Patent Publication Number: US-2023145820-A1

Title: Data center security systems and devices

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a continuation of U.S. Application No. 17/845,075, filed Jun. 21, 2022, and claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/213,538, filed Jun. 22, 2021, U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/216,255, filed on Jun. 29, 2021, U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/229,126, filed on Aug. 4, 2021 and U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/237,400, filed on Aug. 26, 2021, the entire contents of each of which are hereby incorporated by reference. 
    
    
     FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     Embodiments of the present invention relates generally to access management, electronic locks, systems, devices, lockable enclosures, and methods for data centers. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Data centers utilize a variety of media to transfer and store various information. Because the media may contain sensitive or confidential information, it is desirable to ensure that the media is secure and that there is an adequate chain of custody for anyone accessing the media. 
     BRIEF SUMMARY 
     Embodiments of the present invention are directed towards a lockable enclosure for a data drive. The lockable enclosure comprises a housing configured to house a first data drive, the first data drive configured to be removed from the housing. The lockable enclosure also includes a latch contained within the housing and configured to receive a second data drive, wherein the latch is configured to move within the housing for dispensing the first data drive from the housing while the second data drive remains secured therein. 
     In another embodiment, a lockable enclosure for a data drive is provided. The lockable enclosure includes a housing configured to contain a first data drive, the first data drive configured to be removed from the housing. The housing is configured to receive a second data drive, and the first data drive is only configured to be removed from the housing when the second data drive is secured therein. 
     In another embodiment, a method for securing and dispensing data drives. The method includes providing a housing containing a first data drive, the first data drive configured to be removed from the housing. The method further includes inserting a second data drive within the housing and dispensing the first data drive from the housing only when the second data drive is secured within the housing. 
     In some embodiments, a security system for a data center is provided. The security system includes a plurality of electronic keys and a plurality of media drives configured to be removably connected to a respective electrical component of a server rack, each of the media drives configured to communicate with any one of the electronic keys for enabling the media drive to communicate with the component. In aspects of the security system, each of the media drives is a USB drive with a USB connector. In other aspects, each of the media drives is the same size and configuration as an SSD drive. In some cases, each of the media drives comprises a connector configured to move between a retracted position and an extended position relative to the media drive, and the connector is configured to be removably connected to the electrical component. In other cases, the security system also includes one or more remote devices configured to communicate with the plurality of electronic keys and/or the media drives in a cloud network. In one aspect, each of the media devices comprises a unique identifier, and each of the electronic keys is configured to obtain the unique identifier from the media device when the media device is enabled. In another aspect, each of the media drives is configured to be disabled upon removal from the respective electrical component. In yet another aspect, each of the media drives has a disabled mode whereby the media drive is incapable of communicating with the component, and each of the media drives is configured to communicate with one of the electronic keys in the disabled mode for enabling the media drive to communicate with the respective component. 
     In another embodiment, a security device for a data center is provided. The security device comprises a media drive configured to be removably connected to a component of a server rack, the media drive having a disabled mode whereby the media drive is incapable of communicating with the component, the media drive is configured to communicate with a key in the disabled mode for enabling the media drive to communicate with the component. In some aspects, the media drive is a USB drive with a USB connector. In another aspect, the media drive is the same size and configuration as an SSD drive. In one example, the media drive comprises a connector configured to move between a retracted position and an extended position relative to the media drive, and wherein the connector is configured to be removably connected to the component. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG.  1 A  shows an embodiment of a security system and method including a programmable electronic key, a security device, a programming station and a charging station according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG.  1 B  is an enlarged view showing the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  1 A  positioned on the programming station of  FIG.  1 A  to be programmed with a security code. 
         FIG.  2    further shows the system and method of  FIG.  1 A  with the programmable electronic key positioned to operate the security device. 
         FIG.  3 A  further shows the system and method of  FIG.  1 A  with the programmable electronic key disposed on the charging station. 
         FIG.  3 B  is an enlarged view showing the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  1 A  positioned on the charging station of  FIG.  1 A  to recharge a power source disposed within the key. 
         FIG.  4    is an enlarged view showing the security device of the system and method of  FIG.  1 A . 
         FIG.  5    is an enlarged view showing the programmable electronic key of the system and method of  FIG.  1 A  in greater detail. 
         FIG.  6    is an exploded view of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  5   . 
         FIG.  7 A  is a perspective view of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  5   . 
         FIG.  7 B  is an end view of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  5   . 
         FIG.  8    is a perspective view showing a lengthwise cross-section of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  5   . 
         FIG.  9 A  is a top view showing the charging station of the system and method of  FIG.  1 A . 
         FIG.  9 B  is a perspective view showing a diagonal cross-section of the charging station of  FIG.  9 A  taken along the line  9 B- 9 B. 
         FIG.  10    shows another embodiment of a security system and method including a programmable electronic key, a security device, a programming station and a charging station according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG.  11    is an enlarged view showing the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  10    positioned on the charging station of  FIG.  10    to recharge a power source disposed within the key. 
         FIG.  12    is an enlarged view showing the security device of the system and method of  FIG.  10   . 
         FIG.  13    is an enlarged view showing the programmable electronic key of the system and method of  FIG.  10    in greater detail. 
         FIG.  14    is a perspective view showing a pair of matched coils for use with the programmable electronic key and the security device of  FIG.  10   . 
         FIG.  15 A  is a perspective view of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  13   . 
         FIG.  15 B  is an end view of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  13   . 
         FIG.  16    is a perspective view showing a lengthwise cross-section of the programmable electronic key of  FIG.  13   . 
         FIG.  17 A  is a top view showing the charging station of the system and method of  FIG.  10   . 
         FIG.  17 B  is a perspective view showing a diagonal cross-section of the charging station of  FIG.   17 A  taken along the line  17 B- 17 B. 
         FIG.  18    illustrates a system comprising a server rack and a lock according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG.  19    illustrates a system comprising a server rack and a lock configured to communicate with a remote device according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG.  20    is a perspective view of a lockable enclosure and a secure bin according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  21    are perspective views of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    showing the sequence of securing the media in the lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  22    are perspective views of the lockable enclosure and media shown in  FIG.  20   . 
         FIG.  23    is a front view of the lockable enclosure and media shown in  FIG.  20   . 
         FIG.  24    is a front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    and a remote device prior to securing the media according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  25    is a front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    prior to locking the media therein according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  26    is a front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    and a remote device prior to locking the lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  27    is a front view of the lockable enclosure  FIG.  20    with the media locked therein according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  28    is a front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    and a remote device after locking the lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  29    is another front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20   . 
         FIG.  30    is a front view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  20    and a remote device after detecting a tamper attempt according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  31    is a perspective view of a USB drive according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  32    are perspective views of the USB drive shown in  FIG.  31    in different states. 
         FIG.  33    are perspective views of the USB drive shown in  FIG.  31    prior to removal of the USB connector according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  34    is a perspective view of the USB drive shown in  FIG.  31    in communication with an electronic key according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  35    show perspective views of a lockable enclosure according to another embodiment. 
         FIG.  36    are perspective views of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  35    showing the sequence of securing the media in the lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  37    are side views of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  35   . 
         FIG.  38    are perspective views of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  35    showing the sequence of securing the media in the lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  39    is an elevation view of a lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  40    is a side view of a lockable enclosure according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  41    is an elevation view of a lockable enclosure with a latch in a first position according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  42    is an elevation view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  41    with the latch in a second position. 
         FIG.  43    is an elevation view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  41    with the latch in a first position and housing a new media drive. 
         FIG.  44    is an elevation view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  41    with the latch in a first position and after receiving an old media drive. 
         FIG.  45    is an elevation view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  41    with the latch in a second position for dispensing the old media drive. 
         FIG.  46    is an elevation view of the lockable enclosure shown in  FIG.  41    with the latch in the second position and housing the old media drive. 
         FIG.  47    are perspective views of a lockable enclosure in a first position and a second position for dispensing a new media drive according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  48    are perspective views of a lockable enclosure in a first position and a second position for dispensing a new media drive according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  49    are perspective views of a lockable enclosure in a first position and a second position for dispensing a new media drive according to one embodiment. 
         FIG.  50    are perspective views of a lockable enclosure in a first position and a second position for securing a data drive according to one embodiment. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION 
     Referring now to the accompanying drawing figures wherein like reference numerals denote like elements throughout the various views, one or more embodiments of a security system and method for data centers are shown. In the embodiments shown and described herein, the system and method include an electronic key and a security device. Security devices suitable for use with the electronic keys include, but are not limited to, security devices for various types of fixtures, such as server racks for storing various types and quantities of computer and/or network equipment or components, such as for example, servers, computers, hard drives, media storage, routers, hubs, network switches, etc. The server rack may define an enclosure that is configured to secure various computer and/or network equipment or components that is only configured to be accessed by authorized personnel, such as described in the following embodiments. Of course, embodiments of the present invention are applicable to any number of security devices for securing various items from theft, including those other than with respect to data centers. Embodiments of the present invention may provide security devices for protecting equipment from theft in a data center environment that may include valuable data as well as providing various data regarding accesses or attempted accesses to the equipment. Moreover, although some embodiments disclosed herein are directed to use of security devices with cabinets, it is understood that any variety of fixtures may be used that are configured to house or otherwise secure items to be secured. 
