Case Title: Janie S. Dunlap v. Regions Financial Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060384

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel:  10/05/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1060384
____________________
Janie S. Dunlap
v.
Regions Financial Corporation
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-05-3370)
SEE, Justice.
Facts and Procedural History
Janie S. Dunlap was employed by Union Planters Bank as a
residential-mortgage-loan specialist before Union Planters
merged with Regions Financial Corporation in 2004.  Her
1060384
2
position required her to assist mortgage-loan originators by
preparing mortgage documentation.  Dunlap was an at-will
employee.  At the time of the merger with Regions, Union
Planters employed two residential-loan specialists in Mobile
who assisted mortgage-loan originators: Dunlap and Johnette
Johnston.  Regions decided to eliminate one of these two
positions, and Karen Hodge, Union Planters' mortgage-loan
supervisor, 
recommended 
that 
Johnston's 
position 
be
eliminated.  In order to avoid terminating Johnston's
employment, however, Regions placed Johnston in a "floating"
teller position.  
In January 2005, Regions decided to eliminate Dunlap's
residential-mortgage-loan-specialist 
position 
because,
according to Regions, the production of the residential-
mortgage-loan originators in Mobile no longer supported the
position.  Regions terminated 
the position 
effective 
March 
11,
2005, but it attempted to find Dunlap a position within
Regions.  Melanie Thompson, Regions' vice president of human
resources, informed Dunlap of an open position as a loan
processor in the mortgage department, but, according to
Thompson's affidavit, Dunlap indicated that she had other
1060384
3
options and that she wanted her termination papers processed
so that she could accept the severance package.  
Before she received her severance package, Dunlap applied
for a 
position 
with Regions as 
a 
commercial-banking assistant.
That position, however, was filled by another Union Planters
employee who had experience in commercial lending, experience
Dunlap lacked.  The employee who was hired to fill the
position was 44 years old, 13 years younger than Dunlap, who
was 57 at the time.
On March 24, 2005, Dunlap, as part of her severance
agreement, signed 
a general 
release; 
that release provides, in
pertinent part: 
"I understand this is a complete and general
release. In exchange for the severance benefits ...
I release and forever discharge and promise not to
sue Regions, Regions Bank, Union Planters Bank ...
with respect to any and all claims (which term is
defined as including, but is not limited to causes
of 
action, 
suits, 
debts, 
sums 
of 
money,
controversies, 
agreements, 
promises, 
damages, 
costs,
losses, expenses and demands whatsoever, at law or
in equity, or before any federal, state or local
administrative agency, whether known or unknown,
whether accrued or unaccrued, whether contingent or
certain) which I now have, or any claims whatsoever
which may hereafter accrue on account of the events,
circumstances 
or 
occurrences 
related 
to 
my
employment with Regions up to and including the
effective date of this release, including but not
limited to any claims such as breach of contract;
1060384
Dunlap testified as follows at her deposition:
1
"Q. ... There were no comments made to you that
would make you believe that your termination was
because of your age?  
"A. Not that I recall."
In her appellate brief, Dunlap asserts that she was called
"grandma" by fellow employees.  Dunlap's brief at 16.
However, the word "grandma" does not appear in the record.
4
tort; 
claims 
under 
... 
the 
Alabama 
Age
Discrimination In Employment Act, Ala. Code § 25-1-
20, 
et 
seq.; 
conversion; 
wrongful 
discharge;
retaliation; any claims for present or future
effects of past events or actions, and any claims
for the violation of any federal, state or local
law."
The severance agreement also provides that Dunlap "waives any
right [she] may have to future employment with Regions," and
she has acknowledged that she would have no right to be
recalled to work with Regions.
On September 9, 2005, Dunlap filed this action, alleging
age discrimination under the Alabama Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("AADEA"), § 25-1-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,
and breach of contract.  In her deposition, however, Dunlap
testified that no one at Regions or Union Planters had ever
made any comments that would have suggested that her
employment was terminated because of her age.   Regions moved
1
1060384
During her deposition, attorneys for Regions asked Dunlap
about any comments or jokes that had been made about her age,
and she replied, "Well, I had grandchildren and, you know, how
are your grandchildren or something."  When asked if these
comments offended her, she answered that they did not.  When
asked whether these comments "[were] just kind of like the
normal talk you have with co-workers, like how are your kids,
how are your grand kids," Dunlap answered, "Exactly."
5
the trial court for a summary judgment, and the trial court
granted that motion.  Dunlap filed her notice of appeal on
November 27, 2006.  The trial court awarded Regions attorney
fees on December 1, 2006.
