Patent Publication Number: US-2013243189-A1

Title: Method and apparatus for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments

Description:
BACKGROUND 
     Service providers and device manufacturers (e.g., wireless, cellular, etc.) are continually challenged to deliver value and convenience to consumers by, for example, providing compelling network services and access to various kinds of information. At the same time, the service providers need to ensure security of information exchanged between the user devices and the provider networks, and also proper use of provided services by the intended users. For example, in services provided based on identity-based schemes such as ticketing services, etc. user authentication as well as information about services used by the users can be areas of concern where unauthorized entities may gain access to service information or users may misrepresent their identity and/or service usage information. 
     For example, in a ticketing system, if the ticketed user is able to, in the presence of the threat of ticket validation, either stop his travel evidence from being handled by a rating engine, or otherwise modify or misrepresent his travel schedule for his own benefit, such faulty evidence will lead to losses for the transport authority or any entity taking liability for the ticketing system. 
     Additionally, various data associated with the users and their use of the service that is captured and collected by the service provider, need to be handled in an authenticated manner in the user device (e.g., a mobile device) and through a secure environment binding this information to the provider backend (e.g., a ticketing system) for the benefit of either the user or the service provider, depending on the situation. 
     SOME EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS 
     Therefore, there is a need for an approach for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. 
     According to one embodiment, a method comprises causing, at least in part, a generation of at least one cryptographic key for use by (a) at least one secure environment, (b) one or more sensors that are associated with at least one device and that are external to the at least one secure environment, or (c) a combination thereof. The method also comprises causing, at least in part, an authentication of sensor information transmitted by the one or more sensors to the at least one secure environment based, at least in part, on the cryptographic key. 
     According to another embodiment, an apparatus comprises at least one processor, and at least one memory including computer program code for one or more computer programs, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause, at least in part, the apparatus to cause, at least in part, a generation of at least one cryptographic key for use by (a) at least one secure environment, (b) one or more sensors that are associated with at least one device and that are external to the at least one secure environment, or (c) a combination thereof. The apparatus is also caused to cause, at least in part, an authentication of sensor information transmitted by the one or more sensors to the at least one secure environment based, at least in part, on the cryptographic key. 
     According to another embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium carries one or more sequences of one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, cause, at least in part, an apparatus to cause, at least in part, a generation of at least one cryptographic key for use by (a) at least one secure environment, (b) one or more sensors that are associated with at least one device and that are external to the at least one secure environment, or (c) a combination thereof. The apparatus is also caused to cause, at least in part, an authentication of sensor information transmitted by the one or more sensors to the at least one secure environment based, at least in part, on the cryptographic key. 
     According to another embodiment, an apparatus comprises means for causing, at least in part, a generation of at least one cryptographic key for use by (a) at least one secure environment, (b) one or more sensors that are associated with at least one device and that are external to the at least one secure environment, or (c) a combination thereof. The apparatus also comprises means for causing, at least in part, an authentication of sensor information transmitted by the one or more sensors to the at least one secure environment based, at least in part, on the cryptographic key. 
     In addition, for various example embodiments of the invention, the following is applicable: a method comprising facilitating a processing of and/or processing (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one signal, the (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one signal based, at least in part, on (or derived at least in part from) any one or any combination of methods (or processes) disclosed in this application as relevant to any embodiment of the invention. 
     For various example embodiments of the invention, the following is also applicable: a method comprising facilitating access to at least one interface configured to allow access to at least one service, the at least one service configured to perform any one or any combination of network or service provider methods (or processes) disclosed in this application. 
     For various example embodiments of the invention, the following is also applicable: a method comprising facilitating creating and/or facilitating modifying (1) at least one device user interface element and/or (2) at least one device user interface functionality, the (1) at least one device user interface element and/or (2) at least one device user interface functionality based, at least in part, on data and/or information resulting from one or any combination of methods or processes disclosed in this application as relevant to any embodiment of the invention, and/or at least one signal resulting from one or any combination of methods (or processes) disclosed in this application as relevant to any embodiment of the invention. 
     For various example embodiments of the invention, the following is also applicable: a method comprising creating and/or modifying (1) at least one device user interface element and/or (2) at least one device user interface functionality, the (1) at least one device user interface element and/or (2) at least one device user interface functionality based at least in part on data and/or information resulting from one or any combination of methods (or processes) disclosed in this application as relevant to any embodiment of the invention, and/or at least one signal resulting from one or any combination of methods (or processes) disclosed in this application as relevant to any embodiment of the invention. 
     In various example embodiments, the methods (or processes) can be accomplished on the service provider side or on the mobile device side or in any shared way between service provider and mobile device with actions being performed on both sides. 
     For various example embodiments, the following is applicable: An apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any of originally filed claims  1 - 10 ,  21 - 30 , and  46 - 48 . 
     Still other aspects, features, and advantages of the invention are readily apparent from the following detailed description, simply by illustrating a number of particular embodiments and implementations, including the best mode contemplated for carrying out the invention. The invention is also capable of other and different embodiments, and its several details can be modified in various obvious respects, all without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the drawings and description are to be regarded as illustrative in nature, and not as restrictive. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       The embodiments of the invention are illustrated by way of example, and not by way of limitation, in the figures of the accompanying drawings: 
         FIG. 1  is a diagram of a system capable of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 2  is a diagram of the components of an authentication support platform, according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 3  is a flowchart of a process for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 4  is a diagram of secure booting of a device, according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 5  is a general diagram of a ticket scheme, according to one embodiment; 
         FIG. 6  is a diagram of hardware that can be used to implement an embodiment of the invention; 
         FIG. 7  is a diagram of a chip set that can be used to implement an embodiment of the invention; and 
         FIG. 8  is a diagram of a mobile terminal (e.g., handset) that can be used to implement an embodiment of the invention. 
     
    
    