     An embodiment of a system and method according to the invention is illustrated in  FIGS.  1 A- 9 B . The embodiment of the security system and method depicted comprises a programmable electronic key  20 , which is also referred to herein as a security key or an electronic key, and a security device  40  that is configured to be operated by the key. The system and method may further comprise an optional programming or authorization station, indicated generally at  60 , that is operable for programming the key  20  with a security code, which is also referred to herein as a Security Disarm Code (SDC). The term SDC is not intended to be limiting, as it may be any code configured to be used to determine whether the key  20  is authorized to control the security device  40 . In addition to programming station  60 , the system and method may further comprise an optional charging station, indicated generally at  80 , that is operable for initially charging and/or subsequently recharging a power source disposed within the key  20 . For example, security key  20  and security device  40  may each be programmed with the same SDC into a respective permanent memory. The security key  20  may be provisioned with a single-use (e.g., non-rechargeable) power source, such as a conventional or extended-life battery, or alternatively, the key may be provisioned with a multiple-use (e.g., rechargeable) power source, such as a conventional capacitor or rechargeable battery. In either instance, the power source may be permanent, semi-permanent (e.g., replaceable), or rechargeable, as desired. In the latter instance, charging station  80  is provided to initially charge and/or to subsequently recharge the power source provided within the security key  20 . Furthermore, key  20  and/or security device  40  may be provided with only a transient memory, such that the SDC must be programmed (or reprogrammed) at predetermined time intervals. In this instance, programming station  60  is provided to initially program and/or to subsequently reprogram the SDC into the key  20 . As will be described, key  20  is operable to initially program and/or to subsequently reprogram the security device  40  with the SDC. Key  20  is then further operable to operate the security device  40  using power transferred to the security device and/or data communicated with the device, as will be described. 
     In one embodiment of the system and method illustrated in  FIGS.  1 A- 9 B , programmable electronic key  20  is configured to be programmed with a unique SDC by the programming station  60 . A programming station  60  suitable for use with the present invention is shown and described in detail in the commonly owned U.S. Pat. No. 7,737,844 entitled PROGRAMMING STATION FOR A SECURITY SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING MERCHANDISE, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. As illustrated in  FIG.  1 A  and best shown in enlarged  FIG.  1 B , the key  20  is presented to the programming station  60  and communication therebetween is initiated, for example by pressing a control button  22  provided on the exterior of the key. Communication between the programming station  60  and the key may be accomplished directly, for example, by one or more electrical contacts, or indirectly, for example by wireless communication. Any form of wireless communication capable of transferring data between the programming station  60  and key  20  is also possible, including without limitation optical transmission, acoustic transmission, or magnetic induction. In the embodiments shown and described herein, communication between programming station  60  and key  20  is accomplished by wireless optical transmission, and more particularly, by cooperating infrared (IR) transceivers provided in the programming station and the key. The components and method of IR communication between programming station  60  and key  20  is described in greater detail in the aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 7,737,844, and accordingly, will not be repeated here. For the purpose of describing the present invention, it is sufficient that the programming station comprises at least a logic control circuit for generating or being provided with a SDC, a memory for storing the SDC, and a communications system suitable for interacting with the programmable electronic key  20  in the manner described herein to program the key with the SDC. 
     As shown in  FIG.  1 B , programming station  60  comprises a housing  61  configured to contain the logic control circuit that generates the SDC, the memory that stores the SDC, and a communications system, namely an optical transceiver, for wirelessly communicating the SDC to a cooperating optical transceiver disposed within the key  20 . In use, the logic control circuit generates the SDC, which may be a predetermined (e.g., “factory preset”) security code, a serial number, or which may be a security code that is randomly generated by the logic control circuit of the programming station  60  at the time a first key  20  is presented to the station for programming. In the latter instance, the logic control circuit further comprises a random number generator for producing the unique SDC. A series of visual indicators, for example light-emitting diodes (LEDs)  67  may be provided on the exterior of the housing  61  for indicating the operating status of the programming station. Use of the programming station  60  may further require authorization, such as with a mechanical lock mechanism, for example, a conventional key and tumbler lock  68 , for preventing use of the programming station by an unauthorized person. Alternatively, the programming station  60  may require various other forms of authentication, such as a pin code, biometric identification, facial recognition, etc. in order to activate the key  20  or otherwise gain access to the key. As shown herein, the programming station  60  may be operatively connected to an external power source by a power cord  70  having at least one conductor. Alternatively, the programming station  60  may comprise an internal power source, for example an extended-life replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery, for providing power to the logic control circuit and the LEDs  67 . 
     In one example embodiment, the logic control circuit of the programming station  60  performs an electronic exchange of data with a logic control circuit of the key  20 , commonly referred to as a “handshake communication protocol.” The handshake communication protocol determines whether the key is an authorized key that has not been programmed previously, or is an authorized key that is being presented to the programming station a subsequent time to refresh the SDC. In the event that the handshake communication protocol fails, the programming station  60  will not provide the SDC to the unauthorized device attempting to obtain the SDC, for example an infrared reader on a counterfeit key. When the handshake communication protocol succeeds, programming station  60  permits the SDC randomly generated by the logic control circuit and/or stored in the memory of the station to be transmitted by the optical transceiver to the cooperating optical transceiver disposed within the key  20 . As will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, the SDC may be transmitted from the programming station  60  to the security key  20  alternatively by any other suitable means, including without limitation, electrical contacts or electromechanical, electromagnetic or magnetic conductors, as desired. 
     As illustrated in  FIG.  2   , the security key  20  programmed with the SDC is then positioned to operatively engage the security device  40 . In the embodiments shown and described herein, the security device is a conventional cabinet lock that has been modified to be unlocked by the programmable electronic key  20 . Preferably, the security device  40  is a “passive” device. As used herein, the term passive is intended to mean that the security device  40  does not have an internal power source sufficient to perform any functions (e.g., lock and/or unlock a mechanical lock mechanism). Significant cost savings are obtained by a retailer when the security device  40  is passive since the expense of an internal power source is confined to the security key  20 , and one such key is able to operate multiple security devices. If desired, the security device  40  may also be provided with a temporary power source (e.g., capacitor or limited-life battery) having sufficient power to activate an alarm, for example a piezoelectric audible alarm, that is actuated by a sensor, for example a contact, proximity or limit switch, in response to a security breach. The temporary power source may also be sufficient to communicate data, for example a SDC, from the security device  40  to the security key  20  to authenticate the security device and thereby authorize the key to provide power to the security device. With this embodiment of the present invention, the mechanical lock mechanism is operated by electrical power that is transferred from the key  20  to the security device  40  via electrical contacts, as will be described. 
     The security device  40  further comprises a logic control circuit, similar to the logic control circuit disposed within the key  20 , adapted to perform a handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the key in essentially the same manner as that between the programming station  60  and the key. In essence, the logic control circuit of the key  20  and the logic control circuit of the security device  40  communicate with each other to determine whether the security device is an authorized device that does not have a security code, or is a device having a proper (e.g., matching) SDC. The key  20  may be configured to initially transfer power to the security device  40  in the event the security device is a passive device to allow the security device to communicate with the key. In the event the handshake communication protocol fails (e.g., the device is not authorized or the device has a non-matching SDC), the key  20  will not program the device  40  with the SDC, and consequently, the security device will not operate. If the security device  40  was previously programmed with a different SDC, the device will no longer communicate with the security key  20 . In the event the handshake communication protocol is successful, the security key  20  permits the SDC stored in the key to be transmitted by the optical transceiver disposed within the key to a cooperating optical transceiver disposed within the security device  40  to program the device with the SDC. As will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, the SDC may be transmitted from the security key  20  to the security device  40  alternatively by any other suitable means, including without limitation, via one or more electrical contacts, or via electromechanical, electromagnetic or magnetic conductors, as desired. Furthermore, the SDC may be transmitted by inductive transfer of data from the programmable electronic key  20  to the programmable security device  40 . 
     On the other hand, when the handshake communication protocol is successful and the security device  40  is an authorized device having the same (e.g., matching) SDC, the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device  40  may operate using power from the key  20 , either power that had been previously transferred by the key and stored by the security device and/or by power transmitted by the key to the security device. In the embodiment of  FIGS.  1 A- 9 B , electrical contacts disposed on the security key  20  electrically couple with cooperating electrical contacts on the security device  40  to transfer power from the internal battery of the key to the security device. Power may be transferred directly to the mechanical lock mechanism, or alternatively, may be transferred to a power circuit disposed within the security device  40  that operates the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device and may be configured to store the power for subsequent operation of the lock mechanism. In the embodiment of  FIGS.  1 A- 9 B , the cabinet lock  40  is affixed to one of the pair of adjacent and overlapping sliding doors  102  of a conventional cabinet  100 . The cabinet  100  typically contains various types of equipment  110 . The doors  102  overlap medially between the ends of the cabinet  100  and the cabinet lock  40  is secured on an elongate locking arm  104  of a lock bracket  105  affixed to the inner door. In the illustrated example, the key  20  transfers power to an electric motor, such as a DC stepper motor, solenoid, or the like, that unlocks the lock mechanism of the cabinet lock  40  so that the cabinet lock can be removed from the arm  104  of the bracket  105  and the doors moved (e.g., slid) relative to one another to access the equipment  110  stored within the cabinet  100 . As shown, the arm  104  of the bracket  105  is provided with one-way ratchet teeth  106  and the cabinet lock  40  is provided with a complimentary ratchet pawls (not shown) in a conventional manner so that the key  20  is not required to lock the cabinet lock  40  onto the inner door  102  of the cabinet  100 . If desired, however, the cabinet lock  40  can be configured to require use of the key  20  to both unlock and lock the cabinet lock. 
