Case Title: Provost v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc.

Citation: 179 Vt. 545, 2005 VT 115, 890 A.2d 97

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Provost v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. (2004-185); 179 Vt. 545; 890 A.2d 97

2005 VT 115

[Filed 06-Oct-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 115

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-185

                              MARCH TERM, 2005

  Dale Provost, et al.	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }      	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
  Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc.     }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. S1573-02 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiffs Dale and Brenda Provost appeal a decision of the
  Chittenden Superior Court granting defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care,
  Inc.'s (FAHC) motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice suit. 
  We agree that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment, and
  therefore reverse and remand.  

       ¶  2.  On October 26, 2000, plaintiff Dale Provost went to the
  Colchester Family Health Care Clinic, which is owned and operated by FAHC,
  to receive treatment for a severe allergic reaction.  Dr. Vivian Esparza,
  M.D., treated Mr. Provost, and, among other things, administered an
  intramuscular injection of benadryl into his left arm.  During the shot,
  Mr. Provost said "ouch."  Dr. Esparza asked if the shot hurt and then said,
  "perhaps I touched the bone with the needle.  I'll pull it back out a
  little bit."  She then finished the injection.  Shortly after receiving the
  shot and returning to his home, Mr. Provost began experiencing numbness and
  pain in his left arm.  He contacted the Clinic and was told to return to
  see Dr. Esparza the next day.  After seeing Mr. Provost at the follow-up
  appointment on October 27 and consulting with a neurologist, Dr. Esparza
  concluded that he most likely had a radial nerve palsy "secondary to [a]
  hematoma beneath the neuronal sheath from yesterdays [sic] benadryl
  injection."

       ¶  3.  In November 2001, Dr. John Johansson, D.O., evaluated Mr.
  Provost.  Dr. Johansson determined that Mr. Provost had sustained
  permanent, significant impairment to the radial nerve in his left arm as a
  result of the benadryl injection.  

       ¶  4.  In December 2002, Mr. Provost and his wife filed suit,
  alleging that Dr. Esparza had negligently administered the injection,
  damaging the radial nerve, and that FAHC was vicariously liable under the
  doctrine of respondeat superior.  
   
       ¶  5.  FAHC filed a motion for summary judgment in December 2003,
  contending that plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient expert
  testimony to establish the elements of medical malpractice.  Plaintiffs
  then designated Dr. Johansson as their medical expert, filed a supplemental
  interrogatory response, and filed a brief in opposition to summary judgment
  supported by an affidavit from Dr. Johansson.  Dr. Johansson based the
  statements in his affidavit upon his review of Mr. Provost's medical
  records, Dr. Esparza's deposition transcript, and his November 2001
  examination of Mr. Provost.  

       ¶  6.  Specifically, Dr. Johansson opined, "to a reasonable degree
  of medical certainty," that "Dr. Esparza failed to exercise the appropriate
  degree of care" when she administered the benadryl injection because she
  "insert[ed] the needle to the point it made contact with the bone of the
  arm and injured the radial nerve."  He also stated that as a "direct
  result" of the injection, Mr. Provost "suffered significant nerve injury to
  the radial nerve in his left arm," equating to "28% whole person
  impairment."  Finally, he concluded that Dr. Esparza's failure to exercise
  the appropriate degree of care was a proximate cause of Mr. Provost's
  injuries, without which the injuries would not have occurred.

       ¶  7.  In response, FAHC challenged whether Dr. Johansson, who is an
  osteopathic physician with a practice in sports medicine, was competent to
  serve as an expert in the case.  FAHC also questioned whether Dr.
  Johansson's statements were made upon personal knowledge.  Finally, FAHC
  argued that summary judgment was required because Dr. Johansson's affidavit
  did not articulate a relevant standard of care, offer any details on how
  Dr. Esparza's treatment breached the standard of care, or establish that a
  breach of the requisite standard of care proximately caused Mr. Provost's
  injury.  Plaintiffs filed a response that addressed Dr. Johansson's
  credentials and reaffirmed that statements in the affidavit were made
  according to Dr. Johansson's personal knowledge. 

       ¶  8.  The superior court granted FAHC's motion, ruling that
  plaintiffs' expert affidavit consisted of conclusions that fail to "stand
  up to even a lenient scrutiny of proof."  In particular, the court
  emphasized that Dr. Johansson did not enunciate the standard of care owed
  to Mr. Provost by Dr. Esparza and failed to explain how Dr. Esparza
  deviated from the standard of care and thereby caused Mr. Provost's injury. 

       ¶  9.  On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the court failed to give
  them, as the nonmoving party, the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
  inferences when it concluded that plaintiffs' expert affidavit was
  insufficient to survive summary judgment.  We agree.  Plaintiffs provided
  an expert affidavit that states, to a reasonable degree of medical
  certainty, that Dr. Esparza deviated from the standard of care, proximately
  causing Mr. Provost's injury.  While the affidavit provides little explicit
  reasoning, it articulates a theory of the case sufficient to withstand
  summary judgment.  In effect, the trial court weighed Dr. Johansson's
  theory against other possible explanations for Mr. Provost's injury and
  granted summary judgment because plaintiffs had not eliminated those
  explanations as viable theories.  On summary judgment, however, the
  question is not how plaintiffs' theory measures up against any other-that
  weighing is left to the trier of fact.
        
       ¶  10.  On appeal, this Court reviews a motion for summary judgment
  de novo, employing the same standard as applied by the trial court. 
  Hardwick Recycling & Salvage, Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2004 VT 124, ¶ 14,
  15 Vt. L. Wk. 397,