Case Title: Commonwealth v. Ng

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-10476 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  YAT FUNG NG. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 13, 2022. - February 8, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Fair trial, Public trial, 
Assistance of counsel, Sentence.  Due Process of Law, Fair 
trial, Presence of defendant in courtroom, Sentence.  Fair 
Trial.  Evidence, Hearsay, Relevancy and materiality, Self-
defense, State of mind, Spontaneous utterance.  Self-
Defense.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Fair trial, 
Presence of defendant, Public trial, Hearsay, Assistance of 
counsel, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 20, 2004. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Charles T. Spurlock, J.; and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 29, 2014, was heard by 
Maynard M. Kirpalani, J. 
 
 
 
James L. Sultan for the defendant. 
 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn S. 
Feigenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Yat Fung Ng, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
2 
 
premeditation after he shot and killed the victim, Karriem 
Brown, outside a bar in Boston.1  Following his conviction in 
2008, the defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 2.  The 
defendant filed his initial motion for a new trial in 2014, 
which subsequently was denied.  This court consolidated the 
denial of that motion with the defendant's direct appeal from 
his convictions.  Following oral argument, and review of the 
defendant's appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E), the 
case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on an unraised 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 
After the order for remand, but before an evidentiary 
hearing was held, the defendant filed a second motion for a new 
trial.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the judge allowed the 
defendant's second motion for a new trial.  The Commonwealth 
appealed, and this court reversed the allowance of the motion 
for a new trial, concluding that trial counsel in fact was not 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of carrying a firearm 
without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). 
 
2 More specifically, this court sought an evidentiary 
hearing for review of trial counsel's "decision to forgo a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, her focus on the question 
of self-defense, and her decision not to object to certain of 
the jury instructions on the use of deadly force in self-
defense." 
3 
 
ineffective.  See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242 
(2022). 
We now review the defendant's direct appeal of his 
underlying convictions, pursuant to § 33E, as well as his appeal 
from the denial of his initial motion for a new trial.  The 
defendant raises seven issues:  (1) whether the defendant's 
exclusion from all substantive sidebars during the course of the 
trial constitutes structural error warranting automatic 
reversal; (2) whether the trial judge abused his discretion in 
excluding the defendant's statement to Omar Sierra shortly after 
the shooting, where the judge determined that the statement 
constituted inadmissible hearsay; (3) whether the trial judge 
abused his discretion in admitting both the defendant's military 
records and expert testimony on the defendant's designation as 
an Army sharpshooter; (4) whether the closure of the court room 
during jury empanelment violated the defendant's constitutional 
right to a public trial; (5) whether trial counsel 
constitutionally was ineffective for failure to advocate for a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree; (6) whether 
sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, absent an individualized sentencing 
hearing, constituted cruel or unusual punishment; and (7) 
whether this court should reduce the defendant's conviction to 
guilty of murder in the second degree, pursuant to the powers 
4 
 
afforded under § 33E.  For the reasons discussed infra, we 
affirm the defendant's convictions, and we conclude that there 
is no reason to exercise our authority under § 33E either to 
reduce the verdict or to grant the defendant a new trial. 
Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving some details for later discussion.  On May 23, 
2004, at approximately 2 A.M., a bar located on Beacon Street in 
the Fenway section of Boston was closing for the night.  As the 
bar closed, patrons were being ushered out by the bar's security 
staff.  The victim was among those patrons who were leaving, 
along with his two friends, Ray Lee and Standly Miranda. 
As the patrons were leaving, an altercation ensued between 
a group of individuals and Lee and Miranda.  At first, the 
altercation was verbal, mere banter about Lee wearing a New York 
Yankees baseball cap.  However, the banter quickly turned to 
insults.  A woman in one group began to insult Lee on his 
physical appearance, to which Lee responded with insults of his 
own, calling her a "bitch" and a "ho."  At this point, the 
altercation became physical by way of pushing and punching.  The 
victim was not involved in the initiation of the altercation, 
but he joined the fight when he saw Lee and Miranda were 
involved. 
During the fight, witnesses described the victim as 
"throwing bodies" around.  Someone involved in the fight tried 
5 
 
to hit the victim; the victim then punched a man and pushed the 
woman who had been trading insults with Lee to the ground.  The 
woman exclaimed that she was going to call police; in response, 
the victim grabbed the woman's purse and threw it onto the 
median in the middle of Beacon Street.  As the fight was nearing 
an end, Lee retrieved a fraternity "step cane" from the trunk of 
his car, which was parked nearby, and began twirling it, telling 
members of the other group involved in the fight, "[Y]ou don't 
want any of this."  Lee, however, did not use the step cane to 
assault anyone physically during the fight.3  The victim never 
was seen armed with a weapon of any sort before, during, or 
after the initial altercation. 
As the initial fight had concluded, and security from the 
bar had dispersed the group of individuals who were fighting 
outside the bar, the defendant, who had witnessed the victim 
push the woman to the ground, "instinctively took his jacket off 
and ran right over to the scene."  The defendant confronted the 
victim, Lee, and Miranda, and began to threaten them with a gun.  
More specifically, the defendant told the victim and his 
friends, "You think you're bullet proof, you think you're bullet 
 
3 Lee's fraternity step cane signified his membership in an 
African-American fraternity.  The step cane was shorter than a 
typical walking cane, only the length from the ground to Lee's 
knee, as it was designed to be twirled and used for tricks 
during the fraternity's step dances. 
6 
 
proof"; "What's up tough guys?  You think you're bullet proof?  
I got something for you.  I got something for you in my trunk.  
You think you're bullet proof?"4 
At this point, Lee and Miranda grabbed the victim and tried 
to bring him back to Lee's nearby parked car, but the victim 
still was "excited" from the earlier altercation.  As Lee and 
Miranda brought the victim to Lee's car, the defendant continued 
"baiting" them in a loud, antagonistic manner.  As the defendant 
baited the victim and his friends, the defendant repeatedly 
punched his palm. 
Lee and Miranda finally were successful in getting the 
victim into Lee's car.  Miranda returned to his own car to drive 
home.  Lee tried to follow behind Miranda's car, but as Miranda 
drove away, Lee was forced to stop for a group of people who 
were walking in front of Lee's car at the intersection of Beacon 
and Miner Streets, near the bar. 
 
While the car was stopped, the victim opened the 
passenger's side door and exited; he threw his jacket on the 
ground, ripped his shirt open, and began walking toward the 
front of the bar.  The victim was yelling angrily at the 
defendant, asking why the defendant was threatening him.  As the 
victim was yelling, the defendant walked to his own car, parked 
 
4 At trial, Lee testified that what the defendant was 
referring to in the trunk of his car was a firearm. 
7 
 
in front of the bar, to which the victim responded, "You better 
run."  On hearing this, the defendant picked up his pace toward 
his car, walking purposefully.  When a nearby witness told the 
defendant something to the effect of "It's over," the defendant 
responded with either "It's not over for me" or "I have 
business." 
 
When the defendant arrived at his car, he initially 
searched through the driver's side door but then made his way to 
the trunk and emerged with a gun.5  The defendant turned to the 
defendant, raised the gun, and pointed it at the victim, saying, 
"Yeah, you want this?  You want this?"  The victim responded, 
"What are you gonna do, shoot me?  Go ahead, shoot me," as well 
as "Go ahead, do it.  Do it."  At this point, the defendant and 
the victim were at least from ten to twenty feet away from each 
other, and they had stopped advancing toward each other.6 
On hearing the victim's statements goading the defendant to 
shoot him, the defendant fired at the victim, hitting him in the 
 
5 The gun was similar in nature to a handgun. 
 
6 The description of the movements leading up to the 
shooting differed from witness to witness.  Specifically, there 
were differences regarding the distance between the defendant 
and victim at the time the defendant fired the fatal shot; 
whether the victim had continued to advance toward the 
defendant; and whether the victim had been retreating.  We 
summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, however, thus resolving these factual 
inconsistences in the prosecution's favor.  See Commonwealth v. 
Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 651 (2022). 
8 
 
forehead.7  The victim immediately fell backward onto the 
pavement.8  The defendant then got into his car and fled the 
scene.  Seeing that the victim had been shot, Lee got into his 
car as well and sped after the defendant.  Lee was unable to 
keep pace with the defendant but did manage to take note of the 
defendant's vehicle information, including his vehicle's 
registration number. 
The defendant's vehicle information was broadcast to Boston 
police; he was stopped by police in nearby Chelsea, was brought 
back to the scene of the crime, and was arrested after being 
identified by witnesses as the shooter. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Exclusion from sidebar conferences.  At 
trial, the defendant was excluded from all substantive sidebar 
conferences, despite his attorney's requests that he be present 
and subsequent objections on multiple occasions to the judge's 
decision to exclude him.  The defendant argues that his absence 
from all substantive sidebars at trial violated his 
constitutional and procedural right to be present at all 
 
7 The evidence at trial was unclear as to how many shots the 
defendant fired, ranging from at least one to no more than 
three. 
 
