Patent Publication Number: US-7590855-B2

Title: Steganographically authenticated packet traffic

Description:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     1. Technical Field of the Invention 
     The present invention relates to packet communications traffic and, in particular, to cryptographically signing packet traffic and, even more specifically, to the use of steganographic techniques to hide authentication information in packet communications. 
     2. Description of Related Art 
     The Greek term “steganography” refers to the art and science of hiding the existence of information using various secret “hidden writing” communication techniques that allow important messages to be securely carried over insecure communications channels. Steganography achieves confidentiality with respect to a transmitted secret message by hiding that message inside of a larger context. In this way, the secret message is kept from someone who is not supposed to read the message because they neither know how to read it, nor even recognize it is present in the context. Someone who is supposed to read the message, however, possesses a key that permits the message to be both detected in the context and read. 
     Steganographic techniques have, in the past, been primarily associated with, for example, invisible inks, messages sent via telephone line noise, and red cellophane such as that used in games to reveal information hidden in a red-blue block. More recently, steganographic techniques have been used in the computer environment to hide information in graphical images, sound files, text files, or other media. 
     An important characteristic of a steganography process is imperceptibility. By this it is meant that the existence of a stenographically hidden message should not be readily apparent from a review of the carrying media (i.e., the context). More generally, the media in which the message is hidden should not draw any attention to itself in a way that makes the perceiver suspicious of hidden content. Thus, the goal of steganography is to hide messages inside other “harmless” messages in a way that does not allow any enemy to even detect that there is a second secret message present. 
     Most common steganography techniques lose their security when the steganographic operation of the process (i.e., its key) is known, and thus should be used together with key based encryption for additional security. A good steganography process should therefore fulfill the cryptographic “Kerckhoff principle” requirement. In this context, one assumes that the “enemy” has full knowledge of the design and implementation details of the steganographic process. Security is then provided for the process by means of a short, easily exchangeable, secret key, the knowledge of which is required by the enemy in order to obtain the hidden information. 
     By combining the Kerckhoff requirement with the imperceptibility characteristic, an ideal steganography process should be designed in a manner such that the enemy has very little chance of becoming suspicious that hidden information is present and, without knowledge of the secret key, no chance of actually being able to recover that hidden information. 
     With the development of the Internet for linking computers, and the evolution of the Internet protocol (IP) for defining how messages are communicated between linked computers, a need had arisen for using packets as a media for conveying hidden information. The present invention addresses that need in particular as well as other needs concerning the communication of packetized information that are recognized by those skilled in the art. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, a first node cryptographically generates a first special value relating to a communications packet, and hides that first special value in at least one field of a header portion of the communications packet. The communications packet is then transmitted from the source node toward a destination/intermediary node over a network. At the destination/intermediary node, or at some intermediary monitoring node, the received communications packet is authenticated by cryptographically generating a second special value relating to the received communications packet. This second special value is then compared to the first special value as extracted from hiding in the header field of the received communications packet. Authentication is found when there is a match between the extracted first special value and the generated second special value. 
     In accordance with another aspect of the present invention, the source node comprises a vulnerability assessment scanner, the network is an untrusted network, and the destination node comprises a node within a trusted network. The intermediary node performs the authentication and comprises an intrusion detection system that protects the destination node within the trusted network. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       A more complete understanding of the method and apparatus of the present invention may be acquired by reference to the following Detailed Description when taken in conjunction with the accompanying Drawings wherein: 
         FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a communications system in which the steganography process of the present invention may be implemented; 
         FIG. 2  is a diagram illustrating the format of a communications packet; 
         FIG. 3  is a flow diagram illustrating operation of the steganography process of the present invention; 
         FIG. 4  is a graphical representation of the  FIG. 3  process performed at the source node; 
         FIG. 5  is a graphical representation of the  FIG. 3  process performed at the destination/intermediary node; and 
         FIG. 6  is a block diagram of a network defense system that utilizes the steganography process of the present invention. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
     Reference is now made to  FIG. 1  wherein there is shown a block diagram of a communications system  10  in which the steganography process of the present invention may be implemented. The communications system  10  includes a source node  12  and a destination/intermediary node  14 . The recitation of an intermediary node  14  refers to a situation where a node is present in the communications system in between the source node and the destination node (see, for example,  FIG. 6 ). The source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  are interconnected by a communications link  16  that comprises a portion of a packet-based communications network  18 . Packet communications over the network  18  are governed by an appropriate packet communications protocol. One example of such a protocol is the well known Internet protocol (IP) using transaction control protocol (TCP). It will, of course, be understood that other protocols (for example, UDP/IP, and the like) may alternatively be used for communication over the network  18  between the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14 . 
