Case Title: State v. McAlister

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002561

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2561 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
David McAlister, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 17, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Robert R. Henak, Ellen Henak, and Henak Law Office, 
S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Scott 
E. Rosenow. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2561 
(L.C. No.  2005CF0324) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David McAlister, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
FILED 
 
APR 17, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   In January 2007, a 
jury convicted David McAlister, Sr. ("McAlister") of attempted 
armed robbery (threat of force), armed robbery (threat of force) 
and possession of a firearm by a felon for crimes that occurred 
in late 2004.  At trial, the State presented testimony from 
Nathan Jefferson ("Jefferson") and Alphonso Waters ("Waters").  
They testified that McAlister was their accomplice in the 
robberies.    
¶2 
In 2014, McAlister filed the Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion for a new trial that is now before us.  He alleged that 
he had newly discovered evidence represented by the affidavits 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
2 
 
of three men who allege that Jefferson and Waters lied when they 
testified that McAlister was involved in the crimes for which he 
was convicted.  The circuit court1 denied McAlister's motion 
without an evidentiary hearing, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.2 
¶3 
Our review focuses on whether McAlister has provided 
newly discovered evidence that is sufficient to require the 
circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing.  In so doing, we 
consider whether the affidavits McAlister submitted in support 
of his motion meet the requirements necessary to qualify as 
newly discovered evidence.  We specifically examine whether the 
affidavits were cumulative evidence and whether they were 
uncorroborated evidence for which corroboration should be 
required.   
¶4 
We conclude that the affidavits were merely cumulative 
evidence because they were additional evidence of the same 
general character as was subject to proof at trial, i.e., that 
Jefferson and Waters lied when they implicated McAlister in 
order to achieve favorable plea bargains for themselves.  We 
also conclude that the affidavits were insufficient to require 
the circuit court to hold a hearing on McAlister's motion for a 
new 
trial 
because 
they 
were 
supported 
by 
neither 
newly 
discovered corroborating evidence or circumstantial guarantees 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Emily S. Mueller of Racine County presided. 
2 State v. McAlister, No. 2014AP2561, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016). 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
3 
 
of trustworthiness.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied McAlister's 
motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.  State v. 
Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶22, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' affirmance of the 
circuit court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The two crimes of which McAlister was convicted 
occurred in December 2004 in the City of Racine.  On December 
21, Nathan Jefferson and Monique McAlister ("Monique") attempted 
an armed robbery of the Catholic Community Credit Union (the 
"Credit Union").3  When the Credit Union's security alarms began 
to ring, Jefferson and Monique ran from the scene without any 
money.  On December 28, Waters, Jefferson and Monique committed 
an armed robbery at Wisconsin Auto Title Loan ("Title Loan").  
¶6 
Police arrested Waters and Jefferson separately in 
March 2005 for robberies unrelated to the December 2004 
robberies.  Waters was questioned by Racine Police Investigator 
William Warmington regarding an armed robbery that occurred at 
an Open Pantry.  Waters initially denied any knowledge or 
involvement, but after being confronted with video footage that 
Warmington indicated matched the description of one of the 
offenders, Waters admitted that he had been involved.  Waters 
                                                 
3 Monique McAlister is the defendant David McAlister's 
niece.  She also is referred to as Monic McAlister in the 
record. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
4 
 
told Warmington that McAlister had planned the robbery at Title 
Loan and served as the getaway driver.  Waters described in 
detail the location of and the interior of McAlister's home, 
including where the gun used in the Title Loan robbery could be 
found.  
¶7 
Upon his arrest, Jefferson told police that McAlister 
had planned each of the December robberies, served as the 
getaway driver and provided the gun he carried at the Credit 
Union.  Based on the information obtained from Waters and 
Jefferson, police obtained a search warrant for McAlister's 
residence, where they found a .22-caliber handgun.  McAlister, 
who is a convicted felon, was arrested.   
¶8 
At McAlister's trial, Waters testified on behalf of 
the State.  He testified that shortly before December 28, 2004, 
McAlister had driven Waters to Title Loan, where he instructed 
Waters how to conduct the robbery.  On December 28, McAlister 
picked up Waters in a gray Hyundai, a picture of which was 
received as Exhibit 4 and then picked up Monique and Jefferson.  
¶9 
After testifying that the gun the police took from 
McAlister's house, which had been marked as Exhibit 11, was 
"very familiar," Waters described the robbery itself.  On cross-
examination, 
defense 
counsel 
repeatedly 
attacked 
Waters' 
credibility.  Defense counsel hammered on Waters' history of 
lying to police, calling attention to Waters' initial statements 
to police after his March 2005 arrest.  
Q. 
You denied that you robbed the Open Pantry? 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
5 
 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
You told them: No, I didn't.  I had no 
involvement with that? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Then they told you that they had video of 
the robbery? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And that they believed you were the guy that 
did it? 
A. 
Right. 
. . . .  
Q. 
You knew then that the detectives had solid 
evidence establishing that you had committed an armed 
robbery? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
At that point in time, you asked the 
detectives:  What am I looking at? 
A. 
Right. 
Q. 
And by that you meant, how much prison time 
am I going to get for having done this armed robbery? 
A. 
Yeah. 
Q. 
Then you asked them, quote, what can I tell 
you to help me, right? 
A. 
If I -- yeah.  If I did, instinct I did 
because I knew that I was in trouble.  I didn't know, 
you know, what was really going on.  So you know, 
yeah, I was looking for help. 
. . . .  
Q. 
You are willing to lie to keep yourself out 
of jail? 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
6 
 
A. 
Well, out of instinct because I've -- I've 
been arrested so many times, 13 times, and when they -
- when I seen that I was in trouble, of course, yes.  
I -- I didn't want to be in trouble.  I was trying to 
talk my way out of it, yes. 
. . . .  
Q. 
Now, the whole reason that you started to 
ask them about what you could do to help yourself and 
will they give me a break if I tell something, is you 
wanted to make a deal, right? 
A. 
No.  I knew that by being honest -- because 
I've dealt with the court system for so long, I knew 
if I was being honest, that things would be easier on 
me in the long run because the more you lie, the more 
trouble you get into.  So I wanted to clear things up 
at that time. 
. . . .  
Q. 
Now, 
you 
are 
aware 
that 
in 
November . . . November 10th, of 2003, you came into 
contact with police at that point.  It was an Officer 
Stehlow who had asked you your name, and at that point 
in time you told him your name was Steve Jordan, 
correct? 
A. 
I don't remember that. 
[Defense counsel refreshes Waters' recollection]. 
Q. 
Okay.  Now that you've reviewed that, you 
recall that in November of '03, you were confronted by 
this police officer? 
A. 
Yes.  And I obstructed by telling him a 
different name, yes.  
. . . .  
Q. 
Now, on October 30th, of 1998, do you recall 
being again confronted by the police and identifying 
yourself as Steve Morris, with a date of birth 12/6 of 
'68? 
[Defense counsel refreshes Waters' recollection]. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
7 
 