8 The gunshot wound ultimately proved to be fatal; the 
victim was taken off life support nearly thirty days after the 
shooting occurred. 
9 
 
critical stages of the proceedings, thus constituting a 
structural error warranting reversal. 
"Rule 18 (a) [of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 378 Mass. 887 (1979),] provides that criminal 
defendants have the right to be present at all critical stages 
of a court proceeding."  Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 
336, 343 (2021).  "[A] defendant's right 'to be personally 
present at every step of the proceedings against him . . . is of 
ancient origin.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 
Mass. 534, 543 (1988).  The rule is derived from the 
confrontation and due process clauses of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
respectively, and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Vazquez Diaz, supra at 344. 
The defendant argues that his right to be present at all 
critical stages of the proceedings was violated because he was 
excluded by the judge from being present at all substantive 
sidebar conferences during the trial.  In his brief, however, 
the defendant more narrowly focuses only on the sidebar 
conferences concerning the state of the evidence of his 
subjective state of mind as it relates to self-defense.  Those 
sidebar conferences include the initial argument on the fourth 
day of trial as to whether the testimony of a potential key 
witness, Omar Sierra, constituted inadmissible hearsay; the 
10 
 
argument for and against admissibility of Sierra's testimony 
following the voir dire of Sierra; reconsideration of the issue 
later that same day; and the defendant's choice not to call 
Sierra as a witness following the judge's exclusion of certain 
potentially exculpatory hearsay testimony from Sierra.9  Perhaps 
most importantly though, the defendant takes issue with his 
exclusion from a sidebar conference on the seventh day of trial, 
in which the judge remarked that there was "no evidence of any 
subjective fear on [the defendant's] part." 
Whether a sidebar is a critical stage requires 
particularized consideration.  A defendant's right to be present 
at sidebar is not absolute, as a judge "may perform minor 
administrative formalities" at a sidebar conference outside a 
defendant's presence without violating the defendant's right to 
be present at all critical stages of the proceedings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 530 (1993).  There also 
is no absolute right even where the defendant complains of 
exclusion from "substantive sidebars," rather than those that 
involve merely administrative matters.  See Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 98-99 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
2762 (2021), quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 280, 
285 (2005) ("Although rule 18 does not identify what stages of 
 
9 The voir dire of Sierra was also conducted outside the 
defendant's presence. 
11 
 
court proceedings are 'critical,' 'fairness demands that the 
defendant be present when his [or her] substantial rights are at 
stake'" [emphasis added]). 
The defendant's right to be present at a sidebar conference 
turns not on the substantive versus procedural dichotomy, nor 
does it turn on whether a substantive sidebar deals with an 
issue of law as opposed to one of fact;10 while those certainly 
may be considered, the defendant's right to be present at 
sidebar ultimately depends on whether his or her presence "would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure," Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987), particularly where the 
sidebar involves an issue of significance at trial and the 
exercise of the rights reserved only to the defendant, like 
here, where the sidebar conferences necessarily implicated the 
defendant's decision on whether to testify.  However, where a 
defendant's "presence would be useless, or the benefit but a 
shadow," id., quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-
107 (1934), we see no reason for the defendant to be present at 
 
10 A number of Federal courts have concluded that a 
defendant may be excluded from all purely legal discussions at 
sidebar, while recognizing that sidebars presenting a mixture of 
facts and law may raise a different set of considerations.  See 
Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 322 (2d Cir. 2000).  See also 
United States v. Taylor, 489 Fed. Appx. 34, 45 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1017 (2012); United States v. McCoy, 8 F.3d 
495, 497 (7th Cir. 1993); Robinson v. Graham, 671 F. Supp. 2d 
338, 358 n.77 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).  We decline to adopt such a pure 
fact versus law dichotomy. 
12 
 
sidebar, even where the sidebar involves a substantive issue in 
the case.  See Snyder, supra. 
Where the defendant's presence at sidebar would not be but 
a shadow, but instead would serve some consequential purpose as 
it relates to the issues of significance at trial, the 
defendant's presence at sidebar ought to be permitted.  See 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 172 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dyer, 460 Mass. 728, 738 (2011) ("When a judge 
conducts an inquiry about a consequential matter, such as an 
allegation of serious misconduct of a juror or a suggestion of 
juror bias, the defendant is entitled, based on confrontation 
and fair trial rights, to be present").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Sleeper, 435 Mass. 581, 588-589 (2002) (defendant entitled to 
be present for consequential matter of questioning impartiality 
of juror).  In such circumstances, "'[c]ounsel's presence at 
sidebar and intention to relay information to a defendant does 
not substitute for the defendant's presence' during a critical 
stage of the proceedings."  Francis, 485 Mass. at 99, quoting 
Colon, supra at 172-173. 
Allowing the defendant to be present in such circumstances 
"provides the accused with information necessary to adjust [his 
or her] trial strategy, guarantees that a defendant always has 
the opportunity to object, and, in the event of conviction, 
ensures that the defendant is able fully to assist in an 
13 
 
appeal."  Colon, 482 Mass. at 174.  This court trusts that 
judges, the defense bar, and prosecutors throughout the 
Commonwealth will encourage defendants to be present as often as 
needed and should do so based on their collective experience and 
trial judges' inherent discretion over their court rooms.11 
Here, the defendant was excluded from the substantive 
sidebars that concerned the evidence, or lack thereof, of his 
subjective state of mind as it relates to self-defense.  He 
averred in his affidavit in support of his motion for a new 
trial that he would have insisted on testifying had he heard 
that the trial judge characterized the evidence of his 
subjective state of mind as being scant.  Where the defendant 
possessed a unique perspective on the evidence of his subjective 
state of mind in the moments leading up to the shooting, the 
defendant ought to have been present at the sidebar conference.  
See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 373-374 
(2013) (defendant "has the ability to consult with his attorney 
and, as a participant in the event under examination, offer a 
unique perspective"). 
 
11 In addition to such experience, the necessary balance of 
authority between counsel's obligation to determine proper trial 
management strategy, and the defendant's exclusive authority to 
make certain fundamental decisions regarding his or her own 
defense, see Commonwealth v. Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 818-819, 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 683 (2020), also may serve as a guiding 
principle to the defendant's right to be present at sidebar. 
14 
 
While we acknowledge that it would have been better 
practice for the defendant to have been present for these 
particular sidebar conferences, we note the importance of the 
defendant's specific requests to be present at sidebar.  Without 
such a specific request to be present, the defendant's right to 
be present at sidebar will be deemed waived.  See Commonwealth 
v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 347 (2015).  See also Dyer, 460 Mass. 
at 738.  A defendant also may forfeit the right to be present 
through misconduct.12  See Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106, citing Diaz 
v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) ("No doubt the 
privilege [to be present at all critical stages] may be lost by 
consent or at times even by misconduct").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Senati, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 307 (1975) (defendant forfeited 
right to be present at trial by refusing repeatedly to obey 
judge's orders, demonstrating unrelenting determination not to 
comply with court room decorum). 
Because we hold that the defendant ought to have been 
present at the sidebar, we must next assess whether the error 
 
