Case Title: Krste Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93S02-0511-EX-605

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
George C. Patrick 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharon Funcheon Murphy 
Crown Point, IN   
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, IN  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 93S02-0511-EX-605 
 
 
KRSTE PRENTOSKI, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
 
v. 
 
FIVE STAR PAINTING, INC.,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Full Worker’s Compensation Board, No. C-144134  
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 93A02-0410-EX-815 
_________________________________ 
 
November 23, 2005 
 
 
Per curiam.  
 
 
A Single Hearing Member of the Worker’s Compensation Board dismissed Krste Pren-
toski’s second application for adjustment of benefits after finding it untimely under Indiana Code 
Section 22-3-3-27(c).  That subsection provides, “[A]pplications for increased permanent partial 
impairment are barred unless filed within one (1) year from the last day for which compensation 
was paid[.]”  Ind. Code § 22-3-3-27(c) (emphasis added).  The Full Board affirmed.  Later, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed after agreeing the application was untimely because it was not filed 
within one year after the last date for which compensation was paid, even though it was filed 
 
within one year after the date on which Prentoski received a lump-sum payment from his em-
ployer’s insurance carrier for permanent partial impairment benefits that the Board determined 
were owed to him.  Prentoski v. Five Star Painting, Inc., 827 N.E.2d 98, 102-03  (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005).  Prentoski petitioned to transfer.   
 
A long line of Court of Appeals opinions has interpreted the language in Indiana Code 
Section 22-3-3-27(c) and similarly worded predecessor statutes to mean that the limitations pe-
riod begins running on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than on some 
other date.  See, e.g., Gibson v. Indus. Bd., 176 Ind. App. 489, 376 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1978) 
(“[T]he Legislature did not choose a specified period of time after the date of the injury, or after 
the date of the award, or after the last payment of compensation. . . . Rather, the Legislature 
chose the last day for which compensation was paid.”); Lambert v. Powers, 76 Ind. App. 77, 131 
N.E. 420, 421 (1921) (“Time for filing such application does not run from the date of the award  
. . . but from the end of the compensation period fixed by the award.”).  However, as Judge Sul-
livan notes in his concurring opinion, a few opinions have initially quoted the statute correctly 
but then referred imprecisely to “the last date that [the employee] received” benefits under an 
earlier award, Luz v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 771 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. 
denied; or “‘the last day on which compensation was paid[.]’” Halteman Swim Club v. Duguid, 
757 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Gregg v. Sun Oil Co., 180 Ind. App. 379, 
388 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1979); Berry v. Anaconda Corp., 534 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989) (same).    
 
To clarify, we agree the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the statute of limitations in the pre-
sent case correctly focused on the last date “for which” compensation was paid rather than the 
last date “on which” compensation was paid.  We therefore grant transfer, adopt that portion of 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals that addresses the statute of limitations, and incorporate it by 
reference.  See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(1).  We summarily affirm the part of the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals that addresses whether a hearing was required on Five Star’s motion to dismiss.  
See App. R. 58(A)(2).     
 
All Justices concur.   
 
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