A. 
I obstructed.  I gave a false name. 
. . . .  
Q. 
On July 19th, of 1998, do you recall having 
been confronted by the police and identifying yourself 
as Marcus L. Booker, date of birth 12/16 of '69? 
A. 
Not that I recall. 
[Defense counsel refreshes Waters' recollection]. 
Q. 
Okay.  You agree with me that on this day 
you lied to the police, gave them the name Marcus 
Booker, date of birth 11/18/69? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And again, the whole reason that you lied 
was to try to keep yourself out of jail? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
That's something that you are willing to do? 
A. 
At those moments, yes. 
Q. 
But not at this moment? 
A. 
Those were the past.  This is the future. 
Q. 
When did the future begin? 
A. 
The day that I got arrested. 
Q. 
So for the first time in your career, first 
time in your adult life that you decided that things 
were going to be different and now you're going to 
tell the truth, was when you were arrested by 
Investigator Warmington and Investigator Diener? 
A. 
Yes.  
¶10 On re-cross, defense counsel suggested that because 
Waters now faced 154 years total incarceration, he had a very 
big incentive to implicate McAlister.  Waters denied that he had 
any knowledge of a deal. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
8 
 
Q. 
You understand that because you've agreed to 
testify here today, that what the prosecutor is going 
to do is he's somehow going to reduce your exposure? 
A. 
No.  I didn't know any of that. 
Q. 
You were unaware that your lawyer had cut 
this deal with the prosecutor? 
A. 
No, no.  I never -- no one ever brought me 
anything about a deal to me, no. 
Q. 
Your lawyer, who is sitting right there, 
your position is he has never discussed with you the 
fact that you have an agreement with the DA? 
A. 
No. 
¶11 The following day, however, the court read this 
stipulation to the jury: 
The State of Wisconsin by Assistant District 
Attorney James Newlun and defendant David McAlister 
personally and by attorney Patrick K. Cafferty hereby 
agree that the following is true.  One, the District 
Attorney's office has agreed that it would reduce the 
maximum sentence Alphonso Waters faces by either 
dismissing some of his charges or reducing the 
seriousness of the charges. 
Two, the District Attorney's office has agreed to 
recommend that Alphonso Waters should serve less 
prison time than it would have recommended if Alphonso 
Waters had not testified in the trial of David 
McAlister. 
And three, Assistant District Attorney James 
Newlun conveyed the terms of this agreement to 
Alphonso Waters through his attorney Douglas Pachucki 
sometime prior to Waters testifying on January 23rd, 
2007. 
¶12 Jefferson also testified on behalf of the State.  
During his questioning by the assistant district attorney, 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
9 
 
Jefferson admitted that he had a plea bargain with the State and 
the terms of that bargain.  
¶13 Jefferson admitted that he and Monique attempted to 
rob the Credit Union.  He said that McAlister had driven them to 
and from the Credit Union in a four-door gray Hyundai, a picture 
of which was received as Exhibit 5.  He said that McAlister 
provided the .22 semiautomatic handgun that he carried, which he 
identified as Exhibit 11.  
¶14 Jefferson also testified about the Title Loan armed 
robbery.  Jefferson stated that on that day, in the same 
vehicle, McAlister drove Jefferson, Waters and Monique to Title 
Loan to commit the robbery.  After the robbery, McAlister drove 
the four of them back to his apartment, which Jefferson 
described consistently with Waters' earlier description given to 
police.   
¶15 When questioned by police, Jefferson stated that he 
had originally lied, but later told the truth about the two 
robberies.  Jefferson testified that at the time of his arrest 
he was aware that Waters had also been arrested because 
McAlister had told him as much.  McAlister had told Jefferson, 
"Don't say nothing about the robberies; and if I did, that he'll 
make my life a living hell."  
¶16 On cross-examination, defense counsel stressed that 
the effect of the plea agreement between Jefferson and the State 
was that Jefferson's imprisonment exposure was reduced from 60-
plus years to 20 years.  As he did with Waters, defense counsel 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
10 
 
drew attention to Jefferson's past lies to police to avoid going 
to jail.  
¶17 At the conclusion of testimony, the circuit court read 
the following jury instructions regarding witnesses' testimony: 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to 
weigh the testimony of witnesses and to determine the 
effect of the evidence as a whole.  You are the sole 
judges of the credibility, that is the believability, 
of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to 
their testimony.  In determining the credibility of 
each witness and the weight you give to the testimony 
of each witness, consider these factors. 
Whether the witness has an interest or lack of 
interest in the result of this trial; the witness's 
conduct, appearance and demeanor on the witness stand; 
the clearness or lack of clearness of the witness's 
recollections; the opportunity the witness had for 
observing and for knowing the matters that the witness 
testified about; the reasonableness of the witness's 
testimony; the apparent intelligence of the witness; 
bias or prejudice, if any, that has been shown; 
possible motives for falsifying testimony; and all 
other facts and circumstances during the trial which 
tend either to support or to discredit the testimony. 
. . . .  
You have heard testimony from Alphonso Waters and 
Nathan Jefferson who stated that they were involved in 
the crimes charged against the defendant.  You should 
consider this testimony with caution and great care, 
giving to it the weight that you believe it is 
entitled to receive.  You should not base a verdict of 
guilty upon it alone unless after consideration of all 
the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
You have heard testimony from the two witnesses 
Alphonso Waters and Nathan Jefferson who have received 
consideration for their testimony.  These witnesses, 
like 
any 
other 
witness, 
may 
be 
prosecuted 
for 
testifying falsely.  You should consider whether 
receiving consideration affected the testimony and 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
11 
 
give the testimony the weight that you believe it is 
entitled to receive.  
¶18 Following deliberations, McAlister was found guilty of 
attempted armed robbery with use of force in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.32(2), armed robbery with threat of force in 
violation of § 943.32(2) and possession of a firearm by a felon 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).   
¶19 In May 2008, McAlister moved for a new trial, arguing 
that (1) the State failed to provide full disclosure of the 
terms of agreements struck between the State and Waters and 
Jefferson; (2) the jury was not informed that Waters' and 
Jefferson's plea offers were "performance based" or otherwise 
contingent on their value to the State; (3) the State failed to 
correct Waters' alleged perjury; (4) the real controversy was 
not fully tried because the jury did not hear testimony from 
alibi and other witnesses; and (5) McAlister had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed 
to introduce alibi and exculpatory evidence.  His motion was 
denied following an evidentiary hearing on October 23, 2008.  
¶20 On May 19, 2014, McAlister filed the motion for 
postconviction relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 that is now 
before us, claiming that he had newly discovered evidence.  In 
support of his motion, McAlister submitted affidavits of three 
men who claimed that Jefferson and Waters admitted prior to 
trial that they intended to falsely accuse McAlister of 
involvement in crimes in order to reduce their own punishment.   
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
12 
 
