Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF: SRB-M, a minor, DJM V. DM and JM

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0129

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF:  SRB-M, a minor, DJM V. DM and JM2009 WY 22201 P.3d 1115Case Number: S-08-0129Decided: 02/20/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
IN 
THE INTEREST OF:  SRB-M, a minor, 
DJM,Appellant(Respondent),v.DM,Appellee(Petitioner), 
and JM,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

John 
M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Kristen M. Barton, Student Intern, UW Legal 
Services Program.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

No 
appearance.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Paternal great-grandmother (DM) was the 
court appointed legal guardian of minor child (SRB-M).  DJM, the child's mother (Mother) moved 
to terminate the guardianship and DM resisted the motion.  The district court, without finding 
Mother unfit, entered an order continuing the guardianship.  Mother appeals claiming that in order to 
deny her legal custody of her child and continue the guardianship, the district 
court had to find, and DM had the burden of proving, that she was an unfit 
parent.  We reverse and remand with 
directions.     

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  We consider the following 
issues:

 
 
1.         
Whether, in order to deny a parent legal custody of her child and 
continue an existing non-parent guardianship, the district court must find the 
parent unfit. 

 
 
2.         
Whether a non-parent guardian seeking to continue an existing 
guardianship has the burden of proving the parent is 
unfit.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3] 
In October of 2005, when SRB-M was one year old, DM filed a petition in district 
court to establish an emergency temporary and permanent guardianship for the 
child.  DM alleged that the child's 
mother was unable to care for the child because she was incarcerated in Colorado 
following the revocation of her probation.  
DM alleged that the child's father was 19 years old and unable to care 
for the child.  She further alleged 
that the child had resided with her since the child was approximately two weeks 
old.  

 
 
[¶4]  The district court entered an order 
appointing DM emergency temporary guardian and scheduled a hearing to determine 
the necessity for a permanent guardianship.  Mother and Father consented to the 
appointment of DM as guardian.  
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order appointing DM 
to serve as the child's permanent guardian.   The child continued to live with 
DM for the next two years.

 
 
[¶5]  In September of 2007, Mother filed a 
motion to terminate the guardianship.  
She alleged that she was no longer incarcerated, could provide for her 
child and was able to and wished to provide a safe and loving home for the 
child.  She further alleged that she 
had never been adjudicated unfit and was a fit and proper parent to have custody 
of her child.  She also asserted 
that she had a fundamental right to raise her child and, absent a finding that 
she was unfit, the guardianship must be terminated.  

 
 
[¶6]  DM filed a response in which she 
asserted that it was not in the child's best interest to be placed in Mother's 
custody when Mother had been absent for the child's entire life.  DM alleged that the child remained in 
need of a guardian because Mother was unable to care for the child physically or 
emotionally, was not a mature adult, had not psychologically or physically 
bonded with the child and had "forfeited her parental responsibilities to 
provide support."  DM asked the 
district court to continue the guardianship and approve a parenting plan to 
allow Mother to reintegrate into the child's life over time.        

 
 
[¶7]  The district court convened a hearing on 
the motion at which Mother, DM and others testified.  Father appeared at the hearing and, 
through counsel, concurred in DM's request to continue the guardianship.  At the close of the hearing, the 
district court denied the petition to terminate the guardianship, concluding 
that it was in the child's best interest to remain with DM while allowing Mother 
to gradually re-introduce herself into the child's life.  Subsequently, the district court entered 
a written order continuing the guardianship and establishing a visitation 
schedule "intended to gradually increase the parental responsibility of each 
parent while still protecting the child's need for stability and 
consistency."  Mother appealed and 
filed a brief setting forth her arguments.  
Neither DM nor Father filed a responsive brief.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      We presume the district 
court's findings of fact are correct and will not set them aside unless they are 
inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence.  KO v. LDH (In re MEO), 2006 WY 87, ¶ 17, 138 P.3d 1145, 1150 (Wyo. 2006).  We review a 
district court's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Id. Construction of the guardianship 
statutes involves a question of law which we also review de novo.  Id. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]  In denying the petition to terminate the 
guardianship, the district court concluded that Mother's fitness as a parent was 
not the sole factor to be considered; rather, the best interest of the child 
must also be considered.  
Considering Mother's petition from that perspective, the district court 
determined the guardianship should continue for the following 
reasons:

 
 

a.       
That 
the biological mother's history with regard to long term relationships with men 
is not good; she is pregnant with her third child[,] all having three different 
fathers.  Children need 
stability.