12 If a judge finds that a defendant is being unruly, 
disruptive, or otherwise acting inappropriately during sidebar 
conferences, or where there exist security concerns to prevent 
the defendant from being present at sidebar, the judge may 
properly exercise his or her discretion to exclude the defendant 
from sidebar.  See Commonwealth v. Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 316 
(1983), S.C., 442 Mass. 1019 (2004), citing Commonwealth v. 
Haley, 363 Mass. 513, 518-519 (1973) ("A trial judge is 
responsible for controlling the trial, maintaining order in the 
courtroom, and guarding against improper conduct of counsel"). 
15 
 
warrants reversal.  The defendant argues that his exclusion from 
sidebar conferences resulted in structural error, requiring 
reversal without a showing of actual harm.  We disagree.  
"[T]here is a very limited class of cases presenting structural 
errors that require automatic reversal absent waiver.  Such 
errors include the denial of counsel or the right to public 
trial, the omission of an instruction on the standard of beyond 
a reasonable doubt, racial discrimination in the selection of a 
jury, or trial before a biased judge" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  Francis, 485 Mass. at 99-100.  Each of these 
structural errors "contain[s] a 'defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds.'"  Francis, supra at 100, 
quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999). 
Here, the defendant's exclusion from the sidebar 
conferences in which the topic of his subjective state of mind 
was discussed does not affect the framework within which the 
defendant's trial proceeded, and thus does not constitute 
structural error; instead, the error is a constitutional trial 
error that we can quantitatively assess in the context of other 
evidence.  See Sleeper, 435 Mass. at 588-589 (defendant's 
exclusion from colloquy between judge and juror, in which 
impartiality of trial juror was questioned, violated defendant's 
constitutional right to be present but did not rise to level of 
structural error).  Such quantitative assessment involves the 
16 
 
application of a harmless error standard to determine whether 
the exclusion warrants reversal.  See id. at 589; Commonwealth 
v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 603 (1993).  Under this standard, if 
"[t]he defendant's presence . . . would not likely have yielded 
anything or altered [the] outcome," then exclusion of the 
defendant from a critical stage will be deemed harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.13  See Sleeper, supra. 
Here, any such evidence and discussion at the sidebar 
conferences in which the defendant's subjective state of mind 
was discussed only bore on the issue of self-defense, which this 
court already has held was unavailable to the defendant in these 
circumstances, given the defendant's failure to use the 
reasonable means of retreat that were available to him prior to 
shooting the victim.  See Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 253.  
 
13 We only review preserved constitutional errors under the 
harmless error standard, see Commonwealth v. Yasin, 483 Mass. 
343, 350 (2019), citing Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 
700-701 (2010), "unless the constitutional right infringed is 
'so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error'" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. 
Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163-164 (1998).  In the later 
circumstance, as explained supra, we consider the deprivation of 
the defendant's constitutional right to be structural error.  
See Francis, 485 Mass. at 99-100.  Generally, the harmless error 
standard is more favorable to the defendant than the standards 
applicable to certain other nonconstitutional errors.  See 
Vinnie, supra.  Under this more favorable standard, we presume 
prejudice when faced with a constitutional violation, and such 
prejudice can be overcome only where the Commonwealth makes an 
affirmative showing that the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Tyree, supra at 701. 
17 
 
Therefore, where the erroneous exclusion of the defendant from 
these particular sidebar conferences would not have altered the 
outcome, this trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
and does not warrant reversal.14 
 
2.  Sierra's testimony.  At trial, the defendant's primary 
defense was one of self-defense.  The defendant anticipated that 
his statement to the Commonwealth's witness, Sierra, 
approximately twenty minutes after the shooting, would aid that 
defense.  The defendant planned to have Sierra testify on cross-
examination that the defendant told Sierra, soon after the 
shooting, something akin to, "[H]e was coming at me, he was 
coming at me, so I had to shoot him."  At trial, however, the 
Commonwealth chose not to call Sierra as its witness, and 
simultaneously sought to exclude the very statement the 
defendant sought to introduce.  The trial judge ruled in favor 
of the Commonwealth and excluded the statement as inadmissible 
hearsay.  Defense counsel objected and then did not call Sierra 
as a defense witness. 
 
14 In summary fashion in his brief, the defendant also takes 
issue with his exclusion from the substantive sidebars relating 
to other evidentiary issues, including, but not limited to, 
those that addressed the admissibility of Sierra's testimony, 
the admissibility and scope of expert testimony about the 
defendant's military record, and the use of a step cane by the 
prosecutor as a demonstrative device.  Where the defendant's 
presence at these other substantive sidebars would not have 
yielded anything, or altered the outcome, we discern no 
structural error.  See Sleeper, 435 Mass. at 589. 
18 
 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in 
ruling that the defendant's statement to Sierra was inadmissible 
hearsay.  "We review a judge's evidentiary rulings for an abuse 
of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 
(2020), citing Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 237 (2014).  
Under such a standard, we "do not disturb a trial judge's 
decision absent a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
relevant factors."  Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 140 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 820 
(2017). 
 
"Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered by a witness 
at trial or hearing to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  
Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 651 (2013).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 801(c) (2022).  Hearsay is "generally inadmissible 
unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule."  
Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 305 (2004).  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 802 (2022). 
Here, the trial judge excluded Sierra's testimony that the 
defendant told him after the shooting, while still evading 
police, that "he was coming at me, he was coming at me, so I had 
to shoot him."  The trial judge determined that where the 
statement was being admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted, it was inadmissible.  Defense counsel, however, argued 
that the statement was not hearsay, as it was being admitted for 
19 
 
the nonhearsay purpose of the defendant's state of mind.  We 
disagree. 
Here, the probative value of the defendant's statement to 
Sierra rested in its ability to demonstrate that the defendant 
acted in lawful self-defense.  For a defendant to have acted in 
lawful self-defense, the defendant must have "reasonably and 
actually believed that he was in 'imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by 
using deadly force.'"  Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 396 
(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 450 
(1980).  In Commonwealth v. Burbank, 388 Mass. 789, 794-795 
(1983), we examined an almost identical factual scenario to the 
circumstances here, where the defendant called his friend the 
day after shooting the victim and told him, among other things, 
"I was chased into the alleyway and I had to fire."  While we 
determined the statement to be hearsay in character, it was 
nonetheless admitted, not because it constituted admissible 
nonhearsay or alternatively satisfied one of the hearsay 
exceptions, but rather because the prosecution failed to object 
to its admission.15  See id. at 795. 
An almost identical statement was made by the defendant 
here to Sierra.  Like the statement in Burbank, the probative 
 
15 Here, the prosecution objected to the statement's 
admissibility. 
20 
 
value of the defendant's statement is limited by its hearsay 
character, see Burbank, 388 Mass. at 795, as its value to the 
defendant is necessarily intertwined with its truth.  If the 
statement, "he was coming at me, he was coming at me, so I had 
to shoot him," were not admitted for its truth, it would not 
shed any light on whether the defendant reasonably and actually 
believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
harm, as required for the defendant to have acted in lawful 
self-defense.  See Pike, 428 Mass. at 396 (defendant must 
reasonably and actually believe he was in imminent danger of 
serious bodily harm or death to justify use of deadly force in 
self-defense).  The statement necessarily was being offered to 
prove a fact, i.e., the fact that the victim was coming at the 
defendant causing the defendant to shoot.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 793-794 (2011) (statement made to 
defendant, "You don't want to do this here," admissible not to 
prove fact that defendant did not want to shoot victim in 
victim's barbershop, but instead served as cumulative part of 
witness's statement describing verbal altercation that took 
place at victim's barbershop).  Thus, where the statement's 
truth necessarily is intertwined with its probative value, we 
agree with the trial judge that it constituted inadmissible 
hearsay. 
21 
 
We also note the deficiencies in the defendant's argument 
that the statement constituted admissible nonhearsay.  For the 
statement to be admissible as nonhearsay, the statement must be 
relevant on the defendant's state of mind in a manner separate 
and apart from its truth.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801 note ("when 
out-of-court statements are offered for a reason other than to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted or when they have 
independent legal significance, they are not hearsay").  In 
these circumstances, the statement's probative value stems from 
the fact that the statement was made, rather than to prove the 
facts asserted within.  See Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 
Mass. 535, 550 (2011).  Among the nonhearsay purposes for which 
a statement may be admissible is to provide evidence of the 
declarant's state of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 487 
Mass. 265, 272 (2021).  "For statements that convey the 
declarant's state of mind circumstantially or that are probative 
of another's state of mind," the statement is admissible for a 
nonhearsay purpose (emphasis added).  Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B) 
note (2022).  Alternatively, "[w]here the declarant asserts his 
or her own state of mind (usually by words describing the state 
of mind), the statement is hearsay and is admissible only if it 
falls within the [then-existing state of mind] hearsay 
exception."  Mass. G. Evid. § 801 note, Evidence Admitted for 
Nonhearsay Purpose, As Circumstantial Evidence of Declarant's 
22 
 
