Case Title: Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli B.

Citation: 2004 WI 48

Docket Number: 2003AP000061

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 48 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Zachary B., Nathaniel B. and Michael B., Persons 
Under the Age of 18: 
 
Monroe County Department of Human Services,  
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelli B.,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 88 
Reported at 263 Wis. 2d 413, 662 N.W.2d 360 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 28, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 20, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe   
 
JUDGE: 
Steven L. Abbott   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Kerry Sullivan-Flock, corporation counsel, and Ellen M. 
Thorn, guardian ad litem, and Arndt, Buswell & Thorn, S.C., 
Sparta, and oral argument by Ellen M. Thorn. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Timothy Provis, Madison. 
 
 
2
 
A joint amicus curiae brief was filed by Cynthia L. Buchko, 
Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., Madison, Eva Shiffrin, Madison, 
and Carol Medaris, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Coalition 
Against Sexual Assault and Wisconsin Council on Children and 
Families. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Sandra L. Nowack, 
assistant 
attorney 
general, 
and 
Peggy 
A. 
Lautenschlager, 
attorney general, on behalf of the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice. 
 
 
2004 WI 48 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062  
(L.C. No. 
02 TP 000009, 02 TP 000010, 02 TP 000011 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Zachary B., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
Monroe County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelli B.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 28, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Nathaniel B., a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Monroe County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelli B.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Michael B., a Person Under the Age of  
 
 
 
2
18: 
 
Monroe County Department of Human  
Services,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelli B.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Monroe County Department 
of Human Services ("County") seeks review of a published court 
of appeals' decision that reversed the orders of the circuit 
court terminating Kelli B.'s parental rights to her three sons.1  
The County contends that the court of appeals erred in holding 
that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) (2001-02) could not constitutionally 
be applied to Kelli, a victim of long-term and continuous incest 
perpetrated by her father.2  Because we determine that the 
statute, as applied, is not narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest, we conclude that it violates Kelli's 
                                                 
1 Monroe County Department of Human Services v. Kelli B., 
2003 WI App 88, 263 Wis. 2d 413, 662 N.W.2d 360 (reversing a 
decision of the circuit court for Monroe County, Steven L. 
Abbott, Judge). 
2 All statutory references are to the 2001-02 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise noted. 
 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
3 
 
right to substantive due process.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals.3 
I 
¶2 
Kelli was born on January 17, 1980.  Her first son, 
Zachary, was conceived and born when she was 17 years of age.  
Her second son, Nathaniel, was conceived when she was 18, and 
her third son, Michael, was conceived when she was 20.  It is 
undisputed that Kelli's father, Roger, is the father of her 
children. 
¶3 
By most accounts, Kelli's incestuous relationship with 
Roger began about the time she was 12.4  She did not disclose the 
identity of her children's father until after the birth of her 
third son, Michael.  Kelli testified that she kept this secret 
because she feared for her life and the lives of her children. 
                                                 
3 During the pendency of this appeal, Kelli filed a motion 
to strike the County's brief or, in the alternative, for an 
extension of time to file her brief.  The court granted the 
motion for an extension of time, but held in abeyance the motion 
to strike.  Subsequently, Kelli filed a motion to withdraw her 
motion to strike.  That motion was also held in abeyance pending 
our decision on the merits of the case.  The court now grants 
Kelli's motion to withdraw her motion to strike the County's 
brief. 
4 According to the court report, Kelli initially told the 
intake worker as well as the ongoing social worker that sexual 
abuse from her father began when she was approximately age 12.  
This is consistent with her testimony at the jury trial of her 
termination proceedings where she indicated that she was "under 
the age of twelve" when the sexual intercourse first started.  
At her father's sentencing hearing, however, Kelli recanted, 
maintaining that her incestuous relationship with her father had 
begun when she was 17 and that she had wanted the relationship.  
The circuit court later stated that it did not believe this 
recantation.   
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
4 
 
Kelli finally broke her silence on May 30, 2001, and informed a 
child support specialist that her father, Roger, was also the 
father of her children. 
¶4 
After Kelli's disclosure, Roger was charged with 
first-degree sexual assault of a child for having sexual contact 
with Kelli when she was younger than 13, in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.02(1), and second-degree sexual assault of a child 
for having intercourse with Kelli before the age of 16 in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The State later dropped 
the first-degree sexual assault charge and added the charge of 
incest with a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.06(1).   
¶5 
Pursuant to an agreement, Roger entered a plea of 
guilty to the incest charge and a felony bail jumping charge, 
and the sexual assault charge was dismissed.  Eventually, Roger 
was given a sentence of ten years for the incest charge and one 
year, consecutive, for the bail jumping charge.  At both his 
sentencing and resentencing hearings, the court referred to 
Kelli as a "victim."   
¶6 
Subsequently, on September 9, 2001, the Monroe County 
Police Department notified the County that Kelli had been 
arrested on unrelated charges and that no one was available to 
care for her minor children.  Two caseworkers responded to the 
call and found the children to be living in unsafe and 
unsanitary conditions.  The children were taken into custody by 
the County, and it was soon determined that at that time all 
three were developmentally delayed. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
5 
 
¶7 
After Kelli admitted that her children were in need of 
protection and services, a dispositional order was entered under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.13(10) on November 19, 2001.  During the course 
of the next several months, the County attempted to work with 
Kelli to get her into a position where she might be able to care 
for her children.  From the beginning, the County's plan was 
focused on reunifying the children with Kelli. 
¶8 
On June 27, 2002, after months of inconsistent 
visitation, failure to cooperate with the court order, and an 
inability to achieve a stable lifestyle, the County petitioned 
to terminate both Kelli and Roger's parental rights.  For Kelli, 
the petition alleged two separate grounds: (1) that the children 
were in continuing need of protection or services, Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2); and (2) the ground of incestuous parenthood, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(7).  For Roger, the petition alleged (1) 
incestuous parenthood; and (2) that his parenthood was a result 
of sexual assault, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9).  Roger has since 
voluntarily agreed to terminate his parental rights, and his 
rights are not at issue in this case.    
¶9 
Kelli moved to dismiss the incestuous parenthood 
ground.  
She 
contended 
that, as 
the 
victim 
of incest, 
application of this provision violated her right to substantive 
due process.5  On August 6, 2002, the circuit court denied her 
motion, stating that a parent did not have a fundamental right 
                                                 
5 Kelli also contended that application of this ground 
violated her right to equal protection.  Because she did not 
pursue this issue on appeal, however, we do not address it here. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
6 
 
to raise a child born of an incestuous relationship.  The court 
further noted that it had discretion at the disposition stage 
not to terminate parental rights if the parent was providing 
good care to the child born of an incestuous relationship and 
the incest was not voluntary. 
¶10 After the circuit court denied Kelli's motion, the 
County moved for partial summary judgment on the incest ground.  
The circuit court granted the motion.  At that time, the County 
requested to dismiss without prejudice the remaining ground that 
the children were in continuing need of protection, and the 
court granted the motion.  
¶11 On September 26, 2002, the guardian ad litem brought a 
motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's partial 
summary judgment.  The guardian argued that summary judgment was 
inappropriate for such proceedings and that due process required 
that the court reverse its decision.  The court agreed and 
reversed its partial summary judgment.   
¶12 The circuit court then held a jury trial to determine 
whether there was a basis for termination of parental rights on 
the sole ground of incestuous parenthood.  Immediately before 
trial, Kelli renewed her constitutional challenge to the statute 
as it applied to her, a victim of long-term and continuous 
incest perpetrated by her father.  The circuit court again 
denied her motion.  The jury returned a verdict with the 
necessary 
finding 
to 
establish 
the 
ground 
of 
incestuous 
parenthood, that is, a finding that Kelli and Roger were related 
by blood in a degree of kinship closer than second cousin.  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
7 
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4), the circuit 
court found her to be an unfit parent.6 
¶13 After trial, the circuit court held a dispositional 
hearing to determine whether termination of Kelli's parental 
rights was in her children's best interests.  The court 
determined that it was.  Although it acknowledged that "[Kelli] 
has been a victim, and she has been damaged . . ." the court 
concluded that it was not in the children's best interests to 
wait and see if Kelli was able to make sufficient progress to 
become a good parent.  The court explained that at the 
disposition 
stage 
of 
a 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
proceeding, it was required to determine what was in the best 
interests of the children.   
¶14 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
orders terminating Kelli's parental rights.  It concluded that 
the fact of incestuous parenthood in itself did not demonstrate 
that Kelli was an unfit parent.  Monroe County Department of 
Human Services v. Kelli B., 2003 WI App 88, ¶17, 263 Wis. 2d 
413, 662 N.W.2d 36.  The court recognized that Kelli had a 
fundamental liberty interest in raising her children.  Id., ¶14.  
It also noted that the application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) to 
Kelli was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest.  See id., ¶¶16, 17.  Finally, the court rejected the 
County's 
argument 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(4) provides in part, "If grounds 
for the termination of parental rights are found by the court or 
jury, the court shall find the parent unfit. . . ."  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
8 
 
