Title: Mary Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Construction Co
Citation: N/A
Docket Number: a-38-98
State: new-jersey
Issuer: new-jersey Supreme Court
Date: August 9, 1999

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Stein, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether a worker who settles his or her workers' compensation claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-20 (Section 20) simultaneously can waive the future right of his or her spouse to assert a statutory claim for dependency benefits in the event of the worker's death. Carl Kibble was employed by Weeks Dredging &amp; Construction Company (Weeks) from September 1980 until March 1984 as a welder/torch cutter. He had worked for other employers in the same capacity from the mid-1950s until 1980. During the course of that employment, Kibble was exposed to several welding fumes. In 1977, Kibble's chest x-ray revealed that he was suffering from pneumonoconiosis, a lung condition caused by the retention of dust in the lungs. In 1984, after seeking treatment for a chronic cough, Kibble was diagnosed by his family physician with pulmonary fibrosis. The physician concluded that Kibble's condition was caused by his exposure to the welding fumes and that he was totally disabled with welder's lung. He advised Kibble that he should not work as a welder again. In June 1984, Kibble filed a workers' compensation claim against Weeks and seven other prior employers, seeking benefits for permanent disability to lungs, internal and nervous system. A doctor who examined Kibble in connection with his claim concurred with the family physician's conclusions and further found that because of his exposure to welding fumes, Kibble was at an increased risk of developing lung cancer in the future. In January 1989, Kibble settled his compensation claim pursuant to Section 20 for a lump-sum of $36,000. Pursuant to the prevailing practice in the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division), the settlement was placed on the record and approved by the judge of compensation. The transcript of those proceedings was lost or destroyed. However, the pre-printed settlement form used to process Section 20 settlements stated that the settlement has the effect of a dismissal with prejudice, being final as to all right[s] and benefits of the petitioner and the petitioner's dependents and is a complete and absolute surrender and release of all their rights arising out of this/these claim(s). In November 1993, almost four years after the Section 20 settlement, Kibble was diagnosed with lung cancer. He died on March 5, 1994. His death certificate listed his cause of death as lung cancer [and] pneumoconiosis. In April 1994, Kibble's wife, Mary, filed a dependency claim in the Division, alleging that her husband's lung cancer and death were caused by his occupational exposure to welding fumes. The Division dismissed Mary's claim, finding that the intention of the parties in the Section 20 settlement was to make a total settlement of all claims related to lung problems, including dependency claims. The Appellate Division affirmed the Division's judgment, finding ample support in the record to sustain it. The Supreme Court granted Mary Kibble's petition for certification. HELD: In a Section 20 settlement under the Workers' Compensation Act, an injured worker may not unilaterally waive his or her dependents' right to future death benefits, but rather must have the informed consent of his or her spouse and other dependents. 1. The Workers' Compensation Act (Act) requires payment of death benefits to a deceased worker's dependents. The rights of those dependents to compensation are independent and separate rights flowing to them from the Act itself. Unilateral settlement or release by a worker of his own claims does not bar the surviving dependent's claim even if the release signed by the worker explicitly purports to release the dependent's claim. (pp. 7-10) 3. The refusal by our courts to enforce releases of child-support obligations executed by a child's parents and the fact that a spouse's per quod claim survives the release of his or her spouse's personal injury claim, both support the principle that an injured worker should not be permitted to waive future dependency benefits without the informed consent of that worker's dependents. (pp. 13-18) 4. Although the general rule applied in civil cases is that a new rule should apply to all matters that have not yet reached final judgment, the Court repeatedly has rewarded litigants who challenge existing law by applying a new rule of law to those successful litigants, despite otherwise applying its decision only prospectively. (pp. 18-21) 5. Although the 1980 amendment to Section 20 was intended to permit employers to enter into settlements pursuant to Section 20 that would result in a compromise of the employee's compensation claim and also constitute a waiver of the dependency claims of the employee's spouse and children, the Legislature did not intend to diminish the independent status of the dependency claim by allowing the employee to waive it unilaterally. (p. 21) 6. In all future Section 20 settlements in which the parties intend a waiver of dependency claims, the Division must adopt procedures to satisfy itself that the spouse, other adult dependents, and any minor dependents join in the waiver of future dependency claims. (pp. 21-22) 7. The Court's holding constitutes a new principle of law and thus will be applied only prospectively, except that Mary Kibble, who successfully litigated the issue, shall receive the benefit of the Court's holding. (pp. 22-24) 8. Because no provision of the Workers' Compensation Act conditions the right to seek dependency benefits on preservation of one's wrongful death claim for the employer's benefit, and because there is no indication in the record that any portion of the third-party action was paid directly to Mary Kibble to compensate her for her release of the right to institute a wrongful death claim, allowing her to seek dependency benefits does not result in a double recovery. (pp. 