Patent Publication Number: US-10776489-B2

Title: Methods and systems for providing and controlling cryptographic secure communications terminal operable to provide a plurality of desktop environments

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application claims the benefit of priority of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/266,068 filed on Dec. 11, 2015 and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/266,063 filed on Dec. 11, 2015 and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/266,053 filed on Dec. 11, 2015. All are incorporated by reference in their entirety. 
     The present application claims priority to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/105,154, filed on May 11, 2011, and entitled “Methods and Systems for Providing and Controlling Cryptographically Secure Communications Across Unsecured Networks Between a Secure Virtual Terminal and a Remote System”, which further claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/389,535, filed Oct. 4, 2010, and entitled “System and Method for Providing a Stealth Secure Virtual Terminal”, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. 
     This application further claims priority, through U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/105,154, to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/389,511, filed Oct. 4, 2010, and entitled “System and Method for Providing a USB Stick-Based Thin Client”, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. 
     This application further claims priority, through U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/105,154, to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/714,598, filed Mar. 6, 2007, entitled “Gateway for Securing Data to/from a Private Network”, the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. 
    
    
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     The present application relates generally to secured data communication. In particular, the present application relates to methods and systems for providing and controlling secure communications across unsecured networks. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Security is often maintained in organizations by segregating physical networks used by each group of users. This acts to restrict access to data available on computers and databases used in such networks. For example, it prevents someone in engineering from gaining access to data used in the payroll department&#39;s network and vice versa. While separate local network infrastructures help to maintain security of data, superfluous equipment and maintenance is required to maintain these segregated networks. This adds expense, and complexity to the data infrastructures of such organizations. 
     Furthermore, regardless of the organizational structure of networks used in commercial, governmental, and other settings, there is an ever increasing security concern that sensitive data transmitted or stored on local networks will be accessed by an unauthorized individual or accidentally accessed or disclosed outside of a community-of-interest, hence compromising the secret data. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that security threats can also often originate from insiders. Whether the threat is intentional or unintentional, transmitting data exclusively in one security level partitioned network or another does not protect the data if it is in plaintext format. This is because even strict physical segregation of a network by security level is no guarantee that data will not be disseminated to end-users outside that security level. 
     The above security concerns are only further exacerbated when access to open or public networks is provided or required, for example in the case of accessing secure networks remotely via the Internet. For example, the growth of the Internet and related network communication networks has given rise to increasingly larger numbers of distributed information processing systems in which individual users obtain information from an ever increasing number of sources. For example, in the banking industry, electronic communications by customers to their banking institutions to engage in electronic financial transactions is an increasing form of interaction between the customers and the banks. Other organizations or institutions requiring highly secured communications over typically-unsecure networks have analogous problems. 
     In making these transactions possible, customers use any number of computing systems attached to the Internet to communicate with servers operated by their banking institutions to send commands and receive data associated with these transactions. Banks are typically not able to control the customer&#39;s computing systems in a meaningful way that may give rise to potential security issues. A summary of some of these security threats are described in detail in a Unisys White Paper entitled “Zeus Malware: Threat Banking Industry” that is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
     The present invention addresses these limitations of the prior computing systems. 
     SUMMARY 
     In accordance with the present disclosure, the above and other problems are solved by providing a method, apparatus, and article of manufacture for providing a thin client for providing secure access to network-based services from a computing system attached to a generally unsecured network. Various aspects of this thin client, and systems enabling thin client access to such services, for example web based services, are disclosed as well. 
     In a first aspect, a method for switching between multiple brandings of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device, the secure boot device storing a plurality of brandings for a user, the method comprising: initiating an operating system from the secure boot device; receiving credentials including a user identification and a password; receiving a selection of a first branding among the plurality of brandings, each of the plurality of brandings associated with a different entity from which a user may receive authorization to operate the remote desktop client; based on verification of the received credentials, booting, from the secure boot device, a desktop in the selected first branding; receiving a selection of a second branding different from the first branding; and performing a desktop reset, wherein the desktop reset results in execution of the desktop in the second branding. 
     In a second aspect, a secure system for switching between multiple brandings of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device, the secure boot device storing a plurality of brandings for a user, the system comprising: a client computer having a secure boot device connected thereto; a remote server communicatively connected to the client computer via a communications network; 
     a trusted set of processing modules stored in the secure boot device that, when executed on the client computer, cause the client computer to: initiate an operating system from the secure boot device; receive credentials including a user identification and a password; receive a selection of a first branding among the plurality of brandings, each of the plurality of brandings associated with a different entity from which a user may receive authorization to operate the remote desktop client; based on verification of the received credentials, boot, from the secure boot device, a desktop in the selected first branding; receive a selection of a second branding different from the first branding; and perform a desktop reset, wherein the desktop reset results in execution of the desktop in the second branding. 
     In a third aspect, a computer storage medium comprising computer-executable instructions stored in a memory of a secure boot device operating on a remote desktop client and including a trusted set of processing modules which, when executed, cause a computing system to: initiate an operating system from the secure boot device; receive credentials including a user identification and a password; receive a selection of a first branding among the plurality of brandings, each of the plurality of brandings associated with a different entity from which a user may receive authorization to operate the remote desktop client; based on verification of the received credentials, boot, from the secure boot device, a desktop in the selected first branding; receive a selection of a second branding different from the first branding; and perform a desktop reset, wherein the desktop reset results in execution of the desktop in the second branding. 
     In some additional aspects, a utility of the present disclosure is that, among other aspects, it provides a method for securely connecting a client computer, such as one having a secure boot device to a remote server over a communications network. The method boots a client computer from a trusted set of processing modules stored in the secure boot device, verifies the contents of the trusted set of processing modules prior to execution of these processing modules, provides authentication information from data stored upon the secure boot device to an authorization server to establish a secure connection to another server, such as a web services server. In some aspects, the method establishes the secure connection with the server using encryption keys stored on the secure boot device, and transfers data between the client computer and the server over the secure connection to perform transactions initiated by a user of the client computer. Additionally, the present disclosure provides for control and update of software executing at a client computing device. The server computer utilizes encryption keys associated with a unique ID from the secure boot device. Additionally, distributed networks are provided that allow for distributed resource management, to allow customers access to private network areas that share resources with other customers, while also ensuring secure key and update management for each customer. 
     These and various other features as well as advantages, which characterize the present disclosure, will be apparent from a reading of the following detailed description and a review of the associated drawings. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Referring now to the drawings in which like reference numbers represent corresponding parts throughout: 
         FIG. 1  illustrates a distributed system using according to one embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 2  shows an organization in which separate intranets able to be formed in the distributed system of  FIG. 1  are consolidated into a single interconnected infrastructure; 
         FIG. 3  is a chart illustrating end-users and their membership denoted by an “X” to different communities-of-interest of a small subset of an example larger organization; 
         FIG. 4  illustrates an example logical computing environment in which an encryption key is used to encrypt a cryptographic data set transferred from a first computing device to a second computing device; 
         FIG. 5  illustrates a general purpose computing system for use in implementing as one or more computing embodiments of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 6  illustrates an example communications infrastructure useable within a computing environment to manage secure and clear text communications, according to various aspects of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 7  illustrates an exemplary method for securely transmitting a cryptographic data set among logically partitioned data paths; 
         FIG. 8  illustrates an exemplary method for securely transmitting a message among logically partitioned data paths; 
         FIG. 9  illustrates an overall logical flow of how an original packet is containing a cryptographic data set, or message, is concatenated with preheader and then split into portions which are appended with an IP header containing a value indicating which set of data the portion belongs; 
         FIG. 10  illustrates a distributed system using a secure boot device according to another embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 11A  illustrates a set of processing modules stored on a secure boot device according to yet another embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 11B  illustrates an example arrangement of memory of a secure boot device for storing the set of trusted modules on the secure boot device of  FIG. 10 ; 
         FIG. 12  illustrates a flowchart of a method for using a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server according to an embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 13  illustrates a distributed processing system useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 14  illustrates a distributed processing system useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server according to a further possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 15  illustrates a distributed processing system useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server according to a further possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 16  illustrates a flowchart of creating a secure connection according to an embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 17  illustrates an example network in which secure tunnels can coexist with clear text communication, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 18  illustrates a distributed system in which secure tunnels coexist with clear text communication, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 19  illustrates a distributed hybrid system using virtual private network and secure connections, using the distributed systems of  FIGS. 18-19 , according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 20  illustrates a flowchart of authenticating a system for use of coexisting secure and clear text tunnels, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 21  illustrates a flowchart of methods and systems for configuring a distributed system including coexisting secure and clear text tunnels using a provisioning utility, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 22  illustrates an example distributed system in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 23  illustrates a second example distributed system in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 24  illustrates a third example distributed system in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 25  is a flowchart of methods and systems for updating a secure virtual terminal connected to a distributed system, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure; 
         FIG. 26  is a flowchart of an example method for switching languages of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device; 
         FIG. 27  is an example screenshot of a desktop running on the remote desktop client in a first language; 
         FIG. 28  is an example screenshot of a desktop having a toolbar for switching languages of a remote desktop client; 
         FIG. 29  is an example screenshot of a desktop operating system running on the remote desktop client in a second language; 
         FIG. 30  is a flowchart of an example method for switching brandings of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device; 
         FIG. 31  is an example screenshot of a desktop running on the remote desktop client in a first branding; 
         FIG. 32  is an example screenshot of a desktop having a toolbar for switching brandings of a user; 
         FIG. 33  is an example screenshot of a desktop operating system running on the remote desktop client in a selected second branding; 
         FIG. 34  is a flowchart of an example method for operating a remote desktop client from a secure boot device communicatively connected to a secure enterprise network; 
         FIG. 35  is an example distributed system of a remote desktop client positioned within an enterprise network; 
         FIG. 36  is an example distributed system of a remote desktop client positioned within an enterprise network; 
         FIG. 37  is an example distributed system of a remote desktop client positioned within an enterprise network; and 
         FIG. 38  is an example distributed system of a remote desktop client positioned within an enterprise network. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Various embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings, wherein like reference numerals represent like parts and assemblies throughout the several views. Reference to various embodiments does not limit the scope of the invention, which is limited only by the scope of the claims attached hereto. Additionally, any examples set forth in this specification are not intended to be limiting and merely set forth some of the many possible embodiments for the claimed invention. 
     In general, the present disclosure relates to a method, apparatus, and article of manufacture for providing a secure client for providing secure access to a remote server from a computing system attached to an unsecured network. The present disclosure provides for a secure connection to such a server generally, and in particular distributed network resources. Various aspects include methods and systems for secure connection to a distributed system for performing transactions, for example using a thin client, terminal-based system. Methods and systems for updating such a system while a secure connection is established are provided as well. Additionally, methods and systems for managing encryption keys within a secure network, and for allowing secure and clear text connections to coexist within a secure network are provided as well. 
     I. Generalized Infrastructure for Secure Communication 
       FIG. 1  illustrates a distributed system  100  in which aspects of the present disclosure can be implemented, according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. A distributed computing system  100  allows a number of users to communicate with any number of servers  111 - 113  using their own client computers  121 - 124 , via a network, show as the internet  126 . On a client computer  123 , a web page  131  or other network-accessible resource can be displayed to a user that corresponds to a transaction  132  being performed on a particular server, e.g., server  112 . The communications between the client computer  123  and server  112  occurs over a secure connection. 
     In one possible embodiment of the present invention, this secure connection utilizes a security technology developed by the Unisys Corporation that are described in detail in a number of commonly assigned U.S. patent applications. These applications generally describe a cryptographic splitting and recombining arrangement referred to herein as “cryptographically secure” or “Stealth-enabled”. These applications include:
         1. U.S. Provisional Application entitled: Distributed Security on Multiple Independent Networks using Secure “Parsing” Technology, by Robert Johnson, Ser. No. 60/648,531, filed 31 Jan., 2005;   2. U.S. application entitled: Integrated Multi-Level Security System, by Robert Johnson, U.S. Ser. No. 11/339,974 filed 26 Jan. 2006 claiming the benefit of the above provisional applications;   3. U.S. application entitled: Integrated Multi-Level Security System, by Robert Johnson et al., Ser. No. 11/714,590 filed 6 Mar. 2007 which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/339,974;   4. U.S. application entitled: Integrated Multi-Level Security System, by Robert Johnson et al., Ser. No. 11/714,666 filed 6 Mar. 2007 which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/339,974; and   5. U.S. application entitled: Integrated Multi-Level Security System, by Robert Johnson et al., Ser. No. 11/714,598 filed 6 Mar. 2007 which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/339,974.       