authority at the disposition stage was sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of substantive due process.  Id., ¶20.  
¶15 Ultimately, the court of appeals held that the ground 
of incestuous parenthood was unconstitutional as applied to 
Kelli because she was a victim of her father's incestuous 
relationship with her.  Id., ¶21.  Specifically, the court 
concluded that the application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) to 
Kelli violated her right to substantive due process.  Id.   
II 
¶16 In 
this 
case 
we 
address 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(7), as applied, violates the constitutional right to 
substantive due process.  Such an issue presents a question of 
law subject to independent appellate review.  See State v. Allen 
M., 214 Wis. 2d 302, 313, 571 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997).  We 
begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional 
and resolve any doubt in upholding its constitutionality.  See 
id.    
¶17 Here 
the 
parties 
disagree 
as 
to 
whether 
the 
termination of Kelli's parental rights implicates a fundamental 
liberty interest.  If it does, we review the question while 
employing a standard of strict scrutiny.  Winnebago County DSS 
v. Darrel A., 194 Wis. 2d 627, 639, 534 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 
1995).  This requires the County to show that the statute, as 
applied, is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest 
that justifies interference with Kelli's fundamental liberty 
interest.  See id.  If a fundamental liberty interest is not 
implicated, then we need only review the termination of Kelli's 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
9 
 
parental rights under the standard of rational basis.  See Allen 
M., 214 Wis. 2d at 314, n. 12.  This is satisfied if the 
legislative 
enactment 
bears 
a 
rational 
relation 
to 
some 
legitimate end.  State v. McCaughtry, 2003 WI 80, ¶41, 263 Wis. 
2d 83, 664 N.W.2d 596. 
III 
¶18 We begin our analysis with an examination of the 
statute at issue.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(7) provides for the 
termination of parental rights based on the ground of incestuous 
parenthood:   
48.415 Grounds for involuntary termination of parental 
rights . . . Grounds 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights shall be one of the following: 
 . . .  
(7) INCESTUOUS PARENTHOOD.  Incestuous parenthood, 
which shall be established by proving that the person 
whose parental rights are sought to be terminated is 
also related, either by blood or adoption, to the 
child's other parent in a degree of kinship closer 
than 2nd cousin. 
¶19 Kelli asserts that the statute, as applied to her, 
violates her constitutional right to substantive due process.  
This right emanates from the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.7  In essence, it protects against governmental 
actions that are arbitrary and wrong "regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them."  Penterman v. 
                                                 
7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law[.]"  See also Wis. 
Const. art. I, §§ 1 and 8. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
10 
 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 480, 565 N.W.2d 521 
(1997) (citations omitted).  Substantive due process has been 
traditionally afforded to fundamental liberty interests, such as 
marriage, family, procreation, and bodily integrity.  Id. at 
480-81, n. 10.  Its analysis balances the state's compelling 
interests with its chosen method of protecting those interests. 
¶20 The threshold inquiry we address is whether Kelli has 
a fundamental liberty interest in parenting her children.  The 
County contends that she does not.8  It cites Allen M. for the 
proposition that "no court has ever recognized incestuous 
parenthood or the act of incest as a fundamental right."  214 
Wis. 2d 302, 314, n. 12.  Furthermore, it argues that Kelli did 
not have a substantial relationship with her children, despite 
the fact that she had custody and lived with them until 
September 9, 2001, when they were three years old, two years 
old, and nearly seven months old respectively. 
¶21 In Allen M., the court of appeals addressed a 
constitutional challenge to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) in a 
different factual setting.  There, two biological siblings, 
engaged in a consensual and continuing incestuous relationship, 
maintained that the termination of their parental rights 
violated due process and equal protection.  Id. at 306.  
Although the court ultimately reviewed the statute under strict 
                                                 
8 In the court of appeals, the County apparently conceded 
that Kelli has a fundamental liberty interest in parenting her 
children.  Kelli B., 263 Wis. 2d 413, ¶14.  However, it now 
maintains that she does not.  Although this issue has arguably 
been waived, we nevertheless address it here.  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
11 
 
scrutiny, it stated in a footnote that it was "intrigued" by the 
State and guardian ad litem's assertion that rational basis 
review was appropriate because the siblings did not have a 
fundamental right to raise a child born of an incestuous 
relationship.  Id. at 314, n. 12. 
¶22 The County skews the question before us when it 
attempts to apply this comment of the Allen M. court to the 
facts of this case.  The question is not, as asserted by the 
County, whether any court "has ever recognized incestuous 
parenthood or the act of incest as a fundamental right."  To 
suggest that anyone here is asserting that the act of incest is 
a fundamental liberty interest obfuscates the focus.   
¶23 Rather, the question is whether a parent who has a 
substantial relationship with his or her child has a fundamental 
liberty interest in parenting the child.  Our case law 
recognizes this fundamental liberty interest.  See Parental 
Rights to SueAnn A.M., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 686, 500 N.W.2d 649 
(1993); In Interest of Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 446-47, 
335 N.W.2d 846 (1983).   
¶24 Here, 
Kelli 
established 
this 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest by living with her children and having custody of them.  
See In Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 135, 306 N.W.2d 46 
(1981).  The County has not cited, and we have not discovered, 
any precedent that would support its position that a parent in 
Kelli's situation, a victim of long-term and continuous incest, 
is excluded from this constitutional protection.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Kelli does have a fundamental liberty interest 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
12 
 
in parenting her children that requires review under the 
standard of strict scrutiny. 
¶25 Under that standard, we next consider whether the 
statute, as applied to Kelli, is narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest.  "Incestuous parenthood" is one of 11 
grounds set forth by Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  The compelling 
interest underlying the statute is to protect children from 
unfit parents.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.01.  
¶26 As applied to Kelli, we conclude that the incestuous 
parenthood ground as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) is not 
narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest 
underlying the statute.  The reason it is not narrowly tailored 
is that it renders people like Kelli per se unfit solely by 
virtue of their status as victims.  While we recognize a 
correlation between perpetrators of incest and unfit parents, we 
fail to see how being victimized by one's parent or relative 
necessarily 
warrants 
the 
same 
conclusion. 
 
The 
fact 
of 
incestuous parenthood does not, in itself, demonstrate that 
victims like Kelli are unfit parents. 
¶27  We agree with the State of Wisconsin, Department of 
Justice, that filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Kelli.  
It asserts that it is fundamentally unfair to terminate the 
parental rights of victims of incest based solely on that 
status: 
In using Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) to find a victim unfit 
to parent her child based solely on the fact of her 
victimization——without regard for her actual parenting 
activities 
and/or 
the 
actual 
condition 
of 
her 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
13 
 
children——Monroe 
County 
uses 
this 
crime 
victim's 
plight against her. 
In accord with the Wisconsin Department of Justice, we determine 
that it is fundamentally unfair to terminate Kelli's parental 
rights based solely on her status as a victim of incest. 
 
¶28 In addition to the compelling interest underlying the 
statute, the County asserts two specific compelling state 
interests that justify the interference with Kelli's liberty 
interest: (1) the deterrence of father-daughter incest; and (2) 
the protection of children from psychological harm.  Although we 
agree with the County that both interests are compelling, we are 
not persuaded that the statute, as applied to Kelli, is narrowly 
tailored to advance either one. 
¶29 In its first argument, the County contends that the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) to Kelli serves to deter 
"future incestuous conduct resulting in birth between fathers 
and daughters."  It asserts: 
The question put to this Court is whether it would be   
better to condone the biological realities of these 
children's births or discourage it, and any future 
incestuous conduct resulting in births between fathers 
and daughters by refusing to bestow legal protection 
on the relationship between Kelli and her children. 
¶30 We conclude that the statute, as applied to Kelli, is 
not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of 
deterring father-daughter incest.  The concept of deterrence 
presupposes 
that 
Kelli 
had 
a 
meaningful 
choice 
in 
her 
relationship with her father.  Yet the facts here do not support 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
14 
 
this presupposition.  Rather, they support our conclusion as a 
matter of law that she is a victim. 
¶31 From the time Kelli was 12 years old, continuing 
through the birth of her third child nine years later, she was 
involved in an incestuous relationship with her father.  The 
facts reflect that she was a victim of this long-term and 
continuous relationship.  Her father was convicted of felony 
incest with a child.  The County's own petition to terminate 
Roger's parental rights alleged that it was a "substantiated 
[fact] that all three of Kelli's minor children are the products 
of sexual assault."  At both Roger's sentencing and resentencing 
hearings, the circuit court recognized that Kelli was a victim.  
Finally, at the dispositional hearing, the circuit court 
acknowledged, "[a]s to Kelli, it's a very sad story.  There is 
no question about it.  And she has been a victim, and she has 
been damaged . . . ."9   
¶32 Given her status as a victim, the statute is not 
narrowly tailored to promote the compelling state interest of 
deterring father-daughter incest.  The reason it is not narrowly 
tailored is because it applies not only to perpetrators who may 
be amenable to deterrence but also to incest victims, for whom 
deterrence plays no role. 
                                                 
9 Despite these facts, the dissent questions Kelli's status 
as a victim and asserts that her non-consent should be 
established at trial by a jury.  Dissent, ¶90.  Because we 
determine as a matter of law that Kelli was a victim, we need 
not address how the issue of non-consent should be raised and 
decided in future cases.  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
15 
 
¶33 Additionally, the County asserts that failing to apply 
the statute to victims like Kelli would be promoting or 
"admitting a de facto acceptance of incestuous parenthood."  We 
note 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
already 
discourages 
incestuous parenthood through several of its statutes.  The 
legislature has criminalized incestuous sex.10  It has also 
criminalized incest with a child.11  Given the existence of these 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 944.06 states, "Whoever marries or has 
nonmarital sexual intercourse with a person he or she knows is a 
blood relative and such relative is in fact related in a degree 
within which the marriage of the parties is prohibited by the 
law of this state is guilty of a Class F felony." 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.06 states, "Whoever does any of the 
following is guilty of a Class C felony: 
(1) Marries or has sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact with a child he or she knows is related, 
either by blood or adoption, and the child is related 
in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd cousin; or 
(2) Is a person responsible for the child's welfare 
and: 
(a) Has knowledge that another person related to the 
child by blood or adoption in a degree of kinship 
closer than 2nd cousin has had or intends to have 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child; 
(b) Is physically and emotionally capable of taking 
action that will prevent the intercourse or contact 
from occurring or being repeated; 
(c) Fails to take that action; and 
(d) The failure to act exposes the child to an 
unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may 
occur between the child and the other person or 
facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur 
between the child and the other person." 
 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
16 
 
provisions, we are not persuaded that failing to apply the 
statute to victims like Kelli is tantamount to a "de facto 
acceptance of incestuous parenthood." 
¶34 As a final compelling state interest, the County 
maintains that termination is necessary to protect Kelli's 
children from psychological harm encountered by being raised in 
an incestuous household.  Specifically, it cites Allen M. in 
support of its argument: 
A statute that declares incestuous parents unfit 
acknowledges 
the 
fundamentally 
disordered 
circumstances in which the child of an incestuous 
relationship will be raised.  Moreover, it recognizes 
the vulnerability of the child and the compelling 
interest in protecting children from psychological 
confusion and emotional damage they likely will suffer 
as a result of being born to and living within an 
incestuous family.   
214 Wis. 2d at 320. 
  
