Case Title: LEROUX ET AL V SECRETARY OF STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED MARCH 25, 2002  
DAVID LeROUX, MICHAEL GRAY, 
and ROBERT L. ELLIS,  
Plaintiffs,  
v 
No. 120338  
SECRETARY OF STATE and  
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS,  
Defendants,  
and  
SUZANNE L. ANDERSON, SHARON 
YENTSCH, and BRADLEY 
VAN HAITSMA,  
Intervening Defendants.  
PER CURIAM  
In this original action, plaintiffs challenge the plan  
for 
redistricting 
Michigan’s 
fifteen 
seats 
in 
the  
United States House of Representatives adopted by 2001 PA 115.  
Plaintiffs claim that the statute was not validly enacted  
because the bill passed by the Legislature was changed by the  
Secretary of the Senate before presentation to the Governor  
for his approval.  Second, they contend that the plan fails to  
comply with Michigan statutory requirements for congressional  
redistricting established by 1999 PA 221.  We conclude:  
 
(1) 2001 PA 115 was validly enacted because the changes made  
before submission to the Governor were technical corrections  
that do not violate the provisions of the Michigan  
Constitution regarding enactment of legislation; (2) the  
redistricting guidelines of MCL 3.63(c), as enacted by 1999 PA  
211, were not binding on the Legislature’s redistricting of  
Michigan’s congressional seats in 2001; and (3) the reference  
to the 1999 guidelines in the 2001 redistricting act does not  
indicate an intention by the Legislature to make the  
redistricting plan reviewable using those guidelines.  We  
therefore 
deny 
the 
application for review of the congressional  
redistricting plan.  
I. Federal Framework for Congressional Districting  
The Constitution provides that representatives in  
Congress are to be apportioned among the states according to  
their populations,1 with the allocation to be made according  
to the decennial census.2 
In general, the United States  
Constitution leaves to the states the manner of electing  
representatives. US Const, art I, § 4 provides:  
The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of choosing Senators.  
However, 
the 
Congress and the federal courts have imposed  
several limitations on the states’ authority in the area of  
congressional districting.  In a series of decisions, the  
1 US Const, Am XIV, § 2.  
2 US Const, art I, § 2.  
2  
 
United States Supreme Court has established the primacy of the  
principle of “one person, one vote.”  Wesberry v Sanders, 376  
US 1, 7-8; 84 S Ct 526; 11 L Ed 2d 481 (1964); Reynolds v  
Sims, 377 US 533, 562-564; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506  
(1964).  That principle requires that congressional districts  
must be constructed so that “as nearly as practicable one  
man’s vote in a congressional election is . . . worth as much  
as another’s.”  Wesberry, 376 US 7-8.  That standard has been  
refined to require that good-faith efforts be made to achieve  
precise 
mathematical 
equality.  Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394 US  
526, 530-531; 89 S Ct 1225; 22 L Ed 2d 519 (1969). Thus, to  
justify any deviation from mathematical equality, it must be  
demonstrated 
that 
the 
deviation 
was 
either 
unavoidable 
despite  
good-faith 
efforts 
or was necessary to achieve some legitimate  
state goal.  Karcher v Daggett, 462 US 725, 731; 103 S Ct  
2653; 77 L Ed 2d 133 (1983).  
Second, Congress enacted the voting rights act of 1965,3  
which, among other things, prohibits state election practices  
or procedures that result in “a denial or abridgement of the  
right of any citizen of the Untied States to vote on account  
of race or color . . . .” 42 USC 1973(a). See, generally,  
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30; 106 S Ct 2752; 92 L Ed 2d 25  
(1986); Growe v Emison, 507 US 25; 113 S Ct 1075; 122 L Ed 2d  
388 (1993); Reno v Bossier Parish Sch Bd, 520 US 471; 117 S Ct  
1491; 137 L Ed 2d 730 (1997): Beer v United States, 425 US  
130, 141; 96 S Ct 1357; 47 L Ed 2d 629 (1976).  
Third, Congress has imposed a requirement for use of  
3 PL 89-110, 42 USC 1973 et seq.  
3  
single-member districts for the election of representatives.  
2 USC 2c.  
II.  Recent History of Congressional Redistricting 
in Michigan  
Unlike the constitutions of a number of states,4  
Michigan’s Constitution does not include any provisions  
regarding the procedure or standards for congressional  
redistricting.5  Thus, the Legislature has been free to adopt  
redistricting plans in any manner it chose, consistent with  
federal requirements.  However, before 2001 PA 115, the  
Michigan Legislature last enacted a congressional districting  
plan in 1964.  1964 PA 282. 
The Legislature failed to  
redistrict the state following the next three censuses, and  
the federal courts ultimately adopted plans that have been  
used since 1972.  See Dunnell v Austin, 344 F Supp 210 (ED  
Mich, 1972); Agerstrand v Austin, No. 81-50256 (ED Mich,  
unpublished opinion issued May 20, 1982); Good v Austin, 800  
F Supp 557 (ED & WD Mich, 1992).  
III. Michigan Redistricting Legislation  
Three 
Michigan 
statutes are relevant to the issues raised  
in this case—1999 PA 221 and 222, passed in anticipation of  
the redistricting process following the 2000 census, and 2001  
PA 115, the redistricting plan at issue in this case.  
A. 1999 PA 221—The Substantive Statute  
4 E.g., Ariz Const, art IV, § 1; Cal Const, art XXI, § 1; 
Mo Const, art III, § 45; Wash Const, art 2, § 43.  
5 Proposals to include such provisions were considered at 
the Constitutional Convention, but were not adopted.  See 2  
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 2392, 
2409-2410, 2412-2414.  
4  
 
 
1999 PA 221 provided a legislative process for  
redistricting congressional seats.  It set November 1, 2001,6  
as the deadline for legislative action, MCL 3.62, and then, in  
MCL 3.63, established standards to be used in drawing  
districts.
 MCL 3.63(a) and (b) incorporated the federal  
constitutional and statutory requirements.7  In this action,  
plaintiffs do not claim that the legislative plan fails to  
comply with those provisions.8
 MCL 3.63(c) then created  
6 And every 10 years thereafter.  
7  
Except as otherwise required by federal law  
for congressional districts in this state, the 
redistricting plan shall be enacted using only 
these 
guidelines 
in 
the 
following 
order 
of  
priority:  
(a) The constitutional guideline is that each 
congressional 
district 
shall 
achieve 
precise 
mathematical 
equality 
of 
population 
in 
each  
district.  
(b) The federal statutory guidelines in no 
order of priority are as follows:  
(i) Each congressional district shall be  
entitled to elect a single member.  
(ii) Each congressional district shall not 
violate section 2 of title I of the voting rights 
act of 1965, Public Law 89-110, 42 USC 1973.  
The inclusion of the federal guidelines for districting 
in MCL 3.63(a), (b) represents an appropriate recognition of 
the 
controlling 
federal law.  However, those guidelines derive 
their force not from the act of the Michigan Legislature, but, 
rather, from the underlying federal constitutional and  
statutory provisions.  
8 The parties have informed the Court that an action has 
been filed by other plaintiffs against the Secretary of State 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District  
of Michigan that does raise federal challenges to the 
redistricting statute.  O’Lear v Secretary of State, 
No. 01-72584. They report that a three-judge panel has been 
convened and that the district court has denied a motion to  
expedite the scheduling of a conference, but that no further  
5  
“secondary” guidelines.  The first priority was contiguity of  
districts, followed by provisions involving breaking county  
and municipal lines. MCL 3.63(c) provides:  
The secondary guidelines in order of priority 
are as follows:  
(i) Each congressional district shall consist  
of areas of convenient territory contiguous by 
land. Areas that meet only at points of adjoining 
corners are not contiguous.  
(ii) Congressional district lines shall break 
as few county boundaries as is reasonably possible.  
(iii) If it is necessary to break county lines  
to 
achieve 
equality 
of 
population 
between  
congressional districts as provided in subdivision 
(a), the number of people necessary to achieve 
population equality shall be shifted between the 2 
districts affected by the shift.  
(iv) Congressional district lines shall break  
as few city and township boundaries as is  
reasonably possible.  
(v) If it is necessary to break city or 
township lines to achieve equality of population 
between congressional districts as provided in 
subdivision (a), the number of people necessary to 
achieve population equality shall be shifted  
between the 2 districts affected by the shift.  
(vi) Within a city or township to which there 
is apportioned more than 1 congressional district, 
district lines shall be drawn to achieve the  
maximum compactness possible.  
(vii) Compactness shall be determined by 
circumscribing each district within a circle of 
minimum radius and measuring the area, not part of 
the Great Lakes and not part of another state, 
inside the circle but not inside the district.  
(viii) If a discontiguous township island 
exists within an incorporated city or discontiguous 
portions of townships are split by an incorporated 
city, the splitting of the township shall not be 
considered a split if any of the following 
circumstances exist:  
action has been taken in the federal litigation.  
6  
 
