Case Title: State v. Germaine M. Taylor

Citation: 2006 WI 22

Docket Number: 2004AP001092-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 22 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1092-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Germaine M. Taylor, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 8, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 16, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 22
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1092-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF476) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Germaine M. Taylor, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 8, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The defendant, Germaine M. Taylor 
(Taylor), seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, which affirmed Taylor's judgment of conviction for 
second-degree sexual assault of a child and an order of the 
Racine County Circuit Court, Allan B. Torhorst, Judge, denying 
his motion for postconviction relief. 
¶2 
Taylor contends the circuit court did not properly 
explain its reasoning behind the sentence imposed and the 
sentence itself is unduly harsh and excessive and should 
therefore be vacated.  We disagree and conclude that under our 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
2 
 
well-established standards for reviewing the circuit court's 
exercise of its sentencing discretion, and in light of the 
individual facts and circumstances of this case, the circuit 
court exercised proper discretion in its sentence and in its 
refusal to modify that sentence.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals.   
I 
¶3 
On April 29, 2002, the State filed a criminal 
complaint charging Taylor with second-degree sexual assault of a 
child, under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (1999-2000).1  The complaint 
alleged that on or about September 2001, Taylor unlawfully and 
feloniously had sexual intercourse with the victim, S.R., who 
had not attained the age of sixteen years.2  The complaint arose 
when an employee of the Racine County Human Services Department 
informed the Racine Police Department that S.R. became pregnant 
by engaging in non-forced sexual intercourse with Taylor.  S.R. 
indicated that she had sexual intercourse with Taylor on two 
occasions in 2001. 
¶4 
Taylor 
met 
S.R. 
while 
he 
was 
living 
at 
the 
Transitional Living Apartment in Racine on probation for a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
2 At the time of the sexual assault, Taylor was nineteen 
years old, and S.R. was fifteen years old.  Taylor states in his 
brief that he was eighteen years old, but this statement is 
belied by the dates cited in the criminal complaint and other 
documents in the record, and by statements of Taylor's counsel 
at the sentencing hearing.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
3 
 
previous conviction of second-degree sexual assault of a child.  
S.R. and a friend were visiting another resident of the 
facility, Maurice Smith (Smith).  On a later date, the four met 
at Smith's sister's house and got into a vehicle.  S.R. reported 
that she did not know where they were going, but they ended up 
in Green Bay at Smith's cousin's house.  S.R. stated that she 
had sexual intercourse with Taylor after consuming wine and 
liquor.  The two had sex again at Taylor's aunt's house.  Taylor 
stated he believed S.R. was eighteen. 
¶5 
Second-degree sexual assault of a child was classified 
as a Class BC felony when the criminal complaint was filed.  
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  This offense subjected Taylor to a fine 
not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 30 years, or 
both.  Wis. Stat. §  939.50(3)(bc).3  Additionally, Taylor was 
charged as a repeater under Wis. Stat. § 939.62, which increased 
his maximum imprisonment exposure to not more than 40 years, due 
to a previous conviction of second-degree sexual assault of a 
child. 
¶6 
This previous conviction arose from an incident in 
February or March 1999 when Taylor had sexual intercourse with 
                                                 
3 On July 26, 2002, the Wisconsin Legislature enacted 2001 
Wisconsin Act 109, which amended Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) from a 
Class BC felony to a Class C felony.  The act also amended the 
classification of felonies under Wis. Stat. § 939.50.  Under the 
new statutory scheme, the penalty for a Class C felony is a fine 
not to exceed $100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 40 years, 
or both.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c) (2003-04).  The BC felony 
classification was repealed.  The act did not take effect until 
February 1, 2003.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
4 
 
the victim, K.A.H., who had not obtained the age of sixteen 
years.4  This complaint, filed on October 21, 1999, arose when an 
employee of the Racine County Human Services Department informed 
the Racine Police Department that K.A.H. was pregnant and she 
had indicated that Taylor was the father.  When Taylor was 
questioned by the police, he stated the following:  (1) he was 
one of six boys having sex with the victim; (2) he and K.A.H. 
had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with protection on 
two occasions at K.A.H.'s home a few days apart in early 1999; 
and (3) he was not the father of the child.5   
¶7 
Taylor entered a guilty plea on April 28, 2000, and 
the Racine County Circuit Court, Judge Emily Mueller presiding, 
entered judgment of conviction against Taylor on July 5, 2000.  
Judge Mueller withheld sentencing and Taylor was placed on a 
two-year period of probation.  Sixty days of conditional jail 
time was given as a condition of probation; however, this time 
was stayed.  Furthermore, he was ordered to have no sexual 
contact with anyone under the age of eighteen as a condition of 
his probation.   
                                                 
4 At the time of the sexual assault, Taylor was sixteen 
years old, and K.A.H. was fourteen years old. 
5 According to the presentence investigation report (PSI) 
prepared prior to sentencing in Taylor's first sexual assault 
conviction, Taylor explained the situation differently to the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) agent.  He stated that he and 
the victim had been dating from June 1998 through April 1999, 
and they began a sexual relationship in October 1998.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
5 
 