¶35 The psychological harm described in Allen M. stemmed 
from the prospect of being raised in a home in which the parents 
were 
engaged 
in 
a 
consensual 
and 
continuing 
incestuous 
relationship.  There is no evidence that Kelli intended to 
subject her children to such an environment.  Indeed, by 
reporting 
her 
father 
to 
the 
proper 
authorities, 
Kelli 
demonstrated an intent to end the incestuous relationship.  As a 
result we determine that the statute, as applied to Kelli, does 
not meet the standard of strict scrutiny.  
¶36 Thus, we conclude that the statute, as applied here, 
is not narrowly tailored to advance any of the compelling state 
interests offered by the County.  Kelli is a victim of long-term 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
17 
 
and continuous incest perpetrated by her father.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 48.415(7), applied to a victim like Kelli, is not 
narrowly tailored to protect children from unfit parents, does 
not promote deterrence, and does not protect children from the 
psychological harm of being raised in an incestuous family. 
¶37 Perhaps the greatest difficulty we have with the 
County's position is that it elected to prove Kelli's parental 
unfitness solely on the ground of incestuous parenthood, rather 
than relying on other statutory grounds.  It may well be that 
the County can ultimately prove Kelli's unfitness on other 
grounds. Initially, it alleged that her children were in 
continuing 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(2).  However, the County dismissed that ground because 
it thought it more expedient to pursue only the incestuous 
parenthood ground.12   
                                                 
12 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we are not refusing 
"to recognize that the state has a compelling interest in 
terminating the parental rights of a parent who shows serious 
deficiencies in the ability to raise her children as a result of 
her victimization from incest."  Dissent, ¶81, n. 15.  In making 
such a statement, the dissent conflates the grounds for 
unfitness and reads something into Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) that 
is not there.    
 
Of course we recognize that the state has a compelling 
interest in terminating the rights of a parent who shows serious 
deficiencies in the ability to raise her children.  A ground 
that would address those deficiencies, however, is not before 
us.  Rather, the only ground before us is incestuous parenthood, 
which defines unfitness based on a status determination.  
Accordingly, all that the County had to prove was that Kelli and 
Roger were related by blood in a degree of kinship closer than 
second cousin. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
18 
 
¶38 There can be little doubt that the County's objective 
was to do what was best for Kelli's children.  But in taking the 
route thought to be the easiest, the County attempted to 
demonstrate Kelli's unfitness as a parent solely on her status——
a 
victim 
of 
incest 
when 
her 
children 
were 
conceived.  
Accordingly, we agree with Kelli that the County's actions have 
implicated her constitutional right to substantive due process.  
¶39 In its defense, the County maintains that the circuit 
court's discretion at the disposition stage to dismiss pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2)13 is sufficient to satisfy Kelli's 
right to substantive due process.  The circuit court cited this 
discretion as part of its rationale in denying Kelli's motion to 
dismiss.  It explained that it had authority at the disposition 
stage not to terminate parental rights if the parent was 
providing good care to the child born of an incestuous 
relationship and the incest was not voluntary. 
¶40 Again, the County's argument misses its mark.  Here, 
Kelli's challenge is one of substantive due process, not 
procedural due process.  In such cases, the existence of extra 
procedural protections cannot cure the substantive due process 
violation.  See Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 480.  Therefore, it is 
irrelevant to inquire into the adequacy of the termination 
procedure, 
or, 
more 
specifically, 
whether 
the 
procedure 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.427(2) states, "The court may 
dismiss the petition if it finds that the evidence does not 
warrant the termination of parental rights." 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
19 
 
applicable 
at 
the 
dispositional 
phase 
satisfies 
Kelli's 
constitutional rights. 
¶41 In addition to constitutional considerations, Kelli's 
position is also supported by strong public policy favoring the 
protection of crime victims.  Article I, § 9m of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides, "[t]his state shall treat crime victims, 
as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their 
privacy."  Furthermore, the Wisconsin legislature enacted Wis. 
Stat. ch. 950 to ensure that victims have access to, and 
involvement with, the criminal justice system.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 950.01.  Taken together, these provisions send a strong 
message concerning the state's interest in the treatment of 
crime victims.   
¶42 We are mindful of this public policy in reaching our 
decision today.  Were we to accept the County's position, 
Wisconsin 
would 
become 
the 
only 
state 
to 
authorize 
the 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
of 
victims 
as 
well 
as 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
20 
 
perpetrators of incest.14  Not only would this undermine the 
state's general efforts to support crime victims, but it would 
also create a powerful disincentive for victims like Kelli to 
come forward in the first place.  
¶43 In sum, we determine that Kelli has a fundamental 
liberty interest in parenting her children.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.415(7), as applied to Kelli, a victim of long-term and 
                                                 
14 See, Ala. Code § 26-18-7 (2003); Alaska Stat. § 25.23.180 
(Michie 2002); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-533 (2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 
9-9-220 (Michie 2003); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.26 (West 
2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-604 (2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 
45a-717 (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 1103 (2003); Fla. Stat. 
ch. § 39.806 (2002); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-94 (2003); Haw. Rev. 
Stat. § 571-61 (2003); Idaho Code § 16-2005 (Michie 2003); 705 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/2-13 (2003); Ind. Code § 31-35-3-4 (2003); 
Iowa Code § 232.116 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1583 (2002); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625.090 (Michie 2003); La. Children's Code 
art. 1015 (West 2002); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 4055 (West 
2003); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-313 (2003); Mass. Ann. Laws 
ch. 210, § 3(Law. Co-op 2003); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.19b 
(West 2003); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 
93-15-103 (2003); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.447 (2003); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 41-3-609 (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (2003); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 128.105 (Michie 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
170-C:5 (2002); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-19 (West 2003); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 32A-4-28 (Michie 2003); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(4) 
(McKinney 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2003); N.D. Cent. 
Code § 27-20-44 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414 (2003); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1 (2002); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
419B.502 (2003); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2511 (2003); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 15-7-7 (2002); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-763 (Law. Co-op. 
2003); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-26.1 (Michie 2003); Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 36-1-113 (2003); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 
2003); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 
15A, § 3-504 (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-283 (Michie 2003); 
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.180 (2003); W. Va. Code § 49-6-5b 
(2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309 (Michie 2002). 
 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062   
 
21 
 
continuous incest perpetrated by her father, is not narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest.  Therefore, 
like the court of appeals, we determine that the application of 
the statute to Kelli violated her right to substantive due 
process.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.15 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶44 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
15 When a statute is held to be unconstitutional as applied 
to particular facts of a given case, it may be applied in other 
contexts.  State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 304, n. 13, 577 
N.W.2d 601 (1998).  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶45 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  (dissenting).  This is a sad 
case, with profound implications for a mother, her three 
children, and public policy. 
¶46 The 
majority 
asserts 
that 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7) to Kelli B. violates her right to 
substantive due process because, as applied, the statute "is not 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest."  
Majority op., ¶¶1, 32.  The majority concludes that Kelli B. 
"has a fundamental liberty interest in parenting her children," 
id., ¶43, and this interest may not be terminated on "incestuous 
parenthood" grounds because Kelli B. was "a victim of long-term 
and continuous incest perpetrated by her father."  Id.  In 
short, the State may not use Kelli B.'s status as a crime victim 
as grounds to terminate her fundamental liberty interest.   
¶47 Upon reflection, this case is more complicated than 
the 
majority 
is 
prepared 
to 
acknowledge. 
 
 
"Incestuous 
parenthood" is a legitimate ground for termination of parental 
rights in situations where an incestuous parent was the 
"perpetrator" of incest, where an incestuous parent capable of 
consent was a willing participant in incest, and where an 
incestuous parent's inability to provide for the emotional, 
physical, and developmental needs of the offspring of incest is 
inextricably linked to the parent's victimization from incest.  
In approving an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality 
of the statute, the majority opinion is disturbingly selective 
in its consideration of facts and curiously unhelpful in 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
2 
 
explaining how it believes the case should have been handled in 
circuit court.  Because I believe the opinion will create 
problems for the future, I respectfully dissent. 
I. INCEST STATUTES 
 
¶48 There are several Wisconsin statutes that address 
incest.  In the criminal code, Wis. Stat. § 944.06 reads as 
follows: "Whoever marries or has nonmarital sexual intercourse 
with a person he or she knows is a blood relative and such 
relative is in fact related in a degree within which the 
marriage of the parties is prohibited by law is guilty of a 
Class F felony."  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.06 focuses on incest 
with 
a 
child, 
providing 
in 
part 
that 
"Whoever . . . (1) 
[m]arries or has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a 
child he or she knows is related, either by blood or adoption, 
and the child is related in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd 
cousin" is guilty of a Class C felony.  (Emphasis added.)16 
 
¶49 In the chapter on marriage, Wis. Stat. § 765.03(1) 
reads in part:  
No marriage shall be contracted . . . between 
persons who are nearer of kin than 2nd cousins except 
that marriage may be contracted between first cousins 
where the female has obtained the age of 55 years or 
where either party, at the time of application for a 
marriage license, submits an affidavit signed by a 
physician stating that either party is permanently 
sterile.  Relationship under this section shall be 
computed by the rule of the civil law, whether the 
parties to the marriage are of the half or of the 
whole blood. 
                                                 
16 At the time Roger B. was prosecuted in 2001, incest under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.06 was denominated a Class BC felony. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
3 
 
The rule of the civil law alluded to in § 765.03(1) is codified 
in Wis. Stat. § 990.001(16). 
 
