Case Title: CHEYENNE PUBLISHING, LLC v. STAROSTKA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHEYENNE PUBLISHING, LLC v. STAROSTKA2004 WY 8894 P.3d 463Case Number: 03-168Decided: 07/23/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
            

 

CHEYENNE 
PUBLISHING, LLC a Wyoming

Limited 
Liability Company; and LARRY

and 
NANCY LOVELASS as individuals,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

ARDITH 
STAROSTKA,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Guy 
Patrick Cleveland, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

William 
K. Rounsborg of White and Steele, PC., Cheyenne Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellants, 
Cheyenne Publishing, LLC, and Larry and Nancy Lovelass (collectively Cheyenne 
Publishing), filed a complaint seeking damages from Appellee, Ardith Starostka 
(Starostka) for defamation, intentional interference with contract, and 
interference with prospective contractual advantage.  The district court granted Starostka's 
motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over Starostka.  
Starostka is a resident of Nebraska, and it is conceded that she did not 
physically set foot in Wyoming as it pertains to this litigation.  Nonetheless, Cheyenne Publishing 
contends that the district court did not apply the proper test for personal 
jurisdiction and that Starostka's acts, which had an effect on Cheyenne 
Publishing in Wyoming, were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on the 
district court.  We will affirm the 
district court's order.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Cheyenne 
Publishing describes this set of issues:

 

I.          
Whether the trial court erred by ordering a dismissal based on personal 
jurisdiction.

 

            
A.  Whether [Starostka's] 
action caused important consequences to [sic] this state, therefore when 
analyzing personal jurisdiction the district court erred when it applied the 
purposeful availment standard.

 

            
B.  Whether the cause of 
action did arise from the consequences in this state.

 

            
C.  Whether the consequences 
of [Starostka's] actions have a substantial enough connection with this state to 
make the exercise of jurisdiction over [her] reasonable.

 

Starostka 
sets forth her understanding of the issue quite simply:  "Did [Cheyenne Publishing] meet [its] 
burden of establishing the requisite minimum contacts for the trial court to 
exercise jurisdiction over [Starostka]."

 

JURISDICTIONAL 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

 

[¶3]      On January 7, 
2003, Cheyenne Publishing filed a complaint in the district court.  In that complaint it is alleged that 
Cheyenne Publishing is a limited liability company registered and doing business 
in Wyoming, and that its owners, Larry and Nancy Lovelass, are residents 
domiciled in Wyoming.  Cheyenne 
Publishing conceded that Starostka is a resident of Nebraska.  Cheyenne Publishing asserted that the 
district court had jurisdiction as provided in Wyo. Const. Art 5, § 10.1  It also alleged that the complaint was 
filed within the applicable statute of limitations.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(v)(A) 
(libel or slander) (LexisNexis 2003).  
Cheyenne Publishing alleged that Starostka had certain minimum contacts 
with Wyoming so as to permit personal jurisdiction.2  These circumstances were enumerated in 
the complaint:

 

            
a)  [Starostka] purposefully availing herself of acting in this 
State as well as directing her activities toward this State and residents of 
this State and/or  caused important consequences in this State by such 
activities;

            
b)  the alleged causes of action set forth below arise from 
[Starostka's] activities and consequences in this State; 
and

            
c)  [Starostka's] activities and consequences of those 
activities have a substantial connection with this State and this State's 
exercise of jurisdiction over [her] is reasonable.

 

[¶4]      Cheyenne 
Publishing asserted that Starostka entered into a written agreement with 
Cheyenne Publishing to the effect that Cheyenne Publishing agreed to publish a 
catalogue that featured, inter alia, Starostka's artwork.3  Starostka paid Cheyenne Publishing for 
its services, and Cheyenne Publishing claimed it performed the services set 
forth in the agreement.4  Cheyenne Publishing contended that 
Starostka "has contacted and continues to contact numerous individuals, 
businesses, and agencies in this State and other states via e-mail, internet, 
telephone and written correspondence in regards to the above agreement and in 
general about plaintiffs Cheyenne Publishing and Larry and Nancy Lovelass."  As a result of Starostka's alleged 
activities, Cheyenne Publishing contended that it had been defamed, that its 
contracts with others were interfered with, and that its prospective contractual 
relationships with others were damaged.  
The complaint was served on Starostka at her home in Columbus, Nebraska, 
on January 20, 2003.

