Title: Flug v. University of Oregon
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: S48434
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: July 31, 2003

Filed: July 31, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

DEBORAH J. FLUG,
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 16-96-04247; CA A99397; SC S48434)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted September 5, 2002.
	David C. Force, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief
for petitioner on review.
	Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the brief
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
	James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas &amp; Coon, Portland, filed a
brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, 
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.         
	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Jack L. Mattison, Judge. 170 Or App 660, 13 P3d 544 (2000).
    **Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		Plaintiff brought this action against her former
employer, the University of Oregon (defendant), alleging two
counts of unlawful employment practices under ORS chapter 659 
and one count of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED).  The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant,
concluding, inter alia, that plaintiff had failed to give timely
notice of her IIED claim, as ORS 30.275 requires. (1)  The Court of
Appeals affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's argument that certain
letters that her lawyers had sent to defendant amounted to
"actual notice" of her IIED claim within the meaning of ORS
30.275(6), set out below.  Flug v. University of Oregon, 170 Or
App 660, 13 P3d 544 (2000).  We allowed plaintiff's petition for
review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals,
albeit for slightly different reasons. 
   		We draw the following facts from the record on summary
judgment and present them, and all reasonable inferences that we
draw from them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  ORCP
47 C; see also Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 408,
939 P2d 608 (1997) (stating and applying principle).  In late
August 1994, plaintiff took an extended medical leave from her
job in the Housing Department of the University of Oregon because
she was suffering from severe depression.  In November 1994,
plaintiff returned to work on a restricted basis.  By April 1995,
plaintiff was working about 25 hours per week.
	On April 13, 1995, plaintiff's supervisors, Eyster and
Tendick, learned that plaintiff had made certain comments to her
coworkers that raised concerns that plaintiff might harm others. (2) 
Eyster and Tendick immediately placed plaintiff on administrative
leave.  On May 10, Eyster and Tendick met with plaintiff and
presented her with a memorandum outlining her options with
respect to her employment at the University.  According to the
memorandum, plaintiff's first option was to resign, effective
June 30, 1995.  A second option -- returning to work -- was
available only if plaintiff met certain conditions.  One
condition was that she obtain a full release from her doctor and
therapist to work "full time and * * * perform all job
functions."  The supervisors instructed plaintiff to inform them
of her decision by May 15, 1995.
		Plaintiff understood the memorandum as requiring her to
present the requested medical releases by May 15.  She told
Eyster and Tendick that she could not meet that requirement
because her doctors had not released her to work full time. 
Eyster and Tendick repeated their demand for a full release. 
Plaintiff then asked Eyster and Tendick if they were asking her
to ask her doctors to lie.  Eyster and Tendick did not respond.
		Plaintiff was distressed by the meeting with Eyster and
Tendick; she retained a lawyer to represent her in the matter. 
On May 15, 1995, plaintiff's lawyer wrote to Tendick that
plaintiff chose option 2 (returning to work), but that "some
modifications" in the conditions stated in the memorandum would
be required.  The lawyer specifically noted that the requirement
that plaintiff obtain a full release from her doctors "is almost
certainly a violation of federal and state law prohibiting
discrimination against employees with handicaps."  Plaintiff's
lawyer suggested an informal meeting to "iron out" that and other
concerns.  The lawyer also requested a copy of plaintiff's
personnel file.
		Tendick sent the lawyer's letter to defendant's legal
counsel, Swan.  Swan responded to plaintiff's lawyer in a letter
dated June 15, 1995, confirming that defendant needed releases
from plaintiff's doctors before she could return to work.  
		Plaintiff's lawyer and Swan communicated by letter on
various occasions thereafter, in an apparent attempt to negotiate
the conditions of plaintiff's return to work.  On July 20, 1995,
Swan wrote to plaintiff's lawyer that defendant must have the
requested releases by August 2, 1995, "or else the Housing
Department will have no choice but to replace [plaintiff]."  On
September 18, 1995, plaintiff's lawyer sent defendant copies of
plaintiff's doctors' responses to defendant's request for
releases.  The responses stated that plaintiff should not return
to her position in the Housing Department, but suggested that she
could work full time in a different, less stressful position. 
Based on those responses, plaintiff's lawyer asked defendant to
accommodate plaintiff's mental disability by transferring her to
a different department.  Defendant refused to accede to that
request and, instead, indicated that plaintiff's job no longer
existed.  Plaintiff's lawyer then informed Swan, by a certified
letter dated January 29, 1996, that plaintiff was reserving the
right to file an action against defendant "for its discrimination
against her as a disabled person in employment, in violation of
ORS 659.425 and 42 USC § 12102."  The letter added that,
"although we believe that our prior correspondence meets the
requirements of ORS 30.275(6), you should consider this letter as
formal notice of a claim under that statute."   
		On May 10, 1996, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant.  The complaint alleged that:  (1) plaintiff suffered
from a temporary disability (mental depression) that was
susceptible to reasonable accommodation; (2) on May 10, 1995,
defendant had demanded that plaintiff either resign from her
position or obtain a written statement from her treating
physicians "falsely stating" that she could return to work full
time and perform all work functions; (3) plaintiff had responded
by asserting her rights under ORS 659.425 (1995); and (4)
defendant subsequently had refused to accommodate her disability
and ultimately had discharged plaintiff from her position.  Based
on the foregoing facts, the complaint alleged two counts of
unlawful employment practices under ORS 659.121 (1995) (providing
for civil action for persons aggrieved by certain specified
unlawful employment practices) and one count of IIED.  The first
unlawful employment practice count alleged that defendant had
violated ORS 659.425 (1995) by discharging plaintiff and
discriminating against her in the terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment because of her disability. (3)  The second
unlawful employment practice count alleged that defendant had
violated ORS 659.030 by retaliating against plaintiff for
opposing defendant's unlawful discrimination. (4)