¶8 
While 
on 
probation, 
Taylor's 
probation 
agent 
discovered that Taylor impregnated a seventeen-year-old girl, 
B.K., in September 2000.  At the time, Taylor told his agent 
that he did not believe he was in violation of his probation 
because he thought he was only prohibited from having sex with 
individuals who were sixteen years or younger.  Taylor was 
placed in custody, and he served the 60-day sentence that had 
been initially stayed by the court. 
¶9 
In October 2001, Taylor failed to report to his 
probation agent and was in absconder status until he was taken 
into custody on June 19, 2002.  Taylor was charged on this date 
with 
resisting 
or 
obstructing 
an 
officer 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).   
¶10 During the period of time that he was gone from 
supervision, Taylor assaulted B.K. and damaged her motor 
vehicle.  This assault led to a charge of criminal damage to 
property under Wis. Stat. § 943.01(1) filed on March 22, 2002. 
¶11 Taylor's probation was revoked on August 9, 2002, for 
these and other probation violations, and he returned to court 
before Judge Mueller on September 3, 2002, for sentencing after 
revocation.  Judge Mueller sentenced Taylor to an indeterminate 
five-year sentence.    
¶12 In the current case, an information was filed on July 
3, 2002.  Taylor also waived his right to a preliminary hearing, 
and pled not guilty in open court before a court commissioner on 
the same date.  On October 25, 2002, before Judge Allan B. 
Torhorst, Taylor changed his plea.  Pursuant to a plea 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
6 
 
agreement, Taylor pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault 
of a child without the repeater enhancer.  Additionally, the 
misdemeanor charges of criminal damage to property and resisting 
or obstructing an officer were dismissed but would be read-in 
for dispositional purposes at the time of sentencing.  For the 
State's part, it recommended prison, but stood silent as to the 
amount of prison time.  The court also ordered a presentence 
investigation report (PSI).6   
¶13 On April 29, 2003, the court entered judgment of 
conviction and sentenced Taylor to a bifurcated sentence of 18 
years, with 12 years of initial confinement and 6 years of 
extended supervision, consecutive to the 5-year sentence imposed 
by Judge Mueller.  As part of the PSI, the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) recommended a sentence of 12 years with 6 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
6 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision, to be served consecutive to Judge Mueller's 
sentence.   
¶14 Taylor filed a motion for postconviction relief on 
December 10, 2003, requesting that the court order resentencing 
for two reasons:  (1) the court misunderstood the presentence 
recommendation;7 and (2) the sentence was unduly harsh.  After a 
                                                 
6 The initial PSI was prepared on December 27, 2002, and 
later amended on March 7, 2003, after defense counsel requested 
that Taylor's family be contacted in preparation of the report, 
as opposed to relying on a PSI relating to Taylor's first 
conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a child.   
7 At the sentencing hearing, the court stated the DOC 
recommended eighteen and one-half years, as opposed to the 
correct recommendation of twelve years.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
7 
 
hearing on March 18, 2004, the court denied the motion in a 
written decision and order filed April 8, 2004.  The court 
concluded it had merely misspoken when it indicated the DOC 
recommendation, but such misstatement was immaterial to the 
court's conclusions and ultimate sentence.  After reviewing the 
sentencing transcript, the court continued to believe that 
"Taylor is an absolute and legitimate threat to the community by 
his failure to comply with Wisconsin's law prohibiting sexual 
assault."  In sum, the circuit court concluded it imposed an 
appropriate and necessary sentence on Taylor given the facts and 
circumstances of the case.   
¶15 Taylor appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court stated in conclusion:  "We are persuaded that, given 
Taylor's penchant for sexually assaulting young girls and his 
belligerent display at sentencing8, the sentence imposed here 
would neither shock public sentiment nor violate the judgment of 
reasonable people."  State v. Taylor, No. 2004AP1092-CR, 
unpublished order, at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004).   
¶16 Taylor then filed a petition for review in this court, 
and we granted review only as to the second issue presented, 
namely:  Is a sentence of 12 years of initial confinement and 6 
years extended supervision excessive for this nineteen-year-old 
defendant who had non-forced sexual intercourse with a fifteen-
                                                 
8 According to the sentencing transcript, Taylor repeatedly 
argued with the court, at one point stating, "Fuck this shit."  
Once sentenced, Taylor stated, "I'll be back, bitch-ass punk."  
The court had the record reflect that the deputies took Taylor 
out of the courtroom after this latter outburst.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
8 
 
year-old girl?  We conclude that under the totality of the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the sentence is not excessive, 
and we affirm the court of appeals.   
II 
¶17 The standards governing appellate review of an imposed 
sentence are well settled.9  A circuit court exercises its 
discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to 
determining if the court's discretion was erroneously exercised.  
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197; see also McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971) ("It is thus clear that sentencing is a 
discretionary judicial act and is reviewable by this court in 
the same 
manner that 
all 
discretionary acts 
are 
to be 
reviewed.").  "Discretion is not synonymous with decision-
making.  Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning.  
                                                 