(A) The city must be split to achieve equality 
of population between congressional districts as 
provided in subdivision (a) and it is practicable 
to keep the township together within 1 district.  
(B) A township island is contained within a 
whole city and a split of the city would be 
required to keep the township intact.  
(C) The discontiguous portion of a township 
cannot be included in the same district with  
another portion of the same township without  
creating a noncontiguous district.  
(ix) Each congressional district shall be 
numbered in a regular series, beginning with  
congressional district 1 in the northwest corner of 
the state and ending with the highest numbered 
district in the southeast corner of the state.  
B. 1999 PA 222—The Procedural Statute  
1999 PA 222 created a mechanism for involving this Court  
in the redistricting process.  MCL 3.71 said that the Supreme  
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over state claims regarding  
congressional redistricting:  
The supreme court has original and exclusive 
state jurisdiction to hear and decide all cases and 
controversies in Michigan's 1 court of justice 
involving a congressional redistricting plan.  A  
case or controversy in Michigan's 1 court of 
justice involving a congressional redistricting 
plan shall not be commenced in or heard by the 
state court of appeals or any state trial court. 
If a case or controversy involves a congressional 
redistricting plan but an application or petition 
for review was not filed under section 2 or 3, the  
supreme court may, but is not obligated to, 
undertake all or a portion of the procedures 
described in section 4.  
The statute then provided two ways for actions to be  
brought.  First, MCL 3.72 says that if the Legislature passes  
a redistricting plan by November 1, 2001, any voter may seek  
review of the plan:  
Upon the application of an elector filed not 
later than 60 days after the adoption of the 
enactment of a congressional redistricting plan,  
7  
 
the supreme court, exercising original state  
jurisdiction 
may 
review 
any 
congressional 
redistricting plan enacted by the legislature, and 
may modify that plan or remand that plan to a 
special master for further action if the plan fails 
to comply with the congressional redistricting act.  
On the other hand, if the Legislature fails to act by the  
deadline, under MCL 3.73, a political party or member of the  
House of Representatives may request this Court to develop a  
redistricting plan:  
Unless legislation enacting a redistricting 
plan for congressional districts is approved on or 
before 
the 
deadline 
established 
in 
the  
congressional redistricting act, a political party, 
or a member of the United States house of  
representatives on or after November 2 immediately 
following 
the 
deadline 
established 
in 
the  
congressional redistricting act, may petition or 
otherwise file pleadings or papers with the supreme 
court requesting that the supreme court prepare a 
redistricting plan for congressional districts in 
compliance 
with 
the 
redistricting 
guidelines 
provided in the congressional redistricting act.  
If an action is filed under either of those provisions,  
MCL 3.74 sets forth procedures to be followed:  
If an application or petition for review is 
filed in the supreme court under section 2 or 3, 
the supreme court shall do all of the following:  
(a) Exercising original state jurisdiction or 
other state jurisdiction pursuant to Michigan court 
rule 7.301(A)(7) or any successor court rule, 
undertake the preparation of a redistricting plan 
for congressional districts.  
(b) Appoint and utilize a special master or 
masters as the court considers necessary.  
(c) Provide, by order, for the submission of 
proposed redistricting plans by political parties 
and other interested persons who have been allowed 
to intervene.  Political parties shall be granted 
intervention as of right.  
(d) After hearing oral argument or appointing 
special masters, propose 1 plan for consideration 
of the parties and the public, and make that plan 
available for public inspection at least 30 days  
8  
before the time set for hearing in subdivision (f).  
(e) Prescribe, by order or otherwise, the 
procedure for and the deadlines pertaining to 
filing objections and rebuttal to the proposed plan 
in 
advance 
of 
the 
hearing 
scheduled 
in  
subdivision (f).  
(f) Hold a hearing on the proposed plan at a 
time determined by the court but not later than 
March 
1 
immediately 
following 
the 
deadline  
established in the congressional redistricting act.  
(g) In order to provide for the orderly 
election process and for candidates to meet  
statutory deadlines for filing and residency, and 
after making any revisions to the proposed plan 
that the supreme court considers necessary, order a 
redistricting plan for congressional districts not 
later than April 1 immediately following the  
deadline 
established 
in 
the 
congressional 
redistricting act.  
C. 2001 PA 115—The Redistricting Act  
Following the release of the 2000 census data and the  
federal reapportionment of representatives to the states, in  
June 2001, the Legislature took up the question of districting  
the fifteen seats allocated to Michigan.  The Senate passed a  
redistricting plan (SB 546) on June 26, 2001.  During House  
consideration of the bill, two alternative plans were  
introduced, but were rejected.9  
After final action by the Legislature,10 it adjourned for  
9 As one might expect, much of the dispute in the 
Legislature was over the political “fairness” of the several 
plans.  In this Court, plaintiffs also argue that the 
legislatively 
adopted plan is politically unfair, in the sense 
of favoring one of the major political parties over the other. 
However, at oral argument they concede that such questions of 
political fairness are not incorporated in the statutory 
guidelines by which they claim that the plan should be 
reviewed.  
10 After initial passage of the bill, on July 11 each 
house approved an amendment correcting omission of several 
census tracts from the description of the districts.  
9  
the summer recess. 
As the bill was being prepared for  
submission to the Governor, it was discovered that two census  
tracts, including 4,578 people, had been omitted from the  
bill’s description of the districts.  The Secretary of the  
Senate (the originating house) corrected the language by  
inserting the two tracts in the description of District 15 in  
the enrolled version of the bill that was presented to the  
Governor.  He approved it on September 11, 2001, and it was  
filed with the Secretary of State on that date.11  
After the Legislature returned from its recess, on  
October 17, 2001, another proposed plan, which plaintiffs  
claim is superior to the 2001 PA 115 plan, was introduced.  
However, it was never reported out of committee.  
IV. Proceedings in This Case  
Plaintiffs 
filed this action on November 6, 2001, seeking  
to invoke the procedures set forth in 1999 PA 222.  They  
alleged that 2001 PA 115 was void because the bill signed by  
the Governor was not the same one passed by the Legislature,  
and that the act violated the redistricting guidelines of  
MCL 3.63(c).  The named defendants were the Secretary of State  
and the Director of Elections.  On November 29, 2001, we  
granted the motion to intervene by defendants Anderson,  
Yentsch, and Van Haitsma.12  In that order, we directed the  
filing of briefs and included a number of questions that the  
11 The Legislature did not vote to give the act immediate 
effect, and thus, under Const 1963, art 4, § 27, it will be 
effective March 22, 2002.  
12 The plaintiffs and the intervening defendants are 
individual Michigan voters.  However, they are surrogates for 
the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively.  
10  
parties were to address.13
 The parties appeared for oral  
argument on January 23, 2002.  
13 The questions were:  
(1) Is this action properly brought under 
MCL 3.72?  
(2) 
Is 
review 
of 
the 
congressional 
redistricting plan by this Court discretionary or 
compulsory under 1999 PA 222?  
(3) What deference, if any, should this Court 
give to the redistricting plan adopted by the 
Legislature?  
(4) Under separation of powers principles set 
forth in Const 1963, art 3, § 2, may this Court 
modify or reject the redistricting plan adopted by 
the Legislature and adopt its own redistricting 
plan?  
(5) Do the provisions of MCL 3.74, specifying 
the procedures this Court is to follow in reviewing 
a congressional redistricting plan, violate Const 
1963, art 3, § 2, or art 6, § 5?  
(6) Do the standards of MCL 3.63 apply to 
review of the redistricting plan adopted in 2001 PA 
115?  
(A) If the standards of MCL 3.63 apply, are 
those standards exclusive?  
(i) If they are exclusive, does the provision 
of MCL 3.63(c) that the secondary guidelines are 
“in order of priority” mean that one does not  
consider a criterion of lower priority unless two 
plans are equivalent with respect to all of the 
criteria of higher priority?  
(ii) If they are not exclusive, what other 
criteria are applicable?  
(B) If the standards of MCL 3.63 do not apply,  
what 
criteria 
should 
be 
used 
to 
review 
a  
redistricting plan?  
(7) How does one define a “break” of a county 
boundary?  
(8) How does one define a “break” of a city or 
township boundary?  
11  
 
