Patent Publication Number: US-2017352048-A1

Title: Methods and systems for conducting surveys and processing survey data to generate a collective outcome

Description:
RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 13/862,326 filed on Apr. 12, 2013 and entitled “METHODS AND SYSTEMS FOR CONDUCTING SURVEYS AND PROCESSING SURVEY DATA TO GENERATE A COLLECTIVE OUTCOME”, which is a continuation-in-part of International Application No. PCT/IB2012/002479 filed on Oct. 13, 2012 and entitled “A METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR CONDUCTING ONE OR MORE SURVEYS”, which claims the benefit of U.S. provisional application No. 61/547,196 filed on Oct. 14, 2011 and entitled “INFLUENTS ALGORITHM: A METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR MANAGING A SURVEY” and U.S. provisional application No. 61/596,243 filed on Feb. 8, 2012 and entitled “INFLUENTS ALGORITHM: A METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR MANAGING A SURVEY”, the entire teachings and disclosure of which are incorporated by reference thereto. 
    
    
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     The technology described herein relates to methods and systems for conducting surveys and processing survey data or results. Particular embodiments provide for machine-implemented methods and automated systems for conducting surveys and processing survey data or results. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Survey or polling methods may be used to identify solutions to a simple or complex problem or query where a group of participants is involved. Potential solutions to a problem may be determined by asking survey participants to provide their responses to one or more questions, and then analyzing the responses provided by the participants. 
     In some methods, if participants are asked to choose from a plurality of responses, the response that is chosen the most often may be selected as the basis for the final solution or outcome. This may cause an unequal satisfaction distribution between the participants who chose such response and the participants that chose other responses, resulting in a solution that lacks the full support of all participants. 
     Since the results for a survey are generally considered independently of other surveys, it may so happen that the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) experienced by a participant in one survey may be repeated for the outcomes of subsequent surveys. Thus, in methods that give preference to responses chosen by the majority of participants, a participant who tends to choose responses preferred by the minority of participants may be generally left dissatisfied with the outcomes chosen for the surveys. 
     In addition, in some cases, particularly where the survey is complex and a large number of different responses may be provided by the participants, it may be difficult to analyze the survey results to determine a final outcome. It may be difficult in some cases to determine an outcome for which the participants&#39; responses are given equal consideration. 
     There is a need for methods and systems for conducting a survey and determining a survey outcome which address the aforementioned problems. 
     The foregoing examples of the related art and limitations related thereto are intended to be illustrative and not exclusive. Other limitations of the related art will become apparent to those of skill in the art upon a reading of the specification and a study of the drawings. 
     SUMMARY 
     The technology described herein has a number of aspects. These include, without limitation: computer systems for conducting surveys, computer systems for analysing survey data or results, computer-implemented tools for processing survey responses to yield information regarding collective satisfaction and dissonance levels for a range of outcomes, methods for conducting surveys, methods for analysing survey data or results, and methods and systems for determining a collective outcome or solution to a problem for a group of participants based on survey data or results. 
     Certain aspects relate to methods and systems for defining surveys and conducting surveys, and methods and systems for analysing survey data or results. The systems may be implemented by one or more computers, servers or machines. In particular embodiments, the surveys are conducted by one or more machines such as a survey-conducting server which is configured to present survey options to and receive responses from survey participants using their client devices. The survey-conducting server is in communication with the client devices by way of a data communication network (e.g. the Internet). The survey results are analysed by one or more machines such as a survey outcome-generating server having a data processor configured to process the input received from the survey participants and determine a collective outcome for the survey. The survey-conducting server and survey outcome-generating server may form part of a survey and collective decision-making system. 
     The surveys are conducted to evaluate the desirability of potential outcomes. In particular embodiments, each outcome is defined by a particular combination of options. Each option may be associated with an issue (e.g. category), a constraint, and/or a value. The survey is conducted by the survey-conducting server delivering instructions to the survey participant&#39;s client device that cause a graphical user interface (GUI) control to be displayed on the client device to allow the survey participant to provide survey input. The GUI control may display a list of issues and a set of options corresponding to each issue. In particular embodiments, the GUI control prompts the survey participant to rank the displayed issues and options to indicate the importance of that issue and desirability of that option to the participant. The survey participant ranks the issues and options using the GUI control, and the ranking is received by the survey-conducting server. The survey-conducting server performs these survey-conducting steps for a number of survey participants who are communicating using the GUI controls on their client devices, and aggregates the responses received from the participants. 
     Each survey participant&#39;s ranking is used by the survey and collective decision-making system to develop an influent function associated with the participant. The influent function is indicative of how the participant would like the problem to be solved, and counts as the participant&#39;s vote or ballot toward a collective outcome. The influent functions associated with the participants are provided as input to the survey outcome-generating server. A data processor of the survey outcome-generating server processes the influent functions to generate a collective influent function for the survey. The collective influent function may be generated in accordance with one or more algorithms applied by the survey outcome-generating server. For example, in particular embodiments, the survey outcome-generating server generates satisfaction scores and dissonance scores associated with each outcome based on the participants&#39; influent functions and then uses these scores to determine a collective influent function. The data processor of the survey outcome-generating server may then apply the collective influent function to the potential outcomes to score or rank the potential outcomes. The survey outcome-generating server may store, print, display, transmit, and/or otherwise output the results (including for example the strength scores of the potential outcomes, collective satisfaction score, collective dissonance score, and individual satisfaction scores). In certain embodiments, the results may be displayed in the form of a graph (e.g. a graph for each potential outcome displaying information such as satisfaction levels, dissonance and a strength score for the outcome based on the application of the collective influent function). 
     Particular aspects relate to a method which evaluates the satisfaction level of each survey participant for a potential outcome based on the participant&#39;s response (e.g. the participant&#39;s influent function), and assesses differences in the satisfaction levels among the survey participants to determine a dissonance level. This evaluation may be repeated for each potential outcome. Each potential outcome may then be ranked based on the satisfaction levels and dissonance levels among the participants. In particular embodiments, the method may take into account the dissatisfaction that would result from an unfair distribution of satisfaction for a given outcome. The method aims to provide the highest ranking to the outcome that would create the greatest satisfaction among the participants while minimizing dissonance. 
     Another aspect provides for a method that considers satisfaction and dissonance experienced by a participant in a previous survey in determining the outcome in a current survey. 
     Other aspects provide systems for implementing the above-described methods. For example in particular embodiments, a survey conducting and collective decision-making system is provided, having survey-conducting means for presenting options to client devices and receiving a response. The survey-conducting means delivers instructions to a client device that cause a GUI control to be displayed on the client device. The GUI may display a list of issues and a set of options corresponding to each issue. In particular embodiments, through the GUI control the survey-conducting means prompts a survey participant to rank the issues and options to indicate the importance of that issue and desirability of that option to the participant. The survey-conducting means performs these survey-conducting steps for a number of survey participants who are communicating using the GUI controls on their client devices, and aggregates the responses received from the participants. 
     The system may also have an influent function development means to turn each survey participant&#39;s ranking into an influent function associated with a survey participant. As noted above, the influent function is indicative of how the participant would like the problem to be solved. The system may have various results-analyzing means for processing the influent functions associated with the participants to determine a collective outcome for the survey. Results-analyzing means may include, for example: means for generating individual satisfaction scores associated with each participant for each potential outcome, means for generating a collective satisfaction score for each potential outcome, means for generating a dissonance score for each potential outcome, and means for determining a collective influent function. Means for determining a collective influent function may generate a collective influent function based on the satisfaction scores and dissonance scores. The system may also include means for applying the collective influent function to the potential outcomes to score or rank the potential outcomes. The system may have results-outputting means for storing, printing, displaying, transmitting, and/or otherwise outputting the results. In some embodiments, such survey-conducting means, results-analyzing means and results-outputting means may be implemented by software instructions stored in a program memory and executable by a data processor. The data processor executes the software instructions to carry out the means described. 
     In addition to the exemplary aspects and embodiments described above, further aspects and embodiments will become apparent by reference to the drawings and by study of the following detailed descriptions. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS 
       In drawings which illustrate non-limiting embodiments: 
         FIG. 1  illustrates a system according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 2  illustrates a particular implementation of components of the  FIG. 1  system according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 3  is a flowchart of a method in accordance with one embodiment; 
         FIG. 4  is a partial screen shot of a user interface showing a ranking of issues and options for an influent function; 
         FIG. 5  is a partial screen shot of a user interface showing a ranking of issues and options, based on a criterion, for an influent function; 
         FIG. 6  is a partial screen shot of a user interface showing the modification of an influent function by varying a rank or weight associated with an option; 
         FIG. 7  is a partial screen shot of a user interface showing the modification of an influent function by varying a rank or weight associated with an issue; 
         FIG. 8  is a partial screen shot of a user interface showing the merging of influent functions; and 
         FIG. 9  is a block diagram of a system in accordance with one embodiment. 
         FIGS. 10A, 10B, 10C and 10D  show support distributions for different outcomes for a survey. 
         FIG. 11  is a screenshot of an exemplary “Topics” or issue selection page for a survey. 
         FIG. 12  is a screenshot of an exemplary page for ranking the options for a particular issue in a survey. 
         FIG. 13  is a screenshot of an exemplary page for weighing the issues in a survey. 
         FIG. 14A  is a screenshot of an exemplary page summarizing details for an individual&#39;s top choices selected from the potential outcomes. 
         FIG. 14B  is a screenshot of an exemplary page summarizing details for the potential outcome having the highest strength score. 
         FIG. 15  is a screenshot of an exemplary survey administrator user interface for setting up a survey. 
         FIG. 16  is a screenshot of an exemplary survey administrator user interface for setting up outcome constraints for a survey. 
         FIG. 17  illustrates an application programming interface for a system in accordance with an embodiment described herein. 
         FIG. 18A  is a graph which illustrates the relationship between strength score ε and dissonance score DS. 
         FIG. 18B  is a graph which illustrates the relationship between strength score ε and relative weight M. 
         FIG. 18C  is a graph which illustrates the relationship between strength score ε and average support score I. 
     
    
    
