Case Title: Oken v. State

Citation: 343 Md. 256

Docket Number: 80/94

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 80
September Term, 1994
___________________________________
STEVEN HOWARD OKEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
McAuliffe, John F. (Retired,
Specially Assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
 Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, J. dissents.
___________________________________
- 2 -
   Filed: June 13, 1996
      
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations
1
herein are to Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.)
Article 27.
Steven Howard Oken was found guilty by a Baltimore County jury
of first degree murder, first degree sexual offense, burglary and
the use of a handgun in a crime of violence.  The same jury
sentenced him to death.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the
convictions and the sentences for the first degree murder, the
sexual offenses and the handgun violation.  Oken v. State, 327 Md.
628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S. Ct.
1312, 122 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993) (Oken I).  We reversed the burglary
conviction on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence.  Id.
Oken filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) Art. 27, § 645A-
J, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.   After an
1
evidentiary hearing, Judge Dana Levitz of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County filed a well-reasoned opinion and order denying
post-conviction relief.  We granted Oken's application for leave to
appeal.  We shall affirm.
On November 1, 1987, Oken sexually assaulted and murdered Dawn
Garvin at her home in Baltimore County.  The facts that led to
Oken's conviction and sentence were set out in Oken I:
At midnight on Sunday, November 1, 1987, Keith
Douglas Garvin arrived at the United States
Navy base in Oceana, Virginia.  Mr. Garvin,
who had a pass from his naval superiors, had
just spent the weekend with his wife, Dawn
Garvin, at their apartment in the Baltimore
County community of White Marsh and was
- 2 -
returning to his station in Oceana.  Upon his
arrival at the base, Mr. Garvin attempted to
call his wife to notify her that he had
arrived safely.  Although the telephone rang
at their White Marsh apartment, there was no
answer.  After making several additional
unsuccessful attempts to call his wife, Mr.
Garvin became worried and telephoned his
father-in-law, 
Frederick 
Joseph 
Romano.
Because Mr. Romano lived in close proximity to
the Garvins' apartment, Mr. Garvin asked Mr.
Romano to check on his wife.  Mr. Romano
agreed, 
and 
attempted 
to 
telephone 
his
daughter twice. Both times there was no
answer. Concerned about the fact that numerous
calls to his daughter had gone unanswered, Mr.
Romano decided to drive to his daughter's
apartment. 
   
When Mr. Romano arrived at his daughter's
apartment, he found the front door to the
apartment 
ajar, 
all 
the 
lights 
in 
the
apartment turned on, and the television
blaring.  Sensing that something was wrong,
Mr. Romano rushed into the apartment and found
his daughter, Dawn, in the bedroom lying on
the bed nude with a bottle protruding from her
vagina. 
 
While 
attempting 
to 
give 
her
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR"), Mr.
Romano observed that there was blood streaming
from her forehead.  He immediately called for
assistance, and paramedics arrived shortly
thereafter.  A paramedic then began to
administer CPR, but his efforts were in vain.
Dawn Marie Garvin was dead. 
At 2:30 a.m., on November 2, Detective
James Roeder of the Baltimore County Police
Department arrived at the Garvins' apartment
to inspect the scene of the murder.  Detective
Roeder testified that when he entered the
Garvins' apartment he saw no signs of forced
entry.  Once inside, he observed a brassiere,
a pair of pants, tennis shoes, a shirt, and a
sweater on the floor near the sofa in the
living room.  The brassiere was not unhooked,
but instead, was ripped on the side. The pants
were turned inside out. Roeder also noticed a
small piece of rubber on the floor near the
- 3 -
      
The Maryland presentence investigation report indicated
2
that in Maine, Oken was sentenced to life without parole on the
murder charge, twenty years on the robbery charge, and five years
on the theft charge, all sentences to run concurrently.
television set.  In the bedroom, Roeder found
two spent .25 caliber shell casings on the
bed, one of which was lying on top of a shirt.
The shirt was blood stained and had what
Roeder believed to be a bullet hole in it. 
An autopsy of Ms. Garvin's body revealed
that she had died as the result of two contact
gunshot wounds; one of the bullets entered at
her left eyebrow and the other at her right
ear. 
327 Md. at 634-35, 612 A.2d at 261.
Less than two weeks after Oken murdered Dawn Garvin, he
sexually assaulted and murdered his sister-in-law, Patricia Hirt,
at his Maryland home.  He then fled Maryland for Maine, where he
murdered Lori Ward, the desk clerk at his Maine hotel.  He was
arrested in Maine on November 17, 1987, and was ultimately
convicted in Maine for first degree murder, robbery with a firearm,
and theft arising out of the Ward homicide.   See State v. Oken,
2
569 A.2d 1218 (Me.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 818, 111 S. Ct. 62, 112
L. Ed. 2d 36 (1990). 
Oken was returned to Maryland where he faced separate
prosecutions for charges arising out of the Garvin and Hirt
homicides.  He was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County in the Garvin case for first degree murder, sexual offenses,
burglary, daytime housebreaking, robbery with a dangerous or deadly
- 4 -
weapon, theft, and a handgun violation.  The State notified Oken of
its intent to seek the death penalty and advised him that as
aggravating circumstances, it intended to establish that (1) the
defendant committed the murder in the first degree of Dawn Garvin
while committing or attempting to commit a first degree sex offense
upon Dawn Garvin, and (2) the defendant committed the murder of
Dawn Garvin in the first degree while committing or attempting to
commit robbery of Dawn Garvin.  See Art. 27, §421(b).  Oken entered
pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible.  See Maryland
Code (1982, 1994 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) § 12-109 of the Health-
General Article; Maryland Rule 4-242.  At the trial, Oken was
represented by defense counsel, Benjamin Lipsitz.  
The State's evidence as to criminal agency was very strong.
The murder weapon, a handgun, was found in Oken's home shortly
after the murder and a rubber portion of Oken's tennis shoe was
found in Dawn Garvin's living room on the night of the murder.  In
addition, several witnesses at trial identified Oken as the person
in the neighborhood who had attempted to gain entry to residences
in the vicinity of the Garvin home a few days prior to the murder.
On January 18, 1991, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County found Oken guilty of murder in the first degree (on theories
of felony murder and premeditated murder), first degree sexual
offense, burglary, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence.
The jury acquitted Oken of the robbery charge.  Pursuant to
- 5 -
      
Following Oken's conviction in this case, he pled guilty
3
to the murder of Patricia Hirt.  See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628,
644 n.4, 612 A.2d 258, 266 n.4 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931,
113 S. Ct. 1312, 122 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993).
Maryland Rule 4-314, Oken elected a court trial on the issue of
criminal responsibility.  Judge James Smith concluded that Oken was
criminally responsible. 
A capital sentencing proceeding commenced on January 24, 1991
before the same jury that determined Petitioner's guilt.  The State
incorporated 
all 
the 
testimony 
and 
evidence 
from 
the
guilt/innocence phase.  The verdict sheet indicated that one or
more of the jurors, but fewer than all twelve, found as mitigating
circumstances "(1) fact of life sentence, (2) sexual sadism,  and
(3) substance abuse."  On January 25, the jury unanimously
determined the sentence to be death.  On the remaining counts,
Judge Smith  imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the first
degree sexual offense, and consecutive terms of twenty years each
for the burglary and the handgun violation.   This post conviction
3
proceeding reviews only the Baltimore County proceedings relating
to the murder of Dawn Garvin.  Additional facts will be recounted
as necessary in our discussion of the issues raised by Oken in this
appeal.
Before this Court, Oken asks us to consider claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and errors of the trial court at
both the guilt/innocence stage and the sentencing stage.         
He asks us to consider the following questions:
- 6 -
I.
Whether the trial court's voir dire
questions comported with the dictates of
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.
Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992), and
Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d
117, cert. denied,   U.S.   , 115 S. Ct.
109, 130 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994), in
identifying prospective jurors with a
pro-death penalty bias?
II.
Whether the trial court erred at the
sentencing proceeding in failing to
instruct the jury that it could consider,
as a non-statutory mitigating factor,
that appellant was serving a sentence of
life without parole under Maine law?
III. Whether 
Petitioner's 
trial 
counsel
provided 
ineffective 
assistance 
of
counsel?
IV.
Whether the post-conviction court erred
in not allowing Petitioner to obtain his
own hair samples taken from him at the
time of his arrest for purposes of
conducting forensic tests to establish
Petitioner's substance abuse at the time
of the offense? 
V.
Whether the trial court erred in allowing
the jury to use the underlying felony
murder as an aggravator in the penalty
phase of the trial?
VI. Whether the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that under Art. 27,
§ 413(g)(8), the "catch-all provision,"
it could list as a mitigating factor its
desire to extend mercy to Petitioner.
We shall address each of these questions seriatim.
 
I.
Whether the trial court's voir dire questions
comported with the dictates of Morgan v. Illinois,
504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492
(1992), and Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d
- 7 -
      
"Reverse-Witherspoon" voir dire is also known as "life
4
qualification" of the jury.  See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
724, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2227, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (1992).
      