     DESCRIPTION OF SOME EMBODIMENTS 
     Examples of a method, apparatus, and computer program for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments are disclosed. In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. It is apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the embodiments of the invention may be practiced without these specific details or with an equivalent arrangement. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the embodiments of the invention. 
       FIG. 1  is a diagram of a system capable of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, in the context of transport ticketing using mobile devices and secure environments therein, such as Embedded Secure Elements, etc., location information is captured in an authenticated manner in the mobile device and through the secure environment. 
     Traditionally, the transport authorities operate smart-card models for their ticketing process. However, in ticketing systems in which the smart-card model is not used (for example the mobile device is used for user identification), there is a possible risk of losing worth of one or more transportation rides, if the user does not have the actual balance on the backend server hosted account. This can be due to the timing mismatch between validation of the user account and the actual travel time. 
     Furthermore, some of the currently used public transport electronic tickets represent a form of currency, which is preloaded to a card or phone and consumed at travel time. Other public transport tickets may represent a certificate used, for example, as a monthly pass. This type of tickets will only need identity verification at the time of inspection. There are other server-based solutions, where servers send out unique tokens or tickets that are validated at system entry. For electronic systems, this typically requires real-time backend validation to thwart replay attacks. In the current techniques, ticket verification and auditing is not an issue because either the usage is pre-authorized by the presence of ticket value, or the infrastructure has an online, accurate picture of all needed primitives to trivially weed out fraudulent usage. However, these techniques cannot be used by systems that enable users to pay for transport services as they go without previously charged cards or accounts. 
     Additionally, in many transportation systems the default charge for a travel is the maximum-length trip, if the user does not remember to check or tap out at the exit station. At times of exceptional activity (e.g., fire in the underground, user pushing a baby-carriage, etc.) some temporary routing at the exit gate can actually make it impossible for the user to appropriately tap out and pay the appropriate fee for the trip taken. Simply forgetting the tapping is also a common occurrence, for example when the user receives a phone call at the same time as he is exiting the station. 
     It is noted that common interfaces for accessing low-level Global Positioning System (GPS) driver data do not consider authentication as a feature, and this is imperative in order to build reliable systems in open devices for using location (e.g. ticketing protocols) as evidence for billing and charging. 
     To address the problems described, a system  100  of  FIG. 1  introduces the capability to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. In one embodiment, the location information associated with a user of User Equipment (UEs)  101   a - 101   n  is securely considered in the provided transport services by the service provider(s)  111  under the supervision of authentication support platform  103 . In this embodiment, the location information and the technical mechanisms for ticketing process are combined with other security-relevant algorithms in the UEs  101   a - 101   n.    
     Typically, embedded/closed GPS devices are used in combination with charging fees at least in prototypes, for example for service environments (e.g., public transport vehicles)  121   a - 121   p  passing through taxed areas in cities, and the payment is dependent on factors such as distance travelled by a user of UEs  101   a - 101   n . These are dedicated devices, where the GPS receiver is an integral part of the secure environment, the so called Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the ticketing system that is composed of components critical of the system&#39;s security. Thus the location information from the GPS receiver can be trusted. 
     In one embodiment, authenticated location information of UEs  101   a - 101   n  can be combined into the ticketing system of service provider(s)  111  and managed by a secured environment such as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). A TEE  119   a - 119   n  is a secure area that resides in the main processor of the UEs  101   a - 101   n  and guarantees that sensitive data is stored, processed and protected in a trusted environment. Its ability to offer safe execution of authorized security software, known as trusted applications, enables the TEE  119   a - 119   n  to enforce protection, confidentiality, integrity, and access rights of the data belonging to those trusted applications. 
     In one embodiment, the context information can be securely submitted to the service provider(s)  111  backend (e.g., transportation authority) for processing in combination with ticketing. Since time is a part of the GPS signal, the authenticated information can easily be cross-referenced with timetable data or logs from GPS-enabled vehicles  121   a - 121   p.    
     In various embodiments, different combined information can help indicate current status of ticketing process. Table 1 shows some examples of determining ticketing status based on the received information. 
     In one embodiment, authentication features can be added to the typical GPS interfacing protocol, for the TEE  119   a - 119   n  in order to insure that the location information it receives is unaltered, for example, in favor of the user for getting cheaper tickets. The combination of location information authenticated to a local TEE  119   a - 119   n , which further carries out a secure, application specific protocol to a service provider infrastructure  111  or other devices makes it possible to reliably add location dependence to protocols also in open devices such as UEs  101   a - 101   n . 
     
       
         
           
               
               
             
               
                 TABLE 1 
               
               
                   
               
               
                 RECEIVED INFORMATION 
                 TICKETING STATUS 
               
               
                   
               
             
            
               
                 Mobile device GPS signal lost 
                 User entered GPS signal unavailable 
               
               
                 AND subsequent tapping occurred 
                 area AND ticketing is ongoing 
               
               
                 Ticketing ongoing AND mobile 
                 Possibly, user exit the gate without 
               
               
                 device GPS signal is lost 
                 tapping 
               
               
                 Tapping occurred in vehicle AND 
                 user is riding on the vehicle AND 
               
               
                 mobile device GPS indicates 
                 ticketing is ongoing 
               
               
                 velocity 
               
               
                 Mobile device GPS indicated very 
                 Possibly, user exit vehicle 
               
               
                 slow movement OR GPS signal 
               
               
                 disappears for a period of time 
               
               
                 Vehicle GPS and mobile device 
                 User is riding on the vehicle AND 
               
               
                 GPS signals converged for a 
                 ticketing is ongoing 
               
               
                 period of time 
               
               
                   
               
            
           
         
       
     
     In one embodiment, a transit gate or a station  113   a - 113   m  may push the GPS location that the UE  101   a - 101   n  has been last seen at, for example before going underground, to a securely stored stack. Additionally, the UE  101   a - 101   n  may also store the next GPS location which it receives from the GPS satellite once surfacing to the ground (e.g., after a trip) or from a station  113   a - 113   m  at the time of exit. In this embodiment, if the user of UE  101   a - 101   n  did not ride or lawfully pay for the trip, the GPS locations (two or more of them, but not current location) are sent by the station  113   a - 113   m  to the service provider(s)  111 . The GPS location stack values may be registered at the time when the transport application(s)  107   a - 107   n  of the UE  101   a - 101   n  is registered. Therefore, during deployment, it is assured that the GPS information cannot be sent to any inappropriate parties. 
     In one embodiment, a service application(s) (e.g. a ticketing application)  107   a - 107   n  on UE  101   a - 101   n  maintains and stores GPS signal information when plausible relevant from a ticketing perspective. If any incident leads to a ticketing tap being forgotten, or wrong tapping information is exchanged between sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  on UE  101   a - 101   n  and sensor(s)  115   a - 115   m  on station  113   a - 113   m , the user can decide to submit the GPS log to the service provider(s) (e.g., transport authority)  111  for clearance. This process can be automated. For example, the transport authority authentication module can trust the location information as being collected by the same UE  101   a - 101   n  in which the id-resolving for the ticketing takes place (e.g., the UE that taps at the station), and thus, within limits, adjust user travel and especially associated charges, according to the evidence provided by the location information and possible partially collected taps. 
     In one embodiment, a user authentication inspector at the service environment  121   a - 121   p  (e.g., ticket inspector inside a vehicle) may use a Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled UE  101   a - 101   n  as an inspection device, in cases where the user either uses an NFC smart card (not shown) as a ticket and/or a UE  101   a - 101   n . Then the GPS coordinates of the inspection event can be combined with user information to either fine the user or determining that the user has rightful access to the vehicle or transportation system. As an example, the ticket inspection in a moving vehicle can be structured as a network-based activity, where, for example, all users with a valid ticket (in the vehicle identified by location and/or ID) can receive a similar, slowly changing picture on their screens to show to an inspector as the inspection activity. 
     It is noted that the industry standard protocol for communication with GPS receivers is the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 0183 protocol, although inside any given device  101   a - 101   n , proprietary formats may be used. When a GPS fix is made and location information is acquired by the GPS receiver (e.g. sensor  109   a - 109   n ), typically the location is indicated by the GPS receiver using a Geographic Position, Latitude/Longitude (GPGLL) and time message, as shown in Table 2. 
     As seen in Table 2, the information provided by sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  is the proof that is needed for a service provider(s)  111  to evaluate the location of a UE  101   a - 101   n  in conjunction with the travel (position and time) with regards to service environment  121   a - 121   p . It is noted that, the GPS receivers do not support message authentication codes by default, which in theory makes it possible for a user to fake the GPS measurement submitted to the TEE  119   a - 119   n  by sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n . 
     