     The format of a communications packet  20  (for example, an IP packet, TCP packet, UDP packet, and the like) is shown in  FIG. 2 . Generally speaking, the packet  20  includes a header portion  22  and a payload portion  24 . The header portion  22  contains a number of fields  26 . Examples of such fields for an IP packet may include an origination field (identifying the source node  12 ), a destination field (identifying the destination node  14 ), an identification (ID) field, and the like. The payload portion  24  contains the data payload to be communicated from the source node  12  to the destination/intermediary node  14 . 
     It will be recognized by those skilled in the art that other forms of header portions  22  may be used as well. For example, in the case of an IP packet carried by TCP or UDP (i.e., TCP/IP or UDP/IP), a header portion  22  exists with respect to the TCP and/or UDP transport functionality. This header portion  22 , like that with the IP packet, also contains fields  26 , and these included fields may provide, for example, destination and origination port information. 
     With reference once again to  FIG. 1 , the steganography process of the present invention generally operates at the source node  12  to compute  28  a cryptographic special value  30  for each packet to be transmitted. This is accomplished using a shared secret key (SSK) that is shared by the source node  12  and the destination/intermediary node  14 . The cryptographic special value  30  is then stored (hidden) in one (or more) of the fields  26  within the header portion  22 . For example, the special value  30  may be placed in the ID field of the header portion  22 . In order to achieve imperceptibility, the special value  30  placed in the field(s)  26  should possess the characteristics of the commonly used field value. By this it is meant that the special value  30  should have the same number of bits, same general format, same general range, and the like, as the value that is commonly found in that field (or fields)  26  of the header portion  22 . In this way, there is nothing contained in the header fields  26  of the packet  20  which would indicate the presence of hidden information. 
     The packet  20  is then transmitted over the network  18  toward the destination/intermediary node  14 . At the destination node  14  (or at an intermediary node, as desired), a cryptographic special value  30 ′ is also computed  28 ′ using the shared secret key (SSK) for each received packet. The destination/intermediary node  14  then compares  32  its computed special value  30 ′ to the special value  30  contained in the field(s)  26  within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . If the special values match, the destination/intermediary node  14  has successfully authenticated the transmitted packet  20  as being sent from the source node  12 . 
     Reference is now made to  FIG. 3  wherein there is shown a flow diagram illustrating operation of the steganography process of the present invention. In step  50 , the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  share a secret cryptographic key (SSK). Next, in step  52 , each time the source node  12  transmits a packet  20  toward the destination/intermediary node  14 , a special value  30  is cryptographically generated using the shared secret cryptographic key. In step  54 , the special value  30  is then loaded into one or more fields  26  within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . 
     More specifically, the special value  30  is computed in step  52  as a cryptographic hash of the following four values: (a) the destination address (provided in the destination field of the header portion  22 ); (b) the data payload (provided in the payload portion  24 ); (c) the current time; and (d) the shared secret cryptographic key. Any suitable hash algorithm may be used to compute the cryptographic hash. As an example, the SHA algorithm, MD5 algorithm, or HMAC algorithm, known to those skilled in the art may be used to generate the cryptographic hash. This cryptographic hash is then loaded into a first field  26 ( 1 ) of the header portion  22  as the special value  30 . 
     It is recognized that in some instances the number of bits comprising the cryptographic hash will exceed the number of bits available in the first field  26 ( 1 ) within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . For example, the SHA algorithm generates a cryptographic hash that is 160-bits long, and the ID field of the IP header portion  22  is only 16-bits long. If that is the case, only a portion of the generated cryptographic hash is sent in the header portion  22  as the special value  30 . An offset is then used in step  56  (optional) to pick the portion of the generated cryptographic hash that is used for the cryptographic special value  30 . For example, assume that the field  26  within the header portion  22  is n bits long, the cryptographic special value  30  is accordingly bits “offset” to “offset+n” of the step  52  generated cryptographic hash. In one embodiment of the present invention, the offset is agreed to by the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14 , and may be shared there between in step  50  when the secret cryptographic key is shared. In another embodiment, the offset is presumed by both the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  to be zero, in which case the cryptographic special value  30  is accordingly the first n bits of the step  52  generated cryptographic hash. In yet another embodiment, the source node  12  generates the offset as a random number (rand#) using a random number generator, in which case the cryptographic special value  30  is accordingly bits “rand#” to “rand#+n” of the step  52  generated cryptographic hash. 
