Case Title: People v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89795

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 89795-Agenda 33-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								LEON MILLER, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Leon Miller, a 15-year-old juvenile, was charged
with two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)
(West 1996)) based upon accountability. Defendant was
transferred to the criminal division of the Cook County circuit
court and prosecuted as an adult. 705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West
1996). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of both
counts, and the State requested that the circuit court sentence
defendant to natural life imprisonment under the multiple-murder
provision of the Unified Code of Corrections. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996). The circuit court declined to
impose the statutorily mandated sentence, holding that application
of the statute to defendant would offend the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §11) and the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). Instead, the circuit court
sentenced defendant to a term of 50 years in prison. The State
appealed directly to this court. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
	On November 19, 1997, Tommy Jones and Keith Alexander
were shot and killed outside a Chicago apartment complex.
Defendant was among those charged with their murders. In a
court-reported statement made to the police and the prosecution
within hours of the shooting, defendant described the incident and
his participation therein.
	According to defendant, on the night of the murders, Arthur
Beckom and Kentrell Stoutmire observed people walking through
their neighborhood that they believed belonged to a rival gang.
Beckom and Stoutmire approached defendant, who was standing
outside on a corner in the neighborhood, and asked him to stand
as a lookout. Defendant saw that both Beckom and Stoutmire had
guns in their possession, and although defendant never handled or
touched the guns, he agreed to stand as a lookout. One minute
later, Beckom and Stoutmire fired gunshots in the direction of
Jones and Alexander, who both died as a result of their injuries.
Once the shooting began, defendant ran to his girlfriend's house.
	Four individuals were charged for their participation in the
shooting. The first degree murder indictment charged Stoutmire
and Beckom as the alleged shooters and defendant and another 15-year-old male, Douglas Baskerville, for their participation as
lookouts. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996). At separate jury
trials, Beckom and Baskerville were acquitted. Stoutmire, who
was 17 years old at the time of the murders, was convicted and
sentenced to natural life in prison. Defendant was also convicted
of the murders. At sentencing, however, through amicus curiae,
the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, defendant argued that a
sentence of natural life imprisonment, pursuant to the multiple-murder sentencing statute, violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution, the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment contained within the federal constitution, as
well as international law, which prohibits the imposition of a
natural life sentence on a juvenile. Conversely, the State argued
that the circuit court was obligated by the statute to impose a
sentence of natural life imprisonment.
	At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the circuit court
discussed its inability to sentence defendant pursuant to the terms
of the multiple-murder sentencing statute:
		"I have from the moment that the Jury came back with
their findings been very concerned about what this meant,
what this meant to [defendant] as a 15-year-old child,
what this meant to society at large, to be part of a society
where a 15-year-old child on a theory of accountability
only, passive accountability, would suffer a sentence of
life in the Penitentiary without the possibility of parole.
*** I feel that it is clear that in my mind this is blatantly
unfair and highly unconscionable, and let me state that I
do not believe for a second that Mr. Miller is innocent of
these charges. I believe he received a fair trial. I believe
he was adequately represented. I believe he was proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and I believe he should
suffer harsh criminal consequences for acting as a look-out in this case, but to suggest that he ought to receive a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, I find to
be very, very hard to swallow to the point where I can
describe it as unconscionable. I am concerned that a
person under the age of 18 under Illinois law can do
everything that John Gacy did, can torture and abuse and
murder over 30 people, and would be in the same boat as
[defendant] right now looking at a sentence of a minimum
and maximum of life without the possibility of parole.
* * *
			I have a 15-year-old child who was passively acting as
a look-out for other people, never picked up a gun, never
had much more than-perhaps less than a minute-to
contemplate what this entire incident is about, and he is in
the same situation as a serial killer for sentencing
purposes."
	The circuit court then concluded: "[A]s applied to
[defendant], and by that I mean as a juvenile on the strict theory of
accountability, that the [multiple-murder sentencing statute] as
applied to him is unconstitutional under both Illinois and Federal
law and it violates the Illinois Constitution under the
proportionality section, and it violates the 8th Amendment of the
United States Constitution." Defendant was sentenced to a term of
50 years' imprisonment.

ANALYSIS
	In this appeal, we address whether the multiple-murder
sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile
offender convicted under a theory of accountability.
	At the outset, we recognize that this case presents an issue of
jurisdiction. The State invokes this court's jurisdiction pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). However, Rule
302(a) does not provide a basis for the State to appeal in this case:
Rule 302(a) applies to civil, not criminal, cases. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
612.
	Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603) would appear to
provide a criminal counterpart to Rule 302(a). Rule 603 provides:
			"Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the
United States or of this State has been held invalid and
appeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit
courts imposing a sentence of death shall lie directly to
the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals
in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court."