  Plaintiff's claim
for IIED was based on the theory that Eyster's and Tendick's
conduct at the May 10, 1995, meeting was beyond the bounds of
socially tolerable behavior and had caused plaintiff great
emotional distress.  
		Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that
plaintiff could not establish any genuine issue of material fact
with respect to certain elements of her two statutory claims. 
Defendant also sought summary judgment on the IIED claim on the
ground that plaintiff had failed to give notice of that claim
within 180 days of her alleged injury, as ORS 30.275(2)(b)
required.  The trial court accepted defendant's arguments
respecting all three claims and granted the motion.
		Plaintiff appealed.  With respect to the IIED claim,
plaintiff argued that she had provided timely notice of her claim
under two alternative theories.  She argued, first, that the 180-day notice period specified in ORS 30.275(2)(b) did not begin to
run until a few weeks before she filed her action, when she
discovered that, at the May 10, 1995, meeting, Tendick and Eyster
intentionally were inflicting emotional distress on her. (5) 
Plaintiff argued that she satisfied the notice-of-claim
requirement by commencing her action within 180 days of that
discovery. (6)         
		In the alternative, plaintiff argued that three letters
that her lawyer had sent to defendant's legal counsel within 180
days of the May 10, 1995, meeting provided "actual notice" of her
IIED claim within the meaning of ORS 30.275(6). (7)  Plaintiff
acknowledged that those letters did not mention specifically the
possibility of an IIED claim, but argued that references to the
May 10, 1995, meeting and to defendant's possible statutory
violations satisfied the notice of claim requirement with respect
to her claim.     
		With respect to the statutory unlawful employment
practices claims, plaintiff argued generally that there remained
genuine issues of material fact respecting whether defendant had
discriminated or retaliated against her. 
		The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. 
Flug, 170 Or App 664.  The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's
discovery argument on the ground that plaintiff's own affidavit
established that she was "sufficiently aware of facts necessary
to raise an issue about whether her supervisors were acting
intentionally when they asked her to provide false reports."  Id.
at 675.  The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that the
letters that her lawyer sent to defendant qualified as "actual
notice" of her IIED claim for purposes of ORS 30.275(6).  The
court acknowledged defendant's concession that the letters
constituted actual notice of plaintiff's claim for employment
discrimination, but noted that the letters nowhere suggested an
intent to assert a claim for IIED.  Id. at 671-72. 
		With respect to plaintiff's employment discrimination
claim, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that
there was no triable issue of fact as to whether defendant had
made reasonable efforts to accommodate plaintiff's disability. 
Id. at 679-80.  The Court of Appeals further concluded that
plaintiff had failed to preserve her separate argument with
respect to the retaliation claim.  Id. at 680-81.  Ultimately,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment with respect to all plaintiff's claims.  Id. at 681.
		In her petition to this court, plaintiff suggests, as
she did in the Court of Appeals, that her notice of claim was
accomplished by commencing the present action:  That notice was
timely, she asserts, because it occurred within 180 days of her
discovery that, a few days before the May 10, 1995, meeting, her
physician had informed Tendick by letter that plaintiff should
not return to work on a full-time basis for another few weeks. 
Plaintiff contends that that information revealed to her, for the
first time, that Tendick and Eyster understood that she could not
obtain immediate full releases from her doctors and that their
purpose in demanding such releases was to cause her emotional
distress. (8)  Plaintiff argues that her claim did not accrue, and
the notice period did not begin to run, until she discovered that
Tendick's and Eyster's conduct was intentional, i.e., tortious.  
		The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff's
discovery argument was undermined by her own summary judgment
affidavit:
	"In her brief to this court, plaintiff contends
that, because she did not know of her supervisors'
communication with her doctors, she did not know that
her supervisors knew that 'this "option" they offered
her would either be impossible, or require her to
induce her physicians to lie in writing as to their
prognoses for her recovery.'  Plaintiff's own affidavit
disproves that statement -- she states that she told
her supervisors that they were asking her to have her
doctors lie about their medical opinions and further
states that they continued to press her with the demand
after she had told them it was impossible.  Thus, by
her own account, plaintiff was sufficiently aware of
facts necessary to raise an issue about whether her
supervisors were acting intentionally when they asked
her to provide false reports and, thereby, caused her
to suffer emotional distress." 
Flug, 170 Or App at 674-75.     
		Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals' analysis
utilizes an erroneous standard of review, i.e., it does not view
the evidence, and all reasonable inferences, in her favor as the
nonmoving party.  Plaintiff points to her own sworn statement
that she did not discover the intentional nature of defendant's
conduct until long after the May 10, 1995, meeting.  She also
asserts that the Court of Appeals could not infer, from the fact
that she repeatedly told Tendick and Eyster during the meeting
that they were asking for the impossible, that she must have
known that they understood that they were asking for the
impossible. 
		In so arguing, plaintiff demonstrates that she does not
fully understand the requirement of ORS 30.275(2)(b).  That
statute requires that the requisite notice be given "within 180
days after the alleged loss or injury."  Thus, under the specific
wording of the statute, our focus on summary judgment is not on
