Patent Publication Number: US-2021173902-A1

Title: Terminal hardware configuration system

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a 371 National Stage of International Application No. PCT/2019/086235, filed May 9, 2019, which claims the benefit of Provisional Application No. 62/668,866, filed May 9, 2018, the disclosures of which are herein incorporated by reference in their entirety. 
    
    
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     This disclosure relates to updating of point of sale (PoS) terminals and payment terminals. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Smart device based mobile payment systems have become very common in recent years. Examples of these include electronic or digital wallets which store, for example, bank account information, loyalty cards, stored value payment information; and alternative payment methods such as QR code based payment methods. Apart from these consumer side payment applications, merchants are also increasingly making use of smart device based systems in addition to traditional Electronic Funds Transfer Point Of Sale (EFTPOS) systems for payment purposes. Mobile Point of Sale (MPOS) devices such as card reader dongles, and other physical interfaces such as camera and Near Field Communications (NFC) are being increasingly used in addition to traditional EFTPOS systems. 
     The payment applications or payment “apps” used in such smart device based mobile payment systems are normally deployed and maintained through app stores or marketplaces associated with the smart mobile device Operating System (OS) platforms. The security of such systems poses concerns. The handling of sensitive information within the smart device, such as account data, biometric data, passwords and PINs is one such concern. The authenticity and integrity of the payment apps are another concern. Some issues which need to be handled include: 
     Determining if the app downloaded from an app store or app marketplace is authentic,
 
Determining if the app is running on a smart device which is acceptable for running such apps, and
 
Ensuring that unknown apps (which may perform phishing) and non-payment apps cannot make use of sensitive services and sensitive data.
 
     Furthermore, traditional EFTPOS is evolving into ‘smart’ EFTPOSs by making use of smart device OS and hardware platforms, so as to exploit the rapid app development and deployment of apps for these platforms. Such smart EFTPOS systems facilitate the support of alternative payment methods and other value added services, and enhance user experience. 
     Typically payment apps for such smart EFTPOS systems are distributed and managed by the payment platform owners, terminal vendors or acquirers, via Terminal-Management-Servers (TMS) or custom application stores, for full control of security. However, deploying and maintaining apps on a larger scale and in a timely manner with high quality-of-service (QoS) measures such as high up-time and guaranteed throughput, implies high running cost. Typically, these parties do not have the resources and expertise of the smart device OS platform owners to run the stores and mitigate the store&#39;s design faults and vulnerabilities. 
     Thus, it is very desirable to distribute and maintain those apps using the app stores provided by the smart device OS platform owners. In such a case, the following security concerns should be addressed: 
     The extra authentication requirements of the apps and app data;
 
To limit the payment apps such that these apps only run on the authorized intended EFTPOSs or smart devices used for payment purposes, and not on generic smart devices; and
 
To allow other applications to run on the EFTPOS and smart devices used for payment purposes safely.
 
     Currently, basic authentication measures are implemented for the app stores of mobile platforms.  FIG. 1  shows a prior art app authentication process. In step  101  the app is posted or uploaded into the app store. In step  102  the user requests a download of the app from the app store. In step  103  the app image is hashed using a hash function on the app store to create a hash value. The resulting hash value is then signed with the app store private key. In step  104  the app image is bundled with the signed application hash and transmitted to the user smart device. In step  105 , the OS on the user smart device authenticates the downloaded app, to determine whether it is from the store. The encrypted application hash is decrypted using the app store public key, and the downloaded app image is hashed on the user smart device using the same hash function which is on the app store. The decrypted hash and the hash corresponding to the downloaded app image are compared to verify that the app image has 
     authenticity, that is, the app image is real, and
 
integrity, that is, the app image is good.
 
     In step  106  the authentication process is carried out. If the downloaded app passes the authentication process in step  106 , then in step  107  the app is installed and executed. If not, then in step  108 , the app is deleted. 
     In such cases an app vendor relies on the app store private key and app store public key to ensure the authenticity of the app. 
     Alternatively, the app vendor can maintain the authenticity of an app by signing it using the app vendor&#39;s own private key, and the corresponding app vendor&#39;s public key is installed on the user smart device.  FIG. 2  shows a prior art process using the app vendor&#39;s private and public key. Steps  201 - 208  of  FIG. 2  are similar to steps  101 - 108  except that: 
     in step  203  the hash is signed using the app vendor&#39;s private key, and
 
in step  205  the user smart device OS decrypts the signed application hash using the app vendor&#39;s public key.
 
