9, 2010. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 472 Mass. 665 (2015), the 
case was tried before Renee P. Dupuis, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for Jonathan E. Niemic. 
 
Tara L. Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In 2012, the defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty in 
the stabbing death of Michael Correia on October 20, 2010.  
2 
 
 
Following the defendant's appeal from that conviction, we 
remanded the matter to the Superior Court, where the 
Commonwealth was given the option either of vacating the 
conviction and retrying the defendant on the murder indictment, 
or accepting a reduction of the verdict to manslaughter.  See 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 472 Mass. 665, 667, 679 (2015) (Niemic 
I).  The Commonwealth elected to pursue a new trial.  At that 
trial, with a different judge presiding, another attorney for 
the defendant, and the same prosecutor, the jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.   
 
In this appeal, the defendant argues that a new trial is 
required because of four asserted errors at his second trial:  a 
violation of the protection against double jeopardy in pursuing 
the theory of deliberate premeditation, where the jury at the 
first trial had not checked the "guilty" box on the verdict slip 
for that theory; erroneously admitted testimony of a rebuttal 
witness, which later was treated as substantive evidence by the 
Commonwealth; improperly introduced testimony by a substitute 
medical examiner as to facts in the autopsy report; and a number 
of improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument, including 
an issue repeated from the defendant's first trial.  The 
defendant also asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new 
3 
 
 
trial.   
 
We conclude that errors in the closing argument alone, both 
that are reprised from the first trial and those newly 
introduced, would require a new trial.  To the extent that this 
may be a close question, that determination is buttressed by 
other issues that emerged on our review pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the first degree shall be vacated and set aside.  On 
remand, the Commonwealth shall once again be given the option 
either of accepting a reduction in the verdict to manslaughter, 
or of retrying the defendant.   
 
Should the Commonwealth again choose to pursue the latter 
path, we recognize the costs that a third trial would occasion, 
on the parties, the witnesses, the victim's family, and the 
court.  We are nonetheless constrained to conclude that a new 
trial is necessary unless the Commonwealth decides to accept a 
reduced verdict.  See Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 534 
(1983), S.C., 394 Mass. 531 (1985), 409 Mass. 433 (1991), 412 
Mass. 800 (1992), and 432 Mass. 404 (2000).  
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
reserving certain details for later discussion.  The victim was 
stabbed five times; any one of the wounds could have been fatal.  
The defendant testified at trial that he had stabbed the victim; 
4 
 
 
the primary issue before the jury was whether he had done so in 
self-defense.  The theory of defense was that the older, taller, 
and heavier victim initiated a fist fight, and then pulled out a 
knife; the defendant managed to wrench the knife from the victim 
and swung wildly to fend off the victim. 
 
a.  Facts.  In the summer of 2010, the defendant was 
twenty-two years old and living in a halfway house in New 
Bedford for individuals who were recovering from alcohol and 
drug abuse.  He was dating Lisa Weaver, who lived at a different 
sober house in New Bedford.  During his time at the halfway 
house, the defendant befriended his roommates, James Nason and 
Nathan Goodwin.  The defendant also introduced Nason to his 
friend Kari Wright, and the two began dating. 
 
In August of 2010, the defendant left town for 
approximately two months.  When he returned, he moved in with 
his grandmother in New Bedford.  While he was away, the 
defendant wrote Weaver two love letters describing how "perfect" 
she was, and how he missed her and imagined them being together.  
At the same time, however, Weaver and the victim1 appeared to 
have begun a romantic relationship; they were seen in public on 
a number of occasions flirting, holding hands, and kissing.  
 
The defendant returned to New Bedford in October 2010.  A 
                                                          
 
 
1 The victim was then thirty-four years old. 
 
5 
 
 
few days before the stabbing, Nason told the defendant about the 
relationship between Weaver and the victim.  Nason also said 
that the victim had referred to the defendant as a "punk," and 
had bragged that the victim "could take any girl away from [the 
defendant]."  The defendant told Nason that when they next met, 
he would punch the victim in the head.2  A friend of Weaver, who 
was her roommate at the sober house, testified that, at some 
point a few days prior to the stabbing, the defendant had 
appeared at an alcoholics anonymous (AA) meeting looking for the 
victim.  
 
On October 19, 2010, Weaver, Wright, and Nason picked up 
the defendant in a sport utility vehicle (SUV) belonging to 
Wright's mother.  Weaver and the defendant embraced when they 
saw each other, and sat together in the rear seat.  At some 
point, Wright heard the defendant angrily asking, with reference 
to an unknown topic, "Why didn't you tell me that?"  The group 
spent the day at Wright's parents' house, where the relationship 
between Weaver and the defendant seemed affectionate, as usual.  
The group left so that Weaver could get back to the sober house 
before her 11 P.M. curfew.  They planned to meet the following 
day to paint a property in Abington that belonged to Weaver's 
                                                          
 
 
2 The defendant was interested in becoming a professional 
fighter, and for "a couple of" months had been working out at a 
gym, training on punching the heavy bag.   
6 
 
 
parents.  
 
On October 20, 2010, at approximately 3 P.M., the 
defendant, Weaver, Nason, and Wright arrived at the building in 
Abington, and painted until 6:30 P.M., when it got dark.  They 
left intending to return to New Bedford.  En route, Weaver 
realized that she did not have her house key.  She then 
remembered that some of her housemates would be attending an AA 
meeting at a soup kitchen at New Bedford, which regularly took 
place from 7 P.M. until 8:30 P.M. on Wednesdays, and decided 
that she could later enter the sober house with them.  The four 
thus headed to the soup kitchen.  On the way, the defendant 
asked Nason to stop at the side of the road because he had to 
urinate, but Wright would not allow this, as neither she nor 
Nason had a valid driver's license, and she did not want Nason 
to be caught at the side of the road if any police officers 
passed by. 
 
Between seventy and one hundred twenty people attended the 
meeting that evening.  The defendant, Weaver, Nason, and Wright 
reached the soup kitchen shortly before the usual break between 
7:30 and 7:45 P.M., when many people would go outside to smoke.  
Nason parked approximately 200 yards from the front door.  
Wright remained in the vehicle, while the others headed to the 
soup kitchen.  They encountered their former roommate Goodwin 
standing outside.  Nason and the defendant chatted with Goodwin 
7 
 
 
for approximately five minutes, and then went inside to use the 
restroom.  Weaver also went into the building to use the 
restroom, and then joined the crowd outside. 
 
When the defendant and Nason returned to the vehicle, the 
break had begun and numerous meeting participants were heading 
outside.  Nason pointed out to the defendant that the victim was 
at the meeting, and then returned to the SUV.  
 
At that point, approximately eighty people were outside, in 
a small, crowded area.  The victim and Goodwin were standing 
approximately fifteen feet from the entrance to the soup 
kitchen, looking at something on a cellular telephone.  The 
defendant went over to talk to Weaver, who was standing on the 
corner near a crosswalk approximately thirty feet away from the 
victim.  Nason moved the SUV closer to the crosswalk, and stayed 
inside with the vehicle idling.  The defendant gestured to the 
victim, indicating that he wanted to talk.  The victim 
apparently held up a finger, in a "just a minute" gesture.  The 
defendant gave Weaver "a quick goodbye kiss."  She seemed 
"concerned" and appeared to try to "pull[] him back" from 
talking to the victim, and then the defendant and Weaver kissed 
again.3  At some point, the defendant pulled the hood of his 
                                                          
 
 
3 The evidence as to the extent of physical contact between 
the defendant and Weaver, like much other testimony, differed 
widely, ranging from descriptions of talking only, to a brief 
goodbye kiss or a peck on the cheek, to more protracted kissing 
8 
 
 
sweatshirt up.  He crossed the street and opened the rear 
passenger door of the SUV as though he were about to get in, but 
then left the door slightly ajar and walked over to the victim.4   
 
The defendant said, "I've been hearing some things.  I feel 
disrespected"; the victim asked what the defendant had heard.  
The defendant began punching the victim, aiming at his head, 
while the victim attempted to ward off the blows.5  The defendant 
tried to hold the victim in a headlock, but the victim broke 
free.  At some point, the victim lifted his arms up with his 
palms facing outward and said something to the effect of, "What?  
Are you going to use a knife?"6  The defendant lunged at the 
                                                          
 
or hugging before and as the defendant was heading away, when 
Weaver grabbed him by the arm and pulled him back.   
 
