Patent Publication Number: US-2021185026-A1

Title: System and method for hierarchy manipulation in an encryption key management system

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE 
     This application is a Continuation of application Ser. No. 15/439,873, filed Feb. 22, 2017, which claims priority Provisional Application No. 62/300,717, titled System And Method For Hierarchy Manipulation In An Encryption Key Management System, filed Feb. 26, 2016, and is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure relates to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/506,346, titled System And Method For Encryption Key Management Federation And Distribution, and filed Oct. 3, 2014, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure also relates to U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/132,372, titled KO Hierarchy For Key Orchestration System And Process, and filed Mar. 12, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND 
     In security systems, an encryption key refers to a parameter or data that dictates how plain data may be translated into encrypted data during an encryption process and encrypted data into plain data during a decryption process. Typically, the encryption key is made available both of a source device (e.g., a transmitting device) and a target device (e.g., a receiving device) in a communication transaction. Given that encryption keys are so widely used, effective management of the encryption keys (as well as other security objects) to defend and respond to threats against the security systems is of paramount importance. 
     Traditionally, encryption key management is initiated and executed at the device level (e.g., by the source device and/or the target device that are involved in the communication transaction). Communication management, on the other hand, is traditionally centrally managed at a higher level (e.g., by a server for the source device and target device). The end result may be that the encryption management is procedurally unsynchronized with communications management. Thus, loose controls of encryption keys, as demonstrated in current public key infrastructure (PKI) instances, may result. In addition, loose controls of symmetric keys generated and distributed in an enterprise may also occur. Accordingly, an end result may be a breakdown in communication management or communication security. Similar problems confront other types of encryption objects. 
     In addition, because people, processes, devices, and technologies in an organization may realign from time to time (in some cases, rapidly or constantly), encryption key management associated with those changing entities and devices within the organization should also be realigned and updated accordingly so that security is maintained throughout the system, despite realignments and other changes in the organization. 
     SUMMARY 
     Examples described herein relate to manipulation of a structure of a policy hierarchy, while reformulating policies associated with the manipulated nodes of the hierarchy. In some examples, a node may be created, moved, and/or deleted, and the policies associated with the manipulated node (and other nodes effected by the manipulation of the node) may be reformulated, based on the new position of the node or other nodes in the hierarchy. In some examples, nodes indirectly effected by the hierarchy manipulation may be moved within the hierarchy as a result. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a general encryption key orchestration system according to various examples. 
         FIG. 2  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key orchestration system according to various examples. 
         FIG. 2A  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key orchestration system according to various examples. 
         FIG. 3  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation system as implemented in various examples. 
         FIG. 4  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a communication device consuming key orchestration services according to some examples. 
         FIG. 5  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a request authentication process for issuing requests and receiving encryption keys according to some examples. 
         FIG. 6  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process implemented in various key orchestration systems according to various examples. 
         FIG. 7  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key management and distribution process according to various examples. 
         FIG. 8  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key federation process according to various examples. 
         FIG. 9  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process according to various examples. 
         FIG. 10  is a diagram illustrating an example of a policy hierarchy according to some examples. 
         FIG. 11  is a diagram illustrating examples of groups according to some examples. 
         FIG. 12  is a table illustrating examples of policies having complex logical operations according to some examples. 
         FIGS. 13A, 13B, and 13C  illustrate an example of a policy hierarchy undergoing nodal manipulation. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     In the following description of various examples, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof and in which are shown by way of illustration specific examples in which the examples may be practiced. It is to be understood that other examples may be utilized, and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the various examples disclosed in the present disclosure. 
     Examples described herein generally relate to security object orchestration. The security object orchestration may include management, distribution, and federation of the security object. Security objects may include encryption keys and other sensitive objects (such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like). In the present disclosure, encryption key-based orchestration is described in various examples as examples of the security object orchestration systems and methods. It should be appreciated that the orchestration systems and methods are likewise applicable to other security objects, including those described above. 
     As used herein, “key orchestration” may refer to a combination of key management, key federation, and key distribution activities in one or more enterprises. For example, examples described may be associated with the orchestration of encryption key information correlated with utilizing encryption in the one or more enterprises. “Enterprise key management” may include managing and/or overseeing the multiple uses of asymmetric and symmetric keys required for encrypting data, signing emails, authenticating web services, and/or other potential uses. This may also include encryption management for communications systems to include radio, cellular, satellite and internet protocol based communications. “Enterprise key federation” may include coordinating and negotiating the federation of key information to a plurality of disparate key orchestration platforms (each associated with disparate federating organizations) based on established trust between the federating organizations (e.g., the enterprises). “Key distribution” may refer to a centralized distribution (e.g., pushing or forwarding) of key material to support encryption operations within a local enterprise and/or a foreign enterprise. In particular, key distribution may be concerned with assigning or otherwise transmitting the appropriate encryption keys to an appropriately associated device (e.g., the communication device, which may either be a source device or a target device). 
     Examples of key orchestration (e.g., a key orchestration device such as a management request handler coupled to a request handler and various supporting databases) may provide control of encryption key management, federation, and distribution through a centralized user interface. Such key orchestration devices may provide centralized systems and/or methods of managing encryption keys associated with communications, infrastructure, and applications. Such key orchestration devices may also manage device enrollment, monitor device health related to encryption capabilities, and monitor status for key orchestration activities. Such capabilities may allow robust transaction reporting to support audit activities associated with communications, application, and infrastructure management. 
     Key orchestration may be leveraged for additional systems other than the communication systems. Other implementations of key orchestration may include application encryption management, virtualization encryption management, storage encryption management, and/or user identity encryption management. In short, if applications, communications, or infrastructures require use of encryption (or other types of security mechanisms using security objects) and keys (or security objects), orchestration may be applied to provide advantages as described. Communication systems may include, but are not limited to, radio communications, cellular communications, transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) based communications, satellite communications equipment, and the like. Application systems may include, but are not limited to voice-over-internet protocol VOIP applications, virtualization, identification and authentication, messaging, local storage. Infrastructure systems may include, but are not limited to storage solutions, physical security infrastructure, and medical equipment. 
     In particular examples, a key orchestration device may enable encryption key lifecycle activities across multiple types of communication devices in a centralized manner. The key orchestration device may leverage industry standards for key management for interoperability with existing systems and may use, for example, protocols for applied key management as a part of key orchestration. A distinction between applied key orchestration and key management alone may be demonstrated in encryption key management and key distribution for communication systems. Given the requirement to make new encryption connections before breaking existing connections, typical communication systems cannot utilize rekey commands as it would break communications before management steps are taken to establish new lines of communications. However, rekey commands may work for infrastructure—to include storage, applications and virtualization solutions—where services can be reestablished without loss of centralized control of the managed capability. 
     The system architecture of key orchestration can be configured to allow for use of a standard-based approach for supported systems such as key management interoperability protocol (KMIP), for example, but also the capability to develop support interfaces for non-standardized systems such as physical security infrastructure, virtualization applications, satellite communications systems, and medical equipment. This may be accomplished by architecturally separating message handling from support interfaces. Using a purely KMIP example, a storage device may receive a “rekey” command, a communication equipment may receive “put-and-notify” commands, and cellular devices may request queued “notify” commands informing the cellular devices to send “get messages” to the key orchestration device to be relayed to key management and generation system components. Example systems implementing such features are discussed below. 
     Examples described herein may include a key orchestration device to implement centralized, top-down enterprise encryption key management encryption keys (e.g., such as, but not limited to symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and the like) as well as other security objects used in security systems. Such centralized, top-down control of encryption may be for a given enterprise. Examples may include implementing coordinated KMIP on enterprise key management, communications systems, applications, and infrastructure for encryption key lifecycle functions implementing at least one of: device registration, user registration, system and user initialization, key material installation, key establishment, key registration, operational use, key storage, key distribution, key update, key recovery, key de-registration, key destruction, key revocation, and the like. 
     As referred to herein, a “key attribute” (attribute, encryption attribute, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key may refer to a characteristic associated with the encryption key, cryptographic or security characteristics of the encryption key, the cryptographic algorithms of the encryption key, a device generating/transmitting/receiving the encryption key, a user of the device, and/or the like. Each encryption key may be associated with at least one key attribute. The encryption key may be transmitted and/or received with its associated key attributes represented in data values. 
     As referred to herein, a “policy” may be a rule managing an encryption key based on key attribute(s) associated with that encryption key. In particular examples, a policy may dictate whether the particular encryption key is an acceptable encryption key. Such acceptability may be based on the security and cryptographic considerations as to whether the encryption key (e.g., as shown from the key attributes associated with the encryption key) may be secure enough. In other words, the encryption key generated for a particular communication transaction may be presented for inspection by the policy to be evaluated as to whether the encryption key is to be allowed or denied for that communication transaction. 
     Some examples include an interface for key orchestration for mobile communication devices (e.g., a wireless device, and/or the like), or provide an interface for key orchestration for radio/satellite communications systems to include telemetry and payload in satellite communications. Particular implementations of the examples may include interfaces for banking applications such as, but not limited to, automated teller machines (ATMs), bank account interfaces, and the like. The interfaces for banking applications may be implemented on any mobile or non-mobile devices. Examples may provide an interface for key orchestration for applications that include virtualization or providing an interface for key orchestration for network infrastructure to include routers, switches, virtual private network (VPN) appliances, firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusion prevention system (IPSs), tokenizers, and/or the like. 
     For example, a centralized encryption management may be provided for symmetric encryption keys or asymmetric encryption keys, in both private and/or public contexts. In some examples, existing network infrastructure information may be consumed to distribute encryption keys based on active/inactive status of network infrastructure or distributing and managing encryption keys for network infrastructure based on equipment that can readily accept encryption keys (e.g., existing hardware/software may be installed on the equipment for accepting encryption keys). 
     Examples may queue encryption key transaction information for communication devices not available at the point of a given encryption management operation (e.g., in a push-key event). In addition, examples described herein may centrally display encryption key lifecycle information (for supported infrastructure) and successful encryption key management transactions. In addition to or as an alternative, failure message and/or a cause of unsuccessful encryption key management transactions may be displayed. 
     In some examples, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In addition, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In some examples, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on user initiated basis may be provided. In various examples, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a user initiated basis may be provided. Also, federated distribution of encryption keys based on established trust based key exchange between two or more key management and orchestration devices may be provided as described. 
     In some examples, distributing federated symmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated symmetric key distribution may be provided. In various examples, distributing federated asymmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated asymmetric key distribution may be provided. In addition, implementing federated trust model by using multiple devices and split key distribution may be provided to establish trust between two untrusted entities that need to communicate securely. 
     The key orchestration device (e.g., the management request handler and associated components) may include sub-modules including a business logic module, authentication and authorization module, policy enforcement module, system consistency/validation module, and/or the like for performing functions described herein. 