whether, on May 10, 1995, plaintiff had actual knowledge that
Tendick and Eyster already had heard from her doctors.  It is
sufficient that plaintiff knew or should have known facts that
would indicate to a reasonable person that Tendick and Eyster had
caused a loss or injury to her at the meeting on May 10, 1995. 
In that respect it is true, as the Court of Appeals held, that
plaintiff's own affidavit affirmatively showed that she had been
injured by intentional acts of Tendick and Eyster.  That was
enough to commence the 180-day statutory period.  See, e.g.,
Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or 233, 238-39, 611 P2d 1153
(1980) (in negligence action for damage to towed automobile,
statutory notice began at point when plaintiff had reasonable
opportunity to discover his injury and identity of party
responsible for that injury).
		Plaintiff's affidavit describes her repeated protests
to Tendick and Eyster that they were demanding the impossible,
and their intransigence in the face of those protests.  Under
that description of the meeting, Tendick's and Eyster's demands
at the May 10, 1995, meeting caused plaintiff distress.  There is
nothing in this record to suggest that Tendick and Eyster could
not understand what plaintiff was telling them face-to-face. 
Plaintiff's argument about her subjective uncertainty as to
whether she was understood cannot create a factual issue with
respect to that question.  It follows that there was no issue of
material fact respecting whether plaintiff suffered a loss or
injury on May 10, 1995.  Plaintiff's notice of claim was due
within 180 days of that date.
		Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that three
letters that her lawyer sent to defendant within 180 days of the
May 10 meeting qualified as "actual notice" of her IIED claim. (9) 
"Actual notice" is one way of satisfying the Oregon Tort Claim
Act's (OTCA's) notice of claim requirement.  ORS 30.275(3)(b). 
"Actual notice" is a communication by which a responsible person
"acquires actual knowledge of the time, place and circumstances
giving rise to the claim, where the communication is such that a
reasonable person would conclude that a particular person intends
to assert a claim against the public body * * *."  ORS 30.275(6).
		The letters on which plaintiff relies were dated May
15, June 23, and September 18, 1995.  The May 15 letter was
addressed to Tendick.  It stated that plaintiff rejected the
first option listed in the May 10, 1995, memorandum (resignation)
and chose option two (returning to work).  The letter further
stated that "some modifications" in the defendant's conditions
would be required to accomplish plaintiff's return to work.  In
that regard, the letter specifically complained that defendant's
requirement that plaintiff obtain a full release from her doctors
before returning to work "is almost certainly a violation of
federal and state law prohibiting discrimination against
employees with handicaps."  The letter closed by suggesting an
informal meeting to "iron out" that and other concerns and by
requesting a copy of plaintiff's personnel file. 
		Tendick sent the May 15, 1995, letter to Swan.  Swan
wrote a letter to plaintiff's lawyer on June 15, 1995,
reiterating defendant's request for medical releases and
explaining that request in terms of concerns about the "safety of
others."  In that letter, Swan noted that defendant would be
reprimanding plaintiff for her "postal worker" comments and that
a written "clarification" of expectations would be forthcoming.
		Plaintiff's lawyer responded to Swan's June 15, 1995,
letter in a letter dated June 23, 1995, which is the second
letter on which plaintiff relies as actual notice of her IIED
claim.  In that letter, plaintiff's lawyer reiterated her request
for a complete, unedited copy of plaintiff's personnel file and
indicated that plaintiff needed to understand the exact nature of
defendant's safety concerns to obtain the clearances that
defendant was demanding.  The lawyer expressed doubts about one
item from defendant's proposed "clarification" of expectations
and asked Swan about the cancellation of plaintiff's health
insurance and plaintiff's change of status to leave without pay.
		Swan responded in writing on July 20, 1995.  He
explained the changes in plaintiff's status and health insurance
and stated that defendant would not be supplying additional
documentation.  Swan also provided the clarification that
plaintiff had requested respecting an unrelated matter and ended
by stating that defendant must have the doctor's responses by
August 2, 1995, "or else the Housing Department will have no
choice but to replace [plaintiff]."
		On September 18, 1995, plaintiff's lawyer sent the
third letter on which plaintiff relies.  In a letter to Swan, the
lawyer stated that plaintiff's doctors would release plaintiff to
work full time (but only in a different, less stressful position)
and enclosed copies of the doctors' releases.  The lawyer then
requested that defendant "accommodate the restrictions prescribed
by [plaintiff's doctors]" by transferring plaintiff to a
different department.
		As noted, plaintiff contends that a reasonable person
would have understood the material quoted from her lawyer's
letters as conveying an intent to file a statutory employment
discrimination claim and that that expression of intent was
sufficient.  The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding
that the letters were insufficient as notice of the IIED claim
because they did not draw attention to any potential claim for
IIED:
	"Where a communication relates to a variety of
circumstances and events but indicates a person's
intent to assert a claim only as to some, but not all,
of them, the public body is not sufficiently apprised
of the need to investigate those circumstances and
events as to which no intention to assert a claim has
been communicated.  Again, nothing in the lengthy
correspondence between plaintiff's former attorneys and
defendant indicated, even remotely, that plaintiff
intended to assert an IIED claim or other claim against
defendant based on the circumstances ultimately relied
on by petitioner in asserting that claim." 
Flug, 170 Or App at 671-72.
		Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals decision
