Patent Publication Number: US-10329890-B2

Title: System for fracturing an underground geologic formation

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION 
     This is continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 14/371,696, filed Jul. 10, 2014, which is the National Stage of International Application No. PCT/US2013/021491, filed Jan. 14, 2013, which was published in English under PCT Article 21(2), and which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/586,576, filed Jan. 13, 2012. All of these applications are incorporated by reference herein in their entireties. 
    
    
     ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
     This invention was made with government support under Contract No. DE-AC52-06NA25396 awarded by the U.S. Department of Energy. The government has certain rights in the invention. 
    
    
     FIELD 
     This application is related to systems and methods for use in geologic fracturing, such as in relation to accessing geologic energy resources. 
     PARTIES TO JOINT RESEARCH AGREEMENT 
     The research work described here was performed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Chevron under the LANL-Chevron Alliance, CRADA number LA05C10518-PTS-21. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Resources such as oil, gas, water and minerals may be extracted from geologic formations, such as deep shale formations, by creating propped fracture zones within the formation, thereby enabling fluid flow pathways. For hydrocarbon based materials encased within tight geologic formations, this fracturing process is typically achieved by a process known as hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing is the propagation of fractures in a rock layer caused by the presence of a pressurized fracture fluid. This type of fracturing is done from a wellbore drilled into reservoir rock formations. The energy from the injection of a highly-pressurized fracking fluid creates new channels in the rock which can increase the extraction rates and ultimate recovery of hydrocarbons. The fracture width may be maintained after the injection is stopped by introducing a proppant, such as grains of sand, ceramic, or other particulates into the injected fluid. Although this technology has the potential to provide access to large amounts of efficient energy resources, the practice of hydraulic fracturing has come under scrutiny internationally due to concerns about the environmental impact, health and safety of such practices. Environmental concerns with hydraulic fracturing include the potential for contamination of ground water, risks to air quality, possible release of gases and hydraulic fracturing chemicals to the surface, mishandling of waste, and the health effects of these. In fact, hydraulic fracturing has been suspended or even banned in some countries. 
     Therefore, a need exists for alternative methods of recovering energy resources trapped within geologic formations. 
     SUMMARY 
     Explosive systems, compositions, and methods are disclosed herein that are designed to be used to fracture geologic formations to provide access to energy resources, such as geothermal and hydrocarbon reservoirs. Some disclosed methods and systems, such as those for enhancing permeability in tight geologic formations, involve the beneficial spacing and timing of explosive sources within a wellbore, which can include explosives and specially formulated propellants arranged along a insertion string. In some examples, the disclosed methods and systems include high explosive systems, propellant systems, and other inert systems. The beneficial spacing and timing of explosive sources can provide a designed coalescence of shock waves in the geologic formation for the purpose of permeability enhancement. 
     Some exemplary systems for fracturing an underground geologic formation adjacent to a wellbore can comprising a plurality of explosive units and one or more detonation control modules. The explosive units can comprise a casing, a detonator, and an explosive material contained within the casing. The explosive material, in some examples, can be configured to release a total energy of at least twelve kJ/cc upon detonation and with greater than 30% of the energy released by the explosive material being released in a following flow Taylor Wave. The detonation control modules electrically are coupled to the explosive units; can comprise a high-voltage capacitor module, an optical diode module, and a timing and triggering module; and can be configured to cause a power pulse to be transmitted to at least one detonator of at least one of the plurality of explosive units for detonation of the explosive material. The explosive units can be configured to be positioned within a wellbore in spaced apart positions relative to one another with the one or more detonation control modules positioned adjacent to the plurality of explosive units in the wellbore, such that the axial positions of the explosive units relative to the wellbore are at least partially based on geologic properties of the geologic formation adjacent the wellbore. The one or more detonation control modules can be configured to be remotely controlled from a location outside of the wellbore in order to detonate the plurality of explosive units within the wellbore in a predetermined timing sequence. 
     In some embodiments, the system can further comprise one or more propellant units positioned adjacent to the plurality of explosive units and one or more detonation control modules. 
     In some embodiments, the system can further comprise a plurality of connectors, at least one of the connectors coupling two the explosive units together in an end-to-end orientation and housing one of the detonation control modules. In some embodiments, the explosive units, propellant units, and connectors are coupled together end-to-end in an elongated string that is configured to be inserted into a wellbore. The explosive units can be positioned along the string in positions based on geological characteristics of a specific wellbore and a geologic formation adjacent to the wellbore. 
     In some embodiments, the explosive units are arranged in explosive subunits of two explosive units with one of the connectors and one of the detonation control modules coupling the two explosive units together. At least two of the explosive subunits can be separated by at least one of the propellant units. 
     In some embodiments, the explosive units and detonation control modules are electrically coupled to each other and to a remote controller, such that the explosive units can be detonated in a predetermined timing sequence within a wellbore. 
     In some embodiments, the system further comprises a tractor coupled to a distal end of the string and configured to pull the string into a wellbore. In some embodiments, the string is configured to curve with a radius of curvature of less than 500 feet. 
     The foregoing and other features and advantages of the disclosure will become more apparent from the following detailed description, which proceeds with reference to the accompanying figures. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  is a cross-sectional view of a geologic formation accessed with a wellbore. 
         FIG. 2  is an enlarged view of a portion of  FIG. 1  showing a proximal portion of an exemplary tool string being inserted into the wellbore. 
         FIG. 3  is a cross-sectional view of a tool string portion positioned in a curved portion of a wellbore. 
         FIG. 4  is a cross-sectional view of a tool string distal portion having a tractor mechanism for pulling through the wellbore. 
         FIG. 5  is a cross-sectional view of a tool string completely inserted into a wellbore and ready for detonation. 
         FIG. 6  is a cross-sectional view of an exemplary unit of a tool string in a wellbore, taken perpendicular to the longitudinal axis. 
         FIG. 7  is a perspective view of an exemplary tool string portion. 
         FIGS. 8A-8G  are schematic views of alternative exemplary tool strings portions. 
         FIG. 9  is a perspective view of an exemplary unit of a tool string. 
         FIG. 10  is a partially cross-sectional perspective view of a portion of the unit of  FIG. 9 . 
         FIG. 11  is an enlarged view of a portion of  FIG. 10 . 
         FIG. 12  is an exploded view of an exemplary explosive system. 
         FIGS. 13 and 14A  are cross-sectional views of the system of  FIG. 12  taken along a longitudinal axis. 
         FIGS. 14B-14D  are cross-sectional views showing alternative mechanical coupling systems. 
         FIG. 15  is a diagram representing an exemplary detonation control module. 
         FIGS. 16A-16C  are perspective views of one embodiment of a detonation control module. 
         FIG. 17  is a circuit diagram representing an exemplary detonation control module. 
         FIG. 18  is a flow chart illustrating an exemplary method disclosed herein. 
         FIG. 19  is a partially cross-sectional perspective view of a theoretical shock pattern produced by a detonated tool string. 
         FIGS. 20 and 21  are vertical cross-sectional views through a geologic formation along a bore axis, showing rubbilization patterns resulting from a detonation. 
         FIG. 22A  is a schematic representing high and low stress regions in a geologic formation a short time after detonation. 
         FIG. 22B  is a schematic showing the degree of rubbilization in the geologic formation a short time after detonation. 
         FIG. 22C  is a schematic illustrating different geologic layers present in the rubbilization zone. 
         FIG. 23  is a graph of pressure as a function of distance from a bore for an exemplary detonation. 
         FIG. 24  is a graph of gas production rates as a function of time for different bore sites using different methods for fracturing. 
         FIG. 25  is a graph of total gas production as a function of time for different bore sites using different methods for fracturing. 
         FIG. 26A  illustrates detonation planes resulting from the ignition of pairs of propellant containing tubes substantially simultaneously along their entire length and an intermediate pair of high explosive containing tubes from their adjacent ends. 
         FIG. 26B  illustrates an exemplary arrangement of interconnected alternating pairs of propellant and high explosive containing tubes. 
         FIG. 27  is a schematic illustration of a command and control system comprising a movable instrumentation vehicle and a movable command center vehicle. 
         FIG. 28  is a schematic illustration of an exemplary embodiment of a command and control system comprising an instrumentation center and a command center. 
         FIG. 29  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for switch and communication system monitoring at the command center. 
         FIG. 30  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for communication system monitoring and status updating at the instrumentation center. 
         FIG. 31  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for communication processes carried out by computing hardware at the instrumentation center. 
         FIG. 32  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for carrying out physical signal processing by computing hardware at the instrumentation center. 
         FIG. 33  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for a software interface at the command center. 
         FIG. 34  is a flowchart of exemplary logic for an interrupt manager operable to monitor the status of elements such as instruments coupled to the instrumentation center of the system. 
         FIG. 35A  is a schematic illustration of an exemplary display at the command center. 
         FIG. 35B  is a schematic illustration of one example of a functional organization of the various tasks between the command center and instrument center. 
         FIG. 35C  is a schematic illustration of functions that can be carried out by the command and control center. 
         FIG. 36A  is a schematic illustration of exemplary computing hardware that can be used both at the command center and instrumentation center for implementing the command and control system functions. 
         FIG. 36B  is a schematic illustration of a communications network providing communications between computing hardware at the command center and computing hardware at the instrumentation center. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     I. Introduction 
     Although the use of high energy density (HED) sources, such as explosives, for the purpose of stimulating permeability in hydrocarbon reservoirs has been previously investigated, the fracture radius away from the borehole with such technologies has never extended for more than a few feet radially from the borehole. Permeability stimulation in tight formations is currently dominated by the process known as hydraulic fracturing. With hydraulic fracturing, chemically treated water is pumped into the reservoir via a perforated wellbore to hydraulically fracture the rock providing a limited network of propped fractures for hydrocarbons to flow into a production well. The chemicals and the produced water used in this method can be considered environmentally hazardous. 
     Past investigations and present practice of stimulating permeability in tight formation do not take full advantage of the information gained from detailed analysis of both the formation properties and the customization of a HED system to create the largest permeability zone that is economical and environmentally benign. Some systems disclosed herein take into account best estimates of the shock wave behavior in the specific geologic formation and can be geometrically configured and adjusted in detonation time to enhance the beneficial mixing of multiple shock waves from multiple sources to extend the damage/rubblization of the rock to economic distances. Shock waves travel with different velocities and different attenuation depending on physical geologic properties. These properties include strength, porosity, density, hydrocarbon content, water content, saturation and a number of other material attributes. 
     As such, explosive systems, compositions, and methods are disclosed herein which are designed to be used to fracture geologic formations to provide access to energy resources, such as geothermal and hydrocarbon reservoirs, while not requiring the underground injection of millions of gallons of water or other chemical additives or proppants associated with the conventional hydraulic fracturing. Some disclosed methods and systems, such as those for enhancing permeability in tight geologic formations, involve the beneficial spacing and timing of HED sources, which can include explosives and specially formulated propellants. In some examples, the disclosed methods and systems include high explosive (HE) systems, propellant (PP) systems, and other inert systems. The beneficial spacing and timing of HED sources provides a designed coalescence of shock waves in the geologic formation for the designed purpose of permeability enhancement. 
     Beneficial spacing of the HED sources can be achieved through an engineered system designed for delivery of the shock to the geologic formations of interest. A disclosed high fidelity mobile detonation physics laboratory (HFMDPL) can be utilized to control the firing of one or more explosive charges and/or to control the initiation of one or more propellant charges, such as in a permeability enhancing system. 
     Some advantages over conventional hydrofracturing which can be attributed to the HED compositions include the following: (1) the resulting rubblized zone around the stimulated wellbore can comprise a substantially 360° zone around the wellbore, as compared to traditional hydrofractures which propagate in a single plane from the wellbore in the direction of the maximum principle stress in the rock or extents along a pre-existing fracture; (2) the useful rubblizaton zone can extend to a significant radius from the bore, such as a radius or average radius, expected to be an at least three times improvement over a continuous charge of equal yield, such as a six times improvement; (3) the disclosed HED compositions and systems have residual by-products that are environmentally non-hazardous; and (4) the ability to generate explosions tailored to specific geologic profiles, thereby directing the force of the explosion radially away from the bore to liberate the desired energy resource without resulting in substantial pulverization of geologic material immediately adjacent to the wellbore, which can clog flow pathways and waste energy. 
     Various exemplary embodiments of explosive devices, systems, methods and compositions are described herein. The following description is exemplary in nature and is not intended to limit the scope, applicability, or configuration of the disclosure in any way. Various changes to the described embodiments may be made in the function and arrangement of the elements described herein without departing from the scope of the invention. 
     II. Terms and Abbreviations 
     i. Terms 
     As used herein, the term detonation (and its grammatical variations) is not limited to traditional definitions and instead also includes deflagration and other forms of combustion and energetic chemical reactions. 
     As used herein, the term detonator is used broadly and includes any device configured to cause a chemical reaction, including explosive detonators and propellant initiators, igniters and similar devices. In addition, the term detonation is used broadly to also include detonation, initiation, igniting and combusting. Thus a reference to detonation (e.g. in the phrase detonation control signal) includes detonating an explosive charge (if an explosive charge is present) such as in response to a fire control signal and initiating the combustion of a propellant charge (if a propellant charge is present) such as in response to a fire control signal. 
     In addition a reference to “and/or” in reference to a list of items includes the items individually, all of the items in combination and all possible sub-combinations of the items. Thus, for example, a reference to an explosive charge and/or a propellant charge means “one or more explosive charges”, “one or more propellant charges” and “one or more explosive charges and one or more propellant charges. 
     As used in this application, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” include the plural forms unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. Additionally, the term “includes” means “comprises.” Further, the term “coupled” generally means electrically, electromagnetically, and/or physically (e.g., mechanically or chemically) coupled or linked and does not exclude the presence of intermediate elements between the coupled or associated items absent specific contrary language. 
     It is further to be understood that all sizes, distances and amounts are approximate, and are provided for description. Although methods and materials similar or equivalent to those described herein can be used in the practice or testing of the present disclosure, suitable methods and materials are described below. All publications, patent applications, patents, and other references mentioned herein are incorporated by reference in their entirety. In case of conflict, the present specification, including explanations of terms, will control. 
     ii. Abbreviations 
     
         
         
           
             Al: Aluminum 
             CL-20: 2,4,6,8,10,12-hexanitro-2,4,6,8,10,12-hexaazaisowurtzitane 
             DAAF: diaminoazoxyfurazan 
             ETN: erythritol tetranitrate 
             EGDN: ethylene glycol dinitrate 
             FOX-7: 1,1-diamino-2,2-dinitroethene 
             GAP: Glycidyl azide polymer 
             HMX: octogen, Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine 
             HNS: hexanitrostilbene 
             HE: high explosive 
             HED: high energy density 
             HFMDPL: High Fidelity Mobile Detonation Physics Laboratory 
             LAX-112: 3,6-diamino-1,2,4,5-tetrazine-1,4-dioxide 
             NG: nitroglycerin 
             NTO: 3-nitro-1,2,4-triazol-5-one 
             NQ: nitroguanidine 
             PETN: pentaerythritol tetranitrate 
             PP: propellant(s) 
             RDX: cyclonite, hexogen, 1,3,5-Trinitro-1,3,5-triazacyclohexane, 1,3,5-Trinitrohexahydro-s-triazine 
             TAGN: triaminoguanidine nitrate 
             TNAZ: 1,3,3-trinitroazetidine 
             TATB: triaminotrinitrobenzene 
             TNT: trinitrotoluene 
           
         
       
    
     III. Exemplary Systems 
     Disclosed are systems for enhancing permeability of a geologic formation, such as in tight junctions of a geologic formation. In some examples, a system for enhancing permeability includes at least one high explosive (HE) system. For example, an HE system can includes one or more HE, such as a cast curable HE. Desirable characteristics of an HE system can include one or more of the following: the HE system is environmentally benign; the HE is safe to handle, store and utilize in all required configurations, and in industrialized wellbore environments; the HE has a high total stored energy density (e.g. total stored chemical energy density), such as at least 8 kJ/cc, at least 10 kJ/cc, or at least 12 kJ/cc; and the HE is highly non-ideal. A non-ideal HE can be defined, for example, as an HE in which 30% to 40% or more of the meta-stably stored chemical energy is converted to HE hot product gases after the detonation front (shock front) in a deflagrating Taylor Wave. Further details of HE chemical compositions are described below (see, for example, Section VIII). 
     Some exemplary systems for enhancing permeability include one or more propellant (PP) systems, such as one or more PP systems in the axial space along the bore between the HE systems, which can add more useable energy to the system and/or help direct energy from the HE systems radially into the geologic formation rather than axially along the bore, without defeating the goal of wave interaction sought through the axial spatial separation of charges. The PP systems can pressurize the bore and/or add uncompressible or low-compressibility material in the bore between the HE systems the helps high-pressure energy from the HE systems from travelling axially along the bore. The PP systems can further increase or sustain high pressure in the annular region of the bore between the outside of the HE systems and the bore walls. Sustaining a high pressure in the bore helps to support the radially outwardly traveling wave of energy, causing the region of significant fracture to be extended radially. As used herein, a bore is any hole formed in a geologic formation for the purpose of exploration or extraction of natural resources, such as water, gas or oil. The term bore may be used interchangeably with wellbore, drill hole, borehole and other similar terms in this application. 
     The pressure generated by the combustion products of the PP confined in the bore is a contributor to increasing the radial travel of HE energy waves. Desirable characteristics of an exemplary PP system include one or more of the following: the PP system is environmentally benign; the material is safe to handle, store and utilize in all required configurations, and in industrialized wellbore environments; and the PP deflagrates without transitioning into a detonation within the context of the separately timed geometry- and material-specific HE. The active material in a PP system can comprise one or more of variety of materials, including: inert materials, such as brine, water, and mud; and energetic materials, such as explosive, combustible, and/or chemically reactive materials. These materials can be environmentally benign and safe to handle, store and utilize in required configurations and in industrialized bore environments. It is contemplated that the PP material may be fluid, semi-fluid or solid in nature. Desirably, the PP systems comprise or produce a product that has low compressibility. Further details of exemplary propellants are described below (see, for example, Section VIII). 
     Optimized geometry- and material-specific configurations of the disclosed systems enable carefully timed, multiple detonation events along HE-PP strings within the bore environment. The disclosed systems optimize the interaction of multiple shock waves and rarefaction waves within the surrounding formation, thereby producing 360 degree rubblization zones, which can be at least three to four times the radius produced by an equivalent radius of a continuous detonating column of the same HE. Further, optimized material layers between the bore wall and radially outer surfaces of the HE-PP string can minimize the amount of energy wasted on crushing/pulverizing geologic material near the bore/epicenter, thereby optimizing the transition of available energy into the geologic material in a manner that maximizes useful rubblization effects and maximizes flow channels through the rubblized material. 
       FIG. 1  shows a cross-section of an exemplary geologic formation  10  that comprises a target zone  12  comprising an energy resource, which is positioned below another geologic layer, or overburden  14 . An exemplary bore  16  extends from a rig  18  at the surface, through the overburden  14 , and into the target zone  12 . The bore  16  can be formed in various configurations based on the shape of the geologic formations, such as by using known directional drilling techniques. In the illustrated example, the bore  16  extends generally vertically from a rig  18  through the overburden  14  and then curves and extends generally horizontally through the target zone  12 . In some embodiments, the bore  16  can extend through two or more target zones  12  and/or through two or more overburdens  14 . In some embodiments, the bore can be generally vertical, angled between vertical and horizontal, partially curved at one or more portions, branched into two or more sub-bores, and/or can have other known bore configurations. In some embodiments, the target zone can be at or near the surface and not covered by an overburden. The target zone  12  is shown having a horizontal orientation, but can have any shape or configuration. 
     As shown in  FIG. 2 , after the bore  16  is formed, an explosive tool string  20  can be inserted into the bore. The string  20  can comprise one or more units  22  coupled in series via one or more connectors  24 . The units  22  can comprise explosive units, propellant units, inert units, and/or other units, as described elsewhere herein. The units  22  and connectors  24  can be coupled end-to-end in various combinations, along with other components, to form the elongated string  20 . The string  20  can further comprise a proximal portion  26  coupling the string to surface structures and control units, such as to support the axial weight of the string, to push the string down the bore, and/or to electrically control the units  22 . 
     As shown in  FIG. 3 , one or more of the connectors  24  can comprise flexible connectors  28  and one or more of the connectors  24  can comprise rigid connectors  30 . The flexible connectors  28  can allow the string to bend or curve, as shown in  FIG. 3 . In the example of  FIG. 3 , every other connector is a flexible connector  28  while the other connectors are rigid or semi-rigid connectors  30 . In other strings  20 , the number and arrangement of flexible and rigid connectors can vary. The flexible connectors  28  can be configured to allow adjacent units  22  to pivot off-axis from each other in any radial direction, whereas the rigid connectors  30  can be configured to maintain adjacent units  22  in substantial axial alignment. The degree of flexibility of the flexible connectors  28  can have varying magnitude. In some embodiments, the string  20  can comprising at least one flexible connector, or swivel connector, and configured to traverse a curved bore portion having a radius of curvature of less than 500 feet. Additional instances of flexible connectors at smaller intervals apart from each other can further reduce the minimum radius of curvature traversable by the string. Furthermore, each joint along the string can be formed with a given amount of play to allow additional flexing of the string. Joints can be formed using threaded connected between adjoining units and connectors and are designed to allow off-axis motion to a small degree in each joint, as is describe further below. 
     As shown in  FIG. 3 , the distal end of the string  20  can comprise a nose-cone  32  or other object to assist the string in traveling distally through the bore  16  with minimal resistance. In some embodiments, as shown in  FIG. 4 , the distal end of the string  20  can comprise a tractor  34  configured to actively pull the string through the bore  16  via interaction with the bore distal to units  22 . 
       FIG. 5  shows an exemplary string  20  fully inserted into a bore  16  such that units  22  have passed the curved portion of the bore and are positioned generally in horizontal axial alignment within the target zone  12 . In this configuration, the string  20  can be ready for detonation. 
       FIG. 6  shows a cross-section of an exemplary unit  22  positioned within a bore  16 . The unit  22  contains a material  36 , which can comprise a high energy explosive material, a propellant, brine, and/or other materials, as described herein. A fluid material  38 , such as brine, can fill the space between the outer surface of the string  20  (represented by the unit  22  in  FIG. 6 ) and the inner wall of the bore  16 . The inner diameter of the unit  22 , D 1 , the outer diameter of the unit and the string  20 , D 2 , and the diameter of the bore, D 3 , can vary as described herein. For example, D 1  can be about 6.5 inches, D 2  can be about 7.5 inches, and D 3  can be about 10 inches. 
     Each unit  22  can comprise an HE unit, a PP unit, an inert unit, or other type of unit. Two or more adjacent units  22  can form a system, which can also include one or more of the adjoining connectors. For example,  FIG. 7  shows an exemplary string  20  comprising a plurality of HE units  40  and a plurality of PP units  42 . Each adjacent pair of HE units  40  and the intermediate connector  24  can comprise an HE system  44 . Each adjacent pair of PP units  42  and the three adjoining connectors  24  (the intermediate connector and the two connectors at the opposite ends of the PP units), can comprise a PP system  46 . In other embodiments, any number of units  20  of a given type can be connected together to from a system of that type. Furthermore, the number and location of connectors in such system can vary in different embodiments. 
     Connectors  24  can mechanically couple adjacent units together to support the weight of the string  20 . In addition, some of the connectors  24  can comprise electrical couplings and/or detonator control modules for controlling detonation of one or more of the adjacent HE or PP units. Details of exemplary detonator control modules are described below. 
     In some embodiments, one or more HE systems in a string can comprise a pair of adjacent HE units and a connector that comprises a detonator control module configured to control detonation of both of the adjacent HE units of the system. In some embodiments, one or more HE systems can comprise a single HE unit and an adjacent connector that comprises a detonator control module configured to control detonation of only that single HE unit. 
     Each unit can be independently detonated. Each unit can comprise one or more detonators or initiators. The one or more detonators can be located anywhere in the unit, such as at one or both axial ends of the unit or intermediate the axial ends. In some embodiments, one or more of the units, such as HE units, can be configured to be detonated from one axial end of the unit with a single detonator at only one axial end of the unit that is electrically coupled to the detonator control module in an adjacent connector. 
     In some units, such as PP units, the unit is configured to be detonated or ignited from both axial ends of the unit at the same time, or nearly the same time. For example, a PP unit can comprise two detonators/igniters/initiators, one at each end of the PP unit. Each of the detonators of the PP unit can be electrically coupled to a respective detonator control module in the adjacent connector. Thus, in some embodiments, one or more PP systems in a string can comprise a pair of adjacent PP units and three adjacent connectors. The three adjacent connectors can comprise an intermediate connector that comprises a detonator control module that is electrically coupled to and controls two detonators, one of each of the two adjacent PP units. The two connectors at either end of the PP system can each comprise a detonator control module that is electrically coupled to and controls only one detonator at that end of the PP system. In PP systems having three or more PP units, each of the intermediate connectors can comprise detonator control modules that control two detonators. In PP systems having only a single PP unit, the PP system can comprise two connectors, one at each end of the PP unit. In embodiments having detonators intermediate to the two axial ends of the unit, the detonator can be coupled to a detonation control module coupled to either axial end of the unit, with wires passing through the material and end caps to reach the detonation control module. 
       FIGS. 8A-8G  show several examples strings  20  arranged in different manners, with HE unit detonators labeled as De and PP unit detonators labeled as Dp.  FIG. 8A  shows a portion of a string similar to that shown in  FIG. 7  comprising alternating pairs of HE systems  44  and PP systems  46 .  FIG. 8B  shows a portion of a string having HE systems  44  and PP systems as well as inert units  48  positioned therebetween. Any number of inert units  48  can be used along the string  20  to position the HE units and PP units in desired positions relative to the given geologic formations. Instead of inert units  48  (e.g., containing water, brine or mud), or in addition to the inert units  48 , units positioned between the HE units and/or the PP units in a string can comprise units containing non-high energy explosives (e.g., liquid explosives). Any combination of inert units and non-high energy units can be includes in a string in positions between the HE units and/or PP units, or at the proximal and distal ends of a string. 
       FIG. 8C  shows a portion of a string  20  comprising a plurality of single-unit HE systems  50  alternating with single-unit PP systems  52 . In this arrangement, each connector is coupled to one end of a HE unit and one end of a PP unit. Some of these connectors comprise a detonation control module configured to control only a PP detonator, while others of these connectors comprise a detonation control module configured to control one PP detonator and also control one HE detonator.  FIG. 8D  shows an exemplary single-unit PP system  52  comprising a connector at either end.  FIG. 8E  shows an exemplary single-unit HE system  50  comprising a single connector at one end. The single-unit systems  50 ,  52 , the double-unit systems  44 ,  46 , and/or inert units  48  can be combined in any arrangement in a string  20 . In some embodiments, one or more of the connectors do not comprise a detonation control module. 
       FIG. 8F  shows a string of several adjacent single-unit HE systems  50 , each arranged with the detonator at the same end of the system. In this arrangement, each connector controls the detonator to its left.  FIG. 8G  shows a string of double-unit HE systems  44  connected directly together. In this arrangement, each double-unit HE system  44  is coupled directly to the next double-unit HE system without any intermediate connectors. In this matter, some of the connectors in a string can be eliminated. Connectors can also be removed or unnecessary when inert units  48  are included in the string. 
     In some embodiments, a system for enhancing permeability includes one or more HE systems, such as one to twelve or more HE systems and one or more PP systems, such as one to twelve or more PP systems, which are arranged in a rack/column along a string  20 . In some examples, each HE system is separated from another HE system by one or more PP systems, such as one to eight or more PP systems. In some embodiments, the string  20  can comprise a generally cylindrical rack/column of about 20 feet to about 50 feet in length, such as about 30 feet to about 50 feet. In some examples, each HE system and each PP system is about 2 feet to about 12 feet in length, such as about 3 feet to about 10 feet in length. 
     Each of the units  20  can comprise a casing, such as a generally cylindrical casing  22  as shown in cross-section in  FIG. 6 . In some examples, the casing is designed to contain the HE, PP, or inert material. The casing can also separate the contained material from the fluid  38  that fills the bore  16  outside of the casing. In some examples, the casing completely surrounds the contained material to separate it completely from the fluid filling the bore. In some examples, the casing only partial surrounds the contained material thereby only partially separating it from the material filling the bore. 
     In some embodiments, the PP units can be ignited prior to the HE units. This can cause the PP ignited product (e.g., a gas and/or liquid) to quickly expand and fill any regions of the bore outside of the HE units, including regions of the bore not filled with other fluid. The quickly expanding PP product can further force other fluids in the bore further into smaller and more distant cracks and spaces between the solid materials of the target zone before the HE units detonate. Filling the bore with the PP product and/or other fluid prior to detonation of the HE units in this manner can mitigate the crushing of the rock directly adjacent to the bore caused by the HE explosion because the fluid between the HE units and the bore walls acts to transfer the energy of the explosion further radially away from the centerline of the bore without as violent of a shock to the immediately adjacent bore walls. Avoiding the crushing of the bore wall material is desirable for it reduces the production of sand and other fine particulates, which can clog permeability paths and are therefore counterproductive to liberating energy resources from regions of the target zone distant from the bore. Moreover, reducing the near-bore crushing and pulverization reduces the energy lost in these processes, allowing more energy to flow radially outward further with the shock wave and contribute to fracture in an extended region. 
     The dimensions (size and shape) and arrangement of the HE and PP units and connectors can vary according to the type of geologic formation, bore size, desired rubblization zone, and other factors related to the intended use. In some examples, the case(s)  22  can be about ¼ inches to about 2 inches thick, such as ¼, ½, ¾, 1, 1¼, 1½, 1¾, and 2 inches thick. In some examples, the material between the case  22  and the bore wall  16  can be about 0 inches to about 6 inches thick. The cases  22  can contact the bore walls in some locations, while leaving a larger gap on the opposite side of the case from the contact with the bore. The thickness of the material in the bore between the cases and the bore wall can therefore vary considerably along the axial length of the string  20 . In some examples, the HE (such as a non-ideal HE) is about 4 inches to about 12 inches in diameter, within a case  22 . For example, a disclosed system includes a 6½ inch diameter of HE, ½ inch metal case (such aluminum case) and 1¼ inch average thickness of material between the case and the bore wall (such as a 1¼ inch thick brine and/or PP layer) for use in a 10 inch bore. Such a system can be used to generate a rubblization zone to a radius of an at least three times improvement over a continuous charge of equal yield, such as a six times improvement. For example, the explosive charges can be detonated and/or the combustion of each propellant charge initiated to fracture the section of the underground geologic formation in a first fracture zone adjacent to and surrounding the section of the bore hole and extending into the underground geologic formation to a first depth of penetration away from the section of the bore hole and plural second fracture zones spaced apart from one another and extending into the underground geologic formation to a second depth of penetration away from the section of the bore hole greater than the first depth of penetration, wherein the second fracture zones are in the form of respective spaced apart disc-like fracture zones extending radially outwardly from the bore hole and/or the second depth of penetration averages at least three times, such as at least six times, the average first depth of penetration. In some examples, a disclosed system includes a 9½ inch diameter of HE (such as a non-ideal HE), ¼ inch metal case (such aluminum case) and 1 inch average thickness of material between the case and the bore wall (such as a 1 inch thick brine and/or PP layer) for use in a 12 inch borehole. It is contemplated that the dimensions of the system can vary depending upon the size of the bore. 
     In some embodiments, the system for enhancing permeability further includes engineered keyed coupling mechanisms between HE and PP units and the connectors. Such coupling mechanisms can include mechanical coupling mechanisms, high-voltage electrical coupling mechanisms, communications coupling mechanisms, high voltage detonator or initiation systems (planes), and/or monitoring systems. In some examples, independently timed high-precision detonation and initiation planes for each HE and PP section, respectively, can be included. Such planes can include customized programmable logic for performing tasks specific to the system operated by the plane, including safety and security components, and each plane can include carefully keyed coupling mechanisms for mechanical coupling, including coupling detonators/initiators into the HE/PP, high-voltage coupling, and communications coupling. 
     In some examples, cast-cured HE and PP section designs, including high-voltage systems, communication systems, detonator or initiation systems, and monitoring systems, are such that they can be manufactured, such as at an HE Production Service Provider Company, and then safely stored and/or “just in time” shipped to a particular firing site for rapid assembly into ruggedized HE-PP columns, testing and monitoring, and deployment into a bore. Specific formulations utilized, and the geometrical and material configurations in which the HE and PP systems are deployed, can be central for producing a desired rubblization effects in situ within each particular geologic formation. In some examples, these optimized geometric and material configurations can be produced via specifically calibrated numerical simulation capabilities that can include many implementations of models into the commercial code ABAQUS. In further examples, any of the disclosed systems can be developed/up-dated by use of a High Fidelity Mobile Detonation Physics Laboratory (HFMDPL), as described in detail herein (see, for example, Section IX). 
     IV. Exemplary High Explosive and Propellant Units and Systems 
       FIG. 9  shows an exemplary unit  100 , which can comprise a HE unit, a PP unit, or an inert unit. The unit  100  comprises a generally cylindrical, tubular case  102  having at least one interior chamber for containing a material  150 , such as HE material, PP material, brine, or other material. The unit  100  comprises a first axial end portion  104  and a second opposite axial end portion  106 . Each axial end portion  104 ,  106  is configured to be coupled to a connector, to another HE, PP or inert unit, or other portions of a bore insertion string. The casing  102  can comprise one or more metals, metal alloys, ceramics, and/or other materials or combinations thereof. In some embodiments, the casing  102  comprises aluminum or an aluminum alloy. 
     The axial end portions  104 ,  106  can comprise mechanical coupling mechanisms for supporting the weight of the units along a string. The mechanical coupling mechanisms can comprise external threaded portions  108 ,  110 , plate attachment portions  112 ,  114 , and/or any other suitable coupling mechanisms. For example,  FIGS. 14A-14D  show representative suitable mechanical coupling mechanisms. The axial end portions  104 ,  106  can further comprise electrical couplings, such as one or more wires  116 , that electrically couple the unit to the adjacent connectors, other units in the string, and/or to control systems outside of the bore. The wires  116  can pass axially through the length of the unit  100  and extend from either end for coupling to adjacent components. 
     As shown in detail in  FIG. 10 , the unit  100  can further comprise a first end cap  118  coupled to the axial end portion  106  of the case  102  and/or a second end cap  120  coupled to the opposite axial end portion  108  of the case  102 . The end caps  118 ,  120  can comprise an annular body having a perimeter portion that is or can be coupled to the axial end of the case  102 . The end caps  118 ,  120  can be fixed to the casing  102 , such as be welding, adhesive, fasteners, threading, or other means. The end caps  118 ,  120  can comprise any material, such as one or more metals, metal alloys, ceramics, polymeric materials, etc. In embodiments with the end caps welded to the casing, the full penetration welds can be used in order to preclude thing metal-to-metal gaps in which migration of chemical components could become sensitive to undesired ignition. In embodiments having polymeric end caps, thin contact gaps can exist between the caps and the casing with less or no risk of undesired ignition. Polymeric end caps can be secured to the casing via threading and/or a polymeric retaining ring. Furthermore, a sealing member, such as an O-ring, can be positioned between the end cap and the casing to prevent leakage or material  150  out of the unit. In other embodiments, metallic end caps can be used with annular polymeric material positioned between the end caps and the casing to preclude metal-to-metal gaps. 
     The outer diameter of the units and/or connectors can be at least partially covered with or treated with a friction-reducing layer and/or surface treatment. This treatment layer or treatment can comprise at least one of the following: solid lubricants, such as graphite, PTFE containing materials, MoS2, or WS2; liquid lubricants, such as petroleum or synthetic analogs, grease; or aqueous based lubricants. Surface treatments can include attached material layers, such as WS2 (trade name Dicronite®); MoS2, metals having high lubricity, such as tin (Sn), polymer coatings exhibiting high lubricity such as fluoropolymers, polyethylene, PBT, etc.; physically deposited, electroplated, painting, powder coating; or other materials. 
     Wires  116  (such as for controlling, powering and triggering the detonation of the energetic material) pass through or at least up to each unit  100 . Any number of wires  116  can be included, such as one, two, four, or more. At least some of the wires  116  can pass through at least one of the end caps  118 ,  120  on the ends of each unit, as shown in  FIG. 10 . The penetrations in the end caps and the penetrating wires  116  can be free of thin metal-to-metal gaps in which migration of chemical components could become sensitive to undesired ignition. 
     In some embodiments, the end caps  118 ,  120  can comprise one or more penetration glands  122  designed to obviate undesired ignition by eliminating or reducing thin metal-to-metal gaps and preventing leakage of material  150  out of the unit  100 . The penetration glands  122  can be configured to provide thin gaps between polymeric and metal surface penetration holes. The compliance of polymer-to-metal or polymer-to-polymer thin gaps can prevent sufficient compression and friction for sensitive chemical components to ignite. 
     As shown in more detail in  FIG. 11 , each penetration gland  122  can receive a wire  116  with a polymer jacket  124  passing through a hole  126  in the end cap  118 ,  120 . The wire  116  can be sealed with a compliant seal, such as an O-ring  128 . The seal is compressed in place by a polymeric fastener  130 , which is secured to the end cap, such as via threads, and tightened to compress the seal. The fastener  130  can comprise a hole through its axis through which the wire  116  passes. 
     In other embodiments, a penetration gland can be comprised of a threaded hole with a shoulder, a gland screw with a coaxial through-hole, said screw having a shoulder which compresses a seal (such as an o-ring) in order to seal the cable passing through it. Coaxial cable can allow two conductors to be passed through each seal gland with an effective seal between the inside of the unit and the outside of the unit. 
     The unit  100  can further comprise at least one detonator holder  140  and at least one detonator  142  and at least one axial end of the unit, as shown in  FIG. 10 . The term detonator includes any device used to detonate or ignite the material  150  within the unit, or initiate or cause the material  150  to detonate or ignite or explode, or to initiate or cause a chemical reaction or expansion of the material  150 . In an HE filled unit, the unit can comprise a single detonator  142  at one end of the unit, such as at the end portion  106 , with no second detonator at the opposite end of the unit. In a PP filled unit, the unit can comprise a detonator  142  at both axial end portions of the unit, each being generally similar in structure and function. 
     The detonator holder  140 , as shown in  FIG. 10 , for either a HE unit or a PP unit, can comprise a cup-shaped structure positioned within a central opening in the end cap  118 . The holder  140  can be secured to and sealed to the end cap  118 , such as via threads  144  and an O-ring  146 . The holder  140  extends axially through the end cap  118  into the chamber within the casing  102  such that the holder  140  can be in contact with the material  150 . The holder  140  can comprise a central opening  148  at a location recessed within the casing and the detonator  142  can be secured within the opening  148 . An internal end  152  of the detonator can be held in contact with the material  150  with a contact urging mechanism to ensure the detonator does not lose direct contact with the material  150  and to ensure reliable ignition of the material  150 . The urging mechanism can comprise a spring element, adhesive, fastener, or other suitable mechanism. 
     The detonator  142  can further comprise an electrical contact portion  154  positioned within the recess of the holder  140 . The electrical contact portion  154  can be positioned to be not extend axially beyond the axial extend of the rim of the holder  140  to prevent or reduce unintended contact with the detonator  142 . The electrical contact portion  154  can be electrically coupled to a detonation control module in an adjacent connector via wires. 
     In some embodiments, a unit can comprise right-handed threads on one axial end portion of the casing and left-handed threads on the other axial end portion of the casing. As shown in  FIG. 12 , the oppositely threaded ends of each unit can facilitate coupling two units together with an intermediate connector. In the example shown in  FIGS. 12-14A , a system  200  can be formed by coupling an exemplary first unit  202  and an exemplary second unit  204  together with an exemplary connector  206 .  FIGS. 13 and 14A  show cross-sectional views taken along a longitudinal axis of the system  200  in an assembled state. The first and second units  202 ,  204  can be identical to or similar to the illustrated unit  100  shown in  FIGS. 9-11 , or can comprise alternative variations of units. For example, the units  202 ,  204  can comprise HE units that are similar or identical, but oriented in opposite axial directions such that their lone detonators are both facing the connector  206 . 
     The connector  206  can comprise a tubular outer body  208  having first internal threads  210  at one end and second internal threads at the second opposite end, as shown in  FIG. 12 . Mechanical coupling of the units  202 ,  204 , and connector  206  can be accomplished by rotating connector  206  relative to the units  202 ,  204  (such as with the units  202 ,  204  stationary), such that internal threads  210 ,  212  thread onto external threads  214 ,  216  of the units  202 ,  204 , respectively. The rotation of the connector  206  can act like a turnbuckle to draw the adjacent units  202 ,  204  together. The threads  210 ,  212 ,  214 ,  216  can comprise buttress threads for axial strength. 
     After the adjacent pair of units  202 ,  204  are drawn together, locking plates  218 ,  220  can be attached to each unit end portion and engage slots  222 ,  224 , respectively in each end of the connector outer body  208  to prevent unintentional unscrewing of the joint. Lock plates  218 ,  220  are attached to each unit by fastening means (e.g., screws  240 ,  242  and screw holes  244 ,  246  in the unit case). The fastening members preferably do not pass through the case wall to avoid allowing the contained material  250  to escape and so that the system remains sealed. The lock plates  218 ,  220  prevent the connector  206  from unscrewing from the units  202 ,  204  to insure that the assembly stays intact. 
     The described threaded couplings between the units and the connectors can provide axial constraint of sections of a tool string to each other, and can also provide compliance in off-axis bending due to thread clearances. This can allow the tool string to bend slightly off-axis at each threaded joint such that it can be inserted into a bore which has a non-straight contour. One advantage of the described locking plate configuration is to eliminate the need for torquing the coupling threads to a specified tightness during assembly in the field. In practice, the connector shoulders ( 226 ,  228  in  FIG. 12 ) need not be tightened to intimately abut the unit shoulders ( 230 ,  232  in  FIG. 12 ) axially, but some amount of clearance can be left between the connector and unit shoulders to assure torque is not providing any, or only minimal, axial pre-stress on the system. This small clearance can also enhance the off-axis bending compliance of the tool string in conjunction with the thread clearances. 
     The connector  206  can further comprise a detonation control module  260  contained within the outer body  208 . The detonation control module  260  can be configured to be freely rotatable relative to the outer body  208  about the central axis of the connector, such as via rotational bearings between the outer body and the detonation control module. The detonation control module  260  can comprise a structural portion  262  to which the electrical portions  264  are mounted. The electrical portions  264  of the detonation control module  260  are described in more detail below. 
     During assembly of the connector  260  to the units  202 ,  204 , the detonation control module  206  can be held stationary relative to the units  202 ,  204  while the outer body  208  is rotated to perform mechanical coupling. To hold the detonation control module  260  stationary relative to the units  202 ,  204 , one or both of the units can comprise one or more projections, such as pins  266  (see  FIG. 13 ), that project axially away from the respective unit, such as from the end caps, and into a receiving aperture or apertures  268  in the structural portion  262  of the detonation control module  260 . The pin(s)  266  can keep the detonation control module  260  stationary relative to the units  202 ,  204  such that electrical connections therebetween do not get twisted and/or damaged. In some embodiments, only one of the units  202 ,  204  comprises an axial projection coupled to the structural portion  262  of the detonation control module  260  to keep to stationary relative to the units as the outer casing is rotated. 
     The units  202 ,  204  can comprise similar structure to that described in relation to the exemplary unit  100  shown in  FIGS. 9-11 . As shown in  FIGS. 13 and 14A , the unit  202  comprises electrical wires  270  extending through the material  250  in the unit and through glands  272  in an end cap  274 . The unit  202  further comprises a detonator holder  276  extending through the end cap  272  and a detonator  278  extending through the holder  276 . Unit  204  also comprises similar features. Electrical connections  280  of the detonator and  282  of the wires  270  can be electrically coupled to the detonation control module  260 , as describe below, prior to threading the connector to the two units  202 ,  204 . 
       FIGS. 14B-14D  shows cross-sectional views of alternative mechanical coupling mechanisms for attaching the units to the connectors. In each of  FIGS. 14B-14D , some portions of the devices are omitted. For example, the detonation control module, detonator, wiring, and fill materials are not shown. The detonator holder and/or end caps of the units may also be omitted from these figures. 
       FIG. 14B  shows an exemplary assembly  300  comprising a unit  302  (such as an HE or PP unit) and a connector  304 . The unit  302  comprises a casing and/or end cap that includes a radially recessed portion  306  and an axial end portion  308 . The connector  304  comprises an axial extension  310  positioned around the radially recessed portion  306  and an inner flange  312  positioned adjacent to the axial end portion  308 . One or more fasteners  314  (e.g., screws) are inserted through the connector  304  at an angle between axial and radial. The fasteners  314  can be countersunk in the connector to preserve a smooth outer radial surface of the assembly. The fasteners  314  can extend through the inner flange  312  of the connector and through the axial end portion  308  of the unit, as shown, to mechanically secure the unit and the connector together. A sealing member  316 , such as an O-ring, can be positioned between the inner flange  312  and the axial end portion  308 , or elsewhere in the connector-unit joint, to seal the joint and prevent material contained within the assembly from escaping and prevent material from entering the assembly. 
       FIG. 14C  shows another exemplary assembly  320  comprising a unit  322  (such as an HE or PP unit), a connector  324 , and one or more locking plates  326 . The unit  322  comprises a casing and/or end cap that includes a radially recessed portion  328  and an axial end portion  330 . The connector  324  comprises an axial extension  332  positioned adjacent to the radially recessed portion  328  and an inner flange  334  positioned adjacent to the axial end portion  330 . A sealing member  336 , such as an O-ring, can be positioned between the inner flange  334  and the axial end portion  330 , or elsewhere in the connector-unit joint, to seal the joint and prevent material contained within the assembly from escaping and prevent material from entering the assembly. The locking plate(s)  326  comprise a first ledge  338  that extends radially inwardly into a groove in unit  322 , and a second ledge  340  that extends radially inwardly into a groove in the connector  324 . The first and second ledges  338 ,  340  prevent the unit  322  and the connector  324  from separating axially apart from each other, locking them together. The plate(s)  326  can be secured radially to the assembly with one or more fasteners  342 , such as screws, that extend radially through the plate  326  and into the connector  324  (as shown) or into the unit  322 . 
       FIG. 14D  shows yet another exemplary assembly  350  comprising a unit  352  (such as an HE or PP unit), a connector  354 , and one or more locking plates  356 . The unit  352  comprises a casing and/or end cap that includes a radially recessed portion  358  and an axial end portion  360 . The connector  354  comprises an axial extension  362  positioned adjacent to the radially recessed portion  358  and an inner flange  364  positioned adjacent to the axial end portion  360 . A sealing member  366 , such as an O-ring, can be positioned between the inner flange  364  and the axial end portion  360 , or elsewhere in the connector-unit joint, to seal the joint and prevent material contained within the assembly from escaping and prevent material from entering the assembly. The locking plate(s)  356  comprise a first ledge  368  that extends radially inwardly into a groove in unit  352 , and a second ledge  370  that extends radially inwardly into a groove in the connector  354 . The first and second ledges  368 ,  370  prevent the unit  352  and the connector  354  from separating axially apart from each other, locking them together. The plate(s)  376  can be secured radially to the assembly with one or more resilient bands or rings  372 , such as an elastomeric band, that extends circumferentially around the assembly  350  to hold the plate(s) to the connector  354  and to the unit  352 . The band(s)  372  can be positioned in an annular groove to maintain a flush outer surface of the assembly  350 . 
     The assemblies shown in  FIGS. 14A-14D  are just examples of the many different possible mechanical couplings that can be used in the herein described systems and assemblies. It can be desirable that the mechanical couplings allow for some degree of off-axis pivoting between the unit and the connector to accommodate non-straight bore, and/or that the mechanical coupling imparts minimal or no axial pre-stress on the string, while providing sufficient axial strength to hold the string axially together under its own weight when in a bore and with additional axial forces imparted on the string due to friction, etc. 
     PP units and systems can be structurally similar to HE units and systems, and both can be described in some embodiments by exemplary structures shown in  FIGS. 9-14 . However, while HE units can comprise only a single detonator, in some PP units and PP systems, the PP unit can comprise two detonators/ignition systems, one positioned at each end of the unit. The PP ignition systems can be configured to simultaneously ignite the PP material from both ends of the unit. The two opposed PP ignition systems can comprise, for example, ceramic jet ignition systems. The PP ignitions systems can rapidly ignite the PP material along the axial length of the PP unit to help ignite the PP material in a more instantaneous matter, rather than having one end of the unit ignite first then wait for the reaction to travel down the length of the PP unit to the opposite end. Rapid ignition of the PP material can be desirable such that the PP ignition product material can quickly expand and fill the bore prior to the ignition of the HE material. 
     V. Exemplary Detonation Control Module and Electrical Systems 
       FIG. 15  is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary detonation control module  700 . Detonation control module  700  is activated by trigger input signal  701  and outputs a power pulse  702  that triggers a detonator. In some embodiments, output power pulse  702  triggers a plurality of detonators. Trigger input signal  701  can be a common trigger signal that is provided to a plurality of detonation control modules to trigger a plurality of detonators substantially simultaneously. Detonators may detonate explosives, propellants, or other substances. 
     Detonation control module  700  includes timing module  703 . Timing module  703  provides a signal at a controlled time that activates a light-producing diode  704 . Light-producing diode  704 , which in some embodiments is a laser diode, illuminates optically triggered diode  705  in optically triggered diode module  706 , causing optically triggered diode  705  to conduct. In some embodiments, optically triggered diode  705  enters avalanche breakdown mode when activated, allowing large amounts of current flow. When optically triggered diode  705  conducts, high-voltage capacitor  707  in high-voltage module  708  releases stored energy in the form of output power pulse  702 . In some embodiments, a plurality of high-voltage capacitors are used to store the energy needed for output power pulse  702 . 
       FIG. 16A  illustrates exemplary detonation control module  709 . Detonation control module  709  includes timing module  710 , optically triggered diode module  711 , and high-voltage module  712 . Connectors  713  and  714  connect timing module  710  with various input signals such as input voltages, ground, trigger input signal(s), and others. A timing circuit  715  includes a number of circuit components  716 . Exemplary circuit components include resistors, capacitors, transistors, integrated circuits (such as a 555 or 556 timer), and diodes. 
     Timing module  710  also includes light-producing diode  717 . Timing circuit  715  controls activation of light-producing diode  717 . In some embodiments, light-producing diode  717  is a laser diode. Light-producing diode  717  is positioned to illuminate and activate optically triggered diode  718  on optically triggered diode module  711 . Optically triggered diode  718  is coupled between a high-voltage capacitor  719  and a detonator (not shown). 
     As shown in  FIG. 16A , timing module  710  is mechanically connected to high-voltage module  712  via connectors  720  and  721 . Optical diode module  711  is both mechanically and electrically connected to high-voltage module  712  via connectors  722  and mechanically connected via connector  723 . 
       FIG. 16B  illustrates optically triggered diode module  711 . When optically triggered diode  718  is activated, a conductive path is formed between conducting element  724  and conducting element  725 . The conductive path connects high-voltage capacitor  719  with a connector (shown in  FIG. 17 ) to a detonator (not shown) via electrical connectors  722 . 
       FIG. 16C  illustrates high-voltage module  712 . Connectors  726  and  727  connect high-voltage capacitor  719  to two detonators, “Det A” and “Det B.” In some embodiments, each of connectors  726  and  727  connect high-voltage capacitor  719  to two detonators (a total of four). In other embodiments, detonation control module  709  controls a single detonator. In still other embodiments, detonation control module  709  controls three or more detonators. High-voltage capacitor  719  provides an output power pulse to at least one detonator (not shown) via connectors  726  and  727 . Connectors  728  and  729  provide a high-voltage supply and high-voltage ground used to charge high-voltage capacitor  719 . High-voltage module  712  also includes a bleed resistor  730  and passive diode  731  that together allow charge to safely drain from high-voltage capacitor  719  if the high-voltage supply and high-voltage ground are disconnected from connectors  728  and/or  729 . 
       FIG. 17  is a schematic detailing an exemplary detonation control module circuit  732  that implements a detonation control module such as detonation control module  709  shown in  FIGS. 16A-16C . Detonation control module circuit  732  includes a timing circuit  733 , an optically triggered diode  734 , and high-voltage circuit  735 . Timing circuit  733  includes a transistor  736 . Trigger input signal  737  is coupled to the gate of transistor  736  through voltage divider  738 . In  FIG. 17 , transistor  736  is a field-effect transistor (FET). Specifically, transistor  736  is a metal oxide semiconductor FET, although other types of FETs may also be used. FETs, including MOSFETs, have a parasitic capacitance that provides some immunity to noise and also require a higher gate voltage level to activate than other transistor types. For example, a bipolar junction transistor (BJT) typically activates with a base-emitter voltage of 0.7 V (analogous to transistor  736  having a gate voltage of 0.7 V). FETs, however, activate at a higher voltage level, for example with a gate voltage of approximately 4 V. A higher gate voltage (activation voltage) also provides some immunity to noise. For example, a 2V stray signal that might trigger a BJT would likely not trigger a FET. Other transistor types that reduce the likelihood of activation by stray signals may also be used. The use of the term “transistor” is meant to encompass all transistor types and does not refer to a specific type of transistor. 
     Zener diode  739  protects transistor  736  from high-voltage spikes. Many circuit components, including transistor  736 , have maximum voltage levels that can be withstood before damaging the component. Zener diode  739  begins to conduct at a particular voltage level, depending upon the diode. Zener diode  739  is selected to conduct at a voltage level that transistor  736  can tolerate to prevent destructive voltage levels from reaching transistor  736 . This can be referred to as “clamping.” For example, if transistor  736  can withstand approximately 24 V, zener diode  739  can be selected to conduct at 12 V. 
     A “high” trigger input signal  737  turns on transistor  736 , causing current to flow from supply voltage  740  through diode  741  and resistor  742 . A group of capacitors  743  are charged by supply voltage  740 . Diode  741  and capacitors  743  act as a temporary supply voltage if supply voltage  740  is removed. When supply voltage  740  is connected, capacitors  743  charge. When supply voltage  740  is disconnected, diode  741  prevents charge from flowing back toward resistor  742  and instead allows the charge stored in capacitors  743  to be provided to other components. Capacitors  743  can have a range of values. In one embodiment, capacitors  743  include three 25 μF capacitors, a 1 μF, capacitor, and a 0.1 μF capacitor. Having capacitors with different values allows current to be drawn from capacitors  743  at different speeds to meet the requirements of other components. 
     There are a variety of circumstances in which supply voltage  740  can become disconnected but where retaining supply voltage is still desirable. For example, detonation control module  732  can be part of a system in which propellants are detonated prior to explosives being detonated. In such a situation, the timing circuitry that controls detonators connected to the explosives may need to continue to operate even if the power supply wires become either short circuited or open circuited as a result of a previous propellant explosion. The temporary supply voltage provided by diode  741  and capacitors  743  allows components that would normally have been powered by supply voltage  740  to continue to operate. The length of time the circuit can continue to operate depends upon the amount of charge stored in capacitors  743 . In one embodiment, capacitors  743  are selected to provide at least 100 to 150 microseconds of temporary supply voltage. Another situation in which supply voltage  740  can become disconnected is if explosions are staggered by a time period. In some embodiments, supply voltage  740  is 6 V DC and resistor  742  is 3.3 kΩ. The values and number of capacitors  743  can be adjusted dependent upon requirements. 
     Timing circuit  733  also includes a dual timer integrated circuit (IC)  744 . Dual timer IC  744  is shown in  FIG. 17  as a “556” dual timer IC (e.g., LM556). Other embodiments use single timer ICs (e.g. “555”), quad timer ICs (e.g. “558”), or other ICs or components arranged to perform timing functions. The first timer in dual timer IC  744  provides a firing delay. The firing delay is accomplished by providing a first timer output  745  (IC pin  5 ) to a second timer input  746  (IC pin  8 ). The second timer acts as a pulse-shaping timer that provides a waveform pulse as a second timer output  747  (IC pin  9 ). After voltage divider  748 , the waveform pulse is provided to a MOSFET driver input  749  to drive a MOSFET driver IC  750 . MOSFET driver IC  750  can be, for example, a MIC44F18 IC. 
     Timer ICs such as dual timer IC  744 , as well as the selection of components such as resistors  751 ,  752 ,  753 ,  754 , and  755  and capacitors  756 ,  757 ,  758 , and  759  to operate dual timer IC  744 , are known in the art and are not discussed in detail in this application. The component values selected depend at least in part upon the desired delays. In one embodiment, the following values are used: resistors  751 ,  752 , and  755 =100 kΩ; and capacitors  756  and  759 =0.01 μF. Other components and component values may also be used to implement dual timer IC  744 . 
     MOSFET driver IC  750  is powered by supply voltage  760  through diode  761  and resistor  762 . In some embodiments, supply voltage  760  is 6 V DC and resistor  762  is 3.3 kΩ. Supply voltage  760  can be the same supply voltage as supply voltage  740  that powers dual timer IC  744 . A group of capacitors  763  are charged by supply voltage  760 . Diode  761  and capacitors  763  act to provide a temporary supply voltage when supply voltage  760  is disconnected or shorted. As discussed above, diode  761  is forward biased between supply voltage  760  and the power input pin of MOSFET driver IC  750  (pin  2 ). Capacitors  763  are connected in parallel between the power input pin and ground. Capacitors  763  can have a range of values. 
     MOSFET driver output  764  activates a driver transistor  765 . In some embodiments, driver transistor  765  is a FET. MOSFET driver IC  750  provides an output that is appropriate for driving transistor  765 , whereas second timer output  747  is not designed to drive capacitive loads such as the parasitic capacitance of transistor  765  (when transistor  765  is a FET). 
     Resistor  766  and zener diode  767  clamp the input to driver transistor  765  to prevent voltage spikes from damaging transistor  765 . When driver transistor  765  is activated, current flows from supply voltage  768 , through diode  790  and resistor  769  and activates a light-producing diode  770 . In some embodiments, driver transistor  765  is omitted and MOSFET driver output  764  activates light-producing diode  770  directly. 
     In some embodiments, light-producing diode  770  is a pulsed laser diode such as PLD 905D1S03S. In some embodiments, supply voltage  768  is 6 V DC and resistor  769  is 1 kΩ. Supply voltage  768  can be the same supply voltage as supply voltages  740  and  760  that power dual timer IC  744  and MOSFET driver IC  750 , respectively. A group of capacitors  771  are charged by supply voltage  768 . Diode  790  and capacitors  771  act to provide a temporary supply voltage when supply voltage  768  is removed (see discussion above regarding diode  741  and capacitors  743 ). Capacitors  771  can have a range of values. 
     When activated, light-producing diode  770  produces a beam of light. Light-producing diode  770  is positioned to illuminate and activate optically triggered diode  734 . In some embodiments, optically triggered diode  734  is a PIN diode. Optically triggered diode  734  is reverse biased and enters avalanche breakdown mode when a sufficient flux of photons is received. In avalanche breakdown mode, a high-voltage, high-current pulse is conducted from high-voltage capacitor  772  to detonator  773 , triggering detonator  773 . In some embodiments, additional detonators are also triggered by the high-voltage, high-current pulse. 
     High-voltage capacitor  772  is charged by high-voltage supply  774  through diode  775  and resistor  776 . In one embodiment, high-voltage supply  774  is about 2800 V DC. In other embodiments, high-voltage supply  774  ranges between about 1000 and 3500 V DC. In some embodiments, a plurality of high-voltage capacitors are used to store the energy stored in high-voltage capacitor  772 . Diode  775  prevents reverse current flow and allows high-voltage capacitor to still provide a power pulse to detonator  773  even if high-voltage supply  774  is disconnected (for example, due to other detonations of propellant or explosive). Bleed resistor  777  allows high-voltage capacitor  772  to drain safely if high-voltage supply  774  is removed. In one embodiment, resistor  776  is 10 kΩ, bleed resistor  777  is 100 MΩ, and high-voltage capacitor  772  is 0.2 μF. High-voltage capacitor  772 , bleed resistor  777 , resistor  776 , and diode  775  are part of high-voltage circuit  735 . 
       FIG. 18  illustrates a method  778  of controlling detonation. In process block  779 , a laser diode is activated using at least one timing circuit. In process block  780 , an optically triggered diode is illuminated with a beam produced by the activated laser diode. In process block  781 , a power pulse is provided from a high-voltage capacitor to a detonator, the high-voltage capacitor coupled between the optically triggered diode and the detonator. 
       FIGS. 15-18  illustrate a detonation control module in which a light-producing diode activates an optically triggered diode to release a high-voltage pulse to trigger a detonator. Other ways of triggering a detonator are also possible. For example, a transformer can be used to magnetically couple a trigger input signal to activate a diode and allow a high-voltage capacitor to provide a high-voltage pulse to activate a detonator. Optocouplers, for example MOC3021, can also be used as a coupling mechanism. 
     A detonation system can include a plurality of detonation control modules spaced throughout the system to detonate different portions of explosives. 
     VI. Exemplary Methods of Use 
     The herein described systems are particularly suitable for use in fracturing an underground geologic formation where such fracturing is desired. One specific application is in fracturing rock along one or more sections of an underground bore hole to open up cracks or fractures in the rock to facilitate the collection of oil and gas trapped in the formation. 
     Thus, desirably a plurality of spaced apart explosive charges are positioned along a section of a bore hole about which rock is to be fractured. The explosive charges can be placed in containers such as tubes and plural tubes can be assembled together in an explosive assembly. Intermediate propellant charges can be placed between the explosive charges and between one or more assemblies of plural explosive charges to assist in the fracturing. The propellant charges can be placed in containers, such as tubes, and one or more assemblies of plural propellant charges can be positioned between the explosive charges or explosive charge assemblies. In addition, containers such as tubes of an inert material with a working liquid being a desirable example, can be placed intermediate to explosive charges or intermediate to explosive charge assemblies. This inert material can also be positioned intermediate to propellant charges and to such assemblies of propellant charges. The “working fluid” refers to a substantially non-compressible fluid such as water or brine, with saltwater being a specific example. The working fluid or liquid assists in delivering shockwave energy from propellant charges and explosive charges into the rock formation along the bore hole following initiation of combustion of the propellant charges and the explosion of the explosives. 
     In one specific approach, a string of explosive charge assemblies and propellant charge assemblies are arranged in end to end relationship along the section of a bore hole to be fractured. The number and spacing of the explosive charges and propellant charges, as well as intermediate inert material or working fluid containing tubes or containers, can be selected to enhance fracturing. 
     For example, a numerical/computational analysis approach using constituent models of the material forming the underground geologic formation adjacent to the bore hole section and of the explosive containing string can be used. These analysis approaches can use finite element modeling, finite difference methods modeling, or discrete element method modeling. In general, data is obtained on the underground geologic formation along the section of the bore hole to be fractured or along the entire bore hole. This data can be obtained any number of ways such as by analyzing core material obtained from the bore hole. This core material will indicate the location of layering as well as material transitions, such as from sandstone to shale. The bore hole logging and material tests on core samples from the bore hole, in the event they are performed, provide data on stratrigraphy and material properties of the geologic formation. X-ray and other mapping techniques can also be used to gather information concerning the underground geologic formation. In addition, extrapolation approaches can be used such as extrapolating from underground geologic formation information from bore holes drilled in a geologically similar (e.g., a nearby) geologic area. 
     Thus, using the finite element analysis method as a specific example, finite element modeling provides a predictive mechanism for studying highly complex, non-linear problems that involve solving, for example, mathematical equations such as partial differential equations. Existing computer programs are known for performing an analysis of geologic formations. One specific simulation approach can use a software program that is commercially available under the brand name ABAQUS, and more specifically, an available version of this code that implements a fully coupled Euler-Lagrange methodology. 
     This geologic data can be used to provide variables for populating material constitutive models within the finite element modeling code. The constitutive models are numerical representations of cause-and-effect for that particular material. That is, given a forcing function, say, pressure due to an explosive load, the constitutive model estimates the response of the material. For example, these models estimate the shear strain or cracking damage to the geologic material in response to applied pressure. There are a number of known constitutive models for geologic materials that can be used in finite element analysis to estimate the development of explosive-induced shock in the ground. These models can incorporate estimations of material damage and failure related directly to cracking and permeability. Similar constitutive models also exist for other materials such as an aluminum tube (if an explosive is enclosed in an aluminum tube) and working fluid such as brine. 
     In addition, equations of state (EOS) exist for explosive materials including for non-ideal explosives and propellants. In general, explosive EOS equations relate cause-and-effect of energy released by the explosive (and propellant if any) and the resulting volume expansion. When coupled to a geologic formation or medium, the expansion volume creates pressure that pushes into the medium and causes fracturing. 
     In view of the above, from the information obtained concerning the geologic material along the section of a bore hole to be fractured, a constitutive model of the material can be determined. One or more simulations of the response of this material model to an arrangement of explosive charges (and propellant charges if any, and working fluid containers, if any) can be determined. For example, a first of such simulations of the reaction of the material to explosive pressure from detonating explosive charges, pressure from one or more propellant charges, if any, and working fluids if any, can be performed. One or more additional simulations (for example plural additional simulations) with the explosive charges, propellant charges if any, and/or working fluids, if any, positioned at different locations or in different arrangements can then be performed. The simulations can also involve variations in propellants and explosives. The plural simulations of the reaction of the material to the various simulated explosive strings can then be evaluated. The simulation that results in desired fracturing, such as fracturing along a bore hole with spaced apart rubblization areas comprising radially extending discs, as shown in  FIG. 21 , can then be selected. The selected arrangement of explosive charges, propellant charges, if any, and working fluids, if any, can then be assembled and positioned along the section of the bore hole to be fractured. This assembly can then be detonated and the propellant charges, if any, initiated to produce the fractured geologic formation with desired rubblization zones. Thus, rubblization discs can be obtained at desired locations and extended radii beyond fracturing that occurs immediately near the bore hole. 
     The timing of detonation of explosives and initiation of combustion of various propellant charges can be independently controlled as described above in connection with an exemplary timing circuit. For example, the explosives and propellant initiation can occur simultaneously or the propellant charges being initiated prior to detonating the explosives. In addition, one or more explosive charges can be detonated prior to other explosive charges and one or more propellant charges can be initiated prior to other propellant charges or prior to the explosive charges, or at other desired time relationships. Thus, explosive charges can be independently timed for detonation or one or more groups of plural explosive charges can be detonated together. In addition, propellant charges can be independently timed for initiation or one or more groups of plural propellant charges can be initiated together. Desirably, initiation of the combustion propellant charges is designed to occur substantially along the entire length of, or along a majority of the length of, the propellant charge when elongated propellant charge, such as a tube, is used. With this approach, as the propellant charge burns, the resulting gases will extend radially outwardly from the propellant charges. For example, ceramic jet ejection initiators can be used for this purpose positioned at the respective ends of tubular propellant charges to eject hot ceramic material or other ignition material axially into the propellant charges. In one desirable approach, combustion of one or more propellant charges is initiated simultaneously at both ends of the charge or at a location adjacent to both ends of the charge. In addition, in one specific approach, assemblies comprising pairs of explosive charges are initiated from adjacent ends of explosive charges. 
     Desirably, the explosive charges are non-ideal explosive formulations such as previously described. In one specific desirable example, the charges release a total stored energy (e.g., chemically stored energy) equal to or greater than 12 kJ/cc and with greater than thirty percent of the energy released by the explosive being released in the following flow Taylor Wave of the detonated (chemically reacting) explosive charges. 
     In one approach, an assembly of alternating pairs of propellant containing tubes and explosive containing tubes, each tube being approximately three feet in length, was simulated. In the simulation, detonation of the explosives and simultaneous initiation of the propellant charges provided a simulated result of plural spaced apart rubblization discs extending radially outwardly beyond a fracture zone adjacent to and along the fractured section of the bore hole. 
     Desirably, the explosive charges are positioned in a spaced apart relationship to create a coalescing shock wave front extending radially outwardly from the bore hole at a location between the explosive charges to enhance to rock fracturing. 
     The system can be used without requiring the geologic modeling mentioned above. In addition, without modeling one can estimate the reaction of the material to an explosive assembly (which may or may not include propellant charges and working fluid containers) and adjust the explosive materials based on empirical observations although this would be less precise. Also, one can simply use strings of alternating paired explosive charge and paired propellant charge assemblies. In addition, the timing of detonation and propellant initiation can be empirically determined as well. For example, if the geologic material shows a transition between sandstone and shale, one can delay the sandstone formation detonation just slightly relative to the detonation of the explosive in the region of the shale to result in fracturing of the geologic formation along the interface between the sandstone and shale if desired. 
     Unique underground fractured geologic rock formations can be created using the methods disclosed herein. Thus, for example, the explosion and/or propellant gas created fracture structures (if propellants are used) can be created adjacent to a section of a previously drilled bore hole in the geologic rock formation or structure. The resulting fractured structure comprises a first zone of fractured material extending a first distance away from the location of the previously drilled bore hole. Typically this first zone extends a first distance from the bore hole and typically completely surrounds the previously existing bore hole (previously existing allows for the fact that the bore hole may collapse during the explosion). In addition, plural second zones of fractured material spaced apart from one another and extending radially outwardly from the previously existing bore hole are also created. The second fracture zones extend radially outwardly beyond the first fracture zone. Consequently, the radius from the bore hole to the outer periphery or boundary of the second fracture zones is much greater than the distance to the outer periphery or boundary of the first zone of fractured material from the bore hole. More specifically, the average furthest radially outward distance of the second fracture zones from the previously existing bore hole is much greater than the average radially outward distance of the fractured areas along the bore hole in the space between the spaced apart second zones. 
     More specifically, in one example the second fracture zones comprise a plurality of spaced apart rubblization discs of fractured geologic material. These discs extend outwardly to a greater radius than the radius of the first fracture zone. These discs can extend radially outwardly many times the distance of the first zones, such as six or more times as far. 
     By using non-ideal explosive formulations, less pulverization or powdering of rock adjacent to the previous existing bore hole results. Powdered pulverized rock can plug the desired fractures and interfere with the recovery of petroleum products (gas and oil) from such fracturing. The use of propellant charges and working fluid including working fluid in the bore hole outside of the explosive charges can assist in the reduction of this pulverization. 
     Specific exemplary approaches for implementing the methodology are described below. Any and all combinations and sub-combinations of these specific examples are within the scope of this disclosure. 
     Thus, in accordance with this disclosure, a plurality of spaced apart explosive charges can be positioned adjacent to one another along a section of the bore hole to be fractured. These adjacent explosive charges can be positioned in pairs of adjacent explosive charges with the explosive charges of each pair being arranged in an end to end relationship. The charges can be detonated together or at independent times. In one desirable approach, the charges are detonated such that detonation occurs at the end of the first of the pair of charges that is adjacent to the end of the second of the pair of charges that is also detonated. In yet another example, the detonation of the explosive charges only occurs at the respective adjacent ends of the pair of charges. Multiple pairs of these charges can be assembled in a string with or without propellant charges and working liquid containers positioned therebetween. Also, elongated propellant charges can be initiated from opposite ends of such propellant charges and can be assembled in plural propellant charge tubes. These propellant charge tube assemblies can be positioned intermediate to at least some of the explosive charges, or explosive charge assemblies. In accordance with another aspect of an example, pairs of explosive charges can be positioned as intercoupled charges in end to end relationships with a coupling therebetween. Pairs of propellant charges can be arranged in the same manner. 
     In an alternative embodiment, although expected to be less effective, a plurality of spaced apart propellant charges and assemblies of plural propellant charges can be initiated, with or without inert material containing tubes therebetween, with the explosive charges eliminated. In this case, the rubblization zones are expected to be less pronounced than rubblization zones produced with explosive charges, and with explosive charge and propellant charge combinations, with or without the inert material containers therebetween. 
     Other aspects of method acts and steps are found elsewhere in this disclosure. This disclosure encompasses all novel and non-obvious combinations and sub-combinations of method acts set forth herein. 
     VII. Exemplary Detonation Results 
       FIG. 19  shows exemplary shock patterns  500   a ,  500   b , and  500   c  resulting from detonation of an exemplary string  502  within a bore (not shown) in a geologic formation. The string  502  comprises a first HE system  504   a , a second HE system  504   b , and a third HE system  504   c , and two PP systems  506  positioned between the three HE systems. Each of the HE systems  504  is similar in construction and function to the exemplary HE system  200  shown in  FIGS. 12-14 , and comprises a pair of HE units and a connector. The PP systems  506  comprise a pair of PP units and three adjacent connectors. The HE system  504   a  is centered on a causes the shock pattern  500   a , the HE system  504   b  is centered on a causes the shock pattern  500   b , and the HE system  504   c  is centered on a causes the shock pattern  500   c.    
     Taking the HE unit  504   a  and its resulting shock pattern  500   a  as an example, each of the individual HE units  510 ,  512  causes nearly identical shock patterns  514 ,  516 , respectively, that are symmetrical about the connector  518  that joins the HE units. Note that the illustrated shock pattern in  FIG. 19  only shows a central portion of the resulting shock pattern from each HE system, and excludes portions of the shock pattern not between the centers of the two HE units. The portion of the shock pattern shown is of interest because the shocks from each of the two HE units interact with each other at a plane centered on the connector  518  between the two HE units, causing a significant synergistic shock pattern  520  that extends much further radially away from the bore and string compared to the individual shock patterns  514 ,  516  of each HE unit. 
     By spacing the HE charges appropriately there results a zone of interaction between the charges which leads to a longer effective radius of shock and rubblization. Spaced and timed charges can increase the effected radius by a factor of 3 to 4 when compared to a single large explosive detonation. Instead of a dominate fracture being created that extends in a planar manner from the wellbore, the disclosed system can result in an entire volume rubblization that surrounds the wellbore in a full 360 degrees. In addition, possible radial fracturing that extends beyond the rubblized zone can result. 
     The HE charges can separated by a distance determined by the properties of the explosive material and the surrounding geologic formation properties that allows for the development and interaction of release waves (i.e., unloading waves which occur behind the “front”) from the HE charges. A release wave has the effect of placing the volume of material into tension, and the coalescence of waves from adjacent charges enhances this tensile state. Consideration of the fact that rock fracture is favored in a state of tension, an exemplary multiple charge system can favors optimum rock fracture such that these fractures will remain open by self-propping due to asperities in the fracture surface. 
     Furthermore, the space between the HE charges includes PP systems. The PP systems cause additional stress state in the rock to enhance the effect of the main explosive charges. 
       FIG. 20  shows exemplary simulated results of a detonation as described herein. Two 2 meter long HE units, labeled  600  and  602 , are connected in a HE system with an intermediate connector, and have a center-to-center separation L 1  of 3.5 m. The HE system is detonated in a bore  604  in a theoretically uniform rock formation. The contours are rock fracture level, with zone  20  representing substantially full rock fracture and zone X showing no fracture or partial fracture. Expected damage regions directly opposite each charge are apparent, and these extend to about 3 meters radially from the bore  604 . However, the region of the symmetry between the two charges shows a “rubble disk”  606  that extends considerably further to a distance R 1 , e.g., about 10 m, from the bore into the geologic formation. This simulation illustrates the extent of improved permeability through rock fracture that can be accomplished by taking advantage of shock wave propagation effects and charge-on-charge release wave interaction. Also, it is anticipated that late-time formation relaxation will induce additional fracturing between rubble disks.  FIG. 20  is actually a slice through a 360° damage volume created about the axis of the charges. 
     In addition to the interaction between two adjacent charges, performance can be further improved by using an HE system with more than two HE units in series. For example,  FIG. 21  shows three rubble disks created by four separated HE units, A, B, C, D. As in  FIG. 20 ,  FIG. 21  shows a slice through a 360° rubble zone. 
     Additional considerations in the design of explosive stimulation systems, such as described herein, can include the material and configuration of the HE unit container (e.g., aluminum tube), the inclusion of propellant units within the string in the axial volume between the individual charges, and the introduction of brine or other borehole fluid to fill the annulus separating the explosive system and the host rock formation. The propellant has been shown to be effective in boosting and extending the duration of the higher rock stress state, consequently extending fracture extent. The HE unit container can be designed not simply to facilitate placement of the system into a wellbore but, along with the wellbore fluid, it can provide a means for mechanically coupling the blast energy to the surrounding rock. Moreover, coupling of the shock through the aluminum or similar material case avoids short-duration shock which can result in near-wellbore crushing of the rock, with accompanying diminishment of available energy available for the desired long-range tensile fracturing process. This coupling phenomenon is complementary to the energy release characteristics of the explosive as discussed elsewhere herein. 
     The disclosed systems and numerical simulations can include consideration of site geologic layering and other properties. The seismic impedance contrast between two material types can create additional release waves in the shock environment. For example, an interlayered stiff sandstone/soft shale site can be modeled. The resulting environment predicted for a hypothetical layered site subjected to a two-explosive stimulation is shown in  FIGS. 22A-22C . As in previous figures, these figures again show a slice through a 360° rubble zone. 
       FIGS. 22A-22C  do not show a final predicted state (i.e., not full extent of fracturing), but show a point in time chosen to be illustrative of the phenomenology related to geologic layering.  FIG. 22A  is a contour of rock stress, with high stress regions “a” and low stress regions “b”.  FIG. 22B  displays the volume of fractured material, with zone “c” referring to fully fractured rock and transitioning to zone “d” where the material is in incipient fracture state, and zone “e” where there is no fracture.  FIG. 22C  displays the same material volume as in  FIG. 22B , but material changes between sandstone in zone “g” and shale in zone “h” are shown.  FIGS. 22A-22C  illustrate that rubblization disks that can be produced in specific geologic locations with reference to the corresponding geologic layers by properly designed charge length and spacing based on known geologic properties. For example, in  FIG. 22C , a majority of the rubblization is confined to the shale regions “g” and away from the sandstone region “h”. 
     VIII. Exemplary Chemical Compositions 
     Chemical compositions disclosed herein are developed to optimize for cylinder energy. Such compositions are developed to provide different chemical environments as well as variation in temperature and pressure according to the desired properties, such as according to the specific properties of the geologic formation in which energy resources are to be extracted. 
     Compositions disclosed herein can include explosive material, also called an explosive. An explosive material is a reactive substance that contains a large amount of potential energy that can produce an explosion if released suddenly, usually accompanied by the production of light, heat, sound, and pressure. An explosive charge is a measured quantity of explosive material. This potential energy stored in an explosive material may be chemical energy, such as nitroglycerin or grain dust, pressurized gas, such as a gas cylinder or aerosol can. In some examples, compositions include high performance explosive materials. A high performance explosive is one which generates an explosive shock front which propagates through a material at supersonic speed, i.e. causing a detonation, in contrast to a low performance explosive which instead causes deflagration. In some examples, compositions include one or more insensitive explosives. Compositions disclosed herein can also include one or more propellants. In some examples, a propellant includes inert materials, such as brine, water, and mud, and/or energetic materials, such as explosive, combustible, and/or chemically reactive materials, or combinations thereof. 
     It is contemplated that a disclosed unit can include any explosive capable of creating a desired rubblization zones. Compositions which may be used in a disclosed unit are provided, but are not limited to, U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,376,083, 5,316,600, 6,997,996, 8,168,016, and 6,875,294 and USH1459 (United States Statutory Invention Registration, Jul. 4, 1995—High energy explosives). 
     In some examples, a composition includes a high-energy density explosive, such as comprising at least 8 kJ/cc, at least 10 kJ/cc, or at least 12 kJ/cc. In some examples, the explosive is a cast-cured formulation. In some examples, the explosive is a pressed powder (plastic bonded or otherwise), melt-cast, water gels/slurries and/or liquid. In some cases thermally stable explosives are included due to high-temperatures in certain geological formations. In some examples, non-nitrate/nitrate ester explosives (such as, AN, NG, PETN, ETN, EGDN) are used for these formulations, such as HMX, RDX, TATB, NQ, FOX-7, and/or DAAF. In some examples, explosive compositions include binder systems, such as binder systems substantially free of nitrate ester plasticizers. For example, suitable binder systems can include fluoropolymers, GAP, polybutadiene based rubbers or mixtures thereof. In some examples, explosive compositions include one or more oxidizers, such as those having the anions perchlorate, chlorate, nitrate, dinitramide, or nitroformate and cations, such as ammonium, methylammonium, hydrazinium, guanidinium, aminoguanidinium, diaminoguanidinium, triaminoguanidinium, Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Mg, Ca, Sr, and Ba can be blended with the explosive to help oxidize detonation products. These can be of particular utility with fuel-rich binders are used such as polybutadiene based systems. 
     In some examples, the disclosed chemical compositions are designed to yield an energy density being greater than or equal to 8, 10, or 12 kJ/cc at theoretical maximum density, the time scale of the energy release being in two periods of the detonation phase with a large amount, greater than 25%, such as greater than 30% to 40%, being in the Taylor expansion wave and the produced explosive being a high density cast-cured formulation. 
     In some examples, the disclosed chemical compositions include one or more propellants. Propellant charges can be produced from various compositions used commonly in the field, being cast-cured, melt-cast, pressed or liquid, and of the general families of single, double or triple base or composite propellants. For example, a disclosed propellant unit comprises one or more oxidizers such as those having the anions perchlorate, chlorate, nitrate, dinitramide, or nitroformate and cations such as ammonium, methylammonium, hydrazinium, guanidinium, aminoguanidinium, diaminoguanidinium, triaminoguanidinium, Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Mg, Ca, Sr, and Ba. A propellant unit can also comprise one or more binders, such as one or more commonly used by one of ordinary skill in the art, such as polybutadiene, polyurethanes, perfluoropolyethers, fluorocarbons, polybutadiene acrylonitrile, asphalt, polyethylene glycol, GAP, PGN, AMMO/BAMO, based systems with various functionally for curing such as hydroxyl, carboxyl, 1,2,3-triazole cross-linkages or epoxies. Additives, such as transistion metal salt, for burning rate modification can also be included within a propellant unit. In some examples, one or more high-energy explosive materials are included, such as those from the nitramine, nitrate ester, nitroaromatic, nitroalkane or furazan/furoxan families. In some examples, a propellant unit also includes metal/semimetal additives such as Al, Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, and/or Hf which can be present at various particle sizes and morphologies. 
     In some examples, chemical compositions include one or more high-performance explosives (for example, but not limited to HMX, TNAZ, RDX, or CL-20), one or more insensitive explosives (TATB, DAAF, NTO, LAX-112, or FOX-7), one or more metals/semimetals (including, but not limited to Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, Hf or Al) and one or more reactive cast-cured binders (such as glycidyl azide(GAP)/nitrate (PGN) polymers, polyethylene glycol, or perfluoropolyether derivatives with plasitisizers, such as GAP plastisizer, nitrate esters or liquid fluorocarbons). While Al is the primary metal of the disclosed compositions it is contemplated that it can be substituted with other similar metals/semimetals such as Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, and/or Hf. In some examples, Al is substituted with Si and/or B. Si is known to reduce the sensitivity of compositions compared to Al with nearly the same heat of combustion. It is contemplated that alloys and/or intermetallic mixtures of above metals/semimetals can also be utilized. It is further contemplated that particle sizes of the metal/semi-metal additives can range from 30 nm to 40 μm, such as from 34 nm to 40 μm, 100 nm to 30 μm, 1 μm to 40 μm, or 20 μm to 35 μm. In some examples, particle sizes of the metal/semi-metal additives are at least 30 nm, at least 40 nm, at least 50 nm, at least 100 nm, at least 150 nm, at least 200 nm, at least 300 nm, at least 400 nm, at least 500 nm, at least 600 nm, at least 700 nm, at least 800 nm, at least 900 nm, at least 1 μm, at least 5 μm, at least 10 μm, at least 20 μm, at least 30 μm, including 30 nm, 40 nm, 50 nm, 100 nm, 150 nm, 200 nm, 300 nm, 400 nm, 500 nm, 600 nm, 700 nm, 800 nm, 900 nm, 1 μm, 2 μm, 3 μm, 4 μm, 5 μm, 6 μm, 7 μm, 8 μm, 9 μm, 10 μm, 20 μm, 30 μm, 31 μm, 32 μm, 33 μm, 34 μm, 35 μm, 36 μm, 37 μm, 38 μm, 39 μm, or 40 μm. It is contemplated that the shape of particles may vary, such as atomized spheres, flakes or sponge morphologies. It is contemplated that the percent or combination of high-performance explosives, insensitive explosives, metals/semimetals and/or reactive cast-cured binders may vary depending upon the properties desired. 
     In some examples, a disclosed formulation includes about 50% to about 90% high-performance explosives, such as about 60% to about 80%, including 50%, 51%, 52%, 53%, 54%, 55%, 56%, 57%, 58%, 59%, 60%, 61%, 62%, 63%, 64%, 65%, 66%, 67%, 68%, 69%, 70%, 71%, 72%, 73%, 74%, 75%, 76%, 77%, 78%, 79%, 80%, 81%, 82%, 83%, 84%, 85%, 86%, 87%, 88%, 89%, or 90% high-performance explosives; about 0% to about 30% insensitive explosives, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% insensitive explosives; about 5% to about 30% metals or semimetals, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% metals/semimetals; and about 5% to about 30% reactive cast-cured binders, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% reactive cast-cured binders. 
     In some examples, a disclosed formulation includes about 50% to about 90% HMX, TNAZ, RDX and/or CL-20, such as about 60% to about 80%, including 50%, 51%, 52%, 53%, 54%, 55%, 56%, 57%, 58%, 59%, 60%, 61%, 62%, 63%, 64%, 65%, 66%, 67%, 68%, 69%, 70%, 71%, 72%, 73%, 74%, 75%, 76%, 77%, 78%, 79%, 80%, 81%, 82%, 83%, 84%, 85%, 86%, 87%, 88%, 89%, or 90% HMX, TNAZ, RDX and/or CL-20; about 0% to about 30% TATB, DAAF, NTO, LAX-112, and/or FOX-7, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% TATB, DAAF, NTO, LAX-112, and/or FOX-7; about 5% to about 30% Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, Hf and/or Al, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, Hf and/or Al; and about 5% to about 30% glycidyl azide(GAP)/nitrate (PGN) polymers, polyethylene glycol, and perfluoropolyether derivatives with plasitisizers, such as GAP plastisizer, nitrate esters or liquid fluorocarbons, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% glycidyl azide(GAP)/nitrate (PGN) polymers, polyethylene glycol, and perfluoropolyether derivatives with plasitisizers, such as GAP plastisizer, nitrate esters or liquid fluorocarbons. 
     In some examples, a disclosed formulation includes about 50% to about 90% HMX, such as about 60% to about 80%, including 50%, 51%, 52%, 53%, 54%, 55%, 56%, 57%, 58%, 59%, 60%, 61%, 62%, 63%, 64%, 65%, 66%, 67%, 68%, 69%, 70%, 71%, 72%, 73%, 74%, 75%, 76%, 77%, 78%, 79%, 80%, 81%, 82%, 83%, 84%, 85%, 86%, 87%, 88%, 89%, or 90% HMX; about 0% to about 30% Al, such as about 10% to about 20%, including 0%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 21%, 22%, 23%, 24%, 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, or 30% Al (with a particle size ranging from 30 nm to 40 μm, such as from 34 nm to 40 μm, 100 nm to 30 μm, 1 μm to 40 μm, or 20 μm to 35 μm. In some examples, particle sizes of the metal/semi-metal additives are at least 30 nm, at least 40 nm, at least 50 nm, at least 100 nm, at least 150 nm, at least 200 nm, at least 300 nm, at least 400 nm, at least 500 nm, at least 600 nm, at least 700 nm, at least 800 nm, at least 900 nm, at least 1 μm, at least 5 μm, at least 10 μm, at least 20 μm, at least 30 μm, including 30 nm, 40 nm, 50 nm, 100 nm, 150 nm, 200 nm, 300 nm, 400 nm, 500 nm, 600 nm, 700 nm, 800 nm, 900 nm, 1 μm, 2 μm, 3 μm, 4 μm, 5 μm, 6 μm, 7 μm, 8 μm, 9 μm, 10 μm, 11 μm, 12 μm, 13 μm, 14 μm, 15 μm, 16 μm, 17 μm, 18 μm, 19 μm, 20 μm, 30 μm, 31 μm, 32 μm, 33 μm, 34 μm, 35 μm, 36 μm, 37 μm, 38 μm, 39 μm, or 40 μm); about 5% to about 15% glycidal azide polymer, such as about 7.5% to about 10%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, or 15% glycidal azide polymer; about 5% to about 15% Fomblin Fluorolink D, such as about 7.5% to about 10%, including 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14%, or 15% Fomblin Fluorolink D; and about 0% to about 5% methylene diphenyl diisocyanate, such as about 2% to about 4%, including 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, or 5% methylene diphenyl diisocyanate. 
     In some examples, a disclosed composition includes at least a highly non-ideal HE is defined as an HE in which 30% to 40% or more of the meta-stably stored chemical energy is converted to HE hot products gases after the detonation front (shock front) in a deflagrating Taylor wave. In some examples, a disclosed composition does not include an ideal HE. 
     In some examples, a disclosed composition, such as a composition optimized for performance and thermal stability includes HMX, fluoropolymer and/or an energetic polymer (e.g., GAP) and Al. In some examples, other optimized formulations for performance and thermal stability can replace HMX with RDX for reduced cost mixture that also contains a fluoropolymer and/or energetic polymer (e.g., GAP) and Al. 
     In some examples, a disclosed composition includes 69% HMX, 15% 3.5 μm atomized Al, 7.5% glycidal azide polymer, 7.5% Fomblin Fluorolink D and 1% methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (having an mechanical energy of 12.5 kJ/cc at TMD). 
     In some examples, an inert surrogate is substituted for Al. In some examples, lithium fluoride (LiF) is one such material that may be substituted in certain formulations as an inert surrogate for Al. Other compounds which have a similar density, molecular weight and very low heat of formation so that it can be considered inert even in extreme circumstances may be substituted for Al. It is contemplated that the percentage of Al to the inert surrogate may range from about 10% Al to about 90% inert surrogate to about 90% Al and 10% inert surrogate. Such compositions may be used to develop models for metal reactions that extend beyond the current temperature and pressures in existing models. 
     IX. Detonation Command and Control System 
     The detonation of the explosives, as previously described, can be accomplished using any suitable detonation system or control. As previously mentioned, detonation includes deflagration and also includes initiation of propellant charges if present. In the examples where a capacitor is charged and then discharged to set off a detonator or to initiate a propellant initiator, a high voltage source is typically used to provide this charge. In addition, a fire control signal can be provided to a switch operable to discharge the capacitor to a detonator or intiator to cause detonation of the explosive. Similarly, the fire control signal can control the initiation of combustion of propellant charges. Detonators and propellant combustion initiators, if propellant charges are being used, can be used to respectively detonate explosive charges and initiate propellant combustion. As explained above, the explosive charges and propellant combustion initiation of any one or more detonators and initiators (e.g., plural detonators and initiators) can be controlled to respond to the fire control signal at the same or different times. Although a wide variety of alternative detonation control systems can be used, an exemplary system is described below. In addition, the references to firing or detonating explosives in the discussion below applies equally to initiating the combustion of propellant charges if being used with the explosives. The exemplary system can be used both in the context of detonating explosives for experiments and field testing, such as to determine and evaluate the results of explosions from various explosive charge designs, as well as in commercial applications, such as detonating charges in an underground bore or otherwise positioned underground to fracture rock for petroleum recovery purposes. One such system can be denoted by the phrase “high fidelity mobile detonation physics laboratory” (or by the acronym HFMDPL). The term “laboratory” is used to indicate that the system can be used for detonation of explosives for experimental and evaluation purposes, but the system is not limited to laboratory or experimental use. Thus, the use of the acronym HFMDPL connotates a system that is not limited to experimental applications and any references in the discussion below to experimental applications is simply by way of example. 
     An exemplary HFMDPL is suitable for applications such as conducting heavily diagnosed high-fidelity detonation testing in remote areas in a highly controlled manner and operates to enhance safety, security and successful test execution. In some examples, this facility is mobile and can be utilized to execute small-scale and large-scale heavily diagnosed HE (high explosive) testing as dictated by project requirements. A desirable form of HFMDPL can be used to accomplish firing or detonation of complex studies (for example, multiple explosive charges) at multiple different remote locations. Safety and security controls can be integrated into the system along with high-fidelity diagnostic and data acquisition capabilities. The HFMDPL can be used to develop/optimize explosive compositions that enhance permeability systems (rock fracturing) that are specific for a particular geologic formation, thereby allowing energy resources (e.g., oil from fracking) to be more effectively obtained. 
     Many security requirements are set by existing governmental regulations applicable to detonation testing, for example, requirements for HE handling, safety, security and test execution. Several additional requirements can also apply that are specific to the nature of HE system characterization testing, mine-scale test, and the field-scale testing. The primary components of the HFMDPL comprise a command center and an instrument center that are separated by one another during use. Communication between the command center and instrumentation center is typically accomplished wirelessly, such as by a strongly encrypted high-speed wireless link. A quality assured integrated control system and multiple high-fidelity diagnostic systems can be integrated into the command and control system. 
     In one example, the HFMDPL comprises two mobile vehicles, such as two trailers, a command center trailer and an instrument center trailer, that are specifically designed and created as a portable facility structure for use in conducting heavily diagnosed high-fidelity detonation testing or commercial explosions, such as for rock fracturing, in remote areas in a highly controlled manner. These vehicle systems can be utilized for conducting firing site and field-scale HE testing. 
     The HFMDPL also desirably includes a fire set and control system (FSCS). The FSCS can include or be coupled to high voltage detonators, such as several separately timed high voltage detonator systems with a single or common timing firing circuit (which can allow for independent timing control of the detonation of explosive charges and the initiation of combustion of propellant charges) and verification feedback. The HFMDPL can also include personnel safety and security system features, such as one or more interlocks that preclude detonation if not in appropriate status. This system thus can have interlocked access control for HE handling, dry runs and test execution. The system also can include video surveillance of primary control points and test execution. A standardized diagnostics control can also be integrated into the FSCS. These diagnostic systems are conventional and can be utilized to measure physical behavior during detonation events. These data sets can be used for numerical simulation tools, and for verification of test results. 
     The command and control system can also receive inputs from a plurality of instruments, e.g., instruments 1 through N with N being an arbitrary number corresponding to the number of separate data producing instruments that are used. These instruments can be considered to be a part of the system or more typically separate therefrom even though coupled thereto. The instruments can, for example, include camera systems (such as a fast framing [(FF)] camera and Mega Sun Xenon Lighting System used in diagnostics); x-ray systems; a photon Doppler velocimetry (PDV) system; accelerometers; in situ acoustical instrument instruments such as can be used for measuring damage/rubblization, in situ stress measurement instruments, such as strain-gauges, various time-of-arrival (ToA) measurement systems; as well as other instruments. The camera and lighting systems can use visible wavelengths to produce high-fidelity snapshots in time of material positions (surfaces and fragments), which assists with the analysis of shock and rarefaction waves that have been produced due to an explosion. The PDV instrument system (such as a PDV system with 8 points as is commercially available from NSTech) can be used to produce high-fidelity point measurements of shock and particle motion at a surface, and assists with the analysis of shock and rarefaction waves at the surface under interrogation. An x-ray system (such as a dual head 450 keV x-ray system with controller, scanner and cables) can use x-ray wavelengths to, for example, produce high-fidelity snapshots in time of material positions (surfaces and fragments) through an array of materials (depending on attenuation). These data sets can be used for the analysis of shock and rarefaction waves that have been produced within a system in response to an explosion. Also, a diagnostics control can be integrated into the instrumentation center of the system to facilitate the integration of custom diagnostics into each test as dictated by project requirements. Also, data processing can be accomplished by this system, such as by a computer at the control center that can use commercially available analysis software to analyze the data captured by instruments at the instrumentation center in response to shock waves. 
     The command and control center can also send instrument control signals, for example from an instrumentation center of the system at instrumentation outputs thereof (which can be discrete or comprise input/outputs for sending and receiving data from instruments). Thus, a plurality of instrumentation outputs, can be provided with each, for example, being provided for coupling to a respective associated instrument for sending instrument control signals to control the associated instrument. 
     The HFMDPL also can comprise at least one computing hardware apparatus at the command center, such as explained below. Further, the instrumentation center of the HFMDPL can also include a processor, such as a National Instruments FPGA-based controller systems for controlling the data flow and detonation control signals. The command center can also include one or more oscilloscopes (such as commercially available from Textronix) for diagnostic measurements. 
     The exemplary HFMDPL described below, can be used to execute small-scale high explosives (HE) characterization testing, HE system testing, and the Mine- and Field-scale tests, as well as controlling commercial explosion detonations, such as in connection with explosive underground fracking. 
     In some examples, the HFMDPL is used to characterize specific high energy density non-ideal class 1.1 HE formulations. For example, the HFMDPL can be used for shock front characterization, characterization of the reacting plume of products gases behind the shock front, and the verification of HE manufacturer specifications. The HFMDPL can also be used for characterization of specific HE system configurations. For example, the HFMDPL can be used to characterize systems containing HE, Aluminum and brine (or liquid propellant); and the characterization and validation of self-contained high-voltage detonation systems (detonation planes) [see  FIGS. 26A and 26B ]; and/or characterization and validation of combined HE-propellant systems. 
     Mine-scale testing can use conventional diagnostics to analyze data generated from a test explosion to substantially characterize the effects of an HE system within a complex geologic formation without the effects of surface boundary conditions, and to validate/update the associated numerical simulation capabilities required to design such studies. The mine-scale can be used to effectively separate complex issues/developments associated with HE system design and performance from the complex wellbore engineering issues/developments which can utilize these HE system designs once perfected. In some examples, a mine-scale test can include the following: specific diagnostic sets for characterizing HE System functionality and wave interaction characterization within the formation; acoustic techniques for dynamically assessing damage in the formation; postmortem diagnostics for validating this in situ fracturing technique; and seismic and/or micro-seismic diagnostics. The mine-scale test can be designed and used to demonstrate/validate all functions required for executing field-scale HE testing and/or commercial scale fracking for the particular geologic formation. The knowledge gained from the mine-scale test can then be used to update/correct identified flaws in the integrated set of functions required for executing field-scale HE testing. The perfected/validated HE system can be transitioned to a field-scale (down-hole) study. The HFMDPL can then be used for integrating a HE system into an engineered wellbore environment thereby allowing in situ fracturing in a wellbore(s). 
     The HFMDPL in a desirable form can utilize an HE system to liberate energy resources locked in low permeability geological formations to be released by creating new fracture networks and remobilizing existing fractures while not requiring the underground injection of millions of gallons of water or other chemical additives or proppants associated with the conventional hydraulic fracturing. Further, the disclosed HFMDPL can be used to design systems with charges tailored to specific soil profiles thereby directing the force of the explosion outward, away from the wellbore itself and thereby liberating the desired energy resource. 
     With reference to  FIG. 27 , an exemplary command and control system  800  is illustrated. The command and control system comprises an instrumentation center  802  which desirably is mobile and comprises a vehicle such as a trailer having sets of wheels  804 ,  806 . The trailer desirably houses various instrumentation control and monitoring apparatus as well as other components, such as described below. The illustrated trailer  802  has a door  808  with a latch  810  that can comprise an interlock operable to send a signal to computing hardware within the trailer to indicate whether the door  808  is latched. The trailer  802  is shown spaced by a distance D 2  from an area  810  where an explosive is to be detonated. The illustrated blast area  810  is shown surrounded by a fence  812  with an access point, such as a gate  814  in one section of the fence. Other access points can be provided as well. The gate  814  comprises a latch  816  and an interlock such as at the latch on the gate provides a signal from the gate to the instrumentation trailer, such as via wireless communication or hardwire connections, to indicate whether the gate is closed. Various instruments can be positioned in the blast area for use in evaluating the blast or explosion. Depending upon the instrument, they can be coupled to computing hardware in the trailer  802 , such as by hardwire connections or wireless communications, to provide information to the instrumentation center, such as status signals in some cases (e.g., that the instrument has been set with appropriate settings and is operational) and data signals corresponding to data collected by the instruments, such as data resulting from a blast or explosion. 
     The command and control system  800  also comprises a command center  820  which is desirably mobile and can comprise a vehicle. In  FIG. 27 , the command vehicle is shown as a trailer with wheels  822 ,  824  for use in moving the trailer from one location to another. The wheels  804 ,  806 ,  822 , and  824  can be permanently affixed (via respective axles) to their respective trailers or detachable and used only during movement of the trailers from one blast location to another. The mobility of the command center  820  and instrumentation center  802  allows the command and control system to be readily transported from one blast site to another. In  FIG. 27 , the command center  820  is shown spaced a distance D 1  from the instrumentation center  802 . The instrumentation center  802  can be placed relatively close to the blast site  810  whereas the command center is typically placed much further away from the blast center, such as miles away from the blast center. Thus, the distance of the command center  820  to the blast area is desirably greater than the distance from the instrumentation center  802  to the blast area. The command center is shown with a door  822  that can also be provided with an interlock, if desired. However, this is less important since the command center is typically positioned very far away from the blast site. 
       FIG. 28  is a schematic illustration of an exemplary instrumentation vehicle or instrumentation center  802  and an exemplary command vehicle or command center  820 . In general, in one embodiment, the command vehicle comprises a plurality of detonation control devices that must each produce a detonation authorization signal before the instrumentation trailer can command the occurrence of a detonation. In  FIG. 28 , one such control device can comprise a key control  840 . The key control  840  is actuated by manually turning a key to shift a switch from an off or no fire position to a firing authorized position resulting in the generation of a first fire authorization signal at an output  842  of the key control. In addition, a second switch, such as a dead man switch indicated by DMS control  844  in  FIG. 28 , can also be provided. The dead man switch can be a manually actuated switch, such as a pedal controlled switch that, when shifted and held in a firing authorization position, causes another (e.g., a second) fire authorization signal to be provided at an output  845  of the DMS control. The command center  820  can also comprise command computing hardware  846 , such as a programmed computer  847 , configured by programming instructions, an example of which is set forth below, for controlling the operation of the command center to send signals to the instrumentation center resulting in the firing of one or more explosive charges and/or initiation of one or more propellant charges in response to a fire control signal from the instrumentation center as described below. The command center computing hardware, such as the illustrated computer  847 , can run an interface program to interface with the instrumentation center and more specifically with fire set and control system computing hardware (FSCS computing hardware)  900  of the instrumentation center. The command center computing hardware can comprise at least one input/output  848  from which signals can be sent and received. The input/output can comprise one or more discrete inputs and plural outputs. 
     As explained below, the computing hardware  846  can comprise a display  850 . The display can display a representation, for example a visual representation in iconic form, of various instruments and interlocks coupled to the instrument center, as well as any instruments and interlocked devices connected or coupled directly to the command center. In addition, a textual description of the instrument can also be displayed along with the icon, if any. Also, the status of the instruments and interlocks (e.g., whether the instruments are operational, whether a door or gate is open or closed, etc.) can be displayed on display  850 . In addition, the command center computing hardware can be configured to display a computer implemented switch on display  850  together with the status of the key control and DMS control. These displays can be on a single common screen so that an operator in the command center can readily determine if the command and control system is in a position to cause detonation of the explosives. 
     A communications network, which can be a wired network, but in one form is desirably a wireless communications network, is shown at  860 . Communications network  860  can comprise a transmitter/receiver (transceiver)  870  at the command center and a complimentary transmitter/receiver (transceiver)  872  at the instrumentation center. The communications network facilitates the transmission of data and other signals between the command and instrument centers. The communications network can be an extremely secure network, for example a highly encrypted network, to provide enhanced security over the detonation of explosives. Thus, signals corresponding to the first, second and third detonation authorization signals (corresponding to the key control  840  being placed in its fire authorization position, the DMS control  844  being placed and held in its fire authorization position, and the switch of computer  846  being placed in its fire authorization signal) can be communicated from the wireless transmitter receiver  870  to the transmitter receiver  872  of the instrumentation unit. In this disclosure, the term “corresponding” with reference to signals means that one signal is the same as or derived from or a modification of another signal, such as by signal shaping, filtering and/or other processing. In addition, signals sent or transmitted in response to another signal also can constitute a corresponding signal. A corresponding signal in general conveys or represents information content from the signal to which it corresponds. 
     The instrumentation center  802  in the illustrated  FIG. 28  embodiment comprises a key monitor  890 . The monitor can be software implemented and part of the computing hardware at the instrumentation center. The key monitor can operate to monitor input signals on a line  892  from transceiver  872  to determine whether the status of the key control  840  at the command center has been shifted to a position at which the first fire authorization signal has been generated. Thus, the key monitor is looking for a status update corresponding to the positioning of the key control. In addition, a DMS monitor  893 , which also can be software implemented or comprise a portion of the computing hardware at the instrumentation center, is provided and can operate to monitor signals on line  892  indicating the status of the DMS control  844  output. The DMS monitor  893  determines whether the DMS control has been shifted to provide a second fire authorization signal corresponding to the second switch being in the fire authorized position. The illustrated DMS monitor  893  can comprise an input  894  for receiving signals from line  892  corresponding to the status of the DMS control  844 . The key monitor also can comprise an input  891  for receiving signals corresponding to the status of the key control  840 . 
     Fire set and control system (FSCS) computing hardware  900  is also included in the illustrated instrumentation center  802 . The FSCS computing hardware  900  can be a computer like computer  847  as well as other forms of computing hardware, such as an FPGA circuit configured to carry out the functions described below. The FSCS computing hardware comprises an input/output  902  coupled to the line  892  to send signals to and receive signals from the transceiver  872 . The input/output  902  can comprise one or more discrete inputs and outputs. The FSCS computing hardware receives the fire authorization signals corresponding to the position of a software implemented switch, if used, at the command center, and signals indicating the key control and DMS control are in their fire authorization positions as determined by the key monitor  890  and DMS monitor  893  and thus can determine whether all three switches are in their fire authorized firing positions. 
     In addition, the FSCS computing hardware  900  can comprise a plurality of inputs collectively indicated at  904  for receiving signals corresponding to data collected by instruments, interlock related signals and instrument status signals. These inputs can comprise input/outputs and/or discrete outputs at which instrument control signals (e.g., to set operational conditions for the instruments) can be sent from the instrumentation center to respective associated instruments associated with the respective outputs. 
     The FSCS computing hardware is not limited to only processing these signals. 
     In the illustrated embodiment, a plurality of instruments for monitoring explosions in a blast zone  810  are provided. In  FIG. 28 , instruments 1-N are respectively each indicated by an associated block outside of the instrumentation center. It should be understood that, depending upon the instrument, it can be located within or on the instrumentation center structure. In addition, a block is shown in  FIG. 28  labeled interlocks I-N. Typically at least one such interlock is included, and more typically a plurality of discrete interlocks. Hence the figure shows 1-N interlocks. The letter N refers to an arbitrary number as any number of instruments and interlocks can be used. Although more than one instrument can be connected to an instrumentation input at the instrumentation center, in the illustrated embodiment, each instrument is shown with an associated input with all of these inputs indicated collectively by the number  906  in  FIG. 28 . For convenience, the interlocks are shown connected by a common input  908  to the instrumentation center, it being understood that a plurality of interlock inputs would more typically be used with one such input being coupled to each interlock. The inputs  906  and  908  are coupled to the FSCS computing hardware. In this example, these inputs are coupled to respective inputs of an interrupt manager  910  that can comprise a portion of the FSCS computing hardware. The interrupt manager, if used, can for example comprise a field programmable gate array (FPGA) circuit, programmed or configured to carry out the functions described below. 
     In general, the interrupt manager polls the instruments and interlocks to confirm whether the instruments are in their desired operational status (e.g., settings initialized, instruments adequately powered, set up to respond, responds to test signals) and whether the interlocks are in their desired condition or state for firing of an explosive in the blast zone  810 . The interrupt manager can also send programming signals, in the case of programmable instruments, to for example, set parameters for the instruments that place them in their desired operational state. In addition, in the case of remotely controllable interlocks, the interrupt manager can send interlock control signals via input/output  908  to the associated one or more interlocks to, for example, position the interlocks in the desired state (e.g., remotely close a gate and lock it). In addition, upon the occurrence of an explosion in the blast zone, or at other times that data is desired to be collected (e.g., temperature data in a wellbore), instrument data signals corresponding to data such as data gathered as a result of the blasts can be communicated from the respective instruments via inputs  906  to the interrupt manager with signals corresponding to these data signals passed via inputs  904  to, for example, a computer of the FSCS computing hardware. The data can be processed at the FSCS computing hardware or transmitted elsewhere, such as to the command center or to another location for analysis and processing. 
     Assuming the conditions are right for firing (e.g., all of the fire authorization signals are received from the fire authorization switches at the command center, all of the desired instruments are in an acceptable status to collect data upon firing and the interlocks are in their desired state for firing), a fire control signal output from the FSCS computing hardware is delivered via a line  920  (for example along an electrical conductor or wire) to a charge controller  922 . In response, the charge controller causes the detonation of a detonator  924  and/or the initiation of an initiator for a propellant charge in response to the fire control signal and causes the explosive  926  to detonate (or propellant charge to initiate if  926  is a propellant charge). In examples wherein a capacitive discharge system is utilized for detonating the detonator  924 , the FSCS computing hardware can also provide a charging control signal along line  920  to cause a high voltage source coupled to charging circuit  922  to charge a capacitor in the circuit  922  to a level such that, when firing is authorized, the capacitor discharges into the detonator  924  (or initiator if this component is an initiator) causing the detonation/initiation. Also, in this specific example, a drain capacitor  928  is shown for selective coupling to the capacitor of circuit  922  to drain the charge from the capacitor if firing does not occur within a predetermined time after the fire control signal, or if a system is to be placed in a safe mode. The fire set and control system computing hardware can generate an appropriate signal along line  920  to cause the discharge of the capacitor to place the system in a safe mode. Thus, if the detonator/initiator is of a type that is detonated/initiated in response to the discharge of a capacitive discharge unit (CDU), the instrumentation unit can provide a CDU discharge control signal to cause the discharge of the CDU to ground potential in the event any one or more of the plural instruments and at least one interlock are not in their authorized to fire status. The discharge control signal can also be sent if the fire authorization signals are absent, or change from a fire authorized to a non-fire authorized status. 
     It should be understood that various approaches for configuring the computing hardware of the command center and instrumentation center can be used to implement the command and control system. Specific examples of configuration logic, which can be implemented as programming instructions for a computer, are described below. It is to be understood that the disclosure is not limited to these examples. 
     With reference to  FIG. 29 , a flow chart for one exemplary approach for communicating the status of the DMS control (or dead man switch)  844  and key control (or key control switch)  840  from the command center to the instrumentation center is described. Alternatively, other switches can be monitored. In addition, this flow chart also illustrates an approach for monitoring the functioning of the communications link at the command vehicle side of the command and control system. 
     In the examples that follow, dashed lines indicate a communication link, for example an Ethernet connection, established via the communications network  860 . In the illustrations, the reference to “Monitor” refers to the instrumentation center side of the command and control system, in addition, the word “Control” refers to the command center side of the command and control system. 
     The process of  FIG. 29  starts at a block  940  referencing establishing a connection between the command center and instrumentation center via the communications network  860 . From block  940 , a block  942  is reached at which a randomly generated string of data (e.g., a test data packet) is sent from the control center  820  to the instrumentation center  820 . At block  944  the control center reads a responsive string of data (e.g., a responsive test data packet) from the instrumentation center with these test strings being compared at block  946 . If the test strings differ, for example, the responsive test packet is not what was expected, an error in the functioning of the communications link  860  is indicated (the link can be deemed inoperative while such error exists). In the case of a difference, a branch  948  is followed back to block  940  and testing of the communication link continues. Also, if the return string of data is not received from the instrumentation center by the command center within a desired time, which can be predetermined, and can be a range of times, a determination is made at block  946  that the connection has been lost (the link can be deemed inoperative while the connection is lost). In this case line  948  is also followed back to block  940 . Thus, the portion of the flowchart just described, indicated generally at  950 , evaluates the functioning of the communication network from the command center side of the system. If the communication network is not functioning, (deemed inoperative), in this exemplary embodiment the explosives will not be detonated. 
     If at block  946  the test data packet and responsive test data packet match as expected and a responsive test data packet was returned before a time out, then a block  952  is reached. At block  952  a determination is made as to whether the status is changed. More specifically, this block can alternatively comprise separate blocks, at which a check is made for any changes in the status of the key control  840 , the DMS control  844  or the computer implemented switch, if any, implemented by the command computing hardware  846 . In addition, in one embodiment the command computing system software can be placed in a test mode during which an explosion is blocked. The change in this status to the test mode can be checked at block  952 . If the status hasn&#39;t changed at block  952 , a line  954  is followed back to block  942  and the process of monitoring the communications link and looking for status changes continues. If a status change has been determined at block  952 , a block  956  is reached and the new status of the component having a changed status is transmitted to the instrumentation side  802  of the command and control system. At block  958  a check is made as to whether the new status has been received by the instrumentation control side of the system. For example, the instrumentation side  802  can send a signal back to the command side  820  confirming the receipt of the status change. If at block  958  the answer is no, a line  960  is followed back to block  956 . On the other hand, if the answer at block  958  is yes, a status change has been updated and a line  996  is followed back to block  940  with the process continuing. 
     In one embodiment, the command and control system requires each of the detonation authorization signals to be in a detonation authorized state (the status of all such items to be in the authorized firing state) as a precondition to the provision of a fire control signal to an explosive detonator. Also, the system desirably continuously or periodically looks for these status changes. 
       FIG. 30  illustrates an exemplary configuration software or flowchart for the instrumentation center side  802  of the command and control center relating to monitoring the functioning of the communication system from the instrumentation side and also relating to status updating. This sub-process starts at a block  1000 , at which the instrumentation center attempts to connect to the command center of the system via the communications network  860 . At block  1002  reached from block  1000 , a determination is made as to whether the connection has failed. If the answer is yes, a block  1004  is reached at which a determination is made whether attempts have been made for longer than a timeout period, such as three seconds. If the answer is no at block  1004 , a line  1006  is followed to a line  1008  and back to block  1000  with attempted connection continuing. If attempts have been made for more than the timeout period, a set status to false block  1010  is reached. At this block one or both of the dead man switch or key control switch outputs are deemed to be in the not authorized to fire state. As a result, no fire control signal will be delivered to the detonator(s) of the explosives under these conditions where communication from the instrumentation side to the command side of the system is determined by the instrumentation center to be lost (the communication link can be deemed inoperative in such a case). 
     If at block  1002  the connection has succeeded (not failed), a line  1012  is followed to a block  1014  and a data string (e.g., a test data packet) is read from the control side of the system. At block  1016 , reached from block  1014 , a determination is made as to whether a timeout has been reached. If the timeout is reached, then the data string (e.g., a test data packet) has not been received within a desired time. In this case, a yes branch  1017  is followed from block  1016  back to block  1000  and the process continues. If the data string is received before the timeout time is reached, a block  1018  is reached. Another block, not shown, can be placed between blocks  1016  and  1018  as an option to determine whether a data string match has been achieved, and, if not, the line  1018  can be followed back to block  1000 . At block  1018  a determination is made as to whether a new status has been received. Block  1018  can be a plurality of blocks, for example, one being associated with or monitoring the status of each of the switches at the command center side of the system. If the answer is no at block  1018 , a line  1020  returns the process back to block  1014 . If the answer at block  1018  is yes, at least one of the switches has received a new status (e.g., shifted from a no fire status to a fire authorized status). In this case, the status is updated at block  1022 . The process then continues via line  1020  to the block  1014 . Thus, the flowchart of  FIG. 30  illustrates a method of both verifying the communication system is functioning from the instrumentation side of the command and control system. This flowchart also illustrates a method of updating the status of the plurality of fire authorization switches at the command center that in a desirable embodiment must be actuated to a fire authorized state, before the instrumentation center will send a fire control signal to cause detonation of explosive charges. 
     The configuration of exemplary FSCS computing hardware can also comprise plural processes which can run in parallel. One such process can address communication within the logic, such as software logic operated at an FSCS computer. Another such process can deal with communication with physical (e.g., electrical) signals, such as from interlocks and instruments. 
     An exemplary software communication process for the FSCS computing hardware (which again can be implemented in hardware other than a programmed general purpose computer, such as in a programmable chip) is shown in  FIG. 31 . The process of  FIG. 31  begins at a block  1024  at which a connection is made between the FSCS computing hardware  900  and the FSCS interface software running on computer  847  of the command center. At a block  1026 , reached from block  1024 , a data string (e.g., a test data packet) is read from the command center. At block  1028  a determination is made as to whether a timeout has been reached before the test data string has been received. If the answer is yes, at a block  1030  the signal connection via the communications network  860  is deemed lost (the communication link can be deemed to be inoperative upon determining that communication is lost) and used by the logic flowchart of  FIG. 32  as explained below. In block  1030 , the “2nd process” refers to the process dealing with processing electrical or physical signals from external sources, an example of which is explained below in connection with  FIG. 32 . From block  1030 , the process returns to block  1024  and continues. If the timeout is not reached at block  1028 , a block  1034  is reached at which a determination is made as to whether any required settings have been received from the command center. Such settings can be entered by a data entry device into the FSCS interface software of the computer  847  at the illustrated command center. These settings can include attributes such as the timing of any countdown to firing, the identification of interlocks and instruments, as well as their settings and required status to be met before an explosive is detonated. If any new settings are received, a block  1036  is reached and the settings in the 2nd process ( FIG. 32 ) are updated. At a block  1038  reached from block  1036 , a determination is made as to whether the 2nd process of  FIG. 32  should be started. If the answer is yes, the 2nd process is started as indicated by a block  1040 . If the answer at block  1038  is no (the 2 nd  process does not need to be started), a block  1042  is reached via a line  1044 . Line  1044  also connects block  1040  to block  1042 . At block  1042 , the software at the instrumentation center side  802  acknowledges the receipt of the data string (data packet) from the command center side  802  and returns the data string (test data packet) to the command center where it can be checked at the command center for correspondence. From block  1042 , a block  1045  is reached at which updated status information is sent from the instrumentation side to the FSCS interface software of the computer  847 . This status information can comprise the state of interlocks (e.g., doors and gates are closed) and the status of instruments (e.g., they are operational and set with the appropriate settings to collect data upon the occurrence of an explosion). From block  1045 , a line  1046  is followed back to block  1026  and the process continues. 
     With reference to  FIG. 32 , an exemplary logic, which can be computer implemented program steps or instructions, for the FSCS computing hardware  900  is disclosed for physical signal processing. 
     The illustrated exemplary process of  FIG. 32  starts at a block  1050  at which the FSCS computing hardware causes the components of the system to be initialized to initial default values. For example, the output voltage of the fire control signal line is set to zero if zero volts corresponds to a no fire condition. In addition, if capacitors are used to detonate various detonators to thereby detonate their associated respective explosives, control signals, if needed, can be sent to discharge the capacitors. From block  1050 , a block  1052  is reached and a check is made as to whether the instrumentation center of the command and control system is coupled to the FSCS interface software at the command center. This refers back to the process associated with block  1024  in  FIG. 31 . If the connection has been lost, a determination at a block  1054  is made as to whether the connection has been lost for more than a predetermined time. For example, this time can be established at five seconds. If the answer at block  1054  is no, a line  1056  is followed back to block  1052  and the process continues. 
     If the connection has been lost for more than the predetermined time as established at block  1054 , a block  1057  is reached at which a determination is made as to whether both the firing countdown has started and communication has been lost for more than a predetermined time, such as five seconds. If the answer at block  1057  is yes, the system interrupts the countdown to block firing as the connection between the instrumentation center and command center has been lost (e.g., the communication link is deemed inoperative when the connection is found to be lost) and the countdown has begun. That is, in this case a line  1058  is followed from block  1057  to a block  1060  and a safe mode sequence is started. For example, in a safe mode detonation capacitors can be caused to discharge to ground potential (not to detonators) assuming the capacitors are not automatically discharged in the absence of a firing signal and the fire control signal is blocked. From block  1060 , via a line  1062 , a block  1064  is reached and the power supplies of the system are disabled so that firing capacitors cannot be charged when in the safe mode in this example. From block  1064 , via a line  1066 , the process returns to block  1050  and continues as described herein. 
     On the other hand, if the answer at block  1057  is no, then: (i) communication between the software of the command center and instrumentation center has not been lost for too long and the countdown has not started; (ii) communication has not been lost for too long but the countdown has not started; or (iii) communication has not been lost for too long and the countdown has started. In any of these cases, from block  1057  a line  1070  is reached and followed to a block  1072  and the countdown to firing is paused if it has been started. At block  1072 , the process continues via a line  1056  and back to block  1052 . At block  1072  if the countdown had not started (e.g., communication was lost for too long prior to beginning the countdown), the countdown is not paused at block  1072  as it had yet to start. 
     Returning to block  1052  of  FIG. 32 , if at this block the connection between the FSCS computing hardware of the instrumentation center and the FSCS interface software of the command center is not lost, a block  1074  is reached at which a determination is made as to whether all of the interlocks are clear (in an appropriate status for firing). For example, are all doors and gates that need to be shut in a closed state, and are the DMS, key and software switches at the command center in the authorized firing mode. If the answer at block  1074  is no, a block  1076  is reached and a determination is made as to whether countdown has started. If the answer is no, a line  1077  is followed back to block  1052  and the process continues. If the countdown has started when block  1076  is reached and the interlocks are not clear (for example, the dead man switch has opened), detonation is blocked as a yes branch  1078  is followed from block  1076  to the block  1060  with the safe mode sequence beginning at block  1060  as previously described. The process continues from block  1060  as described above. 
     Returning to block  1074 , assume that all of the interlocks are clear. In this case, from block  1074  a block  1080  is reached at which a determination is made as to whether the countdown to firing (to sending the fire control signal) has started. If the countdown has not started, a block  1082  is reached and the countdown starts. If the countdown was paused at  1072  but the connection at block  1052  has not been lost for too long, when block  1082  is reached the countdown can, for example, be restarted at zero or be started where it left off at the time it was paused. From block  1082  the process continues to a block  1084  at which a determination is made as to whether all of the interrupts are clear. Block  1084  is also reached from block  1080  if the countdown was determined to have started when the query was made at block  1080 . At block  1084  a determination is made as to whether the interrupts are in their desired status. Thus, at block  1084  confirmation is made, for example, of whether the instruments needed for the detonation are operational and within their proper settings and proper states to obtain data when an explosion occurs. If the answer at block  1084  is no, a branch  1086  is followed back to block  1072  with the countdown being paused and the process continuing from block  1072  as previously described. The status of the interrupts can be determined from signals, typically digital electrical signals, such as from the interrupt manager computing hardware  910  of  FIG. 28 . 
     If at block  1084  a determination is made that all of the interrupts are clear, the countdown check at block  1087  is reached. If the countdown has not reached zero, a block  1088  is reached and power supplies are set (e.g., to charge detonation capacitors if not charged). The process continues from block  1088  via a line  1090  to the block  1052 . This again results in the checking of the interlocks and interrupts as the process continues through blocks  1074  and  1084  back to block  1087 . If everything remains a go, eventually at block  1087  the countdown will have reached zero. From block  1087 , a block  1092  is reached and a determination is made as to whether a trigger signal has been received. The trigger signal in this example can correspond to activation of the third detonation switch at the command center, such as a software implemented switch actuated by touching a display button enabled by the FSCS interface software at the command trailer. This button may have been shifted to a firing state at an earlier stage in the process. If the trigger signal has not been received at block  1092 , the line  1090  is reached and the process continues back to block  1052  as previously described. If the trigger signal is determined to have been received at block  1092 , from block  1092  a block  1094  is reached and a trigger signal (fire control signal) is sent to cause the detonation of the one or more explosives being controlled and the initiation of combustion of one or more propellant charges. Thus, for example, a fire control signal can be sent to capacitive discharge control units causing the discharge of capacitors to one or more detonators to explode explosive charges associated with the detonators and initiate combustion of propellant charges, if any. Following the sending of the trigger signal, the power supplies are disabled at block  1064  (cutting off power to the detonation circuits to isolate them in this example) and the process continues back to block  1050 . 
       FIG. 33  illustrates an exemplary FSCS interface software program (or logic flow chart) suitable for running on a computer  847  of the command center for interfacing with the FSCS computing hardware  900  of the instrumentation center. With reference to  FIG. 33 , this process starts at a block  1100  at which a connection is established between the FSCS interface software of the command center and the FSCS computing hardware  900  of the instrumentation center. At a block  1102 , the process pauses to allow a user of the system to define the interlocks, the interrupts, the countdown time and any other settings desired for the system. For example, the user can identify interlocks associated with a specific blast zone, such as different gates controlling access to the zone, doors for various components of the system, and any other interlocks being used in the system. In connection with interrupts, the user can define which instruments are being used in the system and their required status and settings for operation that need to be met before an explosion is allowed to occur. 
     At block  1104 , the settings established at block  1102  are transmitted from the command center to the instrumentation center, such as more specifically to the FSCS computing hardware  900  of the instrumentation center in this example. At block  1106 , the interface software is waiting for an acknowledgement from the FSCS computing hardware that the settings have been received. If the answer is no, the process loops back to block  1104  (and the settings are resent) with the process continuing until the settings have been acknowledged. An escape loop can be followed after a time out elapses. From block  1106 , a block  1108  is reached corresponding to an optional test mode operation. In this local test mode operation, testing is accomplished without allowing the firing of the explosives. In the test mode, from the time a software enabled switch is actuated to a fire authorized state, the countdown starts. If the countdown is reached (e.g., five minutes), a block  1110  is reached from block  1108  and a signal is sent to the FSCS computing hardware to start the safe mode sequence of block  1060  of  FIG. 32 . This local countdown can be restarted, for example, by actuating the software enabled switch before the local countdown is reached. The test mode can block firing by overriding the key control and DMS control settings. The test mode does allow testing of the various instrument settings as well as other testing functions. If in the test mode the local countdown has not been reached, the process can continue to test the system with explosive firing being blocked. 
     If the system is not in the test mode, from block  1106 , the block  1112  is reached. At block  1112  a determination is made as to whether the fire button (e.g., the software implemented switch) has been shifted to a fire authorization signal position. If the answer is yes, an authorized fire signal corresponding to the position of the switch is sent from the command center to the instrumentation center as indicated by block  1114 . If the answer at block  1112  is no, checking of the communication network continues by sending a heartbeat string of data (test packet) as indicated by block  1116  from the command center to the instrumentation center. At block  1118  data is obtained by the command center from the FSCS computing hardware, such as the instrument status data. If no data is received within a predetermined time, from a block  1120  a branch  1122  is followed to a block  1124  and another attempt is made to reconnect the interface FSCS software to the FSCS computing hardware of the instrumentation center. If data is received before the time out elapses at block  1120 , a block  1126  is reached from block  1120 . At block  1126  a determination is made as to whether the data updated the status of any of the instruments or interlocks. If so, a block  1128  is reached and a display or other indicators, desirably visual indicators, of the status of the displayed components is updated for easy viewing by an individual at the command center. From block  1128 , following display updating, or from block  1126  in the event no status changes have occurred, a block  1129  is reached at which a determination is made as to whether the heartbeat string (e.g., a test packet returned to the FSCS interface software from the FSCS computing hardware of the instrumentation center) is equal to or otherwise matches or corresponds with the heartbeat string (test packet) sent at block  1116 . If the answer is no, the assumption is made that the communication link has failed and the process continues via line  1122  to the block  1124 . If the answer at block  1128  is yes, the process follows a line  1130  back to block  1108  and continues from there. 
       FIG. 34  illustrates an exemplary approach for monitoring interlocks and instruments coupled to the computing hardware at the instrumentation center of the command and control system. In this case, an interrupt manager portion of the computing hardware at the instrumentation trailer can be used for this purpose. The interrupt manager, if used, can be a separate module or an integral portion of the FSCS computing hardware and can be implemented in software programming, if desired. 
     In  FIG. 34 , the process commences at a block  1140  at which the systems (e.g., the instruments) and interlocks that are to be monitored at the instrumentation center are defined. Thus, the instruments are identified and set to their desired states. In addition, the interlocks to be monitored are defined with their desired states established. From block  1140 , a block  1142  is reached. At block  1142  for all systems (e.g., instruments and interlocks) to be monitored at the instrumentation center, a signal corresponding to their current status is obtained from the FSCS computing hardware, such as from storage in memory of such hardware, as is indicated at block  1144 . The instrument status (as well as interlock status) of each actual instrument and interlock is then checked at block  1146  with the checked or determined status resulting in stored status information. At the check instrument status block, new instrument settings can be applied to the instruments. Also, the status check can involve retrieving data from the instruments, such as collected during an explosion, if data has been stored therein. The activities performed during the check instrument status block can depend on the status of the FSCS computing hardware, such as if it is paused, counting, triggered, or in a safe mode. At block  1148 , a comparison is made to see if a change in status or data has occurred. If no, a branch  1150  is followed to a line  1152  and the process continues to block  1142 . If the answer at block  1148  is yes, a status change is indicated and a branch  1154  is followed to a block  1156  with the status being updated at block  1156 . 
     If a particular instrument or interlock is not being monitored by the instrumentation side of the command and control system, but instead is being monitored at the command center side, from block  1142  a block  1160  is reached with status data being obtained from another source, such as from the FSCS interface of the command center. If the data has not changed (and a comparison can be made in block  1160  to determine if a change has occurred), a no branch  1162  is followed from block  1160  to the block  1152  and the process continues. If the data has changed, the branch  1154  is followed to the block  1156  with the process continuing as previously described. 
     Again, the process for configuring software and or hardware implementations of the command and control system described above are provided by way of example as other configurations can be used in the command and control system. It should also be noted that the ordering of the steps described in the above examples can be altered if desired. 
     An exemplary display  850  is shown if  FIG. 35A . In this display, a single or common screen can be used to simultaneously display the status of a number of instruments, indicated by blocks  1170 , and the status of one or more interlocks, as indicated by the blocks  172 . The displays can be textual, iconic or combinations thereof and may include coding (such as red and green dots with red indicating the status is not okay for explosive firing and green indicating an okay status) to indicate quickly to an individual viewing the screen what needs to happen before an explosive is detonated. Besides color, other visual differentiators or indicators can be utilized, such as differing geometric shapes, to indicate the appropriate status. The illustrated display also can include a display of a software implemented switch, labeled “fire button” in  FIG. 35A  and designated as  1174 . The fire button can be actuated to a fire indicating position, such as by positioning a cursor over the button and clicking, touching the button or sliding the button from one position to another in a touchscreen application, or otherwise be actuatable to shift the displayed switch to a fire authorize signal producing state. Indicators such as described above in connection with the instrument status displays can be used to indicate the status of the fire button as well as the status of key and DMS displayed blocks as discussed below. 
     The illustrated display also in this example can include a block  1176  displaying the status of the key control  840  ( FIG. 28 ) and a block  1178  indicating the status of a dead man switch control  844  ( FIG. 28 ). These displays are desirable, but optional as the operator can readily see the key and DMS positions without looking at the display since the key and DMS switches are desirably included at the command center where the display is also located. 
     An alert  1180  can also be displayed. The alert can provide a visual, auditory or both visual and auditory alarm signal or alert in the event that unanticipated conditions occur. For example, one of the instruments can be a motion sensor for sensing motion in the blast zone and/or a camera for monitoring the blast zone with an alert being provided if motion is detected. The alert status can be associated with a respective fire authorization signal, such as previously described in connection with the key and DMS status signals. The fire authorization signal associated with the alert can be generated if an alert condition does not exist. 
     A display block  1182  can be provided and displayed to indicate that the system is in the test mode. The status of various parameters can also be indicated, such as at block  1192 . These parameters can be environmental parameters (e.g., wind conditions, temperature conditions, other weather conditions), as well as other conditions desired to be monitored. A display block  1194  can be included to display the charging status and/or status of charging sources used to charge a detonation system. In addition, a display block  1196  can be displayed to indicate the status of the communication link, such as whether it is operational or not. Combinations and sub-combinations of these displayed items can be used. Desirably the fire button, key status, DMS status, interlock, and instrument status are displayed on one screen, with or without the com link status. An authorize to fire status of these components in one embodiment can be required before a trigger or fire control signal is sent from the instrumentation center to detonate the explosive. 
       FIG. 35B  is a high level diagram indicating one suitable division of functions between the command center  820  and instrumentation center  802  of the command and control system. As part of the safety and security systems, requirements established by governmental entities can be built in to the checks that must occur prior to detonating an explosion. To the extent these requirements involve monitoring of instruments, they can be accomplished as previously described. To the extent they are outside the operation of the command and control center, such as requirements for explosive storage, they can be implemented separately from the command and control system. 
       FIG. 35C  illustrates in a functional manner yet another example of the operation of an exemplary command and control system. The reference to “autonomous capability” and “any firing site” in  FIG. 35C  simply refers to the fact that a desirable form of the command and control system is mobile and can be moved between different firing sites for use. With reference to  FIG. 35C , interlocks in the form of road blocks  1250  are indicated. These interlocks can be manually actuated, such as by an individual at a road block sending a signal to the instrumentation center indicating that the road block is clear. In addition to the communications network, handheld radios can be used or other communications devices for communicating with the instrumentation center (if manned) and command center portions of the command and control system, such as indicated at  1252 . Video surveillance, such as accomplished by cameras or otherwise (e.g., satellite surveillance) is indicated at  1254  and can be used to monitor the blast site. Security can refer to the secure aspects of the above-described system, as well as to security personnel. The operational checklist can be implemented as previously described for the FSCS computing hardware and FSCS interface software. The phrase “SSOP” refers to standard safety operations procedures, which can be governmentally prescribed. In connection with handling explosives, various checklists are followed in addition to the control provided by the command and control system. 
     With the illustrated command and control system, a single team leader (individual) can be in control of whether to trigger an explosion with the leader being positioned at the command center. This approach avoids the need to rely on multiple dispersed individuals to communicate that conditions are right for detonating an explosive. 
     The HFMDPL up-block  1260  in  FIG. 35C  refers to setting up the command and control system at the desired location for carrying out the detonation at a blast site. The fire shot block  1262  refers to accomplishing the desired explosion. The HFMDPL down-block  1264  refers to transporting the command and control system to another location. The various diagnostics of an explosion can be accomplished by a respective diagnostic team leader for each respective diagnostic. For example, an individual can be in charge of photon Doppler velocimetry diagnostics, another individual can be in charge of X-ray diagnostics, another individual can be in charge of stress and accelerometer diagnostics, and yet another individual can be in charge of video related diagnostics, and so forth. The computer at the command center can have the capability of analyzing and providing reports concerning the collected data. Alternatively, the data may simply be collected and stored, with the stored data then being transferred via storage media or electronically to another computer at another location for analysis. 
     Exemplary Computing Environments for Implementing Embodiments of the Disclosed Technology 
     Any of the disclosed methods can be implemented as computer-executable instructions stored on one or more computer-readable media (e.g., one or more optical media discs, volatile memory components (such as DRAM or SRAM), or nonvolatile memory components (such as hard drives)) and executed on a computer (e.g., any suitable computer, including desktop computers, servers, tablet computers, netbooks, or other devices that include computing hardware). In this case, the computer can comprise one form of computing hardware that is configured by programming instructions to carry out the described activities. Any of the computer-executable instructions for implementing the disclosed techniques as well as any data created and used during implementation of the disclosed embodiments can be stored on one or more computer-readable media (e.g., non-transitory computer-readable media). The computer-executable instructions can be part of, for example, a dedicated software program or a software program that is accessed or downloaded via a web browser or other software application (such as a remote computing application). Such software can be executed, for example, on a single local computer or in a network environment (e.g., via the Internet, a wide-area network, a local-area network, a client-server network (such as a cloud computing network), a distributed computing network, or other such network) using one or more network computers. 
     For clarity, only certain selected aspects of the software-based implementations have been described. Other details that are well known in the art are omitted. For example, it should be understood that the disclosed technology is not limited to any specific computer language or program. For instance, the disclosed technology can be implemented by software written in C++, Java, Perl, JavaScript, Python, or any other suitable programming language. Likewise, the disclosed technology is not limited to any particular computer or type of hardware. Certain details of suitable computers and hardware are well known and need not be set forth in detail in this disclosure. 
     Furthermore, any of the software-based embodiments (comprising, for example, computer-executable instructions for causing a computer or computing hardware to perform any of the disclosed methods) can be uploaded, downloaded, or remotely accessed through a suitable communication means. Such suitable communication means include, for example, the Internet, the World Wide Web, an intranet, software applications, cable (including fiber optic cable), magnetic communications, electromagnetic communications (including RF, microwave, and infrared communications), electronic communications, or other such communication means. 
     The disclosed methods can alternatively be implemented by specialized computing hardware that is configured to perform any of the disclosed methods. For example, the disclosed methods can be implemented (entirely or at least in part) by an integrated circuit (e.g., an application specific integrated circuit (“ASIC”) or programmable logic device (“PLD”), such as a field programmable gate array (“FPGA”)). 
       FIG. 36A  illustrates a generalized example of a suitable computing environment  1300  in which several of the described embodiments can be implemented. The computing environment  1300  is not intended to suggest any limitation as to the scope of use or functionality of the disclosed technology, as the techniques and tools described herein can be implemented in diverse general-purpose or special-purpose environments that have computing hardware. 
     With reference to  FIG. 36A , the computing environment  1300  can include at least one processing unit  1410  and memory  1420 . In  FIG. 36B , this most basic configuration  1300  is included within a dashed line. The processing unit  1410  executes computer-executable instructions. In a multi-processing system, multiple processing units execute computer-executable instructions to increase processing power. The memory  1420  can be volatile memory (e.g., registers, cache, RAM), non-volatile memory (e.g., ROM, EEPROM, flash memory), or some combination of the two. The memory  1420  can store software  1480  implementing one or more of the described logic flowcharts for accomplishing the detonation of explosives and the control techniques described herein. For example, the memory  1420  can store software  1480  for implementing any of the disclosed techniques described herein and user interfaces. 
     The computing environment can have additional features. For example, the computing environment  1300  desirably includes storage  1440 , one or more input devices  1460 , one or more output devices  1450 , and one or more communication connections  1470 . An interconnection mechanism (not shown), such as a bus, controller, or network, interconnects the components of the computing environment  1300 . Typically, operating system software (not shown) provides an operating environment for other software executing in the computing environment  1300 , and coordinates activities of the components of the computing environment  1300 . 
     The storage  1440  can be removable or non-removable, and can include one or more of magnetic disks, magnetic tapes or cassettes, CD-ROMs, DVDs, or any other tangible non-transitory non-volatile storage medium which can be used to store information and which can be accessed within the computing environment  1300 . The storage  1440  can also store instructions for the software  1480  implementing any of the described techniques, systems, or environments. 
     The input device(s)  1460  can be a touch input device such as a keyboard, touchscreen, mouse, pen, trackball, a voice input device, a scanning device, or another device that provides input to the computing environment  1300 . For example, the third detonation switch can be a software implemented and displayed push button or slide switch that is moved to a fire authorize position to cause the provision of a detonation authorization signal. The output device(s)  1450  can be a display device (e.g., a computer monitor, tablet display, netbook display, or touchscreen), printer, speaker, or another device that provides output from the computing environment  1300 . 
     The communication connection(s)  1470  enable communication over a communication medium to another computing entity. The communication medium conveys information such as computer-executable instructions or other data and can be a modulated data or information signal. A modulated data signal is a signal that has one or more of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media include wired or wireless techniques implemented with an electrical, optical, RF, infrared, acoustic, or other carrier. One specific example of a suitable communications network  860  ( FIG. 28 ) for communicating between command and instrumentation centers is a secure two way wireless communication (&gt;802.11n) with a signature heartbeat. 
     As noted, the various methods can be described in the general context of computer-readable instructions stored on one or more computer-readable media. Computer-readable media are any available media that can be accessed within or by a computing environment. By way of example, and not limitation, within the computing environment  1300 , the computer-readable media can include tangible non-transitory computer-readable media, such as memory  1420  and/or storage  1440 . 
     The various methods disclosed herein can also be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions (such as those included in program modules) being executed in a computing environment by a processor. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, libraries, objects, classes, components, data structures, and so on that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. The functionality of the program modules can be combined or split between program modules as desired in various embodiments. Computer-executable instructions for program modules can be executed within a local or distributed computing environment. 
     An example of a possible network topology for implementing the command and control system using the disclosed technology is depicted in  FIG. 36B . Networked computing device  1300  can be, for example, a computer  847  ( FIG. 28 ) at the command center or vehicle that is running software connected to a network  860 . The computing hardware device  1300  can have a computer architecture such as shown in  FIG. 36A  as discussed above. The computing device  1300  is not limited to a traditional personal computer but can comprise other computing hardware configured to connect to and communicate with a communications network  860  (e.g., tablet computers, mobile computing devices, servers, network devices, dedicated devices, and the like). In the illustrated embodiment, the computing hardware device  1300  is shown at the command vehicle or center  820  and is configured by software to communicate with a computing hardware device  1300  (that also can be a computer having the architecture of  FIG. 36A  above) at the instrumentation vehicle or center  802  via the network  860 . In the illustrated embodiment, the computing devices are configured to transmit input data to one another and are configured to implement any of the disclosed methods and provide results as described above. Any of the received data can be stored or displayed at the receiving computing device (e.g., displayed as data on a graphical user interface or web page at the computing device). The illustrated network  860  can be implemented as a Local Area Network (“LAN”) using wired networking (e.g., the Ethernet IEEE standard 802.3 or other appropriate standard) or more desirably by wireless networking (e.g. one of the IEEE standards 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, or 802.11n, with the 802.11n standard being particularly desirable). Alternatively, and less desirably, for security reasons, at least part of the network  860  can be the Internet or a similar public network and operate using an appropriate protocol (e.g., the HTTP protocol). 
     The following examples are provided to illustrate certain particular features and/or embodiments. These examples should not be construed to limit the disclosure to the particular features or embodiments described. 
     EXAMPLES 
     Example 1 
     Explosive Compositions 
     This example discloses explosive compositions which can be used for multiple purposes, including environmentally-friendly fracturing. 
     Background: 
     Explosive regimes can be divided into three basic temporal stages: reaction in the CJ plane (very prompt reaction in the detonation, ns-μs), reaction in the post-detonation early expansion phase (4-10 μs) and late reaction to contribute to blast effects (1-100&#39;s of ms). Work on mixtures of TNT and Al (tritonals) began as early as 1914 and by WWII, where U.S. and British researchers discovered great effects in the third temporal regime of blast and no effects or detrimental effect to the prompt detonation regime. Because of a lack of acceleration in detonation wave speed, it is a commonly held belief in the energetics community that there is no Al participation at the C-J plane. However, some work has demonstrated that replacement of Al with an inert surrogate (NaCl) actually increased detonation velocity as compared to active Al, much more even than endothermic phase change could account for, therefore he postulated that the Al does react in the C-J plane, however it is kinetically limited to endothermic reactions. In contrast, later work did not see as significant a difference in detonation velocity when Al was substituted for an inert surrogate (LiF) in TNT/RDX admixtures. However, this work showed a 55% increase in cylinder wall velocity for late-time expansion for the active Al versus surrogate, with Al contribution roughly 4 μs after the passage of the C-J plane. 
     Modern high performance munitions applications typically contain explosives designed to provide short-lived high-pressure pulses for prompt structural damage or metal pushing, such as PBXN-14 or PBX9501. Another class of explosives, however, includes those that are designed for longer-lived blast output (enhanced blast) via late-time metal-air or metal detonation-product reactions. An example of an enhanced blast explosive, PBXN-109, contains only 64% RDX (cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine), and includes Al particles as a fuel, bound by 16% rubbery polymeric binder. The low % RDX results in diminished detonation performance, but later time Al/binder burning produces increased air blast. Almost in a separate class, are “thermobaric” type explosives, in which the metal loading can range from 30% to even as high as 90%. These explosives are different from the materials required for the present disclosure, as with such high metal loading, they are far from stoichiometric in terms of metal oxidation with detonation products, and additionally detonation temperature and pressure are considerably lower, which also effect metal oxidation rates. Therefore, such materials are well suited for late-time blast and thermal effects, but not for energy release in the Taylor expansion wave. Formulations combining the favorable initial work output from the early pressure profile of a detonation wave with late-time burning or blast are exceedingly rare and rely on specific ratios of metal to explosive as well as metal type/morphology and binder type. It has been demonstrated that both high metal pushing capability and high blast ability are achieved in pressed formulations by combining small size Al particles, conventional high explosive crystals, and reactive polymer binders. This combination is believed to be effective because the small particles of Al enhance the kinetic rates associated with diffusion-controlled chemistry, but furthermore, the ratio of Al to explosive was found to be of the utmost importance. It was empirically discovered that at levels of 20 wt % Al, the metal reactions did not contribute to cylinder wall velocity. This result is not only counterintuitive, but also is an indication that for metal acceleration applications, the bulk of current explosives containing Al are far from optimal. To fully optimize this type of combined effects explosive, a system in which the binder is all energetic/reactive, or completely replaced with a high performance explosive is needed. Furthermore, very little is understood about the reaction of Si and B in post-detonation environments. 
     Measurements: 
     In order to interrogate the interplay between prompt chemical reactions and Al combustion in the temporal reactive structure, as depicted in FIG. R, various measurement techniques are applied. Quantitative measurements in the microsecond time regime at high temperatures and pressures to determine the extent of metal reactions are challenging, and have been mostly unexplored to date. Techniques such as emission spectroscopy have been applied with success for observation of late-time metal oxidation, but the physiochemical environment and sub-microsecond time regime of interest in this study renders these techniques impractical. However, using a number of advanced techniques in Weapons Experiment Division, such as photon doppler velocimetry (PDV) and novel blast measurements, the initiation and detonation/burning responses of these new materials are probed. Predictions of the heats of reaction and detonation characteristics using modern thermochemical codes are used to guide the formulations and comparisons of theoretical values versus measured can give accurate estimations of the kinetics of the metal reactions. From measurement of the acceleration profile of metals with the explosives product gases, the pressure-volume relationship on an isentrope can be fit and is represented in the general form in equation 1, represented as a sum of functions over a range of pressures, one form being the JWL, equation 2.
 
 P   S =Σϕ i ( v )  (eq 1)
 
 P   S   =Ae   −R     1     V   +Be   −R     2     V   +CV   −(ω+1)   (eq 2)
 
     In the JWL EOS, the terms A, B, C, R 1 , R 2  and co are all constants that are calibrated, and V=v/v o  (which is modeled using hydrocodes). With thermochemically predicted EOS parameters, and the calibrated EOS from tested measurements, both the extent and the timing of metal reactions is accurately be accessed, and utilized for both optimization of formulations as well as in munitions design. The time-scale of this indirect observation of metal reactions dramatically exceeds what is possible from that of direct measurements, such as spectroscopic techniques. The formulations are then optimized by varying the amount, type and particle sizes of metals to both enhance the reaction kinetics, as well as tailor the time regime of energy output. Traditional or miniature versions of cylinder expansion tests are applied to test down selected formulations. Coupled with novel blast measurement techniques, the proposed testing will provide a quantitative, thorough understanding of metal reactions in PAX and cast-cured explosives to provide combined effects with a number of potential applications. 
     Formulation: 
     Chemical formulations are developed to optimize for cylinder energy. Such formulations are developed to provide different chemical environments as well as variation in temperature and pressure. Chemical formulations may include high-performance explosives (for example but not limited to HMX, TNAZ, RDX CL-20), insensitive explosives (TATB, DAAF, NTO, LAX-112, FOX-7), metals/semimetals (Al, Si or B) and reactive cast-cured binders (such as glycidyl azide(GAP)/nitrate (PGN) polymers, polyethylene glycol, and perfluoropolyether derivatives with plasitisizers such as GAP plastisizer, nitrate esters or liquid fluorocarbons). While Al is the primary metal of the disclosed compositions it is contemplated that it can be substituted with Si and/or B. Si is known to reduce the sensitivity of formulations compared to Al with nearly the same heat of combustion. 
     In order to verify thermoequlibrium calculations at a theoretical state or zero Al reaction, an inert surrogate for Al is identified. Lithium fluoride (LiF) is one such material that may be substituted in certain formulations as an inert surrogate for Al. The density of LiF is a very close density match for Al (2.64 gcm −3  for LiF vs 2.70 gcm −3  for Al), the molecular weight, 25.94 gmol −1 , is very close to that of Al, 26.98 gmol −1 , and it has a very low heat of formation so that it can be considered inert even in extreme circumstances. Because of these properties, LiF is believed to give formulations with near identical densities, particle size distributions, product gas molecular weights and yet give inert character in the EOS measurements. Initial formulations are produced with 50% and 100% LiF replacing Al. An understanding of reaction rates in these environments are used to develop models for metal reactions that extend beyond the current temperature and pressures in existing models. 
     Resulting material may be cast-cured, reducing cost and eliminating the infrastructure required for either pressing or melt-casting. 
     Particular Explosive Formulation 
     In one particular example, an explosive formulation was generated with an energy density being greater than or equal to 12 kJ/cc at theoretical maximum density, the time scale of the energy release being in two periods of the detonation phase with a large amount, greater than 30%, being in the Taylor expansion wave and the produced explosive being a high density cast-cured formulation. A formulation was developed and tested, which contained 69% HMX, 15% 3.5 μm atomized Al, 7.5% glycidal azide polymer, 7.5% Fomblin Fluorolink D and 1% methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (having an mechanical energy of 12.5 kJ/cc at TMD). 
       FIG. 23  provides a graphic depiction of a detonation structure of an explosive containing Al reacted or unreacted following flow-Taylor wave. Total mechanical energy in the formulation was equal to or greater than 12 kJ/cc. Greater than 30% of the energy was released in the following flow Taylor Wave of the explosive reaction due to reaction of Al (or other metals or semi-metals such as but not limited to Mg, Ti, Si, B, Ta, Zr, Hf). In the demonstrated explosive, 30-40% of energy was released in the Taylor Wave portion of the reaction. Other similar formulations similar to the above, but with a HTBP based non-reactive binder, failed to show early Al reaction in expansion. Further, formulations with nitrate ester plastisizers and added oxidizer failed to pass required sensitivity tests for safe handling. 
     Example 2 
     Use of Environmentally Friendly and Safe Non-Ideal High Explosive (HE) System to Create Fracturing In-Situ within Geologic Formations 
     This example demonstrates the capability of the disclosed non-ideal HE system to be used to create fracturing in-situ within geologic formations. 
     Experimental/theoretical characterization of the non-ideal HE system was accomplished. The conceptual approach developed to the explosive stimulation of a nominal reservoir began with a pair of explosive charges in the wellbore separated by a distance determined by the properties of the explosive and the surrounding reservoir rock. The separation was the least required to assure that the initial outward going pressure pulse has developed a release wave (decaying pressure) behind was prior to the intersection of the two waves. The volume of material immediately behind the (nominally) circular locus of point where the intersecting waves just passed are loading in tension, favoring the fracture of the rock. The predicted result was a disc of fracture rock being generated out from the wellbore about midway between the charges. Numerical simulation supported this concept.  FIG. 20  represents this result, as discussed above. In the center, along the plane of symmetry, the predicted effect of the two wave interaction was seen, projecting damage significantly further radially. The dimensions on this figure are for a particular computational trial, modeling a typical tight gas reservoir rock and are not to be inferred as more than illustrative. 
     Numeric models to represent the non-ideal HE system were built. Potential target reservoirs were identified, together with existing geophysical characterization of the representative formations. Numerical models to represent these formations were implemented. Numerical simulations indicating potential rubblized regions produced by multiple precision detonation events were calculated. Initial production modeling was conducted. Initial simulations indicated a rubblized region extending 20-30 feet in radius from the borehole. 
       FIGS. 24 and 25  illustrate gas production by conventional fracture (solid lines) and rubblized zone (dashed lines) from 250′ fractures with varying fracture conductivity or 3 cases of rubblized zones with radius of 20′, 24′ and 30′. 
     These studies demonstrate that the disclosed non-ideal HE system is a high energy density system which allows the zone affected by multiple timed detonation events to be extended by utilizing a “delayed” push in the energy in an environment of interacting shock/rarefaction waves. Moreover, the disclosed system allowed fracturing tight formations without hydraulically fracturing the formation and without generating harmful byproducts. 
     In view of the many possible embodiments to which the principles disclosed herein may be applied, it should be recognized that illustrated embodiments are only examples and should not be considered a limitation on the scope of the disclosure. Rather, the scope of the disclosure is at least as broad as the scope of the following claims. We therefore claim all that comes within the scope of these claims.