Case Title: Commonwealth v. Burgos

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11005

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11005 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN BURGOS. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     September 5, 2014. - November 21, 2014. 
 
Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Electronic Surveillance.  Evidence, Wiretap, Corroborative 
evidence, Telephone conversation.  Homicide.  
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of 
Law, Assistance of counsel.  Telephone.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, New trial, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 24, 2009. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
F. McGuire, Jr., J.; the case was tried before Gary A. 
Nickerson, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on March 1, 
2013, was considered by him. 
 
 
 
Janet Heatherwick Pumphrey for the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of 
murder in the first degree.  His primary argument on appeal is 
that his motion to suppress a secretly recorded conversation 
2 
 
between him and an informant working with the police was 
erroneously denied, that evidence of the conversation should 
have been excluded at trial, and that his conviction must be 
reversed as a result.1  We agree and reverse the defendant's 
conviction. 
 
Background.  1.  Electronically recorded conversation.  
Dana Haywood was shot and killed on July 4, 2005, in the Monte 
Park neighborhood of New Bedford.  Over three years later, in 
February of 2009, an assistant district attorney in the Bristol 
district received a letter from Rico Almeida, who was then 
sharing a cell with the defendant in the Bristol County house of 
correction.  Almeida wrote that the defendant had been one of 
the participants in the shooting death of Haywood on July 4, 
2005, that the defendant had told Almeida "how they did it, 
where, and when," and that Almeida would be able to arrange for 
the defendant to repeat this admission to the shooting of the 
                     
 
1 In relation to the same recorded conversation, the 
defendant also challenges the constitutional validity of the 
search warrant obtained by police officers pursuant to G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, and Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 77 (1987), 
based on his claim that the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause.  In the circumstances of this case, the police 
were not required to seek and obtain a search warrant pursuant 
to Blood, because the conversation sought to be recorded was 
always intended to, and did, take place in a jail cell -- a 
space that we decline to treat as the equivalent of a private 
home.  The issue here, rather, is solely whether the 
conversation was recorded in violation of the wiretap statute, 
G. L. c. 272, § 99.  Accordingly, we do not reach the 
defendant's constitutional argument. 
3 
 
victim.  Almeida offered to wear a concealed recording device 
and record the proposed conversation.  In response to the 
letter, the Commonwealth submitted an affidavit of Trooper 
Anthony Spencer of the State police to a judge in the Superior 
Court, and obtained a search warrant authorizing the electronic 
recording of conversations between the cooperating witness 
(i.e., Almeida) and the defendant.2 
 
In an affidavit dated March 2, 2009, Spencer begins by 
reciting the following information about police officers' prior 
dealings with Almeida in a homicide investigation involving 
William Payne.  Payne was shot and killed on February 3, 2008, 
in New Bedford.  During the investigation of the Payne homicide, 
in October of 2008, State police Trooper Paul Dockrey had 
interviewed Almeida, who at the time was being held in custody 
at the Bristol County house of correction.  Dockrey learned from 
Almeida that the latter had information about Payne's murder 
from two "gang business meetings" where he and his friends 
discussed how to handle their friend Payne's homicide.  In 
particular, Almeida learned specific details about "how the 
Payne homicide went down."  Based on these facts, Dockrey sought 
                     
 
2 There appears to be no dispute that the Commonwealth 
sought the warrant under the general search warrant statute, 
G. L. c. 276, §§ 1 et seq., and Blood, 400 Mass. at 77, and not 
under the section of the wiretap statute authorizing search 
warrants to conduct an "interception," G. L. c. 272, § 99 F.  A 
so-called Blood warrant was not necessary in this case.  See 
note 1, supra. 
4 
 
and obtained a search warrant that authorized Almeida to record 
telephone conversations electronically with the suspects in the 
Payne murder, and Almeida was released on bail from custody in 
order to do so.  Once he was released, however, Almeida failed 
to secure the recordings. 
 
Spencer's affidavit then turns to the homicide 
investigation relating to Dana Haywood, the victim in this case.  
It states that in a letter dated February 14, 2009, and sent to 
an assistant district attorney, Almeida provided information 
about the July 4, 2005, homicide, and indicated he was willing 
to assist law enforcement in the investigation and to "wear a 
'wire' for this purpose."  Spencer's affidavit then states as 
follows: 
 
"I spoke with Det. Lt. Scott Sylvia, New Bedford 
Police Major Crimes Division, and he informed me that John 
Burgos is a member of the United Front gang.  He has been 
associated with the gang for approximately 12 years.  
According to Det. Lt. Sylvia the United Front gang is a 
group of individuals that operate in and around the United 
Front Homes located adjacent to Chancery and Kempton 
Streets.  The members are known to be heavily involved in 
the distribution of illegal narcotics.  The members are 
also known to commit violent crimes including possession of 
firearms and multiple shootings.  Mr. Burgos himself was 
also a target of a shooting on May 21, 2006 along with 
Justin Barry who was murdered in the shooting.  This 
shooting was perpetrated by rival Monte Park members 
including David DePina.  Mr. DePina is presently awaiting 
trial in the fatal shooting of Barry and the shooting of 
Mr. Burgos. 
 