     All of these applications are currently pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, are commonly assigned to the owner of the instant application, and are incorporated herein in their entireties. 
     In various embodiments of the present disclosure, the servers  111 - 113  can be distributed across a plurality of discrete locations or controlled by different entities; in such embodiments, these servers  111 - 113  can be referred to generally as remote servers, as they represent servers accessible from a remote location and which can be accessed via an unsecured network. For example, in some embodiments of the present disclosure (discussed in greater detail below), one or more of the servers  111 - 113  is a banking server, configured to communicate securely with one or more client terminal devices across a secure connection, formed for example via the Internet. In such examples, or others where a high level of security is required, one or more secure connections can be established between client devices and a server, or among servers, on such an unsecured network. Other server functionalities or arrangements are possible as well, for example including administration, provisioning, and user management/authentication systems. In such embodiments, one or more such separate functionalities can be integrated into, or can reside separate from, an entity requiring highly secure communications such as a financial institution where reliable security is needed. 
       FIG. 2  shows an organization  200  in which separate intranets able to be formed in the distributed system of  FIG. 1  are consolidated into a single interconnected infrastructure. In the organization  200  as shown, a variety of physically separated resources, illustrated as residing at sites  204 ,  206 ,  208 , respectively, can be communicatively interconnected, for example via the Internet  202 . In accordance with the present disclosure, secure communication can be accomplished among the various sites  204 - 208 , and from remote users to one or more sites. For example, one or more of the servers  111 - 113  can be physically located at a different location from other servers, and client computers  121 - 124  can be located at any location either within an entity&#39;s intranet or external to that intranet. Access to the resources of the organization  200  by a user is provided not based on that user&#39;s location, but his/her membership in a community-of-interest associated with that entity. 
     As used in the present disclosure, a community-of-interest refers generally to a group of two or more people who share a common interest and are grouped together based on their common interest. A community-of-interest may correspond to a role of an individual in an organization, a job level, security level, or may correspond to some other characteristic. A community-of-interest may also correspond to some subject defined by an organization or an individual and associated with one or more individuals (i.e., end-users of a computing device). A community-of-interest may be defined differently depending on the organizational structure of the entity. 
       FIG. 3  is a chart  300  illustrating end-users and their membership denoted by an “X” to different communities-of-interest of a small subset of an example organization. In this condensed example, a President of an organization, given his/her position, is entitled to access data in all of the communities-of-interest. On the other hand, a Payroll Specialist whose role may be limited to only issuing paychecks can only view or share data associated with the payroll community-of-interest and no other communities-of-interest. An HR (Human Resources) Manager given his/her position in HR as well as being a manager may view or share data from both the HR and Management communities-of-interest. Finally, in this example, a Sales Associate is only able to view data from or share data with others associated with the Sales community-of-interest. 
     In the example shown, while the President can access data in all four communities-of-interest, the President cannot share data with the Payroll Specialist if the data the President sends to the Payroll Specialist is encrypted for use in a community-of-interest that the Payroll Specialist cannot access. That is, no communication session can be established between the President and the Payroll Specialist other than within the Payroll community-of-interest. Therefore the message with a community-of-interest key not associated with the Payroll Specialist cannot be sent to the Payroll Specialist. Even if the message is accidentally received by the Payroll Specialist, the Payroll Specialist cannot view the message, for example due to use of encryption keys specific to each community of interest, as discussed in further detail below. This safeguard prevents inadvertent or malicious/intentional dissemination of plaintext data to individuals who are not members of a particular community-of-interest, and therefore, are not authorized to receive such information. 
     It is possible to distribute community-of-interest specific encryption keys (also known herein as “community-of-interest keys”) within departments, groups, agencies, different offices of an entity, based on ranks of individuals, security level ratings of individuals, commercial/non-commercial entities, governmental/non-governmental entities, corporations, or just about any group. It is also possible to dynamically create a community-of-interest or revoke a community of interest by the dissemination or removal of community-of-interest keys. 
     Thus, in accordance with one embodiment, each individual (or end user) associated with an organization has one or more community-of-interest keys provided on their computers, which is a secret encryption and/or decryption key previously installed thereon as a set of code or logic on a computer. Only computer devices with matching community-of-interest keys can communicate with one another, or observe data classified within their community-of-interest. That is, each community-of-interest key is associated with an end-user&#39;s community-of-interest (such as a position in a company or a security level), thereby allowing only end-users within the same group and having at least the same community-of-interest key to communicate with each other, or to gain access to data associated with that community-of-interest. 
     Of course, multiple community-of-interest keys can be distributed to individuals based on their membership and roles. It is conceivable that select end-users in each community-of-interest, may have more access to certain data, while others may have less ability to view or share data. The methods of this invention using communities-of-interest keys allows for the sharing or accessing of data to end-users whose computers have been preconfigured with appropriate community-of-interest keys. 
     Community-of-interest keys may also be installed on servers or other platforms within a network to protect sensitive data. Servers dedicated to a particular community-of-interest may only communicate with computing devices that have the same requisite community-of-interest keys installed therein. Otherwise no communication session can be established between a computing device and a server without both devices having the requisite key(s). Details regarding particular implementations in which a user device connects to server systems based on shared community-of-interest keys are described below. 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 4-6 , various components of a computing device are disclosed, with which aspects of the present disclosure can be implemented. With reference to  FIGS. 4-5 , exemplary physical and logical organizations of systems are shown in which aspects of the present disclosure can be implemented. Although some of the discussion below will focus on end-user equipment such as personal computers, the applicability of the present invention is not limited to end-user equipment, and may be used with other computing devices within a network. For example, computing devices according to the present disclosure may be other general or special purpose computing devices, such as, but not limited to, gateways, servers, routers, workstations, mobile devices (e.g., POA, cellular phone, etc.), and a combination of any of the above example devices, and other suitable intelligent devices. 
       FIG. 4  is a block diagram illustrating an example computing device  400 , which can be used to implement aspects of the present disclosure, and upon which one or more of the server applications, operating systems, or authentication systems described herein can be executed. Generally,  FIG. 4  illustrates an example physical system useable for implementing features of the present disclosure include a general-purpose computing device in the form of a conventional personal computer. 
     In the example of  FIG. 4 , the computing device  400  includes a memory  402 , a processing system  404 , a secondary storage device  406 , a network interface card  408 , a video interface  410 , a display unit  412 , an external component interface  414 , and a communications medium  416 . The memory  402  includes one or more computer storage media capable of storing data and/or instructions. In different embodiments, the memory  402  is implemented in different ways. For example, the memory  402  can be implemented using various types of computer storage media. 
     The processing system  404  includes one or more processing units. A processing unit is a physical device or article of manufacture comprising one or more integrated circuits that selectively execute software instructions. In various embodiments, the processing system  404  is implemented in various ways. For example, the processing system  404  can be implemented as one or more processing cores. In another example, the processing system  404  can include one or more separate microprocessors. In yet another example embodiment, the processing system  404  can include an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) that provides specific functionality. In yet another example, the processing system  404  provides specific functionality by using an ASIC and by executing computer-executable instructions. 
     The secondary storage device  406  includes one or more computer storage media. The secondary storage device  406  stores data and software instructions not directly accessible by the processing system  404 . In other words, the processing system  404  performs an I/O operation to retrieve data and/or software instructions from the secondary storage device  406 . In various embodiments, the secondary storage device  406  includes various types of computer storage media. For example, the secondary storage device  406  can include one or more magnetic disks, magnetic tape drives, optical discs, solid state memory devices, and/or other types of computer storage media. 
     The network interface card  408  enables the computing device  400  to send data to and receive data from a communication network. In different embodiments, the network interface card  408  is implemented in different ways. For example, the network interface card  408  can be implemented as an Ethernet interface, a token-ring network interface, a fiber optic network interface, a wireless network interface (e.g., WiFi, WiMax, etc.), or another type of network interface. 
     The video interface  410  enables the computing device  400  to output video information to the display unit  412 . The display unit  412  can be various types of devices for displaying video information, such as a cathode-ray tube display, an LCD display panel, a plasma screen display panel, a touch-sensitive display panel, an LED screen, or a projector. The video interface  410  can communicate with the display unit  412  in various ways, such as via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) connector, a VGA connector, a digital visual interface (DVI) connector, an S-Video connector, a High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) interface, or a DisplayPort connector. 
     The external component interface  414  enables the computing device  400  to communicate with external devices. For example, the external component interface  414  can be a USB interface, a FireWire interface, a serial port interface, a parallel port interface, a PS/2 interface, and/or another type of interface that enables the computing device  400  to communicate with external devices. In various embodiments, the external component interface  414  enables the computing device  400  to communicate with various external components, such as external storage devices, input devices, speakers, modems, media player docks, other computing devices, scanners, digital cameras, and fingerprint readers. 
     The communications medium  416  facilitates communication among the hardware components of the computing device  400 . In the example of  FIG. 4 , the communications medium  416  facilitates communication among the memory  402 , the processing system  404 , the secondary storage device  406 , the network interface card  408 , the video interface  410 , and the external component interface  414 . The communications medium  416  can be implemented in various ways. For example, the communications medium  416  can include a PCI bus, a PCI Express bus, an accelerated graphics port (AGP) bus, a serial Advanced Technology Attachment (ATA) interconnect, a parallel ATA interconnect, a Fiber Channel interconnect, a USB bus, a Small Computing system Interface (SCSI) interface, or another type of communications medium. 
     The memory  402  stores various types of data and/or software instructions. For instance, in the example of  FIG. 4 , the memory  402  stores a Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)  418  and an operating system  420 . The BIOS  418  includes a set of computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the processing system  404 , cause the computing device  400  to boot up. The operating system  420  includes a set of computer-executable instructions that, when executed by the processing system  404 , cause the computing device  400  to provide an operating system that coordinates the activities and sharing of resources of the computing device  400 . Furthermore, the memory  402  stores application software  422 . The application software  422  includes computer-executable instructions, that when executed by the processing system  404 , cause the computing device  400  to provide one or more applications. The memory  402  also stores program data  424 . The program data  424  is data used by programs that execute on the computing device  400 . 
     The term computer readable media as used herein may include computer storage media and communication media. As used in this document, a computer storage medium is a device or article of manufacture that stores data and/or computer-executable instructions. Computer storage media may include volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable devices or articles of manufacture implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. By way of example, and not limitation, computer storage media may include dynamic random access memory (DRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), reduced latency DRAM, DDR2 SDRAM, DDR3 SDRAM, solid state memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically-erasable programmable ROM, optical discs (e.g., CD-ROMs, DVDs, etc.), magnetic disks (e.g., hard disks, floppy disks, etc.), magnetic tapes, and other types of devices and/or articles of manufacture that store data. Communication media may be embodied by computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal, such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and includes any information delivery media. The term “modulated data signal” may describe a signal that has one or more characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media may include wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, radio frequency (RF), infrared, and other wireless media. 
     Additionally, the embodiments described herein are implemented as logical operations performed by a computer. The logical operations of these various embodiments of the present invention are implemented ( 1 ) as a sequence of computer implemented steps or program modules running on a computing system and/or ( 2 ) as interconnected machine modules or hardware logic within the computing system. The implementation is a matter of choice dependent on the performance requirements of the computing system implementing the invention. Accordingly, the logical operations making up the embodiments of the invention described herein can be variously referred to as operations, steps, or modules. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates an example arrangement of logical components of a general purpose computing device  500  for use in implementing as one or more computing embodiments of the present invention, and can be implemented within the hardware environment including computing device  400  illustrated in  FIG. 4 . In the embodiment shown, the computing device  500  includes a controller  502  including at least one processor  504 , a power source  506 , and memory  508 , which can be as described above in connection with  FIG. 4 . In some implementations, volatile memory  510  is used as part of the computing device&#39;s cache, permitting application code and/or data to be accessed quickly and executed by processor  504 . Memory  508  may also include non-volatile memory  512 , as well as flash memory  514 . It is also possible for other memory mediums (not shown) having various physical properties to be included as part of computing device  400 . 
     A file system  522  may reside as a component in the form of computer-executable instructions and/or logic within memory  508 , that when executed serves as a logical interface between code stored in flash memory  514  and other storage mediums. File system  522  is generally responsible for performing transactions on behalf of code stored in ROM or one or more applications. File system  522  may also assist in storing, retrieving, organizing files, and performing other related tasks associated with code and/or data. That is, file system  522  has the ability to read, write, erase, and manage files (applications, etc.). File system  522  may also include other applications such as web browsers, e-mail, applications, and other applications. 
     Computing device  400  may also include one or more Input/Output ports  516  to transmit and/or receive data. I/O ports  516  are typically connected in some fashion to controller  502  (processor  504  and memory  508 ). I/O ports  516  are usually at least partially implemented in hardware for connecting computing device  500  to a communication link  518 , and may include wired as well as wireless capabilities. Communication link  518  may include any suitable connection means for handling the transportation of data to and from computing device  500 , such as, but not limited to, cable, fiber optics, and wireless technology. Communication link  518  may also include network technology including portions of the Internet. 
     Stored within one or more portions of memory  508  is a security engine  550 . That is, security engine  550  includes one or more sets of computer-executable code resident in a computer-readable medium such as memory  508 . Security engine  550  performs security functions associated with transmitting, receiving, or storing data. These security functions may include encrypting data and decrypting data. Typically, cryptographic corresponding key pairs are installed in memory, such as an encryption key and decryption keys. However, it is appreciated that a corresponding cryptographic key may reside on another computing device. The keys may be public or private as would be appreciated by those skilled in the art. The keys may be generated using commercially available products or proprietary technology. 
     In one embodiment, security engine  550  includes one or more filters  552 , which define permissions relating to secure communication by the computing device  500 . By permissions, it is intended that one or more remote endpoints can be defined in a filter, and access to that endpoint can be either allowed or prevented based on an identity of a user. 
     In such an embodiment, security engine  550  also includes one or more community-of-interest keys  554 , which are private and secret keys used for encrypting/decrypting other security keys in accordance with this invention. That is, community-of-interest keys  554  are used for transformation (encryption) of a second key (or additional keys), such as a session key, into a cryptographically split key, as well as for retransformation (decryption) of the second key back to its usable form. 
     A community-of-interest key  554  refers generally to an encryption key and/or corresponding decryption key, that may be assigned to a computing device  500  of an end-user based on an associated community-of-interest attributed to the end-user. For instance, end-users of a computing device  500 , may also have one or more community-of-interest keys  554  installed on their computing device, based on their position or security level within an organization. 
     It is also possible to secure and segregate messages based on a category of a community-of-interest associated with the message using a corresponding community-of-interest key  554  (e.g., cryptographic pairs). Also, unlike private/public key pairs, community-of-interest keys  554  are usually installed or generated before a transaction to increase security, rather than receiving and generating the key on-the-fly during a transaction, in which the key can be intercepted. Community-of-interest keys  554  may be stored in a key repository  566 , which is a storage area in memory  508 . Filters  552  can also be stored in memory  508 . 
