Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Daniel Parks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP85-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daniel Parks, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PARKS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 11, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. HAGEDRON, J., dissents, joined by REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, J. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Daniel Parks, Peyton B. Engel, and Hurley, Burish & Stanton, 
S.C., Madison.  
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Brenda K. Sunby, Wausau. 
 
 
2021 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP85-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Daniel Parks, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,   
 
 
Complaint-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Daniel Parks, 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
FEB 11, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.  Reinstatement denied.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review a report filed by Referee John 
Nicholas Schweitzer, recommending that the court reinstate 
Attorney Daniel Parks' license to practice law in Wisconsin.  
After careful review, we disagree with the recommendation and we 
deny Attorney Parks' reinstatement petition.  We direct Attorney 
Parks to pay the full costs of this reinstatement proceeding, 
which are $6,370.43 as of July 16, 2020.  
¶2 
Attorney Parks was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in September 1991.  In 2013, Attorney Parks announced 
he was leaving the law firm where he had been employed for 18 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
2 
 
years.  Following Attorney Parks' departure, the law firm filed 
a grievance with the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) stating, 
among other things, that it had discovered that Attorney Parks 
had performed unauthorized legal work "on the side" ("non-firm 
work") while employed by the firm.  An investigation ensued and 
in 2016, the OLR filed a disciplinary complaint against Attorney 
Parks, alleging 19 counts of professional misconduct and seeking 
a two-year license suspension.  
¶3 
Following extensive litigation, amended complaints, 
and an appeal, this court accepted the referee's conclusion that 
Attorney Parks had committed eight of 14 alleged counts of 
misconduct.1  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Parks, 
2018 WI 110, 384 Wis. 2d 635, 920 N.W.2d 505.  We suspended 
Attorney Parks' law license for 14 months for:  
 Earning fees from non-firm legal work while employed 
by the firm, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 
(SCR) 20:8.4(c) and SCR 20:8.4(f);  
 Arranging for two clients to perform work for him in 
exchange for a reduction of legal fees and otherwise  
reducing attorney fees without the firm's permission, 
in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and SCR 20:8.4(f);  
 Accepting an unauthorized $5,000 "gift" from two 
clients 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
and 
SCR 20:8.4(f); 
                                                 
1 The OLR twice amended its complaint, dismissing five 
counts. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
3 
 
 Working on client files on an unsecured offsite 
computer belonging to another person, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.6(a); and  
 Obtaining two signatures on a "release" designed to 
limit Attorney Parks' liability, without properly 
clarifying his role in the matter in violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c).2  
¶4 
In January 2020, Attorney Parks filed a petition for 
reinstatement.3  The OLR opposed Attorney Parks' petition for 
three primary reasons: (1) the OLR had learned of an action 
involving Attorney Parks' insurance license; (2) the OLR had 
concerns about aspects of Attorney Parks' 2018 tax returns; and 
(3) the OLR argued that Attorney Parks' failure to reimburse his 
                                                 
2 We dismissed five counts of alleged misconduct.  Several 
of these counts alleged improper dealings with a friend and 
client, C.D., involving a personal loan, SCR 20:1.8(a) and (b); 
providing her with a form for a will, SCR 20:1.7(a)(2); 
transferring the title of a vehicle, SCR 20:8.4(c); arranging 
for a rent payment, SCR 20:8.4(c); and failure to clarify the 
scope 
of 
his 
representation 
of 
two 
relatives 
of 
C.D., 
SCR 20:1.7(a)(2).  A claim of noncooperation with the OLR, 
SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h), was also 
dismissed. 
3 By order effective January 1, 2021, this court amended a 
number of supreme court rules pertaining to lawyer disciplinary 
procedures, 
including 
rules 
governing 
reinstatement 
from 
disciplinary suspension, SCR 22.29 through 22.33.  S. Ct. Order 
19-06, 19-07, 19-08, 19-09, 19-10, 19-11, and 19-12, 2020 WI 62 
(issued June 30, 2020, eff. Jan. 1, 2021).  The rules amended 
pursuant to that order apply to reinstatement proceedings 
commenced after January 1, 2021. Therefore, this reinstatement 
proceeding is governed by the prior rules, in effect at the time 
of the reinstatement petition. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
4 
 
