Case Title: State v. McNeil

Citation: 164 Vt 129, 665 A.2d 51

Docket Number: 94-436

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_MCNEIL.94-436; 164 Vt 129; 665 A.2d 51

[Filed 11-Aug-1995]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                   No. 94-436


State of Vermont                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.                                          
                                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Margaret McNeil                                  June Term, 1995


Alden T. Bryan, J.

       Scot Kline, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
  Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

       Francis X. Murray, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a
  charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), 23
  V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), and was granted an interlocutory appeal on the
  question of whether she was in control of the vehicle "on a highway" within
  the meaning of § 1201(a)(2).(FN1)   We answer that question in the negative.
    
       A dispatcher for the Yellow Cab Company in Burlington observed
  defendant's vehicle late at night in the parking lot where the company
  stores and maintains its cabs.  Notified by the dispatcher, a police
  officer arrived, observed signs consistent with intoxication, and processed
  defendant for DUI.  Defendant consented to a blood test, and her
  blood-alcohol content (BAC) registered .231%.  

 

       Defendant moved to dismiss claiming that the Yellow Cab parking lot
  was not a "highway" within the meaning of 23 V.S.A. §§ 4(13) & 1201(a). 
  The definition section, § 4(13), states "`Highway,' `road,' `public
  highway' or `public road' shall include all parts of any bridge, culvert,
  roadway, street, square, fairground or other place open temporarily or
  permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles, and shall include
  a way laid out under authority of law."  (Emphasis supplied.)  The court
  found that the parking lot was accessible to the adjoining city street
  through an opening, wide enough to allow one car to pass through, in a
  chain link fence.  On the fence are "no trespassing" signs.  The lot has a
  dirt surface.  The cab company treats the lot as private property for
  business invitees.(FN2)   In fact, it is used primarily by employees.  When
  vehicles not on cab company business are observed in the lot, the police
  are called, as in this case.  Based on these findings, the court concluded,
  "[W]e do not have a way that's open to the public."

       Despite its conclusion on public access,(FN3) the court concluded that
  defendant was in actual physical control of her vehicle on a highway,
  reasoning:

 

          Well, clearly the Legislature did not mean public
       access to be the determinative test.  The Court feels
       it's more appropriate to focus on the nature of the
       openness and define what general circulation of
       vehicles can mean.  This lot is open to vehicular
       traffic and given the public safety purpose behind the
       DUI statute and its reference to vehicles on a public
       highway, the Court does not believe that the
       Legislature intended a restrictive interpretation, that
       it intended a liberal interpretation so as to reach all
       reasonably anticipated places where vehicles under the
       control and operation of persons under the influence of
       alcohol might be. . . .

          And on the facts presented this morning, the Court
       will conclude that whether desired by the owner or not
       that the lot is open to the general circulation of
       vehicles and that the State can make a prima facie case
       that this lot was a highway as defined by the statute
       and so the motion to dismiss is denied.  

 (Emphasis supplied.)  The present appeal followed.

       Defendant argues that the Yellow Cab parking lot was not "open
  temporarily or permanently to public or general circulation of vehicles"
  within the meaning of 23 V.S.A. § 4(13).  We have long held that "highway,"
  as used in 23 V.S.A. § 1201, should be given a broad construction.  State
  v. Trucott, 145 Vt. 274, 283,