 
4 Multiple witnesses testified for the Commonwealth and also 
during the defendant's case.  Their descriptions of events 
surrounding the confrontation varied widely, even among 
witnesses for the Commonwealth.  As with much of the other 
testimony about the confrontation, the testimony on this point 
was conflicting.  Only two of the ten witnesses who described 
the events mentioned the defendant as going over to the SUV and 
then returning to the victim; none of the other witnesses 
testified that the defendant went to the SUV before he 
approached the victim.  We present the testimony in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth. 
 
 
5 Wright noticed the altercation and got out of the SUV to 
break up the fight, but dropped her cellular telephone, and its 
battery fell out.  By the time she had retrieved the battery and 
the telephone, the defendant was getting into the rear seat of 
the SUV, so Wright returned to the front seat. 
 
 
6 Both the defendant and the victim were known at times to 
have carried knives.  The knife used in the stabbing had a black 
9 
 
 
victim four to five times.  The victim ran into the soup 
kitchen.  The defendant chased him into the building.  About 
twenty seconds later, the defendant ran out of the building and 
into the SUV; the vehicle then was driven away.7 
 
Bystanders carried the victim, who was saying that he had 
been stabbed and that someone should telephone 911, upstairs to 
the meeting hall and tried to render first aid.  His father was 
present.  Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived within a 
few minutes.  The victim lost consciousness shortly thereafter.  
He was taken to a hospital by ambulance, where physicians 
attempted emergency surgery, but their efforts were unsuccessful 
and the victim was pronounced dead.  He had suffered five stab 
wounds, any one of which could have been fatal.  The two wounds 
on the left side of the chest had penetrated the heart, and a 
wound to the lower right side had perforated the liver.  The 
                                                          
 
handle and a black blade, different from the knife the defendant 
had been known to carry, but both were "flick" knives. 
 
 
7 A number of witnesses testified that when the defendant 
initially confronted the victim, the victim threatened to stab 
the defendant or punched him in the head.  The defendant 
testified that the victim threatened to stab him, and then 
quickly punched him on the side of his head, before reaching 
down into a pocket and pulling out a knife.  The defendant 
wrenched the knife away, while the victim continued to attack 
the defendant.  The defendant then started swinging wildly with 
the knife.  Other witnesses said that there was a "fist fight" 
and they could not see who threw the first punch.  After a 
flurry of punches, the victim eventually backed off, and the 
defendant ran to the SUV.  
 
10 
 
 
fourth and fifth wounds were to the back and the lateral part of 
the chest.  The victim was determined to have died within 
minutes of the stabbing.   
 
Meanwhile, the SUV, with Nason driving, headed toward the 
highway.  The defendant noticed that he had blood on his hands.  
Wright also noticed the blood and that the defendant had a small 
black folding knife in his lap.  The defendant told the others 
that he had been in a fight with the victim, he thought he had 
stabbed the victim, and he hoped the victim was "ok."  The 
defendant wanted to go to his grandmother's house, but Wright 
told Nason to drop him off at a grocery store in Fairhaven.  The 
defendant threw the knife out the window near the exit to the 
grocery store.   
 
When they reached the grocery store parking lot, the 
defendant cleaned the blood from his hands, with Wright's help, 
using one of her tank tops that had been in the back of the SUV.  
He discarded the tank top in the parking lot.  The others headed 
to Wright's parents' house, and the defendant waited at the 
grocery store until his grandmother picked him up. 
 
At 8:30 P.M., the defendant and his grandmother went to the 
home of John Voisine, the stepfather of a close friend of the 
defendant's.  The defendant borrowed some clothes from Voisine, 
11 
 
 
and remained in his apartment for approximately four hours.8  The 
defendant told Voisine he had been in a fight with the victim, 
that he was worried the victim might be dead, and that he had 
not intended to harm the victim, but had been acting in self-
defense.  The defendant left sometime before midnight. 
 
That evening, police interviewed multiple witnesses.  They 
investigated the grocery store parking lot and discovered a 
discarded tank top covered with blood.  In a grassy area near 
the highway, police found a small black folding knife, covered 
with red-brown stains.  Around midnight, officers went to 
Voisine's apartment.  The defendant was not in the apartment, 
but officers eventually found him under a set of exterior stairs 
and arrested him.9 
 
Deoxyribonucleic acid from the blood on the knife handle, 
the blade, and the tank top contained a mixture of two profiles, 
with the "major profile" matching the defendant's; the minor 
profile on the tank top did not match the victim's.  The victim 
was a potential contributor to the minor profile on the knife 
handle and the blade.  The major profile of the stains on the 
                                                          
 
 
8 The defendant later testified that he went to Voisine's 
house to use heroin, as that was the only thing he could think 
to do at the time. 
 
 
9 The defendant had one cut on his right hand and three on 
his left hand. 
 
12 
 
 
jeans that the defendant had been wearing, which were found at 
Voisine's house, matched the defendant's. 
 
The defendant called a number of witnesses, and also 
testified on his own behalf.  Several defense witnesses 
testified that when the defendant initially confronted the 
victim, the victim threatened to stab the defendant.10  The 
victim then punched the defendant on the side of his head, 
before reaching down and pulling out a knife.  The defendant 
wrenched the knife away, while the victim continued to attack.  
The defendant ultimately was able to run to the SUV.  
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  In December 2010, the defendant was 
indicted on a charge of murder in the first degree, G. L. 
c. 265, § 1.  After an eight-day trial in June 2012, a Superior 
Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  In September 
2015, after review of the defendant's direct appeal by this 
court, the matter was remanded to the Superior Court for entry 
of a reduced verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter or a 
new trial, as the Commonwealth preferred.  See Niemic I, 472 
Mass. at 667, 679.   
 
Prior to the defendant's second trial, he moved to preclude 
                                                          
 
 
10 Nason also testified that, a few months prior to this 
incident, the victim had threatened to "slice" the defendant if 
they saw each other again, and then later apologized to the 
defendant for making the threat. 
13 
 
 
the Commonwealth from pursuing the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, and later filed a motion to dismiss the charge of 
murder in the first degree on that theory.  Both motions were 
denied.  After a ten-day trial in September 2016, tried by the 
same prosecutor11 but with different defense counsel and before a 
different judge, a jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  
 
2.  Discussion.  In this direct appeal, the defendant 
maintains that a new trial is required due to a violation of the 
protection against double jeopardy in pursuing the theory of 
deliberate premeditation after a purported acquittal.  He also 
claims error in the introduction of impeachment testimony of a 
rebuttal witness, which was later treated as substantive 
evidence by the prosecutor; impermissible testimony by a 
substitute medical examiner; and a number of improprieties in 
the prosecutor's closing argument.  We consider each issue in 
turn.  
 
a.  Double jeopardy.  At his first trial, the defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The jury checked the guilty box on the 
verdict slip for this theory, the foreperson presented it as the 
                                                          
 
 
11 The second chairs, who did not argue, differed. 
14 
 
 
theory underlying the conviction, and the jurors all agreed that 
they found the defendant guilty under that theory.  See 
Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 666.  On the verdict slip concerning 
murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the jury checked 
neither the "guilty" nor the "not guilty" box.  The foreperson 
also made no reference to the theory of deliberate premeditation 
when responding to the session clerk in announcing the verdict.  
At the second trial, the defendant was convicted on both 
theories. 
 
