Patent Publication Number: US-2019174368-A1

Title: Security handling for network slices in cellular networks

Description:
FIELD 
     The subject matter described herein relates wireless mobility. 
     BACKGROUND 
     As the next generation of cellular wireless evolves, deployments in 5G may see a variety of wireless deployments. In addition to cellular and smart phones, consumer electronics, home automation, smart sensors/internet of things, transportation, and the like may all use the 5G network in different ways and have different requirements. Moreover, the network may include macro base stations with small cell base stations deployed within those macro base stations. In view of this 5G evolution, network slices may be used. The phrase “network slice” refers to a logical, or virtual, network layered on the cellular network. Network slices may provide multiple, independent, and dedicated logical end-to-end networks that may be created within a given network infrastructure to run services which may have different requirements with respect to latency, reliability, throughput, mobility, and/or the like. For example, a network slice may provide a dedicated, logical end-to-end network for a car manufacturer to enable communications with its cars, or may provide a dedicated, logical end-to-end network for the car manufacturer to communicate with interne of things (IoT) devices used in a manufacturing facility during a manufacturing process. The network slice may be setup and operated by an administrator, such as a service provider, although other entities may setup the network slice as well. 
     SUMMARY 
     Methods and apparatus, including computer program products, are provided for mobility. 
     In some example embodiments, there may be provided a method that includes determining whether to handover to a target base station, the determining based on whether a security level of the target base station satisfies a security threshold; enabling a relocation of a packet data convergence protocol entity to enable ciphering a tunnel to a user equipment, when the security level satisfies the security threshold; and inhibiting the relocation of the packet data convergence protocol entity to inhibit ciphering a tunnel to the user equipment, when the security level does not satisfy the security threshold. 
     In some variations, one or more of the features disclosed herein including the following features can optionally be included in any feasible combination. The relocated packet data convergence protocol entity may enable the establishment of a secure session to the user equipment and/or a secure connection to the user equipment by at least enabling the relocation of ciphering information to the target base station. The inhibiting may further include relocating, to the target base station, at least a radio link protocol, a media access control protocol, and/or a radio link control protocol. The inhibiting may further include relocating, to a third node, at least the packet data convergence protocol entity, wherein the third node satisfies the security threshold and relocating, to the target base station, at least a radio link protocol, a media access control protocol, and/or a radio link control protocol. The third node may include a third base station and/or a secure node implemented in a network. The determining may be performed in response to receiving a measurement report from the user equipment. The security of at least one neighboring base station including the target base station may be received. The security threshold may be specific to a network slice to the user equipment and/or predetermined for a plurality of base stations including the target base station. The security level of the at least one neighboring base station may be received via a broadcast, received from a core network node, and/or received during an instantiation of a network slice to the user equipment. The security level may be obtained from subscription information for a network slice to the user equipment. 
     The above-noted aspects and features may be implemented in systems, apparatus, methods, and/or articles depending on the desired configuration. The details of one or more variations of the subject matter described herein are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Features and advantages of the subject matter described herein will be apparent from the description and drawings, and from the claims. 
    
    
     
       DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS 
       In the drawings, 
         FIGS. 1A-1B  depicts an example of the PDCP not being relocated during a handover, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 2  depicts a signaling diagram for providing a base station with neighboring base station security information, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 3  depicts a signaling diagram for relocating the PDCP to a target base station, when the target base station is able to meet certain security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIGS. 4A-4B  depicts an example of the PDCP being relocated during a handover, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 5A  depicts a signaling diagram showing the PDCP not being relocated to the target base station, when the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 5B  depicts the PDCP remaining at the source base station while the lower layer protocols are relocated to the target base station, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 6A-6B  depict the target base station before and after a handover in which the PDCP is not relocated to the target base station but the radio link is relocated, when the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 7  depicts a signaling diagram showing the PDCP being relocated to a third node rather than the target base station, when the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 8A-8B  depict the target base station before and after a handover in which the PDCP is not relocated to the target base station but the radio link is relocated to the target base station while the PDCP is relocated to a third node, when the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 9  depicts an example system including a service node to provide a secure node for PDCP relocation during a handover when the target base station cannot satisfy the security level needed for a network slice, in accordance with some example embodiments; 
         FIG. 10  depicts an example of an over-the-top tunnel via a ciphering entity, in accordance with some example embodiments; and 
         FIG. 11  depicts an example of an apparatus, in accordance with some example embodiments. 
     
