Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 527A12

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 527A12  
FILED 7 MARCH 2014 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
ERIC STEVEN JONES and JERRY ALVIN WHITE 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel 
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 734 S.E.2d 617 (2012), finding no error in 
a judgment and orders entered on 7 September 2011 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in 
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  On 24 January 2013, the Supreme Court 
allowed petitions by the State and defendant Jones for discretionary review of 
additional issues.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 May 2013 by special session in 
the Old Chowan County Courthouse (1767) in the Town of Edenton pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a). 
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan and Joseph L. Hyde, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant/appellee. 
Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Andrew DeSimone, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee/appellant Eric Steven Jones. 
C. Scott Holmes for defendant-appellee Jerry Alvin White. 
 
JACKSON, Justice. 
  
In this appeal we consider whether the trial court properly denied defendant 
Eric Steven Jones’s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft, and whether the 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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trial court properly dismissed indictments charging Jones with obtaining property 
by false pretenses and defendant Jerry Alvin White with trafficking in stolen 
identities.  We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s determination that Jones possessed the specific intent to commit identity 
theft.  We further conclude that the indictments against Jones and White were 
insufficient to support the resulting convictions against Jones for obtaining property 
by false pretenses and against White for trafficking in stolen identities.  
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.   
In the early morning hours of 2 June 2010, Officer Steven Maloney of the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a silver 
Hyundai Accent that was a suspect vehicle in a financial transaction card theft 
case.  Jones, the driver, was unable to produce a driver’s license or vehicle 
registration card.  During a consensual search of the vehicle, Officer Maloney found 
a Maaco work order listing James Coleman as the customer and two bags of 
marijuana.  Officer Maloney placed Jones under arrest and conducted a search 
incident to the arrest.  In Jones’s wallet, Officer Maloney found, inter alia, pieces of 
paper with the names, addresses, and credit card information of John Rini, James 
Payton, Sean Daly, and Charles Batchelor. 
Subsequent police investigation revealed that each of these individuals had 
stayed at The Blake Hotel in Charlotte in May 2010.  Each man had been checked 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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into the hotel by White and had provided a credit card to him for payment.  White 
confessed that he had written down the names, addresses, and credit card numbers 
of Payton, Daly, and Batchelor, and had provided this information to another 
individual; however, White denied recording Rini’s information.  On various dates 
in May 2010, unauthorized charges were made on Rini’s, Payton’s, and Batchelor’s 
credit cards. 
Further investigation revealed that on 18 May 2010, an unauthorized 
purchase was made with Melanie Wright’s credit card for the installation of four 
new tires and rims, an alignment, wiper blades, and brake services for a Hyundai 
Accent with the same vehicle identification number as the car Jones was driving 
when arrested.  The work order was made under the name “Payton James” or 
“James Payton,” and the credit card receipt was signed with the name “James 
Payton.”  On 28 May 2010, Jones paid for paint materials and service, body supplies 
and labor, and “sublet/towing” of the Hyundai Accent by Maaco with Mary Berry’s 
credit card.  This work order was made under the name “James Coleman” and 
Jones signed the credit card receipt as “Coleman J.” 
On 7 September 2010, the grand jury returned true bills of indictment 
charging Jones with four counts of trafficking in stolen identities, two counts of 
obtaining property by false pretenses, and one count of identity theft.  The grand 
jury indicted White for four counts of trafficking in stolen identities.  Jones and 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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White were tried jointly during the 29 August 2011 criminal session of Superior 
Court in Mecklenburg County.  At the close of the State’s evidence, defendants 
moved to dismiss all charges on two grounds:  (1) that the indictments were fatally 
flawed; and (2) that the State’s evidence was insufficient.  The trial court denied 
defendants’ motions as to insufficiency of the evidence, but deferred ruling on the 
