Case Title: In re M.L.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 243A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-51 
No. 243A20 
Filed 23 April 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: M.L.B. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 18 
March 2020 by Judge William J. Moore in District Court, Robeson County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
J. Edward Yeager Jr. for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Matthew D. Wunsche for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by Jacky Brammer, Assistant Parent 
Defender, for respondent-appellant father. 
 
Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
BARRINGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental 
rights to M.L.B. (Mary).1 After careful review, we reverse the termination-of-
                                            
1 The pseudonym “Mary” is used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the 
juvenile and for ease of reading. 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
parental-rights order and remand to the trial court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
The involvement of Robeson County Department of Social Services (DSS) with 
respondents and Mary commenced in February 2014. DSS had received information 
concerning respondents’ substance abuse and ongoing domestic violence in 
respondents’ home. As these issues continued, Mary was placed in kinship care in 
May 2014. DSS filed a petition alleging that Mary was a neglected juvenile on 
10 December 2014. An order granting nonsecure custody to DSS was entered on 
10 December 2014. On 28 April 2015, the trial court entered an order adjudicating 
Mary a neglected juvenile. 
¶ 3 
 
In April 2019, the trial court changed the permanent plan to adoption with a 
concurrent plan of guardianship. DSS filed a termination-of-parental-rights petition 
on 28 May 2019. DSS alleged that grounds existed to terminate respondents’ parental 
rights pursuant to neglect, failure to make reasonable progress in correcting the 
conditions which led to removal, failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care, 
and dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6) (2019). DSS alleged as an 
additional ground that the parental rights of respondent-mother with respect to her 
other children had been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and she lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(9). 
¶ 4 
 
The 
trial 
court 
held 
the 
termination-of-parental-rights 
hearing 
on 
12 February 2020. At the hearing on termination of parental rights, the transcript 
reflects that DSS’s counsel called as DSS’s first witness the social worker for Mary’s 
case from January 2019 until April 2019. During the testimony of this social worker, 
the transcript reflects the colloquy between DSS’s counsel, the social worker, 
respondent-mother’s counsel, and the trial court regarding a document entitled 
Termination of Parental Rights Timeline (Timeline): 
[DSS’S COUNSEL]: Have you, along with [another] social 
worker, . . . prepared an exhibit for the [c]ourt today? 
[SOCIAL WORKER]: I did. 
[DSS’S COUNSEL]: Is it true and accurate, to the best of 
your ability? 
[SOCIAL WORKER]: It is. 
[DSS’S COUNSEL]: Does it outline [DSS’s] efforts with 
regard to the minor child [Mary]? 
[SOCIAL WORKER]: It does. 
[DSS’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we’d ask the [c]ourt to 
accept this witness as a — 
[RESPONDENT-MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: I’m going to 
object for the record, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 5 
 
DSS called three additional witnesses, a domestic violence case worker at a 
healthcare facility that worked with respondent-mother from 14 November 2019 to 
5 December 2019, a substance abuse counselor at a healthcare facility that oversaw 
a program respondent-mother commenced on 6 February 2019, and a social worker 
working on Mary’s case since April or May 2019. The transcript does not reflect the 
admission of any evidence by DSS other than the testimony of the aforesaid three 
witnesses during the adjudicatory phase of the termination-of-parental-rights 
hearing. 
¶ 6 
 
On 18 March 2020, the trial court entered an order in which it determined that 
each ground alleged in the 28 May 2019 petition existed to terminate respondents’ 
parental rights and concluded it was in Mary’s best interests to do so. Respondents 
appealed. 
II. 
Timeline 
¶ 7 
 