 
V. Jurisdiction  
Plaintiffs premise the jurisdiction of this Court on  
MCL 3.71. 
However, the intervenors argue that the  
Legislature’s attempt to confer jurisdiction on this Court is  
unconstitutional because the Legislature lacks the authority  
to extend our jurisdiction by statute.  The constitutional  
provision regarding Supreme Court jurisdiction is Const 1963,  
art 6, § 4:  
The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
general 
superintending control over all courts; power to 
issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial 
writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by 
rules of the supreme court.  The supreme court 
shall not have the power to remove a judge.  
The 
intervenors 
cite 
cases 
decided 
under 
the  
corresponding language of the previous  Constitution14 holding  
that the Legislature lacks the authority to expand Supreme  
Court jurisdiction. 
E.g., In re Manufacturer’s Freight  
Forwarding Co, 294 Mich 57, 69; 292 NW 678 (1940).  
However, it is unnecessary for us to decide this issue.  
As even the intervenors concede, Const 1963, art 6, § 4,  
retains 
our 
authority to issue prerogative and remedial writs,  
such as mandamus. This has been the traditional vehicle for  
challenging 
redistricting 
and 
apportionment 
schemes. 
 
E.g., 
In  
re Apportionment of the State Legislature—1992, 439 Mich 715,  
14 Const 1908, art 7, § 4:  
The supreme court shall have a general 
superintending control over all inferior courts; 
and shall have power to issue writs of error, 
habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, procedendo 
and other original and remedial writs, and to hear 
and determine the same.  In all other cases it  
shall have appellate jurisdiction only.  
12  
 
717; 486 NW2d 639 (1992); Stenson v Secretary of State, 308  
Mich 48, 51; 13 NW2d 202 (1944).  As a general rule,  
MCR 3.301(A) provides that complaints for mandamus may not be  
considered by the Supreme Court if a lower court has  
jurisdiction. However, MCL 3.71 expressly provides that the  
Court of Appeals and state trial courts do not have  
jurisdiction of such cases, making an action in this Court  
appropriate regardless of whether the Legislature’s effort to  
confer jurisdiction on this Court would otherwise be  
effective.15  
VI. Was 2001 PA 115 Validly Enacted?  
In keeping with the one-person, one-vote principles, the  
Legislature sought to minimize the population disparity among  
districts to the greatest extent possible.  In § 4(e)(i) of  
2001 PA 115, it said the following about the population of the  
districts:  
The population of districts 1-9 and 11-15 is 
662,563.  The population of district 10 is 662,562.  
However, after passage of SB 546 by both houses, it was  
discovered that two census tracts16 had been omitted from the  
15 As explained later, the state statutory guidelines for 
redistricting found in MCL 3.63(c) are inapplicable.  Thus, 
the procedural provisions that the Legislature included in 
MCL 3.74 need not be followed, because they are linked to 
challenges based on those criteria.  Instead, this case has 
been processed under our rules for original actions and the 
general provisions governing proceedings in this Court, which 
permit the use of whatever procedure is appropriate in the 
circumstances. MCR 7.304(E), 7.316(A)(7).  
16 
Census 
Tracts 
416200 
and 
422900 
in 
Pittsfield 
Township, 
Washtenaw County.  
13  
 
bill’s description of the districts.17  Those tracts include  
4,578 people.  It is undisputed that totaling the populations  
of the districts as described in SB 546, Districts 1-14 had  
the totals specified in § 4(e)(i). However, the description  
of District 15 included exactly 4,578 fewer people than the  
population of the district stated in that section.  
The Secretary of the Senate, in reliance on Rule 12 of  
the Joint Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives,18  
corrected the bill by inserting references to those census  
tracts in the description of District 1519 in the enrolled  
bill that was submitted to the Governor, and that he approved.  
Plaintiffs argue that because of these events, 2001 PA  
115 was not validly enacted, citing Const 1963, art 4, §§ 120  
17 The enrolled bill is forty-two pages long.  Forty-one 
of those pages consist of descriptions of the districts. 
Where whole counties, cities, or townships are contained  
within a district, there is simply a reference to the county, 
city, or township.  However, where cities or townships are 
split, the act enumerates the census tracts and blocks within 
each district.  The bulk of the bill consists of lengthy lists 
of the census units found within each district.  
18  That rule includes the following:  
[T]he Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the 
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall 
correct obvious technical errors in the enrolled  
bill or resolution, including adjusting totals, 
misspellings, 
the 
omission 
or 
redundancy 
of  
grammatical 
articles, 
cross-references, 
punctuation, updating bill or resolution titles, 
capitalization, citation formats, and plural or 
singular word forms.  
19 There is no dispute that the two tracts are contiguous 
to the rest of District 15.  
20  
The legislative power of the State of Michigan  
is 
vested 
in 
a 
senate 
and 
a 
house 
of  
representatives.  
14  
 