       
         
           
               
             
               
                 TABLE 2 
               
               
                   
               
             
            
               
                 eg1. $GPGLL,3751.65,S,14507.36,E*77 
               
               
                 eg2. $GPGLL,4916.45,N,12311.12,W,225444,A 
               
            
           
           
               
               
            
               
                   
                 4916.46,N Latitude 49 deg. 16.45 min. North 
               
               
                   
                 12311.12,W Longitude 123 deg. 11.12 min. West 
               
               
                   
                 225444  Fix taken at 22:54:44 UTC 
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
            
               
                   
                 A 
                 Data valid 
               
            
           
           
               
            
               
                 eg3. $GPGLL,5133.81,N,00042.25,W*75 
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
               
               
            
               
                   
                 1 
                 2 
                 3 
                 4 5 
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
            
               
                   
                 1 5133.81 
                 Current latitude 
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
            
               
                   
                 2 N 
                 North/South 
               
            
           
           
               
               
            
               
                   
                 3 00042.25 Current longitude 
               
            
           
           
               
               
               
            
               
                   
                 4 W 
                  East/West 
               
               
                   
                 5 *75 
                  checksum 
               
            
           
           
               
            
               
                 $--GLL,lll.ll,a,yyyyy.yy,a,hhmmss.ss,A llll.ll = Latitude of position 
               
               
                 a = N or S 
               
               
                 yyyyy.yy = Longitude of position 
               
               
                 a = E or W 
               
               
                 hhmmss.ss = UTC of position 
               
               
                 A = status: A = valid data 
               
               
                   
               
            
           
         
       
     
     In one embodiment, where the UE  101   a - 101   n  has an internal GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n , during device boot, at the time the integrity of device  101   a - 101   n  firmware is cryptographically checked, the TEE  119   a - 119   n  may produce a random session key (K), store it in a local memory of UE  101   a - 101   n  (not shown), and also submit it to the GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n  with a new NMEA command (e.g., Geographical Position and Time Protect key), for example,
         “$GPTPK, 19AFF1872B81DA12 . . . 981”
 
Additional key management can be constructed if needed, for example if the GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n  is not activated at boot and the session key needs to be transported to the GPS receiver at a later stage, when the device Operating System and application(s)  107   a - 107   n  have been already running for a while, or if, for example, the GPS receiver is external. Such security overlays do not significantly alter the protocol otherwise.
       

     In one embodiment, the GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n  may store the key K for the duration of the boot cycle. Additionally, the GPS receiver may maintain a message counter of submitted location messages (starting from 0). Furthermore, whenever the GPS receiver sends the GPGLL message, it may add the counter value and a cryptographic checksum of the GPGLL position and time information to the message. The checksum which is a fixed-side data computed for the purpose of detecting errors in data, can, for example, be
         c=HMAC(k, ctr|message data)
 
An example of this augmented message is:
       

