Case Title: State v. Bean

Citation: 163 Vt 457, 658 A.2d 940

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_BEAN.94-138; 163 Vt 457; 658 A.2d 940

[Filed 31-Mar-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-138


                                                  Supreme Court
State of Vermont
                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  District Court of Vermont,
     v.                                           Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

                                                  November Term, 1994
Ronald Bean


Francis B. McCaffrey, J.

Peter R. Neary, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
plaintiff-appellant 

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Defender,
Montpelier, for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.  The State of Vermont appeals an order of the Rutland
District Court granting defendant Ronald Bean's motion to suppress
incriminating statements and an attempted guilty plea made by defendant to
the trial court during two hearings in which he was not represented by
counsel.  The State contends that the trial court erred in ruling that
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, as
secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Chapter
I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution, and, further, erred in suppressing
the statements and guilty plea.  We affirm. 

     On February 18, 1993, defendant was arrested for violating an abuse
prevention order, and the next day, he was brought before the Rutland
District Court pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 5. The affidavit of the arresting
officer expressed concern about defendant's mental health, noting that he had
recently been in two psychiatric hospitals, that he said "he believes he is
the reincarnation of Christ," and that he was talking of suicide to bring
inner peace.  Although 

 

defendant had talked with a public defender prior to his appearance, he
rejected her representation.  In response to questions from the judge,
defendant stated that he had been denied use of the telephone to contact "my
proper counsel," who practiced in another state. When asked whether he would
like to represent himself, defendant answered, "For now, yes, sir."  He would
not sign a waiver, however, stating, "I am having a really hard time right
now." 

     The court then proceeded to provide defendant the information required
by V.R.Cr.P. 5(d), including that anything that defendant said "here can be
used against you during prosecution of the case."  The court stated: 


     If you don't wish to be arraigned today, you can wait until
     Monday, that would be the next arraignment day.  You are
     allowed to speak with family and friends before entering a plea
     today.

The court asked defendant if he would like to read the information and
affidavit.  Once he had read the information and affidavit, defendant began
asking questions and making statements about the charges and his rights.  The
court did nothing to stop defendant's questions or statements.  In the course
of his comments, defendant stated: "I know this can be used against me, I was
planning on killing that woman that night."  He described that he had an axe
ready to split her head open, and wood ready to burn her body, but he could
not get her to say anything "that I could kill her for."  After some more
comments by defendant, the court entered a pro forma not guilty plea for
defendant, scheduled an arraignment for the following Monday, continued cash
bail, and ordered a psychiatric examination of defendant. 

     On February 22, 1993, defendant appeared before the district court for
arraignment.  By this time, the State had added the charge of kidnapping to
the charge of violating an abuse prevention order.  Defendant stated he would
not "go with this lawyer," referring to the public defender, and demanded "to
go pro se."  The court allowed defendant to proceed, and another rambling
discussion ensued.  Defendant first asked not to plead "until time of trial."
At that point, the court entered a not guilty plea for defendant.  When the
court asked defendant whether 

 

he wanted to represent himself at all stages of the proceedings, defendant
once again alluded to the out-of-state attorney with whom he had yet to
consult, and stated that he wanted to leave open the option of obtaining an
attorney.  The court commented that obtaining an attorney was advisable due
to the serious nature of the charges.  Defendant then abruptly announced that
he wanted to plead guilty to both charges.  The trial court would not accept
defendant's changed plea, and the proceeding ended. 

     The public defender subsequently assumed defendant's representation and
moved to suppress the incriminating statements and the rejected guilty
plea.(FN1)  In an opinion dated January 30, 1994, the trial court granted the
motion.  The court ruled that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was
not knowing and intelligent on either of the occasions involved.  Because
defendant had not waived his right to counsel, the court found his statements
could not be used against him.  The State has taken an interlocutory appeal
from this ruling as it affects the kidnapping charge.(FN2)

     We take the issues in the order they were decided by the trial court. 
The first issue is whether there was a valid waiver of the right to counsel. 
Both the Vermont and United States Constitutions provide an accused a right
to counsel.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10.  The right
can be waived if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently.  See State
v. Pollard, 6 Vt. L.Wk. 4, 6 (Jan. 20, 1995).  Waiver of this right will not
be inferred from 

 

doubtful conduct, however, and courts "will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver."  In re Huard, 125 Vt. 189, 194,