Patent Publication Number: US-7721340-B2

Title: Registry protection

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
   This application is a continuation of application Ser. No. 11/061,791, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/061,280, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/062,238, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/062,237, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/061,484, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/061,790, filed Feb. 17, 2005; application Ser. No. 11/061,792, filed Feb. 17, 2005; and application Ser. No. 11/061,411, filed Feb. 17, 2005, and further claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/578,937, filed Jun. 12, 2004, all of which are incorporated herein by reference. 

   FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
   The present invention relates generally to security, and more particularly, to inhibiting software tampering by preventing modification by unauthorized individuals or unauthorized pieces of software. 
   BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
   Software makes computing machines powerful. Such machines can correct the irregular rhythm of a person&#39;s defective heart or let people reach for the constellations of the heavens. Yet, software is vulnerable to something as simple as accidental mischief or intentional harm. Accidental mischief may innocently come from a child who somehow gains access to his parents&#39; personal computer, causing physical loss of data or changing settings that are detrimental to the use of the computing machine, among other examples. Intentional harm is typically instigated by a “hacker,” which is a dysphemism for a person who uses computing expertise for illicit ends, such as by causing malicious software to execute on computing machines or directly gaining access to computing machines without permission and tampering with programs and data. 
   Operating systems are software that controls the allocation and usage of computing machine resources such as memory, central processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices. The operating system is the foundation software on which applications depend. Popular operating systems include Windows 98, Windows NT, Windows XP, Mac OS, UNIX, and Linux. Operating systems are sometimes packaged in a way that is appropriate for a particular market. For example, a powerful operating system used for the small niche server market can be retrofitted by the software manufacturer in various ways that are appropriate for novice users in the large general consumer market. One problem is that novice users may inadvertently modify the retrofitted operating system, thereby crippling it. The most pernicious problem of all, however, is that hackers can reverse engineer the retrofitted operating system so as to transform it for use for other illicit purposes to the detriment of the software manufacturer.  FIG. 1  illustrates this problem and other problems in greater detail. 
   A software image  108  represents a duplicate or copy of an operating system containing instructions that make computer hardware work. A hacker or his malicious software  102  can modify the software image  108  or cause it to be easily replaced because the software image  108  is typically a file stored somewhere in the computer hardware. The next time users  110  invoke the software image to run system software, such as the operating system, the modified or supplanted software image is run instead of the original provided by the software manufacturer. 
   The tampering of the software image  108  is typically carried out by hackers or pieces of malicious software  102 , but rarely by users  110 . However, a registry  106  can be unintentionally tampered with by the users  110 , as well as by hackers or pieces of malicious software  102 . The registry  106  is a piece of system software used to store information that can be employed to configure the system for one or more users, applications, and hardware devices. For example, the registry could be used to enable three dimensional rendering and hardware acceleration support for consumer computing machines while disabling those same features for server computing machines. 
   These pieces of information can be changed when users  110  act with administrative permission, or by hackers or pieces of malicious software  102  that improperly obtain permission to modify the registry. Hackers and pieces of malicious software  102  can attempt to manipulate the registry  106  to overcome licensing restrictions so as to change information in the registry, registry settings, and unlock additional features that were not meant for a particular audience or marketing channel. One issue is that modification of the registry may cause the computing machine to stop working or to exhibit unpredictable behaviors. 
   Another problem involves tampering with executing software  104 . Hackers, or pieces of malicious software  102 , can improperly jettison properly executing software  104  and supplant it with unauthorized or prohibited software services. Moreover, hackers or pieces of malicious software  102  can emulate software responses or software calls and tamper with the running of the executing software  104 . 
   Given the problems of software tampering, both by accidental mischief or intentional harm, it will come as no surprise that unscrupulous hackers and their malicious software can cause software to be vulnerable. Without a resolution to the problem of software tampering, users may eventually no longer trust computer manufacturers to provide a secure computing experience while preventing access by unauthorized individuals. Thus, there is a need for a system, method, and computer-readable medium for securing software while avoiding or reducing the above problems associated with existing systems. 
   SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
   In accordance with this invention, a system, method, and computer-readable medium for inhibiting software tampering is provided. The method form of the invention includes a method for inhibiting software tampering. The method comprises upon start-up of a computing machine, invoking by a log-on module a protection function of an obfuscated dynamic link library to create a first thread that protects keys and values of a central hierarchical database associated with the system. The method further comprises upon log-on to the computing machine by a user, invoking by the log-on module the protection function of the obfuscated dynamic link library to create a second thread that protects keys and values of the central hierarchical database associated with the user. 
   In accordance with further aspects of this invention, a computer-readable medium form of the invention includes a computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions thereon for implementing a method for inhibiting software tampering. The method comprises upon start-up of a computing machine, invoking by a log-on module a protection function of an obfuscated dynamic link library to create a first thread that protects keys and values of a central hierarchical database associated with the system. The method further comprises upon log-on to the computing machine by a user, invoking by the log-on module the protection function of the obfuscated dynamic link library to create a second thread that protects keys and values of the central hierarchical database associated with the user. 

   
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
     The foregoing aspects and many of the attendant advantages of this invention will become more readily appreciated as the same become better understood by reference to the following detailed description, when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein: 
       FIG. 1  is a block diagram illustrating a conventional system showing problems of software tampering in computing machines by unauthorized individuals. 
       FIG. 2  is a block diagram illustrating exemplary software components for setting up pieces of software to inhibit tampering. 
       FIG. 3A  is a block diagram illustrating exemplary software components that interoperate to inhibit software tampering. 
       FIG. 3B  is a block diagram illustrating exemplary profiles stored either in a registry or a dynamic-link library and the extraction of profiles by the safe interoperation of pieces of software, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. 
       FIGS. 4A-4Z  are process diagrams illustrating a method for inhibiting software tampering, according to one embodiment of the present invention. 
   

   DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT 
   It is a dichotomy of software that it is powerful but vulnerable. Various embodiments of the present invention inhibit tampering with pieces of software. One embodiment is the obfuscation of a software image so as to becloud the comprehension of hackers in reverse engineering pieces of software comprising the software image. Another embodiment is verifying whether the pieces of software together constitute a software package that requires protection from tampering. As yet another embodiment is determining whether the hardware resources, such as the central processing unit or the cache memory on a computing machine, belong to a class for which inhibiting software tampering is possible. A further embodiment includes checking whether certain critical files on the computing machine have been tampered with. An additional embodiment includes determining whether the registry has been tampered with. Some other embodiments include determining whether software services that are executing have been tampered with. 
     FIG. 2  illustrates a software component  200 , which includes a product identifier (PID) dynamic-link library  200 A, setup software  200 B, and setup information file  200 C. The setup software component  200  is responsible for determining whether a piece of software for inhibiting tampering can be installed on a computer system. The piece of software includes any suitable pieces of software, such as system software (an operating system), application software, and network software. The product identifier dynamic-link library  200 A belongs to a class of executable routines stored separately from files. These routines have particular extensions, such as “DLL,” and are loaded only when needed by a program. These dynamic-link libraries can suitably be found as a feature of the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems and OS/2. A dynamic-link library has several characteristics: first, it typically does not consume any memory until it is used; second, because a dynamic-link library is a separate file, a programmer can make corrections or improvements to only that module without affecting the operating of the calling program, or any other dynamic-link library; and finally, a programmer can use the same dynamic-link library with other programs. 
   The setup information file  200 C belongs to a class of files that is textually based and contains information used by a setup application, such as the setup software  200 B, during an installation. Typically, the setup information file  200 C, among other setup information files (such as a protection information file  202 A), is created before the authoring of a setup application, such as the setup software  200 B. Examples of information that may be stored in an information file includes registry changes, file names, and locations of the source files on source media. The setup information file  200 C, as well as the protection information file  202 A, can also contain private sections. These private sections depend on the setup software  200 B and can be used to store specialized information used by a specific setup application, such as the setup software  200 B, for installing pieces of software that inhibit software tampering. 
