Patent Publication Number: US-2018032759-A1

Title: Open registry for human identification

Description:
RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) of the co-pending U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/402,834, filed Oct. 7, 2016, and titled “LINKING HUMAN IDENTITY TO AN OPEN REGISTRY VIA A CRYPTOGRAPHIC IDENTITY MICROCHIP FOR SECURELY SIGNING MESSAGES AND TRANSACTIONS THAT CAN THEN BE STORED AS AN IMMUTABLE PUBLIC RECORD,” and is a continuation-in-part of the co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/173,461, filed Jun. 3, 2016, and titled “OPEN REGISTRY FOR IDENTITY OF THINGS,” both of which are hereby incorporated by reference. 
    
    
     FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention relates to the field of the unique identity of things, including human identities. More particularly, the present invention relates to identification, authentication and provenance tracking using identifying tags and an open registry. 
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     Physical assets and human identities are poorly represented on the Internet, public databases or marketplaces. Current identification methods are often not machine-readable. Also, existing tags are not secure as they are able to easily be forged and/or re-applied to a different non-authentic asset or identity. In particular, technologies that help prevent the duplication of tags are weak and rely on obfuscation methods (which can be hacked) or require the use of private databases (e.g. privately controlled) which rely on trusting a third party (e.g. the controlling party) to accurately maintain the database. Such methods do not prevent the third party from creating duplicate tags or database records, nor are they able to exist if/when the third party dissolves or goes out of business. Finally, such a third party controlled system lacks the ability for users to seamlessly migrate their identity and/or proof of ownership to other systems. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     A system for identification, authentication and tracking of personal identities using tamper proof seals (e.g. with a cryptographic chip) and an open registry. A first aspect is directed to an open registry and authentication system for authenticating identities of one or more persons. The system comprises one or more identity tags configured to be coupled to the persons, the identity tags each storing a private key and a unique identifier and configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read from the tag, an electronic device configured to wirelessly read the unique identifier from one or more of the identity tags when proximate to the one or more of the identity tags and a open registry storing the unique identifier, personal identification information and a public key of each of the persons, wherein the public key of each of the persons is associated with the private key stored on the identity tag coupled to that person, and further wherein the personal identification information of each of the persons uniquely identifies that person. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises an image of the person. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises a physical description of the person. In some embodiments, for each of the persons, the open registry stores a sequential record of times the tag of the person digital signs a challenge message using the private key of the tag. In some embodiments, the electronic device includes an identity verification function that, upon reading the unique identifier of the identity tag of one of the persons, causes the electronic device to generate and transmit a challenge message to the identity tag, transmit the unique identifier to the registry and access the public key associated with the unique identifier from the registry, receive a digital signature from the identity tag and authenticating the person by determining if the digital signature was generated by the private key stored in the identity tag using the accessed public key. In some embodiments, if the person is authenticated, the electronic device is configured to automatically access and present the personal identification information to a user on the electronic device. In some embodiments, upon receiving the challenge message the identity tag is configured to digitally sign the challenge message thereby generating the digital signature based on the private key stored in the identity tag and transmit the digital signature to the electronic device. In some embodiments, upon receiving the unique identifier the registry is configured to lookup which one of the public keys stored on the registry is associated with the unique identifier and transmit the one of the public keys to the electronic device. The open registry is a blockchain. In some embodiments, the tag is made of a tamperproof fastener that is physically coupled with a wireless signal receiving/transmitting circuit enveloped by a single contiguous plastic shell. In some embodiments, the tags are human-injectable implants and couple with the persons by embedding within the persons. 
     A second aspect is directed to a method of authenticating identities of one or more persons using an open registry and authentication system. The method comprises wirelessly discovering a unique identifier stored on an identity tag coupled to a person with a electronic device, wherein the identity tag stores a private key and is configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read, and further wherein the electronic device is configured to automatically wirelessly read the unique identifier from the identity tag when proximate to the tag, transmitting the unique identifier from the electronic device to an open registry, the registry storing the unique identifier, personal identification information and a public key of the person, wherein the public key is associated with the private key stored on the identity tag coupled to the person, and further wherein the personal identification information uniquely identifies the person, receiving the public key associated with the unique identifier from the registry and receiving a digital signature from the identity tag with the electronic device and authenticating the person with the electronic device by determining if the digital signature was generated by the private key stored in the identity tag using the received public key. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises an image of the person. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises a physical description of the person. In some embodiments, for each of the persons, the open registry stores a sequential record of times the tag of the person digital signs a challenge message using the private key of the tag. In some embodiments, the method further comprises, if the person is authenticated, automatically accessing and presenting the personal identification information to a user with the electronic device. In some embodiments, the method further comprises, upon receiving the challenge message, the identity tag digitally signs the challenge message thereby generating the digital signature based on the private key stored in the identity tag and transmits the digital signature to the electronic device. In some embodiments, the method further comprises, upon receiving the unique identifier, the registry looks up which one of the public keys stored on the registry is associated with the unique identifier and transmits the one of the public keys to the electronic device. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  illustrates an item open registry authentication system according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2A  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2B  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2C  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2D  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2E  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2F  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2G  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2H  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2I  illustrates a tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 3  illustrates a flow chart of an item authentication method using the system according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 4  illustrates a method of presenting item information according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 5  illustrates a method of registering items on the open database according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 6  illustrates a flow chart of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 7  illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary computing device configured to implement the system according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 8  illustrates flow diagram of an item authentication method using the system according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 9  illustrates flow diagram of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 10A  illustrates a non-tampered tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 10B  illustrates a tampered with tag according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 11  illustrates a method of providing a cryptographic sealing identity tag for use in an item open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments. 
         FIGS. 12A-12E  illustrate exemplary personal identity authentication scenarios according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 13  illustrates a method of authenticating identities of one or more persons according to some embodiments. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     Embodiments described herein are directed to a system, device and process of linking a human identity to a unique cryptographic identity microchip in a decentralized, public, and immutable way without reliance on a trusted third-party or database, but such that the record of signatures can be trusted. More particularly, embodiments relate to how to link the identity of a human to a microchip that has a public/private key pair for the purpose of enabling the human to use the microchip to digitally and cryptographically sign messages and transactions, without the need to register the cryptographic identity microchip to a database controlled by any third-party, and such that the record of transactions or messages signed by the identity can be trusted and become an immutable public record. As used herein, it is noted that “goods” or “items” are able to refer to original goods or transformations of those original goods (e.g. processed, repackaged, unitized). Further, the goods/items area ble to be enclosed contents including (but not limited to) contents enclosed in receptacles, containers, parcels, envelops, packages, boxes, and any cases that might hold products or components that form a device, machine, apparatus or utensil using tamper proof seals (e.g. with a cryptographic chip) and an open registry. Examples of goods/items include, but are not limited to, gold, silver, platinum and precious metal bullion, sheets of paper, deeds, certificates, canvas, artwork, sculpture, individual component parts and sub-assemblies in the supply chain, light detection and ranging (LIDAR) unit, airbag, optical chip assemblies, end manufactured products, license plates, lap tops, automobiles, artificial knees, and satellites. 