     It will, of course, be recognized that if the first field  26 ( 1 ) is large enough to completely contain the generated cryptographic hash, then the cryptographic special value  30  loaded into the first field  26 ( 1 ) within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20  will be the entire cryptographic hash itself. 
     If a non-zero offset is used, and if that offset is not previously agreed to by the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  (such as with the random number embodiment), the offset value must be provided in some manner to the destination/intermediary node  14  for its use on packet receipt to authenticate the packet. An optional step  58  is accordingly included to save the offset value (for example, rand#) in a second field  26 ( 2 ) within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . In this scenario, the special value  30  may accordingly be seen as a combination of the selected portion of the generated cryptographic hash and the offset value as saved in the first field  26  ( 1 ) and second field  26  ( 2 ), respectively, of the header portion  22 . 
     It is recognized that in some instances the range of values comprising the offset value will be different than range of values usually contained in the second field  26 ( 2 ) within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . For example, the random number generator may generate a random number in the range of  0 - 144 . This number then specifies the offset in bits used to find the portion of the generated cryptographic hash that is used for the cryptographic special value  30 . However, if the origination (source) port of the header portion  22  is used as the second header field  26 ( 2 ), numbers in the range of  0 - 144  may appear strange and may give away the presence of steganographically hidden information in the packet  20 , thus violating the imperceptibility requirement. To address this concern, the random number value is scaled in the loading step  58  by a fixed or an agreed upon amount (for example, +1024 for source ports) so that the value stored in the origination (source) port field  26 ( 2 ) would appear with a casual observation to be a valid source port address. 
     Once the packet  20  is formed with the included cryptographic special value  30  (saved in one or more header fields  26  of header portion  22 , as discussed above), the packet is transmitted in step  60  over the network  18  toward the destination/intermediary node  14 . Importantly, because of the efforts used as described above in formatting the cryptographic special value  30  for inclusion in the header field(s), the transmitted packet  20  looks no different from casual observation than any other packet and thus draws no attention to itself and its hidden contents. 
     The portion of the  FIG. 3  process performed at the source node  12  is graphically represented in  FIG. 4 . 
     At the destination/intermediary node  14 , a special value  30 ′ is cryptographically generated in step  62  using the shared secret cryptographic key. The special value  30 ′ for the destination/intermediary node  14  is then compared in step  64  to the special value  30  contained within the transmitted packet  20 . Action is then taken in step  66  as a result of that comparison. For example, if the special values do not match, the packet  20  may be rejected for lack of authenticity. Alternatively, or additionally, the packet  20  may be saved for further analysis. Still further, alternatively or additionally, an alarm may be generated in response to receipt of the packet  20 . Other options for handling and response as needed for certain applications will be recognized by those skilled in the art. Although not specifically illustrated, it will be understood that if the authentication is performed at an intermediary node, and if authentication is passed, the packet  20  is then forwarded on from the intermediary node to the destination node. 
     More specifically, the destination/intermediary node  14  special value  30 ′ is computed in step  62 , like that for the source node  12 , as a cryptographic hash of the following four values: (a) the destination address (the destination node&#39;s own address or the destination address as extracted by the intermediary node from the packet); (b) the data payload (extracted from the payload portion  24  of the received packet); (c) the current time; and (d) the shared secret cryptographic key (obtained earlier in step  50 ). Any suitable hash algorithm may be used to compute the cryptographic hash. As an example, the SHA algorithm, MD5 algorithm, or HNAC algorithm, known to those skilled in the art may be used to generate the cryptographic hash. 
     In the event that the first field  26 ( 1 ) is large enough to completely contain the generated cryptographic hash, then the cryptographic special value  30 ′ is simply compared in step 64 bit-by-bit with the value contained in the first field  26 ( 1 ) within the header portion  22  of the transmitted packet  20 . 