motions based upon the indictments.  Defendants did not present any evidence, and 
both renewed their motions to dismiss at the close of the evidence. 
The jury found Jones not guilty of trafficking in stolen identities but guilty of 
two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of identity theft.  
The jury found White guilty of all four counts of trafficking in stolen identities.  The 
trial court denied Jones’s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft.  The trial 
court then dismissed the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false 
pretenses and all charges against White for trafficking in stolen identities on the 
basis that the indictments were “insufficient as a matter of law.” 
Jones appealed his conviction for identity theft to the Court of Appeals, 
arguing, inter alia, that the State failed to prove that he possessed the specific 
intent necessary to be convicted of identity theft.  State v. Jones, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
___, 734 S.E.2d 617, 621 (2012).  The State appealed the dismissals of the charges 
against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and against White for 
trafficking in stolen identities.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 621. 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court’s denial of Jones’s 
motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 622.  The 
court noted that identity theft occurs when a person “ ‘knowingly obtains, possesses, 
or uses identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to 
fraudulently represent that the person is the other person for the purposes of making 
financial or credit transactions in the other person’s name.’ ”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d 
at 621 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2011) (emphasis added)).  The court further 
observed that fraudulent intent may be established “based upon a defendant’s 
conduct or actions.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 621.  The court determined that 
evidence that Jones used the credit card numbers to make purchases and payments 
on his own behalf when he was not the cardholder or an authorized user was 
sufficient to raise  a reasonable inference of misrepresentation.  Id. at ___, 734 
S.E.2d at 622.  The court stated, “[W]hen one presents a credit card or credit card 
number as payment, he is representing himself to be the cardholder or an 
authorized user thereof. . . .  No verbal statement of one’s identity is required, nor 
can the mere stating of a name different from that of the cardholder negate the 
inference of misrepresentation.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 622.  Therefore, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence of Jones’s intent to commit 
identity theft and that the trial court properly denied Jones’s motion to dismiss the 
identity theft charge.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 622. 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The Court of Appeals also found no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the 
charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses.  Id. at ___, 734 
S.E.2d at 626.  The court stated that in charging the crime of obtaining property by 
false pretenses, “ ‘it is the general rule that the thing obtained . . . must be 
described with reasonable certainty, and by the name or term usually employed to 
describe it.’ ”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 
314, 317, 614 S.E.2d 562, 565 (2005) (alteration in original)).  Citing examples of 
insufficient descriptions, the court concluded that alleging that Jones obtained 
“services” from Tire Kingdom and Maaco, “without even the most general 
description of the services or their monetary value,” was “plainly insufficient” to 
sustain the charges.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 627.   
The Court of Appeals was divided on the dismissal of the charges against 
White for trafficking in stolen identities.  Relying upon a long line of cases involving 
illegal trafficking in various substances, the majority below stated that “ ‘it is 
necessary . . . to allege in the bill of indictment the name of the person to whom the 
[transfer] was made or that his name is unknown, unless some statute eliminates 
that requirement.’ ”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 627 (second alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Bissette, 250 N.C. 514, 517, 108 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1959)).  Finding 
no language in either section 14-113.20 or section 14-113.20A of the North Carolina 
General Statutes eliminating the common law requirement, the majority concluded 
that the trial court properly dismissed the indictments for failure to name the 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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recipient of the identifying information or to state that the recipient’s name was 
unknown.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 628.  The majority stated that naming the 