     In some embodiments, each community-of-interest key  554  has an associated filter  552 , such that a set of endpoint access permissions are included with each community of interest. In such embodiments, the filter associated with a community-of-interest key  554 . Example community of interest keys can include a secure community of interest key  554 , that may have an associated filter defining one or more endpoints and/or gateway devices associated with that community of interest and excluding communication with any unsecured sites, or a clear text filter that would allow clear text communication with external, publicly available and unsecured systems (e.g., via the internet). In the example of the clear text filter, such a filter could include one or more exclusionary permissions preventing clear text communication to secured endpoints or gateway devices normally requiring cryptographically-secured communication. Additional details regarding example key and filter arrangements are discussed below in conjunction with  FIGS. 17-21 . 
     Security engine  550  may also include a cryptographic engine  556  for generating cryptographic keys and other information used to encrypt or decrypt messages, as well as route data to a target device. In one embodiment, cryptographic engine  556  generates a cryptographic data set, which may include one or more session keys which are used for encrypting/decrypting one message or a group of messages when computing device  500  is in a communication session with another device. 
     Security engine  550  may also include other authentication data and code  558 , used for purposes of authenticating data or information, such as passwords, recorded biometric information, digital certificates, and other security information. As is appreciated by those skilled in the art after having the benefit of this disclosure, it is possible that there may be various combinations of keys and authentication data in security engine  550 . 
     Although described in terms of code, the exemplary security engine  550  may be implemented in hardware, software, or combinations of hardware and software. Additionally, all components of security engine  550  may be communicatively coupled to each other through controller  502 . As would be appreciated by those skilled in the art, many of the components of security engine  550  may be stored and identified as files under control of file system  522 . 
     Security engine  550  may also include a data splitter module  560  for splitting data that is to be transmitted from computing device  500 . Typically, security engine  550  relies on a community-of-interest key and/or cryptographic engine  556  to determine how to split and encrypt data. Data splitter module  560  divides data into portions of data. A portion of data is any bit or combination of bits of data that comprise a larger set of data, such as a message or a portion of a cryptographic data set (a second key). A portion of data may be encapsulated in packets for transport, but the content of the data may be fixed or of a variable bit length. Accordingly, a portion of data (such as a portion of message or portion of cryptographic data set) corresponds to one or more bits comprising data content, i.e., payload as opposed to a data header message. Data splitter module  560  may be configured to produce predetermined bit length portions of data or it may be determined dynamically in an automatic fashion. 
     Security engine  550  may also include an assignment module  562 . Assignment module  562  assigns tags to each portion of data (portion of a message or key). Each tag contains metadata indicating a traffic path (to be described) a particular portion of data is to be distributed through one or more networks to another computing device  400 . Other metadata may be included in the tags, such as information identifying the network the portion of data originated, the client device destination, possibly the order of the portion of data in relation to other portions of data emitted from the same network, and other suitable information. 
     Security engine  550  may also include an assembler module  564  configured to reassemble portions of data received at different times, and/or via different data paths. Once data is reassembled, authorized assets and messages appear accessible in plaintext format from the end-users perspective. It is noted that various security techniques may be employed on computing device  500  to prevent the user from saving data, mixing different levels of data, or sending the data to other locations for dissemination to another network, such as via email or other electronic transfer means. Applications may also execute on separate physical and/or logical partitions within computing device  500 . 
     Additional details regarding the security engine and cryptographic data sets generated using the security engine are discussed in U.S. Patent Application No. 60/648,531; Ser. Nos. 11/339,974; 11/714,590; 11/714,666; and Ser. No. 11/714,598, which were previously incorporated by reference in their entireties. 
       FIG. 6  illustrates an example communications infrastructure  600  useable within a computing environment to manage both secure and clear text communications channels, according to various aspects of the present disclosure. The communications infrastructure  600  can be implemented within the computing device  400 ,  500  of  FIGS. 4-5 , for example using the operating system  420 , application software  422 , and program data  424  to managing operation of network interface or adapter  408  of  FIG. 4 , and for example as at least in part implemented using security engine  550  of  FIG. 5 . 
     In the embodiment shown, the communications infrastructure  600  includes a physical network interface card  602  communicatively interconnected to a network  604 , illustrated in this embodiment as an Ethernet local area network (LAN). The physical network interface card  602  is generally a piece of communications hardware included within the computing system, and can be, in one embodiment, the network interface adapter  452  of  FIG. 4 . 
     The communications infrastructure  600  includes a routing table  606 , which defines one or more local and remote IP addresses used to communicate messages between a computing system incorporating the communications infrastructure  600  and a remote computing system. For example, the routing table  606  can include a default route, local network and broadcast addresses, as well as one or more network masks, gateways, and other points of interest. 
     In general, when a computing system intends to transmit clear text data using the physical network interface card  602 , that system will determine an address using the routing table  606  and form a packet to be forwarded to the physical network interface card  602  for communication via network  604 . In accordance with the present disclosure, to separate secure data communications from standard clear text communications, a dedicated communication stack can be used for each of one or more types of secured communication. 
     In the embodiment shown, and as discussed in further detail in various embodiments of the present disclosure below, the communications infrastructure  600  includes a first secure software stack  608  and a second secure software stack  609 , each useable to communicate over a secured connection to a remote system. The first secure software stack  608  that includes a secure communications driver  610 , a virtual secure network interface card  612 , and a network interface card driver  614 . 
     The secure communications driver  610  receives data to be transmitted via a secured communication method (e.g., as described in  FIGS. 7-10 , below), and an address from the routing table  606 , and generates one or more packets of encrypted data to be transmitted. In some embodiments, as discussed further below, the secure communications driver uses one or more filters to determine whether secured (split and encrypted) data packets can be sent or received to/from a particular network address, and to determine whether secure or clear text data packets can be accepted at the computing system implementing the communications infrastructure  600 . For example, if a data packet or message is received at the virtual secure network interface card  612  from an endpoint not included in an access list of a filter that defines permissions to that endpoint or client device, the secure communications driver  610  will discard that packet, preventing it from reaching an application to which it would otherwise be addressed or intended. Likewise, the secure communications driver  610  can prevent communication of data packets to remote endpoint systems not authorized by the access lists in one or more filters defined in the computing device. 
     The virtual secure network interface card  612  acts as a virtual version of the physical network interface card  602 , in that it receives data packets formed at the secure communications driver  610  and instructions for where and how to transport those data packets. In certain embodiments, the secure communications driver  610  acts analogously to a hardware driver, but acts on the virtual secure network interface card  612 . 
     The network interface card driver  614  provides the link between the virtual secure network interface card  612 , and physical network interface card  602  to allow communication of secured data packets with a remote system (e.g., an endpoint, gateway, or other remote system). In certain embodiments, the network interface card driver  614  acts as a piece of hardware to the operating system of the computer implementing the communications infrastructure  600 , for example to host the virtual secure network interface card  612 , and allow applications to transmit data via that piece of virtual hardware. 
     In the embodiment shown, an optional second software stack  609  is also shown, which can be used concurrently with the first secure software stack  608 . In the embodiment shown, the second software stack is configured to allow a different type of security, in which security is not provided by data obfuscation on a packet-by-packet basis, but rather by creating a secured connection to a dedicated endpoint. In the example embodiment shown, this second software stack  609  is configured to manage communication via a virtual private network (VPN) connection, where a secure tunnel is formed between the computing system operating the communications infrastructure  600  and a predetermined, known gateway. In this embodiment, the second software stack  609  includes a VPN driver  616 , a virtual VPN network interface card  618 , and a VPN communications driver  620 . The VPN driver  616  generates instructions for communication with a particular VPN gateway, and for constructing a secure tunnel between the computing system implementing the communications infrastructure  600  and the VPN gateway (e.g., as illustrated below in connection with  FIG. 20 ). The virtual VPN network interface card  618 , like the virtual secure network interface card  612 , acts as a virtual version of the physical network interface card  602 , in that it receives data packets formed at the VPN driver  616  and instructions for where and how to transport those data packets (e.g., via a secure tunnel). The virtual VPN network interface card  618 , similar to the network interface card driver  614  acts as a piece of hardware to the operating system of the computer implementing the communications infrastructure  600 , for example to host the virtual VPN network interface card  618 , and allow applications to transmit data via that piece of virtual hardware to remote systems. 
     Overall, and referring to  FIGS. 1-6  generally, it is noted that the computing systems and generalized example networks of the present disclosure generally provide infrastructure for receipt and management of encryption keys specific to one or more communities-of-interest, and distributed use of algorithms for encrypting and splitting data into obscured data packets such that only those individuals having access rights to that data can in fact reformulate the data upon receipt of those data packets.  FIGS. 7-9  below briefly describe methods and arrangements for treatment of data packets sent and received from a gateway, endpoint, or other computing device configured for secured communication using the cryptographic splitting and virtual network arrangements of the present disclosure. 
     II. Methods for Secure Communication 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 7-9 , methods and systems for securely transmitting data packets between computing systems are disclosed. Generally, the methods and systems illustrated in  FIGS. 7-10  provide a brief overview of methods of handling data packets sent and received using the computing systems and networks described herein, for example those discussed above with respect to  FIGS. 1-6 . Additional details regarding these methods and systems are disclosed in the U.S. Patent Application No. 60/648,531; Ser. Nos. 11/339,974; 11/714,590; 11/714,666; and Ser. No. 11/714,598, listed above and previously incorporated by reference. 
     As used herein, a “message” or “data packet” refers generally to any set of data sent from one node to another node in a network. A message may include different forms of data usually in some form of a payload. A message may be an e-mail, a video stream, pictures, text documents, word processing documents, web-based content, instant messages, and various other forms of data that when in plain text, or clear form, may reveal confidential and sensitive information. In most instances, this invention is concerned with securing data-in-motion, or in other words, cryptographic data or messages sent from one node to another node such as data traveling from one location to another within one or more networks which may include the Internet. 
       FIG. 7  illustrates an exemplary method  700  for securely transmitting a cryptographic data set among logically partitioned data paths. The cryptographic data set can include, for example one or more encryption keys, filters, and other information useable at an endpoint or other computing device to enable that device to establish secure communication with a remote system (e.g., another endpoint, a gateway, or any other remote device configured for cryptographically split communication). 
     In this method, in block  702 , a cryptographic data set is divided into a plurality of portions, and tag values are assigned to each portion of the set. Each portion is encapsulated in separate packets. In block  704 , the portions of cryptographic data set are transmitted from an egress point of a computing device, such as a network interface card as discussed above in conjunction with  FIG. 6 . On the receiving endpoint, in block  706 , each portion of cryptographic data is received by a target computing device. In one embodiment, as the packets received include a new community-of-interest key identifier embedded therein. In another embodiment, newly received packets do not include such a key identifier, and instead the receiving endpoint attempts to restore (reassemble) a cryptographic data portion encapsulated in a payload portion of the packet using a community-of-interest key accessed from the receiving computing device&#39;s repository. If there is only one community-of-interest key present in the repository, the receiving computing will attempt to reassemble the cryptographic data portion(s) using the single key. If there are more than one community-of-interest key in the receiving computing device&#39;s repository, the receiving computing device will iteratively try each key until it locates a key which is able to reassemble the cryptographic data portion(s). 
     However, if no identifier match is located in block  706 , in Step  708  each packet and hence portion of cryptographic data set received by the target device is discarded, erased, and/or ignored. This may represent a situation where the end-user of an endpoint does not have authorization to view a message, because the end-user (or the end-user&#39;s computing device) lacks the requisite community-of-interest key, or if the transmitting computing device is not included in a listing of permitted devices at the target device. 
     If according to the Yes branch of block  706 , a community-of-interest key matching the identifier is located, or a community-of-interest key is identified which is able to restore the payload portion of the packet(s), then in block  710  each portion of the cryptographic data set is temporarily stored for eventual reassembly. At this point a tunnel can be established between the sending and receiving computing devices. 
     In block  712 , the cryptographic data set is decrypted. That is, the cryptographic data set is reconstructed (reassembled) by decrypting each portion of the cryptographic data set using the community-in-interest key identified in block  710 . Once all portions of cryptographic data set are received, it is possible to fully reassemble the cryptographic data set on the receiving computing device. The cryptographic data set is in a usable form for use to decrypt portions of a message received, which will be described with reference to  FIG. 8 . 
       FIG. 8  illustrates an exemplary method  800  for securely transmitting a message among logically partitioned data paths, according to a possible embodiment. Generally, method  800  occurs after a secure tunnel has been created, to allow transmission between two computing systems. Method  800  includes blocks  802 ,  804 ,  806 , and  808  (each of the blocks represents one or more operational acts). The order in which the method is described is not to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the described method blocks can be combined in any order to implement the method. Furthermore, the method can be implemented in any suitable hardware, software, firmware, or combination thereof. 
     In block  802 , a message is divided into portions, and tag values are assigned to each portion of the set. Each portion is encapsulated in separate packets using a cryptographic data set at the sending computing device. For example, in one embodiment, an assignment module  562  ( FIG. 5 ) uses a cryptographic data set stored at the sending computing device (or as received, according to the method  700  of  FIG. 7 ) to assign tags to each portion of the message. Each tag contains metadata indicating a traffic path a particular portion of a message is to follow to a target computing device within a network. 
     In block  804 , the portions of cryptographic data set are transmitted from an egress point of a computing device. For example, portions of cryptographic data set are transmitted from an I/O port  516  of computing device  500 , separately. In one embodiment, transmitting the portions separately may include transmitting at least one portion of the message at a different instance in time than at least another portion of the message. In one embodiment, transmitting the portions of the message separately includes transmitting at least two different portions of the message on at least two different data communication paths. For example, computing device  500  assigns a portion of message to a particular data path based on the tag value. Tag values assigned to each portion of cryptographic data may correspond to a particular communication data path, to transmit the portion of cryptographic data set. In block  806 , each portion of the message set is temporarily stored for eventual reassembly in some portion of memory  508  ( FIG. 5 ) of a computing device. 
     In block  808 , the message is put into a useable form. That is, the message is reconstructed (reassembled) by decrypting each portion of the message using the cryptographic data set. For example, security engine  550  ( FIG. 5 ) may use an assembler module  564  ( FIG. 5 ) in conjunction with a cryptographic data set to reassemble portions of message received at different times, and/or via different data paths. Once all portions of the message are received, it is possible to fully reassemble the message in a usable form on the receiving computing device. 
       FIG. 9  illustrates an overall logical flow of how an original message or cryptographic data set (e.g., as in  FIGS. 7-8 , above) is split and encrypted according to the various embodiments discussed herein. As illustrated, an original message  902  is combined with a preheader  904 , and split into portions  906  by a splitting function  908 . The splitting function  908  also acts to encrypt each of the portions, such that each portion contains an obfuscated portion of the original message  902 . Each of the portions  906  are appended with an IP header  910 . The IP header  910  of each split portion identifies the set of data to which the portion  906  belongs. The various portions can then be passed from a first computing system to a second computing system via a number of different routes, with the second computing system having a capability of reassembling that original message  902  (for example, due to possession of a complementary community-of-interest key or cryptographic data set) at a reassembly function  912 . In various embodiments, the splitting function  908  and reassembly function  912  can be performed, for example, by a security engine, such as security engine  550  of  FIG. 5 , on an authorized transmitting and receiving computing device, respectively. In certain embodiments, the splitting function  908  and reassembly function  912  use a strong encryption standard, such as AES-256 encryption. Other types of encryption standards and data splitting/dispersal operations could be used as well. 
     III. Transaction Security Using a Secure Boot Device 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 10-16 , a particular embodiment of the distributed systems discussed above is disclosed in which a secure connection can be established across a public network, such as the internet. In this embodiment, generally a secure boot device can be used to create a secure environment at an otherwise untrusted computing device, which can in turn remotely access a trusted computing device. Such an embodiment can be used, for example, to provide a secure portal to a centralized transaction processor, such as a banking institution, a governmental institution, or other entity where in-transit data security is important. 
     Referring now specifically to  FIG. 10 , a generalized example of a distributed system  1000  is shown, using a secure boot device  1002 , according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. In the embodiment shown, the distributed system  1000  includes a server  1004 , such as a banking or government server. The distributed system also includes one or more remote computer systems  1006 , for example customer-owned, employee-owned, or otherwise uncontrolled systems. The server  1004  can be any of a number of types of server systems capable of receiving transactions from the one or more remote computer systems  1006 , such as a web server or database server. In alternative embodiments include more than one server and/or computer system  1006 . 