Standard of Review
To grant a motion for a summary judgment, the trial court
must determine that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant makes a
prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied,
the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present
"substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of material
fact.  Ex parte CSX Transp., Inc., 938 So. 2d 959, 961 (Ala.
2006); see Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.
2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989).  Evidence is "substantial" if it
is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the
1060384
6
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989); § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.  
In our review of a summary judgment, we apply the same
standard as does the trial court on factual issues. Ex parte
Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 1997).  However, we must
review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant
and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Ex
parte CSX Transp., 938 So. 2d at 962; Hanners v. Balfour
Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1990).  The trial
court's ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of
correctness, and this Court reviews de novo the trial court's
conclusion as to the appropriate legal standard to be applied.
Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997).
Analysis
Dunlap argues that "[t]he trial court erred in granting
summary judgment and not allowing further discovery, not
allowing a response from [Dunlap,] and not allowing argument
upon the motion."  Dunlap's brief at 9.  She further argues
that she was denied an opportunity for "complete discovery,"
1060384
The case-action-summary sheet shows that Regions filed
2
its summary-judgment motion on August 7, 2006, and that the
trial court entered its order on October 13, 2006.
7
and she asserts that she "only learned of the potential
witnesses in [Regions'] motion for summary judgment."
Dunlap's brief at 10.  However, the record does not include
Dunlap's opposition to Regions' summary-judgment motion, nor
does the case-action-summary sheet show that Dunlap filed a
response to Regions' motion.   
2
"We note that '[a]ny grounds not argued to the trial
court, but urged for the first time on appeal, cannot be
considered' on appeal.  Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So.
2d 157, 165 (Ala. 2005).  Thus, the judgment of the trial
court cannot be reversed on this ground." Ex parte State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 924 So. 2d 706, 711 (Ala. 2005) (footnote
omitted); see also Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409,
410 (Ala. 1992) ("This Court cannot consider arguments raised
for the first time on appeal; rather, our review is restricted
to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial
court.").  Because the arguments Dunlap now advances in
opposition to Regions' summary-judgment motion were not
1060384
There is no indication in the record that Dunlap sought
3
additional discovery in the trial court or that the trial
court did not allow Dunlap to respond to Regions' motion for
a summary judgment.  "The law is settled that it is the
appellant's duty to ensure that the appellate court has a
record from which it can conduct a review.  Further, in the
absence of evidence in the record, this Court will not assume
error of the part of the trial court."  Zaden v. Elkus, 881
So. 2d 993, 1009 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted).
8
presented to the trial court, they are not properly before
this Court, and we need not address them.  
3
Moreover, we note that the evidence presented by Regions
in the court below, and uncontroverted by Dunlap, justified a
summary judgment for Regions.  Dunlap signed a general release
that provided 
that 
all her AADEA claims 
and breach-of-contract
claims related to her employment with Regions or with Union
Planters were released.  Dunlap provides no argument or
authority as to why that release should not be enforced.  See
Wayne J. Griffin Elec., Inc. v. Dunn Constr. Co., 622 So. 2d
314, 317 (Ala. 1993) ("[A]bsent fraud, a release, supported by
valuable consideration and unambiguous in meaning, will be
given effect according to the intention of the parties from
what appears in the four corners of the document itself; and
parol evidence is not admissible to impeach or vary its
terms.").  For these reasons, we affirm the summary judgment.
1060384
In her brief, the only authority cited by Dunlap is Rule
4
62, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P.  Rule 62,
Ala. R. Civ. P., relates to the stay of proceedings to enforce
a judgment.  Rule 62(d) provides that a stay on execution of
a judgment "is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved
by the court."  Rule 8, Ala. R. App. P., provides that an
appellant may apply for a stay of an order or a judgment.  The
record does not suggest that Dunlap ever requested such relief
either in this Court or in the trial court.
9
Dunlap argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order awarding attorney fees to Regions after she
had filed her notice of appeal.  In its brief before this
Court, Regions acknowledges that the order awarding attorney
fees was issued after Dunlap had filed her notice of appeal.
However, this Court recently stated:
"Jurisdiction of a case can be in only one court
at a time.  Therefore, while an appeal is pending,
the trial court 'can do nothing in respect to any
matter or question which is involved in the appeal,
and which may be adjudged by the appellate court.'
Although the general rule is that a trial court is
divested of its jurisdiction during a pending
appeal, a trial court may proceed in matters that
are entirely 'collateral' to the appeal."
 
Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874 So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 608
(Ala. 1984)).  Dunlap has put forward no authority or argument
supporting the conclusion that the attorney-fee award is
anything but collateral to this appeal.   This Court has held
4
1060384
10
that "'"[it is not] the function of the appellate courts to
'make and address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient
authority or argument.'"'"  Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v.
Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 2006)
(quoting Beachcroft Props., LLP v. City of Alabaster, 901 So.
2d 703, 708 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Pileri Indus., Inc.
v. Consolidated Indus., Inc., 740 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999), quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652
So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994)).  As we have noted:
"'Appellants who fail to comply with [Ala.] R. App.
P. 28(a) place themselves in a perilous position.
While we attempt to avoid dismissing appeals or
affirming judgments on what may be seen as
technicalities, we are sometimes unable to address
the merits of an appellant's claim when the
appellant fails to articulate that claim and
presents no authorities in support of that claim.
Under appropriate circumstances we will refuse to
consider the appeal.'"
Crutcher v. Wendy's of North Alabama, Inc., 857 So. 2d 82, 97
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co.,
467 So. 2d 251, 253 (Ala. 1985)).  Because Dunlap fails to
"articulate [her] claim [that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the attorney-fee award] and presents no
authorities in support of that claim," Crutcher, 857 So. 2d at
1060384
It appears that this Court has not addressed whether an
5
award of attorney fees is collateral to an appeal; however, we
have "recogniz[ed] that a decision on the merits disposing of
all claims is a final decision from which an appeal must be
timely taken, whether a request for attorney fees remains for
adjudication." State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893,
899 (Ala. 2002).  It also appears that a majority of other
jurisdictions 
have 
held 
that 
a 
trial 
court 
retains
jurisdiction to award attorney fees after a notice of appeal
has been filed.  See, e.g., Iowa State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95, 110 (Iowa 2004) ("Although the filing
of a notice of appeal generally deprives the district court of
jurisdiction, the 
court 
'retains 
jurisdiction to proceed 
as 
to
issues collateral to and not affecting the subject matter of
the appeal.' The issue of attorney fees is such a collateral
matter." (quoting Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co., 454 N.W.2d
891, 897 (Iowa 1990))); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 811 A.2d
788, 791 (Del. 2001) ("We also hold that an appeal from the
final judgment on the merits does not divest the trial court
of jurisdiction to decide the motion to award costs."); Harold
Ives Trucking Co. v. Pro Transp., Inc., 341 Ark. 735, 737, 19
S.W.3d 600, 602 (2000) ("Matters that are collateral or
supplemental to the trial court's judgment are left within the
trial court's jurisdiction even though an appeal has been
docketed.  We have consistently held that the award of
attorney's fees is a collateral matter." (citation omitted));
Kellar v. Von Holtum, 605 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 2000) ("[W]e
consider motions for attorney fee sanctions and costs and
disbursements collateral to the merits of the underlying
litigation."); Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M.
231, 243, 824 P.2d 1033, 1045 (1992) (holding that, in
collateral matters not involved in the appeal, such as
determining the propriety and amount of attorney fees, the
trial court retains jurisdiction); and Maryland-National
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 40, 511
A.2d 1079, 1099 (1986) ("State courts ... generally take the
position that trial courts may award fees despite the fact
11
97, we cannot hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
award attorney fees.5
1060384
that an appeal has been taken from the judgment on the merits
and is pending. ... We hold that the circuit court in this
case had discretion to award counsel fees under § 1988, in
connection with the proceedings in the Court of Special
Appeals, while the petition for a writ of certiorari was
pending in this Court.").
But see  McLaughlin v. Hellbusch, 251 Neb. 389, 396, 557
N.W.2d 657, 662 (1997) ("As a general matter, after an appeal
has been perfected, the trial court is without jurisdiction to
hear a case involving the same matter between the same
parties. We held [in WBE Co. v. Papio-Missouri River Natural
Resources District, 247 Neb. 527, 529 N.W.2d 21 (1995),] that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order for an
attorney fee after the opposing party had perfected its
appeal. We apprehend no reason for a different rule with
respect to a judicial determination and allowance of costs,
and thus hold that after an appeal has been perfected, a trial
court lacks jurisdiction to enter an order for costs."
(citations omitted)); and Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki
Corp.),  76 Haw. 494, 502 n.9, 880 P.2d 169, 177 n.9 (1994)
("We emphasize that HRAP 4(a)(4) does not include motions for
attorneys' fees or costs within its operation; the state trial
courts' jurisdiction to entertain and decide such motions,
therefore, is still divested the moment a notice of appeal is
filed.").   
12
Conclusion
Dunlap did not raise in the trial court the arguments she
advances on appeal in opposition to Regions' motion for a
summary judgment, and a summary judgment was proper based upon
the materials that were submitted to that court.  Dunlap also
has failed to provide authority for her assertion that the
1060384
13
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the attorney-fee
award.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker, and Murdock, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., concurs in the result.
Smith, J., recuses herself.