The defendant now contends that the jury found him not 
guilty of murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation at his 
first trial, based on their failure to check that box. 
Therefore, he claims, it was a violation of the double jeopardy 
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
to have retried him on that theory a second time.  
This court repeatedly has declined to accept a jury's 
failure to mark one of the theories of a charge as an acquittal 
on that theory.  See Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 78-
79 (2007), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass. 
123, 132-134 (1989); Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 
320, 325 n.8 (1984).  Courts in other jurisdictions also have 
determined that retrial is not barred in such circumstances.  
See United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 84-86 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 986 (1995); Beebe v. Nelson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 
15 
 
 
1304, 1307-1308 (D. Kan. 1999); State v. Pexa, 574 N.W.2d 344, 
347 (Iowa 1998).  We see no reason to disturb our well-
established precedent in this case. 
The defendant argues further that because silence was 
interpreted as "no" with respect to the absence of a response to 
a question to the venire during empanelment (when no members of 
the venire raised their hands in response to some of the judge's 
questions), silence likewise must be interpreted as "no" in the 
context of unmarked boxes on the verdict slip.  We do not agree.  
There is no indication that the jury were aware that 
silence on a particular theory would be deemed an acquittal.  
Rather, they were told that they had to be unanimous in deciding 
whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty, and that the 
foreperson was "simply to put an X or a check mark next to the 
appropriate verdict and then sign it certifying that it's 
unanimous."  They were instructed further that, if they found 
the defendant guilty, they had to be unanimous as to which of 
the "two types of murder in the first degree [they found]. . . .  
[I]t can be one, or the other, or both." 
We cannot ascertain by the jury's silence on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation whether they actually reached a 
unanimous decision to acquit the defendant on that theory.  By 
contrast, we do know definitively that the first jury were 
unanimous in their conviction on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
16 
 
 
cruelty at the first trial.  Thus, retrial on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation was not error. 
 
b.  Rebuttal testimony.  Toward the end of trial, after the 
defendant had rested his case, the Commonwealth recalled Wright 
as a rebuttal witness.12  Over the defendant's objection, she 
testified that, as the defendant approached the victim, Nason 
said "[the defendant] wants to sucker Mikey [(the victim)].  
Sucker punch Mikey."  While the testimony was admitted for the 
limited purpose of impeaching Nason's credibility, neither party 
requested a limiting instruction.13 
                                                          
 
 
12 At the beginning of trial, the judge conducted a hearing 
on the defendant's motion in limine to introduce certain 
statements made in the SUV by the defendant after the stabbing.  
The judge then ordered the statements excluded on the 
representation of the prosecutor that the Commonwealth would not 
be seeking to introduce any of the other statements made by the 
occupants of the vehicle.  On direct examination by the 
defendant, Nason testified that, on the evening of the stabbing, 
he was not expecting a physical confrontation between the 
defendant and the victim when the defendant headed toward the 
victim.  On cross-examination, Nason testified that, several 
days earlier, the defendant had told Nason that the next time he 
saw the victim, he was going to "punch [the victim] in the 
head."  Nason added that he had not believed that the defendant 
intended to act on the statement, which Nason viewed as 
something "everybody says."  On further questioning, Nason 
testified that he did not remember having told Wright, while 
they were in the SUV, that the defendant planned to "sucker 
punch" the victim.  After the defense rested, the judge then 
allowed the prosecutor to recall Wright to impeach Nason's 
testimony with her own recollection of his prior inconsistent 
statement. 
 
 
13 Before her final charge, on her own initiative, the judge 
instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which they could 
consider Wright's rebuttal testimony that Nason told her the 
17 
 
 
The defendant now challenges the admission of Wright's 
testimony as reversible error on the ground that it was 
irrelevant and impermissible hearsay.14  Because the statements 
concerned the core issue at trial of the defendant's intent in 
approaching the victim -- in the defendant's words, "the most 
important issue in the case" -- the defendant maintains that 
their improper admission constituted prejudicial error.  We do 
not agree.   
There was no error in the introduction of Wright's rebuttal 
testimony that the defendant wanted to "sucker punch" the victim 
in order to impeach Nason's testimony.  The testimony had the 
potential to undermine Nason's credibility in the eyes of the 
jury, given Nason's testimony on cross-examination that he did 
not recall telling Wright the defendant had wanted to sucker 
punch the victim, and, indeed, believed that the defendant 
                                                          
 
defendant intended to "sucker punch" the victim.  See part 2.d, 
infra. 
 
 
14 Because the defendant objected at trial to the 
introduction of the rebuttal testimony, we review for 
prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 
673 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545 
(2013) (reviewing for prejudicial error where objection was 
preserved).  "An error is not prejudicial if it 'did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect'; however, if 
we cannot find 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that 
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error,' 
then it is prejudicial."  Canty, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
18 
 
 
approached the victim simply to talk.  See Commonwealth v. Pina, 
430 Mass. 66, 76 (1999), overruled on another ground by 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162 (2019).  Testimony 
reporting a prior out-of-court statement that "tend[s] to 
contradict [the declarant's] testimony . . . [is] admissible" 
for purposes of impeachment.15  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. 
Cataldo, 326 Mass. 373, 377 (1950).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 613(a)(2), (3) & note (2019).  "Although there is discretion 
involved in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence 
offered for impeachment, when the impeaching evidence is 
directly related to testimony on a central issue in the case, 
there is no discretion to exclude it."  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 613(a)(4) note, citing Commonwealth v. McGowan, 400 Mass. 385, 
390-391 (1987). 
The rebuttal testimony was particularly important here for 
two reasons.  First, as the defendant argues, it concerned the 
seminal issue in the case:  the defendant's intent at the time 
he approached the victim.  Secondly, the evidence of that intent 
rested in large part on the jury's view of the witnesses' 
credibility, in a case in which almost all the witnesses 
described the events in significantly different ways, many had 
                                                          
 
 
15 Under certain conditions, not present here, a prior 
inconsistent statement made under oath may be admissible not 
just to impeach a declarant's trial testimony, but also for its 
truth.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A) (2019). 
19 
 
 
known the victim, the defendant, or both, and many were 
vulnerable to impeachment.  Both Wright, the Commonwealth's 
primary witness,16 and Nason, who testified for the defense, had 
been friends of the defendant.  Both had been present in the SUV 
with the defendant driving to the soup kitchen, and driving away 
after the stabbing, thus leaving either of them open to possible 
impeachment.17   
Although there was no error in the introduction of the 
rebuttal testimony for impeachment purposes, the later use of 
the statement as substantive evidence in closing is another 
matter.  See part 2.d, infra. 
 
c.  Autopsy report.  The defendant challenges the 
introduction of information in the autopsy report that was 
introduced by a substitute medical examiner.  The Commonwealth 
filed a motion in limine to introduce the testimony of Dr. Henry 
                                                          
 
 
16 There was evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that Wright's testimony was not unbiased and she had a 
reason to cooperate with the prosecution.  The defendant used 
Wright's tank top, which she had handed to him, to clean blood 
from his hands, and she helped him to do so by pouring water on 
them.  Wright testified that, within minutes after she and Nason 
returned to her parents' house from dropping the defendant at 
the grocery store, police arrived.  She and Nason accompanied 
the officers to the police station, where she remained until 
3 or 4 A.M.  At the station, police took photographs, swabbed 
her hands and took a sample of her deoxyribonucleic acid. 
 
