Case Title: Stevenson v. Industrial Commission

Citation: 545 P.2d 712

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1976-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
545 P.2d 712 (1976) Walter Dale STEVENSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Colorado et al., Defendants-Appellants. No. 26956. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 2, 1976. *713 Dilts, Wilson, Dyer & Fossum, P. C. by Guy B. Dyer, Cortez, Benjamin Marcus, Muskegon, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee. William J. Baum, Robert S. Ferguson, Denver, J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., John Kezer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellants. KELLEY, Justice. Walter Dale Stevenson, plaintiff-appellee, while employed at Grand Junction, Colorado, by Colorado Castings, Inc., a defendant-appellant, became totally disabled from silicosis. Stevenson (claimant) sought compensation benefits under the Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act. Section 8-60-101, C.R.S. 1973, et seq. The referee denied the claim, basing his decision on the strict interpretation of section 8-60-110(1)(g),[1] which reads as follows: *714 The claimant, following denial of relief, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment under C.R.C.P. 57. He alleged that section 8-60-110(1) (g) is unconstitutional, in that the classification is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, denying him due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. II, Sec. 25, of the Colorado Constitution. Also, he asserted that it impinges on his constitutional right to travel. The referee had correctly declined to rule on the constitutional issues. Kinterkneckt v. Industrial Commission, 175 Colo. 60, 485 P.2d 721 (1971). The stipulated facts adopted from the findings by Referee William S. Kaufman in his order dated October 2, 1972, were the basic facts on which the declaratory action was tried. The following findings are material to the constitutional issue presented by this appeal: Pertinent to the constitutional issues before it, the trial court additionally found: *715 The defendants-appellants stated the issue here, thusly: Prefatory to ruling the statute unconstitutional, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that section 8-60-110(1) (g) creates not one, but several classifications. The trial court found that the statute improperly distinguishes between: In resolving this challenge, we find it necessary to consider only the equal protection challenge to classification (b).[2] We first focus our attention upon the proper standard of review in analyzing the constitutionality of this statutory classification under the equal protection clause. The oft-applied "strict judicial scrutiny" test for equal protection is not applicable here, because classification (b) is not "suspect,"[3] nor does it infringe upon a "fundamental right."[4] The trial court correctly examined the statutory classification in issue by what is generally known as the "rational basis" test, which requires only that the classification bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S. Ct. 1404, 22 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1969). As to the statutory distinction set out in (b), the trial court concluded, and we agree, that the length of harmful exposure has little value as a criterion for definitely establishing a causal connection between *716 the employment-related exposure and the disease. It based its conclusion on the evidence which showed that the duration of exposure to hazardous quantities of silica dust required to induce disabling silicosis can vary from six months to ten or even twenty years. The trial court's rationale for its conclusion follows: We accept the trial court's findings and hold that the five-year exposure requirement has been shown to bear no reasonable relation to a legitimate state objective. It must be held unconstitutional as an abridgment of claimant's right to equal protection of the laws. The judgment is affirmed. GROVES, J., does not participate. [1] C.R.S.1963, 81-18-10(h). [2] We, thus, find it unnecessary to consider whether the other classifications affect claimant's fundamental right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), or whether classification (b) is an unconstitutional denial of due process as establishing an irrebuttable presumption. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 37 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972). [3] Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964). [4] Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966).