requires that a notice of claim specifically forecast each legal
theory that a plaintiff ultimately intends to assert and that any
such requirement is inconsistent with the wording and overall
purpose of the notice statute.  Plaintiff contends that the
statute instead requires only that a plaintiff convey an intent
to bring some claim and that a communication fulfills the purpose
of the notice requirement (i.e., providing the governmental
defendant with an opportunity to investigate) if it describes the
"time, place and circumstances" surrounding the claim and
generally conveys an intent to sue.
		Defendant disagrees with that analysis.  Defendant
notes, first, that the term "claim" appears to be used throughout
the OTCA in its narrow, legal sense, i.e., to refer to a specific
cause of action or theory of recovery. (10)  From that standpoint,
defendant argues that the wording of ORS 30.275(6) assumes the
circumstance in which the plaintiff intends to and does assert a
single "claim" or cause of action.  In defendant's view, the
provision requires a responsible person to acquire "actual
knowledge of the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the
claim," i.e., the specific theory of tort liability that the
claimant intends to assert, and it also requires that a potential
plaintiff communicate an intent to bring a claim, i.e., an action
on that specific theory of liability.  Defendant contends that
the use of the phrase "a claim" merely reflects the fact that the
provision is couched in terms of a single claim and "in no way
suggests that, when a claimant intends to press multiple claims
in the same tort action, a tort claim notice mentioning only a
general intent to sue would satisfy ORS 30.275(6)." 
		The parties' arguments present a question of statutory
construction, which we address according to the framework set out
in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-612,
859 P2d 1143 (1993).  PGE directs us first to consider the text
and context of the statute, and to proceed to other levels of
analysis only if the meaning of the statute remains unclear at
that first level.  Id. at 610-11.  
		The relevant part of ORS 30.275(6) defines "actual
notice" of a claim as
"any communication by which any individual to whom
notice may be given * * * acquires actual knowledge of
the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the
claim, where the communication is such that a
reasonable person would conclude that a particular
person intends to assert a claim against the public
body or an officer, employee or agent of the public
body." 
(Emphasis added.)  The provision consists of two clauses.  The
first clause refers to the recipient's actual knowledge of facts,
viz., "time, place and circumstances giving rise to" the claim. 
The second clause invokes an objective reasonableness standard by
which the meaning of what is "actual[ly] know[n]" is to be
tested.  It also is significant, in our view, that the foregoing
provision speaks in terms of communicating an intent to assert a
claim against the public entity.  The use of the indefinite
article ("a") suggests that the notice need convey only an intent
to assert some claim.  That impression is bolstered by the fact
that the same subsection spells out a requirement that the notice
describe the "time, place and circumstances giving rise to the
claim."  (Emphasis added.)  The clear import of the contrasting
choice of articles is that, although a plaintiff must provide a
defendant with the facts (i.e., time, place, and circumstances)
that relate to the specific claim or claims that a plaintiff
ultimately asserts, the plaintiff need convey an intent to assert
a claim only in general terms.
	      In sum, we see nothing in the wording of ORS
30.275(6), or in the context of other provisions relating to that
statutory subsection, that suggests or supports defendant's
argument that a notice of claim must predict expressly the
specific claims that will or may be asserted.  ORS 30.275(6)
requires some form of communication by which the proper parties
acquire actual knowledge of the time, place, and circumstances
"giving rise to" the ultimate claim, not of the specific nature
or theory of the claim.  Although the notice also must warn of
the plaintiff's intent to bring "a claim," the use of that term
demonstrates that that warning need not specify precisely what
claim.  The rule for which defendant argues (and that the Court
of Appeals announced) thus is too stringent, and we reject it.
		There is no need to inquire further into the meaning of 
ORS 30.275(6).  It is clear from text and context that, for
purposes of the OTCA notice of claim requirement, "actual notice"
is a communication that (1) allows the recipient to acquire
"actual knowledge of the time, place and circumstances" that give
rise to the specific claim or claims that the plaintiff
ultimately asserts; and (2) would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the plaintiff has a general intent to assert a
claim.  With that definition in mind, we return to the three
letters that plaintiff advances as notice of claim.  
		We need not address whether the letters allowed
defendant to acquire actual knowledge of the "time, place and
circumstances," giving rise to plaintiff's IIED claim, because we
conclude that the other requirement of the statute, viz.,
communication of an intent to assert a claim, is dispositive.  In
that regard, there is no issue whether the letters communicated
information that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that
plaintiff intended to assert a claim against defendant.  They did
not.  Although the letters stated that defendant's demand for
doctors' releases was unlawful, and that other demands and
conditions imposed by plaintiff's supervisors were unreasonable,
the import of those statements merely is that plaintiff regarded
that behavior as contrary to law or unfair, not that plaintiff
intended to sue over those matters. 
		We reject each of plaintiff's theories as to how she
fulfilled the notice of claim requirement of ORS 30.275 with
respect to her IIED claim.  The trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment for defendant respecting that claim. (11)
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.  