¶21 Wendell McPherson ("McPherson") swore that in March 
2006, 
while 
he 
and 
Waters 
were 
incarcerated 
at 
Dodge 
Correctional Institution, Waters told McPherson that "he lied 
and told the police that, David McCallister [sic] planned these 
armed robberies, [and] also said he lied and told police that 
David McCallister [sic] gave him the gun to use and [] drove the 
get away car."  Waters also allegedly told McPherson that while 
he was in Racine County Jail, he wrote Jefferson explaining what 
to say to police.  The attestation of McPherson's affidavit 
occurred 
March 
22, 
2013, 
seven 
years 
after 
the 
alleged 
conversations with Waters took place. 
¶22 Corey Prince ("Prince") swore that between January 4, 
2006 and May 25, 2007, while he and Jefferson were in the Racine 
County Jail, Jefferson told him that his co-defendant, Alphonso 
"Bird" Waters, had instructed him on exactly what to say 
regarding their pending charges.  Jefferson allegedly told 
Prince that "the older man was never involved in any of the 
robberies they committed[, and] 'Bird' instructed him to lie so 
that they could receive a shorter sentence."  Prince said that 
in 2012 he met McAlister at the Waupun Correctional Institution.  
Prince said he overheard McAlister talking about his case, and 
how two men named "Nate" and "Bird" had framed him.  Prince then 
approached McAlister and told McAlister what he knew.  Prince's 
affidavit was attested to on August 8, 2012, between five and 
one-half and six years after the alleged conversation with 
Jefferson took place. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
13 
 
¶23 Antonio Shannon ("Shannon") swore that on December 28, 
2004, he and a woman were sitting in his car across from Title 
Loan.  They saw a hooded man running towards them, followed by 
police sirens.  Two years later, Shannon was housed in the 
Racine County Jail with Jefferson.  Jefferson told Shannon of 
his involvement in the Title Loan robbery.  Shannon said that 
Jefferson told him that he and a man named "Bird" were the only 
two people involved in the robbery, but that he had an "out," 
which was a plea deal if he testified against "someone he said 
was not involved in the robbery."  The attestation was signed on 
September 25, 2013, seven years after the alleged conversation 
took place.   
¶24 McAlister argued, pro se, that he was entitled to a 
new trial as a matter of due process.  The circuit court denied 
McAlister's motion without an evidentiary hearing.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.  We granted review, appointed counsel for 
McAlister, and now affirm the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶25 The issue in this case is whether McAlister's Wis. 
Stat. § 974.06 motion for a new trial is sufficient to entitle 
him to an evidentiary hearing based on a newly discovered 
evidence claim.  To decide that question, "[f]irst, we determine 
whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief."  State v. Allen, 
2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433.  We review 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
14 
 
this question of law, independently, based on the specific 
factual allegations made and the record as a whole.  State v. 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-10, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).   
¶26 Second, "if the motion does not raise facts sufficient 
to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the 
defendant is not entitled to relief," the decision to grant or 
deny a hearing is within the circuit court's discretion.  Allen, 
274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9.  "A circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard to newly-
discovered evidence."  State v. Plude, 2008 WI 58, ¶31, 310 
Wis. 2d 28, 750 N.W.2d 42 (citing State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 
463, 474, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997)).   
B.  General Principles 
1.  Perjury concerns 
¶27 The gravamen of McAlister's argument is that Waters 
and Jefferson perjured themselves at his trial when they 
testified that he was involved in armed robberies.  At the 
outset, we emphasize that "the crime of perjury erodes the 
integrity of our judicial system."  State v. Canon, 2001 WI 11, 
¶9, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 622 N.W.2d 270.  Its effect is profound 
whether the perjury is in trial testimony or in affidavits 
submitted to the court.  This is so because "[i]t is fundamental 
to the American system of jurisprudence that a witness testify 
truthfully.  Without truthful testimony, it is nigh onto 
impossible to achieve the primary goal of our judicial system, 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
15 
 
justice."  State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 416-17, 316 
N.W.2d 395 (1982); see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 
564, 576 (1976) ("Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant 
affront 
to 
the 
basic 
concepts 
of 
judicial 
proceedings.  
Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are 
therefore imperative."). 
¶28 However, whether to grant a hearing on a Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence that claims to uncover perjured trial testimony 
requires careful examination of the movant's specific factual 
allegations in the context of the record as a whole.  Zillmer v. 
State, 
39 
Wis. 2d 
607, 
612-13, 
159 
N.W.2d 
669 
(1968).  
Furthermore, in a § 974.06 motion, the burden shifts to the 
defendant 
who 
must 
show 
the 
need 
for 
a 
postconviction 
evidentiary hearing with a clearly articulated justification.  
State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶58, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 
334.   
2.  Postconviction motions 
¶29 "After the time for appeal or postconviction remedy 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 974.02 has expired, a prisoner in 
custody under sentence of a court may bring a motion to vacate, 
set aside, or correct a sentence, utilizing the procedure set 
out in Wis. Stat. 974.06."  Id., ¶34 (citing State v. Allen, 
2010 WI 89, ¶22, 328 Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124).  Under 
§ 974.06(1), a prisoner may make such a motion where he or she 
is claiming that:  (1) his sentence was imposed in violation of 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
16 
 
the constitution; (2) the court imposing the sentence was 
without jurisdiction; (3) the sentence was in excess of the 
maximum; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral 
attack.  Id. 
¶30 McAlister argues that his motion is a matter of due 
process.  The State, however, argues that claims of actual 
innocence based on newly discovered evidence do not fall into 
any of the permissible categories under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  
The State raises an interesting issue given the facts presented; 
however, we do not decide this issue because the State did not 
present it to the circuit court, to the court of appeals or in 
its response to the petition for review.  Accordingly, we deem 
the issue forfeited.  See State v. Hendricks, 2018 WI 15, ¶32, 
379 Wis. 2d 549, 906 N.W.2d 666. 
3.  Newly discovered evidence 
¶31 If a judgment is to be set aside based on newly 
discovered evidence, the defendant must provide sufficient 
evidence to establish that defendant's conviction is a manifest 
injustice.  Plude, 310 Wis. 2d 28, ¶32.  To obtain an 
evidentiary hearing for such an allegation, a defendant must 
show specific facts that are sufficient by clear and convincing 
proof, when considered in the context of the record as a whole, 
that:  (1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking the evidence; (3) the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; and (4) the 
evidence is not merely cumulative.  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶25; 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
17 
 
