Case Title: Ex parte Antony Lavaughn Bishop. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Anthony Lavaughn Bishop v. State of Alabama) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-19-4203; Criminal Appeals: CR-20-0976).

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0170, SC-2023-0842

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: February 16, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0170 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Antony Lavaughn Bishop  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
 
(In re: Anthony Lavaughn Bishop  
 
v.  
 
State of Alabama) 
 
(Jefferson Circuit Court: CC-19-4203;  
Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-20-0976) 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice. 
 
The writ of certiorari is quashed. 
SC-2023-0170 
2 
 
 
In quashing the writ of certiorari, this Court does not wish to be 
understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law 
in the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion.  Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 
782, 280 So. 2d 155 (1973). 
 
WRIT QUASHED. 
 
Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Cook, J., joins. 
 
 
SC-2023-0170 
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I concur with quashing the writ of certiorari. I write specially to 
address an argument raised in Antony Lavaughn Bishop's1 principal 
brief that his conduct fell within the definition of fourth-degree theft 
because, according to him, he did not take property "from the person of 
another." § 13A-8-5(a), Ala. Code 1975. After reviewing the record, I do 
not believe that there is any way to view Bishop's theft of the money as 
not from the victim's person. Accordingly, I see no error in the Jefferson 
Circuit Court's refusal to give Bishop’s requested instruction for fourth-
degree theft as a lesser-included offense of third-degree robbery. 
I. Facts 
 
On March 12, 2019, Betty Wallace was working as a shift 
supervisor at a CVS Pharmacy store in Birmingham. Bishop entered the 
store and, although he first told Wallace that he wanted to load money 
onto a card, demanded that Wallace give him money. Wallace thought 
Bishop was joking, but then Bishop said: "B****, give me your f****** 
money." Bishop then moved his hand around behind his back. Wallace 
 
1In the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, this defendant's name 
was spelled "Anthony Lavaughn Bishop." 
SC-2023-0170 
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later testified that Bishop insinuated that he had a weapon. Wallace 
opened the cash drawer and threw $79 on the counter. Bishop took the 
money. He was arrested shortly after he left the store with the money. A 
grand jury later indicted Bishop for third-degree robbery, a violation of § 
13A-8-43, Ala. Code 1975. 
 
During Bishop's trial, the jury heard testimony from Wallace 
regarding the incident. The State also played for the jury a video 
recording from CVS's security camera. The video, which has no audio, 
shows the following: Bishop stands in front of the counter across from 
Wallace and fumbles with his wallet. He then lowers his wallet, which is 
in his right hand, and he lowers his left hand to his side. At that moment, 
Wallace steps back from the register. She then reaches forward to open 
the cash drawer. As she opens the cash drawer, Bishop moves his right 
hand, still holding the wallet, behind his back momentarily. Four times, 
Wallace grabs a handful of cash from the register and places it on the 
counter. Bishop collects the money as Wallace places it on the counter. 
He then exits the CVS store, and Wallace picks up the phone to call the 
police. 
 
During the charge conference, Bishop requested an instruction on 
SC-2023-0170 
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fourth-degree theft as a lesser-included offense of third-degree robbery, 
but the circuit judge declined. During the jury deliberations, the jury 
submitted the following question to the judge: "If there is no decision that 
can be reached on this charge, can a lesser charge be agreed to?" The 
judge instructed the jury that it could not consider a lesser charge. 
Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding Bishop guilty of third-
degree robbery. Bishop later submitted a motion for a new trial, arguing 
that the circuit court had erroneously refused to instruct the jury on 
fourth-degree theft. The circuit court denied that motion. The circuit 
court sentenced Bishop, as a habitual felony offender, to 20 years' 
imprisonment, split to serve 5 years in prison followed by 3 years of 
probation. Bishop appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which 
affirmed his conviction and sentence. Bishop v. State, [Ms. CR-20-0976, 
Sept. 2, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022).  
 
II. Analysis 
 
As with all questions regarding jury instructions, appellate courts 
review under the exceeding-discretion standard a trial court's refusal to 
give a requested jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. Arthur v. 
Bolen, 41 So. 3d 745 (Ala. 2010). 
SC-2023-0170 
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Bishop's primary contention is that the circuit court erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on fourth-degree theft as a lesser-included 
offense. Bishop does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his third-degree-robbery conviction. Thus, he appears to concede 
that there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
he "threaten[ed] the imminent use of force" against Wallace while 
committing the theft of the $79. The only issue is whether Bishop was 
entitled to an additional instruction on fourth-degree theft as a lesser-
included offense of third-degree robbery. 
 