Both respondent-mother and respondent-father argue that the trial court’s 
reliance on the Timeline referenced during the termination-of-parental-rights 
hearing was an error. The trial court in the termination-of-parental-rights order 
stated in paragraph 40 that “[t]he [c]ourt relies on and accepts into evidence the 
Timeline, in making these findings and finds the said report to [be] both credible and 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
reliable.”2 Respondents both contend that the trial court’s pervasive reliance on the 
Timeline is reflected in the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the termination-
of-parental-rights order, rendering the termination-of-parental-rights order tainted 
and unreviewable. DSS argues that a trial court is presumed to disregard 
incompetent evidence in a bench trial and that there is competent evidence besides 
the Timeline to support the termination-of-parental-rights order. 
¶ 8 
 
DSS has neither argued that the Timeline was admissible evidence nor that 
respondents waived their objection to the Timeline’s admissibility. Therefore, we do 
not address whether the Timeline was inadmissible hearsay. Instead, we presume 
the Timeline was inadmissible and not properly considered by the trial court. Thus, 
we next consider whether other evidence admitted during the termination-of-
parental-rights hearing provides the bases for the trial court’s findings of fact. “If 
either of the . . . grounds [for termination of parental rights found by the trial court 
are] supported by findings of fact based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence, the 
order appealed from should be affirmed.” In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982). When 
a judge sits without a jury, this Court presumes that the trial court disregards any 
incompetent evidence and will affirm the judgment or order if the trial court’s 
                                            
2 As summarized in the background section of this opinion, the transcript does not 
establish that the Timeline was admitted into evidence during the termination-of-parental-
rights hearing. 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
findings are supported by competent evidence. Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, 301 N.C. 
689, 694 (1981). 
¶ 9 
 
DSS argues that there was overwhelming, unrebutted evidence to support the 
termination of parental rights, reciting the testimony of the witnesses DSS tendered 
at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. However, after a thorough review of 
the testimony presented at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, we cannot 
conclude that the testimony alone provides clear, cogent, and convincing evidence 
supporting the challenged findings of fact of the trial court necessary to support its 
conclusions of law for any ground for termination. See In re Moore, 306 N.C. at 404. 
DSS’s first witness, a social worker, testified that Mary had been in DSS care and 
custody since 11 December 2014. There was also testimony regarding the case plans 
signed by respondents, respondents’ compliance with the case plans, and their 
progress on the conditions that led to Mary’s removal from their home, among other 
things. 
¶ 10 
 
Yet, as highlighted by respondents in their briefs, the challenged findings of 
fact include a substantial amount of information that cannot be discerned from the 
testimony presented at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. This information 
is in the Timeline. For purposes of this appeal, however, the Timeline is inadmissible 
incompetent evidence on which the trial court should not have relied. Therefore, the 
order terminating respondents’ parental rights must be reversed; the testimony at 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the termination-of-parental-rights hearing does not provide clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence supporting the challenged findings of fact of the trial court 
necessary to support the trial court’s conclusions of law for any ground for 
termination. 
III. 
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings 
¶ 11 
 
Respondent-father argues that the trial court failed to comply with the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and asks this Court to vacate and remand for compliance 
with the ICWA. DSS concedes the record is silent as to whether the trial court 
considered the impact of the ICWA on this case and that the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court as a result. The guardian ad litem agrees that the matter 
should be remanded for the trial court to comply with the ICWA. We agree that the 
record does not reflect compliance with the ICWA, and thus we instruct the trial court 
on remand to comply with the ICWA. 
¶ 12 
 
In 2016, the United States Department of the Interior promulgated regulations 
to promote the uniform application of the ICWA codified at subpart I of 25 C.F.R. 
pt. 23. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.101–.144 (2019); Indian 
Child Welfare Act Proceedings; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,777, 38,782 (June 14, 
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23); see also In re E.J.B., 375 N.C. 95, 101 (2020). 
¶ 13 
 
The provisions under subpart I do not affect proceedings initiated prior to 
12 December 2016, but the provisions “apply to any subsequent proceeding in the 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the custody or placement of the 
same child.” 25 C.F.R. § 23.143. A child custody proceeding includes “any action 
resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii). 
¶ 14 
 
Pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a), 
[s]tate courts must ask each participant in an emergency 
or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding 
whether the participant knows or has reason to know that 
the child is an Indian child. The inquiry is made at the 
commencement of the proceeding and all responses should 
be on the record. State courts must instruct the parties to 
inform the court if they subsequently receive information 
that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child. 
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a). 
¶ 15 
 
As defined in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), “ ‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person 
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is 
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of 
an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). “ ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian tribe, band, 
nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for 
the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, 
including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of title 43.” 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903(8); see Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,554, 7,554 (Jan. 29, 2021). 
¶ 16 
 
“The inquiry into whether a child is an ‘Indian child’ under ICWA is focused on 
only two circumstances: (1) Whether the child is a citizen of a Tribe; or (2) whether 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the child’s parent is a citizen of the Tribe and the child is also eligible for citizenship.” 
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,804. The inquiry 
“is not based on the race of the child, but rather indications that the child and her 
parent(s) may have a political affiliation with a Tribe [as defined in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1903].” Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,806; 
see also Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 38,801 
(“ ‘Indian child’ is defined based on the child’s political affiliation with a federally 
recognized Indian Tribe.”). 
¶ 17 
 
Paragraph (c) of 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 states: 
(c) A court, upon conducting the inquiry required in 
paragraph (a) of this section, has reason to know that a 
child involved in an emergency or child-custody proceeding 
is an Indian child if: 
(1) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court 
involved 
in 
the 
proceeding, 
Indian 
Tribe, 
Indian 
organization, or agency informs the court that the child is 
an Indian child; 
(2) Any participant in the proceeding, officer of the court 
involved 
in 
the 
proceeding, 
Indian 
Tribe, 
Indian 
organization, or agency informs the court that it has 
discovered information indicating that the child is an 
Indian child; 
(3) The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives 
the court reason to know he or she is an Indian child; 
(4) The court is informed that the domicile or residence 
of the child, the child’s parent, or the child’s Indian 
custodian is on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village; 
(5) The court is informed that the child is or has been a 
ward of a Tribal court; or 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
(6) The court is informed that either parent or the child 
possesses an identification card indicating membership in 
an Indian Tribe. 
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c). 
¶ 18 
 
As the termination-of-parental-rights hearing occurred after 12 December 
2016 and the trial court did not ask the participants on the record whether the 
participants knew or had reason to know that Mary is an Indian child, the trial court 
did not comply with 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a). Since the trial court did not comply with 
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a), the trial court could not comply with 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) and 
could not determine whether it had reason to know Mary is an Indian child. See 25 
C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (“A court, upon conducting the inquiry required in paragraph (a) of 
this section, has reason to know that a child involved in an emergency or child-custody 
proceeding is an Indian child if . . . .”). 
¶ 19 
 
Therefore, on remand, the trial court “must ask each participant in [the 
termination-of-parental-rights proceeding] whether the participant knows or has 
reason to know that the child is an Indian child” on the record and receive the 
participants’ responses on the record. 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a). The trial court “must 
instruct the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that 
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” Id. This should be done 
promptly upon remand before holding a new termination-of-parental-rights hearing. 
If there is reason to know that Mary is an Indian child, the trial court must comply 
IN RE M.L.B. 
2021-NCSC-51 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
with 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(b), and DSS, as the party seeking termination of parental 
rights, must comply with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) and 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d). See In re 
E.J.B., 375 N.C. at 104–05 (discussing notice requirements under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 
and 25 C.F.R. § 23.111(d)).3 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 20 
 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the termination-of-
parental-rights order and remand this case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing 
on termination of respondents’ parental rights and to comply with the requirements 
of ICWA. Given our disposition of this appeal, we decline to address respondents’ 
remaining arguments on appeal. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
                                            
3 All participants should become familiar with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 
codified at 25 U.S.C. ch. 21, and the corresponding regulations, including but not limited to 
the regulations codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.101–.144, to ensure compliance with the ICWA 
and to assert objections on the record if compliance in a proceeding has not occurred.