     DESCRIPTION 
     Throughout the following description, details are set forth in order to provide a more thorough understanding to persons skilled in the art. However, well known elements may not have been shown or described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the disclosure. Accordingly, the description and drawings are to be regarded in an illustrative, rather than a restrictive, sense. 
     The technology described herein relates to a survey and collective decision-making system which prompts for and receives survey input and generates a collective decision for a query based on the survey input.  FIG. 1  shows a survey and collective decision-making system  100  according to a particular embodiment. System  100  includes a survey conductor  102  and a collective outcome generator  104  which are configurable to be in communication with one another. Survey conductor  102  and collective outcome generator  104  (or various aspects of each) may be implemented using one or more computers, servers, processing units, data processors, CPUs, microprocessors and/or any other machine or component suitably configured to perform one or more of the methods described herein. As will be appreciated by one of skill in the art, it is not necessary that survey conductor  102  and collective outcome generator  104  are provided by separate servers or machines as shown in  FIG. 1 ; in other configurations both survey conductor  102  and collective outcome generator  104  may be provided on the same server or machine and share a common processing unit. In some configurations the functions described herein may be distributed differently among the survey conductor  102  and collective outcome generator  104  than as indicated in  FIG. 1  or explained herein. 
     Survey conductor  102  may be provided as a server, a running instance of a computer program which is configured to prompt for and receive input from users of the system  100 . As shown in  FIG. 1  such users may include survey administrators  103  and survey participants  105 A,  105 B (individually and collectively,  105 ). Survey administrator  103  may provide input to survey conductor  102  by way of an administrative survey interface  106  accessible through and displayed on a client device  107 A. Similarly, survey participants  105  may provide input to survey conductor  102  by way of a participant survey interface  108  accessible through and displayed on their client devices  107 B,  107 C. 
     Survey conductor  102  may be configurable to be in communication with client devices  107 A,  107 B and  107 C (individually and collectively,  107 ). Client devices  107  may communicate with survey conductor  102  by way of a data communication network, such as the Internet, for example. In some embodiments, client devices  107  may also communicate with one another by way of a data communication network, such as in the social networking implementation described below with reference to  FIG. 2 . Client devices  107  may include personal computers, laptops, tablets, smart phones, mobile devices, or any other device capable of connecting to the data communication network, such as the Internet, for communicating with survey conductor  102  and/or with another (e.g. through a server such as survey conductor  102 ). 
     Once survey administrator  103  has logged into the system, he may use the administrative survey interface  106  to define a query or problem to be solved. He may also use the interface  106  to define a list of possible responses to the query or problem. In particular embodiments, the list of possible responses is organized in the form of issues  125  (categories) and corresponding options  126  for each issue  125 . Survey administrator  103  may also define constraints  127  for the available options or outcomes (e.g. logical constraints or cost constraints). The defined issues  125 , options  126  and constraints  127  for the survey may be stored in a survey definitions database  128  that is stored on survey conductor  102  as illustrated in  FIG. 1  or otherwise accessible to survey conductor  102 . 
     Once the survey has been defined by survey administrator  103 , the query and the possible responses are presented by the survey conductor  102  to each of the survey participants  105  by way of participant survey interface  108 . Survey participants  105  are asked to indicate how they would prefer the query or problem to be solved. Where the possible responses are organized by issues  125  and options  126 , survey participant  105  may be asked to submit a ranking  125 A for each issue  125  and a ranking  126 A for each option  126 . Ranking  125 A is indicative of the degree of importance that the survey participant  105  accords to issue  125  and ranking  126 A is indicative of the degree of support that the survey participant  105  has for option  126 . Rankings  125 A,  126 A suggest how the participant  105  would like the survey query or problem to be solved. Rankings  125 A,  126 A are submitted by way of participant survey interface  108  to survey conductor  102 . Survey conductor  102  may store each participant  105 &#39;s rankings  125 A,  126 A (for later use) in a survey results database  118  stored on survey conductor  102  or otherwise accessible to survey conductor  102 . 
     In some embodiments the survey participants may be able to choose from a number of different methods for ranking the issues and options or generating influent functions. These methods may be enabled by survey conductor  102  in some embodiments. For example, a processor  120  of survey conductor  102  may have available to it a number of software routines  124  stored in a program memory  122  which when executed generate particular rankings  125 A of issues  125  and rankings  126 A of options  126 . Such routines may include, for example, routines  124 A for ranking by values, routines  124 B for ranking by trusted advisors, and routines  124 C for merging two or more influent functions. Survey conductor  102  may also contain, or have access to, an influent functions repository  129  which stores influent functions published by survey participants. These influent functions may be made available to other survey participants for use in generating new influent functions. Methods for generating rankings and/or new influent functions are described in further detail below. 
     The responses that are provided by survey participants  105  through participant survey interface  108  may be submitted by survey conductor  102  to collective outcome generator  104  for processing. As discussed above, these responses may be in the form of rankings  125 A,  126 A of issues  125 , options  126  respectively. Such rankings determine an influent function which is indicative of the participant&#39;s satisfaction level for each outcome. The collective outcome generator  104  may iterate over a space of all potential outcomes, wherein each outcome is defined by a set of the options. For each potential outcome, the collective outcome generator  104  uses each participant&#39;s response or influent function to determine a satisfaction score associated with the survey participant for that outcome. The collective outcome generator  104  determines a collective satisfaction score for each potential outcome. The collective satisfaction score may be based on a weighted combination of all of the individual satisfaction scores of the survey participants for that outcome. The collective outcome generator  104  also determines a collective dissonance score for each potential outcome. The collective dissonance score may be a measure of the differences in the individual satisfaction scores among the survey participants for a particular outcome. 
     The collective outcome generator  104  subsequently determines a collective influent function. The collective influent function may be some weighted combination of the collective satisfaction score and collective dissonance score for each potential outcome. The resulting collective influent function is used by the collective outcome generator  104  to rank each potential outcome for the survey. The highest ranked potential outcome may be selected as a collective outcome for the survey. 
     In the illustrated embodiment of  FIG. 1 , collective outcome generator  104  has a processor  112  which is operable to call software routines  114  stored in program memory  116  accessible to processor  112 . Routines  114  may consist of, for example, a compute collective satisfaction score routine  114 A, a compute collective dissonance score routine  114 B, and a generate collective influent function routine  114 C. While not shown, other routines  114  that may be available to processor  112  of collective outcome generator  104  include, for example: an eliminate non-actionable outcomes routine which may eliminate any outcomes that do not meet the predefined constraints, a rank outcomes routine which may apply the collective influent function routine to rank each potential outcome, and various routines for using the past experiences (satisfaction levels) of survey participants in previous surveys to determine the collective influent function of a current survey (or to adjust the survey participants&#39; influent levels or weight accorded to their satisfaction scores, which in turn affects the collective influent function). As will be appreciated by one of skill in the art upon reading this specification, many other routines may be provided to processor  112  of collective outcome generator  104  that are not specifically illustrated in  FIG. 1 . One or more of the methods described herein may be performed by processor  112  executing software instructions provided by software routines  114 . 
       FIG. 2  illustrates a system  200  which is a particular implementation of survey conductor  102  and collective outcome generator  104  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100 .  FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200  is implemented in the context of an online social network, wherein each user or survey participant  105  is also a member or user of the social network. In system  200 , users  105  access and interact with a front-end survey platform  230  to view a survey and input survey responses (e.g. such as by providing rankings of issues and options as discussed above). Survey platform  230  can be considered to implement the functions of survey conductor  102  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  (including for example methods for collecting survey data; methods for ranking issues and options and generating influent functions). In the illustrated embodiment of  FIG. 2 , survey platform  230  incorporates a social networking platform  234 , one or more social networking plug-ins  238 , and user interface tools  236 . The user interface tools  236  have access to a user interface database  242  and may be used to implement the participant survey interface  108  and administrative survey interface  106  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100 . 
     In particular embodiments, the social networking platform  234  consists of the BuddyPress™ platform (a WordPress™-based social networking platform). In other embodiments, other types of social networking platforms may be incorporated into survey platform  230 . The social networking plug-ins  238  to the social networking platform  234  may include plug-ins to provide survey data on friend networks, and user profile pictures, etc. Social networking platform  234  has access to a database  240  which stores the social networking data such as user profiles, friend relationships, comments entered by users, etc. In particular embodiments of a survey conducting and collective decision-making system, social networking platform  234  provides the means for users  105  to communicate information with one another in order to accomplish various objectives of the system such as assisting one another to make decisions as to the responses and generating rankings and influent functions. 
     The use of a social networking platform  234  in  FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200  may provide a number of advantages directed toward facilitating informed and collective decision-making by, for example, allowing users  105  to share their responses, rankings or influent functions or comments related thereto with other users  105 , and providing a user  105  with the recommendations of other users  105  (which may be particularly helpful when voting/ranking by value or by trusted advisor). A user  105  may also use the social networking site to add other users  105  to his trusted network of advisors to help him decide on a response. 
       FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200  also includes a survey results analyzer  232 . Survey results analyzer  232  can be considered to implement the functions of collective outcome generator  104  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  (including for example methods for calculating satisfaction scores, dissonance scores and a collective influent function). In the illustrated embodiment of  FIG. 2 , survey results analyzer  232  includes a collective outcome generator engine  248 , a database  250  for storing the computational results generated by engine  248 , and a client application programming interface (API)  244  and bindings  246  for enabling communication of data and instructions between the survey results analyzer  232  and the survey platform  230 . 
       FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  and  FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200  or portions thereof may be configured to implement one or more of the methods described herein. The methods are described in more detail below. 
     During a survey conducted by the survey and collective decision-making system, each survey participant is invited to submit a response to the query which is indicative of his or her preferred decision or outcome. As noted above, in particular embodiments, possible responses are presented to the participant in the form of issues (or categories) and a corresponding set of options for each issue. A participant is asked to rank each issue and option to indicate how important each issue is and how desirable each option is to the participant in the determination of the collective outcome. Such ranking of issues and options constitutes, or is used as the basis for determining, an “influent function” associated with the participant. A participant&#39;s influent function can be applied to each potential outcome to calculate a satisfaction score for the outcome. The satisfaction score reflects the participant&#39;s satisfaction level with respect to that outcome. The survey participants&#39; influent functions or satisfaction scores can also be used to calculate a collective “dissonance score” with respect to each potential outcome. One manner of calculating the dissonance score is to measure a difference in the satisfaction scores among the participants for a particular outcome. As one example, the dissonance score may be calculated based on the standard deviation of the survey participants&#39; satisfaction scores. This and other techniques for calculating a dissonance score are discussed in further detail below. The dissonance score may be used as a measure of the participants&#39; tendency to reject or act against a particular outcome (or conversely, the participants&#39; tendency to support a particular outcome) due to feelings of unfairness or inequity. 
     A collective decision generator aggregates the influent functions generated for each survey participant and, based on such influent functions, determines a collective influent function for the survey. The collective influent function may be based on the calculated satisfaction scores and the collective dissonance score for each potential outcome. In particular embodiments, the collective influent function consists of a weighted combination of a collective satisfaction score and a collective dissonance score for each potential outcome. The collective satisfaction score may be based on a weighted combination of the individual satisfaction scores associated with each of the survey participants. 
     A ranked list of the potential outcomes may be determined by applying the collective influent function to each potential outcome. In particular embodiments, a principle on which the collective influent function is based is that a decision which has a high average satisfaction level from a group of participants but a significant dissonance or difference in satisfaction levels may be less preferable than another decision which has lower dissonance or difference in satisfaction levels even if the average satisfaction level for that other decision is lower. Thus, for example, the collective influent function may rank outcomes which have a lower average satisfaction level and lower dissonance above other outcomes which have a higher average satisfaction level and greater dissonance. After applying the collective influent function to rank each potential outcome, the highest ranked outcome which is within the predefined constraints (e.g. logical constraints, cost constraints, or other constraints) may be selected as the collective outcome for the survey. 
       FIGS. 10A and 10B  illustrate graphs of the support distributions for two different exemplary outcomes for a survey.  FIG. 10A  shows a support distribution curve  50  for an outcome “A”.  FIG. 10B  shows a support distribution curve  55  for a different outcome “B”. The support level for an outcome ranges from completely oppose at one end  51  of the spectrum, to completely support at the other end  53  of the spectrum. In between the opposing ends  51 ,  53  of the spectrum is a neutral level of support at the mid-point  52  of the spectrum. Graphs  50 ,  55  illustrate support distributions where the participants have the same average satisfaction for each of outcomes “A” and “B”. However, graph  50  of  FIG. 10A  shows a split decision in that there is a significant number of participants who are in favour of outcome “A” (i.e. they have support levels that fall above neutral  52  including many participants that fully support the outcome, at end  53 ) but, at the same time, there is also a significant, albeit smaller, number of participants who are not in favour of outcome “A” (i.e. they have support levels that fall below neutral  52  and are at or close to the “completely oppose” end  51  of the spectrum). Graph  55  of  FIG. 10B  shows a more unified decision in comparison to graph  50  of  FIG. 10A . In  FIG. 10B  there are more participants who are neutral or support outcome “B” and less participants who are opposed to outcome “B” (and in the illustrated embodiment there are indeed no participants who are opposed to outcome “B”). According to methods which evaluate only average satisfaction levels, outcomes “A” and “B” may be indistinguishable since they produce the same average satisfaction levels in the participants. By contrast, the methods and systems described herein may take into consideration, among other factors, resistance due to unfairness, or standard deviation, and determine that graph  50  has a greater difference between satisfaction and resistance than graph  55 , therefore ranking outcome “B” (graph  55 ) higher than outcome “A” (graph  50 ). 
     The number of potential outcomes to a problem can be very large. Consider, for example, a survey having m issues and n options for each issue. If only one of the options can be selected for each issue, the total number of potential outcome is n m , before any constraints are applied to eliminate non-actionable outcomes. For example, for a survey query having 6 issues and 4 options for each issue, the total number of potential outcomes, before any constraints, is 4 6  or 4096. For each of the potential outcomes, each participant will have a particular level of support based on the ranking or weight that she has accorded to each issue and option. Thus, based on all of the participants&#39; support levels for each outcome, a particular distribution curve plotting the support levels for each outcome can be generated (e.g. such as support distribution curves  50 ,  55  shown in  FIGS. 10A, 10B ). Given the very large number of outcomes or scenarios that need to be evaluated, it can be appreciated that this exercise would take an inordinate amount of time to perform manually or without a machine. In addition, this exercise would need to be repeated each time a survey participant modifies his input or a new survey participant contributes input (since even one modification in a ranking of one option by one participant could alter the support distribution curve for each of the 4096 outcomes), further compounding the impracticality of providing any analysis by hand. Accordingly, to interpret the survey results in a meaningful manner, computer systems are provided having one or more data processors configured according to particular embodiments for processing the survey results (such as the computer systems described above with reference to  FIGS. 1 and 2 ). The data processor executes instructions provided by software routines to process the results, and scores or ranks the potential outcomes based on this analysis. Since, in accordance with the methods described herein, influent functions must be applied to each potential outcome, it can be appreciated that the determination of a final result by the data processor can be computationally intensive. In the case where there are 6 issues and 4 options for each issue, the survey participants&#39; influent functions are aggregated and the data processor applies the aggregated or collective influent function to determine the support distribution curve for each of the 4096 potential outcomes. In particular embodiments, the data processor executes instructions provided by software functions—determined by the constraints set by the survey administrator—to determine which of the 4096 potential outcomes are to be eliminated from consideration as failing to meet the constraints; then the aggregate influent functions are applied to the remaining actionable outcomes to determine the support distribution curve for each outcome. It can be appreciated that the task of eliminating non-actionable outcomes is computationally intensive—the data processor executes instructions provided by a constraint function, to each of the 4096 outcomes to determine whether the outcome complies with the constraints (e.g. such as total cost). It can be appreciated that it is also computationally intensive to apply the aggregate influent function to each of the remaining actionable outcomes to determine the support distribution curve for each outcome. In order to distribute the computation over a time period and ease the computational burden when combining survey results, some of the computation, such as calculation of a participant&#39;s satisfaction scores for each potential outcome, may be performed by the data processor once a participant has provided his responses, and stored in a database for later use. After all of the survey participants have submitted their input, the data processor of the collective outcome generator may use the pre-calculated information when determining a collective influent function. 
     The following is a non-limiting example of how a survey and collective decision-making system as described herein may be used. Consider the case where a company wishes to determine an employee compensation package for its employees. The company may wish to survey its employees (and/or management or other interested persons) to determine what to put into its compensation package. In setting up the survey, the issues defined by the survey administrator may consist of: (1) vacation days, (2) sick days, (3) benefits, (4) severance, and (5) wage increases. Options for issue (1) vacation days may consist of: (i) two weeks plus statutory holidays, (ii) three weeks plus statutory holidays, and (iii) four weeks plus statutory holidays. Likewise, other options may be defined for each of the other issues of the survey. The survey administrator may set various constraints for the outcome or options. For example, one constraint may be that the particular combination of options chosen for the compensation package must not exceed a predetermined cost. 
     Once the issues, options and constraints have been defined, each survey participant is prompted to indicate a ranking for each issue and option (which is indicative of the weight, importance or support that he gives to the issue or option). In particular embodiments, the form of rankings of the issues is different from that for the rankings of the options. For example, for the ranking of issues, a participant may be required to allocate a percentage to each issue to indicate its relative importance, wherein the percentages over all the issues total 100%. Thus, an example issue ranking submitted by a survey participant for the employee compensation package survey might be: (1) vacation days 30%, (2) sick days 15%, (3) benefits 25%, (4) severance 10%, and (5) wage increases 20%. For the ranking of options, on a scale between −100 and +100, a participant may be prompted to indicate how much the participant desires or supports (or does not support) a particular option, where +100 indicates full support, 0 indicates a neutral opinion, and −100 indicates strongly opposed. For example, for issue (1) vacation days, the participant might indicate a ranking of +10 for option (i) two weeks plus statutory holidays, a ranking of +70 for option (ii) three weeks plus statutory holidays, and a ranking of +100 for option (iii) four weeks plus statutory holidays. By submitting such rankings for issues and options, a survey participant may fine-tune his preferences for his vote toward a collective outcome. 
     The rankings of issues and options from a survey participant may be implemented by user interface tools (such as user interface tools  236  of  FIG. 2  supporting a participant survey interface  108  of  FIG. 1  as described below). The user interface tools may include software functions that enforce certain constraints on the rankings to ensure that only valid rankings are received. For example, where the survey participant is requested to allocate a percentage weight to each issue, the survey participant may start by moving a cursor to slide the percentage “weight” bar for the first issue (e.g. vacation days in the example above) all the way to the right to allocate 100% importance to the first issue. The user interface tools then force all of the other issues to be displayed as 0% importance since the cumulative weight cannot exceed 100%. If the survey participant subsequently slides the weight bar on the second issue (e.g. sick days in the example above) to indicate 40% importance, then the user interface tools adjust the percentage weight for the first issue down to 60%. The user interface tools may also enable a user to lock an issue&#39;s weight bar at a certain percentage weight. In other embodiments, it is not a requirement that the cumulative weight or importance assigned to all of the issues total 100%. In such embodiments, for example, a survey participant may be prompted to assign a weight to each issue on a sliding scale between “unimportant” and “very important”, with no requirement as to the cumulative importance (see  FIG. 13 ). Thus, for example, the survey participant may decide to assign some weight above 50% to each of the issues or topics to show that all of the issues have importance to the survey participant. In another case, for example, the survey participant may decide to assign some weight above 50% to all of the issues except for one issue which is assigned a weight of 0% to identify that issue as being unimportant to the survey participant. 
     The particular ranking of issues and options that is selected by the participant determines an influent function associated with the participant. The influent function is indicative of how the participant would like the employee compensation package to be determined. Based on the influent functions, satisfaction scores and dissonance scores for each potential outcome may be calculated by processor  112  of collective outcome generator  104  or processor  120  of the survey conductor  102  of  FIG. 1 . In the employee compensation package scenario, each potential outcome is one possible combination of options making up the employee compensation package. 
     The collective outcome generator  104  gathers all of the influent functions developed by the survey participants and determines a collective influent function. Determination of the collective influent function may take into account the calculated satisfaction scores, dissonance scores and/or other factors. The collective influent function may be used to rank each potential outcome. In the employee compensation package scenario discussed above, the collective influent function might determine that within the constraints given (e.g. cost), an employee compensation package having a particular combination of options achieves the best balance between maximizing satisfaction levels and minimizing dissonance levels for the group surveyed. Accordingly, this combination of options may be selected as the collective outcome for the survey, and presented to the company for consideration as the compensation package which would tend to have the most support from the group and face the least resistance due to dissonance or inequity in support levels. In some cases, more than one potential outcome may be shortlisted based on the rankings by the collective influent function and presented to the decision-maker as candidates for the final collective outcome. 
     In some embodiments, the survey participants may be provided with more than one way in which to rank the issues and options. For example, as described in further detail below, survey participants may be able to rank the issues and options by relative importance of values. When a participant wants to rank in accordance with a particular value (e.g. “environmental sustainability”), the participant may prioritize or give more support to the issues and/or options which best reflect that value. Each value may be associated with an influent function developed by the participant (or other influent functions developed by others) which have a ranking of issues and/or options that reflect that value. Sometimes a participant may want to rank in accordance with more than one value. In such case the participant may assign relative weights to each value (e.g. 70% “environmental sustainability” and 30% “sense of community”). The survey and collective decision-making system may then develop a new influent function for the participant that combines an influent function associated with “environmental sustainability” with an influent function associated with “sense of community” in accordance with the relative weights that the participant has assigned to these values. As discussed in more detail below, a participant may also rank issues and options by accepting the suggested recommendations of trusted advisors, or by merging together influent functions or modifying influent functions published by other participants. Other possibilities are also described below. 
     It can be appreciated that a survey and collective decision-making system as described herein may have useful and practical applications in determining a collective outcome based on input from a group of participants in a variety of different decision-making contexts. By way of non-limiting example, in addition to the employee compensation package scenario discussed above, applications of the system include: public (or non-public) consultations (e.g. determining the features of a new community centre or school; deciding on a platform for a political party; deciding on a budget for a government, charity or other organization; deciding on public policy issues); public mediations and arbitrations; strata council decisions; board governance; shareholder meetings; collective decision-making by employees or union members (e.g. determining a resolution to a labour dispute); soliciting feedback for product development, trading, and market testing purposes; coordinating a group vacation; contests; granting processes; strategic planning; contract negotiation; treaty negotiation; event planning, and the like. 
       FIGS. 11 to 14  show screenshots for an exemplary survey participant user interface used to provide input to a survey and collective-decision making system that is configured to determine features for a new community centre. In  FIG. 11 , the topics or issues that have been defined by the survey administrator are shown. These include: co-located housing, financing and taxes, recreation and activities, performing arts, gathering spaces, and construction and design. For each of these issues, a survey participant is presented with some options, each of which the participant is asked to rank to indicate his or her support for the option. For example, for the co-located housing issue, the survey participant is presented with the following options to rank: 20 units of housing, mixed housing, 30 units of housing, market housing and 40 units of housing (see  FIG. 12 ). As shown in  FIG. 12 , for each of these options the survey participant may select one of 9 discrete levels on the sliding scale of support, which range from completely oppose at one end, to completely support at the other end. The survey participant is also asked to rank the importance of each of the topics or issues, using a sliding bar to assign a weight ranging from 0 for unimportant to 100 for very important (see  FIG. 13 ). Based on the survey participant&#39;s support rankings for the options and the importance ranking for the issues, an influent function is generated for the survey participant. After the survey participants have provided their input, the influent functions are aggregated to generate a collective influent function, which is then applied to each actionable outcome (i.e. any option that meets the predefined constraints) to determine a support distribution and collective strength score for the outcome. The outcomes can be ordered based on their strength score, and the outcome with the highest strength score can be selected as the group&#39;s top choice.  FIG. 14  displays the top outcome that has been selected for having the highest strength score. Such outcome has a particular combination of outcomes and associated values (e.g. construction cost, housing revenue, total revenue, operating cost, operating revenue, net operating cost, net cost) as shown. The outcome also has a particular support distribution as shown at the bottom of the screen in  FIG. 14 . 
       FIG. 15  is screenshot of an exemplary survey administrator user interface used with a survey and collective-decision making system to set up the community centre consultation survey discussed above (with reference to  FIGS. 11 to 14 ). The portion of the interface that is shown in  FIG. 15  is for a survey administrator to set up the options for the “performing arts” issue for the community centre. As shown, the survey administrator has set up the first option as a “small theatre”. Using the interface, the survey administrator can specify constraints for this option, such as for example, if the community enter contains a small theatre, it cannot also contain a large theatre. The survey administrator can also specify values for each option such as operating revenue, net square footage, construction cost, etc. The survey administrator can specify conditions for the outcome (such as minimum revenue, maximum square footage, maximum construction cost, etc.) The collective outcome generator can use the specified values and the specified constraints to compute total values for the community centre project (across all options and issues), and then filter out the non-actionable outcomes based on the constraints and outcome conditions. 
       FIG. 3  is a flowchart of a method  300  of conducting a survey and analysing survey results in accordance with one embodiment. Method  300  can be performed to collect input from survey participants as to their preferences for solving a particular problem or query, and to determine a collective outcome based on such input. Method  300  may be repeated for a plurality of surveys to generate a collective outcome or decision for each survey. The surveys correspond to a decision series   comprising a plurality of collective decisions made at different time instances such that,  ={D(t 1 ), D(t 2 ), . . . , D(t n )}; where D(t) represents a collective decision made at time instance t. 
     Method  300  may be implemented by components of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  and/or  FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200 . For example, certain steps of method  300  may be implemented by software which is contained in a program memory  116  accessible to a processor  112  of the collective outcome generator  104  of  FIG. 1 . Other steps of method  300  may be implemented by software contained in a program memory  122  accessible to a processor  120  of the survey conductor  102  of  FIG. 1 . Processors  112 ,  120  execute the software instructions provided by the software to carry out the method steps. Users of the system including survey participants  105  and survey administrators  103  can provide input to the software via the participant survey interface  108  and administrator survey interface  106  of  FIG. 1 . 
     Method  300  begins at step  302 , at which a plurality of options is presented to a plurality of participants. The options may be categorized into various issues. For example, one issue may include two or more options. The issues and their corresponding options may be defined by the survey administrator(s). In some embodiments, a new option for an existing issue (or a new issue and corresponding new options) may be defined by the survey participants. 
     An option may be associated with a set of characteristics. The characteristics of an option a is defined as  (a)={c 1 (a), c 2 (a), . . . , c n  (a)} where   is a set of alphanumeric phrases. For example, if option a is a car, then c 1  may be cost, c 2  may be mileage, c 3  may be color, etc. The characteristics associated with an option may also be defined by taking a function of other characteristics associated with that option. For example, if option a is a house, c 1  is cost and c 2  is square footage, then a third characteristic, the cost per square foot can be defined as:  (a)=c 1 (a)/c 2 (a). 
     A potential outcome for a survey can be defined as a particular combination of the options that are presented to the survey participants. The potential outcomes may be associated with sets of characteristics. The sets of characteristics will not always be reducible to characteristics of the isolated options. In some cases, the sets of characteristics are defined by the interaction of characteristics of the isolated options across a potential outcome. For example, two participants may be deciding how to spend an evening; what restaurant to have dinner at, what movie to see, etc. A characteristic that does not arise from any of the options in isolation might be how far away the restaurant is from the closest movie theatre that is playing the movie they choose, which in turn interacts with the type of transportation to generate an approximate travel time.  (O) represents the set of characteristics for a potential outcome O where   is a set of alphanumeric phrases, and for each potential outcome O∈A′ is an alphanumeric phrase. Here, A′ is the set of all possible sets of A, where A is the set of options associated with a survey. 
     The net characteristics associated with an outcome include characteristics associated with the options that comprise the outcome and also characteristics that arise as a result of interaction of characteristics of the isolated options across an outcome. The net set of characteristics associated with an outcome is given by: C(O)= (O)∪ (O). 
     Moving on, P={P 1 , P 2 , . . . P n } represents the set of participants associated with the decision series , wherein ∥P∥=p is the number of participants participating in the decision making process and x∈P represents a participant x in the set of participants P. 
     The plurality of options presented for making a decision D is indicated as a set of options A such that A={a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). ∥A∥=n represents the number of options for the decision D. A′ is the set of all possible sets of A, A′={φ(a 1 ), (a 1 ,a 2 ), . . . , (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )}. 
     As stated earlier, potential outcomes can be defined as different combinations of the plurality of options. However, some combinations of options might result in impossible or impractical potential outcomes. In other words, some combinations may lead to non-actionable outcomes. To eliminate the non-actionable outcomes from consideration, one or more constraints or rules may be specified. The constraints may be specified by the survey administrator and/or by the survey participants. Constraints may be framed as Boolean logical relations between options and groups of options. Rules can be framed as mathematical or logical functions based on influent functions and characteristics associated with options or outcomes. If Boolean logical relations are used to determine non-actionable outcomes, a function L mapping from the set of outcomes A′ to true or false, L: A′→{T,F} is defined. Thus, L: C(O)→{T,F} is a constraint on the set of outcomes, such that each possible combination of options is given a true or false value indicating whether it is actionable or not. Similarly, other constraints may be defined using rules that are defined by the survey administrators and/or by the survey participants. For example, an organization may decide to have gender equity on its board. In elections to the board where each voter rates all the candidates, a rule can be defined that eliminates any outcomes that include a combination of candidates that is not gender balanced or exceeds the size of the board. 
     Thus, by applying constraints, a subset O a  of A′ is determined to be the set of actionable outcomes. Here, the set of actionable outcomes is actionable for the plurality of participants as a whole and not to any individual participant. Since, O a  ⊂A′ such that O∈O a , L(O)=T for logical constraints L. 
     Issues may be defined to group the options, generally into non-overlapping categories. An issue associated with a survey may include two or more options. An issue may be considered a set which covers all options belonging to that issue. An “issue set” is a set of issues such that every option belongs to one or more issues in an issue set. Issue sets are closed when no options belong to more than one issue. Closed issue sets can be nested to create “issue domains”. That is, there can be a tree hierarchy of closed issue sets which together form a single “issue domain”. For example, in a shopping environment, one issue domain may have “food” containing all the options desired, and under that issue might be sub-issues such as “meat” or “vegetables” which in turn may be divided into sub-issues such as “organic” or “processed”, etc. 
     Take an issue u which is a subset of the total set of options A, i.e., u⊂A. U represents a closed issue set wherein U={u 1 , . . . u n }⊂A′. Here, U is a partition of A into non-overlapping sets such that ∩u i =φ and ∪u i =A. A closed issue set U 1  may be a subordinate to a closed issue set U 2  if U 1  ⊂U 2 , that is, for every u∈U 1 , u⊂v for some v∈U 2 . U′ is an issue domain, wherein U′ is a nested series of issue sets represented as: U′={U 1 , . . . , U s } and U 1 ⊂U 2  ⊂ . . . ⊂U s . 
     At step  304  of  FIG. 3 &#39;s method  300 , a ranking for each of the issues and options associated with the survey is received from each survey participant. Optionally, the rankings may be based on a criterion or value. Ranking may include one or more of: assigning a numerical score, a percentage weight, or a function over a numeric range associated with a characteristic associated with an option. In particular embodiments, a function over a numeric range may be assigned by a participant using a graphic interface to draw a continuous line over an x-axis representing the function. Ranking may also include choosing a word or phrase such as “highly support” where that word or phrase corresponds to a numerical score or percentage weight. A range of a rank to be allocated to an issue or option may be predetermined. The range of ranks associated with issues may be different than the range of ranks associated with options. By way of non-limiting example, ranks for issues may be a percentage weight indicating relative importance, and ranks for options may be chosen from a range of 1 to 10, 0 to 100, or −100 to +100 (where a negative rank signals opposition). In cases where the negation of an option is not a logical consequence of one or more other options, a second option specifically negating the option may be inferred and the ranking of that inferred option may be derived from the ranking given to the first option. The range of ranks may be defined by the survey participants in some cases. Ranking of the issues and options by the survey participants creates a plurality of influent functions. Each participant may be associated with one or more influent functions as described below. An influent function associated with a survey may be defined as a function that orders a plurality of potential outcomes associated with the survey. 
     In particular embodiments, ranking the plurality of options by a participant creates an influent function associated with the participant. An influent function Φ is a function that maps each outcome to  , where   is a range within the set of real numbers. The range could be a finite set, e.g. the integers between 1 and 1000 or some machine-readable representation of the real number line or a subset thereof. The less points in the range, the less computing resources are required (but the less accurate the results). Based on the ranking provided by a participant to the plurality of options, a value for an outcome is determined by summing the ranks corresponding to options that belong to that outcome. Thus, the influent function is defined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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     In another instance, a participant may provide a ranked list of the options. This means that a participant may create an ordered list that specifies the participant&#39;s most preferred option, the participant&#39;s second most preferred option and so on. If #(a) is the rank number of an option a and n is the total number of options, then an influent function Φ(a) is defined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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     Sometimes, an influent function is needed to map an option or an outcome not onto a single value of R, but to a range within R. This might occur in situations where one of the characteristics associated with an option or an outcome is a number that can fall within a range. For example, the amount of support for purchasing an item might vary depending on the price characteristic. That is, the support might be a function of the price. These ranges may be referred as {c[in]}⊂R to {c[out]}⊂R where {c[in]} is the range associated with the characteristic, {c[out]} is usually the range for voting that is selected. c* is a characteristic function mapping {c[in]} to {c[out]} for the characteristic of an option or an outcome. 
     In some embodiments, a participant may rank the issues and the options to create an influent function associated with the participant.  FIG. 4  illustrates an example ranking of the issues and the options by a participant. Referring to  FIG. 4 , “Gymnasium”, “Art Gallery”, “Performance Space”, and “Municipal Offices” represent four issues. Each of these issues further includes two or more options. As shown in  FIG. 4 , “No Gym”, “Small Gym”, and “Large Gym” are options associated with the issue “Gymnasium”. A participant may assign a level of support or importance for the options and issues by assigning a rank to each option and issue, as illustrated in  FIG. 4 . In some embodiments, if a survey participant does not indicate a specific ranking for an option, then a processor of the survey-conducting server (or the collective outcome-generating server) may complete the influent function for the survey participant (thereby determining a rank for the option that was left unspecified) so that the survey participant&#39;s response may be combined with other responses. For example, if an influent function Φ′ is undefined on an option a we can define P={Φ st. Φ well-defined on a} and then take Φ′(a)=avg {Φ(a) where Φ in P}. 
     In other embodiments, an influent function Φ may be created based on the rank provided by a participant associated with the plurality of outcomes, wherein that influent function is not expressed as an influent function associated with the plurality of options. If a participant modifies or merges that influent function Φ based on one or more issues or otherwise applies adjustments using methods that require the influent function to be expressed as an influent function associated with options, then an influent function Φ′ can be found wherein Σ O∈O     a   |Φ(O)−Σ a∈O  Φ′(a)| is minimized, and Φ′ may be adjusted using those same methods to create a new influent function Φ′ new . Based upon the effect of the adjustments applied to Φ′, a new influent function Φ new  based on Φ may be created such that Φ new =Φ*(Φ′ new /Φ′). Modifying and merging influent functions to create other influent functions is explained in further detail below. 
     Given an issue domain U′, the influent function generated as a result of ranking the plurality of options and the one or more issues is given by: 
       Φ( a )= w ( u ( s,a ))* . . . * w ( u (1, a ))* R ( a )  (3)
 