     If there are bit limitations within the first field  26 ( 1 ), however, the process of step  62  must further determine the cryptographic special value  30 ′ from the computed hash value. For example, where only a portion of the source node  12  generated cryptographic hash is sent as the cryptographic special value  30 , the destination/intermediary node  14  must generate a corresponding portion of its generated cryptographic hash as the cryptographic special value  30 ′. An offset is thus used in step  68  (optional) to pick the portion of the generated cryptographic hash that is used for the cryptographic special value  30 ′. In the embodiment of the present invention where the offset is previously agreed to by the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  (for example, at step  50  secret cryptographic key sharing), bits “offset” to “offset+n” of the step  62  generated cryptographic hash are selected for the step  64  comparison of special values. In the embodiment of the present invention where the offset is presumed by both the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  to be zero, the first n bits of the step  62  generated cryptographic hash are selected for the step  64  comparison of special values. Furthermore, in the embodiment of the present invention where the offset is a randomly selected value, the value is retrieved from the second header field  26 ( 2 ) and de-scaled in optional step  70  (if necessary) to obtain the random number (rand#), with bits “rand#” to “rand#+n” of the step  62  generated cryptographic hash then being selected for the step  64  comparison of special values. 
     The portion of the  FIG. 3  process performed at the destination/intermediary node  14  is graphically represented in  FIG. 5 . 
     In order to ensure proper authentication, the source node  12  and destination/intermediary node  14  must have at least loosely synchronized clocks. The reason for this is that in a preferred embodiment, as discussed above, the cryptographic hash computed in steps  52  and  62  utilizes current time as one of the four input values. The degree of clock synchronization required depends of the degree of granularity to which the system must be able to ensure authentication. For example, the clocks may be synchronized to the hour, half hour, quarter hour, minute or second, depending on the authentication security needs of the network  18  and its included nodes. For example, if the clocks are synchronized to an hour degree, this would allow an hour within which an enemy could analyze the packet  20  traffic between the nodes  12  and  14  and attempt to reuse (or replay) the packet communications (because the time variable in the hash would be fixed for all traffic during that hour period). If the network administrator believes that a successful replay attack could be made within an hour, than the hour degree is too long to ensure security within the network and a more stringent time synchronization would be necessary. 
     The method and system of the present invention advantageously allows for the generation and verification of cryptographically signed IP traffic in an implementation where the authentication information is hidden in the packet headers in a manner such that the traffic containing hidden information cannot be readily distinguished from the traffic that does not contain hidden information. More specifically, the traffic containing hidden information can be distinguished and authenticated only by a receiving entity or third party that understands how the steganographic (information-hiding) algorithm operates and who also possesses the cryptographic secret key. 
     Reference is now made to  FIG. 6  wherein there is shown a block diagram of a network defense system  100  that utilizes the steganography process of the present invention. The network defense system  100  is used to provide a level of protection for a network  102  against attacks from outside the network. The network defense system  100  includes a vulnerability assessment scanner  104  that is designed to discover vulnerabilities of the protected network  102  system, allowing network managers to find and patch network security holes before they are discovered by hackers. More specifically, the vulnerability assessment scanner  104  assesses the protected network  102  for computer system and network device vulnerabilities which may arise at any time in connection with, for example, the installation of a new client, server, networking device or application (generally shown as a “destination node” within the trusted network  102 ). The assessment provided by the vulnerability assessment scanner  104  produces enterprise (i.e., network  102 ) specific data identifying potential computer system and network device vulnerabilities (for example, an inventory of the active hosts on the network, the services provided by those hosts, and the known vulnerabilities of the hosts). The produced data is supplied by the scanner and used to trigger the taking of certain threat mitigation or elimination actions (either automatically or manually). 
     The assessment operation performed by the scanner  104  operates at three depths: normal; deep; and, ultra-deep. The normal depth scan generally comprises basic scans of the network  102  that are fast and do not crash a host. For example, the normal scan may determine the operating system (and its version), the service applications on the host, the software version for those services. The deep depth scan performs vulnerability assessments that can be safely executed without crashing a host. Deep depth scans interact with the services on a host to determine whether a vulnerability exists. The deep scan generally takes more time than the normal scan. The ultra-deep scan tests for all known vulnerabilities, even at the risk of crashing a host. Ultra-deep scans may actually perform an attack on the network  102  to determine vulnerability and interact with the actual service in such a way that it might compromise the system. 