 
 
and 26.21  In addition, this theory implicates Const 1963,  
art 4, § 33, which provides:  
Every bill passed by the legislature shall be 
presented to the governor before it becomes law, 
and the governor shall have 14 days measured in 
hours and minutes from the time of presentation in 
which to consider it.  If he approves, he shall 
within that time sign and file it with the  
secretary of state and it shall become law.  
The parties disagree about whether this was a mere  
technical error, which came within the language of Joint  
Rule 12.  However, that is not the question. The courts do  
not review claims that actions were taken in violation of a  
legislative rule. As we explained in Anderson v Atwood, 273  
Mich 316, 319; 262 NW 922 (1935):  
Rules of legislative procedure, adopted by the 
Legislature and not prescribed by the Constitution, 
may be suspended and action had, even if contrary 
thereto, will not be reviewed by the courts.[22]  
Thus, whether the action by the Secretary of the Senate  
in correcting the omission of the two census tracts was  
21  
No bill shall become a law without the  
concurrence of a majority of the members elected to 
and serving in each house.  
22 See also State ex rel Spaeth v Meiers, 403 NW2d 392, 
394 (ND, 1987); Carlton v Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 923; 23 NW2d 
883 (1946):  
With the exception of the few mandatory 
provisions noted the Constitution of Iowa has given 
the General Assembly a free hand in determining its 
rules of procedure. 
Whether either chamber  
strictly observes these rules or waives or suspends 
them is a matter entirely within its own control or 
discretion, so long as it observes the mandatory 
requirements of the Constitution. If any of these 
requirements are covered by its rules, such rules 
must be obeyed, but the observance or nonobservance 
of its remaining rules is not subject to review by 
the courts.  
15  
 
 
authorized by Joint Rule 12 is irrelevant.  The question is  
whether the change violates the constitutional provisions  
governing the enactment of legislation. 
If it does,  
compliance with Joint Rule 12 will not save the statute;23 if  
it does not, a violation of the legislative rule is not a  
basis for finding 2001 PA 115 not to have been validly  
enacted.24  
The issue is whether the correction by the Secretary of  
the Senate was a change that invalidates the statute under the  
governing 
constitutional 
provisions. 
Plaintiffs 
rely  
particularly on language from Beacon Club v Kalamazoo Co  
Sheriff, 332 Mich 412; 52 NW2d 165 (1952).  There, through  
clerical error, the version of the bill initially presented to  
the Governor omitted from the title a reference to an added  
section.25  We said:  
The inclusion of the reference to the added  
section in the title of the measure here involved  
was essential to its validity.  Its omission in the  
original draft of the enrolled act was more than a 
mere clerical error.  We think it may be assumed  
that the legislature considered the section in 
question as a material part of the bill.  As a  
result of the error in printing, the enrolled act 
submitted to the governor differed materially in  
substance from the draft of the measure as passed 
by the legislature.  [332 Mich 418 (emphasis in  
23 See United Ins Co v Attorney General, 300 Mich 200,  
206; 1 NW2d 510 (1942).  
24 The flaw in the reasoning of the dissent is that it 
treats the case as involving review of the Secretary of the 
Senate’s action under Joint Rule 12, discussing at length 
whether the change made was to correct “obvious technical 
errors.” However, as even the dissent recognizes at the end 
of that lengthy discussion, the question is “whether the 
action is proscribed by the constitution.”  
25 The bill as passed by both houses of the Legislature 
had the correct, amended title.  
16  
 
 
original).]  
The facts of Beacon Club are quite different from those  
of this case.26  The language from that case on which  
plaintiffs rely merely stands for the generally accepted  
proposition that a material variation between a bill as  
enacted by the Legislature and approved by the Governor  
invalidates the legislation.27  That begs the question  
presented here—whether the addition of the two inadvertently  
omitted census tracts constitutes a material change in the  
bill.  
On several occasions we have permitted correction of  
discrepancies in statutes where the legislative intent was  
26  The Governor returned the bill to the House of  
Representatives with a message indicating that he had not 
signed it because of doubts about the constitutionality of the 
added section.  The Clerk of the House then determined that  
the amended title had been inadvertently omitted and had a 
correct version printed, which was returned to the Governor, 
who signed it.  
The issue in Beacon Club was whether the Governor’s  
initial return of the document to the House precluded the 
Clerk from resubmitting the corrected bill. 
This Court  
concluded that the previous submission of the incorrect bill 
was a nullity and that the legislation should not be 
invalidated on the basis of an error that was properly 
corrected.  
27  For example, in Rode v Phelps, 80 Mich 598; 45 NW 493  
(1890), significant amendments of the bill, originally 
approved by the Senate, but deleted as a result of conference 
committee action and subsequent passage by both houses, were 
nonetheless included in the bill as signed by the Governor. 
We held that the bill was not validly enacted.  See also  
Foster v Naftalin, 246 Minn 181; 74 NW2d 249 (1956); Kenyon v 
Kansas Power & Light Co, 254 Kan 287; 864 P2d 1161 (1993).  
The 
corollary 
of that principle is that immaterial errors 
can be corrected without invalidating the enactment.  E.g., 
Application of Fisher, 80 NJ Super 523, 527-528; 194 A2d 353 
(1963), and Childers v Couey, 348 So 2d 1349, 1351 (Ala, 
1977).  
17  
 
 
clear.  For example, in People ex rel Gale v Supervisor of  
Onondaga, 16 Mich 254 (1867), the title of the bill as enacted  
by the Legislature referred to the levying and collecting of  
a “bounty” tax in the Township of Onondaga.  After passage,  
through a clerical error, the word “county” was substituted  
for “bounty,” and the bill was signed by the Governor with  
that mistake. We rejected the argument that the discrepancy  
invalidated the bill, because it was not a mistake that could  
mislead anyone who read the act. 16 Mich 258.  
In this case, plaintiffs concede that the Legislature  
intended to include the two census tracts in District 15.  
That 
conclusion 
is 
inescapable 
given 
the 
undisputed 
population  
of the tracts and the population of the districts stated in  
2001 PA 115.28  In that sense, the case is like Michigan State  
Prison Bd of Control v Auditor General, 149 Mich 386; 112 NW  
1017 (1907). There, a bill appropriated  
the sum of one hundred seventy-five thousand  
dollars for the purpose of carrying out the  
provisions of this act: Provided, That of the one 
hundred 
seventy-five 
[thousand] 
dollars 
so  
appropriated fifty thousand dollars is hereby 
appropriated 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
purchasing, 
erecting and equipping the necessary buildings, 
machinery, boilers and equipment to be used in the 
manufacturer of twine and cordage, together with a 
warehouse at the State prison at Jackson, Michigan,  
28 As explained earlier, the question is not whether the 
Secretary of the Senate’s action was authorized by Joint Rule 
12.
 However, even if one analyzes the issues from that 
viewpoint, the dissent can hardly be taken seriously in its 
claim that the correction of the bill at issue by the 
Secretary of the Senate under Senate Rule 12 was nontechnical 
and did not involve adjusting totals.  The simple reason is 
that § 4(e)(i) of 2001 PA 115 states the exact population for 
each district. District 15 was, in short, the only place to 
which these census tracts could have been allocated in order  
to meet the constitutional population requirements. 
The  
plaintiffs themselves acknowledged as much at oral argument.  
18  
 
 
and the remaining sum of one hundred twenty-five 
thousand 
dollars 
is 
hereby 
appropriated 
to  
constitute a “revolving fund” to be disposed of in 
such manner as herein provided.  [149 Mich 387­
388.]  
The word “thousand” in brackets was not in the bill as  
enrolled and signed by the Governor, but was contained in the  
bill as passed by both houses of the Legislature.29  As in the  
instant case, we found the mathematical equivalence of the  
numbers to allow correction of the bill:  
It is perfectly manifest that the legislature 
by this proviso appropriated $50,000 for the  
purpose of purchasing, erecting, and equipping the 
necessary buildings, and it is equally obvious that 
that $50,000 could not be subtracted from $175, and 
that the $175 was plainly intended to mean $175,000 
is again made manifest by the fact that in the same 
clause after appropriating $50,000 the legislature 
further appropriated a remaining $125,000 which 
must be a remainder after deducting $50,000 from 
$175,000.  It is a clerical error which corrects  
itself and leaves nothing doubtful. Such clerical  
errors will not be permitted to defect the plain 
intent of the legislature.  [149 Mich 388 (emphasis  
in original).]  
Plaintiffs’ response is that this principle does not  
apply because one must look beyond the face of 2001 PA 115 to  
identify the correct placement of the census tracts.  That is,  
because the act itself does not include the population figures  
29 The dissent attempts to extract from Board of Control  
the principle that the only corrections that can be made are 
those that “(1) are not essential to the substance of the bill 
and (2) mislead no one.”  However, some errors are such that, 
if 
uncorrected, 
they 
would render a bill internally incoherent 
and illogical.  Where the intent is clear, such clerical 
errors can be corrected.  Board of Control itself is a good 
example.  The word “thousand” can certainly be said to be 
essential to the substance of the bill:  without its  
insertion, 
the 
appropriation 
intended 
by 
the 
Legislature 
could 
not have been implemented.  The point is that, from the 
context, it was clear that the word was meant to be included, 
just as it is clear in this case that the two census tracts 
were intended to be included in District 15.  
19  
 