     It will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art that the cabinet lock illustrated herein is but one of numerous types of passive security devices  40  that can be configured to be operated by a programmable electronic key  20  according to the present invention. In any of the aforementioned embodiments, the security device  40  may further comprise an electronic lock mechanism, such as a conventional proximity, limit or contact switch, including an associated monitoring circuit that activates an alarm in response to the switch being actuated or the integrity of a sense loop monitored by the monitoring circuit being compromised. In such embodiments the security device  40  comprises a logic control circuit, or the equivalent, including a memory for storing a SDC, and a communication system for initially receiving the SDC from the security key  20  and subsequently communicating with the key to authenticate the SDC of the key. 
     As illustrated in  FIG.  3 A  and shown enlarged in  FIG.  3 B , the security system and method further comprises charging station  80  for initially charging and subsequently recharging a rechargeable battery disposed within the security key  20 . The charging station  80  comprises at least one charging port  82  sized and shaped to receive a key  20  to be charged or recharged. As will be described in greater detail with reference to  FIGS.  9 A and  9 B , each charging port  82  comprises at least one magnet  85  for securely positioning and retaining the key  20  within the charging port  82  in electrical contact with the charging station  80 . If desired, the charging station  80  may comprise an internal power source, for example, an extended-life replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery, for providing power to up to four keys  20  positioned within respective charging ports  82 . Alternatively, and as shown herein, charging station  80  may be operatively connected to an external power source by a power cord  90  having at least one conductor. In some embodiments the programming station  60  and charging station  80  may be integrated into a single component. 
     In some embodiments, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may include additional authentication requirements prior to being used by a user, which may be useful for chain of custody. For example, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may require various other forms of authentication, such as a pin code, biometric identification, button presses, facial recognition, etc. in order to activate the key or otherwise gain access to the key. In some cases, the authentication using the key  20 ,  120  itself may be used in combination with authentication of the key using the programming station  60 . For example, a keycode entered by the user at the programming station  60  may be used to initially check out a key  20 ,  120 . However, the user may be further required to present his or her fingerprint to the key  20 ,  120  (or other authentication using the key itself) before the key is capable of being used to control or communicate with a security device  40 . The user may be required to present his or her fingerprint to the key  20 ,  120  within a predetermined time window in order to authorize the key for use. Otherwise, the user may be required to return to the programming station  60  to start the check out process over. The key  20 ,  120  may be configured to store the user’s fingerprint in memory and/or access attempts for auditing purposes. The data could be communicated to one or more remote devices  250  in some embodiments. In addition, key  20 ,  120  may be configured to detect and/or record unauthorized access attempts based on another user attempting to use the key that does not match the stored fingerprint. In lieu of biometric identification, other forms of authentication could be used, such as for example, a “morse code” number of button presses on the key  20 ,  120 . Thus, the user is able to use the key  20 ,  120  only if the button presses matches a predetermined sequence stored by the key. 
     According to other embodiments, a plurality of keys  20 ,  120  may be required in order to control or communicate with a security device  40 . In this regard, the security device  40  may include different modes of operation, e.g., (i) a single mode where a single key  20 ,  120  is needed to operate a single security device or (ii) a dual mode where more than one key is needed to operate a single security device. The security device  40  may be hardcoded with the desired mode of operation, while in other cases mechanical switches or the like could be used to change the mode of operation of the security device. In some embodiments, the key  20 ,  120  is configured to provide information regarding the mode of operation regardless of the type of security device  40 . For example, the key  20 ,  120  may be configured to communicate the desired mode to the security device  40 . In this way, the key  20 ,  120  may communicate a dual-mode operation to the security device  40 , which would require more than one user to present an authorized key to the security device before the security device may be operated. There may be master keys  20 ,  120  in some cases that are configured to bypass any security devices  40  that require multiple user authentication. In one embodiment, a user identification code and an SDC is needed prior to controlling the security device  40  using a key  20 ,  120 . For instance, a user may be required to check out a key  20 ,  120  using a programming station  60 , which would then program the key with the required modes of operation and security devices  40  that the user is able to access. In some cases, the dual-mode setting overrides any single mode of operation. Namely, a key  20 ,  120  required to operate in dual mode would override any single mode setting in the lock and vice versa. 
     In other embodiments, multiple security devices  40  may be configured to secure a single fixture. For example, in some applications, safety or additional authorization may be required prior to granting access to a fixture. One example of this is a hasp for securing access to circuit breakers where the hasp is configured to be used with a plurality of security devices  40 , such as padlocks configured to operate with key  20 ,  120 . In this instance, a plurality of security devices  40  may be desired to be used to ensure safety of the technicians, since all security devices would need to be unlocked prior to granted access to the fixture. Typically, technicians have no awareness of when the security device  40  has been removed or added. However, using keys  20 ,  120  would allow for sequencing and recording of accesses to the security devices  40 . For instance, the time stamp of the time the security device  40  was accessed and by whom could be recorded. Moreover, access to the fixture may be combined with other authorization techniques disclosed herein, such as biometric identification on the key  20 ,  120  and/or multiple modes of operation of the security device and/or key. In some cases, various levels of alerts may be configured to be provided to the technicians, such as via remote devices  250 , to the technician’s keys  20 ,  120  and/or other portable device. 
     An available feature of a security system and method according to the invention is that the logic control circuit of the programmable electronic key  20  may include a time-out function. More particularly, the ability of the key  20  to transfer data and power to the security device  40  is deactivated after a predetermined time period. By way of example, the logic control circuit may be deactivated after about eight hours from the time the key was programmed or last refreshed by the programming station  60 . Thus, an authorized sales associate typically must program or refresh the key  20  assigned to him at the beginning of each work shift. Furthermore, the charging station  80  may be configured to deactivate the logic control circuit of the key  20  (and thereby prevent use of the SDC) when the key is positioned within a charging port  82 . In this manner, the charging station  80  can be made available to an authorized sales associate in an unsecured location without risk that a charged key  20  could be removed from the charging station and used to maliciously disarm and/or unlock a security device  40 . The security key  20  would then have to be programmed or refreshed with the SDC by the programming station  60 , which is typically monitored or maintained at a secure location, in order to reactivate the logic control circuit of the key. If desired, the charging station  80  may alternatively require a matching handshake communication protocol with the programmable electronic key  20  in the same manner as the security device  40  and the key. 
       FIG.  4    is an enlarged view showing the embodiment of the security device  40  in greater detail. As previously mentioned, a security device  40  according to the present invention may utilize electrical power to lock and/or unlock a mechanical lock mechanism, and optionally, further includes an electronic lock mechanism, such as an alarm or a security “handshake.” At the same time, the security device  40  must be a passive device in the sense that it does not have an internal power source sufficient to operate (e.g., actuate the mechanical lock mechanism). As a result, the security device  40  must be configured to receive at least power, and in some cases, both power and data from an external source, such as the security key  20  shown and described herein. The embodiment of the security device depicted in  FIG.  4    is a cabinet lock  40  configured to be securely affixed to the locking arm  104  of a conventional cabinet lock bracket  105 , as previously described. The cabinet lock  40  comprises a logic control circuit for performing a security handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the security key  20  and for being programmed with the SDC by the key. In other embodiments, the cabinet lock  40  may be configured to transmit the SDC to the security key  20  to authenticate the security device and thereby authorize the key to transfer power to the cabinet lock. As previously mentioned, the data (e.g., handshake communication protocol and SDC) may be transferred (e.g., transmitted and received) by electrical contacts, optical transmission, acoustic transmission or magnetic induction, for example. 
     The cabinet lock  40  comprises a housing  41  sized and shaped to contain a logic control circuit (not shown) and an internal mechanical lock mechanism (not shown). A transfer port  42  formed in the housing  41  is sized and shaped to receive a transfer probe of the security key  20 , as will be described. At least one magnet  45  is disposed within the transfer port  42  for securely positioning and retaining the transfer probe of the key  20  in electrical contact with electrical contacts of the mechanical lock mechanism, and if desired, in electrical contact with the logic control circuit of the cabinet lock  40 . In the embodiment shown and described in  FIGS.  1 A- 9 B , data is transferred from the security key  20  to the cabinet lock  40  by wireless communication, such as by infrared (IR) optical transmission, as shown and described in the commonly owned U.S. Pat. No. 7,737,843 entitled PROGRAMMABLE ALARM MODULE AND SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING MERCHANDISE, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Power is transferred from the security key  20  to the cabinet lock  40  through electrical contacts disposed on the transfer probe of the key and corresponding electrical contacts disposed within the transfer port  42  of the cabinet lock. For example, the transfer port  42  may comprise a metallic outer ring  46  that forms one electrical contact, while at least one of the magnets  45  form another electrical contact to complete an electrical circuit with the electrical contacts disposed on the transfer probe of the key  20 . Regardless, electrical contacts transfer power from the key  20  to the mechanical lock mechanism disposed within the housing  41 . As previously mentioned, the power transferred from the key  20  is used to operate the mechanical lock mechanism, for example utilizing an electric motor, DC stepper motor, solenoid, or the like, to unlock the mechanism so that the cabinet lock  40  can be removed from the locking arm  104  of the lock bracket  105 . 