State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶43, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 
(citing State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶161, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 
700 N.W.2d 98); see also State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 805-
06, 285 N.W.2d 905 (1979); McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473.   
¶32 If a defendant satisfies those four criteria, then 
"the 
circuit 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
probability exists that a different result would be reached in a 
trial."  Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶25 (citing McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 473).  "A reasonable probability of a different 
result exists if there is a reasonable probability that a jury, 
looking at both the old and the new evidence, would have a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."  Id. (citing 
Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶44).   
¶33 A claim of newly discovered evidence4 that is based on 
recantation also requires corroboration of the recantation with 
additional newly discovered evidence.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 
476.  As we have explained, "[r]ecantations are inherently 
unreliable."  Id. (citing Dunlavy v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 21 
Wis. 2d 
105, 
114, 
124 
N.W.2d 
73 
(1963)). 
 
Therefore, 
corroboration requires newly discovered evidence that "(1) there 
is a feasible motive for the initial false statement; and, 
(2) there are circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness 
of the recantation."  Id. at 478; see also Zillmer, 39 Wis. 2d 
                                                 
4 Although as we explain below, the evidence at issue does 
not fully meet the definition of recantation evidence, a 
corroboration analysis does provide a useful framework for 
discussing the evidence presented.     
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
18 
 
at 616 (concluding that "a new trial may be based upon an 
admission of perjury if the facts in the affidavit are 
corroborated by other newly discovered evidence").  
C.  Application 
1.  Cumulative 
¶34 It is clear that McAlister has satisfied the first 
three requirements necessary to secure an evidentiary hearing 
based on newly discovered evidence.5  However, whether the 
affidavits satisfy the fourth requirement necessary to qualify 
as newly discovered evidence is unclear; i.e., whether the 
affidavits are cumulative of trial evidence that attacked 
Jefferson's and Waters' credibility.   
¶35 The court of appeals concluded that the affidavits 
submitted by McAlister were "merely an attempt to retry the 
credibility of Waters and Jefferson, whose credibility was well-
aired 
at 
trial." 
 
State 
v. 
McAlister, 
No. 
2014AP2561, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2016).   
¶36 McAlister asks us to ignore the court of appeals' 
decision and recognize that the State has conceded that 
McAlister 
met 
the 
first 
four 
requirements 
of 
his 
newly 
                                                 
5 The first three requirements are:  (1) the evidence 
contained in the written affidavits was not discovered until 
after McAlister's conviction; (2) McAlister was not negligent in 
failing to seek this evidence; and (3) the affidavits are 
material 
to 
whether 
McAlister 
participated 
in 
the 
armed 
robberies.  State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶25, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 
826 N.W.2d 60.   
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
19 
 
discovered evidence claim.6  However, whether alleged newly 
discovered evidence is cumulative forms part of our legal 
determination of whether a jury considering the old and new 
evidence would have a reasonable doubt as to McAlister's guilt.  
Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶25.  We are not required to accept the 
State's concession.  State v. Gomaz, 141 Wis. 2d 302, 307-08, 
414 N.W.2d 626 (1987).  Accordingly, we do not.7 
¶37 We have long held that newly discovered evidence that 
is merely cumulative is not grounds for a new trial.  Lock v. 
State, 31 Wis. 2d 110, 116, 142 N.W.2d 183 (1966).  Newly 
discovered evidence is cumulative where it tends to address "a 
fact established by existing evidence."  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, ¶78, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (citing Washington v. 
Smith, 219 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Wilson v. Plank, 
41 Wis. 94, 98 (1876) (stating that newly discovered evidence in 
the form of witness testimony is merely cumulative where it 
"tends to prove propositions of fact which were litigated at 
trial").   
¶38 Notwithstanding the above principles applicable to 
evaluating 
newly 
discovered 
evidence, 
defining 
when 
such 
                                                 
6 "The State concedes that McAlister has met the first four 
requirements [for newly discovered evidence]."  State's Br., 18 
n.5. 
7 We are always disappointed when counsel concedes a 
difficult issue, as counsel for the State has done here.  The 
sorting out of difficult legal questions is where we most need 
counsel's thoughtful assistance.   
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
20 
 
evidence is cumulative is difficult because the definition of 
cumulative evidence turns to some degree on how the trial issue 
is described.  For further guidance, we look to federal courts, 
who also evaluate when newly discovered evidence is cumulative.  
See 33 Fed. R. Crim. P.    
¶39 In regard to motions for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence, the United States Supreme Court has long 
concluded that newly discovered evidence that is cumulative will 
not support a motion for a new trial.  The Court has defined 
cumulative evidence as, "additional evidence of the same general 
character, to some fact or point, which was subject of proof 
before."  Southard v. Russell, 57 U.S. 547, 554 (1853).  
Recantation testimony is often termed cumulative because it 
"serves merely to impeach cumulative evidence rather than to 
undermine confidence in the accuracy of the conviction."  
Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1234 (1984).  Where the 
credibility of a prosecution witness was tested at trial, 
evidence that again attacks the credibility of that witness is 
cumulative.  United States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1171 
(11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that evidence bearing on the 
credibility of a witness impeached at trial is cumulative).    
¶40 Here, McAlister submitted a 2012 affidavit from Prince 
about statements he claims that Jefferson made to Prince prior 
to May 25, 2007; a 2013 affidavit from Shannon in which Shannon 
relates what he says that Jefferson told him in 2006; and a 2013 
affidavit from McPherson about statements he claims to have 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
21 
 