     where R(a) is the rank given by a participant to an option a, u(i, b) is the set u in U i  such that b∈u, and w(u(i, b)) is the rank or weight given to u(i, b). In a scenario, w(u(i, a))=w(u(i, b)) if option a and option b belong to the same issue. In this case, w(u) is the weight of that issue. Generally, a set of weights w(u) for issues is determined such that:
 
0≦w(u)≦1, for all issues, and where,
 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
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     for each issue u in closed issue set U. In other words, issue weights are expressed as percentages that add up to 100% for each issue set. 
     In other embodiments, a participant may rank the issues and the options associated with each survey based on one or more criteria. The criteria may be defined by the survey administrator(s) and/or the survey participants. The criteria may consist of defined values in particular embodiments.  FIG. 5  shows an example ranking of the issues and options of a survey based on a criterion (or value). In the illustrated example of  FIG. 5 , participants rank the options and issues by considering the criterion “Environment”. For example, a participant may rank the issue “Gymnasium” by considering what impact a Gymnasium may have on the environment. If the participant believes that a Gymnasium may adversely affect the environment in some way, the participant could show relatively less support for a gymnasium by assigning a lower rank to the issue “Gymnasium”. Similarly, each issue and its corresponding options may be ranked by the participant according to this criterion. More than one criterion may be provided to the participants. For example, a second criterion “Cultural Impact” may also be defined for the participants. Each participant then ranks the issues “Gymnasium”, “Art Gallery”, “Performance Space” and “Municipal Offices” and the corresponding options based on the impact they may have on the criterion “Cost”. 
     When a participant ranks the issues and options based on a criterion, an influent function is generated for that participant for the survey. In some cases for each different criterion, a new influent function may be generated for the participant. Thus, a participant may be associated with a plurality of influent functions wherein the number of influent functions corresponds to the number of criteria. A participant may publish one or more of these influent functions to be used by other participants (such influent functions may be stored in an influent functions repository  129  as shown in  FIG. 1 ). 
     In other embodiments, an influent function Φ 1  corresponding to a ranking of issues and options for issue domain U′ 1  over the set of options A may be converted into an influent function Φ 2  corresponding to a ranking of issues and options for a different issue domain U′ 2  over the same set of options A. Take V={Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n } as the set of influent functions associated with issues and options for issue domain U′ 2  such that Φ 1 (a)=Φ i (a)=w i (u(s, a))* . . . *w i (u(1, a))*R i (a) for all the options a in A, where 0≦w(u(j, a))≦1 for all j, and then choose Φ 2 =Φ i  in V such that ({max {R i (a),a ∈A}−min {R i (a), a ∈A}) is minimized. 
     In some embodiments, ranks for issues and options may be recommended to a participant based on a trusted advisor. In particular embodiments, to build a network of trusted advisors, participant accounts may be created for each participant in a social network. The participant accounts may then be approved by a survey administrator and appropriate permissions assigned to each participant. Thereafter, participants are allowed to share information such as maps, reports, plans, images, videos, comments, etc. to influence the other participants. In the social network, a participant may assign trust ranks to one or more other participants according to how much confidence the participant has in their decisions in different areas. Trust ranks may be allocated according to issue, so for example, a participant could give a high trust ranking on scientific decisions to a friend who is an engineer. For example, Joe may know Sam personally and feels that Sam&#39;s views are similar to his own. Hence, Joe may assign a high trust ranking for Sam. However, if Joe feels that Sam&#39;s views on only certain issues match his own, then Joe may assign a high trust ranking to Sam for only those issues. Similarly, Sam may in turn assign a trust rank to Fred. In this example, since Joe has assigned a high trust ranking for Sam since they share the same views, Sam&#39;s ranking of issues and options may be recommended to Joe when Joe ranks the issues and options. 
     τ(x, y) indicates the trust rank of a participant x for a participant y and τ u (x, y) is the trust rank provided by participant x to participant y over an issue u. 
     To recommend ranks for issues or options to a participant, other participants who the participant has not directly assigned a trust rank to may also be considered. In this case, a participant may specify a trust propagation factor. The trust propagation factor Π(x) for a participant x describes the maximum length of the chain of participants between the participant x and a participanty that is to be relied on as a basis of trust. Here, the length of the chain includes both participant x and participant y. For example, Π(x)=2 means participant x and participant y are directly connected as there are only two participants in the chain. Π(x)=3 means that participant x and participant y are connected via one intermediary participant. 
     Trust propagation factor Π may be used to determine how much the trust rank of a participant for another participant changes if the other participant is not known to the participant but is connected to the participant by one or more degrees of separation through intermediary participants. Referring to the previous example, although Joe did not provide a trust rank for Fred, he provided a trust rank for Sam who in turn provided a trust rank for Fred. A trust rank of Joe for Fred may be determined based on the trust propagation factor and the trust rankings provided by Joe to Sam and provided by Sam to Fred. 
     A trust pathway P′(x, y) from participant x to participant y is defined as a series of participants linked by trust ranks. P′(x, y)={P 1 , P 2 , . . . P n } is a subset of P where x=P 1  and y=P n  and τ(P i , P i+1 ) for all 1≦i≦n−1 is received. P o (x, y) is a valid trust pathway between the participant x and the participant y represented by the following equation: 
         P   o ( x,y )=the set{ P ′( x,y ) such that  P ′( x,y )∈ P   o ( x,y ) then| P |≦π( x )}  (5)
 
     In addition to the trust propagation factor, a trust decay factor may also be defined. The trust decay factor is a measure of rate at which the trust between a participant and another participant decays as degree of separation between the two participants increases. The degree of separation between a participant and another participant is the number of participants which connect the participant and the other participant. In some embodiments, the trust decay factor may be an exponential factor. Referring to the previous example, Joe and Sam are directly related therefore the degree of separation between them can be considered as minimum. However, Joe and Fred are connected indirectly with each other through Sam therefore a degree of separation between Joe and Fred is more as compared with the degree of separation between Joe and Sam. The trust decay factor defines a rate of decay in trust for each degree of separation between participants. 
     Based on the trust pathway information, a trust ranking can be recommended to participant x for participant y. To begin with, the trust rankings are normalized such that the most trusted participant has a value ‘1’. The normalized trust ranking τ′(x, y) is given by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
           
               
                 
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     where y∈P and τ(x, y)=max {τ(x, y) for all y∈P} 
     The trust ranking recommended to participant x for participant y is determined by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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                           ) 
                         
                       
                     
                      
                     