    
    
     Like labels are used to refer to same or similar items in the drawings. 
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     In some example embodiments, cryptographic isolation may be provided between network slices in networks, such as 5G and/or other types of networks, and, more particularly, the interaction of the network slices, security, and radio access network. 
     Network slices may carry sensitive or confidential information, in which case the network slice may need to be isolated and independent from other network slices used by other entities, such as tenants sharing a portion of the infrastructure (for example, cloud, network, radio access network, and/or the like). Moreover, different network slices may have different security requirements according to the use case for which the network slice is instantiated. This can range from use cases such as mobile broadband (in which conventional security requirements may be sufficient) to use cases in industrial and sensitive areas (in which very strict requirements on physical security as well as integrity and ciphering may be implemented). To illustrate further, fixed networks and wireless network equipment, such as macro and small cell base stations) may be exposed to different types of security threats, often depending on for example the physical deployment environment. Moreover, wireless network equipment in, or under the control of, network operator premises may be generally considered secure (depending on for example the level of physical security at the premises to prevent tampering with the wireless network equipment). However, wireless network equipment installed outdoors (for example, on a roof or on a mast) and/or beyond physical/perimeter security may be considered more vulnerable to tampering and security threats. These differences in the security level of devices may be seen in other devices/nodes and/or lower-layer wireless functions as well. Moreover, these differences may be seen more frequently with the proliferation of small cells, which may be installed in locations with little physical security as well as locations without or outside safeguards to prevent tampering. As such, different nodes of a mobile network may have different levels of security. 
     In some cases, the security requirements may prohibit the use of certain network nodes that are vulnerable and thus under a possible threat of tampering. This may mean that in practice certain devices or network nodes cannot be used by a user equipment, such as a cellular phone, smart phone, tablet, and/or other wireless device. In the case of evolved Node B (eNB) type base stations for example, security related functions such as ciphering and integrity protection in the packet data convergence (PDCP) layer may not be used in a base station having a relatively low security level (for example, vulnerable to tampering, outside a protected physical security area, and/or the like). The PDCP protocol may be specified by standard, such as TS 25.323 and/or TS 36.323. PDCP may provide, as part of the control plane and/or user plane, services such as ciphering and integrity protection between for example a network node (for example, a base station) and a user equipment (over for example the Uu interface). 
     When there is a handover, the PDCP layer of a radio bearer may need to be relocated to a target base station. However, if the target base station cannot satisfy a certain level of security, then in accordance with some example embodiments, the PDCP layer (or portion thereof) may not be relocated to the target base station. 
       FIG. 1A  depicts an example system  100  including a user equipment  120 , such as a cellular phone, a smart phone, and/or other wireless device, coupled to a source base station (labeled eNB1)  110 A and the core network  130 . The user equipment  120  may send a measurement report to base station  110 A indicating that a handover might be needed to a target base station (labeled eNB2)  110 B. While the source base station  110 A may satisfy the security requirements of the network slice (as shown for example by “security level 1”), the target base station  110 B may not be able to satisfy the security requirements of the network slice as the network slice in the example requires security level 1 and the target base station  110 B cannot satisfy the security level with a lower “security level 3.” As such, the PDCP layer (of the data radio bearer managed by the network slice) may not be relocated to the second base station  110 B as shown at  FIG. 1B  at  115  (showing crossbars across the PDCP). 
     Although some of the examples herein refer to eNB type base stations, other types of base stations, including 5G base stations, femtocell base stations, home eNB base station, picocell base station, and/or other wireless access points may be used as well. Moreover, although some of the examples refer to relocating security (for example, ciphering and/or integrity protection) as part of the PDCP protocol, protocols other than PDCP may be used as well. Furthermore, although some of the examples herein refer to network slices, the examples described herein may be utilized in connection with other services that do not implement network slices as well. 