 
17 Moreover, although Wright testified at the second trial 
that she and Nason were at that point broken up, the two had 
remained in an "on and off" romantic relationship "for years" 
and had two children together. 
20 
 
 
Nields, a substitute medical examiner, as the original medical 
examiner, Dr. William Zane, was unavailable at the time of 
trial.  The defense objected to the use of a substitute due to a 
concern that the defendant would be unable to elicit testimony 
from Zane that the victim had had an injury to his lip, which 
defense counsel viewed as supporting the theory that the 
encounter began as a fist fight.  
 
The Commonwealth offered either to stipulate to Zane's 
prior testimony or to conduct a video-recorded deposition that 
could be played at trial, rather than to rely on Nields's 
testimony.  The defendant rejected both of these options.  
Before Nields testified, the judge reminded both parties of the 
limitations on permissible testimony when using a substitute 
medical examiner, and reminded defense counsel that he had a 
duty to object individually to each question he thought violated 
the limitations on the introduction of underlying facts from the 
autopsy report.   
 
Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
questioning of Nields, nor to the introduction of the answers 
elicited directly from the autopsy report.  Indeed, the evidence 
from the autopsy report was introduced after defense counsel 
stated explicitly, with respect to a question from the 
Commonwealth about an injury to the victim's mouth that was not 
clearly visible on the autopsy photographs, that he had no 
21 
 
 
objection to evidence from the autopsy report being introduced 
on that particular issue.  On appeal, however, the defendant 
challenges the introduction of two different sets of facts from 
the autopsy report, as well as the prosecutor's emphasis on the 
improperly admitted evidence in his closing argument.18  In 
particular, the defendant points to information on the height 
and weight of the victim and the depth and nature of the 
victim's wounds. 
 
Nields testified, in response to an unobjected-to question 
from the prosecutor specifically asking about the content of the 
autopsy report, that the autopsy report described the victim as 
being five feet, eight inches tall, and weighing approximately 
one hundred and seventy-five pounds.  This evidence touched upon 
an important component of the defense strategy:  the defendant 
argued that he had been intimidated by the victim because the 
victim was ten years older, and taller and heavier than the 
defendant, in addition to being known to be aggressive ("a 
bully").  The defendant contends, therefore, that Nields's 
testimony created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
                                                          
 
 
18 Defense counsel also did not object when the prosecutor 
relied heavily upon the information from the autopsy report in 
his closing.  See part 2.d, infra. 
 
22 
 
 
justice because it undermined the defense argument that the 
defendant was smaller than the victim.19 
 
We need not address the extent to which a substitute 
medical examiner who did not perform the autopsy may testify to 
the facts contained in the underlying autopsy report.  Even if 
this evidence were improperly admitted, where it is cumulative 
of other, properly admitted evidence, there is no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 884 (2013); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 459 
Mass. 249, 268, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1080 (2011).  Here, other 
properly admitted evidence about the victim's height and weight 
placed essentially the same information before the jury.  That 
evidence included testimony by Dr. Richard T. Miller, a surgeon 
who was called to the emergency room to perform an emergency 
thoracotomy on the victim; 20 one of the witnesses to the 
                                                          
 
 
19 There was testimony that the defendant was six feet tall 
and weighed two hundred pounds, but there also was testimony 
that the defendant was smaller and thinner than the victim, 
maybe five feet, eight inches tall. 
 
 
20 Miller testified,  
 
"I -- difficult to say.  He was being resuscitated on a 
trauma stretcher on a gurney in the emergency room.  I 
would say he -- my impression was he was an average-sized 
individual, under six feet tall, somewhere between one 
hundred and sixty and one hundred and eighty pounds.  
That's my best recollection."   
 
The prosecutor then asked Miller if he had been able to "refresh 
[his] memory" by reviewing the autopsy report.  When Miller 
23 
 
 
stabbing who testified that he believed the defendant and the 
victim were "[a]bout the same height;" and a friend of the 
victim who testified that the victim was shorter and wider than 
his own six feet and one hundred and ninety-five pounds.  
 
The defendant also challenges the introduction of 
information from the autopsy report describing the victim's 
wounds and stating that the wounds were three to four inches 
deep, information which was not evident from the autopsy 
photographs that Nields properly had relied upon earlier in his 
testimony.  The information about the wounds was introduced by 
the prosecutor's unobjected-to specific questions as to the 
contents of the autopsy report. 
 
Generally, where a defendant relies on erroneously admitted 
facts contained in an autopsy report to challenge the 
Commonwealth's theory of guilt, there is no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by the prosecutor's 
reliance on facts from the same report.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGowen, 458 Mass. 461, 481-482 (2010).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 395-396 (2009).  Such is the case here.  
 
In his closing, defense counsel relied upon the challenged 
                                                          
 
responded that he had, the prosecutor asked if the contents of 
the report were consistent with Miller's memory and Miller 
responded that they were, thus again introducing, albeit 
cumulative of other assumedly improper testimony, the contents 
of the autopsy report. 
24 
 
 
testimony regarding the depth of the wounds.  He argued that the 
nature of the wounds, and their depth, showed that the defendant 
inflicted the fatal wounds to the heart while he swung wildly in 
self-defense, trying to push the victim off and that the victim 
died instantly.  Counsel focused as well on the injury to the 
victim's mouth, likely inflicted by a fist (termed "the busted 
lip" by the prosecutor), which counsel argued showed that the 
confrontation had begun with a fist fight. 
 
Moreover, Miller, the emergency room surgeon, testified 
that, ordinarily, a human heart lies between four and six inches 
below the surface of the chest, and that the victim's heart had 
been penetrated.  One of the witnesses who saw the encounter 
also testified that at first he saw someone wearing a "hoodie" 
punching with nothing in his hand, and later saw the man holding 
what looked like a "blade, four or five inches long."  This 
would have allowed the jury to infer, from properly admitted 
evidence, that the blade of the knife went four inches into the 
victim's body.21  See Rogers, 459 Mass. at 268. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant contends 
that there were multiple improprieties in the prosecutor's 
                                                          
 
 
21 Defense counsel himself interrupted the prosecutor at one 
point to emphasize that, based on the autopsy report, the "three 
to four" inch depth of the wound was from the surface of the 
skin to the heart, not the depth of the cut in the heart itself. 
 
25 
 
 
closing argument, some reprising errors that contributed to the 
remand for a new trial in Niemic I.  In particular, the 
defendant points to the prosecutor's reliance on Wright's 
rebuttal testimony as though it were substantive evidence, and 
the reappearance, albeit in a more nuanced form, of the appeals 
to jury sympathy and suggestions that the defendant's testimony 
was not actual evidence,22 both of which we deemed impermissible 
in reviewing the prosecutor's closing in Niemic I. 
 
At his second trial, the defendant objected to the first 
two issues.  When the prosecutor finished his closing on 
retrial, defense counsel argued that no instruction could 
ameliorate the damage caused by the substantive use of the 
rebuttal testimony and the improper play to juror sympathy, and 
that a mistrial should be declared.   
 