 

[¶5]      On February 19, 
2003, Starostka filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  In support of her 
motion to dismiss, she filed an affidavit with the court that included these 
assertions:

 

            
2.  With respect to the allegations contained in the Complaint, 
and the underlying relationship between the Plaintiffs and me, the first contact 
I had with any Plaintiff was a telephone call from Nancy Lovelass to me at my 
home in Columbus, Nebraska.

 

            
3.  Prior to that phone call, I had never heard of Cheyenne 
Publishing, LLC, Larry Lovelass, Nancy Lovelass, or the Art Buyers Guide 
published by the Plaintiffs.

 

4.  In 
that phone call, Nancy Lovelass offered to sell space in a planned Art Buyers 
Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska artists, and during that phone call I 
rejected the solicitation.

 

5.  My 
next contact with any of the Plaintiffs was a second phone call from Nancy 
Lovelass to my home in Columbus, Nebraska, again soliciting my purchase of space 
in the proposed Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists.  I again advised Nancy 
Lovelass that I was not interested as I did not have the time, and Nancy assured 
me that Larry Lovelass would stop by my house and take up no more than 30 
minutes of my time.  I then agreed 
to meet with Plaintiff Larry Lovelass at my home in Columbus, 
Nebraska.

 

6.  My 
next contact with any of the Plaintiffs was a visit by Larry Lovelass to my home 
in Columbus, Nebraska, at which time I agreed to purchase space in the 
Plaintiffs' proposed  Art Buyers 
Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska artists.

 

7.  I 
never traveled to Wyoming for any purpose related to my purchase of space in the 
Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists.

 

8.  When 
problems or questions arose, I contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiffs by 
way of a toll-free number, and, on at least two occasions, return phone calls to 
me from Plaintiffs originated from Arizona.

 

9.  I 
have had discussions with other artists concerning Plaintiffs; however, those 
artists were from Nebraska, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Montana.  I have had no communication with any 
artist, gallery, or art dealer in Wyoming.  
Of my contacts with artists in states other than Wyoming, certain of 
those contacts were initiated by the Plaintiffs and others were initiated by the 
other artists.

 

10.  The 
only time I ever sold art in Wyoming was when I was a teenager, in the late 
1970's; I sold one painting at that time.

 

11.  I 
have received no contact from any interested party, other artists, art dealer, 
or gallery in Wyoming, either as a result of the appearance of my work in the 
Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska artists, or 
otherwise.

 

12.  My 
only communications or contacts with persons in the state of Wyoming, other than 
the telephone calls to the Plaintiffs, are as follows:

 

a.  I 
wrote to Plaintiffs on June 5, 2002, and a copy of that letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A.

 

b.  Upon 
the request of another artist outside the state of Wyoming, I contacted the 
Wyoming Attorney General's office to register a complaint of my concerns with 
what I believed to be misrepresentations by the Plaintiffs as to publication 
circulation of the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists.5

 

c.  I 
contacted my local postmaster to request assistance in determining the number of 
mailings by Plaintiffs of the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists, and I understand my postmaster contacted the Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
postmaster to inquire into that issue.

 

            
13.  I contacted the Mountain States Better Business Bureau to 
complain about my experiences with the Plaintiffs, but contacted that office in 
Fort Collins, Colorado; it is my understanding that the Mountain States Better 
Business Bureau, through its procedures, contacted Plaintiffs by 
letter.