       FIG. 1  is a schematic diagram of an example of a general encryption key orchestration system  100  as implemented in various examples. In various examples, a key orchestration device  110  may be coupled to at least one source device  150   a  and at least one target device  150   b . The key orchestration device  110  may comprise at least one desktop computer, mainframe computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phone device or the like, configured with hardware and software to perform operations described herein. For example, the key orchestration device  110  may comprise computation systems having suitable processing capabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input) capabilities, and communication capabilities configured with suitable software to perform operations described herein. Thus, particular examples may be implemented, using processor devices that are often already present in many business and organization environments, by configuring such devices with suitable software processes described herein. Accordingly, such examples may be implemented with minimal additional hardware costs. However, other examples of the key orchestration device  110  may relate to systems and processes that are implemented with dedicated device hardware/devices specifically configured for performing operations described herein. 
     Generally, the source device  150   a  may be a communication device transmitting data (or initiating communication) for which encryption (and therefore an encryption key) may be required or preferred. The target device  150   b  may be a communication device for receiving data that may have been encrypted (e.g., with an encryption key). According to various examples, the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b  may be an ATM. The source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b  may also be any server or device for storing bank account information and executing banking functions. In particular examples, each of the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  may include a mobile smart phone (such as, but not limited to an iPhone™, an Android™ phone, or the like) or other wireless mobile communication devices with suitable processing and encryption capabilities. Typical modern mobile communication devices include telephone communication electronics as well as some processor electronics, one or more display devices and a keypad and/or other user input device. In further examples, each of the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  may comprise any suitable type of mobile phone and/or other type of portable electronic communication device, such as, but not limited to, an electronic smart pad device (such as, but not limited to an iPad′), a portable computer, or the like. It should be noted that an encryption key may originate from the source device  150   a  or the target device  150   b , and/or both. In other words, either of the source device  150   a  or the target device  150   b  may be a key source  170 . The source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  may be associated with a same enterprise or separate enterprises. In other examples, one or both of the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  may be a wired device suitable for communication with a wired or wireless device. 
     In some examples, the key orchestration device  110  may be a part of the enterprise associated with the source device  150   a  and target device  150   b . An enterprise may be an organization or security unit having dominance over at least one source device  150   a  and/or target device  150   b . With respect to communication between the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  associated with disparate enterprises, the source device  150   a  may be associated with a first enterprise and the target device  150   b  may be associated with a second disparate enterprise. An enterprise may be a company, subgroup within a company, autonomous and independent entity, a communication group, security provider, various entities, organizations, and/or the like. Each key orchestration device  110  may perform key orchestration activities for a plurality of devices such as the source device  150   a  and the target devices  150   b , establishing a hierarchical model for key orchestration. 
     In other examples, the key orchestration device  110  may be a third party server coupled to the enterprise associated with the source device  150   a  and/or target device  150   b . Thus, various examples may affect centralization of encryption key orchestration with existing communication systems and protocols of the enterprise. In other words, the key orchestration device  110  may be implemented to cooperate with the existing encryption technology for communications, applications, and infrastructure. Key orchestration (e.g., by a third party or otherwise) may interact with both the sources and targets of key information (e.g., the encryption key and the associated key attributes  160 ). Accordingly, a top-down control of key orchestration may be achieved, while maintaining a request model in which the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b  may request key information. 
     In some examples, a key source  170  may be coupled to the key orchestration device  110 . The key source  170  may be any source by which an encryption key (or any other types of security objects) may be generated. In some examples, the key source  170  may be a part of the key orchestration device  110  (e.g., a module or database within the key orchestration device  110  or coupled to the key orchestration device  110 ). In other examples, the key source  170  may be a source external to the key orchestration device  110 . The key source  170  may include the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b , one or more of which may be capable of generating encryption keys for the communication therebetween. Alternatively or additionally, the key source  170  may be a key-generating device (other than the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b ) internal or external to the same enterprise as the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b . In these cases, the key source  170  may be an existing specialized key generating device implemented separately from the key orchestration device  110  (e.g., the key generation and management device  230  of  FIG. 2 ). Other examples of the key source  170  may include a management user interface  220  of  FIG. 2  (e.g., encryption keys may be generated manually through the management user interface  220 ), a key federation interface  260  of  FIG. 2  (e.g., encryption keys generated from a disparate enterprise), various databases storing generated encryption keys, and/or the like. 
     In various examples, a request  175  may be sent to the key orchestration device  110 . The request  175  may be a request to generate an encryption key. For example, the key orchestration device  110  may itself generate (or retrieve from a database coupled to the key orchestration device  110 ) encryption keys in response to the request  175 . In other examples, the key orchestration device  110  may request an encryption key from other devices (e.g., the key source  170 ) within the same or a disparate enterprise. 
     The request  175  may originate from the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the key orchestration device itself  110 , a third-party device within the same enterprise (e.g., the management user interface  220 , the key management interface  240 , and the like), a third-party device in a disparate enterprise (e.g., from the key federation interface  260  of  FIG. 2 ), and/or the like. Examples of the key orchestration device  110  may therefore serve as an intermediary device between the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the requesting device (which issues the request  175 ), the key source  170 , and/or the like. Accordingly, key management, distribution, and federation may effectively be managed for various devices in a same or disparate enterprise. 
     Various components within the general encryption key orchestration system  100  (e.g., the key orchestration device  110 , the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the key orchestration device itself  110 , the device that issues the request  175 , the key source  170 , and/or the like) may be connected via any suitable wired or wireless network. The network may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network may be a wide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, the internet, or one or more intranets, local area networks (LANs), ethernet networks, metropolitan area networks (MANs), a wide area network (WAN), combinations thereof, or the like. In particular examples, the network may represent one or more secure networks configured with suitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls, encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibits access to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities. 
     In some examples, key attributes  160  may refer generally to characteristics associated with the encryption key itself, characteristics of a device associated with the encryption key, and/or the like. In other words, the key attributes  160  may refer to when, where, how, for what, with what device the encryption key has been or is about to be generated. Examples of the key attributes  160  may include, but not limited to, encryption key size, a classification of the encryption key, a time at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source  170 ), a location in which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source  170 ), a role associated with the key source  170 , a role associated with the source device  150   a , a role associated with the target device  150   b , a role associated with a key generating/storage device, a role associated with a user of the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the key generating/storage device, the source  170 , a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     In some examples, the key attributes  160  may include the key size. Typically, the larger the key size (i.e., the longer the encryption key), the more security it may provide for the communication. The key attributes  160  may also include the classification of the encryption key. In various examples, the classification of the encryption key may refer to its utilization e.g., what the encryption key may be used for. Examples of the utilization may include (e.g., for communication systems) whether an encryption key is a global hopping key, whether the encryption key is a secret key, whether the encryption key is symmetrical or asymmetrical, a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     In some examples, the key attributes  160  may include a time and/or location at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated. As described, the time and/or location at which the encryption key may be generated may be defined from the perspective of the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , and/or any other key sources  170 . For example, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding time of the device (e.g., the key sources  170 ) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with a time stamp representing the time. Similarly, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding geo-location of the device (e.g., the key sources  170 ) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with the geo-location. 
     In various examples, the key attributes  160  may include role(s) associated the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the key source  170 , the other key generating/storage device, as well as their associated user. Particularly, a role may refer to a group/classification (e.g., based on predefined assignment, time, geo-location of the device, whether the device is generating encryption keys, whether the device is transmitting the encryption key, whether the device is receiving the encryption keys, and/or the like) in which the device/user is assigned to, a level of security clearance, the type of the device/user, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In particular examples, each device/user may be associated with at least a security group (e.g., assigned to a server). Within each security group, subgroups may exist to further subdivide the devices/users. The groups/subgroups may be predetermined by any suitable personnel. In other or further examples, the groups/subgroups may be defined when the encryption key is generated (e.g., based on current characteristics of the device such as geo-location, time of the day, and/or the like). 
     It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that one or more key attributes  160  may be associated with a given encryption key. In fact, as implemented in various examples, an encryption key may be associated with a plurality of key attributes  160 . The encryption key may be transmitted along with the associated key attributes  160  to a device (e.g., the key orchestration device  110 ). The encryption key and the key attributes  160  associated with the encryption key may be inspected according to at least one policy related to the key attributes  160 . Such process may be referred to as “shooting” the key attributes  160  against the relevant policies or “presenting” the key attributes  160  for “inspection” by the policy. 
     The encryption keys may generally be managed by a set of policies  115 . As implemented in various examples, a policy may refer to at least one defined rules governing the criteria for the key attributes  160 . In some examples, a policy engine (e.g., as embedded in the key orchestration device  110  and/or other devices as described herein) may receive the encryption key and the key attributes  160  associated with the encryption key as input. The policy engine may output a response as to whether the encryption key may be allowable based on the key attributes  160 . In particular examples, the policy engine may output a binary response (e.g., accepted or denied). 
     The encryption key and the associated key attributes  160  may be presented for inspection one or more times per communication transaction. In some examples, the encryption key and the associated key attributes  160  may only be required to be presented for inspection by policy  115  once per communication transaction (e.g., at the initiation stage before the communication transaction has taken place but after the encryption key has been generated). In other or further examples, the encryption key and the associated key attributes  160  may be required to be presented for inspection by the policies  115  periodically and/or every time the encryption key has been altered for a given communication transaction. In some case several encryption keys may be presented for inspection by the policies  115  for a given communication transaction. 
     The policy engine may identify the key attributes  160  received. The policy engine may retrieve relevant policy  115  from a local or remote storage database. In other examples, the policy engine may inspect particular key attributes  160  (or sometimes all key attributes  160 ) associated with the encryption key as the policy engine determines acceptability based on the predefined set of policies  115 . For example, the policy engine may determine, based on the relevant policy  115 , whether the encryption key should be accepted for the communication transaction for which the encryption key may be generated. 
     In one non-limiting example, the policies  115  may dictate that a size of the encryption key must be within a predetermined range (e.g., the size of the encryption key must exceed and/or be below 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits, and/or the like). In some cases, the policy  115  may dictate that the size of the encryption keys must be a particular key size (e.g., 256-bit, and/or the like). 
     The policies  115  may require that the geo-location attribute of the key attributes  160  to be associated with (or not associated with) a predetermined location and/or within (or not within) a predetermined area. For example, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key (e.g., as defined by the geo-location of the generating, transmitting, and/or receiving device of the encryption key) is associated with a “danger” zone, the policy engine may deny the encryption key. This is because there may be a high likelihood that the encryption key may be compromised in the danger zone. On the other hand, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key is associated with a “safe” zone, then the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction. This is because there may be at most a low likelihood of comprised security keys. In further examples, a “neutral” zone may be a safe zone, or, in the alternative, a zone associated with an intermediate likelihood of comprised security keys. 
     In another non-limiting example, the policies  115  may require the time attribute of the key attributes  160  to be within (or not within) a predetermined time period. The policy  115  may deny the encryption key on the basis that the time attribute (e.g., a time stamp) associated with the creation, transmission, and/or reception of the encryption key may be outside of a predetermined time period (for example, at 3:00 am, where acceptable creation, transmission, and/or reception time of the encryption key may be between 9:00 am-5:00 pm). 
     In various examples, the policies  115  may allow the encryption key, when the role attribute of the key attributes  160  is associated with the encryption key generating/transmitting/receiving device (and the device&#39;s associated user) is within a predetermined accepted group. In some examples, the source device  150   a  (the target device  150   b  or other source devices  170 ) associated with a first security group within an enterprise may generate an encryption key and present the encryption key for inspection by the policy  115 . The policy engine may determine whether the first security group may be a part of the accepted group. When the policy engine determined that the source device  150   a  (the target device  150   b  or other source devices  170 ) is a part of the accepted group (e.g., the first security group falls within the accepted group), the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction for which the encryption has been created for. 