 
for each census tract, one must resort to external sources to  
find that data.30  However, the need to resort to census data  
does not invalidate the statute.  The information that one  
must examine is the official government data that are required  
to be used in congressional redistricting, of which judicial  
notice may be taken under MRE 201.31  Further, we have allowed  
correction of errors in the text of statutes to reflect the  
actual legislative intent, even where that required resort to  
sources outside the face of the statute itself.  In Stow v  
Grand Rapids, 79 Mich 595, 597; 44 NW 1047 (1890), we examined  
several other statutes to ascertain the Legislature’s  
intention in the reference to a local act in the title of the  
statute in question.  
We therefore conclude that the correction of SB 546 by  
the Secretary of the Senate to include the two omitted census  
tracts in District 15 implemented the clear intent of the  
Legislature that the tracts be included in that district and  
does not invalidate the statute.32  
30 As noted, § 4(e)(i) does include the total population 
of each district.  
31 See, e.g., Goins v Allgood, 391 F2d 692, 697 (CA 5, 
1968); Barnett v Daley, 32 F3d 1196, 1198 (CA 7, 1994).  
32 We have located only one other case in which the 
question of invalidating a legislative redistricting plan has 
arisen because of omission of a portion of the population from 
any district.  In Harris v Shanahan, 192 Kan 183; 387 P2d 771 
(1963), the legislature passed a bill apportioning the state 
senate, but, through clerical error, the version of the bill 
presented to the governor and signed did not include a city 
(with approximately 8,800 people) in any district.  The Kansas  
Supreme Court declined to insert a reference to the city in 
the district in which the legislature apparently intended to 
include it.  
Without commenting on the correctness of the Harris  
20  
 
VII. Applicability of 1999 Redistricting Guidelines  
As set forth above, 1999 PA 221 included guidelines for  
future congressional redistricting plans.  Similarly, the  
procedural provisions of 1999 PA 222 purport to direct us to  
review any enacted redistricting plan for compliance with  
those guidelines.  
Plaintiffs claim that 2001 PA 115 must be struck down  
because it does not comply with the secondary guidelines of  
MCL 3.63(c).  Particularly, plaintiffs assert that it does not  
break as few county boundaries as is “reasonably possible.”  
They argue that the alternative plans introduced in the  
Legislature in July and October 2001 better meet the “county  
break” 
criterion, 
establishing 
the 
invalidity 
of the  
legislatively adopted plan.  However, we need not reach the  
question of 2001 PA 115's compliance with those secondary  
guidelines, because we find that the MCL 3.63(c) guidelines  
are not applicable.  
It 
is 
a 
fundamental principle that one Legislature cannot  
bind a future Legislature or limit its power to amend or  
repeal statutes.  Absent the creation of contract rights, the  
decision under Kansas law, we note that it lacks a critical 
feature that is present in this case.  In the Kansas case, 
state legislative districts were being apportioned, which do 
not require the exactness of population equality that must be 
used in congressional redistricting. 
The Kansas plan 
apparently 
had 
districts 
that 
ranged 
approximately 
ten 
percent 
above or below the average population figure.  192 Kan 189.  
Thus, it would have been possible to place the omitted city 
and its approximately 8,800 people in one of several  
districts.
 
By 
contrast, 
in 
this 
case, 
the 
exact  
correspondence of the population of the omitted census tracts 
with the population deficit of District 15 makes inescapable 
the conclusion that the Legislature intended to place those 
tracts in that district.  
21  
later Legislature is free to amend or repeal existing  
statutory provisions.  See Detroit v Detroit & Howell Plank Rd  
Co, 43 Mich 140, 145; 5 NW 275 (1880); Stone v Mississippi,  
101 US 814, 816-818; 25 L Ed 1079 (1879).  As we explained in  
Atlas v Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599; 275 NW 507  
(1937):  
The act of one legislative body does not tie 
the hands of future legislatures. Cooper, Wells & 
Co v City of St Joseph, 232 Mich 255 [205 NW 86  
(1925)].  The power to amend and repeal legislation  
as well as to enact it is vested in the  
legislature, and the legislature cannot restrict or 
limit 
its 
right 
to 
exercise 
the 
power 
of  
legislation by prescribing modes of procedure for 
the repeal or amendment of statutes; nor may one 
legislature restrict or limit the power of its 
successors. . . .  One legislature cannot enact 
irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its 
own power, or the power of its successors, as to 
the repeal of statutes; and an act of one  
legislature is not binding on, and does not tie the 
hands of, future legislatures.  
We recently reiterated this principle in Ballard v  
Ypsilanti Twp, 457 Mich 564, 569; 577 NW2d 890 (1998):  
[T]he Legislature, in enacting a law, cannot 
bind future Legislatures. Malcolm v East Detroit, 
437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d 479 (1991); citing 
Harsha v Detroit, 261 Mich 586; 246 NW 849 (1933).  
Thus, as even plaintiffs concede, the 2001 Legislature was not  
bound to follow the guidelines in MCL 3.63(c) adopted by the  
1999 Legislature.  It could repeal, amend, or ignore them, as  
it pleased.  
However, plaintiffs rely on § 4(a) of 2001 PA 115, which  
they believe constitutes an incorporation of the 1999  
standards in the 2001 districting act:  
In 
adopting 
the 
redistricting 
plan 
for  
congressional districts, it is the intention of the 
legislature to comply fully with section 3 of the 
congressional redistricting act, 1999 PA 221, MCL  
22  
 
3.63.  
The 
paramount 
rule of statutory interpretation is to give  
effect to the intent of the Legislature.  Tryc v Michigan  
Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).  
We begin with the language of the statute itself, In re MCI  
Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164  
(1999), and also consider the context in which the language is  
used, Crowe v Detroit, 465 Mich 1, 6-7; 631 NW2d 293 (2001).  
The parties have not cited any authority relevant to  
interpreting an unusual statutory provision such as this one,  
in which it is essentially claimed that the substantive  
provisions of a statute may be challenged on the ground that  
they fail to meet standards set by the statute itself.  In our  
view, § 4(a) does not incorporate the 1999 guidelines as an  
enforceable provision of 2001 PA 115 that would permit review  
of the redistricting plan adopted by that statute.33  Rather,  
§ 4(a) is merely part of the Legislature’s explanation of the  
principles 
it 
used 
in 
developing 
the 
plan. 
This  
interpretation is reinforced by the remainder of § 4, which  
contains a number of such explanatory provisions that in no  
sense could create bases for challenges to the redistricting  
plan. In its entirely, § 4 reads:  
All 
of 
the 
following 
apply 
to 
the  
redistricting plan in section 1:  
(a) In adopting the redistricting plan for 
congressional districts, it is the intention of the 
legislature to comply fully with section 3 of the  
33 
Significantly, 
neither 
2001 
PA 
115 
nor 
House 
Concurrent 
Resolution 34, which further explains SB 546, makes any 
reference to review of the plan by this Court or to 1999 PA 
222.  
23  
congressional redistricting act, 1999 PA 221, MCL 
3.63.  
(b) The number of county breaks in the  
redistricting plan is determined by the following 
principles:  
(i) Breaking a county line means assigning 
part of the population of a county to 1 or more 
counties in the formation of a district.  
(ii) If population is shifted from a county to 
a single election district, including a district 
from 2 geographically-separate areas, there is 1 
break.  Except as provided in subparagraph (iii), 
if population from a county is shifted to 2 or more 
election districts, there are 2 or more breaks.  
(iii) If 1 part of a county is shifted to a 
district and the rest of the county is shifted to 
another district, there is 1 break.  
(c) The redistricting plan was designed to 
comply fully with both section 2 of the voting 
rights act of 1965, Public Law 89-110, 42 USC 
1973, and the requirements of the equal protection 
clause of amendment XIV of the constitution of the  
United States, as set forth in Shaw v Reno, 509 US 
630 (1993), and subsequent cases concerning racial 
gerrymandering.
 