       FIGS.  5 - 8    show an embodiment of a security key, also referred to herein as a programmable electronic key,  20  according to the present invention. As previously mentioned, the security key  20  is configured to transfer both data and power to a security device  40  that comprises an electronic lock mechanism and a mechanical lock mechanism, as previously described. Accordingly, the programmable electronic key  20  must be an “active” device in the sense that it has an internal power source sufficient to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device  40 . As a result, the programmable electronic key  20  may be configured to transfer both data and power from an internal source disposed within the key, for example a logic control circuit and a battery. The embodiment of the programmable electronic key  20  depicted in  FIGS.  5 - 8    is a security key configured to be received within the transfer port  42  of the cabinet lock  40  shown in  FIG.  4   , as well as within the programming port  62  of the programming station  60  ( FIG.  2   ;  FIG.  3 A ) and the charging port  82  of the charging station  80  ( FIG.  3 B ;  FIG.  9 A ;  FIG.  9 B ). The programmable electronic key  20  comprises a logic control circuit for performing a handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the programming station  60  and for receiving the SDC from the programming station, as previously described. The logic control circuit of the programmable electronic key  20  further performs a handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the security device  40  and transfers the SDC to the device or permits operation of the device, as previously described. As previously mentioned, the data (e.g., handshake communication protocol and SDC) may be transferred by direct electrical contacts, optical transmission, acoustic transmission or magnetic induction. 
     As illustrated in  FIG.  6   , the programmable electronic key  20  comprises a housing  21  and an outer sleeve  23  that is removably disposed on the housing. The housing  21  contains the internal components of the key  20 , including without limitation the logic control circuit, memory, communication system and battery, as will be described. A window  24  may be formed through the outer sleeve  23  for viewing indicia  24 A that uniquely identifies the key  20 , or alternatively, indicates a particular server rack for use with the key. The outer sleeve  23  is removably disposed on the housing  21  so that the indicia  24 A may be altered or removed and replaced with different indicia. The programmable electronic key  20  may further comprise a detachable “quick-release” type key chain ring  30 . An opening  26  ( FIG.  8   ) is formed through the outer sleeve  23  and a key chain ring port  28  is formed in the housing  21  for receiving the key chain ring  30 . The programmable electronic key  20  further comprises a transfer probe  25  located at an end of the housing  21  opposite the key chain ring port  28  for transferring data and power to the security device  40 , as previously described. The transfer probe  25  also transmits and receives the handshake communication protocol and the SDC from the programming station  60 , as previously described, and receives power from the charging station  80 , as will be described in greater detail with reference to  FIG.  9 A  and  FIG.  9 B . 
     As best shown in  FIG.  8   , an internal battery  31  and a logic control circuit, or printed circuit board (PCB)  32  are disposed within the housing  21  of the programmable electronic key  20 . Battery  31  may be a conventional extended-life replaceable battery, but preferably, is a rechargeable battery suitable for use with the charging station  80 . The logic control circuit  32  is operatively coupled and electrically connected to a switch  33  that is actuated by the control button  22  provided on the exterior of the key  20  through the outer sleeve  23 . Control button  22  in conjunction with switch  33  controls certain operations of the logic control circuit  32 , and in particular, transmission of the data to the security device  40 . In that regard, the logic control circuit  32  is further operatively coupled and electrically connected to a communication system  34  for transmitting and receiving the handshake communication protocol and SDC data. In the embodiment shown and described herein, the communication system  34  is a wireless infrared (IR) transceiver for optical transmission of data between the programmable electronic key  20  and the programming station  60 , as well as between the key  20  and the security device  40 . As a result, the transfer probe  25  of the key  20  is provided with an optically transparent or translucent filter window  35  for emitting and collecting optical transmissions between the key  20  and the programming station  60 , or alternatively, between the key  20  and the security device  40 , as required. Transfer probe  25  further comprises a pair of bi-directional power transfer electrical contacts  36 ,  38  made of an electrically conductive material for transferring power to the security device  40  and for receiving power from the charging station  80 , as required. Accordingly, electrical contacts  36 ,  38  are electrically connected to battery  31 , and are operatively coupled and electrically connected to logic control circuit  32  in any suitable manner, for example by conductive insulated wires or plated conductors. 
     An important aspect of a programmable electronic key  20  according to the present invention, especially when used for use in conjunction with a security device  40  as described herein, is that the key does not require a physical force to be exerted by a user on the key to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device. By extension, no physical force is exerted by the key on the mechanical lock mechanism. As a result, the key cannot be unintentionally broken off in the lock, as often occurs with conventional mechanical key and lock mechanisms. Furthermore, neither the key nor and the mechanical lock mechanism suffer from excessive wear as likewise often occurs with conventional mechanical key and lock mechanisms. In addition, there is no required orientation of the transfer probe  25  of the programmable electronic key  20  relative to the charging port  82  of the charging station  80  or the transfer port  42  of the security device  40 . Accordingly, any wear of the electrical contacts on the transfer probe  25 , the charging port  82  or the transfer port  42  is minimized. As a further advantage, an authorized person is not required to position the transfer probe  25  of the programmable electronic key  20  in a particular orientation relative to the transfer port  42  of the security device  40  and thereafter exert a compressive and/or torsional force on the key to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the device. 
       FIG.  9 A  and  FIG.  9 B  show charging station  80  in greater detail. As previously mentioned, the charging station  80  recharges the internal battery  31  of the programmable electronic key  20 , and if desired, deactivates the data transfer and/or power transfer capability of the key until the key is reprogrammed with the SDC by the programming station  60 . Regardless, the charging station  80  comprises a housing  81  for containing the internal components of the charging station. The exterior of the housing  81  has at least one, and preferably, a plurality of charging ports  82  formed therein that are sized and shaped to receive the transfer probe  25  of the security key  20 , as previously described. At least one magnet  85  is disposed within each charging port  82  for securely positioning and retaining the transfer probe  25  in electrical contact with the charging station  80 . More particularly, the electrical contacts  36 ,  38  of the key  20  are retained within the charging port  82  in electrical contact with the magnets  85  and a resilient “pogo” pin  86  made of a conductive material to complete an electrical circuit between the charging station  80  and the battery  31  of the key. 
     As best shown in  FIG.  9 B , housing  81  is sized and shaped to contain a logic control circuit, or printed circuit board (PCB)  92  that is operatively coupled and electrically connected to the magnets  85  and the pogo pin  86  of each charging port  82 . The pogo pin  86  is depressible to complete an electrical circuit as the magnets  85  position and retain the electrical contacts  36 ,  38  within the charging port  82 . In particular, magnets  85  make electrical contact with the outer ring electrical contact  36  of the transfer probe  25  of key  20 , while pogo pin  86  makes electrical contact with inner ring electrical contact  38  of the transfer probe. When the pogo pin  86  is depressed and the electrical circuit between the charging station  80  and the key  20  is completed, the charging station recharges the internal battery  31  of the key. As previously mentioned, charging station  80  may comprise an internal power source, for example, an extended-life replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery, for providing power to the key(s)  20  positioned within the charging port(s)  82 . Alternatively, and as shown herein, the logic control circuit  92  of the charging station  80  is electrically connected to an external power source by a power cord  90  having at least one conductor. Furthermore, logic control circuit  92  may be operable for deactivating the data transfer and power transfer functions of the programmable electronic key  20 , or alternatively, for activating the “time-out” feature of the key until it is reprogrammed or refreshed by the programming station  60 . 
       FIG.  10 - 17 B  show another embodiment of a security system and method including a programmable key, a security device, a programming station, and a charging station according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this embodiment, the system and method comprise at least a programmable electronic key (also referred to herein as a security key) with inductive transfer, indicated generally at  120 , and a security device with inductive transfer, indicated generally at  140 , that is operated by the key  120 . The programmable electronic key  120  is useable with any security device or locking device, such as various types of server racks as discussed above, with inductive transfer capability that requires power transferred from the key to the device by induction, or alternatively, requires data transferred between the key and the device and power transferred from the key to the device by induction. Moreover, the electronic key  120  may include the same or similar functionality of the key  20  discussed herein. 
     As illustrated in  FIG.  11   , the security system and method may further comprise a charging station  180  for initially charging and subsequently recharging a rechargeable battery disposed within the security key  120  via inductive transfer. The charging station  180  comprises at least one charging port  182  sized and shaped to receive a security key  120 . If desired, each charging port  182  may comprise mechanical or magnetic means for properly positioning and securely retaining the key  120  within the charging port. By way of example and without limitation, at least one, and preferably, a plurality of magnets (not shown) may be provided for positioning and retaining the key  120  within the charging port  182  of the charging station  180 . However, as will be described further with reference to  FIG.  17 B , it is only necessary that the inductive transceiver of the security key  120  is sufficiently aligned with the corresponding inductive transceiver of the charging station  180  over a generally planar surface within the charging port  182 . Thus, magnets are not required (as with charging station  80 ) to position, retain and maintain electrical contacts provided on the security key  120  in electrical contact with corresponding electrical contacts provided on the charging station  180 . If desired, the charging station  180  may comprise an internal power source, for example, an extended-life replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery, for providing power to the key(s)  120  positioned within the charging port(s)  182 . Alternatively, and as shown herein, charging station  180  may be operatively connected to an external power source by a power cord  190  having at least one conductor in a conventional manner. 
       FIG.  12    shows the security device  140  with inductive transfer in greater detail. In a particular embodiment, a security device  140  with inductive transfer according to the invention may both receive electrical power from the security key  120  and communicate (e.g., transmit/receive) the SDC with the key by magnetic induction. 
