Case Title: State v. Roundtree

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP000594-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP594-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Leevan Roundtree, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 387 Wis. 2d 685,928 N.W.2d 806 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 7, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan & David A. Hansher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Kaitlin A. Lamb assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sarah L. Burgundy¸ assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sarah L. Burgundy. 
 
 
2021 WI 1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP594-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF4729) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Leevan Roundtree, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 7, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, 
JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.  HAGEDORN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Leevan 
Roundtree, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of 
the court of appeals affirming his judgment of conviction and 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
2 
 
the denial of his motion for postconviction relief.1  He asserts 
that 
the 
felon-in-possession 
statute 
under 
which 
he 
was 
convicted is unconstitutional as applied to him.   
¶2 
Specifically, 
Roundtree 
contends 
that 
Wisconsin's 
lifetime firearm ban for all felons is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because his conviction over ten years ago for 
failure to pay child support does not justify such a ban.  He 
maintains that the conviction was for a nonviolent felony and 
that no public safety objective is served by preventing him from 
owning a firearm. 
¶3 
The parties disagree as to the level of scrutiny that 
we should employ to resolve this constitutional challenge.  
Roundtree advances that we should subject the statute to the 
requirements of a strict scrutiny review.  The State counters 
that the application of intermediate scrutiny is consistent with 
precedent. 
¶4 
We determine that Roundtree's challenge to the felon-
in-possession 
statute 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.29(2) 
(2013-14)2) 
requires the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny.  
                                                 
1 State v. Roundtree, No. 2018AP594-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (per curiam) (affirming the 
judgment and order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, 
William S. Pocan and David A. Hansher, Judges). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Although Roundtree was convicted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2), that subsection has since been repealed, with the 
substance of the former § 941.29(2) now residing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m) (2017-18).  See 2015 Wis. Act 109, §§ 6, 8. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
3 
 
Under such an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we conclude that 
his challenge fails.  The statute is constitutional as applied 
to Roundtree because it is substantially related to important 
governmental objectives, namely public safety and the prevention 
of gun violence. 
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶6 
In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony 
counts of failure to support a child for more than 120 days.3  As 
a consequence of these felony convictions, Roundtree was, and 
continues to be, permanently prohibited from possessing a 
firearm. 
¶7 
Milwaukee 
police 
executed 
a 
search 
warrant 
at 
Roundtree's home on October 30, 2015.  Under his mattress, 
officers located a revolver and ammunition.  A record check of 
the recovered gun revealed that it had been stolen in Texas.  
Roundtree claimed that "he purchased the firearm from a kid on 
the street about a year ago, but that he did not know it was 
stolen."  
¶8 
The State charged Roundtree with a single count of 
possession of a firearm by a felon contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2).  He pleaded guilty and was subsequently sentenced 
to 18 months of initial confinement and 18 months of extended 
supervision. 
                                                 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2) (2003-04). 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Roundtree moved for postconviction relief, arguing 
that Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), the felon-in-possession statute, 
was unconstitutional as applied to him.  The circuit court held 
the motion in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018), 
which determined that a federal criminal defendant does not 
waive a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction on 
direct appeal by entering a guilty plea.4   
¶10 After the issuance of the Class opinion, the circuit 
court 
ultimately 
determined 
that 
Roundtree 
waived 
his 
constitutional 
challenge 
by 
entering 
a 
guilty 
plea.  
Consequently, the circuit court denied Roundtree's motion for 
postconviction relief.5 
¶11 Roundtree appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, 
albeit on different grounds.  State v. Roundtree, No. 2018AP594-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (per 
curiam).  Instead of resting on the guilty plea waiver rule, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
"regardless 
of 
whether 
Roundtree forfeited the constitutional argument by entering a 
guilty plea, . . . the argument fails on its merits."  Id., ¶5.  
                                                 
4 The "guilty plea waiver rule" refers to the general rule 
that 
a 
guilty, 
no 
contest, 
or 
Alford 
plea 
waives 
all 
nonjurisdictional 
defects, 
including 
constitutional 
claims.  
State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, 
¶18, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 
N.W.2d 886; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).   
5 The order denying the postconviction motion was entered by 
the Honorable David A. Hansher.  The Honorable William S. Pocan 
accepted 
Roundtree's 
plea 
and 
entered 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
5 
 
By way of explanation on the merits, the court of appeals 
expounded, "Roundtree's notion that his particular nonviolent 
felony matters is incorrect.  Rather, it is settled law that the 
firearm ban applies regardless of the defendant's particular 
felony."  Id., ¶7.  Like the court of appeals, we, too, 
determine that Roundtree's argument fails on its merits, and 
therefore 
we 
need 
not 
address 
whether 
he 
waived 
his 
constitutional challenge.6 
II 
¶12 Roundtree asks us to review whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him.  Examining 
the constitutional application of a statute presents a question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
reviews 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court or court of 
appeals.  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 
786 N.W.2d 227. 
¶13 In our review, we must also determine the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to guide our analysis.  This issue likewise 
presents a question of law that we determine independently.  See 
                                                 
6 Roundtree contends that Wisconsin's use of the guilty plea 
waiver rule was altered by the Court's recent decision in Class 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).  The Class Court 
determined that a guilty plea by itself does not bar a federal 
criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute of conviction on direct appeal.  Id. at 803.  Roundtree 
asserts that, like the defendant in Class, he should be allowed 
to challenge the government's power to criminalize his conduct 
in spite of his guilty plea.  The State disagrees, arguing that 
Class applies in federal court only and that it does not extend 
to as-applied challenges. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
6 
 
Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 536-37, 540-41, 544 
N.W.2d 894 (1996). 
III 
¶14 We begin by setting forth Roundtree's argument and 
some necessary background regarding the individual right to bear 
arms.  Subsequently, we determine the level of scrutiny under 
which we examine the felon-in-possession statute.  Finally, we 
apply the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
A 
¶15 Roundtree was convicted of possession of a firearm by 
a felon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a), which provides 
that a person convicted of a felony in this state "is guilty of 
a Class G felony if he or she possesses a firearm under any of 
the 
following 
circumstances . . . ." 
 
The 
circumstance 
applicable here is that "[t]he person possesses a firearm 
subsequent to the conviction for the felony or other crime, as 
specified in sub. (1)(a) or (b)."  § 941.29(2)(a). 
¶16 This statute, as Roundtree correctly observes, bars a 
person convicted of any felony from firearm possession after 
that conviction without exception, with no time limitation, and 
with no mechanism for restoration of the right to possess a 
firearm.  The statute does not draw any distinctions among 
felonies.  Those convicted of less serious felonies are banned 
from possessing firearms just as are those convicted of the most 
serious felonies. 
¶17 In Roundtree's estimation, this statutory scheme is 
unconstitutional as applied to him.  There are two major types 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
7 
 
of constitutional challenges:  facial and as-applied.  Michels 
v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486.  A 
party challenging a law as unconstitutional on its face must 
show that the law cannot be constitutionally enforced under any 
circumstances.  Id. (citation omitted).   
¶18 In contrast, in an as-applied challenge, the court 
assesses the merits of the challenge by considering the facts of 
the particular case before it.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 
323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63.  For an as-applied challenge to 
succeed, the challenger must demonstrate that the challenger's 
constitutional rights were actually violated.  Id.  If such a 
violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the 
facts presented for the party asserting the claim.  Id.  We 
presume that the statute is constitutional, and the party 
raising 
a 
constitutional 
challenge 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
challenged statute has been applied in an unconstitutional 
manner beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶15.  
¶19 Roundtree's as-applied challenge is based on the 
contention that his conviction for failure to pay child support 
is a nonviolent felony and thus is insufficient to curtail his 
constitutional right to bear arms.  He argues that "[d]isarming 
[him] does not in any way advance public safety, but deprives 
him of his right to keep and bear arms for self-defense."  As 
this is an as-applied challenge, he must demonstrate that his 
constitutional rights specifically were violated, not that the 
statute is unconstitutional in all applications. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
8 
 
B 
¶20 We begin our assessment of Roundtree's claim with some 
background on the right to bear arms.  Both the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions provide for this right.  U.S. Const. 
amend. II; Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.7 
¶21 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
"[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment 
is not unlimited."  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 626 (2008).  The same is true of the right provided by our 
State Constitution.  Moran v. DOJ, 2019 WI App 38, ¶48, 388 
Wis. 2d 193, 932 N.W.2d 430.  Indeed, the Second Amendment 
secures "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
¶22 In Heller, the Court struck down a regulation barring 
residential handgun possession as contrary to the Second 
Amendment.  Id.  In doing so, the Court observed "that the 
Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms."  Id. at 595.  It was careful, however, to delineate the 
reach of its analysis:  
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
                                                 
7 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."  Its Wisconsin counterpart, 
art. I, § 25, sets forth:  "The people have the right to keep 
and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any 
other lawful purpose." 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
9 
 
places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.   
Id. at 626-27.  
¶23 The 
Court 
identified 
such 
regulations 
as 
"presumptively lawful," id. at 627 n.26, and reiterated the same 
assessment two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 786 (2010) ("We made it clear in Heller that our 
holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory 
measures as 'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill,' 'laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.'  We repeat those assurances here.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
¶24 It is the juxtaposition of the United States Supreme 
Court's stated limitations on the Second Amendment individual 
right to bear arms, as well as the felon-in-possession statute's 
presumed lawfulness, that guides our analysis. 
IV 
A 
¶25 With this necessary background in hand, we next 
identify the appropriate level of scrutiny that frames our 
analysis. 
¶26 The parties here disagree as to the level of means-end 
scrutiny that should be applied.  Roundtree contends that we 
should subject Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) to strict scrutiny.  He 
bases this argument on language in the Seventh Circuit's 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
10 
 
decision in Ezell v. City of Chicago which indicates that "the 
rigor of . . . judicial review will depend on how close the law 
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity 
of the law's burden on the right."  Ezell v. City of Chicago, 
651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).  Under this framework, 
Roundtree argues that § 941.29(2) severely burdens the core of 
the Second Amendment right because it completely restricts the 
right to bear arms, thus necessitating strict scrutiny review.  
¶27  In order to survive strict scrutiny, a statute must 
be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.  
Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶17, 
271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831.  Strict scrutiny is an exacting 
standard, and it is the rare case in which a law survives it.  
State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶48, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. 
¶28 The State disagrees and advocates for the application 
of intermediate scrutiny.  In the State's view, such an 
application would be consistent with the language of Heller and 
its interpretation by both the court of appeals of this state 
and the Seventh Circuit.  See State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58, 
¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 N.W.2d 894 (citing United States v. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("In 
a case decided after Heller and McDonald, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals utilized an 'intermediate scrutiny' analysis 
and applied it to a constitutional challenge to a federal law 
prohibiting an individual convicted of misdemeanor domestic 
violence from carrying a firearm in or affecting interstate 
commerce.").  Pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
11 
 
ask whether a law is substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.  Id. 
¶29 We agree with the State that intermediate scrutiny is 
the appropriate inquiry to guide our analysis.  First, Heller 
clearly requires more than mere rational basis review of laws 
that are alleged to burden Second Amendment rights.  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 628 n.27.  "If all that was required to overcome the 
right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second 
Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect."  Id.   
¶30 Second, 
the 
intermediate 
scrutiny 
approach 
lends 
vitality 
to 
the 
Heller 
court's 
statement 
that 
felon 
dispossession statutes are "presumptively lawful."  Kanter v. 
Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2019).  To subject a 
"presumptively lawful" statute to strict scrutiny would in 
effect remove the operation of such a presumption.  As stated, 
strict scrutiny is a steep hill to climb. 
¶31 Our conclusion is consistent with that of other courts 
that have considered the question.  Indeed, federal courts 
around the country have interpreted the above-cited language 
from Heller as indicative of requiring an intermediate scrutiny 
analysis when examining Second Amendment challenges.  See, e.g., 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641-42; Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448; United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).    
¶32 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has taken the same 
approach.  In both Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶¶11-12, and State 
v. Culver, 2018 WI App 55, ¶37, 384 Wis. 2d 222, 918 N.W.2d 103, 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
12 
 
the court of appeals applied intermediate scrutiny to as-applied 
challenges to the felon-in-possession statute.  Support for the 
use of intermediate scrutiny is thus plentiful in the case law 
and accepting Roundtree's position would necessitate overruling 
both Pocian and Culver, which we decline to do. 
¶33 In contrast, Roundtree points us to no case in which 
an appellate court has applied strict scrutiny to a Second 
Amendment challenge to a felon-in-possession statute.8  Absent 
any such application of strict scrutiny in Wisconsin or 
elsewhere in this type of case, we decline to break new ground.9   
                                                 
8 We acknowledge that strict scrutiny has been applied to 
related federal statutes, but none of those cases finds purchase 
here.  In United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-
32 (D. Utah 2009), the District Court applied strict scrutiny to 
the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by a person 
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."  See 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).  Similarly, in Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. 
Sheriff's Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 328-29 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), the Sixth Circuit 
applied strict scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)'s dispossession 
of a person "who has been committed to a mental institution." 
Tyler largely based its application of strict scrutiny on 
citation to separate writings in other cases, and in any event 
the opinion has been vacated.  Id. at 328-29.  Likewise, 
Engstrum is of little value here because the restriction it 
addressed was based on a misdemeanor, not a felony. 
9 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent would apply 
strict scrutiny, citing this court's decision in Mayo v. 
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 
WI 78, ¶28, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678.  Justice Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley's 
dissent, 
¶¶73-74. 
 