9 Taylor argues that "this court should no longer search the 
record for evidence to support the trial court's sentence."  We 
recently reaffirmed the standards of McCleary v. State, 49 
Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  See State v. Gallion, 2004 
WI 42, ¶76, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting McCleary, 
49 Wis. 2d at 277) ("Although we do not change the appellate 
standard of review, appellate courts are required to more 
closely scrutinize the record to ensure that 'discretion was in 
fact exercised and the basis of that exercise of discretion is 
set forth.'").  We note that because Taylor was sentenced a 
little less than a year before we released Gallion, its holding 
does not apply to this case.  See id. ("[W]e reaffirm the 
standards of McCleary and require the application to be stated 
on the record for future cases.").   
Because our analysis resolves the question presented for 
review, we decline to review State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 
106, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507, as being unnecessary to 
this opinion.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
9 
 
This process must depend on facts that are of record or that are 
reasonably derived by inference from the record and a conclusion 
based 
on 
a 
logical 
rationale 
founded 
upon 
proper 
legal 
standards."  Id. at 277. 
¶18 "The sentencing decisions of the circuit court are 
generally afforded a strong presumption of reasonability because 
the circuit court is best suited to consider the relevant 
factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant."  State v. 
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 781-82, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992) (citing 
State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984)).  
"Therefore, the convicted defendant must show some unreasonable 
or unjustified basis in the record for the sentence imposed."  
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 782 (citing Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 622-
23).  "Appellate judges should not substitute their preference 
for a sentence merely because, had they been in the trial 
judge's position, they would have meted out a different 
sentence."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281. 
¶19 Furthermore, "[a] trial judge clearly has discretion 
in determining the length of a sentence within the permissible 
range set by statute."  Hanson v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 203, 207, 
179 N.W.2d 909 (1970).  "An abuse of this discretion will be 
found only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so 
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances."  
Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975) 
(citing Mallon v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 185, 181 N.W.2d 364 (1970); 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
10 
 
Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972); 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263). 
III 
¶20 Taylor challenges his sentence on two interrelated 
grounds.  First, he argues that although the circuit court gave 
reasons for its sentence, it did not explain why 12 years of 
initial confinement was necessary to fulfill the goals of the 
sentence.  In other words, Taylor contends the circuit court 
failed to adequately explain why it deviated from the sentence 
recommended in the PSI or how it reached the length of 
sentencing that it ultimately settled on.  Second, Taylor argues 
that his sentence is excessive on its face when viewed in 
context of the three primary factors a court must consider at 
sentencing as articulated in McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276.  "'The 
sentence imposed in each case should call for the minimum amount 
of 
custody 
or 
confinement 
which 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense and the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'"  Id. (quoting Standards 
Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, American Bar 
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Approved Draft, 1968, § 2.2, at 14).  See also State v. Spears, 
227 Wis. 2d 495, 507, 596 N.W.2d 375 (1999); State v. Carter, 
208 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997); State v. Echols, 
175 Wis. 2d 653, 682, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993).10   
                                                 
10 Beyond these three primary factors, the sentencing court, 
within its discretion, may also consider the following factors: 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
11 
 
A. 
¶21 We begin with the statements made by the circuit court 
at Taylor's sentencing hearing and in its postconviction order 
to determine if the record reflects that the court exercised its 
discretion on a "rational and explainable basis."  McCleary, 49 
Wis. 2d at 276.  As stated by the McCleary court:   
[W]e are obliged to search the record to determine 
whether in the exercise of proper discretion the 
sentence imposed can be sustained. It is not only our 
duty not to interfere with the discretion of the trial 
judge, but it is, in addition, our duty to affirm the 
sentence on appeal if from the facts of record it is 
sustainable as a proper discretionary act.   
Id. at 282.  From our examination of the facts on record, and 
the court's articulated reasoning in the sentencing transcript 
and the postconviction order, we are satisfied that the circuit 
court properly exercised its sentencing discretion and the 
sentence imposed was the product of an appropriate process of 
reasoning. 
                                                                                                                                                             
"(1) Past record of criminal offenses; (2) history of 
undesirable behavioral pattern; (3) the defendant's 
personality, character and social traits; (4) result 
of 
presentence 
investigation; 
(5) 
vicious 
or 
aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the 
defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 
trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and 
employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance 
and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close 
rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; 
and (12) the length of pretrial detention." 
State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 623-24, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984) 
(quoting Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519-20, 250 N.W.2d 7 
(1977). 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
12 
 
¶22 The court first noted that the information contained 
in the PSI weighed heavily on its mind:  "What drives my 
decision in this case . . . is the information I've received on 
not only this presentence, but also the presentence that was 
attached to it that Judge Mueller used in her sentence."  These 
PSIs fully detailed the "illegal criminal sexual activity with 
at least three victims."  In the court's view and the PSI 
writer's view, these repeated violations occurred because Taylor 
believed he had "some type of insular shelter [] concerning the 
laws under which he's been convicted."  The court further 
explained:  "Mr. Cacciotti [the PSI writer] just nailed it when 
he said, when I read it, he doesn't realize the havoc he has 
created in the lives of three young women, three children, no 
father, no responsibilities, and he's out there essentially 
saying give me another pass."   
¶23 The court was cognizant that the sexual acts Taylor 
was involved in were physically nonviolent, but in the court's 
view: 
To embrace the argument that these are consensual 
sexual acts just simply does not recognize not only 
our law, but also my belief that there are people in 
our 
society 
that 
need 
protection. 
 