recipient was “particularly crucial to avoid the risk of double jeopardy” in cases 
involving 
trafficking 
in 
stolen 
identities 
because 
identifying 
information 
theoretically “can be trafficked an infinite number of times to an infinite number of 
recipients.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 628.  Therefore, in order to give a defendant 
sufficient notice of the incidence of trafficking for which he must present a defense, 
the majority held that an indictment for trafficking in stolen identities “must 
specify the identity of the recipient.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 628.  
The dissent below agreed with the majority that the common law requires 
naming the recipient or stating that the recipient is unknown in an indictment for 
trafficking in illicit substances.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 628 (Elmore, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).  Nonetheless, the dissenting judge would have held 
that the common law rule is inapplicable to the distinct crime of trafficking in stolen 
identities.  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 629.  The dissenting judge noted that, unlike 
illicit substances, the items listed as “identifying information” in section 14-
113.20(b) have “independent identifying characteristics which can be specifically 
described in an indictment so as to put the accused on notice regarding the 
identifying information he allegedly sold or transferred.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 
629.  The dissenting judge further noted that identifying information often is stored 
on-line and can be easily accessed without authorization and transferred to another 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in an “anonymous vacuum,” which would result in most indictments stating that 
the transferee’s identity is “unknown.”  Id. at ___, 734 S.E.2d at 629.  Given the 
“unique nature” of trafficking in stolen identities, the dissenting judge reasoned 
that imposing the common law rule is short-sighted and unnecessary.  Id. at ___, 
734 S.E.2d at 629.  Turning to the instant case, the dissenting judge would have 
held that the indictment sufficiently apprised White of the conduct that was the 
subject of the accusation, and therefore, was not fatally defective.  Id. at ___, 734 
S.E.2d at 629.   
The State filed its appeal of right based upon the dissenting opinion.  We 
allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review on the issue of the indictments 
against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and Jones’s petition for 
discretionary review on the issue of his motion to dismiss the charge of identity 
theft.   
Jones argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the specific 
intent necessary to be convicted of identity theft, and therefore, the trial court 
should have granted his motion to dismiss.  We disagree.  The standard of review 
regarding motions to dismiss is well settled: 
“When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss a 
charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court 
determines 
whether 
the 
State 
presented 
substantial evidence in support of each element of the 
charged offense.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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adequate, or would consider necessary to support a 
particular conclusion.  In this determination, all evidence 
is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and 
the State receives the benefit of every reasonable 
inference supported by that evidence. . . .  [I]f there is 
substantial evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or 
both—to support a finding that the offense charged has 
been committed and that the defendant committed it, the 
case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be 
denied.” 
State v. Hunt, 365 N.C. 432, 436, 722 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2012) (quoting State v. 
Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted)).  Here the indictment charged that Jones “did knowingly obtain or 
possess the identifying information pertaining to three or more separate persons 
with [fraudulent intent] . . . , to wit:  [Jones] possessed the credit card number[s] 
of . . . Rini, . . . Batchelor, . . . Payton, . . . and . . . Daly.”  It is undisputed that Jones 
possessed Rini’s, Batchelor’s, Payton’s, and Daly’s credit card numbers.  At issue is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that he did so with the 
intent to “fraudulently represent that [he] [wa]s [Rini, Batchelor, Payton, or Daly] 
for the purposes of making financial or credit transactions in [those individuals’] 
name[s].”  N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2013).   
“[I]ntent is seldom provable by direct evidence and ordinarily must be proved 
by circumstances from which it may be inferred.”  State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 449, 
263 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1980) (citing State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 