heard Waters make in 2006.  Each affiant swears that, at some 
point prior to McAlister's January 2007 trial, Jefferson or 
Waters admitted their plan to perjure themselves at trial to 
secure a plea bargain that would provide less imprisonment for 
crimes to which they pled.  
¶41 Jefferson testified to the attempted armed robbery of 
the Credit Union, which he said that McAlister planned.  
Jefferson 
said 
that 
he 
and 
McAlister's 
niece, 
Monique, 
participated in that attempted robbery.  He testified that 
McAlister drove him and Monique to the Credit Union in a four-
door gray Hyundai.  He said that McAlister instructed him to 
carry a .22 semiautomatic handgun, which McAlister provided.  
¶42 Jefferson also described the armed robbery of Title 
Loan, in which he, Waters and Monique participated.  Jefferson 
said that McAlister again drove the participants to the scene of 
the robbery in a gray Hyundai.  Jefferson testified that Waters 
carried the same gun that McAlister had provided to him for the 
attempted robbery of the Credit Union.  After the Title Loan 
robbery, Jefferson described going to McAlister's house, which 
was a two-family house where McAlister had the upper floor 
apartment.  
¶43 Jefferson 
testified 
that 
he 
was 
offered 
"consideration" 
from 
the 
district 
attorney's 
office 
for 
providing truthful testimony about the robberies.  Jefferson 
confirmed that he had been charged with an armed robbery and an 
attempted armed robbery.  He said that if he pled to attempted 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
22 
 
armed robbery and testified at trial, the armed robbery would be 
read-in, the sentence enhancers would be dismissed and the State 
would recommend less prison time.  Jefferson further explained 
that before he had a plea offer he had relayed the same 
information about the robberies and McAlister's involvement to 
police.  He had asked them for consideration for his testimony 
and the officers said they could not do that.   
¶44 On cross-examination, Jefferson acknowledged that the 
effect of his plea agreement was to reduce his exposure for 
imprisonment from a potential maximum of 60 years to a potential 
maximum of 20 years.  He also acknowledged that the district 
attorney would recommend less prison time because he cooperated.  
Jefferson said that he was on probation or extended supervision 
when he committed the crimes, and that he cooperated with the 
officers because he was concerned about his probation getting 
revoked and he thought that they might help him. 
¶45 Before the jury, both the prosecutor and McAlister's 
attorney repeatedly probed Jefferson's credibility and fully 
laid out the terms of the plea agreement that Jefferson believed 
he had been offered for testifying against McAlister.  The jury 
had to consider whether Jefferson had testified truthfully, or 
whether his testimony was in response to the State's offer of a 
lower sentence on his convictions if he testified against 
McAlister.   
¶46 Both Prince's and Shannon's affidavits assert that 
McAlister was not involved in armed robberies with Jefferson, 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
23 
 
and that Jefferson framed him to get a plea bargain that would 
yield a favorable sentencing recommendation.  These allegations 
are of the same general character, and to the same point for 
which testimony was elicited at trial, i.e., whether Jefferson's 
testimony that McAlister was involved in the armed robberies was 
truthful or whether he testified falsely to get a favorable plea 
bargain.   
¶47 Moving on to McPherson's affidavit, it focuses on 
Waters' testimony and asserts that Waters lied about McAlister's 
involvement in the armed robberies to get a favorable plea 
bargain.  As with Jefferson, Waters was questioned repeatedly 
about the specifics of McAlister's involvement, from getting 
picked up in McAlister's gray Hyundai, to picking up Jefferson 
and Monique, to providing the .22 semiautomatic gun that Waters 
carried.   
¶48 McAlister's 
attorney 
questioned 
Waters 
about 
his 
repeated lying to authorities on many occasions, in regard to 
other matters as well as in regard to armed robberies.  He 
attempted to show that Waters did not have a character for 
truthfulness, but rather, lied whenever it suited his purposes.  
He also elicited Waters' agreement that he talked to police 
officers and was testifying against McAlister with the hope of 
receiving a lesser sentence for the crimes to which he pled.   
¶49 Waters 
acknowledged 
that 
he 
faced 
substantial 
imprisonment for the crimes to which he pled and that he hoped 
his testimony at McAlister's trial would help him.  Once again, 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
24 
 
the statements attributed to Waters in McPherson's affidavit are 
additional statements of the same general character and to the 
same point that was subject to proof at trial:  Waters is a 
repetitive liar; his testimony that McAlister was involved in 
the robbery is not believable.  The jury heard it all before.  
The McPherson affidavit is cumulative because it was drawn to 
the same point, i.e., that Waters' testimony was given in 
exchange for a lesser sentence for his own crimes.  This is the 
same evidence that was presented to the jury.   
¶50 Accordingly, given the testimony at trial, the three 
affidavits were of the same general character and drawn to the 
same point, Jefferson and Waters lied about McAlister to benefit 
themselves; therefore, the affidavits are cumulative.  McAlister 
did not satisfy the fourth requirement necessary to qualify as 
newly discovered evidence. 
¶51 Our conclusion that the affidavits of McPherson, 
Prince and Shannon are merely cumulative evidence of the same 
general character and drawn to the same point for which proof 
was provided at trial, i.e., that Jefferson and Waters lied to 
benefit themselves, is sufficient to affirm the court of 
appeals.  See Avery, 345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶25.  However, because the 
second issue is argued as a recantation issue, which has been 
uniquely framed and fully briefed, we continue.   
2.  Corroboration 
¶52 The affidavits of McPherson, Prince and Shannon, all 
of which were attested to years after McAlister's trial, aver 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
25 
 
that Jefferson and Waters said that they intended to lie at 
McAlister's trial.8  Jefferson and Waters allegedly said that 
they were going to implicate McAlister in robberies in which he 
did not participate so that they could take advantage of plea 
bargains regarding robberies in which Jefferson and Waters 
admitted participation.  
¶53 In the usual presentation, a recantation occurs when a 
witness formally or publically withdraws or renounces prior 
statements or testimony.  Black's Law Dictionary 1382 (9th ed. 
2009).  However, it is argued here that the affidavits presented 
after McAlister's trial contain recantation testimony, even 
though the witnesses' statements allegedly were made before they 
testified at trial.   
¶54 The evidence here differs from classic recantation 
testimony in the temporal sense described above and also because 
there was no formal or public renunciation of Jefferson's or 
Waters' testimony.  Instead, the statements allegedly were made 
while Jefferson and Waters were incarcerated with one or more of 
the affiants, who relayed the statements.  There is no writing 
signed by either Jefferson or Waters.   
¶55 However, 
the 
affidavits 
bear 
a 
similarity 
to 
recantation evidence in that they use what is claimed to be 
Jefferson's and Waters' own words to allege they lied at trial.  
Stated otherwise, as with classic recantation, the witnesses' 
                                                 