 
"Tpr. Ann Marie Robertson, Cold Case Unit Mass. State 
Police, advises me that Dana Haywood was a known member of 
the Monte Park Gang at the time of his death.  Monte[] Park 
5 
 
Gang is a group of individuals that are known to distribute 
illegal narcotics by Monte[] Park on Acushnet Avenue in the 
city of New Bedford.  The gang members are also known to 
commit violent crimes including illegal possession of 
firearms and multiple shootings.  Tpr. Robertson informs me 
that investigators believe that Dana Haywood's murder is 
suspected to be in retaliation for the fatal shooting of 
Cecil Lopes which occurred on October 31, 2004.  The Cecil 
Lopes murder took place at the United Front Homes on 
Chancery Street in the city of New Bedford.  The Cecil 
Lopes murder involved a shooting directly outside a 
residence in the United Front Housing complex.  Tpr. 
Robertson informs me that Mr. Haywood was shot one block 
from the Monte Park Housing complex on Russell Street in 
the city of New Bedford.  Tpr. Robertson further advises me 
that eyewitnesses to Mr. Haywood's shooting saw 3 young 
black males, at least 2 of who [sic] were shooting.  The 3 
males fled from Mr. Haywood's body to an awaiting vehicle." 
 
Following these two paragraphs, the affidavit describes the 
contents of Almeida's February 14, 2009, letter to the assistant 
district attorney: 
"Almeida stated in his letter that his cell mate, John 
Burgos [the defendant] was one of the shooters who killed 
Dana Haywood [the victim] on July 4, 2005.  Almeida also 
states John Burgos told him why, where and when they did 
it.  Almeida believes he can get Burgos to make those 
statements again.  Almeida requests that this investigation 
be expedited due to the fact that Burgos will be released 
soon." 
 
The affidavit then describes the manner in which the electronic 
recording by Almeida would be set up. 
 
Based on Spencer's affidavit, the Superior Court judge 
issued the requested search warrant.  Police officers then 
provided Almeida with an electronic recording device that 
Almeida hid on his person and used to secretly record a 
conversation with the defendant in their jail cell on March 3, 
6 
 
2009.  During the conversation, which lasted over sixty minutes, 
the defendant admitted to being one of the shooters involved in 
killing the victim on July 4, 2005, and described the actual 
shooting incident in some detail, as well as his attitude toward 
it. 
 
Following the defendant's indictment on charges of murder 
and unlawful possession of a firearm, he filed a motion to 
suppress the electronically recorded statements.  He argued that 
the recording was obtained in violation of the wiretap statute, 
G. L. c. 272, § 99, because the Commonwealth had not made the 
requisite showing that the recording would lead to evidence 
about a "designated offense" committed "in connection with 
organized crime."  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4, 7.  The defendant 
also argued that the search warrant had been issued without 
probable cause.  In opposition to the motion, the Commonwealth 
did not offer any evidence other than Trooper Spencer's 
affidavit that had previously been submitted in support of the 
Commonwealth's search warrant application. 
 
A second Superior Court judge held a nonevidentiary hearing 
on the defendant's suppression motion, and thereafter denied it.  
The judge concluded in substance that Spencer's affidavit 
articulated sufficient facts to indicate that the victim's 
7 
 
murder was committed in connection with organized crime because 
the facts showed the murder was "gang related."3 
 
The defendant was tried and convicted of murder in the 
first degree in November, 2010.4  He filed a timely notice of 
appeal and thereafter filed a motion for new trial that raised a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The motion 
was remanded to the Superior Court.  After receiving memoranda 
from the parties, the trial judge denied the motion in an 
explanatory order.  The defendant filed a timely appeal from the 
denial.  We have consolidated for review the defendant's appeal 
from his conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
2.  Evidence at trial.  We summarize briefly what the jury 
could have found based on the trial evidence.  On October 31, 
2004, some nine months before the victim was killed on July 4, 
2005, Cecil Lopes, a resident of the United Front housing 
development in New Bedford, had been killed.  In November, 2004, 
the defendant, who also lived in the United Front development, 
                     
 
3 The judge also concluded that the search warrant was 
supported by probable cause because the Commonwealth had 
established the informant Almeida's basis of knowledge and 
veracity.  There is no need for us to address the probable cause 
issue.  See note 1, supra. 
 