                       
                         
                           
                             π 
                              
                             
                               ( 
                               x 
                               ) 
                             
                           
                           - 
                           
                             
                                
                               
                                 P 
                                 ′ 
                               
                                
                             
                             
                               Δ 
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 x 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                         
                         
                           π 
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             x 
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                       * 
                       
                         
                           ∏ 
                           
                             
                               P 
                               i 
                             
                             , 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 
                                   i 
                                   + 
                                   1 
                                 
                               
                               ∈ 
                               P 
                             
                             , 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           
                             
                               
                                   
                               
                                
                               ′ 
                             
                           
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 i 
                               
                               , 
                               
                                 P 
                                 
                                   i 
                                   + 
                                   1 
                                 
                               
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   7 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where Δ(x) represents a trust decay factor associated with a participant x. 
     In the above equation, the first part represents the trust decay factor and the second part represents the trust propagation factor. The trust decay factor and the trust propagation factor are added up over all the valid trust pathways from x to y. 
     In some embodiments, rankings for an issue or option may be recommended to a participant based on the recommended trust rankings. A recommended rank for the participant x for an option a, R o (a, x), may be determined by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       R 
                       o 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         a 
                         , 
                         x 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         v 
                          
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 o 
                               
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   x 
                                   , 
                                   y 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                         * 
                         
                           R 
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               a 
                               , 
                               y 
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         v 
                          
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 O 
                               
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   x 
                                   , 
                                   y 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   8 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where R(a, y) is the rank provided by the participant y to the option a. P V  is a subset of P where P V  includes P V (a) and P V (u) which represents the set of participants that ranked the option a and the issue u respectively. 
     Similarly, a recommended rank or weight W o (u, x) for an issue u may be determined by the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       W 
                       o 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         u 
                         , 
                         x 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         v 
                          
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 o 
                               
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   x 
                                   , 
                                   y 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                         * 
                         
                           W 
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               u 
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 y 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         v 
                          
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             
                               
                                 P 
                                 O 
                               
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   x 
                                   , 
                                   y 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   9 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Additionally, the confidence of a recommended ranking for an option a may be determined by evaluating the standard deviation of the recommendations as given below: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     C 
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         
                           R 
                           o 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             a 
                             , 
                             x 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         
                           ∑ 
                           
                             y 
                             ∈ 
                             P 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           v 
                            
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               x 
                               , 
                               y 
                               , 
                               
                                 
                                   P 
                                   o 
                                 
                                  
                                 
                                   ( 
                                   
                                     x 
                                     , 
                                     y 
                                   
                                   ) 
                                 
                               
                             
                             ) 
                           
                           * 
                           
                             
                                
                               
                                 
                                   R 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       a 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                                 - 
                                 
                                   
                                     R 
                                     o 
                                   
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       a 
                                       , 
                                       x 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                                
                             
                             2 
                           
                         
                       
                       
                         
                           ∑ 
                           
                             y 
                             ∈ 
                             P 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           v 
                            
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               x 
                               , 
                               y 
                               , 
                               
                                 
                                   P 
                                   O 
                                 
                                  
                                 
                                   ( 
                                   
                                     x 
                                     , 
                                     y 
                                   
                                   ) 
                                 
                               
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   10 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Similarly, the confidence of a recommended weight to an issue u may also be determined. 
     In some embodiments, trust ranks may be recommended based on historical data. Previous voting patterns may be checked to identify other participants who have voted similarly to the participant and based on this information a trust rank for the other participants may be recommended to the participant. A recommended historic trust rank τ h (x, y, a) is provided by a participant x to a participant y related to option a. A historic decision series D″={D(1), D(2), . . . , D(n)} may be referred to for suggesting the recommended historic trust rank to the participant y. A i (x, y, a) is a set of options that may be considered for suggesting the recommended historic rank to the participant y, wherein A i ={a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }⊂D(i), where D(i) contains all voting information for all participants. 
     In calculating a historic trust recommendation for option a, the calculation can be restricted to looking at options belonging to the same issue as option a. In some embodiments, we can take A i (x, y, a)={a j ∈A i  such that R(a j , x), R(a j , y)≠0} where R(a j , x) is a rank provided by the participant x to an option a j  in a decision D(i) in D″; and R(a j , y) is a rank provided by the participant y to an option a j  in a decision D(i). Therefore, the recommended historic trust rank for the participant y by the participant x is determined by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       
                         
                             
                         
                          
                         h 
                       
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         x 
                         , 
                         y 
                         , 
                         a 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     1 
                     + 
                     
                       
                         { 
                         
                           
                             
                               ∑ 
                               
                                 b 
                                 ∈ 
                                 
                                   A 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       x 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                       , 
                                       a 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                             
                              
                             
                                
                               
                                 
                                   R 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       b 
                                       , 
                                       x 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                                 - 
                                 
                                   R 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       b 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                                
                             
                           
                           
                              
                             
                               A 
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   x 
                                   , 
                                   y 
                                   , 
                                   a 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                              
                           
                         
                         } 
                       
                       
                         - 
                         1 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   11 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     In some embodiments, we can take a measure of semantic proximity between two options Prox(a, b), for example where 
     
       
         
           
             
               Prox 
                
               
                 ( 
                 
                   a 
                   , 
                   b 
                 
                 ) 
               
             
             = 
             
               
                  
                 
                   { 
                   
                     
                       u 
                        
                       
                           
                       
                        
                       
                         s 
                         . 
                         t 
                         . 
                         
                             
                         
                          
                         a 
                       
                     
                     ∈ 
                     
                       u 
                        
                       
                           
                       
                        
                       and 
                        
                       
                           
                       
                        
                       b 
                     
                     ∈ 
                     u 
                   
                   } 
                 
                  
               
               
                  
                 
                   { 
                   u 
                   } 
                 
                  
               
             
           
         
       
     
     for all issues u in a set of issue domains. In such a case the recommended historic trust rank would be: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       h 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         x 
                         , 
                         y 
                         , 
                         a 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       { 
                       
                         1 
                         + 
                         
                           
                             
                               ∑ 
                               
                                 b 
                                 ∈ 
                                 
                                   A 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       x 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                       , 
                                       a 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                             
                              
                             
                               
                                 Prox 
                                  
                                 
                                   ( 
                                   
                                     a 
                                     , 
                                     b 
                                   
                                   ) 
                                 
                               
                                
                               
                                  
                                 
                                   
                                     R 
                                      
                                     
                                       ( 
                                       
                                         b 
                                         , 
                                         x 
                                       
                                       ) 
                                     
                                   
                                   - 
                                   
                                     R 
                                      
                                     
                                       ( 
                                       
                                         b 
                                         , 
                                         y 
                                       
                                       ) 
                                     
                                   
                                 
                                  
                               
                             
                           
                           
                             
                               ∑ 
                               
                                 b 
                                 ∈ 
                                 
                                   A 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       x 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                       , 
                                       a 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                             
                              
                             
                               Prox 
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   a 
                                   , 
                                   b 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                         
                       
                       } 
                     
                     
                       - 
                       1 
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   12 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Thereafter, based on the recommended historical trust rank suggested to participant x for the other participants, a recommended historic rank R h  (a, x) is determined for participant x for option a as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       R 
                       h 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         a 
                         , 
                         x 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         
                           v 
                           
                             ( 
                             a 
                             ) 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           h 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             a 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                         * 
                         
                           R 
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               a 
                               , 
                               y 
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           P 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                         
                           v 
                           
                             ( 
                             a 
                             ) 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           h 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             x 
                             , 
                             y 
                             , 
                             a 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   13 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where P v  (a) is the set of participants that voted on the option a. 
     Additionally, a confidence rating of the recommended historic rank R h  (a, x) for participant x for option a may be given as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     C 
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         
                           R 
                           h 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             a 
                             , 
                             x 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         
                           ∑ 
                           
                             y 
                             ∈ 
                             P 
                           
                         
                          
                         
                           
                             v 
                             
                               ( 
                               a 
                               ) 
                             
                           
                            
                           
                             h 
                           
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               x 
                               , 
                               y 
                               , 
                               a 
                             
                             ) 
                           
                           * 
                           
                             
                                
                               
                                 
                                   R 
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       a 
                                       , 
                                       y 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                                 - 
                                 
                                   
                                     R 
                                     h 
                                   
                                    
                                   
                                     ( 
                                     
                                       a 
                                       , 
                                       x 
                                     
                                     ) 
                                   
                                 
                               
                                
                             
                             2 
                           
                         
                       
                       
                         
                           
                             ∑ 
                             
                               y 
                               ∈ 
                               P 
                             
                           
                            
                           
                             
                               v 
                               
                                 ( 
                                 a 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                              
                             
                               h 
                             
                              
                             
                               ( 
                               
                                 x 
                                 , 
                                 y 
                                 , 
                                 a 
                               
                               ) 
                             
                           
                         
                         ) 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   14 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     In a similar manner, a recommended historical trust rank can be found for an issue, and a confidence rating associated with that historical trust rank. 
     In some embodiments, information that is relevant to determining trust rankings (including the historical information discussed above) may be saved in a trust information database and accessed by processor  120  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s survey conductor  102  to automatically determine trust rankings among participants. 
     In addition to directly ranking the issues and options associated with each survey to create one or more influent functions for the survey, a participant may create a new influent function for a survey by modifying one or more existing influent functions associated with the survey. The influent functions associated with the survey may consist of influent functions created by other survey participants. A participant may choose one or more influent functions and modify the ranks associated with one or more of the issues and options of the chosen influent functions to create one or more new influent functions for the participant. It is to be noted here that the original influent functions created by the other participants are left intact to be used by another participant.  FIG. 6  shows an example modification of an influent function by varying a rank or weight associated with an option (i.e. the “small gym” option in  FIG. 6 ). Similarly,  FIG. 7  illustrates an example of modifying an influent function by varying a rank or weight associated with an issue (i.e. the “municipal offices” issue in  FIG. 7 ). In this way, a participant can restrict an influent function to a specific issue by making the rank of that issue ‘1’ and making the ranks of other issues ‘0’. Thus, if there are five issues, a participant could possibly create five influent functions, each one corresponding to the original influent function restricted to an issue. 
     In yet another embodiment, a participant may create an influent function for a survey by merging two or more influent functions associated with the survey. The influent functions may be associated with other survey participants. In this case, the influent functions may be considered as starting influent functions.  FIG. 8  shows an example merging of a plurality of influent functions. In  FIG. 8 , the influent functions happen to be values (i.e. “address climate change”, “affordable”, “economic opportunity”, “habit preservation”, “health &amp; fitness” and “sense of community”), where the influent functions for each value have been predefined (either by the survey participant himself or by other users). Merging the starting influent functions involves assigning a weight to each of the influent functions and combining them to form a single influent function. A survey participant  105  may use a GUI control provided by participant survey interface  108  of  FIG. 1  to select two influent functions and assign the desired weights to the influent functions. Processor  120  of survey conductor  102  then executes merge functions routine  124 C to merge the selected influent functions to generate a new influent function. 
     More particularly, given the starting influent functions Φ*={Φ 1 , . . . , Φ m }, a participant can integrate them into a single function by assigning a relative weight K={k 1 , . . . k m } to each starting influent, given by I (K, φ*). I(K, Φ*) is the sum of the starting influent functions Φ*={Φ 1 , . . . , Φ m } and weights K={k 1 , . . . k m }, given by: I (K,Φ*)=Σ 1≦i≦m k i *Φ i . In some embodiments, the component influent functions Φ i  in Φ* may be divided by their magnitude ∥Φ i ∥=Σ O∈O Φ(O) in order to satisfy the condition ∥Φi∥=1. 
     Assuming there are a number of starting influent functions of the form: 
       Φ i ( a )= w   i ( u ( s,a ))* . . . * w   i ( u (1, a ))* R   i   (a),
 
     then the starting influent functions are merged using the above process to find: 
       Φ( a )=Σ 1≦i≦m   k   i **Φ i ( a ),
 
     for all a. Two approaches may be used to represent this in the form: 
         w ( u ( s,a ))* . . . * w ( u (1, a ))* R ( a ): 
     In a first approach, w(u(j, a)) is defined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               w 
                
               
                 ( 
                 
                   u 
                    
                   
                     ( 
                     
                       j 
                       , 
                       a 
                     
                     ) 
                   
                 
                 ) 
               
             
             = 
             
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
                     1 
                     ≤ 
                     i 
                     ≤ 
                     m 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                   
                     k 
                     i 
                   
                   * 
                   
                     
                       w 
                       i 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         u 
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             j 
                             , 
                             a 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
                     1 
                     ≤ 
                     i 
                     ≤ 
                     m 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                   k 
                   i 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Further, R(a) is defined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 R 
                  
                 
                   ( 
                   a 
                   ) 
                 
               
               = 
               
                 
                   Φ 
                    
                   
                       
                   
                    
                   
                     ( 
                     a 
                     ) 
                   
                 
                 
                   
                     ∏ 
                     
                       1 
                       ≤ 
                       j 
                       ≤ 
                       s 
                     
                   
                    
                   
                       
                   
                    
                   
                     w 
                     ( 
                     
                       u 
                        
                       
                         ( 
                         
                           j 
                           , 
                           a 
                         
                         ) 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
             
             ) 
           
         
       
     
     Φ(a) is then calculated as: 
       Φ( a )= w ( u ( s,a ))* . . . * w ( u (1, a ))* R ( a ).
 
     In a second approach, w′(u(j, a)) is defined as the weighted average by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 w 
                 ′ 
               
                
               
                 ( 
                 
                   u 
                    
                   
                     ( 
                     
                       j 
                       , 
                       a 
                     
                     ) 
                   
                 
                 ) 
               
             
             = 
             
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
                     1 
                     ≤ 
                     i 
                     ≤ 
                     m 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                     
                 
                  
                 
                   
                     k 
                     i 
                   
                   * 
                   
                     
                       w 
                       i 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         u 
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             j 
                             , 
                             a 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
                     1 
                     ≤ 
                     i 
                     ≤ 
                     m 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                     
                 
                  
                 
                   k 
                   i 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Similarly, R′(a) is defined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 R 
                 ′ 
               
                
               
                 ( 
                 a 
                 ) 
               
             
             = 
             
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
                     1 
                     ≤ 
                     i 
                     ≤ 
                     m 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                     
                 
                  
                 
                   
                     k 
                     i 
                   
                   * 
                   
                     
                       w 
                       i 
                     
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         u 
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             j 
                             , 
                             a 
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   
                     ∑ 
                     
                       1 
                       ≤ 
                       i 
                       ≤ 
                       m 
                     
                   
                    
                   
                       
                   
                    
                   
                     k 
                     i 
                   
                 
                  
                 
                     
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Thereafter, V is defined as the space of solutions for {Δw(u(i, a), ΔR(a) for ∀ a∈A} that satisfy the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     [ 
                     
                       
                         
                           w 
                           ′ 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             u 
                              
                             
                               ( 
                               
                                 s 
                                 , 
                                 a 
                               
                               ) 
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       + 
                       
                         Δ 
                          
                         
                             
                         
                          
                         
                           w 
                            
                           
                             ( 
                             
                               u 
                                
                               
                                 ( 
                                 
                                   s 
                                   , 
                                   a 
                                 
                                 ) 
                               
                             
                             ) 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                     ] 
                   
                   * 
                   
                     [ 
                     
                         
                     
                      
                     
                       
                         
                           w 
                           ′ 
                         
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             u 
                              
                             
                               ( 
                               
                                 
                                   s 
                                   - 
                                   1 
                                 
                                 , 
                                 a 
                               
                               ) 
                             
                           
                           ) 
                         
                       
                       + 
                       
                           
                         
                             
                           
                               
                             
                               
                                   
                                 
                                   Δ 
                                    
                                   
                                       
                                   
                                    
                                   
                                     w 
                                      
                                     
                                       ( 
                                       
                                         u 
                                          
                                         
                                           ( 
                                           
                                             
                                               s 
                                               - 
                                               1 
                                             
                                             , 
                                             a 
                                           
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     where Φ(a)=Σ 1≦i≦m k i * Φ i   (a), with the condition that w(u(i, a))=w(u(i, b)) if option a and option b belong to the same issue, and that the sum of the weights of issues in an issue set is 100%. 
     Thereafter, computational methods such as linear programming and numerical approximations are used to determine v in V such that: 
     Σ 1≦i≦m |ΔR i (a)| is minimized. If there is more than one solution, then a random solution may be chosen or further computational methods may be used to choose v such that:
 
Σ 1≦i≦m |Δw i (u(j,a))| is minimized. If there is more than one solution, then a random solution may be chosen.
 