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner
5
raised his Morgan claim in three different ways:  (1) trial court
error in failing to ask his requested "reverse-Witherspoon"
questions of the venire panel, (2) ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failure to object to the trial court's voir dire, and
(3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to
raise the Morgan issue on direct appeal.  
Before this Court, Oken raises only the claim of trial court
error.  In his brief, Oken  states that he is not now claiming that
his counsel's performance during the voir dire was ineffective.
Oken also abandons his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.  He reasons that because this Court did not restrict the
issues in the Order granting the application for leave to appeal
and the only remedy available to Oken on the ineffective assistance
claim is a belated appeal, the proceeding before this Court is in
effect his belated appeal on the Morgan issue.  We disagree with
Oken's interpretation of the nature of this appeal.  We said in
Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 205, 438 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1981),
that 
if the application for leave to appeal is
(continued...)
117, cert. denied,   U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 109, 130
L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994), in identifying prospective
jurors with a pro-death penalty bias?
Before this Court, Petitioner contends that despite his
specific request for appropriate "reverse-Witherspoon"  questions,
4
the trial court's voir dire was inadequate to identify those
prospective jurors who harbored "any convictions in support of the
death penalty" in violation of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
726, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992), and Evans v. State,
333 Md. 660, 637 A.2d 117, cert. denied,   U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 109,
130 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994).   Judge Levitz found that the questions
5
- 8 -
      (...continued)
5
granted, the case shall be treated as any
other appeal.  Section 645-I goes on to state
that "[i]f the application to prosecute such
appeal 
shall 
be 
granted, 
the 
procedure
thereafter shall be in conformity with the
Maryland Rules."
See Kelly v. Warden,  243 Md. 717, 718, 222 A.2d. 835, 836 (1966)
(post-conviction is not a substitute for an appeal).
asked by the trial judge were sufficient to comply with Morgan and
Evans.
The State contended before Judge Levitz, and before this
Court, that because Oken did not raise this claim on direct appeal,
it is waived.  See Oken I, 327 Md. at 634-80, 612 A.2d at 260-85.
Oken argues that the right to "reverse-Witherspoon" voir dire is a
right that cannot be waived unless the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waives the right on the record.  Because Oken did not
knowingly and intelligently relinquish this right, he continues,
his failure to raise this issue on direct appeal cannot constitute
a waiver.  Alternatively, he argues that if this Court finds
waiver, then circumstances exist that excuse appellate counsel's
failure to raise the Morgan claim on direct appeal.
The Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, Art. 27,
§ 645A(c)(1), provides in pertinent part:
[A]n allegation of error shall be deemed to be
waived when a petitioner could have made, but
intelligently and knowingly failed to make,
such allegation before trial, at trial, on
direct appeal (whether or not the petitioner
actually took such an appeal) . . .  unless
- 9 -
the failure to make such allegation shall be
excused because of special circumstances.
When a petitioner had a prior opportunity to raise an allegation of
error but did not do so, the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed
to make the allegation.  Art. 27, § 645A(c)(2).  If the presumption
is not rebutted, the waiver shall be excused if the petitioner
establishes the existence of special circumstances.  Art. 27, §
645A(c)(1); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 140, 395 A.2d 464, 469
(1978).
In Curtis, this Court addressed the question of when the
"intelligently and knowingly" waiver test of the statute was
applicable.  We stated in Curtis that, in assessing waiver, Art.
27, § 645A(c) does not require application of the "intelligently
and knowingly" standard of waiver to every constitutional right.
284 Md. at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474.  Judge Eldridge, writing for
the Court, stated:
[W]e believe that the Legislature, when it
spoke of "waiver" in subsection (c) of Art.
27, § 645A, was using the term in a narrow
sense.  It intended that subsection (c), with
its "intelligent and knowing" standard, be
applicable only in those circumstances where
the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst and
Fay v. Noia was applicable.  Other situations
are beyond the scope of subsection (c), to be
governed by case law or any pertinent statutes
or rules.  Tactical decisions, when made by an
authorized competent attorney, as well as
legitimate 
procedural 
requirements, 
will
normally bind a criminal defendant. 
- 10 -
Id.
In Curtis, we recognized the potential for chaos if every time
counsel made a tactical decision or a procedural default the
"intelligently and knowingly" waiver standard was triggered.  We
said:
For example, under such an interpretation of
the statute, for a criminal defendant to be
bound by his lawyer's actions, the lawyer
would have to interrupt a trial repeatedly and
go through countless litanies with his client.
One of the basic principles of statutory
construction is that a statute should not be
construed to lead to an unreasonable or
illogical result.  It is hardly conceivable
that the Legislature, in adopting § 645A(c),
could have intended to use the word "waiver"
in its broadest sense, thereby requiring that
the "intelligent and knowing" standard apply
every time an issue was not raised before.
Id. at 149, 395 A.2d at 474 (citations omitted).  
It is clear from the testimony of appellate counsel at the
post-conviction hearing that her failure to raise the adequacy of
the voir dire on appeal was a deliberate one.  Counsel testified
that she believed that the questions asked by the court satisfied
the standard set out in Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct.
844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985), and that she did not fully appreciate
the significance of Morgan until this Court decided Evans.  The
decision whether to raise an issue on appeal is quintessentially a
tactical decision of counsel.  Hunt v. Smith, 856 F. Supp. 251, 257
(D. Md. 1994), aff'd sub nom., Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied,  U.S.   , 116 S. Ct. 724, 133 L. Ed. 2d 676
- 11 -
(1996); cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-53, 103 S. Ct. 3308,
3312-14, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 994-95 (1983) (the role of appellate
counsel is to choose which arguments are best to pursue).  Whether
or not Oken's appellate counsel appreciated the impact of Morgan on
this case, the "reverse-Witherspoon" issue could have been raised
on direct appeal.  Oken's counsel made the deliberate decision not
to raise the issue. 
We hold that the right to ask "reverse-Witherspoon" questions
on voir dire may be relinquished by failure to raise the claim on
direct appeal and is not controlled by the "intelligent and
knowing" waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.
Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 2d 1461 (1938), thus falling outside Art. 27,
§ 645A(c).  Compare, e.g. McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140 n.1,
148-49, 617 A.2d 1068, 1070 n.1, 1074-75, 1076 (1993) (guilty
plea); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 262, 582 A.2d 794, 801 (1990)
(jury sentencing in a capital case); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637,
659-60, 579 A.2d 744, 755 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111
S. Ct. 1024, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1106 (1991) (Gilliam I) (right to jury
trial); Curtis, 284 Md. at 150-51, 395 A.2d at 474-75 (effective
assistance of counsel); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507, 341
A.2d 388, 395 (1975) (double jeopardy); Strosnider v. Warden, 245
Md. 692, 694, 226 A.2d 545, 547 (1967) (confession obtained in
violation of right to counsel and right to remain silent).  We
reach this conclusion based upon our review of the nature of this
- 12 -
right and a consideration of the surrounding circumstances under
which the right arises.  Curtis, 284 Md. at 147, 395 A.2d at 473.
In Morgan, the Supreme Court found that a "juror who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in
good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances as the instructions require him to do."  Morgan, 504
U.S. at 729, 112 S. Ct. at 2229, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 502.  Under
Morgan, a defendant is entitled during voir dire, upon request, to
"inquiry discerning those jurors who, even prior to the State's
case-in-chief, had predetermined the terminating issue of his
trial, that being whether to impose the death penalty."  Morgan,
504 U.S. at 736, 112 S. Ct. at 2233, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 507.  The
trial judge need not make this inquiry ex mero motu.  In other
words, absent a request, a trial court does not have an affirmative
obligation to make this inquiry.  Absent a request, the failure to
ask "reverse-Witherspoon" questions is not error.  It follows that
because the right is triggered only upon request, it is subject to
traditional procedural default and not the "intelligently and
knowingly" standard of waiver.  Thus, Oken's failure to raise this
claim on direct appeal constituted waiver.
Oken contends that circumstances exist to excuse his waiver.
First, he suggests that because Morgan was decided by the Supreme
Court on June 15, 1992, appellate counsel had insufficient time to
- 13 -
      
Oken I was decided by this Court on September 17, 1992.
6
learn of the applicability of that case to the instant case.6
Second, he argues that Morgan imposed "new requirements on voir
dire proceedings" and therefore, because his case was pending, he
was entitled to the benefit of Morgan as a matter of law.  
Under Maryland Rule 8-131, this Court retains discretion to
excuse a waiver.  Oken's argument to excuse the waiver, however, is
without merit.  The "reverse-Witherspoon" right to exclude jurors
for cause was established by the Supreme Court in 1988 in Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1988).
We recognized this right in Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d
218 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L. Ed.
2d 86 (1991).  In Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 21-24, 595 A.2d 448,
457-59 (1991), decided prior to Oken's direct appeal, we recognized
that a defendant had a right to voir dire that would identify
prospective jurors who harbored disqualifying biases in favor of
the death penalty.  See also Stamper v. Muncie, 944 F.2d 170, 177
(4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a defendant in Virginia had a
right to "reverse-Witherspoon" voir dire); Smith v. Balkcom, 660
F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d 858, stay
recalled, 677 F.2d 20, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S. Ct. 181,
74 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1982) (recognizing right to eliminate those who
would automatically vote to impose death penalty in spite of the
- 14 -
evidence); Sims v. United States, 405 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (noting that if Government can ask Witherspoon type
questions, defendant should be permitted to ask "reverse-
Witherspoon" questions); Skipper v. State, 257 Ga. 802, 364 S.E.2d
835, 839 (1988) (finding that inability fairly to consider life
sentence is as disqualifying as an inability to consider death
sentence); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 283 S.E.2d 212,
216 (1981) (holding that jurors who are biased in favor of death
penalty under all circumstances may be eliminated for cause).
Accordingly, we find no circumstances excusing the failure to raise
this issue on direct appeal.  
Even if this claim were not waived, we would find no error.
The post-conviction court found that the trial court sufficiently
life-qualified the jury.  We agree.
The voir dire was conducted in a three-part process:  first
the panel was questioned as a group; next, the prospective jurors
were questioned individually in chambers.  They were each asked the
following four questions:
Do you have any strong feelings, one way or
the other, with regard to the death penalty?
Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the
death penalty, would prevent or substantially
impair you from making a fair and impartial
decision on whether the Defendant is not
guilty or guilty, based on the evidence
presented and the Court's instructions as to
the law?
- 15 -
Do you feel your attitude, regarding the death
penalty, would prevent or substantially impair
you from making a fair and impartial decision
on whether the Defendant was or was not
criminally responsible by reason of insanity,
based on the evidence presented and the
Court's instructions on the law?
Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the
death penalty would prevent or substantially
impair you from sentencing the Defendant,
based upon the evidence presented and the
Court's instructions as to the law which is
applicable?
When a prospective juror responded affirmatively to a question, the
trial judge inquired further to explore and disclose the nature of
any bias.  Finally, the trial court concluded with the catch-all
question to members of the entire panel, asking whether there was
any reason, either previously undisclosed or whatsoever, that would
prevent their returning a fair and impartial verdict based on the
evidence presented and the applicable instructions.  
The post-conviction court found:
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
in 
Evans
specifically sanctioned four questions that
should be asked in death penalty cases.
Petitioner correctly points out that the trial
court in the Dawn Garvin proceeding only asked
the first two of these questions as a matter
of course and the second two questions,
including the Witherspoon and the "reverse-
Witherspoon" questions, were not asked as a
matter of course.  The language used in Evans,
however, is not magical.  The Court of Appeals
was simply approving the questions asked in
that case and they did not preclude other
language which could satisfy Ross and Morgan.
After reviewing the transcript, it is the
finding of this court that Judge Smith asked
- 16 -
sufficient follow up questions to comply with
Morgan and Evans.  Anytime any of the jurors
indicated they would have a problem sentencing
Petitioner because of their views on the death
penalty, Judge Smith asked sufficient follow-
up questions to allow trial counsel to have a
basis to strike for cause.  The follow-up
questions asked by Judge Smith elicited the
same information that would have come out if
the 
Judge 
had 
asked 
the 
two 
questions
specifically mentioned in Evans.  
Oken contends that Judge Levitz misread his claim.  As
clarification, he asserts that his complaint does not relate to the
sufficiency of the trial court's follow-up questions; he complains
that the initial four questions were insufficient to identify
prospective jurors who should have been asked follow-up questions.
The State contends that the voir dire was adequate to identify all
members of the venire whose pro-death penalty views would impair
their performance as jurors.  We have independently reviewed the
record and agree that the voir dire was sufficient.
In Morgan, the Supreme Court observed that the Constitution
does not require any particular catechism for voir dire, but only
that voir dire adequately identify constitutionally unqualified
prospective jurors.  504 U.S. at 729, 112 S. Ct. at 2230, 119 L.
Ed. 2d at 503.  The issue before the Supreme Court in Morgan was
whether the voir dire propounded by the trial court was sufficient
to identify prospective jurors who would automatically vote for the
death penalty and thereby fail to follow the law and to consider
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  504 U.S.
- 17 -
at 734-36, 112 S. Ct. at 2232-33, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 506-07.  The
Court found that merely asking jurors whether they can follow the
law or be fair and impartial will not satisfy the constitutional
requirements.  Id. at 735-36, 112 S. Ct. at 2233, 119 L. Ed. 2d at
506-07.  In Evans, Judge Karwacki, writing for this Court, observed
It is important to note that Morgan left
the standard for juror exclusion unchanged;
jurors may still be excused on the basis of
their beliefs about capital punishment if, in
the determination of the trial judge, those
beliefs will "substantially impair their
performance as jurors."  Id. at   , 112 S. Ct.
at 2229, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 502.  Morgan simply
recognizes 
that 
the 
principles 
first
propounded in Witherspoon v. Illinois "demand
inquiry into whether the views of prospective
jurors on the death penalty would disqualify
them from sitting."   Morgan, 504 U.S. at   ,
112 S. Ct. at 2231, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 504.  
333 Md. at 672-73, 637 A.2d at 117.  A juror is disqualified from
sitting if the juror would vote automatically for the death
penalty. A juror "'who may have an inclination to favor the death
penalty, but who would nevertheless conscientiously apply the law,
need not be excused.'"  Id. at 673, 637 A.2d at 123 (quoting Hunt
v. State, 321 Md. at 415, 583 A.2d at 231).
We find that the voir dire asked by the trial court in this
case was adequate to "life qualify" the venire.  Compare Morgan,
504 U.S. at 735-36, 112 S. Ct. at 2233, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 506-07;
with Evans, 333 Md. at 675, 637 A.2d at 124.  Although better
questions could have been asked, these questions were adequate to
identify those jurors with any bias so that further questions could
- 18 -
be propounded.  Indeed, Morgan recognized the broad discretion of
the trial court in the supervision and exercise of voir dire,
subject to the constitutional requirement that the voir dire
adequately identify those unqualified jurors.  504 U.S. at 729, 112
S. Ct. at 2230, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 503.  We too have recognized the
broad discretion of the trial court in the control of voir dire,
and we will not reverse absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 A.2d 867, 870-71 (1993); see
also State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306, 317 (1994),
cert. denied,  U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 750, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995).
We find no abuse of discretion.  The initial questions were
tailored to inquire into a prospective juror's preconceptions
regarding the death penalty and to reveal whether those
preconceptions would be an obstacle to impartially sentencing the
defendant given the facts and the law.  The follow-up questions
were sufficient to disclose any bias identified in the responses to
the initial questions.  Together, the questions were sufficient to
identify a juror's state of mind concerning the death penalty and
the juror's ability to evaluate the evidence impartially.  See
Evans, 333 Md. at 677, 637 A.2d at 125.  We reiterate our
observation in Evans:  "It is unlikely that a juror who has no
strong feelings about the death penalty will simultaneously vote
for the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances of
the case."  Id. at 675, 637 A.2d at 124.  We believe that the voir
- 19 -
dire questions "[o]n their face . . . were clearly sufficient . .
. to determine whether prospective jurors were death-penalty
dogmatists," and thus, the voir dire satisfied the standard
enunciated in Morgan and Evans.  Id.  Accordingly, we find that the
post-conviction court did not err in denying relief on these
grounds.
II.
Whether the trial court erred at the sentencing
proceeding in failing to instruct the jury that it
could consider as a non-statutory mitigating factor
that appellant was serving a sentence of life
without parole under Maine law?
 