 

            
14.  I contacted Plaintiff's printer to inquire concerning the 
number of copies of the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists  that were printed for 
Plaintiffs, but that printer is located in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma.

 

            
15.  I provided materials for inclusion in the Art Buyers 
Guide to Plaintiffs, who I understand reside and conduct business in 
Wyoming.

 

            
16.  Other than as set out above, I have had no communications 
with Plaintiffs or others concerning my dispute with the Plaintiffs over the 
publication of the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska 
artists, and I have otherwise had absolutely no contacts with the state of 
Wyoming.

 

[¶6]      In a letter dated 
June 5, 2002 (the exhibit A mentioned above), Starostka communicated this to 
Cheyenne Publishing:

 

I 
am writing this letter to inform you of my demands as an advertising artist in 
the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska artists.  I give you the option of meeting these 
demands by June 12, 2002 by 5:00 p.m. (cst).

 

1.  Cheyenne 
Publishing, LLC, is to provide me with a postal report and receipt to verify 
that the Art Buyers Guide, Volume IX, featuring Nebraska artists was 
distributed in May, 2002 from Cheyenne, Wyoming, as specified via my phone 
conversation with Nancy Lovelass on June 4, 2002, 11:00 a.m. 
(cst).

 

2.  If a postal report and receipt are not 
provided to me to verify that the "Art Buyers Guide", Volume IX, the Nebraska 
edition was distributed in May, 2002 from Cheyenne, Wyoming, I demand the return 
of my money for the $1995.00 plus $165.00 that was paid for the publication and 
the distribution service.

 

[¶7]      On March 10, 
2003, Cheyenne Publishing filed a response to the motion to dismiss asserting 
that its complaint was sufficient, "[h]owever, there are additional 
jurisdictional facts that can and need to be developed via the discovery 
process."  Cheyenne Publishing asked 
that the district court deny the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, grant 
further time to conduct discovery.  
Both sides submitted written arguments to the district court, and by 
order entered on April 25, 2003, the motion to dismiss was set for hearing on 
May 22, 2003.  Cheyenne Publishing's 
traverse to the motion to dismiss included a copy of a letter it sent to 
Starostka under the date of August 9, 2002:

 

The 
purpose of this letter is to follow-up on our conversation of July 18, 2002 
regarding your dispute with my client, Cheyenne Publishing, 
LLC.

 

My 
goal was to try to resolve what at best was a consumer complaint.  I informed you that I wanted to avoid an 
adversarial dispute as the cost of litigation alone would shadow any money at 
dispute.  I understood that you 
would at least give compromise a chance; however, your behavior since our 
conversation indicates compromise is your last wish.

 

Initially, 
I indicated that your actions of contacting other artists, publishers, and print 
shops might be considered defamatory.  
Since our conversation, you have contacted additional individuals and 
businesses, and in some instances, you have misrepresented yourself in order to 
obtain information.  Such acts are 
irrational in light of the alleged dispute.  In short, you destroyed any hope of 
compromise and have crossed the line into defamation.

 

I 
attempted to warn you of the consequences of your actions.  My last bit of advice is for you to seek 
legal counsel.  You shall 
immediately cease and desist your injurious actions or be held 
accountable.

 

[¶8]      On May 7, 2003, 
Larry Lovelass submitted an affidavit enumerating 17 entities or individuals 
that had received copies of the disputed art guide.  He did not contest any of the assertions 
made by Starostka in her affidavit.