Some app stores, such as the GOOGLE® Play store, also provide a means for application vendors to sign their application, instead of only being signed by a GOOGLE® key.
 
     In some situations, both vendor and app store owner require app authentication before installing and running. Then, the application hash is encrypted using both the vendor private key and the app store private key, and decrypted using both the vendor public key and the app store public key.  FIG. 3  shows a prior art process for this. Steps  301 - 308  of  FIG. 2  are similar to steps  101 - 108  of  FIG. 1  except that: 
     in step  303  the hash is encrypted using both the app vendor&#39;s private key and the app store private key. This is achieved by, for example, cascading the two encryption processes; and
 
in step  305  the user smart device OS decrypts the signed application hash using the app vendor&#39;s public key and the app store public key.
 
     In other cases more than two parties need to sign the app. In these cases, the app goes through more than two encryptions and two authentications instead of just two as shown in  FIG. 3 . In all of these cases, authentication requires support from the app store and the OS. 
     Apart from app authentication to enable a smart device to determine whether a downloaded app is real and good, there are cases where the device needs to be further authorized to run the app. For example, certain terminals may not be authorized for running certain apps. Thus, an authorization process is needed in addition to the authentication process. The authorization process ensures that the terminal is authorized to install and run the app. 
     Such an authorization process is necessary for example, for licensing. It is common, as part of a software registration process which runs on a user smart device, to deliver the licensing key in an out-of-band channel to the user device, and have the user type in the key for activating the app for usage via a remote licensing server of the software vendor. The software vendor then further binds the software license to user smart device hardware addresses such as network interface MAC address. 
     SUMMARY 
     A system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store; a terminal management server (TMS); wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network; wherein a vendor uploads an application to said application store, and said terminal downloads said application via said network; and wherein after said downloading by said terminal, said TMS authorizes said terminal to install and run said downloaded application. 
     A system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store; a terminal management server (TMS); wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network; wherein a vendor uploads an application to said app store, and said terminal downloads said application via said network; wherein said downloaded application is classified into one of a plurality of classes, each of said plurality corresponding to an app class sandbox; and said classification performed based on level of authorization and type of application. 
     A system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store; a terminal management server (TMS); wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network; wherein a vendor uploads either a patch to an application to said app store, or an upgrade to an application to said application store, and said terminal downloads said patch or said upgrade via said network; and wherein after said downloading by said terminal, said TMS authorizes said terminal to install and run said patch or said upgrade. 
     A method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising: uploading an application to an application store; downloading, by a terminal, said application from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network; and authorizing, by a TMS coupled to said terminal and said application store via said network, said terminal to install and run said downloaded application. 
     A method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising: uploading, by a vendor, an application to an application store; downloading, by a terminal, said application from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network; classifying said downloaded application into one of a plurality of classes, each of said plurality corresponding to an app class sandbox, and said classifying performed based on level of authorization and type of application. 
     A method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising: uploading, by a vendor, either a patch to an application to said application store, or an upgrade to an application to said application store; downloading, by a terminal, either said patch or said upgrade from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network; authorizing, by a TMS coupled to said terminal and said application store via said network, said terminal to install and run either said patch or said upgrade. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       For a more complete understanding, reference is now made to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying Drawings in which: 
         FIG. 1  illustrates a prior art app authentication process; 
         FIG. 2  illustrates a prior art process for signing an app using an app vendor&#39;s private key and public key; 
         FIG. 3  illustrates a prior art process for signing apps using an app vendor&#39;s private key, the app store private key, the app vendor&#39;s public key and the app store public key; 
         FIG. 4  illustrates an embodiment of a system and method for distribution of payment terminal software; 
         FIG. 5  shows an example embodiment of a terminal; 
         FIG. 6  illustrates an embodiment of a process for vendor distribution of apps; 
         FIG. 7  illustrates an embodiment of a further measure to prevent a sensitive part of an app from running on an unauthorized device; 
         FIG. 8  illustrates an example embodiment of segregation of apps into different classes for application of app class sandboxes based on level of authorization and type of application; and 
         FIG. 9  illustrates an embodiment of a method for vendor upload of apps incorporating classification of apps so as to determine the relevant app class sandbox. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Referring now to the drawings, wherein like reference numbers are used herein to designate like elements throughout, the various views and embodiments of a system and method for distribution of payment terminal software are illustrated and described, and other possible embodiments are described. The figures are not necessarily drawn to scale, and in some instances the drawings have been exaggerated and/or simplified in places for illustrative purposes only. One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate the many possible applications and variations based on the following examples of possible embodiments. 
     The system and method that is the subject of the disclosure below addresses the issues outlined previously. It enables EFTPOS systems and smart devices to be configured with new payment apps. For example, this system and method enables the payment apps to be distributed to EFTPOS systems and smart devices used for mobile payments via smart device OS platform app stores, while alleviating the concerns of: 
     The extra authentication requirements associated with such apps;
 