     It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that a plurality of policies  115  may act in concert for a comprehensive encryption key management scheme. This means that, the plurality of policies  115 , each of which may regulate at least one disparate key attribute  160 , may be aggregated into a set of policies  115  for regulating encryption keys presented to the policy engine. 
     In other examples, other key sources  170  (e.g., other than the source device  150   a  and the target device  150   b ) may generate an encryption key to be distributed (or pushed) to the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b  for a communication transaction between those devices. The policy engine (e.g., the key orchestration device  110 ) may inspect the key attributes  160  to determine whether the encryption key is allowable. In response to the encryption key being determined to be allowable, the key orchestration device  110  may determine to distribute the encryption key to the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b  for the communication transaction. 
     In various examples, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a rejection indicator (e.g., a “denied” message) to the key source  170 . The key generating device may redesign a second encryption key to be presented (along with the key attributes  160  associated with the second encryption key) to the policy engine for a second round of inspection. In other examples, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a “denied” message to the key source  170  along with a cause of failure (e.g., a hint) as to which the key attribute  160  caused the denial and/or what it should be. 
     For example, an encryption key with key attributes  160  including a time attribute of 4:49 am, geo-location attribute of “safe zone,” and role attribute of “security group A” may be presented to a set of policies  115 . The policy engine may allow the encryption key when the encryption key is generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m., in either a “safe zone” or a “neutral zone,” and for security groups A-C. Such encryption key may be denied, given that it is not generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m. The policy engine may transmit the “denied” message along with a time attribute hint (e.g., to generate the encryption key after 5:00 a.m., in 11 minutes). 
     Accordingly, the key orchestration device  110  may be configured to manage encryption keys and distribute the encryption keys. In other words, the key orchestration device  110  may serve as an intermediary between the source devices  150   a , the target devices  150   b , other key sources  170 , and/or the like as these devices themselves may lack the capability to distribute and manage encryptions in the manner set forth with respect to the key orchestration device  110 . The key orchestration device  110  may include a plurality of modules (or may be coupled to remote modules) for each feature as described herein. In addition, the general encryption key orchestration system  100  may be coupled with at least one other similar general encryption key orchestration system  100  to make up the encryption key federation scheme as described herein. 
       FIG. 2  is schematic diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key orchestration system  200  according to various examples. In some examples, the encryption key orchestration system  200  may illustrate a particularized implementation of the general encryption key orchestration system  100 . From an architectural perspective, examples as illustrated for the encryption key orchestration system  200  may be centered around message handling and interoperability with key generation technology, other key orchestration devices, supported communications systems, applications, and infrastructure. 
     The key orchestration device  110  may include at least a management request handler  205 , a request handler  210 , a support structure  215 , a key federation interface  260 , as well as the associated databases (e.g., a local key database  270 , transactions database  275 , policy database  280 , local user repository  285 , configuration database  290 , device inventory database  295 ). 
     In various examples, the management request handler  205  may include (or is) the policy engine that may be implemented for policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation. As the management request handler  205  can be an intermediary layer between the various components described, rapid integration of the policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation may be added to an existing system without having to make changes to the system level message handling. The management request handler  205  may provide a top-down management for various communication devices (e.g., a cellular device  250   a , a network device  250   b , . . . , a device N  250   n , and/or the like) associated with a given enterprise. In various examples, each of the cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , and the device N  250   n  may be the source device  150   a  or the target device  150   b  depending on the particular communication transaction for which the encryption key is generated. 
     The management request handler  205  and the request handler  210  may be of an agent-interface relationship. That is, the request handler  210  may serve as the interface between the management request handler  205  and the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , and/or the like). The communication between the management request handler  205  and the request handler  210  may be facilitated by the support structure  215 . The support structure  215  may provide suitable communication protocol, management application, infrastructure, communication application program interface (API), configurations, translations, and/or the like for interfacing between the management request handler  205  and the request handler  210 . 
     The request handler  210  may receive key generating requests  175  and/or encryption keys from the various communication devices and relate them to the management request handler  205  with the assistance from the support structure  215 . The request handler  210  may also relate the response of the management request handler  205  (including the hint in some examples) and/or encryption keys to the various communication devices with the assistance from the support structure  215 . 
     In various examples, the management request handler  205  may receive the request  175  for generating an encryption key. Various components may be capable of transmitting the request  175  to the management request handler  205 . The some examples, the management request handler  205  may receive the request  175  from the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , and/or the like). The request  175  may be related by the request handler  210 , which may serve as the interface between the devices and the management request handler as described. The key federation interface  260 , the management user interface  220 , and the key management interface  240  may also transmit the request  175  to the management request handler. 
     In non-request-driven examples, the management request handler  205  may receive encryption keys from at least one key source  170 . The key source  170  may be the key generation and management device  230 , which may be any suitable existing encryption key generating apparatus implemented within the enterprise. In other words, the key generation and management device  230  may represent any existing schemes internal or external to the communication systems of the enterprise. For example, the key generation and management device  230  may be any suitable native protocol associated with safe net equipment. 
     Examples of the key management interface  240  may represent an internal integration of key generation and key management capabilities as well as an external interface with existing solutions. This is because the key management interface  240  may be poised between the key generation and management device  230  (which may generate encryption keys) and the management request handler  205  (which inspects key attributes  160  of the encryption keys based on policies  115 ). For example, the key management interface  240  may be a translation interface that maintains a standard encryption management messaging language with the key orchestration device  110 . This can allow enterprise interoperability between existing solutions (e.g., the key generation and management device  230 ) and the key orchestration platform (e.g., the management request handler  205 ). Accordingly, the policy-based encryption key orchestration systems and methods may be implemented with various types of security object (e.g., encryption key) generation protocols. 
     Additionally or alternatively, in request-driven examples, the management user interface  220  may transmit the request  175  to the management request handler  210 . The management user interface  220  may utilize the same API as other components described herein to assure interoperability. The management user interface  220  may include suitable user input and display devices to receive and display data to a designated managing user. In particular examples, the management user interface  220  may include a mobile device such as a smartphone or a tablet. The management user interface  220  may also include a wired device. 
     In some examples, the key federation interface  260  may transmit the request  175  to the management request handler  205 . The key federation interface  260  may be in communication with a second key federation interface (such as, but not limited to, the key federation interface  260 ) associated with a disparate enterprise (which may utilize the same or similar key orchestration systems and methods described). When one of the various communication devices (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , and/or the like) wishes communicate with another device from the disparate enterprise (or vice versa), the request  175  may be transmitted (from the key federation interface  260  of the second enterprise) to the key federation interface  260  of the current enterprise. In some examples, the request  175  may be directly transmitted to the management request handler  205  when the key federation interface  260  has designated the relationship between the enterprises to be trusted. 
     In some examples, instead of or in addition to the request  175 , encryption keys as well as the “allowed” and “denied” messages may be transmitted and received between the key federation interface  260  (of the current and the second enterprise). The encryption key and its associated attributes  160  may be stored in the local key database  270 , which may be accessible by the management request handler  205  (for policy inspection) and/or the request handler  210  (for distribution). 
     The request  175  may be transmitted with further instructions related to generating the encryption key. The further instructions include, but are not limited to, a source of encryption keys, the encryption keys themselves, key attributes  160  associated with the encryption keys, and/or the like. 
     In various examples, in response to receiving the request  175 , the management request handler  205  may generate or facilitate the generation of the encryption key. For example, where the request  175  may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source  170 ), the management request handler  205  itself may generate the encryption key. The management request handler  205  may generate the encryption key based on the set of policies  115  stored in the policy database  280 . In other words, the management request handler  205  may generate the encryption keys with key attributes  160  that would not have violated any policies  115  set forth in the policy database  280 . 
     Where the request  175  may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source  170 ), or specifies that a particular key source  170  to generate the encryption key, the management request handler  205  may retrieve or otherwise request the encryption key from a suitable key source  170 . The management request handler  205  may request encryption keys from the management user interface  220 , the key federation interface  260 , the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , source device  150   a , and target device  150   b ), key management interface  240 , and/or the like. 
     The management request handler  205  may retrieve encryption keys from a designated database storing encryption keys (e.g., the local key database  270 ). The local key database  270  may be coupled to other key sources  170  (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , source device  150   a , target device  150   b , the key generation and management device  230  the key federation interface  260 , and/or the like) and store cached encryption keys on behalf of the other key sources  170 . The management request handler  205  may retrieve encryption keys from the local key database  270  instead of requesting encryption keys from the key sources  170 . This is so that transaction time for retrieving/generating the encryption key may be improved, and that network problems would not hinder the ability of the management request handler  205  to obtain encryption keys, given that the local key database may be local to (e.g., residing on a same network node) the management request handler  205 . As the management request handler  205  is retrieving encryption keys from the local key database  270 , a verification request may be sent to the key source  170  to ensure whether the encryption key to be retrieved has been altered by the key source  170 . A confirmation or an updated encryption key may be sent to the local key database  270  in response, so that the management request handler  205  may accordingly receive the encryption key. 
     In some examples, the management request handler  205 , upon receiving encryption keys (whether requested or not) in any manner as described, may cache the encryption key along with the key source identifier and the associated key attributes  160  at the local key database  270 . The encryption key, the key source identifier, and the key attributes  160  may be stored in case that the communication is lost or when the encryption key source of the encryption key is not authoritative. Whereas in some examples, the encryption key may not be transmitted with the key attributes  160 . In such examples, the management request handler  205  may determine the key attributes  160  from various sources such as, but not limited to, the local user repository  285 , the device inventory database  295 , and/or the like. 
     The management request handler  205  may then inspect the key attributes  160  associated with the encryption key received based on the set of policies  115  stored in the policy database  280 . The management request handler  205  may retrieve all policies  115  or only the relevant policies (e.g., based on some or all key attributes  160 ) from the policy database  280 . In some examples, the encryption keys generated by the management request handler  205  itself or at the direction of the management request handler  205  may be spared from inspection by policies  115  when they are created based on the policies  115 . In other examples, all encryption keys generated by the management request handler  205  or at the direction of the management request handler  205  may be inspected by the policies  115 . Encryption keys allowable based on the policies  115  may be allowed while unacceptable encryption keys may be denied, in the manner described. The management request handler  205  may be configured to update or add policies stored in the policy database  280  (e.g., as directed by the management user interface  220 ). 
     The local user repository  285  may be a database storing information related to local users of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , device N  250   n , and/or the like) within the enterprise. In various examples, the local user repository  285  may store characteristics/information of the users that would constitute key attributes  160 . The characteristics include, but not limited to, privileges, security groups, assigned roles, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The security groups may be stored in a hierarchical tree. The management request handler  205  may access the local user repository  285  for such characteristics and utilize them as key attributes  160  associated with encryption keys requested, transmitted, or received by that device corresponding to such characteristics. The management request handler  205  may add or alter information stored in the local user repository  285 . A copy of the information stored in the local user repository  285  may be sent to the local key database  270  as key attributes  160  to be stored in the local key database  270 . 