However, 
Mayo 
is 
inapplicable here. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
13 
 
¶34 We are likewise unpersuaded by the argument Roundtree 
makes pursuant to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ezell, 651 
                                                                                                                                                             
In 
Mayo, 
an 
equal 
protection 
case 
regarding 
the 
constitutionality of medical malpractice damage caps, the 
majority of the court overruled the "rational basis with teeth" 
standard from Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.  
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32.  The "rational basis with teeth" 
standard from Ferdon, although similar, is different from 
intermediate scrutiny. (continued)   
The Ferdon court set forth that "rational basis with teeth" 
"focuses on the legislative means used to achieve the ends.  
This standard simply requires the court to conduct an inquiry to 
determine whether the legislation has more than a speculative 
tendency as the means for furthering a valid legislative 
purpose."  Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶78.  Intermediate scrutiny, 
on the other hand, asks whether a law is "substantially related 
to an important governmental objective."  State v. Pocian, 2012 
WI App 58, ¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 N.W.2d 894 (citation 
omitted).   
Importantly, the Ferdon court explicitly disclaimed that it 
was applying intermediate scrutiny.  It stated that rational 
basis was the "appropriate level of scrutiny in the present 
case," clearly evidencing a distinction between intermediate 
scrutiny and "rational basis with teeth."  See Ferdon, 284 
Wis. 2d 573, ¶¶63-65. 
Further, the Mayo court specifically stated that it was 
addressing levels of scrutiny for equal protection challenges.  
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.  Roundtree's challenge is not based on 
the equal protection clause, but on a purported abridgement of 
his Second Amendment rights.   
The intermediate scrutiny standard thus is well established 
and retains vitality.  In 1996, a unanimous court first adopted 
and applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis in a challenge to 
a cruising ordinance as violative of the constitutional right to 
travel.  See Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 540-41, 
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996).  More recently, in State v. Culver, 2018 
WI App 55, ¶37, 384 Wis. 2d 222, 918 N.W.2d 103, the court of 
appeals, post-Mayo, addressed the same question at issue here 
and applied intermediate scrutiny.   
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
14 
 
F.3d 684.  He bases this argument on the Ezell court's statement 
that "the rigor of . . . judicial review will depend on how 
close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right 
and the severity of the law's burden on the right."  Id. at 703.  
In Roundtree's view, the felon-in-possession statute implicates 
the core Second Amendment right and severely burdens such a 
right, necessitating the most rigorous level of scrutiny. 
¶35 However, this argument rests on a faulty premise.  As 
the Seventh Circuit explained in Kanter, less than strict 
scrutiny review is appropriate here because "the weight of the 
historical evidence . . . suggests that felon dispossession laws 
do not restrict the 'core right of armed defense,' but rather 
burden 'activity lying closer to the margins of the right.'"  
Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448 n.10.  Instead, the core right 
identified in Heller is "the right of a law-abiding, responsible 
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense . . . ."  
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis removed).   
¶36 Like the Seventh Circuit in Kanter, we need not 
conclusively determine the scope of the historical protections 
of the Second Amendment.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 447; see infra, 
¶41.  But also like the Seventh Circuit in Kanter, we are not 
persuaded that the core Second Amendment right is implicated so 
as to require strict scrutiny review. 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
15 
 
¶37 Accordingly, we determine that Roundtree's challenge 
to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) requires the application of an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.10   
B 
¶38 We next apply intermediate scrutiny to the felon-in-
possession statute considering the facts of this case. 
¶39 Generally, Second Amendment challenges require this 
court to undertake a two-step approach.  State v. Herrmann, 2015 
WI App 97, ¶9, 366 Wis. 2d 312, 873 N.W.2d 257.  We ask first 
"whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee."  Id. 
(quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89).  If the answer is no, 
then the inquiry ends.  Id.   
¶40 If the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, 
then the court proceeds to inquire into "the strength of the 
government's justification for restricting or regulating the 
exercise of Second Amendment rights."  Id. (quoting Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 703). 
                                                 
10 We observe that defendants around the country who raise 
as-applied challenges to felon-in-possession statutes will face 
an uphill climb.  See Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶12 (explaining 
that as of the writing of that opinion, "[n]o state law banning 
felons from possessing guns has ever been struck down"). 
(continued) 
Of those federal circuits that have not foreclosed such 
challenges entirely, only one has ever upheld an as-applied 
Second Amendment challenge to the federal statute banning 
firearm possession by certain individuals convicted of crimes.  
See Binderup v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016); 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442-44 
(7th Cir. 2019).   
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
16 
 
¶41 The Seventh Circuit has described the historical 
evidence as to whether felons were categorically excluded from 
the Second Amendment's scope as "inconclusive."  Kanter, 919 
F.3d at 445.  Accordingly, when faced with an as-applied 
challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute, the court 
declined to resolve the first step of the inquiry and instead 
relied on the dispositive second step——the application of a 
means-end scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 447.  We take a similar 
approach here. 
¶42 Like the court in Kanter, we assume that the felon-in-
possession statute burdens conduct falling within the scope of 
the 
Second 
Amendment's 
guarantee 
in 
order 
to 
reach 
the 
dispositive issue.  Our inquiry, then, focuses on whether the 
statute at issue is substantially related to an important 
governmental objective. 
¶43 As other courts in this state and elsewhere have done, 
we recognize public safety generally, and preventing gun 
violence specifically, as important governmental objectives.  
See Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶15; Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448.  
Indeed, "[p]ublic safety and the protection of human life is a 
state interest of the highest order."  State v. Miller, 196 
Wis. 2d 238, 249, 538 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1995).  
¶44 Roundtree protests that he should not be prohibited 
from firearm possession because his felony conviction did not 
involve violence.  He claims that the nature of his conviction 
and the fact that it is remote in time weigh in favor of a 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
17 
 
determination that Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) is unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 
¶45 We are not persuaded that the specific facts of 
Roundtree's case compel such a conclusion.  Roundtree was 
convicted of failure to support a child for over 120 days.  In 
his view, this is different in kind from the crime at issue in 
Pocian, where the defendant was convicted of uttering a forgery 
as the underlying felony.  Put frankly, he suggests that failing 
to pay child support is not as bad as "physically taking a 
victim's property."   
¶46 But failure to pay child support is every bit as 
serious as uttering a forgery if not more so.  Those who fail to 
make support payments deprive the very people they should be 
protecting most, their own children, from receiving basic 
necessities.  Roundtree chose to keep money for himself that 
rightly belonged to his children.  And, to further add to the 
egregiousness of his offense, he committed this crime repeatedly 
by failing to support for at least 120 days.  By all accounts 
this is a serious offense. 
¶47 Simply because his crime was not physically violent in 
nature, it does not follow that the felon-in-possession statute 
cannot be constitutionally applied to Roundtree.  The Seventh 
Circuit determined as much in Kanter when it concluded that "the 
government has shown that prohibiting even nonviolent felons 
like Kanter from possessing firearms is substantially related to 
its interest in preventing gun violence."  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
18 
 
448.  The legislature did not in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) create a 
hierarchy of felonies, and neither will this court.    
¶48 Even in the case of those convicted of nonviolent 
felonies, "someone with a felony conviction on his record is 
more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and violent gun 
use."  United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 
2010).  Thus, even if a felon has not exhibited signs of 
physical violence, it is reasonable for the State to want to 
keep firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a 
willingness to not only break the law, but to commit a crime 
serious enough that the legislature has denominated it a felony, 
as Roundtree has here.  
¶49 The State has cited an abundance of research to 
support this conclusion.  "Other courts addressing this issue 
have observed that nonviolent offenders not only have a higher 
recidivism rate than the general population, but certain groups—
—such as property offenders——have an even higher recidivism rate 
than violent offenders, and a large percentage of the crimes 
nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent."  Kaemmerling 
v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003)). 
¶50 As the Kanter court noted, several studies "have found 
a connection between nonviolent offenders . . . and a risk of 
future violent crime."  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 449. 
For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent offenders 
found that about one in five were rearrested for a 
violent crime within three years of his or her 
release.  See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
19 
 
Statistics Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting 
State Prisons 2, 4 (2004).  A separate study found 
that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders——a 
category 
that 
includes 
fraud 
convictions——were 
rearrested for a violent offense within five years of 
their release.  See Matthew R. Durose, et al., U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:  
Patterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014).  Yet another 
study found that "even handgun purchasers with only 1 
prior misdemeanor conviction and no convictions for 
offenses involving firearms or violence were nearly 5 
times as likely as those with no prior criminal 
history to be charged with new offenses involving 
firearms or violence."  Garen J. Wintemute, et al., 
Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for 
Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity 
Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns, 280 J. Am. 
Med. Ass'n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Id. 
¶51 Such assertions are echoed by data from the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections (DOC).  For example, DOC data indicate 
that among recidivists who committed public order offenses, such 
as failure to pay child support, and were released from prison 
in 2011, 21.4 percent recidivated with a violent offense.  
Joseph R. Tatar II & Megan Jones, Recidivism after Release from 
Prison, Wis. Dep't of Corrections, at 14 (August 2016), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/InteractiveDashboards/Recidivism
AfterReleaseFromPrison_2.pdf.  As the State strikingly observes 
in its brief, "the 21.4 percent rate of public order offenders 
recidivating with a violent crime was higher than that of 
property offenders (16 percent) and drug offenders (17.9 
percent).  And it was just seven percentage points lower than 
the rate of violent offenders (28.3 percent)."  This data is 
surely sufficient to support a substantial relation between 
No. 
2018AP594-CR   
 
20 
 
keeping firearms out of the hands of those convicted of 
nonviolent 
felonies 
and 
the 
public 
safety 
objective 
of 
preventing gun violence. 
¶52 Further, the fact that Roundtree's conviction occurred 
over ten years ago does not affect the result.  Roundtree 
asserts that he poses no danger to public safety and should be 
able to possess a firearm as a result.  However, the record 
indicates that the gun Roundtree possessed was stolen and 
purchased off the street.  Supporting street level gun commerce 
is hardly the benign action Roundtree would have us believe it 
is. 
¶53 In sum, we determine that Roundtree's challenge to the 
felon-in-possession statute (Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)) requires 
the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny.  Under 
such an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we conclude that the 
felon-in-possession statute is constitutional as applied to 
Roundtree because the statute in question is substantially 
related to important governmental objectives, namely public 
safety and the prevention of gun violence. 
¶54 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
 
¶55 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately to address the unanswered question of whether by 
pleading guilty Roundtree waived his as-applied challenge to the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  I conclude that, 
following Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798 
(2018), he did not. 
¶56 Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty with the 
assistance of reasonably competent counsel waives his right to 
later raise an independent claim related to a deprivation of his 
constitutional rights that occurred prior to his pleading 
guilty.  See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  
The rationale behind this "guilty-plea-waiver rule" is that a 
counseled guilty plea admits "all of the factual and legal 
elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt 
and 
a 
lawful 
sentence." 
 
United 
States 
v. 
Broce, 
488 
U.S. 563, 569 (1989).1 
¶57 In order to balance efficient judicial administration 
with the rights protected by the United States Constitution, the 
United States Supreme Court has developed exceptions to the 
guilty-plea-waiver rule for claims that implicate the State's 
very power to prosecute the defendant, provided that a court can 
resolve those claims without venturing beyond the record.  See 
id. at 574-76; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) 
                                                 
1 We have interpreted this rule, like other waiver rules, to 
be one of judicial administration that does not deprive an 
appellate court of jurisdiction.  See State v. Riekoff, 112 
Wis. 2d 119, 123-24, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
(per curiam) (guilty plea did not waive a constitutional 
challenge under the Double Jeopardy Clause when the claim could 
be resolved on the existing record); see also Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (guilty plea did not foreclose 
a 
defendant's 
habeas 
petition 
alleging 
"unconstitutional 
vindictive prosecution" because the Due Process Clause precluded 
the State from even prosecuting the defendant). 
¶58 Although the guilty-plea-waiver rule arose in the 
federal context, this court has steadfastly adopted that 
precedent.  See, e.g., State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶42, 294 
Wis. 2d 62, 
716 N.W.2d 886; 
Hawkins 
v. 
State, 
26 
Wis. 2d 443, 448, 132 N.W.2d 545 (1965).  Wisconsin courts have 
broadened the federal exceptions, recognizing that a guilty plea 
does not waive facial challenges to the constitutionality of the 
statute of conviction.  See, e.g., State v. Molitor, 210 
Wis. 2d 415, 419 n.2, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997).  This 
court, however, has not yet extended that exception to as-
applied constitutional challenges.  See State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 112, 
¶46, 
264 
Wis. 2d 520, 
665 
N.W.2d 328; 
State 
v. 
Trochinski, 
2002 
WI 
56, 
¶34 
n.15, 
253 
Wis. 2d 38, 
644 
N.W.2d 891.  But following Class, the application of the guilty-
plea-waiver rule should no longer depend upon whether an appeal 
challenging the constitutionality of a statute is classified as 
facial or as-applied. 
¶59 In Class, the United States Supreme Court applied an 
exception to the guilty-plea-waiver rule to allow a defendant to 
challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
appeal.  138 S. Ct. at 803-05.  Class pleaded guilty to 
unlawfully carrying a firearm on U.S. Capitol grounds, contrary 
to 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1), after the police had found three guns 
in his car in a Capitol parking lot.  On appeal, Class argued 
that the statute violated his due-process rights since he did 
not have fair notice that a parking lot was part of the Capitol 
"grounds."  Id. at 802.  Class also claimed that the statute 
violated his Second Amendment rights because "Capitol Grounds" 
included so broad an area that it was practically impossible to 
lawfully carry a firearm anywhere within the District of 
Columbia.  Id.  In allowing both claims to proceed, the Court 
rested its decision on its 150-year-old understanding of the 
nature of a guilty plea: 
The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all 
the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the 
evil intent imputed to the defendant.  It is a waiver 
also of all merely technical and formal objections of 
which the defendant could have availed himself by any 
other plea or motion.  But if the facts alleged and 
admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of 
the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be 
discharged. 
Id. at 804 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 
(1869)).  The Court held that Class's guilty plea did not waive 
his claims challenging the constitutionality of the statute of 
conviction because those claims involved the State's ability to 
constitutionally prosecute Class and did not contradict the 
terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement.  Id. 
at 805. 
¶60 Given the Court's analysis in Class, there is no 
justification for continuing to treat as-applied challenges to 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
statute 
of 
conviction 
any 
differently than facial challenges.  After all, Class did not 
hinge on the type of constitutional challenge being raised.  See 
United States v. Alarcon Sanchez, 972 F.3d 156, 166 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 2020) ("Pursuant to the holding in Class, defendants have a 
right 
to 
raise 
on 
appeal 
both 
as-applied 
and 
facial 
constitutional challenges to the [statute of conviction].").  
Indeed, when addressing the merits of Class's challenges on 
remand, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals treated both of his 
claims 
as 
as-applied 
challenges. 
 