In 
light 
of 
these 
dual  
obligations, the plan avoids any practice or  
district lines that result in the denial of any 
racial or ethnic group's equal opportunity to elect 
a representative of its choice and, at the same 
time, 
does 
not 
subordinate 
traditional  
redistricting 
principles 
for 
the 
purpose 
of  
accomplishing a racial gerrymander or creating a 
majority-minority district. As a consequence, the 
plan does not result in retrogression or dilution 
of minority voting strength, particularly in light 
of the demographic limitations caused by relative 
population losses and the neutral criteria set  
forth 
in 
section 
3 
of 
the 
congressional 
redistricting act, 1999 PA 221, MCL 3.63. However, 
the plan does not sacrifice traditional neutral 
principles, such as, most importantly, preservation 
of county and municipal boundaries, for the purpose 
of engaging in a gerrymander that unnecessarily 
favors 1 racial group over others.  
(d) The plan furthers the underlying purpose 
of the state constitution of 1963 by facilitating 
effective representation in the legislature where 
elected representatives can advance the shared 
interests of unified municipalities or counties. 
It does so without sacrificing voting rights act of  
24  
 
 
 
1965 principles, equal electoral opportunities, or 
racial fairness.  
(e) The redistricting plan for congressional 
districts consists of 15 single member districts 
comprised of convenient territories contiguous by 
land. All of the following apply to the plan:  
(i) The population in each of districts 1-9 
and 11-15 is 662,563.  The population of district  
10 is 662,562.  
(ii) The number of breaks in county boundaries 
is 11.  
(iii) The number of breaks in city and  
township lines is 14.  
(iv) No congressional district is wholly 
contained within a city.  
For example, if the population totals in § 4(e)(i) turned  
out to be wrong, that would not be a basis for overturning the  
redistricting plan.  Rather, the question would be whether the  
plan itself meets the federal equal population requirement.  
Thus, in context, § 4(a) of 2001 PA 115 constitutes the  
Legislature’s announcement of its conclusion that the  
redistricting plan it was adopting is in compliance with all  
applicable guidelines for redistricting.  
Election redistricting is principally a legislative  
function.34  Legislative action is entitled to great deference  
in such matters, and the courts should only intervene when the  
Legislature has failed to perform its function in a  
constitutional manner.35
 The Legislature was not bound to  
34 Gaffney v Cummings, 412 US 735, 749; 93 S Ct 2321; 37 
L Ed 2d 298 (1973); Cotlow v Growe, 622 NW2d 561 (Minn, 2001).  
35 Wise v Lipscomb, 437 US 535, 539-540; 98 S Ct 2493; 57 
L Ed 2d 411 (1978); Wesch v Hunt, 785 F Supp 1491, 1497 (SD 
Ala, 1992), aff’d  504 US 902; 112 S Ct 1926; 118 L Ed 2d 535 
(1992); State ex rel Lockert v Crowell, 631 SW2d 702, 706 
(Tenn, 1982)  
25  
follow MCL 3.63(c).  It was, of course, free to consider  
those principles that have been historically used by courts in  
cases of legislative impasse.36
 However, its choice to  
consider those principles does not signal an intention to  
convert the nonbinding guidelines into a rigid test under  
which the plan can be challenged by anyone who claims that  
some other plan better meets the guidelines.  
VIII. Conclusion  
Congressional redistricting is primarily a function of  
the Legislature.  Its exercise of that power can be challenged  
on the basis of federal requirements for congressional  
redistricting, 
which 
derive 
their 
authority 
from 
the  
underlying federal constitutional and statutory provisions,  
rather than the Michigan Legislature’s references to them.  
However, in this litigation, plaintiffs do not allege that the  
redistricting plan adopted by 2001 PA 115 fails in any respect  
to comply with applicable federal guidelines.  Whether the  
statute was validly enacted is a question that can be raised  
as a challenge under the Michigan Constitution, but, on the  
facts of this case, the correction of the enrolled bill before  
submission to the Governor does not invalidate the statute.  
The redistricting guidelines in 1999 PA 221 were not binding  
on the Legislature in adopting the 2001 redistricting plan,  
and its reference to MCL 3.63(c) does not incorporate those  
guidelines into 2001 PA 115 so as to create a basis for  
challenging 
the 
plan.  Accordingly, the application for review  
36 See, e.g., Good v Austin, supra, 800 F Supp 563; In re  
Apportionment 
of 
State 
Legislature—1982, 
413 
Mich 
96, 
140-142; 
321 NW2d 565 (1982).  
26  
 
 
 
 
of the redistricting plan is denied.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
27  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
DAVID LeROUX, MICHAEL GRAY, 
and ROBERT L. ELLIS,  
Plaintiffs,  
No. 120338  
SECRETARY OF STATE and  
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS,  
Defendants,  
SUZANNE L. ANDERSON, SHARON 
YENTSCH, and BRADLEY VAN HAITSMA,  
Intervening Defendants.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
As the arguments by the majority and the very able  
dissent demonstrate, it is a close question whether the  
variance between the bill as passed by the Legislature and as  
approved by the Governor is sufficiently great to prevent 2001  
PA 115 from having been validly enacted. In a sense, as the  
dissent notes, the variance is an important one, because  
inclusion of the two omitted census tracts is essential to the  
constitutionality of the districting plan.  On the other hand,  
the intent that these two tracts be included in District 15 is  
clear, given that their inclusion makes the populations of the  
districts correspond exactly to those stated in § 4(e)(i) of  
the bill.  
The majority correctly notes that redistricting is  
primarily 
a 
legislative function, and the courts are extremely  
reluctant to intervene in the process. Where we have become  
involved in the past, it was because the Legislature and  
Governor failed to adopt apportionment plans, and, even as we  
developed plans in order to provide for the continuity of  
government by ensuring that a constitutionally apportioned  
Legislature could be elected, we have given them every  
opportunity to act.  See In re Apportionment of the State  
Legislature—1992, 439 Mich 715, 722, 724; 486 NW2d 639 (1992);  
In re Apportionment of State Legislature—1982, 413 Mich 96,  
142; 321 NW2d 565(1982).  
In recognition of the inappropriateness of judicial  
intervention into the redistricting process, the disruption  
that would occur in the upcoming election if the matter were  
to be returned to the Legislature for reenactment of the plan,  
with a return trip to this Court a very real probability, and  
the fact that the correction of the bill by the Secretary of  
the Senate conformed the bill to the clear intention of the  
Legislature, I concur in the result reached by the majority.  
2  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
DAVID LeROUX, MICHAEL GRAY, 
and ROBERT L. ELLIS,  
Plaintiffs,  
No. 120338  
SECRETARY OF STATE and  
DIRECTOR OF ELECTIONS,  
Defendants,  
SUZANNE L. ANDERSON, SHARON 
YENTSCH, and BRADLEY VAN HAITSMA,  
Intervening Defendants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
Public Act 115 of 2001 suffers from fatal flaws inflicted  
on it by the Secretary of the Senate.  As a consequence of her  
actions, the bill presented to and signed by the Governor was  
never voted on by the Legislature. Hence, it violated the  
Michigan Constitution and cannot become law.  In addition, the  
bill that the Legislature passed was never submitted to the  
Governor. Hence, it too violated the constitution and never  
became law.  
The majority's finding that the addition of two census  
tracts by the Secretary of the Senate was permissible is  
erroneous.  The legal issue regarding it is not accurately  
stated in the per curiam opinion.  It is not a question  
whether the Court will review the Legislature’s violation of  
 
