Case Title: Mattis v. Husky RMP Properties, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-9

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mattis v. Husky RMP Properties, Inc.1990 WY 44790 P.2d 1279Case Number: 89-9Decided: 04/27/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
HENRY MATTIS, 

PETITIONER 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

HUSKY RMP PROPERTIES, 
INC., A/K/A FRONTIER OIL AND REFINING COMPANY, RESPONDENT 
(EMPLOYER-OBJECTOR).

Appeal from the Workers' 
Compensation Hearing Examiner.

Robert T. Moxley 
of Gage & Moxley, Cheyenne, for petitioner.

Lawrence J. 
Wolfe and William L. Combs of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, for 
respondent.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
involves petitioner's, Henry Mattis' (Mattis), 1986 claim for worker's 
compensation benefits based on an environmental or occupational disease as 
distinguished from his 1983 claim for a trauma injury suffered when he was 
burned by hot asphalt during the course of his employment with the respondent, 
Husky RMP Properties, Inc. (Husky). We will address the authority of the hearing 
examiner to dismiss the occupational disease claim without benefit of a hearing 
on its merits. Mattis' appeal is taken from an order of the worker's 
compensation hearing examiner which denied his request for the appointment of a 
medical expert and dismissed his claim for occupational disease as barred by 
principles of res judicata. We reverse and remand with direction that Mattis be 
afforded an administrative agency hearing on the merits of his 
claim.

[¶2]      The chain of 
events which led to this appeal began on March 11, 1983 when Mattis was covered 
with hot tar which spewed onto him when an expansion joint on a pump broke at 
the Husky oil refinery in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Mattis suffered severe burn 
injuries and was provided worker's compensation benefits during his recovery. 
The matter proceeded routinely until Mattis filed a claim for medical treatment 
for an injury described as "numbness, neuropathy" on April 22, 1985. Husky 
objected to an award of benefits, asserting that the testing and treatment of 
Mattis did not relate to his 1983 injury. After hearing evidence on the matter 
on February 7, 1986, the district court noted that Mattis had failed to file a 
motion to reopen his case pursuant to W.S. 27-12-606. Nonetheless, the district 
court treated the case as if such a motion had been filed and addressed the 
claim on its merits. The district court found: "The evidence is simply too 
overwhelming from a medical standpoint that the claimant[']s asserted symptoms 
or complaints cannot be tied to the injury in question." An order to that effect 
was entered and a notice of appeal filed in the district court, but apparently 
the appeal was abandoned.

[¶3]      On August 20, 
1986, proceeding without assistance of counsel, Mattis filed a new claim for 
worker's compensation benefits. One of the documents attached to his claim was a 
diagnosis by Daniel T. Teitelbaum, M.D., dated June 6, 1986:

Thus it seems to me that 
the correct diagnosis at the present time are:

1. Toxic axonopathy, 
secondary to unknown components to which he was exposed to at work.

2. Cognitive loss 
secondary to one.

3. Partial neurogenic 
bladder and impotence secondary to one.

4. Reactive depression 
secondary to one.

Dr. Teitelbaum 
recommended that Mattis continue psychological and/or psychiatric treatment. 
Thus, it appears from the record that receipt of this constituted communication 
of the occupational disease to Mattis and his claim was filed well within the 
one year statute of limitations contained in W.S. 27-14-503.

[¶4]      On April 25, 
1988, the hearing examiner appointed counsel to represent Mattis in his 
occupational disease claim. On June 17, 1988, Mattis filed a motion for 
appointment of a toxicologist to serve as an expert witness on his behalf. All 
unpaid claims from Mattis' old case were transferred to the instant case by 
order dated May 6, 1988.1