They 
need 
protection because they cannot simply, for reasons 
that the legislature believes in, and as adopted, 
consent to do certain things.  
¶24 Indeed, the court listed the facts involved in this 
case which suggested (1) Taylor did not show any concern for the 
laws applicable to him or any desire to change his behavior 
while on probation or after a 60-day period of incarceration; 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
13 
 
and (2) although the sexual intercourse was non-forced, it does 
not follow that it was "consensual."   
Mr. Taylor, what is particularly of concern to me 
is how this case came about.  You're on supervision 
from 
Judge 
Mueller. 
 
You're, 
in 
fact, 
in 
a 
transitional living center; that's when the initial 
meetings took place.  And after contacts are made, you 
and a friend take the young women not anyplace 
locally, not that that makes much difference where 
they were taken, but you go to Green Bay.  There's 
liquor involved, young women admit they drank liquor.  
And what happens is you're saying:  I thought they 
were——or, I thought the victim I'm involved with was 
18.  The same law that protects this victim is a law 
that requires you as an adult in this situation to 
make inquiry.   
 . . . . 
 
This man goes out with a 15-year old when he's on 
supervision and his excuse is it was consensual, or 
his excuse is I didn't know she was 15.  These facts 
are incredulous with his record. 
 . . . . 
THE DEFENDANT:  Man, I've got five years to think 
about this.   
 
THE COURT:  You're going to have more time to 
think about it, Mr. Taylor, because you should have 
thought about that when Judge Mueller told you 
probably about the same thing on the second——on the 
first go around.  You have done nothing to alter your 
criminal behavior and approach to these young women, 
absolutely nothing. 
¶25 The sentencing transcript also reveals that the court 
was 
concerned 
about 
protecting 
the 
public 
from 
Taylor's 
"unmitigated 
sexually 
abusive 
behavior 
towards 
underage 
women[.]"  The court stated: 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
14 
 
This isn't the way it goes, Mr. Taylor.  You are 
responsible right from the get-go.  If you think I'm 
going to turn you lose [sic] on society with your 
attitude, you are sorely mistaken.   
 . . . . 
 
It's not going to happen on my watch, Mr. Taylor.  
I want you out of this community.  I want you to 
understand this type of crime, as I've indicated, is 
one of the most serious short of homicide, batteries 
or something where you beat somebody up.  Then to 
waltz in here today and try to convince me that this 
was all consensual is beyond belief.  I view this as a 
crime where confinement is necessary to protect the 
public.  Our law tries to protect these young women.  
It has forever. 
 . . . . 
 
Court's findings and belief, as I indicated, 
confinement is necessary to protect our society and 
public from further criminal activity.  It would 
unduly depreciate the seriousness of this offense if 
any sentence of probation were imposed. 
 . . . . 
 
I'm sure you're remorseful, but I'm sure your 
remorse will be short-lived if I put you on the street 
and this situation presents itself again.   
¶26 The comments of the court in its decision concerning 
Taylor's postconviction motion further convince us that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.  The 
court clarified that it had misstated, not misunderstood, the 
recommendations of the PSI, when it stated on the record at the 
sentencing hearing that the DOC was recommending 18 and one-half 
years, as opposed to the 12 years actually recommended.  
Additionally, the court concluded that its sentence was not 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
15 
 
unduly harsh given the circumstances and facts of the case.  The 
decision reads in pertinent part as follows: 
 
The Court's sentencing rationale began on page 13 
of the sentencing transcript and concludes at page 20.  
This 
decision 
will 
not 
reiterate 
the 
Court's 
conclusions but rather incorporate those conclusions 
as this Court continues to believe that Taylor is an 
absolute and legitimate threat to the community by his 
failure to comply with Wisconsin's law prohibiting 
sexual assault.  The Court's observation that Taylor 
committed the sexual assault which is the subject of 
the charges in this case occurred while he was on 
supervision for similar 
charges 
and the 
Court's 
observation that Taylor has and continues to believe 
that sexual assault is appropriate regardless of the 
age of the victim becomes clear upon reading the 
sentencing transcript and Taylor's colloquy with the 
Court during the sentencing.   
 
Taylor's professed concern about his children is 
not supported by the facts.  The presentence clearly 
establishes that Taylor's prior criminal acts and past 
failure to support his children notwithstanding his 
claim that his children now need him.  He fails to pay 
support and he fails to develop real relationships 
with his children but for and at his convenience. 
 
The Court concludes it did misspeak when it 
stated the recommendations of the 
Department of 
Corrections but also concludes that the misstatement 
was immaterial to the Court's conclusions and ultimate 
sentence. 
 
The 
Court 
is 
mindful 
that 
Taylor 
will 
be 
incarcerated for a significant time; however, the 
incarceration in the instant case is reflective of 
Taylor's absolute violation of the law; a violation 
while on probation for charges of an identical nature.  
Taylor fails to conform to the law, fails to conform 
and obey the rules of supervision, and repeatedly has 
placed multiple victims at risk because of his 
behavior.   
 