8 McPherson alleges to have spoken with Waters; Prince and 
Shannon allege to have spoken with Jefferson. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
26 
 
statements are presented after the witnesses' trial testimony 
and attack the veracity of the witnesses' own testimony.   
¶56 When testimony that is classic recantation testimony 
is presented as newly discovered evidence, we require that the 
alleged recantation "be corroborated by other newly discovered 
evidence."  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 476.  "Corroboration is 
required because recantation is inherently unreliable; the 
recanting witness is admitting he or she lied under oath.  
Either the original testimony or the recantation is false."  
Gehin v. Wis. Grp. Ins. Bd., 2005 WI 16, ¶98, 278 Wis. 2d 111, 
692 N.W.2d 572.  We conclude that no less should be required as 
we assess the affidavits presented in the case before us.   
¶57 As explained above, when newly discovered evidence is 
based on recantation, the defendant must satisfy an additional 
proof.  "[N]ewly discovered recantation evidence must be 
corroborated by other newly discovered evidence."  McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 476.  "[T]he degree and extent of the corroboration 
required varies from case to case based on its individual 
circumstances."  Id. at 477; see, e.g., Rohl v. State, 64 
Wis. 2d 443, 453, 219 N.W.2d 385 (1974) (citing Zillmer, 39 
Wis. 2d at 616). 
¶58 Corroboration requires newly discovered evidence of 
both:  (1) a feasible motive for the initial false statement; 
and (2) circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of the 
recantation.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 477-78. 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
27 
 
¶59 Here, 
McAlister 
has 
failed 
both 
corroboration 
requirements.  First, he has failed to present newly discovered 
motives for Jefferson's and Waters' initial testimony, which he 
claims is false.  Jefferson and Waters clearly wanted to obtain 
plea bargains that would reduce their imprisonment time, but 
this motive was fully explored at trial and is not newly 
discovered.   
¶60 Second, McAlister has not provided newly discovered 
evidence to support circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
of the affiants or of the alleged statements.  To the contrary, 
the length of time that passed between McAlister's trial and the 
submission of the affidavits cuts against concluding that the 
affidavits are trustworthy.  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 
417 (1993) (concluding that "[n]o satisfactory explanation has 
been given as to why the affiants waited until the 11th 
hour . . . to make their statements.").  Here, McPherson, Prince 
and Shannon waited between five and one-half and seven years 
after Jefferson and Waters allegedly said that they were going 
to commit perjury.  No newly discovered evidence supports this 
delay. 
¶61 Furthermore, 
as 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
has 
noted, 
recantations made while in jail are "highly suspicious."  United 
States v. Walker, 25 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 1994).  Here, 
Jefferson and Waters were incarcerated when they allegedly said 
they were going to frame McAlister.  Also of interest, all three 
affiants were incarcerated, and two, McPherson and Shannon, had 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
28 
 
been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  
Accordingly, they could face no actual, additional incarceration 
if found guilty of perjury for the affidavits they signed.  And 
finally, none of the affidavits mentions Monique, McAlister's 
niece, and Shannon's affidavit affirmatively asserts that 
Jefferson told him that he and Waters were the only participants 
in the robberies.  However, trial testimony clearly shows 
Monique's active participation in the robberies.  
¶62 McAlister argues that despite the lack of newly 
discovered evidence supporting circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, the three affidavits satisfy an alternative 
means of showing corroboration.  Specifically, McAlister argues 
that the three affidavits corroborate each other because they 
agree as to the basic facts:  (1) McAlister was not involved in 
the charged robberies; and (2) Jefferson and Waters nonetheless 
sought to frame him for those robberies to reduce the 
consequences of their own misconduct.  We are not persuaded.  
The three partially-overlapping affidavits do not fulfill the 
standards set forth in McCallum and all suffer from the same 
lack of a newly discovered evidence of motive for Jefferson and 
Waters to lie, as well as the same deficits in regard to 
trustworthiness.  
¶63 Accordingly, we conclude that the alleged statements 
of 
Jefferson 
and 
Waters 
that 
attempt 
to 
withdraw 
the 
truthfulness of their testimony at McAlister's trial have not 
been corroborated.  Therefore, the circuit court had sound 
No. 
2014AP2561 
 
 
29 
 
reasons to exercise its discretion and to deny McAlister's 
motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.  Avery, 
345 Wis. 2d 407, ¶22.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶64 We conclude that the affidavits were merely cumulative 
evidence because they were additional evidence of the same 
general character as was subject to proof at trial, i.e., 
Jefferson and Waters lied when they implicated McAlister in 
order to achieve favorable plea bargains for themselves.  We 
also conclude that the affidavits were insufficient to require 
the circuit court to hold a hearing on McAlister's motion for a 
new 
trial 
because 
they 
were 
supported 
by 
neither 
newly 
discovered corroborating evidence or circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied McAlister's 
motion 
for 
a 
new 
trial 
without 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' affirmance of the 
circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2561.dk 
 
1 
 
¶65 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the court's 
opinion except for its conclusion that the evidence offered by 
Mr. McAlister is cumulative.  I agree with the court's 
observation that "defining when such evidence is cumulative is 
difficult," majority op., ¶38, but a fairly straightforward test 
can establish that the evidence here cannot be so characterized. 
¶66 The point of evidence is to give the trier of fact the 
raw material upon which to exercise his judgment in deciding 
whether a particular fact is true.  We presume he will act in 
good faith, and will conclude that a fact is true if presented 
with sufficient credible evidence.  It's easy enough to say that 
anything beyond this quantum is cumulative.  The tricky part is 
determining whether new evidence is cumulative when the fact 
finder has already determined the old evidence was insufficient 
to establish the contested fact. 
¶67 There is, however, a test that can unmistakably 
identify new evidence as non-cumulative, and we should have 
applied it here.  It is this:  If the trier of fact were to 
believe the new evidence, would he necessarily conclude the 
disputed fact has been established?  If so, then the new 
evidence cannot possibly be cumulative because it is capable of 
producing a result the old evidence did not.  I suspect it will 
be a rare piece of information that will satisfy this criterion, 
in which case other "cumulativeness" tests may be employed.  But 
evidence that does meet this standard definitively answers the 
cumulativeness question. 
No.  2014AP2561.dk 
 
2 
 
¶68 Mr. McAlister has presented such information here.  At 
trial, he introduced evidence suggesting that Messrs. Jefferson 
and Waters had a strong motivation to falsely accuse him of 
involvement in the crimes.  The jurors could have believed this 
evidence——that is, they could believe the witnesses had good 
reason to lie——and nonetheless conclude that, upon the event, 
they told the truth.  The result of the trial suggests this is, 
in fact, what they did. 
¶69 Mr. McAlister's new evidence is not of the same 
nature.  The affidavits he now presents claim that Messrs. 
Jefferson and Waters admitted they made up a story about Mr. 
McAlister's involvement in the crimes.  If the jurors were to 
credit this new evidence, they could not simultaneously believe 
that Messrs. Jefferson and Waters' trial testimony was truthful.  
That is to say, the new evidence is capable of producing a 
result the old evidence did not.  Therefore, it cannot be 
cumulative. 
¶70 Nevertheless, I agree with the court's conclusion that 
this evidence requires corroboration before Mr. McAlister is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his request for a new 
trial.  This new information is in the nature of "recantation" 
evidence (for which we have always required corroboration), even 
though it presents as a pre-existing decision to commit perjury 
rather than a post hoc confession.  The justification for 
requiring corroboration is the same——the inherent unreliability 
of what often looks like a grown-up version of Kipling's "just-
so" stories. 
No.  2014AP2561.dk 
 