508 (1974)).  Moreover, when  “a specific mental intent or state is an essential 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of 
the accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though 
the evidence discloses the commission of another offense by the accused.”  State v. 
McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1954) (citations omitted).  Here the 
evidence showed that using the name James Coleman, Jones used Mary Berry’s 
credit card number to obtain various services at Maaco.  Additionally, the evidence 
tended to show that Jones, using the name James Payton, used Melanie Wright’s 
credit card number to obtain various items and services at Tire Kingdom.  Although 
these actions are not the basis of the identity theft charge, this evidence tends to 
establish Jones’s mental intent in possessing Rini’s, Payton’s, Daly’s, and 
Batchelor’s credit card numbers.  Based upon the evidence that Jones had 
fraudulently used other individuals’ credit card numbers, a reasonable juror could 
infer that Jones possessed Rini’s, Payton’s, Daly’s, and Batchelor’s credit card 
numbers with the intent to fraudulently represent that he was those individuals for 
the purpose of making financial transactions in their names.  It was then “ ‘for the 
[jurors] to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisf[ied] them 
beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . defendant [wa]s actually guilty [of identity 
theft].’ ”  State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d 178, 191 (1998) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 
665 (1965)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999).  
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Jones argues that the Maaco and Tire Kingdom purchases actually negate an 
intent to commit identity theft because he used names that were different from the 
names of the credit card owners.  Specifically, Jones contends that the words “with 
the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person” require the 
State to prove that he intended to represent that he was Rini, Payton, Daly, and 
Batchelor, and not some other individual or an authorized user.  N.C.G.S. § 14-
113.20(a). 
“We generally construe criminal statutes against the State.  However, this 
does not require that words be given their narrowest or most strained possible 
meaning.  A criminal statute is still construed utilizing ‘common sense’ and 
legislative intent.”  State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005) 
(citations omitted).  “[W]here a literal interpretation of the language of a statute 
will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the 
Legislature, . . . the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter 
thereof shall be disregarded.”  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).  We 
cannot conclude that the Legislature intended for individuals to escape criminal 
liability simply by stating or signing a name that differs from the cardholder’s 
name.  Such a result would be absurd and contravene the manifest purpose of the 
Legislature to criminalize fraudulent use of identifying information.  Because the 
State’s evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of Jones’s fraudulent intent in 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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possessing Rini’s, Payton’s, Daly’s, and Batchelor’s credit card numbers, the trial 
court did not err by denying Jones’s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft. 
In its appeal the State first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing 
the indictments against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses.  An 
indictment must contain 
“[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count 
which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, 
asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal 
offense and the defendant’s commission thereof with 
sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or 
defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the 
accusation.” 
State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 234, 262 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1980) (quoting N.C.G.S. 
§ 15A-924(a)(5) (1978)).1  The purpose of this requirement is: 
“(1) [to provide] such certainty in the statement of the 
accusation as will identify the offense with which the 
accused is sought to be charged; (2) to protect the accused 
from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; (3) 
to enable the accused to prepare for trial, and (4) to 
enable the court, on conviction or plea of nolo contendere 
or guilty to pronounce sentence according to the rights of 
the case.” 
Id. at 235, 262 S.E.2d at 281 (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 327, 77 S.E.2d 
917, 919 (1953)).  “[A]n indictment couched in the language of the statute is 
generally sufficient to charge the statutory offense.”  State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 
638, 239 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1977).  But  
                                            