       FIG. 1  illustrates an item open registry authentication system  100  according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 1 , the system  100  comprises one or more items  102  each having an identity (and/or authentication) tag  103 , one or more computing devices  104  each having a receiver/transmitter  105 , an open registry  106  and one or more servers  108 , wherein the servers  108 , the registry  106  and/or the devices  104  are communicatively coupled via one or more networks  110 . Although as shown in  FIG. 1 , a single server  108  is coupled with two client devices  104 , it is understood that any number of servers  108  are able to be coupled with any number of devices  104 . The networks  110  are able to be one or a combination of wired or wireless networks as are well known in the art. The one or more servers  108  are able to store at least a portion of an item authentication agent and/or application  107  including a graphic user interface on a memory of one or more of the servers  108 . As a result, a user is able to download the application  107  from the servers  108  over the network  110  onto one or more of the devices  104 . After being downloaded to the client device  104 , the application  107  is able to create and use an application database within the local memory on the device  104  to store and utilize data necessary for operation. 
     Alternatively, some or all of the data is able to be stored in a server database on the memory on the servers  108  such that the application  107  is able to connect to the servers  108  over the networks  110  in order to utilize the data on the server database. For example, the locally executing application  107  on the devices  104  is able to remotely communicate with the servers  108  over the network  110  to perform any features of the application  107  and/or access any data on the server database not available with just the data on the device  104 . In some embodiments, the same data is stored on both the server database and one or more of the devices  104  such that either local or remote data access is possible. In such embodiments, the data on the servers  108  and/or devices  104  is able to be synchronized by the application. In some embodiments, the server database and/or application  107  is distributed across a plurality of the servers  108 . Alternatively or in addition, one or more of the servers  108  are able to store all of the database and/or application data. In such embodiments, the servers  108  are able to perform a synchronization process such that all the databases and/or other application data are synchronized. 
     Alternatively, the application  107  is able to be replaced or supplemented with an item agent and/or website stored on the server memory and executed by the servers  108 , wherein the agent and/or website provides some or all of the functionality of the application  107  with a website user interface that is substantially similar to the application user interface. In such embodiments, a device  104  is able to access the agent and/or website and utilize the features of the agent and/or website with a web browser that communicates with the servers  108  over the networks  110 . In some embodiments, the functionality of the website is able to be limited to facilitating the downloading of the application  107  onto one or more devices  104 . In other words, the application/agent  107  is able to operate on just the servers  108 , just the devices  104  or a combination of the servers  108  and devices  104 . Accordingly, it should be noted that although described according to an exemplary functional distribution herein, other distributions of the functions of the application/agent  107  between the servers  108  (via the agent/website) and the devices  104  (via the application) are contemplated but not included for the sake of brevity. Alternatively, the device  104  is able to be an autonomous machine such as a drone or an identity/internet of things (IOT) device. In such embodiments, the application  107  is able to be already installed in the device  104  or is able to be part of the software or firmware operating the device  104  itself. 
     Further, the servers  108  are able to store item information describing one or more of the items  102  (e.g. text, audio, photos and/or video describing brand/product/item) and associated with the public key and/or unique identifier stored on the tags  103  coupled to the items  102 . For example, in some embodiments where the item  102  is a person or human identity, the item information is able to comprise information about the person/identity such as an audio recording of the person, a photograph of the person, name, address, work place, associated organizations, physical description (e.g. height, weight, hair color, skin color, eye color, ethnicity, race, religion, sex, age and/or a combination thereof), cards/information from trusted entities (e.g. drivers license information, passport information, social security information and/or a pictures thereof), fingerprints, biometrics, DNA, and/or other human identity markers. 
     As a result, when one of the devices  104  scan/read one or more of the tags  103  on one or more of the items  102 , the application on the device  104  is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags  103  to the server(s)  108 , which then are able to provide the item information associated with the key/identifier to the device  104  for display to the user. In some embodiments, the item information is able to comprise one or more links to or addresses of network accessible locations (e.g. uniform resource identifiers), wherein the locations include information about the items. In such embodiments, when one of the devices  104  scan/read one or more of the tags  103  on one or more of the items  102 , the application on the device  104  is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags  103  to the server(s)  108 , which then are able to provide the links/addresses enabling the application  107  on the device to access the locations (and the server(s) operating the locations) on the device  104  (e.g. via a web browser). In some embodiments, the item information and associated public keys/unique identifiers are uploaded to the servers  108  during a registration process. 
     The computing devices  104  are able to be any computing device having a memory for storing at least a portion of the application  107  and a wireless tag reading feature  105  capable of wirelessly reading and/or communicating with the tags  103 . In some embodiments, the devices  104  comprise a display (e.g. a touchscreen). Examples of suitable computing devices  104  capable of including the reading feature  105  and/or storing the application  107  include smart jewelry (e.g., smartwatch), a personal computer, a laptop computer, a computer workstation, a server, a mainframe computer, a handheld computer, a personal digital assistant, a cellular/mobile telephone, an IOT device, a smart appliance, a game console, a digital camera, a digital camcorder, a camera phone, a smart phone, a portable music player, a tablet computer, a mobile device, a video player, a video disc writer/player (e.g., DVD writer/player, high definition disc writer/player, ultra high definition disc writer/player), a television, a home entertainment system or any other suitable computing device. 
     The items  102  are able to be human bodies and their associated identities. For example, the tags  103  are able to be coupled to the wrist or embedded within the skin of a person for providing a secure identity of that person. Alternatively or in addition, one or more of the items  102  are able to be objects (e.g. receptacles, containers, parcels, envelops, packages, boxes, and any cases that might hold products or components that form a device, machine, apparatus or utensil) having one or more cavities for storing food, medicine, evidence or other items and sealing elements for selectively sealing/unsealing the cavities (e.g. zippers, doors, covers, sliders, lids, flaps, and other types of sealing appendages known in the art). Alternatively or in addition, the items  102  are able to be collectibles, IOT devices, apparel, shoes, hand bags, garments or other commonly forged or collectable physical items. For example, the items are able to be a brand name purse or pair of shoes where because of the existence of numerous knockoffs, it can be difficult to prove that the items are authentic for the purpose of transfers/sales from a current owner to a prospective buyer. In some embodiments, the items  102  are also able to be automobiles, vehicles, boats, collectibles and the like. 