     In some embodiments, a participant may vary a weight associated with the two or more influent functions based on a trust rank associated with each participant associated with the influent functions or a trust rank associated with issues associated with the influent functions. Moreover, the merging of the two or more influent functions may be based on different trust ranks corresponding to different issues, wherein the trust ranks are associated with the expertise of a participant for that issue. A trust rank associated with a participant may be determined as explained earlier. 
     In other embodiments, for the case when influent functions are created by ranking the issues and options based on one or more criteria, a participant may merge two or more such influent functions associated with one or more other participants based on a trust rank associated with each of the other participants. Here, the trust rank may be based on a level of expertise associated with each of the other participants for a criterion. For example, if John had previously created an influent function by ranking the options associated with the issue “Gymnasium” based on a criterion “Environment”, Jim may use the influent function created by John along with one or more influent functions created by other participants with respect to the options associated with “Gymnasium” based on the criterion “Environment” to be merged into an influent function for Jim associated with that criterion. Now, if John happens to be an environmental expert, then Jim may assign a higher trust rank to John for the criterion “Environment” such that a greater weight is given for John&#39;s views regarding environmental impact of the options associated with a gymnasium. Similarly, Jim may assign different trust ranks to different other participants for various criteria with respect to different issues depending on the expertise of the different participants for the various criteria and issues. In yet another embodiment, trust ranks may be recommended to a participant by considering not only the trust propagation factor and the trust decay factor but also the expertise of other participants related to the criteria. 
     In a further embodiment, a participant may create a new influent function (or generate an ordinally ranked list of the potential outcomes) based on one or more existing influent functions associated with the participant and one or more potential outcomes chosen for the participant. For example, the participant may initially create one or more influent functions for a survey by: ranking the issues and options, ranking the issues and options based on one or more criteria, modifying one or more existing influent functions, and/or merging two or more existing functions as explained above. Based on the influent functions created by the participant, each potential outcome for the survey (corresponding to a particular combination of options) may be automatically ranked by a processor in accordance with predefined software routines which receive as input the participant&#39;s influent functions. The potential outcomes and corresponding rankings are presented to the participant. For each outcome, the participant may confirm or change the order in which that outcome has been automatically ranked. For example, the participant may provide a rank ‘1’ to the top ranked potential outcome that was presented as a result of the automatic ranking of the potential outcomes if the participant agrees that the top ranked potential outcome is indeed his most preferred outcome. If the top ranked potential outcome is not the preferred outcome for the participant then the participant may choose another outcome from the list of potential outcomes and assign that potential outcome a rank ‘1’. Similarly, the participant may assign a rank ‘2’, a rank ‘3’, etc. to potential outcomes in the list of ranked potential outcomes to indicate his second preferred outcome, his third preferred outcome and so on. 
     If O 1 , O 2 , . . . O j  is the list of potential outcomes ranked by the participant, then for outcome O 1 , an equation can be generated as: 
     1=Σ is.t.a     i     ∈O     1   r i , where each r i  is some unknown variable in R corresponding to the option a i  in O 1 . 
     For potential outcome O 2 , an equation can be generated as: 
     1−Δ 1 =Σ is.t.a     i     ∈O     2    r i , where Δ 1 &gt;0 using some of the r i  from the equation for O 1  and some new ones from O 2 . 
     If the participant provides a third preferred potential outcome O 3 , then an equation for O 3  is given by: 
       1−Δ 2 =Σ is.t.a     i     ∈O     3     r   i , where Δ 2 &gt;Δ 1 .
 
     This process of generating equations may be continued for however many potential outcomes the participant ranks. If the participant ranks n outcomes, then n simultaneous equations are generated. 
     O′ is defined as the set of a ∈{O 1  ∪O 2  ∪ . . . ∪O n }·s=|O′| 
     Since there are n−1 variables Δ i , there are n equations with s+n−1 variables. Further, there are n−1 inequalities of the form Δ 1 &gt;0 and Δ i+1 &gt;Δ i . This gives a subset V of R s+n−1  comprised of vectors {r 1 , r 2 , . . . r n , Δ 1 , . . . , Δ n−1 } where r i =0 if a i ∉O′. This represents the space of possible solutions to the n simultaneous equations. 
     If Vis empty, then the list of ranks provided by the participant for the potential outcomes does not support creation of an influent function. In this case, the participant may be provided the option of eliminating the last ranked potential outcome on the list and trying again. This may be repeated until a non-empty V is obtained. If V is not empty, an influent function may be chosen from the influent functions in V by taking mid(r i ) and mid(Δ j ) as the median value from the range of solutions for each variable and finding the vector V′={r 1 ′, r 2 ′, . . . r s ′, Δ 1 ′, . . . , Δ n−1 ′} in V such that: 
     Σ|r i ′−mid(r i )|+Σ|Δ i ′−mid(Δ i )| is minimized. If there is more than one such vector, then a further stipulation that:
 
Σ r     i     ∈V′ Σ r     j     ∈V′ |r i −r j | is minimized may be added and then a vector may be chosen randomly. Thereafter, an influent function is defined as Φ P  where Φ P (a 1 )=r i ′.
 
     According to some embodiments, influent functions for a participant may be created using rules. Rules are ways of building influent functions using defined functions. These functions take characteristics and characteristic functions associated with the options and outcomes, as well as other influent functions, to create another influent function. For example, a rule-based influent function may represent a total cost of a date. The choices might be (a) which restaurant (b) which theatre and (c) what transportation in between. The cost of the date may depend on not just the restaurant or movie theatre, but also how much it will cost to travel in between if both a restaurant and a movie theatre are chosen. The cost to travel might in turn depend on the choice of transportation, which depends on which restaurant and theatre is chosen. Rules are ways of expressing more complicated relations which can be entered as formulas. 
     Rules can express inequalities or Boolean statements which can lead to different functions if satisfied or not satisfied. Rules can be defined by survey participants and/or survey administrators. Rules can be used to create influent functions from scratch, or modify an existing influent. For example, a survey participant may take a certain influent function as his starting point, but create a rule which zeros the support for any outcome in which the budget exceeds a certain spending threshold. It might also be used as a multiplier or power function which affects the total support for an outcome based on certain characteristics. 
     In some embodiments, influent functions associated with survey participants may be included in a library of influent functions which serves as a repository of influent functions. The influent functions stored in the repository may include influent functions created by any one of the methods described herein, including: ranking options, ranking issues and options, ranking issues and options based on one or more criteria or values, modifying one or more influent functions, merging two or more influent functions, using one or more starting influent functions associated with the participant and one or more potential outcomes determined based on the influent functions, and using rules. The library of influent functions may be accessed by a participant to select one or more starting influent functions and further perform operations such as modifying the influent functions, merging the influent functions, ranking potential outcomes based on the starting influent functions, and using rules to modify and/or create new influent functions based on the starting influent functions. The repository of influent functions may be populated over time with influent functions created by survey participants. These influent functions may then be presented to other survey participants as starting influent functions. Each survey may have a corresponding repository of influent functions. 
     A participant profile may be associated with each participant. For example, survey conductor  102  of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  incorporates, or has access to, a participant profile database  119  for storing information related to each participant&#39;s profile; such information may be used by survey conductor  102  and/or collective outcome generator  104  to determine influent functions, influent levels, satisfaction scores, dissonance scores, and other variables for each survey. The participant profile may be populated as the participant completes each survey. The participant profile may record information such as information relating to the participant&#39;s survey experiences and responses and the participant&#39;s influent level for the survey. For example, a participant profile may include one or more of the following, for each survey: the participant&#39;s final influent function(s), a satisfaction score and/or dissonance score of the participant with respect to the survey&#39;s collective outcome, an influent level of the participant, and a weight assigned by the participant to the survey. To begin with, at time t 1 , the participant profile for a participant may include an influent level associated with the participant for a decision D(t 1 ) and a weight or “impulse” assigned by the participant to the decision D(t 1 ). 
     The influent level associated with a participant for each survey is the weighing factor accorded to the participant&#39;s one or more influent functions that constitute that participant&#39;s “vote” for the survey. For example, in a democratic process all participants may be considered to have equal say or equal influence in deciding the collective outcome or decision, and a weighing factor of 100% is thus assigned to each participant. However, a democratic process that assigns all participants an equal influence towards a decision may not always be desirable or feasible. For example, in the case of a Parliament, there could be five political parties with 40%, 31%, 19%, 6% and 4% of popular support respectively. In this case, the political parties could be assigned influent levels of 40, 31, 19, 6 and 4 respectively. This means the political parties&#39; votes are weighed by a factor 40%, 31%, 19%, 6% and 4% respectively. The influent level associated with a participant may be assigned by a survey administrator and/or by the survey participants. 
     The influent level of a participant x is referred to as θ(x). The influent level of participant x can also vary depending upon the time or decision, in which case we can write θ(D(t), x) as the influent level for the decision at time t. The influent level of participant x may vary depending on the outcome. For example, the influent level for outcome O may be the percentage of options belonging to O for which participant x provided a rank. We refer to the influent level of participant x for outcome O as θ(O, x). 
     In addition to the influent level associated with a participant for a survey, the participant profile may also include a weight assigned by a participant for a survey. The weight assigned by a participant to a survey indicates a level of importance given by that participant for the survey. A participant can give a rank J(D(t), x) to a decision as a way of indicating its importance relative to other decisions in the series of decisions. The rank J(D(t), x) where 0≦J(D(t), x)≦1, may be called the impulse of x for D(t). 
     The impulse assigned by the participant to each survey may be used to determine the participant&#39;s satisfaction or dissonance for the survey as will be explained below. 
     Each participant may create or select one or more influent functions in the manner described above. If more than one influent function is developed then the participant may select a subset of these influent functions to contribute toward the participant&#39;s “vote” toward a collective decision. The selected influent functions may be combined to create a new influent function for the participant corresponding to the participant&#39;s vote. The selected influent functions may be combined using one or more of the techniques described above for merging together influent functions. The new influent function corresponding to the participant&#39;s vote and/or the influent functions created by the participant may be published by the participant for use by other participants. 
     After the survey participants have cast their vote, at step  306  of  FIG. 3 &#39;s method  300  the influent functions of the participants are aggregated and applied to each potential outcome to determine a collective influent function for each survey, as described in further detail below. This step may be performed by one or more components of  FIG. 1 &#39;s system  100  or  FIG. 2 &#39;s system  200 . For example, the processing at method  300 &#39;s step  306  may be carried out by collective outcome generator  104  of system  100  ( FIG. 1 ). A processor  112  of collective outcome generator  104  may be operated to call software routines  114  stored in a program memory  116  accessible to processor  112 . The influent functions of the survey participants, which may be stored in a survey results database  118 , may be provided as input to one or more of the software routines  114  that are called by processor  112 . The influent functions may be used to determine satisfaction scores and dissonance scores as explained herein. Execution of the software routines  114  by processor  112  causes the processor  112  to generate and return a collective influent function for the survey. 
     As noted above, the generation of a collective influent function for a survey may take into consideration satisfaction scores and/or dissonance scores associated with each potential outcome for the survey. The satisfaction score of a potential outcome represents a participant&#39;s degree of satisfaction with that outcome. The satisfaction score may be indicative of the amount of intentional energy that a participant would put towards realizing that outcome. The satisfaction score Sat′ can be expressed as a percentage of potential energy available. In particular embodiments the satisfaction score for each outcome is derived from the final influent function (as determined from the participant&#39;s rankings of issues and options). Application of the final influent function to the potential outcomes generates a ranked list of the potential outcomes, wherein the top ranked outcome is the one that would provide the greatest satisfaction to the participant and therefore has the highest satisfaction score. 
     In other embodiments, the participant&#39;s satisfaction score may be based on a modified ranked list of the potential outcomes submitted by the applicant. In such cases, each potential outcome may first be automatically ranked in accordance with the participant&#39;s final influent function as discussed above, but the participant is allowed to modify the order in which the outcomes are ranked. The participant may view the pre-ranked list and confirm or change the order by manually ranking one or more of the potential outcomes as the most preferred potential outcome, a second most preferred outcome and so on. In some embodiments, ranks for the potential outcomes may have been recommended to the participant by recommending ranks for issues and/or options as discussed earlier (e.g. as may be recommended when ranking by value or trusted advisor). 
     A participant&#39;s satisfaction score for the collective outcome determined for a survey may be saved in the participant profile of the participant (and stored in participant profile database  119  of  FIG. 1 ) to determine an influent level associated with the participant for a subsequent survey as explained later. Thus, as and when each survey is conducted, the participant profile of a participant is updated to include the participant&#39;s satisfaction score for that survey&#39;s collective outcome. 
     R(O, x) is the rank assigned to a potential outcome O for a participant x. corresponds to an influent function Φ(O) in the unit form, that is, R(O, x)=Φ(O) and ∥Φ∥=1, then, a measure of the satisfaction of participant x for outcome O may be represented by Sat′(O, x). We define the “neutral rank” for an outcome O as that rank R(O,N) where a participant has no energy for or against the outcome. 
     In one example embodiment, Sat′(O, x) is expressed as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       Sat 
                       
                         
                             
                         
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                   ( 
                   16 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where MaxR(x)=R(O, x)s.t.O∈O a  and R(O, x)≧R(O, y)∀y ∈P, x≠y (MaxR(x) corresponds to the greatest rank provided by participant x for any of the outcomes); MinR(x)=R(O, x)s.t.O∈O a  and R(O, x)≦R(O, y)∀y∈P, x≠y (MinR(x) corresponds to the smallest rank provided by participant x for any of the outcomes); and Δ is some very small number, e,g. 0.0001. If MaxR(x)=MinR(x) then Sat′(O, x)=0.5 is taken. 
     In this example embodiment, Sat′(O, x) has a range of 0 to 1. It is generally more convenient to generate Sat′(O, x) in such a manner that the range of Sat′(O, x) is symmetrical about a neutral point corresponding to the neutral rank. The neutral point may, for example, be zero. For example the values of Sat′(O, x) may be in the range of −1 to 1. It is particularly convenient to define a measure of participant satisfaction and a measure of participant dissonance such that both of these measures have the same neutral point and the same range. This facilitates combining these measures as discussed, for example, below. 
     An example way to define Sat′(O, x) such that Sat′(O, x) has the range (−1, 1) is: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       Sat 
                       
                         
                             
                         
                          
                         ′ 
                       
                     
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                       ( 
                       
                         O 
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                                 ) 
                               
                             
                           
                           - 
                           
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                             max 
                           
                           - 
                           
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                         R 
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                         max 
                       
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                         min 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   17 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where Rmax={the maximum rank possible for the outcome O}, Rmin={the minimum rank possible for the outcome O}; and Δ is some very small number, e,g. 0.0001. In this example, if R(O,N), is midway between Rmax and Rmin, then Sat′(O,N) equals 0. 
     If the satisfaction function is considered over the space of all possible outcomes, a way of ensuring fairness and preventing strategic ranking is to require that the influence exerted over the space of all actionable outcomes be the same for all participants. A way of thinking about this is to imagine an automated bidding system, which helps each participant to place a price and bid on each potential outcome, where the amount of each bid is based on how much the participant values that outcome relative to the other outcomes. 
     Normalizing the final influent function associated with each participant ensures the total amount bid by each participant over all the outcomes is the same, while preserving the relative rankings of the outcomes and ensuring that Sat(O, x) remains within a desired range, for example, 0&lt;Sat(O, x)&lt;1 or −1&lt;Sat(O, x)&lt;1, for all outcomes and all participants. Sat(O, x) defines the normalized satisfaction for a participant x and may be given by: 
       |Sat( O,x )−Sat( O,N )|=|Sat′( O,x )−Sat′( O,N )| Px   (18)
 
     where Sat(O,N)=Sat′(O,N) and Px is the exponential modifier for each function that normalizes it to a constant volume while respecting the relative rankings of the outcomes and keeping the result in a desired range, e.g. between 0 and 1. Px may be determined for example by taking n=|O a | and finding Px for each x in P such that: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
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             = 
             
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     for the case where Sat′(O,x) has the range 0 to 1 and the neutral point is zero, or, 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
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                               ( 
                               
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                       Px 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
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                     2 
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   19 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     for the case where Sat′(O,x) has the range −1 to 1 and the neutral point is Sat′(O,N). 
     Thus, in the first case, 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
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             , 
           
         
       
     
     and in the second case, 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   ∑ 
                   
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                       a 
                     
                   
                 
                  
                 
                     
                 
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                       Sat 
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                         ( 
                         
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                         ) 
                       
                     
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                         ( 
                         
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                         Sat 
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                           ( 
                           
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                           ) 
                         
                       
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                      
                   
                 
                 = 
                 
                   n 
                   2 
                 
               
             
             , 
           
         
       
     
     for all x, y∈P, each of which basically asserts that all participants start with the same amount of influence in the bidding process. In other embodiments, the influent functions are not normalized. In such embodiments, we can take Sat(O,x)=Sat′(O,x). 
     If we are considering the survey as a decision following a set of preceding decisions D′={D(i) . . . D(j)}⊂ , we can define D′(O) as D′ ending with a decision to adopt outcome O, for some potential outcome O. If we are not considering previous decisions then we simply take D′(O)=O. The preceding decisions D′ might include all previous decisions, or a subset of previous decisions such as the most recent five decisions. The preceding decisions D′ may include some “blank” decisions D o  where Sat(D o , y)=Sat(D o , x) and J(D o , y)=J(D o ,x) for all participants x, y for decisions with few or no prior decisions. Then we can define a measure of how satisfied a participant x would be with the decision series D′ that ends in decision to adopt outcome O as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     Sat 
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                   20 
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     where J(D(t), x) is the impulse of the participant x on the decision D(t) and Sat(D(t), x) is the satisfaction of the participant x towards a decision D(t). Further, we can define the average satisfaction of the participants for the decisions as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     AvgSat 
                      
                     
                         
                     
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                   ( 
                   21 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where p is the number of participants. 
     For each potential outcome O, we can take I(D′(O)) as the “collective satisfaction score” to represent the amount of influence behind a decision to adopt O by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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                   22 
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     In some embodiments, we may want to find the amount of satisfaction generated per option contained in an outcome, or the amount of satisfaction generated for each unit of a characteristic, for example, cost. In those cases, we can take: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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                   ( 
                   23 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where k(O) corresponds to the number of options, or any other characteristic of the outcome O. 
     In some embodiments, we may want to ensure that I(D′(O)) maps to a specific range where the top of that range corresponds to the maximum possible satisfaction, and the bottom of that range corresponds to the smallest possible satisfaction. In that case we can take imaginary influents Im 1 ={max value of Φ(O)/k(O) over all outcomes, where Φ has given the maximum possible score for each option and an equal weight to all issues} and Im 2 ={min value of Φ(O)/k(O) over all outcomes, where Φ has given the smallest possible score for each option and an equal weight to all issues}. So for example if we want to map the influents to the range [−1, 1], with the neutral influent mapping to 0, we can do a transformation T on I(D′(O)) such that: 
       If  I ( D ′( O ))= Im 0 then  T[I ( D ′( O ))]=0  i.
 