     In some examples, the transaction database  275  may store various communication transactions or potential communication transactions. In some examples, the transaction database  275  may store encryption key transmission instances (i.e., instances where encryption keys are to be distributed) to one or more devices. For example, when a particular encryption key cannot/should not be forwarded (e.g., pushed to a communication device) for any reason, the forwarding transaction (e.g., a job) may be queued or otherwise stored within the transactions database  275  for forwarding the encryption key at a later some. The transaction database  275  may also store a status of each particular encryption key transmission instance, which may later be read by the request handler  210 . For example, the request handler  210  may at a later time attempt to transmit all or some encryption keys to corresponding communication devices for all “unsent” encryption key transmission instances. The transactions database  275  may be coupled to the local key database  270  to gain access of the keys to be forwarded to each communication device that the encryption key may be generated for. 
     In further examples, the transaction database  275  may be coupled to the request handler  210  and may store the communication transactions (for which the encryption key may be requested, transmitted, or received) and/or the associated key attributes  160 . For example, the request handler  210  may transmit such information to the transactions database  275 . The transaction database  275  may be coupled to the local key database  270 . The communication transactions (as the associated details) may be associated with the encryption keys stored in the local key database  270 . The management request handler  205  may need to access only the local key database  270  for the encryption keys and the associated key attributes  260 . 
     The configuration database  290  may store supporting instructions for the key encryption key orchestration system  200 . In some examples, the configuration database  290  may store internal network, configuration of clients, configuration of applications, IP address allocations, various component configurations, device privileges, device communication pathways, credentials, and/or the like. The configuration database  290  may be coupled to the management request handler  205 , which may require the instructions stored within the configuration database  290  for operations. The management request handler  205  may also add or alter the information stored in the configuration database  290 . 
     In some examples, the device inventory database  295  may store information related to the communication devices associated with the given enterprise. For example, information stored may include, but not limited to, security group, security level, geo-location, identification number, internal classification, device specifications, time stamp in which an encryption has been created, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The request handler  210  may be coupled to the device inventory database  295  to store such data therein. The management request handler  205  may be coupled to the device inventory database  295  for accessing such device information. The device inventory database  295  for associating particular cached keys with the corresponding device information as key attributes  160 . A copy of the information stored in the device inventory database  295  may be sent to the local key database  270  as key attributes  160 . 
     The key federation interface  260  may allow one key orchestration device  110  to federate encryption key information with one or more other key orchestration devices  110  (through their associated respective key federation interfaces  260 ) based on an established trust relationship. Each enterprise may include by a key orchestration device  110 . As such, the key federation interface  260  may maintain a trust relationship with the communication systems of at least one other enterprise. It is, in other words, a gateway to extend trust. 
     In some examples, various examples described herein may be implemented with the systems set forth in  FIG. 2A .  FIG. 2A  is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key orchestration system  200   a  or a key orchestration appliance according to various examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-2A , the encryption key orchestration system  200   a  corresponds to the key orchestration class model and applies the same toward solving technical problems by building a key orchestration application. The encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may correspond to the key orchestration device  110 . 
     In some examples, a Quartz  210   a  may handle creation and management of composite jobs for the encryption key orchestration system  200   a , including but not limited to key orchestration administration, user/device administration, key distribution, key management, key federation, and the like. Job control may be made aware of overall application state and interacts with a policy engine  222   a  for policy checks for broad compliance with job creation. The Quartz  210   a  may facilitate management of j ob objects, which represent a composite set of actions for key management, key orchestration application management, user/device management, and/or the like in light of those functions. The Quartz  210   a  may have a connection with the policy engine  222   a  for policy checks associated with composite functions. The job objects may be created by a job control module  236   a . Job objects may be associated with atomic transactions. Atomic transactions created by the job control module  236   a  can be inspected by the policy engine  222   a  to pre-validate a job before running the job. 
     The encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may include an action module  218   a , which represents atomic transactions for key orchestration administration, user/device administration, key distribution, key management, key federation, or the like. Transactions interact with the policy engine  222   a  for inspection of actions as they are occurring for policy compliance at the point of the transaction being executed. 
     The encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may include an agent  216   a , which may represent a programmatic interface that can invoke other functions within the encryption key orchestration system  200   a . The agent  216   a  itself may be a plugin type architecture that allows for plugin components to be implemented per invocation. This may resemble a factory design pattern. 
     The policy engine  222   a  may provide an interface to determine if job control, jobs, or transactions are compliant with defined policy. The policy engine  222   a  may consume user defined policy and exposes the policy as a series of compliance statements and default values. 
     In some examples, a KMIP C Server  240   a  may be a library that provides for a KMIP interface provided by Cryptsoft. The KMIP C Server  240   a  may operably coupled to a spider monkey  244   a , which may be a library that allows the encryption key orchestration system  200   a  to interact with the KMIP C Server  240   a  to allow for server-side execution of Java Script. The KMIP C Server  240   a  may include a KMIP C Client  241   a  for interfacing with the KMIP client  204   a . A KMIP Server OPS KO  220   a  may provide a key orchestration-specific extension of the KMIP C Server that ties all KMIP operations into actions that are evaluated by policy 
     In some examples, a key source  202   a  may represent sources of key information such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM), a KMIP-enabled key management server, or the like. The key source  202   a  can also represent key messages (for elements beyond KMIP register). The key source  202   a  may correspond to the key source  170 . A KMIP client  204   a  may represent users and/or devices that use the KMIP protocols. The KMIP client  204   a  may be a key orchestration daemon, key orchestration service, or another device that uses the KMIP protocols. The key source  202   a  and the KMIP client  204   a  may be external to the encryption key orchestration system  200   a.    
     The encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may include interfaces such as, but not limited to, a KMIP interface  212   a , proto interface  214   a , or the like. Much like the agent  216   a , each interface may be a plugin implementation that provides a channel for sending and/or receiving key management, distribution, and federation type of communications between the encryption key orchestration system  200   a  with the key source  202   a  and/or the KMIP client  204   a . The encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may maintain records of available interfaces through data model. The key source  202   a  and the KMIP client  204   a  may communicate with the KMIP interface  212   a  using KMIP standards. The KMIP interface  212   a  may call OpenSSL. 
     In some examples, transaction data  224   a  may represents data access objects for transactions. Specifically, the transaction data  224   a  tracks composite jobs and atomic transactions that are in progress and that are completed. The transaction data  224   a  can be used to recover a job if a transaction fails for some reason and recovery is defined as an option in policy. 
     Key data  226   a  may represent data for keys that are both locally stored or locally referenced\remotely stored. The key data  226   a  may also be tied to attributes associated with the key data. Policy data  228   a  may represent the storage of the policy Document Security language (DSL), represented as chunks of Extensive Markup Language (XML) that is constructed in the policy engine  222   a  based on what part of the hierarchy that a job is being executed on. 
     Hierarchy data  230   a  may represent the structural organization of control for encryption key orchestration system  200   a . Hierarchy nodes are associated with one or more user\devices, one or more key sources and defined policy. Administrative users are also associated with the Hierarchy. From a source\device perspective, the policy data  228   a  and the hierarchy data  230   a  can be “looked up” to have inheritance. A hierarchy node can exist without anything being assigned to it. 
     In some examples, device data  232   a  may be needed to identify a creator or consumer of key information and contact the creator or consumer of information. The device data  232   a  may include attributes associated with devices, such as the source device  150   a  and/or the target device  150   b . In some examples, user data  234   a  may include information on administrative users. The user data  234   a  may have a normalized relationship with the device data  232   a  and hierarchy data  230   a . Compositions  238   a  may include executable Java Script associated with complex key management operations. 
     In some examples, the encryption key orchestration system  200   a  may include a rest API. Much like an interface that can invoke key orchestration functions, the rest API can allow for external applications to invoke the key orchestration functions with information required to create, read, execute, update, or maybe even delete a key orchestration job. The rest API can leverage the KMIP interface  212   a  and proto interface  214   a  to invoke the agent  216   a  that executes actions associated with operating the encryption key orchestration system  200   a . The rest API can be operably coupled to a Node.JS  206   a . An admin user interface may use the rest API. In some examples, a KO shell  208   a  may be a console interface that uses the KMIP interface  212   a  and proto interface  214   a  to invoke the agent  216   a  that executes actions associated with the encryption key orchestration system  200   a.    
     From an interface perspective, a file driver is no different than any other user\device key orchestration Daemon\Service as one or more of KMIP, classX (as a secondary messaging protocol), and the like are used. The file driver may be a kernel module (character device driver) that represents a certificate or other key file to the host operating system for simpler integration. Other clients may represent other interfaces that encryption key orchestration system  200   a  can use, including customer-specific solutions or other standards such as PKCS 11 or HSM wire protocols. 
       FIG. 3  illustrates an example of an encryption key federation system  300  as implemented in various examples. The key federation system  300  may implement the key orchestration device  110  as set forth with respect to  FIGS. 1-2 . The key federation system  300  may be based on extra-enterprise communication relationship and key federation enabled by the key orchestration device  110  (e.g., the management request handler  205  and the associated components). 
     Encryption keys (e.g., asymmetric encryption keys, symmetric encryption keys, and/or the like) generated by components within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A  390   a ) may be distributed to a disparate key orchestration device (e.g., the key orchestration device  110 , the management request handler  205 , and its associated components, and/or the like) of another enterprise (e.g., enterprise B  390   b ) pursuant to inspection by the policies  115  of either (or both) enterprises. This can enable secured communications or data exchange with outside entities (e.g., enterprises) based on the federated trust model. This can also allow encryption management to parallel communications management in supporting external communications to enable symmetric key encryption for communications. Accordingly, performance of the communications platform may be improved, given that utilization of asymmetric encryption may be expensive from a processing perspective as compared to symmetric encryption. 
     In the key federation system  300 , each enterprise (e.g., the enterprise A  390   a  or the enterprise B  390   b ) may be associated with a respective one of a key orchestration device A  310   a  and a key orchestration device B  310   b ). Each of the key orchestration device A  310   a  and the key orchestration device B  310   b  may be the key orchestration device  110 . The key orchestration device A  310   a  and the key orchestration device B  310   b  may be in communication with one another through any suitable network. In particular, the key federation interfaces (e.g., the key federation interface  260 ) of each of the key orchestration device A  310   a  and the key orchestration device B  310   b  may be in communication with one another. 
     In various examples, the key management server A  330   a  and the key management server B  330   b  may be a device such as, but not limited to, the key generation and management device  230  and the key management interface  240 . Each of the key management server A  330   a  and the key management server B  330   b  may be coupled to their respective key federation interfaces  206  within their respective enterprises in the manner described. 
     A device A  350   a  and a device B  350   b  may attempt to obtain an encryption key for the communication therebetween. Each of the device A  350   a  and the device B  350   b  may be the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     An encryption key may be generated within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A  390   a ) from any suitable key source  170  in the manner described. The encryption key may be generated by the enterprise A  390   a  (e.g., by a key source  170  in the enterprise A  390   a ) with or without a request  170  from either enterprise B  390   b  or within enterprise A. The encryption key may likewise be generated by the enterprise B  390   b  in a similar manner. The encryption key and its associated key attributes  160  may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise A  390   a  (e.g., the key orchestration device A  310   a , which may include the management request handler  205  and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. In response to the policy engine of enterprise A  390   a  determining the encryption key is accepted based on the encryption key attributes  160 , the key orchestration device  310   a  (e.g., the key federation interface  260 ) of enterprise A  390   a  may relate the encryption key as well as its associated key attributes  160  to the key orchestration device B  310   b  (e.g., the key federation interface  260 ) of enterprise B  390   b.    