     $GPGLL,4916.45,N,12311.12,W,225444,A,AU,4998,9B6249018CC615A71F761527916257188 
     where the two added parameters the counter and the checksum, are calculated over the bytes of the message highlighted in bold. The string AU serves as a marker for the fact that the response is authenticated. 
     In one embodiment, when the GPS receiver message is given to the TEE  119   a - 119   n , the TEE can deduce the authenticity of the location data (since it is constructed with a key shared only between the TEE  119   a - 119   n  and the GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n ). The GPS receiver data need not be universally authenticable (this may be even a privacy risk), however, it provides the assurance that the information is not tampered with inside the UE  101   a - 101   n  as it moves from the GPS receiver  109   a - 109   n  through Operating System drivers into the TEE  119   a - 119   n.    
     In one embodiment, a ticketing application(s)  107   a - 107   n  inside the TEE  119   a - 119   n  can use the location data as a part of an evidence package for an external service provider(s)  111  to prove the physical location of the user. It is noted that the combination of building trustworthy location information inside the device  101   a - 101   n  for remote attestation (proving) is not uniquely limited to ticketing, but can be used for a variety of purposes and protocols. 
     In one embodiment, a partially off-line solution is used that is certificate and signature based and intended for pay-as-you-go travel for a user of UE  101   a - 101   n  with no restriction on monthly or annual usage. In this embodiment, a counter and a signature key are used in the secure environment  117 , as a fundamental security primitive, and every time a signature is requested from the environment by any entity outside the secure environment  117  (e.g., by a UE  101   a - 101   n ) the counter is included in the signature (bound to the signature). Furthermore, the counter is automatically updated at every signature event. 
     In one embodiment, the control and auditing mechanisms by the authentication support platform  103  is enforced locally at the UE  101   a - 101   n  by the operation of the TEE  119   a - 119   n . In this embodiment, a ticketing license is associated with each UE  101   a - 101   n  which may include a maximum number of ticketing taps that a UE  101   a - 101   n  is allowed to perform until a release commitment is given from a service provider(s)  111  to the TEE  119   a - 119   n . This system can force the UE  101   a - 101   n  to report ticketing taps to the service provider(s)  111 , to the authentication support platform  103 , or a combination thereof. 
     In one embodiment, the tapping limit may also include an aspect of user ticketing history. For example, a UE  101   a - 101   n  that has performed successfully in the past may be assigned with a higher tap limit than a new user or a user/device with a record of fraudulent use. 
     In one embodiment, an internal authenticated channel from a local positioning entity may be used in a UE  101   a - 101   n . The positioning entity can be a GPS, a WLAN device with similar features, a server-assisted location system by which the UE  101   a - 101   n  location is determined by a combination of local, network and peer-to-peer context, or a combination thereof. Ii is important to note that in all of these scenarios, the location information of UE  101   a - 101   n  includes authentication information, resolvable by the TEE  119   a - 119   n , to protect against ticketing fraud. The local TEE  119   a - 119   n  operation may also temporarily be unavailable based on context such as time. For example, a UE  101   a - 101   n  may be restricted to no more than one taps in every 5 minutes, or only one tap from the same station  113   a - 113   m , or from within the service environment  121   a - 121   p  (e.g., inside a bus, train, etc.). These restrictions provide prevention measures for local man-in-the middle fraud by co-riders. 
     In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  enforces terminal authentication. For example, identity verification may be performed only among counterpart UEs  101   a - 101   n  that are all part of the same ticketing system provided by the service provider(s)  111 . The authentication support platform  103  can cryptographically verify whether a UE  101   a - 101   n  belong to a system provided by a service provider(s)  111 . 
     In one embodiment, the control and auditing mechanisms via the authentication support platform  103  is performed at the service provider(s)  111 . For example, the service provider(s)  111  may be part of a computation cloud (not shown) and a posteriori auditing in the service provider cloud can uniquely identify misbehaving users or UEs  101   a - 101   n . In this embodiment, the TEEs  119   a - 119   n , any TEEs at the stations  113   a - 113   m  (not shown), TEEs at the service environments  121   a - 121   p  (not shown) use counters for all their cryptographic operations. The counters can be used to construct a strict ordering of events conducted by TEEs  119   a - 119   n , TEEs on stations  113   a - 113   m , TEEs at service environments  121   a - 121   p , or a combination thereof. 
     In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  can use the set of ordered event constructed by counters to construct a mapping of events that occurred during the course of travel by a UE  101   a - 101   n . Since the service provider(s)  111  cloud can log the time the event reports were received, an approximate time interval (e.g. a start and an end) can be attached to each event occurrence. Furthermore, taps at stations  113   a - 113   m  can add location information to each event and ticket inspectors on board the service environments  121   a - 121   p  add additional, accurately timed events, to the mapping. 
     In one embodiment, various information can be deduced from the events mapping constructed by the authentication support platform  103 . For example, the mapping can be used to answer questions such as, is the mapping for each UE  101   a - 101   n  consistent? (do all counter values exist, and are the taps consistent with entry and exit locations?), Are all taps at stations  113   a - 113   m  accounted for (over the set of UEs  101   a - 101   n  who used the station  113   a - 113   m ), Combined with verification, is the counter of the entry tap at station  113   a - 113   m  for a UE  101   a - 101   n  consistent with the time of availability of the service environment  121   a - 121   p  at the station (vehicle arrival at the station)? (If not, the user of UE  101   a - 101   n  may have used a relay tapper as soon as he had seen the inspector.) 
     In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  may have a back channel. For example, a station  113   a - 113   m  may log all taps by UEs  101   a - 101   n  and feed the information about those (already occurred) taps to the authentication support platform  103  together with subsequent taps by other UEs  101   a - 101   n . This is a way to improve information feedback to the authentication support platform  103  in cases where one or more UEs  101   a - 101   n  intentionally, or due to some malfunction, are not able to report back evidence. 
     As shown in  FIG. 1 , the system  100  comprises a set of user equipments (UEs)  101   a - 101   n  having connectivity to an authentication support platform  103  via a communication network  105 . By way of example, the communication network  105  of system  100  includes one or more networks such as a data network, a wireless network, a telephony network, or any combination thereof. It is contemplated that the data network may be any local area network (LAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), wide area network (WAN), a public data network (e.g., the Internet), short range wireless network, or any other suitable packet-switched network, such as a commercially owned, proprietary packet-switched network, e.g., a proprietary cable or fiber-optic network, and the like, or any combination thereof. In addition, the wireless network may be, for example, a cellular network and may employ various technologies including enhanced data rates for global evolution (EDGE), general packet radio service (GPRS), global system for mobile communications (GSM), Internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), etc., as well as any other suitable wireless medium, e.g., worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX), Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, code division multiple access (CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), wireless fidelity (WiFi), wireless LAN (WLAN), Bluetooth®, Internet Protocol (IP) data casting, satellite, mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), and the like, or any combination thereof. 
     The UEs  101   a - 101   n  is any type of mobile terminal, fixed terminal, or portable terminal including a mobile handset, station, unit, device, multimedia computer, multimedia tablet, Internet node, communicator, desktop computer, laptop computer, notebook computer, netbook computer, tablet computer, personal communication system (PCS) device, personal navigation device, personal digital assistants (PDAs), audio/video player, digital camera/camcorder, positioning device, television receiver, radio broadcast receiver, electronic book device, game device, or any combination thereof, including the accessories and peripherals of these devices, or any combination thereof. It is also contemplated that the UEs  101   a - 101   n  can support any type of interface to the user (such as “wearable” circuitry, etc.). 
     By way of example, the UEs  101   a - 101   n , and the authentication support platform  103  communicate with each other and other components of the communication network  105  using well known, new or still developing protocols. In this context, a protocol includes a set of rules defining how the network nodes within the communication network  105  interact with each other based on information sent over the communication links. The protocols are effective at different layers of operation within each node, from generating and receiving physical signals of various types, to selecting a link for transferring those signals, to the format of information indicated by those signals, to identifying which software application executing on a computer system sends or receives the information. The conceptually different layers of protocols for exchanging information over a network are described in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model. 