       If  I ( D ′( O ))&gt; Im 0 then  T[I ( D ′( O ))]=| I ( D ′( O ))− Im 0|/| Im 2− Im 0|  ii.
 
       If  I ( D ′( O ))&lt; Im 0 then  T[I ( D ′( O ))]=| I ( D ′( O ))− Im 0|/| Im 0− Im 1|  iii.
 
         I ( D ′( O ))&gt; Im 2 then  T[I ( D ′( O ))]=1  iv.
 
         I ( D ′( O ))&lt; Im 1 then  T[I ( D ′( O ))]=−1  v.
 
     where Im 0  is the neutral influent, If some satisfaction scores get truncated per (iv) and (v), we can re-normalize those influents so that the volume of Φ of over the space of outcomes remains equal to n/2. 
     On determining the satisfaction score and influent level for a potential outcome for a participant, the dissonance score associated with a given potential outcome may be determined based on one or more of: the participant&#39;s satisfaction score, the participant&#39;s average satisfaction score for all of the outcomes, the greatest rank provided by a participant to an outcome, the impulse of the participant given to the outcome, an advantage quotient associated with the outcome, a disadvantage quotient associated with the outcome, and the influent level of the participant. 
     In some embodiments, the dissonance score may be determined as a standard deviation of influents invested in a decision series to come up with an outcome O. Therefore, the dissonance score of the outcome may be determined based on a satisfaction score of each participant for the decision series, an average satisfaction of the plurality of participants for a decision, and an average satisfaction of the plurality of participants over the decision series. Based on the values calculated above, the dissonance score DS 1 (D′(O)) of the outcome O is calculated by the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       
                         DS 
                         1 
                         
                           
                               
                           
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                   ( 
                   25 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Research studies have shown that unfairness in a decision process can lead people resisting an outcome even when they would benefit from the outcome, and conversely, that fairness in a decision process can lead to people supporting an outcome even when they would otherwise be resistant. Framed in mathematical terms, as DS′ over an outcome space decreases from 1 to 0, there will be a “tipping point” when people will cease to resist something because of inequality aversion, and begin to support it due to its fairness. Where this neutral tipping point is found will depend on the type of decision process and group dynamics, and can be determined empirically or by mutual agreement. Call this tipping point t, where 0≦t≦1. In some embodiments, we can take t as the dissonance of the distribution in which there are an equal number of participants at each possible level of satisfaction, that is, where the distribution curve of satisfaction is flat over all participants. Solving for DS 1 (D′(O)) in that scenario returns the value (⅓)̂0.5, which we can then take as the value of t. 
     We can see that Sat(D′(O), x) and AvgSat(D′(O)) will fall in the range [−1, 1] and therefore that DS′(D′(O)) will fall in the range [0, 1]. We can define a linear transformation T which creates DS from DS′ over a new range, T(DS′)=DS, and which shifts the range from [0, 1] to (inverted) [−1, 1]. In other words, if DS′=1, then DS=−1 and if DS′=0 then DS=1, and which also moves the tipping point t to zero, DS(t)=0. For example we can define T(x) as follows: take z=x−t; if z&lt;0 then T(x)=−z/t, if z&gt;0 then T(x)=z/(1−t). 
     A collective influent function may be defined for each outcome based on the collective satisfaction scores and the dissonance scores. When this collective influent function models the collective support that groups will have for outcomes, we refer to it as the strength score. The strength score is a value that is assigned to each outcome that is indicative of the difference between the level of support and level of resistance to an outcome for the collective group. An outcome with strong levels of support and low levels of resistance will tend to have a higher strength score than an outcome with lower levels of support, and high levels of resistance. There are several ways of calculating the strength score. 
     As a first approach (referred to as the “Relative Method”) we can define a strength score ε for an outcome O as the sum of the support/opposition energy due to personal satisfaction I(D′(O), x), and the support/resistance energy due to procedural/distributive fairness DS(D′(O)), in a ratio according to their relative weight M, where 0≦M≦1 as follows: 
       ε( O )=ε( D ′( O ))= M*I ( D ′( O ))+(1− M )* DS ( D ′( O ))   (26)
 
     The value of M will depend on the type of decision process and group dynamics, and can be determined empirically or by mutual agreement. 
     As a second approach (referred to as the “Rawlsian Method”), in some decision scenarios it will be possible to have a “strong” mutual collaboration agreement between the parties, in which the parties will (a) fully support whichever outcome creates the most aggregate satisfaction (b) fully oppose whichever outcome creates the least satisfaction (c) fully support whichever outcome creates the most fairness and (d) fully resist whichever outcome creates the most unfairness. We can refer to this “Rawlsian strength score” as ε R , and it is useful because it provides an a priori frame for weighing the relative importance of personal satisfaction and fairness. 
     One way of defining the Rawlsian strength score as follows: Take DS(max)=greatest value of DS over the space of all actionable outcomes and all participants, DS(min)=smallest possible value of DS over the space of all the actionable outcomes and all participants. Then we can define DS R  such that: if DS(O)&lt;0 then DS R (O)=−DS(O)/DS(min), if DS(O)&gt;0 then DS R (O)=DS(O)/DS(max), if DS(O)=0 then DS R (O)=0. Similarly, we can take I(max)=the greatest value of I over the space of all actionable outcomes and all participants, I(min)=smallest possible value of I over the space of all the actionable outcomes and all participants. Then we can define I R  in a similar manner as DS R : if I&lt;0 then I R =−I/I(min), if I&gt;0 then I R =I/I(max), if I=0 then I R =0. From this, we can define: 
       Ethelo R ( O )=ε R ( D ′( O ))= M*I   R ( D ′( O ))+(1− M )* DS   R ( D ′( O ))   (27)
 
     As a third approach (referred to as the “Absolute Method”) we can define a strength score ε for an outcome O as a function of the support/opposition energy due to personal satisfaction I(D′(O), x), and the support/resistance energy due to procedural/distributive fairness DS(D′(O)) as follows: 
       ε( O )=ε( D ′( O ))= I ′( D ′( O ))̂(( t′/DS ″( D ′( O ))̂ M ) if  I ( D ′(0))≧0 and
 
       ε( O )=ε( D ′( O ))=−| I ′( D ′( O ))|̂(( t′/DS ″( D ′( O )))̂ M ) if  I ( D ′( O ))&lt;0  (28)
 
     Where DS″=1−DS′, where t′=(1−t) the tipping point as defined above, and where value of M will depend on the type of decision process and group dynamics, and can be determined empirically or by mutual agreement. 
     A particular method for calculating the strength score ε of a collective decision according to another example embodiment is described below. The following definitions apply to this method:
         Strength score ε=[−1, 1];   Average support for an outcome, represented as the support score “I”=[−1, 1];   Standard deviation of support or satisfaction score, represented as the dissonance “DS”=[0,1];   Coherency of a group based on fairness, represented as unity “U”=[−I, 1]; and   Impact of unity U on a decision, represented as collective identity ≡=[0, 1]. For example, collective identity ≡ may be defined as 0 in some embodiments, 0.2 in other embodiments, and 0.5 in still other embodiments.       

     Survey participants are asked to score options in a particular range. The range in which the survey participants is asked to score an option may be a range of, for example, [−100, 100], wherein 100 indicates full support and −100 indicates full opposition. For purposes of determining the strength score ε by the system, this range may in turn be translated to the range [−1, 1]. In other embodiments the system may be configured to represent the range to the survey participants in the positive range only, for example, [0, 100], where 100 indicates full support and 0 indicates no support. For purposes of determining the strength score ε, this range may in turn be translated to the range [0, 1]. There is a substantive difference in these two ranges, because the strength score operates differently on negative numbers than positive numbers, as explained below. 
     Support I is the average satisfaction score of an option or outcome as ranked by the survey participants. It has the same range as the range of the option scoring. For a project where opposition as well as support may be expressed for the available options, this range would be [−1, 1], for example. In embodiments where issues and scoring options are weighted, the system performs an adjustment using a standard upper and lower bound, so that the support scores falls in the range [−1, 1]. The support I for a particular outcome may be expressed as a degree, e.g. I=75° (similar to temperature being expressed as a degree on a scale). 
     Support may be analogous to influence. Embodiments as described herein allow the scoring process to be used by participants to distribute their influence across the spectrum of possible outcomes (where more weight is accorded to the rankings provided by participants having higher influence). 
     Approval of an option or outcome may be defined as the percentage of participants in a group who scored the option or outcome with a positive value, or those who were to the right of neutral. This percentage excludes those who gave a neutral or negative value to an option or outcome. Approval can be expressed as a percentage: for example, an approval of 75% means 75% of people gave the option or outcome a net positive score. 
     Dissonance DS refers to the standard deviation of the distribution of support for an option or outcome. Dissonance may be defined in the range of [0,1], such that if everyone has the same support for an option or outcome, DS=0, whereas if a group is completely polarized, DS=1. Framed in mathematical terms, as DS for an outcome decreases from 1 to 0, there will be a tipping point t when people will cease to resist the outcome because of inequality aversion, and begin to support it due to fairness and the unity it creates. Where this neutral tipping point is found will depend on the type of decision process and group dynamics, and can be determined empirically or by mutual agreement. 
     A priori, we can take t as the dissonance of the distribution in which there are an equal number of participants at each possible level of support, that is, where someone lands on the distribution graph is completely random. This distribution curve of support will be flat over all possible supports. In that case, we can take t=(⅓)̂0.5≈0.577. 
     Unity U is a measure of the internal cohesion of a group due to agreement or fairness in the distribution of support. U can range from a negative value, when a group is polarized in its support, to a positive value, when a group is unified in its support. We take the tipping point t as the neutral mid-point where a group is neither polarized nor unified, i.e. where U=0. 
     U may be defined as a function mapping DS onto a range {−1, 1}, where U(1)=−1, U(0)=1, and at the tipping point t, U(t)=0. We can define U as follows: 
       If  DS≦t  then  U =( t−DS )/ t,U  falls in [0,1] 
       If  DS≧ 2 then  U =( t−DS )/(1− t ), U  falls in [−1,0]
 
     Unity U has a different relevance in different decision contexts because the situation in which a decision becomes more powerful through unity is a social phenomenon. It does not appear if there is only one participant. For example, in a process where participants do not have relationships or the sense of reciprocity that arises in community, it may not be important that participants experience similar levels of support for an outcome, or feel that influence in shaping the outcomes was distributed fairly. However, in a stakeholder process where there are entitlements resting on a collective identity, then fairness in support distribution can be quite important. The collective identity ≡ (which may be in the range [0,1]) represents the importance of unity in a specific decision context and determines the impact of unity on a decision. 
     In a collective decision context, the support of individuals alone is not sufficient to determine the strength of a outcome, because of the impact of unity or the lack thereof. Conversely, unity alone is not sufficient to determine the strength of a decision, because people can be highly unified in opposition as well as support. 
     The strength score ε measures the level of “intentional energy” that a group will bring to an option or outcome. The level of energy determines the strength of a decision and its capacity to the harness the aligned intentions of participants towards action. 
     The strength score ε may be determined based on a series of axioms that the equation for computing the strength score ε needs to obey. In particular embodiments, the strength score ε combines the factors of support, collective identity, and unity into a single function that observes one or more of the following axioms, which are abstracted from empirical studies:
         1. If I is constant, |ε| will increase as U increases, and decrease as U decreases   2. If U is constant, |ε| will increase as |I| increases, and decrease as |I| decreases   3. ε must carry the same sign (positive or negative) as I   4. if U=0 then ε=I,   5. if U&gt;0 and ≡&gt;0 then |ε|&gt;|I|   6. if U&lt;0 and ≡&gt;0 then |ε|&lt;|I|   7. if U=−1 and ≡=1 then |ε|=0   8. If U=1 and ≡=1 and |I|≠0 then |ε|=1   9. If I=0 then ε=0   10. increasing increases impact of U on ε   11. all of the equations for determining strength score ε are continuous (optional)       

     Taking the above axioms, we can define the strength score as follows: 
     If I&gt;0 and DS&lt;t, then depending on the strength of ≡, ε will fall somewhere in range of [I,1]. We can define 
       ε= I+≡*U *(1− I )
 
       ε= I +≡*( t−DS )*(1− I )/ t  
 
     If I&gt;0 and DS&gt;t, then depending on strength of ≡, ε will fall somewhere in range of [0,1]. We can define 
       ε= I+≡*U* 1
 
       ε= I +≡*( t−DS )* I (1− t )
 
     If I&lt;0 and DS&lt;t then depending on the strength of ≡, ε will fall somewhere in range of [I,−1]. We can define 
       ε= I+≡*U *(−1− I )
 
       ε= I +≡*( t−DS )*(−1− I )/ t  
 
     If I&lt;0 and DS&gt;t then depending on the strength of ≡, ε will fall somewhere in range of [0,1]. We can define 
       ε= I+≡*U*I  
 
       ε= I +≡*( t−DS )* I /(1− t )
 
     To simplify the strength score ε, we can define ε generally: 
       ε= I +≡*( t−DS )* K.  
 
     where if I&gt;0 and DS&lt;t then K=(1−I)/t;
 
where if I&gt;0 and DS&gt;t then K=I/(1−t);
 
where if I&lt;0 and DS&lt;t then K=(−1−I)/t; and
 
where if I&lt;0 and DS&gt;t then K=I/(1−t).
 
Expressing K as a spreadsheet function:
 
         K =if( DS&gt;t,I /(1− t ), if( I&gt; 0,(1− I )/ t ,(−1− I )/ t ))
 
     Note that this definition of ε is not continuous at U=0. Although this can be remedied using curves or tables, the small impact caused by the discontinuity may be acceptable in view of the simplicity of calculating linear equations. 
     Table I below shows representative data, obtained through an actual test on the system described herein, for the variables described above, to evaluate for the strength score ε, for t=(⅓)̂0.5≈0.5773502692. 
     
       
         
           
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
             
               
                 TABLE I 
               
               
                   
               
               
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                 ≡(collective 
               
               
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                 identity, which 
               
               
                 Unity 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                 is equivalent to 
               
               
                 Factor 
                 ∈ 
                 K 
                 U 
                 I 
                 DS 
                 relative weight M) 
               
               
                   
               
             
            
               
                   
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
            
               
                 −0.450 
                 −0.950 
                 −0.87 
                 1.00 
                 −0.5 
                 0 
                 0.9 
               
               
                 −0.388 
                 −0.888 
                 −0.87 
                 0.91 
                 −0.5 
                 0.05 
                 0.85 
               
               
                 −0.331 
                 −0.831 
                 −0.87 
                 0.83 
                 −0.5 
                 0.1 
                 0.8 
               
               
                 −0.278 
                 −0.778 
                 −0.87 
                 0.74 
                 −0.5 
                 0.15 
                 0.75 
               
               
                 −0.229 
                 −0.729 
                 −0.87 
                 0.65 
                 −0.5 
                 0.2 
                 0.7 
               
               
                 −0.184 
                 −0.684 
                 −0.87 
                 0.57 
                 −0.5 
                 0.25 
                 0.65 
               
               
                 −0.144 
                 −0.644 
                 −0.87 
                 0.48 
                 −0.5 
                 0.3 
                 0.6 
               
               
                 −0.108 
                 −0.608 
                 −0.87 
                 0.39 
                 −0.5 
                 0.35 
                 0.55 
               
               
                 −0.077 
                 −0.577 
                 −0.87 
                 0.31 
                 −0.5 
                 0.4 
                 0.5 
               
               
                 −0.050 
                 −0.550 
                 −0.87 
                 0.22 
                 −0.5 
                 0.45 
                 0.45 
               
               
                 −0.027 
                 −0.527 
                 −0.87 
                 0.13 
                 −0.5 
                 0.5 
                 0.4 
               
               
                 −0.008 
                 −0.508 
                 −0.87 
                 0.05 
                 −0.5 
                 0.55 
                 0.35 
               
               
                 0.008 
                 −0.492 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.05 
                 −0.5 
                 0.6 
                 0.3 
               
               
                 0.021 
                 −0.479 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.17 
                 −0.5 
                 0.65 
                 0.25 
               
               
                 0.029 
                 −0.471 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.29 
                 −0.5 
                 0.7 
                 0.2 
               
               
                 0.031 
                 −0.469 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.41 
                 −0.5 
                 0.75 
                 0.15 
               
               
                 0.026 
                 −0.474 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.53 
                 −0.5 
                 0.8 
                 0.1 
               
               
                 0.016 
                 −0.484 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.65 
                 −0.5 
                 0.85 
                 0.05 
               