We consider first whether the arguments were improper, and, 
if so, whether, in the context of the trial as a whole, the 
impropriety or combination of improprieties requires a new 
trial.  Given all the circumstances, we conclude that the 
                                                          
 
 
22 Notwithstanding that our remand in Commonwealth v. 
Niemic, 472 Mass. 665 (2015) (Niemic I), was based in part on 
the prosecutor's unobjected-to suggestions in closing that the 
defendant's testimony was not evidence, at the second trial 
defense counsel again did not object when the prosecutor made a 
number of statements that were virtually identical to those 
sharply criticized at the first trial.  Given the result we 
reach on the other issues, we need not address the extent to 
which these statements alone may have resulted in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
26 
 
 
improprieties in the prosecutor's closing alone warrant a new 
trial.  That conclusion is further reinforced when other errors 
that emerged during our review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, are 
considered in conjunction with the challenged errors. 
i.  Substantive use of rebuttal testimony.  At four points 
in his closing, the prosecutor referenced Wright's testimony 
concerning Nason's statement that the defendant was going to 
"sucker punch" the victim when he left the SUV.  Three of these 
were used substantively, and one was used properly for 
impeachment purposes.23  Three times, woven throughout his 
closing, the prosecutor relied on the statement to argue that 
the defendant clearly intended to assault the victim, not to 
talk to him and resolve any issues, when the defendant 
approached.24  
The prosecutor maintained further, as the judge commented, 
                                                          
 
 
23 The prosecutor's fourth reference to Wright's rebuttal 
testimony, made in the context of his vigorous efforts to 
discredit several witnesses who testified that the victim threw 
the first punch, was properly used for impeachment purposes.  
The prosecutor argued that Nason and the defendant had testified 
that the victim "land[ed] a punch on the defendant," and 
contrasted that with Wright's testimony that Nason told her the 
defendant was going to "sucker punch" the victim;  the 
prosecutor asked, "Is she making that up?  Is she not credible?  
What does that say to you about who is the aggressor?" 
 
 
24 On appeal, the Commonwealth concedes that the substantive 
use of Wright's testimony in the prosecutor's closing was error, 
but states that this error did not result in a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
27 
 
 
"very effectively," that the defendant had gone to the soup 
kitchen with a "purposeful plan" to attack the victim, and that 
his own words proved the confrontation was planned, rather than 
an unexpected fight in which the defendant stabbed in self-
defense.  Indeed, the prosecutor's use at closing of the 
statement as substantive evidence was so emphatic that, after 
the prosecutor's closing, the judge noted sua sponte that the 
statement went to the "seminal" issue at trial (the defendant's 
intent when he went over to the victim), that she thought 
Wright's testimony had been introduced only for rebuttal 
purposes, and that she was going to give a limiting instruction 
to that effect.  Immediately before her final charge, the judge 
instructed the jury accordingly.25   
Improper argument by a prosecutor can be harmless error 
where confined to collateral issues and accompanied by a 
                                                          
 
 
25 The judge instructed:   
 
"Ms. Wright was called this morning in rebuttal, and she 
testified about a statement that she alleged Mr. Nason made 
to her about -- that he, Mr. Nason, told her that the 
defendant was going to sucker [the victim].  The only 
reason that that testimony was admitted, and we'll talk 
about this a little bit later on, was to impeach Mr. 
Nason's testimony.  That's the only reason it was allowed 
in, and I'll talk to you about impeachment.  You may not 
consider that evidence from Ms. Wright this morning for any 
other purpose than impeaching Mr. Nason's testimony.  You 
may not specifically consider it or attribute it in any way 
to the defendant and his state of mind." 
 
28 
 
 
curative instruction.  Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 
470 (1978), S.C., 381 Mass. 340 (1980), and 411 Mass. 692 
(1992).  The prosecutor's repeated use of what had been admitted 
for a limited purpose as substantive evidence here, however, 
undermined the heart of the defense, "namely, the defendant's 
credibility as to who was the initial aggressor, who produced 
the knife, and whether the defendant acted in self-defense."26  
Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 677.  The improper references to the 
testimony as substantive evidence during closing argument could 
not but have had an effect upon the jury.  See part 2.v, infra.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Giguere, 420 Mass. 226, 234-235 (1995).   
ii.  Appeals to juror sympathy and emotion.  The defendant 
argues that in his closing the prosecutor improperly appealed to 
the jury's sympathies, thus replicating an error in Niemic I 
that contributed to the need for a new trial.  See Niemic I, 472 
Mass. at 675.  The Commonwealth concedes that, rather than 
steering a wide berth around this error on retrial, the 
prosecutor relied on virtually the same language on a number of 
occasions.  Notwithstanding this court's decision in Niemic I, 
supra, the Commonwealth argues that the language was not an 
                                                          
 
 
26 We are cognizant that here, as with other testimony that 
had been excluded or was inadmissible, it was defense counsel's 
own questions that resulted in the introduction of the 
previously excluded statement, with apparently significant 
harmful effect on his client. 
 
29 
 
 
improper appeal to sympathy, but, rather, was "entirely 
appropriate."  Alternatively, the Commonwealth maintains that, 
in "context," no reasonable juror would have drawn the inference 
from the challenged statements that the prosecutor was appealing 
to sympathy or saying that the defendant's testimony was 
inherently incredible.  The Commonwealth also suggests that the 
asserted improprieties were relatively minor in scope in 
comparison to the percentage of the closing that they 
encompassed in Niemic I; in the Commonwealth's view, "only four" 
remarks by the prosecutor are at issue.  While certain specific 
statements were not reiterated in the prosecutor's second 
closing,27 the emphasis on the impermissible arguments was not 
any less "hard driving and sustained" on "critical aspect[s] of 
the case."28  Id. at 677.  The impact of the closing on the jury 
                                                          
 
 
27 Many of the detailed statements about the efforts to 
render aid to the victim, by attendees at the meeting, by the 
EMTs, and at the hospital, that this court had criticized in 
Niemic I, were instead made in the prosecutor's opening 
statement at the retrial, and mentioned more briefly in his 
closing argument. 
 
 
28 As he had in Niemic I, "[t]oward the end of his argument 
the prosecutor focused on the Cunneen factors that must be 
considered on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty." 
Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675.  "This part of the prosecutor's 
closing was very powerful, and proper.  The prosecutor should 
have stopped there."  Id.  Thereafter, "[t]he improper comments 
at the end of the closing comprised a structural segment, 
indeed, the denouement of the prosecutor's closing.  This 
section of his argument was integrated into his argument of the 
Cunneen factors, particularly the defendant's indifference 
to the victim's suffering."  Id. at 676. 
30 
 
 
should be judged not by the number of transcript pages it 
occupies, but by the import of its use.29  Moreover, in many 
instances the language used was perilously close to that which 
had been found inappropriate in Niemic I.   
At the defendant's second trial, the prosecutor began and 
ended his closing with the same attempt to tug at the jury's 
heart strings.  Indeed, he framed his argument with equally 
improper plays to juror sympathy in virtually the same language 
that he had used at the first trial, including the victim's last 
words to his father -- "Dad, don't let me die, don't let me 
die," with which the prosecutor once again ended his closing -- 
which had been a focus of the court's discussion of the 
                                                          
 
 
 
29 In any event, the numbers favor the defendant.  The 
prosecutor's sympathy argument in total was longer at the second 
trial than at the first.  In Niemic I, the prosecutor's closing 
argument in full required thirty-one pages of transcript; of 
these, approximately the last six pages were devoted to the 
improper argument.  At the second trial, the prosecutor's 
closing argument covered approximately thirty-nine pages of 
trial transcript, approximately twenty-one percent longer than 
at the first trial.  While much of the last ten pages of the 
second closing was devoted to improper argument, the improper 
argument began in the first paragraph of the first page, and was 
woven throughout.  Furthermore, the prosecutor's opening 
statement at the new trial also began with reference to the same 
inflammatory statement by the victim that had been a focus of 
the improprieties in the closing at the Niemic I trial.  
Finally, three pages of the prosecutor's opening statement 
contained the reported efforts of meeting attendees, EMTs, and 
emergency room personnel to save the victim for which the 
prosecutor had been admonished in Niemic I.  See note 27, supra. 
 