1  The language of the statute has remained unchanged as of the date of this opinion. 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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“[i]f the statutory words fail to [charge the essential 
elements of the offense in a plain, intelligible, and explicit 
manner,] they must be supplemented by other allegations 
which so plainly, intelligibly and explicitly set forth every 
essential element of the offense as to leave no doubt in the 
mind of the accused and the court as to the offense 
intended to be charged.” 
 
State v. Cook, 272 N.C. 728, 730, 158 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1968) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Section 14-100(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes defines the 
elements of obtaining property by false pretenses as  (1) “knowingly and designedly 
by means of any kind of false pretense”; (2) “obtain[ing] or attempt[ing] to obtain 
from any person . . . any money, goods, property, services, chose in action, or other 
thing of value”; (3) “with intent to cheat or defraud any person of such money, 
goods, property, services, chose in action or other thing of value.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-
100(a) (2013).  Additionally, “[i]t is the general rule that the thing obtained by the 
false pretense . . . must be described with reasonable certainty, and by the name or 
term usually employed to describe it.”  State v. Gibson, 169 N.C. 380, 383, 169 N.C. 
318, 320, 85 S.E. 7, 8 (1915) (citations omitted).  This Court has not had occasion to 
address this issue recently, but consistently has held that simply describing the 
property obtained as “money,” State v. Reese, 83 N.C. 637, 640 (1880), or “goods and 
things of value,” State v. Smith, 219 N.C. 400, 401, 14 S.E.2d 36, 36 (1941), is 
insufficient to allege the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses.   
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Here the indictments alleged that Jones obtained “services” from Tire 
Kingdom and Maaco.  Like the terms “money” or “goods and things of value,” the 
term “services” does not describe with reasonable certainty the property obtained by 
false pretenses.  Moreover, “services” is not the name or term usually employed to 
adequately describe the tires, rims, wiper blades, tire and rim installation, wheel 
alignment, and brake services Jones allegedly obtained from Tire Kingdom, or the 
paint materials and service, body supplies and labor, and “sublet/towing” services 
Jones obtained from Maaco.  Cf. State v. Perkins, 181 N.C. App. 209, 215, 638 
S.E.2d 591, 595 (2007) (holding that an indictment that alleged, inter alia, the 
defendant had “attempted to obtain BEER AND CIGARETTES from FOOD 
LION . . . BY MEANS OF USING THE CREDIT CARD AND C[H]ECK CARD” of a 
named individual was sufficient).  Accordingly, we hold that the indictments were 
insufficient to allege the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses and that the 
trial court property dismissed those charges. 
The State also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictments 
against White for trafficking in stolen identities.  In Bissette, we stated that 
“[w]here a sale is prohibited, it is necessary, for a conviction, to allege in the bill of 
indictment the name of the person to whom the sale was made or that his name is 
unknown, unless some statute eliminates that requirement.”  250 N.C. at 517, 108 
S.E.2d at 861.  We have extended the Bissette rule to apply to a statute prohibiting 
the possession or sale of narcotics.  State v. Bennett, 280 N.C. 167, 169, 185 S.E.2d 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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147, 149 (1971).  Therefore, it is a logical extension to also apply the Bissette rule to 
the crime of trafficking in stolen identities.  Section 14-113.20A(a) of the North 
Carolina General Statutes states that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to sell, transfer, 
or purchase the identifying information of another person with the intent to commit 
identity theft, or to assist another person in committing identity theft, as set forth 
in [N.C.]G.S. 14-113.20.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20A(a) (2013).  Nothing in section 14-
113.20A eliminates the common law requirement that the indictment state either 
the name of the recipient or that the recipient’s name is unknown.  Accordingly, the 
State was required to allege in the indictments the name of the recipient of the 
identifying information or that the recipient’s name was unknown.   
In addition, we note that “[t]he reason for setting forth the name of the 
[recipient] is because each sale [or transfer] constitutes a distinct offense for which 
the offender may be punished.”  State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 305, 307, 145 N.C. 422, 
425, 58 S.E.2d 998, 999 (1907).  Naming the recipient notifies the accused of “the 
particular transaction on which the indictment is founded” and gives the accused 
“the benefit of the first acquittal or conviction if accused a second time of the same 
offense.”  Id. at 425, 58 S.E.2d at 999-1000.  This reasoning is even more persuasive 
in the context of trafficking in stolen identities because a single item of identifying 
information can be transferred to countless recipients.  The State argues that the 
independent identifying characteristics of identifying information are sufficient to 
put a defendant on notice of the particular transaction on which the indictment is 
STATE V. JONES 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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founded.2  However even if a defendant is put on notice of the particular identifying 
information he is alleged to have transferred, he will not know the particular 
transaction with which he is being charged.  We hold that the State must allege the 
name of the recipient or that the recipient’s name is unknown in charging the crime 
of trafficking in stolen identities.  Because the State failed to do so here, the 
indictments were insufficient to support White’s convictions for trafficking in stolen 
identities and the trial court properly dismissed those charges. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
AFFIRMED. 
 