b.      
That 
the biological mother has essentially abandoned her 8-year-old 
child.

c.       
That 
the biological mother's decision to use drugs during her pregnancy was poor, 
using drugs after her pregnancy was [a] poor [decision], and she apparently 
cared more for the immediate gratification from the effects of the drug than for 
the welfare of her daughter.

d.      
That 
the urge of the biological mother to use drugs may still be 
present.

e.       
That 
the biological mother's mental health problems exist, but the exact nature of 
which is unclear to the court.

f.       
The 
mother's family support system is dubious at best.   

g.      
That 
the court is concerned about the evidence demonstrating the biological mother's 
lack of control or maturity; especially, the mother's decision to engage in an 
altercation at her child's birthday party, with the guardian, and in front of 
the child. That [Mother] is currently in compliance with the requirements of 
Parole, and therefore is not a danger to her child.  

h.      
That 
the guardian provides a safe home, the child is well cared for, and well fed; 
the child is well bonded with the guardian, the guardian provides educational 
and emotional development for the child, and the court is reluctant to interrupt 
the relationship between the guardian and the child as consistency and stability 
is important to the life of a child.

i.        
That 
the guardian recognizes the importance of the biological mother in the child's 
life which was demonstrated by initiative of arranging and transporting of the 
child to see the mother while incarcerated.

j.        
That 
the guardian recognizes the importance of the biological father in the child's 
life which was demonstrated by her commitment to arranging visitation between 
the father and the child on a weekly basis.  

 
 
[¶10]  Mother asserts that the order continuing 
the guardianship must be reversed because the district court did not find her to 
be an unfit parent.  She claims 
that, absent a finding that she is unfit, the guardianship is "no longer 
necessary" within the meaning of the guardianship statutes and the order 
continuing it violates her fundamental parental right to the care, custody and 
control of her child.  Mother 
contends the same reasoning this Court applied in MEO in the context of establishing a 
guardianship applies in the context of terminating an established guardianship; 
that is, a parent is the natural guardian of a child and a court-appointed one 
is not necessary absent a determination that the parent is unfit. 

 
 
[¶11]  It is clear from the comments made at 
the close of the hearing that the district court concluded this case must be 
treated differently than one, such as MEO, in which a party seeks to establish 
a guardianship.  The district court 
specifically noted that the guardianship had been in place for two years and, 
given that circumstance, concluded it could not consider "in a vacuum" only 
Mother's "fitness as a parent" but must consider the best interest of the 
child.  Then, without making an 
express finding concerning Mother's fitness, the district court concluded in 
essence that it was in the child's best interest to continue the guardianship 
while allowing Mother to gradually become more involved in the child's 
life.   

 
 
[¶12]  MEO involved the appointment of 
grandparents as the permanent guardians of their 16 year old granddaughter over 
the mother's objection. Prior to the involuntary guardianship proceedings, the 
child had been in mother's custody except for summer visits with her 
grandparents.  The district court 
concluded the child's best interests would be served by appointing grandparents 
as her permanent guardians and entered an order to that effect despite an 
express finding that the mother was not an unfit parent.  We said:

 
 
A 
parent is the natural guardian of her child.  For a minor, a court appointed guardian 
assumes the role of a parent.  That 
relationship is described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(e), which provides:  "The guardian of a minor has the powers 
and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of his 
unemancipated minor child."  A 
determination by a district court that a minor is in need of a plenary guardian 
is, therefore, akin to a finding that the minor needs a 
parent.

 
 

MEO, 
¶ 47, 138 P.3d  at 1158-59.  

 
 
[¶13]  We held:

 
 
[I]n 
the context of an involuntary guardianship proceeding where the proposed ward is 
a minor, a best interests inquiry is not triggered until the district court 
determines that the minor needs a guardian.  A child with a parent has a natural 
guardian and is not in need of a court-appointed guardian, unless the court 
determines that the child's natural guardian is not fit.  Thus, "[o]nce the natural parent is 
deemed fit, the issue of custody is decided."

 
 

Id., 
¶ 55, 138 P.3d  at 1161.  

 
 
[¶14]  We agree with the district court that MEO was factually different from the 
present case in that it involved an involuntary guardianship proceeding in 
which, after 16 years in her mother's care, the child was placed in her 
grandparents' care.  In contrast, 
Mother in the present case voluntarily placed the child in DM's care when she 
was two weeks old and the question before the district court was whether the 
child should be removed three years later from the only home she had known and 
placed in Mother's custody.  Despite 
these factual differences, however, the question in both cases given the 
statutory language was whether the guardianship was necessary.  