¶50 These incest statutes reflect important concerns.  
"The rationale behind punishing incest is founded on . . . the 
danger of biological mutations which might occur in the issue of 
such relationships[ ] and . . . the desire to protect children 
from the abuse of parental authority."  42 C.J.S. Incest § 2(b) 
57-58 (1991) (citing People v. York, 329 N.E.2d 845, 846-47 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975)).17  The latter concern should be expanded 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.03(1) excepts marriages between 
first 
cousins 
in 
limited 
situations. 
 
These 
exceptions 
underscore 
the 
legislature's 
concern 
about 
"biological 
mutations," that is, genetic problems in the issue of incestuous 
relationships. 
The genetic concern about incestuous offspring is under 
attack.  See, e.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the 
Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to Marry? 18 Fam. 
L.Q. 257, 267-81 (1984).  Professor Bratt contends that "[t]he 
primary 
misconception 
underlaying 
the 
asserted 
hereditary-
biological function of incest statutes is the belief that 
consanguineous matings cause genetically defective offspring.  A 
cursory examination 
of 
Mendelian, 
autosomal, 
dominant and 
recessive inheritance reveals that such a belief is simply 
inaccurate."  Bratt, supra, at 267-68. 
After stating her premise, Professor Bratt writes: 
 
Genetic research has identified many genetically 
linked disorders and has determined the probability of 
their occurrence.  Research has also established that 
recessive autosomal traits are more severe in their 
manifestation than are dominant autosomal traits.  On 
the average each human carries between one and five 
deleterious 
recessive 
genes. 
 
However, 
these 
deleterious genes usually do not result in offspring 
who exhibit the trait associated with the gene because 
there is only a very small likelihood of mating with a 
person who carries the same recessive gene at the same 
locus on the same chromosome in the same pair.  The 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
4 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
danger in consanguineous matings is not, as commonly 
believed, that such unions cause or increase the 
number 
of 
deleterious 
recessive 
genes 
in 
the 
offspring. 
 
Rather, 
such 
matings 
increase 
the 
probability that the spouses both carry an identical 
recessive gene which will be passed to the offspring 
in the double dose necessary for the expression of the 
trait associated with that recessive gene. 
 
For 
example, if 
a 
particular 
individual is 
heterozygous for a recessive gene trait, there is a 
0.5 probability that the individual's parent, child or 
sibling is also heterozygous for the trait.  If the 
heterozygous individual has offspring by her or his 
parent, child, or sibling, the probability that the 
offspring will be homozygous for the recessive gene 
trait is 0.125.  Assuming the mean number of harmful 
recessive gene traits carried per person is one and 
there is no history of deleterious gene traits in the 
pedigree, the risk of homozygosity, i.e., expression 
of the recessive gene trait, in the offspring of 
selected consanguineous matings is [0.1250 for 1º 
Lineals 
(parent, 
child) 
and 
2º 
Collaterals 
(siblings)]. 
 
The probabilities of offspring who are homozygous 
for a deleterious recessive gene appear low, but they 
are higher than the 0.001 probability of homozygosity 
for a deleterious recessive gene in nonconsanguineous 
matings when there is no family history of such 
recessive gene traits.  Some empirical data suggest 
that consanguineous matings lead to an increase in 
infant 
mortality, 
congenital 
birth 
defects 
and 
anthropometric changes. 
Bratt, supra, at 271-73.   
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
5 
 
to include a desire to protect children from sexual abuse by any 
close blood relative.  Marriage between close blood relatives 
often facilitates one or both of these evils.   
¶51 In addition, nonmarital sexual intercourse with a 
close blood relative may constitute adultery.18  When it does, it 
is likely to undermine the existing marriage relationship.  
Incest can also spawn intra-family rivalry and tension and 
create 
psychological 
confusion 
in 
the 
family 
about 
the 
appropriate roles of family members.  Incest is sometimes 
described as the product of an already dysfunctional family.19  
The conception of incestuous children will usually lead either 
to abortion20 or to the exacerbation of existing problems within 
the family. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Professor 
Bratt's 
own 
calculations 
indicate 
that the 
probability that a single deleterious recessive gene will appear 
in the offspring of first degree lineals or second degree 
collaterals is 125 times greater than in a nonconsanguineous 
mating.  The probability of genetic problems is bound to go up 
if consanguineous mates are carrying more than one deleterious 
recessive gene or if there is a history of deleterious gene 
traits in the family.  It is the duty of legislators to decide 
whether these probabilities warrant statutory attention.  See 
also Patricia A. Baird & Barbara McGillivray, Children of 
Incest, 101 Journal of Pediatrics 854-58 (Nov. 1982); Children 
born as a result of incest, 282 Brit. Med. J. 250 (Jan. 24. 
1981); Alvin A. Rosenfeld, Incidence of a History of Incest 
Among 18 Female Psychiatric Patients, 136:6 Am. J. Psychiatry 
791 (June 1979); Incest, Inbreeding, and Mental Abilities, Brit. 
Med. J. 4, 336-37 (Nov. 11, 1967); Morton S. Adams & James V. 
Neel, Children of Incest, 40 Pediatrics 55-62 (July 1967). 
18 See Wis. Stat. § 944.16. 
19 Anna C. Salter, Treating Child Sex Offenders and Victims 
39-40 (1988). 
20 See Wis. Stat. §§ 20.927(2) and 253.10(3m)(b)(1). 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶52 "Marriage is the foundation of family and society.  
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of 
vital interest to society and this state."  Wis. Stat. § 944.01.  
In some circumstances, marriage between close blood relatives 
would completely pervert the concept of the nuclear family. 
 
¶53 In the Children's Code, "Incestuous parenthood" is one 
of the grounds for termination of parental rights.21  This ground 
complements the statutes on incest but also embodies separate 
and distinct concerns about the ability of incestuous parents to 
raise and support their children in a manner that does not 
victimize the children. 
II. FELONY INCEST 
 
¶54 The 
felony 
incest 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 944.06, 
prohibits marriage or sexual intercourse with a person who is a 
blood relative nearer of kin than 2nd cousin according to the 
rule of civil law.  This statute is broadly written to include 
relationships with such blood relatives as grandparents, aunts, 
uncles, and cousins.22   
                                                 
21 "(7) Incestuous Parenthood.  Incestuous parenthood, which 
shall be established by proving that the person whose parental 
rights are sought to be terminated is also related, either by 
blood or adoption, to the child's other parent in a degree of 
kinship closer than 2nd cousin."  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7). 
 
22 "Sexual 
intercourse" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(5)(c) and 948.01(6).  Because of these 
definitions, the incest statute does not exclude same sex sexual 
intercourse between close blood relatives.  However, application 
of the felony incest statute to consenting adults of the same 
sex would appear to go beyond the traditional notion of incest 
and not reflect the core objectives of the offense. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶55 Incest may involve two adults, two minors, or one 
adult and one minor.  If the state chooses to prosecute a person 
for incest, it will select either § 944.06 or § 948.06, 
depending upon the facts. 
¶56 A person charged with incest may also be charged with 
sexual assault, provided that the state is able to prove the 
requisite non-consent by the victim of the sexual assault.  See 
State ex rel. Lawrence v. Burke, 253 Wis. 240, 247, 33 
N.W.2d 242 (1948); Porath v. State, 90 Wis. 527, 536, 63 N.W. 
1061 (1895). 
¶57 Consent is a defense to a charge of sexual assault but 
consent is not a defense to a charge of incest.  Mutual consent 
does not validate unlawful incest.  This case indirectly raises 
the 
question 
whether 
a 
person's 
non-consent 
to 
sexual 
intercourse would be a defense if that person were prosecuted 
for incest. 
¶58 When a person is charged with incest under § 944.06 or 
§ 948.06, the person may contend that no crime was committed 
because the person did not have "knowledge" of a blood 
relationship (or of "adoption" in the case of § 948.06(1)).  
"Knowledge" is an essential element of the offense.  The person 
may also rely on such statutory defenses as "intoxication," 
Wis. Stat. § 939.42, 
"mistake," 
Wis. Stat. § 939.43, 
or 
"coercion," Wis. Stat. § 939.46, depending on the facts.   
¶59 If non-consent were recognized as a defense to incest, 
it would likely be a broader defense than the statutory defense 
of coercion, which is narrowly defined in § 939.46.  A non-
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
8 
 
consent defense would present legal issues about definition as 
well as burden of proof.23 
¶60 A 
child 
involved 
in 
sexual 
contact 
or 
sexual 
intercourse who has not attained the age of 16 years is 
incapable of consent as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) 
and (2).  The same cannot be said of a child who is age 16 or 17 
and it certainly cannot be said of an adult.  Thus, when the 
victim of a sexual assault is age 16, 17, or older, the state 
must prove that the sexual intercourse or sexual contact 
occurred without consent.  It follows that when the state fails 
to charge one party to incest with sexual assault or fails to 
prove such a charge, the second party's consent remains an open 
question of fact as long as the second party is capable of 
giving consent. 
¶61 In my view, a person who has engaged in sexual 
intercourse without consent may not be convicted of felony 
incest under any statute.  This means that I would recognize a 
non-consent defense to incest even though that defense does not 
appear in the statutes.  Conversely, I believe a person who has 
attained the age of 16 years and is capable of giving informed 
consent is subject to prosecution for incest if the person 
freely agrees to have sexual intercourse with a blood relative 
nearer of kin than 2nd cousin. 
¶62 In this case, Roger B. was never convicted of sexual 
assault.  He was convicted of incest under Wis. Stat. § 948.06, 
                                                 