The Court concludes that, notwithstanding its 
statement, it has imposed an appropriate and necessary 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
16 
 
sentence upon Taylor and denies Taylor's application 
to be resentenced.     
¶27 All told, the record before us demonstrates that the 
circuit court exercised individualized discretion on behalf of 
the sentence chosen for Taylor.  That is, the court fixed a 
sentence that took into account the following:  (1) Taylor's 
history of sexual assault; (2) his failure to recognize or 
accept the serious criminal nature of his conduct; (3) the read-
in charges concerning the criminal damage to property and 
resisting or obstructing an officer; (4) the court's belief that 
unless Taylor 
was 
made 
to 
serve 
a 
substantial term of 
confinement, the public would not be protected from his ongoing 
criminal conduct; and (5) the court's belief that a long term of 
initial confinement was necessary to rehabilitate Taylor, as 
both probation and 60 days of confinement had not adequately 
impressed upon Taylor the seriousness of his conduct.   
¶28 In terms of the length of his sentence, Taylor argues 
that there appeared to be no "starting point" for the court of 
some very low period of confinement, or even the period of 
confinement recommended by the PSI writer.  We cannot agree.  At 
the sentencing hearing, the court clearly began its assessment 
of the appropriate sentence for Taylor with the PSI and the 
information and recommendations contained therein:  "What drives 
my decision in this case . . . is the information I've received 
on not only this presentence, but also the presentence that was 
attached to it that Judge Mueller used in her sentence."  
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
17 
 
¶29 As stated by this court, "[t]he [PSI] is designed to 
assist the sentencing court in determining the appropriate 
sentence for that defendant and the public.  Rational and 
consistent sentencing decisions cannot be achieved without a 
reliable information base.  The [PSI] is supposed to provide the 
sentencing court with that information base."  State v. Crowell, 
149 Wis. 2d 859, 868, 440 N.W.2d 352 (1989) (citations omitted).  
We believe it is clear from the sentencing transcript that the 
circuit court properly used the PSI as its information base or 
starting point for the appropriate sentence to impose.   
¶30 Granted, the circuit court did not explicitly state 
why, in its discretion, it added six more years of initial 
confinement onto the PSI recommendation.  However, McCleary does 
not require a sentencing court to provide an explanation for the 
precise number of years chosen.  McCleary mandates that the 
court's sentencing discretion be exercised on a "rational and 
explainable basis[,]" and such discretion "must depend on facts 
that are of record or that are reasonably derived by inference 
from the record and a conclusion based on a logical rationale 
founded upon proper legal standards."  McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 
276-77.  Again, we believe the court properly exercised its 
discretion and provided a rational and explainable basis on the 
record for why it began with the recommendation posed in the PSI 
and why, in the court's view, a longer initial incarceration 
period was necessary to promote its sentencing objectives.  In 
other words, the trial court reasoned that based on Taylor's 
repeated sexual assaults and his failure to amend his behavior 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
18 
 
in light of previous probation and incarceration, a longer 
sentence, 
but 
well-within 
the 
general 
range 
of 
the 
PSI 
recommendation and the limits of the maximum sentence, was 
necessary to best protect the public and rehabilitate the 
defendant.  Given our "'strong policy against interference with 
the discretion of the trial court in passing sentence[,]'" 
McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276 (quoting State v. Tuttle, 21 
Wis. 2d 147, 150, 124 N.W.2d 9 (1963)), we cannot say, as a 
matter of law, that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion.     
B. 
¶31 Taylor also argues that the length of his sentence is 
excessive when considered in light of the nature of the offense, 
the character of the offender, and the protection of the public.  
We 
disagree 
and 
conclude 
that 
Taylor's 
term 
of 
initial 
confinement was fully justified by the facts and circumstances 
of this case, and was not "so excessive and unusual and so 
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances."  
Ocanas, 70 Wis. 2d at 185; accord State v. Setagord, 211 
Wis. 2d 397, 416 n.9, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997); State v. Sarabia, 
118 Wis. 2d 655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984); Murphy v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 522, 531, 249 N.W.2d 779 (1977); State v. Killory, 73 
Wis. 2d 400, 408, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976); State v. Schreiber, 
2002 WI App 75, ¶7, 251 Wis. 2d 690, 642 N.W.2d 621.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
19 
 
¶32 First, Taylor contends that his term of confinement is 
excessive in light of the following circumstances surrounding 
the nature of the offense:  (1) S.R. was three months shy of her 
sixteenth birthday, and if the two had intercourse when S.R. was 
sixteen, he would have been guilty of a misdemeanor and not a 
felony; (2) S.R. did not view herself as a victim; (3) although 
his conduct was unlawful, it was not unusual, as teenagers 
engage in sexual intercourse all the time; (4) the age 
difference between himself and S.R. was a little over three 
years; and (5) many sexual assault cases involving the same 
conduct are not prosecuted. 
¶33 Second, Taylor argues his sentence is excessive when 
considering his character:  (1) Taylor was an immature high 
school student when he committed the second charged sexual 
assault; (2) his sexual assaults were nonviolent; and (3) the 
Sex Offender Assessment that had been prepared while he was 
initially incarcerated did not recommend sex offender treatment 
during Taylor's confinement. 
¶34 Finally, Taylor asserts the sentence imposed by the 
circuit court is excessive when considering the need to protect 
the public.  That is, the sentence was not limited to the least 
amount of confinement necessary to protect the public. 
¶35 Although we recognize the accuracy of many of Taylor's 
assertions, we are not persuaded that in light of all the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion under the formidable Ocanas standard. 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
20 
 