       FIGS. 2A-I  illustrate the tags  103  according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 2A , the tag  103  is able to be an external tag that comprises a tamperproof body  202 , a tamperproof fastening mechanism  204  (e.g. a ring, band), with the body  202  housing an authentication circuit  206 . In some embodiments the body  202  and the fastening mechanism  204  are able to be combined (e.g. an adhesive strip or seal). In some embodiments, the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204  are able to be formed by a single contiguous piece of plastic or other material such that the circuit  206  is entirely sealed within the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204 . As a result, the circuit  206  cannot be physically removed or tampered without breaking the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204 . 
     Additionally, in some embodiments the fastening mechanism  204  is able to be coupled to the item  102  such that the item  102  cannot be opened without breaking or altering the body  202 , the fastening mechanism  204  and/or the circuit  206 . For example, the body  202 /mechanism  204  is able to be couple to both the body of the item  102  and the sealing/unsealing element of the item  102  (e.g. lid) that is able to be opened to expose an inner cavity of the item  102 . As a result, the sealing/unsealing element is unable to be opened without breaking or otherwise altering the fastening mechanism  204  and/or the body  202  of the tag  103 . In some embodiments, the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204  visual indicate when they have been tampered with or broken (e.g. because the item  102  was opened) via exposure of a differently colored portion and/or other visual indicators. 
     Alternatively or in addition, in some embodiments the circuit  206  is able to indicate when the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204  (and thus the item  102 ) has been tampered with. For example, as shown in  FIG. 10A , the circuit  206  is able to have an electrically conductive portion (e.g. wire)  1002  that breaks/disconnects when the item  102  is opened and/or the circuit  206 , the body  202  or the fastening mechanism  204  is tampered with. In other words, the body  202  and/or fastening mechanism  204  are able to be coupled with the circuit  206  and/or the item  102  such that tampering with the tag  103 , decoupling of the tag  103  from the item  102 , and/or opening of the item  102  damages the circuit  206  such that the circuit  206  is unable to be read and/or transmit any stored data, and/or the circuit  206  transmits warning data indicating that tampering/opening occurred (e.g. the conductive portion  1002  was disconnected) as shown in  FIG. 10B . In some embodiments, the tag  103  comprises a tampering signal transmitter  1004  separate from the circuit  206  that monitors when the conductive portion  1002  is severed (e.g. by monitoring an electrical signal received via the conductive portion  1002 ). Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to act as the transmitter  1004  and monitor the conductive portion  1002 . 
     As shown in  FIG. 2B , the tag  103  is also able to be an internal tag that is substantially similar to the external tag of  FIG. 2A  except that instead of the fastening mechanism  204  the internal tag is able to be stitched into a label or other material of the item  102 . Specifically, the body  202  is able to be entirely enveloped by two pieces/layers of fabric or other material of the item  102  stitched or otherwise coupled together around the body  202  (e.g. like a sealed pouch). In some embodiments, at least one of the layers is able to be a label of the item  102  and include writing describing the item  102  (e.g the brand name). In some embodiments, the body  202  and the circuit  206  within the body  202  of the internal tag is able to be flexible such that the item  102  is able to flex without damaging the tag  103 . As shown in  FIG. 2C , the tag  103  is able to be an electronic device  210  wherein the circuit  206  is integrated into the circuitry of the electronic device  210 . For example, the electronic device  210  is able to be a printed circuit board or other electronics with wireless communication capabilities (e.g. an IOT device). 
     As shown in  FIG. 2D , the body  202  and/or fastener  204  of the tag  103  is able to an adhesive strip that is adhered across the opening of the item  102  such that the item  102  cannot be opened without tearing the body  202  of the tag  103  and/or disconnecting a conductive portion of the circuit  206 . For example, the body  202  and/or fastener  204  are able to form a thin flexible sheet having the circuit  206  therein and an adhesive on one side (e.g. a sticker) that adheres the tag  103  to the item  102 . In such embodiments, the fastener  204  is able to be omitted or combined with the body  202 . Similarly, as shown in  FIG. 2E , the fastener  204  is able be a loop that holds the opposite ends of the opening of the item  102  together such that the item  102  cannot be opened without damaging/cutting the loop. As also shown in  FIG. 2E , the body  202  is able to have an adhesive that securely (e.g. permanently) adheres the body  202  across the opening of the item  102  such that the item  102  cannot be opened without breaking the body  202  and/or conductive portion  1002  of the circuit  206 . Thus, the tag  103  in  FIG. 2E  provides to separate barriers (i.e. the fastening mechanism  206  and the body  202 ) that prevent opening of the item  102  without visual indicators from the fastening mechanism  206 /body  202  and/or a warning signal transmitted from circuit  206  and/or a transmitter  1004  to the devices  104 . 
     As shown in  FIGS. 2F and 2H , the tag  103  is able to be placard, security badge or ankle lock. Alternatively, as shown in  FIGS. 2G and 21 , the tag  103  is able to be a flexible band (e.g. wristband) or a human-injectable capsule (e.g. pill) that is able to be ingested or inserted under the skin of a person. Thus, as shown in  FIGS. 2F-2I , the tags  103  are able to be configured to securely attach to the body of a person such that the tags  103  are able to serve as an identifier of the person. 
     As a result, all embodiments of the tags  103  provide the benefit of ensuring that the identification and authentication data stored on the tags  103  are securely coupled to the proper item  102  for authentication/identification purposes and/or that tampering with the tags  103  and/or item  102  is easily determined. 
     The circuit  206  is able to communicate wirelessly via near field communication, bluetooth low energy, radio frequency identification, bluetooth, WiFi or other types of wireless communication known in the art. Further, the circuit  206  is able to be public key infrastructure enabled. Specifically, the circuit  206  is able to store a unique identifier and a private key and wirelessly communicate with the readers  105  of the devices  104 . The private key is secret and cannot be read or extracted from the tag  103  (e.g. cannot be read by the reader  105 ). In contrast, the unique identifier is able to be read by a reader  105  and/or otherwise transmitted from the tag  103  to one or more of the devices  104  when requested by the devices  104 . The private key is an encryption key that is associated with a corresponding public key. In other words, the public key and private keys are related such that data encrypted with the public key are only able to be decrypted using the private key and digital signatures generated by the private key are only able to be validated using the public key. As a result, as described in detail below, the private key of each of the tags  103  is able to be used to authenticate the item  102  (and any contents stored in the item) to which the tag  103  is coupled. Specifically, the circuit  206  is able to digitally sign a challenge message received from a device  104  (via the reader  105 ) using the private key and transmit the digital signature back to the device  104  for authentication of the item  102 . Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to perform other authentication processes on the challenge message using the private key in response to a challenge message from a device  104 . In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is able to selectively not respond to a challenge message. For example, a user is able to turn off the response features of the circuit  206  (e.g. if the user is the item  102  and does not want to have their identity verified). 