     In certain embodiments, a client computer system  1006 , also referred to herein as an endpoint or client computing device, can display a user interface, such as web page  1008 . The web page  1008  or other user interface can display to a user details of a transaction  1005  taking place at the server  1004 , for example a financial transaction in the case that the server  1004  is a banking server, or some other type of transaction relating to an entity for which highly secure communications are desired. A secure connection  1010  is created between the client computer system  1006  and the server  1004  to allow transmission of details regarding the transaction over a public network, such as the internet. 
     In order to create the secure connection  1010  in a form that may be trusted by the server  1004 , in certain embodiments the client computer system  1006  boots an operating system that is stored on a secure boot device  1002  attached to the client computer system  1006 . This secure boot device  1002  stores a trusted version of operating system software and secure communications software used when the client computer system  1006  establishes and performs the communications with the server  1004 . In one embodiment, the secure boot device  1002  may correspond to a USB storage device such as a Stealth M500™ from MXI Security. A copy of the datasheet for the MXY M500 device is submitted alongside this application, and incorporated by reference herein in its entirety. In such embodiments, the client computer system  1006  is a USB-bootable computing system capable of communication with a remote system, such as server  1004 , or a gateway providing access to the server having capabilities of communicating using the cryptographic splitting operations discussed herein. 
     The secure boot device  1002  provides secure storage that prevents tampering with the software loaded onto the device. This secure storage permits the institution operating the server  1004 , such as a bank or other financial institution, to load onto the secure storage a set of trusted software modules that may limit the possible operations that a client computer system  1006  may perform. For example, the software modules can be configured to prevent the client computer system  1006  from accessing non-secured network resources, and can limit other peripheral communication channels (e.g., Bluetooth, serial connections, or other peripheral device connections), as well as prevent the client computer system  1006  from executing application programs stored in a memory of the system itself. As such, the transactions  1005  may be trusted by both the user at the client computer system  1006 , and the institution controlling the server  1004 . In addition, the establishment of the secure connection  1010  between the client computer system  1006  and the server  1004  may be authenticated using identification information stored upon the secure storage (e.g., a community-of-interest key) to increase the level of trust that the user corresponds to a customer of the bank. 
       FIG. 11A  illustrates a set of processing modules  1100  stored on a secure boot device  1002  according to yet another embodiment of the present invention. The set of processing modules  1100  are preferably stored in a read-write portion of memory of a secure boot device that can, for example, be updated by a trusted network resource, as discussed below. When a user wishes to establish a secure connection  1010  to a server  1004  using a client computer system  1006 , the user boots the client computer system  1006  from the secure boot device  1002 . To ensure that the client computer system  1006  poses a minimized threat of harm to the server  1004 , a minimal set of software modules  1101 - 1104  are loaded when the client computer system  1006  boots from the secure boot device  1002 . This minimal set of software modules include boot software  1101 , a client terminal process module  1102 , a small OS shell  1103  and secure communications interface software module  1104 . Other modules could be included as well. 
     In some embodiments, each of these modules  1101 - 1104  are read from a secure boot image  1106  on the secure boot device  1002  at boot time of the client computer system  1006 . These modules  1101 - 1104  are stored within the RAM of the client computer system  1006  and executed while the user communicates with the server  1004 . Although in some embodiments, modules  1101 - 1104  can be located in a read-only portion of memory of the secure boot device  1002  and loaded from that location when the client computer system  1006  is booted from the secure boot device, in other embodiments, the modules  1101 - 1104  are stored in a read-write memory, allowing the modules  1101 - 1104  to be updated in parallel with execution from copies of the modules stored in RAM on the client computer system  1006 . Details regarding this feature are described in greater detail below. 
     The boot software  1101  comprises the software modules needed to load the other software modules into the RAM of the client computer system  1006 . This module ensures that the secure boot image is a valid image before the modules are loaded. It may perform consistency checks to verify that the modules have not been modified prior to loading and use. 
     The client terminal process module  1102  comprises the process that provides a user interface to the user of the client computer system  1006  as well as communications to the server  1004 . In various embodiments of the present disclosure, the client terminal process module  1102  creates a communications session, accepts commands and inputs from the user, and interacts with remote resources, such as web services or other data communication services, on the server  1004  to permit the user to perform transactions  1005 . In various embodiments, this process may include a web browser or other file access mechanism for interaction with a server using known Internet based protocols. In other embodiments, the client terminal process module  1102  may be a specialized client application that performs similar communications and user controls. The client terminal process module  1102  may limit a user&#39;s ability to input destination URLs and related server addresses into a browser, thereby allowing only use of one or more addresses preloaded into the secure boot device  1002  as an example additional mechanism to enhance security. 
     The small OS shell  1103  comprises a stripped down version of a standard operating system such as Linux™. For example, the small OS shell  1103  can in some embodiments include only the supporting modules and drivers necessary to support the client terminal process module  1102  and the communications interface module  1104  used to establish and utilize the secure connection  1010  to the server  1004 . All other modules that typically are included in an operating system to permit the general purpose use of the client computer system  1006  as well as to initiate the execution of any program stored on the client computer system  1006  can be omitted. In one embodiment, the client terminal process module  1102  will begin execution at the end of the boot process, and thus provide the only means by which the user may use the client computer system  1006  during its operation. 
     The communications interface software modules  1104  performs the secure communications with between the client computer system  1006  and the server  1004  and any security related processing. This may include, for example, encryption and parsing as defined in the previously identified patent applications that have been incorporated herein. This module may also be involved in the authentication of the client computer system  1006  to the server  1004  as well as its current operation in a secure and trusted state after having booted from the secure boot device  1002 . 
       FIG. 11B  illustrates storage and management of one or more processing modules, such as modules  1101 - 1104 , on the secure boot device  1002 . In the embodiment shown, the secure boot device includes a read/write memory  1120  and a read-only memory  1140 . The read/write memory  1120  includes an open read/write portion  1122  and a dedicated read/write portion  1124 . In certain embodiments, the open read/write portion  1122 , the dedicated read/write portion  1124 , and the read-only memory  1140  are viewable to a user of a computing device as separate logical memory spaces (e.g., separate drives); however, in other embodiments, these partitions could be considered separate directories or otherwise logically distinct. 
     The open read/write portion  1122  generally is useable by a user to store unsecured files, such as documents or files retrieved from websites by that user while using the secure boot device. In some embodiments, the open read/write portion  1122  is accessible for storage only when the secure boot device  1002  is used to boot a computing system to which it is connected; in other embodiments, the open read/write portion  1122  operates as a traditional storage device when the secure boot device  1002  is inserted into such a computing system. 
     The dedicated read/write portion  1124  includes a plurality of software module storage areas in which different types of software can be stored. In the embodiment shown, the dedicated read/write portion  1124  includes a runtime content area  1126 , a custom content area  1128 , and first and second thin client operating system areas  1130 ,  1132 . In alternative embodiments, other storage areas could be used as well. Additionally, in the embodiment shown, the dedicated read/write portion  1124  can be secured using a private partition key which can be used to decrypt the data in the dedicated read/write portion  1124  upon receipt of a PIN or other credential. 
     In the embodiment shown, the runtime content area  1126  stores configuration information used locally on the secure boot device to indicate a configuration of the local device to be used when a computing system is launched using the secure boot device. In certain embodiments, the runtime content area is password protected, preventing an unauthorized user of the secure boot device  1002  from accessing this configuration information, or rebooting a computing system using the secure boot device. 
     The custom content area  1128  stores specific provisioning information, for example a location of a secure server to connect to, as well as various options for connection. The custom content area  1128  can also optionally store branding information, for example to indicate the particular customer or entity distributing the secure boot device  1002  to its employee or affiliate. 
     A first thin client operating system area  1130  can store a thin client version of an operating system, as well as one or more applications capable of running on that operating system. In some embodiments, the first thin client operating system area  1130  stores an embedded version of an operating system, such as Windows XP Embedded, from Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash. Other embedded operating systems could be used as well. In some embodiments, the first thin client operating system area  1130  also stores other application data, such as could be used to access remote websites or other remotely networked resources. One example of such an application is an Internet Explorer web browser provided by Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash. Other applications could be included as well. 
     The second thin client operating system area  1132  stores a second thin client version of an operating system applications capable of running on that operating system, as well as optionally one or more security modules configured to provide application-level access to security features useable on a computing system booted from a secure boot device  1002 . In this embodiment, the second thin client operating system area  1132  can store, for example, an open source thin client operating system (e.g., Linux-based), as well as virtualization software, remote desktop software, and browser software (e.g., Firefox or Chrome web browsers). The second thin client operating system area  1132  can also optionally store one or more security applications allowing a user to control the secure connection established with a remote server. For example, the second thin client operating system area  1132  can include Stealth applications and driver software, as well as a remote update agent configured to manage updating of software on the secure boot device  1002  in accordance with the methods and systems described below in conjunction with  FIGS. 22-25 . 
     The read-only memory  1140  stores one or more utilities intended to be used to establish secure connections, such as libraries and utilities configured to establish a cryptographically split connection with one or more servers. In certain embodiments, the read-only memory  1140  stores an operating system kernel useable with thin client operating system software stored in the second thin client operating system area  1132 . Additionally, in the embodiment shown, the read-only memory  1140  can be secured using a private partition key which can be used to decrypt the data in the read-only memory  1140  upon receipt of a PIN or other credential. 
     In some embodiments, in particular those described below in which update of the secure boot device  1002  is performed, the dedicated read/write portion  1124  also includes a replacement area  1150  for one or more portions of the software stored therein. In the embodiment shown, a replacement custom content area  1128 , and first and second thin client operating system areas  1130 ,  1132  are shown. In such embodiments, these portions can be updated from a remote system, such as a remote update server or update enclave. Update agent software stored in the second thin client operating system area  1132  can be used to track the status of an update, such that the replacement software modules can be substituted for the active software modules once fully downloaded from a remote system. 
       FIG. 12  illustrates a flowchart of a method  1200  for using a secure boot device, such as secure boot device  1002 , to create a secure connection to a server according to an embodiment of the present invention. In the embodiment shown, a four step process is used; however, in alternative embodiments, more or fewer steps could be performed. The method  1200  begins with a user suspending the operation of a client computer, such as client computer system  1006 , by halting the operation of its standard operating system in step  1201 . In one embodiment, a client computer system  1006  typically runs a version of the Windows™ operating system from the Microsoft Corporation; however, in alternative embodiments, different operating system software could be executed on the client computer system  1006 . Irrespective of the particular operating system used, the operating system of the client computer system  1006  is halted in order to permit the client computer system  1006  to reboot using the secure boot device  1002 , i.e., the small OS shell  1103 . 
     A user attaches the secure boot device  1002  to the client computer system  1006  and the computer is rebooted in step  1202 . If the secure boot device  1002  corresponds to a USB memory stick, the device is merely inserted into a USB port on the client computer system  1006  prior to rebooting the computer. Other arrangements are possible as well, depending upon the particular format taken by the secure boot device. When the client computer system  1006  is rebooted, it is instructed to use the operating system image stored on the secure boot device  1002  that causes the trusted system software to be loaded and the client terminal process module  1102  to be executed. 
     In step  1203 , the user provides additional information to the client terminal process module  1102  used in the authentication process as a secure connection is established between the client computer system  1006  and the server  1004 . A secure connection  1010  is then established using the information from the secure boot device  1002 . The user may now use this secure connection  1010  in step  1204  to perform banking transactions on the server  1004 . Once all of these transactions are completed, the user may shut down the client computer system  1006  and reboot into its standard operating system, returning the client computer system  1006  to normal operation. This shut down process terminates the secure connection between the client computer system  1006  and the server  1004 , restoring the functionality of the operating system normally executing on the client computer system  1006 . 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 13-15 , a set of possible embodiments of distributed processing system using a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server are shown. In these multiple alternate embodiments, a client computer uses the previously described processes of establishing a secure connection to a server via a wide area network (WAN) after the client computer boots from a secure boot device. Typically, the WAN connecting these computers corresponds to the public Internet, although any communications may be used. The client computers, according to the embodiments shown, generally interact with a secure appliance to provide a trusted connection to a service provider, such as a bank, data center, or other facility or entity desiring secured communications. The security related operations of encryption and parsing of the data, as described within the previously identified patent applications are performed in the various illustrated client computers and the secure appliances. 
       FIG. 13  illustrates a distributed processing system  1300  useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server according to a first of these possible embodiments. The distributed processing system  1300  is, in the embodiment shown, one example distributed, networked arrangement that can be implemented according to the generalized discussion in conjunction with  FIGS. 10-12 , above. In the embodiment shown, the distributed processing system  1300  includes a pair of client locations  1302   a - b . Each client location  1302  includes one or more client computing devices  1304 , which can join a secured distributed processing system using secure boot devices  1306 . In the embodiment shown, client location  1302   a  includes a network address translation (NAT) module  1308  and a DHCP module  1310 , capable of local domain and network address resolution at the client location  1302   a . Optionally, other client locations, such as client location  1302   b , can include this or other networking functionality as well. 
     Each of the client computing devices  1304  are configured to be capable of accessing a remote location  1312 , such as a central office or institution hosting a resource to be accessed. In the embodiment shown, the remote location  1312  is a data center that includes an entity intranet  1314 , such as a data center network or other set of resources, that is accessible via a web application  1316 . Other types of remote location resources could be made available as well. Each of the client computing devices  1304  connect to the remote location  1312  via an open network, illustrated as the internet  1318 . 
     At the remote location  1312 , typically one or more access devices, illustrated as a network management system  1320 , generally receives clear text communication from the internet  1318 , for example relating to typical, unsecured communication of data. This is illustrated by the solid line extending from the cloud representing the internet  1318  to the network management system  1320 . The network management system  1320  can perform a variety of operations on inbound and/or outbound data, such as packet inspection and routing, load balancing across one or more computing systems and/or workloads, and firewall operations. Additionally, the remote location  1312  can include one or more secure gateway appliances  1322  configured to perform cryptographic splitting and encrypting operations, to allow for secured communication with client computing devices  1304  via a WAN, e.g., the internet  1318  (illustrated by broken line connections). The secure gateway appliances  1322  can receive the split and encrypted data at via the internet  1318 , recompose that data into original, clear text data, and forward it to other portions of the remote location  1312  as desired (e.g., to the network management system  1320  for handling). 
     In some embodiments, a number of secure gateway appliances  1322  are accessible external to the remote location  1312 . For example, in some embodiments, a separate secure gateway appliance  1322  could be made available for every defined community of interest, such that communications for a particular group of users are routed from a common gateway. In other embodiments, secure gateway devices dynamically allocate connection bandwidth to client computing devices  1304  based on current bandwidth use, and connect to client computing devices  1304  associated with users in a number of communities of interest. Other arrangements of gateway devices are possible as well. 
     Additionally, at the remote location  1312 , an authorization server  1324  can be included which includes one or more provisioning and management tools for managing memberships in communities of interest, as well as resources accessible by individuals associated with those communities of interest. The authorization server  1324  can, in certain embodiments, be configured to authenticate a user of a client computing device  1304  and associated secure boot device  1306 . The authorization server  1324  can be configured to, for example, receive username and password, cryptographically-signed certificate, or PIN or other information from a user of a client computing device  1304  seeking to connect to the remote location  1312  via a secure connection, and can transmit one or more encryption keys to the client computing device  1304 , such as an encrypted session key or other information from a cryptographic data set, as discussed above in connection with  FIG. 7 . 