State of Mind (Mass. G. Evid. § 801 note on state of mind).  
"This exception applies only to statements that assert the 
declarant's own state of mind directly" (emphasis added).  Mass. 
G. Evid. § 803(3)(B) note, citing Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 
Mass. 493, 499 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018). 
Here, the words themselves directly described the 
defendant's state of mind, i.e., that the defendant believed he 
had to shoot the victim because the victim was coming at him.  
Because the words themselves directly described the defendant's 
state of mind, the statement is hearsay, and the proper path 
toward admissibility to demonstrate the defendant's state of 
mind would have been only through the state of mind hearsay 
exception.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801 note on state of mind. 
In coming to this conclusion, we emphasize our standard of 
review and the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in 
making evidentiary rulings.  See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 
Mass. 186, 190 (2017).  Where the judge's ruling that the 
statement was hearsay is not clear error in light of the 
relevant considerations, we can discern no abuse of discretion.  
See McDonagh, 480 Mass. at 140.  Where we discern no abuse of 
discretion in the trial judge's determination that the statement 
necessarily was being admitted for its truth, our analysis next 
turns to whether the statement is nonetheless admissible under 
one of the hearsay exceptions.  See Rice, 441 Mass. at 305.  "We 
23 
 
grant a trial judge broad discretion in determining whether a 
hearsay exception applies."  Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 
137-138 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 252, 254-
255 (2002). 
Here, the defendant's statement does not qualify under the 
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, as a statement 
"purporting to explain past conduct is not admissible" under 
this exception.  Commonwealth v. Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 327 
(2001).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii) ("Statements, not 
too remote in time, which indicate an intention to engage in 
particular conduct, are admissible to prove that the conduct 
was, in fact, put in effect.  Statements of memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed do not fall within this 
exception").  Therefore, where the defendant's statement sought 
to explain his past conduct, i.e., why he shot the defendant, it 
did not shed light on the defendant's present or future intent 
to act, and thus was not admissible under the state of mind 
hearsay exception.  See Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 281 
(1986) (suicide note confessing to killing victim not admissible 
to demonstrate premeditation and motive, where it purported to 
explain past conduct and did not disclose present or future 
intent to kill). 
At trial, the defendant also argued that the statement was 
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
24 
 
rule.  See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 476 Mass. 1041, 1042 (2017), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 558 (2015) ("A 
statement meets the test for admissibility as an excited 
utterance if '[1] there is an occurrence or event sufficiently 
startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought 
processes of the observer, and [2] if the declarant's statement 
was a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not 
the result of reflective thought'" [quotations omitted]).  See 
also Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) (2022).  Where the defendant's 
statement came nearly twenty minutes after the shooting 
occurred, undoubtedly after the defendant had time to reflect on 
the incident, we also discern no abuse of discretion in ruling 
that the statement does not constitute an excited utterance, as 
it was not "spontaneous to a degree which reasonably negate[s] 
premeditation or possible fabrication."  Commonwealth v. Linton, 
456 Mass. 534, 548 (2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 236 (1998). 
Finally, on appeal, the defendant argues that the statement 
was admissible pursuant to the more narrow constitutionally 
based hearsay exception.  See Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 
23, 36 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018) (affidavit that failed 
to fall into any traditional hearsay exception would be 
admissible where defendant establishes that such evidence [1] is 
25 
 
critical to his or her defense, and [2] bears persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness).  We disagree.16 
In Drayton, "we carved out a narrow exception for the 
'rarest' of cases 'where otherwise inadmissible evidence is both 
truly critical to the defense's case and bears persuasive 
guarantees of trustworthiness.'"  Commonwealth v. Deconinck, 480 
Mass. 254, 267 (2018), quoting Drayton, 473 Mass. at 40.  We 
have applied this exception only where it is necessary "to avoid 
injustice 'where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated,'" Commonwealth v. 
Steeves, 490 Mass. 270, 282 (2022), quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), or where "exclusion of 
evidence 'significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of [a] 
defendant's defense,'" Steeves, supra, quoting United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (1998).  Neither of those two 
circumstances is present here.  Where we have held that this 
 
16 The Commonwealth argues that trial counsel specifically 
did not raise the constitutionally based hearsay exception as 
the ground for the admission of Sierra's testimony.  The 
Commonwealth contends, therefore, that the proper standard under 
which we review the denial of the admission of Sierra's 
testimony is under § 33E, namely, whether the denial caused a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 159-160 (2020).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 472 (1972) (defendant "is 
not permitted to raise an issue before the trial court on a 
specific ground, and then to present that issue to this court on 
a different ground").  Where neither standard provides the 
defendant relief, we discern no reversible error. 
26 
 
constitutionally based hearsay exception is extremely narrow, we 
also emphasize that the exception is not, and never was intended 
to be, a catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.  See Drayton, 
supra at 32-33.  See also Deconinck, supra at 260-261. 
Even if we were to assume that the defendant's statement 
was the type of statement to come within the purview of this 
extremely narrow, constitutionally based hearsay exception, we 
are skeptical of whether the defendant's statement to Sierra was 
truly critical to the defendant's case, as the defendant at all 
times retained the absolute right to testify in his own defense 
that the victim was coming at him during the altercation, 
causing the defendant to shoot.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 456 
Mass. 476, 480 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 
262, 268 (2004) ("[T]he right to testify on one's own behalf in 
a criminal case is fundamental").  That the defendant may have 
needed to testify to demonstrate his own subjective state of 
mind during the shooting, as it relates to self-defense, would 
have violated neither his right against self-incrimination nor 
his right to present a complete defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Toon, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 651 n.12 (2002) ("That a defendant 
may need to testify or present evidence in order to raise self-
defense does not violate State or Federal constitutional 
privileges against self-incrimination").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 533 n.16, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 
27 
 
(2016) (same).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. 597, 
602-603 (2016) (right to present complete defense "is not 
unfettered; it is subject to the limitations set forth under 
standard rules of evidence"). 
We acknowledge that, because the defendant was excluded 
from all substantive sidebars at trial, see part 1, supra, the 
defendant claims he did not appreciate fully his need to testify 
on his statements to Sierra following the shooting, as well as 
his subjective state of mind.  With that in mind, even if we 
were to further assume that the defendant's statement to Sierra 
was in fact truly critical to his defense, the statement does 
not bear the requisite persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness 
to render it admissible.  See Drayton, 473 Mass. at 40.  
"[C]ertain elements support the conclusion that a hearsay 
statement has 'persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness':  
hearsay that fails to satisfy the technical requirements for a 
traditional hearsay exception, but nevertheless appears to fall 
within the rationale for such an exception; hearsay that is 
corroborated by some other evidence in the case; and hearsay 
offering a consistent account on multiple occasions over time."  
Steeves, 490 Mass. at 282-283, citing Drayton, supra at 37-38.  
The defendant's statement to Sierra that he had to shoot the 
victim was not corroborated by any other evidence in the case, 
28 
 
nor was the statement offered on multiple occasions over time as 
a consistent account of the events of the shooting. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the statement does not 
satisfy the requirements for the state of mind hearsay exception 
because it purports to explain past conduct.  See Pope, 397 
Mass. at 281.  It also fails to satisfy the rationale of an 
excited utterance because it was not "spontaneous to a degree 
which reasonably negate[s] premeditation or possible 
fabrication."  See Linton, 456 Mass. at 548, quoting DiMonte, 
427 Mass. at 236.  Therefore, where the statement also does not 
fall within the rationale of any hearsay exception, this only 
further demonstrates that the statement fails to possess the 
requisite persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness to have been 
admitted under the extremely narrow constitutionally based 
hearsay exception found in Drayton.  See Steeves, 490 Mass. at 
282-283. 
At bottom, where the judge did not his abuse discretion in 
ruling that the statement was inadmissible hearsay, which failed 
to satisfy one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule, we 
discern neither error nor prejudice.17 
 
17 Even if we were to assume that the judge abused his 
discretion in ruling that the statement was inadmissible 
hearsay, where the defendant preserved his evidentiary 
objection, we review such error for prejudice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Carney, 472 Mass. 252, 255 (2015).  In doing so, we consider 
"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error," if 
29 
 