¶36 Admittedly, statutory rape cases are highly charged 
and "do not lend themselves to a simplistic application of the 
law."  See Sandy Nowack, A Community Prosecution Approach to 
Statutory Rape: Wisconsin's Pilot Policy Project, 50 DePaul L. 
Rev. 865, 867 (2001).  "These cases become magnifying glasses, 
exposing with particular clarity any lack of harmony that exists 
in a community's cultural values, beliefs about parenting and 
teens, and attitudes about female sexuality."  Id.; see also 
Gary W. Harper, Contextual Factors that Perpetuate Statutory 
Rape: The Influence of Gender Roles, Sexual Socialization and 
Sociocultural Factors, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 897 (2001) ("Childhood 
and adolescent sexuality are complex phenomena that are impacted 
by a host of cultural, developmental, environmental, and 
familial factors.").  This is especially true in sexual assault 
cases where the age difference between the defendant and the 
victim is not great. 
Unsurprisingly, people react to the notion of 
statutory rape with some skepticism and ambivalence.  
After all, statutory rape laws ostensibly render the 
act of "consensual" sexual contact a crime.  It seems 
that many people hear statutory rape and roll their 
eyes, thinking about the futility of trying to 
regulate the hormonal urgings of those caught in the 
throes 
of 
puberty. 
 
Virtually 
no 
one 
endorses 
statutory 
rape 
laws 
without 
some 
hesitation 
or 
qualification.  At the same time, however, virtually 
no one recommends abolishing the crime of statutory 
rape outright.  In spite of the rosy recollections, it 
seems obvious that young people are vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation in their sexual encounters, and 
that the law must play some role in regulating and 
protecting against that abuse.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
21 
 
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, 
Patriarchy and the Potential for Using the Master's Tools to 
Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 799, 799-800 
(2001) [hereinafter Oberman I].  Exactly what role the law 
should play in dealing with the sexual encounters of young 
people is certainly a matter open to debate.  This debate is 
important, but it should remain in the public arena and with the 
legislative branch.  Until the people of this state determine 
otherwise, Taylor's actions were criminal, and under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the circuit court was well 
within its discretion in imposing the stiff sentence it did. 
¶37 Furthermore, it is no secret that many teenagers are 
sexually active in today's society.11  We also do not disagree 
with the assertion that many state prosecutors have adopted a 
lenient attitude towards enforcing statutory rape laws.  See 
Nowack, supra, at 873-74 ("In reality, non-coerced sexual 
contact between two adolescents is not typically charged without 
some aggravating factor."). 
¶38 Despite these realities, the circuit court did not 
view Taylor's sexual assault of S.R. as an act of consensual 
sexual experimentation between two teenagers with "the hormonal 
urgings of those caught in the throes of puberty." Oberman I, 
                                                 
11 Although the reported numbers vary, one source indicates 
that over 50 percent of adolescents are sexually active.  
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, 
Patriarchy and the Potential for Using the Master's Tools to 
Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 799, 809 
(2001).       
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
22 
 
supra, at 800.  In the court's view, Taylor's crime was 
consistent with a pattern of sexual assaults that inflicted 
significant harm on three young women, three children, and 
society as a whole.  Indeed, the PSI belies Taylor's claim that 
S.R. did not view herself as a victim, as she stated the 
following:  "I think he should be punished.  I believe he will 
continue to do this. . . . He told me that I was to blame for 
getting him in trouble.  He told me that he would go to jail 
because of this.  I believe he should be placed in prison for 
what he has done."  Under the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, we cannot disagree with the court's 
assessment of the seriousness of Taylor's repeated offenses.  
¶39 As detailed in the PSI, Taylor was charged, convicted, 
and subsequently placed on a reasonable period of probation for 
similar behavior once before.  Taylor, however, refused to alter 
his conduct in any meaningful manner during this probationary 
period.  While on probation, Taylor impregnated a seventeen-
year-old girl despite the court's order that he refrain from 
engaging in sexual intercourse with anyone under the age of 
eighteen.  Taylor also violated other conditions set by the 
court 
by 
failing 
to: 
(1) 
attend 
Adult 
Basic 
Education 
Programming and maintain verifiable employment; (2) abide by the 
rules of his Transitional Living Placement and follow the 
procedures of the Electronic Monitoring Program;12 and (3) attend 
                                                 
12 This violation arose during Taylor's first encounter with 
S.R. at Smith's transitional living apartment, when a site check 
monitor stopped by and noted two 40-ounce bottles of beer in 
Smith's apartment.   
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
23 
 
an Intensive Outpatient Programming for Alcohol Drug Abuse 
orientation appointment.  It was during this run of probation 
violations that Taylor first had sexual contact with the victim 
of the present action.  Taylor eventually stopped reporting to 
his probation officer and was in absconder status for at least 
eight months until he was taken into custody for the charges 
that brought about this action.  While he was gone from 
supervision, Taylor reported that he used drugs and consumed 
alcohol.  He also battered the seventeen-year-old subject of his 
earlier probation violation, B.K.  She informed the PSI writer 
that an angry and drunk Taylor arrived at her house and 
proceeded to damage her car and beat her up.13  All told, the 
record is replete with examples of the serial nature of Taylor's 
conduct, and his utter lack of rehabilitation, all of which 
demonstrate that Taylor's sentence was not so excessive as to 
shock public sentiment.   
¶40 The 
serial 
nature 
of 
Taylor's 
conduct 
clearly 
demonstrated to the circuit court he was not a naïve high school 
student caught up in innocent sexual experimentation.  Taylor's 
behavior is alarmingly repetitive and his own statement in the 
PSI report demonstrates he has not taken anything to heart.  As 
the circuit court recognized, it is incredible that after being 
convicted once for the same offense, and after spending time in 
prison 
for 
having 
sex 
with 
a 
seventeen-year-old, 
Taylor 
                                                 