     The cabinet lock  140  comprises a housing  141  sized and shaped to contain a logic control circuit (not shown) and an internal mechanical lock mechanism (not shown). A transfer port  142  formed in the housing  141  is sized and shaped to receive a transfer probe of the security key  120 , as will be described. If desired, the transfer port  142  may comprise mechanical or magnetic means for properly positioning and securely retaining the key  120  within the transfer port. By way of example and without limitation, at least one, and preferably, a plurality of magnets (not shown) may be provided for positioning and retaining the key  120  within the transfer port  142  of the cabinet lock  140 . However, as previously described with respect to the security key  120  and the charging port  182  of the charging station  180 , it is only necessary that the inductive transceiver of the security key  120  is sufficiently aligned with the corresponding inductive transceiver of the cabinet lock  140  over a generally planar surface within the transfer port  42 . Therefore, magnets are not required to position, retain and maintain electrical contacts provided on the security key  120  in electrical contact with corresponding electrical contacts provided on the cabinet lock  140 . In the particular embodiment shown and described herein, data is transferred from the security key  120  to the cabinet lock  140  by wireless communication, such as infrared (IR) optical transmission as shown and described in the aforementioned U.S. Pat. No. 7,737,843. Power is transferred from the security key  120  to the cabinet lock  140  by induction across the transfer port  142  of the cabinet lock using an inductive transceiver disposed within a transfer probe of the key that is aligned with a corresponding inductive transceiver disposed within the cabinet lock. For example, the transfer probe of the security key  120  may comprise an inductive transceiver coil that is electrically connected to the logic control circuit of the key to provide electrical power from the internal battery of the key to an inductive transceiver coil disposed within the cabinet lock  140 . The inductive transceiver coil of the cabinet lock  140  then transfers the electrical power from the internal battery of the key  120  to the mechanical lock mechanism disposed within the housing  141  of the cabinet lock. As previously mentioned, the power transferred from the key  120  is used to unlock the mechanical lock mechanism, for example utilizing an electric motor, DC stepper motor, solenoid, or the like, so that the cabinet lock  140  can be removed from the arm  104  of the lock bracket  105 . 
       FIGS.  13 - 16    show the programmable electronic key  120  with inductive transfer in greater detail. As previously mentioned, the key  120  is configured to transfer both data and power to a security device  140  that comprises an electronic lock mechanism and a mechanical lock mechanism. Accordingly, the programmable electronic key  120  must be an active device in the sense that it has an internal power source sufficient to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device  140 . As a result, the programmable electronic key  120  may be configured to transfer both data and power from an internal source, such as a logic control circuit and a battery disposed within the key. The embodiment of the programmable electronic key  120  depicted herein is a security key with inductive transfer capability configured to be received within the transfer port  145  of the cabinet lock  140  shown in  FIG.  12   , as well as the programming port  62  of the programming station  60  ( FIG.  2   ) and the charging port  182  of the charging station  180  ( FIG.  11   ). The programmable electronic key  120  comprises a logic control circuit for performing a handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the programming station  60  and for receiving the SDC from the programming station, as previously described. The logic control circuit of the programmable electronic key  120  further performs a handshake communication protocol with the logic control circuit of the security device  140  and transfers the SDC to the security device, as previously described. In a particular embodiment, a security key  120  with inductive transfer according to the invention may both transfer electrical power to a security device  140  and communicate the SDC with the security device by magnetic induction. 
     The programmable electronic key  120  comprises a housing  121  having an internal cavity or compartment that contains the internal components of the key, including without limitation the logic control circuit, memory, communication system and battery, as will be described. As shown, the housing  121  is formed by a lower portion  123  and an upper portion  124  that are joined together after assembly, for example by ultrasonic welding. The programmable electronic key  120  further defines an opening  128  at one end for coupling the key to a key chain ring, lanyard or the like. As previously mentioned, the programmable electronic key  120  further comprises a transfer probe  125  located at an end of the housing  121  opposite the opening  128  for transferring data and power to the security device  140 . The transfer probe  125  is also operable to transmit and receive the handshake communication protocol and the SDC from the programming station  60 , as previously described, and to receive power from the charging station  180 , as will be described in greater detail with reference to  FIG.  17 A  and  FIG.  17 B . 
       FIG.  14    shows an embodiment of an inductive coil  126  having high magnetic permeability that is adapted to be disposed within the housing  121  of the electronic key  120  adjacent the transfer probe  125 . As shown herein, the inductive coil  126  comprises a highly magnetically permeable ferrite core  127  surrounded by a plurality of inductive core windings  129 . The inductive core windings  129  consist of a length of a conductive wire that is wrapped around the ferrite core. As is well known, passing an alternating current through the conductive wire generates, or induces, a magnetic field around the inductive core  127 . The alternating current in the inductive core windings  129  may be produced by connecting the leads  129 A and  129 B of the conductive wire to the internal battery of the electronic key  120  through the logic control circuit.  FIG.  14    further shows an inductive coil  146  having high magnetic permeability that is adapted to be disposed within the housing  141  of the security device (e.g., cabinet lock)  140  adjacent the transfer port  142 . As shown herein, the inductive coil  146  comprises a highly magnetically permeable ferrite core  147  surrounded by a plurality of inductive core windings  149  consisting of a length of a conductive wire that is wrapped around the ferrite core. Placing the transfer probe  125  of the electronic key  120  into the transfer port  142  of the cabinet lock  140  and passing an alternating current through the inductive core windings  129  of the inductive core  126  generates a magnetic field within the transfer port of the cabinet lock in the vicinity of the inductive coil  146 . As a result, an alternating current is generated, or induced, in the conductive wire of the inductive core windings  149  of inductive coil  146  having leads  149 A and  149 B connected to the logic control circuit of the cabinet lock  140 . The alternating current induced in the inductive coil  146  of the cabinet lock  140  is then transformed into a direct current in a known manner, such as via a bridge rectifier on the logic control circuit, to provide direct current (DC) power to the cabinet lock. The DC power generated in the cabinet lock  140  by the inductive coil  126  of the electronic key  120 , may be used, for example, to unlock a mechanical lock mechanism disposed within the housing  141  of the cabinet lock. 
     As best shown in  FIG.  16   , an internal battery  131  and a logic control circuit, or printed circuit board (PCB)  132  are disposed within the housing  121  of the programmable electronic key  120 . Battery  131  may be a conventional extended-life replaceable battery, but preferably, is a rechargeable battery suitable for use with the charging station  180 . The logic control circuit  132  is operatively coupled and electrically connected to a switch  133  that is actuated by the control button  122  provided on the exterior of the key  120  through the housing  121 . Control button  122  in conjunction with switch  133  controls certain operations of the logic control circuit  132 , and in particular, transmission of the data (e.g., handshake communication protocol and SDC) between the key and the programming station  60 , as well as between the key and the security device  140 . In that regard, the logic control circuit  132  is further operatively coupled and electrically connected to a communication system  134  for transferring the handshake communication protocol and SDC data. As shown and described herein, the communication system  134  is a wireless infrared (IR) transceiver for optical transmission of data between the programmable electronic key  120  and the programming station  60 , and between the key and the security device  140 . As a result, the transfer probe  125  of the key  120  is provided with an optically transparent or translucent filter window  135  for emitting and collecting optical transmissions between the key  120  and the programming station  60 , or between the key and the security device  140 , as required. Transfer probe  125  further comprises inductive coil  126  ( FIG.  14   ) comprising inductive core  127  and inductive core windings  129  for transferring electrical power to the security device  140  and/or receiving electrical power from the charging station  180  to charge the internal battery  131 , as required. Accordingly, the leads  129 A and  129 B ( FIG.  14   ) of the inductive coil  126  are electrically connected to the logic control circuit  132 , which in turn is electrically connected to the battery  131 , in a suitable manner, for example by conductive insulated wires or plated conductors. Alternatively, the optical transceiver  134  may be eliminated and data transferred between the programmable electronic key  120  and the security device  140  via magnetic induction through the inductive coil  126 . 
     As noted above, one aspect of a programmable electronic key  120  according to the present invention, especially when used for use in conjunction with a security device  140  as described herein, is that the key does not require a physical force to be exerted by a user on the key to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the security device. In addition, there is no required orientation of the transfer probe  125  of the programmable electronic key  120  relative to the charging port  182  of the charging station  180  or the transfer port  142  of the security device  140 . Accordingly, any wear of the electrical contacts on the transfer probe  125 , the charging port  182  or the transfer port  142  is minimized. As a further advantage, an authorized person is not required to position the transfer probe  125  of the programmable electronic key  120   in a particular orientation relative to the transfer port  142  of the security device  140  and thereafter exert a compressive and/or torsional force on the key to operate the mechanical lock mechanism of the device. 
       FIG.  17 A  and  FIG.  17 B  show charging station  180  with inductive transfer capability in greater detail. As previously mentioned, the charging station  180  recharges the internal battery  131  of the security key  120 . In certain instances, the charging station  180  also deactivates the data transfer and/or power transfer capability of the key  120  until the key has been reprogrammed with the SDC by the programming station  60 . Regardless, the charging station  180  comprises a housing  181  for containing the internal components of the charging station. The exterior of the housing  181  has at least one charging port  182  formed therein that are sized and shaped to receive the transfer probe  125  of a programmable electronic key  120 . As previously described, mechanical or magnetic means may be provided for properly positioning and securely retaining the transfer probe  125  within the charging port  182  such that the inductive coil  126  is in alignment with a corresponding inductive coil  186  ( FIG.  17 B ) disposed within the housing  181  of the charging station  180  adjacent the charging port. As will be readily understood and appreciated, the inductive coil  186  adjacent the charging port  182  of the charging station  180  generates, or induces, an alternating current in the conductive wire of the inductive core windings  129  of inductive coil  126  that in turn provides DC power (for example, via a bridge rectifier on the logic control circuit  132 ) to charge the battery  131  of the programmable electronic key  120 . 