23 For discussion of burden of proof in defenses, see Moes 
v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 756, 763-69, 284 N.W.2d 66 (1979). 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
9 
 
an offense in which Kelli B.'s consent or non-consent was 
immaterial.  Thus, Kelli's non-consent to incest was not 
established and remained a material issue of fact.  She gave 
birth to three incestuous children, one of whom was conceived 
and born when she was 17, and two of whom were conceived and 
born when she was an adult.  None of Kelli's children was born 
under circumstances in which she was incapable of giving consent 
to sexual intercourse as a matter of law.   
¶63 In fact, Kelli testified under oath that she wanted 
the relationship with her father.  At Roger B.'s sentencing 
hearing——which occurred on November 1, 2001, more than seven 
months before Monroe County moved to terminate Kelli's parental 
rights——Kelli testified that: "Well, I don't think [my father] 
should go to prison because it was just as much my fault as it 
is his, because I wanted the relationship."  On cross-
examination, the following exchange occurred: 
Q 
Wouldn't you agree that in a normal parent child 
relationship 
that 
the 
parent 
bears 
some 
responsibility for the behaviors and activities 
of the child? 
A 
Well, the thing is is it was my fault just as 
much as it was his because I wanted it just like 
he did. 
 
. . . .  
Q 
And you don't see anything wrong with the 
activity that occurred in this case? 
A 
No. 
¶64 In addition, in response to questions from the court, 
Kelli denied that her father had been physically abusive to her. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
10 
 
Q 
In the presentence report it says that there 
[are] some charges pending  . . . .  [A] charge 
of battery against your father and intimidation 
of a victim  . . . .  [H]e is accused of being 
physically and verbally abusive to you on two 
occasions.  Are you saying that didn't happen? 
A 
The verbal abuse was going on, but the physical 
abuse was not. 
Q 
And the [PSI] report says that, and again the 
person who prepared the report didn't have the 
opportunity to talk to you, but said [Roger B.] 
threatened to kill you, and that if he goes to 
jail you're going to jail? 
A 
That's not true. 
Q 
That's not true.  Okay.  And it also says he is 
accused of strangling you to the point where you 
could not breathe? 
A 
That's not true. 
Q 
Do you know where somebody would come up with 
this kind of information if it's not true? 
A 
I said it to get him away from me, so I lied 
about it. 
Q 
So you lied to the authorities about what your 
father did? 
A 
Yes. 
¶65 The majority is probably correct in believing that 
this testimony is not credible; that Kelli B. was so victimized 
and traumatized by her father that she endured many years of 
extreme sexual abuse and three pregnancies without ever telling 
authorities; that even as an adult, she was unable to break free 
from her father's dominance; that even when her father was 
locked up in jail, she was still so susceptible to his influence 
that she came to court to lie repeatedly in his behalf. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶66 In the book On Trial, America's Courts and Their 
Treatment of Sexually Abused Children (2d ed. 1991), Billie 
Wright Dziech & Judge Charles B. Schudson explain that: 
Most [child victims of sexual abuse] disclose the 
incidents slowly and reluctantly over a period of 
weeks, months, or even years.  Some live all of their 
lives without admitting to anyone what happened to 
them.  Of former victims responding to the [Los 
Angeles] Times poll, 42 percent replied they told 
someone within a year, 21 percent said they waited 
more than a year, and 36 percent reported that they 
had told no one until asked by the interviewer.  This 
response 
is 
indicative 
of 
the 
process 
that 
psychiatrist Roland Summit, after thousands of first-
hand observations and consultations with professionals 
dealing with victims, described as the "child sexual 
abuse accommodation syndrome." 
 
Summit 
noted 
that 
sexually 
abused 
children 
generally reveal five characteristics in coping with 
their dilemmas: secrecy, helplessness, accommodation 
(seeing oneself as responsible for the victimization), 
delayed disclosure, and retraction or recantation.  
Although he originally defined these patterns in terms 
of incest, increased experience with and understanding 
of child sexual abuse has led professionals to 
recognize that the syndrome appears in victims of 
extrafamilial abuse as well. 
Dziech & Schudson, supra at 3-4. 
 
¶67 Applying this analysis, a court could find that Kelli 
B. demonstrated classic symptoms of child sexual abuse, even as 
an adult, in failing to report incestuous molestation.  However, 
because Kelli gave birth to three incestuous children over a 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
12 
 
period of several years, her case necessarily represents either 
extreme victimization or actual consent.24 
 
¶68 In drafting the provision on "incestuous parenthood," 
the legislature must have considered the parenthood of a father 
who was the perpetrator of incest on his daughter.  But in this 
constitutional 
challenge, 
we 
must 
also 
assume 
that 
the 
legislature 
contemplated 
incest's 
potentially 
extreme, 
psychologically damaging effect upon the daughter and the impact 
that this abuse would likely have on her fitness as a parent.  
The crux of this case is whether the legislature could determine 
that a person who is a severely traumatized victim of incest may 
be unable to satisfy the minimum responsibilities of parenthood 
without victimizing the person's children. 
III. POLICY CONCERNS ABOUT INCESTUOUS PARENTHOOD 
                                                 
24 The law ought to require a finding that an adult party to 
incest did not consent to incest before holding the adult 
blameless for incestuous offspring.  This may require new 
definitions of consent and non-consent.  "Consent" is defined, 
for use in the sexual assault statute, as "words or overt 
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent 
indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse 
or sexual contact."  Wis. Stat. § 940.225(4).  In this case, 
Kelli B. gave birth to three children, one of whom was conceived 
and born when she was 17, and two of whom were conceived and 
born when she was an adult.  At least with respect to Kelli B.'s 
second and third children, it is not clear that the State could 
have proved that Roger B. violated Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(a): 
"Whoever . . . [h]as . . . sexual 
intercourse 
with 
another 
person without consent of that person and causes pregnancy" is 
guilty 
of 
a 
Class 
B 
felony. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(a) 
(emphasis added).  My concern in raising this issue is that the 
circuit court never made a finding that Kelli B. had no 
responsibility for her second and third incestuous children.  
Consequently, I do not understand how this court can implicitly 
make that finding. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
13 
 
 
¶69 The majority appears to have no difficulty with the 
proposition that incestuous parenthood may be used as a ground 
to terminate the parental rights of a father who is the 
perpetrator "of long-term and continuous incest" with his 
daughter.  If the daughter did not consent to incest, the father 
would be culpable of sexual assault as well as incest and should 
not be rewarded for his criminality by maintaining his rights to 
nonmarital offspring.  This would be true even if the father had 
a substantial relationship with his child. 
 
¶70 A more difficult question is posed when the state 
seeks to terminate the parental rights of a daughter who gives 
consent to sexual intercourse with her father.  In this 
situation, the daughter would argue that she has a fundamental 
liberty interest in parenting her biological child and that she 
has a relationship with the child.  The state could argue that 
the daughter is a lawbreaker, that she should not be rewarded 
for her lawbreaking, and that termination is required as a 
deterrent to similar lawbreaking.  The daughter's argument would 
indirectly implicate the validity and constitutionality of the 
felony incest statute. 
¶71 The most difficult question arises in a situation 
where the daughter does not consent to incest.  What is the 
state's compelling interest in terminating the parental rights 
of a victim of incest?   
¶72 Therapist E. Sue Blume writes that:  
 
Incest is possibly the most crippling experience 
that a child can endure.  It is a violation of body, 
boundaries, and trust.  Unless identified and dealt 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
14 
 
with, the emotional and behavioral aftereffects can 
stay with the victim.  The very defenses that 
initially protect the incest survivor later lock these 
problems 
into 
place, 
interfering 
with 
adult 
functioning and preventing healing or change. 
E. Sue Blume, Secret Survivors, Uncovering Incest and Its 
Aftereffects in Women xiv (1990).   
¶73 William Masters and Virginia Johnson report that 
"[m]ost researchers and clinicians agree that incest is an 
intensely damaging psychological experience.  It can lead to 
drug abuse, prostitution, suicide attempts, and a host of other 
problems."  William H. Masters, Virginia E. Johnson, & Robert C. 
Kolodny, Masters and Johnson on Sex and Human Loving 426 (1988).  
They continue: 
[T]he most striking, but not surprising, finding in 
incest victims is the long-term persistence of a 
variety of sexual problems. . . .  In many cases, the 
woman has been unable to form close, intimate, 
trusting relationships with men because she expects 
betrayal, rejection, or punishment.  
. . . [I]t 
seems 
likely 
that 
an 
incestuous 
relationship between an adult and a child will create 
major conflicts for the child, even if these are 
eventually overcome. 
Masters, et al., supra, at 427. 
¶74 In her book, Blume describes the "complex and far-
reaching" consequences of incest, and labels them as "post-
incest syndrome."  Blume, supra, at vi.  She provides an "Incest 
Survivors' Aftereffects Checklist," building upon the work and 
studies of rape and incest counselors.  The 34-point checklist 
includes: 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
15 
 