13 She further reported that Taylor brought her around $400 
during the four months after he learned she was pregnant, but 
after they broke up, she has received nothing.    
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
24 
 
explained:  "I really didn't think about [S.R.'s age].  I 
thought she was eighteen."  Furthermore, Taylor's belligerent 
display at the sentencing hearing further demonstrated to the 
court his utter lack of judgment and concern for the seriousness 
of his actions.   
¶41 The circuit court was also unimpressed by the fact 
that 
Taylor's 
sexual 
assaults 
were 
"non-forced" 
because 
Wisconsin's statutory scheme makes it clear that a child lacks 
the legal capacity to consent to sexual intercourse, just as 
children lack the ability to form contracts or buy liquor.  This 
contention is not without reason.  "Investigators studying 
adolescent sexuality have identified a multiplicity of factors 
beyond sexual desire and love that lead teenagers to consent to 
sex.  Among these are fear, confusion, coercion, peer pressure, 
and a desire for male attention."  Michelle Oberman, Regulating 
Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 
48 Buff. L. Rev. 703, 709 (2000); see also Oberman I, supra, at 
813 (It is "clearly true that there is considerable opportunity 
for coercion in sexual encounters between peers.  As the Michael 
M. case[14] powerfully demonstrates, this coercion may be so 
commonplace, and so deeply scripted into contemporary norms of 
sexual interaction, that it is all but invisible.").  In other 
words, there can be an imbalance of power in the sexual 
encounters between young teenage girls and young adult men.  It 
                                                 
14 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 
464 (1981). 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
25 
 
is apparent that the facts of this case persuaded the circuit 
court that such an imbalance of power likely occurred here as 
S.R. was taken to Green Bay without knowing where she was going, 
was served alcohol before engaging in sexual intercourse with 
Taylor, and, according to S.R., Taylor apparently tried to 
persuade her not to cooperate with the prosecution.     
¶42 These facts also led the circuit court to reasonably 
conclude that Taylor would continue his course of detrimental 
sexual behavior unless he was incarcerated for a lengthy period 
of time.  As the PSI amply demonstrated, Taylor was not 
rehabilitated or deterred by his prior criminal conviction, his 
term of probation, or his initial period of incarceration.  He 
was simply unwilling to conform his conduct to the law, and 
there was nothing that led the court to believe that his 
behavior would change in the future.  Indeed, the court 
concluded that Taylor had made the determination that the laws 
of the State of Wisconsin do not apply to him.  In the court's 
view, an extended period of incarceration was necessary to 
protect young girls from Taylor's sexual behavior and his 
disregard for the rule of law. 
¶43 We believe the court clearly considered the nature of 
the offense, the character of the defendant, and the protection 
of the public.  Taylor recognizes the court's legitimate concern 
about protecting the public, but he essentially contends the 
court relied too heavily on this factor and gave too little 
weight 
to 
the 
other 
primary 
factors 
and 
the 
specific 
considerations described above.  We do not dispute the relative 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
26 
 
weight given by the trial court to its concerns about the safety 
of the public.  As we have recognized, however, "[g]iving 
consideration to various relevant factors does involve a 
weighing and balancing operation, but the weight to be given a 
particular factor in a particular case is for the trial court, 
not this court, to determine."  Cunningham v. State, 76 
Wis. 2d 277, 282, 251 N.W.2d 65 (1977); accord Schreiber, 251 
Wis. 2d 690, ¶8.  Furthermore, "a sentence can be imposed which 
considers all relevant factors but which is based primarily on 
the gravity of the crime or the need to protect society."  
Cunningham, 76 Wis. 2d at 283.   
¶44 As such, in light of all the facts and circumstances 
before the circuit court at sentencing, we find no basis for 
holding that, as a matter of law, the sentence imposed is 
excessive, as it is not so unusual, or disproportionate as to 
shock public sentiment.   
IV 
¶45 In sum, Taylor's sentence, while certainly strict, is 
not excessive.  "Indeed, the fact that this court might have 
reacted differently under the facts and circumstances of a 
particular 
case 
is, 
itself, 
insufficient 
to 
warrant 
a 
determination that the trial court abused its discretion[, given 
our] strong policy against interference with the discretion of 
the trial court."  Ocanas, 70 Wis. 2d at 188 (citing Tuttle, 21 
Wis. 2d 147; Voigt v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 17, 211 N.W.2d 445 
(1973)). 
No. 
2004AP1092-CR   
 
