Patent Publication Number: US-2006000893-A1

Title: Method for biometric security using a smartcard-reader

Description:
FIELD OF INVENTION  
      The present invention relates generally to the use of integrated circuit cards, or “smartcards,” for commercial transactions and, more particularly, to methods and system for using biometrics with a smartcard in the context of a distributed transaction system.  
     BACKGROUND OF INVENTION  
      The term “smartcard” refers generally to wallet-sized or smaller cards incorporating a microprocessor or micro-controller to store and manage data within the card. More complex than magnetic-stripe and stored-value cards, smartcards may be characterized by sophisticated memory management and security features. A typical smartcard may include a microcontroller embedded within the card plastic which may be electrically connected to an array of external contacts provided on the card exterior. A smartcard microcontroller generally may include an electrically-erasable and programmable read only memory (EEPROM) for storing user data, random access memory (RAM) for scratch storage, and read only memory (ROM) for storing the card operating system. Relatively simple microcontrollers may be adequate to control these functions. Thus, it may be not unusual for smartcards to utilize 8-bit, 5 MHZ microcontrollers with about 8K of EEPROM memory (for example, the Motorola 6805 or Intel 8051 microcontrollers).  
      A number of standards have been developed to address general aspects of integrated circuit cards, e.g.: ISO 7816-1, Part 1: Physical characteristics (1987); ISO 7816-2, Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts (1988); ISO 7816-3, Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols (1989, Amd. 1 1992, Amd. 2 1994); ISO 7816-4, Part 4: Inter-industry commands for interchange (1995); ISO 7816-5, Part 5: Numbering system and registration procedure for application identifiers (1994, Amd. 1 1995); ISO/IEC DIS 7816-6, Inter-industry data elements (1995); ISO/IEC WD 7816-7, Part 7: Enhanced inter-industry commands (1995); and ISO/IEC WD 7816-8, Part 8: Inter-industry security architecture (1995). These standards may be hereby incorporated by reference. Furthermore, general information regarding magnetic stripe cards and chip cards may be found in a number of standard texts, e.g., Zoreda &amp; Oton, “Smart Cards” (1994), and Rankl &amp; Effing, “Smart Card Handbook” (1997), the contents of which may be hereby incorporated by reference.  
      While some smartcard systems have streamlined the transaction process and provided a system for managing more information, smartcard technology has still not adequately addressed some of the authentication issues related to transactions. Moreover, while biometric technology exists with respect to certain access systems and limited financial systems, the use of biometric security in association with smartcards remains underdeveloped and scarce. As such, a need exists to integrate biometric technology advances with smartcard technology.  
      Additionally, despite advances in information technology and process streamlining with respect to travel arrangements, the modern traveler may be often subjected to unnecessary delays, petty inconveniences, and oppressive paperwork. These travel burdens may be most evident in the airline, hotel, and rental car industries, where arranging and paying for services and accommodations may involve significant time delays due to miscommunication, poor record-keeping, and a host of other administrative inefficiencies. As such, a need also exists to expand the use of smartcards into travel-related applications.  
     SUMMARY OF INVENTION  
      The smartcard system is configured with a biometric security system. The biometric security system includes a smartcard and a reader communicating with the system. The biometric security system also includes a biometric sensor that detects biometric samples and a device for verifying biometric samples. In yet another embodiment, the present invention discloses methods for proffering and processing biometric samples to facilitate authorization of transactions.  
      The present invention may provide methods and apparatus for a smartcard system which securely and conveniently integrates important travel-related applications with biometric security, thereby overcoming the limitations of the prior art. In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, a smartcard system may comprise a cardholder identification application and various additional applications useful in particular travel contexts; for example, airline, hotel, rental car, and payment-related applications. In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, a smartcard system further may comprise space and security features within specific applications which provide partnering organizations the ability to construct custom and secure file structures.  
      In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, a dynamic smartcard synchronization system comprises access points configured to initiate a transaction in conjunction with a smartcard, an enterprise data collection unit, and a card object database update system, along with a biometric security system. An exemplary dynamic synchronization system (DSS) preferably comprises various smartcard access points, a secure support client server, a card object database update system (CODUS), one or more enterprise data synchronization interfaces (EDSI), an update logic system, one or more enterprise data collection units (EDCUs), and one or more smartcard access points configured to interoperably accept and interface with smartcards. In an exemplary embodiment, DSS comprises a personalization system and an account maintenance system configured to communicate with CODUS.  
      In accordance with a further aspect of the present invention, personalization of multi-function smartcards is accomplished using a biometric security system and a security server configured to generate and/or retrieve cryptographic key information from multiple enterprise key systems during the final phase of the smartcard issuance process.  
      These features and other advantages of the system and method, as well as the structure and operation of various exemplary embodiments of the system and method, are described below. 
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS  
      The present invention may hereinafter be described in conjunction with the appended drawing figures, wherein like numerals denote like elements, and:  
       FIG. 1  illustrates an exemplary smartcard apparatus;  
       FIG. 2  is a schematic diagram of an exemplary smartcard integrated circuit, showing various functional blocks;  
       FIG. 3  is an exemplary diagram of files and directories arranged in a typical tree structure;  
       FIG. 4  sets forth an exemplary database structure in accordance with an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;  
       FIG. 5  sets forth an exemplary cardholder ID data structure in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 6  sets forth an exemplary payment system data structure in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 7  sets forth an exemplary airline data structure in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 8  sets forth an exemplary rental car data structure in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 9  sets forth an exemplary hotel system data structure in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 10  illustrates an exemplary distributed transaction system useful in practicing the present invention;  
       FIG. 11  is a schematic overview of an exemplary dynamic synchronization system in accordance with various aspects of the present invention;  
       FIG. 12  is a schematic overview of an exemplary secure support client server;  
       FIG. 13  is a schematic overview of an exemplary enterprise data synchronization interface;  
       FIG. 14  is a schematic overview of an exemplary update logic system;  
       FIG. 15  is a schematic overview of an exemplary enterprise data collection unit;  
       FIG. 16  is a schematic overview of an exemplary card object database update system (CODUS);  
       FIG. 17  is a flowchart depicting an exemplary method for synchronizing pending transaction information;  
       FIG. 18  is a flowchart depicting an exemplary method for synchronizing update transaction information;  
       FIG. 19  is a schematic overview of an exemplary personalization system;  
       FIG. 20  is a flowchart depicting an exemplary method of smartcard personalization;  
       FIG. 21  is an exemplary transaction data structure suitable for use in a travel context;  
       FIG. 22  is another schematic illustration of an exemplary smartcard in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 23  is a depiction of an exemplary biometrics process in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 24  is a schematic illustration of an exemplary smartcard biometric system in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 25  is a schematic illustration of an exemplary smartcard reader in accordance with the present invention;  
       FIG. 26  is an exemplary depiction of a Track 2 layout in accordance with the present invention; and  
       FIG. 27  is an exemplary depiction of another Track 2 layout in accordance with the present invention. 
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION  
      Referring now to  FIGS. 1 and 2 , an exemplary smartcard system suitable for practicing the present invention may now be described. A smartcard  100  generally may comprise a card body  102  having a communication region  108  for providing contact or non-contact communication between an external device (e.g., a card reader) and an integrated circuit  110  encapsulated within card body  102 . Communication region  108  preferably may comprise six conductive pads  106  whose placement and size conform to ISO-7816-2. More particularly, a communication region  108  in conformance with ISO-7816-2 preferably may comprise VCC contact  106 ( a ) (power supply), RST contact  106 ( b ) (reset), CLK contact  106 ( c ) (external clock), GND Contact  106 ( d ) (ground), VPP contact  106 ( e ) (programming voltage), and I/O contact  106 ( f ) (data line).  
      VCC  106 ( a ) may suitably provide power to IC  110  (typically 5.0 V+/−10%). CLK  106 ( c ) may be suitably used to provide an external clock source which acts as a data transmission reference. RST  106 ( b ) may be suitably used to transmit a reset signal to IC  110  during the booting sequence. VPP contact  106 ( e ) may be used for programming of EEPROM  212  in IC  110 . As may be known in the art, however, this contact may be generally not used since modern ICs typically incorporate a charge pump suitable for EEPROM programming which takes its power from the supply voltage (VCC  106 ( a )). I/O  106 ( f ) may suitably provide a line for serial data communication with an external device, and GND  106 ( d ) may be suitably used to provide a ground reference. Encapsulated integrated circuit  110  may be configured to communicate electrically with contacts  106  via any number of known packaging techniques, including, for example, thermosonically-bonded gold wires, tape automated bonding (TAB), and the like.  
      While an exemplary smartcard is discussed above in the context of a plurality of external contacts, it may be appreciated that contactless cards may also be utilized to practice this invention. That is, non-contact communication methods may be employed using such techniques as capacitive coupling, inductive coupling, and the like. As may be known in the art, capacitive coupling involves incorporating capacitive plates into the card body such that data transfer with a card reader may be provided through symmetric pairs of coupled surfaces, wherein capacitance values may be typically 10-50 Pico farads, and the working range may be typically less than one millimeter. Inductive coupling may employ coupling elements, or conductive loops, disposed in a weakly-coupled transformer configuration employing phase, frequency, or amplitude modulation. In this regard, it may be appreciated that the location of communication region  108  disposed on or within card  100  may vary depending on card configuration. For additional information regarding non-contact techniques, see, for example, contactless card standards ISO/IEC 10536 and ISO/IEC 14443, which are hereby incorporated by reference.  
      Smartcard body  102  may be preferably manufactured from a sufficiently rigid material which may be resistant to various environmental factors, e.g., physical deterioration, thermal extremes, and ESD (electrostatic discharge). Materials suitable in the context of the present invention may include, for example, PVC (polyvinyl chloride), ABS (acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrol), PET (polyethylene terephthalate), or the like. In an exemplary embodiment, chip card  100  may conform to the mechanical requirements set forth in ISO 7810, 7813, and 7816. Body  102  may comprise a variety of shapes, for example, the rectangular ID-1, ID-00, or ID-000 dimensions set forth in ISO-7810. In an exemplary embodiment, body  102  may be roughly the size and shape of a common credit card and substantially conforms to the ID-1 specification.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 2 , IC  110  preferably may comprise regions for Random Access Memory (RAM)  216 , Read-Only Memory (ROM)  214 , Central Processing Unit (CPU)  202 , data bus  210 , Input/Output (I/O)  208  and Electrically-Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM)  212 .  
      RAM  216  may comprise volatile memory which may be used by the card primarily for scratch memory, e.g., to store intermediate calculation results and data encryption processes. RAM  216  preferably may comprise at least 256 bytes.  
      EEPROM  212  may provide a non-volatile memory region which may be erasable and rewritable electrically, and which may be used to store, inter alia, user data, system data a smartcard identifier and application files. In the context of the present invention, EEPROM  212  may be suitably used to store a plurality of files related to cardholder information, including general cardholder information, payment information and/or other transaction information. In one exemplary embodiment in accordance with the present invention, EEPROM  212  may be suitably used to store travel-related information (discussed in greater detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 3 ). EEPROM  212  preferably may comprise at least 8 K bytes.  
      A smartcard identifier, as used herein, may include any account number, Card Production Life Cycle (CPLC) data, and/or identifier for an account (e.g., credit, charge debit, checking, savings, reward, loyalty, travel or the like) which may be maintained by a transaction account provider (e.g., payment authorization center) and which may be used to complete a transaction. The smartcard identifier may include financial transaction information, CPLC data, and or other information, such as, for example, a passport number, a driver&#39;s license number, a social security number, and/or any other indicator used to facilitate identification, access and/or any other type of transaction. A typical account number (e.g., account data) may be correlated to a credit or debit account, loyalty account, travel or rewards account maintained and serviced by such entities as American Express, Visa and/or MasterCard or the like. For ease in understanding, the present invention may be described with respect to a credit card account. However, it should be noted that the invention may be not so limited and other accounts permitting an exchange of goods and services for an account data value may be contemplated to be within the scope of the present invention.  
      In addition, the account number (e.g., account data) may be associated with any device, code, or other identifier/indicia suitably configured to allow the consumer to interact or communicate with the system, such as, for example, authorization/access code, personal identification number (PIN), Internet code, digital certificate, biometric data, and/or other identification indicia. The account number may be optionally located on a rewards card, charge card, credit card, debit card, prepaid card, telephone card, smart card, magnetic stripe card, bar code card, and/or the like. The account number may be distributed and stored in any form of plastic, electronic, magnetic, and/or optical device capable of transmitting or downloading data to a second device. A customer account number may be, for example, a sixteen-digit credit card number, although each credit provider has its own numbering system, such as the fifteen-digit numbering system used by American Express. Each company&#39;s credit card numbers comply with that company&#39;s standardized format such that the company using a sixteen-digit format will generally use four spaced sets of numbers, as represented by the number “0000 0000 0000 0000”. In a typical example, the first five to seven digits are reserved for processing purposes and identify the issuing bank, card type and etc. In this example, the last sixteenth digit may be used as a sum check for the sixteen-digit number. The intermediary eight-to-ten digits are used to uniquely identify the customer. The account number stored as Track 1 and Track 2 data as defined in ISO/IEC 7813, and further may be made unique to smart card  102 . Track 1 and Track 2 data may be described in more detail below.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, CPU  202  may implement the instruction set stored in ROM  202 , handles memory management (i.e., RAM  216  and EEPROM  212 ), and coordinates input/output activities (i.e., I/O  208 ).  
      ROM  214  preferably contains, or may be “masked” with, the smart card operating system (SCOS). That is, the SCOS may be preferably implemented as hard-wired logic in ROM  214  using standard mask design and semiconductor processing methods well known in the art (e.g., photolithography, diffusion, oxidation, ion implantation, etc.). Accordingly, ROM  214  cannot generally be altered after fabrication. The purpose of such an implementation may be to take advantage of the fast access times provided by masked ROMs. ROM  214  suitably may comprise about 4K-20 K bytes of memory, preferably at least 16 K bytes. In this regard, it may be appreciated that alternate memory devices may be used in place of ROM  214 . Indeed, as semiconductor technology progresses, it may be advantageous to employ more compact forms of memory, for example, flash-EEPROMs.  
      The SCOS controls information flow to and from the card, and more particularly facilitates storage and retrieval of data stored within EEPROM  212 . As with any operating system, the SCOS may operate according to a well-defined command set. In this regard, a variety of known smart card operating systems may be suitable for the purpose of this invention, for example, IBM&#39;s Multi-Function Card (MFC) Operating System 3.51, the specification of which are hereby incorporated by reference. While the IBM MFC operating system may employ the standard tree structure of files and directories substantially in accordance with ISO 7816-4 (as detailed below), it may be appreciated by those skilled in the art that other operating system models would be equally suitable for implementation of the present invention. Moreover, it may be advantageous to allow certain aspects of operating system functionality to exist outside the card, i.e., in the form of blocks of executable code which may be downloaded and executed by the smartcard during a transaction (for example, Java applets, ActiveX objects, and the like).  
      Given the general characteristics of smartcard  100  as outlined above, it may be apparent that a wide range of microcontrollers and contact-based smartcard products known in the art may be used to implement various embodiments of the present invention. Suitable smartcards may include, for example, the model ST16SF48 card, manufactured by SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, which incorporates a Motorola 6805 microcontroller with 16K ROM, 8K EEPROM, and 384 bytes of RAM. It may be appreciated, however, that particular embodiments of the present invention might require more advanced microcontrollers with greater EEPROM capacity (i.e., in the range of about 12-16K). Such systems may be well known in the art.  
      In accordance with another exemplary embodiment, the smartcard identifier and/or any other account number or data may be stored in magnetic stripe format. For example, where the account number may be in magnetic stripe format, the account number portions are governed by the International Standards Organization ISO/IEC 7811, et al. standard, which are hereby incorporated by reference. The standard requires the magnetic stripe information to be encoded in three “tracks” (i.e., track 1, track 2, and track 3).  
      Data stored in track 1 may be typically used to verify the user&#39;s identity. Track 1 may be reserved for encoding the transaction account identifier, the name of the accountholder and at least the expiration date of the transaction account or the transaction device. The information encoded in track 1 may be alpha-numeric and may be encoded at about 7 Bits/Character. In an exemplary layout of the data stored in track 1, track 1 may be segmented into several distinct predetermined portions (e.g., “fields”) for encoding the various account identifying information. The following table may be useful for determining the field definitions of the information provided.  
               TABLE 1                       Table of Field Codes for Track 1                                            SS = Start Sentinel “%”           FC = Format Code           PAN = Primary Acct. # (19 digits max)           FS = Field Separator “{circumflex over ( )}”           Name = 26 alphanumeric characters max.           Additional Data = Expiration Date, offset, encrypted PIN, etc.           ES = End Sentinel “?”           LRC = Longitudinal Redundancy Check                      
 
      Track 2 may be the track most commonly used by the American Banking Association associated banking institutions. Track 2 may be typically reserved for a duplicate version of the transaction account identifier and the expiration date of the transaction account or the transaction device stored in track 1. In addition, track 2 may include an encrypted Personal Identification Code, and other discretionary data. However, the data in track 2 may be encoded at a lower Bit per Character density than the data encoded in track 1. The data in track 2 may be numeric only and may be encoded at about 5 Bits/Character. The lower density ratio in track 2 may be designed to ensure compatibility with older technology readers and to provide redundancy when reading with newer technology readers.  FIG. 26  illustrates an exemplary layout of the data stored in track 2, wherein track 2 may be segmented into several distinct predetermined portions for encoding the various account identifying information. As shown, the following table may be useful for determining the definitions of the information provided. Table of Field Codes for Track 2.  
                       TABLE 2                                      SS = Start Sentinel “%”           SS = Start Sentinel “;”           PAN = Primary Acct. # (19 digits max)           FS = Field Separator “=“           Additional Data = Expiration Date, offset, encrypted PIN, etc.           ES = End Sentinel “?”           LRC = Longitudinal Redundancy Check                      
 