 

[¶9]      The district 
court conducted a 30-minute hearing on May 22, 2003.  At the hearing counsel for the parties 
presented argument, but no evidence was adduced or taken by the district 
court.  Counsel for Cheyenne 
Publishing did concede that Starostka had not come to Wyoming.  Counsel for Cheyenne Publishing also 
conceded that although it was its contention that Starostka had called into 
Wyoming on three or four occasions with respect to this dispute, it did not get 
that "fact" reduced to an affidavit.  
Cheyenne Publishing also conceded that the phone calls or other contacts 
with third parties that were alleged to be defamatory, or otherwise adversely 
affected its contractual or business interests, were made from Nebraska to 
persons in states other than Wyoming, but that none were made to Wyoming.  The only direct contacts alleged by 
Cheyenne Publishing were calls she made to Cheyenne Publishing itself, and the 
fact that she mailed the materials for publication to Cheyenne Publishing in 
Wyoming.  Counsel for Cheyenne 
Publishing also conceded that its case against Starostka depended upon the 
theory that her actions in Nebraska had "consequences" in Wyoming, vis- -vis 
Cheyenne Publishing, and that was sufficient to invest Wyoming courts with 
personal jurisdiction over Starostka. 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   The applicable standard of review 
is this:

 

The 
question of in personam jurisdiction is a mixed question of law and fact that, 
if disputed, must be resolved before a matter can proceed.  Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of 
Simpson, 290 N.J.Super. 519, 676 A.2d 172, 178 (1996).  The district court has considerable 
leeway in deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. PanAmerican Mineral Svcs., Inc. v. KLS Enviro Resources, 
Inc., 916 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo.1996).  
The court may determine the matter on the basis of pleadings and other 
materials called to its attention; it may require discovery;  or it may conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.  Id. The procedural 
path the district court chooses to follow determines the plaintiff's burden of 
proof and the standard to be applied on appeal.

 

            
When the underlying facts are undisputed, the existence of personal 
jurisdiction is a matter of law.  
Eddy v. Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610, 612 (Wyo.1989).  If the district court's determination is 
made without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must show only a prima facie 
case to defeat the motion to dismiss.  
Robinson v. U-Haul Intern., Inc., 929 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Wyo.1997) 
(quoting PanAmerican Mineral Services, Inc. v. KLS Enviro Resources, 
Inc., 916 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo.1996));  Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee 
Partnership Co., 886 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo.1994).  The district court must view the 
allegations in the pleadings and documentary evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, resolving all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party.  Pelchat 
v. Sterilite Corp., 931 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D.N.H.1996);  Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997).

 

            
When material factual allegations regarding jurisdiction in the 
affidavits cannot be harmonized, the district court should hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the issue of jurisdiction.  Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 
190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503, 507-08 (1983);  Venetian Salami Co. v. 
Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla.1989);  Neways, Inc., 950 P.2d  at 
422.   Once an evidentiary 
hearing is held, however, we will defer to the district court's findings of fact 
and the plaintiff will succeed upon showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the defendant is subject to jurisdiction.  Goodwin v. Hall, 957 P.2d 1299, 
1301 (Wyo.1998); O'Bryan, 952 P.2d at 638;  Robinson, 929 P.2d at 1238;  PanAmerican Mineral Services, 
Inc., 916 P.2d  at 989.   No 
matter the procedural course charted, however, the ultimate question of whether 
personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised is a question of law to be 
reviewed de novo.  O'Bryan, 
952 P.2d  at 638.

 

Shaw 
v. Smith, 
964 P.2d 428, 432-33 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶11]   That preliminary articulation of 
the applicable law is supplemented by this more expansive discussion of the 
applicable standard:

 

The 
issue of in personam jurisdiction, if disputed, must be resolved before a case 
may proceed.  O'Bryan v. 
McDonald, 952 P.2d 636, 638 (Wyo.1998).  When the district court holds an 
evidentiary hearing on the merits of a motion to dismiss alleging lack of in 
personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff must demonstrate personal jurisdiction is 
proper by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Id. The ultimate question of whether personal jurisdiction may 
properly be exercised is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Id. In its decision letter the 
district court, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and viewing 
the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, determined it did 
not have personal jurisdiction over Hall as a matter of 
law.