former firm and two clients reflected adversely on his request 
for reinstatement.     
¶5 
On 
May 
29, 
2020, 
the 
parties 
filed 
a 
partial 
stipulation regarding Attorney Parks' insurance license.  The 
referee conducted an evidentiary hearing on the reinstatement 
petition in June 2020.  On June 24, 2020, the referee filed a 
report recommending that this court grant Attorney Parks' 
reinstatement petition and impose the costs of the reinstatement 
proceeding on Attorney Parks.  Neither party appealed from the 
referee's recommendation so we consider this matter pursuant to 
SCR 22.33(3).4 
¶6 
The 
standards 
that 
apply 
to 
a 
petition 
for 
reinstatement after a disciplinary suspension are set forth in 
SCR 22.31(1).5   The petitioning attorney must demonstrate by 
                                                 
4 SCR 22.33(3) provides:  "If no appeal is timely filed, the 
supreme 
court 
shall 
review 
the 
referee's 
report, 
order 
reinstatement, with or without conditions, deny reinstatement, 
or order the parties to file briefs in the matter."  
5 SCR 22.31(1) provides the petitioner has the burden 
of 
demonstrating, 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence, all of the following:  
(a) That he or she has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  
(b) That his or her resumption of the practice of 
law will not be detrimental to the administration of 
justice or subversive of the public interest.  
(c) That his or her representations in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
(m) 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated.  
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
5 
 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the attorney 
has the moral character necessary to practice law in this state, 
that the attorney's resumption of the practice of law will not 
be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest, and that the attorney has complied fully 
with the terms of the suspension or revocation order and the 
requirements 
of 
SCR 
22.26. 
 
In 
addition, 
SCR 22.31(1) 
incorporates the statements that a petition for reinstatement 
must contain pursuant to SCR 22.29(4)(a)-(k) and (4m).6  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) That he or she has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
6 SCR 22.29(4)(a)-(k) and (4m) provides that a petition 
for reinstatement shall show all of the following:  
(a) The 
petitioner 
desires 
to 
have 
the 
petitioner's license reinstated.  
(b) The petitioner has not practiced law during 
the period of suspension or revocation.  
(c) The petitioner has complied fully with the 
terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated.  
(d) The petitioner has maintained competence and 
learning in the law by attendance at identified 
educational activities.  
(e) The petitioner's conduct since the suspension 
or revocation has been exemplary and above reproach.  
(f) The petitioner has a proper understanding of 
and attitude toward the standards that are imposed 
upon members of the bar and will act in conformity 
with the standards.  
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
6 
 
the petitioning attorney needs to demonstrate that the required 
representations in the reinstatement petition are substantiated.  
¶7 
On review, we accept a referee's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  We review a referee's legal 
conclusions, including whether the attorney has satisfied the 
criteria for reinstatement, on a de novo basis.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jennings, 2011 WI 45, ¶39, 334 
Wis. 2d 335, 801 N.W.2d 304; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gral, 2010 WI 14, ¶22, 323 Wis. 2d 280, 779 N.W.2d 168.  
We 
benefit 
from 
the 
referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusions, 
particularly when, as here, the referee has provided us with 
such a thoughtful and well-structured report.  However, we are 
                                                                                                                                                             
(g) The petitioner can safely be recommended to 
the legal profession, the courts and the public as a 
person fit to be consulted by others and to represent 
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration 
of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of 
the courts.  
(h) The petitioner has fully complied with the 
requirements set forth in SCR 22.26.  
(j) The petitioner's proposed use of the license 
if reinstated.  
(k) A full description of all of the petitioner's 
business activities during the period of suspension or 
revocation.  
(4m) The petitioner has made restitution to or 
settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to 
the Wisconsin lawyers' fund for client protection for 
all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the 
petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability 
to do so. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
7 
 