Ensuring that the payment apps run only on the intended EFTPOS devices or smart devices used for payment purposes, and not on generic smart devices; and
 
Allowing other applications to run on the intended EFTPOS devices or smart devices used for payment purposes.
 
       FIG. 4  shows an embodiment of the system and method  400  that is the subject of the current disclosure. Terminal  401  is a device for handling payments, for example, 
     an EFTPOS terminal, or
 
a smart device being used as an MPOS device.
 
     Terminal Management Server (TMS)  402  performs the functions of acquiring and processing payment transactions from terminal  401 , and communicating with terminal  401  to perform identification, verification, authorization and authentication functions. TMS  402  has capabilities to receive and transmit information and also perform encryption and decryption as necessary. In some embodiments, communications between TMS  402  and terminal  401  are performed using encrypted channels. App store  403  stores one or more apps for vendors  404  to upload apps to. Apps are distributed from app store  403  to terminal  401 . All of these are coupled to each other by network  405 . Network  405  is constructed using one or more communication technologies known to those of skill in the art. These communication technologies include, for example, technologies related to a local area network (LAN), a campus area network (CAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a fiber optic network, a wireless network, a satellite communication link, a terrestrial communication link, a Bluetooth® communication link or a near field communication (NFC) link. In some embodiments, network  405  is comprised of one or more subnetworks. In some of these embodiments, some of the subnetworks are private. In some of these embodiments, some of the subnetworks are public. In some embodiments, communications within network  405  are encrypted. 
       FIG. 5  shows an example embodiment of terminal  401 . Terminal  401  comprises processor  501 , OS  502 , storage  503 , display  504 , application installation controller  505 , input devices  506  and communications module  507 . Examples of input devices  506  include keypads, keyboards, audio input devices, cameras and so on. Communications module  507  is capable of performing encryption of data prior to transmission and decryption of data after reception. 
     As explained above, in some embodiments, TMS  402  and terminal  401  communicate with each other over network  405  using encrypted channels. Examples of encryption techniques used include: 
     symmetric encryption techniques, such as those based on shared secrets, and
 
asymmetric encryption techniques.
 
     In some embodiments, terminal  401  communicates with TMS  402  to indicate to TMS  402  that it wants to install and run an app. The TMS  402  then performs the following functions: 
     Granting of authorization for terminal  401  to install and run the app, and
 
Vendor-based authentication for terminal  401  to install and run the app.
 
The communications necessary to perform these functions are, as explained previously, encrypted.
 