 
4 The judge allowed the defendant's motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the firearm charge before the case went 
to the jury. 
8 
 
had made a telephone call to his brother.5  In this conversation, 
he and his brother had talked about how Lopes's photograph was 
in the newspaper and the defendant had stated that he had put 
the image from the newspaper on his wall.  They also had 
discussed that someone named "Aceon" was responsible for the 
killing.  Aceon was known to be associated with the Monte Park 
area of New Bedford.  The Commonwealth's theory at trial was 
that the defendant and his friend William Payne killed the 
victim in retaliation for Lopes's murder. 
 
At the scene of the shooting resulting in the victim's 
death, police recovered a blue baseball cap and some bullet 
shell casings.  A bystander had seen three individuals at the 
scene, all of whom were wearing white T-shirts.  Later that 
night, the defendant and Payne were at the home of Payne's 
grandfather who observed the defendant to be laughing and 
behaving differently than he usually did. 
 
Almeida, who had entered into a cooperation agreement with 
the Commonwealth, was a witness at trial.  He testified about, 
among other subjects, his March, 2009, electronically recorded 
                     
 
5 This call was made while the defendant was being held in 
custody at a Bristol County correctional facility.  On appeal, 
he challenges the admissibility of statements from this call, 
which we discuss infra. 
 
9 
 
conversation with the defendant.6  A recording of the recorded 
conversation was then played for the jury and entered into 
evidence as an exhibit.  In that conversation, the defendant 
agreed with Almeida's assertion that he and Payne shot the 
victim, described the shooting as "executionist style," and made 
statements suggesting a lack of any feelings of guilt or 
remorse.  He also indicated that he had been wearing a white T-
shirt at the time of the shooting, and that the victim had been 
killed in retaliation for the death of Cecil Lopes. 
 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing was performed on the 
baseball cap found at the scene of the shooting.  It revealed 
that the defendant was the source of the major profile taken 
from the swabbings and scrapings of the baseball cap, and that 
the victim was excluded from that profile.  The shell casings 
found at the scene were compared to a shell casing found three 
months later in a car driven by Payne.  The State trooper who 
did the comparison opined that the casings were fired from the 
same unknown weapon. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress recorded statement.  
The defendant contends that the secret recording of his 
                     
 
6 Rico Almeida was vigorously cross-examined by the 
defendant's counsel.  Almeida admitted, among other things, that 
he had misrepresented some of the facts in his February 14, 
2009, letter to the assistant district attorney, particularly 
the fact that the defendant had told him details about the 
victim's murder prior to the jail cell recording.  He also 
admitted to lying to a grand jury in a prior case. 
10 
 
conversation with Almeida should have been suppressed because 
the Commonwealth obtained this evidence in violation of the 
wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99.  He argues principally that 
the Commonwealth failed to show that the recording was made 
during an investigation of a designated offense committed "in 
connection with organized crime," as that statute requires.  See 
G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4, 7. 
 
The Commonwealth's wiretap statute generally prohibits the 
secret recording of oral communications, see G. L. c. 272, § 99 
C 1, but also contains some narrow exceptions to this 
prohibition.  One of those exceptions, described in § 99 B 4, is 
for a one-party consent recording, where the person who is 
conducting the surreptitious recording "is an investigative or 
law enforcement officer investigating a 'designated offense,' 
and that officer is either (1) a party to the communication, or 
(2) has advance authorization from a party to the communication 
to intercept the conversation."  Commonwealth v. Hearns, 467 
Mass. 707, 714 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 
Mass. 289, 297 (2011).7  See Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 
271, 275–276 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982). 
                     