     In some example embodiments, the base station, such as an eNB type base station, including the radio resource control function may be aware of the security level of the neighboring base stations. As such, when a user equipment moves and needs to perform handover between from a source base station to a target base station, the network may, in some example embodiments, check whether the PDCP (or portion thereof) can be relocated to the target base station (for example, by determining whether the target base station can fulfill the requirements in term of security). 
     In some example embodiments, if the target base station can fulfill the security requirements, the PDCP layer, or portion thereof, may be relocated to the target location 
     In some example embodiments, if the target base station cannot fulfill the security requirements, the PDCP layer stays in its current location. However, some if not all of the sublayers below PDCP in the radio protocol stack may, in accordance with some example embodiments, be relocated to the target base station. 
     In some example embodiments, if the target base station cannot fulfill the security requirements, the PDCP layer may be relocated to another, third network node (for example, a third base station) that fulfills the security requirements while portions of the lower layers may be relocated to the target base station. 
     In some example embodiments, if the target base station cannot fulfill the security requirements, a specific network node (for example, a virtualized network entity in a cloud-computing environment) may be implemented so that the network node has sufficient security so that the ciphering associated with the PDCP may be relocated to that specific network node. For example, the network node may be implemented in a secure area, and may include the PDCP protocol layer and/or other functions, such as a control plane function. Alternatively or additionally, the network node may be implemented securely in the network, such as a cloud, in a virtual machine configured to provide the PDCP protocol layer and/or other functions, such as a control plane function. Alternatively or additionally, the network node may include the PDCP protocol layer and/or certain lower other functions, such as the ability to connect to the core network and/or other neighboring base stations but not the ability to control radio. 
     In some example embodiments, an over-the-top tunnel may be established on-demand between a secure network entity in the radio access network (for example, in a secure edge cloud) and the user equipment, when a handover is requested towards a target base station that cannot fulfill the security requirements. This tunnel may be closed when the user equipment moves again into the coverage of a base station that can fulfill the security requirements. The tunnel end-point on the network side may be logically located between the radio access network-core network interface and the PDCP layer. In this case, a secure tunnel may be established between a tunnel protocol client located in a secure cloud node and the UE over-the-top (for example, above the radio protocol stack). The ciphering function in the secure cloud node may be triggered when there is a handover to a base station with an insufficient security level. At the UE, the UE may need to include tunnel protocol client software (for example, as an application), which may be configured to be available for a tunnel establishment procedure. 
       FIG. 2  depicts a signaling diagram  200 , in accordance with some example embodiments. In the example of  FIG. 2 , a base station, such as base station  110 A, may receive, at  205 , security information from a security management entity  202 . This security information may make the radio access network including the base station  110 A aware of the security level of at least one neighboring base station. To illustrate further, the security information may include an identifier, such as a cell identifier, for a neighboring base station and a corresponding indication of the security level established for that base station. At  205 , the security information may be broadcast to one or more base stations including base station  110 A or signaled between the security management entity  202  and one or more base stations. The security management entity  202  may be implemented as part of the operation and management (OAM) function or system. Alternatively or additionally, the security management entity  202  may be implemented as part of the network slice instantiation procedure and signaled from a core network entity. 
     Table 1 below shows an example of security information for a plurality of base stations. In the example of Table 1, the security level is based on a relative scale, wherein level 3 may be the lowest or least secure, while level 0 may be considered the most secure (for example, the base station is located in a secure or controlled location). Although Table 1 provides an example of security information for neighboring base stations, other schemes may be used to indicate the security level of the base stations. 
     