Before this Court, Oken contends that he is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing because the trial judge failed to instruct the
jury that it could consider as a non-statutory mitigator under Art.
27, § 413(g)(8) that Petitioner previously had been sentenced to
life imprisonment without parole in Maine for the Ward murder.
Although his trial counsel did not request an instruction that the
jury could consider the Maine sentence as a non-statutory
mitigator, he argues that the trial court should have sua sponte
given the instruction.  This is required, he continues, because the
State argued future dangerousness in closing argument and in
rebuttal closing, argued that the jury should ignore Oken's Maine
sentence.  Relying on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.   , 114
S. Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), Oken asserts that the failure
- 20 -
      
The Supreme Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
7
U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), after the post-
conviction hearing in these proceedings was concluded. Oken raised
a similar contention before the post-conviction court. The post-
conviction court rejected Oken's claim.  Judge Levitz found:
Judge Smith did instruct the jury that they
could consider as a mitigating factor a
Maryland life without parole sentence.  Trial
counsel made the tactical decision not to
object to this instruction.  It is clear,
therefore, that Judge Smith had no duty to
instruct the jury about the Maine sentence.
Even if Judge Smith did have such a duty, the
error would still not be grounds for relief as
Petitioner was not prejudiced by the error.
The jury was told they could consider life
without parole as a mitigator and reject a
sentence of death.  This Court finds that this
claim is not grounds for post-conviction
relief.
      
In Simmons, "[t]hree times petitioner asked to inform the
8
jury that in fact he was ineligible for parole under state law;
three times his request was denied."  512 U.S. at    , 114 S. Ct.
at 2193, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 141.  The Court found that Simmons was
(continued...)
to give the instruction deprived him of due process of law.   The
7
State argues that Oken was not entitled to such an instruction and
that, even if he were, there was no prejudice.  
We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Simmons.  The Supreme Court held that due process requires that
if the State urges the imposition of the death penalty based on the
defendant's future dangerousness, the jury should be informed,
either by argument or instruction, that the defendant currently is
parole ineligible or could be parole ineligible through imposition
of the alternative sentence of life imprisonment without parole.8
- 21 -
      (...continued)
8
denied due process because the death penalty was secured, in part,
on the ground of future dangerousness, while concealing from the
jury the meaning of its non-capital sentencing alternative that
life imprisonment meant life without parole.  Id. at   , 114 S Ct.
at 2198, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
Simmons, 512 U.S. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2196, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 145-
46; Id. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2199, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 149 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring); Id. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2200-01, 129 L. Ed. 2d at
150-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  Simmons does not require that
the jury learn of defendant's parole ineligibility through a jury
instruction.  Id. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2196, 129 L. Ed. 2d 145-46.
Due process is met "if the relevant information is intelligently
conveyed to the jury; due process does not dictate that the judge
herself, rather than defense counsel, provide the instruction."
Id. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2199, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 145-46 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).  Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, stated: 
I agree with the Court that [when the State
seeks 
to 
show 
the 
defendant's 
future
dangerousness] the defendant should be allowed
to bring his parole ineligibility to the
jury's attention -- by way of argument by
defense counsel or an instruction from the
court -- as a means of responding to the
State's showing of future dangerousness.
Id. at   , 114 S. Ct. at 2200-01, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 150-51
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  
We find that Oken's parole ineligibility was sufficiently
presented to the jury through evidence and argument of counsel.
- 22 -
Therefore, there was no Simmons violation.  The pre-sentence
investigation report, introduced by the State at the sentencing
hearing, showed that Oken had been sentenced in Maine to life
imprisonment without parole.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1993 Repl.
Vol., 1995 Supp.) Art. 41, § 4-609(c).  Additionally, Mr. Lipsitz
told the jury in his opening statement and closing argument that
Oken was presently serving a sentence of life without parole in
Maine. He said:
The man is already in jail in a prison for the
rest of his days, life without parole, and
that means life without parole.  He isn't
going anywhere.  If you found him not guilty -
- or had found him not guilty, he would go
back to the state of Maine and spend the rest
of his life in jail there.  
So these are all -- you might consider
that as a mitigating factor under that
Mitigating Factor No. 8.
Moreover, we believe the trial court properly instructed the
jury as to the meaning of life without parole and that life without
the possibility of parole was an available alternative sentence.
Jury instructions are sufficient if they fully and fairly cover the
law.  See Rule 4-325(c).  The court instructed the jury that it
could consider Oken's parole eligibility as a mitigating factor:
Steven Oken's parole eligibility, should
he receive a sentence of life imprisonment or
life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, may be taken into account by you in
your consideration of mitigating circumstances
as well as in your determination of whether
the appropriate sentence is death or life
imprisonment.
- 23 -
      
Under Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1994 Cum.
9
Supp.) Art. 27, Section 413(g), the seven statutory mitigators are:
1) the defendant has not previously been convicted of a crime of
violence; 2) the victim was a participant in the defendant's
conduct or consented to the act which caused her death; 3) the
defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or provocation
of another person insufficient to constitute a complete  defense to
prosecution; 4) the defendant was not criminally responsible for
his actions because of some mental disorder, mental incapacity, or
emotional disturbance; 5) the youthful age of the defendant at the
time of the crime; 6) the act of the defendant was not the sole
proximate cause of the victim's death; and 7) it is unlikely that
the defendant would engage in further criminal activity that would
constitute a continuing threat to society.
The trial court then explained the seven statutory mitigators and
explained to the jury that non-statutory mitigators were "every
other mitigating circumstance or circumstances that any one of you
may find not covered by [the statutory mitigators]."   Finally, the
9
court defined the meaning of life imprisonment and life
imprisonment without parole:
If Life Imprisonment is entered in
Section V, you must then proceed to Section
VI.  If you unanimously find that the sentence
of life imprisonment should be without the
possibility of parole, mark "Yes" in the space
provided.  If you unanimously find that the
sentence of life imprisonment should be with
the possibility of parole, mark "No" in the
space provided.
If you sentence Steven Oken to life
imprisonment 
without 
the 
possibility 
of
parole, he will never be eligible for parole
and will not be granted parole for the balance
of his natural life.  If you sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment, he will not be
eligible for parole considerations until he
has served 25 years or the equal of 25 years
less such time credits as are earned by him
for good behavior, exceptional industry, or
the like.  Additionally, in the event that at
- 24 -
      
The note contained two inquiries.  The second question
10
read:  "Could there be a law passed in the future to allow Oken
out?"  The judge responded, "Such speculation should play no part
at all in your discussions as to the sentence in this case."
some 
future 
date 
the 
Parole 
Commission
recommended that Steven Oken be released on
parole, he could only be paroled if that
decision was specifically approved by the
Governor of Maryland.
In addition, during jury deliberations, the jury sent a note
to the trial judge, asking the following question:   
10
If the jury convicts "life w/o parole" is
their {sic} any possibility at all that Oken
could be released?
 
After consultation with counsel in Oken's presence, the trial court
responded 
There is no possibility that the Defendant
could be released on parole if the sentence is
life w/o parole.
Petitioner was not prevented from bringing to the jury's
attention information that would rebut or explain the showing of
future dangerousness.  The trial judge specifically instructed the
jurors that they could sentence Oken to life without the
possibility of parole and if they did so, Oken would remain in
prison for the remainder of his natural life.  Finally, the trial
judge, with Oken's personal approval, responded to the jury inquiry
during deliberations that if sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, Oken would never be released from prison.
We conclude that this jury was adequately informed that life
imprisonment for Oken meant that he would never be released from
- 25 -
      
We are uncertain whether Oken is also arguing that the
11
Maine life sentence should have been listed on the sentencing form
as a potentially mitigating factor.  To the extent that he asserts
this issue, the claim is meritless.  This Court held in Booth v.
State, 327 Md. 142, 161-62, 608 A.2d 162, 171, cert. denied, 506
U.S. 988, 113 S. Ct. 500, 121 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992), that a
defendant "does not have a right to have listed on the sentencing
form furnished to the jury nonstatutory issues of a potentially
mitigating nature that have been generated by the evidence." 
prison by parole.  Moreover, this jury was adequately informed that
Oken was currently serving a life sentence without parole in Maine.
The jury was certainly given the opportunity to find that life
imprisonment was an acceptable alternative to the death penalty.
Cf. Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 404, 583 A.2d 218, 226 (1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S. Ct. 117, 116 L. Ed. 2d 86
(1991).  There is no due process violation.   Accordingly, we find
11
no error.
III. Whether the Petitioner's trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance of counsel?
Oken asserts numerous grounds to support his claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial.  Judge
Levitz reorganized these claims into six categories: (1) failure to
show sufficient evidence of Oken's drug and alcohol abuse; (2)
failure to adequately prepare Oken's expert witnesses; (3)
inadequate presentation of Oken's Maine life sentence as a
mitigating factor; (4) failure to object to the State's closing
- 26 -
      
In Pennington v. State, 308 Md. 727, 728 n.1, 521 A.2d
12
1216, 1216 n.1, (1987) we defined an "Alford" plea as a "guilty
plea containing a protestation of innocence."  See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
See also Maryland Rule 4-242(c) (court may accept plea of guilty
even though defendant does not admit guilt).
arguments; (5) erroneous advice concerning Oken's Alford plea in
Maine;  and (6) the cumulative effect of errors.  
12
In reviewing Oken's claim, we apply the test for assessing the
adequacy of counsel's performance enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  In order to establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the burden is on the petitioner to prove
that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.  Williams v. State, 326 Md.
367, 373, 605 A.2d 103, 106 (1992); see also Gilliam v. State, 331
Md. 651, 665-66, 629 A.2d 685, 692 (1993), cert. denied,    U.S. 
, 114 S. Ct. 891, 127 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1994) (Gilliam II).
To establish that a deficiency existed, Oken must demonstrate
that his counsel's acts or omissions were the result of
unreasonable professional judgment and that counsel's performance,
given all the circumstances, fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness 
considering 
prevailing 
professional 
norms.
Strickland, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693;
Gilliam II, 331 Md. at 665, 629 A.2d at 692; State v. Thomas, 328
Md. 541, 556, 616 A.2d 365, 373 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 917,
- 27 -
113 S. Ct. 2359, 124 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1993) (Thomas III); State v.
Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 441, 509 A.2d 1179, 1185, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 598, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986); Harris v. State,
303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985).  Oken must also overcome the
presumption 
that 
the 
challenged 
action 
might, 
under 
the
circumstances, be considered sound trial strategy.  Gilliam II, 331
Md. at 666, 629 A.2d at 692.  In State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160, 171,
599 A.2d 1171, 1176 (1992) (Thomas II), we addressed the
deferential view that Strickland affords to counsel's performance:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential.  It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a
court, examining counsel's defense after it
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable.  A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made
to 
eliminate 
the 
distorting 
effects 
of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.  Because of the difficulties inherent in
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional 
assistance; 
that 
is, 
the
defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action
`might be considered sound trial strategy.'
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d
at 694-95) (citations omitted).
Petitioner 
must 
also 
show 
that 
counsel's 
performance
prejudiced the defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at
- 28 -
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.  Oken must demonstrate "`that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.'"  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,
369, 113 S. Ct 838, 842, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180, 189 (1993) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
693); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165, 106 S. Ct. 988, 993, 89
L. Ed. 2d 123, 133 (1986).  In order to establish prejudice, Oken
must show that there is a substantial possibility that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.  Williams, 326 Md. at 374-76, 605 A.2d at 106-
07; Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27, 578 A.2d 734, 738-39
(1990).    A proper analysis of prejudice, however, should not
focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider
"whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable."  Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S. Ct. at 842, 122 L.
Ed. 2d at 189.
 