 
 
 
  
its own rules.  Rather, it is a question whether, in violating  
the Legislature’s rules, the Secretary of the Senate exceeded  
her authority and violated the state constitution.  
I would hold that the additions rendered the act invalid.  
The Legislature should be instructed to pass a new act,  
following 
the 
precepts laid down in the Michigan Constitution.  
It is for the Legislature, not this Court and not the  
Secretary of the Senate, to fashion the bill so as to be  
legally valid.  
The Background  
The enrolled bill that the Legislature passed, 2001 PA  
115, describes which state governmental units are to be within  
which congressional districts. 
The act refines the  
description where a county or a municipality is split,  
explicitly stating which census tracts and census blocks  
belong in which district.1  
The Senate passed the bill and sent it to the House of  
Representatives. The House amended and passed the bill, but  
later that day, recalled it to make five additions.2  2001  
Journal of the House 1575.  The House passed the amended bill  
1 
For 
example, 
the 
description 
of 
the 
Second  
Congressional District begins as follows:  
DISTRICT 02  
Allegan County (part) 
Dorr twp (part) 
TRACT 030401 including block(s) 
1006, 1007, 1008, 1009 . . . .  
2 It was discovered that five census tracts had not been  
included. The procedure used to insert them is the one that 
should have been used for the two tracts in question here.  
2  
and the Senate concurred in the amendment.  The Senate ordered  
the bill enrolled.  
After the House and the Senate adjourned, the Secretary  
of the Senate added two additional census tracts to the  
enrolled bill.3
 The two tracts contain 4,578 persons.  
Therefore, the bill the Governor signed allocated 4,578  
persons in two census tracts to a congressional district the  
constituency of which had not been approved by the 
Legislature. 
"Obvious Technical Errors" 
Defendants and intervenors defend the action of the  
Secretary of the Senate, arguing that Rule 12 of the Joint  
Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives permitted it.  
That rule states that the Secretary shall correct "obvious  
technical errors."  
[T]he Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the 
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall 
correct obvious technical errors in the enrolled  
bill or resolution, including adjusting totals, 
misspellings, 
the 
omission 
or 
redundancy 
of  
grammatical 
articles, 
cross-references, 
punctuation, updating bill or resolution titles, 
capitalization, citation formats, and plural or 
singular word forms.  
However, by no stretch of logic did the addition here  
involve an obvious technical error. First, the error is not  
in the nature of those listed in the rule.  Where, as in Rule  
12, the Legislature describes a concept by using a general  
3 The two census tracts are 416200 and 422900.  At oral  
argument, the intervening defendants informed us that these 
tracts lie between Districts 7 and 15.  The plaintiffs have 
not agreed that these tracts belong where the Secretary of the 
Senate placed them.  
3  
term followed by specific examples, this Court applies the  
rule of statutory construction called "ejusdem generis."  
Huggett v Dep't of Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 718; 629  
NW2d 915 (2001).  
Under ejusdem generis, general terms are interpreted to  
include only items that are "of the same kind, class,  
character, or nature as those specifically enumerated." Id.  
at 718-719.  Here the general term is "obvious technical  
errors."  The specific terms describe minor, nonsubstantive  
clerical or grammatical errors.  While more errors than those  
specified are envisioned, when ejusdem generis is applied,  
they should include solely errors of the same class as those  
that are listed.  
The omission of census tracts does not involve a  
misspelling, a grammatical article, punctuation, a title,  
capitalization, citation format, or plural or singular word  
forms. It does not involve adjusting totals.  It should be  
noted that the bill fails to contain a number representing the  
population in each listed census tract.  Hence, one cannot  
tabulate the total population in any district by totaling the  
population of each tract appearing there. Presumably if, as  
defendants 
assert, 
4,578 people were missing from District 15,  
one could have ascertained that fact if the tracts listed had  
included a number representing the population in each.  
However, even then, one could not have ascertained from the  
face of the bill that the missing tracts were 416200 and  
422900.
 Therefore, the error does not involve cross  
references, either.  
4  
What it does involve is the utter omission of vital,  
substantive information.  This is an error of a different kind  
and class from the "obvious technical errors" listed in Rule  
12.  
Second, not only does the error here not pass legal  
scrutiny as an obvious technical error, it does not pass a  
plain language reading either.  "Obvious" means "easily seen,  
recognized, or understood; open to view or knowledge . . .  
lacking 
in 
subtlety."  Random House College Dictionary (1988).  
A perusal of the bill as passed would never reveal that the  
tracts in question were missing. Documents outside the bill  
would have to be consulted to show it.  Hence, as the error is  
not open to view or lacking in subtlety, it is not "obvious"  
in the commonly understood meaning of the word.  
Defendants argue that the error was obvious because the  
total population in all the tracts intended for District 15  
was listed in the act, 662,563 persons.  They consider the  
error obvious because one can discover it by (1) consulting  
documents showing the number of people in each of District  
15's census tracts, figures not listed in the bill, then (2)  
totaling them to determine if they reach 662,563.  If they do  
not, one knows that an error was made.  
This argument confuses what is obvious with what is  
ascertainable.
 One must consult the census data for one  
county, eight cities, eight townships, and fifty-one census  
tracts to learn that the population figure stated in the bill  
for District 15 is not met.  Once that has been completed, one  
knows only that an error has been made.  It could be that the  
5  
 
 
 
Legislature 
miscalculated 
the 
total 
population 
in 
District 
15.  
It could be that one or more tracts are missing.  One could  
then search and compare against the bill lists of thousands of  
tracts to determine whether certain tracts are not included  
and which ones they are.  Hence, even if the Court could  
ascertain that tracts 416200 and 422900 belong in District 15,  
it can scarcely be said that the mistake is an "obvious"  
technical error.  
ANDERSON v ATWOOD DISTINGUISHED  
The majority cites Anderson v Atwood4 for the proposition  
that this Court will not review the Legislature's failure to  
comply with its own rules of procedure.  It is true that in  
Anderson we did not order recognition of an act that died  
after the Legislature withdrew it from the Governor. However,  
Anderson is inapposite to the case before us.  
Here, the bill did not die because of an alleged  
violation of the rules. Rather, Rule 12 was used to alter the  
enrolled bill without the approval of the Legislature. As a  
consequence of the distinctly differing facts in the two  
cases, the legal question in this case is quite different. It  
is whether either a legislative rule or the constitution  
authorizes the Secretary of the Senate to add to an enrolled  
bill vital, substantive  information not ascertainable from  
the bill that the Legislature omitted.  
Anderson does not stand for the proposition that this  
Court will not review an action taken under a rule of  
4  273 Mich 316; 262 NW 922 (1935).  
6  
 