not bound by the referee's recommendation or by the OLR's 
restitution policy.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Nussburger, 2009 WI 103, 321 Wis. 2d 576, 775 N.W.2d 525; 
see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Langer, 213 
Wis. 2d 125, 569 N.W.2d 465 (1997).  The ultimate determination 
of who may practice law in Wisconsin remains with this court.  
Here, we accept the referee's findings, but we reach a different 
conclusion of law with respect to SCRs 22.29(4)(e),(4m) and 
22.31(1)(a).   
¶8 
The OLR did not dispute and the referee found that 
Attorney Parks satisfied a number of the requirements for 
reinstatement.  He demonstrated that he desires to have his 
license reinstated, SCR 22.29(4)(a); that he has not practiced 
law during the period of his suspension, SCR 22.29(4)(b); that 
he has complied fully with the terms of the order of suspension 
and will continue to comply with them until his license is 
reinstated, 
SCR 22.29(4)(c);7 
and 
that 
he 
has 
maintained 
competence and learning in the law, SCR 22.29(4)(d).8  The 
referee found that Attorney Parks fully complied with the 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
SCR 
22.26 
as 
required 
by 
                                                 
7 The referee observed that although Attorney Parks has not 
paid off the costs of the underlying disciplinary proceeding, he 
entered into and is complying with a payment plan. 
8 The Board of Bar Examiners filed a memorandum stating that 
Attorney Parks "is currently in compliance with the court's CLE 
and EPR requirements for reinstatement."  The record reflects 
Attorney Parks' successful completion of numerous continuing 
legal education classes. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
8 
 
SCR 22.29(4)(h); explained how he would use his license if 
reinstated, SCR 22.29(4)(j); and outlined his activities during 
his suspension, SCR 22.29(4)(k).  We accept the referee's 
findings and conclusions with respect to these criteria. 
¶9 
The 
more 
challenging 
questions 
involved 
whether 
Attorney Parks has the moral character to practice law in 
Wisconsin, as required by SCR 22.31(1)(a), and whether he met 
his burden with respect to SCR 22.29(4)(e) (requiring that the 
petitioner's conduct since the suspension has been exemplary and 
above reproach); SCR 22.29(4)(f) (requiring that the petitioner 
has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in 
conformity with the standards); SCR 22.29(4)(g) (requiring that 
the 
petitioner 
can 
safely 
be 
recommended 
to 
the 
legal 
profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in 
matters of trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an 
officer of the courts).  Another concern pertains to Attorney 
Parks' obligation to make restitution to or settle all claims of 
persons injured or harmed by petitioner's misconduct, including 
reimbursement 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Lawyers' 
Fund 
for 
Client 
Protection for all payments made from that fund, or, if not his 
explanation 
of 
the 
failure 
or 
inability 
to 
do 
so.  
SCR 22.29(4m).  Failure to satisfy this criterion bears, in 
turn, on whether a petitioner has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  SCR 22.31(1)(a). 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
9 
 
I.  THE INSURANCE LICENSE INVESTIGATION 
¶10 The referee's findings with respect to the insurance 
license matter derive from a partial stipulation executed by the 
parties as well as evidence from the reinstatement hearing.  In 
1998, Attorney Parks was licensed by the Office of the 
Commissioner 
of 
Insurance 
(OCI) 
as 
a 
Wisconsin 
resident 
insurance intermediary, which authorized him to sell life, fixed 
and variable annuities, accident and health insurance.  To hold 
this particular license, Wisconsin residents must maintain 
active Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Series 6 
or 7 Registration (FINRA Registration) and provide OCI with a 
"Central Registration Depository" number.  
¶11 The parties stipulated that Attorney Parks was duly 
registered through April 2014.  However, from April 2014 to 
January 24, 2019, Attorney Parks did not have the appropriate 
FINRA registration.9  Yet, in his 2017 insurance license renewal 
application, Attorney Parks indicated that he was eligible to 
continue to hold the Variable Life/Variable Annuity lines of 
authority10 and he failed to timely notify the OCI that he was 
ineligible to hold the Variable Life/Variable Annuity lines of 
authority due to the termination of his FINRA registration.11  He 
                                                 