     The unique identifier is able to be the public key (associated with the private key stored on the tag  103 ), a hash of the public key, a universally unique identifier (UUID) or other unique identifier. Additionally, in some embodiments, the circuit  206  is able to store data related to the item  102  to which the tag  103  is attached (e.g. text, photos, video and/or audio describing the item  102  and/or registrant). In such embodiments, when scanned by the reader  105 , the circuit  206  is able to send the item-related data to the application on the device  104  which then automatically presents the data to the user of the device  104 . For example, the item-related data is able to be some or all of the item information (described above). 
     The open registry  106  stores registry data and is able to be a database, a blockchain, or a smart contract whose records are open to the public (e.g. access to view records is not permission based, but ownership/transfer protocol requirements for making changes to database). For example, the registry  106  is able to be a distributed database (e.g. across a plurality of computing devices that each store copies of transactions in one or more linked blocks) that maintains a continuously-growing list of data records (e.g. item information of the items associated with the unique identifiers, provenance or chain of ownership transactions associated with pairs of public keys and unique identifiers, digital signatures of a person/identity utilizing the pairs of public keys and unique identifiers) hardened against tampering and revision. 
     In some embodiments, the registry  106  consists of data structure blocks which hold exclusively data (e.g. public keys, ownership data, item identification data) with each block holding batches of individual transactions and the results of any blockchain executables. Alternatively, the blocks are able to store both data and programs. Each block of the blockchain contains a timestamp and information linking it to a previous block (and indicating a time of the transaction) thereby defining the chain and maintaining a chronological order of each of the records/transactions. Thus, the registry  106  provides the advantages of, unlike private third party databases which are controlled by the third party and often require permission for data access, the data (e.g. chain of ownership information, other information related to the item associated with the unique identifier) of the open registry  106  is able to be self-controlled (based on the transaction rules inherent to the database) and publically accessible/viewable without any privileged permissions required. Alternatively, the open registry  106  is able to be a non-blockchain database. 
     The registry data is able to comprise pairs of public keys and item unique identifiers uploaded by registrants or other owners of keys/items. The registrants are able to be manufacturers, authenticators, owners and/or other entities associated with the item  102 . If the item  102  is a person and/or their identity, the person is able to be the registrant and/or the unique identifiers are able to be identifying information of the person (e.g. person-related item information as described above). The registry data is also able to comprise item information such as network accessible locations (e.g. websites, cloud servers, servers  108 ) or links thereto. This item information is able to be associated with one or more of the pairs and optionally made accessible or not accessible to the public. Additionally, unlike other databases, the registry  106  is able to enable the upload or creation of new entries of pairs of item identifiers and public keys (e.g. as registered by a registrant that just manufactured the items  102  associated with the identifiers) without also associating data with the pairs that identifies the source of the pairs. In other words, if desired, the registry  106  protects registrants from competitors being able to access the registry  106  and determine the quantity of a new product/item rollout or release based on the number of pairs by shielding the source of the pairs from public view. In some embodiments, the shielding is in the form of preventing public access to associated source data. Alternatively, the shielding is able to be in the form of enabling the registration of new pairs without any source information such that even if all the data was publicly accessible the registry  106  does not include any source information (that is associated with the pairs) to be accessed. Alternatively, the registry  106  is provides the registrants the option to include the source information such that the source information is publically associated with the new pairs. 
     Also, as described above, the item information data uploaded by a registrant onto the registry  106  along with the pairs is able to comprise one or more links to or addresses of network accessible locations (e.g. uniform resource identifiers), wherein the locations (e.g. a cloud, website) include information about the items. In such embodiments, when one of the devices  104  scan/read one or more of the tags  103  on one or more of the items  102 , the application  107  on the device  104  is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags  103  to the registry  106  in order to retrieve the associated network accessible location(s). In some embodiments, subsequent access or the level of access provided to the network accessible location is determined based on an authentication, a proof of proximity, a proof of possession, and/or a proof of ownership process as described below. As a result, the registrants are able to limit access to the locations unless a device  104  is able to prove that the item  102  is authentic and/or that the device  104  is in proximity, possession and/or ownership to/of the item  102  as well as help provide the source shielding described above. Alternatively or in addition, the item information and associated public keys and/or unique identifiers are uploaded to the servers  108  and/or devices  104  during a registration process as described in detail below. 
     The application  107  is able to comprise an authentication module, a proximity module and a description module, wherein the application  107  and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application  107 . The authentication module is able to automatically perform the authentication process described below when a device  104  reads one of the tags  103  coupled to an item  102 . Similarly, the description module is able to provide an item description on the device  104  also upon reading one of the tags  103 . In particular, the description module is able to access the item information stored on the device  104  and/or the servers  108  as described above. 
     Additionally, in some embodiments the application is able to comprise a login and registration module and a payment module, wherein the application user interface is configured to enable users to utilize the application modules. The login and registration module enables a user to create a user profile/account by inputting username and password information via the graphical user interface that is then associated with the account such that the information is able to be used to identify the user when logging onto the application. Alternatively, the login information is able to be omitted and a user is able to use the application without creating a user account or logging in. After a user account is created, the user is able to access the account by entering the username and password in order to identify themselves to the application. In some embodiments, during the creation of the account or subsequently, additional information is able to be stored and associated with the account such as, but not limited to, contact information (e.g. phone number, email, address), submitted content (e.g. item images, descriptions), account privileges/subscription information (e.g. unlocked application features), friends or other trusted accounts on the system and payment information. In some embodiments, the additional information is submitted by a user upon logging into the account. Alternatively, some or all of the additional information is able to be applied to the account automatically by the application based on interactions by the user with the application. 
       FIGS. 3 and 8  illustrate a flow chart and a flow diagram  800  of an item authentication method using the system  100  according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIGS. 3 and 8 , the circuit  206  of the tag  103  on an item  102  wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag  103  over the air at the step  302 . In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast. In some embodiments, the circuit  206  monitors whether the tag  103  and/or item  102  have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion  1002 . Specifically, if the signal is no longer received the circuit  206  is able to determine that tampering has occurred. In some embodiments, if the monitoring indicates that the tag  103  and/or item  102  has been tampered with (e.g. the fastening mechanism  204 , body  202  and/or the conductive portion  1002  have been severed), the circuit  206  (and/or the transmitter  1004 ) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred. The warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier. Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application  107  of a device  104 ). Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag  103  or item  102  is detected. 