     Upon receiving the encryption key and its associated key attributes  160 , the encryption key and its associated key attributes  160  may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise B 390   b  (e.g., the key orchestration device B  310   b , which may also include the management request handler  205  and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. The encryption key may be forwarded to both the device A  350   a  and the device B  350   b  when the key orchestration device B  310   b  determines that the encryption key is consistent with its policies  115  defined for enterprise B  390   b . In other words, the encryption key (as defined by its key attributes  160 ) may be allowed only if it is consistent with both sets of policies  115  of enterprise A  390   a  as well as enterprise B  390   b . At least some of the set of policies  115  of enterprise A  390   a  may be different from at least some of the set of policies  115  of enterprise B  390   b . Whereas the encryption key is found not allowable by either the key orchestration device A  310   a  or the key orchestration device b  310   b , the encryption key may be returned back to the key source  170  with the “denied” message and/or the hint in the manner described. 
     In other examples, acceptance by policies  115  associated with only one enterprise (e.g., either enterprise A  390   a  or enterprise B  390   b ) may be sufficient for encryption key to be allowed. In such cases, the trust extends to some or sometimes all of the policies  115 . In addition, each enterprise may include a set of policies  115  for the federated instances (e.g., each enterprise may have agreed with the other regarding a set of policies  115  used when communications between the communication devices of the enterprises are to occur. Accordingly, each enterprise may store (e.g., in each respective policy database  280 ) a same set of federated (mutual and reciprocal) policies for the federated schemes. The federated policies may be the same for both the enterprise A  390   a  and the enterprise B  390   b . Thus, allowance by one key orchestration device associated with one enterprise may be sufficient for the encryption key to be forwarded for usage for communication between both enterprises. 
     In various examples, enterprise federation policies may be stored within each policy database  280 . The enterprise federation policies may specify the manner in which the encryption keys may be federated. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify the federated policies, which key orchestration device may inspect the key attributes  160 , which enterprise may issue a request  175  for an encryption key, which enterprise may generate an encryption key, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The enterprise federation policies allow flexibility in policy defining. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify that enterprises may each include its own policies  115  in addition to the federated policies, where at least a part the policies  115  of each enterprise may be disparate. 
     In some examples, a communication platform A  320   a  and a communication platform B  320   b  of each respective enterprise may be in communication with one another via any suitable network. Such communication between the communication platforms may be encrypted communications, where the encryption key corresponding to such communication may also be presented for inspection by policies  115  similar to described with respect to the devices (e.g., the device A  350   a , the device B  350   b , and/or the like). Each communication platform may be in communication to a respective device, such that configurations related to the key orchestration systems may be exchanged. 
       FIG. 4  illustrates an example of a communication device  400  consuming key orchestration services as part of the enterprise according to some examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-4 , the communication device  400  may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , the cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , the device A  350   a , the device B  350   b , a combination thereof, and/or the like. In some examples, the communication device  400  leverages key orchestration to receive encryption keys (or key updates) associated with applications such as, but not limited to, an Email application  410   a , voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application  410   b , storage encryption  410   c , and/or other encryption applications  410   d  on the communication device  400 . 
     The communication device  400  may be registered with a key orchestration platform to receive key orchestration services. The communication device  400  may provide an application interface  420  based configured to receive with encryption key distribution and encryption key management messages (e.g., the “allowed” message, the “denied” message, the hint, and/or the like) from the key orchestration device  110 . The application interface  420  may be coupled to each of the Email application  410   a , voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application  410   b , storage encryption  410   c , and/or other encryption applications  410   d  to forward the accepted encryption key to them. 
     This communication device  400  may also utilize KMIP by a KMIP proxy  430  to receive KMIP type commands from the key orchestration device  110 . The KMIP proxy  430  may be connected to the key store  440  for managing the encryption keys stored therein. The KMIP proxy  430  may also be connected to a device-end cryptographic unit  450 . The device-end cryptographic unit  450  may be configured to generate encryption keys. In response to the “denied” message, the device-end cryptographic unit  450  may generated a different encryption key to present to the policy engine for inspection. Whereas the hint is given, the device-end cryptographic unit  450  may generate a different encryption key based on the hint. The device-end cryptographic unit  450  may cache its encryption keys in the key store  440 . The device-end cryptographic unit  450  may be coupled to the application interface  420 . The application interface  420  may transmit the encryption keys generated along with the key attributes  160  to the policy engine and forward the response of the policy engine to the device-end cryptographic unit  450  e.g., when the response is negative. 
     Accordingly, operation-level policy inspection may be achieved. Given that the communication device  400  may be capable to interact with the policy engine regarding the encryption keys, the ability to service the request for an encryption key (or inspect the encryption key) by a third-party device (e.g., the policy engine residing in the key orchestration device  110 ) acting as administrating may be achieved. The request  175  for an encryption key or the encryption key may be serviced each communication transaction. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates an example of a request authentication process  500  for issuing requests  175  for encryption keys in various encryption key orchestration systems according to some examples. The request authentication process  500  may be internal to the key orchestration device  110 , when the key orchestration device  110  (e.g., the management request handler  205 , the key orchestration device A  310   a , the key orchestration device B  310   b , and/or the like) itself generates the encryption keys. In other examples, the request authentication process  500  may be external to the key orchestration device  110  to support integration with existing key management and key generation infrastructure (e.g., the key generation and management device  230 , the key management server A  330   a , the key management server B  330   b , and/or the like). 
     First, at block B 510 , the key orchestration device  110  may provide authentication information to a key source  170 . As described, such key source  170  may be the key orchestration device  110  itself, the key generation and management device  230 , the management user interface  220 , the key federation interface  260 , the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , source device  150   a , target device  150   b , device A  350   a , device B  350   b , communication device  400 , a combination thereof, and/or the like), and/or other external key sources. The authentication information may be any suitable authentication method, such as username/passcode request, security handshake algorithms, biometric request, a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     Next, at block B 520 , the key orchestration device  110  may receive authentication response from the key source  170 . The key orchestration device  110  may authenticate the response and establish trusted relationship between the key source  170  and the key orchestration device  110 . Next at block B 530 , the key orchestration device  110 , the management user interface  220 , the key generation and management device  230 , the communication devices, and other API calls may issue a key management/generation request (e.g., the request  175 ) to the key source  170 . In some examples, the key orchestration device  110  may forward the request  175  from a trusted third party (e.g., the communication devices, the management user interface  220 , the key federation interface  260 , and/or other third-party devices) to the key source  170 . In some examples, the request  175  may be directly sent to the key source  170 . The key orchestration device  110  may be configured to determine whether to generate encryption keys itself or forward the request to another key source  170  when the request  175  does not identify the key source  170 . Next, at block B 540 , the key orchestration device  110  may receive response (e.g., the encryption keys as requested) from the key source  170 . 
     Subsequently, the encryption keys obtained by the key orchestration device  110  may be evaluated based on the key attributes  160  and the policies  115  in the manner described. When allowed, the encryption keys may be distributed to the communication devices associated with the corresponding communication transaction. When denied, the key orchestration device  110  may transmit the “denied” message (and in some instances, the hint) and standby for new encryption keys. 
     In some examples, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources  170 ; each request may correspond to a single communication transaction. In response, the multiple responses (e.g., encryption keys) may be received from the key sources  170 . In other examples, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources  170 , where two or more requests may correspond to a same communication transaction. As the key orchestration device  110  may receive two or more encryption keys from the key sources  170 . The key orchestration device  110  may determine one of the two or more encryption keys for the communication transaction based on the policies  115  (e.g., the most secure out of the two or more encryption keys). 
     Accordingly, large scale distribution by the key orchestration device  110  may be possible in systems including at least one source for the encryption keys and multiple recipient communication devices. 
       FIG. 6  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process  600  implemented in various key orchestration systems according to various examples. Blocks B 610 , B 620 , B 630  may be executed simultaneously or sequentially in that order. First, at block B 610  the communication device may be discovered (e.g., by the request handler  210 ). The request handler  210  may detect that the communication device is present within the enterprise (e.g., the networks associated with the enterprise) automatically. 
     At block B 620 , the communication device may be registered (e.g., by the request handler  210 ). In some examples, configuration information related to the key orchestration systems may be transmitted to the communication device. Device information of the communication device may be transmitted to the local user repository  285 , device inventory database  295 , and/or the like. At block B 630 , the communication device may be enrolled (e.g., by the request handler  210 ). For example, the communication device may transmit a server authentication request the request handler  210  and receiving a positive authorization response. 
     Next, at block B 640 , the communication device may be accepted (e.g., by the request handler  210 ). For example, the request handler  210  and/or the management request handler  205  may check existing policies  115  based on the device information to determine whether the communication device has been classified in the appropriate group, whether the key orchestration device  110  may be capable of orchestrating the communication device, a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     Next, at block B 650 , the request handler  210  may provide device authentication information to the communication device. The authentication information may include configurations (e.g., credentials, passcodes, and/or the like) to access the key orchestration device  110 . Next, at block B 660 , the request handler  210  and/or the management request handler  205  may define orchestration rules for the communication device. Following block B 660  at block B 670  a corresponding identifier, the commination device has been added to an orchestration registration. Subsequently, the communication device may request for encryption keys, generate encryption keys, receive approved encryption keys, and/or the like in the manner described. Such process ensures that the communication device utilizing services provided by the key orchestration device  110  may meet the operable standards of the key orchestration device  110 . 
       FIG. 7  illustrates an example of a key management and distribution process  700  according to various examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-7 , the key management and distribution process  700  may be implemented with communication devices registered, discovered, and/or enrolled with the key orchestration device  110 . 
     First, at block B 710 , the management request handler  205  may define key management command. A key management command may be a particularized command for a key management event (e.g., “job”). The key management event may be an event triggering a set of algorithms to create encryption keys based on the policies  115  and distribute (e.g., push) the encryption keys to at least one of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device  250   a , network device  250   b , . . . , device N  250   n , source device  150   a , target device  150   b , device A  350   a , device B  350   b , communication device  400 , a combination thereof, and/or the like). 
     In some examples, the key management event may be based on time. For example, the management request handler  205  may be configured to rekey for at least some (sometimes all) of the communication devices associated with the enterprise (or another enterprise) periodically (e.g., every day, every week, every month, and/or the like). In various examples, the key management event may occur automatically through an API call. The API call may be issued from any components internal and/or external to the key orchestration device  110  within a same or disparate enterprise. 
     The key management event may also be user-defined. For example, the management user interface  220  may receive user input from the designated user to generate encryption keys immediately for at least one communication device. In such examples, such user-defined key management events may be initiated in response to a sudden event, including cyber-attacks, security breaches, change to the polices  115 , and/or the like. The management user interface  220  may also alter the policies  115  stored within the policy database  280  in response to these key management events. The new encryption keys created must follow the altered set of policies  115 . 
