Case Title: Maples v. Compass Harbor Village Condominium Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 46

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 46 
Docket: 
BCD-22-322 
Argued: 
 April 6, 2023 
Decided: 
 August 10, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
CHARLES R. MAPLES et al. 
 
v. 
 
COMPASS HARBOR VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION et al. 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  This matter involves a years-long dispute between two 
condominium unit owners, Charles R. Maples and Kathy S. Brown, and the 
Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association and Compass Harbor 
Village, LLC (separately, the Association and the LLC, and collectively, Compass 
Harbor).  We previously affirmed in part a judgment awarding Maples and 
Brown damages and attorney fees against Compass Harbor.  See Brown v. 
Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2020 ME 44, ¶¶ 1, 10, 18 n.4, 26, 30-31, 229 
A.3d 158.  We also previously dismissed as interlocutory a prior appeal in this 
matter, which involves a complaint, brought against Compass Harbor and the 
other condominium unit owners, seeking, inter alia, to enforce the judgment 
affirmed in Brown.  See Maples v. Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2022 ME 26, 
 
 
2 
¶¶ 1 & n.1, 2, 7 & n.3, 8-10, 13, 20, 273 A.3d 358.  At this juncture, Maples and 
Brown appeal from orders of the Business and Consumer Docket (Duddy, J.) 
granting motions to dismiss filed by some, but not all, of the defendants.  
Because the orders did not dispose of all claims against all defendants, we 
dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  “The following facts are drawn from Maples and Brown’s amended 
complaint and from official public documents central to their claims.”  Id. ¶ 3.  
“We view these facts as if they were admitted.”  Id. 
[¶3]  In July 2019, following a two-day bench trial, the court entered a 
judgment in favor of Maples and Brown on multiple counts against Compass 
Harbor1 for, inter alia, its “longstanding and pervasive mismanagement and 
misconduct” regarding “the Compass Harbor Village Condominiums in Bar 
Harbor, Maine.”  Maples v. Contorakes, No. BCD-CV-18-02, 2019 Me. 
Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 26, at *1 (July 22, 2019).  The court awarded damages 
 
1  Evan and Cheri Contorakes were also defendants in this underlying matter.  According to the 
underlying judgment, Evan was the sole member of the LLC, and the LLC, as declarant of the 
Association, appointed Evan and his wife Cheri as the only members of the Association’s board of 
directors.  See Maples v. Contorakes, No. BCD-CV-18-02, 2019 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 26, at *2-3, 
*7-8 (July 22, 2019); Brown v. Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2020 ME 44, ¶¶ 1, 3, 229 A.3d 158.  
The court determined that “the Contorakeses [were] not subject to personal liability” in the 
underlying matter.  Contorakes, 2019 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 26, at *2 n.1. 
 
 
3 
of $134,900 to Maples and $106,801 to Brown, as well as attorney fees,2 and it 
entered an order of specific performance.  Id. at *44-47, *59.  The court 
specifically stated that “[d]efendants must not impose or attempt to impose or 
collect any special assessment” upon unit owners “to pay for their attorney fees 
and litigation costs, or for the damages awarded in this action.”  Id. at *54; 
see Maples, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 11, 273 A.3d 358.  On April 9, 2020, we affirmed the 
judgment in part, including the damages award.3  Brown, 2020 ME 44, ¶¶ 1, 18, 
26, 30-31, 229 A.3d 158. 
[¶4]  Maples and Brown made demand on Compass Harbor to pay the 
judgment, but the judgment remained unpaid.  According to the amended 
complaint, on September 21, 2020, Maples and Brown “recorded writs of 
execution in the Hancock County Registry of Deeds,” and the writs “were 
indexed against [Compass Harbor] and the condominiums.”  The amended 
complaint further alleges that on October 5, 2020, Maples and Brown recorded 
 
2  Ultimately, the court ordered Compass Harbor to pay $243,170.38 in attorney fees. 
3  Specifically, “we vacated the portion of the judgment on the [Unfair Trade Practices Act] claim, 
including the associated award of attorney fees, as well as the portion [of the judgment] ordering 
specific performance, but we affirmed the judgment in all other respects.”  Maples v. Compass Harbor 
Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 5, 273 A.3d 358; see Brown, 2020 ME 44, ¶¶ 1, 18, 26, 30-31, 229 
A.3d 158.  We also stated that the Association is liable for damages but “the LLC is liable to the 
Association for any costs incurred by the Association as the result of the judgment against it.”  Brown, 
2020 ME 44, ¶ 26 n.6, 229 A.3d 158. 
 