     The application  107  of a device  104  in proximity of the tag  103  discovers the tag  103  and the unique identifier of the tag  103  at the step  304 . In some embodiments, the application  107  provides an authentication option of the authentication module to a user on the device  104  and automatically/continuously monitors for tags  103  (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the authentication option is selected. Alternatively, the application  107  is able to automatically monitor for tags  103  (and/or identifiers) and displays the authentication option of the authentication module on the device  104  when a tag  103  (and/or identifier) is discovered. In such embodiments, the application  107  is able to await selection of the authentication option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps. After receiving the unique identifier, the application  107  on the device  104  transmits the unique identifier to the open registry  106  over the network  110  at the step  306 . Alternatively, if the warning signal is received in addition or in lieu of the unique identifier, the application  107  indicates that the item  102  and/or tag  103  has been tampered with and/or that the authentication attempt failed on the device  104  to the user via the application  107 . 
     Upon receiving the unique identifier, the open registry  106  retrieves the stored public key paired to the unique identifier that matches the received unique identifier and transmits the public key to the device  104  over the network  110  at the step  308 . Additionally, in some embodiments the registry  106  is able to transmit the digital records (e.g. chain of ownership), item information (e.g. user identity) and/or other item related data (e.g. the current owner) associated with the unique identifier to the device  104 . If no pairs match the received unique identifier, the authentication fails and the registry  106  instead sends a failure message to the device  104  which then indicates the failure on the device  104  to the user via the application  107 . In some embodiments, a brand or other entity registers the unique identifier, public key and other information associated with the item  102  onto the registry  106  prior to the request from the device  104 . 
     After or concurrently with steps  306  and  308 , the application  107  on the device  104  generates and transmits a challenge message (e.g. a random data set, a data set received from the registry  106 ) to the tag  103  at the step  310 . Upon receiving the challenge message, the circuit  206  of the tag  103  digitally signs the challenge message using the private key stored on the tag  103  and transmits the signed challenge (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) to the device  104  via the reader  105  at the step  312 . In some embodiments, the digital signature is a hash of the challenge message using the private key. Alternatively, the digital signature is able to be other modulations of and/or operations performed on the message using the private key. 
     The application  107  determines if the message of the signed challenge matches the original challenge message at the step  314 . If the messages do not match, the authentication fails and the application  107  indicates the failure to a user on the device  104 . If the messages match, the application  107  determines if the digital signature from the tag  103  is valid using the public key received from the registry  106  at the step  316 . In some embodiments, determining if the digital signature if valid comprises generating a public signature using the public key and the challenge message and determining if it matches or corresponds to the digital signature. Alternatively, other signature validation methods are able to be used based on the public key and the challenge message. Alternatively, the open registry  106  is able to perform some or all of the signature validation. Specifically, the open registry  106  is able to receive the challenge message from the device  104  and generate and send a public signature based on the public key and the challenge message to the application  107 . In such embodiments, the application  107  only needs to determine if the public signature matches or corresponds to the digital signature from the tag  103  in order to determine if the digital signature if valid. Alternatively, the application  107  is able to further forward the signed message (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) received from the tag  103  to the registry  106  such that all the validation is performed by the registry  106  which then indicates to the device  104  whether the authentication was a success. 
     Alternatively, a third party server (e.g. brand/company server) associated with the application is able to perform some or all of: provide the challenge message, generate the public signature, receive and compare the signed response to the public signature to determine if the digital signature is valid (e.g. wherein any remaining functions are performed by the application  107  and/or registry  106 ). As a result, in such embodiments, the third party server is able to only provide access to content (e.g. item information) associated with the item  102  if the item  102  is authenticated to the third party server. 
     If the digital signature is not verified or validated using the public key, the authentication fails and the application  107  indicates the failure to a user on the device  104 . If the digital signature is verified/validated, the authentication succeeds and the application  107  indicates the success to the user on the device  104  at the step  318 . As a result, the method provides the advantage of enabling a user to authenticate that the item  102  is genuine, the identity of a person/item  102 , the current owner of the item  102  and/or whether the item  102  has been opened by determining if the tag  103  has been tampered with. 
     In some embodiments, indicating the success to the user on the device  104  comprises presenting (or provided access to) the digital records (e.g. chain of ownership information, person identity information) and/or the item information (e.g. stored on the device  104 , the servers  108  or both) corresponding to the item  102  to the user on the device  104  using the description module. For example, if the item  102  is a person, item information such as an image of the person (or other personal identification data) is able to be displayed on the device  104 . As a result, the user of the device  104  is able to utilize the displayed information (e.g. image) to verify that the person coupled to the tag  103  is the person who is identified by the displayed information. In other words, the system provides the benefit of both authenticating the identity of a person associated with the tag  103  and authenticating that the person currently coupled to the tag  103  is the person associated with the tag  103  (and not an imposter). In such embodiments, the application  107  on the device  104  is able to present a confirmation feature after or concurrently with the digital records and/or item information, wherein the authentication is not completed/validated on the device  104  unless the user selects the confirmation feature of the application  107  confirming that the person is associated with the tag  103  (i.e. not an imposter). 
     In such embodiments, the presenting of the item information is able to comprise the automatic navigation to a network accessible address of the item information (e.g. via the application  107  or a web browser) and/or the presentation of a link to the network accessible address to a user. In some embodiments, the method further comprises obtaining proof of ownership data from a user and authenticating the proof of ownership data based on the records and/or protocols of the registry  106  in order to authenticate the ownership. In such embodiments, the application  107  is able to indicate successful authentication of ownership to the user on the device  104 . In some embodiments, the authentication method is used by IOT devices and autonomous machines to recognize objects and execute their programmed behavior accordingly. In some embodiments, the authentication method is used by IOT devices and autonomous machines to recognize other IOT devices and machines and engage them accordingly to their programs, including performing a task and establishing a connection/communication. 
       FIG. 4  illustrates a method of presenting item information according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 4 , the circuit  206  of the tag  103  on an item  102  wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag  103  over the air at the step  402 . In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast. In some embodiments, the circuit  206  monitors whether the tag  103  and/or item  102  have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion  1002 . Specifically, if the signal is no longer received the circuit  206  is able to determine that tampering has occurred. In some embodiments, if the monitoring indicates that the tag  103  and/or item  102  has been tampered with (e.g. the fastening mechanism  204 , body  202  and/or the conductive portion  1002  have been severed), the circuit  206  (and/or the transmitter  1004 ) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred. The warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier. Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application  107  of a device  104 ). Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag  103  or item  102  is detected. 