      Track 3 may be of similar description as Track 2. With the International Standards Organization adoption of standard ISO/IEC 4909, track 3 of the magnetic stripe format was no longer used by the banking industry. However, other transaction devices including a magnetic stripe, such as drivers licenses, use track 3, which may include both numeric only and alpha numeric characters. Track 3 may be unique in that track 3 was intended to have data read and WRITTEN on it. Cardholders would have account information UPDATED right on the magnetic stripe. The present invention anticipates that a smart card user&#39;s travel-related information profile and/or account information may be updated using track 3. Unfortunately, track 3 may be almost an orphaned standard, since most readers currently in operation are not configured to write data onto a magnetic stripe. The original design of track 3 was to control off-line ATM transactions by recording transaction data for later reference by the banking institution. But since ATMs are now on-line, the usage of track 3 has been drastically reduced.  
      The most common technique used to encode data in magnetic stripe format may be known as Aiken Biphase, or “two-frequency coherent-phase encoding.” The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the International Standards Organization (ISO) have chosen two standards to guide the encoding process. The ISO encoding protocol specifies that each of tracks 1, 2 and 3 must begin and end with a length of all Zero bits, called CLOCKING BITS. These are used to synchronize the self-clocking feature of bi-phase decoding. In addition, most transaction devices which use magnetic stripe encoding protocol use either the ANSI/ISO ALPHA Data format or the ANSI/ISO BCD Data format. For example, track 1 may be typically encoded in ANSI/ISO ALPHA Data format which may be a 7 bit, 6 data bits+1 parity bit (odd) format, where the data may be read least significant bit first. The ANSI/ISO ALPHA format character set contains 64 characters, 43 alphanumeric, 3 framing/field characters and 18 control/special characters. On the other hand, tracks 2 and 3 are typically encoded in ANSI/ISO BCD Data format, which may be a 5 bit, 4 data bits+1 parity bit(odd) format. The character set for the ANSI/ISO BCD Data format character set contains 16 characters, 10 alphanumeric, 3 framing/field characters and 3 control/special characters.  
      Ordinarily, a proxy account number (e.g., a portion of the transaction account number) includes essential identifying information, such as, for example, any information that may be common to the account provider. The common information (also called “common character,” herein) may include the account provider routing number, or common source indicator such as the character spaces reserved to indicate the identification of the issuing bank. Thus, where the proxy transaction account identifier corresponds to an American Express account, the proxy transaction account identifier may include the common character number 3, encoded the field location where such common character may be ordinarily encoded in traditional magnetic stripe format.  
       FIG. 27  illustrates the encoding of which would ordinarily be done by an entity, such as, for example, MasterCard in track 2 format.  FIG. 12  shows the encoding of a MasterCard account number 3111 2222 3333 4444 with expiration date October 1999 in traditional track 1 format. Since MasterCard uses the number 3 to identify its transaction accounts, the proxy account identifier will also use the number 3 so that the receiving system (e.g., reader  104  or merchant system  130 , or account provider) further recognizes that the proxy account identifier may be from a MasterCard transaction device. It should be noted that in this example, the “3” and the “101” may be common characters to all MasterCard transaction accounts. For a more detailed explanation of magnetic stripe format data exchange, see U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/810,473 filed on Mar. 26, 2004, entitled SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ENCODING INFORMATION IN MAGNETIC STRIPE FORMAT FOR USE IN RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TRANSACTIONS, incorporated herein by reference.  
      Having thus described an exemplary smartcard  100  and IC  110 , an overview of a smartcard file structure in accordance with the present invention may now be described. Referring now to  FIG. 4 , file structure  400  may be preferably used to store information related to card-holder preferences and various data useful for securing and paying for air travel, rental cars, hotel reservations and the like. More particularly, file structure  400  preferably may comprise cardholder ID application  406 , payment system application  408 , airline application  410 , hotel system application  412 , rental car application  414 , and cardholder verification data  404 . It may be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the term “application” in this context refers to self-contained regions of data all directed at a particular function (e.g., airline, hotel, etc.) rather than a block of executable software code, although the use of executable modules as part of any particular application falls within the scope of the present invention.  
      Cardholder verification data  404  preferably houses data useful in verifying cardholder identity during a transaction. In an exemplary embodiment, cardholder verification data  404  may comprise two eight-byte cardholder verification numbers (i.e., PIN numbers) referred to as CHV 1  and CHV 2 .  
      Cardholder ID application  406  suitably may comprise various files related to personal information of the cardholder (e.g., name, addresses, payment cards, driver&#39;s license, personal preferences and the like). Cardholder ID application  406  is described in greater detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 5 .  
      Payment system application  408  suitably may comprise information useful in effecting commercial transactions, e.g., account number and expiration date information traditionally stored on a magnetic-stripe credit card. Alternatively, Payment system application  408  may comprise a full EMV-compliant application suitable for a wide range of financial transactions. Payment system application  408  is described further below in conjunction with  FIG. 6 .  
      Airline application  410  suitably may comprise data helpful in streamlining commercial airline travel; for example, relevant personal preferences, electronic tickets, and frequent flier information. Airline application  410  is discussed in greater detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 7 .  
      Hotel application  412  suitably may comprise information useful for securing and paying for hotel reservations, including an array of information and preferences associated with a list of preferred hotels as well space for electronic keys. Hotel application  412  is discussed in greater detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 9 .  
      Rental car application  414  suitably may comprise data useful in expediting the process of car rental and return, including, for example, car preference and frequent rental information. Rental car application  414  is described in further detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 8 .  
      In each of the above mentioned applications, sophisticated access and encryption schemes may be, in one embodiment, utilized in order to allow multiple parties to make use of certain file structures while preventing unauthorized entry into others. More specifically, partnering organizations (e.g., hotel chains, airlines, and rental car agencies) may create their own tailor-made file structures (i.e., “partner file structures”) within card  100 . Details of the various security measures employed is described in further detail below in conjunction with Table 39.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 10 , smartcard  100  may be suitably used in the context of a distributed transaction system. Briefly, cardholder&#39;s may employ smartcard  100  at various access points  15  which may be connected via network  19  to an issuer  10  and at least one partnering organization  12 . Issuer  10  suitably may comprise various hardware and software components suitable for client host communications as well as a database system  11 . In this context, the term “issuer” refers to the organization that actually issues the smartcard and retains some high-level access to certain areas of file structure  400  (detailed below).  
      Partnering organizations  12 ( a ),  12 ( b ), and so on, comprise the various hotel chains, rental-car agencies, airlines, and the like, who have access to appropriate data regions within smartcard  100 . Each partnering organization  12  suitably may comprise a database  13  and appropriate hardware and software components necessary for completing a transaction over network  19 . Network  19  may comprise the various components, databases, modules, and apparatus described above connected via a suitable data communication network. Such a network may consist of various physical connections using a variety of conventional data protocols, for example, the TCP/IP protocol. It may be appreciated that the individual connections between components of the present system may differ. For example, network  19  may comprise a wireless PCS network, a Internet TCP/IP connection, a public switched telephone network (PSTN), a digital and analog wireless networks, and the like.  
      Those skilled in the art may appreciate that a variety of hardware systems may be suitable for implementing the present invention. Various modems, routers, CPU&#39;s, monitors, back-up systems, power-supplies, and peripherals may be employed to realize the benefits of the present system. In one embodiment, for example, a Compaq Prolinea computer operating in an OS/2 environment using IBM MQ Server software may be used to implement servers used for the present invention. Further a Compaq Prolinea computer operating in a Windows/NT environment running a suitable database software package may facilitate data exchanges in accordance with the present invention.  
      Each access point  15  suitably may comprise an appropriate card reader  104  for interfacing with smartcard  100  as well as hardware and software suitable for interfacing with a cardholder and performing a transaction over network  19 . Smartcard access points  15  allow the cardholder to gain access to the distributed transactions system through a variety of means. Such access points may include, for example, standard home telephones, various PCS wireless systems, pay phones, palmtop computers, notebook computers, Internet workstations, automated teller machines (ATMs), point of sale terminals (POS) stand-alone kiosks, network computers (NCs), personal data assistants (PDAs), or any other suitably configured communication apparatus. Access points  15  may be portable (as in the case of PDAs and cellular phones) or centrally located, for example, in airline ticketing and gate areas, rental car facilities, hotel lobbies, travel agencies, and malls. In addition, businesses may see fit to host an access point  15  to streamline their employees” business travel. In an exemplary embodiment, various access points  15  may be configured to interface with contact-based smartcards  100  in accordance with the relevant portions of the ISO-7816 standard.  
      In an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, data files and directories may be stored in a “tree” structure as illustrated in  FIG. 3 . That is, the smartcard file structure may resemble the well known MS-DOS (Microsoft Disk Operating System) file structure wherein files may be logically organized within a hierarchy of directories. Specifically, three types of files may be defined in ISO 7816-4: dedicated files (DF), elementary files (EF), and a master file (MF). The master file may be analogous to the MS-DOS “root” directory, and contains all other files and directories. Dedicated files may be actually directories or “folders” for holding other DFs or EFs. Thus, MF  302  may contain an arbitrary number of DFs  306 , and these DFs (e.g., DF  306 ( a )) may or may not contain other DFs (e.g., DF  308 ). Elementary files may be used to store user data, and may exist within a dedicated file (e.g., EF  310  within DF  306 ( a )), or within the master file (e.g., EF  304  within MF  302 ). Higher level DFs (i.e., DFs which house particular applications) may be often referred to as application dedicated files (ADFs).  
      The MF and each of the DFs and EFs may be assigned a unique two-byte file identifier (FID). By convention, the MF may be traditionally assigned an FID of “3F00” hex. Selection of an EF or DF by the operating system may then be performed by tracing its entire path starting at the MF. Thus, if the MF contains a DF with a FID “A100”, and this DF in turn contains an EF with a FID “A101”, then this EF could be referenced absolutely by successive selection of FIDs 3F00, A100, and A101. It may be appreciated that the FID may be essentially a file name used by the operating system to select directories and files; it may be not intended to indicate a physical address within EEPROM  212 . As may be appreciated by those skilled in the art, low-level EEPROM addressing may be preferably handled by the SCOS in conjunction with CPU  202 .  
      Each file preferably has an associated file header containing various indicia of the particular EF, DF, or MF. More particularly, the file header associated with a particular file preferably may include the file identifier (FID), file size, access conditions, and file structure. In this regard, smartcard  100  suitably may employ one of four file structures: transparent, linear fixed, linear variable, or cyclic. For the sake completeness, the nature of these file structures may be briefly reviewed.  
      A transparent file structure consists of a string of bytes accessed by specifying an offset and byte count. For example, with reference to Table 1 below, given a n-byte string of data, bytes  7  through  10  would be accessed using an offset of six and a length of four.  
               TABLE 1                          Transparent file structure       byte#                                                                                 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   ...   ...   n                                 offset   length                  
 
      A linear fixed file structure may comprise a plurality of records of equal length (e.g., a list of phone numbers), wherein access to an individual record may be achieved through reference to a record number. In addition, it may be possible to refer to the “next” or “previous” record relative to the “current” record (i.e., the most recently accessed record). In contrast, a linear variable file structure may comprise records of arbitrary but known length, and may be therefore typically more compact than linear fixed data structures.  
      A cyclic file structure may be a type of linear fixed file wherein a pointer may be used to point to the last data set written to. After the last data record may be written to, the pointer returns to the first record. That is, a cyclic file may comprise a series of records arranged in a “ring”. A data structure particularly important with regard to storing records as well as secure messaging in smartcard applications may be the BER tag-length-value or “TLV” structure in accordance with ISO/IEC 8825, hereby incorporated by reference. In a TLV object, information regarding the type and length of the information may be included along with the actual data. Thus, a TLV object may comprise a tag which identifies the type of data (as called out by the appropriate specification), a length field which indicates the length in bytes of the data to follow, and a value field, which may comprise the primary data. For example, the TLV object illustrated in Table 2 below encodes the text “phoenix”, which has a length of 7 bytes, and corresponds to a the “city” tag of “8C” hex (a hypothetical tag designation).  
               TABLE 2                          Exemplary primitive TLV object                         Tag   Length   Value                                                         ‘8C’   ‘07’   p   h   o   e   n   i   x                  
 
      It may be appreciated that the meaning of the various tag values must be known to the system a priori. That is, in order for the tag field to be useful, the smartcard and any external systems communicating with the smartcard must conform to the same tag specification. In this regard, ISO/IEC 7816-6 defines a series of tags useful in the context of the present invention, as does the IBM MFC 3.2 specification. ISO/IEC 8825 sets forth the basic encoding rules for a TLV system and defines a “template” data object which may be used as a container for multiple TLV objects. That is, it may be often advantageous to encapsulate primitive TLV objects within a larger template which may be itself a TLV object.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 4 , an exemplary smartcard data structure in accordance with the present invention may now be described in detail. Data structure  400  preferably may comprise a MF  402  and five DFs: Cardholder ID application  406 , Payment system application  408 , Airline application  410 , Hotel application  412 , and Rental car application  414 .  
      In the detailed description to follow, various acronyms and abbreviations may be used to refer to particular data types, formats, and the like. A key to these acronyms and abbreviations may be presented in Table 3 below.  
               TABLE 3                       Key to acronyms                                                AN   Alphanumeric           N   Numeric           B   Boolean           C   Convention           M   Matrix           D   Data           AR   Bits array           BIN   Binary           RJ   Right-justified           LJ   Left-justified           BCD   Binary coded decimal                      
 
      In the discussion that follows, the various features of an exemplary data structure may be in some cases described using particular file structure types (i.e., transparent, fixed, etc.). Those skilled in the art may realize, however, that any of the common smartcard file structure types may be typically suitable for implementing any particular data structure. For example, when a file structure is described as including “a plurality of records,” it may be understood that such a structure may be designed, for example, using a list of records assembled in a linear fixed file wherein each record may be itself a transparent file (and offset values correspond to the various fields). Alternatively, such a structure may be designed using TLV strings assembled in a linear fixed file or within a larger template TLV. This may be the case notwithstanding the fact that particular tag values which may be for the most part arbitrary may be not explicitly listed in the tables that follow.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 5 , Cardholder ID application  406  may be used to store various information related to the cardholder. Portions of this information may be freely available to the partnering organizations, thereby preventing the storage of redundant information.  
      More particularly, cardholder ID application  406  preferably may comprise directory EF  532 , holder_ID DF  502  and miscellaneous DF  530 . Holder_ID DF  502  preferably may comprise ID EF  504 , home EF  506 , business EF  508 , preferences EF  514 , passport EF  516 , authentication EF  520 , biometric EF  522 , and driver EF  518 . Miscellaneous EF  530  preferably may comprise payment card EF  510 , sequence EF  512 , issuance EF  511 , preferred programs EF  528 , and card number EF  526 . These files and their respective functions are discussed in detail below.  
      Directory EF  532  may provide a list of application identifiers and labels for the various high-level DF&#39;s existing under cardholder ID application  406 . That is, this file serves the function of a high-level directory listing which specifies the location (i.e., FID) and application label for each DF in this case, holder_ID DF  502  and miscellaneous DF  530 . In an exemplary embodiment, directory EF  532  may be structured in accordance with EMV 3.0 as shown in Table 4 below. In one embodiment, each major application (e.g., hotel, airline, etc.) has an associated directory file with a substantially same file structure.  
               TABLE 4                          Exemplary cardholder ID directory EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Application ID for   16   AN   16   ASCII           holder_ID DF           Application label   16   AN   16   ASCII           Application ID for   16   AN   16   ASCII           miscellaneous DF           Application label   16   AN   16   ASCII                      
 
      ID EF  504  preferably may include personal information related to the cardholder, e.g., name, date of birth, emergency contact, general preferences, and the like. In an exemplary embodiment, member EF  504  may comprise the fields set forth in Table 5 below. Italicized field names indicate a subcategory within a particular field.  
               TABLE 5                          Exemplary ID EF data structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Last Name   30   AN   30   ASCII       First Name   20   AN   20   ASCII       Middle Name   8   AN   8   ASCII       Honorary Title   8   AN   8   ASCII       Name Suffix   4   AN   4   ASCII       Date of Birth   8   D   4   BCD       Social Security Number   10   AN   10   ASCII       Emergency Contact       Last Name   20   AN   20   ASCII       First Name   10   AN   10   ASCII       Relation   1   C   1   BIN       Phone   20   N   10   BCD       Gender   1   AN   1   ASCII       Special Personal Requirements   12   AN   12   M       Language Preference (ISO   2   C   2   ASCII       639)                  
 
      In the above table, and the tables to follow, both internal and external data formats may be listed. As the conservation of EEPROM space may be of paramount importance, the “internal” format of data (i.e., within EEPROM  212 ) may be different from the “external” format of the data (i.e., as read by the card reader at an access point  15 ). Thus, for example, a date field may consist of a four-byte BCD record within the card, but upon reading and processing by the terminal, this data may be converted to an eight-byte decimal value for more convenient processing.  
      Home EF  506  preferably may include data related to one or more of the cardholder&#39;s home addresses. In an exemplary embodiment, home EF  506  comprising the fields set forth in Table 6 below. The personal travel charge account pointer may be preferably used to designate an exemplary payment card, and may consists of a number corresponding to one of the payment card records within payment card EF  510  (detailed below).  
               TABLE 6                          Exemplary home EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Home Address 1   40   AN   40   ASCII       Home Address 2   40   AN   40   ASCII       Home Address City   25   AN   25   ASCII       Home Address State   5   AN   5   ASCII       Home Country (ISO 3166)   2   AN   2   ASCII       Home Address Zip Code   10   AN   10   ASCII       Home Address Telephone   20   N   10   BCD       Home Address FAX   20   N   10   BCD       Home E-mail address   40   AN   40   ASCII       Personal travel charge account   2   N   1   BCD       number pointer                  
 