 
4 
the judgment in the Hancock County Registry of Deeds, “indexed in the name of 
the condominiums” and Compass Harbor.  At the time Maples and Brown 
recorded the judgment, the LLC owned fifteen condominium units, “which were 
subject to a first mortgage from The First, N.A.”  Despite these steps, Maples and 
Brown still did not receive payment of the judgment. 
[¶5]  On October 21, 2020, Maples and Brown filed a five-count complaint 
in the Superior Court (Hancock County) against Compass Harbor and the other 
condominium unit owners.4  On October 23, 2020, The First, N.A., held a 
foreclosure auction on the LLC’s fifteen units, which were purchased by Orono, 
LLC (Orono).  The sale discharged all junior liens and encumbrances, including 
Maples and Brown’s judgment lien against the fifteen units.  The LLC has no 
remaining assets, and the Association does not have sufficient assets to satisfy 
the judgment.  Maples and Brown filed an amended complaint on November 19, 
2020, which added Orono as a defendant. 
[¶6]  Count 1 of the amended complaint seeks enforcement of the 
underlying judgment and requests that the court provide “‘appropriate 
 
4  The complaint named the following unit owners: Eli Simon; Timothy L. Culbertson; Marlo Dee 
Frontiera; Aaron Frontiera; The Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of St. Saviour’s Episcopal Church; 
Judith W. Hines; Ralph Blaikie Hines; Peter N. Geary; Christine A. Geary; Jennifer A. Duffy; and Michael 
McConomy. 
 
 
5 
equitable relief’ by ordering the Association to assess its unit owners,” 
excluding Maples and Brown, for the amount due.  Count 2 seeks the 
appointment of a receiver to make and collect the assessment and to ensure 
Compass Harbor’s and Orono’s compliance with various legal requirements. 
[¶7]  Count 3, brought against all defendants except Orono and the LLC, 
alleges that under 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117(a) (2023)5 the recorded judgment “is 
a lien against all units” and Maples and Brown are entitled, under the court’s 
equitable power, “to a turnover or sale order” of all of the units, excluding those 
owned by Orono following the foreclosure and sale.  Count 4, brought against 
all defendants except Orono and the LLC, alleges that pursuant to the same 
statutory judgment lien, Maples and Brown are entitled to foreclose on all of 
the units, excluding those owned by Orono after the sale.  Count 5 alleges 
contempt against Compass Harbor and seeks punitive and remedial sanctions. 
[¶8]  On November 20, 2020, the Association and Orono, the latter as 
“successor in interest” to the LLC, each filed answers to the amended complaint.  
Orono also filed a motion for the court to substitute it as a party in place of the 
 
5  Title 33 M.R.S. § 1603-117(a) (2023) states, “A judgment for money against the association, if a 
lien order is filed with the Register of Deeds of the county where the condominium is located, as 
provided in Title 14, section 3132 . . . is not a lien on the common elements, but is a lien in favor of 
the judgment lienholder against all of the units in the condominium at the time the judgment was 
entered.  No other property of a unit owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association.” 
 
 
6 
LLC, and Maples and Brown filed an opposition arguing that “[t]he LLC is still a 
proper and necessary party . . . because it is still a party to the underlying 
judgment that [Maples and Brown] seek to enforce.”  Orono later withdrew the 
motion, “leaving both [the] LLC and Orono . . . as parties.” 
[¶9]  On January 8, 2021, the owners of four of the units6 filed a motion 
to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The 
owners of the four units contended, inter alia, that they too suffered harms from 
Compass Harbor’s actions and are not liable for the judgment; that the court 
prohibited the Association from imposing an assessment to pay the awarded 
judgment; that “the LLC, as the declarant, the majority owner and the true bad 
actor, is ultimately responsible for paying the judgment”; and that it would be 
an absurd result to apply the statutory judgment lien mechanism against the 
unit owners.  On January 14, 2021, the case was accepted for transfer to the 
Business and Consumer Docket. 
[¶10]  The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on April 20, 
2021.  On June 17, 2021, the court signed an order denying the motion to 
 
6  The owners were Eli Simon; Judith Hines and Ralph Hines; Peter Geary, Christine Geary, and 
Jennifer Duffy; and Michael McConomy. 
 