 
31 
 
 
improprieties in Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675-676.  The prosecutor 
then proceeded in the same vein as at the first trial, 
frequently using much the same language.  Structuring his 
argument with the jury's focus on the victim's words, he ended 
with the same pleading statement by the victim.  For example,  
First Trial 
Second Trial 
"And they saw him struggling 
and bleeding in front of his 
own father."  See Niemic I, 472 
Mass. at 675. 
"Ladies and gentlemen, on 
October 20, 2010, there was a 
brutal, senseless murder in the 
city of New Bedford.  The 
brutality you've already heard 
about. A young man unarmed, set 
upon by the defendant, hands up, 
defenseless, stabbed multiple 
times over and over.  Ends up 
bleeding out, dying, begging for 
his life in front of his father" 
(emphasis added).  
"What does that say about what 
he intended?  Some punching, 
then the knife comes out.  
Stabbing.  And then he is 
finishing the job right up to 
the point where he chases him 
down, stabs him in the side and 
in the back, and then leaves him 
to die, bleeding out, right at 
the -- in front of all these 
people, including his own father 
who -- give whatever 
consideration you want to the 
stipulation.  It's hard to 
imagine how or what a father 
might say or understand in the 
course of watching his son bleed 
out in front of him, saying, 
'Dad, don't let me die.  Don't 
let me die.'"  (Emphases added.) 
"begging for his life"  
 
This is all the more surprising in that, shortly before 
32 
 
 
closing arguments, the parties informed the judge that they had 
entered into a stipulation concerning a statement by the 
victim's father about the victim's last words to him, a focus of 
our discussion in Niemic I.30  Defense counsel read the 
stipulation to the jury immediately prior to the closings.  
Rather than referencing the language in the agreed-upon 
stipulation, the prosecutor instead chose to attack the very 
idea of the stipulation to which he had agreed, arguing, as 
noted, "give whatever consideration you want to the stipulation.  
It's hard to imagine how or what a father might say or 
understand in the course of watching his son bleed out in front 
of him . . . ."   
As before, the prosecutor pointed out all the other people 
who happened to be present "at the wrong spot at the wrong 
time."  He also said that they had seen the victim "bleeding 
out," "begging for his life" "in front of all these people, 
including his own father," "at the start," "at the middle," 
"and, unfortunately, the bitter end."  Foreshadowed by the 
prosecutor's opening,31 this language mirrored the prosecutor's 
                                                          
 
 
30 The stipulation was that the father stated, "My son comes 
running in.  He said, 'Dad, I was just fighting with a guy.'"   
 
 
31 The prosecutor's opening statement detailed the efforts 
of bystanders, EMTs, and emergency room doctors to save the 
victim, another "highly improper, emotionally charged 
discussion" that had featured in the court's admonition in 
Niemic I.  Id. at 675. 
33 
 
 
improper statements in Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675, that the 
"civilian witnesses" were "at the wrong time at the wrong 
place."  As the court emphasized in Niemic I, "[t]he emotional 
impact on witnesses of the victim's death was not a proper 
matter for consideration by the jury."  Id.   
Notwithstanding this court's prior admonitions, after 
defense counsel objected at the end of the closing, the 
prosecutor told the judge:  
"The one thing I would say, Your Honor, just about dying in 
front of his father.  One, begging for his life, that's in 
evidence; two, in front of his father, that was in 
evidence; and three, I do believe, and I think I maybe said 
this to you or I've said it, dying in front of your father 
to me is more conscious suffering than dying out in the 
woods alone.  I mean, I would feel worse if I'm dying in 
front of my father.  And so it goes to the issue of 
conscious suffering of the victim." 
 
Pointing, however, to this court's comments about playing to 
juror sympathy and emotion in Niemic I, the judge, just prior to 
her final charge, instructed the jury that sympathy, and 
specifically sympathy for the father, should play no role in the 
jury's deliberations.32   
                                                          
 
 
 
32 The judge instructed: 
 
"[T]o the extent that in the closing argument [the 
prosecutor] talked about [the victim] begging for his life 
in front of his father and that the defendant left him to 
die in front of his father, you may not decide this case in 
any way, shape or form based upon sympathy.  It's not to 
take any place in your deliberations.  And if you 
interpret -- if you interpret that argument by [the 
34 
 
 
In Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 675, we concluded that the 
prosecutor's "highly improper, emotionally charged discussion 
covering three pages of transcript" that attempted to inflame 
the jury's emotions was a significant factor in the need for a 
new trial.  Prosecutorial "appeals to sympathy . . . obscure the 
clarity with which the jury would look at the evidence and 
encourage the jury to find guilt even if the evidence does not 
reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 34 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 501 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998). 
In addition to the defendant's claims concerning the 
prosecutor's closing argument, our review under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E,33 reveals two other types of improprieties, namely that 
                                                          
 
prosecutor] that he's -- as appealing to your sympathy, you 
are to disregard because that's not a proper purpose.  It 
may be considered on other issues, but appealing to 
sympathy is not a proper purpose." 
 
See part 2.v, infra. 
 
 
33 "General Laws c. 278, § 33E, directs us to review the 
case of a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree by 
considering the 'whole case,' and not merely questions that have 
been properly preserved for appellate review."  Commonwealth v. 
Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 430-431 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 736 (1976).  "The statute states:  'Upon 
such consideration the court may, if satisfied that the verdict 
was against the law or the weight of the evidence, or because of 
newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice 
may require (a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a 
35 
 
 
the prosecutor used facts not in evidence or misstated facts and 
improperly stated his own opinion on multiple occasions.  We 
discuss each in turn. 
iii.  Facts not in evidence and misstatements of fact.  On 
more than ten occasions, the prosecutor argued facts not in 
evidence, often on issues central to the case, or asked the jury 
to draw inferences the evidence did not support.  We focus on 
only a few of the more significant misstatements:  (A) that the 
defendant had said a few months previously that he planned to 
slice up the victim at an AA meeting; (B) that the defendant had 
attempted deliberately to provoke the victim by overt romantic 
gestures with Weaver in front of the victim; and (C) that the 
victim had gone to the meeting that night to avoid the 
defendant.   
A.  "Slice" up the victim.  In one particularly glaring 
misstatement, the prosecutor argued that, several months before 
the stabbing, the defendant had told the victim he planned to 
"slice [the victim] up when [he saw him] at an AA meeting."  
There was no testimony that the defendant made such a statement.  
To the contrary, Nason testified that, a few months before the 
stabbing, the victim had said he would "slice" the defendant 
when they next met.  The defendant testified similarly.  Even if 
                                                          
 
verdict of a lesser degree of guilt . . .'" (emphasis omitted).  
Colleran, supra at 431, quoting G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
36 
 
 
meant sarcastically, the prosecutor was not free to attribute 
this testimony to the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Young, 461 
Mass. 198, 206 (2012). 
B.  The kiss.  To emphasize the defendant's premeditation, 
and the inference that the defendant's interaction with Weaver 
was designed to upset or annoy the victim, the prosecutor argued 
repeatedly that the defendant had intentionally hugged and 
kissed Weaver multiple times, in order to provoke him.  "[The 
defendant] takes a position with [Weaver], and that's when all 
the hugging and the kissing, like right in front of [the 
victim].  Does that sound like he's trying to get a reaction:  
This is my girl.  There was a lot of hugging and kissing that 
was described."  The prosecutor sprinkled multiple references to 
"the business with the hugging and kissing," and the defendant's 
act of "kiss hug, kiss hug" throughout his closing. 
Whether the physical intimacy between Weaver and the 
defendant was limited to a brief peck on the cheek or included 
some hugs and kisses, see note 3, supra, there was no evidence 
that the defendant had planned or engaged in such interaction 
with Weaver to provoke the victim.  There was no evidence that 
the victim was even watching the two, whose interaction was at 
an approximate distance of thirty feet from the victim.  The 
evidence was that the victim spent that time standing with his 
former roommate looking at his cellular telephone, learning how 
37 
 
 
to download music.  If anything, the evidence suggested that 
Weaver's conduct -- reaching out, grabbing the defendant by the 
arm, and pulling him back toward her, saying, "no, don't" -- was 
meant to detain the defendant and discourage him from 
approaching the victim.  While a prosecutor may argue reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, a prosecutor may not 
argue facts not in evidence or misstate the evidence.  See 
Young, 461 Mass. at 206. 
C.  Hiding from the defendant.  To further his theme that 
the defendant had gone to the soup kitchen with a "purposeful 
plan" to confront the victim, rather than to drop off Weaver, 
the prosecutor argued that the victim ("a deer in the 
headlights") had gone to the AA meeting specifically to avoid 
the defendant, and the defendant, in turn, had "gone to where 
[the victim] is when he has tried -- you know, when [the victim] 
doesn't want to deal with [the defendant]."  There was 
absolutely no evidence to support this misrepresentation that 
the victim was at the meeting at the soup kitchen seeking refuge 
from the defendant.   
Such "[r]eferences to facts not in the record or 
misstatements of the evidence have been treated as serious 
errors where the misstatement may have prejudiced the 
defendant."  Santiago, 425 Mass. at 499–500.  See Shelley, 374 
Mass. at 469 (where prosecutor introduced facts not in evidence, 
38 
 