     The system  100  further includes an intrusion detection system  106  that is designed to expose intruders, break off the intrusion, examine the intruder&#39;s point of entry and prevent future intruders from using the same entry point. The intrusion detection system  106  operates to examine packet traffic in comparison to a detection signature. This signature specifies certain criteria that must be found in a packet or collection of packets in order detect a potential threat to the network  102 . In the event the criteria are satisfied, the intrusion detection signature may take action of various kinds (as specified by the signature) in response to the threat. 
     The vulnerability assessments generated by the scanner  104  are presented to a network administrator, in detail or summary form, with enough information for the administrator to make a rapid, high level decision on responding to the vulnerability. The information provided to the administrator may include severity assessment and links to vendor patches and other pertinent data from the web that would assist in addressing the vulnerability. Responsive to this presentation, the network administrator may specify the actions to be taken in order to defend the network  102 . For example, the actions may include specifying a detection signature to be applied by the intrusion detection system  106  against monitored traffic. 
     The actions of the vulnerability assessment scanner  104  scan the network  102  and further to, perhaps, simulate an attack on the network, raise a number of concerns. Primarily, the scans and/or simulated attacks are perceived by the intrusion detection system as a potential/actual attack and appropriate response may be taken against the attack. This responsive action may preclude the scanner  104  from completing its scan and identifying all vulnerabilities. It further results in the generation of false positive alarms by the intrusion detection system. A need accordingly exists for a way to allow the vulnerability assessment scanner to probe the network  102  with packet traffic without fear of triggering false alarms and unnecessary intrusion detection system  106  response. 
     The steganography process of the present invention addresses the foregoing need. More specifically, and with reference to  FIGS. 1-5 , the scanner  104  comprises the source node  12  and the intrusion detection system  106  comprises the intermediary node  14  (with the server, host, port, application, and the like, in the trusted network  102  comprising the destination node  14 ). The destination/intermediary node  14  may alternatively comprise intrusion detection system  106  itself in some applications. The network  18  may be viewed as an untrusted network  108  over which third party threats to the protected network  102  are manifested, and also as the network over which the scanner  104  performs its probe of the protected network  102 . Utilizing the steganography process of the present invention, the scan/probe traffic packets  20  generated by the scanner  104  include hidden information that may be detected only by the intrusion detection system  106  and used to signal that the source of the traffic is the scanner and not a third party threat. Once this recognition is made, the traffic packets may be allowed by the intrusion detection system  106  to pass into the protected network  102  without having false positive alarms be generated and/or without having the traffic be blocked before a complete and thorough assessment of network vulnerabilities is completed. 
     In this regard, the steganography process serves an important function of allowing the intrusion detection system  106  (as intermediary node  14 ) to recognize the traffic (which appears to be threatening) as being authorized and authenticated. Importantly, no other party will be able to recognize that the vulnerability scanner  104  has generated the traffic, and no other party will be able to generate traffic that can be authenticated by the intrusion detection system  106 . Furthermore, no third party will be able to change the scanner-generated packets and avoid detection, or capture the scanner&#39;s packets and replay them. 
     The following requirements for operation in the network defense environment are all met through the use of the steganography process of the present invention:
         Authentication: the intrusion detection system must be able to distinguish between scanner-generated traffic and all other traffic without error. Then, the intrusion detection system can safely ignore the scanner&#39;s attacks while blocking and alarming on all other attacks;   Integrity: the intrusion detection system must be able to verify that the contents of the scanner&#39;s packets were not modified in transit;   Performance: the operation must not place significant load on either the sender (scanner) or verifier (intrusion detection system);   Constant Change: the scanner must be able to change its IP address as often as on a per-packet basis, to enable the scanner to protect itself from discovery and to protect itself from direct attack. Thus, the intrusion detection system must not need to know the scanner&#39;s IP address; and   Generality: the operation must apply generally to all IP transmissions.
 
The “integrity” requirement is met through the use of the hidden information used to authenticate the traffic, and by having the entire packet payload used in the determination of the hash. The “performance” requirement is met by utilizing an efficient hash algorithm tailored to the defense needs of the network. The “constant change” requirement is met by not requiring that the origination address of the scanner be used in the authentication process. The “generality” requirement is met by having the authentication process utilize available IP header fields to hide the authentication information.