     It is noted that data connections between the secure gateway appliance  1322  and a local server, such as the authorization server  1324 , is typically trusted because of its co-location within a data center or the use of a secure connection that is otherwise trusted. The secure gateway appliance  1322  typically involves the use of encryption keys that are associated with the identity of particular users. These keys may consist of public key encryption keys that would use a set of keys at the client computing device  1304 , and a corresponding set of keys at the secure gateway appliance  1322 . The set of keys used by the client computing device  1304  may be stored on the secure boot device  1306  and are not accessible by the user. As part of the authentication process, the authorization server  1324  may be used to perform any desired authentication and then identify the needed encryption keys that are needed by the secure gateway appliance  1322  for use in performing the secure communications. 
     In use, typical client operations contacting the remote location  1312  can be performed using clear text communication. However, when a user wishes to perform one or more sensitive transactions involving confidential data, that user can reboot his/her client computing device  1304  at the client location  1302  using a secure boot device  1306  as discussed above. Software modules from the secure boot device  1306  are loaded at the client computing device  1304 , and optionally a user is prompted to enter his/her username, certificate, or other credentials. Upon authentication of that user, the client computing device  1304  will form a secure connection with a secure gateway appliance  1322  that is either defined in memory of the secure boot device  1306  or received via the authorization server  1324 . The secure boot device  1306  will dictate communication with only the remote location  1312 , and will require communication to occur via the secure gateway appliances  1322 . Accordingly, implementation of the distributed processing system  1300  allows an entity to protect sensitive data being passed over public, IP-based networks. 
     It is noted that, to devices communicating via the internet  1318  using clear text communications, the various devices communicating only via secure communication protocols of the present disclosure (e.g., a client computing device  1304  when securely booted using a secure boot device  1306 , a gateway appliance  1322 , or the authorization server  1324  in the embodiment shown) appear non-responsive to other devices connected to the internet  1318 . For example, the authorization server  1324  may not respond to communications in clear text, and one or more gateway devices may simply forward data received in clear text to the network management system  1320 . This includes both clear text devices, as well as other clients and/or gateway devices operating using only a different set of community-of-interest keys. This prevents unauthorized access to the data as transmitted, or “data in motion”, within the distributed processing system  1300 . Additionally, it prevents network browsing and malware injections by unauthorized systems via the internet  1318 . 
     Referring now to  FIG. 14 , a second example of a distributed processing system  1400  useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server is shown. In this embodiment, the distributed processing system  1400  represents an arrangement in which the secure connection into an intranet of a remote system is provided as a managed service, i.e., by an entity other than the administrator of the intranet within which the secured, community-of-interest protected resources reside. In this embodiment, the authorization server  1324  exists connected to the internet  1318 , separate from the remote location  1312 . In this second embodiment, a trusted connection from a secure gateway appliance  1322  and the authorization server  1324  may be needed. In both of these cases, the secure gateway appliance  1322  is physically connected via internet  1318  to the server providing the web application  1316 . Additionally, one or more external secure computing resources  1402  can be included in the distributed processing system  1400  and use of those systems could be authenticated by the authorization server  1324  in this embodiment, because it is not specifically only affiliated with the remote location  1312 , but instead can transmit secure messages and provide authentication via the internet  1318 . 
     Referring now to  FIG. 15 , a third example of a distributed processing system  1500  useable in connection with a secure boot device to create a secure connection to a server is shown. In this distributed processing system, the secure gateway appliance  1322  is physically located in a local intranet of a managed service provider  1502 . A managed service provider  1502  can be, for example, an entity configured to manage resources needed to administer communities-of-interest, encryption keys, access control lists, and other information typically managed by an administrator of a local intranet. In the embodiment shown, the distributed processing system  1500  includes a client computing device  1304  and associated secure boot device  1306  as discussed above; the distributed processing system also includes a remote location  1312 , in this embodiment being a customer of the managed service provider  1502 . In the embodiment shown, the remote location  1312  includes an analogous entity intranet  1314 , such as a data center network or other set of resources, which is accessible via a web application  1316 . The remote location  1312  also includes a network management system  1320 , for example for load balancing and routing of data within the intranet. 
     As compared to the two prior embodiments, in this embodiment the managed service provider  1502  is illustrated as including a separate service enclave  1504  and a customer enclave  1506 . As referenced in the present disclosure, an “enclave” generally refers to a particular area or network of one or more computing systems defined by function. 
     Generally, the service enclave  1504  includes one or more computing resources configured to be managed by the managed service provider  1502 , including management of community-of-interest keys, memberships in communities of interest, authentication of users and granting of access to resources in a secured location. In the embodiment shown, the service enclave  1504  includes a service appliance  1508 , an administration appliance  1510 , an authorization server  1512 , and a DHCP server  1514 . 
     The service appliance  1508  is generally an appliance having a known address, such that instructions stored in a secure boot device (e.g., boot device  1306 ) include an address for that appliance, to allow authentication of a user of the device. The service appliance  1508  receives initial connection requests from one or more client computing devices  1304 , and establishes an encrypted connection to the client computing device  1304  to provide the client with its one or more community of interest keys, and other secure, community-of-interest-specific information. In certain embodiments, the service appliance  1508  is accessible using either an administration community-of-interest key or a service key. The service key can be, for example, a key provided to users, e.g., stored in a read-only portion of the secure boot device, such that the boot device itself is authorized to and configured to connect to the service appliance  1508  to obtain one or more community-of-interest keys therefrom. 
     The administration appliance  1510  provides access to the service enclave  1504  for administrative tasks related to the service enclave  1504  and customer enclave  1506 . Example tasks performed via access to the administrative appliance include, for example configuring addresses of gateway appliances, configuring membership lists in one or more communities of interest and keys associated with those communities of interest, logging events, creating and managing virtual private networks within the customer enclave  1506 , and other tasks. In some embodiments, a user requires an administration community-of-interest key to access the administration appliance  1510 , to prevent unauthorized access by customers or other unauthorized individuals. 
     The authorization server  1512  manages keys associated with each of the one or more communities of interest associated with the customer enclave  1506 . The authorization server  1512  receives login information from a user of a client computing device  1304  and associated secure boot device  1306 , and returns the COI keys and identity of the secure gateway appliance to which that user is authorized to connect (discussed below). The DHCP server  1514  manages addressing of systems within the service enclave  1504 , providing IP addresses for resources accessible via the service appliance  1508 . 
     The customer enclave  1506  includes a secure gateway appliance  1322 , as well as a network addressing table (NAT)  1518 . The secure gateway appliance  1322  provides an endpoint to which all secure communications from the client  1304  are directed, while the NAT  1518  receives clear text communications from the client computing device  1304  or remote location  1312 . Preferably, the resources accessible via the secure gateway appliance  1322  and the NAT  1518  are not coextensive, i.e., no clear text communications via the NAT reach the network resources specifically associated with the community-of-interest enabled at the client computing device  1304  and the secure gateway appliance  1322 . In the embodiment shown, a DNS server  1520  and DHCP server  1522  are included at the customer enclave  1506 . The DNS server  1520  allows definition of one or more virtual private networks among computing resources in the customer enclave  1506 , thereby allowing for segregation of computing resources on a community of interest basis within the customer enclave. The DHCP server  1522  allows each endpoint connecting to the customer enclave  1506  to acquire a secured private network address to be used in the customer&#39;s secured portion of the customer intranet within the customer enclave  1506 . Static routes are configured via the DHCP server  1522  to allow TCP/IP packets from a client to be properly routed to the customer intranet. 
     It is noted that in the example of  FIG. 15 , the secure gateway appliance  1322  can be used, not only by more than one community of interest within a particular entity as discussed above with respect to  FIGS. 13-14 , but can also be addressed by multiple different, unaffiliated customers of the managed service provider  1502 . Accordingly, additional remote sites  1312  and client computing devices  1304  could be incorporated as well. 
     For example, a first client computing device  1304  may be affiliated with a first entity, and a second client may be affiliated with a second entity. To initiate secure communication with that user&#39;s specific resources within the customer enclave, both clients would first access the service enclave  1504 , via the service appliance  1508 , using the same service key. Upon validation, each of the first and second client would retrieve its own respective community-of-interest keys associated with the users of those clients, e.g., based on his/her roles relative to the entity with which those users are affiliated. The service enclave  1504  can be configured to provide relevant community-of-interest keys related to users of both the first and second clients to the secure gateway appliance  1322 , or to different gateway appliances associated with the same customer enclave  1506 . When each respective user is validated and accesses his/her community of interest keys (e.g., via the methods and systems of  FIG. 12 , above, or  FIG. 17 , below, that user can initiate communication with a secure gateway appliance  1322  using the community-of-interest key to access user- and entity-specific resources (e.g., virtual private LANs, SANs, or other resources) managed within the customer enclave  1506 . 
     Once a secure connection is established, data is routed to a secure gateway appliance  1322  for communications with the server  1524  at the customers intranet (e.g., intranet  1314 ) running the web service application  1316 , the banking application for example. In this third embodiment, the server  1524  may be located in a separate location on the Internet. A separate secure connection may be used to connect the secure gateway appliance  1322  and the server  1524 . 
       FIG. 16  illustrates a flowchart  1600  of creating a secure connection according to an embodiment of the present invention. The flowchart  1600  outlines example steps taken by a user, a customer facility, and one or more configuration devices or entities (e.g., an entity responsible for configuring authentication of the user within a virtual network affiliated with the customer facility). A configuration data collection operation (step  1602 ) involves 
     A BIOS modification operation (step  1604 ) involves modifying a BIOS configuration setting within a BIOS of a computing system, such that the computing system can be used as a terminal to connect to a remote server, for example to conduct transactions with a bank or other financial institution. In general, the BIOS modification operation involves assigning a boot order to devices associated with the computing system operated by the user (e.g., client computing device  1304 ). In some embodiments, the BIOS modification operation enables the client computing system to boot from a USB device, such as the secure boot device described in some embodiments above. 
     A terminal launch operation (step  1606 ) corresponds to a user inserting a USB-stick boot device into a USB port of a computing system, and rebooting the computing system via that particular secure boot device. The terminal launch operation further includes, upon the computing system booting from the secure boot device, entering one or more types of user credentials when prompted by the computing system, for example to validate the user&#39;s identity (e.g., using a username and password, cryptographically-signed certificate or PIN number security system). 
     A location selection operation (step  1608 ) allows a user to select a particular location to which to connect. For example, the location selection operation may in certain embodiments allow a user to select a particular branch of an institution, or a particular region, or a specific division of that institution. In any event, selection of a location via the location selection operation allows the method  1600  to determine the particular secure gateway device to which the client computing system will connect. If the user elects to add a new location, a new location operation (step  1610 ) receives network and configuration data for that new location. The new location can, for example, be a particular branch or other division of the institution to which secure transactions are desired for that user, in the context of the present disclosure, a new location will typically be a location having a separate secure gateway device; however, other arrangements are possible as well for defining a new location. 
     A terminal initiation operation (step  1612 ) presents a welcome screen to a user, and transmits to the user via a SSL or other tunnel-based connection the one or more community of interest keys associated with that user. Alternatively, in some embodiments, the community-of-interest keys are stored on the secure boot device, and the terminal initiation operation can send a decryption key to the now-secure-booted client computing system to decrypt and access those community-of-interest keys. 
     A secure tunnel operation (step  1614 ) sets up a secure tunnel between the client computing system and the designated location (e.g., an address of a secure gateway device) using the one or more community of interest keys and other encryption information associated with that user. If necessary, the one or more community of interest keys associated with the user are transmitted from an authorization server to the identified secure gateway device, allowing that device to communicate with the client computing device, thereby enabling the secure connection between those devices via the internet. 
     A login operation (step  1616 ) receives login information from a user, for example a username and password, a cryptographically-signed certificate, or PIN-based authorization. The user is validated, and can conduct one or more transactions at a transactions operation (step  1618 ), which corresponds to execution of one or more transactions at a customer facility. 
     While the above embodiments of the present invention describe the interaction of a client computing system and a server computing system over a secure communications connection, it is recognized that other arrangements for secure connection and communication between a client device and server system or dedicated customer resource is possible. As long as a secure boot device, such as a USB memory stick, as described herein, is used to boot the client computer and to create the connection with the server, the present invention to would be useable in performing secure transactions. Additionally, any of a variety of methods for securing an otherwise unsecure terminal could be used as well. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and operational changes may be made without departing from the scope of the present invention. 
     Referring generally to  FIGS. 10-16 , it is recognized that using the secure communications infrastructures discussed herein, a number of advantages are obtained over existing secure connections. For example, using the secure boot devices and resulting secure terminal connection to resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet), a user is still able to maintain a trusted, virus-free computing system at a client site, despite potential corruption issues both relating to data travelling over the open network and data stored at the client device (e.g., on a hard drive of the client device). This reduces the risk of various types of phishing, eavesdropping, and screen- or keystroke recording, because the institution to which a client user connects reliably knows what software is operating at that client device. 
     IV. Coexistence of Secure Tunnels with Internet-Based Infrastructure 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 17-21 , example methods and systems are disclosed relating to a further possible embodiment of the present disclosure in which a secure tunnel connection, such as those described above using community-of-interest based encryption and segregation of resources, can be used in conjunction with clear text communication to a publicly-available resource, such as an internet site.  FIG. 17  illustrates a basic example network in which such an arrangement may occur, while  FIGS. 18-19  illustrate particular example networks similar to the managed service network described above in  FIG. 15 , in which such a hybrid secured/unsecured arrangement is managed.  FIGS. 20-21  illustrate example methods for managing concurrent secure and unsecured connections at a client device. 
     Referring now to  FIG. 17 , an example network  1700  is shown in which secure tunnels can coexist with clear text communication, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. In the network  1700 , a client device  1702  connects to a secure appliance  1704  via an open network, such as the internet  1706 . One or more public sites  1708  are also available to be accessed from the client device  1702 . 
     In this embodiment, client device  1702  corresponds generally to any computing system capable of secure communication using community-of-interest based security and the cryptographic security architecture generally described above in connection with Section I. The client device  1702  can be, for example a computing system as discussed in connection with  FIGS. 4-6 . The secure appliance  1704  can also generally be any secured endpoint or gateway device, such as those described above. 
     In the embodiment shown, the client device  1702  includes one or more community-of-interest keys  1710  and an associated one or more filters  1712 . In one embodiment, each community-of-interest key has an associated filter; in other embodiments, different numbers of keys and filters can be used. 
     Generally, the community-of-interest keys  1710  stored on the client device  1702  are used to cryptographically split messages passed to a particular endpoint known to be capable of reconstituting those messages for use at an opposite end of an unsecured network, so as to provide security between the two endpoints. In certain embodiments disclosed herein, an additional clear text community-of-interest key can be used which, when associated with a particular message, allows for communication of clear text messages concurrently with use of secure communication (including use of the secure software stack  608  of  FIG. 6 ). 
     Optionally, associated with each of the community-of-interest keys  1710 , a filter  1712  can be defined, for example by an administrator of a secure network, using a provisioning utility of an administration appliance. The filter  1712  defines one or more permissions associated with each community-of-interest key  1710 . Each filter can take a variety of forms. In one example embodiment, a plurality of filters can be defined in an XML file associated with each community of interest, and which are delivered to a user alongside any related community-of-interest key(s). For example, a filter can define a key by its key name, and then define an allowed access list of IP addresses relating to endpoints that the client device  1702  is permitted to communicate with using the identified key, or optionally an “exclusions” access list of IP addresses relating to endpoints that the client device  1702  is not permitted to communicate with. An example of a portion of a filter  1712  is illustrated below, in which two community-of-interest keys are defined: 
     