 

            
Wyoming courts are authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant on any basis which is not inconsistent with the Wyoming or United 
States constitutions.    
WYO. STAT.   §  5-1-107(a) (1997).  The due process clause found in the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction 
of state courts over the person of nonresident defendants.  O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 638.   Generally, due process requires 
that a defendant have contacts with the state such that exercise of jurisdiction 
does not offend " 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' 
"  Id. at 639 (quoting 
Markby v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 647 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo.1982), which 
quotes International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)).  We 
have held that the defendant must have at least minimum contacts with the forum 
state to satisfy the due process standard.  
Markby, 647 P.2d  at 1072-73.

 

            
In her brief, Goodwin summarizes her position and urges us to apply a 
two-step jurisdictional analysis to her situation.  She suggests that we adopt a position 
that "[w]ith respect to all matters relative to his or her child, a parent is 
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the child resides."   We have recently had occasion to 
examine this issue in a similar case, O'Bryan v. McDonald, 952 P.2d 636 
(Wyo.1998).  In O'Bryan we 
declined to find the father purposefully availed himself of the privilege of 
acting in Wyoming by  
voluntarily  entering  into  a contract concerning 

child 
support and partially performing that contract in the state.  Id. at 640.   Finding solace in both our own and 
the United States Supreme Court's time-honored three-step analysis of in 
personam jurisdiction questions, we will decline to follow Goodwin's 
recommendation and decline to find personal jurisdiction in this case as 
well.

 

            
No issue of general jurisdiction of Wyoming courts with respect to Hall 
is present in this case.  Goodwin 
does not allege "continuous and systematic" contact by Hall with the State of 
Wyoming.  In O'Bryan, we 
reiterated our long-standing three-part test which defines the outer limits of 
personal jurisdiction based on a single act:

 

1) 
the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the 
forum state or of causing important consequences in that state, 2) the cause of 
action must arise from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant's 
activities, and 3) the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those 
activities must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to 
make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.

 

            
O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 639 (citing Amoco Prod.  Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 
886 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo.1994)); see also First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. 
Trans Mountain Sales and Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 1221 
(Wyo.1979).

 

            
Purposeful availment is a threshold requirement meant to ensure " 'that a 
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts.' "  
O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 639 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1985)).  Unless the purposeful 
availment requirement is satisfied, the court will not have personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident "no matter how strong the interest of the 
plaintiff or the forum state may be in having the suit adjudicated there."  O'Bryan, 952 P.2d  at 639 (citing 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294, 100 S. Ct. 559, 
565-66, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980)); 1 Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions 
§ 2.05 (2d ed.1991).

 

Goodwin 
v. Hall, 
957 P.2d 1299, 1301-2 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶12]   Other analytical tools, in the 
rather large constellation of such tools6 available to courts for use in 
resolving issues relating to personal jurisdiction, are set out in Amoco v. 
EM Nominee Partnership Company, 886 P.2d 265, 267-68 (Wyo. 
1994):

 

The 
courts of Wyoming are authorized by statute to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over defendants on any basis which is not inconsistent with the Wyoming or 
United States constitutions.  W.S. 
5-1-107(a) (1977).  So long as the 
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the courts of this state 
have jurisdiction over a defendant.  
Markby v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 647 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Wyo.1982).

 

            
Due process requires that the defendant have certain "minimum contacts" 
with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction over him does not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."  Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945);  Markby, 647 P.2d  at 1070.   In First Wyoming Bank, N.A., 
Rawlins v. Trans Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., we adopted a three-part 
test for defining the outer limits of personal jurisdiction based on a single 
act:

 

First, 
the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the 
forum state or of causing important consequences in that state.  Second, the cause of action must arise 
from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant's activities.  Finally, the activities of the defendant 
or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough 
connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
defendant reasonable.