     As best shown in  FIG.  17 B , housing  181  is sized and shaped to contain a logic control circuit, or printed circuit board (PCB)  192  that is electrically connected and operatively coupled to an inductive coil  186  adjacent each of the charging ports  182 . In the manner previously described with respect to inductive coli  126  and inductive coil  146 , each inductive coil  186  comprises an inductive core  187  surrounded by a plurality of inductive core windings  189  formed by a conductive wire having a pair of leads (not shown). When an alternating current is passed through the conductive wire of the inductive core windings  189  with the transfer probe  125  of the programmable electronic key  120  disposed in the charging port  182  of the charging station  180 , the inductive coil  186  generates a magnetic field that induces an alternating current in the conductive wire of the inductive core windings  129  of the inductive coil  126  of the key. The alternating current in the inductive coil  126  is then transformed into DC power to charge the internal battery  131  of the programmable electronic key  120 . As previously mentioned, charging station  180  may comprise an internal power source, for example, an extended-life replaceable battery or a rechargeable battery, for providing power to the key(s)  120  positioned within the charging port(s)  182 . Alternatively, and as shown herein, the logic control circuit  192  of the charging station  180  is electrically connected to an external power source by a power cord  190  having at least one conductor. Furthermore, logic control circuit  192  may be operable for deactivating the data transfer and/or power transfer functions of the programmable electronic key  120 , or alternatively, for activating the “timing out” feature of the key until it is reprogrammed or refreshed by the programming station  60 . 
     In some embodiments, each electronic key  20 ,  120  is configured to store various types of data. For example, each key  20 ,  120  may store a serial number of one or more security devices  40 ,  140 , the data and time of activation of the key, a user of the key, a serial number of the key, number of key activations, a type of activation (e.g., “naked” activation, activation transferring only data, activation transferring power, activation transferring data and power), and/or various events (e.g., a security device has been locked or unlocked). This information may be transmitted to a remote location or device (e.g., a backend computer) upon each activation of the key  20 ,  120  or at any other desired period of time, such as upon communication with a programming station  60  or other back-end device. Thus, the data transfer may occur in predetermined time intervals or in real time or automatically in some embodiments. In some cases, the programming station  60  may be configured to store the data and transfer the data to a remote location or device. Authorized personnel may use this data to take various actions, such as to audit and monitor key user activity, audit security devices  40 ,  140  (e.g., ensure the security devices are locked), etc. Moreover, such information may be requested and obtained on demand, such as from the programming station  60  and/or a remote device. 
     In other embodiments, the electronic key  20 ,  120  is configured to obtain data from a security device  40 ,  140 . For example, the security device  40 ,  140  may store various data regarding past communication with a electronic key  20 ,  120  (e.g., key identification, time of communication, etc.), and when a subsequent electronic key communicates with the same security device, the data is transferred to the electronic key. Thus, the security device  40 ,  140  may include a memory for storing such data. In some cases, the security device  40 ,  140  includes a power source for receiving and storing the data, while in other cases, the power provided by the electronic key  20 ,  120  is used for allowing the merchandise security device to store the data. The electronic key  20 ,  120  may then communicate the data for collection and review, such as at a remote location or device. In some instances, communication between the electronic key  20 ,  120  and the programming station  60  may allow data to be pulled from the electronic key and communicated, such as to a remote location or device. In other cases, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may be configured to obtain data from security devices  40 ,  140 , such as an identification of the security device, identification of the items contained within or by the security device, and/or the system health of the security device and/or the items. The electronic key  20 ,  120  may store the data and provide the data to a remote location or device upon communication with the programming station  60 . As such, the electronic keys  20 ,  120  may be a useful resource for obtaining various types of data from the merchandise security devices  40 ,  140  without the need for wired connections or complex wireless networks or systems. In other embodiments, the security devices  40 ,  140  themselves may include wireless communication capability to allow for transmission of the data to a remote device or location. 
     In another embodiment, each electronic key  20 ,  120  may include a security code and a serial number for one or more security devices  40 ,  140 . For example, a key  20 ,  120  may only be able to lock or unlock a security device  40 ,  140  where the security codes and the serial numbers match one another. In one example, each serial number is unique to a security device  40 ,  140  and could be programmed at the time of manufacture or by the retailer. Individual electronic keys  20 ,  120  may then be assigned particular serial numbers for authorized security devices  40 ,  140  (e.g., user 1 includes serial numbers 1, 2, 3; user 2 includes serial numbers 1, 4, 5). Each of the electronic keys  20 ,  120  may be programmed with the same security code using a programming station  60 . In order to lock or unlock a merchandise security device  40 ,  140 , the electronic key  20 ,  120  may communicate with a particular security device and determine whether the security codes and the serial numbers match. If the codes match, the electronic key  20 ,  120  then locks or unlocks the security device  40 ,  140 . 
     According to another embodiment,  FIG.  18    illustrates a system  200  comprising a server rack  202  and a lock  240 . In this example, the server rack  202  includes a cabinet  204  and a door  206  pivotably attached to the cabinet, although other types of server racks and fixtures may be used. The lock  240  is configured to lock the door  206  to the cabinet  204  such that the door is incapable of being opened when the lock is locked but is able to be opened when the lock is unlocked. In this embodiment, the lock  240  may includes a latch that is configured to engage the cabinet  204  to prevent the door  206  from opening when locked. The latch may be any suitable mechanism configured to move between an engaged position with the cabinet  204  and a disengaged position whereby the latch is no longer in engagement with the cabinet. 
     In some embodiments, the lock  240  is configured to operate according to the various embodiments discussed above for the security devices  40 ,  140 . For example, the lock  240  may be an electronic lock configured to be controlled by a key  20 ,  120  using power and/or data communication using various communication protocols. In the illustrated embodiment, the lock  240  may include a transfer port  242  that is configured to facilitate communication with a key  20 ,  120  as disclosed above. In other embodiments, the lock  240  may be configured to be operated using a combination of electrical and mechanical interaction. 
     In other embodiments, the key  20 ,  120  may be used for ensuring chain of custody. For example, the key  20 ,  120  may be configured to scan the rack or hardware contained within the rack (e.g., servers or hard drives). For example, each drive could have an NFC label attached thereto (or any other of a number of devices to be identified), and the key  20 ,  120  may be configured to read data on the NFC label. Scanning the NFC label may result in the key  20 ,  120  storing information stored on the label which may in turn be stored in the key for auditing purposes. When the technician opens the door  206 , they may also be required to scan the drive they are removing, which could likewise be stored on the key  20 ,  120 . In the event the server drives are to be destroyed, the key  20 ,  120  may also be configured to scan the drives at the destruction point for storing additional audit data. Thus, the key  20 ,  120  can facilitate acquiring more data about when and who accessed a drive, leading to a chain of custody for that drive. 
     In additional embodiments, the system  200  may include a security device to detect unauthorized access to a server rack  202 . In one example, the security device may be configured to detect removal of a drive contained within the server rack  202 . 
     In some embodiments, the security system  200  may include wireless communications for facilitating communication between its various components (e.g., electronic locks  254 , programming stations, and/or keys  20 ,  120 ) and/or one or more remote devices  250 . For example,  FIG.  19    shows that the security system may include a monitoring device  252  configured to communicate with one or more electronic locks, keys, and a remote device  250 . The monitoring device  252  may be any device (e.g., a controller, hub, gateway, computer, server, and/or cloud device) configured to communicate with one or more electronic locks and/or keys. For instance, the monitoring device  252  may be a hub configured to communicate with a plurality of electronic locks and/or keys. In other cases, the monitoring device  252  may be a computer (e.g., tablet, laptop, or desktop computer) that is configured to communicate with one or more electronic locks and/or keys and/or one or more hubs  256  to facilitate data transfer. It is understood that any number of monitoring devices  252  may be employed in the system. The electronic locks, keys, and/or the monitoring device  252  may include wireless communications circuitry for communicating with one another using any desired communications protocol (e.g., Bluetooth, LoRa, Wi-Fi, radiofrequency, etc.). The electronic locks, keys, and monitoring device  252  may be located remotely from one another (e.g., the electronic locks may be located in a data center, while the monitoring device may be at a location that is not in the data center). In some cases, the monitoring device  252  may be located at some fixed location in proximity to one or more electronic locks (e.g., attached to a server rack). In other instances, the electronic locks and/or keys and the monitoring device  252  may communicate over a cloud network. In some embodiments, the electronic locks and the monitoring device  18  are electrically connected via hard wiring, and the monitoring device may have wireless communications circuitry for communicating with other monitoring devices or remote devices  250 . 
     The monitoring device  252  may further be configured to facilitate communication with one or more remote devices  250  (e.g., a smartphone or tablet) for providing notification regarding various events and/or providing data. For example, data such as a time, date, server ID, lock ID, key ID, user, etc. of access may be stored by the locks and/or keys and communicated between the electronic locks, keys, and/or monitoring devices to the remote device  250  (e.g., an authorized access attempt). Such communication could occur, for instance, over one or more wireless communication protocols. For instance, a private local network may be used to facilitate communication between the electronic locks, keys, and a monitoring device  18  (e.g., via the LoRa network), and a public network could be used for communication with the remote device  250  (e.g., via a cloud network). In other embodiments, the electronic locks and/or the monitoring device  252  may be configured to generate an alarm signal should an unauthorized access attempt be detected. In some embodiments, reports may be generated at the remote device  250  which may be used to collect and manage data regarding each of the electronic locks and/or keys. 
     It is generally understood that data centers may use data or media drives (e.g., USB, SD, Compact Flash, or SSD) to transfer software, firmware, code and other digital data between computer systems including various components. These drives are often one-time use in that they are destroyed at the end of the process so that there is minimum opportunity for the data on them to be intercepted by nefarious actors. There are several current issues with this process, one of which is that data drives are often small and not suited to be used in the destruction devices used on typical hard drives. For example, the hard drive may be placed on a conveyor belt for purposes of drive destruction that may have gaps that a data drive could fall through. Often the hard drives have a bar code or QR code that is scanned to confirm destruction. A data drive is small and may not have sufficient space for a code that is easily read by the scanners. Also, intermediate storage, such as from the server rack to the destruction machine, might be set up to accommodate typical hard drive sizes, but not smaller data drives. Thus, there exists a need for a data drive to work within the parameters of these existing destruction systems. 
       FIGS.  31 - 34    show various embodiments of a USB drive  300 . In some embodiments, the size of the USB drive  300  (or other media device or drive) matches the size of a typical solid-state drive (SSD) drive, which is the most commonly used in rack systems and destruction machines. These SSD cases are approximately 100x70x15 (mm), but other sizes could be viable depending on the machine in use. Thus, the USB drive  300  may include a case or housing that is the same or substantially similar to the size of a conventional SSD drive. Ensuring that the USB drive  300  is the same size as an SSD case allows the USB drive to be handled in the same manner as SSD drives are typically handled and with at least the same level of security. In some cases, the USB drive  300  may be housed or integrated with an SSD case in order to maintain the ability to plug the USB connector into a wide variety of devices. It may not be viable to simply put a connector on the side of this SSD case, although this may be done in some cases. In one embodiment, a USB connector  302  is coupled to the USB drive  300 , such as via a short cable having a connector extending from the case. In one example, this connector  302  may be configured to be removably engaged with the drive  300  such that it does not increase the overall dimensions of the case. For instance, the USB drive  300  may include a slot or other recess  304  configured to receive the connector  302  and associated cable therein (e.g., compare  FIG.  31    to  FIG.  33   ). In other cases, the USB connector  302  may be configured to move relative to the SSD case between a retracted position relative to the case and an extended position relative to the case to thereby allow connection to the computer system. In one embodiment, the USB electronic components are disposed inside the USB drive, not on the outside of the case or in the connector at the end of the cable. 
     Another possible issue with current techniques for use of USB drives is data security of USB drives while in the possession of a technician performing maintenance at the data center. A USB drive is very easily plugged into any computer system, and there are even small handheld devices that can copy the data of a USB drive easily. In an ideal implementation, the USB drive would be inaccessible by anyone other than the technician, and the technician would also be tracked as to when he/she was moving data to and from the drive. 
     Data security of the USB drives can be addressed in different ways. In one embodiment, the USB drive  300  may be mechanically disabled. This can be done by preventing the USB connector  302  from communicating to the USB components inside the SSD case. This may be accomplished by a cutting device on a slider that the technician could use once the job is complete. The slider could cut anywhere along the electric path from the USB connector the PCB inside the case thereby eliminating any communication between the USB connector and the PCB. The cutter could also cut through a pathway on the PCB to break the connection. Finally, the slider may be configured to move into contact with a location on the circuit board to create a short and thereby render the USB drive useless. The slider may have a one-way latch or mechanism that once moved into position, it could not be physically moved back to its initial position. 
     In other embodiments, techniques may be used destroy the USB drive’s  300  circuit with electricity. For instance, a fuse could be used on one of the circuit lines on the PCB of the USB drive that will blow when a high voltage is applied to it. Alternately, voltage that is above specification could be applied directly to the pins of a microchip, causing it to burn up. There are several ways this power could be applied. The USB connector  302  could be configured to connect to a special device that delivers high current through the connector. Alternately, power could be delivered wirelessly from a device (e.g., through a pick-up coil). In order to not have accidental destruction, a two-factor intent would be beneficial. For example, pushing a button on the USB drive  300  or other actuator while presenting the voltage injection could be used for such a purpose. 
     In another embodiment of the invention, the USB drive  300  is incapable of being used by the technician until the USB drive is successfully activated or otherwise authenticated. In one example, a security key may be used to activate a USB drive. A mechanical key could be used in some cases, but an electronic key may have additional benefits. The electronic key may take many different forms such as those discussed above, as well as an RFID badge, an NFC reader, a device with IR transceivers, etc. In one example, an NFC reader is configured to communicate an activation signal. This activation signal could be writing a bit to the NFC tag, or a wireless or wireless signal delivered directly to the USB components within the USB drive. In this example, each USB drive may have an NFC tag with a unique serial number or other identifier. 
     As noted above, the key may be electronic key  20 ,  120 . The electronic key  20 ,  120  may be authenticated for the particular user using various authentication techniques, which would grant the user permissions to use the USB drives  300 . In operation according to one embodiment, the USB drive defaults to a disabled mode. Once the USB drive  300  is plugged into a port of the server component and receives power, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may be used to authenticate the user and then enable the drive, such as via a socket on the USB drive housing. The USB drive  300  may then latch “ON” so long as it remains powered.  FIG.  32    shows various modes of operation where the USB drive is disabled, then authenticated for use, and then subsequently disabled. Alternatively, the key  20 ,  120  may be presented to the USB drive  300  prior to connection with the port of the server component in order to enable the USB drive. When the USB drive  300  is unplugged from the USB port, it may be configured to automatically return to a disabled mode. Thus, the technician would be required to authenticate the USB drive  300  at every computer component the drive is connected into. In addition to authentication, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may be configured to read the NFC tag (or another identifier  308  such as a UPC code) from the drive and then deliver that information along with the identity of the key owner to a remote device  250 . In this way, the user of the drive  300  can be tracked and audited at every usage. In some cases, the USB drive  300  may include a seal  306  or the like that is configured to be removed prior to use and accessing the connector  302  (see, e.g.,  FIG.  33   ) so that the technician knows that the USB drive is unused. Because the computer systems within the data center are also connected, the USB connection can be confirmed on both sides of the transaction (i.e., by the electronic key  20 ,  120  and also by the server component the drive  300  was plugged into). Thus, any nefarious behavior can quickly be discovered. If, for example, an electronic key  20 ,  120  reported that a drive  300  was authenticated and in use, but the component did not report being connected to the drive, the implication is that the drive was plugged into an unauthorized device and thus the data may have been compromised. Various forms of authentication between the USB drive  300  and the electronic key  20 ,  120  may be used, such as any of the techniques (or combinations thereof) disclosed above. For instance, the electronic key  20 ,  120  may be configured to provide power to the USB drive which allows the USB drive to communicate with the component of the server rack. Moreover, the USB drive  300  may include a transfer port  42 ,  142  similar to that described above to facilitate communication with an electronic key  20 ,  120 . 
     As noted above, various components within a data center may be destroyed to prevent authorized access to such components and data stored thereon. For instance, conventional destruction may occur by physically destroying the components. However, there is no definitive way to confirm that the components have indeed been destroyed and what happened prior to destruction since it is a technician who is tasked with destroying the components without any accurate chain of custody. In the embodiments discussed where a key is required to enable a USB drive for use, destruction may not be required since the USB drive is unusable without a key. In other embodiments, chain of custody may be improved by employing lockable enclosures  400  or secure sleeves for enclosing media  410  and that may include an identifier  402  (e.g., QR code) (see, e.g.,  FIGS.  20 - 30   ). For example, the lockable enclosures  400  may have a one-way latch  404  that prevents the enclosures from being unlocked after the latch is moved to a latched position. It is understood that the one-way latch  404  may take many forms, such as that shown in  FIGS.  35 - 38   , or alternatively any number of engagement members (e.g., one-way snaps, detents, or the like) that prevent media  410  from being removed once received by the lockable enclosure  400 . For example, the one-way latch  404  may include one or more engagement members  408  configured to engage with one another when the latch is closed, such as by rotating relative to one another from an open position to a closed, engaged position. In other examples, the lockable enclosure  400  may be configured to receive the media  410  in such a way that the media cannot be removed without damaging or destroying the lockable enclosure and/or media. 
     Moreover, the identifier  402  may also take many forms, such as a label with a QR or UPC code, which may be placed over the one-way latch (see, e.g.,  FIG.  37   ). Thus, identifier may be located in such a way that attempting to open the one-way latch  404  may damage the identifier. The identifier  402  may only be accessible when the lockable enclosure  400  is successfully latched in some embodiments (e.g., compare  FIG.  26    to  FIG.  27   ). In other cases, a key  20 ,  120  may be used to lock the enclosure, or a remote device  250  in other embodiments. The identifier  402  of each of the lockable enclosure  400  and the media  410  (e.g., SSD or USB drive) may then be required to be scanned or photographed together before the lockable enclosure is confirmed as being secure and ready to be destroyed (see, e.g.,  FIG.  28   ). If the media  410  is moved to a different lockable enclosure  400 , scanning the enclosure’s identifier  402  and the media’s identifier  402  may reveal that a possible tamper has taken place (see, e.g.,  FIG.  30   ). In one embodiment, the lockable enclosures  400  may be required to be inserted within a secure bin  406  (see, e.g.,  FIG.  20   ). This secure bin  406  may include access control as well, such as to log when a particular lockable enclosure  400  is inserted therein. In some instances, the lockable enclosures  400  are single use and may be destroyed along with the media  410 . In other cases, the lockable enclosures  400  may be “smart” and reusable, such as where the enclosures are configured to communicate with an electronic key  20 ,  120 . In this example, the lockable enclosure  400  may be configured to be unlocked to remove the media  410  at the time of destroying the media. In some cases, a scanner station may be used to unlock the lockable enclosure  400 , remove the media  410 , and destroy the media. 