See 
United 
States 
v. 
Class, 930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  But see State v. 
Jackson, 2020 WI App 4, ¶¶8-9, 390 Wis. 2d 402, 938 N.W.2d 639 
(noting that it was "not clear . . . whether Class'[s] challenge 
was an as-applied or facial challenge").  Second, and more 
importantly, the Court's reasoning in Class must apply equally 
to facial and as-applied challenges because both types of 
challenges "call into question the Government's power to 
'constitutionally prosecute'" the defendant.  Class, 138 S. Ct. 
at 805 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575) (adding that whether a 
constitutional challenge can be classified as "jurisdictional" 
is also not dispositive). 
¶61 This court should therefore adopt the holding in 
Class, not only to remain consistent with United States Supreme 
Court precedent but also to continue to strike the proper 
balance between efficient judicial administration and the 
protection 
of 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
See 
Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, ¶27.  It should be the law in Wisconsin 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant's right to 
challenge 
the 
statute 
of 
conviction's 
constitutionality, 
facially or as applied, provided the challenge can be resolved 
without contradicting the record.  We should withdraw language 
from Cole and Trochinski and clarify the court of appeals' 
holding in Jackson to the extent that those decisions hold that 
a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to later raise an 
as-applied 
constitutional 
challenge 
to 
the 
statute 
of 
conviction.2 
¶62 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY joins this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
2 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328; State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n.15, 253 
Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; State v. Jackson, 2020 WI App 4, 
¶¶8-9, 390 Wis. 2d 402, 938 N.W.2d 639. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶64 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The Second 
Amendment provides: 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
U.S. Const. amend. II.  St. George Tucker, a pre-eminent 
constitutional law scholar during the founding era, described 
the Second Amendment as "the true palladium of liberty . . . .  
The right of self defence is the first law of nature:  in most 
governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this 
right within the narrowest limits possible.  Wherever standing 
armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, 
liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of 
destruction."  St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 1: 
App. 300 (1803).
 In plainer words, the Second Amendment is the 
people's ultimate protection against tyranny. 
¶65 Applying the original public meaning of this bulwark 
of liberty, the United States Supreme Court more than a decade 
ago finally dispelled the prevalent, but historically ignorant 
notion that the Second Amendment protects merely a collective, 
militia member's right.  The Supreme Court declared the right to 
keep and bear arms is "exercised individually and belongs to all 
Americans"; accordingly, "the District [of Columbia]'s ban on 
handgun 
possession 
in 
the 
home 
violates 
the 
Second 
Amendment . . . ."  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 581, 635 (2008) (emphasis added).  See also Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in The Papers 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
of Thomas Jefferson, XII, 438-40 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950) ("Let 
me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to 
against every government on earth, general or particular, [and] 
what no just government should refuse or rest on inference.") 
(emphasis added).  Any encroachment upon this fundamental right 
must withstand strict judicial scrutiny.  Wisconsin Carry, Inc. 
v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶9, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 
233 (declaring the right to keep and bear arms to be "a species 
of right we denominate as 'fundamental'"); Mayo v. Wisconsin 
Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶28, 383 
Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 ("Strict scrutiny is applied to 
statutes that restrict a fundamental right."). 
¶66 Ignoring 
conclusive 
historical 
evidence 
to 
the 
contrary, 
the 
majority 
upholds 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wisconsin's categorical ban on the possession of firearms by any 
person convicted of a felony offense,1 regardless of whether that 
individual is dangerous.  Under the majority's vision of what is 
good for society, "even if a felon has not exhibited signs of 
physical violence, it is reasonable for the State to want to 
keep firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a 
willingness 
to . . . break 
the 
law." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶48 
(emphasis added).  It may be "reasonable" to the majority but it 
surely isn't constitutional.  "The very enumeration of the right 
takes out of the hands of government——even the Third Branch of 
Government——the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether 
the right is really worth insisting upon.  A constitutional 
                                                 
1 See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
guarantee 
subject 
to 
future 
judges' 
assessments 
of 
its 
usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all."   Heller, 554 
U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).  Centuries of history warned 
the Founders that governments certainly wanted to keep arms out 
of the hands of the citizenry in order to ease the establishment 
of tyranny——and they often succeeded.  It is for this very 
reason that the Framers insisted on preserving the individual 
right to keep and bear arms for all Americans. 
¶67 Under Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m), the State deprives 
Leevan Roundtree of his fundamental constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms, based solely on his failure to pay child support 
more than ten years ago, with no showing that he poses a danger 
to society.  Applying the wrong standard of review, the majority 
sidelines the United States Constitution, demotes the Second 
Amendment to second-class status,2 and endorses a blanket ban on 
one of our most fundamental constitutional liberties.  In doing 
so, the majority contravenes the original public meaning of the 
Second Amendment.  I dissent. 
I 
¶68 The Constitution takes precedence over any statute, 
and any statute in conflict with the Constitution cannot stand.  
"The [C]onstitution is either a superior, paramount law, 
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
                                                 
2 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) 
("[R]espondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized 
in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely 
different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees 
that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process 
Clause."). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable 
when the legislature shall please to alter it.  If the former 
part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary 
to the [C]onstitution is not law; if the latter part be true, 
then written [C]onstitutions are absurd attempts on the part of 
the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable."  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  Bearing in mind 
that the Second Amendment protects the "first law of nature"——
the right to defend oneself——any infringement of the right must 
be concordant with the Constitution and may replicate only those 
restrictions society accepted at the founding.  Permitting 
restraints on the right to keep and bear arms that were never 
contemplated by the Framers lends an illimitable quality to the 
legislative power to regulate a fundamental right, thereby 
deflating the primacy of the Constitution and imperiling the 
liberty of the people. 
¶69 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.29(1m) bans all felons from 
possessing a firearm in this state:  "[a] person who possesses a 
firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if any of the following 
applies:  (a) [t]he person has been convicted of a felony in 
this state, [or] (b) [t]he person has been convicted of a crime 
elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state."  
This felon dispossession statute draws no distinction between an 
individual convicted of first-degree homicide and someone 
convicted 
of 
"failing 
to 
comply 
with 
any 
record-keeping 
requirement for fish" (a felony in this state).  Wis. Stat.  
§ 29.971(1)(c). 
 
Rather 
than 
the 
historically 
recognized 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
revocation 
of 
Second 
Amendment 
rights 
predicated 
on 
an 
individual's dangerousness to society, the Wisconsin Legislature 
instead 
rescinds 
those 
rights 
based 
merely 
on 
a 
felony 
conviction, irrationally preserving the right to keep and bear 
arms for both violent and dangerous citizens. 
¶70 In 2003, Roundtree failed to pay child support for 
more than 120 consecutive days, resulting in his conviction for 
a felony under Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2).  Roundtree was sentenced 
to four years of probation and later paid his past due child 
support.  Nearly 13 years later, while executing a search 
warrant on Roundtree's property, the police found a handgun 
tucked beneath his mattress.  The State charged Roundtree with 
violating Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m).3  The majority concludes that 
Roundtree's felony conviction for failure to timely pay child 
support more than a decade earlier permanently forecloses his 
individual Second Amendment rights.  Although the United States 
Supreme Court has never opined on the constitutionality of felon 
dispossession laws, the majority reflexively follows federal 
jurisdictions in upholding these laws, neglecting (as other 
courts have) to conduct the historical analysis necessary to 
ascertain the original public meaning of the Second Amendment in 
this regard. 
¶71 Troublingly, 
the 
majority 
applies 
intermediate 
scrutiny to a statute that demands strict scrutiny review, while 
                                                 
3 Roundtree 
was 
actually 
convicted 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.29(2), but sub. (2) was subsequently repealed and replaced 
with Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m).  For consistency and to avoid 
confusion, I use sub. (1m) throughout. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
declining to discern whether the people who ratified the Bill of 
Rights consented to the removal of the Second Amendment right 
from non-violent felons.  While legislatures have always had the 
power to prohibit people who are dangerous from possessing 
firearms, the Second Amendment does not countenance collectively 
depriving all felons of their individual Second Amendment 
rights.  Such laws sweep too broadly, disarming those who pose 
no danger to society.  And if the professed purpose of felon 
dispossession laws is "public safety and the prevention of gun 
violence" as the majority describes,4 then Wisconsin's lawmakers 
need to adjust their aim; Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) leaves violent 
misdemeanants free to keep and bear arms. 
¶72 Since the founding of our nation, Americans have 
understood their right to keep and bear arms as fundamental to 
the people's self-preservation and defense.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
593-94 ("By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had 
become fundamental for English subjects," citing Blackstone's 
description of "the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence").  In Wisconsin Carry, this court 
expressly recognized the right to keep and bear arms to be "a 
species of right we denominate as 'fundamental,' reflecting our 
understanding that it finds its protection, but not its source, 
in our constitutions."  373 Wis. 2d 543, ¶9 (citations omitted).  
During the ratifying conventions, "there was broad consensus 
between Federalists and their opponents on the existence and 
nature of the 'natural right' to keep and bear arms for 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶4. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
defensive purposes."  Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of America, 
836 F.3d 336, 367 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring).  
Although we expound only the Second Amendment in this case, this 
court has also deemed the people's right to keep and bear arms 
protected under the Wisconsin Constitution5 to be a fundamental 
right.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328 ("We find that the state constitutional right to bear 
arms is fundamental.").  Because Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) 
restricts a fundamental right that predates and is "independent 
of" the Constitution entirely, Wisconsin Carry, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 
¶9, strict scrutiny must apply. 
¶73 Inexplicably, but quite conveniently, the majority 
opinion never mentions Wisconsin Carry, nor does it even utter 
the word "fundamental."  When a challenged statute impairs a 
fundamental right, this court must apply a heightened level of 
scrutiny.  Very recently, this court articulated that "[s]trict 
scrutiny is applied to statutes that restrict a fundamental 
right."  Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.  Not only does the majority 
disregard the nature of the right to keep and bear arms, it also 
fails to apply Mayo, which hardly imposed a novel approach to 
examining laws restricting fundamental rights.  Strict scrutiny 
has never been limited to equal protection challenges.  We 
recently reiterated that "[a] statute which directly and 
substantially infringes upon a fundamental liberty interest must 
withstand strict scrutiny:  it must be narrowly tailored to 
                                                 
5 See Article 1, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution:  
"The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, 
defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose." 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
serve a compelling state interest."  Matter of Visitation of 
A.A.L., 2019 WI 57, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486.  See 
also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).  Strict scrutiny applies 
"when a statute impinges on a 'fundamental right' or creates a 
classification that 'operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class.'"  Metropolitan Associates v. City of Milwaukee, 
2011 WI 20, ¶60 n.20, 332 Wis. 2d 857, 96 N.W.2d 717 (emphasis 
added).  In Larson v. Burmaster, 2006 WI App 142, ¶42, 295 
Wis. 2d 333, 720 N.W.2d 134, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held 
that 
"strict 
scrutiny 
is 
applied" 
when 
a 
"fundamental 
constitutional right is violated." 
¶74 Without explanation, the majority altogether ignores 
its holding in Wisconsin Carry and refuses to apply Mayo, two 
cases we recently decided.  The majority threatens every 
Wisconsin citizen's right to keep and bear arms by failing to 
acknowledge the right as fundamental and accordingly using the 
wrong level of review.  In electing to apply an intermediate 
level of scrutiny, the majority misconstrues the nature of the 
infringement of Roundtree's Second Amendment right.  Its error 
stems from mischaracterizing the person who seeks to exercise 
his Second Amendment right as an "activity lying closer to the 
margins of the right."  Majority op., ¶35 (emphasis added) 
(citing Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 n.10 (7th Cir. 2019)).  
Of course, a person is not an "activity" and in this case, 
Roundtree wishes to exercise what Heller pronounced to be the 
"core lawful purpose of armed defense," which the State of 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
Wisconsin totally denies him.  554 U.S. at 630.  "[A] lifetime 
ban on any felon possessing any firearm" undoubtedly "does 
impair the 'core conduct' of self-defense in the home——at least 
for a felon who has completed his sentence, or someone who 
shares his household."   C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha 
Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 697 (2009).  
Such "broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second 
Amendment 
right . . . are 
categorically 
unconstitutional."  
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).  
Roundtree's core right to possess a firearm in his own home is 
not merely restricted, it is extinguished.  This alone warrants 
strict scrutiny. 
¶75 Ultimately, the level of scrutiny applied is not 
dispositive; Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) fails under either level of 
review.  More importantly, the statute is inconsistent with the 
historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment 
right and who possesses it.  For this reason, Heller declined to 
adopt a particular level of scrutiny.6  The Supreme Court 
expressed only that "'rational basis' . . . could not be used to 
evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a 
                                                 
6 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 628 
(2008).  See also State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, ¶34 (Wash. 
2010) ("We follow Heller in declining to analyze [Washington's 
statute restricting the rights of children to keep and bear 
arms] under any level of scrutiny.  Instead we look to the 
Second 
Amendment's 
original 
meaning, 
the 
traditional 
understanding of the right, and the burden imposed on children 
by upholding the statute.  See generally Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:  
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 
1443, 1449 (2009)."). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
specific, enumerated right" such as "the right to keep and bear 
arms."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 ("If all that was required 
to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational 
basis, the Second Amendment would . . . have no effect.").  If 
anything, Heller signals that courts should approach challenges 
to statutes infringing the Second Amendment right with a 
rigorous 
review 
of 
history, 
rather 
than 
the 
inherently 
subjective consideration of whether the government's interest in 
curtailing the right outweighs the individual's interest in 
exercising it.  "As to the ban on handguns[,] . . . the Supreme 
Court in Heller never asked whether the law was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest (strict 
scrutiny) or substantially related to an important government 
interest (intermediate scrutiny).  If the Supreme Court had 
meant to adopt one of those tests, it could have said so in 
Heller and measured D.C.'s handgun ban against the relevant 
standard.  But the Court did not do so; it instead determined 
that handguns had not traditionally been banned and were in 
common 
use——and 
thus 
that 
D.C.'s 
handgun 
ban 
was 
unconstitutional."  Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 
1244, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  The 
majority in this case should have conducted the historical 
analysis 
necessary 
to 
determine 
whether 
felons 
were 
traditionally dispossessed of their weapons.  They weren't, 
unless they were dangerous to society.  Accordingly, Wisconsin's 
categorical dispossession of all felons irrespective of whether 
they pose a danger to the public is unconstitutional. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶76 Although the United States Supreme Court has declined 
to pronounce the appropriate level of review for statutes 
burdening the fundamental right to keep and bear arms in favor 
of discerning the traditional understanding of the Second 
Amendment, this court (as it must) has recognized the right to 
keep and bear arms to be fundamental, and this court has 
declared strict scrutiny to be the appropriate level of scrutiny 
"applied to statutes that restrict a fundamental right."  Mayo, 
383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.  At the very least, the majority should 
explain why it now subordinates the fundamental, constitutional 
right to keep and bear arms. 
II 
¶77 Statutes subject to strict scrutiny rarely survive.  
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) ("[I]t is the rare 
case in which we have held that a law survives strict 
scrutiny.").  In order to survive, "a statute must serve a 
compelling state interest[,] . . . be necessary to serving that 
interest[,] and . . . be narrowly tailored toward furthering 
that compelling state interest."  Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.  
Historically, laws that dispossessed the violent served the 
compelling state interest in public safety.  Wisconsin's felon 
dispossession law, however, ensnares the non-violent, thereby 
detaching itself from the statute's ostensible purpose. 
¶78 Even assuming Wisconsin's felon dispossession statute 
serves the unquestionably compelling state interest in public 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
safety,7 the statute is not "narrowly tailored" toward advancing 
that interest because it applies to any individual convicted of 
a felony offense, even if that person poses no danger to 
society.  For example:  "One man beats his wife, harming her 
physically and emotionally and traumatizing their children who 
witness the assault. He may, however, only have committed 
battery, a misdemeanor."  State v. Thomas, 2004 WI App 115, 
¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 513, 683 N.W.2d 497 (Schudson, J., concurring) 
(emphasis 
in 
original). 
 
