Case Title: SECHRIST v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
SECHRIST v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2001 WY 4523 P.3d 1138Case Number: 00-172Decided: 05/10/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

                                                   CATHY 
SECHRIST,                                                     

Appellant

(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel.,

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee

(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Donald 
L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Delicath.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
This 
appeal presents the sole issue of whether benefits should be denied to a 
claimant who proves that her depression is caused by a compensable physical 
injury as required by statute, but fails to have her diagnosing, licensed 
psychologist state aloud that the diagnosis is based upon the criteria of the 
most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders 
(DSM-IV) published by the American Psychiatric Association.  We hold that statements in the 
psychologist's evaluation, which is an exhibit in the record, satisfy the 
statute.  We reverse the district 
court's order affirming the denial of benefits and remand for entry of an order 
granting benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
Cathy Sechrist presents this issue for our review:

 

1.  Whether the Hearing Examiner erred in 
not affording the parties and their counsel an opportunity to address the ground 
upon which the case was decided.

 

Appellee 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) restates the issues 
as:

 

1.  Did the hearing examiner err in denying 
the appellant's claim for failure to establish every element of her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence?

 

2.  Did the hearing examiner err in denying 
the appellant's motion for reconsideration?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Cathy 
Sechrist sustained a compensable arm injury in the course of her employment on 
September 18, 1995.  She was given a 
nine percent whole body impairment and received a permanent partial disability 
award.  On October 6, 1998, the 
Division denied a claim for medical treatment of her abdomen and depression, 
stating that neither were related to the original work injury.  Sechrist requested a contested case 
hearing. In its disclosure statement, the Division specified that it was 
contesting that the depression was related to the original work injury and that 
the "injuries do not meet the definition of injury' as set forth in W.S. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)."  By deposition, 
Sechrist's treating general practitioner, Dr. Swedberg, eliminated any causation 
between other physical injuries and the 1995 physical injury, and the hearing 
examiner determined that the only issue left to be resolved was the causal 
relationship between her 1995 physical injury and her depression. 

 

[¶4]           
Dr. 
Swedberg and Sechrist's licensed treating psychologist, Jacques Herter, Ph.D., 
both testified by deposition that each had diagnosed her with depression.  Dr. Swedberg had treated her for it with 
antidepressants since November of 1995.  
Dr. Herter first saw Sechrist in May of 1996, for stress and anxiety 
related to chronic pain, and at that time, did not make a depression 
diagnosis.  In 1997, Sechrist was 
evaluated by Dr. Herter to see if she qualified for Social Security disability 
based on psychological and physical problems.  To perform a mental status evaluation, 
Dr. Herter administered two psychological tests, the Beck Depression and 
Hopelessness Inventory, and a mental status evaluation.  Based on those tests, Dr. Herter 
diagnosed her with major depression and recommended that she be placed under 
psychiatric and psychotherapy care and antidepressants continued.  When asked to explain what factors 
comprise the diagnosis of major depression, Dr. Herter detailed those factors 
and testified that Sechrist satisfied all of the requirements.  The exhibits attached to Dr. Herter's 
deposition included the 1997 psychological evaluation performed for Social 
Security.  That report's diagnostic 
impression identified the DSM-IV.  

 

[¶5]           
The 
hearing examiner issued an order denying benefits.  In the findings of fact for depression, 
the hearing examiner noted that Sechrist had the burden of proving her 
depression meets the definition of injury provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (Lexis 1999):

 

(xi)  "Injury" does not 
include:

            

            
* * *

(J) 
Any mental injury unless it is caused by a compensable physical injury, it 
occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the physical injury and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence, which shall include a diagnosis by 
a licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meeting criteria 
established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual 
of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association.  In no event shall benefits for a 
compensable mental injury be paid for more than six (6) months after an injured 
employee's physical injury has healed to the point that it is not reasonably 
expected to substantially improve.

 

The 
hearing examiner's findings of fact stated:

 

5.  Dr. Swedberg testified in his deposition 
that depression magnifies the pain syndrome and was related to the initial 
injury.  Exhibit 1, p. 13, line 16 
and p. 20 lines 4 and 18.

 

6.  Dr. Jacques P. Herter testified in his 
deposition that he diagnosed Sechrist with major depression which was caused by 
the persistence of pain in her elbow.  
Exhibit 2 P. 13 lines 9 and 20.

 

7.  Dr. Herter performed psychological 
evaluations of Sechrist on May 19, 1996 and June 25, 1997.  Dr. Herter indicated in the 1997 
evaluation that Sechrist is currently experiencing Major Depression and a Pain 
Disorder.  She has a high level of 
depression on the Beck Depression inventory.  Exhibit 2 Deposition Exhibit 
2.