This Court stated the following test for determining when a 
criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included 
offense: 
"An individual accused of the greater offense has a right 
to have the court charge on the lesser offenses included in the 
indictment, when there is a reasonable theory from the 
evidence supporting his position. A court may properly refuse 
to charge on lesser included offenses ... when it is clear to the 
judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the 
offense within the definition of the lesser offense .... [E]very 
accused is entitled to have charges given ... which are 
supported by any evidence, however[] weak, insufficient, or 
doubtful in credibility." 
 
Ex parte Chavers, 361 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Ala. 1978) (citations omitted). 
The offense of which Bishop was convicted, third-degree robbery, is 
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committed if a person, while committing a theft, "[t]hreatens the 
imminent use of force against the person of the owner or any person 
present with intent to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping 
with the property." § 13A-8-43(a)(2). In contrast, fourth-degree theft is 
"[t]he theft of property which does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) 
in value and which is not taken from the person of another." § 13A-8-5(a) 
(emphasis added).  
In his principal brief, Bishop contends that the circuit court was 
required to grant his request for an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of fourth-degree theft because a jury could reasonably have 
concluded that he did not threaten to use force against Wallace. Bishop's 
argument assumes that the only difference between third-degree robbery 
and fourth-degree theft is that third-degree robbery requires evidence of 
force or a threat of force, whereas fourth-degree theft does not. Under the 
common law, before robbery and theft were divided into degrees, Bishop's 
assumption would have been generally correct. As some commentators 
have noted, "robbery is larceny plus certain circumstances of 
aggravation." Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 344 
(3d ed. 1982). 
SC-2023-0170 
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But the Alabama Criminal Code, with its varying degrees of both 
robbery and theft, is somewhat more complicated. As it turns out, threat 
of force is not the only difference between third-degree robbery and 
fourth-degree theft: the latter includes an additional requirement that 
the property be "not taken from the person of another." Fourth-degree 
theft is inapplicable if the property is taken from the person of another. 
Reynolds v. State, 334 So. 3d 262, 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020). Bishop 
addresses this element in only one paragraph of his principal brief: 
"Further, there is no contention that any money was 
taken off of a person in this case. [Wallace] testified [that] $79 
was taken off of the counter. The surveillance video evidence 
presented at trial demonstrates this point. Therefore, there 
was sufficient evidence and sufficiently lacking evidence to 
support a charge of theft of property in the fourth degree." 
 
Bishop's brief at 13 (citations to the record omitted). 
 
Bishop's argument leaves the impression that the money was just 
lying there on the counter and that he merely took it without interacting 
with Wallace. But no reasonable fact-finder could conclude either from 
Wallace's testimony or from the surveillance video that Bishop merely 
took the money from the counter. Wallace testified that she placed the 
money on the counter in response to Bishop's demand for it. And it is 
abundantly clear from both Wallace's testimony and from the 
SC-2023-0170 
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surveillance video that the money passed through Wallace's hands 
immediately before Bishop grabbed it.  
This Court has not directly addressed whether taking property from 
the immediate presence of another who is not touching the property is a 
taking "from the person of another." But the Commentary to  § 13A-8-2 
through  § 13A-8-5 explains that "[t]he Criminal Code also continues to 
apply a more serious sanction to thefts from the person. This position 
seems justified because it involves either an element of danger or is 
committed by professional pickpockets or pursesnatchers. Either 
situation warrants a relatively serious punishment." Based on that 
commentary, it would appear that theft is from the person whenever 
there is an element of danger to the victim. In such a case, the offense 
would be first-degree theft, which is not a lesser-included offense of third-
degree robbery because it is a Class B felony, which makes it more serious 
than third-degree robbery.  § 13A-8-3(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("The theft of … 
property of any value taken from the person of another[] constitutes theft 
of property in the first degree.").2  
 