The 
legislature 
allows 
this 
undisputedly violent man to possess a firearm.  "Another man 
enters a garage to steal a shovel; he has committed a 
burglary," which is a felony offense.  Id.  The legislature 
forever prohibits him from possessing a firearm.  "One woman 
drives while intoxicated, threatening the lives of countless 
citizens.  Under Wisconsin's drunk driving laws——the weakest in 
the nation——she has committed a non-criminal offense if it is 
her first, or only a misdemeanor unless it is her fifth (or 
subsequent) offense."  Id., ¶48.  Wisconsin's legislature deems 
this woman fit to possess a firearm.  "Another woman, however, 
forges a check; she has committed a felony."  Id.  As a result, 
Wisconsin's legislature forever prohibits her from possessing a 
firearm.  Despite the utterly ineffectual distinctions drawn by 
the 
legislature, 
the 
majority 
allows 
the 
legislature 
to 
permanently dispossess non-dangerous individuals of their Second 
Amendment rights while allowing violent citizens to retain them.  
                                                 
7 State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58, ¶12, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 
N.W.2d 894 
(quoted 
source 
omitted) 
(holding 
that 
felon 
dispossession statutes are a "matter of public safety"). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
Even intermediate scrutiny cannot save a statute that purports 
to serve an important government interest——protecting society 
from violent criminals——but fails so miserably to achieve it. 
¶79 In considering an as-applied challenge to a law "that 
entirely bars the challenger from exercising the core Second 
Amendment 
right, 
any 
resort 
to 
means-end 
scrutiny 
is 
inappropriate" when the challenger falls outside of "the 
historical justifications supporting the regulation."  Binderup, 
836 F.3d at 363 (Hardiman, J., concurring).  Instead, "such laws 
are categorically invalid as applied to persons entitled to 
Second Amendment protection."  Id.  In Binderup, a federal 
statute 
dispossessing 
all 
individuals 
convicted 
of 
state 
misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison went 
"even further than the 'severe restriction' struck down in 
Heller:  it completely eviscerate[d] the Second Amendment right" 
as to an entire group of individuals who were historically 
proven to retain it.  Id. at 364.  So too with Wisconsin's 
categorical ban on the possession of firearms by non-dangerous 
felons. 
 
The 
original 
meaning 
of 
the 
Second 
Amendment, 
encompassing a traditional understanding of the scope of the 
rights it protects as well as the range of historically 
recognized 
restrictions, 
establishes 
this 
statute's 
unconstitutionality, independent of the application of any 
standard of scrutiny. 
III 
¶80 At its inception, the right to keep and bear arms 
protected under the Second Amendment was never understood to 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
countenance the categorical exclusion of felons that Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m) endorses.  Historically, legislatures prohibited 
only dangerous people from possessing a firearm, not an 
individual like Roundtree who, although convicted of a felony 
offense, poses no demonstrable risk to the public.  This more 
narrowly drawn restriction reflects the nature of the right as 
an individual, rather than a merely collective or civil one. 
¶81 In drafting the Second Amendment, "both Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists accepted an individual right to arms; the 
only debate was over how best to guarantee it."  Don B. Kates, 
Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 223 (1983).  The Founders 
settled on the following language:  "A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."  U.S. 
Const. amend. II.  When judges interpret constitutional text, we 
give words their original public meaning.  Judges who instead 
inject 
a 
modern 
gloss 
over 
constitutional 
provisions 
impermissibly change their meaning, a right reserved to the 
people through the process of constitutional amendment.  In 
interpreting the Second Amendment, we accordingly apply the 
particular meaning of the words "militia" and "right of the 
people" as they were understood at the time of ratification. 
¶82 At the time of the founding, "militia" meant "the body 
of the people"——an adult citizenry "who were not simply allowed 
to keep their own arms, but affirmatively required to do so."  
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican 123 (W. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
Bennett ed. 1978) (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee) ("A militia, 
when 
properly 
formed, 
are 
in 
fact 
the 
people 
themselves . . . ."); Kates, supra, at 214 (discussing how, in 
the pre-colonial tradition, male citizens were required to keep 
arms for purposes of law enforcement).  It was the citizenry's 
collection of personally-owned firearms that made possible law 
enforcement and military service during the founding era.  After 
all, the Founders preserved this right primarily in response to 
the tyranny witnessed in England and its corresponding colonies.  
As George Mason warned, it was the goal of the English monarch 
"to disarm the people," as that was the "best and most effectual 
way to enslave them."  3 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State 
Conventions 380 (2d ed. 1836). 
¶83 As a principal means of resisting such tyranny, the 
Founders enshrined the "right of the people" to keep and bear 
arms as an individual right.  As Richard Henry Lee understood, 
"to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the 
people always possess arms and be taught alike, especially when 
young, how to use them."  Kates, supra, at 221-22 (citing 
Letters from the Federal Farmer, supra, at 124).  For Lee, the 
right to keep and bear arms formed a bedrock of an independent 
nation and free society.  The Second Amendment "right of the 
people" perfectly mirrors the language found in the First and 
Fourth Amendments.  In each of these provisions, "the people" 
unequivocally retain far-reaching and fundamental individual 
rights under the Constitution.  As Heller acknowledged, "the 
people" "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community."  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (citing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).  It is within the context 
of this broad protection of individual liberty that the Second 
Amendment must be understood.  While the Constitution permits 
certain restrictions, regulations, and forfeitures of the right 
to keep and bear arms, any curtailing of such a fundamental 
liberty interest requires close judicial inspection. 
¶84 In a case also concerning a constitutional challenge 
to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m), Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Amy Barrett undertook the "exhaustive historical analysis" 
of the Second Amendment as applied to felons, an issue left 
unexamined 
in 
Heller, 
which 
did 
not 
consider 
the 
constitutionality of felon dispossession laws.  In that seminal 
opinion, 
then-Judge 
Barrett 
concluded 
that 
"[h]istory 
is 
consistent with common sense:  it demonstrates that legislatures 
have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing 
guns[,] [b]ut that power extends only to people who are 
dangerous."  Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(Barrett, 
J., 
dissenting). 
 
Founding-era 
state 
ratifying 
conventions and contemporaneously-enacted legislation reveal 
that the Second Amendment never empowered legislatures to disarm 
non-dangerous felons. 
¶85 Language protecting the right to bear arms proposed 
during the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania 
ratifying conventions is frequently cited as evidence of the 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
constitutionality of felon disarmament.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 
(Barrett, J., dissenting).  All three proposals, however, would 
have excluded from the Second Amendment's protections only 
people who were dangerous.  Id. at 456.  The New Hampshire state 
convention proposed that "Congress shall never disarm any 
Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion."  2 
Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 761 
(1971) (emphasis added).  At the time, "[t]his limitation 
targeted a narrow group because 'rebellion' was a very specific 
crime" denoting treason.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting) (citing Rebellion, 2 New Universal Etymological 
English Dictionary (4th ed. 1756)).  Nothing in the historical 
record suggests New Hampshire would have extended disarmament to 
common criminals, much less individuals who posed no risk to 
public safety. 
¶86 The same can be said for the proposal from the 
Massachusetts convention.  Samuel Adams suggested limiting the 
right to bear arms to "peaceable citizens."  Id. (citing 
Schwartz, supra, at 681).  In the founding era, "'peaceable' 
meant 
'[f]ree 
from 
war; 
free 
from 
tumult'; 
'[q]uiet; 
undisturbed'; '[n]ot violent; not bloody'; '[n]ot quarrelsome; 
not turbulent.'"  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting) (citing 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the 
English Language (5th ed. 1773)).  Each of the antonyms of 
"peaceable" connote some form of danger to the public at large.  
In other words, the Massachusetts convention couched its 
proposed Second Amendment limitation within the context of one's 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
propensity for violence; nothing in the language purports to 
exclude criminals as a class. 
¶87 Lastly, although the Pennsylvania convention offered 
ostensibly the strongest restriction on Second Amendment rights, 
a more careful reading of this proposal suggests otherwise.  The 
Pennsylvania Minority proposed:  "That the people have a right 
to bear arms . . . and no law shall be passed for disarming the 
people or any of them unless for crimes committed, or real 
danger of public injury from individuals."  Schwartz, supra, at 
665 (emphasis added).  There are two potential interpretations 
of this language:  one that would exclude both criminals as well 
as the otherwise dangerous, and another that would exclude those 
who pose a danger to society, irrespective of whether they have 
committed crimes.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 456 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting).  Given the absence of any historical indications 
that the founding generation contemplated the dispossession of 
all criminals, the latter interpretation is the more reasonable 
one, under which "the catchall phrase limiting the rights of 
individuals who pose a 'real danger of public injury' would be 
an effort to capture non-criminals whose possession of guns 
would pose the same kind of danger as possession by those who 
have committed crimes" namely, "a subset of crimes" involving 
"real danger of public injury."  Id. (emphasis in original). 
¶88 Of course, none of the limiting language proposed by 
any 
of 
these 
states' 
conventions 
appears 
in 
the 
Second 
Amendment.  Id.  This omission provides further textual proof 
that Second Amendment rights extend to every citizen, unless 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
19 
 
restricted or removed for constitutionally-permissible reasons, 
which were uniformly rooted in concerns over dangerousness 
rather than general criminality.  An examination of legislation 
in the American colonies predating the Second Amendment confirms 
this understanding.  Concerned at the time with impending 
threats of English tyranny, the founding generation dispossessed 
individuals "who refused to pledge their loyalty to the 
Revolution, state, or nation."  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 368 
(Hardiman, J., concurring).  Early Americans grounded their 
disarmament laws in quelling the "potential danger" posed by 
those who were disloyal, although they had committed no crime.  
Id. (citing Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 
2012)).  At its core, the founding generation enacted these 
types of laws in order to "deal with the potential threat coming 
from armed citizens who remained loyal to another sovereign."  
Kanter, 919 F.3d at 457 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoted source 
omitted).  These laws were not concerned with categorical 
distinctions based upon classes of criminals nor an individual's 
prior legal transgressions.  Instead, they were designed to 
disarm 
individuals 
who 
posed 
a 
danger 
to 
society 
or, 
particularly in the founding era, a danger to the Revolution. 
¶89 The same can be said about other laws enacted close in 
time to the founding.  In particular, colonial legislatures 
passed 
statutes 
disarming 
Native 
Americans 
and 
slaves, 
purportedly out of fear of their armed "revolt" or other threats 
to "public safety."  Id. at 458 (citing Joyce Lee Malcolm, To 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
Keep and Bear Arms 140-41 (1994)).  Similarly, a distrust of 
Catholics 
prompted 
their 
disarmament 
"on 
the 
basis 
of 
allegiance" rather than faith.  Id. at 457 (citing Robert H. 
Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to 
Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second 
Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 157 (2007)).  Although these 
laws would not survive a contemporary constitutional challenge, 
they nevertheless reveal the limits the founding generation 
contemplated for the right to keep and bear arms.  The earliest 
Americans enacted them out of a fundamental fear of rebellion 
and public unrest, rather than as a forfeiture for criminal 
conduct. 
 