27 
 
¶46 We conclude that under our well-established standards 
for reviewing the circuit court's exercise of its sentencing 
discretion, 
and 
in 
light 
of 
the 
individual 
facts 
and 
circumstances of this case, the circuit court exercised proper 
discretion in its sentence and in its refusal to modify that 
sentence.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No.  2004AP1092-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
opinion of the majority.  As the author of State v. Gallion, 
2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, I write separately 
to highlight that the case before the court today is a pre-
Gallion case.  Additionally, I write to emphasize certain 
components of the basic sentencing framework set forth in 
Gallion. 
¶48 The majority correctly notes "because Taylor was 
sentenced a little less than a year before we released Gallion, 
its holding does not apply to this case."  Majority op., ¶17, 
n.9.  Instead, the majority appropriately employs pre-Gallion 
cases in its analysis. 
¶49 Of course, many of the pre-Gallion cases cited by the 
majority form the framework of the Gallion analysis.  In 
Gallion, 
we 
reexamined 
the 
process 
of 
reasoning 
which 
demonstrates the proper exercise of sentencing discretion and 
noted that appellate courts are required to "more closely 
scrutinize the record to ensure that 'discretion was in fact 
exercised . . . .'"  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶4 (quoting State 
v. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).  We 
determined that the exercise of sentencing discretion "must be 
set forth on the record."  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶8. 
¶50 In the wake of truth-in-sentencing legislation, we 
perceived a difference between the sentencing landscape prior to 
Gallion and that which existed at the time that Gallion was 
decided.  See id., ¶28.  Under the old, indeterminate sentencing 
system, all three branches of government played a role in 
No.  2004AP1092-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
establishing the sentence served.1  Id.  Now, the executive 
branch role has been diminished with the abolition of the parole 
board.  Id., ¶¶28, 33.  The role of the legislative branch is 
limited to setting the parameters of the penalty.  Id., ¶28.  
Thus, the responsibility of the judicial branch, in ensuring 
fair sentences, has significantly increased.  Id. 
¶51 Previously, judges were thought to have inadequate 
information to determine the actual date on which a prisoner 
should be released.  Id., ¶32.  Instead, the prison officials 
and the parole board who had sustained contact with the prisoner 
were thought to be in a better position to determine if the 
rehabilitation efforts were successful and when the prisoner 
could be safely released.  Id.  Now, in large part, the release 
date is determined up front, at the time of sentencing.  Id., 
¶34.2 
¶52 In light of these changes, we reaffirmed in Gallion 
the sentencing standards set forth in McCleary and reexamined 
the manner in which those standards were to be applied.  We 
noted a "regrettable disconnect" between the McCleary principles 
as-stated 
and 
those 
principles 
as-applied. 
 
Id., 
¶26.  
Ultimately we concluded that "[w]hat has previously been 
                                                 
1 "The legislature set the maximum penalty and the manner of 
its enforcement; the courts imposed an indeterminate term; and 
the executive branch, through the parole board, determined how 
much of that term was going to be served."  State v. Gallion, 
2004 WI 42, ¶28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
2 Early release options 
are restricted. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 (2003-04). 
No.  2004AP1092-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
satisfied with implied rationale must now be set forth on the 
record."  Id., ¶38. 
¶53 In reaffirming the McCleary standards and reexamining 
the manner in which those standards were to be applied, we set 
forth the basic framework for sentencing and emphasized the need 
for the court to set forth its rationale on the record.  I 
highlight here certain components of that discussion: 
• Courts must specify the objectives of the sentence.  Id., 
¶41. 
• Courts are to describe the facts and sentencing factors 
relevant to those objectives, and explain why the 
sentence imposed advances the specified objectives.  Id., 
¶42. 
• In each case, the sentence imposed shall "'call for the 
minimum amount of custody or confinement which is 
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity 
of the offense and the rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant.'"  Id., ¶44 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 
276). 
• Courts 
are 
to 
consider 
probation 
as 
the 
first 
alternative.  Probation should be the disposition unless:  
confinement is necessary to protect the public, the 
offender needs correctional treatment available only in 
confinement, 
or 
it 
would 
unduly 
depreciate 
the 
seriousness of the offense.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 
¶44. 
No.  2004AP1092-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶54 The requirement of an on-the-record explanation will 
serve to fulfill the McCleary directive that discretion be 
exercised on a "rational and explainable basis."  Id., ¶39 
(quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276).  Merely uttering the 
facts involved, invoking sentencing factors, and pronouncing a 
sentence is not a sufficient demonstration of the proper 
exercise of discretion.  Quoting McCleary, the Gallion court 
recounted that:  "Discretion is not synonymous with decision-
making.  Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning."  
Id., ¶3 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277).  Courts must 
reference the relevant facts and factors, and explain on the 
record the linkage between the sentence given and the sentencing 
objectives. 
¶55 The McCleary court aptly described the importance of 
the on-the-record explanation.  Thus, I end where the Gallion 
court began:  
In 
all 
Anglo-American 
jurisprudence 
a 
principal 
obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for 
his actions.  His decisions will not be understood by 
the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate 
courts unless the reasons for decisions can be 
examined.  It is thus apparent that requisite to a 
prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial 
judge 
detailing 
his 
reasons 
for 
selecting 
the 
particular sentence imposed. 
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶1 (quoting McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 
280-81). 
 
 
No.  2004AP1092-CR.awb 
 
1