     Communications between the network nodes are typically effected by exchanging discrete packets of data. Each packet typically comprises (1) header information associated with a particular protocol, and (2) payload information that follows the header information and contains information that may be processed independently of that particular protocol. In some protocols, the packet includes (3) trailer information following the payload and indicating the end of the payload information. The header includes information such as the source of the packet, its destination, the length of the payload, and other properties used by the protocol. Often, the data in the payload for the particular protocol includes a header and payload for a different protocol associated with a different, higher layer of the OSI Reference Model. The header for a particular protocol typically indicates a type for the next protocol contained in its payload. The higher layer protocol is said to be encapsulated in the lower layer protocol. The headers included in a packet traversing multiple heterogeneous networks, such as the Internet, typically include a physical (layer 1) header, a data-link (layer 2) header, an internetwork (layer 3) header and a transport (layer 4) header, and various application (layer 5, layer 6 and layer 7) headers as defined by the OSI Reference Model. 
       FIG. 2  is a diagram of the components of and authentication support platform, according to one embodiment. By way of example, the authentication support platform  103  includes one or more components for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. It is contemplated that the functions of these components may be combined in one or more components or performed by other components of equivalent functionality. In this embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  includes a key generator  201 , an authentication module  203 , a key transport module  205 , a checksum module  207 , an analysis module  209 , an audit module  211  and a storage  213 . 
       FIG. 2  is described with reference to  FIG. 3 , wherein  FIG. 3  is a flowchart of a process for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  performs the process  300  and is implemented in, for instance, a chip set including a processor and a memory as shown in  FIG. 7 . 
     In one embodiment, per step  301  of flow chart  300 , the key generator  201  causes, at least in part, a generation of at least one cryptographic key. The cryptographic key can be used by at least one secure environment  117  and any entities included in the secure environment  117  such as, for example, TEE  119   a - 119   n , station  113   a - 113   m , sensor(s)  115   a - 115   m , sensor(s)  123   a - 123   p  etc. Additionally, the cryptographic key can be also used by one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  that are associated with at least one UE  101   a - 101   n  and are external to the at least one secure environment  117 . The generated cryptographic key may be stored in storage  213 . 
     In one embodiment, the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  may consist, at least in part, one or more location sensors including one or more satellite location receiver; and the at least one cryptographic key may be transported to the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  via one or more commands of a sensor communication protocol such as, for example, National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 0183 protocol. 
     In one embodiment, per step  303  of flow chart  300 , the authentication module  203  causes, at least in part, an authentication of sensor information from sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  transmitted by the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  to the at least one secure environment  117  based, at least in part, on the cryptographic key. 
     In one embodiment, per step  305  of flowchart  300 , the key transport module  205  determines an initiation of a boot cycle of the at least one UE  101   a - 101   n , wherein the at least one cryptographic key is valid for a duration of the boot cycle. 
     In one embodiment, per step  307  of flowchart  300 , the key transport module  205  determines whether the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  are in an active state at the initiation of the boot cycle. If the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  are in the active state, per step  309  the key transport module  205  causes, at least in part, a transport of the at least one cryptographic key to the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  at the initiation of the boot cycle. Otherwise, if the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  are not in the active state, per step  311 , the key transport module  205  causes, at least in part, a transport of the at least one cryptographic key to the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  when the one or more sensors enter the active state if the one or more sensors are not in the active state. The key transport module  205  may cause the transport of the cryptographic key to the sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  directly by the authentication support platform  103 , via the communication network  105 , via other components of the secure environment  117  such as the service environment  121   a - 121   p  and stations  113   a - 113   m , or a combination thereof. 
     In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  receives one or more messages, wherein the one or more messages include sensor information associated with sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  and have been transmitted from the sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  to the at least one secure environment  117 . In this embodiment, per step  313  of flowchart  300 , the checksum module  207  causes, at least in part, a determination of a message counter information based, at least in part, on a number of the one or more messages generated by the one or more sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n , wherein the message counter information is included, at least in part, in the one or more messages. The counter information may be recorded locally at a local memory of the UE  101   a - 101   n  and included in the message before the message is sent to the secure environment  117 . Subsequently, the authentication support platform  103  and the service provider(s)  111  may process the sensor information for transport ticketing. 
     In one embodiment, per step  315  of flowchart  300 , the checksum counter  207  causes, at least in part, a generation, a verification, or a combination thereof of a cryptographic checksum based, at least in part, on the message counter information, contextual information associated with determination of the sensor information, or a combination thereof. The cryptographic checksum can be generated based on various available data such as, for example, received sensor information form sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n , history of sensor information from UE  101   a - 101   n , types and levels of services provided to UE  101   a - 101   n  by the service provider(s)  111 , tapping data (events) associated with UEs  101   a - 101   n  collected at the stations  113   a - 113   m  (sensor(s)  115   a - 115   m ) or at service environments  121   a - 121   p  (sensor(s)  123   a - 123   p ), or a combination thereof. 
     In one embodiment, per step  317  of flowchart  300 , the analysis module  209  determines an order of one or more events, as stated, based, at least in part, on time stamp information associated with the one or more messages from the sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n . The order shows the sequence of the events and reveals fraudulent activities that may be out of sequence. For example, if the time UE  101   a - 101   n  was tapped at station  113   a - 113   m  occurs after a vehicle  121   a - 121   n  left the station, and the GPS information of UE  101   a - 101   n  indicates that the UE is aboard the vehicle, the analysis module  209  can conclude from the sequence of these events that an error may have occurred with regards to the UE  101   a - 101   n.    
     In one embodiment, per step  319  of flowchart  300 , the authentication module  203  causes, at least in part, an authentication of one or more activities associated with the transport ticketing based, at least in part, on the order of one or more events and the analysis by the analysis module  209 . The authentication may include further analysis for determining the source of the discrepancy in the event order. 
     In one embodiment, per step  321  of flowchart  300 , the analysis module  209  processes and/or facilitates a processing of the sensor information from sensor(s)  109   a - 109   n  to determine one or more activity patterns associated with the at least one UE  101   a - 101   n . The activity pattern can be stored in storage  213  as part of the history of the activities of UE  101   a - 101   n . The history can be used by the authentication support platform  103  for determining privileges of UE  101   a - 101   n  when providing services to UE  101   a - 101   n  (e.g., allowed number of tapping). 
     In one embodiment, per step  323  of flowchart  300 , the audit module  211  causes, at least in part, an auditing of one or more activities associated with the UE  101   a - 101   n  based, at least in part, on a comparison of the one or more activity patterns determined by the analysis module  209  against one or more activity models. The activity models may be predetermined models developed by service provider(s)  111  and stored in storage  213 , at service provider(s)  111 , or a combination thereof. 
     In one embodiment, the one or more activity patterns, the one or more activities, the one or more activity models, or a combination thereof relate, at least in part, to transport ticketing using one or more proximity means including, at least in part, near field communications, short range wireless, or a combination thereof. 
       FIG. 4  is a diagram of secure booting of a device, according to one embodiment.  FIG. 4  shows a communication between a GPS  401  associated with a UE  101   a - 101   n , the GPS can be a combination of hardware and firmware, an operation system (OS) 403 of UE  101   a - 101   n  with a secure boot capability, and a TEE  119   a  of a UE  101   a  (not shown). 
     In one embodiment, arrow  405  represents a boot process, at the start of which, the OS  403  request a key from TEE  119   a  (shown by arrow  407 ). Upon receiving the key request  407 , the TEE  119   a  executes a ticketing algorithm  409  that leads to the generation of a session key by the authentication support platform  103  as described with regards to  FIGS. 2 and 3 . 
     In one embodiment, the authentication support platform  103  sends the generated session key to TEE  119   a . The session key is then transmitted from TEE  119   a  to the OS  403  and the GPS  401  as shown by arrows  411  and  413 . 
     In one embodiment, the booting process of UE  101   a - 101   n  is completed at the point shown by the dotted line  415 . At this point the UE  101   a - 101   n  has booted into its normal run state. However, from this point on there is a possibility that the OS  403  is attacked by viruses or due to user actions. For example, the user may attack the OS  403  to change position data, to circumvent the payment models for the ticketing (e.g. pretend to take trips shorter than the actual trips). 
     In one embodiment, the position data provided by the GPS  401  accompanied by the session key is sent from the GPS  401  to the OS  403  (arrow  421 ). The OS  403  then sends the position data and the session key to the TEE  119   a  (arrow  423 ). In this embodiment, the TEE  119   a  is equipped with the ticketing logic  417  which enables the TEE  119   a  to validate the position data based on the session key, under the supervision of the authentication support platform  103 . At this point, if a user or OS  403  changes the position data received from the GPS  401 , at the gap between arrows  421  and  423 , the validation process by the TEE  119   a  will fail. 
     In one embodiment, the validation process may be performed by the authentication support platform  103  and the TEE  119   a  may function as a secure interface between the UE  101   a - 101   n  and the authentication support platform  103 . 
     In one embodiment, if the position data validation by the TEE  119   a  is performed successfully, the position data is transmitted from the TEE  119   a  via Near Field Communication (NFC) tags associated to the UE  101   a - 101   n  to the station  113   a - 113   m , to the service environment  121   a - 121   p , or a combination thereof. In other embodiments, the position data may be directly transferred from the TEE  119   a  to the authentication support platform  103 , to the service provider(s)  111 , or a combination thereof, via the communication network  105 . The data transfer is shown by arrow  419 . 
       FIG. 5  is a general diagram of a ticket scheme, according to one embodiment. In one embodiment, the transport authority system (the service provider(s)  111 ) operates the vehicles (service environments)  121   a  and  121   b  and also provides an integrated network for its non-gated ticket readers  501   a  and  501   b  onboard the vehicles  121   a  and  121   b . The gated NFC readers  113   a ,  113   b , and  113   c  are assumed to be connected to a backend system of transport authority  111  and the authentication support platform  103 . Therefore, the readers  113   a - 113   c  can receive information such as certificate revocation lists (CRLs) which they refer to during user verification. 
     In one embodiment, all the information exchanged during such verification is collected as transaction evidence and forwarded to a backend processing unit, such as a an accounting system  507 , a fare calculation engine  511 , or a combination thereof. The fare calculation engine  511  may be a database maintained by the transport authority  111 . 
     In one embodiment, the transport authority  111  is responsible for distributing and maintaining the terminals  501   a  and  501   b  (e.g., smart cards) for non-gated travel. These smart cards are physically and firmly attached to their location and are tamper-resistant. 
     In one embodiment, the accounting authority  507  is responsible for fare collection from the users of UEs  101   a - 101   d . A transport authority  111  can simultaneously be connected to several accounting authorities  507 . Additionally, all users may have a relationship with at least one accounting authority  507 , in the form of a prepaid or credit-based user account  509 . In one embodiment, users account status can be used for determining user history that can affect the services provided to the user. 
     In one embodiment, the accounting authority  507  is also responsible for generating ticketing credentials and provisioning secrets to the TEE  119   a - 119   d  (not shown) in UEs  101   a - 101   d . Furthermore, the accounting authority  507  may be responsible for the cryptographic validation of transport evidence and user back-listing (e.g. for users with poor history). 
     The processes described herein for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments may be advantageously implemented via software, hardware, firmware or a combination of software and/or firmware and/or hardware. For example, the processes described herein, may be advantageously implemented via processor(s), Digital Signal Processing (DSP) chip, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), etc. Such exemplary hardware for performing the described functions is detailed below. 
       FIG. 6  illustrates a computer system  600  upon which an embodiment of the invention may be implemented. Although computer system  600  is depicted with respect to a particular device or equipment, it is contemplated that other devices or equipment (e.g., network elements, servers, etc.) within  FIG. 6  can deploy the illustrated hardware and components of system  600 . Computer system  600  is programmed (e.g., via computer program code or instructions) to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments as described herein and includes a communication mechanism such as a bus  610  for passing information between other internal and external components of the computer system  600 . Information (also called data) is represented as a physical expression of a measurable phenomenon, typically electric voltages, but including, in other embodiments, such phenomena as magnetic, electromagnetic, pressure, chemical, biological, molecular, atomic, sub-atomic and quantum interactions. For example, north and south magnetic fields, or a zero and non-zero electric voltage, represent two states (0, 1) of a binary digit (bit). Other phenomena can represent digits of a higher base. A superposition of multiple simultaneous quantum states before measurement represents a quantum bit (qubit). A sequence of one or more digits constitutes digital data that is used to represent a number or code for a character. In some embodiments, information called analog data is represented by a near continuum of measurable values within a particular range. Computer system  600 , or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. 
     A bus  610  includes one or more parallel conductors of information so that information is transferred quickly among devices coupled to the bus  610 . One or more processors  602  for processing information are coupled with the bus  610 . 
     A processor (or multiple processors)  602  performs a set of operations on information as specified by computer program code related to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. The computer program code is a set of instructions or statements providing instructions for the operation of the processor and/or the computer system to perform specified functions. The code, for example, may be written in a computer programming language that is compiled into a native instruction set of the processor. The code may also be written directly using the native instruction set (e.g., machine language). The set of operations include bringing information in from the bus  610  and placing information on the bus  610 . The set of operations also typically include comparing two or more units of information, shifting positions of units of information, and combining two or more units of information, such as by addition or multiplication or logical operations like OR, exclusive OR (XOR), and AND. Each operation of the set of operations that can be performed by the processor is represented to the processor by information called instructions, such as an operation code of one or more digits. A sequence of operations to be executed by the processor  602 , such as a sequence of operation codes, constitute processor instructions, also called computer system instructions or, simply, computer instructions. Processors may be implemented as mechanical, electrical, magnetic, optical, chemical or quantum components, among others, alone or in combination. 
     Computer system  600  also includes a memory  604  coupled to bus  610 . The memory  604 , such as a random access memory (RAM) or any other dynamic storage device, stores information including processor instructions for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. Dynamic memory allows information stored therein to be changed by the computer system  600 . RAM allows a unit of information stored at a location called a memory address to be stored and retrieved independently of information at neighboring addresses. The memory  604  is also used by the processor  602  to store temporary values during execution of processor instructions. The computer system  600  also includes a read only memory (ROM)  606  or any other static storage device coupled to the bus  610  for storing static information, including instructions, that is not changed by the computer system  600 . Some memory is composed of volatile storage that loses the information stored thereon when power is lost. Also coupled to bus  610  is a non-volatile (persistent) storage device  608 , such as a magnetic disk, optical disk or flash card, for storing information, including instructions, that persists even when the computer system  600  is turned off or otherwise loses power. 
     Information, including instructions for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, is provided to the bus  610  for use by the processor from an external input device  612 , such as a keyboard containing alphanumeric keys operated by a human user, a microphone, an Infrared (IR) remote control, a joystick, a game pad, a stylus pen, a touch screen, or a sensor. A sensor detects conditions in its vicinity and transforms those detections into physical expression compatible with the measurable phenomenon used to represent information in computer system  600 . Other external devices coupled to bus  610 , used primarily for interacting with humans, include a display device  614 , such as a cathode ray tube (CRT), a liquid crystal display (LCD), a light emitting diode (LED) display, an organic LED (OLED) display, a plasma screen, or a printer for presenting text or images, and a pointing device  616 , such as a mouse, a trackball, cursor direction keys, or a motion sensor, for controlling a position of a small cursor image presented on the display  614  and issuing commands associated with graphical elements presented on the display  614 . In some embodiments, for example, in embodiments in which the computer system  600  performs all functions automatically without human input, one or more of external input device  612 , display device  614  and pointing device  616  is omitted. 
