Title: Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Hill
Citation: 243 Or. 283, 413 P.2d 392
Docket Number: N/A
State: Oregon
Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court
Date: April 13, 1966

Reversed and remanded April 13, 1966.
*284 Donald A. Schafer, Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Lloyd G. Hammel, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent and Eugene R. Laird, Salem, argued the cause for intervenor. With them on the joint brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, Salem, and Richard W. Sabin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and PERRY, SLOAN, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and SCHWAB, Justices.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SCHWAB, J. (Pro Tempore).
The plaintiff, Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., filed an application with the Public Utilities Commissioner for a permit to operate a passenger bus service from Eugene and Albany to Corvallis as an extension of its common carrier regular route service to central and eastern Oregon. Service is presently provided between these points by the intervenor Greyhound Lines, Inc. only. The defendant commissioner denied the application following a hearing in which Greyhound protested the issuance of the permit. In a circuit court proceeding authorized by ORS 756.580, plaintiff sought to have the *285 commissioner's order set aside and, under the provisions of ORS 756.610, appeals to this court from the judgment of the circuit court affirming the commissioner's order.
1. The commissioner's authority to issue common carrier permits is found in ORS 767.135, which provides that the commissioner shall issue a permit
ORS 756.550, entitled "Rules governing hearings; findings; orders," provides:
The commissioner in his order entered in the case at bar, stated:
The language of the order is almost identical to the most common definition of the "public convenience and necessity" test originally stated in the first Interstate *286 Commerce Commission decision involving busses, Pan American Bus Lines Operation, 1 MCC 190 (1936). See Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation, p. 71 (1961). That case defined the "public convenience and necessity" test as follows:
The "public convenience and necessity" test has been expressly disavowed in Oregon. Pierce Freight Lines v. Flagg, 177 Or 1, 159 P2d 162; Arrow Transportation Co. v. Hill, 236 Or 174, 387 P2d 559.
Pierce Freight Lines v. Flagg, supra, was decided when our statutes provided:
In the Pierce case we held that Oregon's statutes expressed a policy of "regulated competition" as distinguished from statutes which express a policy of "regulated monopoly" by requiring an applicant to *287 obtain a certificate of "public convenience and necessity." The opinion said, "Our statute goes no further in its regard for existing carriers than to require the denial of an application if it proposes an operation which will be contrary to the public interest or one which will impair the ability of existing carriers to serve the public adequately." (177 Or at 63.)
When the motor carrier statutes were amended in 1947, Oregon Laws 1947, ch 467, the clause rejecting the use of the certificate of public convenience and necessity and the clause declaring a policy against monopoly or monopolistic practices were eliminated. However, in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Hill, 236 Or 174, 183, 387 P2d 559, we used the following language which the commissioner and the intervenor do not challenge:
The commissioner and the intervenor characterize the language of the order as "perhaps unfortunate," but appear to be contending that the order should be upheld (1) because the evidence was sufficient to support it under the proper standard, and (2) because the language used by the commissioner can be interpreted as applying the correct (public interest) test.
2, 3. The first proposition is untenable because to accept it would be tantamount to stating that the court will examine the evidence in order to resolve opposing contentions as to what it shows and to spell out and *288 state such conclusions of fact as it may permit. Such is beyond the powers of judicial review conferred upon the courts by ORS ch 756. What the U.S. Supreme Court said about federal I.C.C. statutes in United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 US 475, 489, 62 S Ct 722, 86 L Ed 971, is equally applicable to Oregon P.U.C. statutes:
See also Pierce Freight Lines v. Flagg, 177 Or 1, 159 P2d 162; Pacific Tel. &amp; Tel. Co. v. Flagg, 189 Or 370, 220 P2d 522.
*289 4. The second proposition argued by the commissioner and the intervenor (that the language used by the commissioner can be interpreted as applying the "public interest" test) is equally without merit. The language of the commissioner in his order, "the question in substance is whether the new operation or service will serve a useful public purpose; whether this purpose can and will be served to the extent required as well by existing operators," epitomizes the "regulated monopoly" as distinguished from the "regulated competition" concept to which Oregon adheres. As pointed out in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Hill, supra, the "regulated competition" concept regards healthy competition as being in itself in the public interest; and therefore the public interest may be served by granting a competitive permit even if the existing permit holder establishes that it can adequately handle all traffic.
Even if it can be said that the commissioner's order was not clearly predicated on the wrong standard, the most that can be said for it is that it is incomplete. At the hearing the intervenor Greyhound introduced evidence which was obviously intended to show that the issuance of the permit to Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. would impair the operations of the existing carrier (Greyhound). On appeal the main thrust of the joint brief filed by the commissioner and the intervenor Greyhound is that the granting of the application would have impaired the operation of Greyhound. Their brief states:
By letter to this court subsequent to the filing of defendant's and intervenor's brief, and on oral argument, counsel for the commissioner disavowed the brief and conceded that the order did not make a finding on the "impairment" factor. Counsel for Greyhound expressed himself as "reluctant to separate himself from the position of counsel [for the commissioner] * * *."[1]
The order makes no direct finding on the question of "impairment," but on the contrary stresses what the brief (supra) concedes is not properly an issue in the absence of a showing of impairment by stating:
ORS 767.135 makes "impairment of the ability of existing operators adequately to serve the public" a material factor in determining whether a permit shall be issued. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Hill, supra 236 Or at 184, points out the importance of this factor, stating:
In Valley &amp; Siletz R.R. Co. v. Flagg, 195 Or 683, 247 P2d 639, we stressed the need for clarity and completeness in the basic or essential findings on which administrative orders rest, quoting at length from numerous cases and texts. This case indicates that certain of those quotations need repetition.
We remand the proceeding to the circuit court with instructions to remand it to the commissioner for the entry of an order supported by adequate findings.
Reversed and remanded.
[1]  The oral arguments indicate that perhaps the reason for the uncertain positions of the commissioner and intervenor is some concern whether the statutory criterion "impairment of the ability of existing operators adequately to serve the public" is applicable on a system-wide or local basis, or some combination thereof. The question is not properly presented for consideration on this appeal.