 
7 A surreptitious or secret recording of the contents of 
wire or oral communications is referred to in the wiretap 
statute as an  "interception," and the exception for a one-party 
consent secret recording is included within the statutory 
definition of "interception."  In particular, G. L. c. 272, § 99 
B 4, provides: 
11 
 
 
The Commonwealth from the outset of this case has 
characterized the recording at issue here as fitting within the 
one-party consent exception set out in G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.  
There is no dispute that most of the requirements of that 
exception are met here:  the recording was carried out by law 
enforcement officers investigating the victim's murder; murder 
is one of the crimes listed in the definition of "designated 
offense" in § 99 B 7; and Almeida, one of the parties to the 
recorded conversation, had authorized (in fact, requested) the 
officers in advance to conduct the recording.  But, as the 
defendant contends, for the victim's murder actually to qualify 
as a "designated offense" within the meaning of § 99 B 7, it 
must have been a murder committed "in connection with organized 
crime" -- that is, it was necessary for the Commonwealth "to 
show that the decision to intercept was made on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion that interception would disclose or lead to 
                                                                  
 
"The term 'interception' means to secretly hear, secretly 
record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record 
the contents of any wire or oral communication through the 
use of any intercepting device by any person other than a 
person given prior authority by all parties to such 
communication; provided that it shall not constitute an 
interception for an investigative or law enforcement 
officer . . . to record or transmit a wire or oral 
communication if the officer is a party to such 
communication or has been given prior authorization to 
record or transmit the communication by such a party and if 
recorded or transmitted in the course of an investigation 
of a designated offense as defined herein" (emphasis 
added). 
12 
 
evidence of a designated offense in connection with organized 
crime."  Thorpe, 384 Mass. at 281.  In this context, the term 
"organized crime" means "a continuing conspiracy among highly 
organized and disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal 
goods and services."  G. L. c. 272, §99 A.  See Thorpe, supra at 
277. 
 
To show a nexus to organized crime, there must be "some 
evidence of an ongoing illegal business operation."  Tavares, 
459 Mass. at 300, quoting Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 
556 (2009).  The Commonwealth also must demonstrate a "high 
degree of discipline and organization" among the suspected 
members of the criminal enterprise.  Tavares, supra at 300, 
quoting Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 737 (1999).  
However, facts suggesting "coordination of efforts among cohorts 
standing alone is insufficient. . . .  'For a conspiracy to 
commit an offense enumerated in G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, to rise 
to the level of organized crime, there must, at the very least, 
be an organized plan from which one reasonably may infer the 
existence of an ongoing criminal operation.'"  Tavares, supra at 
301, quoting Long, supra at 557.  Finally, the Commonwealth must 
show that the designated offense was committed to promote "the 
supply of 'illegal goods and services' or the furtherance of an 
'ongoing criminal business operation.'"  Tavares, supra at 301, 
quoting G. L. c. 272, § 99A. 
13 
 
 
In recent years, this court has decided a number of cases 
involving the one-party consent exception under our wiretap 
statute, and the facts of those cases offer useful comparisons 
here.  In Tavares, the Commonwealth failed to show a nexus to 
organized crime when requesting a wiretap in an investigation of 
a murder resulting from a drive-by shooting.  The facts 
contained in a State trooper's supporting affidavit revealed 
that the defendant and the other men suspected of participating 
in the crime were known to carry guns and commit violent crimes, 
and that the defendant had purchased a gun from a fellow group 
member.  Tavares, 459 Mass. at 299.  The facts also indicated 
that the defendant and the other men borrowed a car in advance, 
met at a central location before the shooting, and returned to 
hide the guns at the same site afterwards, suggesting some 
coordination and that there was some degree of a hierarchy 
within the group.  Id. at 291, 299.  However, we concluded that 
taken together, the facts in Tavares did not support a 
connection to organized crime because there was no information 
beyond the speculative that the defendant or any other member of 
his group "was involved in a pecuniary enterprise, such as drug, 
gun, or contraband trafficking, or promoted some other unifying 
criminal purpose."  Id. at 301.  In addition, the evidence 
failed to show "other hallmarks of organized crime -- 
discipline, organization, and a continuing nature."  Id. at 302, 
14 
 
quoting Long, 454 Mass. at 558.  Finally, we observed that there 
was not a "scintilla of evidence in the [State trooper's] 
affidavit that the designated offense [the drive-by murder of 
the victim] was committed 'in connection' with [an] organized 
criminal trade."  Tavares, 459 Mass. at 302. 
 