                                            
2  Although social security numbers and digital signatures may contain “unique 
identifiers,” State v. Jones, ___ N.C. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2014) (527A12) (Martin, 
J., dissenting in part), section 14-113.20(b) lists other examples of “identifying information” 
that do not share the same type of independent identifying characteristics, such as 
passwords and “[a]ny other numbers or information that can be used to access a person’s 
financial resources.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(b)(10), (13). 
 
 
 
Justice MARTIN concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
  
A jury found defendant Jerry White guilty of four counts of trafficking in 
stolen identities.  The majority today affirms the dismissal of all four charges by 
extending a common law rule that has never before been applied to this statutory 
offense.  This extension of the common law rule runs counter to our long-standing 
requirements for indictments and furthers neither the interests of defendants nor 
the administration of justice.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to that portion of 
the majority’s opinion. 
The majority’s decision fails to properly consider the standards for legally 
sufficient indictments.  Indictments must contain “[a] plain and concise factual 
statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts 
facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant’s commission 
thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant . . . of the conduct 
which is the subject of the accusation.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5)(2013).  The 
statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) fulfill a long-standing dual 
purpose: “to give the defendant notice of the charge against him to the end that he 
may prepare his defense and to be in a position to plead [double jeopardy] in the 
event he is again brought to trial for the same offense . . . [and] to enable the court 
to know what judgment to pronounce in case of conviction.”  State v. Burton, 243 
N.C. 277, 278, 90 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1955). 
In State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 443 S.E.2d 68 (1994), this Court considered 
an issue nearly identical to the one now before us, involving an indictment for 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
-18- 
burglary.  While the common law had required burglary indictments to specify 
which felony the defendant intended to commit, we held, “Such cases were decided 
prior to the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) . . . and are no longer controlling 
on this issue.”  Id. at 279, 443 S.E.2d at 73.  The former rule was “drawn from the 
ancient strict pleading requirements of the common law while the pleading 
requirements of the Criminal Procedure Act are more liberal.”  Id. at 280, 443 
S.E.2d at 74 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The indictment 
statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-924, therefore “supplanted prior [common] law.”  Id. at 279, 
443 S.E.2d at 73.  The new statutory paradigm—the same that is in place today—
requires indictments to “ ‘charge[ ] the offense . . . in a plain, intelligible, and 
explicit manner and contain[ ] sufficient allegations to enable the trial court to 
proceed to judgment and to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.’ ”  Id. 
at 281, 443 S.E.2d at 74 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).  The Court 
accordingly held that “[t]he indictment for first-degree burglary in the present case 
therefore satisfie[d] the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5), notwithstanding 
the fact that it [did] not” comply with the prior common law requirement of 
specifying the felony the defendant intended to commit.  Id.  The same reasoning 
applies to the case before us. 
“[A]n indictment couched in the language of the statute is generally sufficient 
to charge the statutory offense.”  State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 638, 239 S.E.2d 406, 
410 (1977).  As long as the indictment “express[es] the charge against the defendant 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
-19- 
in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner  . . . [it] shall not be quashed.”  N.C.G.S. 
§ 15-153 (2013).  Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-925, when a defendant believes he 
needs more information to mount his preferred defense, he “may request a bill of 
particulars to obtain information to supplement the facts contained in the 
indictment.”  State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 210, 321 S.E.2d 864, 872 (1984).  “If 
any or all of the items of information requested are necessary to enable the 
defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense, the court must order the 
State to file and serve a bill of particulars.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-925(c) (2013).  
Indictments receive a liberal construction and quashing indictments is not favored.  
State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 245, 192 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1972) (citations omitted).  
Moreover, “it is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands of the State with 
technical rules of pleading; rather, its purposes are to identify clearly the crime 
being charged, thereby putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it 
and prepare for trial, and to protect the accused from being jeopardized by the State 
more than once for the same crime.”  State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 311, 283 
S.E.2d 719, 731 (1981) (citation omitted).  