 

            
602 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Wyo.1979) (quoting State ex rel. White Lumber 
Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571, 574 (1968));  see also Markby, 647 P.2d  at 
1073.   The determination of 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable must be evaluated in light of 
several factors, including the burden on the defendant, the forum's interest in 
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining effective relief 
in a convenient forum if that interest cannot be adequately protected by his 
power to select the forum, the interstate judicial system's interest in the 
efficient resolution of conflicts, and in the shared interests of the states in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.  Markby, 647 P.2d  at 1073 
(quoting, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d World-Wide 
Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson 490 (1980));  see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. 
v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033, 
94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987).  "These 
considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction 
upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required" if 
the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of acting in the 
forum state.  Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1985).

 

            
The burden is on the plaintiff, once the defendant has contested the 
court's jurisdiction over him, to make a prima facie showing that the defendant 
is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.  McAvoy v. Dist. Court, 757 P.2d 633, 634 (Colo.1988);  Allen v. 
Columbia Financial Management, Ltd., 297 S.C. 481, 377 S.E.2d 352, 354 
(S.C.App.1988);  see Morrison v. 
Reilly, 511 P.2d 970, 972 (Wyo.1973) (burden of proof is on party asserting 
affirmative of any issue).  The 
court may consider any allegations set forth in the complaint and any evidence 
which may be introduced in a hearing on the issue.  McAvoy, 757 P.2d  at 634-35.   The defendant then must present a 
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would make the 
exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable.  
Burger King, 471 U.S.  at 477, 105 S. Ct.  at 
2184-85.

 

            
The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between "general" and 
"specific" personal jurisdiction.  
"Specific" jurisdiction is when a state exercises jurisdiction over a 
defendant in a suit arising out of or related to that defendant's contacts with 
the forum.  Helicopteros 
Nacionales De Colombia, S.A  v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 8, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 
1872, n. 8, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984);  
see Eddy v. Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610, 612-14 (Wyo.1989) (jurisdiction 
exercised over defendants because suit arose out of defendants' contacts with 
Wyoming).  In contrast, "general" 
jurisdiction is when a state exercises jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit 
not arising out of or related to that defendant's contacts with the state.  Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. 
at 414 n. 9, 104 S. Ct.  at 1872; see Markby, 647 P.2d  at 1074 (defendant's 
contacts with the state not sufficient to create personal jurisdiction in 
Wyoming where defendant's contacts with the state were not related to the 
suit).  Even if a single act arises 
out of or is related to the suit, a state may not have jurisdiction if the 
nature of the act creates only an "attenuated" connection with the forum.  Burger King, 471 U.S.  at 475 n. 
18, 105 S. Ct.  at 2184 n. 8.

 

Also 
see Anderson v. Perry, 
667 P.2d 115, 1157-58 (Wyo. 1983) ("The balancing of factors necessary to find 
personal jurisdiction must consider the kind of activities involving the 
defendant as well as the degree.  
Contractual agreements generally establish a clear voluntary assent."); 
and  Markby v. St. Anthony 
Hospital Systems, 647 P.2d 1068, 1070-74 (Wyo. 1982) (special "fairness" 
considerations are a factor in the analysis of personal jurisdiction 
cases).

 

[¶13]   Continuing our consideration of the 
standard of review to be applied here, we take note of this discussion from 4 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
 Civil 3d § 1067.6 at 
523-67 (2002 and Pocket Part 2003):

 

            
Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule 
of Civil procedure 12(b)(2) raise several significant procedural questions that 
must be considered by the attorneys and the district court.  In this regard, one of the more 
interesting aspects of Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz is Justice Brennan's 
suggestion at several points in the opinion for the Court that some burden falls 
on the defendant who is seeking to dismiss the action to persuade the court that 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would be 
unreasonable.  Since that case, a 
number of federal courts similarly have obliged the defendant to show that 
requiring it to defend in the particular forum would create a substantial 
hardship.