2This appears to create an oddity in the Criminal Code. Suppose 
two thieves each steal $100 from their victims' persons. One strikes his 
victim with his fist. The other uses no force at all. The one who uses 
SC-2023-0170 
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The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Willis v. State, 480 So. 
2d 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), is instructive. In that case, the defendant 
placed a stop-payment order on a check in exchange for a cashier's check, 
which he later cashed. He then cashed the original check at a Winn-Dixie 
store. The defendant was convicted of second-degree theft, which was 
then defined as "[t]he theft of property which exceeds $100.00 in value 
but does not exceed $1,000.00 in value, and which is not taken from the 
person of another." Former  § 13A-8-4(a), Ala. Code 1975. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that, when he cashed the original check at Winn-Dixie, 
the money was taken from the person of another because the Winn-Dixie 
cashier handed him the money when he cashed the check. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals rejected that argument, holding: 
"Property is 'taken from the person of another' when the 
taking, 'involves either an element of danger or is committed 
by professional pickpockets or pursesnatchers.' Alabama Code 
1975, § 13A-8-2 through 13A-8-5 Commentary. The element 
of danger justifies the imposition of a more serious 
punishment under [first-degree theft]. Id. Since [the 
defendant's] actions in cashing the check at Winn-Dixie 
clearly did not involve an element of danger, the taking was 
not 'from the person of another.'" 
 
 
nondeadly force is guilty of third-degree robbery, a Class C felony; but 
the one who uses no force at all is guilty of first-degree theft, a Class B 
felony. 
SC-2023-0170 
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Willis, 480 So. 2d at 58. 
 
Here, Bishop's actions involved an element of danger not involved 
in Willis. Bishop did not simply conduct a transaction like cashing a 
check that was later discovered to be fraudulent. Instead, he demanded 
that Wallace give him money from the cash register using obscene 
language. In a face-to-face confrontation, such brazen demands can easily 
escalate into violence. The fact that Wallace avoided further 
confrontation by complying with Bishop's demands did not negate the 
element of danger to her person. 
Moreover, the majority of states that have addressed the question 
have concluded that theft from another's person includes theft of property 
in the immediate presence of the victim. As one commentator has noted: 
"There are in some jurisdictions special larceny statutes 
which provide a greater punishment than for ordinary larceny 
where the larceny in question is 'from the person' (popularly 
called pickpocketing) …. While the traditional view of larceny 
'from the person' is that the taking must be directly from the 
body of the person, the current majority view is that 'from the 
person' includes the area within a victim's immediate 
presence. The rationale is that, in any taking from the area 
'the rights of the person to inviolability would be encroached 
upon and his personal security endangered, quite as much as 
if his watch or purse had been taken from his pocket.' This 
'immediate presence' test 'can only be satisfied if the property 
was in immediate proximity to the victim at the time of the 
taking.'" 
SC-2023-0170 
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3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.3(b) (3d ed. 2017) 
(footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Other commentators have 
addressed the minority position as follows: 
 
"In one case [Terral v. State, 84 Nev. 412, 422 P.2d 465 
(1968),] it was said that the statutory offense of larceny from 
the person was meant to apply to pickpocketing and hence 
requires an actual taking from the person, and is not 
committed by a taking from the immediate presence and 
actual control of the person. This, however, has not been the 
general interpretation, as mentioned above. And it could not 
well be, because the statute made use of a phrase long used in 
connection with robbery, and regularly understood to include 
property taken from one's presence and control. As said by 
Coke in the 1600's: 'for that which is taken in his presence, is 
in law taken from his person.'" 
 
Perkins and Boyce, supra, at 342-43 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
Here, Bishop demanded that Wallace give him money from the cash 
register. As discussed above, that demand involved an element of danger 
to Wallace. Further, the demand required Wallace to personally handle 
the cash before placing it on the counter. And even when Wallace placed 
the money on the counter, it was still in her immediate presence and 
under her control. For these reasons, no reasonable fact-finder could 
conclude that Bishop's taking of the money was "not taken from the 
person of another." § 13A-8-5(a). Thus, "it is clear to the judicial mind 
SC-2023-0170 
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that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within the 
definition" of fourth-degree theft. Chavers, 361 So. 2d at 1107. 
Accordingly, I do not believe the circuit court exceeded its discretion in 
denying Bishop's requested instruction on fourth-degree theft. 
III. Conclusion 
 
This case serves as a reminder that whether a crime is a lesser-
included offense of another depends on the elements of both the greater 
offense and the lesser offense. Defendants seeking an instruction on a 
lesser-included offense and their counsel must pay careful attention to 
all the elements of the alleged lesser-included offense to determine 
whether the defendant's conduct could have fallen within the definition 
of that offense. In particular, when the alleged lesser-included offense is 
a theft crime that includes the requirement that the theft not be from 
another's person, that is an element that must be considered in 
determining whether the defendant's conduct fell within the definition of 
that offense. Theft is not simply robbery minus force or threat of force. 
The Criminal Code's gradation of theft crimes is more nuanced and 
requires careful parsing of the elements of each offense to determine if 
an offense is available as a lesser-included offense in a given case. 
SC-2023-0170 
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Cook, J., concurs.