 
3.  Expert testimony on defendant's military record.  The 
defendant argues that the judge abused his discretion in the 
admission of expert testimony on marksmanship tests the 
defendant previously had passed in order to achieve his military 
designation as a United States Army "sharpshooter" with a nine 
millimeter handgun.  We disagree. 
All evidence must meet a threshold test of relevancy such 
that it has a "rational tendency to prove an issue in the case" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 387 
(2012).  Even relevant evidence may be inadmissible, however, 
where its probative value substantially is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  Id. at 387-388.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 403 (2022).  "[T]rial judges must take care to avoid exposing 
the jury unnecessarily to inflammatory material that might 
 
any, "might have contributed to the jury's verdict" (citation 
omitted.  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 7 (2014).  
"Reversal is not necessary if the error 'did not influence the 
jury, or had but very slight effect.'"  Id. at 8, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005).  Here, the 
defendant's statement to Sierra would have been probative of the 
defendant's theory of self-defense, a theory that we previously 
concluded ultimately was not viable given the defendant's 
failure to retreat prior to shooting the victim.  See Yat Fung 
Ng, 489 Mass. at 253-254 (concluding that self-defense jury 
instruction was not warranted in this case); id. at 253, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 226-227 (2008) (to act in 
self-defense, one must "avail[] himself [or herself] of all 
means, proper and reasonable in the circumstances, of retreating 
from the conflict before resorting to the use of deadly force").  
Therefore, the defendant suffered no prejudice even if the 
statement was improperly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. 
30 
 
inflame the jurors' emotions and possibly deprive the defendant 
of an impartial jury."  Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 109 
(1995). 
"We review a judge's decision whether the probative value 
of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice under the abuse of discretion standard."  Commonwealth 
v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586, 596 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. 
Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 851-852 (2011).  Under this standard 
we "do not disturb a trial judge's decision absent a clear error 
of judgment in weighing the relevant factors."  McDonagh, 480 
Mass. at 140, quoting Brown, 477 Mass. at 820. 
The Commonwealth proceeded on a theory of murder in the 
first degree by means of deliberate premeditation.  "To prove 
deliberate premeditation, the Commonwealth has to show that the 
defendant reflected upon his resolution to kill."  Commonwealth 
v. Robertson, 408 Mass. 747, 756-757 (1990), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Dalton, 385 Mass. 190, 196 (1982).  "Deliberate 
premeditation would have been present even if the killing 
followed reflection by only a few seconds."  Robertson, supra at 
757, quoting Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 622 (1982). 
After threatening the victim and his friends following 
their physical altercation with other patrons near the front of 
the bar, the defendant returned to his car, searched through the 
trunk, retrieved a firearm, turned back toward the victim, aimed 
31 
 
the firearm at the victim as the victim goaded the defendant to 
shoot him, and shot the victim with a single fatal shot to the 
forehead.  That single fatal shot struck the victim 
approximately one and one-half inches to the left of the middle 
of his forehead.  At trial, the Commonwealth used the expert 
testimony of Edward Conley, a former United States Army staff 
sergeant, to testify about the defendant's Army records, 
particularly about the fact that the records showed that the 
defendant had attained a marksmanship qualification of 
"sharpshooter" with a nine millimeter handgun while serving in 
the Army. 
Conley explained the specifics of the test that a soldier 
must complete in order to receive such designation.  He stated 
that each soldier is faced with thirty targets during the test, 
each of which he or she has only three seconds to engage 
successfully.  A soldier must shoot successfully at least 
sixteen of thirty targets to receive a marksmanship badge, at 
least twenty-one of thirty targets to receive a sharpshooter 
badge, and then at least twenty-six of thirty targets to obtain 
the highest level of qualification, an expert qualification.  
Thus, where the defendant's Army records demonstrated that he 
had received a marksmanship badge of "sharpshooter," the expert 
opined that he necessarily must have been able to shoot 
32 
 
successfully between twenty-one and twenty-five of the thirty 
targets presented during the test. 
The defendant argues that the expert testimony of his 
skills and proficiency with a firearm implied to the jury that 
the defendant was a "trained killer."  However, "we have not 
unconditionally disapproved of the admission of weapons-related 
evidence unconnected to the commission of a crime."  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  Here, 
information about the defendant's qualification as a 
sharpshooter with a handgun was highly probative on the 
Commonwealth's theory of deliberate premeditation, as the 
defendant's qualification demonstrated his familiarity and 
specialized proficiency with a firearm.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 352-353 (2013).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Hodge (No. 2), 380 Mass. 858, 863 (1980) (defendant's 
proficiency with firearms relevant to deliberate shooting of 
victim).  Where the victim was hit with a single fatal shot that 
landed approximately one and one-half inches to the left of the 
middle of the victim's forehead, the placement of the fatal 
wound also supports a finding of deliberate premeditation.  See 
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 169 (2001).  See also 
Robertson, 408 Mass. at 757.  More specifically, the placement 
of the victim's wound is highly probative of the defendant's 
33 
 
intent and "reflect[ion] upon his resolution to kill."  See id. 
at 756-757, quoting Dalton, 385 Mass. at 196. 
The defendant characterizes his military qualifications as 
prejudicial because they paint him in a derogatory light as a 
trained killer.  However, contrary to the defendant's argument, 
his qualification as a sharpshooter was not the only subject 
about which Conley testified.  Conley also testified that the 
records demonstrated that the defendant had been discharged 
honorably from the military and had received a number of other 
medals, awards, and designations.18  Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly, the judge recognized the potential for unfair 
prejudice in the admission of the military records.  He 
specifically told the prosecutor that Conley would be permitted 
to testify only about the requirements to be qualified as a 
sharpshooter, as the prosecution was not going to be allowed to 
"make [the defendant] out [to be] a sniper or anything like 
that."  Where the judge recognized the potential for unfair 
prejudice from these records and limited the prosecutor as to 
the scope of the expert's testimony, we discern no clear error 
of judgment in the judge's weighing of the relevant factors and, 
thus, no abuse of discretion.  See McDonagh, 480 Mass. at 140. 
 
18 Those included an Army lapel button; an Army achievement 
medal, second award; a national defense service medal; and an 
Army service medal. 
34 
 
 
4.  Court room closure.  The defendant argues that the 
closure of the court room during jury selection on the first day 
of trial violated his right to a public trial under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  We disagree. 
"The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . guarantee 
defendants 'the right to a . . . public trial.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Garcia, 482 Mass. 408, 414 (2019).  "The Sixth Amendment 
right to a public trial extends to the jury selection process, 
and a violation of that right constitutes structural error."  
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 149 (2018), citing 
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017).  Where a 
defendant timely raises and preserves such a claim of structural 
error, we presume prejudice, such that reversal is automatic.  
Robinson, supra at 150, citing Commonwealth v. Jackson, 471 
Mass. 262, 268 (2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1145 (2016).  
However, "[n]otwithstanding the importance of the right to a 
public trial, it, 'like other structural rights, can be 
waived.'"  Robinson, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 
1), 456 Mass. 94, 105-106 (2010).  "Where counsel fails to lodge 
a timely objection to the closure of the court room, the 
defendant's claim of error is deemed to be procedurally waived."  
Robinson, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. LaChance, 469 Mass. 
854, 857 (2014).  This is true regardless of whether the 
35 
 
defendant's failure to object was a tactical decision or 
inadvertent.  Robinson, supra. 
After an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's first 
motion for a new trial, the motion judge found that the 
defendant's mother and cousin were told by court personnel that 
they were not allowed in the court room on the first day of 
trial while the jury was being empanelled.  They remained 
outside the court room until the jury selection proceedings on 
the first day of trial had concluded.  Both, however, were 
permitted to enter the court room for the remainder of the 
trial.  Where the right to a public trial extends to the jury 
selection process, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a 
public trial was violated.  See Robinson, 480 Mass. at 149.  
Whether such violation constitutes a structural error warranting 
automatic reversal hinges on whether the defendant lodged a 
timely objection to the court room closure.  See LaChance, 469 
Mass. at 857. 
Here, the issue of the court room closure did not come to 
light until 2014, when the defendant's mother mentioned it in 
conversation with the defendant's sister.  As such, neither the 
defendant nor trial counsel was aware at trial that the 
defendant's mother and cousin had been excluded from the court 
room during jury selection.  The mere fact that trial counsel 
was unaware of the exclusion of the defendant's mother and 
36 
 
cousin from the court room during jury selection is immaterial.  
See Robinson, 480 Mass. at 150 (procedural waiver valid 
regardless of whether counsel's failure to object was tactical 
decision or inadvertent, including where trial counsel was 
unaware of court room closure).  A contemporaneous objection 
"creates a record that can be directly reviewed by an appellate 
court without the need for collateral proceedings to develop the 
court room closure issue."  Id. at 151.  Without a 
contemporaneous objection, the trial judge is deprived of the 
ability to confront the violation of the defendant's 
constitutional rights at a time when it could be remedied.  See 
Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. at 118 n.35.  The defendant failed to 
lodge a contemporaneous objection to the court room closure; 
therefore, his argument procedurally is waived, and the 
violation does not constitute structural error warranting 
automatic reversal.  See Robinson, supra at 154.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 407, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 51 (2019); Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 480 Mass. 334, 347 
(2018). 
Nonetheless, even where the issue of court room closure is 
unpreserved, we review the defendant's claim to determine 
whether such violation created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Robinson, 480 Mass. at 147.  In 
doing so, we examine a number of factors, which include whether 
37 
 