  
 

            
Although the Supreme Court never had spoken to the burden of persuasion 
question in its earlier decisions, it has been held uniformly in the lower 
federal courts that the burden of making a prima facie showing of the existence 
of personal jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff and there are countless 
pronouncements to the same effect since the Supreme Court's Burger King 
decision.  Many of the more recent 
judicial statements to this effect are cited in the note below.  The two groups of cases are not 
inconsistent.  That is because the 
Burger  King  opinion  discusses the burden of proof only with 
respect to the additional factors that have been identified by the Court other 
than minimum contacts that are to be considered "in appropriate cases" as 
elements of the fair play and substantial justice aspect of the due process 
doctrine.  In some cases these 
factors might lead a court to decline jurisdiction despite the defendants 
minimum contacts with the forum.

 

            
Thus, as numerous federal cases indicate, and as the illustrative 
citations in the note below seem to demonstrate, it appears that the burden of 
showing satisfaction of the minimum contacts requirement continues to be on the 
plaintiff, but that once a prima facie showing is made, which must be based on 
affirmative proof beyond the pleadings, such as affidavits, testimony or other 
competent evidence of specific facts, it becomes the defendant's burden to 
convince the court that the assertion of personal jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable.  Alternatively, when 
the jurisdictional question is complex or difficult, a court simply may avoid 
the issue by resolving the suit on the merits when they clearly must be decided 
in favor of the party challenging jurisdiction, thereby obviating any need to 
decide the question; that approach is possible even when the jurisdictional 
issue lacks complexity.

 

            
In considering the jurisdictional issue, a district court may examine 
discovery material as well as affidavits submitted by parties.  A court also has discretion to stay 
consideration of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow 
the parties additional time to engage in discovery relevant to the 
jurisdictional issue when there is some basis for believing that would be 
fruitful.  It is well established 
that a federal district court has the power to require a defendant to respond to 
discovery requests relevant to his Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.

 

            
A district court also may require more than a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction by holding a quasi-evidentiary hearing that may consist of oral 
testimony, stipulations, affidavits, deposition transcripts, authenticated 
documents, answers to interrogatories, and requests for admissions.  In assessing the evidence, the court may 
apply a preponderance-of-evidence standard or a standard intermediate between 
the preponderance-of-evidence guideline and a prima facie showing.   If both the plaintiff and the 
defendant produce supporting evidence and affidavits on the motion, a number of 
cases hold that plaintiff's prima facie showing will be considered sufficient 
and the motion to dismiss will be denied, notwithstanding the defendant's 
presentation of contrary material.

 

            
. . . . 

 

            
If the district court has not conducted a discretionary evidentiary 
hearing on a nonresident defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie 
case of personal jurisdiction over that defendant.  In that connection, the court must 
accept the facts the complaint alleges relating to the jurisdiction issue as 
true, at least to the extent they are uncontroverted by whatever material the 
defendant submits in support of its motion to dismiss.  If the contents of the plaintiff's 
complaint conflicts with the defendant's affidavits, the district court must 
construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the papers in the 
plaintiff's favor.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶14]   Although the due process 
requirements pertaining to personal jurisdiction are flexible and cannot be 
characterized as rigorous, the cited authorities make clear that there is 
structure in the process and clear guidelines for parties seeking to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a Wyoming court over a nonresident defendant.  In this case, Cheyenne Publishing filed 
what can only be described as a bare bones complaint.  Of course, this is all that is 
required  under W.R.C.P. 8, 
but such minimal pleadings are not without some attendant risk, especially when 
the claim to jurisdiction is tenuous.  
In response to the complaint, Starostka submitted an affidavit 
establishing that she had no contacts, minimum or otherwise, with Wyoming.  In response, Cheyenne Publishing 
submitted an affidavit and made argument to the district court refining its 
jurisdictional pleading only to the extent that it clarified that its assertion 
of Wyoming's jurisdiction over Starostka relied on the theory that her actions 
in Nebraska came to roost in Wyoming in the form of detrimental, but 
unspecified, consequences for Cheyenne Publishing.  The district court conducted a hearing 
and Cheyenne Publishing had the opportunity to present any additional evidence 
to the district court at that time, as well as to submit other documentary 
evidence in the interim before the hearing.  In his treatise on jurisdiction, 
Professor Robert C. Casad has this to say about this specific 
subject:

 

[1] 
Spoken

 

            
[a] Direct Oral Publication

 

            
When long-arm jurisdiction is asserted over a defendant who, personally 
or through an agent, published the defamation or privacy invasion while 
physically present in the forum state, the cases have upheld jurisdiction.  When the defamatory statement and 
publication take place outside the forum state, however, long-arm jurisdiction 
may turn upon whether the particular long-arm statute applies only when the 
defendant's act occurs within the forum state, or whether it is sufficient if 
injury is sustained there.  If the 
former is the case, jurisdiction probably will be denied unless the defendant 
has significant other connections with the forum state, even if the plaintiff is 
a resident of that state or can identify some injury there.  If the long-arm statute is broad enough, 
however, jurisdiction may be upheld if the out-of-state statements are related 
to a transaction having substantial connections with the forum 
state.

 

            
[b] Interstate Telephone

 

            
When injurious statements are uttered outside the forum state but 
received inside, cases have reached different conclusions on the propriety of 
long-arm jurisdiction.  Some cases 
have upheld jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant committed a tort in 
the state so as to come within the long-arm statute's provision.  Others reject the notion that the 
defendant acted in the state in such a case.  Those other courts may recognize that 
the statements produced "injury" in the state, but long-arm provisions covering 
tortious acts outside the state that cause injury inside the forum state usually 
apply only if the defendant has other connections with the state.  Invoking the transaction of business 
provision may or may not support jurisdiction.

 

2 
Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Action, § 7.07[1][a] and [b] 
(1991).

 

[¶15]   Viewing Cheyenne Publishing's 
pleading as favorably as we are able to under these circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.  The contract between the parties that is 
at the heart of this controversy was formed entirely in Nebraska.  Starostka's performance of her end of 
the bargain was facilitated by telephone calls to a toll free number belonging 
to Cheyenne Publishing that furthered its outreach to Nebraska and other 
states.  For purposes of assessing 
personal jurisdiction, all contacts associated with the contract were in 
Nebraska.  Thus, Cheyenne 
Publishing's pleadings do not assert that Starostka had "minimum contacts" with 
this forum and, to the extent we might accept for purposes of argument that her 
"contacts" were "minimum," we conclude that they are so attenuated as to render 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Starostka in Wyoming unreasonable, as 
well as causing the exercise of such jurisdiction to be offensive to traditional 
notions of  "substantial justice and 
fair play."

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   The district court's order 
dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over Starostka is 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1§ 10. 
District courts generally; jurisdiction.

 

            
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes both at 
law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and 
insolvency and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise 
provided for.  The district court 
shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in 
which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other 
court;  and said court shall have 
the power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor.  They shall have such appellate 
jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts in their 
respective counties as may be prescribed by law.  Said courts and their judges shall have 
power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, 
injunction and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person 
in actual custody in their respective districts.

 

   2§ 5-1-107. 
Personal jurisdiction; service of process outside 
state.

 

            
(a)  A Wyoming court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Wyoming or United States 
constitution.

            
(b)  When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized 
by this section, service may be made outside this state and proved according to 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure or any order of the 
court.

 

  3Although there 
is no real dispute that the parties entered into such an agreement, the 
agreement itself is not in the record.

 

  4Because the 
agreement is not in the record, its terms are uncertain from our perspective. 

 

   5Cheyenne 
Publishing did not further develop the purport of this call with respect to its 
effect on personal jurisdiction, and the district court found that it was not 
asserted in argument as the basis of any claim and that it was potentially 
"privileged."  Because this was not 
fleshed out below we do not further consider it here. 

 

   6For a more 
complete articulation of these analytic tools see 4 Charles Alan Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 3d §§ 1063-1068 at 325-591 
(2002 and Pocket Part 2003).