 
"we have recognized that the failure to object and possibly 
obtain a curative instruction may be the very thing which 
permits the remarks to have their maximum prejudicial effect"). 
iv.  Statements of prosecutor's opinion.  At numerous 
points in his closing, as he had impermissibly in Niemic I, 472 
Mass. at 674-675, 677, the prosecutor explicitly told the jury 
his own opinion of the defendant's credibility, as well as that 
of some of the other witnesses.  See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 
451 Mass. 290, 296-297 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 
427 Mass. 336, 352 (1998), and Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 
703, 713 (1993) (prosecutor may not express his or her personal 
belief in testimony or suggest that he or she has knowledge 
outside record, and may not suggest prosecutor has personal 
knowledge of, or vouch for, credibility of any witness).  See 
also United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 142 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (vouching includes statements that "invite the jury 
to rely on the prestige of the government and its agents rather 
than the jury's own evaluation of the evidence"). 
A prosecutor's statement of personal belief is improper.  
See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 401 Mass. 109, 115 (1987).  "To 
permit counsel to express his personal belief in the testimony 
(even if not phrased so as to suggest knowledge of additional 
evidence not known to the jury), would afford him a privilege 
not even accorded to witnesses under oath and subject to cross-
39 
 
 
examination.  Worse, it creates the false issue of the 
reliability and credibility of counsel.  This is peculiarly 
unfortunate if one of them has the advantage of official 
backing."  Id. at 115-116, quoting Commonwealth v. 
De Christoforo, 360 Mass. 531, 547 (1971) (Tauro, J., 
dissenting). 
Here, the prosecutor repeatedly stated his own opinion that 
Nason "lie[d]"34 in much of his testimony, and, later told the 
jury Nason had "lied to you folks."35  The prosecutor also 
repeatedly emphasized that the defendant was "lying,"36 as were 
the other defense witnesses.37  The prosecutor also identified, 
as he had impermissibly at the first trial, see Niemic I, 472 
                                                          
 
 
34 For example, "So only the words out of his mouth about 
the kind of bad guy [the victim] is to make you think less of 
him.  That's not the evidence.  You heard the evidence in this 
case.  He had a motive.  He had a motive because he was angry 
about the girlfriend." 
 
 
35 For example, "The wheel man who lied to you folks when he 
said [he] didn't know what [the defendant] was going to do as 
he's going to over to talk to [the victim].  Remember?" 
 
 
36 For example, "[The defendant] lied to us about, "Oh, no.  
I didn't know I stabbed him."  He's telling them as he jumped in 
the car, "I stabbed him."  He knew he stabbed him.  Not swinging 
aimlessly.  He knew he stabbed him." 
 
 
37 The prosecutor argued multiple times in a similar vein 
that the defendant's testimony was contrary to "the evidence."  
At one point, the prosecutor argued that the defendant will 
"keep saying what he wants to say.  Get his story out there, 
hoping that there will be a narrative that somebody will buy.  
That's inconsistent with the evidence" (emphasis added). 
40 
 
 
Mass. at 671, 673, 675, 676, that testimony which had been given 
by "civilians" (who were not friends of the defendant) and 
therefore was the sole credible evidence.   
The prosecutor of course was entitled to use "enthusiastic 
rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole" (citation 
omitted).  Wilson, 427 Mass. at 350.  These statements, however, 
crossed the line between fair and improper argument.  "This line 
of argument . . . further suggested to the jury that the 
testimony of these . . . prosecution witnesses had to be 
believed in toto and that any testimony of the defendant which 
diverged had to be discredited as a lie."  Thomas, 401 Mass. at 
116.  A prosecutor "may not explicitly or implicitly vouch to 
the jury that he [or she] . . . knows that the witness's 
testimony is true."  Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 Mass. 488, 501 
(2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 265 
(1989).   
Given the absence of objection by defense counsel,38 the 
                                                          
 
 
38 We are not unaware of apparent deficiencies in defense 
counsel's performance, as already remarked upon here and in 
parts 2.c and 2.d.i, ii, iii, and iv, supra.  See, for example, 
notes 18, 21, 22, 26, and 27, supra.  Also, counsel's efforts to 
introduce evidence favorable to the defendant often served as 
the bulwark of much of the evidence that was contrary to the 
theory of defense.  See note 26, supra.  In addition, counsel 
failed to object to the prosecutor's more than "hard driving" 
cross-examinations; failed to ask for a contemporaneous (or any) 
limiting instruction; and failed to object to the prosecutor's 
persistent interruptions of defense counsel's questions on 
41 
 
 
only relevant instruction provided was the general instruction 
that the attorneys' closing arguments are not evidence, and that 
if the jury's memory of the evidence differed, they were to rely 
on their collective memory.  This general instruction was not 
sufficient to explain to the jury why they should not rely on 
the prosecutor's assertions of his own beliefs.  Marrero, 436 
Mass. at 502.  See Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d at 142.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 894, 906 (2008) ("In cases 
where a prosecutor improperly has given unsworn testimony that 
went to a critical issue in the case, or improperly has vouched 
for a key Commonwealth witness, where there has been an 
objection [and sometimes not], and where the case against the 
defendant is not otherwise overwhelming [as here], we have 
required a judge to respond to prosecutorial misconduct with 
force and specificity.  A general instruction, as here, will not 
suffice to neutralize the prejudice").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Worcester, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 266-267 (1998) (new trial 
required based on prosecutor's improper comments on defendant's 
credibility). 
 
v.  Whether a new trial is warranted.  Given our conclusion 
that portions of the prosecutor's closing were improper, we turn 
                                                          
 
direct and cross-examination of many witnesses.  Because of the 
result we reach, we need not address these issues further.  
  
42 
 
 
to consideration whether one or more of these improprieties, or 
a combination of all, warrant a new trial.  In determining 
whether a new trial is required because of errors at trial, we 
consider "whether 'defense counsel seasonably objected to the 
arguments at trial . . . whether the judge's instructions 
mitigated the error . . . whether the errors in the arguments 
went to the heart of the issues at trial or concerned collateral 
matters . . . whether the jury would be able to sort out the 
excessive claims made by the prosecutor . . . and whether the 
Commonwealth's case was so overwhelming that the errors did not 
prejudice the defendant.'"  Commonwealth v. Maynard, 436 Mass. 
558, 570 (2002), quoting Santiago, 425 Mass. at 500.  
 
"[T]he cumulative effect of all the errors must be 
'considered in the context of the arguments and the case as a 
whole.'"  Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 673, quoting Maynard, 436 Mass. 
at 570.  "Once a properly raised objection to a prosecutor's 
argument is found to be valid, the entire record, including the 
balance of the prosecutor's argument, becomes relevant in 
determining whether the error was prejudicial to the point of 
requiring a reversal of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 
399 Mass. 514, 523 (1987), citing Commonwealth v. Burke, 373 
Mass. 569, 577 (1977). 
 