25-26) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Division of Workers' Compensation for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate dissenting opinion, concluding that the majority's disposition is contrary to legislative intent and is inconsistent with the long-standing practice by the bar and bench in the Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER and O'HERN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join. MARY KIBBLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WEEKS DREDGING &amp; CONSTRUCTION CO., Respondent-Respondent. Argued March 2, 1999 -- Decided August 9, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Patrick R. Caulfield argued the cause for appellant (Levinson, Axelrod, Wheaton, Grayzel, Caulfield, Marcolus &amp; Dunn, attorneys). Francis T. Giuliano argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Giuliano, attorney; Mr. Giuliano and David P. Kendall, on the briefs). Craig H. Livingston submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae New Jersey State American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO, District 15 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and New Jersey Advisory Council on Safety and Health (Ball, Livingston, attorneys; Mr. Livingston and Sherry G. Chachkin, of counsel and on the briefs). Carl Kibble was employed by respondent Weeks Dredging &amp; Construction Co. from September 1980 until March 1984 as a welder/torch cutter. He had worked for other employers in the same capacity from the mid-1950s until 1980. During the course of that employment, Kibble was exposed to chromium, nickel, and other welding fumes. A chest x-ray taken in 1977 revealed that he was suffering from pneumonoconiosis, a lung condition caused by the retention of dust in the lungs. In 1984, he sought treatment from his family physician, Dr. James R. Robin, for a chronic cough. Dr. Robin diagnosed Kibble with pulmonary fibrosis and concluded that that condition had been caused by Kibble's exposure to welding fumes. Dr. Robin also concluded that Kibble was totally disabled with welder[']s lung, and advised him that he absolutely should not work in this field again. In June 1984, Kibble filed a workers' compensation claim against Weeks and seven other prior employers, seeking benefits for permanent disability to lungs, internal and nervous system. A doctor who evaluated Kibble in connection with his claim concurred with Dr. Robin's conclusion that Kibble was totally disabled and found that because of his exposure to welding fumes he was at an increased risk of developing lung cancer in the future. In January 1989, Kibble settled his compensation claim pursuant to Section 20 for a lump-sum payment of $36,000.See footnote 11 As part of the prevailing practice in the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division), the settlement was placed on the official record of the proceedings and approved by the judge of compensation. Regrettably, the transcript of those proceedings was lost or destroyed. The pre-printed settlement form that apparently was used routinely by the Workers' Compensation Court in processing Section 20 settlements stated that the settlement has the effect of a dismissal with prejudice, being final as to all right[s] and benefits of the petitioner and the petitioner's dependents and is a complete and absolute surrender and release of all their rights arising out of this/these claim(s). (Emphasis supplied). Kibble and his wife Mary (petitioner) also had filed suit in federal court alleging claims based on products liability and failure to provide a safe workplace. That case settled prior to the Section 20 settlement. The release in the third-party action explicitly waived any and all claims for injury including pulmonary fibrosis or any other illness or injury yet undiagnosed, past, present or future . . . and all future claims for wrongful death . . . caused by any occupational disease, diagnosed, or yet undiagnosed, past, present, or future. In November 1993, almost four years after the Section 20 settlement, Kibble was diagnosed with lung cancer. He died on March 5, 1994. Kibble's death certificate lists his cause of death as lung cancer [and] pneumoconiosis. In April 1994, petitioner filed a dependency claim, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15 13, alleging that her husband's lung cancer and death were caused by his occupational exposure to welding fumes. The Division dismissed petitioner's claim, finding that the intention of the parties [in the Section 20 settlement] was to make a total settlement of all claims related to lung problems, including dependency claims. The Appellate Division affirmed that judgment, finding ample support in the record to sustain the Division's conclusion. Petitioner argues that Section 20 settlements do not extinguish future causes of action, such as those for dependency benefits and claims for diseases not manifest at the time of settlement. She maintains that her husband's original claims related solely to pulmonary fibrosis, and that the lung cancer that caused his death did not manifest until four years after the Section 20 settlement. Thus, she argues that because her dependency claim is based on the cancer that had not manifested itself at the time of the Section 20 settlement, it is not barred. She also contends that even if dependency claims can be waived in a Section 20 settlement, the evidence in this case failed to establish that the parties intended to waive dependency benefits. Respondent counters that Kibble's original claim was for "permanent disability to the lungs, internal and nervous systems" and was not restricted to pulmonary fibrosis. It maintains that the scope of a Section 20 settlement must be derived from the intent of the parties. The New Jersey State AFL-CIO, New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO, District 15 of The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and New Jersey Advisory Council on Safety and Health, as amici curiae, argue in support of the petitioner's position that Section 20 settlements should not extinguish future