In contrast, in Hearns, 467 Mass. at 710-711, we found a 
nexus to organized crime based on a detailed affidavit from a 
police officer outlining his direct knowledge that specific 
persons in the alleged criminal organization distributed 
narcotics and possessed firearms.  The affidavit also contained 
information about the use of "mission" assignments "guided and 
observed by senior members in the organization" as "part of an 
ongoing 'feud' (or war) between turf conscious criminal 
organizations involved."  Id. at 716.  We concluded that "it is 
reasonable to infer from the information available to the police 
at the time that the shooting at issue was intended as an act of 
intimidation directed at [a rival gang] and related to its 
competing illegal enterprises."  Id.  Similarly, in Commonwealth 
v. Mitchell, 468 Mass. 417, 426 (2014), there was clear evidence 
that the defendant and his associates were involved in "a drug 
distribution enterprise."  The defendant himself previously had 
been arrested in connection with this drug enterprise, along 
with a fellow associate who a witness confirmed was a known drug 
dealer.  Id.  Their enterprise was also highly coordinated, with 
15 
 
multiple members taking part in the shooting and several others 
assisting in hiding the gun and "conspiring to kill a potential 
witness."  Id. at 427.  Facts suggested that the murder was part 
of a "bitter and violent feud" between two rival organizations.  
Id.  We stated that "[e]ven if the feud were purely personal, an 
illegal drug distribution business may see the perception of 
weakness as potentially fatal to an enterprise that wishes to 
protect its turf against competitors."  Id.  This conclusion, 
however, relied on clear evidence showing that the group was, in 
fact, operating an organized drug business. 
 
On its facts, this case is much closer to Tavares than to 
Hearns and Mitchell.  In contrast to the latter two cases, the 
only two relevant paragraphs of Trooper Spencer's affidavit in 
this case, quoted supra, set out relatively vague and conclusory 
"facts" about the existence of two rival gangs operating in 
different neighborhoods of New Bedford, both of which were 
involved in selling narcotics.  These paragraphs, however, do 
not describe or even suggest a nexus between the victim's murder 
-- i.e., the offense being investigated -- and the narcotics or 
any other ongoing business enterprise of either gang.  Spencer 
states in the affidavit that he has learned from other officers 
that the defendant was a longtime member of the United Front 
gang, that the gang is involved "in the distribution of illegal 
narcotics" inferably near the United Front Homes where the gang 
16 
 
operates, that the Monte Park gang of which the victim was a 
member distributes drugs near Monte Park, and that the victim's 
murder was believed to be in retaliation for the earlier murder 
of Cecil Lopes near the United Front Homes.  Nothing in the 
affidavit, however, indicates that the two gangs were engaged in 
a turf war or other dispute over drug dealing or any other 
"business" activities, and nothing connects the murder of the 
victim or even the defendant to the gangs' drug dealing 
operations or any other "business" activity.  Moreover, beyond 
the fact that eyewitnesses saw three individuals at the scene of 
the murder get into a waiting car, there is no evidence 
indicating that the trio were members of the United Front gang, 
much less evidence that the trio's actions that night were part 
of an organized, disciplined plan characteristic of a business 
enterprise.  Contrast Hearns, 467 Mass. at 715-716.  A 
retaliatory killing alone, without a clear link to the goals of 
a criminal enterprise, does not amount to a connection to 
organized crime.  See Long, 454 Mass. at 557-558. 
 
Because Spencer's affidavit fails to show the requisite 
connection between the murder being investigated and "organized 
crime," the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress 
constituted error, and the defendant's recorded conversation 
with Almeida should not have been admitted in evidence at trial.  
The remaining question is the effect of the error.  We assume 
17 
 
for argument that the substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice standard applies.8  Under that standard, "a new trial is 
called for unless [the reviewing court is] substantially 
confident that, if an error had not been made, the jury verdict 
would have been the same."  Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 
288, 292 n.3 (1998). 
The recorded conversation between the defendant and 
Almeida, in which the defendant admitted to having joined with 
Payne in murdering the victim and described the murder in some 
detail without indication of remorse or even regret, 
unquestionably constituted the centerpiece of the Commonwealth's 
case.  There were no eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as 
a shooter.  The closest evidence in this regard was that three 
young men in white T-shirts were observed at the scene, and that 
the defendant had on a white T-shirt that night.  The DNA 
evidence from the blue baseball cap at best places the defendant 
                     
 
8 To consider the effect of the error, it is necessary first 
to identify the appropriate standard of review -- prejudicial 
error or substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
The defendant moved to suppress evidence of the electronically 
recorded conversation before trial, but did not object to the 
admission of this evidence at trial.  Although the admission 
violated only the defendant's statutory rights under the wiretap 
statute, by raising his claim in his pretrial motion to 
suppress, which was heard and denied, he likely preserved his 
objection.  Nevertheless, we do not need to decide the 
preservation issue here because even if we assume that the 
objection was not preserved and the less favorable substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard applies, the 
defendant prevails. 
18 
 
at the scene of the shooting, but proves nothing more.  Although 
the shell casings recovered by police at the scene of the crime 
matched the shell casing found in Payne's car at a later point 
in time, the actual murder weapon was never found.  Reviewing 
this evidence, we cannot conclude with substantial confidence 
that the jury would have reached the same verdict had the 
recorded conversation between the defendant and Almeida been 
excluded.9  See Ruddock, 428 Mass. at 292 n.3.  The defendant's 
conviction must be reversed. 
 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  As he did in his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argues on appeal that he was deprived 
of the effective assistance of counsel based on his trial 
attorney's failure to move for suppression of all evidence of 
his conversation with Almeida -- both the electronic recording 
of it as well as testimony of Almeida relating to the contents 
                     