1. 	ORS 30.275 is part of the Oregon Tort Claims Act and
provides:
	"(1) No action arising from any act or omission of
a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a
public body within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300
shall be maintained unless notice of claim is given as
required by this section.
	"(2) Notice of claim shall be given within the
following applicable period of time, not including the
period, not exceeding 90 days, during which the person
injured is unable to give the notice because of the
injury or because of minority, incompetency or other
incapacity: 
	"(a) For wrongful death, within one year after the
alleged loss or injury.
	"(b) For all other claims, within 180 days after
the alleged loss or injury."

2. 	Plaintiff reportedly told one coworker that she could
understand the feelings of postal workers -- an apparent
reference to nationally publicized incidents in which postal
workers had violently attacked their coworkers and supervisors. 
Plaintiff allegedly also described her shooting prowess to
several coworkers.  

3. 	ORS 659.425(1) (1995) provided:
	"For the purposes of ORS 659.400 to 659.460, it is
an unlawful employment practice for any employer to
refuse to hire, employ or promote, to bar or discharge
from employment or to discriminate in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because:  
	"(a) An individual has a physical or mental
impairment which, with reasonable accommodation by the
employer, does not prevent the performance of the work
involved;
	"(b) An individual has a record of a physical or
mental impairment; or 
	"(c) An individual is regarded as having a
physical or mental impairment."
ORS 659.425 was amended extensively in 1997.  Or Laws 1997, ch
854, § 13.