3 
 
¶71 There is one other aspect of the court's opinion that 
bears comment.  The court took the State to task for conceding 
that Mr. McAlister's new evidence is not cumulative:  "We are 
always disappointed when counsel concedes a difficult issue, as 
counsel for the State has done here."  Id., ¶36 n.7.  I 
disagree. 
¶72 One of the distinguishing characteristics of an 
accomplished and wise advocate is knowing when to concede a 
point.  And, having come to the realization that a previously-
defended position is not actually defensible, it takes courage 
and humility to say so.  This is the type of candor we should be 
encouraging, 
not 
condemning. 
 
Just 
because 
the 
court 
(mistakenly, in my view) disagrees with the State's position 
does not mean the State conceded for some reason other than its 
professional, good faith assessment of the issue's merits.  And 
yet the court's rebuke implies that very thing.  However, 
institutional litigators (like the State) should make certain 
that a concession truly is the result of a good faith assessment 
of the issue's merits, and not an attempt to steer the court 
away from issues it would prefer not to address. 
¶73 I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶74 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  A jury found 
David McAlister guilty of several crimes.  Now, with sworn 
affidavits in hand, he asserts that he has newly discovered 
evidence that his accomplices planned in advance to lie on the 
stand during his trial to falsely implicate him.  The majority 
denies him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he "was not, 
in 
fact, 
involved 
in 
the 
offenses 
for 
which 
he 
was 
convicted . . . ." 
¶75 The issue in this case is not whether McAlister's 
conviction should be vacated, or whether he should receive a new 
trial.  It is merely whether he should be afforded the 
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction 
motion. 
¶76 Our system of law has always operated under the theory 
that it is better for ten guilty people to go free than one 
innocent to languish in prison.  See State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 
126, ¶51 n.1, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Butler, J., 
concurring); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting William O. Douglas, Foreward 
to Jerome Frank & Barbara Frank, Not Guilty 11-12 (1957)); see 
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  Yet, the majority opinion strays from this 
premise, favoring finality.  What if McAlister's claims are 
true?  What if his witnesses are credible?  We will never know 
because the majority has short-circuited the process and there 
will be no hearing. 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶77 Not only does the majority misstep by favoring 
finality over a search for the truth, it also stumbles in three 
significant ways.  First, by refusing to accept the facts 
alleged as true for purposes of determining whether McAlister is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the majority deviates from 
our established case law.  See State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, 
¶18, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334; State v. Love, 2005 WI 
116, ¶¶54-55, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62.  Second, it errs 
in determining that the new evidence is cumulative of that 
already presented.  Third, it attempts to fit a square peg into 
a round hole by creating a false equivalency between recantation 
evidence and the alleged newly discovered evidence at issue 
here.  I address each in turn. 
I 
¶78 This case revolves around McAlister's claim that his 
accomplices lied on the stand during his trial.  With his 
postconviction motion, McAlister presented to the circuit court 
the affidavits of three prison inmates——Wendell McPherson, Corey 
Prince, and Antonio Shannon. 
¶79 Each of the three inmates averred that he had contact 
with one of McAlister's accomplices, Alphonso Waters or Nathan 
Jefferson, prior to McAlister's trial.  Most significantly, the 
affidavits indicate that Waters and Jefferson stated that they 
planned to lie in an effort to implicate McAlister. 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
A 
¶80 The majority errs first by failing to adhere to 
precedent.  It denies McAlister a hearing when the facts, 
accepted as true, indicate that McAlister is entitled to relief. 
¶81 The question before us is whether McAlister is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing, giving him the opportunity 
to establish that a reasonable probability exists that a 
different result would be reached at trial.  At this stage of 
the proceedings, we must accept the facts alleged in McAlister's 
motion as true.  See Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, ¶54.  For our 
purposes, 
it 
is 
not 
relevant 
whether 
the 
alleged 
newly 
discovered evidence is admissible or whether it is credible.  
Id. 
¶82 A court is not to base its decision solely on the 
credibility of the newly discovered evidence, unless it finds 
the new evidence to be incredible as a matter of law.  State v. 
Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶25, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60.  
Testimony is incredible as a matter of law or patently 
incredible if it is in conflict with the uniform course of 
nature or with fully established or conceded facts.  State v. 
Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, ¶28 n.18, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 
N.W.2d 443 (citation omitted). 
¶83 Love, 284 Wis. 2d 111, presents facts very similar to 
those here.  In Love, the defendant was convicted of armed 
robbery and subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence.  Id., ¶¶19, 21.  "Love included an 
affidavit from Christopher Hawley, who claimed to have met 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
another inmate, Floyd Lindell Smith, Jr., while at Green Bay 
Correctional Institution.  Hawley averred that Smith admitted to 
robbing [the victim] and shared in-depth details regarding the 
incident."  Id., ¶21.  The circuit court denied the motion 
without an evidentiary hearing.  Id., ¶23. 
¶84 This court remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  Id., 
¶56.  Like this case, Love turned on the reasonable probability 
prong of the newly discovered evidence test.  Id., ¶¶52-53.  The 
Love 
court 
accepted 
the 
facts 
as 
alleged 
in 
Love's 
postconviction motion as true for purposes of its analysis: 
Love's postconviction motion indicates that Hawley 
would testify that Love was not the assailant.  Hawley 
will testify that Smith (or if Love can get Smith to 
testify, then it would be Smith's testimony that he) 
committed this crime.  Whether that testimony is 
ultimately admissible is not relevant for our purposes 
here.  Whether that testimony is credible is not 
relevant for our purposes here.  It must be accepted 
as true. 
Id., ¶54 (emphasis added). 
¶85 Accepting Love's alleged facts as true, the court 
determined that Love was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  It 
explained: 
If it is true, then the evidence against Love amounts 
to [the victim's] identification against another's 
assertion that Smith committed the crime.  Thus, 
viewing the new evidence, particularly in light of the 
identification discrepancies, there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both, would have a 
reasonable doubt as to Love's guilt. 
Id., ¶55. 
¶86 The only material factual difference between this case 
and Love is the timing of the alleged statements——the affidavits 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
here relate to an admission of future perjury, while in Love the 
affidavit related to an alleged admission to a past crime.  In 
both cases, the affiant was a fellow inmate.  As in Love, I 
would accept the alleged facts as true. 
¶87 In his postconviction motion, McAlister alleged that 
"[l]ong after McAlister's direct appeal and after he filed his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus, he learned that Corey 
Prince, Wendell McPherson and Antonio Shannon had information 
confirming that McAlister was not involved in any robberies and 
that the State's two key witnesses against him, Alphonso Waters 
and Nathan Jefferson had conspired to frame McAlister in order 
to obtain relief from their own sentences." 
¶88 Instead of accepting McAlister's alleged facts as 
true, the circuit court here stated orally that the affidavits 
are "inherently not believable."  In its written order, it 
likewise concluded that they "have limited credibility."  The 
circuit court thus went well beyond its role at this stage of 
proceedings, engaging in a personal, subjective assessment of 
witness credibility rather than accepting the facts presented as 
true. 
¶89 The majority turns a blind eye to the circuit court's 
error and again delves into the credibility of the affiants' 
statements.  In its misguided search for "circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness," the majority laments that "the 
length of time that passed between McAlister's trial and the 
submission of the affidavits cuts against concluding that the 
affidavits are trustworthy."  Majority op., ¶60.  It further 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
decries the "highly suspicious" nature of jailhouse statements 
made by those serving life sentences.  Id., ¶61. 
¶90 This inquiry goes beyond the court's role based on the 
procedural posture with which we are presented.  Properly 
leaving a credibility determination for a later date, the 
court's only determination here should be whether the McPherson, 
Prince, and Shannon affidavits are incredible as a matter of 
law. 
¶91 I conclude that they are not.  The statements are not 
so outlandish as to be in conflict with the "uniform course of 
nature."  See Vollbrecht, 344 Wis. 2d 69, ¶28 n.18.  Without an 
evidentiary hearing we simply do not know if the affidavits are 
credible.  Accordingly, I would accept the alleged facts as true 
and determine that McAlister should be afforded the opportunity 
for an evidentiary hearing. 
B 
¶92 The majority errs next by determining that the newly 
discovered evidence is merely cumulative of that already 
presented.  It reaches this conclusion because "[t]he jury heard 
it all before."  Majority op., ¶49.  According to the majority, 
the alleged newly discovered evidence is "of the same general 
character and drawn to the same point for which proof was 
provided at trial, i.e., that Jefferson and Waters lied to 
benefit themselves[.]"  Id., ¶51. 
¶93 What was the "character" of the evidence offered?  At 
trial, both Jefferson and Waters were cross examined regarding 
deals they made with the district attorney.  See majority op., 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
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¶¶9-11, 16.  In each case, the district attorney agreed to 
recommend less prison time in exchange for their testimony.  
Id., ¶¶11, 16.  This evidence could certainly offer a motive for 
Waters and Jefferson to lie and implicate McAlister, but it says 
nothing about whether Waters and Jefferson in fact conspired to 
frame McAlister. 
¶94 In contrast, the affidavits of Prince, McPherson, and 
Shannon, if true, offer direct evidence that Waters and 
Jefferson conspired to lie.1  Direct evidence that Jefferson and 
Waters planned to lie is of a different general character than 
the circumstantial evidence of their motive to lie that was 
presented at trial.  As McAlister aptly states in his brief, 
"evidence that Jefferson and Waters in fact conspired to frame 
McAlister is not cumulative to evidence that they had a motive 
to do so." 
C 
¶95 The majority's third error lies in its attempt to fit 
a square peg into a round hole by creating a false equivalency 
between recantation evidence and the alleged newly discovered 
evidence in this case. 
¶96 Recantations are inherently unreliable.  State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 476, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) (citing 
                                                 