       FIG.  39    illustrates another embodiment of a lockable enclosure  500 , sometimes referred to as a secure sleeve or case. In general, the lockable enclosure  500  is configured to retain a new data or media drive prior to the old data drive being discarded with the lockable enclosure. For example, the old data drive  504  may be a drive removed from a server rack that is to be replaced with a new data drive  506 . The lockable enclosure  500  may be configured to operate in a one-in-one-out fashion such that a new data drive cannot be accessed until the old data drive is secured within the enclosure. Thus, in some embodiments, the new data drive cannot be dispensed until the old data drive is secure. This one-in-one-out configuration may also allow the technician to easily determine which data drive is old and which is new.  FIG.  39    illustrates that the lockable enclosure  500  includes a housing that contains a latch  502  configured to slide or otherwise move within the housing. The lockable enclosure  500  may house the latch  502  therein such that the latch is unable to be removed. The lockable enclosure  500  may be formed of a clear polymeric material (e.g., polycarbonate) and may be formed of one or more components, such as an upper housing and a lower housing that are attached to one another, such as in a permanent manner (e.g., via ultrasonic welding). Comparing  FIGS.  41  and  42    (a portion of the housing has been removed for illustration), it is shown that the latch  502  may be configured to slide between a first position for receiving a data drive and a second position within the lockable enclosure  500  for dispensing a data drive. 
     In one embodiment, the latch  502  may be configured to receive an old data drive  504  therein (see  FIG.  44   ), and the lockable enclosure  500  may be configured to house a new data drive  506  therein (see  FIG.  43   ). Thus, the lockable enclosure  500  may include a new data drive  506  that is already present, which may for example be provided during manufacturing and assembly of the lockable enclosure. The latch  502  may include one or more flexible members  508  (e.g., a pair) configured to be biased or flexed when the old data drive  504  is inserted therein. The flexible members  508  may include tines or like engagement members  510  at a free end thereof that are configured to align with and engage one or more corresponding slots or channels  512  defined in the lockable enclosure  500 . In this way, the engagement members  510  are configured to slide within the slots  512 . In some cases, the engagement members  510  may be incapable of engaging the slots  512  until a data drive has been inserted within the latch  502 . Thus, the latch  502  may be incapable of sliding within the lockable enclosure  500  until a data drive is inserted. For example, insertion of an old data drive  504  within the latch  502  may cause the flexible members  508  to bias outwardly to align the engagement members  510  with the slots  512  when a data drive with the appropriate width is inserted therein. In certain aspects, the latch  502  may be capable of sliding in only one direction and cannot be slid in an opposite direction. The lockable enclosure  500  may include one or more ribs  514  that are configured to block the latch  502  from sliding in an opposite direction. As such, embodiments of the present invention may provide features that make defeating the lockable enclosure  500  difficult, such as attempted picking of the lockable enclosure. In this example, two tools would be needed to engage the flexible members  508  so as to align them with the slots  5120  to defeat the lockable enclosure  500  which may be difficult to accomplish. 
       FIG.  43    shows an example of a new data drive  506  positioned within the lockable enclosure  500 . The lockable enclosure  500  may define an opening  516  configured to receive an old data drive  504  therein. As shown, the opening  516  may be defined in a top surface of the lockable enclosure  500  and sized to receive the old data drive  504  and facilitate engagement with the latch  502 . When the old data drive  504  is inserted, a user is able to push the latch  502  in a direction towards the new data drive  506 . As the latch  502  progresses within the lockable enclosure  500 , the new data drive  506  is pushed out of an opening  522  defined in the lockable enclosure (see.  FIG.  45   ). For instance, as shown, the end of the lockable enclosure  500  may define an opening  522  that is sized to allow the new data drive  506  to fit through the opening. As noted above, the latch  502  cannot be reversed and moved in an opposite direction. Moreover, the latch  502  may be configured to surround the data drive  504  such that any electrical contacts or pins on the data drive are incapable of being accessed once the data drive is inserted therein. In this way, the contacts of the data drive  504  cannot be accessed by an unauthorized person. Once the new data drive  506  has been removed (see  FIG.  46   ), the old data drive  504  is retained within the lockable enclosure  500  and cannot be removed without damaging the enclosure. In some cases, the lockable enclosure  500  and old data drive  504  retained therein may be destroyed as discussed above. The old data drive  504  may be held in place within the lockable enclosure  500  by any number of means, such as for example, a friction fit, crush ribs, breakable tines or any other means that prevents the data drive from being removed. In some instances, the old data drive  504  may be recessed into the lockable enclosure  500 , and the lockable enclosure may have a tight fit around the data drive such that it is difficult to access or remove the data drive using tools or fingers or by impact to the outside of the enclosure. In some embodiments, sliding the latch  502  from the first position to the second position may reveal a UPC, QR, barcode, serial number, or like identifier  518  for identifying the lockable enclosure  500  (see  FIG.  46   ) and in some cases correlating the lockable enclosure with the old data drive  506  for chain of custody, as described above. 
     Although embodiments of the present invention describe a latch  502  that is configured to slide within the lockable enclosure  500 , it is understood that different configurations may be employed utilizing a one-in-one-out feature. For example,  FIG.  40    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure  500  that employs a cam  520  configured to rotate. Thus, in some cases, the latch may be a cam or other rotatable mechanism. In this design, the cam  520  may be configured to rotate by the act of inserting the old data drive  504 , and the rotation would cause the new data drive  506  to be dispensed. Similar to the embodiments disclosed above, a latch with engagement members may be configured to prevent the cam from rotating unless a data drive with the correct width is inserted into the lockable enclosure. Moreover, it is understood that any number of types and sizes of data drives may be used in different embodiments. For instance,  FIG.  40    illustrates that rather than an old data drive and a new data drive being positioned end-to-end to one another, the drives could be configured to be placed such that one data drive overlies the other data drive or that the drives are configured to slide relative to one another in an overlying manner. 
       FIGS.  47 - 50    illustrate additional embodiments of the present invention. In this regard,  FIG.  47    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure suitable for a compact flash drive,  FIG.  48    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure suitable for an SD card,  FIG.  49    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure suitable for a SSD drive, and  FIG.  50    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure suitable for an USB drive.  FIGS.  47 - 48    include features similar to the lockable enclosure  500  described above with respect to the embodiments of  FIGS.  41 - 46   . Thus, embodiments of lockable enclosures are configured to use with any number of desired media. 
       FIG.  49    illustrates an alternative embodiment for a lockable enclosure  600 . In this embodiment, the lockable enclosure  600  may also operate similar to that described above (i.e., one-in-one out) but is configured for use with larger data drives without necessarily increasing the size of the lockable enclosure. The latch  602  may be configured to engage one or more engagement members  604  on the data drive  506  itself (e.g., holes defined on opposite sides of an SSD drive). Thus, the latch  602  may include engagement members  606  that are configured to engage the engagement members  604  of the data drive  506 . As before, when an old data drive  504  is inserted within the housing, the latch  602  is configured to move within the housing to dispense the new data drive  506 . In some cases, the latch  602  includes a pair of movable members  608  that are configured to move when an old data drive  504  is inserted within the housing. The movable members  608  may be spring biased towards an engaged position with the data drive  506  in some instances. The engagement members  606  may be operably engaged with the movable members  608  such that as the old data drive  504  is inserted within the housing, the movable members move to disengage the engagement members  604 ,  606  from one another. In one embodiment, the new data drive  506  may be configured to be partially displaced from the housing while the engagement members  604 ,  606  are still engaged with one another. Thus, even though the new data drive  506  may be partially positioned outside the housing, the user is incapable of removing the new data drive until the old data drive  504  is fully positioned within the housing due to engagement between the latch  602  and the housing. In some embodiments, the latch  602  may be configured to engage the engagement members  604  of the data drive  504  when the data drive is inserted within the housing so that the old data drive is incapable of being backed out or otherwise removed from the housing. In some cases, the movable members  608  may be configured to pivot between engaged and disengaged positions with the new data drive  506 , such as via sliding of the latch  602  relative to the housing as the old data drive  506  is inserted within the housing. In other embodiments, the movable members  608  may be flexible and configured to flex between engaged and disengaged positions. 
     Moreover,  FIG.  50    shows an embodiment of a lockable enclosure  700 . In this embodiment, the data drive  702  may be configured to be housed within the housing in a first position in which the data drive is able to be removed. Thus, a user is able to freely remove the data drive  702  for use. In addition, the data drive  702  may be tethered to the housing, such as via a cable  704 , wire, or the like. For example, a cable  704  may be attached to the data drive  702  at one end and attached to the housing at an opposite end. When the data drive  702  is ready to be discarded, the data drive  702  is configured to be reinserted within the housing in a second position. The second position may be a different position than the first position, e.g., the data drive may sit lower within the housing in the second position compared to the first position. In the second position, a latch  706  is configured to be moved to secure the data drive  702  within the housing. In some cases, the latch  706  is incapable of being moved relative to the housing when the data drive  702  is in the first position. Thus, in the second position, the data drive  702  may be incapable of being removed from the housing without damaging the lockable enclosure  700  or the data drive. Moreover, in some cases, the latch  706  may be a one-way latch that is incapable of being moved back to reveal the data drive  702  once in the second position. 
     Embodiments of the present invention may utilize similar technology as that disclosed in PCT Publication No. WO 2020/227513, U.S. Pat. No. 11,361,635, PCT Publication No. WO 2022/027021, U.S. Publ. No. 2022/0166785, International Appl. No. PCT/US2021/064837, U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 63/059,280, U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 63/187,747, and U.S. Provisional Appl. No. 63/131,887, the contents of which are each hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety herein. 
     The foregoing has described several embodiments of systems, devices, locks, keys, devices, lockable enclosures, computer storage mediums, and methods. Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications thereto can be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the foregoing description is provided for the purpose of illustration only, and not for the purpose of limitation.