               
                 0.000 
                 −0.500 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.76 
                 −0.5 
                 0.9 
                 3.6E−15 
               
               
                 −0.022 
                 −0.522 
                 −1.18 
                 −0.88 
                 −0.5 
                 0.95 
                 −0.05 
               
               
                 −0.050 
                 −0.550 
                 −1.18 
                 −1.00 
                 −0.5 
                 1 
                 −0.1 
               
               
                   
               
            
           
         
       
     
       FIGS. 18A, 18B and 18C  show plots of the data in Table I. These graphs illustrate the relationship between strength score ε and dissonance score DS (in  FIG. 18A ); the relationship between strength score ε and relative weight M (see  FIG. 18B ); and the relationship between strength score ε and average support score I (see  FIG. 18C ); all over different values of the unity factor U. 
     It can be seen here that ε works differently when I&lt;0 than it does when I&gt;0. This is the idea that consensus strengthens the extent of support or opposition. Therefore, from the perspective of the strength score, we need to distinguish between voting scales that span the spectrum from “oppose” to “support” (e.g. [−1,1]) from voting scales that are gradations of support (e.g. [0,1]). The distinction may be done at the level of the voting tool, so that the influent scores that are sent to the processor for computation should be sensitive to the sign of the score. If the voting scale is based only on gradations of support, then the corresponding influent values must be positive. Negative scores should signify actual opposition. 
     Other approaches to calculating the strength score may model either an empirically observed behaviour or some form of agreement, whether assumed or explicit. In one embodiment of this empirical approach, participants can be presented with visual representations of different support distributions. 
       FIGS. 10C, 10D  show exemplary support distributions  60 ,  65  for two different outcomes (referred to as outcome “C” and “D”). Support distribution  60  for outcome “C” is fairly unified and has all participants falling between neutral and fully support. However, the level of support of the participants who are most in favour of outcome C still fall well below the “fully support” end of the spectrum. On the other hand, support distribution  65  for outcome “D” is more split; it has some participants who are strongly in favor of the outcome (i.e. they are almost at the “fully support” end of the spectrum,) and some participants who oppose the outcome. In a decision-making context for a condominium strata, support distribution  60  may be preferable over support distribution  65  (since it is important not to alienate your neighbours by proceeding with a decision that a group will oppose); thus in those cases participants might choose support distribution  60 . However, in the market research context, support distribution  65  may be preferable over support distribution  60  (since it could be generally easier to convince a group to purchase a product if they are heavily in favour as opposed to simply having moderate support); thus in those cases participants might choose support distribution  65 . Participant feedback can be gathered and analyzed using standard mathematical techniques as conjoint analysis and regression analysis to identify the mathematical function that best models that behaviour. By doing this analysis and correlating values for key variables to specific decision types and factors, the most appropriate mathematical expressions for computing a strength score can be identified and applied in different decision contexts. For example, fairness may be more important in dividing assets than in a project design. 
     When one or more of the final influent functions include rankings based on a characteristic function c* mapping an option or an outcome characteristic to a range within R, then ε 1 (O) is a function mapping {c[in] n } to {c[out] n } where n is the number of such final influent functions. Extending this, if one or more of the final influent functions include rankings based on a set of characteristic functions {c 1 ,* . . . , c m *} then ε 1 (O) is a function mapping {c 1 [in] n(1) }∪ . . . ∪{c m [in] n(m) } to {c 1 [out] n(1) }∪ . . . ∪{c m [out] n(m) } where n(i) is the number of final influent functions that include rankings based on characteristic function c i *. Taking ε 1 (O) as based on a set of characteristic functions {c i *} then for each outcome, the set of values in {c i [in] } that maximize ε 1 (O) is used to determine the final ε 1 (O), and the specific values of the characteristics of that outcome. This may be done using computational methods such as linear programming and numerical approximations. This approach to determining ε(O) can also be used in the processes for calculating the collective influent functions below. 
     In other embodiments, the dissonance score may be determined as a resistance to inequality by a participant based on the resistance of the participant to satisfaction associated with one or more other participants. For a given outcome, the other participants may include one or more participants having a higher satisfaction score than the participant and one or more participants having a lower satisfaction score than the participant. The resistance of a participant to an outcome or decision may be determined based on the impulse of the participant for the decision and difference of satisfaction between the participant and the other participants. 
     In some embodiments, resistance of the participant to an outcome may also be determined based on a difference in the satisfaction of the participant and the other participants, an advantage quotient and a disadvantage quotient. The resistance of the participant to an outcome may indicate resistance toward other participants having higher satisfaction than the participant. The resistance of the participant to an outcome may also indicate the resistance toward other participants having lower satisfaction than the participant. 
     Further, dissonance of the participant to a decision in a decision series may be determined based on the influent functions of the participant for the decision of the decision series, an impulse of the participant for the decision in the decision series, the influent level of the participant, and resistance of the participant to the decision in the decision series. 
     In such case, the resistance of a participant x to a decision O may be determined by: DS 2 (D′(O),x)=δ(x) Hi(D′(O),x)+φ(x) Lo(D′(O),x) where δ(x) is the advantage quotient, φ(x) is the disadvantage quotient, Hi(D′(O),x) is a normalized difference between the satisfaction of the participant x with one or more other participants having better satisfaction scores as compared to the participant x for a decision O and Lo(D′(O),x) is a normalized difference between the participant x and one or more other participants having lower satisfaction score than the participant x for an decision O. Hi(D′(O),x) is determined using the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     Hi 
                      
                     
                       ( 
                       
                         
                           
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                             ( 
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                         , 
                         x 
                       
                       ) 
                     
                   
                   = 
                   
                     
                       
                         ∑ 
                         
                           y 
                           ∈ 
                           Hi 
                         
                       
                        
                       
                           
                       
                        
                       
                         Sat 
                          
                         
                           ( 
                           
                             
                               
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                         ) 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   29 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where Hi is the set of participants whose satisfaction score Sat(D′(O),y) is higher than satisfaction score Sat(D′(O),x) of the participant x. Similarly Lo(D′(O),x) is determined using the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     Lo 
                      
                     
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                         Sat 
                          
                         
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                        
                       
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                         ) 
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
               
                 
                   ( 
                   30 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where Lo is the set of participants whose satisfaction score Sat(D′(O),y) is lower than satisfaction score Sat(D′(O),x) of the participant x. 
     The advantage quotient δ(x) and the disadvantage quotient φ(x) for a participant x may be defined by the survey administrators and/or the survey participants. In some embodiments, δ(x) and φ(x) may be determined to be the same for all participants such that δ(x)=δ(y) and φ(x)=φ(y) for all x and y. In other embodiments, δ and φ may be based on empirical studies. In some embodiments, δ and φ may be determined by making one or more assumptions about agreements between the parties. In some embodiments, survey participants and/or survey administrators may provide a ratio for δ and φ, and one of the assumed agreements may be used to calculate the value of δ and φ. 
     Now, the resistance of the participant x for a decision series D′ is determined as: 
         DS   2 ( D ′( O ), x )=δ( x ) H   i ( D ′( O ), x )+φ( x ) Lo ( D ′( O ), x )  (31)
 
     The dissonance score of an outcome O is determined as: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       DS 
                       2 
                     
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                       ( 
                       
                         
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                           ∀ 
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                           ( 
                           
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                           ) 
                         
                       
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                   ( 
                   32 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where θ(O, x) is the influent level of the participant x for an outcome O. In some embodiments, one can take DS 2 (D′(O)) as the standard deviation of DS 2 (D′(O),x) as per the earlier embodiment, that is: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       DS 
                       2 
                     
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                                  
                                 
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                   ( 
                   33 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 Avg 
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                 p 
               
             
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     which may be interpreted as a measure of fairness in the distribution of unhappiness. 
     As in the preceding embodiments, a collective influent function ε may then be defined for each outcome as a function of the collective satisfaction and dissonance scores using an approach such as Relative, Rawlsian or Absolute Method, as discussed above 
     In other embodiments, the dissonance score may be determined as a deviation of satisfaction of a participant for an outcome, from the satisfaction of the participant for his ideal outcome. The ideal outcome is the outcome to which the participant has provided the maximum or highest rank. Therefore, the dissonance score for an outcome may be determined based on the participant&#39;s influent level, the participant&#39;s rank R(O, x) for the outcome, and the participant&#39;s maximum rank MaxR(x) for an outcome. The dissonance score DS 3 (D′(O),x) for participant x may be determined by the following equations: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
                       
                         DS 
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                   34 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where R(D(t), x) is as defined above for R(O, x) as the rank by the participant x for the final outcome O of the decision D(t) in the decision series D′. Similarly, MaxR(D(t)) is defined as above for MaxR(x) as the maximum rank by a participant x for an outcome of the decision D(t) in the decision series D′. 
     As in the preceding embodiments, a collective influent function ε may then be defined for each outcome as a function of the collective satisfaction and dissonance scores. 
     According to other embodiments, the dissonance score of a particular outcome may be determined as the difference in satisfaction between the participant in question and the other participants with respect to the outcome. The dissonance score may be determined based on one or more of: the influent level of the participant, the influent levels of the other participants, the satisfaction score of the participant, and the satisfaction scores of the other participants. For example, a dissonance score for an outcome O may be determined by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     
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                       4 
                     
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                   ( 
                   35 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     As in the preceding embodiments, a collective influent function ε may then be defined for each outcome as a function of the collective satisfaction and dissonance scores. 
     On determining the collective influent function for a survey, at step  308  of  FIG. 3 &#39;s method  300  the potential outcomes associated with the survey are ranked based on the collective influent function. In some embodiments, the ranked outcomes are processed further to determine shortlisted outcomes. The shortlisted outcomes may be determined based on: a threshold satisfaction score, a threshold dissonance score, a threshold equality factor; a threshold rank; or a combination of one or more of the above. One or more of these may be defined by the survey participants. In some embodiments, the shortlisted outcomes are determined by comparing one or more of the threshold values with the corresponding values associated with each outcome. The shortlisted outcomes may represent a set of possible outcomes. The shortlisted outcomes may then be ranked based on one or more criteria, for example the collective influent function. On ranking the potential outcomes or the shortlisted potential outcomes based on the collective influent function, the top ranked outcome may be selected as a final outcome. In particular embodiments, a shortlist of the top ranked outcomes can be submitted for another decision-making process such as a direct vote. 
     In some embodiments, a confidence rating may be provided for the issues and options based on the shortlisted outcomes. The shortlisted outcomes are further processed to identify a frequency of occurrence of one or more options associated with the shortlisted outcomes. For example, suppose that there are 10 shortlisted outcomes. Each shortlisted outcome is associated with one or more options and one or more issues. If 4 shortlisted outcomes are associated with an option a1, and 3 shortlisted outcomes are associated with an option a2, the frequency of occurrence of option a1 is 4 and the frequency of occurrence of option a2 is 3. Based on the frequency of occurrence of an issue or an option, a confidence rating is provided for the issue or the option. The confidence rating represents a confidence of the survey participants in the issue or the option for solving the problem. 
     In particular embodiments, a revised influent level for each participant is determined based on the final collective outcome associated with a survey, the current influent level of the participant and the satisfaction score for the participant associated with the selected outcome. In some embodiments, a function θ(D(t), x) determining the influent level for participant x for decisions at different times (e.g. from previous surveys) may also be considered in the determination of the revised influent level of participant x. The influent level represents the influence of a participant in the selection of an outcome. The revised influent level may be used in future surveys participated in by the participant. The revised influent level for a participant is updated in the participant profile of the participant to be referred to when such future surveys are conducted. 
     In some embodiments, the revised influent level for a participant is allocated in such a manner so as to compensate for a low satisfaction level achieved by the participant for the final collective outcome of a survey. For example, in a decision series for making a plurality of decisions, a group of participants may have achieved lower satisfaction as compared to another group of participants. In such a scenario, the group of participants who had a lower satisfaction may be provided with increased influent levels for future surveys so that the chosen collective outcome for such surveys may be more satisfactory to such participants. The revised influent level for a participant may be determined based on the participant&#39;s satisfaction associated with the chosen collective outcome, the maximum satisfaction of any participant for the chosen collective outcome, and/or the current influent level of the participant. 
     In one example embodiment, after choosing an outcome O for a decision D based on the satisfaction scores for the survey participants, the influent level of participants may be reduced from the starting influent level. For the participant x having a satisfaction score of Sat(D′(O),x) for a chosen outcome O, the reduced influent level for the participant x is determined by: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
                     T 
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                   ( 
                   36 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     where θ(x) is the starting influent level of the participant x, θ(O, x) is the influent level of the participant x for the outcome O, and max{|Sat(D′(O), y)| for ∀ y} is the maximum absolute satisfaction of one or more participants for the outcome O. T 1 (θ, x) may be used as the starting influent levels for the participant x for a subsequent decision. 
     In some embodiments, recycled influent levels for survey participant x may be determined as a function of time t. The recycled influent levels for the participant x for O may be determined by the following equation: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   
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                   ( 
                   37 
                   ) 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
     Thus, starting influent levels for the participant x for the subsequent decision D(t+1) may be determined by: 
       θ( D ( t+ 1), x )= T 2( T 1(θ( D ( t ), x )))  (38)
 