6. 
Eating disorders, drug or alcohol abuse (or total 
abstinence); 
other 
addictions; 
compulsive 
behaviors 
7. 
Self-destructiveness; skin carving, self-abuse 
8. 
Phobias 
. . . .  
10. Suicidal thoughts, attempts, obsession (including 
"passive suicide") 
11. Depression 
(sometimes 
paralyzing); 
seemingly 
baseless crying 
12. Anger issues; inability to recognize, own, or 
express anger; fear of actual or imagined rage; 
constant anger; intense hostility toward entire 
gender or ethnic group of the perpetrator 
. . . .  
16. Trust issues; inability to trust (trust is not 
safe); total trust; trusting indiscriminately 
17. High risk taking ("daring the fates") . . .  
. . . .  
19. Guilt, shame; low self-esteem, feeling worthless; 
high appreciation of small favors by others 
. . . .  
22. Abandonment issues 
. . . .  
25. Feeling crazy; feeling different; feeling oneself 
to be unreal and everyone else to be real, or 
vice 
versa; 
creating 
fantasy 
worlds, 
relationships, or identities . . .  
. . . .  
27. Sexual 
issues: . . . "promiscuous" 
sex 
with 
strangers . . . sexual acting out to meet anger 
or revenge needs . . .  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
16 
 
. . . .  
33. Stealing (adults) . . .  
34. Multiple personality 
Blume, supra, at xviii-xxi.  When the most serious indicia of 
post-incest syndrome appear, the victim of incest is in a 
psychologically 
precarious 
position 
to 
effectively 
parent 
children.   
¶75 The incest victim may be vulnerable in other ways.  
She is precluded from ever marrying the other parent of her 
child.  The parental rights and responsibilities of the other 
parent, 
including 
the 
support 
obligation, 
are 
normally 
terminated in order to separate the two parents and discourage 
contact between them.  This termination will deprive the victim-
parent of both emotional and financial support.25 
¶76 When an unwed teenager becomes pregnant, she often 
turns to her parents for this sort of support.  But a young 
woman who is the victim of incest by her father may not be able 
                                                 
25 Patricia A. Harrington, The Disposition of Father-
Daughter Incestuous Assault Cases: An Overview 21 New Eng. L. 
Rev. 399, 415 (1985-86).   
The financial impact of removing the breadwinner from the 
family is obvious.  In addition, "many of the fathers who commit 
incest at least occasionally provide some form of positive 
reinforcement to the child they are victimizing, such as gifts, 
monetary rewards, or special privileges."  Masters, et al., 
supra, at 425.  The abusive father may also provide emotional 
support to the victim.  Both forms of support are likely ended 
by the father's forced separation from his daughter. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
17 
 
to turn to other family members.  Her mother may not be present 
or there may be tension between mother and daughter.26 
¶77 If the victim's mother knew of the incest and did 
nothing, 
she 
is 
a 
potential 
criminal 
herself.  
                                                 
26 In her book Treating Child Sex Offenders and Victims, 
Anna C. Salter observed that:  
The literature on the subject of the mother's 
responsibility for father-daughter incest is quite 
sizable and can be divided according to the authors' 
views of the nature of the mother's culpability.  
Authors differ as to whether the mother (1) actively 
encourages the incest to occur, (2) is indirectly 
responsible, (3) fails to set appropriate limits to 
prevent the incest, and/or (4) is aware of the incest 
but does not allow herself to acknowledge it. 
Anna C. Salter, Treating Child Sex Offenders and Victims 35 
(1988).  After describing these theories, Salter concludes:  
The most objectionable part of this literature is not 
that which implies some mothers actively collude with 
incest; some mothers clearly do.  Of more concern is 
the implication that all mothers know . . . and the 
assumption that a lack of knowledge would not render 
them blameless in any case. 
Salter, supra, at 40 (emphasis added). 
 
Masters & Johnson comment further: 
 
Wives of husbands who commit incest were often 
themselves the victims of sexual abuse as children and 
tend to be dependent, disenchanted women who withdraw 
from the family either through depression or outside 
diversions.  The mother may actually force the 
daughter into assuming her role, relieved at having 
the daughter as a "buffer" between her and her husband 
and sometimes pleased to have to deal with her 
husband's sexual advances no longer. 
William H. Masters, Virginia E. Johnson, & Robert C. Kolodny, 
Masters and Johnson on Sex and Human Loving 424 (1988). 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(3); Jennifer J. Freyd, Betrayal Trauma 159-
60 (1996); Masters, et al., supra, at 424 (emphasis added) 
("Even after incest is discovered by a mother, in more than two-
thirds of cases she does not try to help or protect her 
child."). 
¶78 If the mother did not know of the incest, the victim-
daughter may still believe that the mother knew and should have 
intervened.27  Conversely, if the mother did not know, she may 
resent the daughter's relationship with her husband, leading to 
the husband's possible prosecution, imprisonment, and removal 
from the family.28  The mother may view the daughter's silence as 
acquiescence or complicity.  Thus, a daughter who gives birth to 
                                                 
 
27 In Adult Children of Abusive Parents, Steven Farmer 
quotes a case study in which a young woman tried to tell her 
mother of sexual abuse by her stepfather: 
When I was about thirteen, I couldn't take it anymore—
—my stepdad always touching me, molesting me whenever 
my mom wasn't around.  He had threatened that he would 
beat the living daylights out of me if I told her, so 
for three years I didn't say anything.  But finally I 
figured that anything would be better than having to 
live with this kind of fear.  So one day, I took a 
deep breath and told my mom——right in front of him——
what had been going on.  She slapped me——I couldn't 
believe it——she slapped me, and they both told me I 
was a liar. 
Steven Farmer, Adult Children of Abusive Parents 19-20 (1989). 
28 Herbert Maisch writes of the "jealous and hostile 
rivalry" that can develop between mother and daughter.  This 
situation "is particularly sharply accented when the case 
concerns step-daughter-incest resulting in the birth of a 
child."  Herbert Maisch, Incest 209 (1972). 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
19 
 
an incestuous child may not be able to count on either of her 
parents for love or support.  Other family members have no legal 
obligation to be helpful, and they may be too embarrassed or 
resentful to come forward. 
¶79 A mother must provide for the emotional, physical, and 
developmental needs of her children.  Adequate finances are 
integral to this responsibility.  However, financial support for 
the victim of incest is often uncertain.  Inadequate finances 
are only one reason why an incestuous mother may distance her 
children.29  These children are the product of criminal acts 
against the mother.  They are a financial drain.  They may have 
costly special needs.  And they probably curtail the mother's 
freedom and her prospects for education, employment, and 
marriage in the future.  Herbert Maisch declares that: 
                                                 
29 Maisch writes about 10 women who gave birth to incestuous 
children: 
Six of the ten girls adopted an absolutely positive 
attitude, did not want to be parted from their baby in 
any way, and tried to cope with their maternal duties 
as best they could.  All the same, one of these 
girls . . . made a serious attempt at suicide in a 
situation of social and emotional pressure, almost two 
years after the birth of her child.  Two further 
juveniles gave up their children and had them put in a 
home and made available for adoption, and the very 
young mother, whose childish and artless pregnancy was 
mentioned above, did not want to see her baby at 
all. . . .  Situations of emotional stress, often 
serious, also arose after the birth from the jealousy, 
envy and hatred of their own mother (especially in the 
cases of love relationships with the stepfather), and 
the negative reactions and actions of the male partner 
as well as discrimination from people around her. 
Maisch, supra, at 213. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
20 
 
 
Psychiatric work amongst young people offers 
constant proof of the fact that, among the direct 
physiological effects of sexual crime on very young 
girls, pregnancy is the most serious in human and 
social terms.  The damage is less physical——young 
mothers have no higher rate of birth complications 
than adults——than psychological as a result of the 
grave nature of the offence and the discriminatory 
reactions of people around her which often heighten 
this. 
Herbert Maisch, Incest 210 (1972). 
¶80 In these circumstances, the state may be required to 
step in to provide the dysfunctional single parent with 
financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services.  
The children born of the victim-mother's incest may become 
locked in a long holding pattern of foster care, awaiting the 
potential but uncertain rehabilitation of their mother.  They 
cannot be adopted until their mother's parental rights have been 
terminated. 
¶81 To sum up, incestuous parenthood is a legitimate 
ground for termination of parental rights in situations where an 
incestuous parent shows serious deficiencies in the ability to 
raise her children as a result of her victimization from incest.  
The parent's status as a victim should not be permitted to 
excuse 
the 
failure 
to 
perform 
as 
a 
responsible 
parent, 
sacrificing the best interests of the children in the process.  
Children of incest have the same right to a decent, fulfilling 
life as other children.  They are innocent victims of their 
circumstances. 
 
The 
state 
should 
not 
be 
precluded 
from 
protecting these children and promoting their best interest, if 
necessary, by a termination of parental rights when incestuous 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
21 
 
parents 
are 
unable 
to 
discharge 
their 
parental 
responsibilities.30 
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY 
 
¶82 The majority concludes that Kelli B. has a fundamental 
liberty interest in parenting her children.  Majority op., ¶¶23-
24.  As a general proposition, biological parents do have this 
fundamental liberty interest.  A parent's desire for and right 
to the companionship, care, custody, and management of the 
parent's child is an important interest that warrants deference 
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.  
Sheboygan County DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶22, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402.  "This fundamental liberty interest 
of parents 'does not evaporate simply because they have not been 
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to 
the State.'"  Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982)).   
 