   The setup software  200 B is a program whose function is to install another program, such as system software, application software, or network software, either on a storage medium or in memory. The setup software  200 B might be used to guide a user through the often complex process of setting up an application for a particular combination of machine, printer, monitor, and network. The product identifier dynamic-link library  200 A creates a unique product identifier and stores the created product identifier  204 A in a registry  204 , which is discussed hereinbelow. The setup information file  200 C prepares an installation dynamic-link library  202 B for the installation of a piece of software that inhibits software tampering. An installation component  202  comprises a protection information file  202 A and the installation dynamic-link library  202 B. The protection information file  202 A contains various pieces of information, such as registry changes, file names, and locations of the source files for the installation of pieces of software that inhibit software tampering. Additionally, the protection information file  202 A includes information for the installation of a system file  206 B and various software components that are particular to a marketed software package. 
   Contained within a software component  202 , the installation dynamic-link library  202 B installs the actual piece of software that inhibits software tampering, such as the protection dynamic-link library  206 A, that is specific to a particular market segment and may provide content or language appropriate for that particular market segment. The installation dynamic-link library  202 B also sets an activation key  204 C so as to allow the piece of software that inhibits tampering as embodied in the protection dynamic-link library  206 A to quickly identify that the installation is a secured installation. Moreover, the installation dynamic-link library  202 B also installs a number of encrypted protection profiles that contain information pertaining to the hardware and/or language, among other things, and various system files  206 B so as to allow it to determine whether something has been tampered with. 
   The runtime component  206  comprises the protection dynamic-link library  206 A, which embodies a piece of software that inhibits software tampering with system files  206 B, which include help files, and market-specific content files, such as language. 
   A central hierarchical database  204  includes the product identifier  204 A, the activation key  204 C, and the encrypted protection profiles  204 D. The central hierarchical database  204  is used to store information necessary to configure the systems for one or more users, applications, and hardware devices. The central hierarchical database  204  contains information that an operating system continually references during operation, such as profiles for each user, the applications installed on the computer, and types of documents each can create; property sheet settings for folders and application icons; what hardware exists on the system; and which ports are being used. The central hierarchical database  204 , in addition, can be used, as mentioned above, to store pieces of information that aid in the inhibition of software tampering. One suitable piece of information includes checksums, which are calculated values that are used to test data for tampering, such as when a hacker modifies a file. The checksum is preferably calculated for a given chunk of data by sequentially combining all the bytes of data with a series of arithmetic or logical operations. During the time period in which software tampering is verified or validated, a new checksum can be calculated in the same way using the stored data. If the two checksums do not match, software tampering may have occurred, and suitable steps can be taken to correct the tampering or shut down the computing machine. 
     FIG. 3A  illustrates the execution of a piece of software for inhibiting software tampering as embodied by the protection dynamic-link library  306 A. Various elements of  FIG. 3A  are similar to various elements of  FIG. 2A , and for brevity purposes they will not be further discussed. A log-on component  308  comprises a log-on module  308 A, and at the initiation of a computer system, the log-on module  380 A attempts to load the protection dynamic-link library  306 A depending on the product identifier  304 A. If the appropriate product identifier exists in the central hierarchical database  304 , the protection dynamic-link library  306 A will be loaded by the log-on module  308 A. The log-on module  308 A is preferably a piece of software that receives the user name and password and validates the information before allowing the user to access the system software on the computing machine. 
   The protection dynamic-link library  306 A, during the execution of the software of the computer system, verifies that various system files  306 B have not been tampered with by reading various encrypted protection profiles  304 D. In addition, the protection dynamic-link library  306 A verifies various settings of keys and their associated values to determine whether they have been tampered with. The protection dynamic-link library  306 A initially creates timers to check the registry as well as services that are authorized to run on the computer system. If the system has been tampered with, the protection dynamic-link library  306 A preferably attempts to fix the tampering or initiates shutdown of the computing machine, among other suitable methods of dealing with tampering. 
   For example, the protection dynamic-link library  306 A monitors the central hierarchical database  304  and resets keys and their associated values if there has been tampering. The protection dynamic-link library  306 A also checks critical files, such as various system files  306 B, against the information contained in the encrypted protection profiles  304 D and the protection dynamic-link library  306 A to determine whether there has been tampering. Moreover, the protection dynamic-link library  306 A checks to make sure that software services running on the computer systems are authorized and removes unauthorized software services. 