       
         
           
               
               
             
               
                   
                   
               
             
            
               
                   
                 &lt;tuples&gt; 
               
               
                   
                 &lt;key id=ClearText1&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;type&gt;5&lt;/type&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;keyName&gt;keyname&lt;/keyName&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;denyAccessList&gt; 
               
               
                   
                       &lt;IPAddress name=”*”&gt; 
               
               
                   
                          &lt;exceptFor count=”1”&gt; 
               
               
                   
                             &lt;IPAddress name=”121.15.20.31” /&gt; 
               
               
                   
                          &lt;/ exceptFor&gt; 
               
               
                   
                       &lt;/IPAddress&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;/denyAccessList&gt; 
               
               
                   
                 &lt;/key&gt; 
               
               
                   
                 &lt;key id=Stealth1&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;type&gt;0&lt;/type&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;keyName&gt;keyname&lt;/keyName&gt; 
               
               
                   
                    &lt;hostIP&gt; 139.72.10.10&lt;/hostIP&gt; 
               
               
                   
                 &lt;/key&gt; 
               
               
                   
                 &lt;/tuples&gt; 
               
               
                   
                   
               
            
           
         
       
     
     In this example, a clear text filter, defined as “ClearText1” allows an associated endpoint to communicate with any endpoint except for one at address 121.15.20.31, which is included in an exclusions list (denied access). Further, a second filter, defined as “Stealth1”, has no specific exclusions or limitations on where it can or cannot transmit messages, but is specifically instructed that it has a “home” gateway located at 139.72.10.10. If both of these filters are associated with the same user, that user could communicate with a number of network addresses via clear text, while also communicating with various network locations via the secured connection and community-of-interest key associated with the “Stealth1” filter, including the endpoint or gateway at 139.72.10.10. Other example filters could be defined as well, for example to exclude clear text communication from occurring to the same endpoint to which secured communication is directed from a given client device. 
     In some embodiments, client device  1702  can include an application  1714  that runs as a background process and which manages selection of one or both of clear text and cryptographically secure communication settings. In such embodiments, client device  1702  can be configured to selectively allow or disallow use of one or more clear text or secure filters by disabling that type of communication at the application level. In additional embodiments, the client device  1702  is by default configured to include a clear text filter, and does not need to retrieve that filter from a remote system such as an authorization server. Once the authorization server in fact authorizes the client device  1702  for cryptographically secure communications and community-of-interest keys are provided to that client device  1702 , the clear text filter may be modified, for example to prevent clear text communication to a known secure appliance  1704  configured to communicate with the client device  1702  using cryptographic security. Other embodiments are possible as well in which the clear text filter is selectively provided to each client device  1702  by an authorization server as needed/desired. 
     Additionally, in some embodiments, secure appliance  1704  or client device  1702  can generate a tunnel status report  1716  relating to activity at the secure appliance  1704 , either specifically relating to client device  1702  or generally relating to any client device transmitting packets to the secure appliance. Example information included in the tunnel status report  1716  can include, for example, a current connection status and keys used for connection to the secure appliance by one or more client devices. Other information can be included in the tunnel status report as well. 
     As can be seen from this key/filter arrangement, the network  1700  provides added functionality to existing secured networks (e.g., VPN) which route all traffic via a secure tunnel when such a tunnel has been formed between endpoints. Furthermore, as compared to the secure transactional systems described above in connection with  FIGS. 10-16 , in this arrangement, a user of a client device is not precluded from accessing unsecured resources; accordingly, a user of a secure boot device or other system that typically prevents communication other than to a particular gateway or server of an institution can use the methods and systems discussed herein to also allow access to all or selected publicly available sites accessible via clear text browsing. 
     Referring now to  FIG. 18 , a distributed system  1800  is illustrated in which secure tunnels and clear text communication can exist, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. In this embodiment, the distributed system  1800  generally illustrates use of concurrent clear text and secured communications from the same endpoint while concurrently using a secure managed service network. This arrangement may be implemented, for example, by one or more companies or other entities wishing to communicate from a trusted intranet to a remotely managed network application via an open network. In cases such as that depicted in  FIG. 18 , where that remotely managed network application manages sensitive data, a secure communication arrangement is desired between the local intranet and that remotely managed application, but concurrent normal, clear text access to a public network site (e.g., an address accessible via clear text on the internet) is desired as well. 
     In the embodiment shown, the distributed system  1800  includes a set of client devices  1802 , each located in customer local area networks  1804   a - b . Both customer local area networks  1804  are connected to a service enclave  1806  and a customer enclave  1808  via a public network, shown as the internet  1810 . The internet  1810  additionally connects the local area networks  1804   a - b  to a variety of publicly-available internet sites, in the example shown as public internet site  1812 . Additionally, one or more client computing systems  1802  can be directly connected to the internet  1810  without being a part of a customer local area network  1804 , for example a home user or other remote access user wishing to access applications or resources managed at the customer enclave  1808 . 
     The service enclave  1806  includes a plurality of computing devices, depending upon the particular requirements of the managed entities. In the embodiment shown, the service enclave includes a service appliance  1814 , and a plurality of computing devices  1816   a - d . In various embodiments, one or more of the computing devices  1816   a - d  can include an administration gateway including a provisioning tool, by which an administrative user can define and provision one or more other gateways, endpoints, and network resources. Others of the computing devices  1816   a - d  can be an authorization server configured to provide authentication of users connecting to the service enclave  1806  via a service gateway. Still other computing devices  116   a - d  can provide DHCP or other network routing services. 
     The customer enclave  1808  includes a customer appliance  1818  as well as a plurality of computing devices  1820   a - b . In various embodiments, the customer enclave can be managed by the one or more computing devices  1816   a - d  of the service enclave to form one or more virtual private networks, with each such network associated with a particular community of interest. Each community of interest can be specific to one of the customers (e.g., a separate community of interest for each customer local area network  1804   a - b , respectively), or based on an identity of a user within those networks. Accordingly, the generalized network topology of the distributed system  1800  is similar to that illustrated above in conjunction with  FIG. 15 , but is adapted for use by either an untrusted client device and associated secure boot device, or for secure access from a trusted client, such as a client within a trusted client intranet (e.g., customer local area network  1804 ). 
     In general, the key and filter arrangements of the present disclosure allow concurrent access to both secured systems, such as those at the service enclave  1806  and customer enclave  1808 , as well as to public internet site  1812 , as desired. To allow a particular user access to both secured and unsecured resources, that user must simply be included within a secure communities of interest and a clear text community of interest, such that the client computing system associated with that user will receive a community-of-interest key, as well as one or more filters defining allowed secure and clear text communication. Depending upon the definitions included in the filter associated with the community-of-interest key, the user may be allowed partial or full clear text communication capabilities, while concurrently communicating securely with one or both of the service enclave and customer enclave. 
       FIG. 19  illustrates a more particular example of a distributed hybrid system  1900 . In this example, a network topology is illustrated that allows use of any of clear text, virtual private network, or secure connections, using the distributed systems of  FIGS. 17-18 , according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. In this system, a user can connect to a private cloud, such as a customer enclave  1902 , via a public network such as the internet  1904 , using one or both of a VPN connection and a cryptographic, community-of-interest-based connection according to the principles of the present disclosure. In the embodiment shown, a client device  1906  is configured at a customer intranet  1907  with both a “stealth” based cryptographic splitting virtual adapter and a virtual private network virtual adapter. This can correspond, for example to the network interface infrastructure illustrated in  FIG. 6 , described above, in which first and second secure communication stacks, e.g. software stack  608 ,  609  are implemented. 
     The customer enclave  1902  includes, in the embodiment shown, a DHCP server  1908 , a domain server  1910 , a stealth server  1912 , and an application server, shown as Exchange server  1914 . Other network resources could be included in the virtual private network as well. From the internet  1904 , the virtual private network shown as the customer enclave  1902  can be accessed via either VPN server  1916 , or a secure appliance (e.g., from secure appliances  1918   a - b ). Additionally, one or more public internet sites  1920  are available to a client device  1906  via the internet  1904 . 
     In this example configuration, the client device  1906  is configured with both a Stealth virtual adapter (illustrated as being assigned IP address 172.30.0.100) and a VPN virtual adapter (illustrated as being assigned IP address 172.31.0.110). The client device  1906  is further configured with a clear text filter, analogously to the example of  FIG. 17 , to allow access to the public internet sites  1920  via clear text, and to the VPN server  1916 . Additionally, the physical adapter with the NAT assigned IP address (10.0.0.11) is used for local communications to other endpoints in the NAT subnet, e.g., at the same location as the client device  1906 . 
     In certain embodiments, the customer enclave  1902  includes a DHCP server  1908  to allow the client device  1906  to acquire a Stealth VPN address to be used in the Stealth-enabled portion of the customer&#39;s intranet  1907 . Static routes are configured via the DHCP server  1908  to allow TCP/IP packets on the endpoint to be properly routed to the customer intranet  1907 . The destination IP address/subnet in the customer intranet is configured with a static route so Windows TCP/IP selects the correct virtual adapter. For example, if the client device  1906  is using the secure appliances  1918  as a destination, then the stealth virtual adapter must be selected by Windows TCP/IP stack in that client device. If the destination is using the VPN path (i.e., via VPN server  1916 ), then the VPN virtual adapter must be selected by Windows TCP/IP. 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 20-21 , methods for authenticating a system for use of coexisting stealth-enabled and clear text tunnels are described, as well as for configuring a distributed system including such tunnels using a provisioning utility.  FIG. 20  illustrates a flowchart of a method  2000  for authenticating a client device, such as an endpoint, for use of coexisting secure and clear text tunnels, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. The method  2000  generally corresponds to a client device requesting authorization from an authorization server, such as may be located within a service enclave of a managed environment, to communicate with one or more other endpoints or gateway devices using secure, stealth-based communication and clear text communication to other locations in an open network. 
     The method  2000  is initiated, a request is transmitted for authorization of a user from a client device to a service enclave, for example to the authorization server (step  2002 ). The request can include, for example a user identifier and password or other authentication information, such as a PIN based authentication. 
     At an authorization server, the identification of the user of the client device is checked against a list of communities of interest that are defined using a provisioning utility at the service enclave. Once the client device associated with the user is authorized, it receives one or more community-of-interest keys and filters defining connection rights from a remote system (step  2004 ), such as an authorization server via a service appliance, as discussed above. The community-of-interest keys and filters define the available endpoints to which the client device can communicate and receive communication, both in stealth-enabled (cryptographic) and clear text. 
     Once the client device has received the community-of-interest keys and filters, it can communicate using the community-of-interest keys as limited by the associated filters. In step  2006 , the client device can transmit one or more messages to one or both of clear text or cryptographically-enabled endpoints using a clear text or secure filter alongside a specified community-of-interest key, if that message (clear text or cryptographic) is allowed based on the defined access lists (both inclusion and exclusion permissions) in the associated filter. In step  2008 , the client device can also receive one or more messages from one or both of clear text or cryptographically-enabled endpoints. It is noted that, even if the remote endpoint transmits a message in clear text or using a community of interest key available on the endpoint, the communications software stack at the client device will discard the message if received from an unauthorized remote endpoint, as defined in the filters received at the client device. 
       FIG. 21  illustrates a flowchart of a method  2100  for configuring a distributed system including coexisting secure and clear text tunnels using a provisioning utility, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. The method  2100  can be used, for example to associate users with communities of interest and defining filters to be associated with those communities of interest, thereby controlling access to endpoints (clear text and cryptographically secured) for that particular user. The method  2100  can be performed, for example, using an administration appliance, such as those discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 15 and 18 . 
     The method  2100  is initiated by opening a provisioning utility, such as can be made available via an administration appliance of a service portal, and defining one or more communities of interest and filters associated with those communities of interest using the provisioning utility (step  2102 ). This can include, for example, using a provisioning tool of an administrative gateway to define communities of interest and filters, as discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 17-18 . Alternatively, the one or more communities of interest can be defined based on a user&#39;s membership in another user group, such as a defined group within Active Directory. In such an arrangement, those predefined groups could be associated with particular keys, filters, and access permissions using the provisioning utility. 
     After the distributed system is provisioned, a service enclave can receive an authorization request from a client device or endpoint (step  2104 ). The service enclave typically establishes a secure connection with the client device using a service key to maintain encryption. The service key can, for example be stored in an obscured location at a client device. In one example embodiment, the service key can be stored in a registry entry at a client device. In another example embodiment, the service key could be stored within a read-only or read-write memory of a secure boot device, such as a device as described above in connection with  FIGS. 10-16 . Other storage arrangements for the service key could be used as well. 
     A set of communities-of-interest are determined to be associated with the user of the client device (step  2106 ), for example at the authorization server. The authorization server returns the community-of-interest keys and filters, alongside any other information in a cryptographic data set, to the client device (step  2108 ), for use in establishing a secure connection with a customer enclave. 
     Although in  FIGS. 20-21 , a particular order of operations is illustrated, it is understood that other arrangements of these methods are possible. Additionally, more or fewer steps could be used to accomplish the provisioning and access methods described herein. 
     Overall, referring to  FIGS. 17-21 , it can be seen that using the community-of-interest keys and filters, alongside the communications infrastructure provided at a computing system as discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 4-6 , a user can be enabled to communicate via clear text with selected public sites via the internet while concurrently communicating via cryptographic security features with other secure endpoints. This allows even trusted terminals, such as those using secure boot devices described above in connection with  FIGS. 10-16 , to perform both dedicated secure operations and to access external websites to the extent allowed by an administrator of a distributed system. Additionally, concurrent clear text and cryptographic communication allows an administrator to implement a hybrid access arrangement in which any of clear text, virtual private network, or stealth-enabled, cryptographic communications can be used. 
     V. Updating of and Key Management in Secure Endpoints 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 22-25 , example systems and methods for managing key distribution throughout a distributed system are described, and methods for updating security and system software at remote terminals are also described in the context of such a distributed system. The distributed system used can be, for example, a network providing a managed service to one or more customers, such as would include the example service and customer enclaves discussed in the above examples illustrating other features of such a system. 
       FIGS. 22-24  illustrate three example networks that can be deployed to manage encryption keys and provide software updates to secure client software.  FIG. 22  illustrates an example distributed system  2200  in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network, according to a first possible embodiment of the present disclosure. The distributed system  2200  includes a pair of client computer systems  2202 , illustrated as being generalized computing devices having associated secure boot devices  2204 . The client computer systems  2202  can be located at a common location, or can be at different locations. The client computer systems  2202  can also be associated with the same or different customers, and the users of the client computer systems  2202  can be part of the same or different communities of interest. 