9 The OCI found that this oversight violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 628.04(2) and Wis. Admin. Code § Ins. 6.59(4)(an). 
10 The OCI found that this representation violated Wis. 
Admin. Code § Ins. 6.59(5)(b) and (d)l and 3. 
11 The OCI found that this oversight violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 628.08. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
10 
 
also failed to disclose to the OCI the lawyer disciplinary 
proceeding that was then pending against him, as well as his 
business address.12  Ultimately, Attorney Parks and the OCI 
resolved the insurance matter by stipulation.  Attorney Parks 
consented to the revocation of his insurance license, the 
imposition of a forfeiture, and the condition that he not seek 
relicensure in the future.   
¶12 At the reinstatement hearing Attorney Parks was 
questioned at length about this issue.  Attorney Parks explained 
that when he obtained and later renewed his insurance license he 
sought guidance from an insurance professional, an individual 
who was a financial advisor and a regional vice-president for 
Primerica, for whom Attorney Parks worked at the time.  Attorney 
Parks explained that in 2014, Primerica informed its agents that 
they considered estate planning to present a possible conflict 
of interest with certain types of insurance; anyone who was 
doing both should give one up.  So, Attorney Parks opted to 
resign from Primerica in April 2014 in order to continue his 
estate planning practice.   
¶13 Attorney Parks explained that as he was no longer 
associated with an insurance company he knew he could no longer 
                                                 
12 The OCI found that this failure violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 628.04(8) and Wis. Admin. Code §§ Ins. 6.59(5)(b), (d)(1), and 
6.61(16)(a) and (d).  Attorney Parks did not timely notify the 
OCI within 30 days of the formal complaint filed by OLR on 
January 12, 2016, or of this court's December 13, 2018 order.  
The OCI found that this violated Wis. Stat. § 628.08 and Wis. 
Admin. Code § Ins. 6.61(16)(a) and (d). 
 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
11 
 
sell insurance or act as an insurance agent and he ceased doing 
so.  It was not disputed that Attorney Parks has not engaged in 
the insurance business since October 2012.  Attorney Parks 
testified that neither he nor the professional he consulted 
realized that he should have reported the termination of his 
appointment with Primerica to the OCI. 
¶14 In 2017, Attorney Parks decided to renew his insurance 
license in order to maintain a hard-earned credential.  He 
stated that he reviewed the renewal application with the 
individual mentioned above, and testified that neither of them 
interpreted a question on the license application as requiring 
him to report the then-pending OLR action.  He testified that 
neither of them realized that because an insurance license in 
Wisconsin has a variable annuity component that remains intact 
even with a loss of FINRA Registration, Attorney Parks was 
impliedly asserting in his renewal application that he was still 
eligible to sell variable life and variable annuity products.  
The referee was satisfied with Attorney Parks' explanation and 
found that these violations were not intentional. 
¶15 As the referee observed, the OCI matter is relevant 
not for the violations per se, but rather as they inform whether 
Attorney Parks "has a proper understanding of and attitude 
toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar 
and will act in conformity with the standards," and whether he 
"can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts, 
and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to 
represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
12 
 
confidence and in general to aid in the administration of 
justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts."  
SCR 22.29(4)(f) and (g).  The referee noted that this incident 
occurred before Attorney Parks' law license suspension, and that 
Attorney Parks admitted that he bore the ultimate responsibility 
for his actions.  The referee found Attorney Parks' testimony 
credible 
and 
opined 
that 
by 
obtaining 
and 
relying 
on 
professional 
advice, 
Attorney 
Parks 
exhibited 
appropriate 
judgment and sought to act properly.  The referee commented that 
his errors were "greatly mitigated by his genuine attempts to 
get it right."   
¶16 The referee then considered Attorney Parks' failure to 
fully disclose to the OCI the scope of his attorney misconduct. 
Specifically, in his answer to the OCI's complaint, Attorney 
Parks admitted having been found to have committed eight counts 
of professional misconduct.  However, he denied the remaining 
characterizations in the paragraph, i.e. that he was found to 
have committed eight counts of misconduct "including acts of 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation 
against 
a 
client."  
¶17 The referee acknowledged the OLR's legitimate concern 
that "this appears to be an attempt to minimize his culpability, 
which would cast doubt on his truthfulness, his understanding of 
his 
responsibilities, 
and 
his 
fitness 
to 
be 
consulted."  
Attorney Parks took the position that that not all of the eight 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
involved 
violations 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) (i.e. acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
13 
 