       
         
           
               
               
               
             
               
                   
                 TABLE 1 
               
               
                   
                   
               
               
                   
                 Cell or Access Point ID 
                 Security Level 
               
               
                   
                   
               
             
            
               
                   
                 eNB#1 
                 security level 0 
               
               
                   
                 eNB#2 
                 security level 0 
               
               
                   
                 eNB#3 
                 security level 1 
               
               
                   
                 eNB#4 
                 security level 3 
               
               
                   
                 eNB#5 
                 security level 2 
               
               
                   
                   
               
            
           
         
       
     
       FIG. 3  depicts a signaling diagram  300 , in accordance with some example embodiments. The example embodiment of  FIG. 3  depicts the PDCP being relocated to a target base station, when the target base station is able to meet the security requirements. 
     At  310 , the user equipment  120  may report one or more radio measurements to the source base station  110 A, in accordance with some example embodiments. The radio measurements may indicate that a handover may be desirable or needed to a target cell being served by the target base station  110 B. The target base station may be implemented as a small cell base station, although other types of base stations and wireless access points may be used as well. Furthermore, the radio measurement reporting may be event driven, such as A3 (for example, neighboring cell becomes better than the serving cell by an offset), although other events may trigger the report. 
     At  320 , the source base station  110 A may check the security level of the target base station  110 B to determine whether the target base station&#39;s security level satisfies a certain security level, in accordance with some example embodiments. The source base station  110 A may have information indicating the security level of one or more neighboring nodes including target base station  110 B. Moreover, the source base station  110 A may determine that the target base station  110 B satisfies or can fulfill the security level needed. The source base station may obtain this information as noted above with respect to  FIG. 2 . In some implementations, the base stations may use a common or absolute security level system. The source base station may also have a mapping between a given network slice and the required security level. For example, the source base station may have a mapping that indicates network slice X to UE  120  needs at least security level 3. As such, the source base station can determine, based on neighboring base station security level and the needed security level, whether a neighboring base station is secure enough for relocating the PDCP. In some implementations, the security level needed for a given network slice may be stored in subscription information for a given UE  120 . Alternatively or additionally, the security level may also be a per-slice parameter (for example, the security level would be the same for all UEs in a certain network slice). 
     In accordance with some example embodiments, the source base station  110 A may request, at  330 , relocation to the target base station  110 B of the PDCP including security information and lower layer information (for example, radio bearer information), when the check at  320  determines the target base station  110 B can satisfy the security requirements for user equipment  120 . 
     At  340 , the target base station  110 B may send an acknowledgement message back to the source base station  110 A, in accordance with some example embodiments. At  350 , the source base station  110 A may send the handover message to the user equipment suggesting or commanding the handover to the target base station  110 B, in accordance with some example embodiments. In response to the message  350 , the user equipment may, at  360 , perform a random access procedure by accessing a random access channel (RACH) to the target base station  110 B to complete the handover, in accordance with some example embodiments. 
       FIG. 4A  depicts the source base station  110 A including the PDCP, and  FIG. 4B  depicts the PDCP at the target base station  110 B after the handover when the target base station can fulfill certain security requirements, in accordance with some example embodiments. In the example of  FIG. 4B , a PDCP entity may be relocated to the target base station  110 B, and the PDCP entity may represent a protocol or code that enables the relocation of a secure session or a secure connection (for example, over a ciphered tunnel) to the user equipment (where another PDCP entity may de-cipher the session or tunnel). 
       FIG. 5A  depicts a signaling diagram  500 , in accordance with some example embodiments. The example embodiment of  FIG. 5A  depicts the PDCP not being relocated to the target base station  110 B, when the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements. 
     In some example embodiments, the user equipment  120  may, at  310 , report one or more radio measurements to the source base station  110 A, as described above with respect to  FIG. 3 . 