     In the illustrated embodiment, special purpose hardware, such as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)  620 , is coupled to bus  610 . The special purpose hardware is configured to perform operations not performed by processor  602  quickly enough for special purposes. Examples of ASICs include graphics accelerator cards for generating images for display  614 , cryptographic boards for encrypting and decrypting messages sent over a network, speech recognition, and interfaces to special external devices, such as robotic arms and medical scanning equipment that repeatedly perform some complex sequence of operations that are more efficiently implemented in hardware. 
     Computer system  600  also includes one or more instances of a communications interface  670  coupled to bus  610 . Communication interface  670  provides a one-way or two-way communication coupling to a variety of external devices that operate with their own processors, such as printers, scanners and external disks. In general the coupling is with a network link  678  that is connected to a local network  680  to which a variety of external devices with their own processors are connected. For example, communication interface  670  may be a parallel port or a serial port or a universal serial bus (USB) port on a personal computer. In some embodiments, communications interface  670  is an integrated services digital network (ISDN) card or a digital subscriber line (DSL) card or a telephone modem that provides an information communication connection to a corresponding type of telephone line. In some embodiments, a communication interface  670  is a cable modem that converts signals on bus  610  into signals for a communication connection over a coaxial cable or into optical signals for a communication connection over a fiber optic cable. As another example, communications interface  670  may be a local area network (LAN) card to provide a data communication connection to a compatible LAN, such as Ethernet. Wireless links may also be implemented. For wireless links, the communications interface  670  sends or receives or both sends and receives electrical, acoustic or electromagnetic signals, including infrared and optical signals, that carry information streams, such as digital data. For example, in wireless handheld devices, such as mobile telephones like cell phones, the communications interface  670  includes a radio band electromagnetic transmitter and receiver called a radio transceiver. In certain embodiments, the communications interface  670  enables connection to the communication network  105  for providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments, to the UEs  101   a - 101   n.    
     The term “computer-readable medium” as used herein refers to any medium that participates in providing information to processor  602 , including instructions for execution. Such a medium may take many forms, including, but not limited to computer-readable storage medium (e.g., non-volatile media, volatile media), and transmission media. Non-transitory media, such as non-volatile media, include, for example, optical or magnetic disks, such as storage device  608 . Volatile media include, for example, dynamic memory  604 . Transmission media include, for example, twisted pair cables, coaxial cables, copper wire, fiber optic cables, and carrier waves that travel through space without wires or cables, such as acoustic waves and electromagnetic waves, including radio, optical and infrared waves. Signals include man-made transient variations in amplitude, frequency, phase, polarization or other physical properties transmitted through the transmission media. Common forms of computer-readable media include, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magnetic medium, a CD-ROM, CDRW, DVD, any other optical medium, punch cards, paper tape, optical mark sheets, any other physical medium with patterns of holes or other optically recognizable indicia, a RAM, a PROM, an EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM, an EEPROM, a flash memory, any other memory chip or cartridge, a carrier wave, or any other medium from which a computer can read. The term computer-readable storage medium is used herein to refer to any computer-readable medium except transmission media. 
     Logic encoded in one or more tangible media includes one or both of processor instructions on a computer-readable storage media and special purpose hardware, such as ASIC  620 . 
     Network link  678  typically provides information communication using transmission media through one or more networks to other devices that use or process the information. For example, network link  678  may provide a connection through local network  680  to a host computer  682  or to equipment  684  operated by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). ISP equipment  684  in turn provides data communication services through the public, world-wide packet-switching communication network of networks now commonly referred to as the Internet  690 . 
     A computer called a server host  692  connected to the Internet hosts a process that provides a service in response to information received over the Internet. For example, server host  692  hosts a process that provides information representing video data for presentation at display  614 . It is contemplated that the components of system  600  can be deployed in various configurations within other computer systems, e.g., host  682  and server  692 . 
     At least some embodiments of the invention are related to the use of computer system  600  for implementing some or all of the techniques described herein. According to one embodiment of the invention, those techniques are performed by computer system  600  in response to processor  602  executing one or more sequences of one or more processor instructions contained in memory  604 . Such instructions, also called computer instructions, software and program code, may be read into memory  604  from another computer-readable medium such as storage device  608  or network link  678 . Execution of the sequences of instructions contained in memory  604  causes processor  602  to perform one or more of the method steps described herein. In alternative embodiments, hardware, such as ASIC  620 , may be used in place of or in combination with software to implement the invention. Thus, embodiments of the invention are not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software, unless otherwise explicitly stated herein. 
     The signals transmitted over network link  678  and other networks through communications interface  670 , carry information to and from computer system  600 . Computer system  600  can send and receive information, including program code, through the networks  680 ,  690  among others, through network link  678  and communications interface  670 . In an example using the Internet  690 , a server host  692  transmits program code for a particular application, requested by a message sent from computer  600 , through Internet  690 , ISP equipment  684 , local network  680  and communications interface  670 . The received code may be executed by processor  602  as it is received, or may be stored in memory  604  or in storage device  608  or any other non-volatile storage for later execution, or both. In this manner, computer system  600  may obtain application program code in the form of signals on a carrier wave. 
     Various forms of computer readable media may be involved in carrying one or more sequence of instructions or data or both to processor  602  for execution. For example, instructions and data may initially be carried on a magnetic disk of a remote computer such as host  682 . The remote computer loads the instructions and data into its dynamic memory and sends the instructions and data over a telephone line using a modem. A modem local to the computer system  600  receives the instructions and data on a telephone line and uses an infra-red transmitter to convert the instructions and data to a signal on an infra-red carrier wave serving as the network link  678 . An infrared detector serving as communications interface  670  receives the instructions and data carried in the infrared signal and places information representing the instructions and data onto bus  610 . Bus  610  carries the information to memory  604  from which processor  602  retrieves and executes the instructions using some of the data sent with the instructions. The instructions and data received in memory  604  may optionally be stored on storage device  608 , either before or after execution by the processor  602 . 
       FIG. 7  illustrates a chip set or chip  700  upon which an embodiment of the invention may be implemented. Chip set  700  is programmed to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments as described herein and includes, for instance, the processor and memory components described with respect to  FIG. 6  incorporated in one or more physical packages (e.g., chips). By way of example, a physical package includes an arrangement of one or more materials, components, and/or wires on a structural assembly (e.g., a baseboard) to provide one or more characteristics such as physical strength, conservation of size, and/or limitation of electrical interaction. It is contemplated that in certain embodiments the chip set  700  can be implemented in a single chip. It is further contemplated that in certain embodiments the chip set or chip  700  can be implemented as a single “system on a chip.” It is further contemplated that in certain embodiments a separate ASIC would not be used, for example, and that all relevant functions as disclosed herein would be performed by a processor or processors. Chip set or chip  700 , or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of providing user interface navigation information associated with the availability of functions. Chip set or chip  700 , or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. 