4. 	ORS 659.030 (1995) provided, in part:
	"(1) For the purposes of ORS 659.010 to 659.110,
659.227, 659.330, 659.340 and 659.400 to 659.545, it is
an unlawful employment practice: 
	"* * * * *
	"(f) For any employer, labor organization or
employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise
discriminate against any person because the person has
opposed any practices forbidden by this section * * *
and [ORS] 659.400 to 659.460 * * *." 
5. 	The discovery that plaintiff says led to that
conclusion was that, at the time of the May 10, 1995, meeting,
Tendick and Eyster had a letter from her doctor in hand that
indicated that he would not release plaintiff to work full-time
for at least another few weeks.

6. 	ORS 30.275(3)(c) provides:
	"Notice of claim required by this section is
satisfied by
	"* * * * *
	"(c) Commencement of an action on the claim by or
on behalf of the claimant within the applicable period
of time provided in subsection (2) of this section."

7. 	ORS 30.275(6) provides, in part:
	"Actual notice of claim is any communication by
which any individual to whom notice may be given * * *
or any person responsible for administering tort claims
on behalf of the public body acquires actual knowledge
of the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the
claim, where the communication is such that a
reasonable person would conclude that a particular
person intends to assert a claim against the public
body or an officer, employee or agent of the public
body."

8. 	In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff pointed to her
affidavit, submitted in response to defendant's motion for
summary judgment, which explained her perception of Tendick's and
Eyster's motives:
	"At the meeting on May 10 I was very confused,
because my requests that Mr. Eyster or Mr. Tendick
simply call my doctors to confirm what I was telling
them, were ignored.  I knew that Mr. Tendick was not a
very competent manager and lots of things were over his
head, but at that time I did not realize that he and
Mr. Eyster had developed the conditions in the May 10
memo based on their actual knowledge that I could not
comply with them because they had already talked to my
doctor.  Months later, * * * we learned of the
existence of the telephone conversation between Tendick
and Dr. Cordes and her confirming letter.  * * * It
then became clear that the whole purpose of the May 10
memo and meeting had been to cause me to become so
upset and frightened about losing my job that I would
either agree to return to fulltime work against my
doctors' advice, or accept the alternative of
'resigning' to receive disability insurance benefits."

9. 	In her complaint, plaintiff indicated that she timely
had communicated notice of claim in five letters from her lawyer
to defendant's representatives.  However, two of the letters were
sent more than 180 days after the May 10, 1995, meeting.  

10. 	Defendant notes, for example, that ORS 30.275(2) sets
out a one-year notice period for wrongful death and a 180-day
period "for all other claims."  Defendant also points to the fact
that ORS 30.270(1) repeatedly uses the plural form, "claims,"
when discussing limits of liability to any one claimant for a
single accident or occurrence.  Defendant contends that that
usage pattern establishes that, throughout ORS 30.275, "claim"
always refers to a particular theory of liability in tort and not
to the claimant's overall claim for relief.     

11. 	Plaintiff advances other arguments respecting the
notice requirement that we also conclude are not well taken.  A
more complete discussion of them is unnecessary.  Plaintiff also
advances a second claim of error that is entirely fact-specific. 
We decline to discuss the Court of Appeals' rationale concerning
the issue.