[¶5]      On July 21, 1988, 
the hearing examiner entered an order denying Mattis' motion for appointment of 
the toxicologist. On August 19, 1988, Mattis filed a petition for review of the 
hearing examiner's decision in the district court. Upon joint motion of the 
parties, the matter was certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09 by 
order dated December 9, 1988. The petition for review was docketed in this court 
on January 17, 1989. The petition was first dismissed as not a final order, upon 
a motion of Husky, and then reinstated, upon motion of Mattis, with a remand to 
the hearing examiner for the limited purpose of clarification of his previous 
order. The matter appeared to be languishing before the hearing examiner and, on 
October 12, 1989, the parties were directed to report to this court concerning 
the remanded case. On October 16, 1989, the additional materials from the remand 
were docketed with this court and, on October 20, 1989, a briefing schedule was 
set. Mattis filed his brief on November 6, 1989 and Husky filed its brief on 
November 21, 1989. The case was argued before this court on February 20, 1990, 
and assigned for disposition on March 2, 1990.

[¶6]      The hearing 
examiner's final order dated July 21, 1988 denied Mattis' motion for appointment 
of the toxicologist and dismissed the occupational disease claim as res 
judicata. These factual findings and legal conclusions were made by application 
of Mattis' second claim to his earlier 1983 claim and resulting district court 
proceedings which involved the trauma injury. We need not tarry long with these 
decisions of the hearing examiner because it is clear from the governing 
statute, case law, and facts asserted in the claim that Mattis is seeking 
compensation for an occupational disease, allegedly caused by his employment 
with Husky, that is unrelated to the asphalt burn injury that occurred in 1983. 
W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b), and its predecessors, identify two distinct types of 
claims: (a) claims resulting from a single brief occurrence (e.g., the asphalt 
burn injury); and (b) injuries that occur over a substantial period of time 
(e.g., Mattis' assertion of neuropathy). The former is not related to the latter 
and cannot serve as a disposition that makes the occupational disease claim res 
judicata. See, generally, Matter of Injury to Van Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120 (Wyo. 
1987); Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo. 1985); and 1B Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 41 (1985).

[¶7]      Moreover, the 
hearing examiner's summary disposition of this case violates our recently 
enunciated rule that where a worker's claim states a prima facie case for 
benefits, a hearing must be held. Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1990). Appointment of a health care 
provider to give testimony at the required hearing will be governed by W.S. 
27-14-604 and our cases construing that statute. We cannot, and need not, decide 
that issue on the record now provided.

[¶8]      The order of the 
hearing examiner dismissing Mattis' claim is reversed and remanded for a hearing 
in conformity with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 On April 19, 1988, the 
following stipulation, which had been entered into by Mattis and the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, was filed in the record:

COMES NOW the parties by 
and through their respective counsel and show the Court:

1. That on or about March 
16, 1988, the above-styled case was opened by the filing of an Employee's Report 
of Occupational Disease.

2. That a previous case 
involving the same Claimant and employer, * * *, involved claims for benefits by 
reason of the Claimant suffering extensive asphalt burns in a work-related 
accident * * *.

3. That various medical 
claims presented in the prior case involved a complex of symptoms not related to 
the burn trauma, e.g. problems with neuropathy, impotence and other physical 
problems of unknown etiology at the time of presentation of the 
claims.

4. That the claimant's 
position is that said unpaid claims are related to the Occupational Disease 
diagnosis claimed herein, to-wit toxic axonopathy, such that the claims should 
be transferred to the above-styled case from the old case for the purpose of 
investigation, evaluation and admission of the claimant to such benefits as are 
proper under the Worker's Compensation Act.

5. That the previously 
filed Motion for Transfer of Claims is rendered moot by this 
Stipulation.

6. That the injured 
Worker's Claim herein should be taken as a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits, presently objected-to by the division, such that this case should be 
docketed as a contested case in the office of the Hearing Examiner.

7. That pending 
investigation the case is not ripe for trial.

WHEREFORE, IT IS, HEREBY 
STIPULATED that an Order should enter causing the Division to transfer unpaid 
medical claims to this case from the prior case * * *, without prejudice to the 
Division or the employer to litigate the right to benefits based upon the said 
claims, and that this case should be docketed as a contested case pending 
investigation.