 
7 
dismiss with respect to Count 27 but granting the motion to dismiss with 
respect to the remaining counts and dismissing those counts as to the unit 
owners who filed the motion to dismiss.8  The court reasoned that it could not 
allow the Association to make an assessment, given the underlying judgment’s 
plain language prohibiting an assessment, and determined that it was not 
required by the Maine Condominium Act to provide that requested relief 
“under the unique circumstances of the case.”  Further, because the unit owners 
were not responsible for paying the judgment and the Association could not 
make an assessment, the court deemed the judgment lien mechanism from 
33 M.R.S. § 1603-117(a) to be inapplicable and determined that Maples and 
Brown were not entitled to the turnover and sale or the foreclosure of those 
units. 
[¶11]  Maples and Brown appealed.  “On October 7, 2021, we ordered that 
Orono be substituted in place” of the defendant owners of four units “because 
 
7  Regarding Count 2, the court reasoned that although we previously vacated the order of specific 
performance, see Brown, 2020 ME 44, ¶¶ 1, 27-31, 229 A.3d 158, we did not foreclose the option of a 
receivership if Compass Harbor continued to violate its duties, see id. ¶ 30 n.7, and that the amended 
complaint alleges the Association has continued to violate various legal requirements.  However, on 
June 30, 2021, Maples and Brown moved to dismiss Count 2, and on July 1, 2021, the court granted 
their motion and dismissed Count 2 without prejudice. 
8  Although Count 5 was brought only against Compass Harbor, the court determined that Count 5 
must be dismissed with respect to those unit owners who had moved to dismiss, to the extent that 
the count “seeks collection of the full amount of the judgment through an order requiring the 
Association to make an assessment on the unit owners.” 
 
 
8 
Orono had purchased those parties’ units during the summer of 2021.”9  Maples, 
2022 ME 26, ¶ 13, 273 A.3d 358.  We then considered and dismissed Maples 
and Brown’s appeal as interlocutory because the “order granting the motion to 
dismiss, filed by some, but not all, defendants” did “not fully dispose of the 
entire matter” and no exception to the final judgment rule applied.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 
14-20. 
[¶12]  On July 21, 2022, additional defendants (the movants)10 filed a 
motion to dismiss, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which included arguments 
similar to those made by the other unit owners in the first motion to dismiss 
 
9  “Orono was substituted as successor-in-interest for the following parties: Marlo Dee Frontiera 
and Aaron Frontiera; The Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of St. Savio[u]r’s Episcopal Church; Judith 
Hines and Ralph Hines; and Peter Geary, Christine Geary, and Jennifer Duffy.”  Maples, 2022 ME 26, 
¶ 13 n.8, 273 A.3d 358. 
10  The motion to dismiss states that the motion is brought “by those remaining non[-]moving 
Defendants in order to resolve any and all remaining claims as against all Defendants and achieve 
complete finality.”  The docket lists the following parties as having filed the motion to dismiss: the 
Association, Orono, Timothy Culbertson, Michael McConomy, and Eli Simon. 
 