     Therefore, since only authorized devices would be able to communicate with the TMS  402  using an encrypted channel, this alleviates the concern of payment apps running on unauthorized devices such as generic smart devices. This also removes the need for extra authorization mechanisms such as out-of-band license keys. 
     An embodiment of a process for vendor distribution of apps including the TMS  402  providing authentication for terminal  401  before installation and running of the app is illustrated in  FIG. 6 . Steps  601  to  606  and  608  are identical to steps  101  to  106  and  108  of  FIG. 1 . However, in place of using an app vendor private key and an app vendor public key as shown in  FIG. 3 , steps  611  to  617  are performed. In step  611  of  FIG. 6 , the app installation controller  505  on terminal  401  calculates the hash value of the app image. This is performed using, for example, a hash function stored in storage  503  of terminal  401 . 
     In step  612 , the terminal  401  then signs the app image prior to transmission to the TMS  402 . This step comprises encrypting the resultant hash by a unique-per-device key and submitting the signature together with the app image to TMS  402 . In one embodiment, a symmetric key arrangement is used, that is, where TMS  402  uses the same key as terminal  401  for decryption. In one embodiment, the signing then utilizes a symmetric key or some means based on a shared secret for TMS  402  to derive such a symmetric key. An example is where TMS  402  derives a symmetric key from a base-key and a unique number from terminal  401 . 
     In another embodiment, an asymmetric key arrangement is used, that is, where TMS  402  uses a different key to terminal  401  for decryption. An example embodiment would be where terminal  401  has a private key and sends the signature with a certification of its public key, so the TMS can verify and extract the terminal public key and use the terminal public key for verifying the signature. 
     Steps  613 - 617  concern the authorization and authentication steps performed by TMS  402 . In step  613 , TMS  402  receives the signed app image, and decrypts the received encrypted hash. In step  614 , TMS  402  calculates a hash for the received app image using a stored hash function. In step  615 , TMS  402  compares the two hash values. If the two hash values match each other, then in step  616  TMS  402  authenticates the app and authorizes the terminal  401  to install and run the app. If the two hash values do not match each other, then in step  617  TMS  402  instructs terminal  401  that the app is not valid. 
     While the above describes a situation where the key is unique per device, there are other possibilities. For example, the keys can be unique per account, unique per session or unique per download. This offers more security compared to the prior art where the keys are limited to being unique per app image. 
     Since the signature for vendor app authentication no longer needs to be bundled with the app download package, the app is transparent to the standard app store. This is because the process of downloading the app is then similar to the process of downloading other non-payment apps. This makes it easier to use a smart device OS app store for the purposes of distribution and managing of payment apps for terminals. 
     As the apps for the terminals are intended to be distributed in normal smart device platform app stores, such as the Google® Play store, devices other than terminals intended for payment may download and run the apps. This is not desirable. As explained above, one security measure is the requirement to communicate with TMS  402  over an encrypted channel.  FIG. 7  shows an embodiment of a further security measure to prevent the sensitive part of the app from running on unauthorized devices. In  FIG. 7 : 
     The vendor  404  encrypts the one or more portions of the app code which handle sensitive operations prior to uploading the app to the app store, as shown in step  701 , and
 
Once the app is authenticated and authorized by the TMS  402  for installation and running on terminal  401  following the process of  FIG. 6 , the terminal  401  obtains a decryption key from the TMS  402  to decrypt the encrypted one or more portions of the app image in step  702 .
 
Steps  701  and  702  work to prevent the protected code segment from being exposed outside the trusted terminal execution environment, and the protected code segment prevents the app from performing critical/sensitive operations in devices or platforms other than the intended terminals with the intended EFTPOS platforms.
 