Yet, in People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151 (1997), this court held
that Rule 603 only specifies what court should hear the case and
does not afford the State an independent basis for appellate review.
In Truitt, the State appealed a pretrial ruling made by the circuit
court that section 115-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was
unconstitutional. We held that the State's right to appeal was
limited to the situations identified in Supreme Court Rule
604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)):
			"Initially, the State claimed that we had jurisdiction
pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). That
rule, however, does not apply to criminal appeals. 134 Ill.
2d R. 612. Once it realized this, the State next invoked
Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603) ***:
				***
			The problem with reliance on this rule is that it was not
intended to create an independent basis for appellate
review. It merely specifies which court should hear a case
that is otherwise appealable. Where, as here, the State
takes issue with a nonfinal order entered by the circuit
court in a criminal case, the threshold question of whether
that order is appealable by the State is determined
exclusively by Rule 604(a)(1)." [citation] Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d  at 151.
Rule 604(a) restricts the State's right to appeal in criminal cases
to those orders or judgments which have the substantive effect of
(1) dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in
section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/114-1 (West 1994)); (2) arresting judgment because of a
defective indictment, information or complaint; (3) quashing an
arrest or search warrant; or (4) suppressing evidence. 145 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1). We held that because the circuit court order did not fall
within Rule 604(a), jurisdiction was lacking. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d  at
151.
	However, two years later we silently deviated from our
holding in Truitt and exercised jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 603
in a case procedurally similar to the present case. In People v.
Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), this court considered the
constitutionality of a mandatory sentencing provision held
unconstitutional by the trial court at sentencing. Similar to the case
before us, in Wooters, the State directly appealed to this court
based upon the trial court's finding that the sentencing statute was
unconstitutional. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d  at 504. Despite our holding
in Truitt, we considered the appeal under Rule 603 without
reference to either Rule 604(a) or Truitt.
	Likewise, we consider the instant appeal under Rule 603.
Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution of 1970, this court has the sole
authority to regulate procedure with respect to appeals in criminal
cases, subject to the limitations of the double jeopardy clauses. See
U.S. const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10.
Consistent with this authority, we find that this court must have
the ability to review, in the first instance, a declaration of
unconstitutionality arising in the circuit court. A finding of
unconstitutionality in criminal cases by a circuit court affects the
prosecution of the case and the future prosecution of similar cases.
See People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 246-47 (1980) ("[s]ociety also
has a broader, secondary interest in the coherent development of
the law. *** The denial of review in a particular case may thus
affect not only the ability of the State to prosecute a particular case
but also its ability to prosecute similar cases in the future").
Moreover, our finding that Rule 603 affords the State a basis of
independent review corrects the unreasonable result created by
Truitt. Specifically, we note that the State may appeal as of right
"whenever a question arising under the constitution of the United
States or this State arises for the first time in the appellate court or
as a result of the action of the appellate court." 177 Ill. 2d R.
612(b) (adopting civil appeal Rule 317 in criminal cases). Under
Rule 612, had the circuit court rejected defendant's challenge that
the statute was unconstitutional and, on appeal, the appellate court
declared the statute unconstitutional this court's jurisdiction would
be clear. No purpose is served by limiting the State's right of
appeal when a circuit court, rather than the appellate court,
invalidates a statute on constitutional grounds. Therefore, we find
that our holding in Truitt with respect to Rule 603 and the State's
ability to directly appeal a circuit court's finding of
unconstitutionality was overly broad. Accordingly, we exercise
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Rule 603.
	Turning to the merits, our review begins with the presumption
that the statute is constitutional. Because of this presumption, the
party challenging the statute bears the burden of showing its
invalidity. People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 501 (1997); People v.
Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330, 333 (1996). A circuit court's finding that
a statute is unconstitutional is reviewed de novo. People v.
Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).
	The multiple-murder sentencing statute provides, in pertinent
part:
			"(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute
defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a
felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court
under this Section, according to the following limitations:
				(1) for first degree murder,
* * *
					(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment when the death
penalty is not imposed if the defendant,
						***
						(ii) is a person who, at the time of the
commission of the murder, had attained the age
of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an
individual under 12 years of age; or, irrespective
of the defendant's age at the time of the
commission of the offense, is found guilty of
murdering more than one victim[.]" 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996).
	We have repeatedly recognized that the legislature has
discretion to prescribe penalties for defined offenses. See People
v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984). The legislature's discretion
necessarily includes the power to prescribe mandatory sentences,
even if these mandatory sentences restrict the judiciary's discretion
in imposing sentences. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 208. However, the
power to impose sentences is not without limitation; the penalty
must satisfy constitutional constrictions. See Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at
502; People v. Morris, 136 Ill. 2d 157, 161 (1990); People ex rel.
Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981).
