Case Title: Litchfield Township Board of Trustees v. Forever Blueberry Barn, LLC

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1508

Docket Number: 2019-0418

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Litchfield Twp. Bd. Of Trustees v. Forever Blueberry Barn, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-
1508.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1508 
LITCHFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, APPELLANT, v. FOREVER 
BLUEBERRY BARN, L.L.C., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Litchfield Twp. Bd. Of Trustees v. Forever Blueberry Barn, 
L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1508.] 
Township zoning—R.C. 519.21(A)—Exemption for viticulture—Buildings used 
primarily for vinting and selling wine—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2019-0418—Submitted February 11, 2020—Decided April 21, 2020) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, 
No. 18CA0023-M, 2019-Ohio-322. 
__________________ 
STEWART, J. 
{¶ 1} In Terry v. Sperry, 130 Ohio St.3d 125, 2011-Ohio-3364, 956 N.E.2d 
276, ¶ 26, we construed R.C. 519.21(A) and held that “a township may not prohibit 
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the use of buildings for the vinting and selling of wine on a property as long as the 
property also cultivates grapes for wine making.”  In this discretionary appeal, we 
consider a related question under R.C. 519.21(A): the quantum of evidence required 
to show that a building located upon land on which grapes are cultivated is used 
primarily for “vinting and selling wine.”  We hold that whether a building is used 
primarily for vinting and selling wine under R.C. 519.21(A) is a question of fact 
that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Forever Blueberry Barn, L.L.C. (“Blueberry Barn”), owns 
a barn in Litchfield Township on land that is designated as residential.  Blueberry 
Barn rents the barn for “barn weddings” and other social gatherings.  Believing that 
Blueberry Barn’s use of its land for those purposes was not permitted in a 
residential district, appellant, Litchfield Township Board of Trustees (“township 
trustees”), filed a complaint in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas seeking 
to enjoin Blueberry Barn from using its land for weddings and other social 
gatherings.  The trial court issued an injunction barring Blueberry Barn from using 
the land for weddings and other social gatherings, but the court later rescinded the 
injunction after hearing evidence that Blueberry Barn had planted grapevines on 
the land and planned to sell wine made from the grapes to its renters as a condition 
of renting the barn.  The trial court determined that Blueberry Barn’s use of the land 
met the “vinting and selling wine” exemption under R.C. 519.21(A). 
{¶ 3} The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the trial 
court had failed to determine whether the barn, as opposed to the land on which it 
is located, was being used primarily for the purpose of vinting and selling wine.  
2018-Ohio-345, ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 4} On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing and determined that 
Blueberry Barn had produced wine and stored it in the barn, along with the 
equipment used for the production of the wine, and that persons renting the barn 
January Term, 2020 
 
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would be required to purchase the wine in order to have exclusive use of the barn.  
Because the ability to rent the barn would be dependent upon the purchase of 
Blueberry Barn’s wine, the trial court determined that the barn was used primarily 
for vinting and selling wine. 
{¶ 5} On further appeal, the Ninth District affirmed.  2019-Ohio-322.  
Citing the trial court’s factual finding that the barn is primarily used for the vinting 
and selling of wine, the court of appeals determined that the trial court’s judgment 
was supported by the weight the evidence.  Id. at ¶ 8.  A dissenting judge concluded 
that the trial court’s decision was against the weight of the evidence because 
Blueberry Barn exists “primarily as an event venue.”  Id. at ¶ 14 (Carr, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 6} We accepted for review the township trustees’ following proposition 
of law: 
 
Upon a property where grapes are cultivated, the owner’s use 
of a building upon said property must be shown to be utilized 
primarily for the production of wine made from grapes and 
for the sale of wine produced therein, in order, pursuant to 
R.C. § 519.21(A), for the use of the building to be exempt 
from zoning regulation. 
 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} Ohio townships have no inherent zoning power—any zoning 
authority they have is conferred by the legislature.  Trustees of New London Twp. 
v. Miner, 26 Ohio St. 452, 453-454 (1875); Torok v. Jones, 5 Ohio St.3d 31, 32, 
448 N.E.2d 819 (1983).  Zoning regulations are in derogation of property rights and 
are ordinarily construed in favor of the property owners.  Boice v. Ottawa Hills, 
137 Ohio St.3d 412, 2013-Ohio-4769, 999 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 10.  When a statute creates 
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an exemption from restrictive zoning provisions, the exemption should be “liberally 
construed.”  Terry, 130 Ohio St.3d 125, 2011-Ohio-3364, 956 N.E.2d 276, at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 519.21(A) creates an exemption from restrictive zoning by 
townships: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in divisions (B) and (D) of this 
section, sections 519.02 to 519.25 of the Revised Code confer no 
power on any township zoning commission, board of township 
trustees, or board of zoning appeals to prohibit the use of any land 
for agricultural purposes or the construction or use of buildings or 
structures incident to the use for agricultural purposes of the land on 
which such buildings or structures are located, including buildings 
or structures that are used primarily for vinting and selling wine and 
that are located on land any part of which is used for viticulture, and 
no zoning certificate shall be required for any such building or 
structure. 
 