     At  520 , the source base station  110 A may check the security level of the target base station  110 B to determine whether the target base station&#39;s security level satisfies the security requirements for a given network slice, in accordance with some example embodiments. The source base station  110 A may have information indicating the security level of one or more neighboring nodes including target base station  110 B (which may be obtained as noted above with respect to  FIG. 2 ). In some example embodiments, the source base station  110 A may determine that the target base station  110 B cannot satisfy the security level needed. 
     When the check at  520  determines the target base station  110 B cannot satisfy the security requirements for user equipment  120 , the source base station may, at  530 , request the relocation of the lower layers (for example, physical layer, media access control, radio link control, radio bearers, and/or the like) to target base station  110 B, but not the relocation of security information such as PDCP security (for example, ciphering or integrity protection) which may remain at the source base station  110 A. 
       FIG. 5A  depicts the PDCP remain at the source base station  110 A, while the lower layer protocols, such as the physical (PHY) layer, media access control (MAC) layer, and/or radio link control (RLC) layer, being relocated to the target base station  110 B. 
     At  540 , the target base station  110 B may send an acknowledgement message back to the source base station  110 A, in accordance with some example embodiments. At  550 , the source base station  110 A may send a handover message to the user equipment suggesting or commanding the handover to the target base station  110 B, in accordance with some example embodiments. In response to the message  550 , the user equipment may, at  560 , perform a random access procedure by accessing a random access channel (RACH) to the target base station  110 B to complete the handover, in accordance with some example embodiments. 
       FIG. 6A  depicts the source base station  110 A including the PDCP before the handover, while  FIG. 6B  depicts the UE after the handover to target base station  110 B. At  FIG. 6B , encrypted PDCP packet data units (PDUs) are forwarded at  666  to the target base station  110 B, which forwards the encrypted PDU to the lower layers and the user equipment  120 . The configuration of  FIG. 6B  may be implemented in accordance with for example Alternative  2 C as described in 3GPP TS 36.842, although other implementation may be used as well. 
       FIG. 7  depicts a signaling diagram  700 , in accordance with some example embodiments. When the target base station is not able to meet the security requirements, the example embodiment of  FIG. 7  depicts the PDCP being relocated to another network node such as a third base station rather than relocating the PDCP to the target base station  110 B. 
     In accordance with some example embodiments, the user equipment  120  may report, at  310 , one or more radio measurements to the source base station  110 A, as described above with respect to  FIG. 3 . 
     At  720 , the source base station  110 A may check the security level of the target base station  110 B to determine whether the target base station&#39;s security level satisfies the security requirements for the given network slice, in accordance with some example embodiments. The source base station  110 A may have information indicating the security level of one or more neighboring nodes including target base station  110 B (which may be obtained as noted above with respect to  FIG. 2 ). In some example embodiments, the source base station  110 A may determine that the target base station  110 B cannot satisfy the security level needed. However, the source base station  110 A may determine that a third network node, such as a third base station  710  can satisfy the security requirements. 
     When the check at  720  determines the target base station  110 B cannot satisfy the security requirements for user equipment  120 , the source base station may request, at  730 , the relocation of the lower layers (for example, physical layer, media access control, radio link control, radio bearers, and/or the like) to target base station  110 B, but not the relocation of ciphering or other security information such as PDCP security information to enable tunneling, in accordance with some example embodiments. 
     At  740 , the target base station  110 B may send an acknowledgement message back to the source base station  110 A, in accordance with some example embodiments. At  750 , the source base station  110 A may request the relocation of PDCP to the third base station  710 , in accordance with some example embodiments. In response, the third base station  710  may, in accordance with some example embodiments, send an acknowledgement at  760 . At  770 , the source base station  110 A may send the handover message to the user equipment suggesting or commanding the handover to the target base station  110 B, in accordance with some example embodiments. In response to the message  770 , the user equipment may, at  780 , perform a random access procedure by accessing a random access channel (RACH) to the target base station  110 B to complete the handover to the target base station  110 B, in accordance with some example embodiments. 
       FIG. 8A  depicts the source base station  110 A including the PDCP before the handover, while  FIG. 8B  depicts the state after the handover to target base station  110 B including the security aspects of the PDCP (for example, ciphering and/or integrity protection) being located at the third base station  710  as shown at  FIG. 8B . At  FIG. 8B , encrypted PDCP PDUs may be forwarded at  888  to the target base station  110 B, which forwards the encrypted PDUs to the lower layers and the user equipment  120 . 