     FIG. 3B  illustrates the encrypted protection profiles  304 D, accessible by pieces of software, such as the log-on module  308 A. The log-on module  308 A communicates with the protection dynamic-link library  306 B to access the encrypted protection profiles  304 D. The interoperability between the log-on module  308 A and the protection dynamic-link library  306 B is preferably by a suitable protocol acknowledging that communication or the transfer of information can safely take place between pieces of software. 
   One suitable protocol includes the transmission of a random salt value, which can comprise a string of numeric, alphabetic, or alphanumeric information, sent by the log-on module  308 A to the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. The protection dynamic-link library  306 B preferably has two keys, a public library key and a private library key. In encryption and digital signatures, these keys comprise a string of bits used for encrypting and decrypting information to be transmitted or received. Encryption commonly relies on two different types of keys, a public key known to more than one person, and a private key known only to one person. 
   The protection dynamic-link library  306 B uses the private library key to decrypt a profile, such as profiles  312 - 316 . Each profile is suitably organized as a data structure, known as a blob, which is an amorphous data structure in which various pieces of information can be stored. Preferably, blobs of profiles  312 - 316  are encrypted using the private library key of the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. The profile  312  includes a blob  1 , which has been encrypted by the private library key of the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. The blob  1  includes profile data  1   312 A, whose size and format depend on a profile type, such as a hardware profile or a language profile. Blob  1  also includes a signature  1   312 B, which contains a checksum of the profile data  1   312 A, digitally signed with the public library key of the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. Blob  1  also includes a verify blob  1   312 C, which is a checksum of the identifier of the profile  312  and the profile data  1   312 A, digitally signed with a public calling key of the log-on module  308 A and also encrypted with a private calling key of the log-on module  308 A. 
   The profile  314  is organized as a blob  2  within which is contained a verifier blob  2   314 A, which is a checksum of an identifier of the profile  314  and its data described by the profile data  2   314 B, digitally signed with the private calling key of the log-on module  308 A and also encrypted with a private calling key of the log-on module  308 A. The blob  2  includes the profile data  2   314 B, whose size and format depend on a profile type, such as a hardware profile or a language profile. The blob  2  also includes a signature  2   314 C, which is a checksum of the profile data  2   314 B, digitally signed with the public library key of the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. 
   The profile  316  is organized as a blob  3 . The blob  3  includes a signature  3   316 A, which is a checksum of a profile data  3   316 C, digitally signed with the public library key of the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. The blob  3  includes a verifier blob  3   316 B, which is a checksum of an identifier of the profile  316  and its profile data  3   316 C, digitally signed with the public calling key of the log-on module  308 A and also encrypted with the private calling key of the log-on module  308 A. The blob  3  includes the profile data  3   316 C, whose size and format depend on a profile type, such as a hardware profile or a language profile. Note that for each blobs  1 - 3  of profiles  312 - 316 , various named organizations, such as profile data  1 - 3 , signatures  1 - 3 , and verifier blobs  1 - 3 , are placed differently in each of blobs  1 - 3  or profiles  312 - 316 . These differing arrangements aid in the inhibition of the tampering of profile data contained within the registry  304 . Headers containing placement information exist within the blobs  1 - 3  allowing a determination where each of the named organizations reside within the blobs  1 - 3 . 
   When the protection dynamic-link library  306 B has found the desired profile by decrypting the profile or the blob using its private library key, it will return the profile to the log-on module  308 A. Prior to returning the data to the log-on module  308 A, the protection dynamic-link library  306 B computes a checksum from the identifier and the profile data of the found profile. The checksum includes the result of comparing the profile and the random salt value that was originally transmitted by the log-on module  308 A. The salt value in essence inhibits the ability of a hacker from simply emulating the protection dynamic-link library  306 A to return a false profile to the log-on module  308 A. 
   When the computation of the checksum has occurred, the protection dynamic-link library  306 B returns to the log-on module  308 A a result which is essentially a result data structure with various pieces of information (e.g., success, failure, and flags detailing the success or failure), a verifier blob in the found profile, and the calculated checksum computed from the identifier of the profile, its data, the result, and the random salt value. The log-on module  308 A verifies the returned result from the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. The log-on module  308 A decrypts the verifier blob using its private calling key to obtain the checksum of the identifier of the profile and the data of the profile. In addition, the log-on module  308 A verifies the signature of the verifier blob by using its public calling key. Moreover, the log-on module  308 A computes a checksum from the decrypted verifier blob checksum, the results of the DLL, and the random salt value passed originally to the protection dynamic-link library  306 A. The log-on module  308 A performs a test to determine whether the checksum it has computed matches the checksum returned by the protection dynamic-link library  306 B. If the checksums do not match, the log-on module  308 A concludes that the system has been tampered with. 
     FIGS. 4A-4Z  illustrate a method  400  for inhibiting software tampering. For clarity purposes, the following description of the method  400  makes references to various elements illustrated in connection with software components  200 ,  202 ,  204 , and  206  of  FIG. 2A ; the log-on module  308 A; and the protection dynamic-link library  306 B of  FIGS. 3A-3B . From a start block, the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  402 , defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal A”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal B”). The set of method steps  402  describes the obfuscation of pieces of software for inhibiting software tampering. 
   From Terminal A ( FIG. 4C ), the method  400  proceeds to block  414  where source code is created for a protection dynamic-link library, which embodies pieces of software that inhibit software tampering. The source code is compiled and linked to create the protection dynamic-link library (DLL). See block  416 . Next, at block  418 , an obfuscation control file, which contains names of classes, methods, and fields, is created. The method  400  then proceeds to block  420  where an obfuscation process is executed using the protection DLL and the obfuscation control files as input. An obfuscated DLL is produced in which names of classes, methods, fields, and control flows are obfuscated. See block  422 . The obfuscation process makes the protection dynamic-link library difficult to debug by a hacker who is attempting to reverse engineer the protection dynamic-link library. One example of obfuscation is the insertion of jump instructions into the protection dynamic-link library or the reordering of programming instructions. 
   The obfuscation process described above is one of many suitable techniques that provides for the renaming of symbols in the assembly of software so as to foil decompilers that attempt to reverse engineer software for illicit purposes. The obfuscation process can increase protection against illicit decompilation while leaving the application intact. The goal of obfuscation is confusion, which taxes the minds of hackers to comprehend multifaceted intellectual concepts of pieces of software. While the obfuscation process would not only confuse a human interpreter, who is a hacker, it would also likely break a decompiler, which depends on certainties of logic. An obfuscation process creates a myriad of decompilation possibilities, some of which lead to incorrect logic, hence causing uncertainties in translation. 
   From Terminal A 1  ( FIG. 4D ), the method  400  proceeds to block  426  where the method calculates a checksum of the obfuscated protection DLL. A catalog file is then created. See block  428 . One suitable implementation of the catalog file is a database. The catalog contains the name of each software component, its version, and its signature (e.g., checksums). Next, at block  430 , the checksum of the obfuscated protection DLL is placed into the catalog file. The method  400  then proceeds to block  432  where the method calculates a checksum of the catalog file containing the checksum of the obfuscated protection DLL. The checksum of the catalog file is also encrypted using a private key. See block  434 . In other words, the catalog file is digitally signed by the private key. At this point, the method  400  produces the obfuscated protection DLL and the catalog file that can be verified. Verification aids in ascertaining whether the obfuscated protection DLL is coming from a known source, such as a particular software manufacturer, and that the obfuscated protection DLL has not been tampered with. The method  400  then continues to the exit Terminal B. 
   From Terminal B ( FIG. 4A ), the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  404 , defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal C”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal D”). The set of method steps  404  describes the setting up of the protection dynamic-link library, which embodies pieces of software for inhibiting software tampering, on a computing machine. 
   From Terminal C ( FIG. 4E ), the method  400  proceeds to block  438  where the method obtains a product identifier for a piece of software and stores it in a central hierarchical database, such as a registry. The product identifier is provided by a user, which he can obtain from a key typically affixed to the packaging of the piece of software. The method decodes the product identifier to identify a class in which the piece of software is categorized. See block  440 . The piece of software can include any suitable pieces of software, such as system software, application software, or network software. Next, at decision block  442 , a test is made to determine whether protection is available for the identified class. If the answer is NO, the method  400  proceeds to another continuation terminal (“Terminal L”) and terminates execution. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  442  is YES, the method  400  proceeds to block  444  where the installation dynamic-link library is invoked. The installation dynamic-link library installs an activation key into the central hierarchical database, such as the registry, based on the product identifier. See block  446 . The activation key allows the computing machine to quickly check and determine whether pieces of software for inhibiting software tampering are running on the computing machine without decoding the product identifier, which could be time consuming. 
   From Terminal C 1  ( FIG. 4F ) the installation dynamic-link library installs encrypted protection profiles into the central hierarchical database, such as the registry. Upon the start-up of the computing machine, a log-on module of the piece of software, such as system software, is executed. See block  450 . Next, at block  452 , the log-on module decodes the product identifier stored in the central hierarchical database, such as the registry, and obtains the product class in which the piece of software is categorized. The method  400  proceeds to decision block  454  where a test is performed to determine whether protection is available for the identified product class. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  454 , the method  400  continues to Terminal L where it terminates execution. If the answer, on the other hand, to the test at decision block  454  is YES, the log-on module  308 A attempts to load the obfuscated protection dynamic-link library onto the computing machine. See block  456 . The method continues at another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 2 ”). 
   From Terminal C 2  ( FIG. 4G ), the method  400  proceeds to block  458  where the method calculates the checksum of the protection dynamic-link library to be installed. Note that hereinafter the obfuscated protection dynamic-link library will be known as the protection dynamic-link library for brevity purposes. The method obtains a list of catalog files included in the system files. See block  460 . Next, at block  462 , the method takes a catalog file from a list and searches for a checksum contained in the catalog file. Decryption and verifying of the signature occurs. The method  400  proceeds to decision block  464  where a test is performed to determine whether there is a match between the two checksums. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  464 , the method  400  continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 3 ”). If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  464  is YES, the method  400  continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 4 ”). The processing steps discussed in connection with  FIG. 4G  describe a process by which a software image of the obfuscated protection dynamic-link library is verified to determine the originality of the software image (i.e., whether the software image was originally shipped or distributed by a desired software manufacturer.) If tampering has occurred, the verification process indicates that the software image of the obfuscated protection dynamic-link library to be loaded has been tampered with and security error measures, such as shutting down a computing machine, may have to be taken. 
   From Terminal C 3  ( FIG. 4H ), the method  400  continues to decision block  466  where a test is performed to determine whether there are more catalog files to search. If the answer to the test at decision block  466  is YES, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 5 ”). From Terminal C 5  ( FIG. 4G ), the method  400  loops back to block  462  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  466  is NO, the method  400  continues to block  468  where the protection dynamic-link library to be installed is not the original that came with the catalog files, signifying that it may have been tampered with. The method  400  then continues at another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 7 ”). From Terminal C 4  ( FIG. 4H ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  470 , where a test is performed to determine whether there is a protection dynamic-link library and the trusted catalog file. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  470 , the method  400  continues to Terminal C 5  where it loops back to block  462  and the above-described processing steps are repeated. One suitable implementation of the test discussed in decision block  470  is a set of trust-checking application programming interfaces provided by Microsoft Windows. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  470  is YES, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal C 6 ”). 
   From Terminal C 6  ( FIG. 4I ), the method  400  proceeds to block  472  where the method verifies the found catalog file and obtains state data as a return value by invoking a set of trust-checking application programming interfaces. The method obtains trust provider information using obtained state data via the set of trust-checking application programming interfaces. See block  474 . Next, at block  476 , the method obtains a base signer from a certificate chain using the obtained trust provider information. The method  400  proceeds to block  478  where the method validates the last element of the certificate chain using the context of the base signer. A test is performed to determine whether the last element contained a proper public key. See decision block  480 . If the answer is YES to the test at decision block  480 , the method  400  continues to Terminal C 7 . If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  480  is NO, the method continues to Terminal C 5  where it loops back to block  462  and the above-described processing steps are repeated. 
   From Terminal C 7  ( FIG. 4J ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  482  where a test is performed to determine whether the protection dynamic-link library loaded successfully. If the answer to the test at decision block  482  is NO, the method initiates system shutdown. See block  484 . The method  400  proceeds to Terminal L and terminates execution. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  482  is YES, the method  400  proceeds to block  486  where the method creates a first timer running in a non-terminable thread. The method then continues on to two paths of execution represented by a continuation terminal (“Terminal C 8 ”) and the exit Terminal D. This splitting of execution paths at  FIG. 4J  is to illustrate the concurrency of several pieces of software running on the computing machine. 