1 That there was no direct evidence of a conspiracy 
presented at trial was repeatedly highlighted by the prosecutor 
during closing argument.  The State's closing argument was 
peppered with statements such as, "[t]here's no evidence they 
ever met and talked about it" and "there is no evidence they 
ever even talked."  If true, the McPherson, Prince, and Shannon 
affidavits do provide such evidence. 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
Dunlavy v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 105, 114, 124 
N.W.2d 73 (1963)).  "The recanting witness is admitting that he 
or she has lied under oath.  Either the original sworn testimony 
or the sworn recantation testimony is false."  McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 476.  This is the reason behind the corroboration 
requirement for recantation testimony.  Gehin v. Wis. Group Ins. 
Bd., 2005 WI 16, ¶98, 278 Wis. 2d 111, 692 N.W.2d 572. 
¶97 Contrary to the majority's assertion, the evidence at 
issue here is not akin to recantation evidence.  The alleged 
"recantation" is not the product of the witnesses who are 
alleged to have lied on the stand, Jefferson and Waters.  
Rather, the alleged "recantation" statements are from three 
individuals who did not previously testify in this case.  By 
definition, 
a 
recantation 
must 
consist 
of 
the 
witness 
withdrawing or renouncing prior testimony.  See McCallum, 208 
Wis. 2d at 476.  Neither Waters nor Jefferson has submitted an 
affidavit recanting his trial testimony. 
¶98 Consequently, the logic of the corroboration rule does 
not hold here.  As we explained in McCallum, in the recantation 
situation "[t]he recanting witness is admitting that he or she 
has lied under oath.  Either the original sworn testimony or the 
sworn recantation testimony is false."  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 
467.  Here, the alleged "recantations" of Jefferson and Waters 
were not made under oath.  There is no sworn "recantation" 
testimony from the "recanters."  The "either/or" situation 
described in McCallum is not present here because Jefferson and 
No.  2014AP2561-CR.awb 
 
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Waters each made only one statement under oath——his trial 
testimony. 
¶99 The statements at issue are better characterized as 
prior inconsistent statements rather than a "recantation."  A 
prior inconsistent statement is not "inherently unreliable" as 
is a recantation.  To the contrary, a prior inconsistent 
statement is reliable enough to constitute a non-hearsay 
statement.  See Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a)1.  The majority's 
attempt to force the evidence here within the category of 
"recantation" evidence is simply unconvincing. 
II 
¶100 If a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion raises sufficient 
facts that, if true, show that the defendant is entitled to 
relief, the circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing.  
Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶18.  The sworn affidavits assert 
that witnesses lied and McAlister maintains he was not involved 
in the offense for which he was convicted.  Accepting the facts 
as alleged in McAlister's motion as true, I conclude that 
McAlister has shown he is entitled to relief.  I therefore would 
reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for 
an evidentiary hearing. 
¶101 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
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