	Here, the circuit court refused to impose the sentence
mandated by the statute because it found that the statute, as
applied to defendant, offends the Illinois Constitution's
proportionate penalties clause and the United States Constitution's
cruel and unusual punishment clause. In contrast, the State argues
that the multiple-murder sentencing statute does not exempt
juvenile offenders, but in fact expressly declares that juveniles are
eligible for natural life. Thus, because the statute makes no
exception for those convicted as accomplices as opposed to those
convicted as principals, the statute's plain language required the
circuit court to sentence defendant to natural life imprisonment.
The State further argues that Illinois courts have previously upheld
the constitutionality of the multiple-murder sentencing statute as
applied to juveniles against proportionate penalty challenges. See
Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 204-05; see also People v. Cooks, 271 Ill.
App. 3d 25, 35-42 (1995) (holding that the multiple-murder
sentencing statute did not violate the United States or Illinois
Constitutions as applied to a 14-year-old principal offender);
People v. Wages, 261 Ill. App. 3d 576, 589 (1994) (holding that
the "fact that defendant was 15 years old at the time that he
committed the two murders is irrelevant" because "regardless of
age, a defendant found guilty of murdering more than one victim
must be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment"); People
v. Rice, 257 Ill. App. 3d 220, 228-29 (1993) (holding that the
multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to a mentally
retarded 16-year-old offender does not violate the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution); People v.
Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App. 3d 582, 593 (1985) (holding that
defendant's youth did not require special consideration and that
the application of the multiple-murder sentencing statute to the 16-year-old principal offender was consistent with the Illinois
Constitution's due process clause and the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution).
	We reject the State's assertion that the question at issue in this
appeal has been decided. Illinois courts have only upheld
application of the statute to juvenile principals and adult
accomplices. The issue we address-the application of the statute
to a juvenile convicted upon a theory of accountability-is an issue
of first impression. We begin with a discussion of the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
	The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution
declares that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined *** according to
the seriousness of the offense." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. While
courts of review are generally " 'reluctant to override the judgment
of the General Assembly with respect to criminal penalties' "
(People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 219 (1992), quoting People v.
Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962)), it is also true that when
defining crimes and their penalties, the legislature must "consider
the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful
citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness
of the offense" (Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d at 206). With regard to the
statute at issue, we have recognized that the legislature considered
the possible rehabilitation of an offender who commits multiple
murder, and the seriousness of that offense, in determining that a
mandatory minimum sentence of natural life imprisonment is
appropriate for the offense of multiple murders. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 
at 206 (the mandatory sentencing provision of the multiple-murder
sentencing statute does not offend article I, section 11, as applied
to a 16-year-old principal offender).
	However, the instant matter concerns a different type of
challenge under the proportionate penalties clause and a different
set of circumstances not addressed in Taylor. We have recognized
three different forms of proportionality review. A statute may be
deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate if (1) the punishment
for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate
to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community; (2)
similar offenses are compared and the conduct that creates a less
serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more
harshly; or (3) identical offenses are given different sentences.
Davis, 177 Ill. 2d at 503-04; see People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194,
209-10 (1995); Miller, 171 Ill. 2d  at 334; People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 320 (1985); People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240
(1962). Here, the circuit court ruled that application of the
multiple-murder sentencing statute to defendant was "highly
unconscionable," and, therefore, we first consider whether the
statute as applied to defendant is shocking to the moral sense of
the community.
	In this context, we have stated:
		"When the legislature has authorized a designated
punishment for a specified crime, it must be regarded that
its action represents the general moral ideas of the people,
and the courts will not hold the punishment so authorized
as either cruel and unusual, or not proportioned to the
nature of the offense, unless it is a cruel or degrading
punishment not known to the common law, or is a
degrading punishment which had become obsolete in the
State prior to the adoption of its constitution, or is so
wholly disproportioned to the offense committed as to
shock the moral sense of the community." People ex rel.
Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421-22
(1894).
	We have never defined what kind of punishment constitutes
"cruel," "degrading," or "so wholly disproportioned to the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community." This is so because,
as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental
decency and fairness which shape the "moral sense" of the
community. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598 (1958) (whether a punishment
shocks the moral sense of the community is based upon an
"evolving standard[ ] of decency that mark[s] the progress of a
maturing society"). Similarly, our United States Supreme Court
has stated in the context of the eighth amendment that
"[p]roportionality review under those evolving standards should
be informed by ' "objective factors to the maximum possible
extent." ' " Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. ___, ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 344, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002), quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 868, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704 (1991), quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 391, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139 (1980). However,
this "objective evidence, though of great importance, [does] not
'wholly determine' the controversy, 'for the Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to
bear on the question.' " Atkins, 536 U.S. at ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at
345, 122 S. Ct.  at 2247, quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
597, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 992, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2868 (1977).