In evaluating Oken's claim, we need not approach the inquiry
in any particular order, nor are we required in every instance to
address both components of the Strickland test.  The Supreme Court
commented that 
[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is
not to grade counsel's performance.  If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.
- 29 -
466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 699.  We shall
address Oken's allegations within this framework and make our own
independent analysis.
- 30 -
      
The testing procedure is known as radioimmunoassay.  Some
13
courts have approved the use of radioimmunoassay of hair samples to
demonstrate habitual drug usage.  See e.g., United States v.
Medina, 
749 
F. 
Supp. 
59 
(E.D.N.Y. 
1990) 
(approving 
the
admissibility of hair sample tests to determine if defendant had
ingested narcotics in violation of the conditions of his parole);
Burgel v. Burgel, 141 A.D.2d 215, 533 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1988)
(approving decision to allow test to confirm habitual drug use
during discovery phase of civil custody dispute).  This Court,
however, 
has 
not 
yet 
addressed 
the 
admissibility 
of
radioimmunoassay under Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364
(1978).  We do not today decide whether the evidence is admissible
in Maryland. 
A.  Evidence of Substance Abuse
Oken contends that his counsel should have investigated and
presented readily available evidence of substance abuse at the
guilt/innocence stage and the sentencing stage of his trial.  He
claims that this evidence could have convinced the jury to convict
him of second degree murder, thereby making him ineligible for the
death penalty.  See Art. 27, § 412(d).  Alternatively, he argues
that this evidence would have been a possible mitigating factor for
sentencing.  He argues that counsel's failure to interview four lay
witnesses and to perform radioimmunoassay of hair samples collected
by the Maine police fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.    
13
Before the post-conviction court, Oken asserted that his trial
counsel put on virtually no evidence to prove Petitioner's
longstanding alcohol and drug abuse.  At the post-conviction
hearing, he called four lay witnesses who each testified that they
lived in the Baltimore area, that they were never contacted by
- 31 -
Petitioner's trial counsel before trial, and that they each
possessed personal knowledge of Oken's serious drug abuse before
the Garvin murder.  He attributes the alleged omission to call
these witnesses to oversight and neglect.  The State contends that
trial counsel presented sufficient evidence of Oken's history of
substance abuse and was, therefore, not ineffective.  In addition,
the State asserts that this evidence would have been merely
cumulative.
The post-conviction court found that counsel's failure to
develop additional evidence of drug or alcohol abuse at either
stage of the proceedings was not deficient under Strickland.  With
respect to counsel's performance during the guilt/innocence phase,
Judge Levitz stated:
[C]ounsel may very well have decided that
Petitioner's defense would not have benefitted
by a voluntary intoxication issue.  The jury,
for example, may very well have been angered
by the fact that Petitioner was selling drugs
from the family pharmacy to support his own
habit.  This coupled with the fact that
Petitioner was claiming to have amnesia for
the time which the murders occurred make
counsel's decision appear to be a reasonable
one.
Similarly, with respect to counsel's performance during the
sentencing phase, Judge Levitz found that "[t]he decision of
whether to pursue the drug abuse defense is a tactical decision and
counsel may very well have believed that this evidence would have
angered the jury."
- 32 -
      
At the post-conviction hearing, Mr. Lipsitz summarized
14
his defense strategies.  He testified:
First of all, there was an insanity defense
which was running.  Secondly, I was interested
in trying to beat the sexual offense count and
the burglary count.  Thirdly, there was a
substance abuse defense.  Fourthly, there was
a defense of, can you find a hole in the
State's case that might give you some leeway.
General defenses.
He further testified that with respect to the substance abuse
defense:
In my opinion in this case under all the
facts the substance abuse defense wouldn't
have gone anywhere. . . .  
I mean, if you are talking about my
proving the extent of his substance abuse, I
don't 
think 
that 
would 
have 
succeeded,
although I did what I could in that area.
We note that until the time of trial Oken claimed to be
suffering from amnesia that prevented him from recalling events
from the time period surrounding the Garvin murder.  We agree with
Judge Levitz that counsel's decisions regarding presentation of the
voluntary intoxication defense were reasonable in light of Oken's
claimed amnesia.
We think that Mr. Lipsitz' presentation of the voluntary
intoxication defense was essentially a tactical choice within the
realm of reasonable assistance of counsel.  The decision on how
best to present a defense is a tactical one.   See  Hunt v. Smith,
14
856 F. Supp. 251, 257 (D. Md. 1994), aff'd sub nom., Hunt v. Nuth,
57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,  U.S.   , 116 S. Ct.
724, 133 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1996).  Mr. Lipsitz's failure to present
- 33 -
      
For example, Oken's mother testified for the defense at
15
both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases that Oken had begun
using alcohol and cocaine at an early age and that Oken admitted to
her that he had used Xanex that he had taken from the family
pharmacy.  She also testified at the guilt/innocence phase that
Oken's behavior in October 1987 was erratic, that she sometimes
noticed alcohol on his breath, and that on one occasion Oken reeked
of alcohol when he opened the pharmacy in 1987.  On another
occasion she found Oken with pills.  Oken's father testified at the
guilt/innocence phase that Oken was acting erratically during
October 1987, that it was obvious to him that  Oken had a substance
abuse problem, and that a substantial quantity of Xanex had been
found missing from the family pharmacy in the Spring of 1987.  Drs.
Payson, Berlin, and Spodak each testified at the sentencing phase
that Oken had a substance abuse problem.  Oken's ex-wife testified
during the guilt/innocence phase that Oken was drinking heavily
during October 1987, that she found pills in a pair of his pants
and another vial of pills in his nightstand, that on at least one
occasion in September or October 1987 she drove Oken home because
he seemed intoxicated, and that she had disposed of a case of wine
and a vial of pills to prevent Oken from using these substances. 
Xanex is a trade name for benzodiazepine.  Oken contends that
radioimmunoassay would have shown the presence of benzodiazepine.
Since the jury heard evidence of Oken's abuse of xanex, the testing
would have been cumulative.
the additional evidence did not rise to the level of deficient
performance.  Tichnell, 306 Md. at 456-57, 509 A.2d at 1193-94.  
We have made our own independent review of the record and find
that the jury heard substantial evidence of substance abuse.  This
evidence was presented through the testimony of Oken's ex-wife,
father, mother, acquaintances, and the three medical witnesses, Dr.
Berlin, Dr. Payson, and Dr. Spodak.15
Moreover, the evidence would have been cumulative.  Gilliam
II, 331 Md. at 678-80, 629 A.2d at 699-700 (rejecting claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel where evidence not presented was
- 34 -
cumulative); see also Proctor v. United States, 729 F. Supp. 473,
476 (D. Md.) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim
where evidence would have been merely cumulative, notwithstanding
defendant's claim that evidence was `vital'), aff'd sub nom., Epps
v. United States, 911 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1038, 111 S. Ct. 707, 112 L. Ed. 2d 697, (1991).  Counsel's
failure to present this cumulative evidence does not satisfy either
prong of the Strickland test.  Accordingly, we find that the post-
conviction court did not err in denying relief on these grounds. 
B.  Preparation of the Experts
Oken contends that the failure of his counsel to adequately
prepare two defense psychiatrists for their testimony at the
sentencing hearing rises to the level of ineffective assistance.
At sentencing, Oken's counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Berlin
and Dr. Payson to establish that Oken suffered from sexual sadism.
He hoped to persuade the jury that sexual sadism, a mental disorder
listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d
- 35 -
      
Sexual Sadism is defined in the Diagnostic and
16
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d Ed. Rev.) at § 302.84.
The disorder is characterized by 
recurrent, intense, sexual urges and sexually
arousing fantasies, of at least six months'
duration, involving acts (real, not simulated)
in 
which 
the 
psychological 
or 
physical
suffering (including humiliation) of the
victim is sexually exciting.  The person has
acted 
on 
these 
urges, 
or 
is 
markedly
distressed by them.
Ed. Rev.) (DSM III-R),  would mitigate against imposing the death
16
penalty.  
As part of the factual predicate for his diagnosis, Dr. Berlin
testified that Oken raped and killed his sister-in-law, Patricia
Hirt, about two weeks after the rape and murder of Dawn Garvin.  In
addition, both doctors testified that Oken's sexual sadism was an
incurable and untreatable disorder.  Oken argues that this highly
prejudicial testimony portrayed him as an "incurably violent man"
and should not have been presented to the jury.  His counsel, he
claims, was ineffective in failing to instruct the Doctors to avoid
mentioning this aspect of the disease.  He asserts that there is
nothing improper in instructing expert witnesses to avoid
mentioning prejudicial evidence on direct examination.  Oken also
asserts that during the cross-examination of the State's expert,
Dr. Spodak, Mr. Lipsitz compounded his error by mentioning that
Oken left Maryland because of "another substantial event which
occurred," a clear reference to the Hirt murder. 
- 36 -
Counsel's strategy was to present evidence of a mental
disorder as a mitigating circumstance through the testimony of Dr.
Berlin and Dr. Payson, even though the basis for the diagnosis
included the Hirt murder.  At the post-conviction hearing, Mr.
Lipsitz explained his strategy:
Because one of the defenses was a diagnosis of
sexual sadism, that information might be to
reenforce 
that 
allegation 
and 
persuade
somebody that he really was sick.  
Mr. Lipsitz also testified that his strategy was to demonstrate
that Oken would not be dangerous in the future:  "I was hoping to
establish that he was innocuous as possible, of course. . . .  I
was trying to prove, if I could, that he won't be a danger in the
future."  
The post-conviction court found that Mr. Lipsitz's preparation
of Dr. Berlin and Dr. Payson did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.  With respect to the Hirt murder, Judge
Levitz stated:
[t]his Court does not believe that counsel's
failure to instruct Dr. Berlin to withhold an
important part of his factual basis supporting
his medical diagnosis can in any way be
construed as deficient.  It was, of course,
sound trial strategy for the defense to submit
evidence of a mental disorder as this is a
mitigating factor under the Maryland death
penalty statute.  The downside to this tactic
in this case was that the basis of the mental
disorder was Petitioner's past homicides.  A
diagnosis without a basis would have little
weight with a jury.  Furthermore, it would
have been improper for counsel to instruct Dr.
Berlin to withhold part of his factual basis
simply because it hurt Petitioner's case.
- 37 -
With respect to the future dangerousness testimony, Judge Levitz
found:
Petitioner's 
third 
claim 
regarding
counsel's performance during sentencing is
that counsel was ineffective by failing to
properly prepare Drs. Henry Payson and Fred
Berlin on the issue of future dangerousness
and Petitioner's long term recovery prospects.
Both doctors testified that Petitioner was
suffering from "sexual sadism" and that there
was no cure or treatment for this disorder.
Petitioner argues that this portrayed him as
an 
incurably 
violent 
man 
and 
severely
prejudiced his case.  This Court does not
believe this claim is grounds for post-
conviction relief.  Counsel made the decision
to put on evidence of the mental disorder and
the 
doctors 
properly 
explained 
their
understanding of this disorder.  This disorder
would be more persuasive if it was fully
explained to the jury.  Moreover, counsel's
failure to instruct the doctors to withhold
this evidence cannot be considered deficient
as any instruction to do so would be
considered improper.
Judge Levitz also found that because there was no error in allowing
Dr. Berlin to discuss the Hirt homicide, there was no error to
compound when counsel referred to the Hirt murder during his cross-
examination. 
We agree with Judge Levitz that trial counsel made the
tactical decision to present the factual basis for the medical
diagnosis.  At the post-conviction hearing, Oken's legal expert
testified that this "[c]ase seems to cry out for some sort of
medical explanation as to why these crimes occurred."  He stated
that "once they went down that track of sexual sadism, I think they
were kind of stuck with the Hirt homicide."  Considering the
- 38 -
diagnostic criteria for sexual sadism, we cannot say that this
strategy was unsound.  Through the psychiatric testimony, Mr.
Lipsitz succeeded in convincing at least one juror, if not more,
that Oken's mental disorder was a mitigating factor.  
Counsel's failure to "sanitize" the testimony was not
deficient.  See Gilliam II, 331 Md. at 669, 629 A.2d at 694; State
v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 170-72, 571 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (1990)
(cautioning counsel to avoid suggesting testimony to the witness.)
Mr. Lipsitz testified that he made the tactical decision to elicit
testimony from the experts in order to establish Oken's lack of
future dangerousness.  Mr. Lipsitz testified that he prepared Dr.
Berlin before trial and that he was generally familiar with what
the testimony would cover.  Moreover, Dr. Berlin testified at the
trial, in response to Mr. Lipsitz' question, that "I told you when
you asked me to testify, I am going to call it like I see it."   
Petitioner is correct that the proponent of expert testimony
is not required to elicit all the facts upon which the opinion is
based; nevertheless, the factual basis for the expert's opinion is
admissible to enable the jury to properly weigh the testimony.
Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 42-43, 542 A.2d 1258, 1262-63 (1988);
see also Department v. Bo Peep, 317 Md. 573, 589, 565 A.2d 1015,
1023 (1989).  Clearly, Mr. Lipsitz thought the factual basis for
- 39 -
      