¶83 United States Supreme Court decisions and our own 
cases suggest that the following classes of parents have a 
fundamental liberty interest: the biological mother of a child, 
whether or not she is married; the biological parents of a child 
who are married or were married at the time the child was born; 
and the biological father of a child if the father, though never 
                                                 
30 The majority refuses to recognize that the state has a 
compelling interest in terminating the parental rights of a 
parent who shows serious deficiencies in the ability to raise 
her children as a result of her victimization from incest.  The 
majority does not explain why this is not a compelling state 
interest, and it does not explain what the test is for 
determining a compelling state interest. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
22 
 
married 
to 
the 
mother, 
has 
established 
a 
substantial 
relationship with the child.  However, an unmarried father who 
does not have a substantial relationship with his biological 
child is not likely to have a fundamental liberty interest in 
parenting the child. 
 
¶84 The possession of a fundamental liberty interest in 
parenting a child does not mean that a parent's rights may not 
be terminated.  It means that the state's action in the 
termination is subject to strict scrutiny.  "[W]hen the state 
moves to terminate parental rights, 'it must provide the parents 
with fundamentally fair procedures,'" Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 
U.S. at 754), and must assert an interest in termination that is 
more compelling than the interest of the parent. 
 
¶85 Most often a party whose fundamental liberty interest 
is at stake attacks the statute that authorizes government 
action, arguing that the statute is not narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest.  A facial challenge to the 
statute attempts to invalidate the statute so that it may not be 
applied to anyone.  An "as applied" challenge to the statute 
seeks to preclude application of the statute in particular 
circumstances. 
 
¶86 In this case, the majority has not ruled that 
"incestuous parenthood" is a wholly improper ground upon which 
to base the termination of a parent's rights.  In fact, the 
majority recognizes "a correlation between perpetrators of 
incest and unfit parents."  Majority op., ¶26.  In addition, the 
majority has not overruled State v. Allen M., 214 Wis. 2d 302, 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
23 
 
571 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997), a case in which the court of 
appeals upheld incestuous parenthood as a ground to terminate 
the parental rights of a brother and sister who engaged in 
incest and produced a daughter.  Allen M., 214 Wis. 2d at 305. 
 
¶87 The majority does not demand that the statute be 
rewritten.  Rather, it appears to find that Kelli B. was a 
"victim" of incest in each of her three pregnancies and 
concludes that because she was a "victim," Monroe County could 
not constitutionally apply the incestuous parenthood ground to 
her. 
 
¶88 This appellate conclusion raises questions.  The 
majority goes through the ritual of saying: "We begin with the 
presumption that the statute is constitutional and resolve any 
doubt in upholding its constitutionality."  Majority op., ¶16 
(emphasis added).  By invalidating the statute, as applied, 
however, the majority indicates either that there is no doubt 
about Kelli's non-consent to incest or that her non-consent does 
not matter, and that, in any event, the state has no compelling 
interest grounded in incestuous parenthood to terminate her 
parental rights. 
 
¶89 First, we must ask how the majority can say there is 
no doubt about Kelli's non-consent.  Kelli B. was an adult in 
two of her three pregnancies, she was legally capable of giving 
consent to sexual intercourse in all three of her pregnancies, 
and she testified under oath that she "wanted it just like [her 
father] did."  Admittedly, she recanted this testimony months 
later in the termination proceeding when she had a motive to do 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
24 
 
so.  But Kelli's state of mind could be a disputed fact.  The 
issue here is not whether Kelli actually gave consent to incest.  
The issue is how the possibility of her consent was ruled out.  
In short, how did Kelli meet her burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
incestuous 
parenthood 
could 
not 
constitutionally be used in her case? 
¶90 An adult biological mother's non-consent to incest is 
a question of fact.  When she puts the constitutionality of the 
statute at stake, the adult mother has the burden of proving 
this pivotal fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  Is this element 
established at the fact-finding trial or at the dispositional 
hearing?    I believe it should be established at the fact-
finding trial. 
¶91 The truth is that Kelli's non-consent was not proved 
at the fact-finding trial.  The evidence tending to establish 
that Kelli was a victim who did not fully consent to incest came 
in at the dispositional hearing, at the same time the County 
presented evidence about the consequences of the incest to Kelli 
and to her children. 
¶92 The critical evidence in the Allen M. case also came 
in at the dispositional stage, 214 Wis. 2d at 308, and this 
appears to be the direction provided in Steven V. v. Kelley H., 
2004 WI 47, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  The majority ought 
to provide clear guidance on how a person is to satisfy the 
burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional "as 
applied." 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
25 
 
¶93 Second, assuming that non-consent to incest is a 
pivotal element in a termination proceeding, that it is a 
question of fact, and, for the sake of argument, that the 
circuit court found that Kelli did not consent to incest, why 
has this court excluded the circuit court's findings of fact 
related to the consequences of Kelli's incest victimization?  In 
this "as applied" challenge, why isn't the court bound to 
consider all the facts?  The record in this case is overflowing 
with evidence that Kelli B. exhibited the indicia of extreme 
post-incest syndrome and a concomitant unfitness to parent her 
children. 
¶94 Some of the facts are as follows: 
¶95 Kelli B.'s third child was born in mid-February 2001.  
Her father was charged with incest on June 12, 2001, and 
convicted August 29, 2001.  When Roger B. was incarcerated in 
June 2001, he left Kelli largely on her own. 
¶96 The Monroe County Department of Human Services became 
involved with Kelli and her three children on August 20, 2001, 
upon receiving a referral that the children were living in an 
unclean environment and Kelli needed assistance in providing for 
their care.  Several weeks later, on September 9, the Department 
was advised by law enforcement that Kelli had been arrested and 
that no one was available to care for her children.  When they 
entered Kelli's residence, County social workers discovered that 
conditions had deteriorated.  They were overwhelmed by a foul 
smell in the residence.  They found "an extremely filthy, dirty, 
unsanitary and unsafe living condition in the residence," 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
26 
 
including puddles of urine on the floor, smeared feces on the 
wall, garbage throughout the residence, overturned furniture, 
old spoiled stale food, and a multitude of flies.  The social 
workers were unable to locate more than one clean diaper.  The 
other diapers were completely filthy and soiled.  The baby was 
laying in a urine-soaked baby seat or car seat.  Food was matted 
in his hair.  The social workers could find no clean clothing 
for the three children.  They also noticed that the two older 
children were non-verbal and appeared to have communication 
difficulties. 
 
Because 
all 
three 
children 
were 
having 
respiratory problems, the 
social 
workers sought 
immediate 
medical care, and all three children were given medication. 
¶97 The children were taken into temporary custody because 
they needed protection or services.  The court held a follow-up 
dispositional hearing on November 19.  The court ordered the 
continuation of services as well as additional services for 
Kelli to assist her in reunification with her children.  The 
court established multiple conditions in its dispositional order 
that were designed to help Kelli get back on her feet and resume 
the custody and parenting of her boys. 
¶98 Ann Garrity, a social worker with the Monroe County 
Department of Human Services, was Kelli's case manager beginning 
in December 2001.  Ten months later, she prepared a 21-page 
Court Report and was Monroe County's only witness at the October 
9, 2002, dispositional hearing.  In her report and in her 
testimony, Garrity recounted in meticulous detail how Kelli had 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
27 
 
failed to satisfy the conditions in the November 19, 2001, court 
order, thus demonstrating her unfitness as a parent. 
¶99 The picture that emerges from this evidence is of an 
immature young woman with all the earmarks of post-incest 
syndrome.  Kelli failed to complete required psychological 
evaluation, failed to show up for appointments, switched 
doctors, then failed to consistently meet with the new doctors.  
Kelli 
had 
depression 
problems 
and 
post-traumatic 
stress 
disorder.  She herself testified that she had a nervous 
breakdown. 
¶100 Kelli acknowledged having three different "significant 
others," all women, during the period of the court order.  She 
moved to northern Wisconsin against the advice of her social 
worker to live with one of these women.  This made it very 
difficult for Kelli to visit her children on a regular basis, 
and she missed many scheduled visitations.  Kelli visited her 
boys only twice between June 6 and the October hearing.  After 
she left the Monroe County area, she also failed to participate 
in the children's doctor appointments and in her own parenting 
assessment appointments. 
¶101 Another reason for missed visitations and appointments 
was that Kelli spent 22 days in jail in February and March 2002, 
and was jailed again in August and September. 
¶102 During the court order, Kelli was unable to settle on 
consistent living arrangements or employment.  She provided no 
verification of income.  She did not demonstrate any stability 
or ability to manage money effectively as she had little or no 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
28 
 
money to manage.  She was not helped in this by the fact that 
she left high school before graduation. 
¶103 Kelli reported that her family turned their backs on 
her once her father was sent to prison.  She felt she was blamed 
by family members for tearing the family apart.  She told her 
social worker that both her mother and her brother knew about 
the incest.  At the dispositional hearing she was critical of 
both of them.  "Obviously," Garrity wrote in her report, "given 
the significant dysfunction, Kelli does not have a strong 
support network in place with her extended family." 
¶104 Garrity described the cool relations between Kelli and 
her children during her sporadic visitations.  She reported that 
a family support worker noted that early on, when Kelli was 
visiting her children with her second significant other, the 
woman 
"was 
doing 
the 
majority 
of 
parenting 
during 
the 
visitation."  Garrity wrote that "Kelli is unable to manage all 
three children effectively at the same time.  She appears to 
focus 
all 
of 
her 
energy 
on 
one 
of 
the 
children, 
usually . . . the youngest of the three."  In her last visit 
before the hearing, "All three of the boys were described as 
very reserved and shy, and needed to be prodded into greetings 
by Kelli in order to give her any welcoming hugs at all." 
¶105 In concluding her written report, Garrity wrote: 
Although[ ] there is no doubt that Kelli herself has 
been significantly victimized throughout her life at 
the hands of her father, she chose to defend his 
actions and continued a sexual relationship with him 
in her adulthood.  Kelli is in need of significant 
mental health treatment to address these issues within 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
29 
 
her own life and she has not demonstrated a readiness 
to do that, much to the further victimization of her 
children.  Kelli fails to see the ongoing cycle of 
abuse within her family and therefore has demonstrated 
no 
ability 
to 
provide 
a 
safe 
and 
stable 
home 
environment for these children. 
 