     The key management command may include providing encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or a disparate enterprise, re-transmitting a same or different encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or disparate enterprise, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In various examples, the management request handler  205  may define for a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication transaction and/or communication device associated with the enterprise. In further examples, the management request handler  205  may define key management commands for communication devices associated with a disparate enterprise when allowed by the federation model. The management commands (e.g., encryption keys) may be transmitted via the key federation interfaces  260  associated with each enterprise. 
     Next, at block B 720 , the management request handler  205  may build a key management command queue. A job created in response to the key management event may include a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication device and/or a communication transaction. Accordingly, where the key management commands are generating new encryption keys and distributing to two or more communication devices, the key management commands may be queued (e.g., stored within the transactions database  275 ) for execution, given the volume of the key management commands. As such, a composite command may correspond to key management commands for multiple key sources to issue encryption keys to multiple encryption key receiving communication devices. The composite command may be associated with a plurality of key management commands, and may be stored as a whole in the transaction database  275  awaiting distribution. Thus, even if a server (e.g., the management request handler  205 ) is shut off before all the key management commands are executed/distributed, the process may resume as soon as the sever is switched on. 
     Key management command associated with inactive communication devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned off and/or off the network) may be stored in the transactions database  275  for future distribution (e.g., when the inactive communication devices are switched on) by the management request handler  205  at block B 730 . On the other hand, for active devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned on and/or on the network), the key management command may be executed by the management request handler  205  at block B 740 . 
     For example, the management request handler  205  may request encryption keys from key sources  170  based on the key management commands at block B 750 . For example, the key management commands may specify one or more key sources  170  to issue encryption keys to the communication devices. Accordingly, some communication devices may receive encryption keys from a first key source while other communication devise may receive encryption keys from a second different key source. Next, at block B 760 , the management request handler  205  may distribute encryption keys to the communication devices. In some examples, the management request handler  205  may perform encryption key inspection based on the key attributes  160  and the set of policies  115  in the manner described. Once approved, the management request handler  205  may forward the encryption keys to the corresponding communication devices through the request handler  210 . 
     Next, at block B 770 , the management request handler  205  may receive response to the distribution from the communication devices. For example, the management request handler  205  may determine, based on the responses of the communication devices, whether such distribution was successful at block B 780 . Whereas the management request handler  205  determines that the distribution was successful with respect to a given communication device (e.g., that communication device has received the encryption key distributed to it), positive feedback may be provided to the management request handler  205  at block B 795 . 
     On the other hand, whereas the management request handler  205  determines that the distribution was unsuccessful (e.g., that communication device has not received the encryption key distributed to it) for a given communication device, a negative response of that communication device may be provided to the management request handler  205  at block B 790 . The management request handler  205  may then determine whether to attempt to execute the key management command again at a later time for that communication device based on preexisting algorithms or user input at block B 798 . 
     When management request handler  205  determines that execution of the key management commands (e.g., the distribution of the encryption) is not to be attempted again (B 798 :NO), the process ends. On the other hand, whereas the management request handler  205  determines that key management commands not successfully distributed are to be attempted again (B 798 :YES), the key management commands may be stored at block B 730  (e.g., in the transactions database  275 ) for future distribution. 
     In some examples, when distribution of the key management commands may be unsuccessful, the management request handler  205  may determine to retry distribution of the unsuccessful key management commands (B 780 :RETRY). For example, the management request handler  205  may again execute key management commands for active devices at block B 740 . 
       FIG. 8  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation process  800  according to various examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-8 , key orchestration devices  110  (e.g., both in a same local enterprise and in a foreign enterprise) may mutually authenticate and distribute encryption keys based on the policies  115  implemented for key orchestration devices  110  or each enterprise for federating encryption keys from one enterprise to another enterprise. In addition, the encryption key federation process  800  may also include the receiving of encryption keys from a foreign key orchestration device as a result of the federation policy of the foreign key orchestration device. 
     First, at block B 810 , the local key orchestration device (e.g., the key orchestration device A  310   a ) may provide authentication information to a foreign key orchestration device (e.g., the key orchestration device B  310   b ). The authentication information may be any suitable authentication prompt and/or request for federation. Next, at block B 820 , the local key orchestration device may receive authentication response from the foreign key orchestration device agreeing to initiation the federation model. The blocks B 810  and B 820  may represent typical security credential handshakes, where federation trust has been established between the two enterprises. 
     Next, at block B 830 , the local key orchestration device may provide trust policy information to the foreign key orchestration device. At block B 840 , the local key orchestration device may receive trust policy information from the foreign key orchestration device. The trust policy information may include any configurations, settings, extent of trust, mutually agreed policies, a combination thereof, and/or the like. 
     Next, at block B 850 , the local key orchestration device and the foreign key orchestration device may manage and distribute key information (e.g., the encryption key, the associated key attributes  160 , a combination thereof, and/or the like) in the manner described. 
     In particular examples, the foreign key orchestration device transmit the request  175  to the local key orchestration device for generating the encryption key for a communication transaction between a communication device associated with the foreign key orchestration device and a communication device associated with the local key orchestration device. The encryption key may be generated by the local key orchestration device and inspected by local policy engine. The encryption key may be transmitted to the foreign key orchestration device for inspection by the foreign policy engine in some examples, but not others. 
     In some examples, instead of the request  175 , the foreign key orchestration device may transmit a generated encryption key (which may or may not have been inspected by policy engine of the foreign key orchestration device depending on trust policy information specified). The local key orchestration device may or may not inspect the encryption key and its associated key attributes  160  by policies  115  based on the trust policy information specified between the enterprises. 
       FIG. 9  is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process  900  according to various examples. In various examples, the encryption key management and distribution process  900  may incorporate elements of key orchestration, including key management, key distribution, and key federation. 
     First, at block B 910 , a set of policies  115  may be defined, where each policy  115  may relate to one or more key attributes  160 . The policies  115  may be defined by designed personnel and stored in the policy database  280  for future retrieval and update. Next, at block B 920 , the management request handler  205  may receive encryption key and at least one key attribute associated with the encryption key from the key source  170  in the manner described. 
     Next, at block B 930 , the management request handler  205  may determine acceptability of the encryption key received based, at least in part, on the at least one key attribute and the set of policies  115  that relate to one of the at least one key attribute. For example, the management request handler  205  may check a value corresponding to a key attribute  160  to determine whether the value is within an acceptable range as defined by the policies  115  in the manner described. 
     Next, at block B 940 , the management request handler  205  may determine whether the encryption key is acceptable. Whereas the encryption key is acceptable (B 940 :YES), the management request handler  205  may distribute the encryption key to the communication devices requiring the key for the communication transaction therebetween, at block B 950 . On the other hand, whereas the encryption key is unacceptable (B 940 :NO), the management request handler  205  may transmit the “denied” message to the key source  170  at block B 960 . Optionally, the management request handler  205  may transmit the hint to the key source to facilitate key generation at block B 970 . The management request handler  205  may then standby until receiving a second encryption key (and associated key attributes  160 ) at block B 920 . 
     The key orchestration system (e.g., the key orchestration device  110 , the management request handler  205 , key orchestration device A  310   a , key orchestration device B  310   b , and/or the like) described herein may be implemented on any suitable computing devices having a processor and a memory device. The processor may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor), but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The memory may be operatively coupled to the processor and may include any suitable device for storing software and data for controlling and use by the processor to perform operations and functions described herein, including, but not limited to, random access memory RAM, read only memory ROM, floppy disks, hard disks, dongles or other RSB connected memory devices, or the like. 
     The key orchestration device  110 , the management request handler  205 , key orchestration device A  310   a , and/or key orchestration device B  310   b  may be implemented on suitable operating systems (OS) such as, but not limited to, the Linux OS, Windows, the Mac OS, and the like. Additionally, the key orchestration device  110 , the management request handler  205 , key orchestration device A  310   a , and/or key orchestration device B  310   b  may be implemented on small form factors such as embedded systems. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be organized in a hierarchical structure for a structured organization of the policies  115 . A structured organization may be a well-known, documented, and understood organization structure. For example, the policies  115  may be organized in a Directed Acyclic Graph in some examples. The Directed Acyclic Graph may be a hierarchical graph having nodes (vertices) and directed edges. The directed edges may indicate an order or hierarchy in which the nodes are organized. In other examples, the policies  115  may be organized in other suitable hierarchical structures such as, but not limited to, a tree. Each node of the Directed Acyclic Graph or tree may be associated with a particular hierarchical entity of the structured organization. Each node may represent a conceptual level, subdivision, department, collection of clients, and/or the like of a structured organization of a company or other organization. 
       FIG. 10  is a diagram illustrating an example of a policy hierarchy  1000  according to some examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-10 , the policy hierarchy  1000  may be a Directed Acyclic Graph having a root node  1010 , Node A  1020 , Node B  1030 , and Node C  1040 . A node (e.g., the root node  1010 , Node A  1020 , Node B  1030 , or Node C  1040 ) may be associated with one or more devices such as, but not limited to, the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , and/or the like. In some examples, a node may be associated with one or more devices such as, but not limited to, the key source  170 , key generation and management device  230 , and/or the like. 
     In addition or alternatively, each node may be associated with at least one policy  115  such as, but not limited to, the complex policies EQUAL, ONE-OF, MEMBER OF, NULL, NOT-NULL, GREATER-THAN, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, LESS-THAN, LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, and/or the like described herein. Accordingly, each device associated with a given node may also be associated with the policies  115  corresponding to that node. 
     In some examples, child nodes may inherit the policies  115  of parent node(s) based on parentage set forth in the policy hierarchy  1000 . For example, the root node  1010  may be a parent node to Node A  1020  and Node C  1040 . Node A  1020  and Node C  1040  may be child nodes to the root node  1010 . Node A  1020  may be a parent node to Node B  1030 . Node B  1030  may be a child node to Node A  1020 . In some examples, policies  115  associated with the root node  1010  may also be associated with devices corresponding with Node A  1020  and Node C  1040  through inheritance. In some examples, policies  115  associated with Node A  1020  may be associated with devices corresponding to Node B  1030 . In some examples, policies  115  associated with the root node  1010  may be associated with devices corresponding to Node B  1030 , through inheritance. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be classified into groups for organizing the policies  115  in an ad hoc manner. An ad hoc organization or group is an impromptu, operation-driven implementation influenced by cross-functional organization operations. That is, ad hoc groups may be defined based on need. Groups may be a vehicle to organizing nodes (e.g., the nodes  1010 - 1040 ), clients, users, and/or other groups. Clients may refer to devices that consume key orchestration services provided by the key orchestration device  110 . For example, the clients may refer to one or more devices such as, but not limited to, the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , and/or the like. Users may refer to consumers of key management interface  240  and/or the management user interface  220 . For example, the users may refer to the key generation and management device  230 . 
       FIG. 11  is a diagram illustrating examples of groups  1110 ,  1120 , and  1130  according to some examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-11 , each of the groups  1110 ,  1120 , and  1130  may be associated with a particular set of policies  115 . Each of the groups  1110 ,  1120 , and  1130  may include one or more of a node, client, user, and/or another group associating with the policies  115  of that group. For example, Group A  1110  may include Node B  1030  and the source devices  150   a . In a non-limiting example, the source devices  150   a  may be associated with Node B  1030  in a policy hierarchy such as, but not limited to, the policy hierarchy  1000 . In another non-limiting example, the source devices  150   a  may not be associated with Node B  1030  in the policy hierarchy (e.g., the source devices  150   a  may be associated with another node in the same policy hierarchy). Thus, groups may present a separate organization of policies  115  for nodes, clients, users, and/or the like as compared to the policy hierarchy, allowing additional control and flexibility in defining policies  115 . 
     Group B  1120  may include the target device  150   b  and Group A  1110 . In a non-limiting example, the target device  150   b  may not be included in Group A  1110 , as shown in  FIG. 11 . In another non-limiting example, the target device  150   b  may be included in Group A  1110  in addition to Group B  1120 . Group C  1130  may include the cellular device  250   a  and Node C  1040 . In a non-limiting example, the cellular device  250   a  may be associated with node C  1040 . In another non-limiting example, the cellular device  250   a  may not be associated with node C  1040 . In other examples, a Group may include those or other devices or nodes or other combinations thereof. 
     Nodes and groups may be separate vehicles to organize and define the policies  115 . When used in combination, nodes and groups may allow flexible and convenient organization and definition of the policies  115 , adding additional control and management of the policies  115 . In some examples, the nodes may correspond to an existing structure of the structured organizations while groups can be used to classify some policies  115  based on need. Nodes may be used to organize and define the policies  115  associated with particular department, sub-department, and/or office of a company, while groups may be used to organize and define the policies  115  associated with other criteria other than the existing structure of the company. The groups may be used to organize and define the policies associated with a particular type of device, user, client, time, and/or other suitable criteria. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, a client of a particular transaction may be associated with a subsidiary company (e.g., the root node  1010 ), Los Angeles office (e.g., Node A  1020 ), accounting department (e.g., Node B  1030 ), and all devices associated with accounting departments across the subsidiary company (e.g., Group A  1110 ). 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be defined and/or evaluated on a basis of a policy hierarchy (e.g., the policy hierarchy  1000 ). For example, each node (e.g., the nodes  1010 - 1040 ) may have a set of policies  115  associated with any device designated for that node. In some examples, the policies  115  may be defined and/or evaluated on a basis of groups (e.g., the groups  1110 - 1130 ). For example, each group may have a set of policies  115  associated with any node, client, user, or another group designated for that group. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be defined and/or evaluated on a basis of clients. For example, each client may be associated with a particular set of policies  115  for that client. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, an encryption key for the cellular device  250   a  may be defined and/or evaluated based on at least a first set of policies associated for the cellular device  250   a  while an encryption key for the network device  250   b  may be defined and/or evaluated based on a second set of policies associated with the network device  250   b.    
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be defined and/or evaluated on a basis of users. For example, each user may be associated with a particular set of policies  115  for clients administrated by the user. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, an encryption key for a device administrated by the key generation and management device  230  may be defined and/or evaluated based on a first set of policies associated with the key generation and management device  230  while another device administrated by another user (such as, but not limited to, the key generation and management device  230 ) may be defined and/or evaluated based on a second set of policies associated with the another user. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may be defined and/or evaluated based on a combination of one or more of the policy hierarchy, groups, clients, or users. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, with respect to a particular communication transaction or action of a particular device (e.g., the source device  150   a , the target device  150   b , cellular device  250   a , the network device  250   b , . . . , the device N  250   n , and/or the like), an encryption key may be evaluated based on policies consistent with: 
       ΣNode Policies∪ΣGroup Policies  (1)
 
     That is, the encryption key may be evaluated by a combination of policies corresponding to a node associated with the device and the policies corresponding to a group associated with the device. 
     Illustrating with another non-limiting example, with respect to a particular communication transaction or action of a particular device, an encryption key may be evaluated based on policies consistent with: 
       ΣNode Policies∪ΣGroup Policies∪ΣClient Policies∪ΣUser Policies  (2)
 
     That is, the encryption key may be evaluated by a combination or sum of policies corresponding to a node associated with the device, the policies corresponding to a group associated with the device, the policies specific to that device (client), and the policies associated with the user administrating encryption keys for the device. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include an EQUAL (or EQ) policy. The EQUAL policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is equivalent or identical to a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the EQUAL policy may evaluate whether a size (e.g., length) of an encryption key is identical or equivalent to the policy value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the EQUAL policy may evaluate whether a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is identical or equivalent to the policy value. The name may be in string format in some instances. The EQUAL policy is more complex than a simple True/False statement. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include an ONE-OF policy. The ONE-OF policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is a member of a set. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the ONE-OF policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryption key is one of a set of different sizes, where the set of different sizes represents valid responses. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the ONE-OF policy may evaluate whether a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is one of a set of different names. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a MEMBER-OF policy. The MEMBER-OF policy may be concerned with a parentage (with respect to the nodes) or association (with respect to groups) of a key attribute  160  of an encryption key. The key attribute  160  associated with the MEMBER-OF policy may be a client or user from which the encryption key is requested or generated. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the MEMBER-OF policy may evaluate whether a given client or user is associated with a node or group based on a policy value. The policy value may indicate a name, tag, or another type of identifier representing the node or group. In some examples, a given client or user may be associated with a node or group for the purposes of the MEMBER-OF policy if the client or user directly belongs to the node or group. In additional or alternative examples, a given client or user may be associated with a node (e.g., Node A  1020 ) for the purposes of the MEMBER-OF policy if the client or user belongs to a child node (e.g., Node B  1030 ) or parent node (e.g., the root node  1010 ) of that node (e.g., Node A  1020 ). In additional or alternative examples, a given client or user may be associated with a group (e.g., Group B  1120 ) for the purposes of the MEMBER-OF policy if the client or user belongs to a group (e.g., Group A  1110 ) that is included in that group (e.g., Group B  1120 ). 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a NULL policy. The NULL policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is set to NULL. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the NULL policy may evaluate whether a date (e.g., date created, date deleted, date modified, date approved, date relocated, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key is set to NULL, as compared to another value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the NULL policy may evaluate whether a name of an encryption key is set to NULL, as compared to another value. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a NOT-NULL (or EMPTY) policy. The NOT-NULL policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is set to a non-NULL value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the NOT-NULL policy may evaluate whether a date (e.g., date created, date deleted, date modified, date approved, date relocated, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key is set to a non-NULL value, as compared to NULL. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the NOT-NULL policy may evaluate whether a name of an encryption key is set to a non-NULL value, as compared to NULL. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a GREATER-THAN policy. The GREATER-THAN policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is greater than a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryption key is greater than a policy value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN policy may evaluate whether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is greater than a policy value. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy. The GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is greater than or equal to a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryption key is greater than or equal to a policy value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is greater than or equal to a policy value. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a LESS-THAN policy. The LESS-THAN policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is less than a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryption key is less than a policy value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN policy may evaluate whether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is less than a policy value. 
     In some examples, the policies  115  may include a LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy. The LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may be concerned with whether a key attribute of an encryption key is less than or equal to a policy value. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether a size of an encryption key is less than or equal to a policy value. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO policy may evaluate whether an ASCII value or a number of characters of a name (or a portion thereof) of an encryption key is less than or equal to a policy value. 
     In some examples, a STRLEN_MIN policy is concerned with string length. A policy value for the STRLEN_MIN policy represents a minimum string length for a given operation that can be processed as a string. A STRLEN MAX policy is similarly concerned with string length. A policy value for the STRLEN MAX policy represents a maximum string length for a given operation that can be processed as a string. In some examples, an ENTITY_EXISTS policy has a policy value that represents an entity (e.g., a device, group, node, client, user, or the like) that has to exist in the encryption key orchestration system  200  or within a network of the encryption key orchestration system  200  for the operation to be valid. 
     Each complex policy as described herein defines an operation that ultimately aligns with a single decision to act or not act on the operation based on the outcome of evaluation based on the complex policy. Therefore, as compared to a BOOLEAN policy that traditionally governs the decision to act or not to act on the operation, a complex policy allow improved complexity and flexibility during evaluation of an operation. 
       FIG. 12  is a table  1200  illustrating examples of policies  115  having complex logical operations according to some examples. Referring to  FIGS. 1-12 , the policies  115  may be organized according to a node (e.g., Node Y), group (e.g., Group X), client (e.g., Client Z), and user (e.g., User Key Admin) according to some examples. In some examples, Client Z may be associated with Node Y in a hierarchical structure (e.g., the policy structure  1000 ) and Group X in terms of groups. For an encryption key of a given action or transaction of Client Z, relevant policies  115  may include, according to expression (2), a sum of policies associated with Node Y, Group X, Client Z, and User Key Admin. In other examples, the relevant policies  115  may include one or a combination of two or more of the policies  115  associated with Node Y, Group X, Client Z, or User Key Admin. The policies  115  of the table  1200  may be presented in a human-readable format for clarity. The policies  115  of the table  1200  may be stored in the policy database  280  in the manner described. 
     A policy name may identify a particular policy  115  in memory (e.g., in the policy database  280 ). A policy value may be a value based on which the relevant key attribute of the encryption key may be evaluated. The policy value may be set via the management user interface  220  or defined via any suitable manner for caching or storage. A policy type may identify particular types of policies, including, but not limited to, complex policies EQUAL, ONE-OF, MEMBER OF, NULL, NOT-NULL, GREATER-THAN, GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, LESS-THAN, LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO, and/or the like described herein. A policy operation may identify how the policies  115  are evaluated. For example, “ADD” may indicate that the corresponding policy  115  is to be evaluated in addition to other policies  115  that may apply. 
     In the non-limiting example of table  1200 , Node Y may be associated with complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Create.Key.Size”) related to the key size of an encryption key that has been created. The key size may be a key attribute  160  of an encryption key. In some examples, a first complex policy may indicate that the key size should be LESS-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO 256 bits. In some examples, a second complex policy may indicate that the key size should be GREATER-THAN-OR-EQUAL-TO 128 bits. Thus, an encryption created having a size less than or equal to 256 bits and greater than or equal to 128 bits may be allowed per the combination of the first complex policy and second complex policy, as they are evaluated in combination. 
     In some examples, a third complex policy may indicate that the key size should be LESS-THAN 257 bits. In some examples, a fourth complex policy may indicate that the key size should be GREATER-THAN 127 bits. Thus, an encryption created having a size less than 257 bits (less than or equal to 256 bits) and greater than 127 bits (greater than or equal to 128 bits) may be allowed per the combination of the third complex policy and fourth complex policy, as they are evaluated in combination. 
     In some examples, Node Y may be associated with complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Get.Attribute.Deleted Date”) related to a delete date of an encryption key that has been created. For example, a fifth complex policy may indicate that a delete date of the encryption key should be NULL, instead of any other values. NULL indicates that the encryption key does not have a delete date (e.g., the encryption key has not been deleted). 
     In some examples, Node Y may be associated with complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Get.Attribute.Object.Group”) related to parentage or association of the client (e.g., the Client Z) or the user (e.g., User Key Admin) of the policy operation in which an encryption key has been created. For example, a sixth complex policy may indicate that client or user (from which the encryption key is requested or generated) should be associated with a node or group identified by the name “Fresh.” 