At the post-conviction hearing, Mr. Lipsitz testified "I
17
think there was a basis for what Dr. Berlin said, which might have
been helpful to Mr. Oken."
Dr. Berlin's diagnosis might have been helpful to Oken.   We will
17
not second guess his decision.  Gilliam II, 331 Md. at 666, 629
A.2d at 692.  Petitioner's claim that Mr. Lipsitz failed to
adequately prepare the experts is without merit.  Counsel's
performance was not deficient.  Accordingly, we find no error.
C.  Maine Life Sentence
Oken contends that his counsel failed to adequately
demonstrate to the sentencing jury that his sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for the Maine homicide mitigated
against imposition of the death penalty.  We have previously
addressed this argument in section II; Oken now recasts this claim
in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The 
post-conviction 
court 
found 
that 
Mr. 
Lipsitz'
representation was neither deficient nor prejudicial to Oken:
[C]ounsel did explain to the jury that
Petitioner's sentence in Maine was life
without the possibility of parole making the
jury aware of this fact.  More importantly,
there is no way Petitioner can show he was
prejudiced by counsel's failure to put on
proof regarding the Maine sentence.  Judge
Smith explained to the jury during his
instructions that the jury could consider as a
mitigating factor the fact that if Petitioner
received 
life 
imprisonment 
without 
the
possibility of parole, he will never be
released during his natural life.  The jury
- 40 -
was aware that they could reject a death
sentence and keep Petitioner incarcerated for
the rest of his life.
*
*
* 
Judge Smith instructed the jury that they
could consider as a mitigating factor a life
sentence "should he [Petitioner] receive life
or life without parole." . . .  The jury was
aware that they could reject a death sentence
and keep Petitioner in jail for the rest of
his life.  They decided, nonetheless, that
Petitioner should receive the death penalty
rather than life without parole.  It is clear,
therefore, that there is not a significant
possibility 
that 
if 
the 
jury 
had 
been
instructed on the Maine sentence the result
would be any different.
We agree.  Accordingly, we find no error in the post-
conviction court's denial of relief on this grounds.
D.  The State's Closing Arguments
Oken next contends that his trial counsel should have objected
to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument
at both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of the trial.
Counsel did not object to the prosecutor's comments referring to
Oken's demeanor, the prosecutor's comments that Oken now claims
infringed on his right to remain silent, nor to the State's Persian
Gulf War/Patriotic Duty Speech. 
Oken's first claim is that the prosecutor improperly commented
about his demeanor.  We addressed these comments in Oken I and held
that these statements were not improper and were not plain error.
- 41 -
      
He suggests that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure
18
to object because on direct appeal an error objected to below is
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, whereas, if no
objection is made in a capital case, reversal is only required
where it appears that the remarks of the prosecutor actually misled
the jury or were likely to have misled or influenced the jury to
the prejudice of the accused.  Booth, 327 Md. at 193, 608 A.2d at
187.  Because trial counsel did not object, he continues, the
demeanor error was reviewed under the more stringent standard.  We
need not engage in a discussion of the different standard of review
because the result is the same under either standard.
327 Md. at 674-77, 612 A.2d at 280-82.  Oken now couches his
argument in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel and urges a
different result when considered in this context.18
Oken next contends that portions of the prosecutor's opening
and closing remarks constituted impermissible comments on his right
to remain silent.  He argues that the prosecutor's statements that
"the defendant said some things through his attorney in opening"
and that Mr. Lipsitz "really doesn't dispute these items" were in
derogation of his right to remain silent.  
Finally, Oken contends that his counsel was ineffective in
failing to object when the prosecutor told the jury in closing
argument:
I find it ironic that during the course of
this lengthy, difficult and painful trial our
country went to war, right in the middle of
it, and we saw every night other people making
personal sacrifices of this nature so that we
can live in a fair and just and hopefully a
safe society.  And that's what you all have
also been asked to do, make that kind of a
personal sacrifice to keep our country and our
community the way it is and the way it should
be.
- 42 -
Oken asserts that these comments, by drawing an analogy between the
jury's role in Oken's trial and the role of U.S. soldiers in the
Persian Gulf War, improperly urged the jury to take his life to
keep our community the way it should be, just as our soldiers were
doing in Iraq.  This argument, he continues, substitutes passion,
emotion and patriotism for reasoned judgment, thereby shifting the
jury's focus away from the facts of the case.  Oken concludes that
trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's statements,
that counsel's failure to object was not reasonable and that there
is a significant possibility that but for this unprofessional
performance, the result of the proceedings would have been
different.   
At the post-conviction hearing, Oken's counsel testified that
his reasons for not objecting to the prosecutor's comments were
tactical.  He explained that he did not believe that objecting
would make a difference, that the jury knew he did not agree with
the State, that he chose not to highlight the comments, and that he
decided not to object to avoid antagonizing the jury.
Judge Levitz rejected Oken's arguments and found that
counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective
assistance.  Judge Levitz noted that objections at trial, and
especially during closing argument, are tactical decisions best
left to the discretion of trial counsel.  In addition, relying on
our opinion in Oken I, he found that the prosecutor's statements
- 43 -
      
In Oken I, 327 Md. at 677, 612 A.2d at 282, finding no
19
cause to reverse, we stated that 
the jurors observed Oken throughout the course
of the trial, and were free to reach their own
independent 
conclusions 
regarding 
his
demeanor.  The jurors were also instructed by
the trial judge that the opening and closing
arguments of counsel were not to be considered
as evidence.  Moreover, the record reflects
that the evidence presented in this case
fairly supported the prosecutor's remarks
concerning Oken's demeanor. 
In addition, we note that the comment, when viewed in context of
the prosecutor's closing argument, could reasonably be interpreted
as the State's response to Oken's written allocution that was read
to the jury wherein he professed remorse.
about Oken's demeanor were not improper, and therefore, Petitioner
suffered no prejudice.   We agree.  Because the prosecutor's
19
comments were not improper, a fortiori Oken was not prejudiced.
Cf. State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 22, 548 A.2d 506, 516 (1988).
We also agree with Judge Levitz that Oken's counsel was not
ineffective in failing to object to the comments Oken claims 
infringed on his right to remain silent.  We find that neither of
the statements were a comment upon the failure of Petitioner to
testify, nor did these statements violate Petitioner's right to a
fair trial.  To be sure, comments on a defendant's failure to
testify violate the defendant's constitutional rights.  See Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L. Ed.
2d 106, 110 (1965); Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 265, 600 A.2d
420, 426 (1992).  Reading the prosecutor's closing argument in
- 44 -
context, however, we do not believe the statements were comments on
Petitioner's right to remain silent.  See King v. State, 190 Md.
361, 373-74, 58 A.2d 663, 668 (1948) (holding that statement that
there was no evidence to refute the State's case was not improper
comment on defendant's failure to testify); State v. Ward, 338 N.C.
64, 449 S.E.2d 709, 729 (1994) (holding prosecutor's remarks were
not a comment on defendant's failure to testify, but fair and
proper comments on defendant's failure to present any evidence),
cert. denied,    U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 2014, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1013
(1995); see also Eastman v. State, 47 Md. App. 162, 167, 422 A.2d
41, 43-44 (1980).  Nor do we find that the jury would naturally
interpret the State's argument as a comment on Petitioner's failure
to testify.  Accordingly, we find that neither of the prosecutor's
statements were improper, nor did they violate Petitioner's right
to a fair trial.
Finally, we find trial counsel's failure to object to the
prosecutor's Persian Gulf War comments was not constitutionally
deficient.  The decision to interpose objections during trial is
one of tactics and trial strategy.  Colvin, 314 Md. at 22, 548 A.2d
at 516; see Evans v. Thompson, 881 F.2d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010, 110 S. Ct. 3255, 111 L. Ed. 2d 764
(1990).  Counsel's failure to object was clearly a tactical
decision within the range of reasonably competent representation.
- 45 -
      
Prior to the Garvin prosecution in Maryland, Oken was
20
represented by Mr. Lipsitz in the Maine prosecution.  See State v.
Oken, 569 A.2d 1218 (Me.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 818, 111 S. Ct.
62, 112 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1990).  On April 21, 1989, Oken entered a
conditional guilty plea pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2).  The plea was offered as an Alford plea.
      
At the hearing on Oken's Motion to Dismiss the charges,
21
(continued...)
For the reasons stated above, we find no reversible error in
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's remarks.
E.  The Guilty Plea in Maine
Oken next claims that he entered the Alford plea in Maine
based on erroneous legal advice that he received from Mr. Lipsitz.20
He claims that Mr. Lipsitz told him that the plea could not be used
against him in any manner in the Maryland prosecution.  He also
claims that Mr. Lipsitz told him that under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") he would have to serve the Maine
sentence of life without parole before any Maryland sentence could
be satisfied. 
Oken identifies two consequences of Mr. Lipsitz' advice that
he 
alleges 
prejudiced 
his 
defense. 
 
Contrary 
to 
Oken's
expectations, the Governors of Maryland and Maine entered into an
executive agreement providing that if the Maryland sentence was
less than life without parole, Oken would be returned to Maine
within a reasonable period of time following the conclusion of the
Maryland proceedings.   In addition, during the penalty phase in
21
- 46 -
      (...continued)
21
the State's Attorney read portions of the agreement into the
record.  The agreement reads in pertinent part:
In the event that Steven Howard Oken is
acquitted in the Courts of the State of
Maryland or the prosecution in the State of
Maryland is concluded or terminated for any
reason but not limited to
a.
The Defendant is found to be
not competent to stand trial;
or
b.
The Defendant is found not
criminally responsible; or
c.
The Defendant is found Guilty
and receives a sentence of Life
or a term of incarceration of
less than Life; or 
d.
Any conviction of Steven Howard
Oken 
is 
pardoned 
by 
the
Executive 
Authority 
of
Maryland; or 
e.
Any sentence imposed on Steven
Howard Oken is commuted to a
term of years of less than Life
Without Parole;
then the said Steven Howard Oken shall
thereafter 
be 
returned 
at 
the 
earliest
reasonable time to the State of Maine.
The trial judge denied the Motion to Dismiss, finding that Maryland
Code (1957, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.) Art. 41, § 2-205 does not
preclude the Governor of Maine and the Governor of Maryland from
entering into such an agreement.
the Maryland proceeding, the State introduced evidence of the Maine
conviction.  Oken contends that his guilty plea to a crime of
violence in Maine deprived him of a statutory mitigator at his
death penalty sentencing in Maryland and he is therefore entitled
to a new sentencing hearing.  See Art. 27, § 413(g)(1).  
The post-conviction court made the following findings:
- 47 -
Petitioner's own expert admitted the case
against Petitioner in Maine was overwhelming.
Based on this fact, counsel advised Petitioner
to enter the Alford plea with the hope that an
argument could be made during the Dawn Garvin
proceedings that this plea was inadmissible.
Despite these efforts, the plea was found to
be admissible and was entered into evidence
during the Dawn Garvin proceedings.  The fact
that the plea was admitted, however, does not
make counsel's advice deficient.  Faced with
an overwhelming case in Maine, the advice to
enter an Alford plea was reasonable despite
its ultimate admission in the Dawn Garvin
proceedings.  While it is true that an Alford
plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty
plea, it was not certain that this plea would
be admissible in the Dawn Garvin proceeding.
Furthermore, counsel testified that he never
promised 
Petitioner 
the 
plea 
would 
be
inadmissible; 
he 
was 
only 
trying 
to
manufacture as many arguments as possible.
This particular argument failed, but it is the
finding of this Court that the advice was not
deficient.
Petitioner's second argument regarding
the Maine case is that counsel erroneously
advised 
him 
that, 
under 
the 
Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), the Maine
sentence would have to be served before any
Maryland sentence.  Since Maine had no death
penalty statute, counsel believed this would
insulate petitioner from a death sentence.  As
it turned out, however, the Governors of
Maryland and Maine entered into an Executive
Agreement which "trumped" the IAD by allowing
Maryland to execute its sentence first.
Counsel testified at the post conviction
hearing that he believed this was a good
argument to help Petitioner escape the death
penalty but he never guaranteed this argument
would be successful.  Although allowed by law,
there was no way of knowing the Governors of
the two states would enter into the agreement
and 
counsel 
was 
simply 
trying 
every
possibility to save his client from a death
sentence.  The fact of the matter is,
- 48 -
counsel's advice regarding the Alford plea
developed two arguments which could have saved
Petitioner's life.  This Court finds that not
only was this advice in no way deficient, it
was a good way to try to develop sound
arguments in a very weak case.
Judge Levitz clearly rejected Oken's argument that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no deficiency or
prejudice under Strickland.  In addition, his ruling was based on
factual findings and an assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses at the hearing.
At the post-conviction hearing, Mr. Lipsitz testified that he
made no promises to Oken.  He testified that he had the impression
that there was a possibility that the State could not use an Alford
plea in a death penalty proceeding.  With respect to the IAD, he
denied making any guarantees or promises to Oken.  He recounted
that he advised Oken that under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers, it was possible that Oken would have to be returned to
Maine to serve his sentence before any Maryland sentence could be
satisfied; although he was aware that the Governors could agree
otherwise, he did not expect that they would do so in this case.
Mr. Lipsitz testified that he was looking for ways to manufacture
arguments on Oken's behalf because Oken was reluctant to go to
trial:  "My approach was I was looking for issues.  I was looking
for something to roll in front of a judge to give him a chance to
make a mistake and stub his toe on."
- 49 -
      