 
9 
filed on January 8, 2021.11  On July 22, 2022, the court granted a motion for 
substitution of parties.12 
[¶13]  On October 3, 2022, the court entered an order granting the second 
motion to dismiss, adopting the reasoning from its order on the first motion to 
dismiss.  The court’s order states that the second motion was filed by Orono 
and Around The World, and the court referred to them as, inter alia, the 
“Remaining Unit Owner Defendants.”  The court reiterated that it had 
“concluded that Section 1603-117 did not apply on the facts of this case” and 
elaborated on its analysis of the statute.  The court stated that “a plain reading 
of the statute, coupled with application of the Court’s equity powers, militates 
against providing [Maples and Brown] with the relief they seek.”  Maples and 
Brown timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
 
11  The movants also alleged, inter alia, that there was “no basis for holding the Association in 
contempt” and that the court’s intent in the underlying judgment “was to require only Evan and Cheri 
Contorakes, [the] LLC, and the Association, to the extent it was under the control of the Contorakes 
defendants . . . to pay the damages.” 
12  The motion sought to implement in the BCD the same substitutions that had occurred while the 
matter was previously before us.  See supra n.9.  Eli Simon also had transferred his ownership interest 
in his condominium unit to Around The World, LLC, and so Around The World was substituted for 
him as a party.  Per the consented-to motion, the only remaining defendants are the Association, 
Around The World, Orono, Culbertson, and McConomy. 
 
 
10 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶14]  The court’s order granting the second motion to dismiss is not a 
final judgment.  “A final judgment is a decision that fully decides and disposes 
of the entire matter pending before the court” so that “no questions for the 
future consideration and judgment of the court” remain.  Maples, 2022 ME 26, 
¶ 15, 273 A.3d 358 (quotation marks omitted) (explaining the rationale of the 
final judgment rule, including that it “prevents piecemeal litigation,” stops us 
“from deciding issues which may ultimately be mooted,” and produces “a 
crisper, more comprehensible record for review” (quotation marks and 
alteration omitted)); see also M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1). 
[¶15]  The record does not reflect an entry of appearance for the LLC, the 
substitution of another party for the LLC, a dismissal of the LLC from the 
proceeding, or a judgment of default against the LLC.  Further, the court’s order 
does not address the counts against the LLC or the Association.13 
[¶16]  The court states that its order concerns the motion to dismiss filed 
by Orono and Around The World, the “Remaining Unit Owner Defendants.”  The 
 
13  The parties conceded on appeal that the LLC is not represented and has not participated in the 
action, and counsel for the movants, including the Association, conceded at oral argument that the 
Association had not been dismissed from the matter and that the court’s order on the second motion 
to dismiss did not apply to the Association.  The movants also concede that Count 5, the claim for 
contempt brought against only the Association and the LLC, “is not applicable to the issues before 
[us] at this time.” 
 
 
11 
court’s reasoning in its order on the second motion to dismiss mirrors the 
court’s reasoning in its order on the first motion to dismiss, which related to a 
motion brought by only other unit owners and did not involve an analysis of 
the counts brought against the LLC or the Association.  Thus, the court’s order 
did not dispose of all claims against all defendants, and the appeal is 
interlocutory.  See Maples, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16, 273 A.3d 358. 
[¶17]  We have stated that “[a] party urging that we reach the merits of 
an otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating” that one 
of the exceptions to the final judgment rule “justifies our reaching the merits of 
the appeal.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted) (“The exceptions include (1) the 
death knell exception, (2) the collateral order exception, and (3) the judicial 
economy exception.”).  The parties did not brief this issue, let alone contend 
that an exception to the rule applies. 
[¶18]  Further, we dismissed the appeal of the court’s order on the first 
motion to dismiss after determining that no exception to the final judgment rule 
applied, in part because the Association and the LLC remained parties and had 
not moved to dismiss so “the motion was therefore not granted as to them.”  
Id. ¶¶ 18-20 (adding that “there is no indication on this record that, if we were 
to affirm the court’s order, Maples and Brown would abandon their remaining 
 
 
12 
claims against Compass Harbor”).  Applying similar reasoning here, we dismiss 
this interlocutory appeal and do not reach the parties’ arguments regarding the 
merits. 
The entry is: 
 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brendan P. Rielly, Esq. (orally), Jensen Baird, Portland, for appellants Charles R. 
Maples and Kathy S. Brown 
 
Richard Silver, Esq. (orally), Lanham Blackwell & Baber, Bangor, for appellees 
Compass Harbor Village Condominium Association et al. 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number CIV-2021-2 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY