Case Title: In re Ryan G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 214

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 214 
Docket: 
Yor-17-197 
Submitted 
On Briefs: October 24, 2017 
Decided: 
November 9, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE RYAN G. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother and father of Ryan G. appeal from a judgment of the 
District Court (Biddeford, Foster, J.) terminating their parental rights to 
Ryan G. pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) 
(2016).  They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
judgment and the court’s discretionary determination of the child’s best 
interest.  The father also contends that his right to counsel was violated and 
that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for amended or 
additional findings of facts and conclusions of law.1  Because the evidence 
                                         
1  Although the father attempts to challenge the temporary denial of court appointed legal 
counsel and the denial of his motion for amended or additional findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4006 those decisions were interlocutory and not appealable, and we 
will not consider them.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2) (2016); 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2016); In re L.R., 2014 ME 
95, ¶ 9, 97 A.3d 602 (“Section 4006 unequivocally provides that in child-protective cases orders 
other than termination orders, jeopardy orders, or orders authorizing medical treatment are not 
appealable.  We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature.”) (citations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted).  We note, however, that the stripping of counsel from a parent involved 
in a child protection proceeding should occur rarely, if ever.  At a minimum, the parent’s assigned 
counsel should be permitted to assist his or her client in having a financial screener, employed by 
 
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supports the court’s findings and discretionary determinations, we affirm the 
judgment.   
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by 
clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the parents are unwilling or unable to 
protect the child from jeopardy and that those circumstances are unlikely to 
change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, 
(2) that they are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within 
a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (3) that the 
mother has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with 
the child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016), and (4) that termination of 
their parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055; In re 
Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345.  The court based these 
determinations on the following findings of fact. 
 
[¶3]  In the fall of 2014, the mother and father engaged in a sexual 
relationship that involved the use of drugs, including crack cocaine.  The 
mother became pregnant and the child was born drug affected due to the 
mother’s continued abuse of drugs up until his birth, including an injection of 
heroin into her breast three hours before the child’s delivery.  The 
                                                                                                                                   
the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, review the parent’s financial affidavit before the 
court takes such an extreme step. 
 
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Department of Health and Human Services filed the present action pursuant 
to the terms of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, 
22 M.R.S. §§ 4001-4099-H (2016), and obtained temporary custody of the 
child.  The court’s termination order states: 
 
Reunification efforts with [the mother] have been stymied 
by her repeated incarcerations over the last year and one half.  
The caseworker made every attempt to maintain contact with [the 
mother], including conducting several Family Team Meetings in 
jail as well as telephone contact when that was available.  The 
reunification services for [the mother] have been consistent 
throughout the case – mental health and substance abuse 
treatment, safe and stable housing, and regular visitation.  [The 
mother] has been unable to comply with any of those obligations.  
She was unable to complete the [Intensive Outpatient Program] at 
Key3West due to continued abuse of substances.  At one point 
during the case, [the mother] had an intake appointment to attend 
Crossroads for Women, a residential substance abuse treatment 
program. . . .  However, [she was] unable to find the facility and 
missed the appointment.  [The mother] insisted she had been 
unable to reschedule another intake.   
 
 
Although 
difficulties 
with 
transportation 
and 
communication may have complicated the reunification effort, the 
hard fact is that [the mother’s] continued use and repeated 
incarcerations are the real reasons for her failure in this matter.  
Even if she is able to re-engage in treatment when released from 
jail, it will take an extended period of time to address a problem 
with which [the mother] has struggled for years and to persuade 
the [c]ourt that she has been truly successful at that endeavor.   
 
 
[¶4]  Three months after the child was born and the Department 
obtained temporary custody, paternity testing confirmed the father’s 
 
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relationship to the child.  After the father’s initial rejection of the child, his 
wife encouraged him to change his position, and he expressed an interest in 
having contact with the child.  In discussing the father, the court stated: 
 
On one level, [the father] has been extremely cooperative 
with this process.  As the [caseworker] acknowledged, he has 
expressed a willingness to do almost everything the Department 
has requested.  He went to the initial appointment for an 
evaluation at Maine Behavioral Health, completed a [Families 
Affected by Substance Abuse evaluation] at Day One, participated 
in a daylong appointment for a [Court Ordered Diagnostic 
Evaluation], and ultimately connected with [a Violence No More 
counselor] for individual counseling.  He has visited faithfully with 
his son and remained in touch with the Department. . . . 
 
 
[The father] and [his wife] have never accepted [the trial 
court’s] findings as outlined in the Jeopardy Order. . . .  At trial, 
[the father] repeatedly rejected the [c]ourt’s findings, both in 
general terms and specific points.  He referred to them as “twisted 
lies and stories.”2  In challenging the positive hair test for cocaine, 
[the father] insisted there had been no test for that substance and 
suggested it might have been the Adderall someone gave him at 
work.  He asserted that the caseworker had never mentioned 
concerns about domestic violence and never asked that he engage 
in counseling on that subject.  He continues to alternately control 
and ignore his wife, who will be the primary caretaker for [the 
child].  Throughout the case he has demonstrated an inability to 
appropriately deal with others with whom he disagrees, most 
notably the caseworker and the Guardian, often behaving in an 
aggressive and bullying manner. 
 
. . . . 
                                         
2  In the transcript, the father’s exact words were “twisted stories and lies.” 
 
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The issue as to [the father] is the time frame necessary for 
him to address the jeopardy defined by the Court.  At the time of 
trial he had just begun counseling with [a Violence No More 
counselor].  Even if he continues to attend on a regular basis, a 
proposition for which there is some doubt, [the father] has a 
significant amount of work to do before he alleviates jeopardy.  
Despite his assertions to the contrary, his wife also has work to 
do, as she would be responsible for [the child], by herself, for 
extended periods of time.  For a child who has been in foster care 
essentially since birth, the time required to complete those efforts 
is not reasonably calculated to meet his needs.   
 
[¶5]  The father’s wife is diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder, 
depression, and chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and has a history of 
self-injurious and uncontrollable behavior.  Although the court acknowledged 
that neither it nor the Department had any authority to insist that the father’s 
wife engage in services, the court noted: 
If a parent’s partner is a source of jeopardy to the child, the parent 
may have to make a difficult election.  He may attempt to 
encourage the partner to correct the behavior that presents a risk 
of harm, or, if the partner is unwilling, he may have to ensure the 
partner does not have access to or responsibility for the child.  In 
this case, [the wife], both as an individual and as a partner to [the 
father], presents jeopardy to [the child] and will be his primary 
caretaker for extended periods of time.  Unless [the wife] 
alleviates that jeopardy, [the child] would remain at risk even if 
[the father] addressed the concerns the [c]ourt raised about him. 
 
 
[¶6]  Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact 
that are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court adequately 
explained how the deficits of the parents render each parent unwilling or 
 
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unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in 
time to meet his needs, and adequately explained how the mother failed to 
make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child.  See In re 
Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195.  The court also found that the 
father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify, but this 
finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  “Where the 
court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the 
alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.”  In re K.M., 
2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (quotation marks omitted); see 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4005(1)(B).  The court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that 
termination of the parents’ parental rights, with a permanency plan of 
adoption, is in the child’s best interest.  In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, 
¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Stephen H. Shea, Esq., Fairfiled & Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellant Mother 
 
Alison B. Thompson, Esq., Hanly Law, LLC, Portland, for appellant Father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2015-30 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY