Patent Publication Number: US-10326796-B1

Title: Dynamic security mechanisms for mixed networks

Description:
CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/498,300, filed on Apr. 26, 2017, which claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/327,836, filed on Apr. 26, 2016, and U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/344,267, filed on Jun. 1, 2016. Each of the aforementioned applications is incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. 
    
    
     BRIEF SUMMARY 
     Provided are methods, including computer-implemented methods or methods implemented by a network device, devices including network devices, and computer-program products for providing dynamic security mechanisms for mixed networks. A mixed network can include a variety of network devices, including desktop computers, laptop computers, mobile computers, and servers. A mixed network can also include electric and electronic devices that were not previously network-enabled. These so-called “Internet-of-Things” devices can include household electronics and appliances, industrial equipment and control systems, vehicles, and wearable and implantable devices, among other things. 
     In various implementations, a system, method, or computer-program product for providing dynamic security mechanisms for a mixed network can include determining, by a security device on a mixed network, a configuration of the mixed network. A mixed network can include an IoT type device and a non-IoT device. The configuration can include information identifying a device type associated with other devices on the mixed network. The security device can further be configured to determine a deception device type. The deception device type can be determined using the configuration. The deception device type can determine network traffic that can be sent by a deception mechanism. The security device can further be configured to determine whether the deception device type corresponds to an IoT type device or a non-IoT type device. The security device can further be configured to determine a second network. The second network can include a deception mechanism that corresponds to the deception device type, where the deception mechanism corresponds to an IoT deception mechanism when the deception device type corresponds to an IoT type device, and where the deception mechanism corresponds to a non-IoT deception mechanism when the deception device type corresponds to a non-IoT type device. The security device can further be configure to configuring a network tunnel to the second network. The network tunnel can enable the deception mechanism to be a node on the mixed network. Enabling the deception mechanism as a node on the mixed network enables access to the deception mechanism from the mixed network. The security device can further be configured to use the deception mechanism to monitor the mixed network for network abnormalities. The security device can further be configured to take an action to secure the mixed network when the deception mechanism detects an abnormality. 
     In various implementations, an IoT type device uses a protocol to communicate with another device in the mixed network. In these implementations, the protocol does not use a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol. 
     In various implementations, a network abnormality is detected when the deception mechanism is accessed. 
     In various implementations, determining the configuration of the mixed network includes sending a packet to another device on the mixed network and receiving a response from the other device on the mixed network. The response can include information about the configuration of the mixed network. 
     In various implementations, determining the configuration of the mixed network includes monitoring network traffic to and from another device on the network. 
     In various implementations, the security device can further be configured to configure the deception mechanism to send network traffic to the mixed network. 
     In various implementations, the deception device type corresponds to a device type associated with the other devices on the mixed network. 
     In various implementations, the security device can further be configured to determining one or more device types associated with the configuration, where one or more device types are not associated with the other devices on the mixed network. The deception device type can determined from among the one or more device types. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Illustrative embodiments are described in detail below with reference to the following figures: 
         FIG. 1  illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysis system, in which various implementations of a deception-based security system can be used; 
         FIGS. 2A-2D  provide examples of different installation configurations that can be used for different customer networks; 
         FIG. 3A-3B  illustrate examples of customer networks where some of the customer networks&#39; network infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, is provided by a cloud services provider; 
         FIG. 4  illustrates an example of an enterprise network; 
         FIG. 5  illustrates a general example of an Internet-of-Things network; 
         FIG. 6  illustrates an example of an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in a private home; 
         FIG. 7  illustrates an Internet-of-Things network, here implemented in a small business; 
         FIG. 8  illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrial control system; 
         FIG. 9  illustrates an example of a SCADA system, here used for distributed monitoring and control; 
         FIG. 10  illustrates an example of a distributed control; 
         FIG. 11  illustrates an example of a PLC implemented in a manufacturing control process 
         FIGS. 12A-12C  illustrate examples of a mixed network, such as may be found in a private home or a small business; 
         FIG. 13  illustrates an example of a network threat detection system that can be used to implement a deception-based network security device; 
         FIG. 14  illustrates an example of a process that may be implemented by an attack pattern detector to identify a pattern of behavior as a possible threat; 
         FIGS. 15A-15B  illustrate an example of two stages of a process for confirming that the pattern of behavior is an actual threat; 
         FIG. 16A-16D  illustrate an example of a network deception system configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network; 
         FIG. 17  illustrates an example of a network deception system configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network; 
         FIG. 18  illustrates an example of a deception system that includes a projection point with network tunnels to multiple deception farms; 
         FIG. 19  illustrates an example of a deception system for a site network that includes multiple sub-networks; 
         FIG. 20  illustrates an example of a network deception system, where multiple projection points have been connected to multiple deception centers; and 
         FIGS. 21A-21B  illustrate an example where a site network includes a local segment and a cloud segment. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Network deception mechanisms, often referred to as “honeypots,” “honey tokens,” and “honey nets,” among others, defend a network from threats by distracting or diverting the threat. Honeypot-type deception mechanisms can be installed in a network for a particular site, such as a business office, to act as decoys in the site&#39;s network. Honeypot-type deception mechanisms are typically configured to be indistinguishable from active, production systems in the network. Additionally, such deception mechanisms are typically configured to be attractive to a network threat by having seemingly valuable data and/or by appearing vulnerable to infiltration. Though these deception mechanisms can be indistinguishable from legitimate parts of the site network, deception mechanisms are not part of the normal operation of the network, and would not be accessed during normal, legitimate use of the site network. Because normal users of the site network would not normally use or access a deception mechanism, any use or access to the deception mechanism is suspected to be a threat to the network. 
     “Normal” operation of a network generally includes network activity that conforms with the intended purpose of a network. For example, normal or legitimate network activity can include the operation of a business, medical facility, government office, education institution, or the ordinary network activity of a private home. Normal network activity can also include the non-business-related, casual activity of users of a network, such as accessing personal email and visiting websites on personal time, or using network resources for personal use. Normal activity can also include the operations of network security devices, such as firewalls, anti-virus tools, intrusion detection systems, intrusion protection systems, email filters, adware blockers, and so on. Normal operations, however, exclude deceptions mechanisms, in that deception mechanisms are not intended to take part in business operations or casual use. As such, network users and network systems do not normally access deceptions mechanisms except perhaps for the most routine network administrative tasks. Access to a deception mechanism, other than entirely routine network administration, may thus indicate a threat to the network. 
     Threats to a network can include active attacks, where an attacker interacts or engages with systems in the network to steal information or do harm to the network. An attacker may be a person, or may be an automated system. Examples of active attacks include denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spoofing attacks, “man-in-the-middle” attacks, attacks involving malformed network requests (e.g. Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning, “ping of death,” etc.), buffer, heap, or stack overflow attacks, and format string attacks, among others. Threats to a network can also include self-driven, self-replicating, and/or self-triggering malicious software. Malicious software can appear innocuous until activated, upon which the malicious software may attempt to steal information from a network and/or do harm to the network. Malicious software is typically designed to spread itself to other systems in a network. Examples of malicious software include ransomware, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, spyware, keyloggers, rootkits, and rogue security software, among others. 
     Small networks tend to have simple network security systems. For example, a typical small network may have only a hardware or software firewall at the modem or router that connects the network to an Internet service provider (ISP). Often the network owner either cannot pay for a more sophisticated security infrastructure, or believes that a more sophisticated security infrastructure is too costly. In other cases, the network owner does not know how to set up a more sophisticated security device, believes his basic network security is good enough, or otherwise gives little thought to the security of his network. 
     Small networks thus may be particularly vulnerable to unwanted and harmful intrusions, and other network threats. Network threats can originate outside the network, for example through the Internet connection provided by the ISP. Network threats can also originate inside the network. For example, an unauthorized device may connect to the network&#39;s wireless network. As another example, an intruder may physically connect to a device in the network and gain access to the device using infiltration software, or simply because the device has no security barrier. Computers and portable computing devices (e.g., tablet computers and smart phones) may have some security, such as passwords and anti-virus tools, but these protect only the computer itself from being infiltrated, and do not necessarily protect any other devices in the network from being accessed. Some devices may be accessible and controllable simply by connecting to them, either physically or wirelessly. 
     Small networks can sometimes be mixed networks. A mixed network, as described herein, is a network that includes a variety of networked devices, which may use a variety of protocols to inter-communicate. Some of these network devices are referred to herein as “traditional” network devices, while others are referred to herein as “non-traditional” network devices. 
     Traditionally, networks included computers and the infrastructure to network computers together. Network infrastructure devices include, for example, routers, switches, wireless base stations, and so on. “Computers” as used herein include desktop computers consisting of a processor and memory on a motherboard and connected to various peripheral devices, such as a monitor, keyboard, and mouse, as well as laptop computers. “Computing devices” as used herein includes tablet computers and hand-held devices such as personal digital assistants and smartphones. Computers, computing devices, and network infrastructure equipment may be collectively referred to herein as traditional network devices. 
     Under the “Internet of Things” paradigm, one may find more than only traditional network devices on a network. An Internet-of-Things network may include everyday objects, machines, and even people and animals. The decreasing size and increasing capability of microprocessors have made it possible to put a computer into practically any electrical device, and connect that device to a network. Thus, for example, a network may now include thermostats, cars, and washing machines, among other things. People may also be connected to an Internet-of-Things network. For example, many people are rarely separated from their network-enabled smartphone, smart watch, or fitness tracker. Some people may wear or have implanted network-enabled medical devices, such as pacemakers. Having all of these non-traditional devices on a network, however, increase the opportunities for malicious actors to hack into a network. Moreover, in some cases gaining access to a network-connected device may provide access to all of an inadequately secured network. 
     Non-traditional network devices may use networking protocols that fall outside of those used in traditional networks. For example, traditional networks use networking protocols based on the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and/or Internet Protocol (IP). In contrast, Internet-of-Things networks may use protocols based on proprietary technology, home or industrial automation standards, and/or other protocols that are not derived from, and may not be compatible with, TCP/IP. Mixed networks can include a devices that use either TCP/IP-based protocols, and/or other protocols. 
     A deception-based network security device can provide simple and cost-effective security for a mixed network. The security device need only connect to the network to monitor the network and detect intrusions originating both outside and inside the network. By using deceptive security mechanisms, the security device can deflect the attention of a network threat away from valuable and/or easily infiltrated network assets. Security mechanisms designed to deceive, sometimes referred to as “honeypots,” may be used as traps to detect and deflect unauthorized use of a network. A deception-based security mechanism may be a computer attached to the network, some other device connected to the network, and/or a process running on one or more network systems. A security mechanism may be configured to offer services, real or emulated, to serve as bait for an attack on the network. Deception-based security mechanisms that take the form of data, also called “honey tokens,” may be mixed in with real data in devices in the network. Alternatively or additionally, emulated data may also be provided by emulated systems or services. 
     Deception-based security mechanisms are generally configured to appear as legitimate parts of a network. These security mechanisms, however, are not, in fact, part of the normal operation of the network. Consequently, normal activity on the network is not supposed to access the security mechanisms, and any access over the network to the security mechanism is automatically suspect. 
     A deception-based network security device may deploy deceptive security mechanisms in a targeted and dynamic fashion. The security device may scan the network and determine the current topology of the network. The security device may then determine devices to emulate with security mechanisms, including the type and behavior of the device. The security mechanisms may be selected and configured specifically to attract the attention of a network infiltrator. The security mechanisms may also be selected and deployed based on suspicious activity in the network. Security mechanisms may be deployed, removed, modified, or replaced in response to activity in the network, until sufficient information is gathered to confirm that an attack is, in fact, taking place. 
     Once the network security device has confirmed an intrusion into the network, the security device may raise an alarm. The alarm may be audible, similar to a smoke detector, and/or may be sent to an application on a smart phone, and/or may alert the authorities. In some implementations, the security device may also take preventive action to attempt to prevent the intruder from doing harm to the network steal information from the network. In some implementations, the security device may block the network&#39;s access to the outside world, effectively quarantining the network until the intruder can be expelled. 
     I. Deception-Based Security Systems 
       FIG. 1  illustrates an example of a network threat detection and analysis system  100 , in which various implementations of a deception-based security system can be used. The network threat detection and analysis system  100 , or, more briefly, network security system  100 , provides security for a site network  104  using deceptive security mechanisms, a variety of which may be called “honeypots.” The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into the site network  104  using a deception center  108  and sensors  110 , which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in the site network  104 . In some implementations, the deception center  108  and the sensors  110  interact with a security services provider  106  located outside of the site network  104 . The deception center  108  may also obtain or exchange data with sources located on the Internet  150 . 
     Security mechanisms designed to deceive, sometimes referred to as “honeypots,” may also be used as traps to divert and/or deflect unauthorized use of a network away from the real network assets. A deception-based security mechanism may be a computer attached to the network, a process running on one or more network systems, and/or some other device connected to the network. A security mechanism may be configured to offer services, real or emulated, to serve as bait for an attack on the network. Deception-based security mechanisms that take the form of data, which may be called “honey tokens,” may be mixed in with real data in devices in the network. Alternatively or additionally, emulated data may also be provided by emulated systems or services. 
     Deceptive security mechanisms can also be used to detect an attack on the network. Deceptive security mechanisms are generally configured to appear as if they are legitimate parts of a network. These security mechanisms, however, are not, in fact, part of the normal operation of the network. Consequently, normal activity on the network is not likely to access the security mechanisms. Thus any access over the network to the security mechanism is automatically suspect. 
     The network security system  100  may deploy deceptive security mechanisms in a targeted and dynamic fashion. Using the deception center  108  the system  100  can scan the site network  104  and determine the topology of the site network  104 . The deception center  108  may then determine devices to emulate with security mechanisms, including the type and behavior of the device. The security mechanisms may be selected and configured specifically to attract the attention of network attackers. The security mechanisms may also be selected and deployed based on suspicious activity in the network. Security mechanisms may be deployed, removed, modified, or replaced in response to activity in the network, to divert and isolate network activity related to an apparent attack, and to confirm that the network activity is, in fact, part of a real attack. 
     The site network  104  is a network that may be installed among the buildings of a large business, in the office of a small business, at a school campus, at a hospital, at a government facility, or in a private home. The site network  104  may be described as a local area network (LAN) or a group of LANS. The site network  104  may be one site belonging to an organization that has multiple site networks  104  in one or many geographical locations. In some implementations, the deception center  108  may provide network security to one site network  104 , or to multiple site networks  104  belonging to the same entity. 
     The site network  104  is where the networking devices and users of the an organizations network may be found. The site network  104  may include network infrastructure devices, such as routers, switches hubs, repeaters, wireless base stations, and/or network controllers, among others. The site network  104  may also include computing systems, such as servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, and smart phones, among others. The site network  104  may also include other analog and digital electronics that have network interfaces, such as televisions, entertainment systems, thermostats, refrigerators, and so on. 
     The deception center  108  provides network security for the site network  104  (or multiple site networks for the same organization) by deploying security mechanisms into the site network  104 , monitoring the site network  104  through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for the site network  104 , in various implementations the deception center  108  may communicate with sensors  110  installed in the site network  104 , using network tunnels  120 . As described further below, the tunnels  120  may allow the deception center  108  to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than the site network  104 , on a different network, or remote from the site network  104 , with intermediate networks (possibly including the Internet  150 ) between the deception center  108  and the site network  104 . 
     In some implementations, the network security system  100  includes a security services provider  106 . In these implementations, the security services provider  106  may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, the security services provider  106  may communicate with multiple deception centers  108  that each provide security for a different site network  104  for the same organization. In some implementations, the security services provider  106  is located outside the site network  104 . In some implementations, the security services provider  106  is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, the security services provider  106  may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider  106  is controlled by the same entity as that controls the site network  104 . 
     In some implementations, when the network security system  100  includes a security services provider  106 , the sensors  110  and the deception center  108  may communicate with the security services provider  106  in order to be connected to each other. For example, the sensors  110 , which may also be referred to as deception sensors, may, upon powering on in the site network  104 , send information over a network connection  112  to the security services provider  106 , identifying themselves and the site network  104  in which they are located. The security services provider  106  may further identify a corresponding deception center  108  for the site network  104 . The security services provider  106  may then provide the network location of the deception center  108  to the sensors  110 , and may provide the deception center  108  with the network location of the sensors  110 . A network location may take the form of, for example, an Internet Protocol (IP) address. With this information, the deception center  108  and the sensors  110  may be able to configure tunnels  120  to communicate with each other. 
     In some implementations, the network security system  100  does not include a security services provider  106 . In these implementations, the sensors  110  and the deception center  108  may be configured to locate each other by, for example, sending packets that each can recognize as coming for the other. Using these packets, the sensors  110  and deception center  108  may be able to learn their respective locations on the network. Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator can configure the sensors  110  with the network location of the deception center  108 , and vice versa. 
     In various implementations, the sensors  110  are a minimal combination of hardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection with the site network  104  and a tunnel  120  with the deception center  108 . For example, a sensor  110  may be constructed using a low-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system. In various implementations, the sensors  110  provide the deception center  108  with visibility into the site network  104 , such as for example being able to operate as a node in the site network  104 , and/or being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into the site network  104 , as described further below. Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors  110  may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on the site network  104  can be redirected to the deception center  108 , as is also described below. 
     In various implementations, the deception center  108  may be configured to profile the site network  104 , deploy deceptive security mechanisms for the site network  104 , detect suspected threats to the site network  104 , analyze the suspected threat, and analyze the site network  104  for exposure and/or vulnerability to the supposed threat. 
     To provide the site network  104 , the deception center  108  may include a deception profiler  130 . In various implementations, the deception profiler may  130  derive information  114  from the site network  104 , and determine, for example, the topology of the site network  104 , the network devices included in the site network  104 , the software and/or hardware configuration of each network device, and/or how the network is used at any given time. Using this information, the deception profiler  130  may determine one or more deceptive security mechanisms to deploy into the site network  104 . 
     In various implementations, the deception profiler may configure an emulated network  116  to emulate one or more computing systems. Using the tunnels  120  and sensors  110 , the emulated computing systems may be projected into the site network  104 , where they serve as deceptions. The emulated computing systems may include address deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. In some implementations, the emulated computing systems may be configured to resemble a portion of the network. In these implementations, this network portion may then be projected into the site network  104 . 
     In various implementations, a network threat detection engine  140  may monitor activity in the emulated network  116 , and look for attacks on the site network  104 . For example, the network threat detection engine  140  may look for unexpected access to the emulated computing systems in the emulated network  116 . The network threat detection engine  140  may also use information  114  extracted from the site network  104  to adjust the emulated network  116 , in order to make the deceptions more attractive to an attack, and/or in response to network activity that appears to be an attack. Should the network threat detection engine  140  determine that an attack may be taking place, the network threat detection engine  140  may cause network activity related to the attack to be redirected to and contained within the emulated network  116 . 
     In various implementations, the emulated network  116  is a self-contained, isolated, and closely monitored network, in which suspect network activity may be allowed to freely interact with emulated computing systems. In various implementations, questionable emails, files, and/or links may be released into the emulated network  116  to confirm that they are malicious, and/or to see what effect they have. Outside actors can also be allowed to access emulated system, steal data and user credentials, download malware, and conduct any other malicious activity. In this way, the emulated network  116  not only isolated a suspected attack from the site network  104 , but can also be used to capture information about an attack. Any activity caused by suspect network activity may be captured in, for example, a history of sent and received network packets, log files, and memory snapshots. 
     In various implementations, activity captured in the emulated network  116  may be analyzed using a targeted threat analysis engine  160 . The threat analysis engine  160  may examine data collected in the emulated network  116  and reconstruct the course of an attack. For example, the threat analysis engine  160  may correlate various events seen during the course of an apparent attack, including both malicious and innocuous events, and determine how an attacker infiltrated and caused harm in the emulated network  116 . In some cases, the threat analysis engine  160  may use threat intelligence  152  from the Internet  150  to identify and/or analyze an attack contained in the emulated network  116 . The threat analysis engine  160  may also confirm that suspect network activity was not an attack. The threat analysis engine  160  may produce indicators  162  that describe the suspect network activity, including indicating whether the suspect activity was or was not an actual threat. The threat analysis engine  160  may share these indicators  162  with the security community  180 , so that other networks can be defended from the attack. The threat analysis engine  160  may also send the indicators  162  to the security services provider  106 , so that the security services provider  106  can use the indicators  162  to defend other site networks. 
     In various implementations, the threat analysis engine  160  may also send threat indicators  162 , or similar data, to a behavioral analytics engine  170 . The behavioral analytics engine  170  may be configured to use the indicators  162  to probe  118  the site network  104 , and see whether the site network  104  has been exposed to the attack, or is vulnerable to the attack. For example, the behavioral analytics engine  170  may search the site network  104  for computing systems that resemble emulated computing systems in the emulated network  116  that were affected by the attack. In some implementations, the behavioral analytics engine  170  can also repair systems affected by the attack, or identify these systems to a network administrator. In some implementations, the behavioral analytics engine  170  can also reconfigure the site network&#39;s  104  security infrastructure to defend against the attack. 
     The behavioral analytics engine  170  can work in conjunction with a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)  172  system. In various implementations, SIEM includes software and/or services that can provide real-time analysis of security alerts generates by network hardware and applications. In various implementations, the deception center  108  can communicate with the SIEM  172  system to obtain information about computing and/or networking systems in the site network  104 . 
     Using deceptive security mechanisms, the network security system  100  may thus be able to distract and divert attacks on the site network  104 . The network security system  100  may also be able to allow, using the emulated network  116 , and attack to proceed, so that as much can be learned about the attack as possible. Information about the attack can then be used to find vulnerabilities in the site network  104 . Information about the attack can also be provided to the security community  180 , so that the attack can be thwarted elsewhere. 
     II. Customer Installations 
     The network security system, such as the deception-based system described above, may be flexibly implemented to accommodate different customer networks.  FIGS. 2A-2D  provide examples of different installation configurations  200   a - 200   d  that can be used for different customer networks  202 . A customer network  202  may generally be described as a network or group of networks that is controlled by a common entity, such as a business, a school, or a person. The customer network  202  may include one or more site networks  204 . The customer network&#39;s  202  site networks  204  may be located in one geographic location, may be behind a common firewall, and/or may be multiple subnets within one network. Alternatively or additionally, a customer network&#39;s  202  site networks  204  may be located in different geographic locations, and be connected to each other over various private and public networks, including the Internet  250 . 
     Different customer networks  202  may have different requirements regarding network security. For example, some customer networks  202  may have relatively open connections to outside networks such as the Internet  250 , while other customer networks  202  have very restricted access to outside networks. The network security system described in  FIG. 1  may be configurable to accommodate these variations. 
       FIG. 2A  illustrates one example of an installation configuration  200   a , where a deception center  208  is located within the customer network  202 . In this example, being located within the customer network  202  means that the deception center  208  is connected to the customer network  202 , and is able to function as a node in the customer network  202 . In this example, the deception center  208  may be located in the same building or within the same campus as the site network  204 . Alternatively or additionally, the deception center  208  may be located within the customer network  202  but at a different geographic location than the site network  204 . The deception center  208  thus may be within the same subnet as the site network  204 , or may be connected to a different subnet within the customer network. 
     In various implementations, the deception center  208  communicates with sensors  210 , which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in the site network over network tunnels  220  In this example, the network tunnels  220  may cross one or more intermediate within the customer network  202 . 
     In this example, the deception center  208  is able to communicate with a security services provider  206  that is located outside the customer network  202 , such as on the Internet  250 . The security services provider  206  may provide configuration and other information for the deception center  208 . In some cases, the security services provider  206  may also assist in coordinating the security for the customer network  202  when the customer network  202  includes multiple site networks  204  located in various geographic areas. 
       FIG. 2B  illustrates another example of an installation configuration  200   b , where the deception center  208  is located outside the customer network  202 . In this example, the deception center  208  may connected to the customer network  202  over the Internet  250 . In some implementations, the deception center  208  may be co-located with a security services provider, and/or may be provided by the security services provider. 
     In this example, the tunnels  220  connect the deception center  208  to the sensors  210  through a gateway  262 . A gateway is a point in a network that connects the network to another network. For example, in this example, the gateway  262  connects the customer network  202  to outside networks, such as the Internet  250 . The gateway  262  may provide a firewall, which may provide some security for the customer network  202 . The tunnels  220  may be able to pass through the firewall using a secure protocol, such as Secure Socket Shell (SSH) and similar protocols. Secure protocols typically require credentials, which may be provided by the operator of the customer network  202 . 
       FIG. 2C  illustrates another example of an installation configuration  200   c , where the deception center  208  is located inside the customer network  202  but does not have access to outside networks. In some implementations, the customer network  202  may require a high level of network security. In these implementations, the customer network&#39;s  202  connections to the other networks may be very restricted. Thus, in this example, the deception center  208  is located within the customer network  202 , and does not need to communicate with outside networks. The deception center  208  may use the customer networks  202  internal network to coordinate with and establish tunnels  220  to the sensors  210 . Alternatively or additionally, a network administrator may configure the deception center  208  and sensors  210  to enable them to establish the tunnels  220 . 
       FIG. 2D  illustrates another example of an installation configuration  200   d . In this example, the deception center  208  is located inside the customer network  202 , and further is directly connected to the site network  204 . Directly connected, in this example, can mean that the deception center  208  is connected to a router, hub, switch, repeater, or other network infrastructure device that is part of the site network  204 . Directly connected can alternatively or additionally mean that the deception center  208  is connected to the site network  204  using a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN). For example, the deception center  208  can be connected to VLAN trunk port. In these examples, the deception center  208  can project deceptions into the site network  204  with or without the use of sensors, such as are illustrated in  FIGS. 2A-2C . 
     In the example of  FIG. 2D , the deception center  208  can also optionally be connected to an outside security services provider  206 . The security services provider  206  can manage the deception center  208 , including providing updated security data, sending firmware upgrades, and/or coordinating different deception centers  208  for different site networks  204  belonging to the same customer network  202 . In some implementations, the deception center  208  can operate without the assistances of an outside security services provider  206 . 
     III. Customer Networks 
     The network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can be used for variety of customer networks. As noted above, customer networks can come in wide variety of configurations. For example, a customer network may have some of its network infrastructure “in the cloud.” A customer network can also include a wide variety of devices, including what may be considered “traditional” network equipment, such as servers and routers, and non-traditional, “Internet-of-Things” devices, such as kitchen appliances. Other examples of customer networks include established industrial networks, or a mix of industrial networks and computer networks. 
       FIG. 3A-3B  illustrate examples of customer networks  302   a - 302   b  where some of the customer networks&#39;  302   a - 302   b  network infrastructure is “in the cloud,” that is, is provided by a cloud services provider  354 . These example customer networks  302   a - 302   b  may be defended by a network security system that includes a deception center  308  and sensors  310 , which may also be referred to as deception sensors, and may also include an off-site security services provider  306 . 
     A cloud services provider is a company that offers some component of cloud computer—such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) or Platform as Service (PaaS) to other businesses and individuals. A cloud services provider may have a configurable pool of computing resources, including, for example, networks, servers, storage, applications, and services. These computing resources can be available on demand, and can be rapidly provisioned. While a cloud services provider&#39;s resources may be shared between the cloud service provider&#39;s customers, from the perspective of each customer, the individual customer may appear to have a private network within the cloud, including for example having dedicated subnets and IP addresses. 
     In the examples illustrated in  FIGS. 3A-3B , the customer networks&#39;  302   a - 302   b  network is partially in a site network  304 , and partially provided by the cloud services provider  354 . In some cases, the site network  304  is the part of the customer networks  302   a - 302   b  that is located at a physical site owned or controlled by the customer network  302   a - 302   b . For example, the site network  304  may be a network located in the customer network&#39;s  302   a - 302   b  office or campus. Alternatively or additionally, the site network  304  may include network equipment owned and/or operated by the customer network  302   a - 302   b  that may be located anywhere. For example, the customer networks&#39;  302   a - 302   b  operations may consist of a few laptops owned by the customer networks  302   a - 302   b , which are used from the private homes of the lap tops&#39; users, from a co-working space, from a coffee shop, or from some other mobile location. 
     In various implementations, sensors  310  may be installed in the site network  304 . The sensors  310  can be used by the network security system to project deceptions into the site network  304 , monitor the site network  304  for attacks, and/or to divert suspect attacks into the deception center  308 . 
     In some implementations, the sensors  310  may also be able to project deceptions into the part of the customer networks  302   a - 302   b  network that is provided by the cloud services provider  354 . In most cases, it may not be possible to install sensors  310  inside the network of the cloud services provider  354 , but in some implementations, this may not be necessary. For example, as discussed further below, the deception center  308  can acquire the subnet address of the network provided by the cloud services provider  354 , and use that subnet address the create deceptions. Though these deceptions are projected form the sensors  310  installed in the site network  304 , the deceptions may appear to be within the subnet provided by the cloud services provider  354 . 
     In illustrated examples, the deception center  308  is installed inside the customer networks  302   a - 302   b . Though not illustrated here, the deception center  308  can also be installed outside the customer networks  302   a - 302   b , such as for example somewhere on the Internet  350 . In some implementations, the deception center  308  may reside at the same location as the security service provider  306 . When located outside the customer networks  302   a - 302   b , the deception center  308  may connect to the sensors  310  in the site network  304  over various public and/or private networks. 
       FIG. 3A  illustrates an example of a configuration  300   a  where the customer network&#39;s  302   a  network infrastructure is located in the cloud and the customer network  302   a  also has a substantial site network  304 . In this example, the customer may have an office where the site network  304  is located, and where the customer&#39;s employees access and use the customer network  302   a . For example, developers, sales and marketing personnel, human resources and finance employees, may access the customer network  302   a  from the site network  304 . In the illustrated example, the customer may obtain applications and services from the cloud services provider  354 . Alternatively or additionally, the cloud services provider  354  may provide data center services for the customer. For example, the cloud services provider  354  may host the customer&#39;s repository of data (e.g., music provided by a streaming music service, or video provided by a streaming video provider). In this example, the customer&#39;s own customers may be provided data directly from the cloud services provider  354 , rather than from the customer network  302   a.    
       FIG. 3B  illustrates and example of a configuration  300   b  where the customer network&#39;s  302   b  network is primarily or sometimes entirely in the cloud. In this example, the customer network&#39;s  302   b  site network  304  may include a few laptops, or one or two desktop servers. These computing devices may be used by the customer&#39;s employees to conduct the customer&#39;s business, while the cloud services provider  354  provides the majority of the network infrastructure needed by the customer. For example, a very small company may have no office space and no dedicated location, and have as computing resources only the laptops used by its employees. This small company may use the cloud services provider  354  to provide its fixed network infrastructure. The small company may access this network infrastructure by connecting a laptop to any available network connection (e.g., in a co-working space, library, or coffee shop). When no laptops are connected to the cloud services provider  354 , the customer network  302   b  may be existing entirely within the cloud. 
     In the example provided above, the site network  304  can be found wherever the customer&#39;s employees connect to a network and can access the cloud services provider  354 . Similarly, the sensors  310  can be co-located with the employees&#39; laptops. For example, whenever an employee connects to a network, she can enable a sensor  310 , which can then project deceptions into the network around her. Alternatively or additionally, sensors  310  can be installed in a fixed location (such as the home of an employee of the customer) from which they can access the cloud services provider  354  and project deceptions into the network provided by the cloud services provider  354 . 
     The network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can provide network security for a variety of customer networks, which may include a diverse array of devices.  FIG. 4  illustrates an example of an enterprise network  400 , which is one such network that can be defended by a network security system. The example enterprise network  400  illustrates examples of various network devices and network clients that may be included in an enterprise network. The enterprise network  400  may include more or fewer network devices and/or network clients, and/or may include network devices, additional networks including remote sites  452 , and/or systems not illustrated here. Enterprise networks may include networks installed at a large site, such as a corporate office, a university campus, a hospital, a government office, or a similar entity. An enterprise network may include multiple physical sites. Access to an enterprise networks is typically restricted, and may require authorized users to enter a password or otherwise authenticate before using the network. A network such as illustrated by the example enterprise network  400  may also be found at small sites, such as in a small business. 
     The enterprise network  400  may be connected to an external network  450 . The external network  450  may be a public network, such as the Internet. A public network is a network that has been made accessible to any device that can connect to it. A public network may have unrestricted access, meaning that, for example, no password or other authentication is required to connect to it. The external network  450  may include third-party telecommunication lines, such as phone lines, broadcast coaxial cable, fiber optic cables, satellite communications, cellular communications, and the like. The external network  450  may include any number of intermediate network devices, such as switches, routers, gateways, servers, and/or controllers that are not directly part of the enterprise network  400  but that facilitate communication between the network  400  and other network-connected entities, such as a remote site  452 . 
     Remote sites  452  are networks and/or individual computers that are generally located outside the enterprise network  400 , and which may be connected to the enterprise network  400  through intermediate networks, but that function as if within the enterprise network  400  and connected directly to it. For example, an employee may connect to the enterprise network  400  while at home, using various secure protocols, and/or by connecting to a Virtual Private Network (VPN) provided by the enterprise network  400 . While the employee&#39;s computer is connected, the employee&#39;s home is a remote site  452 . Alternatively or additionally, the enterprise network&#39;s  400  owner may have a satellite office with a small internal network. This satellite office&#39;s network may have a fixed connection to the enterprise network  400  over various intermediate networks. This satellite office can also be considered a remote site. 
     The enterprise network  400  may be connected to the external network  450  using a gateway device  404 . The gateway device  404  may include a firewall or similar system for preventing unauthorized access while allowing authorized access to the enterprise network  400 . Examples of gateway devices include routers, modems (e.g. cable, fiber optic, dial-up, etc.), and the like. 
     The gateway device  404  may be connected to a switch  406   a . The switch  406   a  provides connectivity between various devices in the enterprise network  400 . In this example, the switch  406   a  connects together the gateway device  404 , various servers  408 ,  412 ,  414 ,  416 ,  418 , an another switch  406   b . A switch typically has multiple ports, and functions to direct packets received on one port to another port. In some implementations, the gateway device  404  and the switch  406   a  may be combined into a single device. 
     Various servers may be connected to the switch  406   a . For example, a print server  408  may be connected to the switch  406   a . The print server  408  may provide network access to a number of printers  410 . Client devices connected to the enterprise network  400  may be able to access one of the printers  410  through the printer server  408 . 
     Other examples of servers connected to the switch  406   a  include a file server  412 , database server  414 , and email server  416 . The file server  412  may provide storage for and access to data. This data may be accessible to client devices connected to the enterprise network  400 . The database server  414  may store one or more databases, and provide services for accessing the databases. The email server  416  may host an email program or service, and may also store email for users on the enterprise network  400 . 
     As yet another example, a server rack  418  may be connected to the switch  406   a . The server rack  418  may house one or more rack-mounted servers. The server rack  418  may have one connection to the switch  406   a , or may have multiple connections to the switch  406   a . The servers in the server rack  418  may have various purposes, including providing computing resources, file storage, database storage and access, and email, among others. 
     An additional switch  406   b  may also be connected to the first switch  406   a . The additional switch  406   b  may be provided to expand the capacity of the network. A switch typically has a limited number of ports (e.g., 8, 16, 32, 64 or more ports). In most cases, however, a switch can direct traffic to and from another switch, so that by connecting the additional switch  406   b  to the first switch  406   a , the number of available ports can be expanded. 
     In this example, a server  420  is connected to the additional switch  406   b . The server  420  may manage network access for a number of network devices or client devices. For example, the server  420  may provide network authentication, arbitration, prioritization, load balancing, and other management services as needed to manage multiple network devices accessing the enterprise network  400 . The server  420  may be connected to a hub  422 . The hub  422  may include multiple ports, each of which may provide a wired connection for a network or client device. A hub is typically a simpler device than a switch, and may be used when connecting a small number of network devices together. In some cases, a switch can be substituted for the hub  422 . In this example, the hub  422  connects desktop computers  424  and laptop computers  426  to the enterprise network  400 . In this example, each of the desktop computers  424  and laptop computers  426  are connected to the hub  422  using a physical cable. 
     In this example, the additional switch  406   b  is also connected to a wireless access point  428 . The wireless access point  428  provides wireless access to the enterprise network  400  for wireless-enabled network or client devices. Examples of wireless-enabled network and client devices include laptops  430 , tablet computers  432 , and smart phones  434 , among others. In some implementations, the wireless access point  428  may also provide switching and/or routing functionality. 
     The example enterprise network  400  of  FIG. 4  is defended from network threats by a network threat detection and analysis system, which uses deception security mechanisms to attract and divert attacks on the network. The deceptive security mechanisms may be controlled by and inserted into the enterprise network  400  using a deception center  498  and sensors  490 , which may also be referred to as deception sensors, installed in various places in the enterprise network  400 . In some implementations, the deception center  498  and the sensors  490  interact with a security services provider  496  located outside of the enterprise network  400 . The deception center  498  may also obtain or exchange data with sources located on external networks  450 , such as the Internet. 
     In various implementations, the sensors  490  are a minimal combination of hardware and/or software, sufficient to form a network connection with the enterprise network  400  and a network tunnel  480  with the deception center  498 . For example, a sensor  490  may be constructed using a low-power processor, a network interface, and a simple operating system. In some implementations, any of the devices in the enterprise network (e.g., the servers  408 ,  412 ,  416 ,  418  the printers  410 , the computing devices  424 ,  426 ,  430 ,  432 ,  434 , or the network infrastructure devices  404 ,  406   a ,  406   b ,  428 ) can be configured to act as a sensor. 
     In various implementations, one or more sensors  490  can be installed anywhere in the enterprise network  400 , include being attached switches  406   a , hubs  422 , wireless access points  428 , and so on. The sensors  490  can further be configured to be part of one or more VLANs. The sensors  490  provide the deception center  498  with visibility into the enterprise network  400 , such as for example being able to operate as a node in the enterprise network  400 , and/or being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into the enterprise network  400 . Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors  490  may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on the enterprise network  400  can be redirected to the deception center  498 . 
     The deception center  498  provides network security for the enterprise network  400  by deploying security mechanisms into the enterprise network  400 , monitoring the enterprise network  400  through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for the enterprise network  400 , in various implementations the deception center  498  may communicate with sensors  490  installed in the enterprise network  400 , using, for example, network tunnels  480 . The tunnels  480  may allow the deception center  498  to be located in a different sub-network (“subnet”) than the enterprise network  400 , on a different network, or remote from the enterprise network  400 , with intermediate networks between the deception center  498  and the enterprise network  400 . In some implementations, the enterprise network  400  can include more than one deception center  498 . In some implementations, the deception center may be located off-site, such as in an external network  450 . 
     In some implementations, the security services provider  496  may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, the security services provider  496  may communicate with multiple deception centers  498  that each provide security for a different enterprise network  400  for the same organization. As another example, the security services provider  496  may coordinate the activities of the deception center  498  and the sensors  490 , such as enabling the deception center  498  and the sensors  490  to connect to each other. In some implementations, the security services provider  496  is located outside the enterprise network  400 . In some implementations, the security services provider  496  is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, the security services provider  496  may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider  496  is controlled by the same entity as that controls the enterprise network  400 . In some implementations, the network security system does not include a security services provider  496 . 
       FIG. 4  illustrates one example of what can be considered a “traditional” network, that is, a network that is based on the interconnection of computers. In various implementations, a network security system, such as the deception-based system discussed above, can also be used to defend “non-traditional” networks that include devices other than traditional computers, such as for example mechanical, electrical, or electromechanical devices, sensors, actuators, and control systems. Such “non-traditional” networks may be referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). The Internet of Things encompasses newly-developed, every-day devices designed to be networked (e.g., drones, self-driving automobiles, etc.) as well as common and long-established machinery that has augmented to be connected to a network (e.g., home appliances, traffic signals, etc.). 
       FIG. 5  illustrates a general example of an IoT network  500 . The example IoT network  500  can be implemented wherever sensors, actuators, and control systems can be found. For example, the example IoT network  500  can be implemented for buildings, roads and bridges, agriculture, transportation and logistics, utilities, air traffic control, factories, and private homes, among others. In various implementations, the IoT network  500  includes cloud service  554  that collects data from various sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , located in various locations. Using the collected data, the cloud service  554  can provide services  520 , control of machinery and equipment  514 , exchange of data with traditional network devices  516 , and/or exchange of data with user devices  518 . In some implementations, the cloud service  554  can work with a deception center  598  and/or a security service provider  596  to provide security for the network  500 . 
     A cloud service, such as the illustrated cloud service  554 , is a resource provided over the Internet  550 . Sometimes synonymous with “cloud computing,” the resource provided by the cloud services is in the “cloud” in that the resource is provided by hardware and/or software at some location remote from the place where the resource is used. Often, the hardware and software of the cloud service is distributed across multiple physical locations. Generally, the resource provided by the cloud service is not directly associated with specific hardware or software resources, such that use of the resource can continue when the hardware or software is changed. The resource provided by the cloud service can often also be shared between multiple users of the cloud service, without affecting each user&#39;s use. The resource can often also be provided as needed or on-demand. Often, the resource provided by the cloud service  554  is automated, or otherwise capable of operating with little or no assistance from human operators. 
     Examples of cloud services include software as a service (SaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), desktop as a service (DaaS), managed software as a service (MSaaS), mobile backend as a service (MBaaS), and information technology management as a service (ITMaas). Specific examples of cloud services include data centers, such as those operated by Amazon Web Services and Google Web Services, among others, that provide general networking and software services. Other examples of cloud services include those associated with smartphone applications, or “apps,” such as for example apps that track fitness and health, apps that allow a user to remotely manage her home security system or thermostat, and networked gaming apps, among others. In each of these examples, the company that provides the app may also provide cloud-based storage of application data, cloud-based software and computing resources, and/or networking services. In some cases, the company manages the cloud services provided by the company, including managing physical hardware resources. In other cases, the company leases networking time from a data center provider. 
     In some cases, the cloud service  554  is part of one integrated system, run by one entity. For example, the cloud service  554  can be part of a traffic control system. In this example, sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  can be used to monitor traffic and road conditions. In this example, the cloud service  554  can attempt to optimize the flow of traffic and also provide traffic safety. For example, the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  can include a sensor  512   a  on a bridge that monitors ice formation. When the sensor  512   a  detects that ice has formed on the bridge, the sensor  512   a  can alert the cloud service  554 . The cloud service  554 , can respond by interacting with machinery and equipment  514  that manages traffic in the area of the bridge. For example, the cloud service  554  can turn on warning signs, indicating to drivers that the bridge is icy. Generally, the interaction between the sensor  512   a , the cloud service  554 , and the machinery and equipment  514  is automated, requiring little or no management by human operators. 
     In various implementations, the cloud service  554  collects or receives data from sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , distributed across one or more networks. The sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  include devices capable of “sensing” information, such as air or water temperature, air pressure, weight, motion, humidity, fluid levels, noise levels, and so on. The sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  can alternatively or additionally include devices capable of receiving input, such as cameras, microphones, touch pads, keyboards, key pads, and so on. In some cases, a group of sensors  510   a - 510   d  may be common to one customer network  502 . For example, the sensors  510   a - 510   d  may be motion sensors, traffic cameras, temperature sensors, and other sensors for monitoring traffic in a city&#39;s metro area. In this example, the sensors  510   a - 510   d  can be located in one area of the city, or be distribute across the city, and be connected to a common network. In these cases, the sensors  510   a - 510   d  can communicate with a gateway device  562 , such as a network gateway. The gateway device  562  can further communicate with the cloud service  554 . 
     In some cases, in addition to receiving data from sensors  510   a - 510   d  in one customer network  502 , the cloud service  554  can also receive data from sensors  512   a - 512   d  in other sites  504   a - 504   c . These other sites  504   a - 504   c  can be part of the same customer network  502  or can be unrelated to the customer network  502 . For example, the other sites  504   a - 504   c  can each be the metro area of a different city, and the sensors  512   a - 512   d  can be monitoring traffic for each individual city. 
     Generally, communication between the cloud service  554  and the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  is bidirectional. For example, the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  can send information to the cloud service  554 . The cloud service  554  can further provide configuration and control information to the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d . For example, the cloud service  554  can enable or disable a sensor  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  or modify the operation of a sensor  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , such as changing the format of the data provided by a sensor  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  or upgrading the firmware of a sensor  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d.    
     In various implementations, the cloud service  554  can operate on the data received from the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , and use this data to interact with services  520  provided by the cloud service  554 , or to interact with machinery and equipment  514 , network devices  516 , and/or user devices  518  available to the cloud service  554 . Services  520  can include software-based services, such as cloud-based applications, website services, or data management services. Services  520  can alternatively or additionally include media, such as streaming video or music or other entertainment services. Services  520  can also include delivery and/or coordination of physical assets, such as for example package delivery, direction of vehicles for passenger pick-up and drop-off, or automate re-ordering and re-stocking of supplies. In various implementations, services  520  may be delivered to and used by the machinery and equipment  514 , the network devices  516 , and/or the user devices  518 . 
     In various implementations, the machinery and equipment  514  can include physical systems that can be controlled by the cloud service  554 . Examples of machinery and equipment  514  include factory equipment, trains, electrical street cars, self-driving cars, traffic lights, gate and door locks, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service  554  can provide configuration and control of the machinery and equipment  514  in an automated fashion. 
     The network devices  516  can include traditional networking equipment, such as server computers, data storage devices, routers, switches, gateways, and so on. In various implementations, the cloud service  554  can provide control and management of the network devices  516 , such as for example automated upgrading of software, security monitoring, or asset tracking. Alternatively or additionally, in various implementations the cloud service  554  can exchange data with the network devices  516 , such as for example providing websites, providing stock trading data, or providing online shopping resources, among others. Alternatively or additionally, the network devices  516  can include computing systems used by the cloud service provider to manage the cloud service  554 . 
     The user devices  518  can include individual personal computers, smart phones, tablet devices, smart watches, fitness trackers, medical devices, and so on that can be associated with an individual user. The cloud service  554  can exchange data with the user devices  518 , such as for example provide support for applications installed on the user devices  518 , providing websites, providing streaming media, providing directional navigation services, and so on. Alternatively or additionally, the cloud service  554  may enable a user to use a user device  518  to access and/or view other devices, such as the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , the machinery and equipment  514 , or the network devices  516 . 
     In various implementations, the services  520 , machinery and equipment  514 , network devices  516 , and user devices  518  may be part of one customer network  506 . In some cases, this customer network  506  is the same as the customer network  502  that includes the sensors  510   a - 510   d . In some cases, the services  520 , machinery and equipment  514 , network devices  516 , and user devices  518  are part of the same network, and may instead be part of various other networks  506 . 
     In various implementations, customer networks can include a deception center  598 . The deception center  598  provides network security for the IoT network  500  by deploying security mechanisms into the IoT network  500 , monitoring the IoT network  500  through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. To provide security for the IoT network  500 , in various implementations the deception center  598  may communicate with the sensors  510   a - 5106   d ,  512   a - 512   d  installed in the IoT network  500 , for example through the cloud service  554 . In some implementations, the IoT network  500  can include more than one deception center  598 . For example, each of customer network  502  and customer networks or other networks  506  can include a deception center  598 . 
     In some implementations, the deception center  598  and the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  interact with a security services provider  596 . In some implementations, the security services provider  596  may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple site networks, possibly including site networks controlled by different organizations. For example, the security services provider  596  may communicate with multiple deception centers  598  that each provide security for a different IoT network  500  for the same organization. As another example, the security services provider  596  may coordinate the activities of the deception center  598  and the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d , such as enabling the deception center  598  and the sensors  510   a - 510   d ,  512   a - 512   d  to connect to each other. In some implementations, the security services provider  596  is integrated into the cloud service  554 . In some implementations, the security services provider  596  is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, the security services provider  596  may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider  596  is controlled by the same entity as that controls the IoT network  500 . In some implementations, the network security system does not include a security services provider  596 . 
     IoT networks can also include mixed networks of non-traditional devices.  FIG. 6  illustrates an example of a customer network that is a mixed network  600 , here implemented in a private home. A network for a home is an example of mixed network that may have both traditional and non-traditional network devices connected to the network  600 , in keeping with an Internet-of-Things approach. Specifically, Internet-of-Things networks can include “traditional” network devices, which use a network protocol based on TCP/IP to communicate with a network. “Non-traditional” network devices, on the other hand, may use networking protocols that are not based on TCP/IP, such as proprietary protocols, legacy protocols, home or industrial automation protocols, and others. In some cases, non-traditional networking protocols may not be directly compatible with TCP/IP-based protocols (e.g., a non-traditional network device may not be able to communicate with a TCP/IP network without an adapter). 
     Home networks are also an example of networks that are often implemented with minimal security. The average homeowner is not likely to be a sophisticated network security expert, and may rely on his modem or router to provide at least some basic security. The homeowner, however, is likely able to at least set up a basic home network. A deception-based network security device may be as simple to set up as a home router or base station, yet provide sophisticated security for the network  600 . 
     The example network  600  of  FIG. 6  may be a single network, or may include multiple sub-networks. These sub-networks may or may not communicate with each other. For example, the network  600  may include a sub-network that uses the electrical wiring in the house as a communication channel. Devices configured to communicate in this way may connect to the network using electrical outlets, which also provide the devices with power. The sub-network may include a central controller device, which may coordinate the activities of devices connected to the electrical network, including turning devices on and off at particular times. One example of a protocol that uses the electrical wiring as a communication network is X10. 
     The network  600  may also include wireless and wired networks, built into the home or added to the home solely for providing a communication medium for devices in the house. Examples of wireless, radio-based networks include networks using protocols such as Z-Wave™, Zigbee™ (also known as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.4), Bluetooth™, and Wi-Fi (also known as IEEE 802.11), among others. Wireless networks can be set up by installing a wireless base station in the house. Alternatively or additionally, a wireless network can be established by having at least two devices in the house that are able to communicate with each other using the same protocol. 
     Examples of wired networks include Ethernet (also known as IEEE 802.3), token ring (also known as IEEE 802.5), Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), and Attached Resource Computer Network (ARCNET), among others. A wired network can be added to the house by running cabling through the walls, ceilings, and/or floors, and placing jacks in various rooms that devices can connect to with additional cables. The wired network can be extended using routers, switches, and/or hubs. In many cases, wired networks may be interconnected with wireless networks, with the interconnected networks operating as one seamless network. For example, an Ethernet network may include a wireless base station that provides a Wi-Fi signal for devices in the house. 
     As noted above, a mixed network  600  implemented in a home is one that may include both traditional network devices and non-traditional, everyday electronics and appliances that have also been connected to the network  600 . Examples of rooms where one may find non-traditional devices connected to the network are the kitchen and laundry rooms. For example, in the kitchen a refrigerator  604 , oven  606 , microwave  608 , and dishwasher  610  may be connected to the network  600 , and in the laundry room a washing machine  612  may be connected to the network  600 . By attaching these appliances to the network  600 , the homeowner can monitor the activity of each device (e.g., whether the dishes are clean, the current state of a turkey in the oven, or the washing machine cycle) or change the operation of each device without needing to be in the same room or even be at home. The appliances can also be configured to resupply themselves. For example, the refrigerator  604  may detect that a certain product is running low, and may place an order with a grocery delivery service for the product to be restocked. 
     The network  600  may also include environmental appliances, such as a thermostat  602  and a water heater  614 . By having these devices connected to the network  600 , the homeowner can monitor the current environment of the house (e.g., the air temperature or the hot water temperature), and adjust the settings of these appliances while at home or away. Furthermore, software on the network  600  or on the Internet  650  may track energy usage for the heating and cooling units and the water heater  614 . This software may also track energy usage for the other devices, such as the kitchen and laundry room appliances. The energy usage of each appliance may be available to the homeowner over the network  600 . 
     In the living room, various home electronics may be on the network  600 . These electronics may have once been fully analog or may have been standalone devices, but now include a network connection for exchanging data with other devices in the network  600  or with the Internet  650 . The home electronics in this example include a television  618 , a gaming system  620 , and a media device  622  (e.g., a video and/or audio player). Each of these devices may play media hosted, for example, on network attached storage  636  located elsewhere in the network  600 , or media hosted on the Internet  650 . 
     The network  600  may also include home safety and security devices, such as a smoke detector  616 , an electronic door lock  624 , and a home security system  626 . Having these devices on the network may allow the homeowner to track the information monitored and/or sensed by these devices, both when the homeowner is at home and away from the house. For example, the homeowner may be able to view a video feed from a security camera  628 . When the safety and security devices detect a problem, they may also inform the homeowner. For example, the smoke detector  616  may send an alert to the homeowner&#39;s smartphone when it detects smoke, or the electronic door lock  624  may alert the homeowner when there has been a forced entry. Furthermore, the homeowner may be able to remotely control these devices. For example, the homeowner may be able to remotely open the electronic door lock  624  for a family member who has been locked out. The safety and security devices may also use their connection to the network to call the fire department or police if necessary. 
     Another non-traditional device that may be found in the network  600  is the family car  630 . The car  630  is one of many devices, such as laptop computers  638 , tablet computers  646 , and smartphones  642 , that connect to the network  600  when at home, and when not at home, may be able to connect to the network  600  over the Internet  650 . Connecting to the network  600  over the Internet  650  may provide the homeowner with remote access to his network. The network  600  may be able to provide information to the car  630  and receive information from the car  630  while the car is away. For example, the network  600  may be able to track the location of the car  630  while the car  630  is away. 
     In the home office and elsewhere around the house, this example network  600  includes some traditional devices connected to the network  600 . For example, the home office may include a desktop computer  632  and network attached storage  636 . Elsewhere around the house, this example includes a laptop computer  638  and handheld devices such as a tablet computer  646  and a smartphone  642 . In this example, a person  640  is also connected to the network  600 . The person  640  may be connected to the network  600  wirelessly through personal devices worn by the person  640 , such as a smart watch, fitness tracker, or heart rate monitor. The person  640  may alternatively or additionally be connected to the network  600  through a network-enabled medical device, such as a pacemaker, heart monitor, or drug delivery system, which may be worn or implanted. 
     The desktop computer  632 , laptop computer  638 , tablet computer  646 , and/or smartphone  642  may provide an interface that allows the homeowner to monitor and control the various devices connected to the network. Some of these devices, such as the laptop computer  638 , the tablet computer  646 , and the smartphone  642  may also leave the house, and provide remote access to the network  600  over the Internet  650 . In many cases, however, each device on the network may have its own software for monitoring and controlling only that one device. For example, the thermostat  602  may use one application while the media device  622  uses another, and the wireless network provides yet another. Furthermore, it may be the case that the various sub-networks in the house do not communicate with each other, and/or are viewed and controlled using software that is unique to each sub-network. In many cases, the homeowner may not have one unified and easily understood view of his entire home network  600 . 
     The mixed network  600  in this example may also include network infrastructure devices, such as a router or switch (not shown) and a wireless base station  634 . The wireless base station  634  may provide a wireless network for the house. The router or switch may provide a wired network for the house. The wireless base station  634  may be connected to the router or switch to provide a wireless network that is an extension of the wired network. The router or switch may be connected to a gateway device  648  that connects the network  600  to other networks, including the Internet  650 . In some cases, a router or switch may be integrated into the gateway device  648 . The gateway device  648  is a cable modem, digital subscriber line (DSL) modem, optical modem, analog modem, or some other device that connects the network  600  to an Internet Services Provider (ISP). The ISP may provide access to the Internet  650 . Typically, a home network only has one gateway device  648 . In some cases, the network  600  may not be connected to any networks outside of the house. In these cases, information about the network  600  and control of devices in the network  600  may not be available when the homeowner is not connected to the network  600 ; that is, the homeowner may not have access to his network  600  over the Internet  650 . 
     Typically, the gateway device  648  includes a hardware and/or software firewall. A firewall monitors incoming and outgoing network traffic and, by applying security rules to the network traffic, attempts to keep harmful network traffic out of the network  600 . In many cases, a firewall is the only security system protecting the network  600 . While a firewall may work for some types of intrusion attempts originating outside the network  600 , the firewall may not block all intrusion mechanisms, particularly intrusions mechanisms hidden in legitimate network traffic. Furthermore, while a firewall may block intrusions originating on the Internet  650 , the firewall may not detect intrusions originating from within the network  600 . For example, an infiltrator may get into the network  600  by connecting to signal from the Wi-Fi base station  634 . Alternatively, the infiltrator may connect to the network  600  by physically connecting, for example, to the washing machine  612 . The washing machine  612  may have a port that a service technician can connect to service the machine. Alternatively or additionally, the washing machine  612  may have a simple Universal Serial Bus (USB) port. Once an intruder has gained access to the washing machine  612 , the intruder may have access to the rest of the network  600 . 
     To provide more security for the network  600 , a deception-based network security device  660  can be added to the network  600 . In some implementations, the security device  660  is a standalone device that can be added to the network  600  by connecting it to a router or switch. In some implementations, the security device  660  can alternatively or additionally be connected to the network&#39;s  600  wireless sub-network by powering on the security device  660  and providing it with Wi-Fi credentials. The security device  660  may have a touchscreen, or a screen and a keypad, for inputting Wi-Fi credentials. Alternatively or additionally, the homeowner may be able to enter network information into the security device by logging into the security device  660  over a Bluetooth™ or Wi-Fi signal using software on a smartphone, tablet, or laptop, or using a web browser. In some implementations, the security device  660  can be connected to a sub-network running over the home&#39;s electrical wiring by connecting the security device  660  to a power outlet. In some implementations, the security device  660  may have ports, interfaces, and/or radio antennas for connecting to the various sub-networks that can be included in the network  600 . This may be useful, for example, when the sub-networks do not communicate with each other, or do not communicate with each other seamlessly. Once powered on and connected, the security device  660  may self-configure and monitor the security of each sub-network in the network  600  that it is connected to. 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may be configured to connect between the gateway device  648  and the network&#39;s  600  primary router, and/or between the gateway device  648  and the gateway device&#39;s  648  connection to the wall. Connected in one or both of these locations, the security device  660  may be able to control the network&#39;s  600  connection with outside networks. For example, the security device can disconnect the network  600  from the Internet  650 . 
     In some implementations, the security device  660 , instead of being implemented as a standalone device, may be integrated into one or more of the appliances, home electronics, or computing devices (in this example network  600 ), or in some other device not illustrated here. For example, the security device  660  or the functionality of the security device  660  may be incorporated into the gateway device  648  or a desktop computer  632  or a laptop computer  638 . As another example, the security device  660  can be integrated into a kitchen appliance (e.g., the refrigerator  604  or microwave  608 ), a home media device (e.g., the television  618  or gaming system  620 ), or the home security system  626 . In some implementations, the security device  660  may be a printed circuit board that can be added to another device without requiring significant changes to the other device. In some implementations, the security device  660  may be implemented using an Application Specific 
     Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that can be added to the electronics of a device. In some implementations, the security device  660  may be implemented as a software module or modules that can run concurrently with the operating system or firmware of a networked device. In some implementations, the security device  660  may have a physical or virtual security barrier that prevents access to it by the device that it is integrated into. In some implementations, the security device&#39;s  660  presence in another device may be hidden from the device into which the security device  660  is integrated. 
     In various implementations, the security device  660  may scan the network  600  to determine which devices are present in the network  600 . Alternatively or additionally, the security device  660  may communicate with a central controller in the network  600  (or multiple central controllers, when there are sub-networks, each with their own central controller) to learn which devices are connected to the network  600 . In some implementations, the security device  660  may undergo a learning period, during which the security device  660  learns the normal activity of the network  600 , such as what time of day appliances and electronics are used, what they are used for, and/or what data is transferred to and from these devices. During the learning period, the security device  660  may alert the homeowner to any unusual or suspicious activity. The homeowner may indicate that this activity is acceptable, or may indicate that the activity is an intrusion. As described below, the security device  660  may subsequently take preventive action against the intrusion. 
     Once the security device  660  has learned the topology and/or activity of the network  600 , the security device  660  may be able to provide deception-based security for the network  600 . In some implementations, the security device  660  may deploy security mechanisms that are configured to emulate devices that could be found in the network  600 . In some implementations, the security device  660  may monitor activity on the network  600 , including watching the data sent between the various devices on the network  600 , and between the devices and the Internet  650 . The security device  660  may be looking for activity that is unusual, unexpected, or readily identifiable as suspect. Upon detecting suspicious activity in the network  600 , the security device  660  may deploy deceptive security mechanisms. 
     In some implementations, the deceptive security mechanisms are software processes running on the security device  660  that emulate devices that may be found in the network  600 . In some implementations, the security device  660  may be assisted in emulating the security devices by another device on the network  600 , such as the desktop computer  632 . From the perspective of devices connected to the network  600 , the security mechanisms appear just like any other device on the network, including, for example, having an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a Media Access Control (MAC) address, and/or some other identification information, having an identifiable device type, and responding to or transmitting data just as would the device being emulated. The security mechanisms may be emulated by the security device  660  itself; thus, while, from the point of view of the network  600 , the network  600  appears to have additional devices, no physical equivalent (other than the security device  660 ) can be found in the house. 
     The devices and data emulated by a security mechanism are selected such that the security mechanism is an attractive target for intrusion attempts. Thus, the security mechanism may emulate valuable data, and/or devices that are easily hacked into, and/or devices that provide easy access to the reset of the network  600 . Furthermore, the security mechanisms emulate devices that are likely to be found in the network  600 , such as a second television, a second thermostat, or another laptop computer. In some implementations, the security device  660  may contact a service on the Internet  650  for assistance in selecting devices to emulate and/or for how to configure emulated devices. The security devices  660  may select and configure security mechanisms to be attractive to intrusions attempts, and to deflect attention away from more valuable or vulnerable network assets. Additionally, the security mechanisms can assist in confirming that an intrusion into the network  600  has actually taken place. 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may deploy deceptive security mechanisms in advance of detecting any suspicious activity. For example, having scanned the network, the security device  660  may determine that the network  600  includes only one television  618  and one smoke detector  616 . The security device  660  may therefore choose to deploy security mechanisms that emulate a second television and a second smoke detector. With security mechanisms preemptively added to the network, when there is an intrusion attempt, the intruder may target the security mechanisms instead of valuable or vulnerable network devices. The security mechanisms thus may serve as decoys and may deflect an intruder away from the network&#39;s  600  real devices. 
     In some implementations, the security mechanisms deployed by the security device  660  may take into account specific requirements of the network  600  and/or the type of devices that can be emulated. For example, in some cases, the network  600  (or a sub-network) may assign identifiers to each device connected to the network  600 , and/or each device may be required to adopt a unique identifier. In these cases, the security device  660  may assign an identifier to deployed security mechanisms that do not interfere with identifiers used by actual devices in the network  600 . As another example, in some cases, devices on the network  600  may register themselves with a central controller and/or with a central service on the Internet  650 . For example, the thermostat  602  may register with a service on the Internet  650  that monitors energy use for the home. In these cases, the security mechanisms that emulate these types of devices may also register with the central controller or the central service. Doing so may improve the apparent authenticity of the security mechanism, and may avoid conflicts with the central controller or central service. Alternatively or additionally, the security device  660  may determine to deploy security mechanisms that emulate other devices, and avoid registering with the central controller or central service. 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may dynamically adjust the security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, when the homeowner adds devices to the network  600 , the security device  660  may remove security mechanisms that conflict with the new devices, or change a security mechanism so that the security mechanism&#39;s configuration is not incongruous with the new devices (e.g., the security mechanisms should not have the same MAC address as a new device). As another example, when the network owner removes a device from the network  600 , the security device  660  may add a security mechanism that mimics the device that was removed. As another example, the security device may change the activity of a security mechanism, for example, to reflect changes in the normal activity of the home, changes in the weather, the time of year, the occurrence of special events, and so on. 
     The security device  660  may also dynamically adjust the security mechanisms it has deployed in response to suspicious activity it has detected on the network  600 . For example, upon detecting suspicious activity, the security device  660  may change the behavior of a security mechanism or may deploy additional security mechanisms. The changes to the security mechanisms may be directed by the suspicious activity, meaning that if, for example, the suspicious activity appears to be probing for a wireless base station  634 , the security device  660  may deploy a decoy wireless base station. 
     Changes to the security mechanisms are meant not only to attract a possible intrusion, but also to confirm that an intrusion has, in fact occurred. Since the security mechanisms are not part of the normal operation of the network  600 , normal occupants of the home are not expected to access the security mechanisms. Thus, in most cases, any access of a security mechanism is suspect. Once the security device  660  has detected an access to a security mechanism, the security device  660  may next attempt to confirm that an intrusion into the network  600  has taken place. An intrusion can be confirmed, for example, by monitoring activity at the security mechanism. For example, login attempts, probing of data emulated by the security mechanism, copying of data from the security mechanism, and attempts to log into another part of the network  600  from the security mechanism indicate a high likelihood that an intrusion has occurred. 
     Once the security device  660  is able to confirm an intrusion into the network  600 , the security device  660  may alert the homeowner. For example, the security device  660  may sound an audible alarm, send an email or text message to the homeowner or some other designated persons, and/or send an alert to an application running on a smartphone or tablet. As another example, the security device  660  may access other network devices and, for example, flash lights, trigger the security system&#39;s  626  alarm, and/or display messages on devices that include display screens, such as the television  618  or refrigerator  604 . In some implementations, depending on the nature of the intrusion, the security device  660  may alert authorities such as the police or fire department. 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may also take preventive actions. For example, when an intrusion appears to have originated outside the network  600 , the security device  660  may block the network&#39;s  600  access to the Internet  650 , thus possibly cutting off the intrusion. As another example, when the intrusion appears to have originated from within the network  600 , the security device  660  may isolate any apparently compromised devices, for example by disconnecting them from the network  600 . When only its own security mechanisms are compromised, the security device  660  may isolate itself from the rest of the network  600 . As another example, when the security device  660  is able to determine that the intrusion very likely included physical intrusion into the house, the security device  660  may alert the authorities. The security device  660  may further lock down the house by, for example, locking any electronic door locks  624 . 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may be able to enable a homeowner to monitor the network  600  when a suspicious activity has been detected, or at any other time. For example, the homeowner may be provided with a software application that can be installed on a smartphone, tablet, desktop, and/or laptop computer. The software application may receive information from the security device  660  over a wired or wireless connection. Alternatively or additionally, the homeowner may be able to access information about his network through a web browser, where the security device  660  formats webpages for displaying the information. Alternatively or additionally, the security device  660  may itself have a touchscreen or a screen and key pad that provide information about the network  600  to the homeowner. 
     The information provided to the homeowner may include, for example, a list and/or graphic display of the devices connected to the network  600 . The information may further provide a real-time status of each device, such as whether the device is on or off, the current activity of the device, data being transferred to or from the device, and/or the current user of the device, among other things. The list or graphic display may update as devices connect and disconnect from the network  600 , such as for example laptops and smartphones connecting to or disconnecting from a wireless sub-network in the network  600 . The security device  660  may further alert the homeowner when a device has unexpectedly been disconnected from the network  600 . The security device  660  may further alert the homeowner when an unknown device connects to the network  600 , such as for example when a device that is not known to the homeowner connects to the Wi-Fi signal. 
     The security device  660  may also maintain historic information. For example, the security device  660  may provide snapshots of the network  600  taken once a day, once a week, or once a month. The security device  660  may further provide a list of devices that have, for example, connected to the wireless signal in the last hour or day, at what times, and for how long. The security device  660  may also be able to provide identification information for these devices, such as MAC addresses or usernames. As another example, the security device  660  may also maintain usage statistics for each device in the network  600 , such as for example the times at which each device was in use, what the device was used for, how much energy the device used, and so on. 
     The software application or web browser or display interface that provides the homeowner with information about his network  600  may also enable the homeowner to make changes to the network  600  or to devices in the network  600 . For example, through the security device  660 , the homeowner may be able to turn devices on or off, change the configuration of a device, change a password for a device or for the network, and so on. 
     In some implementations, the security device  660  may also display currently deployed security mechanisms and their configuration. In some implementations, the security device  660  may also display activity seen at the security mechanisms, such as for example a suspicious access to a security mechanism. In some implementations, the security device  660  may also allow the homeowner to customize the security mechanisms. For example, the homeowner may be able to add or remove security mechanisms, modify data emulated by the security mechanisms, modify the configuration of security mechanism, and/or modify the activity of a security mechanism. 
     A deception-based network security device  660  thus can provide sophisticated security for a mixed network. The security device  660  may be simple to add to a network, yet provide comprehensive protection against both external and internal intrusions. Moreover, the security device  660  may be able to monitor multiple sub-networks that are each using different protocols. The security device  660 , using deceptive security mechanisms, may be able to detect and confirm intrusions into the network  600 . The security device  660  may be able to take preventive actions when an intrusion occurs. The security device  660  may also be able to provide the homeowner with information about his network, and possibly also control over devices in the network. 
       FIG. 7  illustrates another example of a mixed network  700 , here implemented in a small business. A network in a small business may have both traditional and non-traditional devices connected to the network  700 . Small business networks are also examples of networks that are often implemented with minimal security. A small business owner may not have the financial or technical resources, time, or expertise to configure a sophisticated security infrastructure for her network  700 . The business owner, however, is likely able to at least set up a network  700  for the operation of the business. A deception-based network security device that is at least as simple to set up as the network  700  itself may provide inexpensive and simple yet sophisticated security for the network  700 . 
     The example network  700  may be one, single network, or may include multiple sub-networks. For example, the network  700  may include a wired sub-network, such as an Ethernet network, and a wireless sub-network, such as an 802.11 Wi-Fi network. The wired sub-network may be implemented using cables that have been run through the walls and/or ceilings to the various rooms in the business. The cables may be connected to jacks in the walls that devices can connect to in order to connect to the network  700 . The wireless network may be implemented using a wireless base station  720 , or several wireless base stations, which provide a wireless signal throughout the business. The network  700  may include other wireless sub-networks, such as a short-distance Bluetooth™ network. In some cases, the sub-networks communicate with one another. For example, the Wi-Fi sub-network may be connected to the wired Ethernet sub-network. In some cases, the various sub-networks in the network  700  may not be configured to or able to communicate with each other. 
     As noted above, the small business network  700  may include both computers, network infrastructure devices, and other devices not traditionally found in a network. The network  700  may also include electronics, machinery, and systems that have been connected to the network  700  according to an Internet-of-Things approach. Workshop machinery that was once purely analog may now have computer controls. Digital workshop equipment may be network-enabled. By connecting shop equipment and machinery to the network  700 , automation and efficiency of the business can be improved and orders, materials, and inventory can be tracked. Having more devices on the network  700 , however, may increase the number of vulnerabilities in the network  700 . Devices that have only recently become network-enabled may be particularly vulnerable because their security systems have not yet been hardened through use and attack. A deception-based network security device may provide simple-to-install and sophisticated security for a network that may otherwise have only minimal security. 
     The example small business of  FIG. 7  includes a front office. In the front office, the network may include devices for administrative tasks. These devices may include, for example, a laptop computer  722  and a telephone  708 . These devices may be attached to the network  700  in order to, for example, access records related to the business, which may be stored on a server  732  located elsewhere in the building. In the front office, security devices for the building may also be found, including, for example, security system controls  724  and an electronic door lock  726 . Having the security devices on the network  700  may enable the business owner to remotely control access to the building. The business owner may also be able to remotely monitor the security of building, such as for example being able to view video streams from security cameras  742 . The front office may also be where environmental controls, such as a thermostat  702 , are located. Having the thermostat  702  on the network  700  may allow the business owner to remotely control the temperature settings. A network-enabled thermostat  702  may also track energy usage for the heating and cooling systems. The front office may also include safety devices, such as a network-connected smoke alarm  728 . A network-connected smoke alarm may be able to inform the business owner that there is a problem in the building be connecting to the business owner&#39;s smartphone or computer. 
     Another workspace in this example small business is a workshop. In the workshop, the network  700  may include production equipment for producing the goods sold by the business. The production equipment may include, for example, manufacturing machines  704  (e.g. a milling machine, a Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine, a  3 D printer, or some other machine tool) and a plotter  706 . The production equipment may be controlled by a computer on the network  700 , and/or may receive product designs over the network  700  and independently execute the designs. In the workshop, one may also find other devices related to the manufacturing of products, such as radiofrequency identification (RFID) scanners, barcode or Quick Response (QR) code generators, and other devices for tracking inventory, as well as electronic tools, hand tools, and so on. 
     In the workshop and elsewhere in the building, mobile computing devices and people  738  may also be connected to the network  700 . Mobile computing devices include, for example, tablet computers  734  and smartphones  736 . These devices may be used to control production equipment, track supplies and inventory, receive and track orders, and/or for other operations of the business. People  738  may be connected to the network through network-connected devices worn or implanted in the people  738 , such as for example smart watches, fitness trackers, heart rate monitors, drug delivery systems, pacemakers, and so on. 
     At a loading dock, the example small business may have a delivery van  748  and a company car  746 . When these vehicles are away from the business, they may be connected to the network  700  remotely, for example over the Internet  750 . By being able to communicate with the network  700 , the vehicles may be able to receive information such as product delivery information (e.g., orders, addresses, and/or delivery times), supply pickup instructions, and so on. The business owner may also be able to track the location of these vehicles from the business location, or over the Internet  750  when away from the business, and/or track who is using the vehicles. 
     The business may also have a back office. In the back office, the network  700  may include traditional network devices, such as computers  730 , a multi-function printer  716 , a scanner  718 , and a server  732 . In this example, the computers  730  may be used to design products for manufacturing in the workshop, as well as for management of the business, including tracking orders, supplies, inventory, and/or human resources records. The multi-function printer  716  and scanner  718  may support the design work and the running of the business. The server  732  may store product designs, orders, supply records, and inventory records, as well as administrative data, such as accounting and human resources data. 
     The back office may also be where a gateway device  770  is located. The gateway device  770  connects the small business to other networks, including the Internet  750 . Typically, the gateway device  770  connects to an ISP, and the ISP provides access to the Internet  750 . In some cases, a router may be integrated into the gateway device  770 . In some cases, gateway device  770  may be connected to an external router, switch, or hub, not illustrated here. In some cases, the network  700  is not connected to any networks outside of the business&#39;s own network  700 . In these cases, the network  700  may not have a gateway device  770 . 
     The back office is also where the network  700  may have a deception-based network security device  760 . The security device  760  may be a standalone device that may be enabled as soon as it is connected to the network  700 . Alternatively or additionally, the security device  760  may be integrated into another device connected to the network  700 , such as the gateway device  770 , a router, a desktop computer  730 , a laptop computer  722 , the multi-function printer  716 , or the thermostat  702 , among others. When integrated into another device, the security device  760  may use the network connection of the other device, or may have its own network connection for connecting to the network  700 . The security device  760  may connect to the network  700  using a wired connection or a wireless connection. 
     Once connected to the network  700 , the security device  760  may begin monitoring the network  700  for suspect activity. In some implementations, the security device  760  may scan the network  700  to learn which devices are connected to the network  700 . In some cases, the security device  760  may learn the normal activity of the network  700 , such as what time the various devices are used, for how long, by whom, for what purpose, and what data is transferred to and from each device, among other things. 
     In some implementations, having learned the configuration and/or activity of the network  700 , the security device  760  may deploy deceptive security mechanisms. These security mechanisms may emulate devices that may be found on the network  700 , including having an identifiable device type and/or network identifiers (such as a MAC address and/or IP address), and being able to send and receive network traffic that a device of a certain time would send and receive. For example, for the example small business, the security device  760  may configure a security mechanism to emulate a  3 D printer, a wide-body scanner, or an additional security camera. The security device  760  may further avoid configuring a security mechanism to emulate a device that is not likely to be found in the small business, such as a washing machine. The security device  760  may use the deployed security mechanisms to monitor activity on the network  700 . 
     In various implementations, when the security device  760  detects suspect activity, the security device  760  may deploy additional security mechanisms. These additional security mechanisms may be selected based on the nature of suspect activity. For example, when the suspect activity appears to be attempting to break into the shop equipment, the security device  760  may deploy a security mechanism that looks like shop equipment that is easy to hack. In some implementations, the security device  760  may deploy security mechanisms only after detecting suspect activity on the network  700 . 
     The security device  760  selects devices to emulate that are particularly attractive for an infiltration, either because the emulated device appears to have valuable data or because the emulated device appears to be easy to infiltrate, or for some other reason. In some implementations, the security device  760  connects to a service on the Internet  750  for assistance in determining which devices to emulate and/or how to configure the emulated device. Once deployed, the security mechanisms serve as decoys to attract the attention of a possible infiltrator away from valuable network assets. In some implementations, the security device  760  emulates the security mechanisms using software processes. In some implementations, the security device  760  may be assisted in emulating security mechanisms by a computer  730  on the network. 
     In some implementations, the security device  760  may deploy security mechanisms prior to detecting suspicious activity on the network  700 . In these implementations, the security mechanisms may present more attractive targets for a possible, future infiltration, so that if an infiltration occurs, the infiltrator will go after the security mechanisms instead of the actual devices on the network  700 . 
     In various implementations, the security device  760  may also change the security mechanisms that it has deployed. For example, the security device  760  may add or remove security mechanisms as the operation of the business changes, as the activity on the network  700  changes, as devices are added or removed from the network  700 , as the time of year changes, and so on. 
     Besides deflecting a possible network infiltration away from valuable or vulnerable network devices, the security device  760  may use the security mechanisms to confirm that the network  700  has been infiltrated. Because the security mechanisms are not part of actual devices in use by the business, any access to them over the network is suspect. Thus, once the security device  760  detects an access to one of its security mechanisms, the security device  760  may attempt to confirm that this access is, in fact, an unauthorized infiltration of the network  700 . 
     To confirm that a security mechanism has been infiltrated, the security device  760  may monitor activity seen at the security mechanism. The security device  760  may further deploy additional security mechanisms, to see if, for example, it can present an even more attractive target to the possible infiltrator. The security device  760  may further look for certain activity, such as log in attempts to other devices in the network, attempts to examine data on the security mechanism, attempts to move data from the security mechanism to the Internet  750 , scanning of the network  700 , password breaking attempts, and so on. 
     Once the security device  760  has confirmed that the network  700  has been infiltrated, the security device  760  may alert the business owner. For example, the security device  760  may sound an audible alarm, email or send text messages to the computers  730  and/or handheld devices  734 ,  736 , send a message to the business&#39;s cars  746 ,  748 , flash lights, or trigger the security system&#39;s  724  alarm. In some implementations, the security device  760  may also take preventive measures. For example, the security device  760  may disconnect the network  700  from the Internet  750 , may disconnect specific devices from the network  700  (e.g., the server  732  or the manufacturing machines  704 ), may turn some network-connected devices off, and/or may lock the building. 
     In various implementations, the security device  760  may allow the business owner to monitor her network  700 , either when an infiltration is taking place or at any other time. For example, the security device  760  may provide a display of the devices currently connected to the network  700 , including flagging any devices connected to the wireless network that do not appear to be part of the business. The security device  760  may further display what each device is currently doing, who is using them, how much energy each device is presently using, and/or how much network bandwidth each device is using. The security device  760  may also be able to store this information and provide historic configuration and/or usage of the network  700 . 
     The security device  760  may have a display it can use to show information to the business owner. Alternatively or additionally, the security device  760  may provide this information to a software application that can run on a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, or a smartphone. Alternatively or additionally, the security device  760  may format this information for display through a web browser. The business owner may further be able to control devices on the network  700  through an interface provided by the security device  760 , including, for example, turning devices on or off, adjusting settings on devices, configuring user accounts, and so on. The business owner may also be able to view any security mechanisms presently deployed, and may be able to re-configure the security mechanisms, turn them off, or turn them on. 
     IoT networks can also include industrial control systems. Industrial control system is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other control system configurations, such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), often found in the industrial sectors and infrastructures. Industrial control systems are often found in industries such as electrical, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods). While a large percentage of industrial control systems may be privately owned and operated, federal agencies also operate many industrial processes, such as air traffic control systems and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling). 
       FIG. 8  illustrates an example of the basic operation of an industrial control system  800 . Generally, an industrial control system  800  may include a control loop  802 , a human-machine interface  806 , and remote diagnostics and maintenance  808 . In some implementations, the example industrial control system can be defended by a network threat detection and analysis system, which can include a deception center  898  and a security services provider  896 . 
     A control loop  802  may consist of sensors  812 , controller  804  hardware such as PLCs, actuators  810 , and the communication of variables  832 ,  834 . The sensors  812  may be used for measuring variables in the system, while the actuators  810  may include, for example, control valves breakers, switches, and motors. Some of the sensors  812  may be deceptions sensors. Controlled variables  834  may be transmitted to the controller  804  from the sensors  812 . The controller  804  may interpret the controlled variables  834  and generates corresponding manipulated variables  832 , based on set points provided by controller interaction  830 . The controller  804  may then transmit the manipulated variables  832  to the actuators  810 . The actuators  810  may drive a controlled process  814  (e.g., a machine on an assembly line). The controlled process  814  may accept process inputs  822  (e.g., raw materials) and produce process outputs  824  (e.g., finished products). New information  820  provided to the controlled process  814  may result in new sensor  812  signals, which identify the state of the controlled process  814  and which may also transmitted to the controller  804 . 
     In some implementations, at least some of the sensors  812  can also provide the deception center  898  with visibility into the industrial control system  800 , such as for example being able to present or project deceptive security mechanisms into the industrial control system. Additionally, in various implementations, the sensors  812  may provide a portal through which a suspected attack on the industrial control system can be redirected to the deception center  898 . The deception center  898  and the sensors  812  may be able to communicate using network tunnels  880 . 
     The deception center  898  provides network security for the industrial control system  800  by deploying security mechanisms into the industrial control system  800 , monitoring the industrial control system through the security mechanisms, detecting and redirecting apparent threats, and analyzing network activity resulting from the apparent threat. In some implementations, the industrial control system  800  can include more than one deception center  898 . In some implementations, the deception center may be located off-site, such as on the Internet. 
     In some implementations, the deception center  898  may interact with a security services provider  896  located outside the industrial control system  800 . The security services provider  896  may act as a central hub for providing security to multiple sites that are part of the industrial control system  800 , and/or for multiple separate, possibly unrelated, industrial control systems. For example, the security services provider  896  may communicate with multiple deception centers  898  that each provide security for a different industrial control system  800  for the same organization. As another example, the security services provider  896  may coordinate the activities of the deception center  898  and the sensors  812 , such as enabling the deception center  898  and the sensors  812  to connect to each other. In some implementations, the security services provider  896  is located outside the industrial control system  800 . In some implementations, the security services provider  896  is controlled by a different entity than the entity that controls the site network. For example, the security services provider  896  may be an outside vendor. In some implementations, the security services provider  896  is controlled by the same entity as that controls the industrial control system. In some implementations, the network security system does not include a security services provider  896 . 
     The human-machine interface  806  provides operators and engineers with an interface for controller interaction  830 . Controller interaction  830  may include monitoring and configuring set points and control algorithms, and adjusting and establishing parameters in the controller  804 . The human-machine interface  806  typically also receives information from the controller  804  that allows the human-machine interface  806  to display process status information and historical information about the operation of the control loop  802 . 
     The remote diagnostics and maintenance  808  utilities are typically used to prevent, identify, and recover from abnormal operation or failures. For diagnostics, the remote diagnostics and maintenance utilities  808  may monitor the operation of each of the controller  804 , sensors  812 , and actuators  810 . To recover after a problem, the remote diagnostics and maintenance  808  utilities may provide recovery information and instructions to one or more of the controller  804 , sensors  812 , and/or actuators  810 . 
     A typical industrial control system contains many control loops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools, built using an array of network protocols on layered network architectures. In some cases, multiple control loops are nested and/or cascading, with the set point for one control loop being based on process variables determined by another control loop. Supervisory-level control loops and lower-level control loops typically operate continuously over the duration of a process, with cycle times ranging from milliseconds to minutes. 
     One type of industrial control system that may include many control loops, human-machine interfaces, and remote diagnostics and maintenance tools is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets, where centralized data acquisition is typically as important as control of the system. SCADA systems are used in distribution systems such as, for example, water distribution and wastewater collection systems, oil and natural gas pipelines, electrical utility transmission and distribution systems, and rail and other public transportation systems, among others. SCADA systems typically integrate data acquisition systems with data transmission systems and human-machine interface software to provide a centralized monitoring and control system for numerous process inputs and outputs. SCADA systems are typically designed to collect field information, transfer this information to a central computer facility, and to display the information to an operator in a graphic and/or textual manner. Using this displayed information, the operator may, in real time, monitor and control an entire system from a central location. In various implementations, control of any individual sub-system, operation, or task can be automatic, or can be performed by manual commands. 
       FIG. 9  illustrates an example of a SCADA system  900 , here used for distributed monitoring and control. This example SCADA system  900  includes a primary control center  902  and three field sites  930   a - 930   c . A backup control center  904  provides redundancy in case of there is a malfunction at the primary control center  902 . The primary control center  902  in this example includes a control server  906  which may also be called a SCADA server or a Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and a local area network (LAN)  918 . The primary control center  902  may also include a human-machine interface station  908 , a data historian  910 , engineering workstations  912 , and various network equipment such as printers  914 , each connected to the LAN  918 . 
     The control server  906  typically acts as the master of the SCADA system  900 . The control server  906  typically includes supervisory control software that controls lower-level control devices, such as Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and PLCs, located at the field sites  930   a - 930   c . The software may tell the system  900  what and when to monitor, what parameter ranges are acceptable, and/or what response to initiate when parameters are outside of acceptable values. 
     The control server  906  of this example may access Remote Terminal Units and/or PLCs at the field sites  930   a - 930   c  using a communications infrastructure, which may include radio-based communication devices, telephone lines, cables, and/or satellites. In the illustrated example, the control server  906  is connected to a modem  916 , which provides communication with serial-based radio communication  920 , such as a radio antenna. Using the radio communication  920 , the control server  906  can communicate with field sites  930   a - 930   b  using radiofrequency signals  922 . Some field sites  930   a - 930   b  may have radio transceivers for communicating back to the control server  906 . 
     A human-machine interface station  908  is typically a combination of hardware and software that allows human operators to monitor the state of processes in the SCADA system  900 . The human-machine interface station  908  may further allow operators to modify control settings to change a control objective, and/or manually override automatic control operations, such as in the event of an emergency. The human-machine interface station  908  may also allow a control engineer or operator to configure set points or control algorithms and parameters in a controller, such as a Remote Terminal Unit or a PLC. The human-machine interface station  908  may also display process status information, historical information, reports, and other information to operators, administrators, mangers, business partners, and other authorized users. The location, platform, and interface of a human-machine interface station  908  may vary. For example, the human-machine interface station  908  may be a custom, dedicated platform in the primary control center  902 , a laptop on a wireless LAN, or a browser on a system connected to the Internet. 
     The data historian  910  in this example is a database for logging all process information within the SCADA system  900 . Information stored in this database can be accessed to support analysis of the system  900 , for example for statistical process control or enterprise level planning. 
     The backup control center  904  may include all or most of the same components that are found in the primary control center  902 . In some cases, the backup control center  904  may temporarily take over for components at the primary control center  902  that have failed or have been taken offline for maintenance. In some cases, the backup control center  904  is configured to take over all operations of the primary control center  902 , such as when the primary control center  902  experiences a complete failure (e.g., is destroyed in a natural disaster). 
     The primary control center  902  may collect and log information gathered by the field sites  930   a - 930   c  and display this information using the human-machine interface station  908 . The primary control center  902  may also generate actions based on detected events. The primary control center  902  may, for example, poll field devices at the field sites  930   a - 930   c  for data at defined intervals (e.g., 5 or 60 seconds), and can send new set points to a field device as required. In addition to polling and issuing high-level commands, the primary control center  902  may also watch for priority interrupts coming from the alarm systems at the field sites  930   a - 930   c.    
     In this example, the primary control center  902  uses point-to-point connections to communication with three field sites  930   a - 930   c , using radio telemetry for two communications with two of the field sites  930   a - 930   b . In this example, the primary control center  902  uses a wide area network (WAN)  960  to communicate with the third field site  930   c . In other implementations, the primary control center  902  may use other communication topologies to communicate with field sites. Other communication topologies include rings, stars, meshes, trees, lines or series, and busses or multi-drops, among others. Standard and proprietary communication protocols may be used to transport information between the primary control center  902  and field sites  930   a - 930   c . These protocols may use telemetry techniques such as provided by telephone lines, cables, fiber optics, and/or radiofrequency transmissions such as broadcast, microwave, and/or satellite communications. 
     The field sites  930   a - 930   c  in this example perform local control of actuators and monitor local sensors. For example, a first field site  930   a  may include a PLC  932 . A PLC is a small industrial computer originally designed to perform the logic functions formerly executed by electrical hardware (such as relays, switches, and/or mechanical timers and counters). PLCs have evolved into controllers capable of controlling complex processes, and are used extensively in both SCADA systems and distributed control systems. Other controllers used at the field level include process controllers and Remote Terminal Units, which may provide the same level of control as a PLC but may be designed for specific control applications. In SCADA environments, PLCs are often used as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable than special-purpose controllers. 
     The PLC  932  at a field site, such as the first field site  930   a , may control local actuators  934 ,  936  and monitor local sensors  938 ,  940 ,  942 . Examples of actuators include valves  934  and pumps  936 , among others. Examples of sensors include level sensors  938 , pressure sensors  940 , and flow sensors  942 , among others. Any of the actuators  934 ,  936  or sensors  938 ,  940 ,  942  may be “smart” actuators or sensors, more commonly called intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Intelligent electronic devices may include intelligence for acquiring data, communicating with other devices, and performing local processing and control. An intelligent electronic device could combine an analog input sensor, analog output, low-level control capabilities, a communication system, and/or program memory in one device. The use of intelligent electronic devices in SCADA systems and distributed control systems may allow for automatic control at the local level. Intelligent electronic devices, such as protective relays, may communicate directly with the control server  906 . Alternatively or additionally, a local Remote Terminal Unit may poll intelligent electronic devices to collect data, which it may then pass to the control server  906 . 
     Field sites  930   a - 930   c  are often equipped with remote access capability that allows field operators to perform remote diagnostics and repairs. For example, the first remote  930   a  may include a modem  916  connected to the PLC  932 . A remote access  950  site may be able to, using a dial up connection, connect to the modem  916 . The remote access  950  site may include its own modem  916  for dialing into to the field site  930   a  over a telephone line. At the remote access  950  site, an operator may use a computer  952  connected to the modem  916  to perform diagnostics and repairs on the first field site  930   a.    
     The example SCADA system  900  includes a second field site  930   b , which may be provisioned in substantially the same way as the first field site  930   a , having at least a modem and a PLC or Remote Terminal that controls and monitors some number of actuators and sensors. 
     The example SCADA system  900  also includes a third field site  930   c  that includes a network interface card (NIC)  944  for communicating with the system&#39;s  900  WAN  960 . In this example, the third field site  930   c  includes a Remote Terminal Unit  946  that is responsible for controlling local actuators  934 ,  936  and monitoring local sensors  938 ,  940 ,  942 . A Remote Terminal Unit, also called a remote telemetry unit, is a special-purpose data acquisition and control unit typically designed to support SCADA remote stations. Remote Terminal Units may be field devices equipped with wireless radio interfaces to support remote situations where wire-based communications are unavailable. In some cases, PLCs are implemented as Remote Terminal Units. 
     The SCADA system  900  of this example also includes a regional control center  970  and a corporate enterprise network  990 . The regional control center  970  may provide a higher level of supervisory control. The regional control center  970  may include at least a human-machine interface station  908  and a control server  906  that may have supervisory control over the control server  906  at the primary control center  902 . The corporate enterprise network  990  typically has access, through the system&#39;s  900  WAN  960 , to all the control centers  902 ,  904  and to the field sites  930   a - 930   c . The corporate enterprise network  990  may include a human-machine interface station  908  so that operators can remotely maintain and troubleshoot operations. 
     Another type of industrial control system is the distributed control system (DCS). Distributed control systems are typically used to control production systems within the same geographic location for industries such as oil refineries, water and wastewater management, electric power generation plants, chemical manufacturing plants, and pharmaceutical processing facilities, among others. These systems are usually process control or discrete part control systems. Process control systems may be processes that run continuously, such as manufacturing processes for fuel or steam flow in a power plant, for petroleum production in a refinery, or for distillation in a chemical plant. Discrete part control systems have processes that have distinct processing steps, typically with a distinct start and end to each step, such as found in food manufacturing, electrical and mechanical parts assembly, and parts machining. Discrete-based manufacturing industries typically conduct a series of steps on a single item to create an end product. 
     A distributed control system typically uses a centralized supervisory control loop to mediate a group of localized controllers that share the overall tasks of carrying out an entire production process. By modularizing the production system, a distributed control system may reduce the impact of a single fault on the overall system. A distributed control system is typically interfaced with a corporate network to give business operations a view of the production process. 
       FIG. 10  illustrates an example of a distributed control system  1000 . This example distributed control system  1000  encompasses a production facility, including bottom-level production processes at a field level  1004 , supervisory control systems at a supervisory level  1002 , and a corporate or enterprise layer. 
     At the supervisory level  1002 , a control server  1006 , operating as a supervisory controller, may communicate with subordinate systems via a control network  1018 . The control server  1006  may send set points to distributed field controllers, and may request data from the distributed field controllers. The supervisory level  1002  may include multiple control servers  1006 , with one acting as the primary control server and the rest acting as redundant, back-up control servers. The supervisory level  1002  may also include a main human-machine interface  1008  for use by operators and engineers, a data historian  1010  for logging process information from the system  1000 , and engineering workstations  1012 . 
     At the field level  1004 , the system  1000  may include various distributed field controllers. In the illustrated example, the distributed control system  1000  includes a machine controller  1020 , a PLC  1032 , a process controller  1040 , and a single loop controller  1044 . The distributed field controllers may each control local process actuators, based on control server  1006  commands and sensor feedback from local process sensors. 
     In this example, the machine controller  1020  drives a motion control network  1026 . Using the motion control network  1026 , the machine controller  1020  may control a number of servo drives  1022 , which may each drive a motor. The machine controller  1020  may also drive a logic control bus  1028  to communicate with various devices  1024 . For example, the machine controller  1020  may use the logic control bus  1028  to communicate with pressure sensors, pressure regulators, and/or solenoid valves, among other devices. One or more of the devices  1024  may be an intelligent electronic device. A human-machine interface  1008  may be attached to the machine controller  1020  to provide an operator with local status information about the processes under control of the machine controller  1020 , and/or local control of the machine controller  1020 . A modem  1016  may also be attached to the machine controller  1020  to provide remote access to the machine controller  1020 . 
     The PLC  1032  in this example system  1000  uses a fieldbus  1030  to communicate with actuators  1034  and sensors  1036  under its control. These actuators  1034  and sensors  1036  may include, for example, direct current (DC) servo drives, alternating current (AC) servo drives, light towers, photo eyes, and/or proximity sensors, among others. A human-machine interface  1008  may also be attached to the fieldbus  1030  to provide operators with local status and control for the PLC  1032 . A modem  1016  may also be attached to the PLC  1032  to provide remote access to the PLC  1032 . 
     The process controller  1040  in this example system  1000  also uses a fieldbus  1030  to communicate with actuators and sensors under its control, one or more of which may be intelligent electronic devices. The process controller  1040  may communicate with its fieldbus  1030  through an input/output (I/O) server  1042 . An I/O server is a control component typically responsible for collecting, buffering, and/or providing access to process information from control sub-components. An I/O server may be used for interfacing with third-party control components. Actuators and sensors under control of the process controller  1040  may include, for example, pressure regulators, pressure sensors, temperature sensors, servo valves, and/or solenoid valves, among others. The process controller  1040  may be connected to a modem  1016  so that a remote access  1050  site may access the process controller  1040 . The remote access  1050  site may include a computer  1052  for use by an operator to monitor and control the process controller  1040 . The computer  1052  may be connected to a local modem  1016  for dialing in to the modem  1016  connected to the process controller  1040 . 
     The illustrated example system  1000  also includes a single loop controller  1044 . In this example, the single loop controller  1044  interfaces with actuators  1034  and sensors  1036  with point-to-point connections, instead of a fieldbus. Point-to-point connections require a dedicated connection for each actuator  1034  and each sensor  1036 . Fieldbus networks, in contrast, do not need point-to-point connections between a controller and individual field sensors and actuators. In some implementations, a fieldbus allows greater functionality beyond control, including field device diagnostics. A fieldbus can accomplish control algorithms within the fieldbus, thereby avoiding signal routing back to a PLC for every control operation. Standard industrial communication protocols are often used on control networks and fieldbus networks. 
     The single loop controller  1044  in this example is also connected to a modem  1016 , for remote access to the single loop controller. 
     In addition to the supervisory level  1002  and field level  1004  control loops, the distributed control system  1000  may also include intermediate levels of control. For example, in the case of a distributed control system controlling a discrete part manufacturing facility, there could be an intermediate level supervisor for each cell within the plant. This intermediate level supervisor could encompass a manufacturing cell containing a machine controller that processes a part, and a robot controller that handles raw stock and final products. Additionally, the distributed control system could include several of these cells that manage field-level controllers under the main distributed control system supervisory control loop. 
     In various implementations, the distributed control system may include a corporate or enterprise layer, where an enterprise network  1080  may connect to the example production facility. The enterprise network  1080  may be, for example, located at a corporate office co-located with the facility, and connected to the control network  1018  in the supervisory level  1002 . The enterprise network  1080  may provide engineers and managers with control and visibility into the facility. The enterprise network  1080  may further include Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES)  1092 , control systems for managing and monitoring work-in-process on a factory floor. An MES can track manufacturing information in real time, receiving up-to-the-minute data from robots, machine monitors and employees. The enterprise network  1080  may also include Management Information Systems (MIS)  1094 , software and hardware applications that implement, for example, decision support systems, resource and people management applications, project management, and database retrieval applications, as well as basic business functions such as order entry and accounting. The enterprise network  1080  may further include Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems  1096 , business process management software that allows an organization to use a system of integrated applications to manage the business and automate many back office functions related to technology, services, and human resources. 
     The enterprise network  1080  may further be connected to a WAN  1060 . Through the WAN  1060 , the enterprise network  1080  may connect to a distributed plant  1098 , which may include control loops and supervisory functions similar to the illustrated facility, but which may be at a different geographic location. The WAN  1060  may also connect the enterprise network to the outside world  1090 , that is, to the Internet and/or various private and public networks. In some cases, the WAN  1060  may itself include the Internet, so that the enterprise network  1080  accesses the distributed plant  1098  over the Internet. 
     As described above, SCADA systems and distributed control systems use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) as the control components of an overall hierarchical system. PLCs can provide local management of processes through feedback control, as described above. In a SCADA implementation, a PLC can provide the same functionality as a Remote Terminal Unit. When used in a distributed control system, PLCs can be implemented as local controllers within a supervisory scheme. PLCs can have user-programmable memory for storing instructions, where the instructions implement specific functions such as I/O control, logic, timing, counting, proportional-integral-derivative (PID) control, communication, arithmetic, and data and file processing. 
       FIG. 11  illustrates an example of a PLC  1132  implemented in a manufacturing control process  1100 . The PLC  1132  in this example monitors and controls various devices over fieldbus network  1130 . The PLC  1132  may be connected to a LAN  1118 . An engineering workstation  1112  may also be connected to the LAN  1118 , and may include a programming interface that provides access to the PLC  1132 . A data historian  1110  on the LAN  1118  may store data produced by the PLC  1132 . The PLC  1132  can also be connected to a modem  1116 , which enables remote access to the PLC  1132 . 
     The PLC  1132  in this example may control a number of devices attached to its fieldbus network  1130 . These devices may include actuators, such as a DC servo drive  1122 , an AC drive  1124 , a variable frequency drive  1134 , and/or a light tower  1138 . The PLC  1132  may also monitor sensors connected to the fieldbus network  1130 , such as proximity sensors  1136 , and/or a photo eye  1142 . A human-machine interface  1108  may also be connected to the fieldbus network  1130 , and may provide local monitoring and control of the PLC  1132 . 
     Most industrial control systems were developed years ago, long before public and private networks, desktop computing, or the Internet were a common part of business operations. These well-established industrial control systems were designed to meet performance, reliability, safety, and flexibility requirements. In most cases, they were physically isolated from outside networks and based on proprietary hardware, software, and communication protocols that included basic error detection and correction capabilities, but lacked secure communication capabilities. While there was concern for reliability, maintainability, and availability when addressing statistical performance and failure, the need for cyber security measures within these systems was not anticipated. At the time, security for industrial control systems mean physically securing access to the network and the consoles that controlled the systems. 
     Internet-based technologies have since become part of modern industrial control systems. Widely available, low-cost IP devices have replaced proprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber security vulnerabilities and incidents. Industrial control systems have adopted Internet-based solutions to promote corporate connectivity and remote access capabilities, and are being designed and implemented using industry standard computers, operating systems (OS) and network protocols. As a result, these systems may to resemble computer networks. This integration supports new networking capabilities, but provides less isolation for industrial control systems from the outside world than predecessor systems. Networked industrial control systems may be exposed to similar threats as are seen in computer networks, and an increased likelihood that an industrial control system can be compromised. 
     Industrial control system vendors have begun to open up their proprietary protocols and publish their protocol specifications to enable third-party manufacturers to build compatible accessories. Organizations are also transitioning from proprietary systems to less expensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft Windows and Unix-like operating systems as well as common networking protocols such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) to reduce costs and improve performance. Another standard contributing to this evolution of open systems is Open Platform Communications (OPC), a protocol that enables interaction between control systems and PC-based application programs. The transition to using these open protocol standards provides economic and technical benefits, but also increases the susceptibility of industrial control systems to cyber incidents. These standardized protocols and technologies have commonly known vulnerabilities, which are susceptible to sophisticated and effective exploitation tools that are widely available and relatively easy to use. 
     Industrial control systems and corporate networking systems are often interconnected as a result of several changes in information management practices, operational, and business needs. The demand for remote access has encouraged many organizations to establish connections to the industrial control system that enable of industrial control systems engineers and support personnel to monitor and control the system from points outside the control network. Many organizations have also added connections between corporate networks and industrial control systems networks to allow the organization&#39;s decision makers to obtain access to critical data about the status of their operational systems and to send instructions for the manufacture or distribution of product. 
     In early implementations this might have been done with custom applications software or via an OPC server/gateway, but, in the past ten years this has been accomplished with TCP/IP networking and standardized IP applications like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or Extensible Markup Language (XML) data exchanges. Often, these connections were implemented without a full understanding of the corresponding security risks. In addition, corporate networks are often connected to strategic partner networks and to the Internet. Control systems also make more use of WANs and the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local stations and individual devices. This integration of control system networks with public and corporate networks increases the accessibility of control system vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can expose all levels of the industrial control system network architecture to complexity-induced error, adversaries and a variety of cyber threats, including worms and other malware. 
     Many industrial control system vendors have delivered systems with dial-up modems that provide remote access to ease the burdens of maintenance for the technical field support personnel. Remote access can be accomplished, for example, using a telephone number, and sometimes an access control credential (e.g., valid ID, and/or a password). Remote access may provide support staff with administrative-level access to a system. Adversaries with war dialers simple personal computer programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking for modems and password cracking software could gain access to systems through these remote access capabilities. Passwords used for remote access are often common to all implementations of a particular vendor&#39;s systems and may have not been changed by the end user. These types of connections can leave a system highly vulnerable because people entering systems through vendor-installed modems are may be granted high levels of system access. 
     Organizations often inadvertently leave access links such as dial-up modems open for remote diagnostics, maintenance, and monitoring. Also, control systems increasingly utilize wireless communications systems, which can be vulnerable. Access links not protected with authentication and/or encryption have the increased risk of adversaries using these unsecured connections to access remotely controlled systems. This could lead to an adversary compromising the integrity of the data in transit as well as the availability of the system, both of which can result in an impact to public and plant safety. Data encryption may be a solution, but may not be the appropriate solution in all cases. 
     Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and industrial control systems require the integration of systems with different communications standards. The result is often an infrastructure that is engineered to move data successfully between two unique systems. Because of the complexity of integrating disparate systems, control engineers often fail to address the added burden of accounting for security risks. Control engineers may have little training in security and often network security personnel are not involved in security design. As a result, access controls designed to protect control systems from unauthorized access through corporate networks may be minimal. Protocols, such as TCP/IP and others have characteristics that often go unchecked, and this may counter any security that can be done at the network or the application levels. 
     Public information regarding industrial control system design, maintenance, interconnection, and communication may be readily available over the Internet to support competition in product choices as well as to enable the use of open standards. Industrial control system vendors also sell toolkits to help develop software that implements the various standards used in industrial control system environments. There are also many former employees, vendors, contractors, and other end users of the same industrial control system equipment worldwide who have inside knowledge about the operation of control systems and processes. 
     Information and resources are available to potential adversaries and intruders of all calibers around the world. With the available information, it is quite possible for an individual with very little knowledge of control systems to gain unauthorized access to a control system with the use of automated attack and data mining tools and a factory-set default password. Many times, these default passwords are never changed. 
     IV. Deception Mechanisms for Mixed Networks 
     In various implementations, the systems and methods discussed above can be used to implement dynamic deception mechanisms for mixed networks. A deception-based network security device can provide simple and cost-effective security for a mixed network. The security device need only connect to the network to monitor the network and detect intrusions originating both outside and inside the network. By using deceptive security mechanisms, the security device can deflect the attention of a network threat away from valuable and/or easily infiltrated network assets. 
       FIGS. 12A-12B  illustrate examples of a mixed network  1200 , such as may be found in a private home or a small business, whose security may be improved by the addition of a deception-based network security device. 
     One example of the mixed network  1200  is illustrated in  FIG. 12A . The example mixed network  1200  includes multiple different types of sub-networks, such as an Ethernet network  1210 , an electrical network  1220 , and/or various radio-based networks  1230 ,  1232 . Each sub-network may be self-contained, such that devices within each sub-network may only be able to communicate with other devices in the same network. In this example, each of the sub-networks is connected to the network  1200 , and the devices within each sub-network may be able to communicate with devices in other sub-networks, and/or with external networks, such as the Internet  1250 . In this example, the network  1200  includes a gateway device  1248  that can connect the network  1200  to other networks, including the Internet  1250 . The example mixed network  1200  further includes a router  1246  or similar network infrastructure device that can be used connect the various sub-networks to the gateway device  1248 . In some implementations, the gateway device  1248  and the router  1246  may be integrated into one physical device. 
     The example Ethernet network  1210  can include computing devices and network infrastructure devices configured to use an Ethernet-based protocol to connect to the mixed network  1200 . The Ethernet network  1210  can include a wireless sub-network  1212 , which includes network devices configured to use a Wi-Fi based network protocol to connect to the wireless sub-network  1212 . In some cases, the Ethernet network  1210  can connect directly to the illustrated router  1246 . For example, the Internet  1250  uses Ethernet-based network protocols, and for ease of communication with the Internet  1250 , the gateway device  1248  and the router  1246  may be Ethernet-based devices. In this example, the Ethernet network  1210  can connect to the gateway device  1248  and/or the router  1246  directly. 
     The example electrical network  1220  can use the electrical wiring in a building to form a network between devices connected to wall outlets in the building. An example of a networking system that uses electrical wiring is X10. To connect an appliance, such as a lamp or a television, to the electrical network  1220 , a network owner can connect the appliance to an adapter device. The adapter device may have physical switches or digital controller that allows the network owner to configure an appliance type, an appliance identifier, and/or some other information about the appliance. Once the adapter device is connected to a wall socket, the appliance can be connected to the electrical network  1220 . 
     In some implementations, the electrical network  1220  can include a central controller. The central controller can keep track of each of the appliances on the electrical network  1220 , including the device type, identifier, and/or their capabilities of each appliance. Through the central controller, the network owner may be able to monitor and control the appliances in the electrical network, including being able to see what each appliance is presently doing, and/or being able to turn an appliance on or off. The central controller may communicate with the adapter devices using signals sent over the electrical wires. These signals may be at a different frequency than the frequency of the alternating current on the electrical wires, and thus would not interfere with the transmission of power on the electrical wires. 
     To connect the electrical network  1220  to the network  1200 , the electrical network  1220  may be connected to an adapter  1224 . This adapter  1224  may translate data between the protocol used by the electrical network  1220  and the Ethernet protocol used by the router  1246 . In some implementations, the adapter  1224  may be integrated into a central controller for the electrical network  1220 . In some implementations, other devices in the network  1200  may be able to access appliances in the electrical network  1220  through the adapter  1224 . 
     The example radio-based networks  1230 ,  1232  can each support a different radio-based network communication protocol. For example, the first radio-based network  1230  can use the Zigbee protocol to network together various appliances, while the second radio-based network  1232  can use Bluetooth™ to connect various electronics together. These radio-based network protocols generally use a specific radio frequency, and/or a particular format for sending data between devices connected to the radio-based network  1230 ,  1232 . Generally, to connect an appliance or electronic device to a radio-based network  1230 ,  1232 , the appliance or electronic device can include a radio interface configured to use the particular radio protocol used by the radio-based network  1230 ,  1232 . In some cases, a radio-based network can include a central controller for monitoring and/or controlling devices in the network. In some cases, a radio-based network has distributed control, such that devices in the network can be controlled by multiple various devices within the radio-based network. 
     The radio-based networks  1230 ,  1232  may also be connected to the network  1200  through adapters  1234 ,  1236 . Each adapter  1234 ,  1236  can be configured to translate the specific radio-based protocol used by each radio-based network  1230 ,  1232  to an Ethernet protocol, or some other protocol. In some implementations, an adapter  1234 ,  1236  may be integrated into a central controller for the radio-based network  1230 ,  1232 . In some implementations, the adapters  1234 ,  1236  may provide access to the devices within the radio-based networks  1230 ,  1232  to other devices in other sub-networks in the mixed network  1200 . 
     Through the use of adapters, the various sub-networks in the illustrated example network  1200  may be able to inter-communicate, and/or communicate with the Internet  1250 . This may provide the network owner with the ability to monitor and/or control her network  1200  from a single point of access, such as a computer or smart phone connected to the mixed network  1200 . Alternatively or additionally, the network owner may be able to monitor and/or control the network  1200  remotely, such as while connected to the Internet  1250 . 
       FIG. 12B  illustrates an example of the mixed network  1200 , where the mixed network  1200  includes a deception-based network security device  1260  to provide improved security for the network  1200 . In this example, the gateway device  1248  is a separate device from the router  1246 , and the security device  1260  has been added between the gateway device  1248  and the router  1246 . In this example, the security device  1260  can communicate with the rest of the mixed network  1200  through the router  1246 . 
     Placing the security device  1260  between the gateway device  1248  and the router  1246  may allow the security device  1260  to monitor all or most network traffic between the network  1200  and the Internet  1250 . Being able to monitor all outgoing and incoming network traffic may enable the security device  1260  to quickly find suspect network traffic, including suspect network traffic that bypassed a firewall at the gateway device  1248 . The security device  1260  may also be able to defend the network  1200  from this position. For example, the security device  1260  may be able to disconnect the network  1200  from the gateway device  1248 , and thus cut off an attack originating on the Internet  1250 . Alternatively or additionally, the security device  1260  may be configured to intercept and redirect suspect network traffic, thus preventing the suspect network traffic from reaching the network  1200 . In some implementations, the security device  1260  may be configured to deploy security mechanisms to receive suspect network traffic, and thus engage a network threat. 
     In some implementations, the security device  1260  can examine the network  1200  to determine which devices are in the network, how the devices are used, when the devices are used, and/or possibly who uses the devices, among other things. To learn this information, the security device  1260  can employ various methods. For example, in some cases, a sub-network may have a central controller. For example, some electrical network  1220  protocols employ a central controller to monitor and control the devices in the sub-network. In this example, the central controller may provide an application program interface (API) that the security device  1260  can use to request information about the devices in the electrical network  1220 . This information can include, for example, a list of devices, the types of the devices, an identifier for each device, and/or possibly the functionality of each device. 
     In some cases, one or more of the devices in the mixed network  1200  may be registered with a cloud-based, Internet-of-Things service provider. The Internet-of-Things service, which may be hosted by an entity on the Internet  1250 , may monitor the various devices that are registered with the service. Through the service, the devices may also be able to discover each other. In various implementations, the network owner can provide the security device  1260  with her login credentials, so that the security device  1260  can log into the service. In some implementations, the security device  1260  can act like another device that is registered with the service, and thus be able to discover the other devices registered with the service. In some implementations, the security device  1260  can operate with elevated privileges, such as for example being able to control other devices that are registered with the service. In some implementations, the security device  1260  can also use the cloud-based service to deploy security mechanisms that can register with the service, and appear as additional devices that are monitored by the service. 
     In some cases, a sub-network may be implemented with a protocol that enables devices in the network to discover each other. For example, the Windows® operating system provides a protocol that enables computers running a compatible Windows® operating system to find each other on the network. In some implementations, the security device  1260  can implement a similar protocol, and so can also discover Windows®-based computers in the mixed network  1200 . Other operating systems and networking protocols may have a similar discovery mechanism. 
     In some cases, the security device  1260  can use network mapping tools, such as nmap, to obtain a “map” of the network  1200 . Tools such as nmap can provide information such as names, IP addresses, available ports, services running, and/or possibly the operating system and applications on each device connected to the network  1200 . 
     In some cases, the security device  1260  can use basic network queries to learn about the devices on the mixed network  1200 . For example, the security device  1260  may the subnet address for each of the subnetworks by querying, for example, a local Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server. Having obtaining the subnet address, the security device may scan each IP address in the subnet address range. For any IP address that is in use, an address resolution protocol may translate the IP network addresses to MAC addresses. A MAC address typically includes an “organizationally unique identifier;” that is, an identifier that has been assigned to a specific manufacturer. The security device  1260  thus may be able to use a MAC address to at least identify a device&#39;s manufacturer, and possibly also the device&#39;s type. 
     In some cases, when the security device may not be able to directly obtain information about the devices in the mixed network  1200 , the security device may monitor network packets coming from and going to each device. By monitoring network traffic, the security device  1260  may be able to build a profile of each device. The profile may provide usage information, such as when the device is used and how much. The profile may also provide some idea of the type and functionality of the device. For example, a computer may transmit email, request webpages, receive streaming video, and/or may receive this variety of network traffic for extended periods of time during the day. On the other hand, a network-connected thermostat might only send basic data packets, and send these packets at fixed intervals. Additionally, the data packets may contain the same basic information, such as a current operating state. 
     Having obtaining the configuration of the mixed network  1200 , in various implementations, the security device  1260  may then use this information to select and configure security mechanisms. The security mechanisms can be selected to conform with devices that could be found in the network. For example, the mixed network  1200  may be installed in a small apartment. The security device  1260  may not be able to identify the space as a small apartment, but may see only one or two computers and one or two appliances. In this example, the security device  1260  may determine that configuring security devices to emulate, for example, a second refrigerator or an extensive security system may not appear realistic. The security device  1260  may instead deploy security mechanisms configured to emulate a basic home entertainment system, a laptop, or a tablet computer. Alternatively, the security device  1260  may instead determine, for this example, to deploy a large number of security mechanisms, configured to emulate a varied number of devices, to make the small apartment resemble a large house or even a small business. In this example, the nature of the network  1200  may be hidden, and/or the real network devices may be presented as less attractive targets for hacking. 
     As another example, in some implementations, the security device  1260  may determine that the mixed network  1200  does not have particular devices that could otherwise be find in the mixed network  1200 . For example, the network owner may not have a network-enable thermostat or television, both of which could be present in the network owner&#39;s home. In this example, the security device  1260  thus determine to deploy security mechanisms that emulate a thermostat and/or a television. 
       FIG. 12C  illustrates another example the mixed network  1200 , where the mixed network  1200  includes a deception-based network security device  1260 . In this example, the security device  1260  has been added between the router  1246  and several of the sub-networks. The security device  1260  may be installed in this way because, for example, the gateway device  1248  and router  1246  are integrated into a single device. In this example, the security device  1260  may communicate with the Ethernet network  1210  through the router  1246 . 
     In this example, the security device  1260  has also been configured to connect directly to the electrical network  1220  and the radio-based networks  1230 ,  1232 . In some implementations, the security device  1260  may be configured to communicate with the electrical and radio sub-networks using the protocol used by each sub-network. In these implementations, the security device  1260  can translate between the protocols used by the sub-networks and an Ethernet protocol, taking the place of the adapters  1224 ,  1234 ,  1236  illustrated in  FIG. 12A-12B . 
     In the example of  FIG. 12C , in some implementations, the security device  1260  can learn about the devices in the sub-networks by being able to use the same protocol that is used by each sub-network. For example, the security device  1260  may connect to the electrical network  1220  as another appliance, or may act as a central controller for the electrical network  1220 . As another example, the security device  1260  may appear on a radio-based network  1230  as another relay in the radio communications. In these and other examples, the security device  1260  can build a profile of each sub-network in the mixed network  1200 . 
     With a profile of the mixed network  1200 , the security device  1260  can generate deceptions for the mixed network  1200 , where the deceptions are configured to resembled devices that can be found in the mixed network  1200 . Alternatively or additionally, the deceptions can hide the true nature or layout of the mixed network  1200 , thereby hiding the mixed network  1200  behind deceptions. 
     In the example of  FIG. 12C , the security device  1260  can take actions to secure the network. For example, in some cases, the security device  1260  can isolate the electrical network  1220  or a radio-based network  1230 ,  1232  if a network threat is detected in one of these networks. Isolating the compromised network can prevent the threat from spreading to other parts of the network or to the Internet  1250 . 
       FIG. 13  illustrates an example of a network threat detection system  1340  that can be used to implement a deception-based network security device. The threat detection system  1340  can use dynamic security mechanisms to locate, identify, and confirm a threat to a site network. The various components of the network threat detection system  1340  may be implemented as discreet hardware components, as software components executing on different computing systems, as software components executing on one computing system, or as a combination of hardware components and software components in one or multiple computing systems. 
     The threat detection system  1340  may be monitoring a site network  1302 . The site network  1302  may include various interconnected network devices, including both computers and network infrastructure equipment, as well as home appliances and electronics, tools and manufacturing equipment, and other non-traditional network devices. An attack pattern detector  1306  may collect data  1304   a - 1304   c  from the site network  1302  and/or an emulated network  1316 . This collected data  1304   a - 1304   c  may come from various sources, such as servers, computers devices, and network infrastructure devices in the site network  1302 , and from previously-deployed deception mechanisms in the site network  1302  or in the emulated network  1316 . The collected data  1304   a - 1304   c  may be structured or unstructured. The collected data  1304   a - 1304   c  may be continuously updated. 
     The attack pattern detector  1306  may monitor and/or analyze the collected data  1304   a - 1304   c  to determine whether a network abnormality has occurred or is occurring. In many cases, a network abnormality may fall within acceptable network usage. In other cases, the network abnormality may indicate a potential network threat. One example of a network abnormality is an access detected at a deception mechanism in the site network  1302 . In some implementations, emulated network devices in the emulated network  1316  may be projected into the site network  1302  as deception mechanisms. Because the emulated network devices are not part of the normal business of the site network  1302 , any access to them is automatically suspect. In various implementations, the attack pattern detector  1306  may identify or isolate the pattern of network behavior that describes the network abnormality. This pattern of behavior may be provided as a suspected attack pattern  1308  to a dynamic deployment generator  1310 . 
     The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may analyze the suspected attack pattern  1308  and determine what should be done to confirm that an attack occurred or is in progress. The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may have access to various deceptive security mechanisms, which emulate devices that may be found in the site network  1302 . The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may determine which of these security mechanisms are most likely to be attractive to the potential threat. The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may further determine how and where to use or deploy one or more security mechanisms. In some cases, the security mechanisms may be deployed into an emulated network  1316 , while in other cases the security mechanisms may be deployed into the site network  1302 . For example, when the suspected attack pattern  1308  indicates that a production server may have been accessed for illegitimate reasons, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may initiate an emulated server in the emulated network  1316  that appears to be particularly vulnerable and/or to have valuable data. The emulated server may further be projected into the site network  1302  to attract the attention of the possible attacker. As another example, when the suspected attack pattern  1308  indicates that a deception mechanism has been logged into, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may initiate emulated network devices in the emulated network  1316  that mimic production servers in the site network  1302 . In this example, should the user who logged into the deception mechanism attempt to log into a production server, the user may instead be logged into an emulated version of the production server. In this example, the user&#39;s activity may be contained to the emulated network  1316 . 
     In some implementations, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may contact an external service, possibly located in on the Internet, for assistance in determining which security mechanisms to deploy and where to deploy them. For example, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may contact an external security services provider. The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may produce a deployment strategy  1312  that includes one or more security mechanisms to deploy, as well as how and where those security mechanisms should be deployed. 
     The deployment strategy  1312  may be provided to a deployment engine  1314 . The deployment engine may deploy security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  into an emulated network  1316  and/or into the site into the site network  1302 . In various implementations, the emulated network  1316  may emulate one or more network devices, possibly configured to resemble a real configuration of inter-connected routers and/or switches and network devices in a subnetwork. The emulated network devices may be, for example, address deception mechanisms, low-interaction deception mechanisms, and/or high-interaction deception mechanisms. In various implementations, the security mechanisms  1320   b - 1320   c  deployed into the emulated network  1316  can be projected into the site network  1302 . In these implementations, the security mechanisms  1320   b - 1320   c  may function as actual nodes in the site network  1302 . In various implementations, the emulated network  1316  may be hosted by a network emulator. 
     In various implementations, the deployment strategy  1312  may indicate where in network topology of the emulated network  1316  and/or the site network  1302  the security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  are to be deployed. For example the deployment strategy  1312  may indicate that a certain number of security mechanisms  1320   b - 1320   c  should be deployed into the subnetwork where an attack appears to be occurring. These security mechanisms  1320   b - 1320   c  may be deployed into the emulated network  1316 , from which they may be projected into the site network  1302  Alternatively or additionally, the deployment strategy  1312  may call for placing a security mechanisms  1320   a  at a node in the site network  1302  where it are most likely to attract the attention of the potential threat. Once deployed, the security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  may begin collecting data about activity related to them. For example, the security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  may record each time that they are accessed, what was accessed, and, with sufficient information, who accessed them. The security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  may provide this data to the deployment engine  1314 . 
     In various implementations, the deployment strategy  1312  may alternatively or additionally indicate that one or more deceptions should be escalated. For example, the suspected attack pattern  1308  may indicate that a MAC or IP address for an address deception was scanned, and the deployment strategy  1312  may then indicate that the address deception should be escalated to a low-interaction deception. As another example, the suspected attack pattern  1308  may indicate that a connection attempt to a low-interaction deception was seen, and the deployment strategy  1312  may then indicate that the low-interaction deception should be escalated to a high-interaction deception. 
     The deployment engine  1314  may provide a deployment strategy  1312  and feedback data  1318  from the security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  to a validation engine  1322 . The validation engine  1322  may analyze the deployment strategy  1312  and the feedback data  1318  from the security mechanisms  1320   a - 1320   c  to determine whether an actual attack has occurred or is in progress. In some cases, the network abnormality that triggered the deployment of the security mechanisms may be legitimate activity. For example, a network bot (e.g., an automated system) may be executing a routine walk of the network. In this example, the network bot may be accessing each IP address available in the site network  1302 , and thus may also access a security mechanism deployed to resemble a network device that is using a specific IP address. In other cases, however, a network abnormality may be a port scanner that is attempting to collect IP addresses for illegitimate purposes. The validation engine  1322  may use the feedback data  1318  to confirm that the activity is malicious. The validation engine  1322  may provide verification data  1324 . The verification data  1324  may, in some cases, confirm that an attack has occurred or is occurring. In other cases, the verification data  1324  may indicate that no attack has happened, or that more information is needed. 
     The verification data  1324  may be provided to the dynamic deployment generator  1310 . The dynamic deployment generator  1310  may use the verification data  1324  to dynamically adjust the deployment strategy  1312 . These adjustments may be directed towards establishing more attractive traps for the potential threat, and/or towards obtaining more information about the potential threat. For example, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may call for dynamically adjusting or changing the nature of an already deployed security mechanism  1320   a - 1320   c . Alternatively or additionally, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may determine that a security mechanism  1320   a - 1320   c  can be disabled or removed from the site network  1302 . Alternatively or additionally, the dynamic deployment generator  1310  may cause different security mechanisms to be deployed. These changes may be reflected in the deployment strategy  1312 , and may be implemented by the deployment engine  1314 . 
     In some implementations, the adjustments to the deployment strategy  1312  may be directed towards containing an apparent threat within the emulated network  1316 . For example, the verification data  1324  may indicate that an unexpected access has occurred at a security mechanism  1320   a  deployed into the site network  1302 . Using this information, the deployment strategy  1312  may include deploying security mechanisms  1320   b - 1320   c  into the emulated network  1316  that mimic production systems in the site network  1302 . Should an apparent attacker attempt a lateral movement from the security mechanism  1320   a  where he was detected to a production system, the apparent attacker may instead be logged into a security mechanism  1320   b - 1320   c  that mimics that production server. The apparent attacker may not be aware that his activity has been contained to the emulated network  1316 . Using this deployment strategy  1312 , the apparent attacker may be kept away from production systems. 
     The threat detection system  1340  may, using the components and data described above, determine that a network abnormality is an acceptable and legitimate use of the site network  1302 , or that the network abnormality is an actual threat to the site network  1302 . In some implementations, the threat detection system  1340  may also be able to take action to stop a perceived threat. 
       FIG. 14  illustrates an example of a process  1400  that may be implemented by an attack pattern detector to identify a pattern of behavior as a possible threat. The process  1400  may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. The attack pattern detector may include one or more integrated memory systems for storing data, or may be connected to external memory systems. 
     The process  1400  may receive new alert data  1404 . The new alert data  1404  may include information about a network abnormality that may be a threat to the network. The new alert data  1404  may include information such as a possible identity of the source of the threat, what the nature of the threat appears to be, when the threat began or occurred, and/or where the threat occurred in the site network. 
     The new alert data  1404  may be examined, at step  1480 , to determine whether the information provided by the new alert data  1404  matches a pervious attack. The new alert data  1404  may match a previous attack when the pattern of behavior indicated by the new alert data  1404  matches a pattern of behavior that is known to be a network threat. Previously identified attack patterns  1490  may be provided at step  1480  to make this determination. Alternatively or additionally, the new alert data  1404  may be related to a previously identified attack pattern  1490 , and/or may describe behavior that is an extension of a known attack pattern. 
     When the new alert data  1404  matches an identified attack pattern  1490 , and/or is related to an identified attack pattern, at step  1488 , the matching attack pattern may be updated. Updating the matching attack pattern may include, for example, changing a ranking of the attack pattern. A ranking may indicate the seriousness of the attack pattern. For example, a more serious attack pattern may be more likely to be a real attack, and/or a higher ranking may indicate a greater need to address the attack. Alternatively or additionally, updating the matching attack pattern may include adding a location where the pattern of behavior was seen. Alternatively or additionally, updating the matching attack pattern may include, for example, describing variations on the attack pattern, alterations to the attack pattern, additional sources of this type of pattern, and so on. 
     When the new alert data  1404 , at step  1480 , does not match an identified attack pattern  1490 , the process  1400  next attempts, at step  1482 , to determine whether the new alert data  1404  describes a pattern of behavior that may be a new and previously unidentified threat to the network. To make this determination, various data may be provided at step  1482 , such as, for example, raw log files  1470  and previously unmatched alerts  1472 . Raw log files  1470  may provide additional information about the new alert data  1404  that can be used by the process  1400  to further determine whether an attack may be occurring. The previously unmatched alerts  1472  may be patterns of behavior that has previously been determined to not be an attack. The new alert data  1404  may be matched against these previously unmatched alerts  1472  to determine that the new alert data  1404  describes behavior already determined to not be an attack. Alternatively, the new alert data  1404  may indicate that a previous unmatched alert  1472  may, in fact, describe an actual attack. 
     Using the raw log files  1470 , unmatched alerts  1472 , and possibly other data, the process  1400  examine, for example, the seriousness of the behavior described by the new alert data  1404 , the nature of the behavior, the source of the behavior, and so on. When it is determined, at step  1482 , that the new alert data  1404  does not indicate a new attack pattern, the new alert data may be saved, at step  1484 , with previously unmatched alerts  1472 . When it is determined that the new alert data  1404  does, in fact, describe a new attack pattern, the new alert data may be saved, at step  1486 , along with previously identified attack patterns  1490 . In some cases, at step  1486 , additional information may be stored with the new attack pattern data. For example, the new attack pattern may be given a rank, indicating the degree of seriousness, level of threat, and/or degree of immediacy. 
     The process  1400  of  FIG. 14  may identify a pattern of behavior that could be a threat to the network. The pattern, however, may only be a potential threat.  FIGS. 15A-15B  illustrate an example of two stages of a process  1510 ,  1550  for confirming that the pattern of behavior is an actual threat. The process  1510  may be a first stage in an overall process for confirming a pattern as a threat, while the process  1550  may be a second stage. The process  1510  of  FIG. 15A  may be executed, for example, by a dynamic deployment generator. The process  1510  may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. 
     An identified attack pattern  1590  may be provided to the process  1510 . The identified attack pattern  1590  may be produced, for example, by the process  1400  of  FIG. 14 . Additionally, in some cases, the process  1400  may identify multiple attack patterns simultaneously or successively, all of which may be provided to the process  1510  of  FIG. 15A , or some of which may be provided while the rest are set aside for later processing. The process  1510  may, at step  1592 , get the next highest ranked attack pattern. The ranking may indicate a seriousness, importance, urgency, or otherwise indicate an order in which the attack patterns should be addressed. 
     For the next highest ranked attack pattern, at step  1594 , the process  1510  generates a dynamic deployment strategy. Pre-defined attack pattern deployment strategies  1574  may be provided at step  1594 . The pre-defined attack pattern deployment strategies may include strategies that were effective against the same or similar attack patterns, or that were designed with certain attack patterns in mind. Alternatively or additionally, the process  1510  may, at step  1594  dynamically generate a deployment strategy based on prior attack pattern deployment strategies  1574 , and/or the behavior described by the attack pattern. The process  1510  may not produce a deployment strategy exactly tailored for the attack pattern, and may instead produce a deployment strategy that is expected to be effective. Additionally, the process  1510  may produce more than one deployment strategy. Each of these deployment strategies may be ranked in various ways, such as their likelihood to be most attractive to the attack pattern, their impact on the network, how quickly they can be deployed, or resources required for their deployment. Each deployment strategy may be tried sequentially, or several deployment strategies, may be tried at the same time. 
     One example of a deployment strategy is a strategy for a port scanner attack. When the identified attack pattern  1590  indicates port scanning of a server, a deployment strategy may call for deploying one or more security mechanisms that emulate services provided by the server. One or more corresponding ports on the server may then be opened. A true port scanner attack may then attempt to access the emulated services through an open port. Alternatively or additionally, security mechanisms may be deployed outside of the server. These security mechanisms may also emulate services provided by the server, and attract the attention of the port scanner without the port scanner being able to enter the server. 
     Another example of a deployment strategy is a strategy for a network scanner attack. In this example, when the identified attack pattern  1590  indicates scanning of, for example, a subnet, a deployment strategy may call for deploying one or more emulated servers into the subnet. These emulated servers may resemble production servers in the subnet, and so may provide the same ports and servers as the production servers. The emulated servers, however, will monitor for network scanning activity. 
     Another example of a deployment strategy is a strategy for a database attack. When the attack pattern  1590  indicates unauthorized querying or copying of a database, the deployment strategy may include security mechanisms that mimic parts of the database, such as additional views or tables with artificial or artificially tainted data. The security mechanisms may report being accessed or copied, either of which indicates an attack on the database. 
     At step  1596 , the process  1510  may select one or more security mechanisms from available security mechanisms  1576  that are called for by the deployment strategy or strategies generated at step  1596 . Additionally or alternatively, at step  1596  the process  1510  may dynamically generate a security mechanism, and/or modify a security mechanism from among the available security mechanisms  1516 . 
     The process  1510  may produce an attack pattern  1518 , one or more deployment strategies  1512 , and one or more security mechanisms  1516 . The attack pattern  1518  may be the attack pattern that was selected at step  1592 , and that is being confirmed as an actual threat. The deployment strategy or strategies  1512  may be one or more deployment strategies generated at step  1594 . The security mechanisms  1516  may be the security mechanisms chosen at step  1596 . 
     The outputs of the process  1510  may be provided to a second stage for confirming that a pattern of behavior is an actual threat.  FIG. 15B  illustrates an example of a process  1550  that may be used for the second stage. The process  1550  may be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software. 
     The process  1550  may receive an attack pattern  1518 , one or more deployment strategies  1512 , and one or more security mechanisms  1516 . The attack pattern  1518 , deployment strategies  1512 , and security mechanisms  1516  may be provided by a first stage of the process to confirm an attack pattern as an actual threat, such as the process  1510  illustrated in  FIG. 15A . In  FIG. 15B , the attack pattern  1518  describes a pattern of behavior that is being verified to determine whether it is an actual attack. The deployment strategies  1512  describe one or more plans for verifying that the pattern is a threat, including a selection of one or more dynamic security mechanisms and a plan for where in the network to deploy them. The security mechanisms  1516  may be the processes and/or data that are to be deployed. 
     A deployment engine  1514  may receive the attack pattern  1518 , deployment strategies  1512 , and security mechanisms  1516 , and may deploy  1530  one or more security mechanisms  1516 , using one or more of the deployment strategies  1512 . As noted above, the deployment engine  1514  may try different deployment strategies sequentially, or may try several deployment strategies concurrently. The deployment engine  1514  may also be configured to dynamically react to changing conditions in the network. For example, the attack pattern  1518  may describe a user whose credentials are suspect. In this example, the deployment engine  1514  may automatically deploy security mechanisms  1516  when the suspect user logs in. Furthermore, the deployment engine  1514  may also be configured to remove the security mechanisms  1516  when the user logs out. As another example, the deployment engine  1514  may launch additional security mechanisms configured to contain the suspect user within an emulated network. The deployment engine  1514  may provide deployment details  1540  to a validation engine  1522 , where the deployment details  1540  may include, for example, the attack pattern  1518  and the deployment strategy  1512 . 
     In some implementations, the validation engine  1522  may attempt to determine whether the attack pattern  1518  is, in fact, a real attack. Deployed security mechanisms  1520   a - 1520   d  may provide data  1532  about activity around them or related to them to the validation engine  1522 . This data  1532  may indicate, for example, no activity, suspect activity, or confirmed activity. In some cases, the data  1532  may indicate that the deployment strategy may be more effective if adjusted. The validation engine  1522  may provide this feedback  1542  to the deployment engine. The deployment engine  1514  may take actions such as a real-time, dynamic modification of a deployed security mechanism  1520   a - 1520   d , removing a deployed security mechanism  1520   a - 1520   d , and/or deploying different security mechanisms. 
     In some cases, data from deployed security mechanisms  1520   a - 1520   d  may also be provided to one or more other systems. These other systems may be able to provide additional information about the attack pattern  1518 . In some cases, these other systems may be able to address the threat, for example by blocking access to the network, revoking authentication, or terminating processes. 
     Ultimately, the validation engine  1522  may provide an attack confirmation  1544 . An attack confirmation  1544  may confirm that the attack pattern  1518  is an actual attack. An attack confirmation  1544  may be brought to the attention of a human network administrator. Alternatively or additionally, an attack confirmation  1544  may be sent to network security systems that may be able to address the threat. In some cases, the validation engine  1522  may instead determine that the attack pattern  1518  was not an actual attack. Yet, in other cases, the validation engine  1522  may not come to a conclusion, in which case the attack pattern  1518  may be marked for continuing observation. 
     In some implementations, the network security system described above may also be configured to react to an attack confirmation  1544  by attempting corrective action against the attack. For example, the system may block the IP address that appears to be the source of the attack, or attempt to trace the attack to the source. Alternatively or additionally, the system may provide tainted data to the attacker, thereby possibly disabling the attacker&#39;s own system. Alternatively or additionally, the system may provide traceable data to the attacker. Traceable data may enable the system or others to track the attacker&#39;s movements in the network. In some implementations, tracking data may provide up-to-date information that may be used to dynamically change or modify an existing deployment strategy, or to deploy a new deployment strategy. Alternatively or additionally, the system may make information about the attacker public, such as for example in the anti-virus community, on anti-hacker forums, or through mass media outlets. 
     In various implementations, deceptions can be provided for a mixed network using network tunnels. For example, a deception-based network security device that has been added to a mixed network can use a network tunnel to connect to a deception farm. Using the tunnel, deceptions hosted by the deception farms can be projected into the mixed network. In the discussion that followed, the mixed network is referred to as a site network. 
       FIGS. 16A-16D  illustrate an example of a network deception system  1600  configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network  1604 . A site network  1604  is a network installed at a customer site, such as a business, an office complex, an educational institution, or a private home. Some or all of the site network  1604  may be “in the cloud,” meaning that some or all of the site network  1604  is hosted by a cloud services provider. The example site network  1604  includes various network infrastructure devices  1674 , such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, and gateway devices  1662 , among others. Gateway devices  1662  can provide the site network  1604  access to other networks. The example site network  1604  also includes various other network devices  1676   a - 1676   d , such as servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, netbook computers, tablet computers, personal digital assistants, smartphones, smart home assistants, printers, scanners, and/or other network devices, among others. In some cases, the example site network  1604  can also include other electronic devices that have network interfaces, such as televisions, gaming consoles, thermostats, refrigerators, and so on. Some of the network devices  1676   a - 1675   d  may be virtual; for example, some network devices may be virtual machines. In some cases, the site network  1604  can include wired and/or wireless segments. 
     In some cases, the site network  1604  can have one or more broadcast domains. A broadcast domain is a logical division within a network, in which all the nodes can reach other nodes in the network using broadcast packets. As an example, quite often all the network devices connected to the same repeater or switch are in the same broadcast domain. As a further example, routers frequently form the boundaries of a broadcast domain. 
     In various implementations, the network deception system  1600  can provide deception mechanisms (also referred to herein as deceptions) for the broadcast domains in the site network  1604 . In the example of  FIGS. 16A-16D , a deception mechanism can be a network device that is added to the site network  1604  as a decoy. The deception mechanisms do not participate in the ordinary activities of the site network  1604 , where the ordinary activities include functions for which the site network  1604  was set up. For example, when the site network  1604  hosts a website, ordinary activities can include transferring data between webservers, responding to external requests for webpages, conducting database searches, and so on. As another example, when the site network  1604  is used by a research and development company to develop new software, ordinary activities can include storing data, providing data to network devices  1676   a - 1676   b  where engineers work, executing compilation software, and so on. 
     Ordinary activities of the site network  1604 , with some exceptions, do not normally include exchanging network traffic with deception mechanisms. Exceptions can include, for example, broadcast and multicast network traffic, and/or accesses for purposes of administrating the deception mechanisms. Because the deception mechanisms do not participate in the ordinary activities of the site network  1604 , any network access to a deception mechanism is automatically suspect. The deception mechanisms can thus be used to detect suspicious activity within the site network  1604 , where the suspicious activity may be generated by a network threat. 
     To provide deception mechanisms to the site network  1604 , in various implementations, the network deception system  1600  can include a deception farm  1640 . In various implementations, a deception farm can include a number of network devices, configured to operate as deception mechanisms. Similar to a server farm or a data center, deception mechanisms in a deception farm can be allocated to particular site networks and/or specific customers of the deception farm. In the example of  FIG. 16A , the deception farm  1640  includes a network device, configured as a network emulator  1620 . The network emulator  1620  can be configured to host an emulated network  1616 , which can include a number of emulated network devices  1618 . 
     In various implementations, the emulated network devices  1618  can mimic network devices that can be found in the site network  1604 . For example, when the site network  1604  includes computers running the Windows or Linux operating systems, the emulated network devices  1618  can include emulated computers running Windows or Linux. In this example, the emulated network devices can further be configured with the specific versions and/or patch levels that are common among the network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network  1604 . 
     In various implementations, the emulated network devices  1618  can be simple or more complex deceptions, as the need requires. For example, one or more of the emulated network devices  1618  may be super-low interaction deceptions (also referred to as address deceptions), low-interaction deceptions, or high-interaction deceptions. Low-interaction and high-interaction can also be referred to collectively as interactive deceptions. 
     In various implementations, a super-low interaction deception is a deception mechanism that includes an network address, such as an IP address, and can also have a hardware address, such as a MAC address. Super-low-interaction deceptions can respond to simple queries about whether the network address is in use, and thus can establish that a node exists in the site network  1604  at the network address. Multiple super-low interaction deceptions can be hosted by an address deception engine, and can occupy few processing resources. Super-low interaction deceptions do not otherwise have dedicated hardware, and are not associated with an operating system or network services. 
     A low interaction deception is an emulated system executing a basic installation of an operating system. A low-interaction deception can also be executing some network services. A low-interaction deception can be initiated when a network interaction with a particular network address becomes more complicated than simple queries about whether a network address is in use. A low-interaction deception can respond to network traffic for multiple network addresses, where the responses may be formatted as appropriate for the operating system executing on the low-interaction deception. A low-interaction deception can thus represent multiple nodes in the site network  1604 . 
     A high-interaction deception is an emulated system configured to resemble a network device that may be found in the site network. A high-interaction deception may have a particular variation of an operating system installed, may have certain services and ports available, and may have a usage history in the form of data and log files. A high-interaction deception can be the most convincing type deception, and can be initiated when a network interaction escalates to a serious probe of a network device. 
     In various implementations, the deception farm  1640  can be located remotely from the site network  1604 . “Remotely” can mean that the deception farm  1640  is in a different network domain, and/or is outside of the security perimeter of the site network  1604 . Stated another way, the deception farm  1640  can connect to the site network  1604  over other, intermediate networks  1650 . The intermediate networks  1650  can be public and/or private and can include, for example, the Internet. 
     To provide deception mechanisms to the site network  1604 , in various implementations, the deception farm  1640  can be connected, using a network tunnel  1622 , to a network device in the site network, where the network device is configured as a projection point  1610 . The network device configured as a projection point  1610  can be, for example, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a server computer, a hand-held computer, or some other computing device that includes an integrated circuit configured as a processor, memory, and a network interface. In some implementations, the projection point  1610  can be a network infrastructure device, such as a switch. In some implementations, the projection point  1610  can be a virtual machine. In some implementations, a site network can include multiple projection points, each connected to the deception farm  1640  by a network tunnel. 
     In various implementations, the projection point  1610  can serve as an endpoint for a network tunnel  1622 . The other end of the network tunnel  1622  can terminate at tunneling endpoint  1614  in the deception farm  1640 . In various implementations, the tunneling endpoint  1614  can be a physical or a virtual switch. Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, the tunneling endpoint  1614  can be hosted by a network device, such as a server or desktop computer. In some implementations, a network device that hosts the tunneling endpoint  1614  can be configured as a tunneling and traffic manager, possibly also as a configuration manager, as discussed further below. In some implementations, the tunneling endpoint  1614  can provide physical port through which the network emulator  1620  (and other devices hosted by the deception farm  1640 ) can be connected to other networks  1650 . 
     The tunnel  1622  between the deception farm  1640  and the projection point  1610  can be configured using various tunneling protocols. Examples of tunneling protocols and network protocols that include tunneling include Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), IP in IP, point-to-point tunneling protocols (PPTP), Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and Virtual Extensible Local Area Network (VXLAN), among others. A tunneling managing can configure the tunnel  1622  to be secure, using various tunneling security protocols. Examples of tunneling security protocols include Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), and secure socket layer (SSL), among others. 
     In various implementations, the deception farm  1640  can obtain network addresses in each of the broadcast domains of the site network  1604 . For example, each broadcast domain may have a server running Domain Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). In this example, a configuration manager can request network addresses from a DHCP server, and thereby obtain network addresses for the domain in which the DHCP server is running. The configuration manager can then assign these network addresses to emulated network devices  1618  in the emulated network  1616 . By having network addresses in a domain of the site network  1604 , the emulated network devices  1618  can appear indistinguishable from legitimate network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network  1604 . In other examples, network addresses can be manually configured for the deception farm  1640 , for example by network administrators of the site network  1604  and/or by administrators of the deception farm  1640 . 
     In some implementations, instead of or in addition to a deception farm  1640 , deceptions can be provided to the site network  1604  using appliances installed in the site network  1604  itself. For example, a local network emulator can be installed in the site network  1604 . In this example, the local network emulator can also connect to a projection point in the site network  1604 , which can be the same projection point  1610  that is connected to the deception farm  1640  or can be a different projection point. The local network emulator can further obtain network addresses that are local to the site network  1604 . The local network emulator can further assign these network addresses to emulated network devices executing in the network emulator. 
     In various implementations, the network tunnel  1622  enables the emulated network devices  1618  to be “projected” into the site network  1604 .  FIG. 16B  illustrates an example in which the emulated network  1616  has been connected to the site network  1604  using the network tunnel  1622 . 
     A tunnel is a mechanism that can be used to transmit network traffic that has one network protocol over a network that normally would not support the network protocol. Tunneling uses the packet encapsulation, in which a header and sometimes also a trailer is added to a packet. The original packet becomes the data portion of a new packet. For example, a network device  1676   a  in the site network  1604  can address a packet to an emulated network device  1618  in the deception farm  1640 . The projection point  1610 , as one endpoint of the tunnel  1622 , can add one or more headers to the packet, where the headers can be formatted according to a tunneling protocol. When the encapsulated packet reaches the tunneling endpoint  1614  in the deception farm  1640 , the tunneling endpoint  1614  can remove the headers added by the projection point  1610 , and produce the original packet. The tunneling endpoint  1614  can then put the original packet on the emulated network  1616 , where the original packet can be treated in the same way as the packet would be treated in the site network  1604 . 
     The effect of the network tunnel  1622 , in the example of  FIG. 16B , can thus be to make the emulated network devices  1618  appear as nodes in the site network  1604 . Network devices projected into a site network  1604  will be referred to herein in as projected nodes  1642 . As discussed above, the emulated network devices  1618  can be given network addresses that are in a broadcast domain of the site network  1604 . The projected nodes  1642  can thus appear as network neighbors, in the same broadcast domain, as the network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network  1604 . For example, the network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  may have IP addresses 10.10.1.1600, 10.10.1.101, 10.10.1.102, and 10.10.1.103. In this example, the emulated network devices can thus be assigned, for example, IP address 10.10.1.1604, 10.10.1.105, 10.10.1.106, and 10.10.1.107. So configured, the emulated network devices  1618  can receive broadcast traffic sent within the site network  1604 . 
     Being a network neighbor can mean that the projected nodes  1642  can be treated by the site network  1604 , and by devices in the site network  1604 , in the same way as the legitimate network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network  1604 . For example, legitimate network device  1676   a - 1676   d  occupies a particular network address, and, similarly, each emulated network device  1618  also occupies a network address. Thus, in this example, a host discovery tool running from a first network device  1676   a  can discover each emulated network device  1618  in the same way that the discovery tool discovers its neighbor network device  1676   b , without the tool determining any difference between the emulated network device  1618  and the legitimate network device  1676   b . As another example, network packets from the first network device  1676   a  can be exchanged with one of the emulated network devices  1618  without seeming to leave the site network  1604 . As yet another example, network traffic originating outside of the site network  1604  can reach an emulated network device  1618  by being addressed to the site network  1604 . 
     The tunnel  1622  provides a path for network traffic to be exchanged between devices in the site network  1604  and emulated devices in the emulated network  1616 . The projection point  1610 , as the tunnel endpoint in the site network  1604 , can be configured to receive any network traffic that is addressed to one of the emulated network devices  1618 . This network traffic passes over the tunnel  1622  to emulated network  1616  in the deception farm  1640 , where the network traffic can be directed to the appropriate emulated network device  1618 . Similarly, network traffic from an emulated network device  1618  can pass over the tunnel back to the site network  1604 . 
     The tunnel  1622  can be transparent, and may not visible to the network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network. In some implementations, the projection point  1610  can also hide itself, so that the projection point&#39;s function as a tunnel endpoint cannot be readily discovered. For example, the projection point  1610  can have a network address within the site network  1604  that is distinct from any network address assigned to the emulated network devices  1618 . In this example, the projection point  1610  may hide its own network address by not responding to any network traffic that is addressed to projection point&#39;s network address. 
     In various implementations, the emulated network  1616  can also be dynamically reconfigured.  FIG. 16C  illustrates an example of the network deception system  1600 , where the emulated network  1616  has been reconfigured. In various implementations, the emulated network  1616  can be reconfigured in response to network traffic  1624  received by emulated network  1616  from the site network  1604 . For example, network traffic  1624  may be received that indicates that one of the network devices  1676   c  in the site network  1604  is attempting to connect with an emulated network device  1618 . The connection attempt may be suspicious, so the network emulator  1620  may “escalate” a deception to respond to the connection attempt. For example, a low-interaction deception may be switched to a high-interaction deception. 
     In various implementations, reconfiguring the emulated network  1616  can also include adding and/or removing deception mechanisms in response to network traffic  1624  received by the emulated network  1616 . For example, a network threat may have connected to one of the emulated network devices  1618  from a network device  1676   c  in the site network  1604 . The network threat may then attempt to connect from the emulated network device  1618  to a legitimate network device  1676   a  in the site network  1604 . Rather than providing the network threat with access to the legitimate network device  1676   a  over the tunnel  1622 , in this example, the network emulator  1620  can add an emulated network device  1686   a  that is configured to resemble the legitimate network device  1676   a  that the network threat is attempting to reach. To resemble the legitimate network device  1676   a , the new emulated network device  1686   a  can have the same MAC and IP address as the legitimate network device  1676   a . The new emulated network device  1686   a  can also have the same operating system or a similar operating system as the legitimate network device  1676   a , and be running the same or similar services. By having the new emulated network device  1686   a  mimic the legitimate network device  1676   a , the network threat can be kept contained within the emulated network  1616 . The network threat might also not be aware that, by moving to the new emulated network device  1686   a , the network threat has not left the emulated network  1616 . In some cases, the network emulator  1620  may also add emulated network devices  1286   b - 1686   d  to mimic other network devices  1676   b - 1676   c  in the site network  1604 . Thus, no matter which network device the network threat attempts to move to, threat can be contained to the emulated network. 
     To assist in containing a network threat in the emulated network  1616 , the network emulator  1620  can provide isolation mechanisms between the emulated network  1616  and the site network  1604 . For example, the network emulator  1620  can include packet filters. Packet filters can prevent packets to or from the new emulated network devices  1686   a - 1686   d  to go back over the tunnel  1622  to the site network  1604 . Packet filters can also prevent some broadcast network traffic originating in the emulate network  1616  from going across the tunnel  1622 . Packet filters and other isolation mechanisms can also prevent any problems that can be caused by two network devices (e.g., a legitimate network device  1676   a  and a corresponding an emulated network device  1686   a  that mimics the legitimate network device  1676   a ) appearing to be identical, including having identical MAC and IP addresses. For example, network traffic can be allowed to flow into the emulated network  1616 , but not out. 
     In various implementations, reconfiguring the emulated network  1616  can also include adding and/or removing deception mechanism for purposes other than mimicking the network devices  1676   a - 1676   d  in the site network  1604 . For example, the network emulator  1620  can occasionally remove and/or add emulated network devices  1618  to simulate network devices disconnecting and reconnecting to the site network  1604 . This behavior can mimic, for example, a user leaving the office with her laptop at the end of the day and coming back the next day. As another example, when it appears that an attack on the site network  1604  is in progress, the network emulator  1620  can add emulated network devices  1618  that have open ports or appear to have valuable data, or are otherwise attractive as targets. 
     As illustrated in the example of  FIG. 16D , in some implementations, the projection point  1610  can also project some simple deceptions. For example, the projection point  1610  can be configured with one or more super-low interaction deceptions  1612 . As discussed above, a super-low interaction deception can respond to simple queries, such as ARP requests and/or other requests that ask whether a network address is occupied. In this and similar examples, the projection point  1610  can respond to such requests, and the requests need not be sent over the tunnel  1622  to the deception farm  1640 . 
     As in the above examples, the projection point  1610  can be hidden, such that network scanning tools may not readily identify the projection point  1610 . For example, the projection point  1610  can avoid responding to any network traffic broadcast, multicast, or unicast to the projection point&#39;s network address. As another example, the network address of the projection point  1610  can be used as a network address of one of the super-low interaction deceptions  1612  hosted by the projection point  1610 . 
     In various implementations, the projection point  1610  can continue to project emulated network devices  1618  into the site network  1604 . For example, in addition to accepting network traffic directed to the super-low interaction deceptions  1612 , the projection point  1610  can also accept network traffic directed to an emulated network device  1618 . In this example, the projection point  1610  can send any network traffic for an emulated network device  1618  over the tunnel  1622  to the deception farm  1640 . 
     In various implementations, a deception farm can provide deception mechanisms using emulated network devices and/or physical network devices.  FIG. 17  illustrates an example of a network deception system  1700  configured to provide deception mechanisms for a site network  1704 . The example site network  1704  includes various network infrastructure devices  1774 , such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, and gateway devices  1762 , among others. Gateway devices  1762  can provide the site network  1704  access to other networks. The example site network  1704  also includes various other network devices  1776   a - 1776   d , which may be physical or virtual devices. In some cases, the site network  1704  can include wired and/or wireless segments. 
     To provide deceptions mechanisms to the site network  1604 , in various implementations, the network deception system  1700  can include a deception farm  1740 . In various implementations, the deception farm  1740  can include an emulated network  1716  that can include a number of emulated network devices  1718 . The emulated network devices  1718  can be configured to resemble the network devices  1776   a - 1776   d  in the site network  1704 , including having similar hardware and software configurations. The emulated network devices  1718  can be, for example, super-low interaction deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. The emulated network  1716  can be hosted by one or more network devices, such as server computers, which are not illustrated here. 
     In various implementations, the deception farm  1740  can alternatively or additionally include a physical network  1730 , where the physical network  1730  includes physical network devices  1732 . A physical device, in this example, can be a computing device (e.g., a chassis containing a circuit board and integrated circuit devices such as processors and memory), such as a laptop computer or a handheld device. In some implementations, physical devices  1732  in the physical network  1730  can alternatively or additionally include home appliances, such as network-enabled refrigerators, thermostats, televisions, gaming consoles, home security controllers, and so on. In some implementations, the physical devices  1732  can alternatively or additionally include machinery and/or factory equipment, such as Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines, 3-D printers, industrial robots, and so on. In various implementations, physical devices that can be difficult to emulate can be added to the physical network  1730 . 
     In various implementations, the deception farm  1740  can be located remotely from the site network  1704 . For example, the deception farm  1740  can be in a different network domain, in a different geographical location, and/or outside of the security perimeter of the site network  1704 . In these and other examples, the deception farm  1740  can communicate with the site network  1704  over intermediate network  1750 . The intermediate networks can be public and/or private, and can include, for example, the Internet. 
     To provide deception mechanisms to the site network  1704 , in various implementations, the deception farm  1740  can use a network tunnel  1722  to connect to a network device in the site network  1704 , where the network device is configured as a projection point  1710 . The projection point  1710  can serve as an endpoint of the tunnel  1722 . The other end of the tunnel  1722  can terminate at a tunneling endpoint  1714  in the deception farm  1740 . The tunneling endpoint  1714  can be hosted by a network device in the deception farm  1740 . In some implementations, the network device that hosts the tunneling endpoint  1714  can be configured as a tunneling and traffic manager and/or a configuration manager. In various implementations, the projection point  1710  can hide its presence from other devices in the site network  1704 , for example by hiding the network address used by the projection point  1710 . 
     In various implementations, the physical devices  1732  in the deception farm  1740  can be projected into the site network  1704 . As discussed above, the network tunnel  1722  can provide a conduit for network traffic between network devices  1776   a - 1776   d  in the site network  1704  and emulated network devices  1718  and/or physical devices  1732  in the deception farm  1740 . Services, such as packet encapsulation, provided by a tunneling protocol can enable network traffic to pass over the tunnel  1722  transparently, meaning that, from the point of the view of the network devices  1776   a - 1776   d  in the site network  1704  and devices in the deception farm  1740 , the tunnel does not appear to exist. 
     In various implementations, particular deceptions in the deception farm  1740  can be selected for projection into a site network. For example, in the example illustrated in  FIG. 17 , physical devices  1732  have been selected for projection into the example site network  1704 . The physical devices  1732  thus appear as projected nodes  1742  in the site network  1704 . The physical devices  1732  may have been selected because the physical devices  1732  are representative of the type of devices that can be found in the site network  1704 , because the physical devices  1732  are similar to the network devices  1776   a - 1776   d  in the site network, because the physical devices  1732 , when present alongside the network devices  1776   a - 1776   d , appear as attractive targets for network threats, or for some other reason. In various implementations, it may have been determined that emulated network devices  1718  may not have been suitable at the present time, and/or may be useful deceptions at a later time. 
     In various implementations, a network device configured as a configuration manager can determine the appropriate deceptions for the site network  1704  at any given time. The configuration manager can be located at the site network  1704 , at the deception farm  1740 , and/or at another network location, such as at a security services provider. In some implementations, the configuration manager can execute on the projection point  1710 . 
     To assist in making the devices in the deception farm  1740  appear as nodes in the site network  1704 , a configuration manager can obtain network addresses that are local to the site network  1704 . These network addresses can then be assigned, in the example of  FIG. 17 , to the physical devices  1732  in the deception farm  1740 . With local network addresses, the physical network devices  1732  can appear as network neighbors of the network devices  1776   a - 1776   d  in the site network  1704 . 
     In various implementations, the network deception system  1700  can alternatively or additionally include physical devices, configured as deception mechanisms, that are in the site network  1704  itself. For example, one or more physical devices, which are designated for use as decoys, can be connected to available ports in the site network  1704 . Because these physical devices are intended for use as deceptions, these physical devices would not be used for the ordinary, legitimate uses of the site network  1704 . In this and similar examples, network traffic to these local physical devices need not be passed over the tunnel  1722  to the deception farm  1740 . 
     In various implementations, a projection point in a site network can be configured to connect to more than one deception farm.  FIG. 18  illustrates an example of a deception system  1800  that includes a projection point  1810  with network tunnels  1822  to multiple deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c.    
     In this example, the projection point  1810  is providing deception mechanisms for a particular site network  1804 . The example site network  1804  includes various network infrastructure devices  1874 , such as routers, switches, hubs, repeaters, and gateway devices  1862 , among others. Gateway devices  1862  can provide the site network  1804  access to other networks. The example site network  1804  also includes various other network devices  1876   a - 1876   d , which may be physical or virtual devices. In some cases, the site network  1804  can include wired and/or wireless segments. 
     The example site network  1804  also includes a network device configured as a project point  1810 . In various implementations, the projection point  1810  can act as an endpoint of one or more network tunnels  1822 , where each network tunnel  1822  terminates at a different deception farm  1840   a - 1840   b . In these implementations, the projection point  1810  can project deceptions from different deceptions farms  1840   a - 1840   b . For example, in the example illustrated in  FIG. 18 , the projection point  1810  is projecting one set of deceptions  1832  from a first deception farm  1840   a  and a second set of deceptions  1834  from a second deception farm  1840   b . The first set of deceptions  1832  and the second set of deceptions  1834  thus appear as projected nodes  1842  in the site network  1804 . The deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  can be in different geographical locations. Alternatively or additionally, some of the deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  can be in the same geographical location. In some cases, one or more of the deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  can be in the same physical location as the site network  1804 . 
     The projection point  1810  can connect to more than one deception farm  1840   a - 1840   b  for different purposes. For example, one deception farm  1840   a  can be a back-up for the second deception farm  1840   b , such that, should the first deception farm  1840   a  experience technical problems, the projection point  1810  can switch to the second deception farm  1840   b  to obtain deceptions to project. As another example, the projection point  1810  may need more deceptions and the first deception farm  1840   a  may be at full utilization, such that additional deceptions may not be available from the first deception farm  1840   a . In this example, the projection point  1810  can obtain additional deceptions from the second deception farm  1840   b . As another example, different deception farms may host different deceptions. For example, the second deception farm  1840   b  may have physical devices that are not available from the first deception farm  1840   a , and it may be determined that the projection point  1810  should project those physical devices. In other example, there may be additional or other reasons for connecting the projection point  1810  to multiple deception farms  1840   a - 1840   b.    
     In various implementations, when the projection point  1810  is enabled in the site network  1804 , a network device configured as a configuration manager can determine to which deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  the projection point  1810  should be connected. In various implementations, the configuration manager can be located in the site network  1804  and be configured to communicate with the deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c . Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, the configuration manager can be located at a deception farm  1840   a , and can coordinate with other deception farms  1840   b - 1840   c  over intermediate networks  1850 . Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, each deception farm  1840   a - 1840   c  can include a configuration manager, and the various configuration managers can coordinate the activities of each deception farm  1840   a - 1840   c . Alternatively or additionally, in some implementations, the configuration manager can be located in another network, such as at a security services provider, and can coordinate between the projection point  1810  and the deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  over intermediate networks  1850 . In some implementations, a configuration manager can be running on the projection point  1810 . In some cases, the configuration manager can be executing in a deception center. 
     In various implementations, the configuration manager can be manually configured with profiles that describe the hardware and/or software configuration of the network devices  1876   a - 1876   d  in the site network  1804 . Alternatively or additionally, the configuration manager can automatically and dynamically profile the network devices  1876   a - 1876   d . In various implementations, the configuration manager can use these profiles to determine suitable deceptions for the site network  1804 . For example, the configuration manager can select deceptions that are representative of typical devices found in the site network  1804 . Alternatively or additionally, the configuration manager can be configured with descriptions of the desired deceptions for the site network  1804 . 
     In various implementations, once deceptions for the site network  1804  have been selected, the configuration manager can determine which deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  have suitable deceptions and/or have capacity to provide deceptions. For example, in the illustrated example, two of three available deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c  were selected. The configuration manager can then configure network tunnels  1822  between the projection point  1810  and each selected deception farm  1840   a - 1840   b.    
     In various implementations, the configuration manager can continuously monitor the deception needs for the site network  1804 . For example, when the site network  1804  appears to be experiencing a network attack, the configuration manager can determine that additional deceptions may be needed. In this example, the configuration manager may determine to obtain the additional deceptions from a third deception farm  1840   c , and thus configure tunnel  1822  between the projection point  1810  and the third deception farm  1840   c . Should the deceptions from the third deception farm  1840   c  no longer be needed, in some cases, the configuration manager can remove the tunnel  1822  to the third deception farm  1840   c.    
     In the example of  FIG. 18 , in some implementations, the projection point  1810  can include context management logic. Context management can enable the projection point  1810  to manage network traffic between the network devices  1876   a - 1876   d  and the different deception farms  1840   a - 1840   c . Specifically, when the projection point  1810  receives network traffic for a particular deception  1832 , the projection point&#39;s context management system can determine that the particular deception  1832  is located in the first deception farm  1840   a . The projection point  1810  can use this information to select the correct tunnel  1822  to send the network traffic through. The context information for each network tunnel  1822  can be maintained using, for example, tables, lists, associative arrays, databases, and/or another data structure. 
     In various implementations, one deception farm can provide deceptions to multiple projection points in the same site network.  FIG. 19  illustrates an example of a deception system  1900  for a site network  1904  that incudes multiple sub-networks, or subnets  1908   a - 1908   c . A subnet is a logical group of devices in a larger network (e.g., the site network  1904 , in the illustrated example). Nodes in a subnet tend to be located in close proximity to one another within a local area network (LAN). Subnets enable a site&#39;s network administrators to partition a large network into logical segments, which may be easier to administer, including administration of network security. In many cases, the nodes in a subnet have a same subnet address, as well as an address that is distinct within the subnet. 
     In the example of  FIG. 19 , projection point  1910   a - 1910   c  has been configured for each subnet  1908   a - 1908   c  in the site network  1904 . Additionally, a tunnel  1922  has been configured between each projection point  1910   a - 1910   c  and the deception farm  1940 . In this example, the deception farm  1940  can provide deceptions for each subnet  1908   a - 1910   c . Specifically, the deception farm  1940  can maintain a set of deceptions for each subnet  1908   a - 1910   c , where, for example, the set of deceptions for the first subnet  1908   a  have network addresses that are within the first subnet  1908   a  (e.g., within the domain of the first subnet  1908   a ). Similarly, a set of deceptions for the second subnet  1908   b  can have network addresses that are within the second subnet  1908   b . Similarly, a set of deceptions for the third subnet  1908   c  can have network addresses that are within the third subnet  1908   c . In other examples, more than one projection point can be installed in any particular subnet  1908   a - 1908   c , where the additional projection points are also connected to the deception farm  1940 . 
     The deception farm  1940  can use various techniques to provide deceptions that are within different network address domains. For example, the deception farm  1940  can be configured with multiple subnets. In this example, devices within a subnet can be assigned to a particular projection point  1910   a - 1910   c , and devices within a different subnet can be assigned to a different projection point  1910   a - 1910   c . Alternatively or additionally, an entire subnet within the deception farm  1940  can be assigned to one projection point  1910   a - 1910   c.    
     As another example, the deception farm  1940  can include a software defined network (SDN). In software defined network, network devices and/or network infrastructure can be configured in a software layer, independent from the underlying hardware. Using a software defined network, in some implementations, the deception farm  1940  can dynamically configure a virtual subnet, without needing to reconfigure network hardware within the deception farm  1940 . The virtual subnet can then be assigned to a particular projection point  1910   a - 1910   c , where the virtual subnet can provide deceptions for a particular subnet in the site network  1904 . 
     In some implementations, the deception farm  1940  can include tunneling and traffic management logic. For example, a network device configured as an endpoint for the tunnels  1922  can maintain a context for each tunnel  1922 . The context can include for example, which deceptions within the deception farm  1940  are associated with a particular tunnel  1922 , the network addresses for deceptions that are currently being used, and/or active connections between devices in the site network  1904  and deceptions in the deception farm  1940 . For traffic management, the network device can additionally or alternatively direct network traffic arriving over a tunnel  1922  to the appropriate deception mechanism. In various implementations, the network device can also manage establishing new tunnels to projection points, commissioning new deceptions for new tunnels, and/or decommissioning active deceptions when a tunnel is shut down. 
       FIG. 20  illustrates an example of a network deception system  2000 , where multiple projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  have been connected to multiple deception centers  2040   a - 2040   c . In this example, a first projection point  2010   a  has been configured for a first site network  2004   a  and a second projection point  2010   b  has been configured for a second site network  2004   b . Additionally, two projection points  2010   c - 2010   d  have been configured for a third site network  2004   c.    
     In this example, the first site network  2004   a  and the second site network  2004   b  are part of a same customer network  2002 . Being part of a same customer network  2002  means that the first  2004   a  and second  2004   b  site networks are controlled and/or administered by the same entity. For example, both site networks  2004   a - 2004   b  can be part of the same corporate VLAN. In some cases, both site network  2004   a - 2004   b  can be within the same broadcast domain. In some cases, each site network  2004   a - 2004   b  can be within a different broadcast domain. 
     In some cases, the two site networks  2004   a - 2004   b  can be in physical proximity, such as being in the same office complex, but may have separate security perimeters, and hence are distinct site networks. Alternatively, the two site networks  2004   a - 2004   b  can be in different geographical locations, and may connect to each other over intermediate, public and/or private networks. In some cases, the customer network  2002  can include additional site networks, which are not illustrated here. 
     In the example of  FIG. 20 , the third site network  2004   c  is controlled by a different entity. This may mean, for example, that the third site network  2004   c  is independently administered from the site networks  2004   a - 2004   c  in the customer network  2002 , and/or that a free exchange of data between the third site network  2004   c  and the customer network  2002  is not anticipated. 
     The projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  in each site network  2004   a - 2004   c  can be connected to one or more deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c . For example, in the illustrated example, some of the projection points  2010   a - 2010   c  are each connected to all three example deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c . A projection point need not be connected to all available deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c . For example, one projection point  2010   d  in the third site network  2004   c  is connected to only two deception farms  2040   b - 2040   c . As discussed above, a projection point  2010   a - 2010   d  can be connected to deception farms that are hosting suitable deceptions, that have capacity to provide deceptions, because a site network&#39;s deception needs have increased, and/or for some other reason. 
     To manage the multi-to-multi connectivity illustrated in  FIG. 20 , in various implementations, each projection point  2010   a - 2010   d  and/or each deception farm  2040   a - 2040   b  can include context management logic. For example, the projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  can maintain a context for each tunnel  2022 , such that the projection point  2010   a - 2010   d  can track associations between projected deceptions and tunnels. For example, the first projection point  2010   a  can determine that a set of deceptions being projected by the first projection point  2010   a  are being hosted by the second deception farm  2040   b , and that a different set of deceptions are being hosted by the third deception farm  2040   c . By maintaining a context, when a deception receives network traffic, the projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  are able to direct the network traffic over the appropriate tunnel a deception farm  2040   a - 2040   c.    
     In various implementations, the deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c  can also maintain a context. By maintaining a context, the deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c  can direct network traffic between a deception hosted by a deception farm  2040   a - 2040   c  to an appropriate site network  2004   a - 2004   c . In the case of the customer network  2002 , context management can ensure that network traffic does not flow across the tunnels  2022  in unexpected ways. For example, the first  2004   a  and second  2004   b  site networks may be in the same broadcast domain. In this example, when a broadcast packet originates from a legitimate network device in the first site network  2004   a , the broadcast packet should be transmitted across the tunnels  2022  to any deceptions being projected into the first site network  2004   a . In some cases, however, the broadcast packet should not be transmitted from a deception center  2040   a - 2040   c  to the second site network  2004   b . Network tunnels can act as simple conduits that enable remote networks to function as one, unified network, where traffic flows across the tunnels as if the networks were directly connected. Thus, in various implementations, the deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c  and/or projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  can include filters and/or similar logic that prevents some packets from being transmitted from a site network  2004   a - 2004   c  to a deception farm  2040   a - 2040   c  and/or from a deception farm  2040   a - 2040   c  to a site network  2004   a - 2004   c.    
     In the example above, the second site network  2004   b  may receive the broadcast packet by some other route; for example, the first  2004   a  and second  2004   b  site networks may have a separate network tunnel, not illustrate here, where the separate network tunnel is part of the customer network&#39;s configuration. In this example, broadcast packet can be transmitted over the tunnels  2022  so that the packet can be received by deceptions for the customer network  2002 , but the broadcast packet should not be transmitted back to the customer network  2002 , or else the broadcast packet may appear twice in the second site network  2004   b . Similarly, broadcast traffic originating from a deception in a deception farm  2040   a - 2040   c  can be transmitted across the tunnels  2022  to the customer network  2002 , but, in some cases, should not be transmitted from the customer network  2002  back to the deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c.    
     In various implementations, for the above example and other examples, context management can include tracking the source of a packet, and determining whether the source is a legitimate network device or a deception. In some implementations, context management can be aided by systems that generate traffic for deceptions. For example, a network traffic generation system can inform the context management system of any network traffic being generated, where the network traffic is configured to appear to come from a deception. In various implementations, the projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  and/or deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c  can operate cooperatively, using, for example, packet exchanges (which may be encrypted) Alternatively or additionally, a deception center and/or security services provider can manage cooperation between the projection points  2010   a - 2010   d  and/or deception farms  2040   a - 2040   c.    
     In various implementations, a site network can be partially “in the cloud.”  FIGS. 21A-21B  illustrate an example where a site network includes a local segment  2104  and a cloud segment  2106 . The local segment  2104  of the site network can be where the human operators of the site network may be able to access and/or administer the site network. In this example, the local segment  2104  includes some network devices  2126   a - 2126   b , such as laptop, desktop, and/or handheld computers. The local segment  2104  can also include network infrastructure devices  2124 , such as routers, gateways, and/or wireless access points, that enable the network devices  2126   a - 2126   b  to connect to a network. The local segment  2104  can be connected to the cloud segment  2106  over various intermediate, private and/or public networks. 
     The cloud segment  2106  of the site network can be hosted by a cloud services provider  2154 . The cloud services provider  2154  can, for example, operate a data center, where hardware and/or software resources can be dynamically allocated to different customers at the same time or at different times. In the illustrated example, a set of network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  and network infrastructure  2174  have been allocated to the cloud segment  2106  of the site network. The set of network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  can, for example, have more bandwidth, processing capacity, functionality, and/or storage than is available in the local segment  2104 . The set of network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  and the network infrastructure  2174  can include physical hardware and/or virtual machines. In some cases, the set of network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  and the network infrastructure  2174  can be a software defined network. In most cases, the cloud services provider  2154  can include additional hardware and/or virtual resources that are allocated to other site networks, and which are not illustrated here. 
     In some cases, the local segment  2104  and the cloud segment  2106  of the site network can be in a same broadcast domain. In these cases, the network devices  2126   a - 2126   b  in the local segment  2104  can exchange network traffic with the network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  in the cloud segment  2106  as though the local segment  2104  and the cloud segment  2106  were directly connected, and not connected by way of intermediate networks. In some cases, the cloud services provider  2154  can provide an interface through which network devices  2126   a - 2126   b  in the local segment  2104  communicate with the cloud segment  2106 . In these cases, the cloud segment  2106  can be kept isolated from the local segment  2104 , for security and/or ease of administration. In these cases, the local segment  2104  and the cloud segment  2106  may not be in the same broadcast domain. 
     In various implementations, a deception farm  2140  can provide deceptions to monitor and defend the site network from network threats. In various implementations, the deception farm  2140  can include an emulated network  2116  that can include a number of emulated network devices  2118 . The emulated network devices  2118  can be configured to resemble the network devices in either or both of the local segment  2104  and the cloud segment  2106  of the site network. The emulated network devices  2118  can be, for example, super-low interaction deceptions, low-interaction deceptions, and/or high-interaction deceptions. The emulated network  2116  can be hosted by one or more network devices, such as server computers, which are not illustrated here. 
     In various implementations, the deception farm  2140  can alternatively or additionally include a physical network  2130 , where the physical network  2130  includes physical devices  2132 . The physical devices  2132  can include computers, appliances, equipment, machinery, and/or other network-enabled devices that can be found in the local segment  2104  and/or the cloud segment  2106  of the site network. 
     In the example of  FIG. 21A , a projection point  2110  has been configured in the local segment  2104  of the site network. The projection point  2110  can function as an endpoint for a network tunnel  2122  to the deception farm  2140 . The deception farm  2140  can include a network device that is configured as a tunneling endpoint  2114  for the tunnel  2122 . 
     In various implementations, the projection point  2110  can project deceptions into either the local segment  2104  or the cloud segment  2106  of the site network. For example, in the illustrated example, an emulated network device  2118  has been projected into the local segment  2104  (referred to herein as local projected nodes  2144 ), and a combination of emulated network devices  2118  and physical network devices  2132  have been projected into the cloud segment  2106  (referred to herein as remote projected nodes  2142 ). 
     In various implementations, the local projected nodes  2144  can be provided by assigning network addresses from the local segment  2104  to deceptions in the deception farm  2140 . By having a network address that is local to the local segment  2104 , a deception can appear as a network neighbor in the local segment  2104 . 
     In some cases, as noted, above, the cloud segment  2106  may be in the same broadcast domain as the local segment  2104 . In these cases, the remote projected nodes  2142  can be provided by obtaining network addresses that are within the broadcast domain. The projection point  2110  can provide these deceptions by way of the projection point&#39;s connection to the local segment  2104 , and the local segment&#39;s connection to the cloud segment  2106 . In these cases, the remote projected nodes  2142  may be indistinguishable from the network devices  2176   a - 2176   c  in the cloud segment  2106 . In cases where the cloud segment  2106  is not in the same broadcast domain as the local segment  2106 , the remote projected nodes  2142  can be provided, for example, by obtaining network addresses that are local to the cloud segment  2106 . In some cases, such network addresses can be requested from the cloud services provider  2154 . 
       FIG. 21B  illustrates an example where the projection point  2110  has been configured for the cloud segment  2106  of the site network. The projection point  2110  can be configured on, for example, a network device allocated to the cloud segment  2106 . Alternatively or additionally, the projection point  2110  can, for example, be an appliance installed in the network of the cloud services provider  2154 . 
     Configuring the projection point  2110  in the cloud segment  2106  is an alternate technique for providing deceptions in the cloud segment  2106 . In this example, the projection point  2110  can tunnel directly from the cloud services provider  2154  to the deception farm  2140 . The projection point  2110  can possibly also communicate directly with systems at the cloud services provider  2154 , to determine suitable deception mechanisms and/or obtain network addresses for the deceptions. 
     Specific details were given in the preceding description to provide a thorough understanding of various implementations of systems and components for provided dynamic security mechanisms for mixed networks. It will be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, however, that the implementations described above may be practiced without these specific details. For example, circuits, systems, networks, processes, and other components may be shown as components in block diagram form in order not to obscure the embodiments in unnecessary detail. In other instances, well-known circuits, processes, algorithms, structures, and techniques may be shown without unnecessary detail in order to avoid obscuring the embodiments. 
     It is also noted that individual implementations may be described as a process which is depicted as a flowchart, a flow diagram, a data flow diagram, a structure diagram, or a block diagram. Although a flowchart may describe the operations as a sequential process, many of the operations can be performed in parallel or concurrently. In addition, the order of the operations may be re-arranged. A process is terminated when its operations are completed, but could have additional steps not included in a figure. A process may correspond to a method, a function, a procedure, a subroutine, a subprogram, etc. When a process corresponds to a function, its termination can correspond to a return of the function to the calling function or the main function. 
     The term “computer-readable medium” includes, but is not limited to, portable or non-portable storage devices, optical storage devices, and various other mediums capable of storing, containing, or carrying instruction(s) and/or data. A computer-readable medium may include a non-transitory medium in which data can be stored and that does not include carrier waves and/or transitory electronic signals propagating wirelessly or over wired connections. Examples of a non-transitory medium may include, but are not limited to, a magnetic disk or tape, optical storage media such as compact disk (CD) or digital versatile disk (DVD), flash memory, memory or memory devices. A computer-readable medium may have stored thereon code and/or machine-executable instructions that may represent a procedure, a function, a subprogram, a program, a routine, a subroutine, a module, a software package, a class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment may be coupled to another code segment or a hardware circuit by passing and/or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. may be passed, forwarded, or transmitted via any suitable means including memory sharing, message passing, token passing, network transmission, or the like. 
     The various examples discussed above may further be implemented by hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description languages, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, firmware, middleware or microcode, the program code or code segments to perform the necessary tasks (e.g., a computer-program product) may be stored in a computer-readable or machine-readable storage medium (e.g., a medium for storing program code or code segments). A processor(s), implemented in an integrated circuit, may perform the necessary tasks. 
     Where components are described as being “configured to” perform certain operations, such configuration can be accomplished, for example, by designing electronic circuits or other hardware to perform the operation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (e.g., microprocessors, or other suitable electronic circuits) to perform the operation, or any combination thereof. 
     The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the implementations disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, firmware, or combinations thereof. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present disclosure. 
     The techniques described herein may also be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, firmware, or any combination thereof. Such techniques may be implemented in any of a variety of devices such as general purposes computers, wireless communication device handsets, or integrated circuit devices having multiple uses including application in wireless communication device handsets and other devices. Any features described as modules or components may be implemented together in an integrated logic device or separately as discrete but interoperable logic devices. If implemented in software, the techniques may be realized at least in part by a computer-readable data storage medium comprising program code including instructions that, when executed, performs one or more of the methods described above. The computer-readable data storage medium may form part of a computer program product, which may include packaging materials. The computer-readable medium may comprise memory or data storage media, such as random access memory (RAM) such as synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), read-only memory (ROM), non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), FLASH memory, magnetic or optical data storage media, and the like. The techniques additionally, or alternatively, may be realized at least in part by a computer-readable communication medium that carries or communicates program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed, read, and/or executed by a computer, such as propagated signals or waves. 
     The program code may be executed by a processor, which may include one or more processors, such as one or more digital signal processors (DSPs), general purpose microprocessors, an application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable logic arrays (FPGAs), or other equivalent integrated or discrete logic circuitry. Such a processor may be configured to perform any of the techniques described in this disclosure. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor; but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. Accordingly, the term “processor,” as used herein may refer to any of the foregoing structure, any combination of the foregoing structure, or any other structure or apparatus suitable for implementation of the techniques described herein. In addition, in some aspects, the functionality described herein may be provided within dedicated software modules or hardware modules configured to provide dynamic security mechanisms for mixed networks.