dependency claims unless "such claims arise from the same condition that was the basis for the settlement of the compensation claim." The amici argue that because the cancer was not manifest when the Section 20 settlement was approved by the judge, the dependency claims based on cancer were not waived. After argument of this appeal, the Court requested and the parties submitted supplemental briefs on whether waivers of dependency claims in connection with Section 20 settlements were statutorily authorized and, if so, what proofs should be required to establish the validity of such waivers. Separate from and in addition to the right of workers to receive compensation benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act or WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128, in the event of permanent partial or total disability caused by a compensable accident or occupational disease, the Act provides benefits to dependents of deceased workers. Accordingly, if an accident or occupational disease that arises out of and in the course of employment causes or contributes to the cause of the employee's death, the Act requires payment of benefits to the workers' dependents. N.J.S.A. 34:15-13. Our cases emphasize that "[t]he rights of dependents to compensation are independent and separate rights flowing to them from the [WCA] itself. They are not rights to which [dependents] succeed as the representatives of the [deceased employee]." Eckert v. New Jersey State Highway Dep't, 1 N.J. 474, 480 (1949); accord McAllister v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 56, 59-60 (1964); Lusczy v. Seaboard By-Products Co., 101 N.J.L. 170, 173 (E. &amp; A. 1925); Adams v. Woodbridge Sanitary Pottery Corp., 174 N.J. Super. 284, 287-88 (App. Div. 1980); Roberts v. All Am. Eng'g Co., 104 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 351 (1969). Professor Larson succinctly describes the separate and independent status of dependency claims: The dependent's right to death benefits is an independent right derived from statute, not from the rights of the decedent. Accordingly, death benefits are not affected by compromises or releases executed by decedent, or by an adverse holding on decedent's claim, or by claimant's failure to claim within the statutory period. [2 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 64.00 (1989).] Only a small minority of states permits a settlement of a compensation claim by a worker during his or her lifetime to preclude a claim for future death benefits by that worker's dependents. In the vast majority of states, a dependent's right to seek worker's compensation death benefits is not affected by a lump-sum settlement agreement between an injured worker and that worker's employer. Deborah Tauber, A Proposal to Resuscitate the Abrogated Rights of Dependents Under Section 20 of the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act, 20 Rutgers L.J. 513, 519 n.30 (1989). The majority rule is based on the sound theory that the dependents' rights are not derived from the employee's rights, but instead, are separate and independent rights of the dependent. Ibid.; accord Lewis v. Connolly Contracting Co., 264 N.W. 581, 586 (Minn. 1936); Industrial Comm'n v. Davis, 186 N.E. 505, 505 (Ohio 1933); Hotel Claridge Co. v. Blank, 89 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tenn. 1936); Laird v. Vermont Highway Dep't, 20 A.2d 555, 561 (Vt. 1941). In those jurisdictions adopting the majority view, [a] unilateral settlement or release by a worker of his or her own claims does not bar the surviving dependent's claim even if the release signed by the worker explicitly purports to release the dependent's claim. Buchanan v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 908 P.2d 242, 245 (N.M. Ct. App.) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 905 P.2d 1119 (N.M. 1995). The New Mexico Supreme Court in Buchanan, explained the majority rule: The WCJ's decision presupposes that Worker's valid release is also effective to release Claimant's cause of action as a surviving dependent under the Occupational Disease Law. We disagree with this premise and the conclusion that follows from it. We hold that Claimant, as Worker's widow and dependent, has independent statutory rights to death benefits which arise upon Worker's death, and Claimant is not bound by the Release. The claim of a dependent arising from the death of a worker is a new and separate claim and is not derivative of the worker's claim. A unilateral settlement or release by a worker of his or her own claims does not bar the surviving dependent's claim even if the release signed by the worker explicitly purports to release the dependent's claim, as was the case here. Our holding is in accord with the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions. [Id. at 245 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).] Professor Larson observes that a striking consequence of the independent status of dependency rights is the rule, accepted by the majority of jurisdictions, that an adverse decision on the merits of a claim by the employee while he was alive does not bar a dependency claim under the doctrine of res judicata, since the parties and rights involved are different, and since the dependent is not in privity with the injured employee as to the rights asserted by him. Prior to 1980, there was no provision in the WCA, that permitted a worker to settle a compensation claim with his or her employer. However, that did not prevent parties from entering into surreptitiously negotiated settlements whereby the worker would agree to dismiss his or her claim voluntarily and with prejudice in exchange for a subsequent payment from the employer. See Tauber, supra, 20 Rutgers L.J. at 515. That informal, out-of-court settlement procedure was found to be contrary to public policy by the Appellate Division in Brown v. General Aniline &amp; Film Corp., 127 N.J. Super. 