       FIG. 9  depicts an example system  900 , in accordance with some example embodiments. Rather than use a fully functional third base station  710 , the base station  910  may be implemented as a service node with a PDCP function and minimal control plane functions, as well as the ability to connect to the core network  130  and neighboring base stations such as base station  110 B. This entity  910  may fulfill the security requirements of the network slice. However, this entity  910  may not be configured to control any radio cells at the source base station  110 A or target base station  110 B. Moreover, the entity  910  may not directly possess physical, media access control, and/or radio link control layers. Alternatively or additionally, this entity  910  may be instantiated on demand on specific hardware, which may be hardened against security threats. 
       FIG. 10  depicts an example of an over-the-top tunnel via a ciphering entity  1010 , in accordance with some example embodiments. The over-the-top tunnel may be established on-demand between a secure network entity the radio access network (for example, in a secure edge cloud) and the user equipment, when a handover is requested towards a target base station, which may not be able to fulfill security requirements. The data from the core network may be ciphered in a secure network entity before being treated in the target base station. There may be a corresponding entity at the UE to de-cipher the data. The ciphered data may be handled in the target base station (for example, the PDPCP and lower layers) as if it came from the core network. The ciphered data may then be deciphered in the UE. The tunnel may be closed as soon as the user equipment moves into the coverage of base station with sufficient security. The tunnel end-point on the network side may be logically located between the RAN-CN interface and the PDCP layer. 
       FIG. 11  illustrates a block diagram of an apparatus  10 , in accordance with some example embodiments. The apparatus  10  (or portions thereof) may be configured to provide a radio, such as user equipment (for example, user equipment  120 ) and/or a base station (for example, base station  110 A-B). The apparatus may be implemented as any device including a wireless device, a smart phone, a cell phone, a machine type communication device, a wireless sensor, a radio relay, an access point, and/or any other radio including a processor and memory based device. 
     The apparatus  10  may include at least one antenna  12  in communication with a transmitter  14  and a receiver  16 . Alternatively transmit and receive antennas may be separate. The apparatus  10  may also include a processor  20  configured to provide signals to and receive signals from the transmitter and receiver, respectively, and to control the functioning of the apparatus. Processor  20  may be configured to control the functioning of the transmitter and receiver by effecting control signaling via electrical leads to the transmitter and receiver. Likewise, processor  20  may be configured to control other elements of apparatus  10  by effecting control signaling via electrical leads connecting processor  20  to the other elements, such as a display or a memory. The processor  20  may, for example, be embodied in a variety of ways including circuitry, at least one processing core, one or more microprocessors with accompanying digital signal processor(s), one or more processor(s) without an accompanying digital signal processor, one or more coprocessors, one or more multi-core processors, one or more controllers, processing circuitry, one or more computers, various other processing elements including integrated circuits (for example, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and/or the like), or some combination thereof. Accordingly, although illustrated in  FIG. 4  as a single processor, in some example embodiments the processor  20  may comprise a plurality of processors or processing cores. 
     Signals sent and received by the processor  20  may include signaling information in accordance with an air interface standard of an applicable cellular system, and/or any number of different wireline or wireless networking techniques, comprising but not limited to Wi-Fi, wireless local access network (WLAN) techniques, such as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11, 802.16, and/or the like. In addition, these signals may include speech data, user generated data, user requested data, and/or the like. 
     The apparatus  10  may be capable of operating with one or more air interface standards, communication protocols, modulation types, access types, and/or the like. For example, the apparatus  10  and/or a cellular modem therein may be capable of operating in accordance with various first generation (1G) communication protocols, second generation (2G or 2.5G) communication protocols, third-generation (3G) communication protocols, fourth-generation (4G) communication protocols, Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) communication protocols (for example, session initiation protocol (SIP) and/or the like. For example, the apparatus  10  may be capable of operating in accordance with 2G wireless communication protocols IS-136, Time Division Multiple Access TDMA, Global System for Mobile communications, GSM, IS-95, Code Division Multiple Access, CDMA, and/or the like. In addition, for example, the apparatus  10  may be capable of operating in accordance with 2.5G wireless communication protocols General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Enhanced Data GSM Environment (EDGE), and/or the like. Further, for example, the apparatus  10  may be capable of operating in accordance with 3G wireless communication protocols, such as Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), and/or the like. The apparatus  10  may be additionally capable of operating in accordance with 3.9G wireless communication protocols, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE), Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), and/or the like. Additionally, for example, the apparatus  10  may be capable of operating in accordance with 4G wireless communication protocols, such as LTE Advanced, 5G, and/or the like as well as similar wireless communication protocols that may be subsequently developed. 