     In some embodiments, app class sandboxes are employed to protect system resources and applications from being accessed by unauthorized apps. In one embodiment, the apps are divided into 3 classes, each having a corresponding app class sandbox, so as to achieve segregation of applications based on level of authorization and type of application. In some embodiments, these app class sandboxes are employed in addition to, for example, existing Linux/Android sandboxes. 
     An example embodiment of this segregation into different classes followed by utilization of app level sandboxes is shown in  FIG. 8 .  FIG. 8  shows the properties of each class in table  800 . Row  801  of  FIG. 8  corresponds to class A, row  802  of  FIG. 8  corresponds to class B, and row  803  corresponds to class C. Column  804  describes the types of apps covered in each class, column  805  describes the security objective of each class, and column  806  describes the control means. For the remainder of this description each cell of the table  800  is denoted by (row, column). For example, the cell which indicates the type of app covered in class A is in the cell within row  801  and column  804 , and will be denoted as ( 801 ,  804 ). 
     Class A covers authorized payment apps, as shown in cell ( 801 ,  804 ). Class B covers authorized non-payment apps as shown in cell ( 802 ,  804 ). Class C covers unauthorized apps as shown in cell ( 803 ,  804 ). 
     The security objectives for each class are different. For class A apps: As shown in cell ( 801 , 805 ), since these are authorized payment apps the OS does not restrict the access of these apps to sensitive data and functions. These apps are then placed in a relatively loose app class sandbox, with restrictions similar to, for example, the application sandbox in Security-Enhanced Linux (SE Linux), as shown in cell ( 801 ,  806 ). 
     For class B apps, as shown in cell ( 802 ,  805 ), the OS restricts the access of these apps to sensitive data and functions, such as the functions for reading finance card data, and certain related functions for cryptographic operations. Therefore, these apps will not be able to impact such sensitive assets. It significantly reduces the effort of app approval processes. The app class sandbox for class B apps therefore has restrictions on access to sensitive data and functions in addition to the restrictions of the app class sandbox for class A apps, as shown in cell ( 802 ,  806 ). 
     For class C apps, as shown in cell ( 803 ,  805 ), as the apps are not authorized by the vendor, in addition to the security objective for class B apps of restricting access to sensitive functions and data, the OS prevents these apps from requesting data from consumers and merchants, which may lead to security issues. Specifically, for EFTPOS, the risk with an unknown app is that the app can ask the user to enter authentication information such as a Personal-Identification-Number (PIN) or a card account number. In one embodiment, a combination of one or more techniques is used to warn the user not to enter such information when running a class C app. These warning techniques operate independently of the app and have the following effect: If there is an unauthorized app displaying misleading messages requesting sensitive information such as payment data to be entered into the app, then since the app cannot control the operation of these techniques, the user will then be warned not to enter sensitive information into the app. These methods include, for example: 
     Screen watermarking,
 
Screen flying stamp,
 
Screen status bar,
 
Screen border,
 
Screen overlay,
 
Dedicated light indicator,
 
Warning sound, and
 
Warning vibration.
 
The app class sandbox for class C apps therefore has extra restrictions when compared to the app class sandbox restrictions for class B apps.
 
     It would be known to one of skill in the art that the approach described above and in  FIG. 8  is generalizable to more than 3 classes. 
     In some embodiments, the operating system determines the class of the app being installed. The determination is based on, for example: 
     attribute field from the app,
 
the signing key of the app, or
 
the information from TMS  402  when the app is being authenticated.
 
     An embodiment of a method for vendor upload of apps incorporating classification of apps so as to determine the relevant app class sandbox is illustrated in  FIG. 9 . Steps  901  to  906  and  908  are identical to steps  601  to  606  and  608  of  FIG. 6 . If in step  906  the downloaded app passes the authentication process, then in step  907  a determination is made as to whether the app is an EFTPOS vendor app. If not, then in step  908  the app is installed as a class C app. If so, then step  911  is executed. Steps  911  to  917  are identical to steps  611  to  617  of  FIG. 6 . In step  918  a determination is made as to whether the app is a payment app. If it is a payment app in step  919  the app is installed as a class A app. If not, then in step  920  the app is installed as a class B app. 
     Typically apps may require patches for bugs and vulnerabilities, upgrades and introductions of new features. For EFTPOS vendors, traditionally these updates were distributed by terminal vendors, acquirers, or other third parties certified by electronic payment industrial standards. However, as the size of the new OS, updates and patches are significantly larger in size than ordinary EFTPOS firmware and software, it implies a heavy loading to the traditional terminal-management-system or other traditional distribution channels, which is very undesirable. 
     In one embodiment, the process outlined above in  FIGS. 6 and 9  can be generalized to these other processes. This makes maintenance and updating of such apps easier as well, as most smart device OS app stores are better equipped for maintenance and updating of apps. Furthermore, this makes it easier to improve QoS, as smart device OS app stores have established procedures to improve QoS. Then, the authenticity, authority, integrity and sensitive code privacy can be assured by such methods. 
     One example embodiment includes a system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store and a terminal management server (TMS), wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network, wherein a vendor uploads an application to said application store, and said terminal downloads said application via said network, and wherein after said downloading by said terminal, said TMS authorizes said terminal to install and run said downloaded application. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, after said application is downloaded by said terminal, said TMS authenticates said application. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, prior to said upload, said vendor encrypts one or more portions of said application, and said terminal obtains a decryption key from said TMS to decrypt said encrypted one or more portions after said authentication and authorization. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said encryption is operative to prevent exposure of said one or more portions of said application outside a trusted environment. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said encryption is operative to prevent the application from performing critical or sensitive operations in unauthorized platforms. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said encryption is operative to prevent the application from performing critical or sensitive operations in unauthorized platforms. 
     One example embodiment includes a system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store, a terminal management server (TMS), wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network, wherein a vendor uploads an application to said app store, and said terminal downloads said application via said network, wherein said downloaded application is classified into one of a plurality of classes, each of said plurality of classes corresponding to an app class sandbox, and said classification performed based on level of authorization and type of application. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, classification is based on at least one of an attribute field within said application, a signing key associated with said application, and information from a TMS when said application is being authenticated. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, at least one of said plurality of classes contains applications which are not related to payments. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, a first of said plurality of classes contains applications which are unauthorized and are not related to payments, wherein a first class is associated with an app class sandbox having restrictions on a user entering one or more pieces of sensitive information. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, one or more warning techniques are associated with said first class, wherein said one or more warning techniques operating independently of said applications contained within said first class, and wherein said one or more warning techniques are used to warn the user not to enter said one or more pieces of sensitive information. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said classification is performed after said downloading. 
     One example embodiment includes a system to install and run an application for a terminal, said system comprising an application store, a terminal management server (TMS), wherein said TMS, application store and terminal are coupled to each other via a network, wherein a vendor uploads either a patch to an application to said app store, or an upgrade to an application to said application store, wherein said terminal downloads said patch or said upgrade via said network, and wherein after said downloading by said terminal, said TMS authorizes said terminal to install and run said patch or said upgrade. 
     One example embodiment includes a method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising uploading an application to an application store, downloading, by a terminal, said application from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network, and authorizing, by a TMS coupled to said terminal and said application store via said network, said terminal to install and run said downloaded application. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, the method further comprises authenticating, by said TMS, said application after said downloading. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, the method further comprises encrypting, by a vendor prior to said uploading, one or more portions of said application, and obtaining a decryption key from said TMS to decrypt said encrypted one or more portions after said authenticating and authorizing. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said encrypting is operative to prevent exposure of said one or more portions of said application outside a trusted environment. 
     One example embodiment includes a method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising uploading, by a vendor, an application to an application store, downloading, by a terminal, said application from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network, and classifying said downloaded application into one of a plurality of classes, each of said plurality of classes corresponding to an app class sandbox, and said classifying performed based on level of authorization and type of application. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, classifying is based on at least one of an attribute field within said application, a signing key associated with said application, and information from a TMS when said application is being authenticated. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, at least one of said plurality of classes contains applications which are not related to payments. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, a first of said plurality of classes contains applications which are unauthorized and are not related to payments, wherein a first class is associated with an app class sandbox having restrictions on a user entering one or more pieces of sensitive information. 
     In one or more of the examples herein, said classifying is performed after said downloading. 
     One example embodiment includes a method for installing and running an application for a terminal comprising uploading, by a vendor, either a patch to an application to an application store, or an upgrade to an application to said application store, downloading, by a terminal, either said patch or said upgrade from said application store, wherein said terminal is connected to said application store by a network, and authorizing, by a TMS coupled to said terminal and said application store via said network, said terminal to install and run either said patch or said upgrade. 
     It should be understood that the drawings and detailed description herein are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive manner, and are not intended to be limiting to the particular forms and examples disclosed. On the contrary, included are any further modifications, changes, rearrangements, substitutions, alternatives, design choices, and embodiments apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art, without departing from the spirit and scope hereof, as defined by the following claims. Thus, it is intended that the following claims be interpreted to embrace all such further modifications, changes, rearrangements, substitutions, alternatives, design choices, and embodiments.