The Maine transcript of the guilty plea proceedings
22
reads, in pertinent part:
THE COURT:
Mr. Oken, you have heard what the
Assistant 
Attorney 
General 
has
stated here, that, one, this is an
open plea.  That mean that there
have been no negotiations as to the
length of the plea.  The plea can be
anywhere from 25 years, on the
murder charge, the sentence can be
anywhere from 25 years to life, you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
And you understand what the
Attorney General said in that
regard?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
And, secondly, that there may
be prosecutions against you in
other jurisdictions and that
this plea has nothing to do
with those prosecutions and the
Attorney General's office is
not 
going 
to 
in 
any 
way
interfere 
with 
any 
other
prosecutions 
in 
other
jurisdictions, you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Before the post-conviction court, the State introduced the
transcript of the Maine guilty plea proceedings.  In response to
the voir dire at the time of the plea, Oken told the Maine court
that his decision to enter a plea was unrelated to any other
prosecutions against him in other states.   The State argues that
22
Oken's statements clearly indicate that Oken's plea was not
- 50 -
predicated on the potential future effect on any Maryland
proceedings.  We agree with the State.  While Oken can challenge
his statements before the Maine court, these statements are strong
evidence that his plea was unrelated to the Maryland proceedings.
See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S. Ct. 1703, 118 L. Ed. 2d 412
(1992).
Judge Levitz saw and heard the witnesses testify, and he
assessed their credibility.  Judge Levitz believed the testimony of
trial counsel over that of Petitioner.  He found that Mr. Lipsitz
made no promises to Oken concerning the Maryland proceedings.  We
will not disturb these findings of the post-conviction court unless
they are clearly erroneous.  Maryland Rule 8-131(c); see Thomas II,
325 Md. at 177, 599 A.2d at 1179; Tichnell, 306 Md. at 442-43, 509
A.2d at 1186.
It is clear that Mr. Lipsitz' strategy was to give Oken the
benefit of every possible defense that he could create.  Judge
- 51 -
      
Even if Judge Levitz had not made these fact findings, we
23
are in no way indicating that there would have been grounds for
post-conviction relief because Oken fails to satisfy the prejudice
prong of Strickland -- that there would have been a substantial
possibility of a different result.  Oken has never moved to vacate
his plea in Maine and has never claimed that his plea was
involuntary.  The transcript of the Maine proceeding indicates that
the plea judge asked Oken on three separate occasions if his plea
was voluntary; Oken's response was in the affirmative.  Oken has
not shown that there is a substantial possibility that but for the
allegedly erroneous advice of Mr. Lipsitz, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.  Williams v. State, 326 Md.
367, 374-76, 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992); Bowers v. State, 320 Md.
416, 425-27, 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990).
     He makes no suggestion that he was not guilty of the Maine
charges or that if he had gone to trial in Maine, that he would
have been found not guilty.  The evidence in Maine was
overwhelming.  Had Oken gone to trial and been convicted, the
result would have been the same; the conviction would have been
admissible in Maryland.
Levitz' findings were not clearly erroneous.   We find that the
23
representation was not deficient.  Accordingly, we find no error.
F. Cumulative effect of errors
Oken contends that the cumulative effect of the errors alleged
warrant the grant of a new trial and a new sentencing hearing.  The
post-conviction court denied Oken's claim that the cumulative
effect of Mr. Lipsitz' errors warranted relief.  Oken's allegations
are not collectively more indicative of ineffective assistance of
counsel than they are individually.  See Gilliam II, 331 Md. at
686, 629 A.2d at 703.  As we said in Gilliam II, the issue is one
of simple mathematics:  "twenty times nothing still equals
nothing."  Id.  Accordingly, we find no error.
- 52 -
IV.
Whether the post-conviction court erred in not
allowing Petitioner to obtain his own hair samples
taken from him at the time of his arrest for
purposes of conducting forensic tests to establish
Petitioner's substance abuse at the time of the
offense?
Oken contends that the post-conviction court erred in refusing
to permit him to test hair samples for the presence of drugs.  In
his petition for post-conviction relief, Oken claimed that his
counsel's failure to fully investigate and obtain evidence of
Oken's substantial drug use constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.  To support this claim and to establish the necessary
prejudice prong under Strickland, Oken requested permission to test
the previously collected hair samples for the presence of drugs.
The State objected and argued that the forensic testing could
not pinpoint when drug use occurred, the amount of drug use, nor
the effect the drug use had on the user.  At best, the State
argued, the forensic evidence was cumulative and would only
potentially corroborate evidence of drug abuse already provided
through the testimony of family members and expert witnesses.
Judge Levitz denied Oken's motion, stating:  "I feel that the
motion is inappropriate.  It's not proper.  It's not proper for a
post-conviction proceeding and accordingly, the motion is denied."
Before this Court, Oken contends that the post-conviction
court erred for two reasons.  First, Oken suggests that the State
misrepresented 
the 
reliability 
and 
capabilities 
of
- 53 -
radioimmunoassay.  He concludes that because the post-conviction
court relied on misinformation provided by the prosecutor, the
ruling was based on inaccurate information.  Second, Oken asserts
the court deprived him of his right to establish prejudice to his
defense resulting from his counsel's deficient representation.  We
disagree.
Judge Levitz did not appear to rely upon the prosecutor's
argument as a basis for his ruling.  The discretion to exclude
unnecessary and cumulative evidence is within the sound discretion
of the post-conviction court.  See Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 307,
550 A.2d 925, 931 (1988); Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 354-55,
283 A.2d 392, 400 (1971).  We find no abuse of discretion.
V.
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury
to use the underlying felony murder as an
aggravator in the penalty phase of the trial?
Oken contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State
to use his first degree sex offense conviction as both an element
of the felony murder and as an aggravator during the penalty phase.
Oken failed to raise this issue on direct appeal and he has waived
this claim.  Art. 27, § 645A(c); Maryland Rule 8-131; State v.
Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 709, 716, 718, 511 A.2d 461, 469, 473, 474
(1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S. Ct. 1339, 94 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1987) (Calhoun II).
- 54 -
Furthermore, we considered and rejected this argument in
Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 358-60, 473 A.2d 903, 916-17, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S. Ct. 276, 83 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1984).  See
also Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 82-83, 665 A.2d 223, 249
(1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3575 (1996); Calhoun v. State,
297 Md. 563, 629, 468 A.2d 45, 77 (1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Tichnell v. Maryland, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 2374, 80 L. Ed. 2d
846 (1984) (Calhoun I).  A felony may serve as both the basis of a
felony murder conviction and as an aggravator under the Maryland
death penalty statute.  In Stebbing, we reasoned that "Art. 27, §§
412-414, makes plain the legislative intent that the commission of
certain felonies, underlying a felony murder conviction, is to be
considered an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing
proceeding."  299 Md. at 359, 473 A.2d at 917.  Oken has not
presented us with any persuasive reason to reconsider the issue and
we decline to do so.  Accordingly, we find no error.
VI. Whether the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury that under Art. 27, § 413(g)(8),
the "catch-all provision," it could list as a
mitigating factor its desire to extend mercy.
Oken contends that the trial court erred by not instructing
the jury that it was permissible to use the catchall provision of
Art. 27, § 413(g)(8) to express as a non-statutory mitigator the
desire of any juror to extend mercy.  He did not request this
- 55 -
instruction at trial and he did not raise this issue on direct
appeal.  The issue is waived.  Art. 27, § 645A(c); Maryland Rule 8-
131; Tichnell, 306 Md. at 467, 509 A.2d at 1199; see also Foster,
Evans and Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326 (1986),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3310, 92 L. Ed. 2d 722
(1986).  
Even if this claim was not waived, the failure to give this
instruction was not error.  The trial court was not required to
instruct the jury to consider specific non-statutory mitigating
circumstances.  Booth, 327 Md. at 161-64, 608 Md. at 171-72. 
Furthermore, Oken's claim lacks merit.  We find that the trial
court clearly informed the jury it could consider mercy as a
mitigating factor.  The jury was instructed that
[f]or purposes of this sentencing proceeding,
a mitigating circumstance is anything about
the defendant or about the facts of this case
that, in fairness or in mercy, may make the
death sentence an inappropriate penalty for
this defendant.  
A mitigating circumstance is, simply put,
any fact which may cause any of you to
conclude that the death penalty is not
appropriate in this case.
The jury was also instructed that they could consider mercy.  They
were told as follows:
In determining whether death is the
appropriate sentence, it is proper for you to
exercise your own moral, factual and legal
judgment in deciding whether the aggravating
circumstance you may have found is sufficient
in your minds to call for the punishment of
- 1 -
death.  You may decide that the aggravating
factor proved by the State is not a sufficient
reason to impose a death sentence and on that
basis alone decide to impose a life sentence.
Nothing in the law forbids you from extending
mercy out of the belief that life imprisonment
is sufficient punishment under all of the
circumstances.
 
The jury was adequately informed that it could impose a life
sentence based solely on a desire to extend mercy.  See Scott v.
State, 310 Md. 277, 289, 529 A.2d 340, 346 (1987) (the catch-all
provision of Art. 27, § 413(g)(8) permits jury to extend mercy).
In fact, Oken received more than he was entitled to receive.  We
stated in Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 757, 506 A.2d 580, 616,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S. Ct. 38, 93 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1986),
that it was not error for a trial court to refuse to give an
identical instruction:
To have instructed the jury as Grandison
requested would have negated the carefully
thought out sentencing procedure designed to
meet the constitutional requirements set forth
by the Supreme Court by injecting the risk of
arbitrary and capricious action into the
proceeding.
For the reasons given above, the petition for post-conviction
relief was properly denied.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.
- 2 -
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, J.:
The majority holds that the appellant has waived the right to
raise, on post-conviction, the issue of the trial court's refusal
to ask the venire, on its voir dire, questions sufficient to
uncover the prospective jurors' attitudes about the death penalty.
- 3 -
     
  Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.)
24
Article 27, § 645A(c)(1) provides, as relevant:
[A]n allegation of error shall be deemed to be
waived when a petitioner could have made, but
intelligently and knowingly failed to make,
such allegation before trial, at trial, on
direct appeal, (whether or not the petitioner
actually took such an appeal) ... unless the
failure to make such allegation shall be
excused because of special circumstances.
    
       Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20
2
L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).  Witherspoon questions are those designed to
elicit information concerning the prospective juror's attitude
against the death penalty. Id. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d
at 785.   
 
This is so, it reasons, because the appellant failed to raise the
issue on direct appeal and, in addition, there are no "special
circumstances", see  § 645A(c)(1)   of the Maryland Uniform Post
24
Conviction Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.,
1995 Supp.) Article 27, §§ 645A - J, justifying that failure.  The
majority goes on to opine that, even if not waived, the issue lacks
substantive merit.  I disagree with both bases for the decision on
this point.           
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.
Ed.2d 
492 
(1992), 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
"reverse
Witherspoon"  questions, i.e., those which seek to determine the
2
prospective jurors' predisposition in favor of the death penalty,
must be asked in order to avoid a constitutional deficiency. Id. at
726, 112 S.Ct. at 2230-31, L.Ed.2d at 504.  See Evans v. State, 333
- 4 -
Md. 660, 672-73, 637 A.2d 117, 123 (1994).  Thus, "Morgan simply
recognizes that the principles first propounded in Witherspoon v.
Illinois, [391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)]
`demand inquiry into whether the views of prospective jurors on the
death penalty would disqualify them from sitting."' Evans, 333 Md.
at 672-73, 637 A.2d at 123 (quoting Morgan, 504 U.S. at 731, 112
S.Ct. at 2231, 119 L.Ed.2d at 504).  The Court made clear, however,
that "follow the law" type questions and questions that inquire
generally into the prospective juror's ability to be fair do not
suffice to satisfy that inquiry, it being clear that             
jurors 
could 
in 
all 
truth 
and 
candor 
respond
affirmatively [to such questions], personally  confident
that such dogmatic views are fair and impartial ... it
may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to
uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining ...
dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent
him or her from doing so. 
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct.at 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506-07.
     