     The application  107  of a device  104  in proximity of the tag  103  discovers the tag  103  and the unique identifier of the tag  103  at the step  404 . In some embodiments, the application  107  provides an authentication option of the authentication module to a user on the device  104  and automatically/continuously monitors for tags  103  (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the authentication option is selected. Alternatively, the application  107  is able to automatically monitor for tags  103  (and/or identifiers) and displays the authentication option of the authentication module on the device  104  when a tag  103  (and/or identifier) is discovered. In such embodiments, the application  107  is able to await selection of the authentication option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps. After receiving the unique identifier, the application  107  on the device  103  accesses the item information (on the device  104  and/or the servers  108 ) and/or digital records (e.g. chain of ownership information, human identity information) associated with the received unique identifier and presents the digital records and/or the item information to the user on the device  104  using the description module at the step  406 . In some embodiments, the presenting of the item information is able to comprise the automatic navigation to a network accessible address of the item information (e.g. via the application  107  or a web browser) and/or the presentation of a link to the network accessible address to a user on the device  104 . Alternatively or in addition, the presenting of the item information is able to comprise accessing the item information associated with the unique identifier on the servers  108 , locally on the device  104  and/or on the open registry  106  over the network  110 . As a result, the method provides the advantage of enabling a user to quickly find authenticated information about an item  102  and/or be forwarded to a location (e.g. website) with information about the item. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates a method of registering items  102  on the registry  106  according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 5 , a registrant uploads one or more pairs of public keys and item unique identifiers (e.g. item information) to the open registry  106  over the network  110  at the step  502 . The public keys correspond to the private keys stored in the tags  103  along with the item unique identifiers to which the public keys are paired. The registry  106  provides the registrant with an option to make the source (e.g. the registrant or owner) of the pairs private or publically accessible at the step  504 . If the private option is selected, the registry  106  does not store any information associated with the pairs indicating the source of the pairs at the step  506 . If the public option is selected, information indicating the source of the pairs is stored along with the data associated with the pairs (e.g. optional digital records data, other item information data) at the step  508 . 
     The registry  106  enables the registrant to associate a network accessible location (e.g. cloud server, website, server  108 ) with one or more of the pairs at the step  510 . In some embodiments, the network accessible location requires item authentication, proof of proximity, proof of possession and/or proof of ownership as described below, before enabling access to digital content and/or executing services or programs related to the pairs provided by the network accessible location. Thus, the registration method provides the advantage of enabling owners or registrants to remain anonymous if desired and/or to restrict access to a network accessible location associated with the items  102  (associated with the uploaded pairs) unless a proof of proximity, authentication, possession and/or ownership process is completed. Thus, the method enables the registrants to protect themselves from competitive product size release determination while still utilizing an open registry  106 . 
       FIGS. 6 and 9  illustrate a flow chart and a flow diagram  900  of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIGS. 6 and 9 , the circuit  206  of the tag  103  on an item  102  wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag  103  over the air at the step  602 . In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast. In some embodiments, the circuit  206  monitors whether the tag  103  and/or item  102  have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion  1002 . Specifically, if the signal is no longer received the circuit  206  is able to determine that tampering has occurred. In some embodiments, if the monitoring indicates that the tag  103  and/or item  102  has been tampered with (e.g. the fastening mechanism  204 , body  202  and/or the conductive portion  1002  have been severed), the circuit  206  (and/or the transmitter  1004 ) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred. The warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier. Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application  107  of a device  104 ). Alternatively, the circuit  206  is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag  103  or item  102  is detected. 
     The application  107  of a device  104  in proximity of the tag  103  discovers the tag  103  and the unique identifier of the tag  103  at the step  604 . In some embodiments, the application  107  provides a proof of proximity option of the proof of proximity module to a user on the device  104  and automatically/continuously monitors for tags  103  (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the proof of proximity option is selected. Alternatively, the application  107  is able to automatically monitor for tags  103  (and/or identifiers) and displays the proof of proximity option of the proof of proximity module on the device  104  when a tag  103  (and/or identifier) is discovered. In such embodiments, the application  107  is able to await selection of the proof of proximity option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps. In some embodiments, the proof of proximity and authentication options are able to be presented simultaneously and/or concurrently by the application  107  such that a user is able to select whether they want to perform an authentication method, proximity method, or both on the discovered tag  103 . 
     After receiving the unique identifier, the application  107  accesses the open registry  106  and uses the unique identifier to retrieve the associated network accessible location stored on the registry  106  at the step  606 . Alternatively, if the warning signal is received in addition or in lieu of the unique identifier, the application  107  indicates that the item  102  and/or tag  103  has been tampered with and/or that the authentication attempt failed on the device  104  to the user via the application  107 . Additionally, in some embodiments the application  107  is able to concurrently access the other data (e.g. digital records and/or other item information data) associated with the unique identifier on the registry  106 . If no pairs match the received unique identifier, the proof of proximity fails and the device  104  indicates the failure on the device  104  to the user via the application  107 . Alternatively, if the network accessible location and associated unique identifier is stored on the servers  108  and/or the device  104 , the application  107  on the device  104  is able to omit the communication with the registry  106  and instead obtain the network accessible location associated with the unique identifier locally or in the same manner from the servers  108 . In some embodiments, a brand or other entity registers the unique identifier, public key and other information associated with the item  102  with the registry  106 , approves developers and/or develops digital content (e.g. item information) on the server  108  (e.g. cloud service) prior to the request from the device  104 . 
     The application  107  requests access to the network accessible location and/or the services provided at the location at the step  608 . In some embodiments, the services comprise one or more of digital content, raw data, execution of a program or other services related to the unique identifier (and/or the item  102  coupled to the tag  103 ). The network accessible location (e.g. cloud server, website server, server  108 ) generates and transmits a proximity challenge message to the application  107  on the device  104  in response to the access request at the step  610 . In some embodiments, the proximity challenge message is able to be similar to the authentication challenge message described above. For example, the proximity challenge message is able to be a random string, the unique identifier or other data sets. In some embodiments, the entropy used as the seed to generate this random string of bytes may be the content of the last time-sequenced block on the blockchain. Upon receiving the proximity challenge message, application  107  on the device  104  forwards the message to the circuit  206  of the tag  103 , which digitally signs the challenge message using the private key stored on the tag  103  at the step  612 . The circuit  206  then transmits the signed proximity challenge (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) to the device  104  via the reader  105  which then forwards it to the network accessible location via the network  110  at the step  614 . In some embodiments, the digital signature is a hash of the challenge message using the private key. Alternatively, the digital signature is able to be other modulations of or operation on the message using the private key. 