93, 95, aff'd o.b., 65 N.J. 555 (1974). In Brown, the injured worker testified before a judge of compensation that he could not prove a compensable accident, and requested a dismissal of his petitions with prejudice against ever reopening his claims. Id. at 94. After the judge dismissed the worker's claims, the employer paid the worker $20,000. Following the worker's death, his widow filed dependency petitions, which were dismissed by the judge of compensation on the theory that the widow was collaterally estopped from relitigating decedent's claim which had been dismissed with prejudice because a compensable claim had not been proven. Id. at 95. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the WCA precluded the out-of-court settlement. Relying on Larson, supra, the court held that because dependency benefits are separate and distinct from the benefits due to an injured worker, nothing that the decedent does, or attempts to do during his lifetime, can deprive dependents of their statutory benefits. Id. at 96. In 1980, as part of extensive revisions to the WCA, the Legislature amended Section 20 to include a provision allowing lump-sum settlements between employers and employees. L. 1979, c. 283, 8. That amendment apparently was enacted as a partial response to the Appellate Division's holding in Brown, supra: [Section 20] would benefit employers by ... clarifying the effect of the decision in Brown v. General Aniline by permitting compensation judges to enter an award approving settlement in matters where causal relationship, jurisdiction, dependency or liability are in issue, resulting in the payment of a lump sum having the effect of a dismissal of the petition and a complete surrender of any future right to compensation or other benefits arising out of that claim. [Senate Labor, Industry &amp; Professions Committee, Joint Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for S. Bill 802 and Assembly Committee Substitute for A. Bill 840, Nov. 13, 1979, at 2.] In relevant part the amended Section 20 reads as follows: [A] judge of compensation may with the consent of the parties, after considering the testimony of the petitioner and other witnesses, together with any stipulation of the parties, and after such judge of compensation has determined that such settlement is fair and just under all the circumstances, enter "an order approving settlement." Such settlement, when so approved, notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, shall have the force and effect of a dismissal of the claim petition and shall be final and conclusive upon the employee and the employee's dependents, and shall be a complete surrender of any right to compensation or other benefits arising out of such claim under the statute. That holding appears to be consistent with the rule in the majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Papale, 541 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Mass. 1982) (applying Massachusetts law); Nealy v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. La. 1981)), aff'd, Stretton v. Penrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Elliot, 551 A.2d 62 (Del. 1988); Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa); Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio 1992); Buttermore v. Aliquippa Hosp., 561 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1989); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tx. 1978). That a spouse's per quod claim survives the release of his or her spouse's personal injury claim supports the view that a spouse must participate in and consent to a Section 20 settlement proceeding purporting to waive future workers' compensation dependency benefits. Both a per quod claim and a claim for dependency benefits belong not to the injured party but to that party's spouse. Accordingly, in both instances, the spouse alone has the authority to compromise the claim. We are persuaded that the 1980 amendment to Section 20 was intended to modify Brown v. General Aniline, supra, 127 N.J. Super. 93, to permit employers to enter into settlements pursuant to Section 20 that would result in a compromise of the employee's compensation claim and also constitute a waiver of the dependency claims of the employee's spouse and children. However, in our view the Legislature did not intend to diminish the separate and independent status of the dependency claim, Eckert, supra, 1 N.J. at 480, by allowing the employee to waive it unilaterally. Accordingly, we hold that in all future Section 20 settlements in which the parties contemplate waiver of dependency claims in the event the employee's death occurs as a result of the injuries or conditions encompassed by the employee's compensation claim, the Division must be satisfied that the spouse, other adult dependents, and any minor dependents (whose interests ordinarily will be represented by the employee's spouse) join in the waiver of future dependency claims. As a general rule, we anticipate that such waiver by the spouse (and other dependents) will occur on the record of the Division's Section 20 settlement proceedings, and will be preceded by an adequate explanation by the Judge of Workers' Compensation of the preclusive effect that the Section 20 settlement will have on any potential dependency claims. The Division should adopt regulations that will specify the procedures to be followed in Section 20 settlements that involve waivers of dependency claims, and should make appropriate revisions to its pre-printed form to take into account the need for consent to such waivers by spouses and other adult dependents. In general, we leave to the Division the responsibility for adopting and implementing procedures consistent with our holding, but we require that in each such case the Division ensure that a spouse's or other dependent's waiver of dependency benefits is given knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Under our precedents, and in the context of the Division's longstanding past practice, the principle that a spouse or other adult dependent must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive dependency benefits shall have the effect of a new rule of law for purposes of retroactivity analysis. For a holding to constitute a new rule of law there must be a 'sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice.'" State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 58 (1997) (quoting State v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996)). Another formulation is that "there must be 'some appreciable past from which the [new] rule departs.'" State v. Purnell, 1 999 WL 462168, *4 (1999) (quoting Afanador, supra, 151 N.J. at 58); see also Stafford v. Stafford Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.J. 62, 74 (1998) (concluding that Court's holding requiring applicants for non-conforming use certification to comply with notice to adjoining landowner provisions of Municipal Land Use Law constituted new rule of law). We are satisfied that our holding constitutes a substantial and significant departure from the Division's past practice and appropriately should be regarded as a new principle of law for retroactivity purposes. Applying the standards we described in State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 251 (1996), we will apply our holding only prospectively, except that petitioner, who successfully litigated the issue, shall receive the benefit of our holding. "'Fundamental fairness' compels that 'champions of the cause' should be rewarded for their effort and expense in challenging existing law." Coons II, supra, 96 N.J. at 436 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Although no evidence in the record suggests that petitioner was fully informed of and consented to the waiver of her dependency benefits, on remand to the Division respondent may move for a hearing on that issue if it can demonstrate to the Division's satisfaction that there exists a genuine factual dispute on the question of petitioner's actual consent to the waiver. Because of our holding, resolution of the issue that occupied the lower courts -- whether Kibble intended to waive his wife's future dependency claim when he entered into his Section 20 settlement -- is unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal. That issue was vigorously contested before us, respondent contending that no purpose would be served by its consent to the Section 20 settlement unless dependency claims were waived; and petitioner contending that that settlement was intended only to compromise Kibble's claims based on pneumonoconiosis and pulmonary fibrosis, and not intended to affect claims based on the lung cancer that Kibble contracted years later. Because the Division's record is no longer available, resolution of the issue is unusually difficult. We note, however, that in 1989, when the settlement was effected, petitioner was sixty-years old with a life expectancy exceeding twenty-two years, and that her annual dependency benefit would exceed $13,000. As a matter of simple economics, a lump-sum settlement of $36,000 that purports to waive annual dependency benefits of over $13,000 per year for the remainder of the life of the worker's wife, at a time when the worker allegedly was likely to develop cancer from his occupational pulmonary exposure, is suspect. We note that Kibble could have insisted on an adjudication of his right to compensation benefits and, had he prevailed, no waiver of dependency benefits would have occurred. In any event, that economic evaluation underscores our conviction that in the future only a knowing, informed and voluntary waiver of dependency benefits by a spouse or other dependent will be valid. Finally, we note that if respondent ultimately is required on remand to pay dependency benefits to petitioner, and if petitioner's right to sue for wrongful death benefits had not been released, then respondent could have been "subrogated to the rights of the widow . . . to assert a claim against the third party tortfeasor under the Death Act." Roberts, supra, 104 N.J. Super. at 8. However, petitioner released her right to sue for wrongful death as a condition of settlement of decedent's third party action. Significantly, no provision of the Act conditions her right to seek dependency benefits on her preservation of her wrongful death claim for the employer's benefit. In Roberts, supra, the employee's net recovery from his third-party action exceeded the employer's liability under the Act for compensation and dependency benefits combined, and the employer contended that that recovery by the employee barred his widow's dependency claim. Rejecting that contention the Appellate Division observed that "[s]ince the widow and children had no legal rights in the fund created by the employee's third-party action, the employer had no right to be subrogated to any part of this fund by way of reimbursement therefrom for any dependency benefits made to the widow and children." Id. at 9. Similarly, the record before us does not indicate that any portion of the settlement of the third-party action was paid directly to petitioner to compensate her for her release of the right to institute a wrongful death claim. Accordingly, as in Roberts, allowing petitioner on this record to seek dependency benefits "does not effectuate 'a double recovery.'" Ibid. If the remand proceedings disclose otherwise, appropriate adjustments may be sought. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the Division of Workers' Compensation for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MARY KIBBLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WEEKS DREDGING &amp; CONSTRUCTION CO., Respondent-Respondent. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. The Court's conclusion that a worker may not knowingly and intelligently waive future dependency claims, unless the worker's spouse or other beneficiary consents, is contrary to legislative intent and is inconsistent with the long-standing practice by the bar and bench in the Division. Hence, I dissent. Carl Kibble was employed by respondent Weeks Dredging &amp; Construction Co. from September 1980 until March 1984 as a welder/torch cutter. He had worked for other employers in the same capacity from the mid-1950s until 1980. During the course of that employment, Kibble was exposed to chromium, nickel, and other welding fumes. In the early 1970s, Kibble began experiencing shortness of breath. A 1977 chest x-ray revealed a lung condition called pneumoconiosis. In 1980, Kibble consulted his family physician, Dr. James R. Robin, for a productive and more frequent cough. In March or April 1984, Dr. Robin concluded that Kibble was suffering from pulmonary fibrosis and restrictive lung disease that were causally related to welding fumes. He also concluded that Kibble was totally disabled from welders lung disease. Kibble stopped working on March 12, 1984. Kibble filed workers' compensation claim petitions on June 8, 1984, against respondent Weeks and seven other prior employers. He sought workers' compensation benefits for "permanent disability to lungs, internal and nervous system." On July 1, 1985, Dr. Elaine Panitz, who specialized in occupational and environmental medicine, examined Kibble in connection with his workers' compensation claims. Dr. Panitz concluded that Kibble's pulmonary function would continue to deteriorate even though he was no longer working as a welder. The exposure to chromium and nickel fumes increased Kibble's risk of getting lung cancer. Dr. Panitz also found Kibble to be totally and permanently disabled. On April 21, 1987, the doctor repeated her concern for the possible development of lung cancer. Although we have not been informed of the details, Kibble also filed a products liability case in federal court against the manufacturers and distributors of welding rods used by him, and against maritime employers for failure to provide a safe workplace. The claims against the third parties related to his pulmonary conditions. He received an unknown amount believed to be in excess of $200,000 from those independent third parties in a settlement. After that settlement, the workers' compensation claims were settled pursuant to Section 20 for $36,000 on January 20, 1989. Respondent Weeks paid Kibble's counsel an additional $6,000 in counsel fees for services rendered in connection with the Section 20 settlement. At the time of the Section 20 settlement, counsel for Kibble contemplated that Kibble was totally and permanently disabled and that he was entitled to a lifetime award of $229,265 ($255 a week for a projected life expectancy of 17.29 years) plus a counsel fee of $6,000. Counsel therefore sought $50,000 to settle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-20. The $50,000 demand was based not only on the assumption that Kibble was totally and permanently disabled, but also on the acknowledgment that Weeks and other respondents in the pending workers' compensation cases were entitled to reimbursement pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 from the third-party settlement for two-thirds of their workers' compensation liability. The demand was calculated on the projected value of a lifetime award for total and permanent disability rather than the $114,750 judgment for 450 weeks that would have been awarded pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12b if the claims had been successfully litigated. The purpose was to recover approximately one-third of the $114,750 as reimbursement for counsel fees incurred in the third-party settlement plus $200 for "expenses of suit." The widow-petitioner argues that Section 20 settlements do not extinguish future causes of action, such as those for dependency benefits and claims for diseases not manifest at the time of settlement. She maintains that her husband's original claims related solely to pulmonary fibrosis, and that the lung cancer that caused his death did not manifest until four years after the Section 20 settlement. Thus, she argues that because her dependency claim is based on the cancer that had not manifested itself at the time of the Section 20 settlement, it is not barred. She also contends that even if dependency claims can be waived in a Section 20 settlement, the evidence in this case failed to establish that the parties intended to waive dependency benefits. Respondent counters that Kibble's original claim was for "permanent disability to the lungs, internal and nervous systems" and not restricted to pulmonary fibrosis. It maintains that the scope of a Section 20 settlement must be derived from the intent of the parties. The New Jersey State AFL-CIO, New Jersey Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO, District 15 of The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, and New Jersey Advisory Council on Safety &amp; Health, as amici curiae, argue in support of the petitioner's position that Section 20 settlements should not extinguish future dependency claims unless "such claims arise from the same condition that was the basis for the settlement of the compensation claim." The amici argue that because the cancer was not manifest when the Section 20 settlement was approved by the judge, the dependency claims based on cancer were not waived. Before deciding whether dependency claims may be covered in Section 20 settlements, an understanding of the meaning of dependency claims is important. In addition to the benefits injured workers are entitled to receive under the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -128 (WCA), dependents of deceased employees may receive death benefits. N.J.S.A. 34:15 13. The same controlling principles governing compensation for employees also apply to compensation for death. Ibid. Thus, if an accident or occupational disease arises out of and in the course of the employment, and if that accident or occupational disease materially accelerates or contributes to the cause of the death, death benefits may be paid to dependents. Importantly, "[t]he rights of dependents to compensation are independent and separate rights flowing to them from the [WCA] itself. They are not rights to which [dependents] succeed as the representatives of the [deceased employee]." Eckert v. New Jersey State Highway Dep't, 1 N.J. 474, 480 (1949); McAllister v. Board of Educ., Town of Kearney, 42 N.J. 56, 59-60 (1964); Lusczy v. Seaboard By Products Co., 101 N.J.L. 170, 173 (E. &amp; A. 1925); see Adams v. Woodbridge Sanitary Pottery Corp., 174 N.J. Super. 