 
  
legislative procedure when the action is proscribed by the  
constitution. The addition of substantive items to the bill  
in question by the Secretary of the Senate was an action  
proscribed by the constitution.  
THE APPLICABILITY OF ART 4, 
§ 33 OF THE CONSTITUTION  
The Michigan Constitution provides that no bill becomes  
law without the consent of a majority of the members elected  
to and serving in each house.  Const 1963, art 4, § 26. It  
also provides that every bill passed by the Legislature must  
be presented to the Governor before it becomes law.  Const  
1963, art 4, § 33.  It follows that, since the bill presented  
to the Governor in this case was not the one passed by the  
Legislature, the constitution was violated.  
The majority finds that the changes made in the enrolled  
bill were technicalities; hence, they did not substantially  
alter the bill passed by the Legislature.  The precedent of  
this Court does not support that finding.  Rather, it  
establishes that the only changes permissible in the text of  
a bill between passage and submission to the Governor are the  
addition of words that (1) are not essential to the substance  
of the bill and (2) mislead no one.  Michigan State Prison Bd  
of Control v Auditor General, 149 Mich 386; 112 NW 1017  
(1907).5  
5 In Board of Control the enrolled bill accidentally left 
out the word "thousand" in one place when designating $175,000 
for the construction of a binder-twine plant at Jackson 
prison.  The bill passed by the Legislature correctly cited 
the amount.  This Court found the omission to be unsubstantial  
because the word "thousand" was nonessential.  It was clear  
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
As has been demonstrated herein, the addition of two  
census tracts was essential to the substance of the bill. It  
is without contest that, without the addition, District 15 was  
incomplete and 4,578 people were left without a congressional  
district. Also, the addition is misleading.  It causes one to  
believe that the Legislature intended the tracts to be in  
District 15.  The truth appears to be that the Legislature had  
no position with respect to these tracts. It simply overlooked  
them.  
A holding that the action of the Secretary of the Senate  
was unconstitutional would be in accord with our decision in  
Rode v Phelps6 where we observed, relative to the role of the  
Legislature in lawmaking:  
The people speak, in the enactment of laws, 
through the Legislature, acting within the limits 
of the Constitution; and any holding which would 
authorize or permit laws, or any part of any law, 
to be ordained or created in any other way, would 
be inconsistent with the logic of our free  
institutions, and dangerous to the safety and 
security of the liberties of the people.  
It would be consistent, also, with our holding in Stow v Grand  
Rapids, 79 Mich 595; 44 NW 1047 (1890).  In that case, we  
ruled that the inclusion of immediate effect by the Clerk of  
5 (...continued) 
from the text of the bill that the intent of the Legislature 
was to appropriate $175,000.  
By contrast, it is not clear from the text of the bill 
here that the Legislature intended any more tracts to be 
included in District 15, much less which tracts.  It can only 
be hypothesized after prolonged study of census data.  That is  
why Board of Control does not support the majority's argument, 
but instead cuts against it.  
6 80 Mich 598, 609; 45 NW 493 (1890).  
8  
 
 
  
the House of Representatives was an unconstitutional addition  
to the bill passed by the Legislature.  
This state has no case law allowing the addition of  
substantive items to a bill between passage and submission to  
the Governor. What has been found to be nonsubstantive, by  
contrast, has been the omission of a word in an enrolled bill  
when the omission is obvious on the bill's face. Board of  
Control, supra.  Also nonsubstantative was the second alleged  
error in the bill in Stow, supra, because it involved a  
typographical error wrongly describing the act to be amended  
as an act from 1887, instead of 1877.  
The majority’s use of these cases to justify the addition  
of substantive items like a census tract permits the Secretary  
of the Senate to engage in fact finding to determine  
legislative intent. It permits that individual to speak for  
the Legislature in a manner never before permitted in  
Michigan.
 The designation of voting districts is a  
legislative decision. Williams v Secretary of State, 145 Mich  
447; 108 NW 749 (1906). It cannot be a mere technical  
correction for the secretary to add 4,578 people to a  
congressional district.  
The case most nearly on point with the one before us was  
decided by the Supreme Court of Kansas.  Harris v Shanahan,  
192 Kan 183; 387 P2d 771 (1963).  It involved apportionment of  
the Kansas Legislature.  The bill submitted to the governor  
omitted a city of 8,800 people from any senatorial district.  
The 
Kansas 
court rejected arguments that the omission was  
technical and that the court should correct it to prevent  
9  
 
constitutional error. In so ruling, it observed  
We assume that the intention of both houses of  
the legislature and of the governor was to enact a 
law which gave adequate senatorial representation 
to every citizen of Kansas, including the residents 
of the city of Leawood.  No one questions that  
fact.  But we are confronted with what was done, 
not what the legislature may have really intended 
to do. [Id. at 786.]  
In Harris, as here, the bill passed by both houses of the  
legislature was not the bill submitted to and signed by the  
governor. The Kansas court found that the defect was one that  
the legislature alone could correct.  
Since the bill submitted to the Governor in the case  
before us contained substantive, not technical, additions, it  
was not the bill passed by the Legislature.  And since the  
bill passed by the Legislature was never submitted to the  
Governor, art 4, § 33 of the Michigan Constitution was  
violated.  
CONCLUSION  
I would hold the Secretary of the Senate's modification  
invalid because it violates legislative Rule 12 and, most  
significantly, it violates the Michigan Constitution. Adding  
tracts to the description of a legislative district is both a  
substantive provision and it is misleading.  A fair reading of  
Rule 12 based on plain meaning or a statutory construction  
using ejusdem generis will not permit us to construe the  
omission as an obvious technical error.  The secretary's  
change made a substantive alteration to the reapportionment  
bill.  As a consequence, the bill passed by the Legislature  
was not submitted to the Governor, a violation of the Michigan  
10  
 
Constitution.  The bill that was passed was never submitted to  
the Governor. Hence it never became law.  
The majority chooses to pass off as nonserious my  
conclusion that the Secretary of the Senate's changes to the  
bill were substantive and not a mere adjustment of totals.  
However, it does seem serious to me (1) that 4,578 persons  
were added to a congressional district without a vote, or even  
the knowledge, of the Legislature, (2) that no figures can be  
found in this bill that, by any method, can be totaled or  
retotalled to assure us that 4,578 people are or are not  
missing from District 15, and (3) that no Michigan case law  
has ever condoned such a significant and unorthodox amendment  
to a legislative bill as the majority has approved here.  
To remedy this troubling situation, the Court should  
avoid legislating. Rather, it should afford the Legislature  
the opportunity to heed its constitutional mandate to  
reapportion in accordance with art 4, § 33 of the Michigan  
Constitution.  
If there is to be a judicial determination of  
congressional reapportionment, it should occur only after the  
Legislature 
has 
shown 
itself 
unable 
to 
perform 
its  
constitutional duty to reapportion.  
After remand, should the Legislature be unable to pass a  
valid reapportionment bill and give it immediate effect, it  
may return to this Court, seeking further and timely relief.7  
7 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed  
2d 506 (1964); California Assembly v Deukmejian, 30 Cal 3d 
(continued...)  
11  
Because of the increasingly short timetable involved in  
preparing for the congressional elections, this Court should  
retain jurisdiction of the matter.  
It is regrettable that an error on the part of the  
Secretary of the Senate should defeat the action of the  
Legislature.  This is especially true as the congressional  
reapportionment law is of great public importance. However,  
my strict application of the law calling for full compliance  
with constitutional requirements is, taking the long view, a  
sound one and in the interest of good government.  
7 (...continued) 
638; 180 Cal Rptr 297; 639 P2d 939 (1982).  
12