 

8.  Sechrist has established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that depression is caused by her compensable 
physical injury, however she has failed to provide evidence that the diagnosis 
made by licensed psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist meets the 
criteria established in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric 
Association.

 

[¶6]           
Benefits 
were denied because the hearing examiner determined that Sechrist had not 
provided evidence that the diagnosis met the criteria of the manual for which 
the most recent edition is commonly referred to as the DSM-IV.  Sechrist requested a reconsideration and 
offered proof that Dr. Herter's diagnosis did meet the criteria established in 
the most recent edition of the manual, but the hearing examiner denied the 
motion on grounds that the evidence did not constitute newly discovered 
evidence.  The district court 
affirmed these denials, and this appeal followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard 
of Review

 

[¶7]           
Judicial 
review of agency action is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 
1999):

 

            
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

            
* * *

 

            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

            
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record 
of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 

General 
Chemical Corp. v. Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 346 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶8]           
Sechrist 
contends that the sole issue at the hearing was whether the depression was 
causally related to the work-related injury and whether the hearing examiner 
improperly denied benefits on another issue.  The Division contends that benefits were 
properly denied for failure to prove every element of the claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  We 
find that the issue on appeal is the proper interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(J), first enacted in 1994.  

 

[¶9]           
Before 
this provision's enactment, a worker could recover for mental injuries 
developing gradually without an accompanying physical injury.  In Re Summers, 987 P.2d 153, 155 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Graves v. Utah Power & Light Co., 713 P.2d 187, 
193 (Wyo. 1986)).  This provision 
now excludes from coverage "[a]ny mental injury unless it is caused by a 
compensable physical injury, it occurs subsequent to or simultaneously with, the 
physical injury * * *."   Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(J) (Lexis 1999).  Summers, 987 P.2d  at 155.  After the provision's enactment, we 
denied an equal protection challenge in Frantz v. Campbell County Memorial 
Hosp., 932 P.2d 750, 754 (Wyo. 1997).  
Although we have considered the equal protection challenge, we have not 
otherwise interpreted this provision.

 

[¶10]       
Our 
well-established rules of statutory interpretation were recently summarized to 
be:

 

We 
decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  This Court makes that determination as a 
matter of law.  If we determine that 
a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  In effectuating the plain 
language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.  We construe the statute 
as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia.  If, on the other hand, we determine that 
the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory 
construction to determine the legislature's intent.  

 

Prasad, 11 P.3d  
at 347.

 

[¶11]       
Subsection 
J is unambiguous and presents a question of fact whether the employee has shown 
by a preponderance of evidence that she has received a diagnosis satisfying the 
statute's specific requirements: a diagnosis by a licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist that meets the criteria for that mental disorder in the specified 
manual by the American Psychiatrists Association.  This burden of proof differs from the 
provision's requirement that the employee show by clear and convincing evidence 
that she has suffered a compensable mental injury caused by a compensable 
physical injury.  Here, the hearing 
examiner properly assigned a preponderance of the evidence standard to the 
question of fact whether the employee showed that her diagnosis had been made by 
the proper medical authority in accordance with the proper criteria.  

[¶12]   As our discussion of the statement 
of facts showed, the overwhelming weight of the evidence did establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Sechrist's depression was diagnosed by the 
proper authority in accordance with the criteria of the DSM-IV.  The hearing examiner's finding of fact 
that Sechrist had failed to provide this evidence is arbitrary and 
capricious.  The evidence did not 
indicate that the DSM-IV was the most recent edition of this particular 
publication, but the Division did not challenge it.  It is, therefore, a technicality, and it 
serves no purpose to deny benefits on a technicality.  In any event, the hearing examiner is 
entitled to take judicial notice of that fact.  See Heiss v. City of Casper Planning 
and Zoning Comm'n, 941 P.2d 27, 31 (Wyo. 1997) (capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned).  

[¶13]       
Our 
review of the record showed that Sechrist established by clear and convincing 
evidence that her depression is caused by her compensable physical injury, and 
the hearing examiner's finding on this issue is correct.  The Division does not challenge the 
accuracy of this finding, and we need not remand this case for further 
proceedings. Having met her burden, we reverse the order denying benefits and 
remand to the hearing examiner for entry of an order granting benefits. 

 

[¶14]       
This 
ruling is dispositive of the issues, and we need not consider Sechrist's claim 
that the Division failed to specifically challenge whether Dr. Herter's 
depression diagnosis met the criteria of the DSM-IV in its Final Determination 
letter, and the hearing examiner was therefore precluded from considering the 
issue.    The order 
denying benefits is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of an order 
granting benefits.