The post conviction court recognized, as this Court
previously had done in Evans, 333 Md. at 672, 637 A. 2d at 123,
that Morgan did not enunciate new law.  Nevertheless, it did not
rule, as the State had asked it to do, that, by not raising it on
direct appeal, the appellant had waived the Morgan issue. Instead,
the court addressed the merits of the appellant's contention,
- 5 -
       Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides:
1
(c) Action Tried Without a Jury.- When an
action has been tried without a jury, the
appellate court will review the case on both
the law and the evidence.  It will not set
aside the judgment of the trial court on the
evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will
give due regard to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
noting that Morgan and Evans "flesh[ed] out a very murky area of
the law."  By taking that approach, at the very least, the post
conviction court,  found, if only implicitly, sufficient "special
circumstances" to excuse the appellant's failure to raise the
Morgan issue on direct appeal.  And because the presence or absence
of "special circumstances" is a factual issue, the trial court's
finding in that regard is entitled to great deference and, indeed,
should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  See Maryland
Rule 8-131(c);  Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc.,
1
320 Md. 584, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990).  The factual finding of special
circumstances certainly is not clearly erroneous.  The majority,
however, approaches the matter as if it involved a question of law.
The majority is wrong in doing so.    
The majority is also wrong on the merits. The post conviction
court acknowledged that this Court, in Evans, "specifically"
approved four voir dire  questions that minimally should be asked
to qualify the venire with respect to the death penalty.  That
court recognized, at the same time, that, in this case, only two of
- 6 -
those questions were actually propounded to the venire.  To shield
the failure of the trial court to ask all four of the questions
from the sanction of reversal, the post conviction court relied on
the follow up questions that the trial court asked some, but not
all, of the prospective jurors. That is also the approach taken by
the majority.  ___  Md. ___ , ___, ___ A.2d ___ , ___ (1996) [slip
op. at 16-17].  In holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to propound the appellant's proposed
voir dire questions to the prospective jurors, the majority
asserts:                              The initial questions were
specifically tailored to inquire into a prospective juror's
preconceptions regarding the death penalty and to reveal whether
those preconceptions would be an obstacle to impartially sentencing
the defendant given the facts and the law.  The follow-up questions
were sufficient to disclose any bias identified in the responses to
the initial questions.  Together, the questions were sufficient to
identify a juror's state of mind concerning the death penalty and
the juror's ability to evaluate the evidence impartially. 
Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 17].  It concluded "that
the voir dire questions `[o]n their face ... were clearly
sufficient ... to determine whether prospective jurors were death-
penalty dogmatists,' and thus, the voir dire satisfied the standard
enunciated in Morgan and Evans."  Id. [slip op. at 17] (quoting
Evans, 333 Md. at 677, 637 A.2d at 124).                         
The four questions propounded to the venire in this case were:
Do you have any strong feelings, one way or
the other, with regard to the death penalty? 
                                             
Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the
death penalty, would prevent or substantially
impair you from  making a fair and impartial
decision on whether the Defendant is not
- 7 -
guilty or guilty, based on the evidence
presented and the Court's instructions as to
the law?
Do you feel your attitude, regarding the death
penalty, would prevent or substantially impair
you from making a fair and impartial decision
on whether the Defendant was or was not
criminally responsible by reason of insanity,
based on the evidence presented and the
Court's instructions on the law?             
                                             
Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the
death penalty, would prevent or substantially
impair you from sentencing the Defendant,
based upon the evidence presented and the
Court's instructions as to the law which is
applicable?   
By way of contrast, the appellant had requested that the following
questions be propounded:                                         
Are there any murders or any type of murders
where no matter what excuses or explanations
are offered, you would feel that the person
responsible should get the death penalty?
What are they? 
                          