misrepresentation against a client).  So, he reasoned that the 
phrase "eight counts of professional misconduct as an attorney, 
including acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation 
against a client" was "technically" inaccurate.  The referee 
deemed Attorney Parks' explanation credible and concluded that 
he satisfied SCRs 22.29(4)(f) and (g) and that the OCI matter 
should not preclude his reinstatement to the practice of law.  
We accept the referee's findings and conclusions with respect to 
this matter. 
II.  2018 TAX RETURNS 
¶18 Shortly before the reinstatement hearing, the OLR 
expressed concern about a deduction that Attorney Parks claimed 
on his 2018 tax return.  At the hearing, Attorney Parks' tax 
preparer 
testified 
and 
opined 
that 
the 
deduction 
was 
appropriate, and noted that a different tax preparer had claimed 
the same deduction the previous year.  
¶19 Again, the issue is not whether the deduction was 
improper, per se, but whether it reflects adversely on Attorney 
Parks' ability to demonstrate that his conduct has been 
exemplary and above reproach.  SCR 22.29(4)(e).  The referee 
noted that the OLR presented no testimony to contradict the tax 
preparer's opinion.  The referee noted favorably that Attorney 
Parks not only relied on his tax preparer's advice, but also 
specifically asked about that item while preparing his tax 
returns.  The referee concluded that Attorney Parks' handling of 
the 
tax 
question 
should 
not 
preclude 
Attorney 
Parks' 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
14 
 
reinstatement.  We accept the referee's findings and conclusion 
with respect to the tax question. 
III.  FAILURE TO REIMBURSE FIRM AND CLIENTS 
¶20 We turn to the issue that causes us to reject this 
reinstatement petition.  The OLR suggests that Attorney Parks' 
failure to reimburse his former law firm for legal fees he 
diverted from it, or to reimburse certain clients for an 
improperly solicited "gift," should preclude his reinstatement.13  
To be clear, the OLR did not seek restitution in the underlying 
disciplinary proceeding, citing its restitution policy.14  The 
underlying disciplinary referee did not recommend restitution 
and we did not order it.  Parks, 2018 WI 110, ¶1. 
¶21 However, the OLR now contends that Attorney Parks' 
failure to voluntarily reimburse the firm and these clients 
reflects 
"a 
degree 
of 
potential 
callousness 
or 
lack 
of 
responsibility for his conduct."  The OLR suggests this omission 
                                                 
13 The OLR indicated that at least one member of the 
former firm thought Attorney Parks should have repaid the 
firm. 
14 In 2007, the OLR formulated a policy whereby it seeks 
restitution only under the following circumstances: 
 The grievant's or respondent's rights in a collateral 
proceeding will not likely be prejudiced; 
 The funds to be restored do not constitute incidental or 
consequential damages; 
 The funds to be restored were in the respondent lawyer's 
direct control; and 
 There is a reasonably ascertainable amount. 
 
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussburger, 
2009 WI 103, 321 Wis. 2d 576, 775 N.W.2d 525. 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
15 
 
reflects 
adversely 
on 
Attorney 
Parks' 
conduct 
since 
his 
suspension, 
SCR 
22.29(4)(e), 
and 
may 
not 
wholly 
satisfy 
SCR 22.29(4m).15  The OLR asserted that "at the least that Parks 
should 
satisfactorily 
explain 
to 
the 
referee 
at 
the 
reinstatement proceeding why despite a finding of dishonesty by 
the Court, Parks has apparently made no effort to pay or repay 
the firm" or the others affected by his misconduct.  
¶22 The 
referee 
analyzed 
this 
issue 
carefully 
and 
concluded that Attorney Parks' failure to reimburse the firm and 
his former clients should not be the basis for denying his 
petition for reinstatement.  We disagree.  
¶23 In the underlying disciplinary proceeding, Attorney 
Parks admitted that he performed legal work "on the side" for 
over 30 clients and that he collected at least $13,875 in fees 
that he deposited into his personal account.  Although Attorney 
Parks insisted that he had discretion over the cases he accepted 
and that he was authorized to reduce fees, for example to 
facilitate a settlement that might otherwise fail, the firm's 
partners categorically denied that the firm had ever authorized 
him to work "on the side" or to unilaterally reduce legal fees.  
                                                 