     It is understood that the processor  20  may include circuitry for implementing audio/video and logic functions of apparatus  10 . For example, the processor  20  may comprise a digital signal processor device, a microprocessor device, an analog-to-digital converter, a digital-to-analog converter, and/or the like. Control and signal processing functions of the apparatus  10  may be allocated between these devices according to their respective capabilities. The processor  20  may additionally comprise an internal voice coder (VC)  20   a , an internal data modem (DM)  20   b , and/or the like. Further, the processor  20  may include functionality to operate one or more software programs, which may be stored in memory. In general, processor  20  and stored software instructions may be configured to cause apparatus  10  to perform actions. For example, processor  20  may be capable of operating a connectivity program, such as a web browser. The connectivity program may allow the apparatus  10  to transmit and receive web content, such as location-based content, according to a protocol, such as wireless application protocol, WAP, hypertext transfer protocol, HTTP, and/or the like. 
     Apparatus  10  may also comprise a user interface including, for example, an earphone or speaker  24 , a ringer  22 , a microphone  26 , a display  28 , a user input interface, and/or the like, which may be operationally coupled to the processor  20 . The display  28  may, as noted above, include a touch sensitive display, where a user may touch and/or gesture to make selections, enter values, and/or the like. The processor  20  may also include user interface circuitry configured to control at least some functions of one or more elements of the user interface, such as the speaker  24 , the ringer  22 , the microphone  26 , the display  28 , and/or the like. The processor  20  and/or user interface circuitry comprising the processor  20  may be configured to control one or more functions of one or more elements of the user interface through computer program instructions, for example, software and/or firmware, stored on a memory accessible to the processor  20 , for example, volatile memory  40 , non-volatile memory  42 , and/or the like. The apparatus  10  may include a battery for powering various circuits related to the mobile terminal, for example, a circuit to provide mechanical vibration as a detectable output. The user input interface may comprise devices allowing the apparatus  20  to receive data, such as a keypad  30  (which can be a virtual keyboard presented on display  28  or an externally coupled keyboard) and/or other input devices. 
     As shown in  FIG. 11 , apparatus  10  may also include one or more mechanisms for sharing and/or obtaining data. For example, the apparatus  10  may include a short-range radio frequency (RF) transceiver and/or interrogator  64 , so data may be shared with and/or obtained from electronic devices in accordance with RF techniques. The apparatus  10  may include other short-range transceivers, such as an infrared (IR) transceiver  66 , a Bluetooth™ (BT) transceiver  68  operating using Bluetooth™ wireless technology, a wireless universal serial bus (USB) transceiver  70 , a Bluetooth™ Low Energy transceiver, a ZigBee transceiver, an ANT transceiver, a cellular device-to-device transceiver, a wireless local area link transceiver, and/or any other short-range radio technology. Apparatus  10  and, in particular, the short-range transceiver may be capable of transmitting data to and/or receiving data from electronic devices within the proximity of the apparatus, such as within 10 meters, for example. The apparatus  10  including the Wi-Fi or wireless local area networking modem may also be capable of transmitting and/or receiving data from electronic devices according to various wireless networking techniques, including 6LoWpan, Wi-Fi, Wi-Fi low power, WLAN techniques such as IEEE 802.11 techniques, IEEE 802.15 techniques, IEEE 802.16 techniques, and/or the like. 
     The apparatus  10  may comprise memory, such as a subscriber identity module (SIM)  38 , a removable user identity module (R-UIM), an eUICC, an UICC, and/or the like, which may store information elements related to a mobile subscriber. In addition to the SIM, the apparatus  10  may include other removable and/or fixed memory. The apparatus  10  may include volatile memory  40  and/or non-volatile memory  42 . For example, volatile memory  40  may include Random Access Memory (RAM) including dynamic and/or static RAM, on-chip or off-chip cache memory, and/or the like. Non-volatile memory  42 , which may be embedded and/or removable, may include, for example, read-only memory, flash memory, magnetic storage devices, for example, hard disks, floppy disk drives, magnetic tape, optical disc drives and/or media, non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM), and/or the like. Like volatile memory  40 , non-volatile memory  42  may