     In one embodiment, the chip set or chip  700  includes a communication mechanism such as a bus  701  for passing information among the components of the chip set  700 . A processor  703  has connectivity to the bus  701  to execute instructions and process information stored in, for example, a memory  705 . The processor  703  may include one or more processing cores with each core configured to perform independently. A multi-core processor enables multiprocessing within a single physical package. Examples of a multi-core processor include two, four, eight, or greater numbers of processing cores. Alternatively or in addition, the processor  703  may include one or more microprocessors configured in tandem via the bus  701  to enable independent execution of instructions, pipelining, and multithreading. The processor  703  may also be accompanied with one or more specialized components to perform certain processing functions and tasks such as one or more digital signal processors (DSP)  707 , or one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)  709 . A DSP  707  typically is configured to process real-world signals (e.g., sound) in real-time independently of the processor  703 . Similarly, an ASIC  709  can be configured to performed specialized functions not easily performed by a more general purpose processor. Other specialized components to aid in performing the inventive functions described herein may include one or more field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), one or more controllers, or one or more other special-purpose computer chips. 
     In one embodiment, the chip set or chip  700  includes merely one or more processors and some software and/or firmware supporting and/or relating to and/or for the one or more processors. 
     The processor  703  and accompanying components have connectivity to the memory  705  via the bus  701 . The memory  705  includes both dynamic memory (e.g., RAM, magnetic disk, writable optical disk, etc.) and static memory (e.g., ROM, CD-ROM, etc.) for storing executable instructions that when executed perform the inventive steps described herein to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. The memory  705  also stores the data associated with or generated by the execution of the inventive steps. 
       FIG. 8  is a diagram of exemplary components of a mobile terminal (e.g., handset) for communications, which is capable of operating in the system of  FIG. 1 , according to one embodiment. In some embodiments, mobile terminal  801 , or a portion thereof, constitutes a means for performing one or more steps of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. Generally, a radio receiver is often defined in terms of front-end and backend characteristics. The front-end of the receiver encompasses all of the Radio Frequency (RF) circuitry whereas the backend encompasses all of the base-band processing circuitry. As used in this application, the term “circuitry” refers to both: (1) hardware-only implementations (such as implementations in only analog and/or digital circuitry), and (2) to combinations of circuitry and software (and/or firmware) (such as, if applicable to the particular context, to a combination of processor(s), including digital signal processor(s), software, and memory(ies) that work together to cause an apparatus, such as a mobile phone or server, to perform various functions). This definition of “circuitry” applies to all uses of this term in this application, including in any claims. As a further example, as used in this application and if applicable to the particular context, the term “circuitry” would also cover an implementation of merely a processor (or multiple processors) and its (or their) accompanying software/or firmware. The term “circuitry” would also cover if applicable to the particular context, for example, a baseband integrated circuit or applications processor integrated circuit in a mobile phone or a similar integrated circuit in a cellular network device or other network devices. 
     Pertinent internal components of the telephone include a Main Control Unit (MCU)  803 , a Digital Signal Processor (DSP)  805 , and a receiver/transmitter unit including a microphone gain control unit and a speaker gain control unit. A main display unit  807  provides a display to the user in support of various applications and mobile terminal functions that perform or support the steps of providing information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. The display  807  includes display circuitry configured to display at least a portion of a user interface of the mobile terminal (e.g., mobile telephone). Additionally, the display  807  and display circuitry are configured to facilitate user control of at least some functions of the mobile terminal. An audio function circuitry  809  includes a microphone  811  and microphone amplifier that amplifies the speech signal output from the microphone  811 . The amplified speech signal output from the microphone  811  is fed to a coder/decoder (CODEC)  813 . 
     A radio section  815  amplifies power and converts frequency in order to communicate with a base station, which is included in a mobile communication system, via antenna  817 . The power amplifier (PA)  819  and the transmitter/modulation circuitry are operationally responsive to the MCU  803 , with an output from the PA  819  coupled to the duplexer  821  or circulator or antenna switch, as known in the art. The PA  819  also couples to a battery interface and power control unit  820 . 
     In use, a user of mobile terminal  801  speaks into the microphone  811  and his or her voice along with any detected background noise is converted into an analog voltage. The analog voltage is then converted into a digital signal through the Analog to Digital Converter (ADC)  823 . The control unit  803  routes the digital signal into the DSP  805  for processing therein, such as speech encoding, channel encoding, encrypting, and interleaving. In one embodiment, the processed voice signals are encoded, by units not separately shown, using a cellular transmission protocol such as enhanced data rates for global evolution (EDGE), general packet radio service (GPRS), global system for mobile communications (GSM), Internet protocol multimedia subsystem (IMS), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), etc., as well as any other suitable wireless medium, e.g., microwave access (WiMAX), Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, code division multiple access (CDMA), wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), wireless fidelity (WiFi), satellite, and the like, or any combination thereof. 
     The encoded signals are then routed to an equalizer  825  for compensation of any frequency-dependent impairments that occur during transmission though the air such as phase and amplitude distortion. After equalizing the bit stream, the modulator  827  combines the signal with a RF signal generated in the RF interface  829 . The modulator  827  generates a sine wave by way of frequency or phase modulation. In order to prepare the signal for transmission, an up-converter  831  combines the sine wave output from the modulator  827  with another sine wave generated by a synthesizer  833  to achieve the desired frequency of transmission. The signal is then sent through a PA  819  to increase the signal to an appropriate power level. In practical systems, the PA  819  acts as a variable gain amplifier whose gain is controlled by the DSP  805  from information received from a network base station. The signal is then filtered within the duplexer  821  and optionally sent to an antenna coupler  835  to match impedances to provide maximum power transfer. Finally, the signal is transmitted via antenna  817  to a local base station. An automatic gain control (AGC) can be supplied to control the gain of the final stages of the receiver. The signals may be forwarded from there to a remote telephone which may be another cellular telephone, any other mobile phone or a land-line connected to a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), or other telephony networks. 
     Voice signals transmitted to the mobile terminal  801  are received via antenna  817  and immediately amplified by a low noise amplifier (LNA)  837 . A down-converter  839  lowers the carrier frequency while the demodulator  841  strips away the RF leaving only a digital bit stream. The signal then goes through the equalizer  825  and is processed by the DSP  805 . A Digital to Analog Converter (DAC)  843  converts the signal and the resulting output is transmitted to the user through the speaker  845 , all under control of a Main Control Unit (MCU)  803  which can be implemented as a Central Processing Unit (CPU). 
     The MCU  803  receives various signals including input signals from the keyboard  847 . The keyboard  847  and/or the MCU  803  in combination with other user input components (e.g., the microphone  811 ) comprise a user interface circuitry for managing user input. The MCU  803  runs a user interface software to facilitate user control of at least some functions of the mobile terminal  801  to provide information authentication from external sensors to secure environments. The MCU  803  also delivers a display command and a switch command to the display  807  and to the speech output switching controller, respectively. Further, the MCU  803  exchanges information with the DSP  805  and can access an optionally incorporated SIM card  849  and a memory  851 . In addition, the MCU  803  executes various control functions required of the terminal. The DSP  805  may, depending upon the implementation, perform any of a variety of conventional digital processing functions on the voice signals. Additionally, DSP  805  determines the background noise level of the local environment from the signals detected by microphone  811  and sets the gain of microphone  811  to a level selected to compensate for the natural tendency of the user of the mobile terminal  801 . 
     The CODEC  813  includes the ADC  823  and DAC  843 . The memory  851  stores various data including call incoming tone data and is capable of storing other data including music data received via, e.g., the global Internet. The software module could reside in RAM memory, flash memory, registers, or any other form of writable storage medium known in the art. The memory device  851  may be, but not limited to, a single memory, CD, DVD, ROM, RAM, EEPROM, optical storage, magnetic disk storage, flash memory storage, or any other non-volatile storage medium capable of storing digital data. 
     An optionally incorporated SIM card  849  carries, for instance, important information, such as the cellular phone number, the carrier supplying service, subscription details, and security information. The SIM card  849  serves primarily to identify the mobile terminal  801  on a radio network. The card  849  also contains a memory for storing a personal telephone number registry, text messages, and user specific mobile terminal settings. 
     While the invention has been described in connection with a number of embodiments and implementations, the invention is not so limited but covers various obvious modifications and equivalent arrangements, which fall within the purview of the appended claims. Although features of the invention are expressed in certain combinations among the claims, it is contemplated that these features can be arranged in any combination and order.