In this case, White’s indictment for trafficking in stolen identities mirrored 
the language of the controlling statute.  The indictment not only alleged the precise 
statutory language but also included the names of White’s victims, the dates of the 
sales, the county in which the sales occurred, and the type of identifying 
information being trafficked.  Yet the majority has seen fit to void that indictment 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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based on a common law rule that has never been—and should not be—extended to 
trafficking in stolen identities.   
The rule applied by the majority because of its “logical extension” to this case 
was formally announced in State v. Bissette, 250 N.C. 514, 108 S.E.2d 858 (1959), 
but it originated much earlier.  The Court’s earliest application of the rule requiring 
the State to allege the name of the recipient of an illicit sale was in the unlawful 
sale of alcohol, and its purpose was “to identify the particular fact or transaction on 
which the indictment is founded.”  State v. Stamey, 71 N.C. 202, 203 (1874); see also 
State v. Pickens, 79 N.C. 652 (1878); State v. Blythe, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 199 
(1835).  Bissette extended that rule to the unlawful sale of agricultural seeds.  250 
N.C. at 517-18, 108 S.E.2d at 861.  Later, the Court again extended the rule to the 
unlawful sale of narcotics.  State v. Bennett, 280 N.C. 167, 169, 185 S.E.2d 147, 149 
(1971).  
The commonality among all these cases is the inherent fungibility of the 
substances being unlawfully sold.  Differentiating between two jugs of malt liquor, 
two sacks of tobacco seed, or two baggies of cocaine is nearly impossible.  It was this 
lack of differentiation that raised the concern of multiple prosecutions for the same 
transaction.  Because the goods themselves could not be used to specify which 
unlawful transaction was the basis for prosecution, this Court substituted a 
different identifying element, concluding, “When the name of the vendee of the 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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liquor is given, the particular transaction on which the indictment is founded is 
identified.”  State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 422, 425, 58 S.E. 998, 999-1000 (1907).  
Stolen identities, however, are not fungible goods.  The inherent nature of the 
information regulated by N.C.G.S. §§ 14-113.20 and 14-113.20A—social security 
numbers, drivers license numbers, bank account numbers, debit and credit card 
numbers, digital signatures, biometric data, etc.—is that they are unique 
identifiers.  The uniqueness and non-fungibility of these data are what make them 
valuable.  When the State alleges trafficking in stolen identities, it must allege 
specific information sufficient to put defendant on notice when it “asserts facts 
supporting every element of [the] criminal offense and the defendant’s commission 
thereof.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5).  Alleging the specific credit card or passport 
number that has been sold necessarily limits the possible transactions for 
prosecution.  Therefore, logic does not require the extension of the Bissette rule to 
the offense of trafficking in stolen identities. 
While the majority uses the potential for repetitious and anonymous sales as 
a reason to enforce the extra-statutory Bissette rule, in reality it shows the harmful 
consequences of extending the rule.  As noted by the majority, stolen identifying 
information can be sold many times over to anonymous purchasers, creating a 
situation (not at issue here) in which a defendant has sold someone else’s 
identifying information so many times that he does not know to which sale the 
indictment is referring.  While alleging the recipient may provide additional notice 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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to the defendant, compliance with the Bissette rule may be accomplished either by 
alleging “the name of the person to whom the sale was made” or that “the purchaser 
was in fact unknown.”  Bissette, 250 N.C. at 517-18, 108 S.E.2d at 861 (citations 
omitted).  The State can thus comply with this extra-statutory common law rule 
without providing any useful information to the defendant.  Yet under the 
majority’s rule, failure to include this statement is grounds for quashing the 
indictment and finding a jurisdictional defect.  This result furthers neither 
defendant’s desire for notice of his alleged crimes nor the State’s interest in 
pursuing violations of our criminal code.  The Bissette rule simply is poorly tailored 
to this uniquely twenty-first century criminal offense. 
As in Worsley, the passage of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 supplanted the prior 
common law requirement.  The indictment here charged the offense “in a plain, 
intelligible, and explicit manner” that “inform[ed] the defendant of the charge 
against him with sufficient certainty to enable him to prepare his defense.”  
Worsley, 336 N.C. at 281, 443 S.E.2d at 74 (citations and quotation marks omitted).   
The decision to extend or limit common law rules is rooted in the courts’ duty 
“to reflect the spirit of their times and discard legal rules when they serve to impede 
society rather than to advance it.”  Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 632, 507 
S.E.2d 882, 893 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  The State suffers a 
harsh penalty for flawed indictments—complete dismissal of its case.  The Criminal 
Procedure Act was “designed to remove from our law unnecessary technicalities 
STATE V. JONES 
 
MARTIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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which tend to obstruct justice.”  State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436, 333 S.E.2d 
743, 746 (1985).  Accordingly, when determining whether indictments are fatally 
flawed, we apply N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 and decline to “engraft additional unnecessary 
burdens upon the due administration of justice.”  Id.  The common law “is not 
inflexible, and therefore we will not hesitate to abandon a rule which has resulted 
in injustices, whether it be criminal or civil.”  Nelson, 349 N.C. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 
893 (citation omitted).  The indictment in this case reasonably put White on notice 
of the transactions for which he was being prosecuted.  It contained “plain and 
concise factual statement[s] supporting every element of [the] criminal offense[s] 
with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which [was] 
the subject of the accusation.”  Freeman, 314 N.C. at 436, 333 S.E.2d at 746.  I 
would not quash this indictment based on a technical pleading requirement that 
this Court now imposes for the first time.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
Justice NEWBY joins in this opinion. 
 
 
Justice HUDSON concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
 
While I agree with the majority that the trial court properly dismissed the 
obtaining property by false pretenses charges against defendant Jones and the 
trafficking in stolen identities charges against defendant White, I believe the trial 
STATE V. JONES 
 
HUDSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
-24- 
court erred in denying Jones’s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. 
The crime of identity theft requires that a defendant “knowingly obtain[ ], 
possess[ ], or use[ ] identifying information of another person, living or dead, with 
the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person for the 
purposes of making financial or credit transactions in the other person’s name, to 
obtain anything of value, benefit, or advantage, or for the purpose of avoiding legal 
consequences.”  N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2013) (emphasis added).  Here defendant 
Jones argued that the State had not presented any evidence that he had acted with 
the intent of representing that he was the person named on the credit cards; in fact, 
as noted by the majority, defendant Jones pointed out that he specifically did not 
sign the transactions at either Maaco or Tire Kingdom with the names on the credit 
cards.  In rebutting this argument, the majority states that it “cannot conclude that 
the Legislature intended for individuals to escape criminal liability simply by 
stating or signing a name that differs from the cardholder’s name.  Such a result 
would be absurd and contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature to 
criminalize fraudulent use of identifying information.” 
The majority here seems to overlook the other statutes besides the identity 
theft statute that “criminalize fraudulent use of identifying information”; an 
offender could be charged with one of these, which would easily avoid the result the 
majority fears.  Most relevant here, N.C.G.S. § 14-113.13 provides in part:  
STATE V. JONES 
 
HUDSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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(a) A person is guilty of financial transaction card fraud when, with intent to 
defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or 
anything else of value, or any other person, he 
 
. . . . 
 
(2) Obtains money, goods, services, or anything else of value by: 
a. Representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the        
holder of a specified card; or 
b. Presenting the financial transaction card without the authoriza-               
tion or permission of the cardholder . . . . 
 
Id. § 14-113.13 (2013).  Unlike the crime of identity theft addressed in section 14-
113.20, financial transaction card fraud does not require that the defendant 
represent that he is the other person, it is instead enough that he represents that he 
is an authorized user of the card.  Id. § 14-113.13(a)(2)(b).  If we read out of the 
identity theft statute the requirement that the defendant act “with the intent to 
fraudulently represent that the person is the other person,” there is little to no 
difference between identity theft and financial transaction card fraud.  Because I do 
not see our task as rewriting this statute, and because our doing so cannot be what 
the legislature intended, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Given the above, I would hold that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence that defendant committed identity theft and that the trial court erred in 
denying defendant Jones’s motion to dismiss.  Therefore, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 Justice BEASLEY joins in this opinion. 
 
STATE V. JONES 
 
HUDSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
 
 
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