Constitutionally 
permissible 
disarmament 
is 
circumscribed by founding-era conceptions of a person's danger 
to society.  In other words, "Heller instructs that the public 
understanding of the scope of the right to keep and bear arms at 
the time of the Second Amendment dictates the scope of the right 
today."  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 367 (Hardiman, J., concurring). 
¶90 In 
contrast 
to 
its 
meaning 
under 
Wis. 
Stat.  
§ 941.29(1m), 
the 
word 
"felon" 
signified 
something 
quite 
different in the founding era.  "At early common law, the term 
'felon' applied only to a few very serious, very dangerous 
offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and robbery."  Don B. 
Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1362 
(2009).  Over time, English Parliament began classifying more 
and more crimes as "capital offenses, some involving trivial 
thefts."  Id.  In colonial America, capital punishment was rare.  
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
21 
 
Kanter, 919 F.3d at 459 (Barrett, J., dissenting).  Although a 
definitive understanding of what "felony" meant at that time 
remains elusive, a felony conviction unaccompanied by a life 
sentence typically resulted in a suspension of rights, rather 
than a permanent loss.  Id. 
¶91 Contrary 
to 
this 
overarching 
distinction 
between 
dangerous and non-dangerous individuals, some courts——and the 
State in this case——claim that the original meaning of the 
Second Amendment is rooted in a "virtuous citizenry" test.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir. 
2010) (citing with approval cases concluding that the right to 
bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry); 
United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979-80 (4th Cir. 
2012) ("[F]elons were excluded from the right to arms because 
they were deemed unvirtuous.").  According to this theory, the 
"right to arms was inextricably and multifariously linked to 
that of civic virtue . . . ."  Kates & Cramer, supra, at 1359.  
Because criminals have engaged in unvirtuous conduct, purveyors 
of this notion posit that the Framers intended to limit their 
Second 
Amendment 
liberties 
outright, 
irrespective 
of 
dangerousness.  See id. at 1360. 
¶92 The majority alludes to this concept in a selective 
but incomplete citation to Heller, proclaiming that "the Second 
Amendment 
secures 
'the 
right 
of 
law-abiding, 
responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.'"  Majority 
op., ¶21 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).  Of course, far from 
restricting the right to keep and bear arms to a select segment 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
22 
 
of society, to be exercised only for self-defense in the home, 
Heller instead declared that the Second Amendment right "belongs 
to all Americans" and broadly protects all "defensive purposes" 
regardless of whether the right is exercised within or beyond 
the home.  554 U.S. at 581, 602.  This is the core right 
protected by the Second Amendment.  The full context of the 
phrase from Heller cited by the majority shows that the Second 
Amendment is neither limited to "law-abiding" citizens nor 
confined to the "defense of hearth and home."  Instead, the 
Heller Court reserved other applications of the Second Amendment 
for "future evaluation" while declaring that the Constitution 
"surely elevates above all other interests" the practice 
prohibited by the District of Columbia's handgun ban:  "the 
right of law-abiding citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home."  Id. at 635.  While this may constitute a 
particularly sacrosanct exercise of the Second Amendment right, 
at its core, the Second Amendment protects far more, and nothing 
in an original understanding of its text remotely suggests a 
non-violent 
criminal 
forfeits 
his 
Second 
Amendment 
right 
altogether. 
¶93 In suggesting that the Second Amendment right belongs 
only to the law-abiding, the virtuous citizen standard is deeply 
intertwined with the collective rights interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, a reading Heller debunked as contrary to the 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
23 
 
original meaning of the Second Amendment.8  While "history does 
show that felons could be disqualified from exercising certain 
rights——like the rights to vote and serve on juries——because 
these rights belonged only to virtuous citizens[,]" such "virtue 
exclusions are associated with civic rights——individual rights 
that 'require[] citizens to act in a collective manner for 
distinctly public purposes.'"  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 462 (Barrett, 
J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  In contrast, the Second 
Amendment "unambiguously" protects "individual rights," not 
collective rights.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.  Given the Supreme 
Court's rightful rejection of the collective rights theory as 
applied to the right to keep and bear arms, the virtuous 
citizenry standard is entirely misplaced in construing the 
Second Amendment, particularly considering that its exercise is 
"intimately connected with the natural right of self-defense, 
and not limited to civic participation."  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 
464 (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
¶94 The virtuous citizenry standard lacks any foundation 
in the historical backdrop to the Second Amendment.  For one, 
                                                 
8 The "virtuous-citizens-only conception of the right to 
keep and bear arms is closely associated with pre-Heller 
interpretations of the Second Amendment by proponents of the 
'sophisticated collective rights model' who rejected the view 
that the Amendment confers an individual right and instead 
characterized the right as a 'civic right . . . exercised by 
citizens, not individuals . . . who act together in a collective 
manner, for a distinctly public purpose:  participation in a 
well regulated militia.'"  Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of 
America, 836 F.3d 336, 371 (3rd Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., 
concurring) (citing Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well 
Regulated Right:  The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 
Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491-92 (2004)). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
24 
 
"this supposed limitation on the Second Amendment stems from a 
misreading 
of 
an 
academic 
debate 
about 
'ideological 
interpretation.'"  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 371 (Hardiman, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted).  In advancing this theory, 
certain scholars divorced themselves from more authoritative 
historical sources and wrongly focused upon whether or not 
particular Founders were civic republicans or libertarians.  
Id.; see also Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated 
Right:  The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. 
Rev. 487, 492 (2004).  This debate over ideology may inform the 
Framers' motivations for constitutionally preserving the right 
to keep and bear arms, but it has nothing to say about the scope 
of the right or any constitutionally permissible restrictions on 
its exercise. 
¶95 If the virtuous citizenry test was historically valid, 
we would expect to discover 18th and 19th century laws depriving 
felons of their Second Amendment rights——a class of people that 
would certainly be categorized as "unvirtuous."  But that is 
simply not the case.  In the decades following ratification, 
"nine states enacted their own right-to-arms provisions in their 
constitutions," 
and 
none 
of 
them 
placed 
restrictions 
on 
criminals.  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 463 (Barrett, J., dissenting) 
(citing Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and 
Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 191, 208-09 (2006)).  The 
historic 
record 
affords 
the 
virtuous 
citizenry 
test 
no 
credibility; in fact, there is "no historical evidence on the 
public meaning of the right to keep and bear arms indicating 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
25 
 
that 'virtuousness' was a limitation on one's qualification for 
the right."  
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 373 (Hardiman, J., 
concurring).  Instead, as outlined above, the original meaning 
of the Second Amendment contemplates curtailing the rights of 
only those individuals who pose a danger to the public. 
¶96 The majority's rationale for sanctioning the blanket 
revocation of felons' Second Amendment right is even weaker than 
the "virtuous citizen" justification.  Wisconsin's citizens 
should be alarmed by the breathtaking scope of the majority's 
conclusion that "it is reasonable for the State to want to keep 
firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a willingness 
to . . . break the law"9 considering the "cancerous growth since 
the 1920s of 'regulatory' crimes punishable by more than a year 
in prison, as distinct from traditional common-law crimes.  The 
effect of this growth has been to expand the number and types of 
crimes that trigger 'felon' disabilities to rope in persons 
whose convictions do not establish any threat that they will 
physically harm anyone, much less with a gun."  Marshall, supra, 
at 697.  As but one example of how the ever-expanding regulatory 
state may eventually make felons of us all, recall that whomever 
fails "to comply with any record-keeping requirement for fish" 
is guilty of a Class I felony under Wis. Stat. § 29.971(1)(c) 
(provided the fish are worth more than $1,000). 
¶97 Only months ago, a slim majority of this court 
invalidated Executive Order 28, which had been issued by a 
single, unelected bureaucrat who in the name of the COVID-19 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶48. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
26 
 
pandemic "claimed the authoritarian power to authorize the 
arrest and imprisonment of the people of Wisconsin for engaging 
in lawful activities proscribed by the DHS secretary-designee in 
her sole discretion."  Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 
42, ¶81, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring).  Had the court ruled otherwise, would 
a majority of this court deem it "reasonable" to keep firearms 
out of the hands of those who disobeyed a cabinet secretary's 
decree to "all people within Wisconsin to remain in their homes, 
not to travel and to close all businesses that she declares are 
not 'essential'"?  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶1.  If so, the 
court's decision in this case would give the State license to 
disarm a substantial portion of the citizens of Wisconsin based 
on their "willingness to break the law" as unilaterally decreed 
by an unelected bureaucrat, for the unspeakable crimes of 
opening their "non-essential" businesses or washing their hands 
for less than 20 seconds.  Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶87 (Kelly, 
J., concurring).  As a general proposition, the judiciary should 
defer to the policy choices of the legislative branch, but when 
those policy choices unconstitutionally infringe the people's 
fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judicial branch to say 
so.  "[T]o make an individual's entitlement to the Second 
Amendment right itself turn on the predilections of the 
legislature . . . is deference the Constitution won't bear."  
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 374 (Hardiman, J., concurring). 
¶98 Underlying the founding generation's reverence for the 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms was the understanding 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
27 
 
that "[o]ne of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish 
their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, 
and making it an offence to keep arms."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 
608-09 (citing Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the 
Constitution of the United States § 450 (reprinted 1986)).  
Embodying "the first law of nature" and representing "the true 
palladium of liberty," the people's Second Amendment right 
deserves far more respect than the legislature or the majority 
give it. 
IV 
¶99 Whether applying strict scrutiny or some lesser 
standard, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) is unconstitutional as applied 
to 
Roundtree, 
under 
the 
original 
meaning 
of 
the 
Second 
Amendment.  Even if a compelling state interest underlies the 
statute, it lacks any narrow tailoring tied to the protection of 
the public and therefore the statute unconstitutionally limits 
Roundtree's right to keep and bear arms.  Nor does § 941.29(1m) 
bear a substantial relation to an important governmental 
objective.  Section 941.29(1m) bans every felon from possessing 
a firearm in this state, regardless of whether he poses a danger 
to the public.  If the compelling/important state interest is 
protecting the public from dangerous felons, then the statute 
must actually do so.  Instead, § 941.29(1m) disarms every 
citizen convicted of a felony offense, regardless of the nature 
of the crime involved, and irrespective of whether the offender 
is dangerous.  To survive either strict or intermediate 
scrutiny, § 941.29(1m) would need to reach only dangerous 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
28 
 
felons, as determined by the crime committed or the offender's 
personal characteristics.  Under the intermediate level of 
scrutiny applied by the majority, in order to assess "the 
strength of the government's justification for restricting"10 
Roundtree's Second Amendment rights——public safety——the court 
must ask whether the public is safer now that Roundtree is 
completely and permanently disarmed.11 
¶100 Roundtree committed a non-violent felony when he 
failed to pay child support nearly 13 years ago.  The sentencing 
court did not send Roundtree to prison, indicating he was not 
deemed dangerous to the public.  The record shows he made full 
restitution by paying what he owed and he did not reoffend.  
Roundtree has never been convicted of a violent crime and the 
State did not introduce any evidence otherwise suggesting that 
Roundtree poses a danger to society.  Abandoning any pretense of 
conducting an individualized inquiry into the application of 
Wisconsin's felon disarmament statute to Roundtree specifically, 
the majority instead resorts to nearly decade-old data from the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections indicating that 21.4 percent 
of those who committed "public order offenses" and spent time in 
prison later committed a violent crime.  Majority op., ¶51.  Of 
course, Roundtree was never incarcerated for his offense, so the 
only foundation for the majority's declaration of a "substantial 
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶40 (citation omitted). 
11 C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 
32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 696 (2009) ("Is the public safer 
now 
that 
Martha 
Stewart 
is 
completely 
and 
permanently 
disarmed?"). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
29 
 
relation" between disarming nonviolent felons and "preventing 
gun violence" collapses when applied to Roundtree and others 
like him who never spent time in prison. 
¶101 Even if Roundtree had spent time in prison, the 
premise that the State may permanently disarm all felons in 
order to protect the public, based on data showing that 21.4 
percent of felons incarcerated for "public order offenses" later 
commit violent ones, presents a specious justification for 
infringing a fundamental constitutional right.  Unlike Roundtree 
who was sentenced to probation, Martha Stewart spent five months 
in jail.  Marshall, supra, at 695.  "Is the public safer now 
that Martha Stewart is completely and permanently disarmed?"  
Id. at 696.  Of course not, and "it is at least curious how 
Martha Stewart could merit anyone's concern."  Id. at 735.  The 
same could be said for Roundtree, since the State produced no 
evidence indicating that Roundtree presents a danger to society 
warranting removal of his Second Amendment right. 
¶102 The Founders never understood legislatures to have the 
power to strip non-dangerous criminals of their Second Amendment 
rights, which the Constitution protects for all Americans.  
Absent statutory language narrowly tailoring the disarming of 
felons based upon their perceived dangerousness, or even bearing 
a substantial relationship to the ostensible governmental 
objective of protecting society, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) cannot 
survive any level of constitutional scrutiny as applied to 
Roundtree, much less the hapless possessor of fish who runs 
afoul of the record-keeping requirements of Chapter 29 of the 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
30 
 
Wisconsin Statutes.  Without the predictive powers of the mutant 
precogs from "The Minority Report,"12 permanently revoking the 
Second Amendment rights of those who fail to meet their familial 
financial obligations or carelessly keep their fish records, 
bears no relationship to "public safety" or "the prevention of 
gun violence," majority op., ¶53, much less a substantial one. 
¶103 Of particular constitutional concern, Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m) permanently disarms Roundtree and other non-
dangerous felons, who have no avenue for having their Second 
Amendment rights restored.  In contrast, a convicted felon only 
temporarily loses his right to vote during his incarceration and 
extended supervision.  Wis. Stat. § 6.03(1)(b).  Once he 
completes the term of his sentence, the State restores his 
voting rights.  Wis. Stat. § 304.078(3).  Similarly, convicted 
felons regain their right to serve as jurors after their civil 
rights have been restored.  Wis. Stat. § 756.02.  Reviving these 
collective rights for felons while permanently dispossessing 
them of their individual and fundamental Second Amendment rights 
turns the constitutional order on its head. 
 
                                                 
12 "The Minority Report is a 1956 science fiction novella by 
American writer Philip K. Dick, first published in Fantastic 
Universe. In a future society, three mutants foresee all crime 
before it occurs. Plugged into a great machine, these 'precogs' 
allow a division of the police called Precrime to arrest 
suspects before they can commit any actual crimes."  The 
philosophical premise underlying the novella "question[s] the 
relationship between authoritarianism and individual autonomy."  
The story was adapted into the 2002 film "Minority Report," 
directed 
by 
Steven 
Spielberg.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Minority_Report. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.rgb 
 
31 
 
* * * * * 
¶104 To the extent Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) permanently 
deprives Roundtree of his fundamental, individual right to keep 
and bear arms, with no showing of his dangerousness to society, 
this statute is unconstitutional as applied to Roundtree.  While 
the wisdom of the legislature's policy choices may be fiercely 
debated, "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily 
takes certain policy choices off the table."  Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 636.  Permanent dispossession of felons' Second Amendment 
rights is one of them.  "[A]n act of the Legislature repugnant 
to the Constitution is void."  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  As 
applied to felons who pose no danger to society, Wisconsin's 
felon dispossession statute is repugnant to the Constitution, 
and therefore void.  Because the majority allows statutory law 
to override the fundamental constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms, I dissent. 
 