Here, even if no one impropriety alone would mandate a new 
trial, we conclude that the confluence of the asserted errors in 
43 
 
 
closing, one of which reiterated the essence of the errors that 
contributed primarily to the need for the second trial, do again 
necessitate a new trial.  Counsel "seasonably objected" to two 
of the arguments -- the substantive use of rebuttal testimony 
and the play to jury sympathy -- and not to the others, which we 
uncovered in our review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, but the 
absence of an objection makes no difference in our conclusion.  
Even when reviewed under a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice standard,39 the improprieties require a 
new trial, because we cannot be certain that the jury would have 
been able to look at the evidence clearly and reach a decision 
based only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Bois, 476 
Mass. at 34, quoting Santiago, 425 Mass. at 501.   
 
As to the second Maynard factor, while there was no 
contemporaneous limiting instruction, the judge gave appropriate 
curative instructions with respect to the two preserved errors 
immediately before her final charge.  See Maynard, 436 Mass. 
at 570; notes 25 and 32, supra.  In her final charge, given 
shortly thereafter, the judge provided general instructions that 
                                                          
 
 
39 Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we review for a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, under which a defendant 
is entitled to relief only "if we have a serious doubt whether 
the result of the trial might have been different had the 
error[s] not been made."  Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 Mass. 
340, 345 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 
174 (1999). 
44 
 
 
attorneys' arguments are not evidence, and that the jurors 
should not make a decision based on sympathy or pity.  The judge 
did as much as she could to mitigate the improprieties, which, 
in other circumstances, might be enough.  See Giguere, 420 Mass. 
at 235.   
 
We have long recognized, however, that not all errors can 
be cured by providing proper instructions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Redmond, 370 Mass. 591, 597 (1976) (no one error "was 
necessarily so prejudicial that curative instructions were 
useless or that the instructions given were inadequate"; 
nonetheless, curative instructions were inadequate in 
circumstances to overcome combination of errors); Commonwealth 
v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 681 (1974) ("It is reasonable for us 
to be confident that in most cases limiting instructions 
accomplish their intended purpose.  Nevertheless, in cases like 
the instant one, where the evidence subject to limitations has 
an extremely high potential for unfair prejudice, we have a duty 
to be skeptical as to the effectiveness of limiting 
instructions"); id., quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 
1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932) (in some 
contexts, curative instructions "have been characterized by 
Judge Learned Hand as 'the recommendation to the jury of a 
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their power, but 
anybody's else'").  See also Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 
45 
 
 
770, 782 (1997), quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 
(1987) (curative instruction not sufficient to cure prejudice in 
"cases where the codefendant's statement 'expressly 
implicate[s]' the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would 
prove to be 'powerfully incriminating'").  In the circumstances 
here, given the confluence of errors, the inherently highly 
emotional testimony, and the context of the trial, we cannot say 
with confidence that the repeated references to the rebuttal 
testimony and the appeals to sympathy and emotion did not infect 
the jury.   
 
Turning to the remaining Maynard factors, the improprieties 
went to "the heart of the issues at trial," and were not 
collateral.  See Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 676-677.  The 
Commonwealth's case at the defendant's first trial was "not 
overwhelming," id. at 677, and in some respects it was weaker at 
the second trial, due to the unavailability of the medical 
examiner who had performed the autopsy and changes in testimony 
or lapses in memory by a number of witnesses.  The improper 
undermining of the theory of defense in effect instructed the 
jury that they reasonably could not believe the defendant's 
testimony.   
 
At the same time, the improper statements in the 
prosecutor's closing were designed to inflame the jury's 
passions, such that they would feel the need to avenge the 
46 
 
 
victim, in a trial where a significant portion of the evidence, 
concerning the efforts to save the victim after he lost 
consciousness, was designed to be emotionally disturbing, in 
order to support the charge of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
Yet, the statements were not so clearly hyperbole that the jury 
would have been able to identify and sort out "the excessive 
claims made by the prosecutor," and his exhortations that the 
jury could not believe the defendant or any of the "non-
civilian" testimony.  Maynard, 436 Mass. at 570, quoting 
Santiago, 425 Mass. at 500. 
 
"[T]he prosecutor, in his opening and closing 
statements . . . improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for 
the victim in a way that may have 'swe[pt] the jurors beyond a 
fair and calm consideration of the evidence."  Santiago, 425 
Mass. at 493–494, quoting Commonwealth v. Perry, 254 Mass. 520, 
531 (1926).  The prosecutor's "comments went to the very heart 
of the case.  They struck, and struck impermissibly, at the 
defendant's sole defense, and sought to impeach his only 
witnesses."  Shelley, 374 Mass. at 471.  "[I]mproper 
suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of 
personal knowledge [by the prosecutor] are apt to carry much 
weight against the accused when they should properly carry 
none."  Id. at 472, quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935).  It was thus unlikely that the jurors would have 
47 
 
 
been able to "sort out the excessive claims made by the 
prosecutor" and decide the case on the evidence (citation 
omitted).  See Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 673-674.  
 
Given all this, the improprieties in argument, especially 
the appeals to sympathy, were rendered particularly crucial.  
"[T]hat is the nature of appeals to sympathy:  they do not 
misstate any piece of evidence, but rather obscure the clarity 
with which the jury would look at the evidence and encourage the 
jury to find guilt even if the evidence does not reach the level 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case is particularly crucial where improper 
appeals to sympathy are made.  Where guilt is clear, we may 
conclude that the overwhelming strength of the evidence led the 
jury to its conclusion, but where the questions are close and 
difficult, we cannot be certain that the jury's conclusion was 
not clouded by the improper appeals and that their verdict was 
based on a dispassionate view of the evidence."  Santiago, 425 
Mass. at 501-502.  Here, the evidence was not overwhelming, and 
the appeals to sympathy are accordingly worrisome.   
 
We turn to the effect of the improprieties as a whole.  As 
discussed, two of the improprieties in the prosecutor's closing 
are preserved, and are reviewable under a prejudicial error 
standard.  With respect to those uncovered during § 33E review, 
we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
48 
 
 
justice, under which a defendant is entitled to relief only "if 
we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might 
have been different had the error[s] not been made."  
Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 Mass. 340, 345 (2003), quoting 
Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).   
In the context of this case, the use of the rebuttal 
testimony as substantive evidence, and the improper appeals to 
sympathy and emotion were prejudicial to the defendant.  Because 
the statements at issue addressed his intent in approaching the 
victim -- a core issue at trial underpinning his conviction for 
premeditated murder -- and called upon the jury to rely on 
sympathy and emotion, the wrongful use of such evidence 
constituted prejudicial error.  That is so because, in this 
context, the prosecutor's improper statements on seminal issues 
would have been too intertwined with what the prosecutor himself 
described as his "strenuous[]" and "contentious" trial 
strategies for the jury to have engaged in "fair and calm" 
consideration of the evidence (citation omitted).  See Santiago, 
425 Mass. at 494.  We have serious doubt, particularly when 
these errors are reviewed in combination with those revealed in 
our review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "whether the result of the 
trial might have been different had the error[s] not been made."  
Russell, 439 Mass. at 345, quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 174.  
Accordingly, a new trial is necessary. 
49 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  "We take no pleasure, in fact we harbor a 
degree of concern, that a time-consuming and costly retrial must 
be held. . . .  Our task, not always an easy one, is to preserve 
the interests of justice, both for the Commonwealth and the 
accused.  On this record, the risk of a miscarriage of justice 
is too great for us to let stand the defendant's conviction of 
murder . . . ."  Kater, 388 Mass. at 534. 
The verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree is 
vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court, where the Commonwealth again may accept a reduction in 
the verdict to manslaughter, or once again may retry the 
defendant on the murder charge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.