 
9 At oral argument before this court, the Commonwealth 
contended for the first time that there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice resulting from the 
admission in evidence of the defendant's recorded conversation 
with Almeida because Almeida himself had described the contents 
of that conversation in his testimony before the jury.  The 
point, presumably, was that evidence of the actual recording was 
cumulative.  But actually hearing the defendant make the 
statements at issue is far more powerful than listening to 
testimony about them by Almeida.  Moreover, Almeida himself was 
a witness testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement with 
the government; for this and other reasons, his credibility came 
under substantial attack at trial.  In the circumstances, the 
significance of the actual recorded conversation between Almeida 
and the defendant, which featured the defendant explaining his 
role and actions in the commission of the murder, cannot be 
overstated. 
19 
 
of the conversation -- under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  More particularly, the defendant contends that 
because Almeida was an agent of the police at the time he 
secretly recorded the conversation with the defendant, and 
because the recorded conversation took place while the defendant 
was in custody, the conversation qualified as a "custodial 
interrogation."  Accordingly, evidence of the conversation was 
inadmissible because the defendant was not given Miranda 
warnings before the conversation took place and never waived his 
right to remain silent.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
444 (1966) ("the prosecution may not use statements . . . 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination").  By never 
challenging this evidence on Fifth Amendment and art. 12 
grounds, the defendant avers here, his trial attorney's actions 
fell "measurably below that which might be expected from an 
ordinary fallible lawyer," and deprived him of an "otherwise 
available, substantial ground" of defense.  Commonwealth v. 
Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 295 n.9 (2002), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). 
"It is not ineffective assistance of counsel when trial 
counsel declines to file a motion with a minimal chance of 
20 
 
success."  Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983).  
In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990), the United 
States Supreme Court, focusing on the Fifth Amendment, rejected 
the argument the defendant makes here.  The Court emphasized 
that Miranda sought to protect or preserve a suspect's ability 
to exercise his right against self-incrimination in the 
"inherently compelling" atmosphere of a police-dominated 
official interrogation, and concluded that under the Fifth 
Amendment, incriminating statements made during a voluntary 
conversation between a suspect who was incarcerated on other 
charges and his cellmate -- an undercover officer posing as an 
inmate -– were not rendered inadmissible because of the absence 
of Miranda warnings.10  Id. at 296, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
                     
10 The Supreme Court reasoned: 
 
"Conversations between suspects and undercover agents 
do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.  The 
essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' 
and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person 
speaks freely to someone whom be believes to be a fellow 
inmate.  Coercion is determined from the perspective of the 
suspect. . . .  When a suspect considers himself in the 
company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive 
atmosphere is lacking. . . .  
 
"It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of 
coercion results from the interaction of custody and 
official interrogation.  We reject the argument that 
Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect is in 
custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who 
happens to be a government agent.  Questioning by captors, 
who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create 
mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed 
21 
 
467.  The defendant in essence disagrees with the reasoning of 
the Court's majority in Perkins, cites to the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Marshall, and urges us to conclude that under art. 
12, the administration of Miranda warnings was required before 
Almeida, who was in substance a government agent, engaged the 
defendant in conversation about the circumstances of the 
victim's murder.  See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 303 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  In support of this position, the defendant points 
out that in the context of Miranda, the court in certain cases 
has construed art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights to afford 
more protections to suspects of crimes. 
In Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass 426, 432 (1999), 
quoting Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297, this court observed that 
"Miranda warnings are only necessary where one is the subject of 
'custody and official interrogation.'"11  We also stated that 
                                                                  
will weaken the suspect's will, but where a suspect does 
not know that he is conversing with a government agent, 
these pressures do not exist."  (Citations omitted.) 
 
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-297 (1990). 
 
