Case Title: State v. Long

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-26-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Defendant lived with her mother, Mabel Long, in Avon, New Jersey. Her friend Tracey Roche lived with her mother, Irene, in Hillsborough. On August 27, 1998, defendant called Tracey to cancel a lunch date. At that time, Irene overheard Tracey exclaim, Oh my God and Was she hurt? After hanging up, Tracey told Irene that defendant called to cancel their lunch date because Mabel had fallen down the stairs. The next day, August 28, Tracey called defendant to inform her that Mabel had died. Again, Irene was in the vicinity, overheard the conversation, and was told by Tracey that Mabel had died. On Saturday, August 29, Tracey and defendant made plans to have lunch the following day. On August 30, at 8:28 a.m., Avon police responded to a 911 call from defendant s residence requesting an ambulance for an elderly woman who had fallen down the stairs. Upon arrival, police found Mabel alive but injured. Mabel was taken to the hospital where she died later that day. Later that morning, defendant telephoned Tracey to advise her that she would be late for their lunch date, but did not say anything about that morning s events. Tracey left her house for the lunch date at about 12:45 p.m. and Irene never heard from her daughter again. On September 9, 1998, Tracey s car was found in Ocean Grove by Neptune Township Police and in the car police found Tracey s badly decomposed body. Tracey s death was determined to be a homicide. Stains found on defendant s driveway tested positive for blood. With search warrant in hand, police discovered additional bloodstains in defendant s residence and DNA tests revealed that the blood came from Tracey. On January 10, 2000, defendant was indicted for the death of Tracey Roche. The State filed a motion in limine seeking to use at trial the statements made by Tracey to Irene, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). The State sought to use these statements to establish defendant s motive for killing Tracey; to eliminate the chance that Tracey would implicate defendant in Mabel s death. The State argued that, though hearsay, the statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). Defendant argued that the statements were not admissible because they were evidence of other crimes or wrongs that tended to show disposition to commit the charged offense and should be excluded under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The trial court held, in part, that Tracey s statements to Irene that Mabel had fallen on August 27, 1998, and that she died on August 28, 1998, were other crimes evidence and inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Relying in part on State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), the court held that the prejudice far outweighed the probative value of the proffered evidence. The Appellate Division denied the State s motion for leave to appeal. This Court granted the State s motion for leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division to hear the appeal on the merits. On remand, the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division s order in an unpublished opinion, agreeing that the prejudice to defendant outweighed its uncertain probative value. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification. HELD: Tracey s statements to Irene concerning what defendant had told Tracey are part of the res gestae of Tracey s murder; they satisfy the state of mind exception, are not other-crime evidence, and are admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). In addition, the statements are admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), and satisfy the probative value prejudicial impact analysis under Cofield. 1. The hearsay rule applies when a declaration is offered to prove the truth of the statement attributed to the declarant. Hearsay evidence can be admitted only pursuant to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Whether either or both of Tracey s statements are hearsay depend on the State s intended use of them and who will present that testimony at the trial. Although the statements are not being presented to prove the truth of the matter, since it is undisputed that Mabel did not die until August 30, the State must still rely on hearsay to prove that defendant actually made the two reputed statements to Tracey. The statements must therefore be treated as hearsay. Although the statements do not fit neatly into any one exception to the hearsay rule, we conclude that they are part of the res gestae of Tracey s murder, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3), that is, evidence of her state of mind, and that the excited utterance nature of the two statements help to corroborate their trustworthiness, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). (Pp. 16-27) 2. The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), requires that (1) there was a startling event, (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement from that event, and (3) the statement related to that event. Viewing defendant as the declarant when she made the statements to Tracey, the record does not satisfy the standard established under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). Since defendant deliberately fabricated both statements, they were not in fact made under any stress related to the occurrence of a startling event. However, to the extent that the admissibility of those statements turns on Tracey s mental state at the time she told Irene what defendant had said to her about Mabel s fall and death, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) has been satisfied. (Pp. 27-31) 3 Defendant s statements are admissible to establish defendant s motive for murdering Tracey. Because the motive evidence is not being admitted as other-crime evidence, there is no need to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis. However, both res gestae evidence and evidence admissible pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule are subject to Rule 403 balancing, the purpose of which is to determine whether the risk of prejudice to defendant in admitting the motive evidence outweighs its probative worth. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), established a four-prong test to determine when other-crime and civil-wrong evidence is inadmissible. The fourth prong incorporates the traditional probative/prejudicial balancing test of Rule 403 and although the emphasis will not be on defendant s criminal responsibility for Mabel s death, that evidence will likely raise a suggestion or an inference in the minds of jurors regarding defendant s culpability for her mother s death. For that reason, the probative value-prejudicial impact analysis under Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) are the same. Although this Court has imposed a stringent standard for the admission of other-crime evidence, our courts have not frequently excluded highly prejudicial evidence under the fourth prong of Cofield, in particular when the probative value of the evidence is enhanced by the absence of other less inflammatory evidence, as is the case here. The fourth prong of the Cofield test is satisfied. (Pp. 31-39) 4. Generally no limiting instruction is necessary insofar as res gestae evidence is concerned. In this case, however, a limiting instruction is appropriate because both the res gestae and the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule are applicable. A limiting instruction would also ensure that the prosecutor does not use the motive evidence improperly during summation. (P. 39) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for trial. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ concurring, in which JUSTICE LONG joins, is of the opinion that the res gestae principle remains a useful interpretive tool when tethered to specific Evidence Rules. JUSTICE STEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagrees with the majority s use of the phrase res gestae, characterizing it as archaic, and is not persuaded that the victim s reaction to defendant s phone calls appropriately can be characterized as an excited utterance. JUSTICES VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN s opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ filed a separate concurring opinion in which JUSTICE LONG joins. JUSTICE STEIN filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROLE LONG, Defendant-Respondent. Argued February 25, 2002 -- Decided July 15, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Monmouth County. Richard E. Incremona, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (John A. Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Mary R. Juliano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Kelly S. Anderson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Lisa Sarnoff Gochman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. The critical issue in this appeal is whether extra-judicial declarations made by an accused prior to the commission of a murder are hearsay, and if so, whether they are admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule to prove defendant s motive for killing the victim where the declarations imply that defendant was involved in another death that the medical examiner has not classified as a homicide and for which defendant has not been charged. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division analyzed the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence and concluded that it was not admissible because its use carried a risk of prejudice and confusion that outweigh[ed] its uncertain probative value. We reverse. Accordingly, I m not going to allow any reference to the motive evidence that [defendant] killed Tracey Roche to cover up the murder of Mabel Long. The Appellate Division denied the State s motion for leave to appeal the court s order. This Court granted the State s motion for leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division to hear the appeal on the merits. 167 N.J. 83 (2001). On remand, the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division s order in an unpublished opinion. The court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the inflammatory nature of Irene s proposed testimony and its use carried a risk of prejudice and confusion that outweighs its uncertain probative value. The Appellate Division relied on the fact that [d]efendant has not been charged with murdering her mother, and the medical examiner has not determined the death to be a homicide. It reasoned that [t]he proposed testimony raises issues of prejudice and potential jury confusion to a degree that a proper limiting instruction is hard to fathom. The State again sought leave to appeal to this Court. We granted the State s application, 170 N.J. 202 (2001), and now reverse. A. [Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 312 (1949).] Thus, [i]t may be regarded as long since settled in this State that a person s own statements of a present existing state of mind, when made in a natural manner and under circumstances dispelling suspicion and involving no suggestion of sinister or improper motives, reflect his mental state and are competent to prove the condition of his mind that is, his plan or design. State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 390 (1962). The rule . . . is that where the declaration is concomitant with the main fact under consideration and is so connected with it as to illustrate its character, it may be proved as part of the res gestae; but, where it is merely narrative of a past occurrence, it cannot be received as proof of the character of that occurrence. Blackman v. W. Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 68 N.J.L. 1, 2 (Sup. Ct. 1902). In some cases, courts focused narrowly on whether the declaration was spontaneous, exclamatory and contemporaneous, and refused to admit declarations that were not uttered coincidentally with the happening of an event. E.g., State v. Simmons, 52 N.J. 538, 542 (1968) (holding that rape victim s identification of attacker was admissible as either res gestae or spontaneous declaration because victim was still in a state of excitement ), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 924, 89 S. Ct. 1779, 23 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1969); State v. De Paola, 5 N.J. 1, 15 (1950) (stating that [t]o be admissible as part of the res gestae the statement must have been made spontaneously under conditions such as to preclude calm reflection and eliminate any opportunity for composing a self-serving declaration ). However, this Court noted in Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 502 (1971), that in more recent times the res gestae concept has been considerably broadened and the requirement for strict contemporaneity has been modified. Now evidence of declarations made under the immediate influence of the principal transaction or occurrence is admissible. They need not be concomitant or coincident with the exciting stimulus; they may be subsequent providing that in the light of all the circumstances it may be said reasonably that the exciting influence had not lost its sway or had not been dissipated in the interval. [(Citation omitted).] Under this modern trend, our courts have admitted evidence as part of the res gestae because of the connection between the evidence and the crime for which a defendant is charged even where there is an interval of time between the occurrence and the declaration to which it relates and even in factual situations that pose a risk of prejudice to the defendant. In the capital case of State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995), we held that the defendant s threats against the victim s spouse and the theft of the victim s car were part and parcel of a kidnapping rather than other-crime evidence. The defendant s actions serve[d] to paint a complete picture of the relevant criminal transaction and therefore were admissible. Id. at 242. Further, a limiting instruction was unnecessary because the evidence was admitted under the res gestae exception. Ibid. Similarly, in State v. Cherry, 289 N.J. Super. 503, 522 (App. Div. 1995), evidence that the defendant and two other men planned to rob a bar shortly before a police officer was murdered outside the bar was admitted as part of the res gestae of the murder. The court held that [e]vidence of events that take place during the same time frame as the crime charged in the indictment will not be excluded if the evidence establishes the context of the criminal event, explains the nature of, or presents the full picture of the crime to the jury. Ibid. Accord State v. L.P., supra, 338 N.J. Super. at 236 (stating that evidence is admissible as res gestae of criminal event if it involves an identifiable, overriding objective that ties together disparate conduct ); State v. Torres, 313 N.J. Super. 129, 160-61 (App. Div.) (holding that testimony that defendant sold jewelry in exchange for cash and cocaine and tried to bribe corrections officers with cash and jewelry was res gestae evidence necessary to establish full nature of robbery of jewelry store, not other-crime evidence), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 425 (1998); see also State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 246 (E. & A. 1922) (holding that defendant s statement that he killed his wife and son was admissible as part of res gestae because it was made immediately after and was connected to act); State v. Overton, 85 N.J.L. 287, 291 (E. & A. 1913) (holding that evidence that defendant did not want to marry wife and did so only after he was arrested on bastardy charge was part of res gestae and relevant to defendant s motive to kill her). The res gestae or state of mind exception can be used to prove or explain acts or conduct of a defendant-declarant. Such statements of a defendant-declarant are admissible because they are so connected with an act, itself admissible as part of the res gestae, as to have become incorporated with it. Hunter v. State, supra, 40 N.J.L. at 537. Here, Tracey had no sinister reason to fabricate the statements and she reported them to her mother almost contemporaneously as she heard them over the telephone. Those circumstances enhance the trustworthiness of the statements. In addition, it was natural for Tracey to tell Irene that defendant had just said that Mabel had fallen down the stairs and died because Tracey and defendant had been friends for a long time. Moreover, the time between when the statements were made by defendant to Tracey and the time of Tracey s death was less than seventy-two hours. To summarize, a review of our case law reveals a sound justification to admit into evidence the extra-judicial declarations made by defendant. Declarations . . . by the accused prior to the criminal event . . . are admitted notwithstanding their hearsay character . . . . [because] the behavior of . . . the defendant [is] part of the mosaic of the criminal event, and hence, insofar as [the defendant s] declarations bear upon either the quality of [the defendant s] acts or a relevant state of mind, [the declarations] must be accepted as part and parcel of the critical scene. [State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 394, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 980, 87 S. Ct. 527, 17 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1966).] Such declarations are deemed to be an integral part of the criminal scene because they bear on the quality of the defendant s act or his or her intent or motive. Ibid. Contrary to the trial court s conclusion that the two statements are other-crime evidence, a conclusion that was not addressed by the Appellate Division, we hold that the statements are part of the res gestae of Tracey s murder; they satisfy the state of mind exception and are not other-crime evidence. As such, the statements are admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). Proof of defendant s motive to kill Tracey establishes the context of the criminal event and assists in presenting the full picture of the crime to the jury. State v. Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 242. Those statements are woven into the fabric of the . . . crime, and [are] inseparable from Tracey s subsequent death. State v. Mule, 114 N.J.L. 384, 392 (E. & A. 1935). The declarations were made by defendant prior to the murder of Tracey and should be admitted as res gestae evidence because they are part of the mosaic of the criminal event. State v. Baldwin, supra, 47 N.J. at 394. 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [State v. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338 (citation omitted).] [T]he balancing test of Cofield s fourth prong . . . incorporates the traditional balancing test of Rule 403. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 127 (2001). That prong requires the State to establish that the probative value of the statements made by defendant to Tracey are not outweighed by its apparent prejudice. Whether the proffered evidence of defendant s motive for murdering Tracey is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on defendant must be pragmatically evaluated in the context in which that evidence [will be] offered. State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 491 (1997); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 303 (1989). Historically, motive evidence has been treated differently by our courts even under a Rule 404(b) analysis: New Jersey courts generally admit a wider range of evidence when the motive or intent of the accused is material. That includes evidentiary circumstances that tend to shed light on a defendant s motive and intent or which tend to fairly explain [a defendant s] actions, even though they may have occurred before the commission of the offense [for which the defendant is on trial]. [State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565 (1999) (citing and quoting State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228 (1955)).] Although this Court has imposed a stringent standard for the admission of other-crime evidence, our courts have not frequently excluded highly prejudicial evidence under the fourth prong of Cofield. In State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 452 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001), a capital case involving the felony murder of a gas station attendant, the State was permitted to introduce testimony that the defendant and a co-defendant had planned to rob a bank or another gas station prior to the murder for which they were on trial. That evidence was introduced to prove the defendant s state of mind. Ibid. In State v. Marrero, supra, 148 N.J. at 490-91, evidence that the defendant was awaiting sentencing on an earlier sexual assault was admissible to establish a motive for killing a subsequent aggravated-sexual-assault victim to avoid an enhanced prison term on the first assault. In State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376, 388-90 (1997), we held that evidence that the defendant was jealous of the victim was admissible to prove his motive for murder. In State v. Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 339-42, another capital case, this Court did not find too prejudicial evidence that defendant had made threats against the murdered victim s wife prior to the murder. In State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 130-31 (1991), another capital case, the State was allowed to introduce evidence of a prior eleven-year old murder to establish motive, namely that the defendant killed the victim to prevent her from causing a revocation of his parole from his sentence on the earlier conviction. This Court allowed the use of that evidence as necessary to prove the State s theory of [the] defendant s motive. Id. at 131. The Appellate Division has rendered similar holdings. E.g., State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219, 231-36 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that evidence of defendant s earlier abuse of her child was admissible to show intent and prejudice did not outweigh probative value); State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452, 464-67 (App. Div.) (holding that evidence defendant had sexually assaulted three six-year old girls was admissible to establish motive, intent and absence of mistake in subsequent trial for aggravated assault on eight-year old girl), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 54 (1987). Notwithstanding the fact that the Appellate Division found the risk of undue prejudice high in this case, the State argues that any evidence which logically tends to show a motive, or which fairly tends to explain the conduct of the accused, should be permitted, and evidence as to motive is admissible even though it may be prejudicial in the sense that it will arouse or inflame the jury against the defendant. State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 102, 106 (1982) (quoting 1 Wharton on Criminal Evidence 170, at 316-18 (13th ed. 1972)). Evidence claimed to be unduly prejudicial is excluded only when its probative value is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the issues in the case. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 486 (2001) (quoting State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971)). The mere possibility that evidence could be prejudicial does not justify its exclusion. State v. Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 453-54. Certainly, the motive evidence sought to be introduced in this case is, at the very least, no more prejudicial than the objectionable evidence permitted in cases such as Morton, Marrero, Nance, Martini, Erazo, T.C. and Cusick. Furthermore, certain types of evidence, including evidence of motive or intent, require a very strong showing of prejudice to justify exclusion. State v. Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 486 (quoting State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570). In deciding whether to exclude evidence based on its potential for prejudice, a court must consider the availability of other evidence that can be used to prove the same point. State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 569. Probative value is enhanced by the absence of such other evidence. Ibid.; State v. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 303 (requiring trial courts to consider whether other evidence can serve same purpose for which other-crime evidence is proffered). On the other hand, relevant evidence loses some of its probative value if there is other less inflammatory evidence available to prove that point. State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 569; State v. Chavies, supra, 345 N.J. Super. at 273-74 (finding that portions of murder victim s diary about her pregnancy and defendant s illegal use of her credit cards was highly prejudicial and should not have been admitted because other less prejudicial evidence existed to demonstrate same facts). We acknowledge that the introduction of defendant s statements will likely create some prejudice, but the evidence regarding motive has extremely high probative value. That high probative value and the absence of any other source to establish motive must be weighed pragmatically against the reality that [v]irtually any evidence of other crimes will probably entail some risk of prejudice to a defendant. State v. Mazowski, 337 N.J. Super. 275, 287 (App. Div. 2001). Similarly, [t]hat evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof. The unwholesome aspects, authored by defendant himself [or herself], if the evidence be believed, [is admissible if] inextricably entwined with the material facts. State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335 (1959). Our conclusion that the motive evidence should not be excluded under Rule 403 is influenced by the fact that there is no other less prejudicial evidence available to establish defendant s motive for killing her friend. The absence of less prejudicial evidence to establish motive enhances the probative value of the motive evidence because it is necessary to prove the State s theory of defendant s motive, State v. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 131, for murdering a friend when the surrounding circumstances of the crime make it difficult to infer a motive. In arguing against the admissibility of the motive evidence, defendant points out that she has never been charged for any crime relating to the death of Mabel Long, and the cause of her death remains undetermined. Those same arguments also have the potential of reducing the prejudice to defendant. We hold that the fourth prong of the Cofield test has been satisfied and that Irene Roche can testify regarding statements made by defendant to Tracey Roche on August 26 and 27 regarding Mabel Long s fall and her death. Notwithstanding the fact that generally no limiting instruction is necessary insofar as res gestae evidence is concerned, State v. Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 242, we direct the trial court to give the jury an appropriate instruction limiting the use of the motive evidence because this case involves both the res gestae and the excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. In addition, a limiting instruction helps to ensure that the prosecutor does not use the motive evidence improperly during summation. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROLE LONG, Defendant-Respondent. PORITZ, C.J., concurring. Like my colleagues, I would admit the statements made by defendant to Tracey on August 27 and 28 under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) and (3). I write separately to note that although the res gestae principle, standing alone, has been discredited by scholars as a basis to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, where, as here, its use is tethered to specific Evidence Rules, it remains a useful interpretive tool. Justice Long joins in this concurrence. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROLE LONG, Defendant-Respondent. STEIN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I join in the Court s determination that the August 27 and August 28 statements made by defendant to Tracey are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). However, I disagree with the majority s use of the archaic, catch-all phrase res gestae to describe an exception to the hearsay rule that has been codified precisely under our evidence rules. See footnote 1 Moreover, I am not persuaded by this record that the victim s reaction to defendant s August 27 and August 28 phone calls appropriately can be characterized as an excited utterance. Res gestae, the Latin phrase meaning things done, can be used to refer to the events surrounding the issue being litigated, or other events contemporaneous with them. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999). The phrase may have made its first appearance as early as 1637 [but] was not in common use until the early nineteenth century. Chris Blair, Let s say Good-bye to Res Gestae, 33 Tulsa L.J. 349, 349 (1997). Although the phrase initially developed as an exception to the hearsay rule for statements [that] were associated with the happening of the principal litigated event, such as a murder, a collision, or a trespass, eventually it seemed to embody the notion that evidence of any concededly relevant act or condition might also bring in the words which accompanied it. " Id. at 349-50. Over the years the res gestae exception has evolved into several different exceptions, including the present sense impressions, excited utterances, and statements of then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition . . .[or] words that we now would refer to as verbal acts or verbal parts of acts. Id. at 350. Res gestae also has been used to explain the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct. Ibid. Although not admissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with his character, uncharged misconduct evidence can be used where the uncharged misconduct was a part of a single criminal episode and [] the jurors could not adequately evaluate the charged crime without the contextual evidence provided by the uncharged misconduct. Id. at 350-51. Use of the res gestae term has been criticized by commentators who find the term to be archaic and largely superseded by specific exceptions set forth in the evidence rules. One commentary has described res gestae as a confusing and much discredited common law concept that once served as a substitute for reasoning and careful analysis. Virginia M. Klemme & Dennis D. Prater, Res Gestae Raises Its Ugly Head, 65 J. Kans. Bar Ass n 24, 27 (1996). Yet another discusses how the phrase has outlived its usefulness: Although the phrase may have played some beneficial role in the development of the law of hearsay and uncharged misconduct evidence, it has been widely criticized for being useless and harmful. It is useless because the concepts included within res gestae can all be explained by reference to other more refined principles of evidence law. It is harmful because it causes confusion of evidentiary principles and acts as a deterrence to principled analysis of evidentiary concepts. NO. A-26 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAROLE LONG, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 15, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Coleman CONCURRING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Stein