 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
1 
 
¶105 BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
Second 
Amendment prohibits the government from infringing upon the 
individual and fundamental right to keep and bear arms.  
Wisconsin, however, makes possession of firearms a crime for any 
person convicted of a felony.  Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) (2017-
18).1  This complete ban on possessing firearms never expires; it 
lasts for a lifetime.  It matters not whether the felony was for 
making 
unlawful 
political 
contributions 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 11.1401(1)(a)), legislative logrolling (Wis. Stat. § 13.05), 
armed robbery (Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2)), or here, delinquent 
child support (Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2)). 
¶106 In 2003, Leevan Roundtree was convicted of a felony 
for failure to pay child support for more than 120 days.  In 
2015, a search warrant found him in possession of a firearm 
under his mattress at his home, leading to the charge currently 
before us on appeal.  Roundtree asks this court to decide 
whether the Second Amendment permits the State to criminalize 
his possession of a firearm.  The majority answers yes, 
reasoning that the State may disarm all those who have committed 
a felony of whatever kind.  I disagree.  I conclude that the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment supports 
applying at least intermediate scrutiny to this type of 
restriction.  This places the burden on the State to demonstrate 
that the law is constitutional as applied to Roundtree by 
proving a substantial relationship, a close fit, between 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
2 
 
criminalizing gun possession for those convicted of any felony 
or of the felony of failure to pay child support and the State's 
interest in preventing gun-related violence.  The State has come 
nowhere close to meeting its burden.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
¶107 We begin by laying down the guiding principles of 
constitutional interpretation, and then apply those principles 
to the Second Amendment.2 
 
A.  Principles of Constitutional Interpretation 
¶108 In America, the people are sovereign.  This is the 
bedrock principle of American government.  Wis. Leg. v. Palm, 
2020 WI 42, ¶172, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Hagedorn, J., 
dissenting) ("Government has a morally legitimate claim to order 
and command not because it has the biggest guns or because it's 
always been that way, but because the people have given it that 
power.").  When the people established our federal government, 
they granted it only a limited set of enumerated powers.  United 
States 
v. 
Morrison, 
529 
U.S. 598, 
607 
(2000). 
 
States, 
meanwhile, retained broad and far-reaching police powers, 
covering the state's inherent power "to promote the general 
welfare," which "covers all matters having a reasonable relation 
                                                 
2 Roundtree also challenges Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) under 
Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  However, 
he fails to develop this argument in any meaningful way, and we 
will not do so for him.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 
2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.  Accordingly, 
this analysis focuses on the Second Amendment alone. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
3 
 
to the protection of the public health, safety or welfare."  
State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 482, 490, 222 
N.W.2d 912 (1974). 
¶109 Neither state nor federal power is without limitation, 
however.  The people declared certain areas off limits.  Many of 
these limits are listed in the federal Constitution's Bill of 
Rights, including the Second Amendment's protection of the right 
"to keep and bear Arms."  U.S. Const. amend. II. 
¶110 Initially, the Bill of Rights only applied against the 
federal government.  Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 
(2019).  Following the Civil War, however, the people decided 
that some of the limits on federal power should also constrain 
the exercise of state power.  Id.  To that end, the people 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment which, among other things, 
provides that states may not "abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States" or "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Over time, the United 
States Supreme Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment as 
incorporating most of the protections in the Bill of Rights 
against the States——the Second Amendment among them.  McDonald 
v. 
City 
of 
Chicago, 
561 
U.S. 742, 
750 
(2010). 
 
Once 
incorporated, the amendment's "protection applies 'identically 
to both the Federal Government and the States.'"  Timbs, 139 
U.S. at 
689 
(quoting 
McDonald, 
561 
U.S. at 
766 
n.14).  
Therefore, no arm of Wisconsin government may infringe upon "the 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
4 
 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms."  U.S. Const. amend. 
II. 
¶111 The Supreme Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence is 
sparse, establishing for our purposes only two controlling 
propositions:  (1) the Second Amendment is incorporated against 
the States via the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the right the 
Second Amendment protects is an individual right, not a 
collective right.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749-50; District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).  While we are 
bound by these holdings, neither offers much assistance in this 
case.  Several federal courts of appeals have opined on the 
intersection of the Second Amendment and felon-dispossession 
laws, but those decisions are merely persuasive, not binding. 
¶112 In other words, this court is both free and duty-bound 
to do the job of a court——not just to compare and contrast other 
courts' opinions, but to explore the meaning of the Second 
Amendment and apply it afresh.  Admittedly, this is a difficult 
task.  But we are not without the tools to do the job.  When the 
people enacted the Constitution, they used words with certain 
meanings, and those words were understood——and meant to be 
understood——by the public.  Our job when reading and applying 
the Constitution is to learn how its words were understood by 
the public when they were written, what many call the "original 
public meaning." 
¶113 The first task in this inquiry is, not surprisingly, 
to read the constitutional text taking into account its context 
and structure.  The people who adopted it, after all, can be 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
5 
 
presumed to have meant what their words conveyed when they wrote 
and adopted them.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 
(1824) ("[T]he people who adopted [the Constitution], must be 
understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to 
have intended what they have said."); see also Joseph L. Story, 
1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 451 
(1833) ("In the first place, then, every word employed in the 
constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and 
common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to 
control, qualify, or enlarge it."). 
¶114 However, 
sometimes 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
text 
is 
difficult to determine.  This can be especially true with the 
passage of time.  When that is the case, we look to the 
historical record for clues as to what the public understood the 
provision to mean when it was adopted.  Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 
Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28 n.10, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35 ("[W]here necessary, helpful extrinsic aids may 
include the practices at the time the constitution was adopted, 
debates 
over 
adoption 
of 
a 
given 
provision, 
and 
early 
legislative interpretation as evidenced by the first laws passed 
following the adoption.").  The meaning of the text as 
enlightened by the historical record is no less binding because 
the historical inquiry is still directed toward discovering what 
the words were understood to convey when written.  See McPherson 
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892); Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  In 
other words, the original public meaning controls, even when we 
have to work a little to find it. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
6 
 
¶115 Judicial application of the original public meaning is 
sometimes quite easy.  A President, for example, must be at 
least 35 years old.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  Putting 
that into practice isn't difficult and requires nothing more 
than analyzing and applying the text.  But other provisions, 
especially the more vaguely worded protections in the Bill of 
Rights, often demand some legal framework or test that enables a 
court to apply the law to the facts of a case.  See, e.g., Ezell 
v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700-04 (7th Cir. 2011); see 
also Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶256-59, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 
945 N.W.2d 685 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).  Our law is replete 
with these implementing doctrines that give effect to various 
constitutional provisions.3 
¶116 A proper legal test must implement and effectuate the 
original public meaning of the law.  Bartlett, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 
¶259 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (explaining that an appropriate 
implementing doctrine is one "that gets us to the heart of the 
constitution's meaning").  This is not a license for the 
judiciary 
to 
engage 
in 
policy-driven 
constitutional 
line 
drawing.  Rather, an implementing doctrine must be a faithful 
                                                 
3 For 
example, 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
protects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  This text is put into 
practice with the default warrant requirement and analytical 
categories such as reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and 
exigent circumstances.  E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).  Most 
challenges under the equal protection clause are analyzed under 
a rational basis test.  E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
470 (1991).  But government discrimination on the basis of race 
is subject to strict scrutiny.  E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 11 (1967).  And the list could go on. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
7 
 
extension of the lines ascertainable in the provision's text and 
history.  Id., ¶¶257-59.   
¶117 With these principles in mind, we turn to the text and 
history of the Second Amendment, followed by a discussion of its 
proper application. 
 
B.  The Text 
¶118 The Second Amendment provides:  "A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed."  U.S. Const., amend. II.   
¶119 As more extensively discussed in Heller, the Second 
Amendment contains both a prefatory and operative clause, the 
latter of which protects the right to keep arms and to bear 
them.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-78.  Historical evidence makes 
clear that "'[k]eep arms' was simply a common way of referring 
to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else."  Id. at 
583.  Similarly, to "bear" arms meant to carry, as it is 
understood today.  Id. at 584.  
¶120 The text's reference to "the right of the people" 
reflects an understanding that this right——like the Founders' 
understanding of many protections in the Bill of Rights——did not 
create a new right unknown to the people.  Id. at 592.  Rather, 
the Second Amendment presumes this right already existed and was 
held by the people.  Id.  The Second Amendment therefore called 
upon a right that had an ascertainable scope and substance, and 
gave it protection in our fundamental law. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
8 
 
¶121 By adopting the Second Amendment, then, the people 
prohibited the federal government from infringing their right to 
keep and bear arms to the same extent the right existed when the 
Second Amendment was ratified in 1791.  As Heller explained, 
"Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were 
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not 
future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope 
too broad."  Id. at 634-35.   
¶122 The text, however, leaves many questions unanswered.  
It does not readily reveal the nature of the right as it was 
originally understood, and therefore the power of the state to 
regulate matters touching its protections.  Accordingly, we look 
to the historical record for further assistance. 
 
C.  The History 
¶123 In 1689 King William and Queen Mary assured Englishmen 
that they would never be disarmed.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.  
Codified in the English Bill of Rights, the protection provided:  
"That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for 
their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by 
Law."  Id. (quoting 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at 
Large 441 (1689)).  The English right to arms "has long been 
understood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment."  Id.  
This forerunner, and its understanding leading up to the 
adoption of the Second Amendment in 1791, is our starting point. 
¶124 But our study of the historical record does not end 
there.  As noted above, the Second Amendment does not operate 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
9 
 
against the states directly; it does so by incorporation via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1868.  Although this 
issue engenders some debate, the prevailing view is that "when 
state- or local-government action is challenged, the focus of 
the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the 
Second Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends 
on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified."  Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702 (citing McDonald, 561 
U.S. at 770-77).  Thus, our study of the historical record does 
not conclude with the close of the Founding Era, but rather 
continues through the Reconstruction Era.  Id. at 702-03. 
 
1.  A Positive Right 
¶125 At its core, the historical record demonstrates that 
the Second Amendment protects the longstanding, natural right to 
self-defense. 
¶126 From the outset, the English Bill of Rights made this 
point 
explicit 
by 
guaranteeing 
the 
right 
to 
"have 
Arms 
for . . . Defence."  Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.  Blackstone, 
reflecting on the English right, noted that it protected the 
"natural right of resistance and self-preservation" and "the 
right of having and using arms for self-preservation and 
defence." 
 
Id. at 
594 
(quoting 
1 
William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 139-40 (1765)). 
¶127 Across the Atlantic, after King George III tried to 
disarm American colonists, Americans "invoke[ed] their rights as 
Englishmen to keep arms."  Id.  It was in that context that a 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
10 
 
New York newspaper said in April 1769 that "[i]t is a natural 
right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by 
the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence."  Id. 
(quoted source omitted).  On the American conception of the 
right to keep and bear arms, Blackstone observed it was "without 
any qualification as to their condition or degree, as [was] the 
case in the British government."  1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 143 n.40 (St. George Tucker 
ed. 1803). 
¶128 In 
short, 
the 
central 
component 
of 
the 
Second 
Amendment is the longstanding, natural right to self-defense.  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.  And, as Heller noted, this right 
extends "to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute."  Id. at 628. 
 
2.  With Limitations 
¶129 This core right, however, was not impervious to 
certain types of government regulation.  Laws restricting the 
right to keep and bear arms were rare, but they were not 
unknown.  Those that existed were largely aimed at persons or 
classes of people who might violently take up arms against the 
government in rebellion, or at persons who posed a more 
immediate danger to the public. 
¶130 An early instance of this was in 1689, the same year 
the English Bill of Rights codified Protestants' right to 
possess arms.  At that time, Catholics were deemed a threat to 
rebel against the Protestant crown and "were not permitted to 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
11 
 
'keep arms in their houses.'"  Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (quoting 
4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 55 
(1769)).  A 1695 Irish law disarmed Catholics on the same basis.  
7 Will. III ch. 5, § 3 (1695); see also Joseph G.S. Greenlee, 
The Historical Justifications for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons 
from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 260 (2020).  These 
class-based dispossessions of those feared to be disloyal to the 
crown, and therefore likely to take up arms against the crown, 
were renewed multiple times and persisted well into the 18th 
century.  Greenlee, supra at 260-61. 
¶131 The American colonies adopted similar laws disarming 
those they feared would use them to violent ends.  In 1736, 
Virginia permitted constables to "take away Arms from such who 
ride, or go, offensively armed, in Terror of the People."  
Id. at 262 (quoting George Webb, The Office of Authority of a 
Justice of Peace 92-93 (1736)).  And in 1756, during the French 
and Indian War, Virginia authorized the seizure of arms from 
Catholics out of fear they were sympathetic to the French cause 
and would take up arms against the colonies.  Id. at 263.  But 
even that law provided an exception "for the defense of his 
house or person."  Id. (quoting 7 William Waller Hening, The 
Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of 
Virginia 37 (1820)).  Maryland and Pennsylvania also enacted 
similar laws during the French and Indian War.  Id. 
¶132 The revolutionary years gave rise to related laws 
targeting those perceived as disloyal to the American cause and 
therefore at risk to take up arms in violence against it.  In 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
12 
 
1775, Connecticut prohibited anyone who defamed acts of Congress 
from keeping arms "until such time as he could prove his 
friendliness to the liberal cause."  Id. at 268 (quoting G.A. 
Gilbert, The Connecticut Loyalists in 4 Am. Historical Rev. 273, 
282 (1899)).  One year later, the Continental Congress passed 
the Tory Act, which called for disarming those with "erroneous 
opinions, respecting the American cause."4  Also that year, 
Congress recommended that the colonies disarm those "who are 
notoriously disaffected to the cause of America."  4 Journals of 
the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 205 (1906).  And, at a 
minimum, 
Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, 
New 
Jersey, 
North 
Carolina, and Virginia all heeded the call, disarming those 
disaffected with or unwilling to take an oath of allegiance to 
the American cause.  Greenlee, supra at 264-65. 
¶133 Massachusetts' responded likewise to Shays' Rebellion 
a decade later.  Beginning in August 1786, armed bands of 
western Bay Staters revolted against the federal government, 
attacking government properties and, on February 2, 1787, 
engaging a Massachusetts militia in a military confrontation.  
Id. at 
268-69. 
 