11 In Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 427 (1999), the 
defendant, who was being held in custody at a house of 
correction in connection with an outstanding probation surrender 
warrant, agreed to be questioned by police officers about an 
unrelated homicide.  The court concluded that although the 
interrogating officers ultimately gave the defendant Miranda 
warnings, the administration of warnings was not required 
because "the circumstances of the interview were in the special 
Miranda sense noncustodial."  Id. at 435.  The defendant was not 
under the control of the officers investigating him, and 
22 
 
"[w]hether a suspect was subject to custodial interrogation is a 
question of Federal constitutional law."  Larkin, supra at 432.  
Although on occasion, we have interpreted art. 12 to afford 
greater protections to criminal suspects than the Fifth 
Amendment, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 
858 (2000), we are not persuaded that this case presents a 
ground to do so.12  In other words, considering the purpose of 
Miranda warnings, we find no good reason to conclude that where 
an unindicted suspect held in custody on separate charges enters 
voluntarily into a conversation with a cellmate, art. 12 
requires that the suspect receive Miranda warnings before the 
                                                                  
although he could not leave the house of correction, he was free 
to end the interview at any time.  Id. at 435-436.  See Maryland 
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112-113 (2010).  Contrast Commonwealth 
v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 147-149 & n.9 (2013) (defendant, held 
in custody in Puerto Rico on local charges and permitted 
relatively free movement, was brought without notice to Federal 
Bureau of Investigation office and questioned in handcuffs by 
police officers about Massachusetts murder for two hours with no 
Miranda warnings given; interview may have been custodial). 
 
Without question, the facts of Larkin are different from 
the facts in this case, but the court's discussion of what a 
"custodial interrogation" means for purposes of Miranda warnings 
cites and is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-297. 
 
 
12 We have broadened art. 12 protections where a defendant 
made incriminating statements to an undercover informant in his 
jail cell after his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution had attached.  See 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 448 Mass. 452, 453 (2007).  However, in 
the present case, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had not been triggered because at the time of his 
conversation with Almeida, he had not been indicted or charged 
in connection with the victim's murder. 
23 
 
conversation begins if it turns out that the cellmate was acting 
as an agent of the police.13 
 
Here, the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes 
during his jail cell conversation with Almeida.  Although 
Almeida was deliberately eliciting information from him, the 
defendant was not being coerced to answer in any way.  Rather, 
he was having a conversation with someone he knew and appeared 
to consider a friend, and there is nothing to indicate his 
statements were anything but voluntary.  See Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011).  Because there was no basis 
on which to argue that evidence of the conversation should have 
been suppressed under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12, the 
defendant's trial attorney was not ineffective in failing to 
raise the claim.  The defendant's motion for a new trial was 
properly denied. 
 
3.  Other issues.  Because there may be a new trial, we 
briefly address the defendant's two other claims. 
First, the defendant asserts that in light of the 
Commonwealth's failure to provide sufficient evidence to 
corroborate his statements made during the electronically 
recorded conversation with Almeida, his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty should have been allowed.  This argument 
                     
 
13 If we were to accept the defendant's position, as a 
practical matter it would eliminate any conversation with a 
cooperating witness where a suspect is held in jail. 
24 
 
relies on a misguided application of the corroboration rule, 
which "requires only that there be some evidence, besides the 
confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that 
is, that the crime was real and not imaginary."  Commonwealth v. 
Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984).  It is not necessary that the 
corroborating evidence "point to the accused's identity as the 
doer of the crime."  Id.  In a murder case, the additional 
evidence "need only tend to show that the alleged victim is 
dead."  Id.  The victim in this case was clearly killed as a 
result of multiple gunshot wounds.  There is therefore no issue 
whether the crime of murder occurred.14  There was no error in 
the denial of the defendant's required finding motion. 
 
The defendant also argues that his motion to suppress 
evidence of his recorded telephone call with his brother, 
recorded in 2004 while he was a pretrial detainee in a Bristol 
County correctional facility, was improperly denied, and 
evidence of that recorded call should not have been admitted at 
trial.15  Specifically, he asserts that the subpoena was issued 
                     
 
14 Furthermore, even if evidence pointing to the accused's 
identity were to be required under this rule, the Commonwealth 
did provide some corroborating evidence potentially linking the 
defendant with the crime, including the baseball cap found at 
the crime scene that matched with the defendant's 
deoxyribonucleic acid, and the shell casing from Payne's car 
that matched the type of weapon used to shoot the victim. 
 