15 The OLR's response references a potential failure to 
satisfy SCR 22.29(4)(k).  This appears to be a scrivener's 
error.  Subparagraph (k) pertains to a lawyer's activities 
during suspension.  Supreme Court Rule 22.29 (4m) requires a 
petitioner to have made "restitution to or settled all claims of 
persons injured or harmed by petitioner's misconduct, including 
reimbursement 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
lawyers' 
fund 
for 
client 
protection for all payments made from the fund, or, if not, the 
petitioner's explanation for the failure or inability to do so."   
 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
16 
 
The underlying record was replete with mutual accusations of 
lying; many of the disciplinary issues turned on credibility 
assessments.  At the end of the day, neither the referee nor 
this court was persuaded by Attorney Parks' explanations.  We 
determined that he made unauthorized fee reductions, and/or 
accepted services that benefitted him personally in exchange for 
a reduction of legal fees, at the firm's expense.  He was 
disciplined, accordingly.   
¶24 Attorney Parks was also accused of misconduct in his 
dealings with C.D. and some of her relatives.  C.D. was, at 
various times, Attorney Parks' client, tenant, and personal 
friend from the early 1990s until her death in 2013.  She rented 
a home from Attorney Parks and she lent him money.  He served as 
her power of attorney, took her to medical appointments, and 
visited her.  In her will she partially forgave the loan she had 
made him and she bequeathed to him a number of personal 
household items.  Attorney Parks was also friends with C.D's 
daughter, L.E., and L.E.'s husband, T.E.  Attorney Parks 
represented T.E. in a personal injury case, wrote two wills for 
the couple, and was the best man at their wedding.  
¶25 The reimbursement dispute at issue here stems from 
T.E.'s personal injury case.  The firm's standard contingency 
fee agreement provided that the firm would receive 33 percent of 
any recovery for attorney fees.  Around the time of settlement, 
Attorney Parks unilaterally reduced the attorney fees from 33 
percent to 25 percent.  The firm received $12,000 less than it 
should have for the legal representation of T.E.  
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
17 
 
¶26 During this representation Attorney Parks repeatedly 
mentioned to T.E. and L.E. that clients sometimes gave him a 
"bonus."  When the couple arrived to collect their settlement 
money, Attorney Parks asked about "his $5,000 bonus."  L.E. 
wrote a $5,000 check and handed it to Attorney Parks.  He asked 
that she write "gift" on the memo line, which she did.  
¶27 Although Attorney Parks has maintained this was a 
gift, neither this court nor the referee in the underlying 
disciplinary case was persuaded.  The referee noted that the 
couple had little money at this time, and found that they felt 
compelled to give Attorney Parks the requested bonus.  The 
referee found that the "gift" was not the couple's idea; they 
felt they needed to pay it to receive their settlement.  We 
agreed and we ruled that by this conduct, Attorney Parks 
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) and SCR 20:8.4(f). 
¶28 At his reinstatement hearing, Attorney Parks was asked 
why he never repaid his former law firm the funds that he 
improperly diverted from it.  Attorney Parks responded that he 
not been ordered to do so, he'd had no communication with the 
firm since the underlying disciplinary hearing, and the firm had 
not asked for reimbursement.  Similarly, when asked why he had 
not repaid L.E. the $5,000 "gift" that was the basis of her 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
18 
 
grievance against him, Attorney Parks responded that she had 
never asked for it to be repaid.16 
¶29 The referee acknowledged that these were "not the most 
satisfying answers" to address what "might be considered 
'ethical' or 'moral' obligations."  The referee, however, was 
willing to accept that the absence of a restitution order in the 
underlying disciplinary case "surely had a reasoned basis, which 
should be accepted" and concluded that Attorney Parks' failure 
to make restitution in the absence of a restitution order should 
not preclude his reinstatement. 
¶30 We disagree.  The requirement to make restitution in 
SCR 22.29(4m) may include amounts due to those harmed by the 
lawyer's misconduct, even if restitution is not expressly 
ordered in the original disciplinary proceeding.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Woodard, 2012 WI 41, 340 
Wis. 2d 248, 812 N.W.2d 511.  On occasion we have ordered, as a 
condition of practice, that a lawyer make restitution payments 
after reinstatement from a license suspension, even when 
restitution was not ordered in the underlying disciplinary 
proceeding.  Id.  In Woodward, for example, shortly before the 
                                                 