     The network accessible location determines if the signed proximity challenge message is valid using the public key at the step  618 . In some embodiments, the network accessible location locally stores a copy of the public key paired with the unique identifier. Alternatively, the location is able to request/receive the public key from the registry  106 , the servers  108 , the device  104  or a combination thereof The verification of the signed challenge is able to be performed in the same manner as the verification of the signed authentication message described above in the item authentication method. Specifically, the network accessible location is able to determine validity if both the signed challenge matches the original proximity challenge message and the submitted signature validates against the public key associated with the private key of the tag  103 . If the verification fails (e.g. due to the messages not matching and/or due to the signature being incorrect), the proof of proximity fails and the location sends a failure message to the application  107  which indicates the failure to a user on the device  104  at the step  618 . If the digital signature is verified/validated, the proof of proximity succeeds such that the location provides the device/application  104 / 107  access to the services provided by the location at the step  620 . The application  107  is then able to provide the user with access to the services via the device  104 . As a result, the method provides the advantage of enabling registrants to require a proof of proximity before providing access to item related information and/or features from a network accessible location. Indeed, this also serves to help ensure that the item  102 /tag  103  is not tampered with and ensure the anonymity of the registry  106  as the item related information (which likely indicates the source/registrant of the item  102 ) is able to be separate from the data on the open registry  106  (such that it is shielded from the public). 
     In some embodiments, the network accessible location is able to restrict access based on the proof of proximity method combined with other protocols (e.g. developer tokens, user authentication) such that both must be satisfied for access to be granted. In some embodiments, the network accessible location is a smart contract operating on a blockchain database (e.g. the registry  106 ). In some embodiments, the providing access to the content/features of the location is able to comprise the automatic navigation to the network accessible address by the device  104  (e.g. via the application  107  or a web browser) and/or the presentation of a link to the network accessible address on the device/application  104 / 107  to a user. In some embodiments, the application  107  on the device  104  and/or the servers  108  (or other third party servers associated with the application  107  or item  102 ) are able to perform the verification of the signed proximity challenge message. In such embodiments, if performed on the device  104  the signed message does not need to be forwarded and instead the public key is requested/received from the registry  106  and/or the network accessible location to perform the verification. Similarly, if performed by the servers  108  (e.g. by the agent/application  107  on the servers  108 ), the signed message is forwarded to the servers  108  which either currently store or request/receive the public key from the registry  106  and/or the network accessible location to perform the verification. The network accessible location described herein is able to refer to the address itself and/or the computers/servers operating the website and/or other services provided at the network accessible location. 
     In some embodiments, the application  107  is able to comprise a possession module and an ownership module, wherein the application  107  and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application  107 . The options to initiate the possession and ownership process is able to be presented to a user on the device  104  in the same manner as the authentication and proof of proximity options as described above. The possession module is able to automatically perform the a possession process wherein a user establishes possession of the item  102  by performing the authentication and/or proof of possession process (described above) multiple times (e.g. 3 times) over a threshold period (e.g. 7 days). In particular, a brand/company/entity associated with the item  102 , the server  108  and/or the application  107  is able to set a threshold of times that the authentication and/or proximity process must be validly performed and/or a time period that the threshold must span (e.g. from the first process to the last process and/or a time period between each process). 
     The brand/company/entity is then able to condition access to content (e.g. item information, features of the application  107  and/or access/use of the network accessible location) on successful completion of the proof of possession. Similarly, the ownership module is able to automatically perform the an ownership process wherein a user establishes possession of the item  102  and/or entitlement to the item  102  based on the chain of custody information stored on the registry  106  for the item  102 . Alternatively, the ownership process is able to be the same as the possession process except with an increase in the number of times and/or threshold period over that of the possession process. As a result, as described above, the network accessible location is able to restrict access to one or more features/content (e.g. features/content associated with the item  102 ) based on whether a device  104  and associated user have established authentication, proximity, possession and/or ownership as described above. 
     Some examples of features/content include photos, videos, operating manuals, promotions, timelines of ownership, social interactions, “write privileges” to comment socially on the item  102  (e.g. on the application  107 , server  108  and/or an associated website), update the item  102  timeline, transfer/sell the item  102 , list the item  102  for sale on a secondary market, privileges to receive a trade-in opportunity or limited edition release associated with the item  102  and/or other types of content. Other examples include enabling a consumer to post to a social network their interactions with an item  102  (e.g. like, comment, and/or sign the digital guest book of the item  102 ) from their smart phone device (e.g. device  104 ), only if they are able to prove proof of proximity. 
     In some embodiments, the content is able to be sales/promotions that are unique to the item  102  (or content stored in the item) even amongst other items  102 . For example, a discount could be offered on a new pair of shoes, wherein the discount is only available to the user/device  104  that authenticates, proves proximity, proves possession and/or proves ownership of a specific item  102  (e.g. designer purse) even among users/devices  104  that are able to do the same with other items  102  of the same brand/model. As a result, the content provided can be truly unique to one specific item  102  even amongst other duplicate of the item. 
     In some embodiments, the application  107  is able to comprise an analytics module, wherein the application  107  and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application  107 . The options to initiate the analytics function is able to be presented to a user on the device  104  in the same manner as the authentication and proof of proximity options as described above. The analytics module is able to automatically track usage and location data about the items  102  and the devices  104  based on the authentication, proximity, possession and/or ownership processes. 
       FIG. 7  illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary computing device  700  configured to implement the system  100  according to some embodiments. In addition to the features described above, the computing devices  104  and/or servers  108  are able to be substantially similar to the device  700 . In general, a hardware structure suitable for implementing the computing device  700  includes a network interface  702 , a memory  704 , a processor  706 , I/O device(s)  708  (e.g. reader  105 ), a bus  710  and a storage device  712 . Alternatively, one or more of the illustrated components are able to be removed or substituted for other components well known in the art. The choice of processor is not critical as long as a suitable processor with sufficient speed is chosen. The memory  704  is able to be any conventional computer memory known in the art. The storage device  712  is able to include a hard drive, CDROM, CDRW, DVD, DVDRW, flash memory card or any other storage device. The computing device  700  is able to include one or more network interfaces  702 . An example of a network interface includes a network card connected to an Ethernet or other type of LAN. The I/O device(s)  708  are able to include one or more of the following: keyboard, mouse, monitor, display, printer, modem, touchscreen, button interface and other devices. Authentication system application  107  or module(s) thereof are likely to be stored in the storage device  712  and memory  704  and processed as applications are typically processed. More or fewer components shown in  FIG. 7  are able to be included in the computing device  700 . In some embodiments, authentication system hardware  720  is included. Although the computing device  700  in  FIG. 7  includes applications  730  and hardware  720  for the authentication system, the authentication system is able to be implemented on a computing device in hardware, firmware, software or any combination thereof. 