"[t]he closure was limited to the jury voir dire; the courtroom 
remained open during the evidentiary phase of the trial; the 
closure decision . . . was made by court officers rather than 
the judge; there were many members of the venire who did not 
become jurors but who did observe the proceedings; and there was 
a record made of the proceedings that does not indicate any 
basis for concern, other than the closure itself."  Weaver, 137 
S. Ct. at 1913. 
We agree with the Commonwealth that many, if not all, of 
the factors listed in Weaver also were present in this case.  
The closure was limited only to the jury selection process, as 
both the defendant's mother and cousin were permitted to be in 
the court room during the evidentiary phase of the trial.  The 
closure also was done at the direction of the court officers, 
rather than the trial judge.  Further, there exists a transcript 
of the entire trial, from which we discern neither harm nor 
prejudice.19  Therefore, where the closure "did not pervade the 
whole trial or lead to basic unfairness," we conclude there was 
 
19 Potential harms from a court room closure include (1) the 
suggestion that a juror may have lied during voir dire, (2) 
misbehavior by the prosecutor, judge, or any other party, and 
(3) the suggestion that "any of the participants in the voir 
dire failed to approach their duties with the neutrality and 
serious purpose that our system demands."  Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 
1913.  None is present here. 
38 
 
no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1913. 
 
5.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that trial counsel's failure to advocate for a lesser 
verdict of murder in the second degree, based on insufficient 
evidence of deliberate premeditation, rendered her 
representation of the defendant constitutionally ineffective.  
"Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, we do not evaluate his ineffective assistance [of 
counsel] claim under the traditional standard set forth in 
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)."  
Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 150 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62 (2018).  Instead, we 
analyze such a claim under the more favorable standard of § 33E 
to determine whether trial counsel's alleged ineffective 
assistance created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Denson, supra at 150-151.  See Commonwealth v. Seino, 
479 Mass. 463, 472 (2018).  More specifically, "we determine 
whether defense counsel erred in the course of the trial and, if 
so, 'whether that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion.'"  Id. at 472-473, quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  "[T]he 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both error and 
39 
 
harm."  Seino, supra at 473, citing Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 
Mass. 658, 674 (2017). 
 
The defendant argues that where this court already has 
decided that no reasonable juror could have found that the 
defendant acted in self-defense, defense counsel's failure to 
advocate for a guilty verdict for murder in the second degree 
left the defendant without any true defense at all, see 
Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 441-442 (1987), and 
thus, constitutionally was ineffective. 
 
"Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is based on a strategic decision, we must determine 
whether that decision was manifestly unreasonable such that 
'lawyers of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law' 
would not consider it competent."  Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482 
Mass. 823, 826 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017).  This inquiry 
"involves both temporal and substantive considerations."  
Kolenovic, supra.  "The temporal consideration limits the effect 
of hindsight by requiring a focus on the point in time when 
counsel made the challenged strategic decision."  Id., citing 
Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 843 (2011).  Such 
limitation allows us to "make 'every effort . . . to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight.'"  Glover, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fenton F., 442 Mass. 31, 38 (2004). 
40 
 
 
At trial, defense counsel's primary defense was self-
defense.  Defense counsel had anticipated that Omar Sierra would 
testify that the defendant told him shortly after the shooting, 
"[the victim] was coming at me, he was coming at me, so I had to 
shoot him."  This evidence was excluded.  Defense counsel 
nonetheless proceeded with the theory of self-defense.  During 
her closing argument, she told the jury, "[T]his case from 
beginning to end, from beginning to end, screams of self-
defense, screams of self-defense."  She repeated that argument 
throughout her closing.20 
In our previous decision, however, we held that self-
defense was not legally available in the circumstances of this 
case because the defendant failed to retreat where he 
undoubtedly had reasonable means to do so.  See Yat Fung Ng, 489 
Mass. at 254 (self-defense unavailable where defendant had 
access to vehicle as reasonable means of retreat but instead 
chose to reach inside vehicle to retrieve firearm to shoot 
victim).  Defense counsel's decision to proceed solely on the 
legally untenable theory of self-defense after the exclusion of 
 
20 In her closing argument, defense counsel also challenged 
the element of malice, one of the essential elements of murder 
in both the first and second degrees.  More specifically, 
defense counsel stated:  "What [the prosecution does] to try to 
prove that my client committed this crime with some sort of 
malice is pathetic."  This only further supports the conclusion 
that defense counsel wanted the jury to focus their attention 
solely on an acquittal. 
41 
 
Sierra's testimony, whether strategic or not, was "manifestly 
unreasonable" and constituted error.  Rhodes, 482 Mass. at 826. 
However, although defense counsel committed a manifestly 
unreasonable error at trial, the error warrants reversal only if 
it created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 Mass. 127, 135 (2017).  See 
also Seino, 479 Mass. at 472.  Here, the error likely would not 
have influenced the jury's conclusion, and thus would not have 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
because, as discussed in part 7, infra, the evidence of 
deliberate premeditation supporting a conviction of murder in 
the first degree was strong.  See Montrond, supra at 135-136 
(trial counsel's decision not to introduce evidence of 
defendant's intoxication did not create substantial likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice on defendant's conviction of murder in 
first degree on theory of deliberate premeditation, where 
Commonwealth presented strong evidence of motive). 
Furthermore, defense counsel's rigorous advocacy focused 
the jury on self-defense.  In addition, the judge instructed the 
jury on self-defense, an instruction to which the defendant was 
not entitled given his failure to use reasonable means of 
retreat.  See Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 254.  Where the error 
awarded a benefit to the defendant to which he was not entitled, 
and where there was strong evidence of deliberate premeditation, 
42 
 
the error likely would not have influenced the jury's conclusion 
and thus did not result in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 
304, 315 (2007) (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of 
justice where trial error benefitted defendant).  See also 
Seino, 479 Mass. at 472. 
 
6.  Life sentence without possibility of parole.  The 
defendant argues that a sentence of life without the possibility 
of parole constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation 
of art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights, because the defendant 
was twenty-four years old at the time he committed the murder 
and was not afforded an individualized sentencing hearing as 
described in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and 
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 
655 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015).  We disagree. 
 
"The touchstone of art. 26's proscription against cruel or 
unusual punishment . . . [is] proportionality."  Commonwealth v. 
Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 86 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 683 (2017).  For a sentence "[t]o reach 
the level of cruel [or] unusual, the punishment must be so 
disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity."  Concepcion, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. LaPlante, 482 Mass. 399, 403 
43 
 
(2019).  The defendant bears the burden of proving 
disproportionality.  Concepcion, supra. 
In Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 673, this court concluded that 
a mandatory sentence of life without parole for juveniles 
convicted of murder in the first degree violates art. 26.  In 
light of the available scientific research on adolescent brain 
development, it was clear that "the brain of a juvenile is not 
developed fully, either structurally or functionally, by the age 
of eighteen."  See id. at 670.  Juveniles, therefore, may 
possess "diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform," suggesting that they may be "less deserving of the most 
severe punishments" (citation omitted).  Id.  As such, we held 
that juveniles ought to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation, as life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole for this narrow group of criminal defendants violated the 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment in art. 26.  See 
id. at 670-671.  We specifically limited our holding in 
Diatchenko only to those individuals under the age of eighteen 
who are faced with mandatory sentences of life without parole 
for murder in the first degree.  Id. at 673 n.17.  The exception 
to parole eligibility for those "individuals who are eighteen 
years of age or older at the time they commit murder in the 
44 
 
first degree" undoubtedly still remained valid throughout the 
Commonwealth.21  Id. 
Here, the defendant was twenty-four years old at the time 
he murdered the victim.  Aside from the defendant's age, 
however, and his claim that he was only a young adult at the 
time he committed the murder, the defendant has provided no 
evidence of any circumstance which plausibly could suggest that 
the known research on adolescent brain development, and its 
impact on adolescent behavior, ought to extend to individuals 
who are the age of twenty-four.  Cf. Garcia, 482 Mass. at 412-
413 (defendant presented at least some expert testimony that 
suggested that some brain functions do not develop fully until 
around age twenty-two).  Thus, we discern no error. 
 