include a cache area for temporary storage of data. At least part of the volatile and/or non-volatile memory may be embedded in processor  20 . The memories may store one or more software programs, instructions, pieces of information, data, and/or the like which may be used by the apparatus for performing operations disclosed herein with respect to a user equipment and/or a base station. The memories may comprise an identifier, such as an international mobile equipment identification (IMEI) code, capable of uniquely identifying apparatus  10 . The memories may comprise an identifier, such as an international mobile equipment identification (IMEI) code, capable of uniquely identifying apparatus  10 . In the example embodiment, the processor  20  may be configured using computer code stored at memory  40  and/or  42  to control and/or provide one or more aspects disclosed herein with respect to the user equipment and/or a base station (see, for example, process  200 ,  300 ,  500 ,  700 , and/or the like as disclosed herein). 
     Some of the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented in software, hardware, application logic, or a combination of software, hardware, and application logic. The software, application logic, and/or hardware may reside on memory  40 , the control apparatus  20 , or electronic components, for example. In some example embodiment, the application logic, software or an instruction set is maintained on any one of various conventional computer-readable media. In the context of this document, a “computer-readable medium” may be any non-transitory media that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transport the instructions for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer or data processor circuitry, with examples depicted at  FIG. 11 , computer-readable medium may comprise a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that may be any media that can contain or store the instructions for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer. 
     Without in any way limiting the scope, interpretation, or application of the claims appearing below, a technical effect of one or more of the example embodiments disclosed herein is more secure handovers. 
     The subject matter described herein may be embodied in systems, apparatus, methods, and/or articles depending on the desired configuration. For example, the base stations and user equipment (or one or more components therein) and/or the processes described herein can be implemented using one or more of the following: a processor executing program code, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a digital signal processor (DSP), an embedded processor, a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and/or combinations thereof. These various implementations may include implementation in one or more computer programs that are executable and/or interpretable on a programmable system including at least one programmable processor, which may be special or general purpose, coupled to receive data and instructions from, and to transmit data and instructions to, a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one output device. These computer programs (also known as programs, software, software applications, applications, components, program code, or code) include machine instructions for a programmable processor, and may be implemented in a high-level procedural and/or object-oriented programming language, and/or in assembly/machine language. As used herein, the term “computer-readable medium” refers to any computer program product, machine-readable medium, computer-readable storage medium, apparatus and/or device (for example, magnetic discs, optical disks, memory, Programmable Logic Devices (PLDs)) used to provide machine instructions and/or data to a programmable processor, including a machine-readable medium that receives machine instructions. Similarly, systems are also described herein that may include a processor and a memory coupled to the processor. The memory may include one or more programs that cause the processor to perform one or more of the operations described herein. 
     Although a few variations have been described in detail above, other modifications or additions are possible. In particular, further features and/or variations may be provided in addition to those set forth herein. Moreover, the implementations described above may be directed to various combinations and subcombinations of the disclosed features and/or combinations and subcombinations of several further features disclosed above. Other embodiments may be within the scope of the following claims. 
     If desired, the different functions discussed herein may be performed in a different order and/or concurrently with each other. Furthermore, if desired, one or more of the above-described functions may be optional or may be combined. Although various aspects of some of the embodiments are set out in the independent claims, other aspects of some of the embodiments comprise other combinations of features from the described embodiments and/or the dependent claims with the features of the independent claims, and not solely the combinations explicitly set out in the claims. It is also noted herein that while the above describes example embodiments, these descriptions should not be viewed in a limiting sense. Rather, there are several variations and modifications that may be made without departing from the scope of some of the embodiments as defined in the appended claims. Other embodiments may be within the scope of the following claims. The term “based on” includes “based on at least.” The use of the phase “such as” means “such as for example” unless otherwise indicated.