       

     The operation in the network defense environment further requires resistance to the following types of attack:
         Spoofing Attack: an attacker must not be able to generate traffic that looks like it came from the scanner and wage attacks that the intrusion detection system will ignore;   Man-in-the-Middle Attack: an attacker must not be able to intercept the scanner&#39;s packets in transit and modify their contents such that the modifications go undetected;   Replay Attack: an attacker must not be able to capture the scanner&#39;s packets with a sniffer and replay the attacks against different targets, or against the same target at a later time;   Attack Against the Scanner: an attacker must not be able to distinguish the scanner-generated transmissions from any other traffic. If an attacker can identify the scanner, he may feed the scanner bogus data, or he may attack the scanner directly.
 
Resistance to the “spoofing attack” is provided through use of the hidden information based on a shared secret key to authenticate scanner generated traffic. Additionally, the third party will not be able to distinguish scanner packets from other packets because the authentication information is hidden in the normal packet headers and is indistinguishable from arbitrary probe traffic. The “man-in-the-middle attack” is resisted because the hash is generated from the payload. Resistance to the “replay attack” is provided because the hash is determined using the current time value and further because the hash is determined using the destination IP address. Finally, the “attack against the scanner” is resisted because the address of the scanner is allowed to constantly change.
       

     A number of benefits thus accrue from use of the steganography process in the network defense environment:
         a third party cannot tell scanner packets from other packets because the authentication information is hidden in the normal packet headers and is indistinguishable from arbitrary probe traffic;   the attacker cannot spoof packets that look like they came from the scanner because the attacker does not know the secret key;   the attacker cannot capture the scanner&#39;s packets and replay them against a different target because the target IP is included in the hash;   the attacker cannot capture the scanner&#39;s packets and replay them against the same target because the timestamp is included in the hash; and   the attacker cannot modify the scanner&#39;s packet contents in transit because the entire IP payload is used as input data to the hash function.       

     The loose synchronization of the clocks in the source node  12  and destination  14  was mentioned previously. This operational feature is also applicable to the network defense embodiment of the steganography process. The level of synchronization is directly determined by the length of time for which protection against replay attacks against the same target must be maintained. For example, an attacker will only have a window of opportunity that is a minute long if the clocks are synchronized to a minute resolution. Note that, in the event that the timestamp is close to a minute boundary, and the clocks are synchronized to within a minute, the intrusion detection system may need to compute two hash values (one for the time stamp on each side of the boundary) and check if either matches the packet. These concepts can be extended depending on the protection required and the level of synchronization available. If no protection is required, the timestamp can be dropped completely from the hash algorithm and clocks need not be synchronized at all. 
     It was also mentioned previously that the value  30  could be stored in the IP ID header field. The result of this is that the IP ID stored in the field will appear completely random to someone who collects and analyzes the scanner&#39;s packets. This technique works extremely well for the scanner, because the scanner is launching attacks and attack tools usually randomize IP IDs. However, if this technique is applied to a large amount of non-attack traffic, a third party may be able to recognize that the traffic is different from normal operating system traffic. The difference arises because most operating systems (OpenBSD is an exception) do not randomize IP IDs in practice, although randomization is recommended for security reasons. 
     Although a preferred implementation utilizes the SHA algorithm for hash calculation, other algorithms may be used. For example, MD5 provides an alternative algorithm. Additionally, if a need exists for the hash to be stronger, a real keyed hash, like HMAC, may be used. Alternatively, if only a weaker hash is needed to provide the requisite level of security, a DES algorithm or checksum algorithm could be used for the hash, with a benefit of increased speed. 
     With reference once again to  FIG. 1 , it will be understood that in the implementation where both an intermediary node and a destination node are present, that the intermediary node acts as an authentication monitoring agent or gateway. In this architecture, it is only when the intermediary node can successfully authenticate the packet communications based on the steganographic process that the packet is permitted to be forwarded on toward the destination node. As an alternative, the intermediary node may, in fact be the addressed destination of the packet, but the payload data is instead intended for delivery to a true destination node. In this architecture, the addressee destination node acts as an intermediary, authenticates the packet, and then, if authentication is successful, forwards the included payload data on toward the true destination node. Other operations implicating destination/intermediary nodes, in the context of steganographically authenicated packet communications, may be implemented in a manner obvious to those skilled in the art. 
     Although preferred embodiments of the method and apparatus of the present invention have been illustrated in the accompanying Drawings and described in the foregoing Detailed Description, it will be understood that the invention is not limited to the embodiments disclosed, but is capable of numerous rearrangements, modifications and substitutions without departing from the spirit of the invention as set forth and defined by the following claims.