7.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that because of the circumstances of this case, 
justice requires this court to reduce the defendant's conviction 
to murder in the second degree after plenary review of the 
record pursuant to § 33E.  We decline to disturb the jury's 
verdict in the circumstances of this case. 
 
21 Since our holding in Diatchenko, 466 Mass. at 670-671, we 
have declined to extend this protection to individuals who are 
over the age of eighteen.  See Garcia, 482 Mass. at 413.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Gamboa, 490 Mass. 294, 311 n.13 (2022); 
Denson, 489 Mass. at 154; Commonwealth v. Colton, 477 Mass. 1, 
18-19 (2017); Chukwuezi, 475 Mass. at 610. 
45 
 
 
This court has used its extraordinary authority pursuant to 
§ 33E "sparingly and with restraint," reducing convictions "only 
in the most compelling circumstances" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 619-620 (2020).  See 
Hartung, The Limits of "Extraordinary Power":  A Survey of 
First-Degree Murder Appeals under Massachusetts General Laws 
Chapter 278, Section 33E, 16 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 9 
(2011) (discussing low reversal rate by this court in § 33E 
cases).  See also Allen, Section 33E Survives the Death Penalty:  
Why Extraordinary Review of First-Degree Murder in Massachusetts 
Serves No Compelling Purpose, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 979, 993 
(2012) (same).  "Our power under [§ 33E] directs us to consider 
a defendant's entire case, taking into account a broad range of 
factors, when determining whether a conviction of murder in the 
first degree was a miscarriage of justice that warrants a 
reduction in the degree of guilt."  Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 94, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 (2014).  We 
emphasize that in conducting plenary review pursuant to § 33E, 
"[o]ur duty is not to sit as a second jury but, rather, to 
consider whether the verdict returned is consonant with 
justice."  Concepcion, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 
Mass. 498, 512 (2019). 
This court, however, has considered a number of factors to 
determine whether a reduction in a jury's verdict is in the 
46 
 
interests of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 
417, 431-432 (2008).  These factors include whether (1) "the 
intent to kill was formed in the heat of sudden affray or 
combat"; (2) "the homicide occurred in the course of a senseless 
brawl"; (3) "a minor controversy exploded into the killing of a 
human being"; (4) "the entire sequence reflects spontaneity 
rather than premeditation"; (5) "the defendant carried a weapon 
to the scene or left the scene after an initial confrontation 
and returned with a weapon to kill the victim"; (6) "the victim 
was the first aggressor"; (7) "the defendant and the victim were 
strangers or, if only acquaintances, whether there had been 
prior trouble between them"; (8) "the defendant and the victim 
had enjoyed a good relationship prior to the killing"; (9) 
"alcohol or drugs were involved"; and (10) "the personal 
characteristics of the defendant, such as age, family, [work 
ethic], disability, and lack of prior criminal record" 
(quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).  Id.  This 
list is not exhaustive of all possible considerations that may 
arise in the future. 
Before we examine whether the circumstances of the 
defendant's conviction warrant a reduction in verdict, we note 
that many of this court's previous reversals and reductions in 
verdict, pursuant to § 33E review, are grounded in particular 
reversible error, most often erroneous jury instructions, and do 
47 
 
not evidence a practice of this court to conclude, sua sponte, 
that the facts of the murder are so unusual and compelling that 
a reduced verdict is more consonant with justice.  See Hartung, 
supra at 9-11.  Instead, where there exists no clear reversible 
error, and where a defendant merely urges this court that the 
unique circumstances of the case warrant a reduction in the 
verdict pursuant to § 33E, we have exercised our discretion to 
reduce a defendant's verdict far less, and we emphasize that we 
will continue to do so only in the most extraordinary and 
compelling factual circumstances.  See Billingslea, 484 Mass. at 
619 (from 2011 to 2019, this court exercised § 33E powers as 
sole means of reversal in only four cases, of approximately 296 
cases and thirty-seven total reversed convictions).  See also 
Colleran, 452 Mass. at 431, quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 
364 Mass. 145, 151 (1973) ("Regard for the public interest 
impels us to use with restraint our power under § 33E to modify 
the jury's verdict"). 
In Colleran, 452 Mass. at 433, we concluded that, while 
there existed sufficient evidence for the jury to return a 
verdict of murder in the first degree by means of deliberate 
premeditation, "the heft of the evidence [fell] more squarely 
with murder in the second degree."  There, the defendant 
suffered from profound depression and mental illness, which 
produced an illogical ideation serving as the motive for the 
48 
 
defendant's deliberate killing of her two and one-half year old 
daughter.  See id. at 419, 432.  The incident reflected 
spontaneity:  it was not planned; no weapon was carried to the 
scene; no hostile relationship existed between the defendant and 
her child; the defendant "was in a stable family relationship, 
and gainfully employed"; and, although the defendant had used 
drugs before, there was no drug use in the five years before the 
murder, nor did the defendant possess any sort of criminal 
record.  See id. at 433. 
Thus, where "the evidence of premeditation was so 
intertwined with the defendant's mental illness, and where the 
case present[ed] multiple factors we have previously identified 
when exercising our power under § 33E," this court reduced the 
verdict to murder in the second degree, a verdict that was "more 
consonant with justice."  Id.  While mental illness alone 
generally is insufficient to reduce a verdict under § 33E, in 
recent years, this court has reduced convictions of murder in 
the first degree to murder in the second degree to account 
particularly for a defendant's mental health and severe mental 
illness issues.  See Concepcion, 487 Mass. at 95-96 (defendant's 
mental condition, cognitive impairments, and young age rendered 
him ill-suited to resist pressure from other adult gang members 
to carry out shooting of victim).  See also Dowds, 483 Mass. at 
513 (defendant's two serious brain injuries as child produced 
49 
 
long-term brain damage and abnormal inability to control 
impulses, which weighed heavily in defendant's reckless killing 
of victim during unarmed robbery of victim's car).  But see 
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421 (2011) (declined to 
reduce verdict where "defendant's psychological diagnosis, while 
significant, does not reach [a sufficient] level of severity, 
and there is no evidence that it was intertwined with the 
victim's killing"). 
There is nothing here to suggest that the defendant's 
killing of the victim was the result of mental illness such as 
in the aforementioned cases.  Instead, the defendant's case more 
closely aligns with those cases in which a defendant is found 
guilty of murder in the first degree as a result of a "senseless 
brawl," see Commonwealth v. Ransom, 358 Mass. 580, 583 (1971), 
or "the heat of sudden affray or combat," that demonstrates "a 
minor controversy . . . explod[ing] into the killing of 
[another]," see Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 110, 119 
(1963). 
In Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 365-366 (2016), 
this court determined that there were many Colleran factors 
present to justify reducing the verdict.  In Vargas, the victim 
burst into his estranged wife's apartment and attacked both her 
and the defendant.  Id. at 341.  The victim knocked the 
defendant back, from the living room into the bedroom, and 
50 
 