16 In his report, the referee noted that L.E. was present at 
the reinstatement hearing, which was open to the public.  The 
referee noted that "somewhat ironically her only comment was to 
wish Mr. Parks the best of luck in the future."  L.E. was not a 
witness and thus was not cross-examined by either party so there 
is no additional context for her statement, which the referee 
described as "surprising and mysterious."  It is impossible on 
this record to ascertain what L.E. meant by this comment.   
 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
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reinstatement hearing, the lawyer sent a former client a check 
for $500 as "a full and final settlement" of an acknowledged 
$1,500 debt.  The client objected.  We reinstated the lawyer's 
law license but ordered the lawyer to reimburse the client in 
full, as a condition of continued practice.  Id. 
¶31 In this case, even if we were persuaded that Attorney 
Parks had satisfied all reinstatement criteria, imposing a 
restitution order as a condition of practice is not a viable 
option; the precise amount of the obligations are difficult to 
ascertain.  As the OLR explained at the time, "witness accounts 
differed and credibility uncertainties rendered the amounts at 
issue not reasonably ascertainable."  In any event, we deem 
Attorney Parks' explanation for his failure to make any effort 
to make restitution wholly inadequate to satisfy his burden to 
demonstrate compliance with SCR 22.29(4)(e) and (4m).  This 
omission also causes us to conclude that he has not demonstrated 
that he possesses the requisite moral character to practice law 
in this state.  See SCR 22.31(a). 
¶32 We are under no obligation to reinstate an attorney 
who has made no effort at all to make restitution to or settle 
all claims of persons injured or harmed by his misconduct.  
Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 
(1960) (observing that the practice of law is not a right but a 
privilege); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 2002 
WI 6, ¶4, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293 (stating that a 
petitioner seeking reinstatement does not enjoy a presumption of 
rehabilitation upon the expiration of a specified term of 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
20 
 
suspension).  Upon a showing that Attorney Parks has sought in 
good faith to address the requirements of SCR 22.29(4m), we will 
be more favorably disposed to a future reinstatement petition.  
Although a petitioner typically must wait nine months before 
seeking reinstatement after denial of a reinstatement petition, 
in this case we exercise our discretion to reduce that time.  
SCR 22.33(4); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 
2004 WI 19, 269 Wis. 2d 172, 675 N.W.2d 792.  Attorney Parks may 
seek reinstatement when he can demonstrate that he has addressed 
SCR 22.29(4m). 
¶33 Finally, it is our general practice to assess the full 
costs of a reinstatement proceeding against the petitioning 
attorney.  See SCR 22.24(1m).  The OLR's statement of costs 
indicates that the costs of this proceeding are $6,370.43 as of 
July 16, 2020.  We find no basis to depart from our general 
policy in this matter and we agree with the referee's 
recommendation 
that 
we 
impose 
the 
full 
costs 
of 
the 
reinstatement proceeding on Attorney Parks.   
¶34 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for reinstatement of 
Daniel Parks is denied.   
¶35 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
requirement 
in 
SCR 22.33(4) requiring a nine-month waiting period before filing 
a subsequent reinstatement petition is waived.  Daniel Parks may 
seek reinstatement upon a showing that he has addressed 
SCR 22.29(4m). 
¶36 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Daniel Parks shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
No. 
2016AP85-D   
 
21 
 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $6,370.43 as 
of July 16, 2020, or enter into a payment agreement plan with 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation for the full payment of costs 
over a period of time.   
 
 
No.  2016AP85-D.bh 
 
1 
 
¶37 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   (dissenting).  I would grant 
Attorney Parks' petition for reinstatement. 
¶38 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶39 
I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP85-D.bh 
 
1