Case Title: Glass v. Adkins

Citation: 436 So. 2d 844

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1983-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
436 So. 2d 844 (1983)
Edward O. GLASS and Ernest Glass
v.
Cilla ADKINS, as Administratrix of the Estate of Grace R. Windham Glass, deceased, et al.
81-809.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 5, 1983.
*845 James B. Morton, Birmingham, for appellants.
A.B. Foshee and John Hollis Jackson, Clanton, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This appeal involves title to certain joint savings accounts and the construction of a provision in a will.
The case was tried on the following stipulation of facts:
Relying on these facts, Cilla Atkins, the administratrix of Mrs. Glass's estate, joined with Mrs. Glass's other heirs at law in a declaratory judgment action against Edward Glass, Ernest Glass, and the bank and savings and loan associations which held the deposits. All parties agreed that the bank and savings and loan associations which held the deposits were named merely as stakeholders.
The plaintiffs maintained that the deposits should descend to them as in the case of intestacy because Edward, having been convicted of murdering his wife, was barred from participating in the ownership of the deposits. The plaintiffs also asserted that neither Edward nor his nephew Ernest could inherit under Mrs. Glass's will. The plaintiffs claimed that Edward was disqualified by his wrongful act and that Ernest could take nothing since his inheritance was contingent upon the condition that Edward predecease the testatrix.
The trial court acceded to each of the plaintiffs' contentions and ordered that Mrs. Glass's property descend to the plaintiffs as in the case of intestacy.
The first issue presented is whether Edward should be precluded from taking the deposits. In our opinion, the trial court reached the correct result by barring Edward from all incidents of ownership.
Sections 5-16-1 through -53, Code 1975, govern savings and loan associations. Section 5-16-45 provides that when a deposit is made in a savings and loan association
Code 1975, § 5-5A-41, contains an analogous provision for bank deposits, allowing the bank to pay the deposit to the survivor of a joint account. While this section does not purport to convey title to the deposit, we do not find it necessary to reach the question of ownership in this case.
Edward contends that he is entitled to the deposits as the surviving joint owner, or at least that to deprive him of a half interest would work a forfeiture. We find, however, that to permit Edward to take any of these deposits would allow him to profit from his wrongful act. Had he not killed Grace, she might have survived him and thereby owned the deposits. At the very least, he accelerated his survivorship of her. Moreover, she might have withdrawn the deposits if he had not killed her.
It is axiomatic that one is not allowed to profit by his wrongful acts. Kempaner v. Thompson, 394 So. 2d 918 (Ala.1981); Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945). Because there are several circumstances in which Edward would have taken nothing if he had not killed Grace, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that to give Edward *847 any of the bank deposits would allow him to profit by his wrongful act.
The remaining question is whether the contingent beneficiary in Mrs. Glass's will, Ernest Glass, can inherit her estate. Certainly, Edward, the primary beneficiary, must not profit from his wrong by taking under the will. The trial court, however, decided to also prohibit the contingent beneficiary from inheriting. The trial court ruled that the contingent devise was never activated because the condition upon which the contingent beneficiary would take that the testatrix outlive the primary beneficiarydid not occur. We disagree.
Such strict compliance with the condition should not defeat the presumption that the testatrix intended to die testate.
Baker v. Wright, 257 Ala. 697, 60 So. 2d 825 (1952).
Additionally, wills should be construed to uphold rather than to defeat devises and bequests. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Klein, 285 Ala. 505, 234 So. 2d 42 (1970). As we see it, the contingent devise was inserted in the will to insure against intestacy should the primary beneficiary, Edward, be unable to take. We construe the condition that the primary beneficiary predecease the testatrix as merely the one event envisioned by the testatrix in which the primary devise would fail. The fact that the primary devise failed for a reason other than that foreseen by the testatrix should not defeat the contingent devise, especially where we must presume that the testatrix did not intend to die intestate.[1]
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the contingent beneficiary, being totally unconnected with the murder of Mrs. Glass, may inherit as provided in her will.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions that a judgment be entered in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
[1]  Mrs. Glass's will contained no residuary clause. Beyond the contingent beneficiary, the will named no other takers. The decision of the trial court brings about intestacy.