 
 
[¶15]  In MEO, the governing statute was Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(a) (LexisNexis 2007), which provided as 
follows:

 
 
§ 
3-2-104.  Appointment of 
guardian.

 
 
(a)  The court may appoint a guardian if the 
allegations of the petition as to the status of the proposed ward and the necessity for the appointment of 
a guardian are proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

(b)    
 The order appointing a guardian shall 
state the findings of the court, including:

(i)   The reasons why the ward is in 
need of a guardian;

(ii)  The appointment of the 
guardian;

(iii) 
The duration of the appointment for a specified term or permanent, subject to 
W.S. 3-3-1101;

(iv)  The limited or plenary duties of the 
guardian.

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶16]  The governing statute in the present 
case is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-1101(a)(v) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides as 
follows: 

 
 
§ 
3-3-1101.  Cause for 
termination.

 
 
  (a) A guardianship shall cease, and a 
conservatorship shall terminate, upon the occurrence of any of the following 
circumstances:

(i)  If upon attaining the age of majority 
when the ward is a minor who has not been adjudged an incompetent person or a 
mentally incompetent person;

            
(ii)  The death of the ward . 
. . ;

(iii) 
A determination by the court that the ward is competent and capable of managing 
his property and affairs and that the continuance of the guardianship or 
conservatorship is not in his best interest;

(iv)  A determination by the court that the 
guardian or conservator is not acting in the best interest of the ward.  In such case, the court shall appoint 
another guardian or conservator; 

(v)  Upon determination by the court that the 
conservatorship or guardianship is no 
longer necessary for any other reason. 

 
 
[¶17]   Considering the meaning of the 
word "necessity" as used in § 3-2-104(a) in MEO, we said:

 
 
The 
term "necessity" means the "condition or quality of being necessary" or the 
"state  of being in need."  
Necessary generally means essential or required.   

 
 

MEO, 
¶ 46, 138 P.3d  at 1158.  We 
concluded a court-appointed guardian was not necessary if the child's natural 
guardian was deemed fit.  Id., ¶ 55, 138 P.3d  at 1161.  Additionally, we held that consideration 
of the child's best interests is not triggered until the necessity of a guardian 
has been proven. 

    

[¶18]  Our holding in MEO was based in part on the important 
constitutional principle that a parent has a fundamental right to care for, 
educate and associate with his or her child.  In re MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 (Wyo. 
1984).  The fundamental right of a 
parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 
children is also recognized by the United States Supreme Court.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000).  
Given this fundamental right, this Court has not condoned removal of a 
child from a fit parent.  MEO, ¶ 53, 138 P.3d  at 1160.  "Although we have sometimes described 
the child's best interests as having constitutional preeminence,' we have done 
so in light of an adjudication of neglect or abuse, elevating the child's 
interests above the individual claims of the parent."  Id.  

 
 
[¶19]  Thus, in the context of appointing a 
guardian, we have interpreted the guardianship statutes as requiring a finding 
that a parent is unfit in order to permit placing a child with a non-parent over 
the parent's objection.  We have not 
previously addressed the issue in the context of terminating an established 
guardianship.  However, given the 
strength of our precedent requiring a showing of parental unfitness before a 
parent's fundamental right to the custody of his or her child can be denied, the 
fact that both § 3-2-104(a) (appointment of guardian) and § 3-3-1101(a)(v) 
(termination of guardian) require a showing of necessity, and our holding in MEO that a guardianship is not necessary 
if the parent is deemed fit, we conclude that a finding of parental unfitness is 
required in order to continue an established guardianship over a parent's 
objection.

 
 
[¶20]  In reaching this result, we are 
influenced by the policy underlying guardianship proceedings.  As stated by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court:

 
 
A 
guardianship is no more than a temporary custody arrangement established for the 
well-being of a child.  Important 
here, the "appointment of a guardian is not a de facto termination of parental 
rights, which results in a final and complete severance of the child from the 
parent and removes the entire bundle of parental rights."  Rather, guardianships give parents an 
opportunity to temporarily relieve themselves of the burdens involved in raising 
a child, thereby enabling parents to take those steps necessary to better their 
situation so they can resume custody of their child in the 
future.