     The secure boot devices  2204  can be, for example, USB-based memory devices storing a plurality of software modules used to create a secure terminal at the client computer systems  2202 . As mentioned briefly above, each of the secure boot devices  2204  can optionally include stored thereon a secure service key and address identifier of a service appliance, such as service appliance  2206  useable to securely connect to a service enclave  2208 . In such embodiments, the service key can, for example, be stored within a shell operating system&#39;s registry settings. Connection to the service enclave  2208 , and subsequently to a customer enclave  2210  (discussed in further detail below) occurs via internet  2212 . 
     An authorization server  2214  within the service enclave  2210  transmits a cryptographic data set to the client computer system  2202 , which can act to validate the user and provide, for example, one or more community-of-interest keys, one or more filters, a location of a secure gateway to which the customer can connect to access the customer enclave  2210 , and other information. In certain embodiments, the authorization server  2214  encrypts the above information for transmission to the client computer system  2202  in a manner specific to that client computer system (e.g., using a key known by the client computer system due to data stored on a secure boot device  2204 ). 
     The service enclave  2208  includes a number of additional features not typically used directly by a user of a client computer system  2202 , but rather for management of communities of interest and encryption keys associated therewith. In the embodiment shown, the service enclave  2208  includes a router connecting service appliance  2206  to a variety of other servers and networking equipment, including an administration appliance  2216 , and a router  2218  configured to connect to the authorization server  2214  and other networking components used to maintain and monitor the service enclave  2208 , including a DNS server  2220 , a DHCP server  2222 , a system logging server  2224 , and a stealth administration server  2226 . The administration appliance  2216  provides an interface to a remote administrator of the distributed system, for example an owner of the managed service (i.e. the service enclave  2208  and customer enclave  2210 ). The interface of the administration appliance  2216  allows an administrative user to configure one or more communities of interest and filters as discussed above, as well as configure virtual and physical networks in the service and customer enclaves, and schedule and configure updates needed for any trusted software modules executing on client computer systems  2202  and stored on secure boot devices  2204 . Additional functionality could be incorporated into the administration appliance  2216  as well 
     The stealth administration server  2226  can, in some embodiments, maintain a listing of communities of interest, as well as a listing of authentication information and users associated with that authentication information. The authentication information can be username and password information, a cryptographically-signed certificate, or can be PIN-based or other code information associated with a particular secure boot device  2204 . This information can be accessed by the authorization server  2214  in response to receipt of requests for access to a customer enclave received from client computer systems  2202 . It is noted that each of these components could be a physical server system, or could be implemented as a virtual system within the service enclave  2208 . 
     In certain embodiments, the authorization server  2214  or some other component within the service enclave  2208  can also transmit to the client computer system  2202  an update script alongside the one or more filters, community-of-interest keys, and other information used for establishing a secure connection to a customer enclave  2210 . In some embodiments, the authorization server  2214  transmits the update script when an update becomes available to alter the one or more secure software modules stored on a secure boot device  2204  (e.g., a version of the software modules identified by the client device as present on the secure boot device is out of date). As discussed above, in some embodiments, the authorization server  2214  transmits encrypted community-of-interest keys and other information to the client computer system  2202  such that the encryption is performed in a manner specific to that client device. 
     When a customer wishes to initiate communication with a customer enclave  2210 , the customer will establish a secure tunnel with an identified secure gateway  2228  using the one or more secure community-of-interest keys received as part of the cryptographic data set from the authorization server  2214 . Once the secure connection is established with the secure gateway  2228 , the customer can access one or more additional resources within the customer enclave  2210 , such as a web application  2230  or other application configured to allow secure transactions, or a hosted application or data storage, as discussed above. The customer enclave  2210  optionally includes a router  2231  or other internal logical routing equipment for directing customer communications to a particular application (e.g., web application  2230 ) or area associated with that customer, based on identifying users associated with that customer by the communities of interest to which they belong. The customer enclave  2210  also, in the embodiment shown, includes a DNS server  2232  and a DHCP server  2234 , useable to route data among various virtual private networks and/or systems present within the customer enclave. 
     In the embodiment shown in  FIG. 22 , an update server  2236  is located within the customer enclave  2210 , and is configured to, based on the contents of an update script delivered to the client computer system  2202  by the authorization server  2214 . To update the software on the client computer system  2202 , the update server  2236  will transmit to the client computer system  2202  a set of one or more software modules useable to implement the secure connection between the client device and one or both of the service enclave  2208  and the customer enclave. The set of one or more software modules can be a complete replacement of the software modules present in rewritable memory of the secure boot device  2204 , or can alternatively include only a portion of the information included on the secure boot device. 
     As discussed further in connection with  FIG. 25 , below, the update server  2236  can deliver an update as defined on the update script concurrently with a client computer system  2202  performing one or more transactions in the customer enclave  2210 , such that the update occurs in the background (i.e., is opaque to the user of the client computer system  2202 ). In certain embodiments, the size of an update can be substantial (e.g., greater than 1 gigabyte); as such, the update transfer process for transmitting the update to the client computer system  2202  can be interruptible, and can be restored during a next subsequent connection between the client computer system  2202  and the customer enclave  2210 . For example, a user can direct or schedule an update using update client software stored on a secure boot device, such as discussed above in connection with  FIG. 11B . Additionally, the update client software can, in certain embodiments, allow a user to view a state of the update (e.g., amount of update software that has been downloaded or is yet to be downloaded). 
     In an alternative embodiment to that shown in  FIG. 22 , the update server  2236  can be located within the service enclave  2208 , rather than the customer enclave  2210 . In such embodiments, when the client computer system  2202  is securely connected to the customer enclave  2210 , the client computer system  2202  can concurrently maintain a connection to the service enclave via the service key. In such embodiments, the client computer system  2202  can also continue to communicate with the service enclave, for example to receive software updates to the secure boot device  2204  from the update server  2236 . 
     In still a further alternative embodiment to that shown in  FIG. 22 , the update server  2236  can be located within a separate update enclave. Such a separate update enclave can include one or more computing systems, such as those shown to be incorporated in the service enclave  2208 , but could be used to separate the authentication and updating responsibilities across multiple enclaves. This could be used, for example, to reduce bandwidth stress on the service enclave and customer enclave, depending upon the number of authorization requests and updates required. 
       FIG. 23  illustrates a second example distributed system  2300  in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network. In the distributed system  2300 , web application  2230  resides within a customer network  2302 . The customer network  2302  can be located behind a firewall  2304 , separating it from the internet  2212 . In this arrangement, although the customer of the managed service can retain control over the web application  2230 , communication with the customer enclave  2210  from the customer network  2302 , as well as from customers remote from or otherwise detached from the customer network (e.g., client computer system  2202   a ) can connect to the customer enclave  2210  and service enclave  2208  for updates, data storage, and other features by way of a secure connection, for example using a secure boot device  2204 . 
       FIG. 24  illustrates a third example distributed system  2400  in which a secure terminal can be updated during secure connection to a customer virtual network. In this arrangement, the distributed system  2400  can be located entirely within a customer&#39;s enterprise network, such that only that customer will access the service enclave  2208  and customer enclave  2210 , with each of the communities of interest defined within the system  2400  representing separate departments or sub-organizations within the customer&#39;s infrastructure. In this embodiment, the arrangement of the service enclave  2208  and customer enclave  2210  can generally correspond to that shown in  FIG. 22 ; however, in this embodiment, an additional interface between the authorization server  2214  and a customer administration infrastructure  2402  may also be included in the service enclave. The customer administration infrastructure  2402  can, in certain embodiments, include a customer&#39;s internal user validation system, such as a local area network authentication system, for example Active Directory-based authentication (e.g., Kerberos), or other type of authentication system that can receive external authentication messages. 
     As with  FIG. 22 , above, in both of  FIGS. 23-24 , the update server  2236  can be located either within the customer enclave  2210  as shown, or optionally within the service enclave  2208  instead. Example reasons for placing the update server  2236  within the service enclave  2208  include separation of bandwidth required for responding to requests from a customer enclave  2210  from bandwidth required for performing an update, and maintaining more universal control over updates of security features, for example in the case of a managed service provider wishing to control update distribution from a service enclave while allowing customers to manage/control their own customer enclave resources. Other reasons for placing the update server  2236  in the customer enclave  2210  or the service enclave  2208  may exist as well.  FIG. 25  is a flowchart of a method  2500  for updating a secure virtual terminal connected to a distributed system, according to a possible embodiment of the present disclosure. The method  2500  can be performed, for example, in any of the distributed systems described above, particularly those discussed in connection with  FIGS. 22-24  in which an update server resides within a service enclave or customer enclave. The method  2500  begins with a user of a client device transmitting a request for validation at a service enclave, such as at an authorization server (step  2502 ). This can include, for example, transmitting a username and password, cryptographically-signed certificate, or PIN number for authorization of a particular user, or an identity of a particular secure boot device, or some combination thereof. Optionally, the validation step can also include transmitting an identifier of a version of a set of software modules stored at a client device. The software modules can include, for example, one or more secure software modules stored on a secure boot device, as discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 10-16 . Alternatively, the software modules can include one or more driver files used to perform cryptographic communications, such as the driver files discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 1-9 . Other possibilities exist as well. 
     After the user is validated at the service enclave, the user can be authorized to connect to a customer enclave (step  2504 ). This authorization can take a number of forms. In some embodiments, the authorization includes transmitting to the client device associated with the authorized user or secure boot device a cryptographic data set including information required to create a secure connection to the customer enclave, such as one or more community-of-interest keys and associated filters, an address of a particular gateway device through which to access the customer enclave, and other cryptographic information. Authorization of the client can include, for example, encrypting and transmitting to the client device the one or more community-of-interest keys and associated filters, as well as other information used to connect to a particular gateway or customer enclave. Additionally, this authorization step can include transmitting to the client device one or more update scripts defining an update process to occur on the client device. 
     A secure connection can be established to the customer enclave (step  2506 ) once the client device receives the necessary cryptographic data. This can include, for example, establishing a tunnel between the client device and a gateway device identified by the authorization server in the service enclave, using one or more community-of-interest keys provided to the client device, as discussed above. 
     Once connected to the customer enclave, a client device can be used to perform transactions in the customer enclave (step  2508 ). Various types of transactions could be performed; example types of transactions are discussed above in connection with  FIGS. 10-16 . Concurrently with the user connected to the customer enclave, an update server can deliver to a client device one or more updated software modules, based on the update script received at the client device (step  2510 ). In some embodiments, the software modules can be, for example trusted software modules  1101 - 1104  of  FIG. 11A , as included within a secure boot image. In other embodiments, the software modules can include one or more filters, community-of-interest keys, service keys or service enclave locations, driver software, or other information to be installed or stored at a client device for use in establishing a secure connection between the client device and a remote system, or for ensuring that the client device is not infected by malware of some type when such communication is established. 
     Although illustrated as occurring concurrently with transactions performed using the customer enclave, it is recognized that transmission of an update to a secure client device can occur either before or after commencement of transactions at the customer enclave. For example, in some embodiments, at least a portion of an update can occur prior to launch of an application for performing such transactions. Other arrangements and orders of operations within the method  2500  are possible as well. 
     It is recognized that in performing this update step, the update server can, in various embodiments, transmit an encrypted, compressed version of one or more software modules (or portions thereof) to a client device for use as a replacement to modules in a secure boot image. In some embodiments, one or more modules are transferred to a client device associated with a secure boot device, and then transmitted to the secure boot device once completely received, thereby overwriting existing trusted software modules. In other embodiments, the modules to be updated are transferred and stored in a temporary storage area of the secure boot device. In such embodiments, when completely transferred, the modules are then copied into a location reserved for the trusted software modules on the secure boot device, thereby overwriting the prior versions of the trusted software modules. In this embodiment, different client devices could be used for different connection sessions with the update server without requiring the updated software modules to be entirely resent if not completed during a previous session. 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 21-25  generally, it can be seen that, through use of a two-level key management scheme, communities-of-interest and keys related thereto can be managed and updated in a centralized manner, allowing changes in a service enclave to be propagated to users and customer enclaves as customers access the managed service. Additionally, through use of a dedicated update server, optionally included within a service enclave, a customer enclave, or an entirely separate update enclave, update processes can be offloaded from a service or application hosting system, allowing updates to be performed concurrently with transaction processing (e.g., at the customer enclave). This reduces the bandwidth demands from the customer enclave and service enclave, each of which may be concurrently hosting multiple users associated with an entity or community of interest, or multiple entities or communities of interest. 
     VI. Switching Between Multiple Languages of a Remote Desktop Client 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 26-29 , generally, disclosed are methods and systems for switching between multiple languages of a remote desktop client. As will be described herein, the remote desktop client, accessible through a secure boot device, is configured to be displayed in multiple languages that may be stored in the custom content area  1128  of the secure boot device, such as secure boot device  1002  shown in  FIG. 11B . 
       FIG. 26  illustrates a flowchart of an example method  2600  for switching languages of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device  1002 . In the example illustrated, the method  2600  is performed by the secure boot device  1002 . In this example, the method  2600  begins with step  2602  in which the operating system is initiating from the secure boot device  1002 . In some embodiments, this step  2602  of initiating an operating system from the secure boot device  1002  begins by initially suspending the operating system used by the client computing device, such as client computer system  1006  and thereafter rebooting using an operating system stored on the secure boot device  1002 . As described herein, the secure boot device enables a client computing device to initiate a secure operating system directly from the secure boot device  1002  without the need for additional, dedicated hardware. The operating system stored in the secure boot device  1002  causes trusted system software to be loaded and a client terminal process module, such as client terminal process module  1102  of  FIG. 11 , to be executed. 
     In step  2604 , the secure boot device  1002  receives a user&#39;s credentials such as client identification and a password. In other embodiments, other credentials are used to identify a user. In an example, the secure boot device receives the user&#39;s credentials via the client terminal process module  1102 . In some embodiments, the credentials received from the user are sent to an authentication server to verify the user&#39;s identity. 