Are there any circumstances which you could
consider as a basis for not imposing the death
penalty in the case of a person who has been
proven guilty of first degree murder? ...
Would you be able to vote for a sentence of
imprisonment for life, and not death, even
though Steven Oken was found guilty of first
degree 
murder, 
if 
you 
found 
that 
the
aggravating circumstances proven by the state
do not outweigh the explanations or mitigating
circumstances 
presented 
to 
you 
by 
the
defendant?
As indicated, the trial court refused to ask any of the questions
proposed by the appellant, even though each of them was relevant to
- 8 -
the proper qualification of the jury with respect to the death
penalty.
In Evans, the trial court included in its voir dire four
questions essentially as follows:
Some feel that the death penalty should be
imposed in every case of first degree murder,
and others feel that  the death penalty should
never be imposed.  Do you feel or do you have
any strong feelings one way or the other
about the imposition of the death penalty?
Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the
death penalty, would in any way prevent or
substantially impair you from making a fair
and impartial decision as to the Defendant's
sentence in accordance with your oath as a
juror, based upon the evidence presented and
the Court's instructions as to the law which
is applicable?
After listening to the evidence and applying
the law, if you were convinced that the
appropriate sentence would be death, would you
be able to vote for the death penalty?
On the other hand, after listening to the
evidence and applying the law, if you were not
convinced the appropriate sentence should be
death, but were convinced life was the
appropriate sentence, would you vote for that
alternative?
The defendant had asked that the venire be asked: Would the fact
that Vernon Evans has been convicted 
of two first degree murders
in this case cause you 
to automatically vote for the death
penalty, regardless of the facts?  
This Court was satisfied that "[t]he questions posed to the
venirepersons were sufficient to uncover any pro-death penalty bias
and measure that bias against the standard for juror exclusion."
Evans, 333 Md. at 677, 637 A.2d at 125.  We accordingly affirmed
- 9 -
the trial court's denial of the defendant's requested  instruction
on that point. Id.
Although I dissented on other grounds and did not share, in
toto, the majority's rationale, I agreed with the majority's bottom
line conclusion on the Morgan issue. Therefore, I joined that part
of the opinion. Id. at 700, 637 A.2d at 137 (Bell, J., dissenting).
Convinced that the voir dire question the defendant sought to have
propounded -- whether "the fact that Vernon Evans has been
convicted of two first degree murders in this case [would] cause
you to automatically vote for the death penalty, regardless of the
facts" -- was relevant to the issue before the court, I rejected
the majority's conclusion that "the specific circumstances of a
particular crime are irrelevant to one's pre-existing bias or
predisposition and thus cannot be factored into the court's
evaluation of a jury's ability to judge impartiality."  Id at 703,
637 A.2d at 138 (quoting 333 Md. at 675, 637 A.2d at 124-25).  Nor
was I convinced that the proposed question was deficient for
seeking advance clues from the prospective jurors with regard to
their assessment of "an important  aggravating factor." Id.  My
joining the majority was prompted by my belief that "the voir dire
questions asked, taken cumulatively, required each prospective
juror to come to grips with the issue which the question proposed
by the appellant addressed; each had to consider whether he or she
would act automatically or only after considering all relevant
issues and facts."   Id., at 702, 637 A.2d at 138.
- 10 -
This was consistent with my view of the purpose, and the
manner, of conducting, voir dire, as set forth in my dissenting
opinion in Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27,59, 633 A.2d 867, 883 (1993):
Under Maryland law it is clear that the 
focal point of voir dire is the trial judge.
It is the trial judge that has responsibility
for regulating and conducting voir dire.  It
is the trial judge that controls the process;
he or she determines:  what questions to ask
on voir dire; whether, and when, to allow
counsel to ask follow up questions; and
whether, and when, a prospective juror is
dismissed for cause.  It follows, therefore,
that it is the trial judge that must decide
whether, and when, cause for disqualification
exists as to any particular venireperson.
Neither 
the 
venire 
nor 
the 
individual
venirepersons occupies such an important
position.
Thus, I opined, in Evans, that
[i]n cases of this kind - when the issue is
whether a prospective death penalty juror is
predisposed for, or against, the death penalty
- the critical inquiry is into the propriety
of the trial court's exercise of discretion in
determining whether the prospective juror is
qualified to sit in that particular case.
Ordinarily, ... that inquiry involves a
determination of the prospective juror's state
of mind, i.e., whether the juror is biased or
prejudiced.  This, in turn, is informed by how
the juror views, and reacts to, the death
penalty.
333 Md. at 701, 637 A.2d at 137.  Explaining my conclusion that the
trial court in Evans did not abuse its discretion, I said:
First of all, ... the series of questions
which the venire was asked were sufficient to
permit the trial court to determine whether a
prospective juror was biased or prejudiced to
the point where he or she could not render a
fair and impartial capital sentencing verdict.
- 11 -
To be sure, the information voir dire elicited
did not  focus on identifying which side of
the death penalty issue may have caused the
prospective juror's apprehension or bias; the
purpose of eliciting the information was only
to identify its effect from that juror's
perspective.  And the fact that the voir dire
was 
conducted 
on 
an 
individual 
basis,
requiring the prospective juror to answer each
of the questions, permitted the trial court to
assess each juror's credibility on the basis
of factors that could not be discerned from
the appellate record.
Id. at 702, 637 A.2d at 138 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 855, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 855 (1985)).
I continue to adhere to those views.  Their application to the
case sub judice leads to only one conclusion:  the death penalty
voir dire propounded to the venire in this case was inadequate to
"life qualify" that venire.  For that reason, I dissent.
Accordingly, believing that the appellant is entitled to a new
sentencing proceeding, see Morgan, 504 U.S, at 739, n.11, 112 S.Ct.
at 2235, n.11, 119 L.Ed.2d at 509, n.11, I would reverse and remand
the case  for that purpose.
I recognize that, in order to be sufficient, questions put to
the venire need not be in a specific form or asked in a particular
way; they need not be identical to the questions asked in Evans.
While the formulation need not be uniform, the content and purpose
of the questions must be, however.  The questions must direct the
juror's focus to his or her attitude toward the death penalty and
explore how she or he would act when called upon to make the
decision meaning life or death to the defendant.  The questions
- 12 -
       In Evans, we did not purport  to approve each individual
2
question as being, by itself, a sufficient question to elicit the
appropriate information.  Rather, the questions were viewed as a
group to determine whether, cumulatively, they had the desired
effect.  Consequently, when considered in conjunction with the
other three questions asked, the second question in Evans, the one
asking for the juror's bottom line conclusion as to his or her
ability, consistent with the evidence and the court's instruction,
to reach a fair and impartial decision as to the defendant's
sentence, was not considered to be a general fairness and follow
the law type question.  Viewed by itself, however, it is clear that
that is all that it is - it asked the jury to make its assessment
and report that assessment to the court.  The court is then
required to accept that response without in any way exploring the
basis for that assessment. 
must also be designed to provide the court with meaningful
information with which it could determine, factually, each juror's
credibility both on the basis of the information directly elicited
from the prospective jurors and on the basis of intangible factors
that cannot be discerned from the appellate record.  Because I
believe the questions asked in Evans minimally did so, a comparison
of the questions asked in this case with those asked in Evans will
demonstrate the inadequacy of the subject voir dire questions.  
As we have seen, the voir dire on the death penalty in the
instant case contained only two questions which were substantially
similar to the questions we found minimally sufficient in Evans.2
The question concerning the jurors' feeling, one way or the other,
is, in form and content, substantially identical to the Evans'
counterpart.  The fourth question asked in this case is
substantially identical to the second Evans question. Rather than
directing the prospective jurors' attention to factors relevant to
- 13 -
each individual juror's attitude toward the death penalty, the
critical issue to be addressed at this stage, both it and its Evans
counterpart ask for each juror's assessment of his or her ability
to be fair and impartial concerning the determination of the
defendant's sentence, and to abide by the oath and follow the
court's instructions.  The remaining two questions in this case,
those for which there is no Evans counterpart, take the same form;
their focus, too, is aimed at determining each juror's assessment
of his or her ability to be fair and impartial and "follow the
law", albeit with respect to different, though related issues.  In
this case, the second question's focus was  on the step just prior
to sentencing, the determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.  Criminal responsibility was the subject of the third
question.  Except for the first question, therefore, in this case,
in each instance, the only information sought was the juror's
assessment of whether he or she would be affected by his or her
feelings about the death penalty to the extent that he or she would
be unable to follow the court's instructions or the oath he or she
took and, consistent with the evidence presented, render a fair and
impartial decision with respect to the appellant's culpability,
criminal responsibility or the appropriate sentence.  
Except for the first question concerning the juror's attitude
toward the death penalty, none of the questions asked in this case
is sufficient to uncover juror bias.  The remaining three questions
are, rather, in the nature of general fairness and "follow the law"
- 14 -
type questions.  See Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 23, 595 A.2d 448,
458 (1991); Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct. at 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d
at 506-07.  Such questions are insufficient to meet the Morgan
requirements, id., and, as such, rendered the voir dire inadequate.
That is reversible error.  See Bowie, 324 Md. at 23-24, 595 A.2d at
459.  
In Evans, the voir dire questions we found minimally
sufficient consisted of a pro-death question - asking each
prospective juror whether he or she would be able to vote for the
death penalty if he or she were convinced that it was the
appropriate sentence - and a pro-life question - asking the
prospective jurors whether they would be able to vote for life
imprisonment as the appropriate sentence when they were convinced
that it was.  Questions designed to elicit that information were
submitted by the appellant, albeit in a different form.  The
information those questions sought to elicit was designed to
uncover bias in favor of the death penalty, a cause for
disqualification of a juror.  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 731, 112 S.Ct. at
2230-31, 119 L.Ed.2d at 504; Evans, 333 Md. at 677, 637 A.2d at
138-39; Bowie, 324 Md. at 23, 595 A.2d at 458.  Therefore, the
appellant's proposed voir dire questions should have been asked.
See Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995);
Davis v. State, 333 Md. at 35, 633 A.2d at 871; Bowie, 324 Md. at
23-4, 595 A.2d at 456; Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md.
595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958).  The failure of the trial court
- 15 -
to propound those questions to the venire was error, rendering the
voir dire inadequate and requiring reversal of the appellant's
death sentence, Bowie. 324 Md. at 23-4, 595 A.2d at 459.
The majority recognizes that the questions asked in the
instant case were not the equivalent of those asked in the Evans
case.  Nevertheless, the majority is impressed by the fact that the
trial judge asked follow-up questions of those prospective jurors'
whose responses to any one of the four questions was in the
affirmative or indicated that clarification was needed. Those
follow up questions, it says, were sufficient to salvage the death
penalty voir dire.  As the appellant points out, however, the
problem with the majority approach is that follow up questions were
only asked of some prospective jurors, when the prospective juror
answered a question in the affirmative or ambiguously.  No follow-
up questions were asked of those jurors who answered "no" to all of
the questions.  As the appellant recognizes and points out:
It is quite possible that a prospective juror
could harbor pro-death penalty sentiments yet
still answer "No" to the question posed by the
trial court herein regarding strong feelings
(death penalty voir dire question No. 1).  For
instance, a prospective juror could answer
"No" to question No. 1 but still always favor
the imposition of the death penalty in cases
involving first degree felony murder where the
underlying felony is a sex offense, the
circumstances of this case.  In effect, this
juror would not have "strong feelings" for or
against the death penalty in general but only
in limited circumstances not addressed by the
overly broad nature of the court's questions.
However, under the trial court's method of
questioning, there would be no way to elicit
- 16 -
this information since no follow-up questions
would be asked in order to determine the basis
for the "No" answer.
The Appellant's Reply Brief at 5.  See also State v. Conner, 440
S.E.2d 826, 840 (N.C. 1994)(citation omitted).  Morgan, as we have
seen, also recognized this possibility when the death penalty voir
dire questions are general fairness and "follow the law" type
questions, as I believe these are, which do not focus the attention
of each venireperson to his or her attitude toward the death
penalty. 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct. at 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d 506.
To the trial court, and apparently the majority agrees, it is
significant that the record of the voir dire proceedings does not
disclose affirmatively that any person who sat on the jury had a
predisposition in favor of the death penalty.  Where, however, as
here, the death penalty voir dire is inadequate, it is not
surprising that the record will not disclose such bias.  Where
questions designed to uncover pro-death penalty bias were not asked
of all jurors as a matter of course, it can be, and, indeed, it
should be, expected that prospective jurors can, and will, be
accepted for jury service without their predispositions and biases
properly and adequately having been explored. Moreover, the failure
to explore the predisposition and biases of such jurors, because it
rendered impossible any determination that any one or more of them
was, in fact, biased, dooms to failure the "harmless error"
argument that the trial court and the majority seem  also to be
- 17 -
espousing.   See Bowie, 324 Md. at 11, 595 A.2d at 453.  In any
event, under Morgan, what is relevant is whether the prospective
jurors were adequately voir dired, not whether the record discloses
any juror bias, the uncovering of which was the only purpose of
asking the questions in the first place.  It seems to me perfectly
clear that if the death penalty  voir dire is inadequate, the
absence of an affirmative showing on the record that any one of the
prospective jurors was biased in favor of the death penalty does
not mean that no members of the jury were biased.  What biases a
juror may or may not have, under the circumstances, could only be
the subject of speculation; therefore, a new sentencing hearing is
required.
When the defendant was tried in this case, he had already pled
guilty to first degree murder in Maine and been sentenced there to
life imprisonment without parole. As its name implies, that
sentence  meant that he was ineligible for parole and would have to
serve all of his sentence; he was required to be imprisoned for the
remainder of his life.  That sentence was an accomplished fact.  It
was not a contingency which could only become a reality upon the
Maryland jury impaneled to try the appellant's case determining
that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole was the
appropriate sentence in this case.   
Maryland law requires the consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the weighing of those circumstances to
determine the proper sentence.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.
- 18 -
Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27 § 413(d), (g), and (h).  Section
413(g)(8), dealing with mitigating circumstances, permits the
sentencing jury to find as a mitigating circumstance "[a]ny other
facts which [it] ... specifically sets forth in writing."  To be
sure, the appellant's counsel told the jury, in opening statement,
that the appellant was serving a life without parole sentence in
Maine, and even argued that it could be considered a nonstatutory
mitigating circumstance.   The appellant's counsel did not,
however, offer proof of the Maine sentence during the sentencing
proceedings.  Nor did he request a jury instruction informing the
jury that it could consider the Maine sentence in determining
whether there were mitigating circumstances applicable to the
appellant.   Moreover, the appellant's counsel did not object when
the trial court instructed the jury concerning the appellant's
parole eligibility in prospective terms, i.e. that "should [the
appellant] receive a sentence of life imprisonment or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, [that sentence] may
be taken into account by you in your consideration of mitigating
circumstances as well as in your determination of whether the
appropriate sentence is death or life imprisonment."  And the
appellant's counsel did not ask the court to answer the jury's
question concerning the possibility of the appellant's being
released even if he were sentenced to life without parole by
informing it that the appellant had already been sentenced to life
without parole in Maine and by instructing it that that fact also
- 19 -
has a bearing on whether the appellant would ever be released and,
indeed, could itself be dispositive. 
The post conviction court, denying relief, found and relied
upon the facts that the appellant's counsel told the jury in
closing argument that the appellant was already under a sentence in
Maine of life without parole and that the trial court instructed
the jury that, in the case it was trying, it could sentence the
appellant to life without parole and consider that sentence as a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.  Accepting those rationales,
the majority upholds the denial of post conviction relief on that
ground as well. 
The standard for determining whether there has been
ineffective assistance of counsel is whether trial counsel's
performance fell below prevailing professional norms and whether
that deficiency prejudiced the appellant.  State v. Thomas, 328 Md.
541, 556, 616 A.2d 365, 373 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. ___ 113
S.Ct. 2359, 124 L.Ed.2d 266 (1993).  To meet the latter standard,
the defendant must show that, but for the unreasonableness of his
or her counsel's performance, there is a "substantial possibility"
that the outcome of the trial may have been different.  Williams v.
State, 326 Md. 367, 376, 605 A.2d 103, 107 (1992); Bowers v. State,
320 Md. 416, 425-26, 578 A.2d 734, 38-39 (1990).   The standard is
no longer simply "outcome determinative."  "An analysis focusing on
mere outcome determination without attention to whether the result
of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is
- 20 -
defective."  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 510 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 838,
842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 189 (1993); Sampson v. State, 506 N.W.2d 722,
726 (N.D. 1993).
The record in this case, clearly in my view, demonstrates
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The trial court was clearly
erroneous in concluding otherwise.  Accordingly, on this ground as
well, the appellant is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding.  
In Maryland, it is well settled that arguments of counsel are
not evidence, a fact of which juries regularly are reminded by
pointed jury instructions to that effect.  On the other hand, it is
at least as well settled in this State that the focal point -- the
most important personality -- in a jury trial is the trial judge,
to whom the jury more likely than not will defer.  See State v.
Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 206, 411 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980)("The trial
judge is the central figure at trial, having the chief
responsibility of steering the jury through the maze of evidence.
In such role, the trial judge may influence the jury by the
inflection of his voice, his words, his conduct and his assessment
of the evidence, if known."). Consequently, it can be expected that
the jury will pay greater attention to what the trial judge
instructs than to the arguments a defendant's counsel might make.
Indeed, this Court, in Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 47, 585 A.2d
209, 215 (1991), held that arguments of counsel can not effectively
substitute for instructions by the court.  (Quoting Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-89, 90 S.Ct. 1933, 1936, 56 L.Ed.2d
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468, 477 (1978).  In a concurring opinion, Justices Souter and
Stevens made the same point.  Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
___, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2198-99, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, 141 (1994) (quoting
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. at 384, 110 S.Ct. at 1200, 108
L.Ed.2d at 331.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that:
[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less
weight with a jury than do instructions from
the court.  The former are usually billed in
advance to the jury as matters of argument,
not evidence, and are likely viewed as a
statement of advocates; the latter, we have
often recognized, are viewed as definitive and
binding statements of the law. 
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1200, 108
L.Ed.2d 316, 331 (1990).  See also Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511,
519, 601 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (1992).
It is also significant that, in response to arguments
characterizing an improper argument by counsel as prejudicial, the
appellate courts of this State have frequently relied on the
instruction that arguments of counsel are not evidence, at least
as a partial basis, to avoid ordering reversals of convictions or,
in capital cases, the capital sentence.  See, e.g.,Evans, 333 Md.
at 682, 637 A.2d at 128; Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 677, 612 A.2d
258, 282 (1992); Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 178, 608 A.2d 162,
179 (1992); Tully v. Dauber, 250 Md. 424, 436, 244 A.2d 207, 214
(1968); Nicholson v. Blanchette, 239 Md. 168,176, 210 A.2d 732, 736
(1965); Market Tavern, Inc. v. Bowers, 92 Md. App. 622, 657, 610
- 22 -
A.2d 295, 313 (1992); Marks v. State, 84 Md. App. 269, 292, 578
A.2d 826, 839-40 (1990); Hairston v.State, 68 Md. App. 230, 241,
511 A.2d 73, 78 (1986); McDowell v. State, 31 Md. App. 652, 665,
358 A.2d 624, 631 (1976); Murphy v. Board of County Comm'rs, 13 Md.
App. 497, 503, 284 A.2d 261, 265 (1971).  These rulings are
premised, no doubt, on the presumption that juries follow the trial
court's instructions.
See e.g., Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167,
175, 453 A.2d 1218, 1223 (1983); Washington v. State, 293 Md. 465,
471 445 A.2d 684, 687 (1982); State v. Moulden, 292 Md. 666, 679
n.8, 441 A.2d 699 n.8 (1982); Blanchfield v. Dennis, 292 Md.
319,325,438 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1982); Stevenson v. State, 289 Md.
167, 191, 423 A.2d 558, 571 (1982)(Eldridge, J. dissenting); Wilson
v. State, 261 Md. 551, 570, 276 A.2d 214, 224 (1971); Hunter v.
State, 193 Md. 596, 604, 69 A.2d 505, 508 (1949); Cohen v. State,
173 Md. 216, 232, 196 A. 819, 823 (1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
660, 58 S.Ct. 764, 82 L.Ed.2d 1119 (1938).
There can be no doubt that the appellant was already under a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Nor can it be doubted
that there is a significant difference between an event that has
already occurred and a contingency.  The difference is even more
pronounced when the contingency is critical to the ultimate
decision required to be made in the case and the very jury that is
charged with making that decision must also decide how to resolve
the contingency.  Therefore, it should have been argued, as it was,
albeit somewhat ambiguously, that the Maine sentence was a
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       The State raised the question of the appellant's future
3
dangerousness.  It is interesting to note that the appellant's
response focused entirely on the effect of the Maryland
proceedings. Whether, and how, the Maine sentence was relevant was,
at best, a secondary consideration.  To the extent it was mentioned
at all, it was only by way of counsel's argument.  Indeed, it was
in the context of the pending jury sentence that the trial court
defined "life without parole"; whether that definition also applied
to the Maine sentence was left to the jury to determine and, then,
only by implication. 
nonstatutory mitigator and, on the basis of that fact alone, the
appellant's counsel should have sought a jury instruction to that
effect.   It is true that the presentence report also indicated
that the appellant was subject to the Maine sentence and accurately
characterized it, proving the sentence, and its meaning, by
reference to court records and judicial pronouncements and causing
the jury to be instructed consistent therewith, would have been
more persuasive and forceful.  Moreover, that would have forced the
jury to come to grips with a present reality, rather than grappling
with how it should handle a prospective one.  This is particularly
the case when, as here, whether, and how, that sentence  could be
used by the jury to determine the appropriate sentence in this case
was, at best, ambiguous. The court never instructed the jury as to
the effect of the Maine sentence, notwithstanding there being
conflicting arguments on the issue.  The prosecutor told  the jury,
in closing argument, that it should disregard the Maine sentence
and focus on the Maryland sentence only.  As we have seen, the
appellant's counsel argued just the opposite.  
3
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The ineffective assistance the appellant received was also
prejudicial.  It is impossible to determine what the jury would
have done had counsel sought and received an instruction with
regard to the Maine life imprisonment without parole sentence and
also caused the trial court to respond to the jury's question
relative to the possibility of the appellant's release by
referencing the fact that the appellant was already serving a life
sentence without parole.  That, based only on counsel's  argument,
at least one juror found the Maine life sentence without parole to
be a mitigating circumstance, is telling in that regard.