 
 
[G]uardianships 
are intended to encourage parents experiencing difficulties to temporarily turn 
over the custody and care of their children  safe in the knowledge that they 
will be able to regain custody in the future.  This policy would be frustrated if 
guardianships were permanent or resulted in the automatic termination of 
parental rights, because parents would be less likely to voluntarily petition 
for a guardian to be appointed to care for their minor children.  Therefore, children would unnecessarily 
be placed in jeopardy in many circumstances.

 
 

Carla 
R. v. Tim H. (In re D.J.), 
682 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Neb. 2004).  To 
further these purposes, we hold that in guardianship termination proceedings, as 
in guardianship appointment proceedings, the biological parent is entitled to 
custody of his or her child absent a finding that he or she is unfit.      

 
 
[¶21]  We are aware that the termination of an 
established guardianship may raise concerns that do not arise when a guardian is 
appointed, specifically, the fact that a child may have been in a guardian's 
custody for many years, may be strongly attached to the guardian, and may 
experience significant emotional turmoil if removed from the guardian's 
custody.  In light of these 
concerns, we reiterate our statement in MEO, 138 P.3d  at 1159 n.14, that under 
"exceptional circumstances" or for "compelling reasons" exceptions may be made 
to the principle that a fit parent is entitled to custody of his or her 
child.  "Generally, these exceptions 
acknowledge a child's real family unit or emotional attachment, or take account 
of a biological parent's failure to accept parental responsibility."  Id., citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 
(N.Y. 1976), where a child was in the custody of a non-parent for so long that 
his removal risked causing him psychological trauma and Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 489 
(Wis. 1984), in which the court found "compelling reasons" to include 
abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsibilities, extended 
disruption of parental custody, or other extraordinary circumstances drastically 
affecting the welfare of the child.  

 
 
[¶22]  We did not consider in MEO whether compelling reasons or 
exceptional circumstances existed warranting a departure from the general rule 
because the parties did not raise the issue and no exception appeared 
applicable.  We are not persuaded 
from the record before us that this case involves the sort of exceptional 
circumstances or compelling reasons warranting an exception to the rule that, 
absent a finding of unfitness, a parent is entitled to custody of his or her 
child.  The district court did not 
find Mother unfit; it, therefore, erred in ordering the guardianship to continue 
indefinitely.  

  

[¶23]  Mother also contends DM had the burden 
of proving that Mother was unfit.  
From the statutory language, it is clear Mother had the burden of proving 
the guardianship was no longer necessary.  
We conclude, however, under the facts of this case that Mother did not 
have the burden of proving that she was fit.  Just as a non-parent seeking the 
appointment of a guardian over the parent's objection has the burden of proving 
the parent unfit by a preponderance of the evidence, a non-parent seeking to 
continue a guardianship over the parent's objection has the burden of proving 
the parent unfit.  

 
 
[¶24]  In the present case, Mother was never 
adjudicated to be unfit.  Therefore, 
once Mother established that the guardianship was no longer necessary for the 
reasons it had been established, i.e. she was no longer incarcerated and was 
complying with the conditions of her parole, the parental preference principle 
applied and Mother was presumed to be the child's guardian.  The burden then shifted to DM to rebut 
the presumption by showing that Mother was unfit and the guardianship was still 
necessary.  As in the case where a 
non-parent seeks the appointment of guardian over the parent's objection, DM had 
the burden of proving Mother's unfitness by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  This allocation of the 
burden of proof is consistent with the policy underlying the establishment of 
guardianships and the constitutional protections afforded a child's biological 
parent.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]  To further the policy underlying the 
guardianship statutes and in recognition of a parent's fundamental right to the 
custody of his or her child, we conclude that in order to continue the 
guardianship the district court was required to find Mother unfit.  DM, as the party objecting to 
termination of the voluntary guardianship, had the burden of proving Mother to 
be unfit.  The district court did 
not find that Mother is unfit.  Therefore, the district court's 
determination that the guardianship should continue, based solely upon a best 
interest analysis, was clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶26]  The district court's order continuing 
the guardianship is reversed.  The 
case is remanded for the district court to determine from the evidence presented 
whether DM met her burden of proving Mother is unfit.  In making that determination, the 
district court may wish to consider relevant evidence of Mother's circumstances 
since the last hearing.  Should the 
district court find that DM proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Mother is unfit, the petition to terminate the guardianship must be denied.  Absent a finding that Mother is unfit, 
the district court must grant the petition to terminate the guardianship.  However, the district court retains the 
discretion to enter a reasonable order to assist the child in the transition 
from DM's home to Mother's home.  

 
 
[¶27]   Reversed and remanded to the 
district court for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.