       FIG. 11  illustrates a method of providing a cryptographic sealing identity tag for use in an item open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 11 , one or more physical items  102  are provided each having a body including a sealable inner cavity and a sealing element that is configured to move between an open position and a closed position to selectively seal or unseal the inner cavity at the step  1102 . One or more identity tags  103  are coupled to the one or more physical items  102  such that the sealing element of the items is blocked from opening by the tags  103  at the step  1104 . In some embodiments, the identity tags  103  each storing a private key and a unique identifier and configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read from the tag  103 . In some embodiments, each of the identity tags comprise an authentication circuit  206  storing the private key and the unique identifier, wherein the private key is associated with a public key such that data encrypted by the private key can only be decrypted using the public key. In some embodiments, each of the identity tags  103  comprise a flexible thin sheet having an adhesive on one side of the sheet, wherein the tags  103  are coupled to the items  102  by the adhesive. 
     In some embodiments, the circuit  206  comprises a conductive tamper wire  1002  that extends a length of the tag  103  and/or the circuit  206 , and the method further comprises generating and transmitted with the circuit  206  a tamper warning signal if any portion of the conductive tamper wire  1002  is severed. In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is configured to generate and transmit a digital signature using the private key in response to a challenge message, wherein the digital signature corresponds to the challenge message and the private key. In some embodiments, the method further comprises wirelessly reading the tags  103  with a mobile device  104  and displaying a message indicating that the items  102  have been tampered with if the tamper warning signal is discovered during the reading. In some embodiments, the circuit  206  is integrated into at least one of the group consisting of a printed circuit board of the device, a microchip of the device, firmware of the device and software of the device. 
       FIGS. 12A-12E  illustrate exemplary scenarios wherein the item  102  is a person or person&#39;s identity according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 12A , the item  102  is able to be an employee and the device  104  is able to be from an employer (e.g. a computer at corporate headquarters). As a result, the employer is able to transmit a challenge message  1200  (e.g. job code) to the employee  102 , that the employee  102  is able to sign using the tag  103  in order to authenticate the identity of the employee  102 . As shown in  FIG. 12B , the item  102  is able to be a bank customer and the device  104  is able to be from bank (e.g. a computer from the bank). As a result, the bank is able to transmit a challenge message  1200  (e.g. banking transaction information) to the customer  102 , that the customer  102  is able to sign using the tag  103  in order to authenticate the identity of the customer  102  as being associated with the transaction. 
     As shown in  FIG. 12C , the item  102  is able to be a car owner and the device  104  is able to be a vehicle or an electronic device (e.g. a computer within an automobile). As a result, the vehicle is able to transmit a challenge message  1200  (e.g. access message) to the owner  102 , that the owner  102  is able to sign using the tag  103  in order to authenticate the identity of the owner  102  before the vehicle/electronic device grants access/control to the owner  102 . Thus, non-owners can be prevented from stealing or using the vehicle/device. As shown in  FIG. 12D , the item  102  is able to be a prisoner and the device  104  is able to be from a correctional facility (e.g. a computer at the facility). As a result, the employer is able to transmit a challenge message  1200  to the prisoner  102 , that the prisoner  102  is able to sign using the tag  103  in order to authenticate the identity of the prisoner  102  and track the movements of the prisoner in door exit/entrance logs. Finally, as shown in  FIG. 12E , the item  102  is able to be congressman and the device  104  is able to be from the government (e.g. a computer of the president). As a result, the government is able to transmit a challenge message  1200  (e.g. a nuclear request code) to the congressman  102 , that the congressman  102  is able to sign using the tag  103  in order to authenticate the identity of the congressman  102 . Thus, the system provides the advantage of enabling personal identities to be securely verified when beneficial for various actions/transactions. 
       FIG. 13  illustrates a method of authenticating identities of one or more persons  102  according to some embodiments. As shown in  FIG. 13 , a device  104  wirelessly discovers a unique identifier stored on an identity tag  103  coupled to a person  102  at the step  1302 . In some embodiments, the identity tag  103  stores a private key and is configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read, and the electronic device  104  is configured to automatically wirelessly read the unique identifier from the identity tag  103  when proximate to the tag  103 . The device  104  transmits the unique identifier to an open registry  106  at the step  1304 . In some embodiments, the registry  106  stores the unique identifier, personal identification information and a public key of the person  102 , wherein the public key is associated with the private key stored on the identity tag coupled to the person  102 , and further wherein the personal identification information uniquely identifies the person  102 . The device  104  receives the public key associated with the unique identifier from the registry  106  and receives a digital signature from the identity tag  103  at the step  1306 . The device  104  authenticates the identity of the person  102  by determining if the digital signature was generated by the private key stored in the identity tag  103  using the received public key. 
     Alternatively, the authentication is able to be withheld by the application  107  on the device  104  pending a confirmation of the user of the device  104 . Specifically, upon determining that the digital signature is correct, the application  107  is able to display a confirmation feature and item information associated with the tag  103 /person  102  on the device  104  such that the user is able to confirm or disconfirm the identity of the person  102  based on the item information using the confirmation feature. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises an image of the person  102 . In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises a physical description of the person  102 . 
     The present invention has been described in terms of specific embodiments incorporating details to facilitate the understanding of principles of construction and operation of the invention. Such reference herein to specific embodiments and details thereof is not intended to limit the scope of the claims appended hereto. It will be readily apparent to one skilled in the art that other various modifications may be made in the embodiment chosen for illustration without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the claims. For example, in some embodiments, to maximize the strength of identity verification for a high value manufactured item  102 , a cryptographic identity contained in a secure seal on one or more parts connected to the item  102  is able to be coupled together with several analog identities of other component parts or items  102  (such as serial numbers, UIDs, bar codes, and QR codes) and registered together to the blockchain in order to create a strong “composite identity” for the item  102 . 
     Embodiments described herein are directed to a system, device and process of provenance tracking for the supply chain that enables verifying identity of goods via identifiers managed via an open registry, proving possession, and registering supply-chain-related transactions on a transaction ledger. As a result, the embodiments are able to prevent counterfeiting, forgery and integrity breaches for sealed contents via unique and unforgeable cryptographic identity. As used herein, it is noted that “goods” or “items” are able to refer to original goods or transformations of those original goods (e.g. processed, repackaged, unitized). Further, the goods/items area ble to be enclosed contents including (but not limited to) contents enclosed in receptacles, containers, parcels, envelops, packages, boxes, and any cases that might hold products or components that form a device, machine, apparatus or utensil using tamper proof seals (e.g. with a cryptographic chip) and an open registry. Examples of goods/items include, but are not limited to, gold, silver, platinum and precious metal bullion, sheets of paper, deeds, certificates, canvas, artwork, sculpture, individual component parts and sub-assemblies in the supply chain, light detection and ranging (LIDAR) unit, airbag, optical chip assemblies, end manufactured products, license plates, lap tops, automobiles, artificial knees, and satellites.