     In some examples, Node Y may be associated with at least one BOOLEAN policies such as, but not limited to, “Job.Transaction.Create.Key,” which is related to whether the encryption key has been created. 
     In some examples, Group X may be associated with a seventh complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Create.Key.Encryption Mask”) related to whether the encryption mask is a member of a set named “ENCRYPT DECRYPT ENCRYPT DECRYPT.” The set may be a collection of encryption masks. 
     In some examples, Group X may be associated with complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Create.Key.Name”) related to a name of an encryption key that has been created. For example, an eighth complex policy may indicate that a name of the encryption key should be not be NULL (NOT-NULL), instead of NULL. NOT-NULL indicates that the encryption key has been named. 
     In some examples, Client Z may be associated with complex policies (e.g., “Job.Transaction.Create.Key.Name”) related to a name (a descriptive string attribute) of an encryption key that has been created. For example, a ninth complex policy may indicate that a name of the encryption key should EQUAL “foo,” instead of another name. All other names may be denied according to this policy. 
     In some examples, the User Key Admin may have the same policies  115  as those of Node Y in the non-limiting example of the table  1200 . In other examples, the User Key Admin may have at least one different policy  115  than one or more policies  115  of Node Y. The key attributes governed by the complex policies may include, but not limited to, key size, creation, deletion, date created, date deleted, object group, encryption mask, name, key name, and/or the like. 
     In some examples the complex policies may define unique fine-grained policies for encryption management that can be applied for not only encryption key management lifecycle, but to the actual management of the applied encryption key management server itself. 
       FIGS. 13A, 13B, and 13C  illustrate an example of a policy hierarchy  1300  undergoing nodal manipulation. Referring to  FIGS. 1-13A , the policy hierarchy  1300  may correspond to policy hierarchy  1000 . In particular examples, the policy hierarchy  1300  may include a plurality of hierarchy nodes  1302 ,  1304 ,  1306 , and  1308 . Node  1302  may be a hierarchy root node and may correspond to root node  1010 . Nodes  1304  and  1306  may be second level nodes and the children of the root node  1302 . Nodes  1304  and  1306  may correspond to nodes  1020  and  1040 . Node  1308  may be a third level node and may be the child of nodes  1304  and  1302 . Node  1308  may correspond to node  1030 . 
     In some examples, the policy hierarchy  1300  may further include a group A  1310  including node  1308  (hierarchy node 1.2) and one or more source devices. Although group A  1310  is described as being a part of the policy hierarchy  1300 , group A  1310  may not be within the hierarchal structure itself, but may encompass one or more components within the policy hierarchy (e.g., one or more nodes, one or more source devices, one or more destination devices, etc.). Group A  1310  may correspond to one or more of groups  1110 ,  1120 , and  1130 . 
     Referring to  FIGS. 1-13B , a user of the encryption key orchestration system  200  may input commands into the system  200  (e.g., via the management user interface  220 ) for performing realignment, addition, deletion, moving, or any other suitable action with respect to the nodes, devices, users, and the like in the policy hierarchy  1300 . Accordingly, as a non-limiting example, a move operation of node  1308  is illustrated within the policy hierarchy  1300 . The move operation may change a node&#39;s parentage from one lineage of nodes to another lineage of nodes. For example, hierarchy node  1308  may be moved from having node  1304  as its parent to having node  1306  as its parent (as illustrated by the dashed arrow). As such, in the aftermath of the move, node  1304  no longer has any children, and node  1306  is now associated with a child (node  1308 ), whereas node  1306  previously did not have any children. 
     In some examples, because in policy hierarchy  1300  nodes inherit policies  115  based on their parentage (i.e., a child node will inherit the policies associated with its parent node), after being moved to its new parent node  1306 , node  1308  will undergo a change in its policy  115  due to its new parentage, and thus node  1308  will inherit the policies  115  corresponding to node  1306  and forget the policies  115  associated with node  1304 . In other words, the policy cache of node  1308  may be rebuilt reflecting its new policy  115  based on its new parentage, or the string hash representation of policy for the sum of node policies union with the sum of group policy union with the sum of client policies union with the sum of user policies may be reestablished at the node  1308 . 
     In some examples, the policy cache of a node may be rebuilt any time (e.g., immediately) after an action is performed on the node (e.g., after the node is moved, created, shifted, etc.), or when the node is affected by an operation performed within the policy hierarchy  1300  (e.g., on another node, but affects parentage of the node). In some examples, the rebuilding of the policy cache can be performed at any node that has detected a change in parentage. In some examples, the rebuilding of a policy cache to assign new policies  115  at a node (e.g., due to a change in parentage) may be performed by the key orchestration system  200  (e.g., at the management user interface  220  or by another module of the system  200 ). In some examples, the effective policy  115  for operations associated with node  1308  corresponds to the sum of policies for root node  1302 , parent node  1306 , and the node  1308  itself. Furthermore, because node  1308  has membership within group A  1310 , the sum of policies of group A  1310  may also be incorporated at the node  1308 . 
     In some examples, in a situation where a conflict in policies  115  is introduced, the key orchestration system  200  may automatically bias the conflicting policies toward being failed or null operations. For example, if a destination device associated with the node  1308  has a policy dictating that a key must be less than 256 bits, but the new parent node  1306  has a policy dictating that the a key must be greater than 256 bits, the key orchestration system  200  may void those two conflicting policies at the node  1308  when rebuilding its policy cache. 
     In some examples, although the hierarchy node  1308  has been moved from parent node  1304  to parent node  1306 , the membership of the node  1308  in group A  1310  remains unaffected. In other words, in the aftermath of its move, node  1306  maintains its membership in group A  1310 . In some examples, because the policies  115  of node  1308  change due to new parentage, the sum of group A&#39;s  1310  policies also changes to account for the node&#39;s  1308  move. 
     Referring to  FIGS. 1-13C , a nodal delete operation is illustrated with respect to parent node  1306 . In some examples, a user may delete a node altogether. However, in some examples, because the deletion of node  1306  leaves node  1308 , which was moved to be a child of node  1306  as shown in  FIG. 13B , as an orphaned child node, the policy hierarchy  1300  may respond to the orphaned node  1308  and assign it a parent node of the level above node  1306 , which in this case is the root node  1302 . In other words, in some examples, the parentage of an orphaned node due to a deletion or any other action may be assigned a parent node that was the parent node of the deleted node (e.g., a grandparent node of the orphaned node may be assigned to be the orphan&#39;s parent). As such, node parentage may be collapsed to maintain structure of the policy hierarchy  1300 . In other examples, the parent of an orphaned node may simply be assigned as the root node  1302 , no matter the parental lineage of the orphaned node. However, in some examples, removing groups (e.g., group A  1310 ) may not impact the relationship between subsequent groups, as group relationships are arbitrary and unstructured and are not a part of the framework of the policy hierarchy  1300 . 
     In some examples, similar to the effects on policies  115  after the move shown in  FIG. 13B , the policies  115  of node  1308  may be rebuilt with respect to its new parentage. For example, the policy cache of node  1308  may be rebuilt for inheritance of the policies  115  of root node  1302 , node  1308 &#39;s new parent. In other words, the effective policy  115  for operations associated with node  1308  may include the sum of policies  115  for the root node  1302  and the node  1308  itself. In some examples, because node  1308  has membership within group A  1310 , the sum of policies of group A  1310  may also be incorporated at the node  1308 . In some examples, similar to that shown in  FIG. 13B , the group membership of node  1308  in group A  1310  may be maintained regardless of the manipulation of node  1308 &#39;s parentage. 
     As such, in various examples, restructuring of the policy hierarchy  1300  and rebuilding of the policy cache of a node may occur not only for a node that is directly operated on (e.g., a moved node), but also at nodes that are indirectly operated on (e.g., a node that has its parent deleted may be assigned a new parent node). 
     In various examples, other operations may be utilized within the policy hierarchy  1300 . In some examples, a user may create a node and insert the node into the policy hierarchy  1300  (e.g., as a child node, as a parent node, or as both a child and parent node). In some examples, an operation may include moving clients or users to different nodes or groups. In examples, an operation may include assigning clients, users, or nodes to an ad-hoc group that is associated with the policy hierarchy  1300 . In some examples, an operation may include unassigning clients, users, or nodes from an ad-hoc group that is associated with the policy hierarchy  1300 . In some examples, an operation may include creating or removing ad-hoc groups. 
     The examples described with respect to the figures relate to encryptions keys. It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skills in the art that, in other examples, the systems and methods directed to the key orchestration device  110  involving management, distribution, and federation may be likewise implemented for other sensitive objects such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like. 
     Complex policies are described with respect to Provisional Application No. 62/300,352 and Non-Provisional application attorney docket no. 107283-0221, each of which titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Complex Logical Operations and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Ephemeral policies are described in detail in Provisional Application No. 62/300,521 and Non-Provisional application attorney docket no. 107283-0222, each of which titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Ephemeral Policies and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Organization of the policies  115  are described in detail in Provisional Application No. 62/300,670 and Non-Provisional application attorney docket no. 107283-0223, each of which titled Structure Of Policies For Evaluating Key Attributes Of Encryption Keys and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Granular policies are described in detail in Provisional Application No. 62/300,687 and Non-Provisional application attorney docket no. 107283-0224, each of which titled Linking Encryption Key Management With Granular Policy and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Policies with device activity is described in detail in Provisional Application No. 62/300,699 and Non-Provisional application attorney docket no. 107283-0225, each of which titled System And Method For Associating Encryption Key Management Policy With Device Activity and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
     Various examples described above with reference to the figures include the performance of various processes or tasks. In various examples, such processes or tasks may be performed through the execution of computer code read from computer-readable storage media. For example, in various examples, one or more computer-readable storage mediums store one or more computer programs that, when executed by a processor cause the processor to perform processes or tasks as described with respect to the processor in the above examples. Also, in various examples, one or more computer-readable storage mediums store one or more computer programs that, when executed by a device, cause the computer to perform processes or tasks as described with respect to the devices mentioned in the above examples. In various examples, one or more computer-readable storage mediums store one or more computer programs that, when executed by a database, cause the database to perform processes or tasks as described with respect to the database in the above examples. 
     Thus, examples include program products comprising computer-readable or machine-readable media for carrying or having computer or machine executable instructions or data structures stored thereon. Such computer-readable storage media can be any available media that can be accessed, for example, by a general purpose or special purpose computer or other machine with a processor. By way of example, such computer-readable storage media can comprise semiconductor memory, flash memory, hard disks, optical disks such as compact disks (CDs) or digital versatile disks (DVDs), magnetic storage, random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), and/or the like. Combinations of those types of memory are also included within the scope of computer-readable storage media. Computer-executable program code may comprise, for example, instructions and data which cause a computer or processing machine to perform certain functions, calculations, actions, or the like. 
     The examples disclosed herein are to be considered in all respects as illustrative, and not restrictive. The present disclosure is in no way limited to the examples described above. Various modifications and changes may be made to the examples without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. Various modifications and changes that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are intended to be within the scope of the disclosure.