     In step  2608 , upon verification of the user&#39;s identity, a secure connection is established between the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  and a remote server and accordingly, a desktop running on the remote desktop client is booted in a first language. As will be described in further detail, the desktop may include selectable and non-selectable user interface elements such as, for example, secure and non-secure application icons and a menu or tool bar. In this example, the desktop is booted in a first, default language such as English. However, it is understood that any default language may be set based on the location or preference of the user. As will be described in further detail, the icons and associated text may be displayed in different languages. In an example, a user may select the desired language in the user settings feature of a toolbar. 
     In step  2610 , the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  receives a selection of a second language that is different from the first language or currently displayed language. As described herein, such a selection may be received from a settings feature of a toolbar, and in other embodiments, the selection may be accessible using a different desktop feature. 
     Upon receiving the selection of the second language, in step  2612 , the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  resets the desktop in the second language. In an example, the desktop reset performed by the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  does not re-start the operating system running on the secure boot device  1002 , but rather, merely resets the desktop without requiring a user to re-enter credentials as was performed in step  2604 . 
       FIG. 27  is an example screenshot of a desktop  2702  running on the remote desktop client in a first language. As illustrated in this example, the language is English and each application icon  2704 ,  2706 , and  2708  as well as the start menu  2710  are displayed in English. Although three application icons  2704 ,  2706 , and  2708  and a start menu  2710  are displayed, it is understood that more or fewer icons may be displayed. In addition to the text identifying each application icon  2704 ,  2706 , and  2708 , the text displayed when the application icon  2704 ,  2706 , and  2708  is selected is also displayed in English. For example, if application icon  2704  is an internet browser application, the text associated with the internet browser and webpages themselves are also displayed in English. 
       FIG. 28  is an example screenshot of a desktop  2702  having a toolbar  2802  for allowing the dynamic switching of languages displayed by a remote desktop client. Continuing the example illustrated in  FIG. 27 , the default or first language displayed is English. As illustrated in  FIG. 28 , the language may be dynamically updated, using toolbar  2802 , upon a user&#39;s selection of a language from a plurality of language options. Although this example illustrates three languages (English, Spanish, and German) it is understood that more or fewer languages may be optionally provided. As illustrated in this example, the second selected language is Spanish. 
       FIG. 29  is an example screenshot of a desktop operating system running on the remote desktop client in a second language. Continuing the example displayed in  FIG. 28  wherein the second selected language is Spanish, the desktop is dynamically reset without re-booting the operating system. Accordingly, user credentials are not required to be re-entered upon a language change. As is displayed in  FIG. 29 , the three application icons  2704 ,  2706 , and  2708  and a start menu  2710  are now displayed in Spanish. Still further, not only is the identifying text associated with the application icon displayed in Spanish, but so is the text associated during operation of each application. 
     VII. Switching Between Multiple Brandings 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 30-33 , generally, disclosed are methods and systems for switching between multiple brandings associated with a different entity from which a user may receive of a remote desktop client. As will be described herein, the remote desktop client, accessible through a secure boot device, is configured to allow a user to be associated with multiple brandings. Each branding may be associated with a different entity such as a school, place of employment, or other organization, wherein each entity provides the user with authorization to various communities of interest and therefore a particular set of applications. Furthermore, each branding may be associated with different settings, desktop backgrounds, languages, and security settings. 
     The custom content area  1128  of  FIG. 11  may store specific provisioning information, for example a location of a secure server to connect to, as well as various options for connection. The custom content area  1128  can also optionally store branding information, for example to indicate the particular user or entity distributing the secure boot device  1002  to its employee or affiliate. 
       FIG. 30  illustrates a flowchart of an example method  3000  for switching between multiple brandings of a remote desktop client operating on a secure boot device, such as secure boot device  1002  illustrated in  FIG. 10 . In the example illustrated, the method  3000  is performed by the secure boot device  1002 . In this example, the method  3000  begins with step  3002  in which the operating system is initiating from the secure boot device  1002 . In some embodiments, this step  3002  of initiating an operating system from the secure boot device  1002  begins by initially suspending the operating system used by the client computing device, such as client computer system  1006  and thereafter rebooting using an operating system stored on the secure boot device  1002 . As described herein, the secure boot device  1002  enables a client computing device to initiate a secure operating system directly from the secure boot device without the need for additional, dedicated hardware. The operating system stored in the secure boot device  1002  causes trusted system software to be loaded and a client terminal process module, such as client terminal process module  1102  of  FIG. 11 , to be executed. 
     In step  3004 , the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  receives a user&#39;s credentials such as client identification and a password. In other embodiments, other credentials are used to identify a user. In an example, the secure boot device receives the user&#39;s credentials via the client terminal process module  1102 . In some embodiments, the credentials received from the user are sent to an authentication server to verify the user&#39;s identity. 
     In step  3006 , a selection of a first branding is received by the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002 . As will be described in further detail herein, each user is associated with at least one branding, wherein each branding is further associated with a different entity from which the user may receive authorization to operate the remote desktop client. For example, a user may be associated with two brandings: a work branding and a school branding, wherein the work branding and the school branding independently provide the user with separate authorization to operate a remote desktop client. Each branding may be associated with different communities of interests and therefore, when a first branding is selected, only those communities of interest associated with that user&#39;s particular branding may be accessed. For example, if a user selects a school branding, only those applications associated with the communities of interest to which the user belongs under the school branding may be accessed. 
     In step  3008 , upon verification of the user&#39;s identity, a secure connection is established between the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  and a remote server and accordingly, a branding and associated desktop operating on the remote desktop client is booted in the selected branding. As will be described in further detail, the desktop may include selectable and non-selectable user interface elements such as, for example, secure and non-secure application icons that represent scripts for running secure and non-secure applications and a menu or tool bar. As is described herein, the secure boot device  1002  does not store any applications, but rather application scripts that may be operated through the secure boot device  1002 . In this example, the selected first branding is booted, such as a school branding. In an example, a user may select the desired branding in the user settings feature of a toolbar. 
     In step  3010 , the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  receives a selection of a second branding that is different from the selected first branding. In an example, the second branding may be a work branding or a researching branding. As described herein, such a selection may be received from a settings feature of a toolbar, and in other embodiments, the selection may be accessible using a different feature. 
     Upon receiving the selection of the second branding, in step  3012 , the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  resets the desktop in the selected second branding. The user is associated with multiple brandings and as such, because the user had already provided authorization information, this example does not require the user to re-provide such information. In an example, the desktop reset performed by the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  does not re-start the operating system running on the secure boot device  1002 , but rather, merely resets the branding without requiring a user to re-enter credentials as was performed in step  3004 . In some examples, the desktop reset involves the shutting down and resetting of all stealth-related processes and the current desktop, which are then re-started for the newly selected branding. Accordingly, the branding is switched and the user is presented with a new desktop having particular security parameters. Because the operating system does not reboot, and because the user credentials provided by the user allowed the computing system hosting the secure boot device  1002  to obtain all communities of interest for that user, switching between brandings allows that computing system to switch between communities of interest associated with the user without requiring reauthentication. 
       FIG. 31  is an example screenshot of a desktop  3102  running on the remote desktop client in a first branding. In this example, the user is associated with a first branding, which is the user&#39;s place of employment. Accordingly in this example, the user is associated with particular security parameters that are associated with applications  1 - 3   3104 ,  3106 , and  3108 . 
       FIG. 32  is an example screenshot of a desktop  3102  having a toolbar  3202  for switching brandings of a user. Continuing the example illustrated in  FIG. 31 , the first selected branding was the user&#39;s work branding. As illustrated in  FIG. 32 , the user may dynamically change the branding, using toolbar  3202 , upon the user&#39;s selection of a branding from a plurality of brandings with which the user is associated. Although this example illustrates three brandings (Work, School, and Home) it is understood that more or fewer brandings may be optionally provided for each user. As illustrated in this example, the second selected branding is the user&#39;s school branding.  FIG. 33  is an example screenshot of a desktop  3302  running on the remote desktop client in the selected second school branding. As is illustrated, the desktop  3302  now only includes applications  1   3104  and application  4   3304 . Accordingly, in this example, under the user&#39;s school branding, the user is only authorized to access application  1   3104  and application  4   3304 . 
     VIII. Remote Desktop Operation within an Enterprise Using a Secure Boot Device 
     Referring now to  FIGS. 34-38 , generally, disclosed are methods and systems for operating a remote desktop client from a computing device hosting a secure boot device, such as secure boot device  2204  illustrated in  FIG. 22 . More particularly, the  FIGS. 34-38  generally refer to the operation of a remote desktop client, from a secure boot device, while connected to a secure enterprise network. For example,  FIGS. 34-38  demonstrate the capability of a user to log into the remote desktop client from the secure boot device  2204  connected to a client computing device from within the enterprise while also having the capability to communicate with one or more trusted endpoints within the secure enterprise network. 
       FIG. 34  is a flowchart of an example method for operating a remote desktop client from a secure boot device  2204  communicatively connected to a secure enterprise network. In the example illustrated, the method  3500  is performed by the computing system, such as client computer system  2202  hosting the secure boot device  2204 . In this example, the method  3500  begins with step  3502  in which the operating system is initiating from the secure boot device  2204 . In some embodiments, this step  3502  of initiating an operating system from the secure boot device  2204  begins by initially suspending the operating system used by the client computing device, such as client computer system  2202  illustrated in  FIG. 22  and thereafter rebooting using an operating system stored on the secure boot device  2204 . As described herein, the secure boot device  2204  enables a client computing device to initiate a secure operating system directly from the secure boot device  2204  without the need for additional, dedicated hardware. The operating system stored in the secure boot device  2204  causes trusted system software to be loaded and a client terminal process module, such as client terminal process module  1102  of  FIG. 11 , to be executed. 
     In step  3504 , the computing system hosting secure boot device  1002  receives a user&#39;s credentials such as client identification and a password. In other embodiments, other credentials are used to identify a user. In an example, the computing system hosting the secure boot device receives the user&#39;s credentials via the client terminal process module  1102 . In some embodiments, the credentials received from the user are sent to an authentication server to verify the user&#39;s identity. 
     In step  3506 , upon verification of the user&#39;s identity, a secure connection is established between the computing system hosting the secure boot device  2204  and a remote server. As will be described in further detail, the desktop may include selectable and non-selectable user interface elements such as, for example, secure and non-secure application icons that represent scripts for running secure and non-secure applications and a menu or tool bar. As is described herein, the secure boot device  2204  does not store applications or data, but rather application scripts that may be operated through the secure boot device  2204  upon verification of a user&#39;s identity. 
     As described herein, this example illustrates an embodiment in which the client computer system  2202  hosting the secure boot device  2204 , is communicatively connected to a secure enterprise network as further illustrated in  FIG. 35 . Accordingly, in step  3508 , a secure connection is established with a service appliance device, such as service appliance  2206  shown in  FIG. 35 . The service appliance  2206  directs the client computer system  2202  hosting the secure boot device  2204  to communicate with a secure gateway device, such as the gateway device  2228  illustrated in  FIG. 35 . The connection between the service appliance  2206  and the client computer system  2202  is also illustrated by the bolded arrow in  FIG. 36 . As is shown in  FIG. 36 , the secure boot device  2204  may have stored thereon a secure service key and an address of the service appliance  2206 . Accordingly, the secure boot device  2204  is provided with initial destination information for connecting to the service appliance  2206 . In this embodiment, the connection between the secure boot device  2204  and the service appliance  2206  is a secure communication channel. 
     In example embodiments described herein, a client computer system  2202  hosting the secure boot device  2204 , at least when positioned within a secure enterprise network, is configured to connect to a cleartext gateway computing system, which allows the client computer system  2202  to connect within the secure enterprise network without establishing a separate secured connection, as may otherwise be required if the client computer system  2202  were located external to the secure enterprise network. In some embodiments, even when external to the secure enterprise network, the client computer system  2202  may connect to the cleartext gateway computing system, for example if the secure boot device  2204  hosts an operating system that is not supported by the Stealth-based security system implemented within a secure enterprise network. Details regarding connections established via a cleartext gateway computing system are described in further detail in copending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/753,437 and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62/018,802 filed on Jun. 30, 2014, the disclosures of each of which are incorporated by reference in their entireties. 
     In step  3510 , the client computer system  2202  receives, from the service appliance  2206 , over the secure communication channel, a destination address of the secure gateway device  2228 . Additionally, the service appliance may also provide the client computer system  2202  with community of interest keys and filters. As described herein, the community of interest keys and filters provided to the client computer system  2202  are based on the user credentials provided in step  3504 . This communication between the service appliance  2206  and the client computer system  2202  is further illustrated by the bolded arrow in  FIG. 37 . As shown in  FIG. 37 , the service appliance  2206  provides the client computing device with the destination address of the gateway device  2228  (bolded) along with community of interest keys and filters, thereby allowing the client computer system  2202  to view and communicate with various endpoints connected to the enterprise network. 
     In step  3512 , the client computer system  2202  establishes a cleartext communication channel with the secure gateway device  2228 . As described herein, the client computer system  2202  received, from the service appliance  2206 , destination address information of the secure gateway device  2228 . In this example, the communication channel established between the client computer system  2202  and the secure gateway device  2228  is a cleartext communication channel, however the data transmitted over the cleartext communication channel is encrypted. The established cleartext communication channel between the client computer system  2202  and the secure gateway device  2228  is further illustrated by the bolded arrow in  FIG. 38 . Upson establishment of the cleartext communication channel, the client computer system  2202  can now communicate with one or more trusted endpoints within the enterprise. Although the cleartext communication channel is established, thereby providing the client computer system  2202  to communicate with various endpoints, the client computer system  2202  may only communicate with those endpoints within its community of interest. Accordingly, any communication, over a cleartext communication channel, between the client computer system  2202  and an endpoint within the enterprise is premised on each device belonging to identical communities of interest. 
     Referring now to the overall disclosure, the methods and systems of the present disclosure provide for both a trusted client device using a secure boot device, as well as secure and flexible access to network-based services via a typically unsecured network. The methods and systems described herein allow for concurrent secured and unsecured communications, as well as concurrent updating and transactional access. 
     The foregoing description of the exemplary embodiments of the invention has been presented for the purposes of illustration and description. They are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise forms disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching. It is intended that the scope of the invention be limited not with this detailed description, but rather by the claims appended hereto.