      Business EF  508  preferably may include various data related to the cardholder&#39;s business (i.e., addresses, phone numbers, and the like). In an exemplary embodiment, business EF  508  comprising the fields set forth in Table 7 below. In this regard, the credit card pointer field may be preferably used to point to a payment card record within payment card EF  510  (detailed below). The cost center, dept., division, and employee ID fields may be employer-specific, and may or may not apply in a given case.  
               TABLE 7                          Exemplary business EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Business Address 1   40   AN   40   ACSII       Business Address 2   40   AN   40   ASCII       Business Address City   25   AN   25   ASCII       Business Address State   5   AN   5   ASCII       Business Country (ISO   2   AN   2   ASCII       3166)       Business Address Zip Code   10   AN   10   ASCII       Business Telephone No.   20   N   10   BCD       Business Address Fax   20   N   10   BCD       Business E-mail Address   40   AN   40   ASCII       Professional Title   10   AN   10   ASCII       Employee ID   10   AN   10   ASCII       Division   20   AN   20   ASCII       Dept   20   AN   20   ASCII       Cost Center   12   AN   12   ASCII       Professional travel account number   2   N   2   BCD       pointer       Professional license data   20   AN   20   ASCII       Credit Card pointer   2   N   1   BCD       Company Name   20   AN   20   ASCII                  
 
      Preferences EF  514  preferably may comprise data related to the cardholder&#39;s default personal preferences. In an exemplary embodiment, preferences EF  514  may include a field comprising an array of preferences as set forth in Table 8 below. Preference values may be preferably chosen from a list of preference tags as set forth in Table 39.  
               TABLE 8                          Exemplary preferences EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Preferences Array   20   C   20   C                      
 
      Passport EF  516  may be preferably used to store cardholder passport information. In an exemplary embodiment, passport EF  516  may comprise the fields set forth in Table 9 below.  
               TABLE 9                          Exemplary passport EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Passport Number   20   AN   20   ASCII       Passport Country - ISO 3166   2   AN   2   ASCII       Issuance Date   8   D   4   BCD       City of Issuance   20   AN   20   AN       Expiration Date   8   D   4   BCD       Restrictions (glasses, disability, etc.)   20   AN   20   ASCII                  
 
      Driver EF  516  preferably may comprise cardholder driver license data. In an exemplary embodiment, driver EF  518  comprising the fields set forth in Table 10 below.  
               TABLE 10                          Exemplary driver EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                                     Driver&#39;s License No.   20   a   20   ASCII           Driver&#39;s License Issuing   2   a   2   BCD           State/Country           License Expiration Date   8   D   4   ASCII           License Type   2   C   4   BCD                      
 
      Biometric EF  522  may be used to store biometric data (preferably encoded) such as fingerprint data, retina scan data, or any other sufficiently unique indicia the cardholder&#39;s physical or behavioral characteristics. Information related to biometric data stored on biometric EF  522  is discussed in further detail below. In an exemplary embodiment, biometric EF  522  may comprise a single data string as set forth in Table 11 below.  
               TABLE 11                          Exemplary biometric EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Biometrics template   100   AN   100   BIN                      
 
      Authentication EF  520  preferably may comprise information for static authentication of the cardholder ID  406  application. This data may be unique for each card, and may be sufficiently complex such that counterfeit values cannot feasibly be created. This prevents creation of “new” counterfeit cards (i.e., cards with new authentication data), but does not prevent creation of multiple copies of the current card.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, authentication EF  520  may include public key certificate fields as shown in Table 12 below, wherein the external format may be identical to the internal format. Preferably, the issuer RSA key may be 640 bits long, and the CA key may be 768 bits long.  
               TABLE 12                          Exemplary authentication EF                         Internal           format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type                                             Signed Static Application Data   80   B           Static Data Authentication Tag List   16   B           Issuer Public Key Certificate   96   B           Issuer Public Key Exponent   1   B           Issuer Public Key Remainder   20   B                      
 
      Turning now to files under miscellaneous DF  530 , preferred programs EF  528  preferably may comprise data related to the cardholder&#39;s preferences as to airline companies, hotels, and rental car agencies. Specifically, this EF, in an exemplary embodiment, may comprise a plurality of records (e.g., three) indicating preferred companies for each type of travel partner as shown in Table 13. The actual data values conform to an arbitrary convention; That is, each airline, hotel, and rental car agency may be assigned an arbitrary three-byte code.  
               TABLE 13                          Exemplary programs EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Preferred Airlines   9 (3 × 3)   C   9   C           Preferred Hotels   9   C   9   C           Preferred Rental Cars   9   C   9   C                      
 
      Payment card EF  510  may be preferably used to catalog information related to the cardholder&#39;s various payment cards, i.e., debit cards, charge cards, and the like. In an exemplary embodiment, payment card EF may comprise card numbers and expiration dates for two cards as shown in Table 14. The “ISO” and “non-ISO” designations refer to ISO-7813, which specifies a particular payment card number format. Thus, in an exemplary embodiment, either an ISO or non-ISO card number scheme may be used. Moreover, it may be appreciated that this data set may be sufficient only for “card not present” transactions, for example, transactions taking place remotely where only the card number and expiration date may be required to effect a transaction. Data stored within payment system application  408  (described below) must be used to effect a “card present” transaction.  
               TABLE 14                          Exemplary payment card EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         First Payment Card # (ISO)   19   N   10   BCD       First Payment Card Expiration Date   8   D   4   BCD       Second Payment Card # (non-ISO)   20   AN   20   ASCII       Second Payment Card   8   D   4   BCD       Expiration Date                  
 
      Sequence EF  512  preferably may include information used to provide synchronization of the host and smartcard databases. In an exemplary embodiment, sequence EF  512  may comprise a plurality of records comprising the field set forth in Table 15 below. This number may be analogous to a “version” number for the data stored in the application.  
               TABLE 15                          Exemplary sequence EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Sequence Number   16   AN   16   ASCII                      
 
      Card number EF  526  may be used to record a unique number identifying the smartcard, and may also be used for key derivation (as described in further detail below). Preferably, card number EF  526  may comprise a eight-byte string as set forth in Table 16 below.  
               TABLE 16                          Exemplary card number EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Card Number   8   HEX   8   HEX                      
 
      Issuance EF  511  may be used to record various details related to the manner in which the application (i.e., cardholder ID DF  406 ) was created. This file may include information related to the identity of the organization that created the application, as well as information related to the application itself. In an exemplary embodiment, issuance EF  511  may comprise fields as set forth in Table 17 below.  
               TABLE 17                          Exemplary issuance EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format (bytes)                                 Field   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Country Authority       1SO 3166   2           Issuer Authority   10   RID -   5   HEX               ISO 7816-5       Application version   5   XX.YY   2   BCD       Application expiration date   8   YYYYM   4   BCD               M DD       Application effective   8   YYYYM   4   BCD       date       M DD       Personalizer Code   1   AN   1   ASCII       Personalization Location   1   AN   1   ASCII                  
 
      The personalizer code field shown in Table 17 refers to the organization that actually “personalizes” the file. That is, before a smartcard may be issued to the cardholder, the database structure must be created within EEPROM  212  ( FIG. 2 ), and the initial data values (i.e., default preferences, cardholder name, pin numbers, etc.) must be placed in the appropriate fields within the various EFs. It may be appreciated that, given the nature of the present invention, the smartcard “issuer” and “personalizer” for any given application may not be the same. Therefore, it may be advantageous to record various details of the personalization process within smartcard  100  itself. Similar issuance file structures may be provided for the other major applications. A method and system for personalization are described in greater detail herein.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 6 , payment system application  408  preferably may comprise a directory EF  610 , issuer DF  602 , and a number of optional DFs  603 ( a )-( n ) for use by partnering financial organizations.  
      Directory EF  610  preferably may include a list of application identifiers and labels as described above in the context of cardholder ID application  406 .  
      Issuer DF  602  may comprise pay1 DF  604 , which may include data that would traditionally be stored within a track on a magnetic stripe card (i.e., debit cards, charge cards, and the like). Track 1 and Track 2 storage is described in greater detail above.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, pay1 DF  604  may comprise a plurality of records having commonly known magnetic-stripe fields as specified in Table 18 below.  
               TABLE 18                          Exemplary Pay1 EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format (bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Format Code (Track 1)   1   AN   1   ASCII       PAN (Track 2)   15   N   8   BCDF                       right                       padding       Expiration date (Track 1 or 2)   4   YYMM   2   BCD       Effective date (Track 1 or 2)   4   YYMM   2   BCD       Discretionary data (Track 1 or 2)   5   N   3   BCDF                       right                       padding       Name (Track 1)   26   AN   26   ASCII, LJ                       blank                       padding                  
 
      Referring now to  FIG. 7 , airline application  410  preferably may comprise directory EF  730 , common DF  702 , and issuer DF  704 , and additional airline applications  703 ( a ),  703 ( b ), and so on.  
      Directory EF  730  preferably may include a list of application identifiers and labels as described above in the context of cardholder ID application  406 .  
      Common DF  702  generally may include data accessible to all participating airlines, while issuer DF  704  generally may include data which may only be read or written to by the smartcard issuer. Airline application  410  preferably further may comprise at least one (preferably three) additional DF  703  for use by airline partnering organizations. That is, one airline partner may have access to and specify the structure of data stored within DF  703 ( a ) (as well as common EF  702 ), while another airline may have similar access to DF  703 ( b ). These partner DFs preferably conform to the relevant portions of the IATA specification.  
      Common DF  702  suitably may comprise common data which would be of use to any of the various partnering airlines, i.e., passenger EF  706 , frequent flier EF  708 , IET EF  710 , boarding EF  712 , and biometric EF  714 .  
      Issuer DF  704 , in contrast, may comprise information readable by all, but updateable only by the card issuer, i.e., preferences EF  716 , PIN EF  718 , and issuance EF  720 .  
      Referring now to information stored within common EF  702 , passenger EF  706  preferably may comprise various records related to the passenger as specified in Table 19 below.  
               TABLE 19                          Exemplary passenger EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format (bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Passenger Name   49   AN   49   ASCII       Gender   1   A   1   BIN       Language Preference   2   AN   2   ASCII       Unique ID   24   AN   24   ASCII       Airline ID (3 letters code)   3   AN   3   ASCII       Type code (2 letters)   2   AN   2   ASCII       Unique ID   19   AN   19   ASCII       Application version   2   N   2   BIN                  
 
      In an exemplary embodiment, frequent flyer EF  708  may comprise a plurality of frequent flier numbers (e.g., ten numbers) having the structure specified in Table 20 below.  
               TABLE 20                          Exemplary frequent flyer EF file structure                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Airline Customer ID   22   AN   22   ASCII                      
 
      IET EF  710  preferably may comprise a plurality of electronic ticket records as set forth in Table 21 below. The format of these electronic tickets preferably conforms to the IATA standard.  
               TABLE 21                          Exemplary lET file structure                                             External       Internal               Description   format       format (bytes)                                         of the Records   Size   Type   Size   Type                       IET 1   14   AN   14   BIN           IET 2   14   AN   14   BIN           IET 3   14   AN   14   BIN           IET 4   14   AN   14   BIN           IET 5   14   AN   14   BIN                      
 
      In an exemplary embodiment, boarding EF  712  may comprise boarding data to be used during check in as specified in Table 22. The format of this data preferably conforms to the IATA specification.  
               TABLE 22                          Exemplary boarding EF file structure                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Boarding data   40   AN   40   ASCII                      
 
      Biometric EF  714  may be suitably used to store biometric data associated with the cardholder, e.g., retina scan data, fingerprint data, or any other sufficiently unique indicia of the cardholder&#39;s physical or behavioral characteristics. Information related to biometric data stored on biometric EF  522  is discussed in further detail below. In an exemplary embodiment, biometric EF  714  may comprise data as specified in Table 23 below.  
               TABLE 23                          Exemplary biometric EF file structure                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Biometrics data   100   AN   100   BIN                      
 
      Issuance EF  720  may be suitably used to hold data related to the issuance of the various applications. In an exemplary embodiment, issuance EF  720  may comprise a data structure as specified in Table 24 below.  
               TABLE 24                          Exemplary issuance EF file structure                             External   Internal           format   format (bytes)                                 Field   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Country Authority (2       ISO 3166   2           letters)       Issuer Authority   10   RID - ISO 7816-5   5   HEX       Application version   5   XX.YY   2   BCD       Application expiration   8   YYYYMM   4   BCD       date       DD       Application effective   8   YYYYMM   4   BCD       date       DD       Personalizer Code   1   AN   1   ASCII       Personalization Location   1   AN   1   ASCII       (custom code)                  
 
      PIN EF  718  may be suitably used to store PIN values corresponding to each of the participating airline partners. In an exemplary embodiment, PIN EF  718  may comprise a plurality of records having the structure specified in Table 25 below, wherein each record may be related to the corresponding entry in frequent flyer EF  708  (i.e., record one in EF  718  corresponds to record one in EF  708 , and so on.)  
               TABLE 25                          Exemplary PIN EF file structure                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       PIN   8   AN   8   BIN           Expiration date   8   D   4   BCD                      
 
      Preferences EF  716 , in an exemplary embodiment, may comprise a preferences array as shown in Table 26 below. The preference values stored in this file correspond to those discussed below in conjunction with Table 38.  
               TABLE 26                          Exemplary preferences EF 716 file structure                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Preferences Array   8   C   8   BIN                      
 
      Referring now to  FIG. 8 , rental car application  414  preferably may comprise common DF  802 , directory EF  820 , and one or more rental_car DFs  803  (i.e.,  803 ( a ),  803 ( b ), and so on) corresponding to individual rental car agencies.  
      Common DF may comprise preferences EF  805 , which is described in detail below. Rental_car DFs  803  each comprise a rental_car_id EF  807 , reservation EF  809 , and expenses EF  811 .  
      Directory EF  820  may include a list of application identifiers and labels for the various DFs under rental_car application  414 . The structure of this EF preferably conforms to that described above in the context of cardholder ID application  406 .  
      In an exemplary embodiment, preferences EF  805  may comprise a set of preferences arrays file structure as shown in Table 27 below. An exemplary list of preference codes for use in each of these arrays are described below in conjunction with Table 38.  
               TABLE 27                          Exemplary preferences EF                         Record description   External format   Internal format (bytes)                                         Preferences Array   8   C   8   BIN       (Default)       Preferences Array (No.   8   C   8   BIN       2)       Preferences Array (No.   8   C   8   BIN       3)       Preferred limousine   12   AN   12   ASCII       company                  
 
      Rental_car_id  807  may be used to store frequent rental information, upgrade information, insurance information, and the like. In an exemplary embodiment, rental_car_id  807  may comprise a file structure as shown in Table 28 below.  
               TABLE 28                          Exemplary rental_car_id EF                         Record description   External format   Internal format(bytes)                                         Frequent Rental ID#   22   A   22    ASCII       Company name   3   A   3   ASCII       Unique Customer ID   19   A   19    ASCII       CDP (Contract Disc.   10   A   10    ASCII       Program)       Accumulated points   8   N   3   BIN       Rental features       AR   2   BIN       Car Type Upgrade       B   1 bit   B       Week-end/Vacation Special       B   1 bit   B       Guaranteed Late       B   1 bit   B       Reservation       Insurance       Array   2   BIN       Loss Damage Waiver       B   1 bit   B       (LDW)       Personal Automobile       B   1 bit   B       Insurance       Personal Effects Coverage       B   1 bit   B       Personal Insurance       B   1 bit   B       Corporate Insurance       B   1 bit   B                  
 
      Reservation EF  809  may be used to store confirmation numbers corresponding to one or more rental car reservations. In an exemplary embodiment, reservation EF  809  may comprise a plurality of records (e.g., two) having a file structure as shown in Table 29 below.  
               TABLE 29                          Exemplary reservation EF                         Record description   External format   Internal format (bytes)                                         Rental Car Company   3   A   3   ASCII       Location   3   A   3   ASCII       Date   8   D   4   BCD       Time   4   T   2   BCD       Reservation Number   15   A   15   ASCII       Flight Number   5   M   5   BIN       Airlines   3   AN   3   ASCII(RJ)       Flight number   4   N   2   BCD       Preferred profile   1   C   1   ASCII                  
 
      Expenses EF  811  may be used to record expenses incurred by the cardholder during car rental (e.g., the total rental charge). In an exemplary embodiment, expenses EF  811  may comprise a plurality of records (e.g., five) having a file structure as shown in Table 30 below.  
               TABLE 30                          Exemplary expenses EF                         Record description   External format   Internal format (bytes)                                         Type of expense   1   C   1   ASCII       Date   8   ID   4   BCD       Location code   3   AN   3   ASCII       Amount   7   N   3   BIN                  
 
      Referring now to  FIG. 9 , hotel system application  412  preferably may comprise directory EF  920 , common DF  914 , one or more hotel chain DFs  902 , and one or more property DFs  903 .  
      Common DF  914  may comprise reservation EF  918 , expenses EF  916 , key-of-the-room EF  910 , and preferences EF  912 .  
      Hotel chain EFs  902 ( a ),  902 ( b ), and so on, comprise preferences EF  904  and stayer ID EF  906  associated with individual hotel chains. In contrast, property EFs  903 ( a ),  903 ( b ), and so on, comprise a similar file structure associated with individual hotel properties (i.e., independent of whether the particular hotel may be a member of a nationwide chain).  
      In an exemplary embodiment, reservation EF  918  may comprise a plurality of records having the structure shown in Table 31 below. In general, this EF may be used to store confirmation numbers transmitted to smartcard  100  when the cardholder makes a reservation at a given hotel (designated in the property code field). The date field stores the date on which the confirmation number was dispensed.  
               TABLE 31                          Exemplary reservation EF                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                                     Property Code   3   AN   1   ASCII           Date   8   D   4   BCD           Confirmation Number   15   AN   15   ASCII                      
 
      Preferences EF  912  preferably may comprise three sets of array preferences. The particular codes used in these arrays are discussed below in conjunction with Table 38.  
               TABLE 32                          Exemplary preferences EF                                     External       Internal               format       format (bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                                     Preferences Array   8   C   8   BIN           (default)           Preferences Array   8   C   8   BIN           (number 2)           Preferences Array   8   C   8   BIN           (number 3)                      
 
      Expenses EF  916  preferably may comprise a list of recent hotel expenses, for example, room costs, dinner expenses, and the like. In an exemplary embodiment, expenses EF  916  may comprise a plurality of records (for example, fifteen) arranged in a cyclic file structure and comprising the fields shown in Table 33 below. Thus, the cardholder may be able to examine and print a list of recently incurred expenses by type (a code fixed by convention), date, amount, and property code.  
               TABLE 33                          Exemplary expenses EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Type   1   C   1   ASCII           Date   8   D   4   BCD           Property Code   3   AN   3   ASCII           Amount   7   N   3   BIN                      
 
      Key-of-the-room EF  910  preferably may comprise electronic key values that may be used in conjunction with card readers to provide access to particular hotel rooms. In an exemplary embodiment, key-of-the-room EF  910  may comprise a plurality of alphanumeric key values as shown in Table 34 below.  
               TABLE 34                          Exemplary key-of-the-room EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                         Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                       Key value   40   AN   40   BIN                      
 
      Stayer ID EF  906  preferably may comprise frequent stayer data for a particular hotel chain. In an exemplary embodiment, Stayer ID EF  906  may comprise frequent stayer information as shown in Table 35 below.  
               TABLE 35                          Exemplary stayer ID EF                                 Internal           External format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type                                         Frequent stayer number   19   AN   19   ASCII       Frequent Stayer Level   1   AN   1   ASCII       Code       Frequent Stayer Level   6   YYYYMM   3   BCD       Expiration Date       CDP   10   AN   10   ASCII       Event Counter   3   N   1   BIN       Hotel Frequent Stayer PIN   8   AN   8   BIN                  
 
      Preferences EF  904  preferably may comprise three sets of array preferences as shown in Table 36. The particular codes used in these arrays are discussed below in conjunction with Table 38.  
               TABLE 36                          Exemplary preferences EF                             External   Internal           format   format(bytes)                                 Record description   Size   Type   Size   Type               Preferences Array (default)   8   C   8   BIN       Preferences Array (number   8   C   8   BIN       2)       Preferences Array (number   8   C   8   BIN       3)                  
 
      Property DFs  903 ( a ),  903 ( b ), etc., may be used in cases where the partnering hotel may be not part of a major chain, or when the hotel chooses to employ its own data set independent of its affiliation. In one embodiment, these property DFs may be identical in structure to hotel chain DFs  902 , except that much of the frequent stayer ID information may be removed. More specifically, a typical property DF  903  may comprise a preferences EF  938  identical to preferences  904  described above, along with a stayer ID EF  934  which may include only the CDP, event counter, and hotel frequent stayer PIN fields described in conjunction with Table 33 above. Alternatively, a particular hotel chain or property may choose to implement a different file structure than that described above.  
      As mentioned briefly above, an exemplary embodiment may be configured such that preferences may be located in several files distributed throughout smartcard  100 ; i.e., in preferences EF  514 , airline preferences EF  716 , hotel preferences EF  912  and  904 , and car preferences EF  810 . This allows apparently conflicting preferences to coexist within the card depending on context. For example, it may be possible to opt for non-smoking in the cardholder ID application while choosing the smoking option within the hotel application. In the case of conflict, preferences may be read from the top level to the bottom level, and each level supersedes the previous one.  
      An exemplary set of codification rules may be set forth in Table 37 below:  
               TABLE 37                       Exemplary Preferences Code Ranges                                         0-49   General purpose (Cardholder ID 406)       50-99   Hotel application 412       100-149   Rental car application 414       150-199   Airline application 410       200-255   Other                  
 
      More specifically, in an exemplary embodiment, preference flags may be coded as set forth in Table 38 below.  
               TABLE 38                          Exemplary preference codes                             Preference   Code (decimal)                                         GENERAL PURPOSE               Smoking   00           Non-smoking   01           Home as preferred address   02           Work as preferred address   03           Handicapped   04           Home as preferred e-mail address   05           Work as preferred e-mail address   06           HOTEL PREFERENCES           King-size bed   50           Queen-size bed   51           Double bed   52           High floor room   53           Low floor room   54           Near elevator room   55           Away from elevator room   56           RENTAL CAR PREFERENCES           Compact car   100           Standard car   101           Mid-size car   102           Luxury car   103           AIRLINE PREFERENCES           Window seat preferred   150           Aisle seat preferred   151           Low calorie   152           Vegetarian   153           Diabetic   154           Low sodium   155           Kosher   156                      
 
      In the context of smartcard transactions, data security has five primary dimensions: 1) data confidentiality, 2) data integrity, 3) access control, 4) authentication, and 5) nonrepudiation. Each of these dimensions may be addressed through a variety of security mechanisms. Data confidentiality, which deals with keeping information secret (i.e., unreadable to those without access to a key), may be substantially ensured using encryption technology. Data integrity (and data source verification) focuses on ensuring that data remains unchanged during transfer, and typically may employ message authentication techniques. Access control involves card holder verification and other requirements necessary in order for a party to read or update a particular file. Authentication involves ensuring that the card and/or the external device may be what it purports to be, and non-repudiation deals with the related task of ensuring that the source of the data or message may be authentic, i.e., that a consumer may not repudiate a transaction by claiming that it was “signed” by an unauthorized party. Cardholder verification using a biometric security system is described in greater detail below.  
      Authentication may be preferably performed using a “challenge/response” algorithm. In general, authentication through a challenge/response system involves: 1) generation of a random number by a first party; 2) transmission of the random number to a second party (the “challenge”, 3) encryption of the random number by the second party in accordance with a key known to both parties, 4) transmission of the encrypted random number to the first party (the “response”), 5) encryption of the random number by the first party, and 6) comparison by the first party of the two resulting numbers. In the case where the two numbers match, authentication may be successful; if not, the authentication may be unsuccessful. Note that authentication may work both ways: the external world may request authentication of a smartcard (internal authentication), and a smartcard may request authentication of the external world (external authentication). a more detailed account of an exemplary challenge/response algorithm may be found in the IBM MFC specification.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, the DES algorithm (Data Encryption Standard) may be employed for the various security functions; however, it may be appreciated that any number of other symmetrical or asymmetrical techniques may be used in the context of the present invention. More particularly, there may be two general categories of encryption algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric algorithms use the same key for encryption and decryption, for example, DEA (data encryption algorithm) which uses a 56-bit key to encrypt 64-bit blocks of data. Asymmetric algorithms, in contrast, use two different keys: one secret key and one public key. The RSA algorithm, for example, uses two such keys and exploits the computational complexity of factoring very large prime numbers. Additional information these and other cryptographic principles may be found in a number of standard texts, for example: Seberry &amp; Pieprzyk, “Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer Security” (1989); Rhee, “Cryptography and Secure Communications” (1994); Stinson, “Cryptography: Theory and Practice” (1995); “Contemporary Cryptography: The Science of Information Integrity” (1992); and Schneier, “Applied Cryptography” (2d ed. 1996), the contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference.  
      Access control may be suitably provided by including access conditions within the header of each EF and DF. This prevents a particular operation (e.g., reading or updating) from being performed on a file unless the required access conditions have been fulfilled. Many different access conditions may be appropriate in a smart card context. For example, the smartcard may require cardholder verification (i.e., request that the cardholder enter a PIN) before a file operation may be allowed. Similarly, internal and/or external authentication as described above may be required.  
      Another important access condition (referred to herein as the SIGN condition) corresponds to the case where a particular file may be “protected” and where updating of a record requires “signing” of the data using a message authentication code (MAC). A MAC may be thought of as a form of electronic seal used to authenticate the content of the message. In a paradigmatic signing procedure, a shortened, encrypted representation of the message (the MAC) may be created using a message authentication algorithm (MAA) in conjunction with a key known to both the card and external device. The MAC may be then appended onto the message and sent to the card (or external device, depending on context), and the card itself generates a MAC based on the received message and the known key. The card then compares the received MAC with the its own internally-generated MAC. If either the message or MAC was altered during transmission, or the sending party did not use the correct key, then the two MACs may not match, and the access condition may not be fulfilled. If the two MACs correspond, then the access condition may be fulfilled, and the particular file operation may proceed.  
      A MAC may be generated using a variety of MAAs, for example, the ANSI X9.9 method using an eight-byte key, or the ANSI X9.19 method using a sixteen-byte key. Furthermore, the actual key may be “diversified” through encryption with a random number or other appropriate value. These and other details regarding MAC generation may be found in the references cited above as well as the IBM MFC specification.  
      Two other important access conditions may be the NEVER and FREE conditions. The NEVER condition corresponds to the case where a certain file operation (typically updating) may be never allowed. The FREE condition, on the other hand, corresponds to the case where either updating or reading a file record may be always allowed, without any additional preconditions for access.  
      In contrast to the MAC techniques discussed briefly above, non-repudiation may be necessarily performed using asymmetrical techniques. That is, as symmetrical techniques such as MAC “sealing” use a key known to more than one party, such techniques may not be used by a third-party to ascertain whether the source of the message may be correct. Thus, non-repudiation typically may employ a public key encryption scheme (e.g., the Zimmerman&#39;s PGP system), wherein the sender uses a secret key to “sign” the message, and the receiving party uses the corresponding public key to authenticate the signature. In the context of the present invention, this function may be suitably performed by allocating an EF for public and secret key rings, which may be well known in the art, along with suitable encryption software resident in the card for assembling the signed message.  
      Having thus given a brief overview of typical smartcard security procedures, an exemplary set of access conditions may be set forth below in Table 39. In this regard, the various access conditions for each EF may be tabulated with regard to whether the file may be being read or updated. In each case, the access condition (FREE, SIGN, etc.), key “owner” (issuer, partner, user, etc.), and key name may be listed. In this regard, it may be appreciated that the key name may be arbitrary, and may be listed here for the sake of completeness.  
               TABLE 39                          Exemplary access conditions                             READING   UPDATING                                             Access           Access                   condition   Owner   Key   condition   Owner   Key                                                     MF                               DF Cardholder       ID 406       DF Holder_ID 502       EF ID 504   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Home 506   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Business 508   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Preferences 514   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Passport 516   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Biometrics 522   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       EF Driver 518   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       DF Miscellaneous       EF Payment card   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       510       EF Sequence 512   FREE           FREE       EF Card Number   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       526       DF Payment       System 408       DF Issuer 602       EF Pay1 604   FREE           FREE       DF Airline 410       DF Common 702       EF Passenger   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY2       706       EF Frequent flier   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY2       708       EF IET 710   FREE           FREE       EF Boarding 712   FREE           FREE       EF Biometric   FREE           FREE       714       DF Issuer 704       EF Preferences   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY2       716       EF PIN 718   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY2       EF Issuance 720   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY2       DF Rental car       414       DF Common 802       EF Preferences   FREE           USER   IDENT   PIN       805       DF Rental_car       803       EF   FREE           SIGN   RENTCAR   KEY6       Rental_car_ID       807       EF Reservation   FREE           FREE       809       EF Expenses 811   FREE           SIGN   RENTCAR   KEY6                       (append)   (append)   (append)                       IDENT   USER   PIN                       (erase)   (erase)   (erase)       DF Hotel system       412       DF Common 914       EF Reservation   FREE           FREE       918       EF Expenses 916   FREE           FREE   USER   PIN                       (append)   (erase)   (erase)                       IDENT                       (erase)       EF Key-of-the-   FREE           FREE       room 910       EF Preferences   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       912       DF Hotel_chain       902       EF Preferences   FREE           SIGN   ISSUER   KEY1       904       EF Stayer ID 906   FREE           SIGN   HOTEL   KEY5                  
 
      Having thus given a detailed description of an exemplary smartcard  100  and an exemplary data structure  400 , the various details related to transactions involving smartcard  100  may now be described. In general, a typical smartcard session involves: (1) activation of the contacts (or comparable non-contact means); (2) card reset; (3) Answer to reset (ATR) by card; (4) Information exchange between card and host; and, at the conclusion of a session, (5) deactivation of contacts.  
      First, card  100  may communicate with a card reader provided at an access point  15 , and suitable connections may be made between communication region  108  on card  100  and the card reader. By “may communicate,” a user may swipe card  100 , insert card  100  into access point  15  and/or a reader associated with access point  15 , and interact with access point  15  via communication region  108  by any suitable communication channels, such as, for example, a telephone network, an extranet, an intranet, Internet, point of interaction device, online communications, off-line communications, wireless communications, transponder communications, local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), networked or linked devices and/or the like. Communication may entail the use of one or more biometric security systems described in greater detail herein.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, physical contacts (contacts  106  in  FIG. 1 ) may be used, and DATA, CLOCK, RESET, VDD, and GND connections may be made. These contacts may be electrically activated in a particular sequence, preferably in accordance with ISO 7816-3 (RST to low state, VDD powered, DATA to reception mode, then CLK applied).  
      The card reader then initiates a reset (i.e., RST to high state), and the card returns an answer to reset string (ATR) on the DATA line, preferably in conformance with the content and timing details specified in the appropriate parts of ISO 7816. In an exemplary embodiment, the interface characters may be chosen to reflect a T=1 protocol (asynchronous, half-duplex, block-oriented mode). Further in accordance with ISO-7816-3, after the card sends an ATR string and the proper protocol may be selected (in an exemplary embodiment, the T=1 mode), host  314  and card  100  begin the exchange of commands and responses that comprise a particular transaction. The nature of these commands is discussed in further detail below.  
      At the end of a smartcard session, contacts  106  may be deactivated. Deactivation of contacts  106  may be preferably performed in the order specified in ISO 7816-3 (i.e., RST to low state, CLK to low state, DATA to low state, VDD to inactive state). As mentioned above, the VPP contact may be not utilized in an exemplary embodiment.  
      In the context of the present invention, command classes and instructions may be provided for 1) working with application data (i.e., files stored within the various applications), 2) ensuring data security, 3) card management, and 4) performing miscellaneous functions.  
      Application data commands may be suitably directed at selecting, reading, and updating individual records or groups of records within files. Security commands may suitably include commands for performing the challenge/response authentication process, generating random numbers, loading or updating cryptographic keys, and changing and verifying the card-holder verification codes (CHV 1  and CHV 2 ). Card management commands may suitably include commands which allow for the creation and deletion of directories (DFs) and elementary files (EFs). Miscellaneous commands may be suitably provided for modifying the baud rate and reading various card statistics (e.g., data logged during production of the card.) It may be appreciated that many different command sets could be designed for implementing these basic functions. One such command set may be provided by the IBM Multifunction Card Operating System 3.51, hereby incorporated by reference.  
      Referring again to  FIG. 10 , access point  15  preferably may comprise software which may provide a user interface (for example, a graphical user interface) and may be capable of executing the appropriate SCOS commands in accordance with the particular transaction being effected. For example, consider the case where a cardholder wishes to add a preference in car preferences EF  810  within rental car application  414  (shown in  FIG. 8 ). In this instance, a cardholder would locate a convenient access point  15  (for example, a stand-alone kiosk in a mall) and insert card  100  in a provided card reader in order to initiate a transaction. After suitable handshaking between card  100  and the card reader has taken place, and after the cardholder has been properly authenticated (i.e., the correct access conditions for updating car preferences EF  810  have been fulfilled), the application program at access point  15  queries the user with a choice of preference codes (for example, those listed in Table 39 above). The user then indicates a choice through textual or graphical means, and the appropriate value may be sent to card  100  by the application program as part of a command string. This value may then be sent to the appropriate partnering organization  12  (i.e., a rental car partner) and issuer  10  over network  19  to be stored in their respective databases  13  and  11 . Alternatively, this data may be sent later as part of a card/database synchronization procedure, e.g., when the original transaction proceeds off-line.  
      Consider, as another example, the typical hotel transaction. As detailed above, the cardholder inserts card  100  into a card reader deployed at a suitable access point  15 . After appropriate initialization procedures take place, the cardholder may be presented, through the use of a graphical user interface, the option to make a hotel reservation. Upon choosing this option, the software may interrogate the hotel preferences field in exemplary programs EF  524  in cardholder ID application  406  and display these hotels first within the list of possible choices.  
      After the cardholder selects a specific hotel property, the software contacts the appropriate partner  12  over network  19  and requests a hotel room for a particular set of dates. This step may involve an interrogation of the various files within hotel system application  412  to which the particular hotel has access (i.e., a hotel chain DF  902  or property DF  903 ), or this step may be deferred until check-in (as described below).  
      Once a reservation has been made, the associated confirmation number supplied by the hotel may be downloaded into the confirmation number field in reservation EF  918  along with the date and the property code of the hotel. This step may require the cardholder to transmit appropriate credit card information, which may be suitably retrieved from pay1 EF  604 .  
      Upon arrival at the hotel, the cardholder may use smartcard  100  to access a kiosk or other convenient access point provided for check-in. Thus, check-in may take place unassisted by hotel personnel, or may involve a more traditional person-to-person interaction where card  100  may be used primarily to streamline the check-in process initiated by personnel at the front desk.  
      At check-in, the confirmation number information may be retrieved from reservation EF  918 , and a particular room may be assigned (if not assigned previously). This step may typically involve retrieving, from the appropriate preference file (i.e., preferences EF  904  or  912 ), a list of preferences regarding bed size, room type, and the like. This list may be matched against the hotel&#39;s database of available rooms, thereby helping to streamline the room assignment process.  
      Once a room may be assigned, a digital key corresponding to the assigned room (e.g., a numeric value or alphanumeric string) may be stored in key-of-the-room EF  910 . Card readers may be then employed as part of the door lock apparatus for each room, which may be configured to open only upon receiving the correct key.  
      At check-out time, payment may take place using payment card information stored in payment card EF  510  and pay1 EF  604 . Again, a suitable smartcard reader (i.e., a reader configured with access point  15 ), may be provided in any location convenient for check out, e.g., the hotel lobby or within the individual hotel rooms themselves. The cardholder may then acquire frequent stayer points, which would involve updating one of the stayer ID EFs  906  (or  936 ). During the course of his stay at the hotel, the cardholder may have incurred any number of expenses related to room-service, on-site dining, film viewing, and the like. These expenses, or a subset thereof, may be conveniently downloaded into expenses EF  916  for later retrieval, printout, or archiving.  
      Use of card  100  in a rental car context would necessarily involve many of the same steps described above. The task of assigning a car would involve retrieving car preferences stored within preferences EF  805  and comparing them to a database of available automobiles. Upon returning the automobile, the cardholder may then be awarded frequent rental points (through update of frequent renter EF  807 ), and an expense record may be stored within expenses EF  811 .  
      In the airline context, card  100  could be used to make reservations, record preferences, and provide a payment means as described above. In addition, electronic tickets may be downloaded (EF IET  710 ), and boarding information may be supplied via boarding EF  712 . Frequent flyer EF  708  may then be used to update the cardholder&#39;s frequent flyer miles.  
      The system in accordance with various aspects of the present invention may include methods and apparatus for personalizing and dynamically synchronizing smartcards and associated databases in the context of a distributed transaction system. More particularly, referring now to  FIG. 11 , an exemplary dynamic synchronization system (DSS) preferably may comprise a secure support client server  1104 , a card object database update system  1106  (CODUS), one or more enterprise data synchronization may interface  1108  (EDSI), an update logic system  1110 , one or more enterprise data collection units  1112  (EDCUs), and one or more smartcard access points  15  configured to interoperably accept and interface with smartcards  100 . In an exemplary embodiment, DSS also suitably may comprise a personalization system  1140  and an account maintenance system  1142  configured to communicate with CODUS  1106 .  
      More particularly, in an exemplary embodiment, secure support client server  1104  may be connected over a suitable network to EDSIs  1108  through enterprise network  1114 . EDSIs  1108  may be linked to update logic system  1110 , which itself may be linked to enterprise data collection units  1112 . Enterprise data collection units  1112  may be linked to CODUS  1106  and secure support client server  1104 . In general, as described in further detail below, each enterprise (e.g., airline partner, hotel partner, travel agency, etc.) may be preferably associated with a corresponding EDSI  1108 , enterprise network  1114 , and EDCU  1112 . That is, EDCU  1112 ( a ) corresponds to EDSI  1108 ( a ) and enterprise network  1114 ( a ), EDCU  1112 ( b ) corresponds to EDSI  1108 ( b ) and enterprise network  1114 ( b ), and so on. The DSS may include an arbitrary number of such functional blocks in accordance with the number of enterprises represented.  
      Personalization system  1140  may suitably function as the issuing source of smartcards  100 . That is, personalization system  1140  may create and issue smartcards for use by the consumer by providing a predetermined file structure populated with initialization data (e.g., account numbers, serial numbers, smartcard identifiers, default preferences, and the like). In this regard, CODUS  1106  may interface with personalization system  1140  in order to facilitate reissuance of the card by providing updated data in the event a card may be destroyed, lost, or stolen. Personalization system  1140  is described in detail below in conjunction with  FIG. 19 .  
      Account maintenance system  1142  may be provided for customer service purposes and, in this capacity, acts as the point of entry for cardholder complaints, questions, and other customer input. CODUS  1106  suitably may communicate with account maintenance system  1142  in order to assist customer service representatives and/or automated systems in addressing cardholder issues.  
      Enterprise network  1114  may be configured similarly to network  19  described above. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that a variety of hardware systems are suitable for implementing the present invention. Various modems, routers, CPU&#39;s, monitors, back-up systems, power-supplies, and peripherals may be employed to realize the benefits of the present system. In one embodiment, for example, a Compaq Prolinea computer operating in an OS/2 environment using IBM MQ Server software is used to implement secure support client server  1108 , wherein the various access points comprise stand-alone smartcard kiosks, an EDCU  1112  and CODUS  1116  is then implemented on a Compaq Prolinea computer operating in a Windows/NT environment running a suitable database software package.  
      Secure support client server  1104  may provide, where appropriate, any functionality missing from the individual access point  15  used during a transaction. Server  1104  also may suitably handle routing of messages from access points  15  to the appropriate EDSI  1108  and/or EDCU  1112 .  
      Referring now to  FIGS. 11 and 12 , an exemplary secure support client server  1104  may comprise a security engine  1202 , a supplemental application support  1204 , and a router  1206 . Security engine  1202  may comprise suitable hardware and/or software to provide secure messaging between server  1104 , EDSUs  1112 , and enterprise network  1114 . More specifically, security engine  1202  may utilize authentication, data encryption, and digital signature techniques in connection with incoming and outgoing message packets. A variety of conventional security algorithms may be suitable in the context of the present invention, including, for example, DES encryption, RSA authentication, and a variety of other symmetrical and nonsymmetrical cryptographic techniques.  
      Supplemental application support  1204  preferably may comprise suitable hardware and/or software components related to a specific access point  15  functionality. More particularly, server  1104  may suitably determine the nature of access point  15  utilized during a transaction. If access point  15  does not include the appropriate software for effecting the requested transaction, then server  1104  supplies the functionality (i.e., software modules) which completes the transaction with respective EDSIs  1108  and/or EDCUs  1112 . The supplemental functionality may include, inter alia, software modules for properly formatting message packets (described in further detail below) sent out over the various networks comprising the DSS. For example, where a transaction takes place via an access point  15  which may consists entirely of a stand-alone smartcard reader  2500 , then nearly all functionality may be supplied by server  1104  because the smartcard reader, by itself, may be only capable of transferring messages to and from smartcard  100  in a “dumb” manner. However, when a suitably configured PC may be included for access point  15 , most necessary functionality may be supplied by various software modules residing in the PC. In such a case, server  1104  may need only transfer the various message packets to and from access point  15  without supplying additional software. Added functionality may be supplied through any suitable method, for example, through the use of portable software code (e.g., Java, ActiveX, and the like), or distributed software residing within access points  15 , cards  100 , and/or server  1104 .  
      Router  1206  may suitably handle routing of messages to the appropriate EDCUs  1112 , enterprise network  1114 , and access points  15 . That is, router  1206  may be configured to identify the appropriate functional blocks within the DSS to which a given message packet should be sent. The identification of the appropriate functional blocks may take place in a number of ways. In an exemplary embodiment, the identification may be accomplished through the use of a look-up table comprising a list of appropriate destinations keyed to information extracted from requests received from access points  15 .  
      In an alternate embodiment of the present invention, a secure support client server  1104  may be not used, and the functionality of access points  15  may be suitably specified in order to obviate the need for server  1104 . Alternatively, the functions of server  1104  may be allocated and distributed throughout the DSS components in any advantageous manner.  
      It may be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the term “transaction” refers, generally, to any message communicated over the system for effecting a particular goal, for example, debit/charge authorization, preference changes, reservation requests, ticket requests, and the like.  FIG. 21 , for example, shows an exemplary transaction data structure useful in the context of performing an online transaction with a travel partner, wherein the field name  2102 , data type  2104  (“C” for character), maximum byte-length  2106 , and description  2108  may be listed in tabular form. In this example, the transaction messages may suitably comprise comma delimited data packets, although other data structures may be employed.  
      CODUS  1106  may suitably securely store information related to the state of the various issued smartcards  100 . Referring now to  FIGS. 11 and 16 , in an exemplary embodiment, CODUS  1106  may comprise a security engine  1602 , a data management module  1604 , a object database  1616 , a card object administration module  1606 , and an audit file  1608 .  
      Security engine  1602  may provide suitable security for, inter alia, the information stored within object database  1616 . In this regard, security engine  1602  may utilize various authentication, data encryption, and digital signature techniques in connection with incoming and outgoing message packets. Suitable algorithms in the context of the present invention, include, for example, DES encryption, RSA authentication, and a variety of other symmetrical and non-symmetrical cryptographic techniques.  
      Data management module  1604  may suitably act as a data interface between CODUS  1106  and account maintenance  1142  as well as between CODUS  1106  and the various EDCUs  1112 . More specifically, module  1604  converts and translates between the data format used in these systems. For example, data stored within object database  1616  may not be stored in a format which may be easily used by EDCUs  1112  or account maintenance  142 . Accordingly, data management module  1604  may comprise suitable routines for effecting conversion and formatting of both incoming and outgoing data.  
      Card object administration module  1606  preferably may provide suitable database software to edit, update, delete, synchronize, and ensure non-corruption of data stored within object database  106 . A variety of database packages may be suitable for this task, including, for example, various conventional fourth-generation relational database management systems (4GL RDBMS).  
      Audit file  1608  suitably may track changes to object database  1616 , thereby helping to ensure the integrity of card data stored within CODUS  1106 . More particularly, when changes to object database  1616  take place as a result of preference updates, transactions, application structure changes, and the like, audit file  1608  may track suitable information related to these changes, e.g., time, date, and nature and content of the change.  
      Object database  1616 , may be used to store the known state of the various smartcards  100 . In general, the state of a smartcard may be characterized by a suitable set of card indicia. In an exemplary embodiment, wherein a data structure in accordance with ISO-7816 may be employed, object database  1616  stores information related to the individual applications present on the various smartcards  100  (i.e., the overall file structure) as well as the individual fields, directories, and data that comprise those applications. A file structure for object database  1616  may be chosen such that it may include a suitable set of data fields for a given smartcard  100 .  
      In an exemplary embodiment, the various EDSIs  1108  track changes to smartcard data and/or applications corresponding to individual enterprises. With reference to  FIGS. 11 and 13 , in an exemplary embodiment, EDSI  1108  may comprise a communication server  1302 , a security engine  1304 , and a file structure  400 .  
      Communication server  1302  may suitably facilitate communication with enterprise network  1114  and update logic system  1110 . In this regard, server  1302  may be configured to translate between various formats, media, and communication protocols as may be necessary given the particular choice of components employed.  
      Security engine  1304  may provide suitable security measures with respect to the access and storage of information with file structure  400 . Security engine  1304  may utilize various authentication, data encryption, and digital signature techniques in connection with incoming and outgoing message packets. Suitable algorithms in the context of the present invention, include, for example, DES encryption, RSA authentication, and a variety of other symmetrical and non-symmetrical cryptographic techniques.  
      File structure  400 , described in greater detail above, may comprise a single database or a set of distributed databases and may suitably provide a means for storing smartcard information related to individual partners or enterprises. During synchronization (as described in further detail below) any changes to file structure  400  may be propagated through the system and, visa-versa, changes elsewhere in the system may be communicated to file structure  400 . This communication may be preferably done securely (using security engine  1304 ) in conjunction with communication server  1302 .  
      In an alternate embodiment, the functionality provided by the EDSIs  1108  may be folded into the corresponding EDCU  1112 . That is, while an illustrated embodiment may employ one or more physically separate EDSIs  1108 , it may be advantageous to further streamline the DSS by incorporate this functionality into the corresponding EDCU  1112  functional block.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, update logic system  1110  formats and securely routes card data received from and transmitted to EDCUs  1112  and EDSIs  1108 . Referring now to  FIG. 14 , in an exemplary embodiment, update logic system  1110  may include a logic engine  1402 , a data management module  1404 , a security engine  1406 , an enterprise update administrator  1408 , and an enterprise update audit module  1410 .  
      Logic engine  1402  may suitably function to direct and distribute information changes across the system. Thus, logic engine  1402  may be able to determine which modules (i.e., which EDCUs  1112  and EDSIs  1108 ) need to reflect the change Data management module  1404  may suitably act as a data interface between EDSIs  1108  and EDCUs  1112 . More specifically, module  1404  may be able to convert and translate between data format used in these systems. Accordingly, data management module  1604  may comprise suitable routines for effecting conversion and formatting of both incoming and outgoing data.  
      Security engine  1406  may be used to provide suitable security measures with respect to data flowing through update logic system  1110 . Security engine  1406  may utilize various authentication, data encryption, and digital signature techniques in connection with incoming and outgoing message packets. Suitable algorithms in the context of the present invention, include, for example, DES encryption, RSA authentication, and a variety of other symmetrical and non-symmetrical cryptographic techniques.  
      Enterprise update administrator  1408  suitably may comprise overhead software necessary to maintain data transfer between EDSIs  1108  and EDCUs  1112 .  
      Enterprise update audit module  1410  suitably may track update information flowing through update logic system  1110 . More particularly, when information may be communicated across update logic system  1110 , (as a result of preference updates, transactions, application structure changes, and the like), audit module  1410  may track suitable indicia of this information, e.g., time, date, and nature and content of the communication.  
      EDCUs  1112  preferably store and coordinate the transfer of synchronization data corresponding to a particular enterprise. With reference to  FIG. 15 , in an exemplary embodiment, enterprise data collection unit  1112  may include a security engine  1508 , a customer update transaction database  1504 , a customer pending transaction database  1514 , an update database  1502 , an EDCU audit file  1506 , an EDCU administrative file  1512 , and an EDCU data management module  1516 .  
      Security engine  1508  may be used to provide suitable security measures with respect to data flowing through EDCU  1112 . Toward this end, security engine  1406  may utilize various authentication, data encryption, and digital signature techniques in connection with incoming and outgoing message packets. Suitable algorithms in the context of the present invention, include, for example, DES encryption, RSA authentication, and a variety of other symmetrical and non-symmetrical conventional cryptographic techniques.  
      Customer update transaction database  1504  may be used to store information which has been updated on a smartcard  100 , but which has not yet propagated to the various databases and networks that require updating. For example, smartcard  100  may be used to change cardholder preferences in the course of a transaction with a particular enterprise. This information would, in the short term, be stored in database  1504  (for the particular enterprise) until it could be fanned-out to CODUS  1106  and the appropriate EDCUs  1112  and EDSIs  1108 . This type of transaction is described in further detail below.  
      Customer pending transaction database  1514  may be suitably used to store information related to transactions which have taken place without direct use of the smartcard  100 . More particularly, some transactions, such as preference changes and the like, may be initiated by a cardholder through a channel which does not involve use of the card, for example, through a verbal request over a standard telephone. In such a case, and as detailed further below, this data may be suitably stored in pending transaction database  1514 . The transaction data remains in database  1514  until the corresponding smartcard  100  may be used in conjunction with an access point  15 , whereupon smartcard  100  itself (as well as CODUS  1106 ) may be updated with this new information.  
      Update database  1502  may be suitably used to store other types of transactions, i.e., transactions which may not be classifiable as update, loyalty or pending. For example, update database  1502  may be employed to store file structure updates as detailed below.  
      Audit file  1506  may be used to track changes to update database  1504 , pending database  1514 , and database  1502 . Audit file  1506  therefore helps to ensure the integrity of data in the respective files.  
      Administrative file  1512  may provide suitable database software necessary to edit, update, delete, synchronize, and ensure non-corruption of data stored within the various databases that comprise EDCU  1112  i.e., databases  1502 ,  1504 , and  1514 .  
      Data management module  1516  may provide data management capabilities to facilitate data transfer between smartcards  100  and databases  1504 ,  1514 , and  1502  as well as between these databases and the other systems i.e., update logic system  1110  and CODUS  1106 . Thus, data management module  1516  acts as interface to ensure seamless transfer of data between the various systems.  
      Referring now to  FIG. 19 , in an exemplary embodiment, personalization system  1140  suitably may comprise a card management system  1902 , a legacy management system  1904 , a gather application module  1906 , one or more databases  1910 , an activation block  1908 , a common card personalization utility  1912  (CCP), a service bureau  1914 , a common card security server  1916 , a key management system  1918 , and one or more key systems  1920 . Key management system  1918  suitably may comprise a database module  1922 , CID replace module  1924 , key system  1926 , and key system  1928 .  
      CCP  1912  suitably may communicate with CODUS  1106  (shown in  FIG. 11 ), and legacy management system  1904  suitably may communicate with account maintenance  1142  which may be also configured to communicate with CODUS  1106 .  
      Card management system  1902  may suitably receive the card request  1901  and initiates the gathering of information from various sources. Generally, card request  1901  may consists of various request information intended to specify a desired group of card characteristics. Such characteristics may include, for example: a smartcard identifier (a serial number, account number, and/or any other identifier of a particular smartcard  100 ), a list of desired applications (airline, hotel, rental car, etc.); a designation of whether the card may be new, a renewal, or a replacement; a list of default cardmember preferences corresponding to the desired applications; personal information related to the cardmember (name, address, etc.); and required security levels.  
      Card management system  1902  may suitably parse the card request and, for information already stored by the issuer, sends a request to legacy card management system  1904 . For information not available as legacy data, card management system  1902  forwards the relevant components of card request  1901  to gather application module  1906 . In an exemplary embodiment, card management system  1902  chooses the optimum smartcard physical characteristics for a particular card request  1901 . That is, card management system  1902  may suitably determine the appropriate type of smartcard chip to be used based on a number of factors, for example, memory requirements and computational complexity of the desired security functions. Similarly, the optimum smartcard operating system (SCOS) may be chosen. In an alternate embodiment, the smartcard chip, operating system, and the like, may be specified in card request  1901 .  
      Legacy management system  1904  acts as a suitable repository of information related to the cardholder&#39;s past relationship if any with the card issuing organization. For example, a cardholder may have a long-standing credit or debit account with issuing organization (based on a standard embossed mag-stripe card) and this information may be advantageously incorporated into the issued card.  
      Gather application module  1906  may be suitably configured to receive information from card management system  1902  and legacy management system  1904  and then interface with the various databases  1910  to gather all remaining application information specified in card request  1901 . Preferably, databases  1910  correspond to and may be associated with the individual partnering enterprises which offer smartcard applications for use in smartcard  100  (e.g., enterprise network  1114  in  FIG. 11 ). Thus, for example, a card request  1901  which included a request for a hotel application would trigger gather application  1906  to initiate data communication with the appropriate hotel database  910 . Hotel database  910  would then return information specifying the correct file structure, access conditions (security), default values, and other data necessary to configure smartcard  100  with the requested application. Communication with the various databases  1910  may take place through any suitable means, for example, data communication over the Internet, PSTN, and the like, or through other channels, such as simple phone requests.  
      Activation block  1908  may be suitably used to provide a means for the cardmember to activate the card once it has been issued. For example, it may be common for credit cards and the like to be sent to the cardmember unactivated, requiring that the cardmember call (or otherwise contact) an automated system at the issuer in order to activate the card. This may be typically accomplished via entry of the card number and other suitable ID using a touch-tone phone. In this regard, activation block  1908  may be used to facilitate this function for the requested smartcard, i.e., to specify whether such activation may be necessary for a particular card.  
      CCP  1912  may be used to create a correctly formatted card “object” i.e., the operating system, file structure  400  and all other available card data to be downloaded to card  100  then transfer this information to service bureau  1914  (for creation of the smartcard) and CODUS  1106  (for recording the card&#39;s state as issued). CCP  1912  may be preferably configured to tailor the format of the card object to the specific card issuance system to be used (described below). Thus, gather application system  1906  may deliver a relatively high-level functionality request, and CCP  1912  may create the specific “object” to be used in the implementation.  
      Personalization Service Bureau  1914  may comprise suitable hardware and software components to complete production of the smartcards for issuance to the respective cardmembers. In this regard, service bureau  1914  may include a suitable smartcard “printer” to handle the transfer of information to the smartcard chip as well as any conventional embossing or mag-stripe writing that may take place. Suitably smartcard printers may include, for example, any of the series 9000 and series 150i smartcard issuance systems manufactured by Datacard Corporation of Minnetonka, Minn.  
      Common card security server  1916  (CCSS) suitably may comprise software and hardware components necessary to retrieve cryptographic key information from various enterprise key systems  1920 . In an exemplary embodiment, this information may be accessed by service bureau  1914  in order to complete the personalization process. More particularly, it may typically be the case that a smartcard  100  contains a number of different applications associated with a wide range of enterprise organizations. One in the art may appreciate that the writing, updating, and reading of these files may be advantageously restricted to particular parties in accordance with a set of access condition rules. These access conditions may be suitably implemented using cryptographic keys which may be known by the appropriate parties. Thus, service bureau  1914  whose task it may be to create and populate the card file structure may not, ab initio, have access to the keys necessary to perform this function. As mentioned briefly above, known systems have attempted to solve this problem by accumulating key data in a central repository used in the issuance process, thereby creating an unacceptable security risk. Methods in accordance with the present invention, however, allow for communication between the smartcard and the individual key systems  1920  as the card may be being issued, thus allowing key information to be securely downloaded to the smartcard without the intervention of a third party. CCSS  916  may be suitably used to facilitate this process by receiving information from CCP  1912  regarding the identity of the various applications to be created in the various cards, then, when prompted by service bureau  1914  (or, alternatively, prior to issuance by service bureau  1914 ), contacting the appropriate key system  920  to request a key to be transmitted to service bureau  1914  during personalization.  
      Key systems  1920  comprise suitable database systems capable of storing, generating, and securely transmitting cryptographic keys associated with a particular enterprise. Key management system  1918  may be, in this context, a system comparable to key systems  1920 , but which may be “owned” by the party implementing the personalization system. The key-generating function may be distributed between CCSS and key systems  1920 . That is, the keys may be generated in real time at CCSS  1916  (in accordance with algorithms and key information received from the particular enterprises), rather than being generated at key systems  1920 .  
      It may be appreciated to one skilled in the art that the functional blocks illustrated in  FIG. 19  may be implemented using a variety of hardware and software components, both off-the-shelf and/or custom-developed. Database-intensive functions performed, for example, by card management system  1902 , may be implemented using any suitable database package, e.g., Codebase, dBase, or the like.  
      A personalization system as described above in conjunction with  FIG. 19  may be suitably used to efficiently issue a large number of smartcards with a wide range of functionality levels. This task involves obtaining and coordinating, in a timely fashion, accurate data for individual cardmembers across the various partnering enterprises supported by the system. In this regard, it may be the case that certain partnering enterprises desire to limit the dissemination of proprietary data. This data may include, for example, private keys used in connection with smartcard access conditions as well as file structure and cardmember personal data.  
      Referring now to  FIGS. 19 and 20 , an exemplary smartcard personalization process may now be described. First, the system receives a smartcard request (step  2002 ). As mentioned above, card management system  1902  may be suitably used to receive the card request and initiate the gathering of information from various sources. Card request  1901  suitably may consists of request information intended to specify a desired group of card characteristics. Such characteristics may include, for example: a smartcard identifier, a list of desired applications (airline, hotel, rental car, etc.); a designation of whether the card may be new, a renewal, or a replacement; a list of default cardmember preferences corresponding to the desired applications; personal information related to the cardmember (name, address, etc.); and required security levels.  
      Next, the system selects the smartcard type and configuration appropriate for the given card request  1901  (step  2004 ). This step may be suitably performed by card management system  1902 . Thus, card management system  1902  examines a number of factors in light of information received in card request  1901  (e.g., memory requirements, desired security functions, and the like), then selects an appropriate smartcard chip from a library of available chips. In the same way, the optimum smartcard operating system (SCOS) may also be selected.  
      Cardmember information may then be obtained (step  2006 ). This step may be suitably performed by gather application module  1906  operating in conjunction with databases  1910  and legacy management system  1904 . More particularly, cardmember-specific information may be preferably classified in two groups: information known to the personalization system, and information not known by the personalization system. Known information generally may consists of data acquired through a past relationship with the organization hosting the personalization system. In such a case, certain data such as cardholder name, exemplary billing address, title, company, etc., may most likely already be known, as may certain application data. Such information may be suitably stored in, and may be retrieved from, one or more databases comprising legacy management system  1904 . As part of step  2006 , the system (specifically, module  1908 ) preferably determines whether the card should require activation. That is, as mentioned briefly above, it may be common to apply a sticker or the like to a card that notifies the cardmember that activation of the card may be required prior to use. Activation typically involves the use of an automated phone system). The choice of whether a particular card requires activation may be based on a number of factors, for example, demographics, crime-rate numbers, or mail fraud statistics associated with the cardmember&#39;s zip-code number.  
      For data not included in legacy management system  1904 , gather application module  1906  suitably may communicate with databases  1910  to retrieve the information needed to satisfy card request  1901 . This information may typically consist of file structure  400  information, e.g., the DF and EF hierarchy, data types and lengths, and access condition specifications for the particular enterprise-sponsored application. For example, in the case where card request  1901  may include a request for an airline application, gather application module  1906  would contact the database corresponding to the enterprise hosting the airline application, then download all necessary file structure information. This process would continue in turn for each new or modified application to be incorporated into the smartcard.  
      A full cardmember data set may then be created (step  2008 ) suitably using CCP  1912 . This data set, or “card object”, may ultimately be used by service bureau  1914  to create the physical smartcard. The form of the card object may vary. In one embodiment, the card object may comprise what has been termed a Binary Large Object (“BLOB”). The card object may be preferably tailored to the selected smartcard configuration (e.g., chip type and operating system as specified in step  2004 ), the content of cardmember information data (gathered in step  2006 ), and the intended smartcard “printer” (i.e., the apparatus used to create the finished card within service bureau  1914 ). This allows the system, in the preceding steps, to specify file structures, data types, and the like, without concerning itself with how this structure may be encoded onto the smartcard or how the data may be accessed. Up until step  2008 , the system need only develop a relatively high-level model of the intended smartcard data structure; the specifics may be substantially invisible to all but CCP  1912 .  
      In an alternate embodiment, various details of the smartcard data object may be determined at a prior point in the system. That is, the functionality of CCP  1912  may be distributed among various components of the system.  
      Having created the cardmember data set, or card object, in step  2008 , this data may be then sent to CODUS  1106  (step  2010 ). This ensures that the DSS (particularly CODUS  1106 ) has a record of the smartcard state at the time of personalization. This information may be then immediately available to account maintenance system  1142 .  
      The card object may be then sent to service bureau  1914  and (if required) CCSS  1916  (step  2012 ). The necessary keys may be acquired to allow service bureau  1914  to create the finished smartcard (step  2014 ). As mentioned above, step  2014  may be suitably performed by CCSS  1916  concurrently or serially with the issuance process. In one embodiment, as each individual card may be being created using an issuance system suitably located at service bureau  1914 , service bureau  1914  interrogates CCSS  1916  for the appropriate cryptographic keys. These keys have either been retrieved from key systems  1920  and  1918  earlier (i.e., after step  2012 ), or may be retrieved in real-time in response to the request from service bureau  1914 . Alternatively, the keys may be retrieved by CCSS  1916  and transmitted to CCP  1912  prior to transmission of the card object to service bureau  1914 . In either case, the key or keys may be then retrieved for inclusion in the card object created in step  2008 .  
      The actual card may be issued (step  1016 ). Service bureau  1914  may suitably download the card object into the correct smartcard hardware using the correct cryptographic keys. The initialized smartcard may then be packaged and distributed to the appropriate cardmember in accordance with conventional methods.  
      A dynamic synchronization system as described above in various embodiments may be used to track the “state” of the consumer&#39;s smartcard. The state of the smartcard may be suitably characterized by the structure of applications used in the smartcard and the various pieces of data that may be stored within these applications.  
      A number of synchronization issues may arise in the multi-function smartcard context; indeed, three paradigmatic cases reoccur with some frequency, and relate to: 1) update transactions, 2) pending transactions, and 3) file structure changes. Each of these cases may now be described in turn with respect to the present invention.  
      It may be quite common for a cardholder to make a local change to smartcard  100  which may be not immediately reflected in all the databases which could advantageously make use of this information. For example, suppose that upon initialization (i.e., when the card was originally issued via personalization system  1140 ) the cardholder&#39;s smartcard  100  was configured to reflect a general preference for smoking (e.g., one file contains a Boolean field keyed to smoking/non-smoking), but the cardholder now wishes to change this general preference file to reflect a non-smoking preference.  
      In this case, referring now to  FIGS. 11, 18  with respect to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the cardholder may suitably insert card  100  into a conveniently located access point  15 , whereupon authentication of the card and/or card-reader takes place (step  1802 ). In an exemplary embodiment, authentication takes place in accordance with relevant sections of the ISO 7816 standard.  
      Next, the cardholder uses a suitable user interface (supplied by access point  15  working in conjunction with server  1104 ) in order to perform a transaction i.e., to request a change to the preferences file (step  1804 ). This change would typically be reflected at the smartcard  100  immediately. That is, access point  15  and/or server  1104  would include the functionality necessary to access and update the appropriate files within smartcard  100 .  
      Communication router  1206  in server  1104  then routes the transaction to the appropriate party, i.e., an EDSI  1108  or an EDCU  1112 , corresponding to branches  1807  and  1812  respectively. That is, depending on the system configuration, the file to be changed may be associated with a particular enterprise or, alternatively, may be associated with the organization hosting the DSS. These two cases will be described in turn.  
      Following branch  1807  in  FIG. 18 , the change data may be sent to and stored in the appropriate EDSI  1108  (step  1808 ). Update logic system  1110  then transfers this change request to the appropriate EDCU  1112  i.e., the EDCU  1112  corresponding to the particular EDSI (step  1810 ). This information may be suitably stored in the corresponding update database  1504 . The information may be also distributed to other EDSIs. In the instant example, update logic system  1110  would identify those systems that would benefit from knowing the cardholder&#39;s smoking status. Such systems may include, for example, various hotels, rental car agencies, and the like.  
      Alternatively, following branch  1805  in  FIG. 18 , the data may first be stored at the appropriate EDCU (step  1812 ), then distributed to other EDCUs  1112  and EDSIs  1108  as described above.  
      The card data change may be then transferred to CODUS  1106 . Specifically, the various fields and files associated with the smartcard  100  may be updated to reflect the change stored in update database  1504 . Thus, the information within CODUS  1106  conforms to that contained within smartcard  100  and the various EDCUs  1112  and EDSIs  1108 . After this transfer, the corresponding change data in update database  1504  may be cleared (step  1818 ).  
      The cardholder may make a change or perform a transaction through a channel that does not directly involve smartcard  100 , thus creating an inconsistency between the data in smartcard  100  and the data in various databases throughout the DSS. Such a case may arise, for example, when the cardholder calls a hotel to make a reservation (rather than performing the transaction on line using smartcard  100 ) and makes an oral request to change his preferences from smoking to non-smoking. Referring now to  FIGS. 11 and 17 , in this case, with respect to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention, the cardholder first contacts an enterprise through a means that does not include smartcard  100  i.e., a “smartcard not present” transaction (step  1702 ). Using an appropriate interface (voice, keypad, etc.), a change or transaction may be selected (step  1704 ). This change may be then stored locally within a particular enterprise network  1114  and/or may be stored within an EDSI  1108  (step  1706 ).  
      Next, update logic system  1110  routes this information to the corresponding EDCU  1112  (step  1708 ), where it resides in pending database  1514 . At this point, smartcard  100  itself may be oblivious to the change. As a result, if the cardholder were to initiate a smartcard-present transaction, the corresponding enterprise would likely look first to the data structure in smartcard  100  for preferences, and as just stated, would most likely arrive at the wrong conclusion (e.g., a smoking room may be assigned notwithstanding the cardholder&#39;s expressed preference).  
      In order to remedy this situation, the present invention may provide a method by which the smartcard may be updated upon its next use (steps  1710 - 1712 ). That is, after the smartcard may be inserted at an access point  15  and may be suitably authenticated (step  1710 ), the system interrogates pending database  1514  to determine whether any changes have been made. If so, the appropriate information may be downloaded to smartcard  100  (step  1712 ).  
      After the above information transfer may be successfully completed, the change data may be transferred to CODUS  1106 , where it may be stored within object database  1616 . Finally, the respective information within pending database  1514  may be cleared (step  1716 ).  
      In addition to the data-related modifications detailed above, changes to the structure of data stored in smartcard  100  may also be desirable in certain contexts. That is, during the life of a smartcard, it may be likely that the card issuer, a partnering enterprise, or the cardholder himself may desire to extend the card&#39;s functionality by augmenting the suite of applications housed within the card. For example, a cardholder who uses a smartcard for rental car and airline reservations may also wish to use the card for acquiring and paying for hotel reservations. In such a case, the appropriate hotel partner may process the cardholder&#39;s request and arrange for addition of a hotel application to be added to the smartcard file structure. In another example, the smartcard issuer may authorize the addition of a new application on its own, for example, a credit and/or debit application. Conversely, it may also be appropriate in some instances to remove applications from the card.  
      In an exemplary embodiment, the types of file structure changes described above may be handled in a manner analogous to the procedure set forth in  FIG. 17 , depending, to some extent, upon which party originates the file structure change. That is, as in step  1712 , the appropriate file structure change information may be stored in EDCU  1112  (for example, in database  1502 ), and then transferred to smartcard  100  when the card may be used in conjunction with an on-line transaction (steps  1710  and  1712 ). After the file structure on smartcard  100  may be augmented or otherwise modified, CODUS  1106  (specifically, database  1116 ) may be similarly modified to reflect the change. The change information may be then cleared from database  1502  (step  1716 ).  
      While the example transactions set forth above are described in general terms, the particular nature of data flow to and from the appropriate memory locations within the card may be apparent to those skilled in the art.  
      In another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, a smartcard transaction system  2400  may be configured with one or more biometric scanners, processors and/or systems.  FIG. 24  illustrates an exemplary smartcard transaction system  2400  in accordance with the present invention, wherein exemplary components for use in completing a smartcard transaction using travel-related information are depicted. System  2400  may include smartcard  100  having IC  110 . Smartcard  100  may also be configured with a biometric sensor  2204 , described in further detail herein. System  2400  may also comprise a smartcard reader  2500  configured to communicate with smartcard  100  and access point  15 . Smartcard reader  2500  may be configured with a biometric sensor  2430 , described in further detail herein. Smartcard  100  may communicate with enterprise network  1114  and/or network  19  through smartcard reader  2500 .  
      A biometric system may include one or more technologies, or any portion thereof, to facilitate recognition of a biometric. As used herein, a biometric may include a user&#39;s voice, fingerprint, facial, ear, signature, vascular patterns, DNA sampling, hand geometry, sound, olfactory, keystroke/typing, iris, retinal or any other biometric relating to recognition based upon any body part, function, system, attribute and/or other characteristic, or any portion thereof. Certain of these technologies will be described in greater detail herein. Moreover, while some of the examples discussed herein may include a particular biometric system or sample, the invention contemplates any of the biometrics discussed herein in any of the embodiments.  
      The biometric system may be configured as a security system and may include a registration procedure in which a user of transaction instrument (e.g., smartcard  100 ) proffers a sample of his fingerprints, DNA, retinal scan, voice, and/or other biometric sample to an authorized sample receiver (ASR). An ASR may include a local database, a remote database, a portable storage device, a host system, an issuer system, a merchant system, a smartcard issuer system, an employer, a financial institution, a non-financial institution, a loyalty point provider, a company, the military, the government, a school, a travel entity, a transportation authority, a security company, and/or any other system or entity that may be authorized to receive and store biometric samples and associate the samples with specific biometric databases and/or transaction instruments (e.g., smartcards  100 ). As used herein, a user of a smartcard, cardmember, or any similar phrase may include the person or device holding or in possession of the smartcard, or it may include any person or device that accompanies or authorizes the smartcard owner to use the smartcard.  
       FIG. 23  illustrates an exemplary registration procedure in accordance with the present invention. In one embodiment, a cardmember may contact an ASR to submit one or more biometric samples to an ASR (Step  2301 ). The cardmember may contact the ASR and submit a sample in person, through a computer and/or Internet, through software and/or hardware, through a third-party biometric authorization entity, through a kiosk and/or biometric registration terminal, and/or by any other direct or indirect means, communication device or interface for a person to contact an ASR.  
      A cardmember may then proffer a biometric sample to the ASR (step  2303 ). As used herein, a biometric sample may be any one or more of the biometric samples or technologies, or portion thereof, described herein or known in the art. By proffering one or more biometric samples, a biometric may be scanned by at least one of a retinal scan, iris scan, fingerprint scan, hand print scan, hand geometry scan, voice print scan, vascular scan, facial and/or ear scan, signature scan, keystroke scan, olfactory scan, auditory emissions scan, DNA scan, and/or any other type of scan to obtain a biometric sample. Upon scanning the sample, the system may submit the scanned sample to the ASR in portions during the scan, upon completing the scan or in batch mode after a certain time period. The scanned sample may include a hardcopy (e.g., photograph), digital representation, an analog version or any other configuration for transmitting the sample. The ASR receives the sample and the ASR may also receive copies of a cardmember&#39;s biometric data along with the sample or at a different time (or within a different data packet) from receiving the sample.  
      The ASR and/or cardmember may correlate and/or register the sample with cardmember information to create a data packet for the sample and store the data packet in digital and/or any storage medium known in the art. As used herein, a data packet may include the digitized information relating to at least one of a biometric sample, a registered biometric sample, a stored biometric sample, a proffered biometric, a proffered biometric sample, cardmember information, smartcard information and/or any other information. The terms “data packet,” “biometric sample,” and “sample” may be used interchangeably. As used herein, registered samples may include samples that have been proffered, stored and associated with cardmember information. By storing the data packet in digital format, the ASR may digitize any information contained in one of the biometric scans described herein. By storing the data packet in any storage medium, the ASR may print and/or store any biometric sample. Hardcopy storage may be desirable for back-up and archival purposes.  
      The biometric sample may also be associated with user information to create a data packet (step  2305 ). The sample may be associated with user information at any step in the process such as, for example, prior to submission, during submission and/or after submission. In one embodiment, the user may input a PIN number or zip code into access point  15 , then scan the biometric to create the biometric sample. The local access point may associate the biometric sample data with the PIN and zip code, then transmit the entire packet of information to the ASR. In another embodiment, the access point may facilitate transmitting the sample to an ASR, and during the transmission, the sample may be transmitted through a third system which adds personal information to the sample.  
      The information associated with the biometric sample may include any information such as, for example, cardmember information, smartcard  100  information, smartcard  100  identifier information, smartcard  100  issuer information, smartcard  100  operability information, and/or smartcard  100  manufacturing information. Smartcard  100  information may be not limited to smartcard chip information and may include information related to any transaction instrument such as transponders, credit cards, debit cards, merchant-specific cards, loyalty point cards, cash accounts and any other transaction instruments and/or accounts. The cardmember information may also contain information about the user including personal information—such as name, address, and contact details; financial information—such as one or more financial accounts associated with the cardmember; loyalty point information—such as one or more loyalty point accounts (e.g., airline miles, charge card loyalty points, frequent diner points) associated with the cardmember; and/or non-financial information—such as employee information, employer information, medical information, family information, and/or other information that may be used in accordance with a cardmember.  
      For example, a cardmember may have previously associated a credit card account, a debit card account, and a frequent flier account with his biometric sample which may be stored at an ASR. Later, when cardmember desires to purchase groceries, cardmember may submit his biometric sample while using smartcard  100  for the purchase at access point  15 . Access point  15  may facilitate sending the biometric sample to the ASR such that the ASR authorizes the biometric sample and checks a look-up table in the ASR database to determine if any information may be associated with the sample. If information (e.g., financial accounts) may be associated with the sample, the ASR may transmit the information to the Access point. The Access point may then present cardmember with a list of the three accounts associated with the biometric sample. Cardmember and/or a merchant may then chose one of the accounts in order to continue and finalize the transaction.  
      In another embodiment, cardmember may associate each account with a different biometric sample. For example, during registration, cardmember may submit a sample of his right index fingerprint, and request that the system primarily associate this sample with a particular credit card account. Cardmember may additionally submit a sample of his left index fingerprint and request that the system primarily associate the sample with a particular debit account. Additionally, cardmember may submit his right thumbprint and request that the system primarily associate that sample with a particular frequent flier account. By “primarily” associating a sample with an account, the system initially associates the sample with that account. For example, cardmember submitting his right index fingerprint for a financial transaction may have money for the transaction taken from his credit card account. Cardmember may additionally specify which accounts should be secondarily associated with a sample. For example, cardmember may have a debit card account secondarily associated with his right index fingerprint. As a result, if cardmember submits his right index fingerprint for a transaction, and the primary account associated with the sample is overdrawn or unavailable, the secondary account may be accessed in order to further the transaction.  
      While primary and secondary account association are described herein, any number of accounts may be associated with a sample. Moreover, any hierarchy or rules may be implemented with respect to the association. For example, the cardmember may instruct the system to access a debit card account when it receives a right index fingerprint sample, the purchase qualifies for loyalty points with a certain airline and the purchase amount is less than $50. The cardmember may additionally instruct the system to access a credit card account if it receives a right index fingerprint sample, the purchase does not qualify for airline miles and the purchase amount is greater than $50. Further, while fingerprint samples are discussed herein, any biometric sample may have one or more accounts associated with it and may be used to facilitate a transaction using any of the routines discussed herein.  
      The ASR and/or cardmember may associate a specific smartcard  100  identifier with the biometric sample by any method known in the art for associating an identifier (e.g., through the use of software, hardware and/or manual entry.) The ASR may additionally verify the cardmember and/or smartcard  100  by using one or more forms of the user&#39;s secondary identification (step  2307 ). For example, the ASR may verify the cardmember by matching the smartcard information to information retrieved from scanning information from a cardmember&#39;s driver&#39;s license. The ASR may verify smartcard  100  by contacting the vendor of smartcard  100  to confirm that smartcard  100  was issued to a specific cardmember. In another embodiment, the ASR may activate smartcard  100  during the registration procedure to confirm that the smartcard  100  smartcard chip identifier and other information may be properly associated with the cardmember and the cardmember&#39;s specific biometric samples. The ASR may additionally employ one or more verification methods to confirm that the biometric sample belongs to the user, such as, for example, the ASR may request from the user demographic information, further biometric samples and/or any other information. As used herein, “confirm,” “confirmation” or any similar term includes verifying or substantially verifying the accuracy, existence, non-existence, corroboration, and/or the like of the information, component, or any portion thereof. The ASR may additionally employ one or more additional processing methods in order to facilitate association of a biometric sample. As used herein, the term processing may include scanning, detecting, associating, digitizing, printing, comparing, storing, encrypting, decrypting, and/or verifying a biometric and/or a biometric sample, or any portion thereof.  
      Upon association, authentication and/or verification of the biometric sample and smartcard  100 , the system may create a data packet store the data packet and smartcard  100  identifier (step  2309 ) in one or more databases on and/or in communication with system  2400  via a network, server, computer, or any other means of communicating as described herein. The database(s) may be any type of database described herein. For example, a biometric sample stored on smartcard  100  may be stored in EEPROM  212 . The database(s) may be located at or operated by any of the entities discussed herein such as, for example, the ASR and/or by a third-party biometric database operator.  
      The information stored in the database may be sorted or stored according to one or more characteristics associated with the sample in order to facilitate faster access to the stored sample. For example, fingerprint samples may be stored in a separate database than voice prints. As another example, all fingerprints with certain whirl patterns may be stored in a separate sub-database and/or database from fingerprints with arch patterns.  
      The biometric samples may also be stored and/or associated with a personal identification number (PIN) and/or other identifier to facilitate access to the sample. The PIN may be cardmember selected or randomly assigned to the biometric sample. The PIN may consist of any characters such as, for example, alphanumeric characters and/or foreign language characters.  
      The system may further protect the samples by providing additional security with the sample. The security may include, for example, encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates, firewalls and/or any other security methods known in the art and discussed herein. One or more security vendors may utilize the security methods to store and/or access the biometric samples. The present invention anticipates that storage of the biometric samples may be such that a sample may be first encrypted and/or stored under a security procedure, such that the sample may only be accessed by a vendor with the proper level of access or security which corresponds to or provides access to the stored sample. The samples may be accessible by certain vendors such as, for example, smartcard  100  transaction account provider system, an issuer system, a merchant system, a smartcard issuer system, an employer, a financial institution, a non-financial institution, a loyalty-point provider, a company, the military, the government, a school, a travel entity, a transportation authority, and/or a security company.  
      The smartcard of the invention may include a particular security system wherein the security system incorporates a particular biometric system. As shown in  FIG. 22 , smartcard  100  may include a biometric security system  2202  configured for facilitating biometric security using, for example, fingerprint samples. As used herein, fingerprint samples may include samples of one or more fingerprints, thumbprints, palm prints, footprints, and/or any portion thereof. Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with a sensor and/or other hardware and/or software for acquiring and/or processing the biometric data from the person such as, for example, optical scanning, capacitance scanning, or otherwise sensing the portion of cardmember. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may scan a finger of a cardmember in order to acquire his fingerprint characteristics into smartcard  100 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with integrated circuit  110  such that IC  110  receives the fingerprint information and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , the user may place his finger on the biometric sensor to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. Smartcard  100  may digitize the fingerprint and compare it against a digitized fingerprint stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The fingerprint information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. As used herein, compare, comparison and similar terms may include determining similarities, differences, existence of elements, non-existence of elements and/or the like.  
      CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors. One or more comparison techniques and/or technologies may be used for comparisons. For example, for fingerprint comparisons, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare fingerprint minutia such as, for example, ridge endings, bifurcation, lakes or enclosures, short ridges, dots, spurs and crossovers, pore size and location, Henry System categories such as loops, whorls, and arches, and/or any other method known in the art for fingerprint comparisons.  
      Smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples may be not being used. For example, to detect the use of fake fingers, smartcard  100  may be further configured to measure blood flow, to check for correctly aligned ridges at the edges of the fingers, and/or any other secondary procedure to reduce biometric security fraud. Other security procedures for ensuring the authenticity of biometric samples may include monitoring pupil dilation for retinal and/or iris scans, pressure sensors, blinking sensors, human motion sensors, body heat sensors, eyeball pressure sensors and/or any other procedures known in the art for authenticating the authenticity of biometric samples.  
      After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication, and the transaction may proceed accordingly. However, the invention contemplates that the verification of biometric information may occur at any point in the transaction such as, for example, after the mutual authentication. At any point in the transaction, the system may additionally request cardmember to enter a PIN and/or other identifier associated with the transaction account and/or biometric sample to provide further verification of cardmember&#39;s identification. As part of the transaction, cardmember payer may be requested to select from one of the financial accounts, loyalty accounts, credit accounts, debit account, and/or other accounts associated with the biometric sample. The user may be presented with a list of account options on a display associated with smartcard reader  2500 , smartcard  100 , a third-party security device and/or any other financial or transaction device association with a transaction. In another embodiment, a payee may select one of the accounts. For example, a department store payee may manually and/or automatically select a department store issued account, if available, for a transaction.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using facial recognition or recognition of any other body part or object. As discussed herein, facial recognition may include recognition of any facial features obtained through a facial scan such as, for example, the eyes, nose, cheeks, jaw line, forehead, chin, ear features, head shape, hairline, neck features, shoulder height, forehead slope, lip shape, distance between the ears and/or any portion thereof. Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with a video camera, optical scanner, imaging radar, ultraviolet imaging and/or other hardware and/or software for acquiring the biometric data from the person such as, for example video scanning, optical scanning or otherwise sensing any portion of cardmember. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may scan the face of a cardmember in order to acquire his facial characteristics into smartcard  100 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the facial information and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may scan the facial features of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. Security system  2202  may be configured such that cardmember may stand at least two-feet away from sensor  2204 . Additionally, sensor  2204  may be configured to detect facial features of a user turned at least 30 degrees toward the camera.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the facial scan and compare it against a digitized facial scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The facial scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples.  
      CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and may validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors. One or more comparison techniques and/or technologies may be used for comparisons. For example, for facial recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare nodal points such as the distance between the eyes, the width of the nose, the jaw line, and the depth of the user&#39;s eye sockets. While only some types of nodal points are listed, the present invention recognizes that it is known that there are over 80 different nodal points on a human face that may be used for comparison in the present invention. Additionally, third-party devices such as facial recognition software and/or hardware systems may be used to facilitate facial recognition, such as the systems developed by Viisage, Imagis, and Identix which employ complex algorithms that facilitate both searching facial and/or ear scans and adjusting stored data based on eyewear, facial hair, and other changes in outward facial and/or ear appearance.  
      Smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples may be not being used. For example, to detect the use of fake facial features, smartcard  100  may be further configured to measure blood flow, to detect a thermal pattern associated with facial features, and/or any other secondary procedure to reduce biometric security fraud. Other security procedures for ensuring the authenticity of biometric samples may include monitoring pupil dilation for retinal and/or iris scans, pressure sensors, blinking sensors, human motion sensors, body heat sensors and/or any other procedures known in the art for authenticating the authenticity of biometric samples. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by any of the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using voice recognition. As discussed herein, voice recognition may include recognition of voice and/or speaker features such as, phonated excitation, whispered excitation, frication excitation, compression, vibration, parametric waveforms, tone, pitch, dialect, annunciation, and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these voice recognition features may be collectively referred to as a “voice print.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an audio capture device such as a microphone, telephone, cellular phone, computer, speaker and/or other hardware and/or software for acquiring the biometric data from the person such as, for example auditory scanning, recording or otherwise sensing the portion of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the voice print of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a voice print, when a user recites, for example, a pass phrase or audible PIN. Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the voice print and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the voice print and compare it against a digitized voice print stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The voice print information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      One or more comparison techniques and/or technologies may be used for comparisons. For example, for voice recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the voice print by comparing voice print waveforms in the time domain, by comparing energy content in the voice prints across the frequency domain, by the use of stochastic models and/or template models, and/or by any other voice recognition method known in the art. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as voice recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate voice print comparisons, such as, for example SAFLINK and Voice Security Systems.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a recorded voice, system  2202  may be further configured to detect audio noise associated with an electronic device and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using signature recognition. As discussed herein, signature recognition may include recognition of the shape, speed, stroke, stylus pressure, timing information, character height and width and/or other signature information and/or any portion thereof during the act of signing. As discussed herein, these signature recognition features may be collectively referred to as a “signature scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an LCD screen, digitizing tablet and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates digitization of biometric data from the person such as, for example signature scanning, recording or otherwise sensing the signature of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the signature scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a signature scan, when a user signs, for example, his name or a specified word or phrase. Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the signature scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the signature scan and compare it against a digitized signature scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The signature scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for voice recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the features of a signature scan by comparing graphs, charts, and or other data relating to shape, speed, stroke, stylus pressure, timing information, character height and width and/or by any other signature recognition data. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as signature recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate signature scan comparisons, such as, for example CyberSIGN, LCI Computer Group, and Xenetek.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false signature device, system  2202  may be further configured to detect a thermal pattern associated with a human hand and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using vascular pattern recognition. As discussed herein, vascular pattern may include recognition of structures, depths, and other biometric reference points of arterial tissues, vein tissues, capillary tissues, epithelial tissues, connective tissues, muscle tissues, nervous and/or other inner tissues and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these vascular pattern features may be collectively referred to as a “vascular scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an optical scanner, x-ray, ultrasound, computed topography, thermal scanner and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a vascular pattern of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the vascular scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a vascular scan, when a user places his hand in front of an optical scanner. Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the vascular scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the vascular scan based on biometric reference points and compare it against a digitized vascular scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The vascular scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for vascular pattern recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the vascular scan by comparing biometric reference points, vascular coordinates, vascular and/or tissue lengths, widths and depths; blood pressure including waveforms, dicrotic notches, diastolic pressure, systolic pressure, anacrotic notches and pulse pressure, and/or any other characteristic of vascular and/or tissue patterns. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as vascular pattern recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate vascular scan comparisons, such as, for example VEID International, Identica and ABT Advanced Biometric Technologies.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false vascular patterns, system  2202  may be further configured to detect a thermal pattern associated with vascular patterns and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using DNA biometrics. As discussed herein, DNA biometrics may include recognition of structures, gene sequences, and other genetic characteristics of skin tissue, hair tissue, and/or any other human tissue and/or any portion thereof containing genetic information. As discussed herein, these genetic features may be collectively referred to as a “DNA scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an infrared optical sensor, a chemical sensor and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a DNA scan of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the DNA scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a DNA scan, when a user submits genetic material to sensor  2204 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the DNA scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the DNA scan based on genetic information reference points and compare it against a digitized DNA scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The DNA scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for DNA recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the DNA scan by comparing nucleotides, code sequences, regulatory regions, initiation and stop codons, exon/intron borders, and/or any other characteristics of DNA. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as DNA recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate DNA scan comparisons, such as, for example Applied DNA Sciences.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use false DNA, system  2202  may be further configured to take a DNA sample directly off a user and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using hand geometry biometrics. As discussed herein, hand geometry biometrics may include recognition of hand geometry parameters, such as, for example, hand shape, finger length, finger thickness, finger curvature and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these hand geometry features may be collectively referred to as a “hand geometry scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an infrared optical sensor, a three-dimensional imaging system and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a hand geometry scan of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the hand geometry scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a hand geometry scan, when a user places his hand in front of an optical scanner. Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the hand geometry scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the hand geometry scan based on hand geometry parameters and compare it against a digitized hand geometry scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The hand geometry scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for hand geometry recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare hand shape, finger length, finger thickness, finger curvature and/or any other of the 90 different hand geometry parameters known in the art. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as hand geometry recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate hand geometry scan comparisons, such as, for example IR Recognition Services and Human Recognition Services.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of false hands, system  2202  may be further configured to measure blood flow, to detect body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using auditory emissions biometrics. As discussed herein, auditory emissions biometrics may include emissions that an ear generates when stimulated by sound, such as vibrations and reverberated sound waves and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these auditory emissions features may be collectively referred to as an “auditory emissions scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an infrared optical sensor, an auditory sensor, an auditory generator and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates the capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example sound generating, scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing an auditory emissions scan of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the auditory emissions scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture an auditory emissions scan, when a user hears an auditory stimulant and the user&#39;s auditory emissions may be detected by biometric sensor  2204 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the auditory emissions scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the auditory emissions scan based on emissions waveforms and compare it against a digitized auditory emissions scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The auditory emissions scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for auditory emissions recognition, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare emissions difference in frequency, wavelength, and/or other characteristics between the transmitted and reverberated sound waves. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as auditory emissions recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate auditory emissions scan comparisons, such as, for example those developed by the University of Southampton.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of false auditory emissions scans, system  2202  may be further configured to detect electronic noise associated with a device producing electronic auditory emissions and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using olfactory biometrics. As discussed herein, olfactory biometrics may include odorants that a body generates when odor evaporates from and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these odorants may be collectively referred to as a “smellprint.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an electronic sensor, a chemical sensor, and/or an electronic or chemical sensor configured as an array of chemical sensors, wherein each chemical sensor may detect a specific odorants, or smell. In another embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  may be configured as a gas chromatograph, spectrometer, conductivity sensor, piezoelectric sensor and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates the capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example, scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a smellprint of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the smellprint of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a smellprint, when a user stands within at least two feet of sensor  2204 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the smellprint and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the smellprint and compare it against a digitized smellprint stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The smellprint information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for smellprints, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the difference in molecular structures, chemical compounds, temperature, mass differences, pressure, force, and odorants by using statistical, ANN and neuromorphic techniques. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as smellprint recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate smellprint comparisons, such as, for example those developed by Company Mastiff Electronic Systems.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false odorant, system  2202  may be further configured to detect man-made smells, abnormal odorants, body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using keystroke/typing recognition biometrics. As discussed herein, keystroke/typing recognition biometrics may include recognition of the duration of keystrokes, latencies between keystrokes, inter-keystroke times, typing error frequency, force keystrokes and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these features may be collectively referred to as a “keystroke scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with an electronic sensor, an optical sensor, a keyboard, and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates the capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example, scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a keystroke scan of cardmember. A keyboard may include any type of input device, such as, for example, flat electronic pads with labels as keys, touch screens, and/or any other types of input devices.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the keystroke scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a keystroke scan, when a user types, for example, a PIN or pass phrase into a keyboard configured with sensor  2204 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the keystroke scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the keystroke scan based on keystroke characteristics and compare the scan against a digitized keystroke scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The keystroke scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for keystroke scans, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the behavioral, temporal and physical characteristics associated with keystrokes. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as keystroke scan recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate keystroke scan comparisons, such as, for example those developed by BioPassword® by BioNet Systems, LLC.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false keystroke, system  2202  may be further configured to detect body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using iris scan biometrics. As discussed herein, iris scan biometrics may include recognition of characteristics of the colored tissues surrounding the pupil, such as the rings, furrows and freckles and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these characteristics may be collectively referred to as an “iris scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with a video camera, an optical scanner, a digital camera, a charge coupled device and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates the capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example, scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing an iris scan of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the iris scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture an iris scan, when a user uses sensor  2204  to scan his iris while he may be up to five feet away from sensor  2204 . Sensor  2204  may scan the user&#39;s iris through contacts, sunglasses, and/or any other type of eye glasses. Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the iris scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the iris scan based on iris characteristics and compare the scan against a digitized iris scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The iris scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for iris scans, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the surface patterns of the iris by localizing the boundaries and the eyelid contours of the iris and creating a phase code for the texture sequence in the iris. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as iris scan recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate iris scan comparisons, such as, for example those developed by Iridian, LG Electronics and BioCom.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false iris, system  2202  may be further configured to vary the light shone into the eye to watch for pupil dilation, to detect body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, biometric security system  2202  may be configured for facilitating biometric security using retinal scanning biometrics. As discussed herein, retinal scanning biometrics may include recognition of characteristics of the reflected retinal pattern of the eye, such as the location, structure, size, and shape of blood vessels and/or any portion thereof. As discussed herein, these characteristics may be collectively referred to as a “retinal scan.” Biometric security system  2202  may include a biometric sensor  2204  which may be configured with low-intensity light source, such as an infrared source, an optical coupler and/or other hardware and/or software that facilitates the capture of biometric data from the person such as, for example, scanning, detecting or otherwise sensing a retinal scan of cardmember.  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard  100  incorporating biometric security system  2202 , system  2202  may capture the iris scan of the cardmember to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. In one embodiment, biometric sensor  2204  of the security system  2202  may capture a retinal scan, when a sensor  2204  shines a light source into the user&#39;s retina and detects the reflected retina pattern. Sensor  2204  may detect a user&#39;s retinal pattern when the user may be up to five feet away from sensor  2204 . Biometric sensor  2204  may be in communication with IC  110  such that sensor  2204  receives the retinal scan and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 . A power source (e.g., VCC contact  106 ( a )) may be in communication with biometric sensor  2204  and IC  110  to provide the desired power for operation of the biometric security system components.  
      Smartcard  100  may digitize the retinal scan based on retinal characteristics and compare the scan against a digitized iris scan stored in a database (e.g., security EEPROM  212 ) included on smartcard  100 . The retinal scan information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard reader  2500 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. CPU  202  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric and validate the information. Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by one or more third-party security vendors.  
      For example, for retinal scans, CPU  202  may utilize an existing database to compare the blood vessel patterns of the retina by comparing stored and detected retinal patterns. This transfer of information may include use of encryption, decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard  100  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples. Further, the present invention anticipates use of one or more third-party devices such as retinal scan recognition software and/or hardware systems to facilitate keystroke scan comparisons, such as, for example those developed by EyeKey and Retinal Technologies.  
      Smartcard  100  and/or any other third-party security vendor system used in connection with smartcard  100  may additionally be configured with secondary security procedures to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, to detect the use of a false retina, system  2202  may be further configured to vary the light shone into the eye to watch for pupil dilation, to detect body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to thwart biometric security fraud. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication by the methods described herein.  
      Additionally, smartcard  100  may be configured with a security verification mechanism to verify whether the sampled biometric and/or related information is staying on smartcard  100  and/or reader  2500 . The security verification mechanism may be used to safeguard biometric information from getting lost and/or compromised on the host system.  
      In an additional or alternate embodiment, smartcard reader  2500  may include one or more security system, wherein the security system incorporates one or more biometric system. As shown in  FIG. 25 , smartcard reader  2500  includes a biometric security system  2502  configured for facilitating biometric security using a biometric sample. Biometric security system  2502  may include a biometric sensor  2504  which may be configured with a sensor, video camera, digital camera, optical scanner, light source and/or other hardware and/or software for acquiring biometric data form the person such as, for example, optical scanning, chemical sensing, or otherwise detecting the portion of cardmember. Biometric sensor  2504  may be in communication with a sensor interface-driver  2506  such that sensor interface  2506  receives biometric information and transmits a signal to CPU  202  to facilitate activating the operation of smartcard  100 .  
      In one exemplary application of smartcard reader  2500  including biometric security system  2502 , the user may submit a biometric sample to the biometric sensor to initiate the mutual authentication process between smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500 , and/or to provide verification of the user&#39;s identity. Smartcard reader  2500  may digitize the sample and compare it against a digitized biometric sample stored in a database (e.g., database  2510 ) included on smartcard reader  2500 . The biometric sample information may additionally be compared with information from one or more third-party databases communicating with smartcard  100  through any communication software and/or hardware, including for example, smartcard  100 , a USB connection, a wireless connection, a computer, a network and/or any other means for communicating. The transfer of information may include use of encryption decryption, security keys, digital certificates and/or other security devices to confirm the security of the sample. Smartcard reader  2500  may additionally communicate with third-party databases to facilitate a comparison between smartcard  100  identifier and other smartcard identifiers stored with the biometric samples.  
      A smartcard reader CPU  2514  may facilitate the local comparison to authenticate the biometric sample and may validate the information. Reader CPU  2514  may be configured in a manner similar to that of CPU  202 . Any of the embodiments may alternatively or additionally include remote comparisons performed or controlled by third-party security vendors in any way known in the art for comparing biometric data.  
      Smartcard reader  2500  may also be configured with secondary security procedures biometric to confirm that fake biometric samples are not being used. For example, smartcard reader  2500  may be further configured to measure blood flow, body heat and/or any other secondary procedure to reduce biometric security fraud. Other security procedures for ensuring the authenticity of biometric samples may include monitoring pupil dilation for retinal and/or iris scans, pressure sensors, blinking sensors, human motion sensors, and/or any other procedures known in the art for authenticating the authenticity of biometric samples. After verifying the biometric information, smartcard  100  and smartcard reader  2500  may begin authentication, and the transaction may proceed accordingly.  
      Additionally, CPU  2514  may be configured with a security verification mechanism to verify whether the sampled biometric and/or related information is staying on smartcard  100  and/or reader  2500 . The security verification mechanism may be used to safeguard biometric information from getting lost and/or compromised on the host system.  
      While the biometric safeguard mechanisms describe smartcard  100  and/or smartcard reader  2500  configured with a biometric safeguard mechanism, any part of system  2400  may be equipped with a biometric safeguard system. For example, the invention contemplates receiving a biometric sample only at the reader, only at the smartcard, at both the smartcard and the reader, or at any other combination of location or device. As such, any scanner or database discussed herein may be located within or associated with another device. For example, the smartcard may scan a user biometric, but the database used for comparison may be located within the reader or merchant server. In other embodiments, the biometric security device may be located away from the point of sale device and/or provide other functions. For example, the biometric security device may be located near the item to be purchased or located in any other location within or outside of the merchant. In one embodiment, the biometric security device may be located outside of a jewelry display to allow a user to not only start the authentication process before check-out, but also to allow access to the product within the display case. In this regard, the biometric security device may communicate the information to the point of sale device so access point  15  may verify that the person that entered the jewelry box is the same person that is now buying the jewelry. In another embodiment, any portion of system  2400  may be configured with a biometric security device. The biometric security device may be attached and/or free-standing. Biometric security devices may be configured for local and/or third-party operation. For example, the present invention contemplates the use of third-party fingerprint scanning and security devices such as those made by Interlink Electronics, Keytronic, Identix Biotouch, BIOmetricID, on Click, and/or other third-party vendors.  
      In yet another embodiment, the database used for comparison may contain terrorist and/or criminal information. As used herein, terrorists and/or criminals may include terrorists, felons, criminals, convicts, indicted persons, insurgents, revolutionaries and/or other offenders. The information may include biometric information, personal information as described herein, arrest records, aliases used, country of residence, affiliations with gangs and terrorist groups, and/or any other terrorist and/or criminal information.  
      As an example of a secondary security procedure in accordance with the present invention, the biometric sensor  2204 ,  2504  may be configured to allow a finite number of scans. For example, biometric sensor  2204 ,  2504  may be configured to only accept data from a single scan. As a result, biometric sensor  2204 ,  2504  may turn off or deactivate smartcard  100  and/or smartcard reader  2500  if more than one scan may be needed to obtain a biometric sample. Biometric sensor  2204 ,  2504  may also be configured to accept a preset limit of scans. For example, biometric sensor  2204 ,  2504  may receive three invalid biometric samples before it turns off and/or deactivates smartcard  100  and/or smartcard reader  2500 .  
      The sensor or any other part of system  2400  may also activate upon sensing a particular type or group of biometric samples. The activation may include sending a signal, blinking, audible sound, visual display, beeping, providing an olfactory signal, providing a physical touch signal, and providing a temperature signal to said user and/or the like. For example, if the sensor detects information from a gold card member, the system may display a special offer on access point  15 . If the sensor detects a repeat customer, the sensor may signal or notify a manager to approach the customer and thank them for their repeat business. In another embodiment, the system may send a signal to a primary account holder or any other person or device to notify them that the smartcard is being used or that a condition or rule is being violated (e.g., charge above $1000).  
      Any of the biometric security systems described herein may additionally be configured with a fraud protection log. That is, a biometric security system, such as biometric security system  2204 ,  2504  may be configured to log all biometric samples submitted on smartcard  100  and/or smartcard reader  2500  and store the log information on databases on and/or communicating with system  2204 ,  2504 . If a new and/or different biometric sample is submitted that differs from the log data, biometric security system  2204 ,  2504  may employ a security procedure such as deactivation, warning authorities, requesting a secondary scan, and/or any other security procedure.  
      Biometric security system  2204 ,  2504  and/or the biometric security system configured with system  2400  may also be configured to obtain a plurality of biometric samples for verification and/or other security purposes. For example, after biometric security system  2202 , receives a first biometric sample (e.g., scans one finger) it may be configured to receive a second biometric sample (e.g., scans a second finger). The first and second biometric samples may be compared with stored biometric samples by any of the methods disclosed herein. The second biometric sample may be the only sample compared with stored biometric samples if the first sample may be unreadable or inadequate.  
      In yet another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, smartcard  100  may be equipped with a biometric safeguard mechanism. For example, in one exemplary application of smartcard  100 , smartcard  100  may use biometric security system  2202  to authorize a transaction that violates an established rule, such as, for example, a purchase exceeding an established per purchase spending limit, a purchase exceeding a preset number of transactions, any portion of a purchase and/or transaction involving non-monetary funds (e.g., paying a portion of the transaction with loyalty points, coupons, airline miles, etc.) and/or any other purchase and/or transaction exceeding a preset or established limit. Cardmember, a third-party issuer system a third-party financial system, a company and/or any other entity or system may establish the preset limits. The limits may be used to prevent fraud, theft, overdrafts, and/or other non-desirable situations associated with financial and non-financial accounts. For example, if smartcard  100  is stolen and the thief tries to make a large purchase with the card, the biometric safeguard mechanism may prevent the purchase until cardmember&#39;s identity is verified by biometric means.  
      For example, smartcard  100  may activate biometric security system  2202  to notify a user a user who is attempting to make a large purchase that the user must provide a biometric sample to verify the user&#39;s identity. By notifying, smartcard  100  may be configured to provide an audible signal, visual signal, optical signal, mechanical signal, vibration, blinking, signaling, beeping, providing an olfactory signal, providing a physical touch signal, and providing a temperature signal to said user and/or provide any other notification to a cardmember. Accordingly, cardmember may provide such verification by submitting a biometric sample, for example placing his finger over biometric sensor  2204  and/or any other biometric security devices used in association with smartcard  100 . Biometric sensor  2204  may then digitize the biometric sample (e.g., fingerprint) and use the digitized sample for verification by any of the methods described herein. Once cardmember&#39;s identity and/or smartcard  100  smartcard chip identifier may be verified, smartcard  100  may provide a transaction authorized signal to CPU  202  (and/or to IC  110 ) for forwarding to smartcard reader  2500 . Smartcard reader  2500  may then provide the transaction authorized signal to Access point  15  in a similar manner as is done with conventional PIN driven systems and Access point  15  may process the transaction under the merchant&#39;s business as usual standard. If smartcard  100  has been stolen, then cardmember&#39;s identity may not be verified and the transaction may be cancelled. Additionally, one or more further security procedures may be triggered, such as, for example, smartcard  100  may deactivate, smartcard  100  may send a notification to a security vendor, smartcard  100  may be confiscated by the merchant and/or any other security procedures may be used.  
      In another exemplary embodiment, smartcard reader  2500  may be equipped with a biometric safeguard mechanism. For example, in one exemplary application of smartcard reader  2500 , smartcard reader  2500  may use biometric security system  2502  to authorize a transaction that violates an established rule, such as, for example, a purchase exceeding an established per purchase spending limit, a purchase exceeding a preset number of transactions and/or any other purchase exceeding a preset or established limit. Cardmember, a third-party issuer system a third-party financial system, a company and/or any other entity or system may establish the preset limits. The limits may be used to prevent fraud, theft, overdrafts, and/or other non-desirable situations associated with financial and non-financial accounts. For example, if smartcard  100  is stolen and the thief tries to make a large purchase with the card, the biometric safeguard mechanism may prevent the purchase until cardmember&#39;s identity is verified by biometric means.  
      In one example, where cardmember is using a company-issued smartcard  100 , smartcard  100  may the have a preset limit of transactions that may be completed before biometric verification is required. If the user exceeds the transaction limit, smartcard reader  2500  may be configured to scan a biometric sample in order to verify the user&#39;s identity. Accordingly, the user may provide such verification by submitting a biometric sample, for example submitting a retinal scan to biometric sensor  2504 . Smartcard reader  2500  may then digitize the biometric sample (e.g., retinal pattern) and use the digitized sample for verification by any of the methods described herein. Once cardmember&#39;s identity and/or smartcard  100  smartcard chip identifier may be verified, smartcard reader  2500  may receive a transaction authorized signal from a security vendor authorized to give such a signal. Smartcard reader  2500  may then provide the transaction authorized signal to Access point  15  in similar manner as is done with conventional PIN driven systems and Access point  15  may process the transaction under the merchant&#39;s business as usual standard.  
      While the biometric safeguard mechanisms described herein use fingerprint scanning and retinal scanning for biometric sample verification for exemplification, any biometric sample may be submitted for verification, authorization and/or any other safeguard purpose. For example the present invention contemplates the use of voice recognition, facial and/or ear recognition, signature recognition, vascular patterns, DNA sampling, hand geometry, auditory emissions recognition, olfactory recognition, keystroke/typing recognition, iris scans, and/or any other biometric known in the art.  
      In another exemplary embodiment of the present invention, one or more biometric samples may be used to sign and/or encrypt information. For example, smartcard  100  and/or reader  2500  may be configured to receive a biometric sample from a user. The sample may then be digitized and used, for example, as a variable in an encryption calculation to secure data. If the user wants to retrieve the encrypted data, the user must submit the relevant biometric sample and have it authenticated by any of the methods described herein. Once the biometric sample is authenticated, the data will be decrypted for access.  
      Similarly, a biometric may be used as both a private key and a public key for encryption purposes. In one exemplary embodiment, an entity may use stored biometric sample information to encrypt data in a manner similar to a public key. The data may then be configured such that it is only accessible by a real biometric sample, for example, by a user proffering a fingerprint sample at a reader. Upon verification of the real biometric sample, the data may be decrypted and/or retrieved.  
      While the exemplary embodiments describe herein make reference to identification, authentication and authorization processes, it should be understood that the biometric security systems and methods described herein may be used for identification purposes only, authentication purposes only, and/or authorization purposes only. Similarly, any combination of identification, authentication and/or authorization systems and methods may be used in conjunction with the present invention.  
      The preceding detailed description of exemplary embodiments of the invention makes reference to the accompanying drawings, which show the exemplary embodiment by way of illustration. While these exemplary embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention, it should be understood that other embodiments may be realized and that logical and mechanical changes may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. For example, the steps recited in any of the method or process claims may be executed in any order and are not limited to the order presented. Further, the present invention may be practiced using one or more servers, as necessary. Thus, the preceding detailed description is presented for purposes of illustration only and not of limitation, and the scope of the invention is defined by the preceding description, and with respect to the attached claims.  
      Benefits, other advantages, and solutions to problems have been described above with regard to specific embodiments. However, the benefits, advantages, solutions to problems, and any element(s) that may cause any benefit, advantage, or solution to occur or become more pronounced are not to be construed as critical, required, or essential features or elements of any or all the claims. As used herein, the terms “comprises,” “comprising,” or any other variations thereof, are intended to cover a nonexclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Further, no element described herein is required for the practice of the invention unless expressly described as “essential” or “critical.”