{¶ 9} In Terry, we determined that “[t]he exemption from township zoning 
in R.C. 519.21(A) does not require for its application that viticulture be the primary 
use of property engaged in the vinting and selling of wine.”  Terry at syllabus.  We 
explained that there are “two circumstances under which the use of a property is 
exempt from township zoning regulations: (1) the property is used for agricultural 
purposes or (2) the construction or use of buildings or structures on the property is 
incident to an agricultural use of the land.”  Id. at ¶ 21.  We concluded that “[a] 
township may not prohibit the use of a property for vinting and selling wine if any 
part of the property is used for viticulture.  * * * “ ‘[A]ny’ can mean one vine.”  Id. 
at ¶ 27. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 10} This case differs from Terry because it involves the use of a building 
(the barn), as opposed to the use of the land itself for viticulture.  Blueberry Barn 
had produced wine and stored it in the barn, along with the equipment used for the 
production of the wine, and it intended to require its renters to purchase the wine 
as a condition of having exclusive use of the barn.  Use of the land for viticulture 
clearly falls within the R.C. 519.21(A) exemption from zoning restriction.  This 
case asks whether the barn itself is used primarily for vinting and selling wine under 
R.C. 519.21(A). 
{¶ 11} R.C. 519.21(A) does not define the word “primary,” so we give the 
word its usual and ordinary meaning.  In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent 
Land Taxes, 140 Ohio St.3d 346, 2014-Ohio-3656, 18 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 12.  The word 
“primary” means “of first rank, importance, or value.”  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2003).  We determine that whether a building is 
used primarily for vinting and selling wine is a question of fact that must be proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
{¶ 12} The township trustees argue that Blueberry Barn does not use its 
barn primarily for vinting and selling wine because only a small percentage of the 
barn’s overall space (4 percent) is used for vinting and selling wine. 
{¶ 13} The word “primary” is not synonymous with the word “majority,” 
particularly with respect to the amount of space or time devoted to a particular land 
use.  Thus, the amount of a building’s interior space, or the time dedicated to a use 
of the space, do not always control whether the use is the “primary” use.  When a 
winery is, like Blueberry Barn, in the initial stages of production and is producing 
limited quantities of wine, it is not unreasonable to use the space for other purposes.  
That Blueberry Barn used its space in the barn for events does not mean that vinting 
and selling wine is not the primary purpose of the barn. 
{¶ 14} Suppose that Ohio Stadium hosts 20 events on a yearly basis, but 
only 7 of those events are home games for The Ohio State University football team.  
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It would be difficult to argue that under that scenario the primary use of Ohio 
Stadium is something other than football. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, the trial court determined that Blueberry Barn, in addition 
to using the barn to make and store its wine, intended to rent the barn for weddings 
and other social events at which the renter would be required to purchase Blueberry 
Barn’s wine.  Because Blueberry Barn intended to require its renters to purchase 
Blueberry Barn’s wine, a trier of fact could determine that the rental facilitated the 
vinting and selling of wine and contributed to the barn’s primary use of vinting and 
selling wine. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 16} The trial court determined that the primary use of the barn, and the 
events held therein, was to facilitate the sale of Blueberry Barn wine by 
conditioning the rental of the barn on the purchase of its wine.  This was a proper 
application of the primary-use test under R.C. 519.21(A), the factual merit of which 
we do not decide because it is a question going to the weight of evidence, and this 
court does not ordinarily consider the weight of the evidence.  Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio 
St.2d 203, 204, 414 N.E.2d 426 (1980); In re Estate of Hatch, 154 Ohio St. 149, 
153, 93 N.E.2d 585 (1950) (“This court is not required to and ordinarily does not 
weigh the evidence”). 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and 
DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
S. Forrest Thompson, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tom J. 
Karris and Brian M. Richter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
Laribee & Hertrick, L.L.P, and Michael L. Laribee, for appellee. 
_________________