¶106 Circuit Judge Steven Luse Abbott adopted Ann Garrity's 
report and made his own observations.  He said that Kelli had 
been a victim but so had her children: 
[W]hen something happens to you, what you do 
about what happens to you counts more than what 
happened to you. 
. . . . I have seen improvements . . . at least 
the way [Kelli] conducts herself.  But how much time 
do we have to wait when we're also dealing with kids 
who are growing up . . .  The time is now we have to 
move on this.  There is no question that we cannot 
spread this out any longer than we have. 
. . . . We have to look at what has happened, not 
what we think may happen in the future. . . . I think 
in time [Kelli] is going to mature, and she is going 
to develop and be a real good person, but we can't 
make these kids wait until that happens. 
¶107 As I see it, Kelli B.'s many problems are a direct 
result of her victimization by her father.  Her serious 
deficiencies as a parent are a direct and predictable result of 
her incest and sexual abuse. 
¶108 If a biological mother's non-consent to incest is a 
question of fact that must be established, it is inexplicable 
why evidence of that fact may be considered but evidence of the 
direct consequences of that fact upon the fitness of the victim 
as a parent are excluded. 
¶109 Third, if the court were to take the position that a 
biological mother's consent to incest does not matter in a 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
30 
 
termination proceeding, it would open the door to incestuous 
relationships and undermine part of the basis for the felony 
incest and marriage limitation statutes. 
¶110 There are, of course, theorists who contend that 
substantive due process sweepingly protects a person's freedom 
of choice in marriage, family, and procreation.  For instance, 
Professor Carolyn S. Bratt writes that the Supreme Court "has 
found that the right to marry is a constitutionally protected 
right.  That right is restricted . . . by state incest statutes 
which impede marriage between adults by making some choices of a 
marriage partner illegal."  Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes 
and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to Marry? 
18 Fam.L.Q. 257 (1984). 
Because incest statutes make certain adult choices of 
a 
marriage 
partner 
illegal, 
they 
are 
direct, 
substantial, and intentional state intrusions upon the 
individual's 
constitutionally 
protected 
right 
to 
marry.  The Supreme Court's marriage cases mandate 
close scrutiny of such statutes in order to determine 
if they serve a substantial and important state 
interest and whether they are discriminately tailored 
to accomplish such a purpose. 
Bratt, supra at 296. 
¶111 If the state loses its ability to set orderly limits 
to marriage and sexual intercourse, it may be required to shift 
its focus to the consequences of these activities instead of the 
activities themselves.  To illustrate, in the Allen M. case, the 
court terminated the parental rights of a woman who engaged in 
incest with her brother and produced a daughter.  The court 
considered additional evidence that the mother substantially 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
31 
 
abandoned her daughter.  In the future, such a case might have 
to be decided differently unless the state relied on grounds 
other than incestuous parenthood.  The mother might be able to 
keep her child.31 
¶112 Fourth, accepting the premise that Kelli B. was a 
"victim" and that she satisfied any test that could be devised 
for non-consent to incest, the State still had compelling 
reasons 
to 
terminate 
her 
parental 
rights 
on 
incestuous 
parenthood grounds because she evinced many disabling symptoms 
of post-incest syndrome.  Kelli was psychologically damaged by 
her victimization.  She had not recovered at the time the court 
made its decision and had a long way to go.  When Monroe County 
authorities intervened to take custody of the children, Kelli 
was in a meltdown and the safety of her children was at risk.  
All three children were developmentally delayed and needed to 
participate in early childhood remedial programs.   
¶113 In circuit court, the County's corporation counsel, 
the children's guardian ad litem, and social worker Ann Garrity 
stressed that incestuous parenthood per se was not the basis for 
termination.  They were concerned about the harmful fallout from 
incest upon Kelli and the children.  At the dispositional 
hearing, Kelli's attorney attempted to place the blame for 
Kelli's instability and lack of progress on Monroe County, 
                                                 
31 Suppose a minor son fathered a child with his mother.  
See Sex contact with kids brings term, Wis. St. J. B1 (Mar. 27, 
2004).  Would the son's status as a "victim" preclude a 
termination of his parental rights? 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
32 
 
suggesting that the County should have done more to help her.  
In effect, however, counsel's questions to Ann Garrity proved 
the County's case: 
Q 
Okay.  And Kelli's intellectual capacity is not 
high functioning, is it? 
A 
I would say not by my assessment.  We don't have 
an IQ report as one was never completed. 
Q 
But her education level is, in fact, her father 
Roger took her out of school at a very early age, 
didn't he? 
A 
I believe high school, yes. 
Q 
Now, when you first came into this . . . Kelli 
was quite dependent on Roger, wasn't she? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
In fact, Roger pretty much did everything for 
her? 
A 
Well, when we first came into the situation on 
this specific incident, Roger was already out of 
the house. 
Q 
But [in] looking into the background of the 
family, looking into Kelli's background, there 
was a dependency by Kelli on Roger? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And . . . basically the family turned their back 
on her, didn't they? 
A 
By her report, yes. 
 
. . . .  
Q 
So to a great extent Kelli was, after Roger was 
taken away, she was left without much support? 
A 
Correct. . . .  
Q 
And the boys were very young at the time? 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
33 
 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
Three children under the age of three? 
A 
Right. 
Q 
So she needed a lot of support? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And probably more support than someone older? She 
is young, she has been kept very isolated? 
A 
Correct. 
Q 
She has been kept dependent? 
A 
Yes. 
. . . .  
Q 
And rather dysfunctional at that point? 
A 
Yes. 
This dialogue reinforced Ann Garrity's direct testimony and 
written report. 
 
¶114 Turning to the boys, the children of incest face 
special challenges, even in the absence of genetic problems.  
Corporation counsel Kerry Sullivan-Flock explained to the court 
that "the family issues here cannot be ignored.  Any family 
placement option is going to have that issue to deal with.  The 
parentage of these children, the incest that happened in this 
family.  That is a huge, huge issue for any relative placement 
to have to tackle."  Guardian ad Litem Ellen M. Thorn added that 
the children had been "born into a house where they have a huge 
genetic question mark where we don't know what problems they 
will face medically. . . .  They were also born into a house 
that 
was 
so 
environmentally 
dysfunctional 
that 
they 
had 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
34 
 
significant delays. . . .  [The children] were noticeably unable 
to do the things that other children their age were  . . . [W]e 
need to give these kids a better chance than their mother ever 
had." 
 
¶115 The legislature was entitled to find a link between 
incestuous parenthood and deficiencies in the ability to raise 
the children of incest.  When these deficiencies are serious and 
clearly established by the evidence, the state has a compelling 
interest to move for termination on incestuous parenthood 
grounds. 
 
¶116 It must be emphasized that under Wisconsin's statutory 
scheme, a finding of unfitness does not terminate parental 
rights.  A finding of unfitness is separate from the subsequent 
judicial decision to terminate parental rights, and the court 
may 
preserve 
the 
parent's 
rights, 
despite 
a 
finding 
of 
unfitness, when they are not incompatible with the best 
interests of the children. 
V. VICTIMS OF CRIME AMENDMENT 
 
¶117 The majority's opinion invokes Article I, Section 9m 
of the Wisconsin Constitution to support Kelli's position.  This 
is not appropriate and creates a dangerous precedent for the 
future.  See majority op., ¶41.  Article I, Section 9m was 
designed to afford victims of crime certain privileges and 
protections related to the criminal justice system.  These 
include such things as "notification of court proceedings," "the 
opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition," 
and the right to "information about the outcome of the case."  
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
35 
 
The victims of crime amendment may not be used by crime victims 
as a talisman to excuse wayward conduct. 
 
¶118 The majority opinion overlooks the fact that Kelli's 
three boys are also victims of crime.  "The compelling interest 
underlying the [termination] statute is to protect children from 
unfit parents."  Majority op., ¶25. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
¶119 This is a sad case.  But, objectively, there is only 
one reasonable result: the termination of the mother's parental 
rights.  The court is conflicted about this outcome, but 
ultimately it is struggling over means, not ends.  Monroe County 
authorities have acted with professionalism and compassion.  
Incestuous parenthood per se was not the basis of their petition 
for termination.  See ¶69, supra.  Chastising them and forcing 
them to start over with a new and different petition for 
termination if they want to protect three vulnerable children 
needlessly exacerbates a tragic situation. 
 
¶120 The majority has permitted heartfelt sympathy for 
Kelli B. to displace orderly analysis.  After studying the 
majority opinion, I do not know (1) how a person establishes 
that he or she is a "victim" of incest so that the state may not 
constitutionally apply "incestuous parenthood" as a grounds for 
unfitness; (2) when a person must establish that he or she is a 
"victim" of incest; and (3) what a compelling state interest is.  
In addition, I believe the majority has misused Article I, 
Section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution to bolster its case.  
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
36 
 
 
¶121 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 03-0060, 03-0061, 03-0062.dtp 
 
 
 
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