jumped on top of him, which led to the defendant stabbing the 
victim in the use of excessive deadly force in self-defense.  
Id. at 341, 366-367.  In finding the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree, the jury rejected a theory of deliberate 
premeditation and, instead, found the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, "focus[ing] its inquiry exclusively on the altercation 
itself."  Id. at 365.  The lack of clear deliberate 
premeditation demonstrated that the killing "was the result of 
uncontrolled violent action."  Id. at 367.  This was exacerbated 
only further by the evidence that the victim was the initial 
aggressor; the victim was "much larger, trained in unarmed 
combat, and [was] enraged" at the time of the altercation; and, 
moreover, prior to using the knife in killing the victim, the 
defendant asked a nearby witness to call 911.  Id. at 365.  
Therefore, where "[t]he sequence that led to the killing 
indicate[d] spontaneity, and reflect[ed] that the killing was 
more the product of sudden combat and the heat of passion than 
of malice," we found the case to be one of the unusual 
circumstances in which a reduction in the verdict from murder in 
the first degree to voluntary manslaughter was "more consonant 
with justice."  See id. at 366-367. 
Here, the victim was unarmed during the entire altercation 
with the defendant.  Unlike in Vargas, the instant defendant was 
51 
 
the initial aggressor or, at the very least, was the individual 
who reignited the already dispersed altercation, by threatening 
the victim and his two friends with deadly force.  Cf. Vargas, 
475 Mass. at 365-366.  Prior to the shooting, the victim here 
also neither had lunged at the defendant, like the victim in 
Vargas, nor used any physical force against the defendant beyond 
mere insults and vaguely threatening gestures.  See Commonwealth 
v. Vatcher, 438 Mass. 584, 588 (2003) (mere insults insufficient 
to constitute adequate provocation to negate murder conviction). 
Perhaps most important, however, for our analysis on 
whether the circumstances of the defendant's killing of the 
victim warrant a reduction in the verdict is the fifth factor 
found in Colleran, namely, "whether the defendant carried a 
weapon to the scene, . . . or left the scene after an initial 
confrontation and returned with a weapon to kill the victim."  
See Colleran, 452 Mass. at 431.  In Coleman, 434 Mass. at 166-
167, 173, this court denied relief under § 33E in almost 
identical circumstances to the present case.  There, the 
defendant was involved in an altercation where punches were 
thrown outside a nightclub.  Id. at 166.  The defendant left the 
brawl and went to a nearby car, where another man told the 
defendant, "It ain't over.  It ain't over.  Pop the trunk.  Pop 
the trunk."  Id. at 168.  The defendant then retrieved a gun 
from the trunk.  Id. at 166.  While the victim had followed the 
52 
 
defendant to the car, the victim was unarmed.  Id.  Ultimately, 
the defendant turned toward the victim and shot him at close 
range.  Id. at 168. 
In Commonwealth v. Whipple, 377 Mass. 709, 712, 714-715 
(1979), a similar circumstance unfolded, where a defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree by means of deliberate 
premeditation where a defendant disengaged from a fistfight, 
obtained a gun from a nearby car, returned to the scene of the 
previous altercation in short time, and shot the victim.  Both 
Coleman and Whipple demonstrate that where this court has been 
faced with circumstances in which a defendant has left the scene 
after an initial confrontation, only to return with a deadly 
weapon to kill the victim, we have "regularly denied § 33E 
relief."  Whipple, supra at 715.  See Coleman, 434 Mass. at 168-
169, 173.  See also Commonwealth v. Stillwell, 366 Mass. 1, 5-6 
(1974), cert. denied sub nom. McAlister v. Massachusetts, 419 
U.S. 1115 (1975) (no reduction in verdict where defendant had 
dispute with victim over ten-dollar dice game, retrieved gun 
from his house, and returned to resume argument and shoot 
victim); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 360 Mass. 708, 715 (1972) (no 
reduction in verdict where defendant argued with victim, went 
home to retrieve gun, and shortly thereafter shot victim seven 
times). 
53 
 
The facts of the defendant's case glaringly are similar to 
those of Coleman and Whipple, both of which are instances where 
this court declined to exercise its extraordinary § 33E powers.  
See Coleman, 434 Mass. at 166-167; Whipple, 377 Mass. at 714-
715.  Here, after the altercation outside the instant bar had 
concluded, and security had dispersed the two groups of 
individuals that had been fighting, the defendant confronted the 
victim, Lee, and Miranda, and began to threaten them with a gun.  
More specifically, the defendant said to the victim and his 
friends, "You think you're bullet proof, you think you're bullet 
proof"; "What's up tough guys?  You think you're bullet proof?  
I got something for you.  I got something for you in my trunk.  
You think you're bullet proof?"22  As the victim yelled back, the 
defendant walked to his own car, which led the victim to say, 
"You better run."  The defendant picked up his pace toward his 
car, walking purposefully.  When a nearby witness told the 
defendant something to the effect of "It's over," the defendant 
responded with either "It's not over for me" or "I have 
business."  In that moment, as he walked toward the car, the 
defendant "formed the plan to kill."  See Coleman, 434 Mass. at 
168.  The defendant retrieved a gun from his trunk, turned to 
the defendant, raised the gun, and pointed it at the victim, 
 
22 At trial, Lee testified that what the defendant was 
referring to in the trunk of his car was a firearm. 
54 
 
saying, "Yeah, you want this?  You want this?"  The victim 
responded, "What are you gonna do, shoot me?  Go ahead, shoot 
me," as well as "Go ahead, do it.  Do it."  As the victim 
antagonized the defendant to shoot him, the defendant fired at 
the victim, hitting him with a single shot that landed one and 
one-half inches to the left of the middle of the victim's 
forehead. 
The defendant argues that this court nonetheless should 
look to his personal characteristics as justification for a 
reduction in the verdict to murder in the second degree.23  More 
specifically, the defendant argues that at the time of the 
crime, he was only twenty-four years of age, he was employed 
gainfully by a university as a full-time security guard, he was 
enrolled as a student at a community college, he was honorably 
discharged from the United States Army, and he had no previous 
criminal record.24  While we can appreciate the fact that these 
 
23 The defendant also argues that where he received 
deficient legal representation and where there were multiple 
errors throughout his trial, this court ought to reduce the 
verdict.  Where we already have concluded, supra, that the 
defendant neither received constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel nor suffered from any other reversible 
trial error, we decline to do so. 
 
24 The defendant also urges this court to look at the fact 
that he had been drinking prior to killing the victim, as 
another factor to consider for a reduction in the verdict.  The 
mere fact that the defendant's alleged "anger and fear [were] 
somewhat compounded and heightened by drink" necessarily does 
55 
 
factors possibly could weigh in the defendant's favor, see 
Colleran, 452 Mass. at 431-432, we do not believe they are 
sufficient to warrant a reduction in the verdict to murder in 
the second degree.  The circumstances surrounding the killing 
demonstrate that the defendant "disengaged after the initial 
encounter, but then . . . chose to return."  See Whipple, 377 
Mass. at 715.  He did so despite neither being physically 
injured in the altercation nor even being involved in the 
initial altercation outside the bar.  The defendant deliberately 
left the scene to retrieve a weapon, to confront an unarmed 
victim, to "return[] to do murderous work."  See id.  See also 
Stillwell, 366 Mass. at 5-6 (defendant "left the scene for a 
[short] period of time to obtain [a] weapon[], then returned to 
the scene and committed the homicide[]"). 
The overwhelming evidence of deliberate premeditation 
boiled down to the defendant's decision to "reach[] for his 
firearm rather than his keys."  Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. at 254.  
The defendant unnecessarily caused a mere verbal argument, one 
in which he was not even involved and that initially began with 
the childish verbal banter of "Yankees suck," to explode into a 
killing through the unnecessary and unjustified use of deadly 
force.  Despite his claim that he was acting as a "good 
 
not warrant a reduction in verdict to murder in the second 
degree.  See Whipple, 377 Mass. at 715. 
56 
 
[S]amaritan," the defendant antagonized and reignited an 
altercation that had ended.  Most importantly, he retained a 
clear, short period of reflection and premeditation after the 
original verbal altercation, in which he very well could have 
gotten into his car and left the bar; instead, he chose to arm 
himself, because the situation was not "over for [him]," and he 
took care of the so-called "business" that he had with the 
victim, which unfortunately ended in the victim's death. 
The factual circumstances surrounding the defendant's case 
are not so extraordinary and compelling as to justify a 
reduction in verdict pursuant to § 33E.  See Billingslea, 484 
Mass. at 620.  Accordingly, after plenary review of the entire 
record, we discern it necessary to exercise restraint over our 
extraordinary powers pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and we 
affirm the defendant's convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
Order denying motion for a 
new trial affirmed.