In 
response 
to 
the 
violent 
rebellion, 
Massachusetts 
placed 
a 
variety 
of 
restrictions 
on 
those 
involved, including dispossession of their firearms for three 
years.  1 Private and Special Statutes of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts from 1780-1805 145-47 (1805).  Notably, the law 
provided that arms given up be kept safe "in order that they may 
                                                 
4 4 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1775-1789 18-22 
(1906); https://www.loc.gov/resource/bdsdcc.00801/?st=text. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
13 
 
be returned to the person or persons who delivered the same, at 
the expiration of the said term of three years."  Id. at 147.  
The response to Shays' Rebellion epitomized the type of 
dispossession laws that existed during the Founding Era.  They 
were aimed at those considered dangerous to the government 
during a time of war, and to a more limited extent, those 
considered dangerous to society. 
¶134 Moving 
forward 
in 
time, 
the 
Reconstruction 
Era 
unsurprisingly reflects the prejudices of the age; most arms 
regulations targeted slaves and freedmen.  At a minimum, 
Mississippi, Indiana, Maryland, Kentucky, North Carolina, and 
Delaware adopted such discriminatory laws.  Greenlee, supra at 
269 n.133.  Before passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
condemned these laws as a violation of the right to keep and 
bear arms in the Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act, 
both of 1866.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 773-75.  Ratification of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
which 
was 
widely 
viewed 
as 
constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, affirmed that 
states could not enact such discriminatory laws depriving 
persons of their constitutional rights.  Id. at 775. 
¶135 A Kansas law adopted in 1868, the same year the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, is quite instructive.  See 
Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶64 ("Early enactments following adoption 
of the constitution are appropriately given special weight.  
This is because these enactments are likely to reflect the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text."  (citation 
omitted)).  It provides: 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
14 
 
Any person who is not engaged in any legitimate 
business, 
any 
person 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
intoxicating drink, and any person who has ever borne 
arms against the government of the United States, who 
shall be found within the limits of this state 
carrying on his person a pistol, bowie-knife, dirk, or 
other deadly weapon, shall be subject to arrest upon 
charge of misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be 
fined a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding three 
months, or both, at the discretion of the court. 
2 General Statutes of the State of Kansas 353 (1897).  This law 
prohibits carrying arms:  (1) while "not engaged in legitimate 
business"; (2) while intoxicated; or (3) for any individual "who 
has ever borne arms against" the United States.  The first two 
restrictions are temporarily imposed in circumstances where 
individuals pose a danger of engaging in arms-related violence.  
The third restriction focuses on those who could be considered a 
threat to rebel against the government because they had done so 
in the past. 
¶136 Notably the Kansas law prohibited only the "carrying," 
or "bearing," of arms, and not their possession.  See supra ¶15.  
Therefore, it did not prohibit keeping arms in defense of one's 
home.  The law also did not prohibit long guns, so it was not a 
complete prohibition on carrying weapons.  Greenlee, supra at 
271 (citing Parman v. Lemmon, 244 P. 232, 233 (Kan. 1926) 
(holding shotguns were not included in a similarly constructed 
statute)).   
¶137 Although more historical clarity would be welcome, the 
record sufficiently establishes three key propositions regarding 
the original meaning of the Second Amendment.  First, possession 
of firearms for self-defense and protection of one's home as an 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
15 
 
individual right was widely accepted as the core of the Second 
Amendment's protections.  And the relative paucity of laws 
prohibiting the possession or carrying of arms shows that this 
fundamental 
right 
was 
subject 
to 
only 
narrow 
bands 
of 
restrictions.  Second, in at least some circumstances, states 
could permissibly restrict the right to keep and bear arms among 
those posing a danger to take up arms against the government and 
those posing a danger of engaging in arms-related violence.5  
Third, states had some authority to protect against dangerous 
individuals by way of class-based arms restrictions, even when 
not everyone in the class posed a clear danger of putting their 
arms to violent use. 
¶138 Instead of this relevant historical evidence, the 
majority relies in large part on Heller's declaration that its 
opinion was not meant to cast doubt about "longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons," which 
were presumed lawful.  554 U.S. at 626-27.  This statement 
reflects that Heller was limited in its reach, and at least 
suggests not all such laws would be unconstitutional.  But it 
also does not mean all such laws are constitutional (that 
question is reserved), nor does it establish that these laws are 
                                                 
5 In addition to the examples provided, see United States v. 
Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory 
of Michigan 337, 346 (W. Blume ed. 1940) ("The constitution of 
the United States also grants to the citizen the right to keep 
and bear arms.  But the grant of this privilege cannot be 
construed into the right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his 
neighbor."). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
16 
 
embedded into the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment.  
¶139 To be sure, felon-dispossession laws laws have been on 
the books for some time.  But these laws are of 20th century 
vintage; they do not date back to the 18th or 19th centuries——
the relevant time periods when the Second Amendment was 
ensconced as an individual constitutional right.  See generally 
C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695 (2009) (examining the genesis of 
felon-dispossession laws).  In fact, no historical evidence from 
the time the Second Amendment was adopted or incorporated 
against the states demonstrates broadscale dispossession of 
those who have committed certain crimes.  Kanter v. Barr, 919 
F.3d 437, 454 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) ("[A]t 
least thus far, scholars have not been able to identify any such 
laws."). 
¶140 The first felon-dispossession laws appeared in 1923, 
when New Hampshire, North Dakota, and California enacted laws 
forbidding 
felons 
from 
possessing 
pistols 
or 
revolvers.  
Greenlee, supra at 273 & n.160.  In 1927, Rhode Island went a 
step further, barring those convicted of "a crime of violence" 
from possessing "any firearm."  Id. at 274 (quoting 1927 R.I. 
Pub. Laws 257).  The federal felon-dispossession law, meanwhile, 
was not enacted until the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, and even 
then it only applied to those who had committed certain violent 
crimes.  Id. (citing Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, §§ 1(6), 
2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (1938)).  It was not until a 1961 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
17 
 
amendment to the Federal Firearms Act that federal law first 
prohibited all felons nationwide from possessing firearms 
regardless of their underlying felony.  Marshall, supra at 698 
(citing An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. 
No. 
87-342, 
75 
Stat. 757 
(1961)). 
 
Wisconsin's 
felon-
dispossession law, meanwhile, dates back only to 1981.  Ch. 141, 
Laws of 1981.   
¶141 Thus, the proliferation of these laws in the last 
century——far removed from the time the Second Amendment was 
enshrined in the Constitution and incorporated against the 
states——does not support the notion that these laws were 
understood to be permissible under the historic preexisting 
right to keep and bear arms.  Such laws may be common today, but 
they do not enlighten the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment.   
¶142 Moreover, even if such a law had existed when the 
Second and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified, it is unclear 
how much help that would be.  This is because the definition of 
a "felon" has greatly expanded since the Founding Era.  See 
Kanter, 919 F.3d at 458-62 (Barrett, J., dissenting).  In 1791, 
felonies were a narrow subset of crimes generally involving 
violence, many of which warranted the death penalty.  Id. at 
459.  In contrast, today a person can become a felon for 
possessing certain fish illegally, falsifying a boat title, tax 
fraud, trafficking SNAP benefits, second offense dialing 911 for 
a nonexistent emergency, adultery, and perjury, just to name a 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
18 
 
few.6  This reality seems to undercut any useful comparisons 
between the treatment of felons in 1791 and today.  But again, 
the historical record reveals no evidence from the Founding or 
Reconstruction Eras of the kind of broad felon-dispossession law 
like the one here. 
¶143 Some have justified these laws by applying a so-called 
"unvirtuous citizenry" theory to the Second Amendment.  See 
Greenlee, supra at 275-85.  But this lacks any sound basis in 
historical fact, at least insofar as it would apply to today's 
felon-dispossession laws.   
¶144 This theory is based on the accurate premise that 
founding-era felons could be 
disqualified from exercising 
certain civic rights because those rights belonged only to 
virtuous citizens.  See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations 29 (1st ed. 1868) (noting that 
certain groups including "the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, 
on obvious grounds," were "almost universally excluded" from 
exercising certain civic rights).  The problem with extending 
this theory to the Second Amendment, however, is that the right 
to keep and bear arms is not a "civic right" as that term was 
understood at the founding.  "Civic rights" were understood to 
be just that——rights related to the civic space, i.e., the 
community.  They included "individual rights that 'require[] 
citizens to act in a collective manner for distinctly public 
purposes.'"  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 462 (Barrett, J., dissenting) 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 29.971(1)(c); § 30.80(3m); § 71.83(2)(b)(1); 
§ 946.92(3)(a); § 256.35(10)(a); § 944.16; § 946.31(1). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
19 
 
(quoting Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 
22 Law & Hist. Rev. 161, 165 (2004) (alteration in original)).  
Put differently, civic rights were those rights that empowered 
individuals to participate in the enterprise of self-governance—
—for example, the right to vote and to serve on juries.  Id.  
Although these civic rights are "held by individuals," they are 
exercised "as part of the collective enterprise[s]" of self-
governance or administration of justice.  Id. 
¶145 "Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that 
the Second Amendment protects a purely civic right"; it protects 
a personal, individual right.  Id. at 463 (citing Heller, 554 
U.S. at 595 ("[T]he Second Amendment confer[s] an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.")).  Because the right to keep and 
bear arms is not a civic right, it was not one of the rights 
that could historically be withdrawn from unvirtuous citizens.  
Indeed, there is "no historical evidence on the public meaning 
of 
the 
right 
to 
keep 
and 
bear 
arms 
indicating 
that 
'virtuousness' was a limitation on one's qualification for the 
right——contemporary insistence to the contrary falls somewhere 
between guesswork and ipse dixit."  Binderup v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 
836 F.3d 336, 372 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., 
concurring).  In short, nothing in the text or history of the 
Second Amendment suggests the right to keep and bear arms could 
be removed by the government because the government deemed 
certain kinds of people unvirtuous. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
20 
 
¶146 Putting all this together, the historical record 
reveals the following regarding the original public meaning of 
the Second Amendment:   
 The Second Amendment protects an individual right to 
keep and bear arms, especially in the defense of one's 
home;  
 The government nevertheless was understood to have 
some ability to dispossess those who posed a danger of 
engaging in arms-related violence, often due to the 
risk of rebellion against the government; 
 The government had some flexibility to disarm classes 
of people that posed a high risk of engaging in arms-
related violence, even if individuals within that 
group might themselves not pose that danger; and 
 No 
evidence 
supports 
the 
notion 
that 
felon-
dispossession laws of the type at issue here are 
"longstanding" 
in 
the 
sense 
that 
they 
were 
contemplated when the right to keep and bear arms was 
safeguarded in the Constitution. 
¶147 With this history in mind, we turn to the task of 
determining what legal framework or test best effectuates the 
Second Amendment's original public meaning. 
 
D.  An Implementing Doctrine 
¶148 The application of these principles to the case before 
us requires some additional work.  We need some judicially 
enforceable legal framework, or implementing doctrine, to 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
21 
 
effectuate 
the 
constitutional 
provision's 
original 
public 
meaning.  See supra ¶¶11-12. 
¶149 For better or for worse, both federal courts and this 
court have created and adopted a tiers of scrutiny approach for 
evaluating some types of constitutional claims, especially those 
dealing with fundamental rights.  Courts typically employ three 
tiers of judicial scrutiny:  rational basis, intermediate 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny——although these tiers sometimes 
work more like a sliding scale.  Some have criticized this 
approach, not without merit.7  But it has the virtue of putting 
the State to its proof when government attempts to regulate in 
areas the Constitution generally places outside the permissible 
bounds of regulation.  While a better analytical tool may be 
devised, I accept this general construct in this case as a 
reasonable approach to the tricky problem of applying the text 
of the Constitution to various kinds of regulations touching the 
Second Amendment. 
¶150 The United States Supreme Court has described the 
right to keep and bear arms as "among those fundamental rights 
necessary to our system of ordered liberty."  McDonald, 561 U.S. 
at 778.  This is consistent with its inclusion in the 
Constitution 
alongside 
other 
basic, 
pre-existing 
rights, 
including the freedoms of speech and religion.  Generally, when 
the 
government 
restricts 
the 
exercise 
of 
rights 
deemed 
                                                 
7 E.g., R. George Wright, What if All the Levels of 
Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. Mem. 
L. Rev. 165 (2014) (advocating for abolition of the tiers of 
scrutiny). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
22 
 
fundamental, courts apply strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., State v. 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  To survive a 
challenge, the "statute must further a compelling state interest 
and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest."  Id.  This 
burden rests on the state, not the challenger, and will rarely 
succeed. 
¶151 An 
honest 
evaluation 
of 
the 
historical 
record 
regarding 
the 
Second 
Amendment, 
however, 
suggests 
strict 
scrutiny may not be appropriate for all regulations affecting 
the right it protects.  We must match the doctrine to the scope 
of the right, and do so fairly.  Prohibiting the possession of 
firearms altogether (especially in the home, as with Roundtree), 
cuts on its face right to the core of the Second Amendment 
right.  That said, as best as I can discern from the historical 
evidence now available and summarized above, the state was 
nevertheless understood to have some authority to dispossess 
those who posed a danger of engaging in arms-related violence, 
and to do so in ways that were at least somewhat over- or under-
inclusive. 
¶152 As explained above, in the early English tradition of 
protecting the right to keep and bear arms, the government 
dispossessed an entire class of citizens based on the fear they 
would take up arms in violent rebellion against the Protestant 
crown.  Surely, not every member of that class was predisposed 
to violence against the government, yet the class as a whole was 
restricted.  Similarly, during the Founding Era, states broadly 
dispossessed those unwilling to take an oath to support the 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
23 
 
cause of independence or otherwise sympathetic to British rule.  
Surely not everyone dispossessed under those laws presented a 
danger to public safety.  Even the 1868 Kansas law that 
dispossessed anyone "who has ever borne arms against the 
government of the United States" cannot be said to be narrowly 
tailored in the context of the Civil War's aftermath.  Former 
confederate soldiers presumably comprised a not insignificant 
class of people in Kansas, many of whom no longer would have 
posed a significant risk of violence simply by virtue of their 
past war efforts on behalf of the Confederacy. 
¶153 As a starting point, then, the individual right to 
keep and bear arms, especially for the protection of one's home, 
is a fundamental and individual right that should be treated as 
such.  But where there is a significant risk of arms-related 
violence, government retains some authority to restrict this 
right in ways that are not narrowly drawn; it may be over- or 
under-inclusive.  Even though restrictions on the individual and 
fundamental right to keep and bear arms should ordinarily be 
subject to the highest judicial scrutiny, where the risk of gun-
related violence is at stake, a slightly more deferential 
standard is appropriate and in keeping with the historical 
record. 
¶154 Overly-generous deference to the government, however, 
would not be appropriate, especially since the text generally 
carves this right out as an impermissible area of government 
interference.  The State must bear the burden in this context to 
show it is acting within constitutional limits, not the other 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
24 
 
way around.  When it comes to individuals who pose a danger of 
using a firearm to commit violence, however, strict scrutiny 
would seem to demand too much of the government in ways that do 
not capture the historical understanding of the right.  A more 
appropriate analysis in this context is therefore a heightened 
scrutiny that still puts the government to its proof.  Among the 
tools available, intermediate scrutiny best fits the bill.8 
¶155 This 
approach 
has 
parallels 
in 
other 
areas 
of 
constitutional law.  The Supreme Court applies intermediate 
scrutiny in some other circumstances where fundamental rights 
are implicated.  In the First Amendment context, for example, 
the Court analyzes content-based restrictions on speech under 
strict scrutiny, but it applies a form of intermediate scrutiny 
to time, place, or manner regulations.  Compare Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying "the most exacting 
scrutiny" to a flag-burning statute) with United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to uphold a defendant's conviction for burning a draft 
                                                 