284, 287-88 (App. Div. 1980); Roberts v. All Am. Eng'g Co., 104 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 1968), certif. denied, 53 N.J. 351 (1969); Lex K. Larson, 2 The Law of Workmen's Compensation 64.00, at 11-195 (1993) (citing numerous authorities from other jurisdictions standing for the same principle). Those rights, however, do not vest until the death of the worker. McAllister, supra, 42 N.J. at 59-60; Eckert, supra, 1 N.J. at 480. The remaining issue is whether the scope of the Section 20 settlement in the present case was intended to include potential dependency claims. Although the transcript of the Section 20 settlement is not available, the Judge of Compensation reconstructed the record and found that the parties intended to waive dependency benefits. The Appellate Division concluded that that finding could reasonably have been reached based on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. See Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). I agree. The Judge of Compensation reviewed the medical reports and concluded that the effect of the settlement was to acknowledge that Kibble was totally and permanently disabled due to his pulmonary disability caused by exposure to welding fumes for thirty years. In reconstructing the record, the Judge of Compensation observed that he was familiar with the procedure followed by the judge who presided over the Section 20 proceedings. Based on the reconstructed record, the judge concluded that the parties intended to include the high risk for cancer and potential death benefits claims in the Section 20 settlement. He found: Well, taking into account the amounts of money paid, that we have a clear indication by the respondent's attorney that he was specifically contemplating death as one of the risks and the dependency benefits as one of the risks, Dr. Panitz, petitioner's expert, was monitoring in the future, specifically to be on the lookout for neoplasia, cancer, who was considering the nature, as I know, universal practice in Section 20 Settlements become available following the 1980 revision of the Statute to remind the petitioner that he was giving up rights not only on his own behalf, but for dependants. I think the intention of the parties was to make a total settlement of all claims related to lung problems, including dependancy claims. I think that was their intent when they entered the Section 20 Settlement. I think it's almost incredible - well, I do think it's very very improbable that respondents in 1989 would have paid out this kind of money only to face the risk that in the future they'd be back answering a new claim by the decedent, by the petitioner, by the employee. I don't think you can say well, the employee gave up all lifetime claims and the only thing that wasn't released was the dependency claim. I think petitioner can argue that it was not in contemplation that cancer was to be released, but to make that argument, they'd have to argue that if the day after the Section 20 Settlement was entered, then there was a diagnosis of cancer and the petitioner wanted treatment for it, that then the respondent would have to start paying for that treatment of the cancer during their lifetime. And if the disability was greater than at the time, if the ultimate permanent disability became greater, that the respondents would have to pay for that too. I don't see how you can - how it could be argued that the employee meant to give up any lifetime claims for cancer and any treatment for cancer, but did not mean to give up a dependency claim. That just doesn't make any sense at all. So you'd have to be arguing that cancer was not released. With Dr. Panitz pointing to the risk of that, the man did have a smoking history, so if the matter of any lung problems were tried, there'd be an issue of causation. Dr. Burke specifically says in his opinion that the extent of disability was regardless of cause, so the amount paid in settlement certainly reflects some discount for the issues of causation. I referred earlier to present values, of course under the Owens Case, the third-party settlement would compel any right, any obligation that the respondents had, so to that extent my comments on present value have to be put in that context. So the bottom line of my ruling is that I feel it's res judicata, the dependency claim is barred by the prior Section 20. There's no question about it, that at the time of the Section 20 Settlement the experts on both sides agreed that there was a condition present in the lungs which would fall within the very general category of pneumoconiosis, and to allow petitioner now to bring a dependancy claim based on the fact that the cancer contributed to the death and the cancer hadn't been diagnosed at the time of the Section 20 Settlement, it would mean that the death occurred from two causes, pneumoconiosis and cancer. That the respondent had been released from the affects of the pneumoconiosis, petitioner would have to concede that. It shows the practical difficulty almost impossible of trying to say when somebody has a major pulmonary problem that the claim can be released and then the pulmonary problem can get worse and he can come back again and get additional compensation for that, especially after a Section 20 Settlement was done. Under Section 12 of the Act the respondent is entitled to credit for pre-existing disability, but how would you have calculated the value of pre-existing disability released by a Section 20 settlement? Mr. Nadeau talked about the chilling effect on settlements, but I think the position of the petitioner is much more condusive to chilling effects on settlements. I think if it had been clearly stated to the respondents at the time this Section 20 Settlement was put on the record, that despite the Section 20 Settlement, if the fear expressed by petitioner's expert, Dr. Panitz adheres and he develops cancer, the petitioner is going to be back seeking treatment for the cancer, seeking temporary disability benefits, seeking more permanent disability benefits, and the respondent will have a terrible time trying to prove what was pre-existing