	We review the gravity of the defendant's offense in
connection with the severity of the statutorily mandated sentence
within our community's evolving standard of decency. Here, a
sentence of natural life imprisonment would be the result of three
converging statutes. Section 5-4(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996)) mandates that all
15- or 16-year-old offenders charged with murder be automatically
transferred and prosecuted as adults in criminal court. The
accountability statute (720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1996)) effectively
bars courts from considering the offender's degree of participation
in the crime by making all persons who participate in a common
criminal design equally responsible. See People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 434-35 (2000) (discussing accountability and the
"common design" rule). Finally, the multiple-murder sentencing
statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996)) does not
allow a court to consider the age of the offender or the offender's
participation in the crime at the time of sentencing. Under the
automatic transfer statute, defendant was considered to be an adult
for purposes of trial. Under the accountability statute, defendant
was considered equal to the actual shooter. Therefore, defendant
was tried as if he were the adult shooter in the crime. Under the
sentencing statute, defendant was then subject to the most severe
punishment. When these three statutes converge, a court never
considers the actual facts of the crime, including the defendant's
age at the time of the crime or his or her individual level of
culpability.
	Accordingly, we hold that the penalty mandated by the
multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to this defendant is
particularly harsh and unconstitutionally disproportionate. We
agree with defendant that a mandatory sentence of natural life in
prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual
realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant's
personal culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the
community. This moral sense is particularly true, as in the case
before us, where a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his
decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout
during the shooting, but never handled a gun, is subject to life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole-the same sentence
applicable to the actual shooter. Our decision does not imply that
a sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile offender convicted
under a theory of accountability is never appropriate. It is certainly
possible to contemplate a situation where a juvenile offender
actively participated in the planning of a crime resulting in the
death of two or more individuals, such that a sentence of natural
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.
However, that is not the case before this court-as recognized by
Judge Linn during sentencing, this case presents the least culpable
offender imaginable, a 15-year-old who had "about a minute from
the time this plan began until the act was completed by other
persons."
	Our decision is consistent with the longstanding distinction
made in this state between adult and juvenile offenders, a
distinction underscored by the reality that our state was the first to
create a court system dedicated exclusively to juveniles. 1899 Ill.
Laws 131; see also People ex rel. Bradley, 148 Ill.  at 423. Illinois
led the nation with our policy towards the treatment of juveniles
in first forming the juvenile court, and, traditionally, as a society
we have recognized that young defendants have greater
rehabilitative potential. "There is in the law of nature, as well as
in the law that governs society, a marked distinction between
persons of mature age and those who are minors. The habits and
characters of the latter are, presumably, to a large extent as yet
unformed and unsettled. This distinction may well be taken into
consideration by the legislative power in fixing the punishment for
crime, both in determining the method of inflicting punishment
and in limiting its quantity and duration." People ex rel. Bradley,
148 Ill.  at 423; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
838, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702, 720, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2700 (1988).
Therefore, in many cases courts have discretion to grant leniency
to a juvenile even if he or she is prosecuted as an adult. See, e.g.,
People v. Kolakowski, 319 Ill. App. 3d 200, 217 (2001) (noting
that defendant's sentence was less than her codefendant's because
of her age and potential for rehabilitation). While it is true that the
multiple-murder sentencing statute explicitly applies regardless of
the offender's age (Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201), this case does not only
concern the sentence of a juvenile. Rather, this case concerns the
sentence of a juvenile convicted under a theory of accountability.
And as with juvenile offenders, courts in some cases may grant
leniency in sentencing to offenders guilty by accountability.
Disparate sentences between an offender convicted by
accountability and a principal offender reflect the different degrees
of participation in the crime. See, e.g., People v. Godinez, 91 Ill. 2d 47, 54-56 (1982) (finding that a defendant who stood as a
lookout deserved a lesser sentence than his codefendant who was
convicted as the principal). However, the convergence of the
Illinois transfer statute, the accountability statute, and the multiple-murder sentencing statute eliminates the court's ability to consider
any mitigating factors such as age or degree of participation. A life
sentence without the possibility of parole implies that under any
circumstances a juvenile defendant convicted solely by
accountability is incorrigible and incapable of rehabilitation for the
rest of his life. The trial judge in this case did not agree with such
a blanket proposition. We also decline to find that the sentence
mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute in this case
satisfies the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. We affirm the trial court's finding that the multiple-murder sentencing statute as applied to defendant violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Accordingly, we need not address additional issues raised in this
appeal.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we find that section
5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996)) as applied to defendant, a
juvenile offender convicted under a theory of accountability,
violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). We affirm the circuit
court's imposition of a term of 50 years' imprisonment.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.