15 The table of contents in the defendant's brief contains a 
heading that contends that the recording violated the 
25 
 
in violation of the procedural requirements of Commonwealth v. 
Odgren, 455 Mass. 171 (2009).  See id. at 184-185 (Commonwealth 
must obtain judicial approval under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 [a] 
[2], 378 Mass. 885 [1979], before issuing subpoena requiring 
third party to produce telephone records in advance of trial). 
It is true that the procedural requirements spelled out in 
Odgren were not followed here -- Odgren had not been decided 
when the subpoena was served -- but as that case makes clear, 
suppression of evidence of recorded telephone calls such as the 
call at issue here is warranted only where the defendant can 
show that the erroneously issued subpoena caused him prejudice.  
See id. at 188-189.  See also Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 
827, 833 (1990). 
There was no prejudice shown here.  The Bristol County 
district attorney's office served a subpoena for the defendant's 
recorded telephone calls on the Bristol County sheriff on 
October 5, 2009, without seeking prior judicial approval.  On or 
about October 13, 2009, and in accordance with its policy, the 
sheriff's office delivered to the district attorney's office a 
copy of the recording of the defendant's telephone calls made in 
                                                                  
defendant's constitutional right to privacy, but the brief 
itself contains no argument on this point.  The defendant has 
waived the point.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 
367 Mass. 921 (1975).  In any event, there is no merit to his 
claim.  Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. 685, 688-693 
(2009). 
26 
 
November, 2004.  The defendant received a copy on October 7, 
2010.  The trial did not begin until a month later, a period of 
time that allowed the defendant and his counsel to prepare.16,17  
See Odgren, 455 Mass. at 188. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction is reversed, 
the verdict is set aside, and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
16 At the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence of the recorded telephone call, the judge offered a 
continuance to the defendant in order to provide more time to 
prepare, but the defendant did not accept the offer. 
 
17 The defendant makes no claim of prejudice on a 
substantive level -- e.g., a claim that if the Commonwealth had 
filed a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 (a) (2) seeking 
judicial approval to summons the recording of the telephone 
call, a judge might well have denied the motion on the ground 
that the materials sought were not "evidentiary and relevant."  
See Commonwealth. v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269-270 (2004) 
(citation omitted).  We have considered the issue, however, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The subpoena itself is not 
included in the record before us, but it appears from other 
record materials that the November, 2004, recordings were sought 
because the Commonwealth had information that these recorded 
conversations would include information relating to the 2004 
Lopes murder and may pertain to the issue of motive in 
connection with the victim's murder in 2005.  In these 
circumstances, the recordings would appear to be both 
evidentiary and relevant, and a motion for approval of a summons 
or subpoena for those records was highly likely to have been 
allowed. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Spina, J., joins).  In 
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 303 (2011) (Gants, J., 
concurring), I concurred with the court's conclusion "that the 
information in the electronic surveillance affidavit, while it 
provided probable cause to believe that the defendant had 
committed a murder and that the requested oral interceptions 
would provide evidence of the defendant's participation in the 
murder, did not provide the required reasonable suspicion that 
the murder was 'in connection with organized crime.'"  I wrote 
separately in that case to highlight that the legislative 
inclusion of five words in the statutory language in G. L. 
c. 272, § 99, "in connection with organized crime," "means that 
electronic surveillance is unavailable to investigate and 
prosecute the hundreds of shootings and killings committed by 
street gangs in Massachusetts, which are among the most 
difficult crimes to solve and prosecute using more traditional 
means of investigation."  Id. at 305.  I added, "If the 
Legislature wishes to avoid this result, it should amend § 99 to 
delete those words."  Id.  To date, no such amendment has been 
enacted. 
 
The reversal of the convictions in this case is a 
consequence of the inclusion of those five words.1  There is no 
                     
 
1 To be fair, even prompt legislative action to address this 
issue after the issuance of the opinion and concurrence in 
2 
 
reason to believe that the plague of retaliatory shootings by 
teenagers and young men belonging to street gangs that are not 
committed "in connection with organized crime" has materially 
abated since the concurrence in Tavares was issued, or that 
those shootings have become any easier to investigate or 
prosecute.  Nor is there any reason to believe that the 
consequence of those five words can be measured solely by the 
number of murder convictions that are reversed.  No doubt, for 
every conviction reversed on this ground, there are many more 
cases that are never indicted or that fall short of conviction 
because the evidence that may be obtained from oral 
interceptions, including those intercepted with one-party 
consent, cannot be obtained in compliance with § 99. 
 
I agree with the court's reasoning and its judgment, based 
on the language of § 99.  I concur only to reiterate that only 
the Legislature can change that language. 
                                                                  
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289 (2011), would not have 
prevented the reversal of the convictions in this case, because 
the one-party consent recording took place in 2009.