8 I endorse the majority of Justice Rebecca Bradley's 
dissent.  However, I believe something less than strict scrutiny 
is more in keeping with the historical record——and therefore the 
original public meaning——for the type of restriction here.  I 
also agree with the majority that our decision in Mayo v. 
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018 
WI 78, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678, is inapplicable.  Whatever 
analytical framework this court applies to equal protection 
cases under the Wisconsin Constitution is not, in my view, 
relevant to the framework we should employ to a claim under the 
Second Amendment to the federal Constitution.  The original 
public meaning inquiry should dictate the appropriate legal 
test, regardless of the tests this court has employed in 
analyzing cases under different constitutional provisions.  
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
25 
 
card); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to strike down a statute establishing 
"buffer zones" around facilities where abortions are performed). 
¶156 Intermediate scrutiny places the burden on the State 
to show that the law at issue advances an important governmental 
interest 
and 
is 
substantially 
related 
to 
that 
interest.  
Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 150 Wis. 2d 563, 570-71, 441 
N.W.2d 734 (1989).  Even when the governmental interest is 
important, a law survives intermediate scrutiny only if it "does 
not 
burden 
substantially 
more 
[protected 
activity] 
than 
necessary to further those interests."  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).  As now-Justice Barrett 
explained in her dissent in a case challenging this same 
Wisconsin law, the fit between the means and the ends must be a 
close one.  Kanter 919 F.3d at 465 (Barrett, J., dissenting) 
("'[A] very strong public-interest justification and a close 
means-ends fit' is required before [the defendant] may be 
constitutionally subject to the United States and Wisconsin 
dispossession statutes."). 
¶157 It's worth emphasizing again that the burden when 
applying intermediate scrutiny is on the State to prove that the 
restriction advances an important interest and is substantially 
related to that interest.  State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶14, 318 
Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.  Every federal circuit to consider 
this matter agrees.  See, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353; Tyler 
v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sherriff's Dept., 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 
2016); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1258 (D.C. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
26 
 
Cir. 2011).  As one court put it, "Strict and intermediate 
scrutiny 
(which 
we 
collectively 
refer 
to 
as 
'heightened 
scrutiny' to distinguish them from the far less demanding 
rational-basis review) in effect set up a presumption of 
invalidity that the defendant must rebut."  Hassan v. City of 
New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015). 
¶158 To summarize, where the government purports to act in 
ways the people have made clear in their constitution are 
outside the power granted, it is not the citizen who must show 
the 
government 
has 
acted 
unconstitutionally; 
it 
is 
the 
government that must demonstrate it has authority to do what it 
wishes.  The Constitution reflects a presumption that government 
action in that zone is unlawful unless proven otherwise.  The 
historic right to keep and bear arms is an individual and 
fundamental right.  But the government has broader authority to 
restrict the right of those who would use arms for gun-related 
violence. 
 
Intermediate 
scrutiny——requiring 
a 
substantial 
connection to the important governmental interest——appears to 
best capture and secure the right in accordance with its 
original public meaning where government acts to protect against 
those who pose a danger of engaging in gun-related violence. 
 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
27 
 
II.  APPLICATION 
¶159 Roundtree 
challenges 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wisconsin's 
felon-dispossession 
law 
as 
applied 
to 
him.9  
Wisconsin Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) provides:  "Any person who 
possesses a firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if any of the 
following applies:  (a) The person has been convicted of a 
felony in this state."  "In this context, 'possess' . . . simply 
'means that the defendant knowingly had actual physical control 
of a firearm.'"  State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶19, 242 
Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363.  Thus, for anyone convicted of a 
felony, § 941.29(1m)(a) operates as a lifetime ban on possessing 
firearms for self-defense, hunting, or any other ordinarily 
lawful purpose. 
¶160 Roundtree brings two types of as-applied challenges.  
First, he argues that the State may not constitutionally 
dispossess him because the State has not shown that he 
personally poses a danger of engaging in gun-related violence.  
To support this challenge, Roundtree notes that his underlying 
felony, besides being nonviolent, occurred more than ten years 
ago, and that nothing he has done since suggests he poses any 
heightened risk of using a gun violently.  But as we have 
discussed, the historical record suggests states may, consistent 
                                                 
9 As 
we 
have 
explained 
before, 
"Challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of a statute are generally defined in two 
manners:  as-applied and facial."  Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶37.  
Where "[a]s-applied challenges address a specific application of 
the statute against the challenging party," a facial challenge 
argues 
a 
statute 
"operates 
unconstitutionally 
in 
all 
applications."  Id., ¶¶37-38. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
28 
 
with the right secured by the Second Amendment, dispossess some 
people on a somewhat overbroad class-wide basis.  This is so 
even if some individual members of the class demonstrate their 
personal characteristics are inconsistent with a propensity for 
violence.  Moreover, the challenged law criminalizes firearm 
possession for committing a felony, not for any of Roundtree's 
personal characteristics or other actions.  In other words, the 
State has charged Roundtree with the crime of illegally 
possessing a firearm on one basis only——his prior felony 
conviction.  Therefore, a challenge focused on Roundtree's 
personal risk of danger is off the mark.  
¶161 Roundtree also argues the State may not dispossess him 
simply for belonging to either the class of people that 
committed any felony or the class of people that committed the 
same felony as him. 
¶162 It is indisputable that public safety is a compelling 
governmental interest.  See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶23, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  This interest is also well-
illustrated in the history of the Second Amendment.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) therefore advances an important government 
objective. 
¶163 Thus, we turn to the second prong of the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis:  whether a law that dispossesses all felons 
is substantially related to the government's interest in 
preventing 
gun-related 
violence. 
 
And 
again, 
it's 
worth 
repeating that the State bears the burden to show a close and 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
29 
 
substantial connection exists.  The State tries to meet its 
burden by pointing us to two studies.10   
¶164 The study most heavily relied on by the State is a 
2016 study on recidivism prepared by the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections.  See Joseph R. Tatar II & Megan Jones, Recidivism 
After Release from Prison, Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections 
(August 2016) (hereinafter "DOC Study").  In its analysis, that 
study grouped all offenses into four categories:  violent 
offenses, property offenses, drug offenses, and public order 
offenses.  Id. at 14.  Relevant here, the public order offense 
category included failure to pay child support (120 days+) in 
addition to crimes like operating while intoxicated, bail 
jumping, and operating a vehicle to elude an officer.  Id.  The 
State primarily relies on the study's conclusion that for those 
who committed a prior public order offense, 21.4 percent of 
recidivists in that category went on to commit a violent offense 
within three years.  The remaining 78.6 percent of crimes 
committed within three years by recidivists whose original 
incarceration was for a public order offense committed non-
violent offenses (either a drug offense, property offense, or 
another public order offense).  Id. 
                                                 
10 The majority, in a block quote to the majority opinion in 
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 449 (7th Cir. 2019), notes two 
additional studies that are not discussed by the State in its 
briefing.  Majority op., ¶50.  Because it is the State's burden 
to satisfy the substantial relationship prong of intermediate 
scrutiny, its failure to discuss these studies should preclude 
the majority's consideration of them.  This court should not 
attempt to prove the State's case for it.   
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
30 
 
¶165 The 
State 
erroneously 
cites 
this 
study 
for 
a 
proposition 
it 
most 
certainly 
does 
not 
support. 
 
It 
characterizes the DOC Study as concluding that 21.4 percent of 
all those released after committing a public order offense went 
on to commit a violent offense.  That's simply not what the 
study says, and it is an egregious error in light of its almost 
singular prominence in the State's effort to prove the requisite 
connection.  This 21.4 percent is not the percentage of all 
public order offenders who, after release, committed violent 
crimes.  Rather, it considers only those who committed another 
crime after committing a public order offense, and conveys the 
percentage of those public order offense recidivists who 
committed a violent crime.  In other words, this 21.4 percent 
figure has nothing to do with, and makes no reference to, those 
who never recidivate after committing a public order offense.  
It should be obvious, then, that this statistic offers no 
assistance in establishing the relationship between past crime 
and a person's risk to commit gun-related violent crime in the 
future, which is the core inquiry of the intermediate scrutiny 
analysis. 
¶166 The second study offered by the State surveys "5,923 
authorized purchasers of handguns in California in 1977," 3,128 
of whom had at least one prior misdemeanor conviction at the 
time of purchase.  Garen J. Wintemute et al., Prior Misdemeanor 
Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-
Related 
Criminal 
Activity 
Among 
Authorized 
Purchasers 
of 
Handguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2083, 2083 (1998) (hereinafter 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
31 
 
"Wintemute Study").  Specifically, the State points to that 
study's conclusion that "even handgun purchasers with only 1 
prior misdemeanor conviction and no convictions or offenses 
involving firearms or violence were nearly 5 times as likely as 
those with no prior criminal history to be charged with new 
offenses involving firearms or violence."  Id.  Consider me 
unsurprised that people with criminal records who purchase 
handguns are more likely to commit future crime than those 
without a criminal record.  But this correlation hardly 
demonstrates the close and substantial relationship required to 
justify this law.  While those with a prior criminal record are 
surely more likely to commit future crime, the vast majority of 
people in the study who had prior criminal records did not 
commit a new violent offense.  And the State must demonstrate 
that 
dispossessing 
the 
entire 
class 
that 
it 
chose 
will 
substantially further the State's efforts to remediate the risk 
of gun-related violence.11  This study falls far short of 
demonstrating why those convicted of illegal possession of 
certain fish, tax fraud, or failure to pay child support should 
be dispossessed in the interest of preventing gun-related 
violent crime. 
¶167 The State's correlation-centric reasoning——that Wis. 
Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) substantially furthers the fight against 
gun-related violence simply by virtue of a correlation between 
past crime of any sort and future violent crime——does not meet 
                                                 
11 Importantly, the Wintemute Study does not actually 
analyze felons as a class because generally, felons will not be 
authorized handgun purchasers. 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
32 
 
the mark.  Playing this logic out further, suppose those who 
previously declared bankruptcy are modestly more likely to 
commit violent crime in the future?12  Or those who do not have a 
bachelor's degree by the time they are 25?13  How about those who 
were born out of wedlock,14 or who fall below the poverty line?15  
Taking the State's argument on its face, dispossession laws 
barring these classes of persons (which impact not a small 
amount of the population) would survive as long as the State 
could prove that these features are correlated with an increased 
risk of committing violent crime with a firearm.  Modest 
correlation, however, is simply not enough.  And at best, that 
is all the State has here. 
                                                 
12 Gercoline van Beek, Vivienne de Vogel & Dike van de 
Mheen, The Relationship Between Debt and Crime:  A Systematic 
and Scoping Review, European J. of Probation, Oct. 2020, at 1 
(showing "a strong association between debt and crime whereby 
debt is a risk factor for crime"). 
13 Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education 
on Crime:  Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-
Reports, 94 The Am. Econ. Rev. 155, 156-57 (2004) ("Instrumental 
variable estimates reveal a significant relationship between 
education and incarceration . . . ."). 
14 Todd D. Kendall & Robert Tamura, Unmarried Fertility, 
Crime, and Social Stigma, 53 J.L. & Econ. 185, 213 (2010) ("[A]n 
increase of 10 nonmarital births per 1,000 live births is 
associated with an increase in future murder and property crime 
rates between 2.4 and 4 percent."). 
15 U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 248384, Household Poverty and 
Nonfatal Violent Victimization, 2008-2012, 1 (2014) ("Persons in 
poor households had a higher rate of violence involving a 
firearm (3.5 per 1,000) compared to persons above the FPL (0.8-
2.5 per 1,000)."). 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
33 
 
¶168 Including all felonies in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a)'s 
reach, no matter how violent and no matter how serious, is 
"wildly overinclusive."  Kanter, 919 F.3d at 466 (Barrett, J., 
dissenting).  It is an extraordinarily broad class that lacks a 
substantial relationship to the harm it seeks to remedy.  Id.  
The fit between means and ends must be close——not perfect, but 
close.  The State's evidence is far from showing that 
dispossessing all felons forever bears a close or substantial 
relationship to remediating the danger of gun-related violence.   
¶169 If the class of all felons is too broad, perhaps the 
State could nonetheless show that criminalizing possession of 
firearms based on the particular underlying felony survives 
constitutional scrutiny.  But the State does not even purport to 
argue that those who have failed to pay child support or 
committed other analogous crimes pose any risk of committing 
gun-related violence as a consequence of their underlying 
felony, nor do its studies support that conclusion.  The State 
therefore fails to meet its burden of proof here as well. 
¶170 The important goal of protecting against gun-related 
violence does not seem to be furthered by dispossessing those 
who have not committed a violent act with a gun, and indeed have 
not committed a violent act at all.  The State does not meet 
this challenge head on; it has not met its burden to prove a 
close and substantial relationship between the means and ends of 
the prohibition.  Accordingly, Roundtree's conviction for 
possession of a firearm, a criminal prohibition triggered 
No.  2018AP594-CR.bh 
 
34 
 
because he was convicted of failure to pay child support for 120 
days, violates the Second Amendment and is unconstitutional. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶171 We are bound to interpret and apply the Constitution 
as written.  A careful study of the history surrounding the 
right to keep and bear arms as protected by the Second Amendment 
demonstrates that while the right to keep arms in the home for 
self-defense is within the core of the right, some class-based 
restrictions on firearm possession are permissible to protect 
against the danger of gun-related violence.  Felon-dispossession 
laws may be permissible under this historical protection, but 
only where the State shows the restriction substantially 
advances the State's interest in protecting against gun-related 
violence.  Here, however, the State did not carry its burden to 
show that Wisconsin's dispossession law satisfies this standard 
as applied to Roundtree.  Therefore, his conviction violates the 
Second Amendment.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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