Patent Publication Number: US-2022239757-A1

Title: Securing Communications in a Network Function Virtualization (NFV) Core Network

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a divisional of and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/698,639, filed on Nov. 27, 2019, entitled “Securing Communications in a Network Function Virtualization (NFV) Core Network,” by Ronald R. Marquardt, et al., which is a divisional of and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/872,936, filed on Oct. 1, 2015, entitled “Securing Communications in a Network Function Virtualization (NFV) Core Network,” by Ronald R. Marquardt, et al., now U.S. Pat. No. 10,542,115 issued Jan. 21, 2020, all of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety for all purposes. 
    
    
     STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT 
     Not applicable. 
     REFERENCE TO A MICROFICHE APPENDIX 
     Not applicable. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Electronic communications may carry a wide variety of content, for example electronic mail, medical records, financial transactions, and other confidential information. The electronic communications may travel for some of the communication end-to-end path over unsecured communication links where the content may be subject to tampering or intrusion. A variety of security measures have been applied to provide increased security and to raise the level of difficulty for nefarious actors attempting to access the confidential information. 
     SUMMARY 
     In an embodiment, a method of electronic communication via a virtual network function (NFV) implementation of a core network is disclosed. The method comprises receiving a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) content request from a user equipment (UE), wherein the HTTP content request comprises an identification of a content source and determining by an orchestrator service that insufficient NFV processing capacity is available to perform the HTTP content request, where the orchestrator service is an application that executes on a first physical host. The method further comprises dynamically increasing the NFV processing capacity by the orchestrator service, performing the HTTP content request using the increased NFV processing capacity, and returning a HTTP content response to the UE, wherein the HTTP content response does not comprise identification of the content source. 
     In another embodiment, a method of domain name resolution is disclosed. The method comprises receiving a first domain name lookup request that comprises a service name and, in response to receiving the first domain name lookup request, looking up an internet protocol (IP) address of a server based on the service name. The method further comprises creating a mapping between a one-time-use domain name and the IP address, where the one-time-use domain name is created dynamically, transmitting a reply to the first domain name lookup request comprising the one-time-use domain name, and receiving a second domain name lookup request that comprises the one-time-use domain name. The method further comprises, in response to receiving the second domain name lookup request, looking up the IP address based on the one-time-use domain name, transmitting a reply to the second domain name lookup request comprising the IP address, and, after looking up the IP address based on the one-time-use domain name, destroying the mapping between the one-time-use domain name and the IP address. 
     In another embodiment, a method of providing a trusted communication service using network function virtualization (NFV) is disclosed. The method comprises determining by a trusted orchestrator service that a communication processing load of a common function supported by at least one virtual server executing in a NFV core network is greater than a predefined processing load threshold, where the trusted orchestrator service is an application that executes in a trusted security zone of a first physical host that provides hardware assisted security and, in response to the determination of the processing load being greater than the predefined processing load threshold, creating by the trusted orchestrator service a second virtual server on a second physical host that provides hardware assisted security. The method further comprises requesting by the trusted orchestrator service a plurality of trust keys from a trusted repository of trust keys and initiating by the trusted orchestrator service at least one instance of the common function in the second virtual server, wherein the at least one instance of the common function is configured with at least one of the plurality of trust keys received from the trusted repository. 
     These and other features will be more clearly understood from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and claims. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       For a more complete understanding of the present disclosure, reference is now made to the following brief description, taken in connection with the accompanying drawings and detailed description, wherein like reference numerals represent like parts. 
         FIG. 1A  is a block diagram of a communication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 1B  is a block diagram of another communication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 2  is an illustration of an aspect of trusted communication according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 3  is an illustration of a virtualized network function communication paradigm according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 4  is a block diagram of yet another communication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 5  is an illustration of an aspect of trusted execution in a virtualized computing environment according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 6  is an illustration of dynamic instantiation of virtual servers according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 7  is a flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 8  is a flow chart of another method according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 9  is a flow chart of yet another method according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 10  is an illustration of a user equipment (UE) according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 11  is a block diagram of a hardware architecture of a UE according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 12A  is a block diagram of a software architecture of a UE according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 12B  is a block diagram of another software architecture of a UE according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
         FIG. 13  is a block diagram of a computer system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     It should be understood at the outset that although illustrative implementations of one or more embodiments are illustrated below, the disclosed systems and methods may be implemented using any number of techniques, whether currently known or not yet in existence. The disclosure should in no way be limited to the illustrative implementations, drawings, and techniques illustrated below, but may be modified within the scope of the appended claims along with their full scope of equivalents. 
     The present disclosure teaches several independent but complimentary secure communication mechanisms that may be used to increase the security of communications in a core network (e.g., in the communication network infrastructure maintained by a communication service provider). The mechanisms may be deployed independently of each other or they may advantageously be combined with each other in some circumstances. Some commonly used communication protocols may be readily exploited to breach security of communication systems and/or to attack a service provided via a communication network. Such vulnerability may slow adoption of new applications or deployment of new services. The increased security offered by the secure communication mechanisms taught herein may provide desirable comfort and confidence on the part of communication carriers and contribute to the more prompt adoption of a new network function virtualization communication paradigm, increasing the economic efficiency of network operations. 
     A hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) GET message typically receives a response message that contains a header that identifies the IP address of the content source. The present disclosure teaches suppressing that needless inclusion of the IP address of the content source in the HTTP header in the response message, which may be referred to as a taciturn or quiet HTTP protocol. This may reduce the chance of a packet sniffing engine on the Internet sniffing the address of the content source in the response message and targeting the content server with a denial of service (DOS) attack. 
     A one-time-use domain name construct is taught herein. A web browser executing on a user equipment (UE) may render a page that provides a link to a service. The service is identified by an abstract service name. A UE may be a mobile telecommunications device. When the link is clicked on, the web browser responds by sending out a DNS lookup request including the abstract service name. The lookup request is routed to a special domain name system (DNS) server. The special DNS server looks up an Internet Protocol (IP) address based on the abstract service name. The special DNS server creates a one-time-use domain name and stores a mapping of the one-time-use domain name to the IP address associated with the abstract service name. The special DNS server returns a DNS lookup response containing the one-time-use domain name. The web browser responds to the DNS lookup response by posting the text of the one-time-use domain name to a browser field and sends a second DNS lookup request including the one-time-use domain name. The second lookup request is routed to the special DNS server. The special DNS server looks up the IP address mapped to the one-time-use domain name, destroys the association between the one-time-use domain name and the IP address, and returns a DNS lookup response containing the IP address. The web browser responds by requesting content and/or service from the IP address. 
     When the same or a different web browser sends a lookup request containing the same abstract service name to the special DNS server, the DNS server associates a different one-time-use domain name to the IP address associated with the abstract service name and returns that different one-time-use domain name to the requesting web browser. In an embodiment, the one-time-use domain name may be generated as a random string of characters. A portion of the one-time-use domain name may be meaningful and statically defined for the same abstract service name while the remaining portion of the one-time-use domain name may be a random string of characters. For example, if the abstract service name is Texas Hospital Records, the one-time-use domain name may comprise a “TxHospRecs” portion combined with a random character string. In an embodiment, the randomized portion of the one-time-use domain name may be repeated at a low frequency rate, for example as a function of the number of different unique combinations of random characters. For example, if 8 random characters are employed in the one-time-use domain name, a finite number of combinations of those 8 random characters is possible and repetition of the one-time-use domain name may occur after a large number of DNS lookups of the abstract service name. 
     The one-time-use domain name described above prevents a user of an electronic device executing the web browser (e.g., a user of a mobile smart phone) from learning the domain name, which can support secure communication under some circumstances. Additionally, if combined with the quiet HTTP method described above, the IP address itself is exposed less to sniffing malware that may be watching. In an embodiment, the web browser may be a trusted web browser, and the trusted web browser and the special DNS server may communicate with each other via a trusted communication channel, and the DNS server may encrypt the IP address using an encryption key known to the trusted web browser before sending it to the trusted web browser. In a trusted DNS lookup exchange, the UE and the DNS server may exchange trust tokens to establish the trusted communication channel. For example, the trusted web browser may send the first DNS lookup request with the abstract service name and a trust token associated with the trusted web browser and/or the UE and may send the second DNS lookup request with the one-time-use domain name and the trust token. 
     Core network functions may be factored into common functions, and the common functions may be executed in virtual servers executing on physical hosts in a cloud computing environment. This may be referred to as network function virtualization (NFV). When trusted communications is desired, communication end points may execute communication applications that execute in trusted security zones that provide hardware assisted security. Trusted security zones and hardware assisted security are discussed further hereinafter. The communication between the endpoints is typically provided through core network functions. To provide trusted end-to-end communication channels, the NFV core network desirably provides support for trusted execution. 
     In an embodiment, an orchestrator application mediates call flows among common functions executing in virtual servers in the NFV core network. The orchestrator, or another component executing in the NFV core network, dynamically starts additional virtual servers to execute additional instances of common functions and stops virtual servers as needed to handle dynamically changing communication loads in the NFV core network. In the case of trusted communication, the orchestrator or other application executes in trust and starts additional virtual servers on physical hosts that are known to the orchestrator to feature hardware support for trusted execution (e.g., hardware assisted security). The orchestrator obtains a plurality of trust keys from a trusted key repository and provisions the newly started virtual server on the physical host supporting trusted execution with the trust keys. This may be said to enable the newly started virtual server for trusted execution. It is understood that the virtual server need not execute solely in trust but is enabled to transition to execute in the trusted operation mode as called upon by the orchestrator in the course of providing a trusted end-to-end communication service. 
     Turning now to  FIGS. 1A and 1B , a system  100  is described. In an embodiment, system  100  comprises a user equipment (UE)  102  that communicates with a network  106  via a wireless link provided by an enhanced node B (eNB)  104 . The UE  102  may be a mobile smart phone, a media player, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a wearable computer, or a headset computer. The network  106  may comprise one or more private networks, one or more public networks, or a combination thereof. The eNB  104  may be a base transceiver station (BTS) or a cell tower. The UE  102  may access the network  106  to obtain a variety of communication services. The UE  102  may request content based on a user of the UE  102  clicking on a link in a web page presented on a display of the UE  102  by a web browser application  110 . The content may be served by a content server  107  from a content data store  108 . The web browser application  110  may obtain an IP address of the content server  107  and/or content stored in the data store  108  through one or more domain name system (DNS) lookup requests directed to a DNS server  112 . The DNS server  112  may lookup a mapping of the provided name to an IP address of the content server  107  in a DNS mappings data store  114 . 
     The DNS server  112  may provide a one-time-use domain name functionality. The web browser application  110  may render a link in a web page presented on a display of the UE  102 , where the link identifies an abstract communication service. When the link is selected (e.g., a user touches the link presented on a touchscreen of the UE  102 ), the web browser application  110  sends a DNS lookup request containing the name of the abstract communication service to the DNS server  112  for translation. The DNS server  112  searches the DNS mappings data store  114  based on the abstract communication service name and finds the service name  116   a  that is associated with or linked to an IP address  116   b  of the communication service associated with the abstract communication service name. The DNS server  112  dynamically creates a one-time-use domain name  116   c  and associates or links the one-time-use domain name  116   c  to the IP address  116   b . The DNS server  112  returns the one-time-use domain name  116   c  in a DNS lookup response to the web browser application  110 . The web browser application  110  may present the one-time-use domain name  116   c  in a browser window on the display of the UE  102 . By presenting a one-time-use domain name  116   c  instead of the prior art static domain name, the opportunity to capture and store the static domain name is defeated. In this case, the one-time-use domain name  116   c  may be captured and stored, but other than a single use the one-time-use domain name  116   c  will not map to an IP address. 
     The web browser application  110 , in response to receiving the one-time-use domain name  116   c , sends a second DNS lookup request containing the one-time-use domain name  116   c  to the DNS server  112 . The DNS server  112  searches the DNS mappings data store  114  based on the one-time-use domain name  116   c  and reads the IP address  116   b  associated with the one-time-use domain name  116   c . The DNS server  112  destroys the association between the one-time-use domain name  116   c  and the IP address  116   b  and returns the IP address  116   b  in a DNS lookup response to the web browser application  110 . After the association of the one-time-use domain name  116   c  to the IP address  116   b  is destroyed, any attempts to lookup the IP address  116   b  based on the one-time-use domain name  116   c  will fail. 
     In an embodiment, the DNS server  112  may send both the IP address  116   b  and the one-time-use domain name  116   c  to the web browser application  110  in response to the first DNS lookup request. In this case, the DNS server  112  may not ever associate the one-time-use domain name to the IP address  116   b . This may be referred to in some contexts as a dummy domain name. The purpose of the dummy domain name may be to satisfy application programming interface (API) call expectations, to satisfy security functions of the web browser application  110 , and/or to provide an expected domain name in the web browser window on a display of the UE  102 . For example, even if the user of the UE  102  sees the partially randomized domain name “TxHospRecs8#V84$g” presented in the web browser, he or she may deem that feedback assuring in the context of having initiated a request for records on a recent hospital stay. 
     The web browser application  110  may send an HTTP GET or other HTTP request to the host computer associated with the IP address  116   b , for example to the content sever  107  to retrieve content from the content data store  108 . The content may be returned to the web browser application  110 , and the web browser application  110  may render the content and present it on the display of the UE  102 . In an embodiment, the IP address  116   b  may be associated with some other communication service that the host computer associated with the IP address  116   b  provides, and that service may be rendered for the web browser application  110  or other application executing on the UE  102 . 
     In an embodiment, the web browser application  110  does not provide access to the IP address  116   b  to a user of the UE  102  or to other applications executing on the UE  102 . Further the web browser application  110  may not store the IP address  116   b  but may immediately consume it when sending the HTTP GET to the IP address  116   b . The mechanism of the one-time-use domain name may provide security against denial of service (DOS) attacks and against other vulnerabilities. 
     In an embodiment (now with reference to  FIG. 1B ), the UE  102  comprises a trusted web browser  111  or has a trust operation mode. When the trusted web browser  111  determines that it is requesting a DNS lookup for a trusted abstract communication service name (e.g., based on a standardized format, prefix, or suffix of the abstract service name), the trusted web browser  111  may hand over processing to a trusted web browser component and/or to a web browser trustlet that executes in a trusted security zone of the UE  102 . A web browser trustlet may comprise instructions that are an extract of the full web browser application instructions, where the trustlet instructions are to be executed in the trusted security zone. The trusted web browser  111  communicates with a trusted DNS server  113  via a trusted end-to-end communication link. For more details on a trusted end-to-end communication infrastructure, see U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/532,588, filed Jun. 25, 2012, entitled “End-to-end Trusted Communications Infrastructure,” by Leo Michael McRoberts, et al., which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The DNS server may be a trusted DNS server  113  and/or may comprise a DNS server trustlet that provides trusted instructions for handling trusted communications and trusted DNS lookup operations. 
     In an embodiment, the trusted DNS server  113  may encrypt the IP address  116   b  before returning it to the trusted web browser  111  in a DNS lookup response. The trusted DNS server  113  may encrypt the IP address  116   b  with an encryption key known to the trusted web browser  111  and/or with a trust key provisioned into the web browser trustlet. Encrypting the IP address  116   b  may make it more difficult to intercept by packet sniffing malware in the network  106  or more difficult to use. In an embodiment, the trusted web browser  111  sends the request for communication service to the IP address  116   b  over a trusted end-to-end communication link with the IP address  116   b  encrypted along this communication link, hence preventing packet sniffing malware in the network  106  from learning the IP address  116   b  when the trusted web browser  111  uses the IP address  116   b  for obtaining communication service (for example requesting trusted content from a trusted content server  109 , from a trusted content data store  115 , or requesting another trusted communication service). 
     In an embodiment, the web browser  110 / 111  and the content server  107 / 109  may communicate using a quiet or taciturn HTTP communication protocol. The standard HTTP communication protocol may be “chatty” and return optional information in the HTTP header such as the IP address of the content server  107 / 109 . This information is optional because the web browser  110 / 111  would have already requested the desired content. This optional information may be sniffed by packet sniffing malware in the network  106  that thereby identifies the IP address of the content server  107 / 109  and uses that IP address in a DoS attack. Use of the taciturn HTTP communication protocol may provide advantages in either trusted or normal communication paradigms. 
     Turning now to  FIG. 2 , a further portion of the wireless communication system  100  is illustrated. The UE  102  is illustrated as communicating with a server computer  128  via a trusted bearer  138 . The server  128  comprises a processor  130  that comprises a normal portion  132  and a trust zone portion  134 . Under this circumstance, the trust zone  124  of the UE  102  is communicating with the trust zone  134  of the server  128  via the network  106  via the trusted bearer path  138  having continuity of trust. Any of the trusted communication described above may be conducted along lines described here with reference to  FIG. 2  and as described further in the McRoberts patent application incorporated by reference above. 
     The trusted communication may involve transport over the trusted bearer  138  of sensitive confidential or financial information. For example, the UE  102  may be sending and/or receiving sensitive health records, medical reports, or biometric data over the trusted bearer  138  to a trusted service  135  executing on the server  128 . In an embodiment, the server  128  may be executing a trusted medical records application that stores the transmitted information in a data store and/or retrieves medical records information from a data store. In an embodiment, the trusted web browser  111  may be accessing trusted content from the trusted content server  109  via the trusted bearer  138 . 
     Turning now to  FIG. 3 , the virtualized network function (VNF) communication paradigm is described. The traditional communication core network may be considered to comprise independent physical servers, each independent server providing one of the network functions. For example, the mobility management entity  158 , the home subscriber server  160 , the policy and charging rules function server  162 , and the serving gateway  164 . In some cases, to handle communication processing loads, a network function may be distributed on a plurality of servers. It is understood that the communication network may comprise many other communication nodes, notably routers and other servers. 
     Each of the traditionally structured network function servers provide their processing functionality by executing one or more functions, for example a network attach function  202 , an authentication function  204 , a mobility function  206 , a bearer function  208 , a context function  210 , a policy function  212 , and a data function  214 . Since some of these functions are performed by a plurality of network function servers, there is duplication of these functions in the traditionally structured network. This duplication may result in maintenance and/or common behavior problems over time. 
     One skilled in the art understands what these functions are, but for the sake of others reading this specification a thumbnail description of the functions is provided here. It is understood that the described common functions may perform additional tasks or functions that may not be mentioned here. It is further understood that other common functions may be factorized from traditional network functions and may be supported by the network function virtualization paradigm using the virtual computing environment  218 . 
     The network attach function  202  provides functions that may be used by a service to attach to the network and communicate (e.g., a network attach function may be performed on behalf of the UE  102  in order for it to obtain communication service on the network  106 ). The authentication function  204  provides functions that may be used to authenticate users, for example to authenticate a user of the UE  102  who wishes to obtain communication service on the network  106 . The mobility function  206  provides functions to support mobile communications, for example handoffs and continuity for the UE  102  when it is engaged in a voice call or other communication session. The bearer function  208  provides functions that contribute to maintaining a network connection over a period of time to support providing communication service (e.g., to carry bearer traffic). The context function  210  provides functions that promote service continuity during handoff, interruption, or transfer. The policy function  212  provides functions to support policy managed or policy constrained access to or use of a service. The data function  214  provides functions to support data creation, reading, update, and deletion (CRUD) functions. 
     The communication core network may be restructured, at least in part, as common functions executing in virtual servers in a virtual computing environment  218  that are called by an orchestrator application  222  or by a state control application that provides one of the traditional network functions (e.g., one of MME  158 , HSS  160 , PCRF  162 , SGW  164 , etc.) by calling the appropriate common functions and passing parameters or intermediate results between and/or among the common functions in a desired sequence. For example, an attach common function  202  may execute in a first virtual server  220   a , an authentication common function  204  may execute in a second virtual server  220   b , a mobility common function  206  may execute in a third virtual server  220   c , a bearer common function  208  may execute in a fourth virtual server  220   d , a context common function  210  may execute in a fifth virtual server  220   e , a policy common function  212  may execute in a sixth virtual server  220   f , and a data common function  214  may execute in a seventh virtual server  220   g . The functionality of the MME  158 , hence, may be provided by executing the attach common function  202  in the first virtual server  220   a , the authentication common function  204  in the second virtual server  220   b , the mobility common function  206  in the third virtual server  220   c , the bearer common function  208  in the fourth virtual server  220   d , and the context common function  210  in the fifth virtual server  220   e.    
     The functionality of the HSS  160  may be provided by executing the attach common function  202  on the first virtual server  220   a  and by executing the authentication common function  204  on the second virtual server  220   b . Thus, the common functionality of network attach can be provided to both the MME  158  and to the HSS  160  from the same attach common function  202  executing on the virtual server  220   a . This restructuring of the traditional siloed network functions into common functions may be referred to as network function factorization or factorization. Different traditional network functions would be associated with different orchestrators  222  and would execute on different virtual servers  220 . 
     A single virtual server  220  may concurrently execute a plurality of instances of a common function. For example, the first virtual sever  220   a  may concurrently execute  2  instances of the attach common function  202 ,  4  instances of the attach common function  202 ,  8  instances of the attach common function  202 , or some other number of instances of the attach common function  202 . Additionally, a plurality of virtual servers  220 , each executing instances of the same common function, may be deployed to carry a communication load. For example, 2, 3, or more instances of the first virtual sever  220   a  may execute instances of the attach common function  202 . In an embodiment, any one virtual server  220  executes instances of only one common function. For example, no virtual server  220  would concurrently execute instances of different common functions. 
     Turning now to  FIG. 4 , a communication system  230  is described. From some points of view, the communication system  230  is substantially similar to the communication system  100  described above with reference to  FIG. 1A  and/or  FIG. 1B . For example, from the point of view of the UE  102  and the enhanced node B  104 , the systems  100 ,  230  may be indistinguishable. From the point of view of a content server  240  (or application server) or of a telephone  244 , the systems  100 ,  230  may be indistinguishable. Communication between the enhanced node B  104  and the content server  240  or the telephone  244  provides data and/or voice services in substantially similar ways over substantially similar interfaces, regardless of what implementation of the core network—system  100  or system  230 —is deployed. The use of a virtual computing environment  218  to provide at least some of the core network functionality can provide significant advantages to the wireless communication service provider. 
     The virtual computing environment  218  may support ease of maintenance, ease of upgrading, ease of expansion and contraction of compute resources. The virtual computing environment  218  may be provided with a private environment of compute resources or with a public deployment of compute resources. Said in another way, the virtual computing environment  218  may be a private cloud computing environment owned, operated, and managed by a wireless communication service provider. Alternatively, the virtual computing environment  218  may be a public cloud computing deployment owned, operated, and managed by a cloud computing service provider and supporting not only the core network functionality of a wireless communication service provider but also supporting computing needs of web-based enterprises, large on-line retail sales enterprises, governmental entities, and the like. 
     The virtual computing environment  218  may comprise a physical host  234  or physical server that provides a variety of compute resources. The physical host  234  comprises processors (e.g., microprocessors, digital signal processors, graphics processors), main memory, mass storage (e.g., disk drives), and network interfaces. The processors may comprise a single processor unit or may comprise multiple processor units. For example, a processor may comprise a quad-core processor having four distinct processing units. Alternatively, a processor may contain some other number of distinct processing units. The mass storage may be located in physical proximity to the computer blade on which a virtual server executes that uses the mass storage. Alternatively, the mass storage may be located remote from the computer blade on which the virtual server  236  executes and may be addressed or accessed logically. The physical host  234  may be partly deployed as blade computers in a rack of an equipment cabinet. A single virtual server  236  may execute on one computer host or computer blade, or a plurality of virtual servers  236  may execute on one computer host or computer blade. 
     The virtual server  236  may be built or deployed as a server image. A server image may comprise instructions or logic that can be loaded into main memory of a compute resource (a blade computer) or on top of a hypervisor and then executed to provide the functionality of the virtual server. A server image may be viewed as a kind of template for creating or instantiating a virtual server. The same server image may be used to instantiate multiple virtual servers, either on the same compute resource or on separate compute resources. The server image may be constructed or built targeted to a category or class of compute resources, and a virtual server instantiated from that server image may take advantage of or employ the compute resources that comport with that class of compute resources. For example, when a first server image is built according to a class of compute resources that includes a graphics processor, a virtual server instantiated from that first server image may employ the resources of one or more graphics processors. When a second server image is built according to a class of compute resources that includes a trusted security zone, a virtual server instantiated from that second server image may employ the resources of a trusted security zone. 
     The virtual computing environment  218  may comprise a first virtual server  236   a  executing on the physical host  234  that performs processing of a common function  238 . A second virtual server  236   b  and a third virtual server  236   c  may likewise execute on the physical host  234  and may perform processing of the same common function  238  or different common functions. It is understood that the physical host  234  may be viewed as the collection of all the compute resources in the virtual computing environment  218 : a plurality of processors, main memories, mass memories, and network interfaces. The virtual computing environment  218  may comprise any number of active or instantiated virtual servers  236  and any number of physical hosts  234  on which the virtual servers  236  execute. In some contexts, the virtual computing environment  218  may be said to constitute a core network or that a core network may comprise the virtual computing environment  218  (as well as comprising other network nodes that are not part of the virtual computing environment  218 ). 
     A communication may be initiated by the UE  102  by establishing a wireless communication link with the enhanced node B  104 . The enhanced node B  104  may establish a communication link with the virtual computing environment  218 , for example over a data communication interface such as an S1-U interface or an S1-C interface. The communication may be serviced by a plurality of network virtual functions and a plurality of common functions within the virtual computing environment  218  and link to the content server  240  to access content stored in a data store  242  or to link to the telephone  244  to conduct a voice call. 
     In an embodiment, the UE  102  initiates a trusted communication, for example to access confidential information via the content server  240  and the data store  242  (e.g., medical records, bank account information, or credit history information). The wireless link between the UE  102  and the enhanced node B  104  may be deemed to be inherently trusted or secure from hacking. The enhanced node B  104  may request a trusted communication link with the content server  240  by engaging in trusted signaling with the virtual computing environment  218 . The enhanced node B  104  sends a trusted link request via a S1 interface to the virtual computing environment  218 . A virtual server  236  may recognize the trusted link request and cause a common function  238  to transition to executing its trustlet. 
     The trustlet executes in a trusted security zone provided by the underlying physical host  234  in which the subject trustlet and virtual server  236  execute. The trustlet sends trust tokens to the enhanced node B  104  via the S1 interface, and a trusted communication link is established between the common function  238  and the enhanced node B  104 . The trustlet may then signal with other virtual servers  236  and other common functions  238  to provide the appropriate virtualized network functions to support the desired trusted communication. One of the common functions may be the bearer common function  208  that provides the trusted communication link to the server  240 . 
     The bearer common function  208 , likewise executing in its trustlet in a trusted security zone of the physical host  234  in which its virtual server  236  executes, signals with the content server  240  to establish a trusted communication link. When the content server  240  provides the appropriate trust tokens and handshaking, the end-to-end trusted bearer path from the UE  102  to the content server  240  (or to the telephone  244 , depending on the communication scenario) may be established. 
     Turning now to  FIG. 5 , the overlay of a virtual server  236  on physical host  234  is described. The virtual server  236  executes using physical host  234 . The virtual server  236  may not directly interact with the physical host  234  and instead may run on top of a hypervisor or on top of a logical operating system (an operating system that itself operates in the context of another operating system). Notwithstanding, the processing provided by the virtual server  236  is performed using the physical host  234 . The physical host  234  may comprise a rich environment  250  and a trusted security zone  252 . The details of trusted security zones are described further above. To briefly reprise here, a trusted security zone provides hardware assisted trust or hardware assisted security. A trusted security zone may comprise a portion of main memory. An operating system may mediate access to the main memory and may enforce the constraint that only instructions executing in trust may access the trusted portion of memory. Alternatively, the trusted portion of main memory may be physically isolated and only physically accessible to a trusted portion of a processor. A trusted security zone may be supported by a fundamental operation mode of processor units that prevents other potentially untrusted instructions executing concurrently with the trusted instructions (e.g., intercalated with the trusted instructions, as in a context switching situation or possibly when executed on a co-processor of a multi-core processor). 
     The rich environment  250  is the portion of main memory that is not trusted and any mass storage allocated to the virtual server  236 . The rich environment  250  comprises the processor units that are not configured to have a trusted mode of operation or are not currently operating in a trusted mode of operation. The rich environment  250  may be considered to further comprise operating system commands that are disallowed when executing in the trusted mode of operation and/or accessing network interfaces that may be disallowed when executing in the trusted mode of operation. 
     The common function  238  executing in the virtual server  236  may comprise rich environment processing logic or instructions  254  and a trustlet  256 . The rich environment processing  254  executes in the rich environment  250  of the physical host  234 , and the trustlet  256  executes in the trusted security zone  252 . A security monitor  258  may be part of an operating system in which the virtual server  236  executes or may be provided as part of the server image that is used to instantiate the virtual server  236 . The security monitor  258  executes in the trusted security zone  252 . The virtual server  236  may be configured or created to map execution of the trustlet  256  and the security monitor  258  to the trusted security zone  252 . The security monitor  258  may be referred to in some contexts as a security monitor module or a security monitor component. 
     The security monitor  258  may be configured with an execution invocation handle (e.g., a logical address) of the trustlet  256  that it can use to launch and terminate the trustlet  256 . The security monitor  258  may further be configured with the location of a trust flag in main memory of the physical host  234  or configured with a logical address that the operating system may map to a physical address to access the trust flag in main memory. The security monitor  258  may periodically poll the trust flag. When the trust flag is unset, no trusted communication request is pending. When the trust flag is set, a trusted communication request is pending. The security monitor  258  may further be configured with a physical address of a trusted communication request parameter list (or a logical address that the operating system can map to the trusted communication request parameter list). To handle a pending trusted communication request, the security monitor  258  may access and read the trusted communication request parameters. The security monitor  258  may first validate the trusted communication request parameters, for example validating a trust token provided in the parameters list. 
     The security monitor  258  may then cause the operating system (or may itself) to pause the rich environment processing  254  and may instantiate the trustlet  256 , passing the trusted communication request parameters to the trustlet  256 . Instantiating the trustlet  256  may be referred to in some contexts as allocating the trustlet  256  or allocating the trustlet  256  to the common function  238 . The trustlet  256  may then handshake with the requesting communication node or common function and carry on trusted communications. When the trustlet  256  indicates that the trusted communication session is completed, the security monitor  258  may terminate the trustlet  256  and cause the rich environment processing  254  to resume execution. 
     In an embodiment, the security monitor  258  may maintain a registry of trustlets  256 , for example in the situation where a plurality of instances of the common function  238  are executing on the same virtual server  236 . The registry of trustlets  256  may comprise information associated with instantiated trustlets  256 , for example an execution handle to use in communicating with each instantiated trustlet  256 , a trust token, state information such as communication parameters associated with the instantiated trustlet  256 . 
     Turning now to  FIG. 6 , the orchestrator  222  (or another virtual computing environment application) is illustrated executing on a physical host  270  in virtual server  220   h  and dynamically initiating additional virtual servers to support trusted common functions operations. As said above, it is an advantage of a virtual computing environment that compute resources and/or virtual servers can be put into service and taken out of service on short notice, supporting the desirable function of providing computing resources on an as needed basis. When the orchestrator  222  or another application detects that additional compute power is needed to support current or projected near term demand, the orchestrator  222  locates an available idle host and instantiates a virtual server on that idle host or locates a host that has spare processing capacity and instantiates another virtual server on that host based on multi-tenancy principles of virtual computing. 
     When the additional compute power is desired to further support trusted operations, the orchestrator  222  (e.g., a trusted orchestrator) or another application (e.g., a trusted application executing in a trusted security zone of a virtual server) consults a trusted resource inventory  272  that identifies physical hosts that have resources that are able to support trusted operations. For example, the orchestrator  222  identifies a plurality of idle physical hosts  276  that each comprises a trusted security zone capability  278 . The orchestrator  222  may select an idle physical host  280  and enable its trusted security zone capability  282  by provisioning a plurality of trust keys  284  into the enabled trust zone  282 . In an embodiment, the orchestrator  222  or another application communicates over a trusted end-to-end communication link with a trusted key repository  274  to checkout or otherwise obtain trust keys  284  that it configures into the enabled trusted security zone  282 . 
     When the orchestrator  222  or another application has enabled the trusted security zone  292  on an idle physical host  280 , it instantiates one or more virtual servers  288  on the physical host  286  and launches the common function  290  in the virtual server  288 . The common function  290  may then contribute to carrying the trusted processing burden. It is understood that hosts  276 ,  286 , and  280  may be the same physical host represented at different points in time and in different states of provisioning. For example, one of the idle physical hosts  276  is transformed to the idle physical host  280  by enabling the trusted security zone  282  and provisioning it with trust keys  284 ; and the idle physical host  280  is transformed to the physical host  286  by instantiating the virtual server(s)  288  on the physical host  286  and launching the common function  290  in the virtual servers(s)  288 . 
     Turning now to  FIG. 7 , a method  300  is described. At block  302 , receive a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) content request from a user equipment (UE), wherein the HTTP content request comprises an identification of a content source. At block  304 , determine by an orchestrator service that insufficient NFV processing capacity is available to perform the HTTP content request, where the orchestrator service is an application that executes on first physical host. At block  306 , dynamically increase the NFV processing capacity by the orchestrator service. At block  308 , perform the HTTP content request using the increased NFV processing capacity. At block  310 , return a HTTP content response to the UE, wherein the HTTP content response does not comprise identification of the content source. The processing of block  310  may be provided by the content server  107 / 109  as described above with reference to  FIG. 1A / FIG. 1B . The processing of block  310  may be referred to as quiet or taciturn HTTP. 
     Turning not to  FIG. 8 , a method  320  is described. At block  322 , receive a first domain name lookup request that comprises a service name. At block  324 , in response to receiving the first domain name lookup request, look up an internet protocol (IP) address of a server based on the service name. At block  326 , create a mapping between a one-time-use domain name and the IP address, where the one-time-use domain name is created dynamically. At block  328 , transmit a reply to the first domain name lookup request comprising the one-time-use domain name. At block  330 , receive a second domain name lookup request that comprises the one-time-use domain name. At block  332 , in response to receiving the second domain name lookup request, look up the IP address based on the one-time-use domain name. At block  334 , transmit a reply to the second domain name lookup request comprising the IP address. At block  336 , after looking up the IP address based on the one-time-use domain name, destroy the mapping between the one-time-use domain name and the IP address. The mapping may be destroyed before or after the reply to the second domain name lookup request is transmitted. 
     Turning now to  FIG. 9 , a method  340  is described. At block  342 , determine by a trusted orchestrator service that a communication processing load of a common function supported by at least one virtual server executing in a NFV core network is greater than a predefined processing load threshold, where the trusted orchestrator service is an application that executes in a trusted security zone of a first physical host that provides hardware assisted security. At block  344 , in response to the determination of the processing load being greater than the predefined processing load threshold, create by the trusted orchestrator service a second virtual server on a second physical host that provides hardware assisted security. At block  346 , request by the trusted orchestrator service a plurality of trust keys from a trusted repository of trust keys. At block  348 , request by the trusted orchestrator service a plurality of trust keys from a trusted repository of trust keys. 
     A trusted security zone provides chipsets with a hardware root of trust, a secure execution environment for applications, and secure access to peripherals. A hardware root of trust means the chipset should only execute programs intended by the device manufacturer or vendor and resists software and physical attacks, and therefore remains trusted to provide the intended level of security. The chipset architecture is designed to promote a programmable environment that allows the confidentiality and integrity of assets to be protected from specific attacks. Trusted security zone capabilities are becoming features in both wireless and fixed hardware architecture designs. Providing the trusted security zone in the main mobile device chipset and protecting the hardware root of trust removes the need for separate secure hardware to authenticate the device or user. To ensure the integrity of the applications requiring trusted data, such as a mobile financial services application, the trusted security zone also provides the secure execution environment where only trusted applications can operate, safe from attacks. Security is further promoted by restricting access of non-trusted applications to peripherals, such as data inputs and data outputs, while a trusted application is running in the secure execution environment. In an embodiment, the trusted security zone may be conceptualized as hardware assisted security. 
     A complete trusted execution environment (TEE) may be implemented through the use of the trusted security zone hardware and software architecture. The trusted execution environment is an execution environment that is parallel to the execution environment of the main mobile device operating system. The trusted execution environment and/or the trusted security zone may provide a base layer of functionality and/or utilities for use of applications that may execute in the trusted security zone. For example, in an embodiment, trust tokens may be generated by the base layer of functionality and/or utilities of the trusted execution environment and/or trusted security zone for use in trusted end-to-end communication links to document a continuity of trust of the communications. Through standardization of application programming interfaces (APIs), the trusted execution environment becomes a place to which scalable deployment of secure services can be targeted. A device which has a chipset that has a trusted execution environment on it may exist in a trusted services environment, where devices in the trusted services environment are trusted and protected against attacks. The trusted execution environment can be implemented on mobile phones and tablets as well as extending to other trusted devices such as personal computers, servers, sensors, medical devices, point-of-sale terminals, industrial automation, handheld terminals, automotive, etc. 
     The trusted security zone is implemented by partitioning all of the hardware and software resources of the mobile device into two partitions: a secure partition and a normal partition. The secure partition may be implemented by a first physical processor, and the normal partition may be implemented by a second physical processor. Alternatively, the secure partition may be implemented by a first virtual processor, and the normal partition may be implemented by a second virtual processor. Placing sensitive resources in the secure partition can protect against possible attacks on those resources. For example, resources such as trusted software applications may run in the secure partition and have access to hardware peripherals such as a touchscreen or a secure location in memory. Less secure peripherals such as wireless radios may be disabled completely while the secure partition is being accessed, while other peripherals may only be accessed from the secure partition. While the secure partition is being accessed through the trusted execution environment, the main mobile operating system in the normal partition is suspended, and applications in the normal partition are prevented from accessing the secure peripherals and data. This prevents corrupted applications or malware applications from breaking the trust of the device. 
     The trusted security zone is implemented by partitioning the hardware and software resources to exist in a secure subsystem which is not accessible to components outside the secure subsystem. The trusted security zone is built into the processor architecture at the time of manufacture through hardware logic present in the trusted security zone which enables a perimeter boundary between the secure partition and the normal partition. The trusted security zone may only be manipulated by those with the proper credentials and, in an embodiment, may not be added to the chip after it is manufactured. Software architecture to support the secure partition may be provided through a dedicated secure kernel running trusted applications. Trusted applications are independent secure applications which can be accessed by normal applications through an application programming interface in the trusted execution environment on a chipset that utilizes the trusted security zone. 
     In an embodiment, the normal partition applications run on a first virtual processor, and the secure partition applications run on a second virtual processor. Both virtual processors may run on a single physical processor, executing in a time-sliced fashion, removing the need for a dedicated physical security processor. Time-sliced execution comprises switching contexts between the two virtual processors to share processor resources based on tightly controlled mechanisms such as secure software instructions or hardware exceptions. The context of the currently running virtual processor is saved, the context of the virtual processor being switched to is restored, and processing is restarted in the restored virtual processor. Time-sliced execution protects the trusted security zone by stopping the execution of the normal partition while the secure partition is executing. 
     The two virtual processors context switch via a processor mode called monitor mode when changing the currently running virtual processor. The mechanisms by which the processor can enter monitor mode from the normal partition are tightly controlled. The entry to monitor mode can be triggered by software executing a dedicated instruction, the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction, or by a subset of the hardware exception mechanisms such as hardware interrupts, which can be configured to cause the processor to switch into monitor mode. The software that executes within monitor mode then saves the context of the running virtual processor and switches to the secure virtual processor. 
     The trusted security zone runs a separate operating system that is not accessible to the device users. For security purposes, the trusted security zone is not open to users for installing applications, which means users do not have access to install applications in the trusted security zone. This prevents corrupted applications or malware applications from executing powerful instructions reserved to the trusted security zone and thus preserves the trust of the device. The security of the system is achieved at least in part by partitioning the hardware and software resources of the mobile phone so they exist in one of two partitions, the secure partition for the security subsystem and the normal partition for everything else. Placing the trusted security zone in the secure partition and restricting access from the normal partition protects against software and basic hardware attacks. Hardware logic ensures that no secure partition resources can be accessed by the normal partition components or applications. A dedicated secure partition operating system runs in a virtual processor separate from the normal partition operating system that likewise executes in its own virtual processor. Users may install applications on the mobile device which may execute in the normal partition operating system described above. The trusted security zone runs a separate operating system for the secure partition that is installed by the mobile device manufacturer or vendor, and users are not able to install new applications in or alter the contents of the trusted security zone. 
       FIG. 10  depicts the user equipment (UE)  400 , which is operable for implementing aspects of the present disclosure, but the present disclosure should not be limited to these implementations. Though illustrated as a mobile phone, the UE  400  may take various forms including a wireless handset, a pager, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a gaming device, or a media player. The UE  400  includes a touchscreen display  402  having a touch-sensitive surface for input by a user. A small number of application icons  404  are illustrated within the touch screen display  402 . It is understood that in different embodiments, any number of application icons  404  may be presented in the touch screen display  402 . In some embodiments of the UE  400 , a user may be able to download and install additional applications on the UE  400 , and an icon associated with such downloaded and installed applications may be added to the touch screen display  402  or to an alternative screen. The UE  400  may have other components such as electro-mechanical switches, speakers, camera lenses, microphones, input and/or output connectors, and other components as are well known in the art. The UE  400  may present options for the user to select, controls for the user to actuate, and/or cursors or other indicators for the user to direct. The UE  400  may further accept data entry from the user, including numbers to dial or various parameter values for configuring the operation of the handset. The UE  400  may further execute one or more software or firmware applications in response to user commands. These applications may configure the UE  400  to perform various customized functions in response to user interaction. Additionally, the UE  400  may be programmed and/or configured over-the-air, for example from a wireless base station, a wireless access point, or a peer UE  400 . The UE  400  may execute a web browser application which enables the touch screen display  402  to show a web page. The web page may be obtained via wireless communications with a base transceiver station, a wireless network access node, a peer UE  400  or any other wireless communication network or system. 
       FIG. 11  shows a block diagram of the UE  400 . While a variety of known components of handsets are depicted, in an embodiment a subset of the listed components and/or additional components not listed may be included in the UE  400 . The UE  400  includes a digital signal processor (DSP)  502  and a memory  504 . As shown, the UE  400  may further include an antenna and front end unit  506 , a radio frequency (RF) transceiver  508 , a baseband processing unit  510 , a microphone  512 , an earpiece speaker  514 , a headset port  516 , an input/output interface  518 , a removable memory card  520 , a universal serial bus (USB) port  522 , an infrared port  524 , a vibrator  526 , one or more electro-mechanical switches  528 , a touch screen liquid crystal display (LCD) with a touch screen display  530 , a touch screen/LCD controller  532 , a camera  534 , a camera controller  536 , and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver  538 . In an embodiment, the UE  400  may include another kind of display that does not provide a touch sensitive screen. In an embodiment, the UE  400  may include both the touch screen display  530  and additional display component that does not provide a touch sensitive screen. In an embodiment, the DSP  502  may communicate directly with the memory  504  without passing through the input/output interface  518 . Additionally, in an embodiment, the UE  400  may comprise other peripheral devices that provide other functionality. 
     The DSP  502  or some other form of controller or central processing unit operates to control the various components of the UE  400  in accordance with embedded software or firmware stored in memory  504  or stored in memory contained within the DSP  502  itself. In addition to the embedded software or firmware, the DSP  502  may execute other applications stored in the memory  504  or made available via information carrier media such as portable data storage media like the removable memory card  520  or via wired or wireless network communications. The application software may comprise a compiled set of machine-readable instructions that configure the DSP  502  to provide the desired functionality, or the application software may be high-level software instructions to be processed by an interpreter or compiler to indirectly configure the DSP  502 . 
     The DSP  502  may communicate with a wireless network via the analog baseband processing unit  510 . In some embodiments, the communication may provide Internet connectivity, enabling a user to gain access to content on the Internet and to send and receive e-mail or text messages. The input/output interface  518  interconnects the DSP  502  and various memories and interfaces. The memory  504  and the removable memory card  520  may provide software and data to configure the operation of the DSP  502 . Among the interfaces may be the USB port  522  and the infrared port  524 . The USB port  522  may enable the UE  400  to function as a peripheral device to exchange information with a personal computer or other computer system. The infrared port  524  and other optional ports such as a Bluetooth® interface or an IEEE 802.11 compliant wireless interface may enable the UE  400  to communicate wirelessly with other nearby handsets and/or wireless base stations. In an embodiment, the UE  400  may comprise a near field communication (NFC) transceiver. The NFC transceiver may be used to complete payment transactions with point-of-sale terminals or other communications exchanges. In an embodiment, the UE  400  may comprise a radio frequency identify (RFID) reader and/or writer device. 
     The switches  528  may couple to the DSP  502  via the input/output interface  518  to provide one mechanism for the user to provide input to the UE  400 . Alternatively, one or more of the switches  528  may be coupled to a motherboard of the UE  400  and/or to components of the UE  400  via a different path (e.g., not via the input/output interface  518 ), for example coupled to a power control circuit (power button) of the UE  400 . The touch screen display  530  is another input mechanism, which further displays text and/or graphics to the user. The touch screen LCD controller  532  couples the DSP  502  to the touch screen display  530 . The GPS receiver  538  is coupled to the DSP  502  to decode global positioning system signals, thereby enabling the UE  400  to determine its position. 
       FIG. 12A  illustrates a software environment  602  that may be implemented by the DSP  502 . The DSP  502  executes operating system software  604  that provides a platform from which the rest of the software operates. The operating system software  604  may provide a variety of drivers for the handset hardware with standardized interfaces that are accessible to application software. The operating system software  604  may be coupled to and interact with application management services (AMS)  606  that transfer control between applications running on the UE  400 . Also shown in  FIG. 12A  are a web browser application  608 , a media player application  610 , and JAVA applets  612 . The web browser application  608  may be executed by the UE  400  to browse content and/or the Internet, for example when the UE  400  is coupled to a network via a wireless link. The web browser application  608  may permit a user to enter information into forms and select links to retrieve and view web pages. The media player application  610  may be executed by the UE  400  to play audio or audiovisual media. The JAVA applets  612  may be executed by the UE  400  to provide a variety of functionality including games, utilities, and other functionality. 
       FIG. 12B  illustrates an alternative software environment  620  that may be implemented by the DSP  502 . The DSP  502  executes operating system kernel (OS kernel)  628  and an execution runtime  630 . The DSP  502  executes applications  622  that may execute in the execution runtime  630  and may rely upon services provided by the application framework  624 . Applications  622  and the application framework  624  may rely upon functionality provided via the libraries  626 . 
       FIG. 13  illustrates a computer system  380  suitable for implementing one or more embodiments disclosed herein. The computer system  380  includes a processor  382  (which may be referred to as a central processor unit or CPU) that is in communication with memory devices including secondary storage  384 , read only memory (ROM)  386 , random access memory (RAM)  388 , input/output (I/O) devices  390 , and network connectivity devices  392 . The processor  382  may be implemented as one or more CPU chips. 
     It is understood that by programming and/or loading executable instructions onto the computer system  380 , at least one of the CPU  382 , the RAM  388 , and the ROM  386  are changed, transforming the computer system  380  in part into a particular machine or apparatus having the novel functionality taught by the present disclosure. It is fundamental to the electrical engineering and software engineering arts that functionality that can be implemented by loading executable software into a computer can be converted to a hardware implementation by well-known design rules. Decisions between implementing a concept in software versus hardware typically hinge on considerations of stability of the design and numbers of units to be produced rather than any issues involved in translating from the software domain to the hardware domain. Generally, a design that is still subject to frequent change may be preferred to be implemented in software, because re-spinning a hardware implementation is more expensive than re-spinning a software design. Generally, a design that is stable that will be produced in large volume may be preferred to be implemented in hardware, for example in an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), because for large production runs the hardware implementation may be less expensive than the software implementation. Often a design may be developed and tested in a software form and later transformed, by well-known design rules, to an equivalent hardware implementation in an application specific integrated circuit that hardwires the instructions of the software. In the same manner as a machine controlled by a new ASIC is a particular machine or apparatus, likewise a computer that has been programmed and/or loaded with executable instructions may be viewed as a particular machine or apparatus. 
     Additionally, after the system  380  is turned on or booted, the CPU  382  may execute a computer program or application. For example, the CPU  382  may execute software or firmware stored in the ROM  386  or stored in the RAM  388 . In some cases, on boot and/or when the application is initiated, the CPU  382  may copy the application or portions of the application from the secondary storage  384  to the RAM  388  or to memory space within the CPU  382  itself, and the CPU  382  may then execute instructions that the application is comprised of. In some cases, the CPU  382  may copy the application or portions of the application from memory accessed via the network connectivity devices  392  or via the I/O devices  390  to the RAM  388  or to memory space within the CPU  382 , and the CPU  382  may then execute instructions that the application is comprised of. During execution, an application may load instructions into the CPU  382 , for example load some of the instructions of the application into a cache of the CPU  382 . In some contexts, an application that is executed may be said to configure the CPU  382  to do something, e.g., to configure the CPU  382  to perform the function or functions promoted by the subject application. When the CPU  382  is configured in this way by the application, the CPU  382  becomes a specific purpose computer or a specific purpose machine. 
     The secondary storage  384  is typically comprised of one or more disk drives or tape drives and is used for non-volatile storage of data and as an over-flow data storage device if RAM  388  is not large enough to hold all working data. Secondary storage  384  may be used to store programs which are loaded into RAM  388  when such programs are selected for execution. The ROM  386  is used to store instructions and perhaps data which are read during program execution. ROM  386  is a non-volatile memory device which typically has a small memory capacity relative to the larger memory capacity of secondary storage  384 . The RAM  388  is used to store volatile data and perhaps to store instructions. Access to both ROM  386  and RAM  388  is typically faster than to secondary storage  384 . The secondary storage  384 , the RAM  388 , and/or the ROM  386  may be referred to in some contexts as computer readable storage media and/or non-transitory computer readable media. 
     I/O devices  390  may include printers, video monitors, liquid crystal displays (LCDs), touch screen displays, keyboards, keypads, switches, dials, mice, track balls, voice recognizers, card readers, paper tape readers, or other well-known input devices. 
     The network connectivity devices  392  may take the form of modems, modem banks, Ethernet cards, universal serial bus (USB) interface cards, serial interfaces, token ring cards, fiber distributed data interface (FDDI) cards, wireless local area network (WLAN) cards, radio transceiver cards that promote radio communications using protocols such as code division multiple access (CDMA), global system for mobile communications (GSM), long-term evolution (LTE), worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX), near field communications (NFC), radio frequency identity (RFID), and/or other air interface protocol radio transceiver cards, and other well-known network devices. These network connectivity devices  392  may enable the processor  382  to communicate with the Internet or one or more intranets. With such a network connection, it is contemplated that the processor  382  might receive information from the network, or might output information to the network in the course of performing the above-described method steps. Such information, which is often represented as a sequence of instructions to be executed using processor  382 , may be received from and outputted to the network, for example, in the form of a computer data signal embodied in a carrier wave. 
     Such information, which may include data or instructions to be executed using processor  382  for example, may be received from and outputted to the network, for example, in the form of a computer data baseband signal or signal embodied in a carrier wave. The baseband signal or signal embedded in the carrier wave, or other types of signals currently used or hereafter developed, may be generated according to several methods well-known to one skilled in the art. The baseband signal and/or signal embedded in the carrier wave may be referred to in some contexts as a transitory signal. 
     The processor  382  executes instructions, codes, computer programs, scripts which it accesses from hard disk, floppy disk, optical disk (these various disk based systems may all be considered secondary storage  384 ), flash drive, ROM  386 , RAM  388 , or the network connectivity devices  392 . While only one processor  382  is shown, multiple processors may be present. Thus, while instructions may be discussed as executed by a processor, the instructions may be executed simultaneously, serially, or otherwise executed by one or multiple processors. Instructions, codes, computer programs, scripts, and/or data that may be accessed from the secondary storage  384 , for example, hard drives, floppy disks, optical disks, and/or other device, the ROM  386 , and/or the RAM  388  may be referred to in some contexts as non-transitory instructions and/or non-transitory information. 
     In an embodiment, the computer system  380  may comprise two or more computers in communication with each other that collaborate to perform a task. For example, but not by way of limitation, an application may be partitioned in such a way as to permit concurrent and/or parallel processing of the instructions of the application. Alternatively, the data processed by the application may be partitioned in such a way as to permit concurrent and/or parallel processing of different portions of a data set by the two or more computers. In an embodiment, virtualization software may be employed by the computer system  380  to provide the functionality of a number of servers that is not directly bound to the number of computers in the computer system  380 . For example, virtualization software may provide twenty virtual servers on four physical computers. In an embodiment, the functionality disclosed above may be provided by executing the application and/or applications in a cloud computing environment. Cloud computing may comprise providing computing services via a network connection using dynamically scalable computing resources. Cloud computing may be supported, at least in part, by virtualization software. A cloud computing environment may be established by an enterprise and/or may be hired on an as-needed basis from a third party provider. Some cloud computing environments may comprise cloud computing resources owned and operated by the enterprise as well as cloud computing resources hired and/or leased from a third party provider. 
     In an embodiment, some or all of the functionality disclosed above may be provided as a computer program product. The computer program product may comprise one or more computer readable storage medium having computer usable program code embodied therein to implement the functionality disclosed above. The computer program product may comprise data structures, executable instructions, and other computer usable program code. The computer program product may be embodied in removable computer storage media and/or non-removable computer storage media. The removable computer readable storage medium may comprise, without limitation, a paper tape, a magnetic tape, magnetic disk, an optical disk, a solid state memory chip, for example analog magnetic tape, compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) disks, floppy disks, jump drives, digital cards, multimedia cards, and others. The computer program product may be suitable for loading, by the computer system  380 , at least portions of the contents of the computer program product to the secondary storage  384 , to the ROM  386 , to the RAM  388 , and/or to other non-volatile memory and volatile memory of the computer system  380 . The processor  382  may process the executable instructions and/or data structures in part by directly accessing the computer program product, for example by reading from a CD-ROM disk inserted into a disk drive peripheral of the computer system  380 . Alternatively, the processor  382  may process the executable instructions and/or data structures by remotely accessing the computer program product, for example by downloading the executable instructions and/or data structures from a remote server through the network connectivity devices  392 . The computer program product may comprise instructions that promote the loading and/or copying of data, data structures, files, and/or executable instructions to the secondary storage  384 , to the ROM  386 , to the RAM  388 , and/or to other non-volatile memory and volatile memory of the computer system  380 . 
     In some contexts, the secondary storage  384 , the ROM  386 , and the RAM  388  may be referred to as a non-transitory computer readable medium or a computer readable storage media. A dynamic RAM embodiment of the RAM  388 , likewise, may be referred to as a non-transitory computer readable medium in that while the dynamic RAM receives electrical power and is operated in accordance with its design, for example during a period of time during which the computer system  380  is turned on and operational, the dynamic RAM stores information that is written to it. Similarly, the processor  382  may comprise an internal RAM, an internal ROM, a cache memory, and/or other internal non-transitory storage blocks, sections, or components that may be referred to in some contexts as non-transitory computer readable media or computer readable storage media. 
     While several embodiments have been provided in the present disclosure, it should be understood that the disclosed systems and methods may be embodied in many other specific forms without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure. The present examples are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the intention is not to be limited to the details given herein. For example, the various elements or components may be combined or integrated in another system or certain features may be omitted or not implemented. 
     Also, techniques, systems, subsystems, and methods described and illustrated in the various embodiments as discrete or separate may be combined or integrated with other systems, modules, techniques, or methods without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Other items shown or discussed as directly coupled or communicating with each other may be indirectly coupled or communicating through some interface, device, or intermediate component, whether electrically, mechanically, or otherwise. Other examples of changes, substitutions, and alterations are ascertainable by one skilled in the art and could be made without departing from the spirit and scope disclosed herein.