       FIG. 9  illustrates a block diagram of a system  700  for conducting surveys according to various embodiments. System  700  includes a plurality of modules, some of which are optional as indicated by the dotted lines in  FIG. 9 . The modules may be implemented by one or more computers configured to perform the module&#39;s functions as described. For example, a processing unit in the computer may execute software routines to perform the functions carried out by the module. In the illustrated embodiment, system  700  includes a presenting module  702 , a receiving module  704 , an aggregation module  706 , and a ranking module  708 . These modules work in conjunction with each other for conducting a survey. Presenting module  702  is configured to present issues and options associated with a survey to the survey participants. (As discussed above, options may be categorized by issue.) Presenting module  702  may include a user interface through which the issues and options are displayed to the participants.  FIG. 4  shows an example of a group of issues and corresponding options as presented to a survey participant in a user interface. Further, presenting module  702  of system  700  may be configured to present one or more potential outcomes associated with the issues and options to the survey participants. 
     Each particular combination of the available options is a potential outcome for the survey. However, as already noted above, some combinations might lead to non-actionable outcomes. In this regard, system  700  may include a shortlisting module  710  for eliminating one or more non-actionable outcomes from the potential outcomes associated with the survey. To eliminate the non-actionable outcomes, survey administrators and/or survey participants may specify one or more constraints or one or more rules. Constraints can be framed as Boolean logical relations between options and groups of options. Rules can be framed as mathematical or logical functions based on influent functions and characteristics associated with options or outcomes. Shortlisting module  710  analyses the plurality of potential outcomes associated with a survey based on the constraints or rules specified for that survey and eliminates any potential outcomes that are not actionable. The shortlisted potential outcomes may be presented to the participants by presenting module  702 . 
     The issues and options associated with a survey are presented to each survey participant for ranking by the participant. Various methods of ranking are further explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 . Receiving module  704  receives the ranking of issues and options provided by each participant. These rankings may be used as the basis for influent functions (as explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 ). In some embodiments, rankings may be recommended to a participant by another participants based on a trust rank assigned to the other participant. A participant can give another participant more than one trust rank, depending on their expertise in different areas under consideration. For those participants to whom the participant has not assigned a trust rank, a trust rank may be established by considering a trust propagation factor and a trust decay factor (as explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 ). In this case, system  700  may include a trust establishing module  712  to determine a trust rank for those participants for whom the participant has not directly assigned a trust rank. A trust rank may also be established by considering historical voting information. 
     In some embodiments, system  700  includes a modification module  714  to enable a participant to create new influent functions based on existing published influent functions. Modification module  714  may be configured to present influent functions created by other participants. The participant may select one or more of these existing influent functions and modify the selected influent functions in some manner to create a new influent function (as explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 ). In some embodiments, modification module  714  may include a user interface to allow a participant to modify the influent functions. In particular embodiment, modification module  714  may be configured to modify influent functions using one or more rules. Rules can express inequalities or Boolean statements which can lead to different functions if satisfied or not satisfied. 
     System  700  may include a merging module  716  configured to allow merging of two or more influent functions associated with a survey. Merging module  716  may include a user interface to allow a survey participant to select two or more existing influent functions for merging. The influent functions may be associated with other survey participants. In this case, the influent functions may be considered as starting influent functions. Merging the influent functions involves assigning a weight to each of the influent functions and combining them to form a single influent function. Merging the influent functions to create a single influent is further explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 . In some embodiments, merging module  716  is configured to create one or more influent functions by merging existing influent functions using one or more rules. 
     In some embodiments, system  700  may include an influent function generation module  718  for generating an influent function for a participant (or generating an ordinally ranked list of the potential outcomes) based on one or more existing influent functions associated with the participant and one or more potential outcomes chosen for the participant. For example, the participant may initially create one or more influent functions for a survey by: ranking the issues and options, ranking the issues and options based on one or more criteria, modifying one or more existing influent functions, and/or merging two or more existing functions as explained above. Based on the influent functions created by the participant, each potential outcome for the survey (corresponding to a particular combination of options) may be automatically ranked by an ordering module  720 . Ordering module  720  works in conjunction with presenting module  702  to present the ordered potential outcomes to the participant. For each outcome, the participant may confirm or change the order in which that outcome has been automatically ranked (as explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 ). Receiving module  704  receives the ranks provided for potential outcomes and works in conjunction with influent function generation module  718  to generate an influent function for the participant based on the initially created influent functions and the ranked outcomes. 
     An aggregation module  706  aggregates all of the created influent functions across the plurality of participants to generate a collective influent function for each survey. As explained in detail above in conjunction with  FIG. 3 , determination of the collective influent function for a survey may take into consideration satisfaction scores and/or dissonance scores associated with the potential outcomes. To this end, aggregation module  706  may include a satisfaction determination module  722  for calculating a degree of satisfaction associated with each participant for each potential outcome, and a dissonance determination module  724  for calculating a measure of difference in satisfaction between the participants for each potential outcome. For each participant, satisfaction determination module  722  determines a satisfaction score for each potential outcome that indicates how satisfied the participant would be with that potential outcome. In some embodiments, the satisfaction score and dissonance score associated with an outcome can be determined by considering the results of previous surveys and information associated with those surveys stored in the participant&#39;s profile, including the weight given by the participant to those surveys. 
     In other embodiments, in order to determine a satisfaction score for each potential outcome for a participant, the plurality of potential outcomes may be first automatically ordered by ordering module  720  in accordance with the final influent function developed by the participant. Presenting module  702  may then present the ordered potential outcomes to the participant. Thereafter, the participant may manually rank one or more of the potential outcomes by providing a most preferred potential outcome, a second most preferred outcome and so on. 
     On determining the satisfaction score for each potential outcome for each participant, dissonance determination module  724  determines the dissonance score associated with each potential outcome based on one or more of the satisfaction score of the participants, an average satisfaction score for the outcome, a maximum rank given by the participant to the outcome, the weight given by the participant to the outcome, an advantage quotient associated with each outcome, a disadvantage quotient associated with each outcome and the influent level of the participant. 
     The dissonance score may also be based on one or more of a standard deviation of satisfaction for the outcome, a number of participants having a higher satisfaction score than the participant and a number of participants having a lower satisfaction score than the participant, a difference in satisfaction between a preferred outcome of the participant and the chosen collective outcome for the survey, and the sum of differences in satisfaction for the outcome across the plurality of participants. Methods for calculating the dissonance score are explained in more detail in conjunction with  FIG. 3 . 
     On determining the collective influent function based on the satisfaction score and the dissonance score associated with each participant, ranking module  708  ranks the potential outcomes based on the collective influent function. In some embodiments, ranking module  708  may further process the ranked outcomes to determine shortlisted outcomes. The shortlisted outcomes may be determined based on one or more of a threshold satisfaction score, a threshold dissonance score, a threshold equality factor and a threshold rank. These may be defined by the survey participants. In some embodiments, the shortlisted outcomes may be determined by comparing one or more of the threshold values with the corresponding values associated with each outcome. The shortlisted outcomes may represent a set of possible outcomes. The shortlisted outcomes may then be ranked based on one or more criteria, for example the collective influent function. On ranking the potential outcomes or the shortlisted potential outcomes based on the collective influent function, the top ranked outcome may be selected as a final collective outcome or a shortlist of the top ranked outcomes can be submitted for another decision-making process such as a direct vote. 
     Based on the final collective outcome associated with a survey, the influent level of each participant and the satisfaction score of each participant associated with the selected outcome, a revised influent level for each participant may be determined. The revised influent level for a participant may be applied in a future survey to compensate for a satisfaction level achieved by the participant in a current survey due to selection of the final collective outcome as explained in conjunction with  FIG. 3 . 
     Thus, the disclosed methods and systems enable surveys to be conducted to identify a collective outcome for each survey aiming to satisfy the largest number of the survey participants and minimize dissonance. The satisfaction and dissonance of the participants may be carried through from one survey to another to compensate a participant who had a relatively low satisfaction in a previous survey. 
     In some embodiments, a system such as system  100  or  200  or  700  includes a user interface which permits an administrative user to set parameters affecting the operation of the system. For example, the user interface may allow an administrative user to directly or indirectly set values for: a tipping point, t, (e.g. a number between 0 and 1); a switch to determine whether an absolute or Rawlsian strength score will be used; and a value, M, indicative of a relative importance of personal satisfaction vs. fairness (e.g. a percentage value). Use of an absolute strength score will tend to give more comparable ratings across different decisions as compared to a Rawlsian strength score. 
       FIG. 17  shows schematically a system  260  comprising a platform application programming interface (API)  262  that may be used in connection with the system components as described elsewhere herein, such as survey platform  230  and collective outcome generator engine  248  (collectively forming system  260 ). The API  262  enables the methods performed by survey platform  230  and collective outcome generator engine  248  to be provided as a web service to other software platforms. The other software platforms may be third party platforms providing services which are accessible, for example, by way of a customer application operating on a client device  270  at the front end. The API  262  allows the functionality of survey platform  230  and collective outcome generator engine  248  to be integrated as a component into the third party&#39;s systems and applications. The API  260  may be based on a REST (Representational State Transfer) protocol, GraphQL protocol or other suitable API protocol that allows other applications to interface and exchange data with survey platform  230  and collective outcome generator engine  248 . 
     One method for determining the collective outcome involves the collective outcome generator engine  248  building a database consisting of every possible and actionable outcome and iterating over the space of all of these outcomes. If there are n options, there may be as many as 2 n  possible outcomes. 
     Other methods incorporate the use of non-linear programming (NLP) to reduce the computational time required to determine a single collective outcome. Although the outcomes are not specifically enumerated using NLP, these methods may presuppose the space of potential outcomes. NLP methods can be affected by local maxima or minima and therefore they may deliver an outcome that is not the best, but is close to the best, outcome. Heuristics may be employed to help mitigate against these limitations. The various limitations of NLP methods may be outweighed by the benefits of being able to generate the results in a significantly reduced time frame. For example, particular embodiments have been implemented using NLP to generate the collective outcome in fractions of a second or in seconds, which may be faster than methods that involve building a database of every possible outcome and ranking all of the outcomes in a list. 
     The determination for a collective outcome may be expressed as a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problem. For purposes of optimizing a solution to the problem, the function for evaluating a strength score of an outcome may be expressed as a non-linear real value function defined over the outcome space, and it may be taken to be the objective function. The constraints associated with the decision are expressed as real value functions over the outcome space together with lower and upper bounds. 
     A MINLP solver can be used to maximize the strength function over the outcome space subject to the given constraints. If the solver is successful, it will return the outcome with the highest strength score that satisfies the given constraints. 
     Particular embodiments deliver a list of top-scoring outcomes, such as the top 10 or top 100 outcomes (including the topmost outcome which is selected as the collective outcome). Particular embodiments may also deliver a list of the bottom-scoring outcomes, such as the bottom 5 outcomes. To address the desire for an administrator or participant to review/scan a set of outcomes by using a NLP method to solve for the strength score using different values for the collective identity ≡ variable, which may be equivalent to the relative weight M (as described elsewhere herein), a method is provided to calculate the strength score using 100 different values for ≡, {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}, to create a set of outcomes. The function can also be reversed to find the lowest scoring outcome, in order for the administrator or participant to view what a low-scoring decision would look like (as a bad or undesirable outcome), and use a set of values for to identify a set of undesirable decisions. 
     NLP may not normalize influence over all the potential outcomes in the same way as methods which iterate over all potential outcomes. For example, in some embodiments, instead of normalizing the influent functions over all the actionable outcomes, we can normalize them over all the options. That is, for all users x, y, we have an exponential factors Px, Py such that: 
     
       
         
           
             
               
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     In other embodiments, the influent functions may not be normalized. 
     In embodiments described herein, characteristics (e.g. cost, square footage, cost per square footage) are associated with options and outcomes. An administrator may define the option characteristics, for example, when the options are defined. In particular embodiments, instead of an administrator defining the characteristics, crowdsourcing may be used to define these characteristics. For example, when a participant is voting on an option, they can also be invited to answer one or more survey questions related to a characteristic of the option. The information that is collected can be analysed and used to generate a crowdsourced characteristic for the option. 
     Various methods may be used to gather information about the characteristic. For example, suppose we are trying to identify the cost of an option (wherein the cost is the characteristic). Some methods include:
         1. Asking participants what they think is the cost of the option (one answer for each participant). Then, we can find the mean or median value across the group, and send that to the survey platform  230  and/or collective outcome generator engine  248  to generate the collective outcome.]   2. Asking participants to specify a range for the cost, between $x and $y. We find the average upper and lower bounds, and send the mean to the survey platform  230  and/or collective outcome generator  248 .   3. Asking participants to indicate what they think is the cost, and assigning a confidence value to that guess. The confidence value may be self-assigned by the participants, or assigned by the administrator or some other method (e.g. each participant may be associated with a certain confidence rating). They, we can use the confidence score as a weight, and use weighted averages to assign a value for the cost.   4. Employing a Monte Carlo-based approach, as explained below.
 
Crowdsourced values that are determined for a characteristic may be sent to the survey platform  230  and/or the collective outcome generator  248  for use in determining a collective outcome.
       

     A Monte Carlo-based method is a way of integrating probabilities into a decision process. We can take a list of factors pertaining to an option, and assign a “probability” and “impact” to each one. We can then use this to determine an overall value of the “impact” for that option. 
     For example, suppose that we want to find the maintenance cost of a building (the “maintenance cost” is a characteristic of the “building” which is an option). The building may have risk factors such as flooding, fire, etc., which would impact the maintenance cost. In this case, we could list all the risk factors, and for each risk factor, have each participant use a widget on the graphical user interface provided by the survey platform  230  (such as a slider, radio buttons, spinner, and the like) to indicate: 
     a) an estimated cost of the risk factor; and 
     b) a probability of the risk factor. 
     Applying a Monte Carlo computation to these inputs will determine, for each participant, their “risk-adjusted” prediction of the characteristic (i.e. maintenance cost in the above example). We can then feed that information into the collective outcome generator engine  248 . Alternately, the mean/median (obtained for example using crowd-sourced characteristics as described above) in combination with Monte Carlo computations can be used to find a value for the characteristic that is sent to the collective outcome generator engine  248 . 
     Monte Carlo methods may be used to determine a participant&#39;s level of support/satisfaction for an option by evaluating the consequences. To apply Monte Carlo, the consequences are listed (similarly to the listing of risk factors above), and the participant evaluates each consequence by using a widget (such as a slider, radio buttons, spinner, and the like) on the graphical user interface provided by the survey platform  230  to indicate: 
     a) The probability of the consequence; and 
     b) Their level of support for the consequence. 
     Using this information, Monte Carlo computations may find each participant&#39;s support score for the option itself. This information becomes the participant votes that are sent to collective outcome generator  230 . 
     In some embodiments, a sorting algorithm is employed wherein an estimate of a participant&#39;s influent function may be determined from a partial set of data points. This allows operation of a system  100 ,  200 ,  260  to determine a collective outcome with a smaller set of data points. For example, one embodiment may identify, for a given participant, other participants with similar votes (e.g. the top 5% of participants whose votes are most similar) and use that information to assign probabilities to how that participant will vote in future. Alternatively, the absolute difference between the participant option scores and another participant&#39;s option score may be considered, and a multiplicative trust factor is assigned to each participant on that basis. A distribution curve is created for all the remaining options and issues by putting all the participants&#39; votes in bins. 
     The standard deviation of this curve for all the options and issues that the participant has not voted on yet is considered. The higher the standard deviation, the more “unknown” the participant&#39;s next vote will be. In certain embodiments the most “unknown” option or issue is shown to the participant. Then the top 5% can be reselected and the next option/issue shown for ranking, and so on. 
     We can distribute the task of evaluating options based on criteria. For example, consider the top 5% of people who voted similarly to a particular participant (with respect to one or more criteria). A distribution curve is assigned to correspond to criteria scores for each option. By weighing the criteria we can predict the participant&#39;s scores for each option based on those weights and by referring to similar influents. Looking at these new distributions we can determine what option the participant should be shown (e.g. the more “unknown” option). Then the top 5% can be recalculated and the next option/issue shown for ranking, etc. 
     In other embodiments, participants may be evaluated based on their expertise in a certain criteria and/or issue. Using those scores as weights, criteria distribution curves can be determined for each option to predict the options for the participant. This can determine what option to show the participant next (e.g. the more “unknown” option). 
     Participants may be invited to evaluate others&#39; expertise on different issues and criteria. Information about weighting of criteria and issues may be gathered through this process. A sampling of ordered options may be provided to the survey participant. Machine learning techniques may be employed to make predictions based on the data and to choose tools such as weighting of criteria and issues. 
     From the foregoing a distribution curve is determined for each option. For the options that the survey participant has voted on, the distribution curve may comprise a single point (that is, the survey participant&#39;s vote). For the other options where there is a probability distribution, we may take the high point of that distribution as the option score. Performing the above with each survey participant yields a score for each option for each survey participant. This information may be input into the collective outcome generator  248 . 
     In particular embodiments, a sampling algorithm is employed wherein demographic data is gathered and used to adjust influence and to convert a non-representative sample into something approaching a representative sample. We can assume there are m demographic factors for which we (a) collect info from participants about and (b) have correlative population data. For each demographic factor k, k(n) may be defined as the number of different buckets we are using to categorize participants with respect to that factor. As such, there is an m-dimensional space containing a plurality of buckets. The number of buckets that a participant might fit into is B=Πk(n) for all k≦m. 
     If the population demographic data is detailed, we will be able to associate an independent percentage with each bucket, the percentage corresponding to the number of persons falling into that bucket. For example, we may know that men over 60 years comprise 12% of the population, and women over 60 years comprise 14% of the population. The total across all the buckets is 100%. 
     If the population data is not so detailed, we may not be able to correlate across factors. So, for example, we may only know that people over 60 comprise 26% of the population, and 49% of the population is male. We can derive the size of buckets using this information, by multiplying across the factors. However, it would not be as accurate as the above, as it would tell us that men and women over 60 each comprise 13% of the population respectively. 
     We can define B(j) as the percentage of participants in the general population falling into bucket j, where j≦B. Considering the participant demographic information, we know that there will be the same number of buckets in both the participant and general population, but the percentage of people falling in each bucket will be different. We can define P(j) as the percentage of participants falling into bucket j, where j≦B. 
     For each demographic factor, we assign a demographic adjustment for each participant depending on the bucket they fall into. This can be defined as DemAdj=B(j)/P(j). That adjustment reflects how over- or under-represented the participant is, relative to the general population. For example, if age is a demographic factor and a participant is 60 years old, and persons who are at least 60 year olds are under-represented in the sample (e.g. they are 15% of the population when they should be 30% for example), then the demographic adjustment for this factor will be positive for such participant (in this above case, 2 because 15%*2=30%). 
     By default, all the different demographic factors would have the same importance. In some cases it may be desirable to assign different levels of importance to the demographic factors. If each demographic factor&#39;s importance can be expressed as DemImp, each person&#39;s influence then becomes for all factors: 
     
       
         
           
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     As discussed above, systems  100  ( FIG. 1 ),  200  ( FIG. 2 ) and  700  ( FIG. 9 ) may be configured to perform one or more of the methods described herein. Aspects of the technology (such as the methods described herein) may also be provided in the form of a program product. The program product may comprise any non-transitory medium which carries a set of computer-readable signals comprising instructions which, when executed by a data processor, cause the data processor to execute a method of the invention. Program products according to the invention may be in any of a wide variety of forms. The program product may comprise, for example, physical media such as magnetic data storage media including floppy diskettes, hard disk drives, optical data storage media including CD ROMs, DVDs, electronic data storage media including ROMs, flash RAM, or the like. The computer-readable signals on the program product may optionally be compressed or encrypted. 
     Where a component (e.g. processor, program memory, database, user interface, server, client device, plug-in, etc.) is referred to above, unless otherwise indicated, reference to that component (including a reference to a “means”) should be interpreted as including as equivalents of that component any component which performs the function of the described component (i.e., that is functionally equivalent), including components which are not structurally equivalent to the disclosed structure which perform the function in the illustrated exemplary embodiments. 
     As will be apparent to those skilled in the art in the light of the foregoing disclosure, many alterations and modifications are possible. For example:
         In some cases it is the survey administrator who defines the issues, options and constraints. In some embodiments the survey participants may be responsible for defining the issues, options and/or constraints. In particular embodiments, the survey participants may be able to suggest, for addition to the list of available outcomes, a new option for an existing issue or a new issue and associated options. If there is sufficient support for these suggestions by other survey participants (e.g. these options may also have been suggested or approved by other survey participants), or if the survey administrator approves, then the new options may be added to the survey.   In other embodiments, different subsets of the participants may be responsible for different aspects of the tasks of proposing, shortlisting, editing and categorizing options, defining issues and sub-issues, assigning characteristics and applying constraints.   While machine-implemented embodiments of survey conducting and collective decision-making methods and systems are disclosed herein, in certain other embodiments some of the steps may be performed manually. For example, in some cases one may manually collect survey data (e.g. rankings of issues and options) using paper questionnaires completed by a survey participant. The survey responses may be gathered and input into a computer system which provides the data to a data processor for processing and analysis in accordance with the methods described herein.       

     While a number of exemplary aspects and embodiments have been discussed above, those of skill in the art will recognize certain modifications, permutations, additions and sub-combinations thereof. It is therefore intended that the scope of the following appended claims and claims hereafter introduced should not be limited by the preferred embodiments set forth in the examples, but should be given the broadest interpretation consistent with the description as a whole.