disability. And then if the petitioner dies, then the widow will come in seeking dependancy benefits. If the petitioner had said all that on the record at the time of the Section 20 Settlement, I can't imagine the respondents would have said okay, that's wonderful, we'll close the file for the current diagnosis and leave open the possibility of petitioner coming back tomorrow with a new diagnosis of cancer and seeking all those additional benefits for himself and his dependents. I just can't imagine that any respondent would have an intention to enter a settlement on that basis, and I can't imagine that a petitioner would fail to realize that at the time of entering the Section 20 settlement. Significantly, although the same law firm, and generally the same attorney, represented Mr. and Mrs. Kibble in all the litigation discussed, no person from the firm has presented sworn testimony, an affidavit, or certification stating that Mr. Kibble did not waive any future dependency claims. As the Judge of Compensation observed, given that the amount of Section 20 settlement was an acknowledgment of total permanent disability from pulmonary pathology, if the respondent was not receiving a waiver of future dependency benefits, then a Section 20 settlement was of no meaningful benefit to the respondents. Stated in common sense terms, why would respondents pay $36,000 of a potential $38,250 exposure if they were not buying out of a potential dependency claim at a time when medical experts had already concluded Kibble was totally disabled from lung pathology that would likely cause lung cancer. In the area of tort litigation, our decisional law with respect to wrongful death causes of action bears some similarity to dependency claims under the WCA. Under our wrongful death act, dependents of the decedent are generally entitled to any damages awarded. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-4. Yet, the injured party during his or her lifetime may extinguish a future wrongful death cause of action when settling a personal injury case. Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 123 (1981). "The parties in the tort action [are] free to expressly include a release of any potential wrongful death action" by including in any settlement agreement or general release a provision that covers all potential wrongful death beneficiaries. Garde v. Wasson, 251 N.J. Super. 608, 616 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992). Indeed, the general release executed as one of the documents involved in the settlement of the third-party case provides that Carl Kibble and his wife Mary Kibble released any and all claims and rights "resulting from anything which has happened to [Carl Kibble] . . . for compensatory damages and/or punitive damages against [the specified defendants] . . . for injuries sustained[,] including pulmonary fibrosis or any other illness or injury yet undiagnosed, past, present or future; . . . and all future claims for wrongful death against [the specified defendants] caused by any occupational disease, diagnosed, or yet undiagnosed, past, present, or future." The release also acknowledged that it was binding on Kibble, his wife, and "[a]nyone who succeeds to my rights and responsibilities, such as my heirs or the executor of my estate." If minor children of Mr. Kibble survived him, they would have been bound by his waiver. However, the widow is the only named dependent in the petition. Under the third-party settlement, Weeks would not be entitled to a credit under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 against any dependency award based on the remaining funds received in the third party action that are in excess of the sum considered for the Section 20 settlement. The balance then remaining belonged to Kibble to dispose of as he desired. Roberts, supra, 104 N.J. Super. at 7-9. Ordinarily, the widow and children have no legal rights in the fund created by the employee's third-party action. Id. at 9. Similarly, "the employer has no right to be subrogated to any part of this fund by way of reimbursement therefrom for any dependency payments made to the widow and children." Ibid. However, that general rule may not be applicable to the present case because the third-party settlement included any potential wrongful death claims. A more difficult question is whether petitioner's signature on the release executed in the third-party action that foreclosed any wrongful death action should bar her dependency claim. Weeks had the right to file a wrongful death cause of action against the appropriate defendants. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(f); Erickson v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 246 N.J. Super. 457, 263-65 (App. Div. 1991). It has now been deprived of that right. Also, if Weeks ultimately is required to pay dependency benefits, it "would be subrogated to the rights of the widow . . . to assert a claim against the third-party tortfeasor under the Death Act." Roberts, supra, 104 N.J. Super. at 8; see United States Casualty Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. 157, 166 (1950); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Laval, 131 N.J. Eq. 23, 26 (Ch. Div. 1942). Because Weeks would step into the shoes of petitioner if it paid dependency benefits, New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 227-28 (1955), it has been deprived of its right of subrogation as well. Although I express no opinion regarding the impact that releasing the tortfeasors from a wrongful death cause of action should or may have on the dependency claim, the relinquishment of that right could serve as an additional reason for either partially or totally barring the present dependency claim. See generally Sperling v. Board of Review, 156 N.J. 466 (1998); Longworth v. Van Houten, 223 N.J. Super 174 (App. Div. 1988). As modified, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. Justices Pollock and Garibaldi join in this opinion. NO. A-38 MARY KIBBLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WEEKS DREDGING &amp; CONSTRUCTION CO., Respondent-Respondent. DECIDED