   From Terminal C 8  ( FIG. 4K ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  488  where a test is performed to determine whether a pre-configured time period has expired. If the answer is NO, the method  400  loops back to decision block  488  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. If the answer to the test at decision block  488  is YES, the method  400  proceeds to block  490  where the method checks the activation key stored in the central hierarchical database, such as the registry, to decode the product class. Another test is performed to determine whether there is protection available for the decoded product class. See decision block  492 . If the answer is YES to the test at decision block  492 , the method  400  loops back to Terminal C 8  where the above-discussed processing steps are repeated. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  492  is NO, the core application programming interface has been tampered with and the method takes security measures, such as shutting down the computing machine. See block  494 . The method  400  then continues to Terminal L and terminates execution. 
   From Terminal D ( FIG. 4A ), the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  406 , which is defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal E”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal F”). The set of method steps  406  determines whether the computing machine belongs to a class of supportable machinery. 
   From Terminal E ( FIG. 4L ), the method  400  proceeds to block  496  where the method verifies the existence of a set of instructions on the central processing unit of the computing machine to obtain its identification. A test is performed to determine whether the set of instructions is available. See decision block  498 . If the answer to the test at decision block  498  is NO, the central processing unit of the computing machine has an architecture that does not support self-identification. See block  499 . One suitable conclusion is that the central processing unit can support pieces of software for inhibiting software tampering. The method  400  then continues to the exit Terminal F. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  498  is YES, the log-on module communicates with the protection dynamic-link library to access the encrypted protection profile relating to the excluded central processing unit classes. See block  497 . In other words, there are files installed on the computing machine that describe various parameters with which the computing machine operates. For example, language files describe the language in which an operating system presents information to users. As another example, hardware files describe the pieces of computing machinery that the operating system supports. The problem is that files can easily be tampered with by a hacker or malicious software. Contained within the encrypted protection profile are checksums that signify the original files installed on the computing machine. If the original files were to be tampered with, the checksums of the tampered files and the checksums stored in the encrypted protection profile will not match, signifying that the original files have been tampered with. For example, if a hacker were to modify the hardware files to fool the operating system into supporting a non-supportable computing machine, the checksum of the modified hardware files are likely to be different than the checksum stored in the encrypted protection file, hence allowing a determination of tampering. Returning to  FIG. 4A , the log-on module passes into the protection dynamic-link library of a random salt value that is used to enhance security. See block  495 . The random salt value makes it difficult for a hacker to defeat or intercept a functional invocation or call. As will be discussed hereinbelow, the random salt value is used in the calculation of a checksum based on the random salt value and data sent by the protection dynamic-link library. That checksum is compared against the checksum calculated by the protection dynamic-link library to determine if tampering has occurred. The method  400  then continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 1 ”). 
   From Terminal E 1  ( FIG. 4M ), the method  400  proceeds to block  493  where the protection dynamic-link library decrypts an encrypted protection profile (“profile”) using a private library key. The protection dynamic-link library compares the profile to the system. See block  491 . Next, at decision block  489 , a test is performed to determine whether the profile has been found. Each profile has a name that preferably is a number of bits, such as 64 bits. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  489 , the method  400  loops back to block  493  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. If, on the other hand, the answer to the test at decision block  489  is YES, the method  400  proceeds to block  487 , where the protection dynamic-link library computes a checksum for the identity of the profile, its data, the comparison result, and the salt value. The protection dynamic-link library returns a result data structure, a verifier blob of the profile, and the computed checksum. See block  485 . The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 2 ”). 
   From Terminal E 2  ( FIG. 4N ), the method  400  proceeds to block  483  where the log-on module uses a private calling key to decrypt the verifier blob and obtains a verifier checksum. The log-on module validates the signature of the checksum using a public calling key. See block  481 . Next, at block  479 , the log-on module computes a checksum from the decrypted verifier checksum, the received result data structure, and the salt value. The method  400  proceeds to block  477  where the method prepares the checksums computed by the log-on module and the protection dynamic-link library. A test is performed to determine whether the checksums are a match. See decision block  475 . If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  475 , the method  400  continues to Terminal L and terminates execution. Otherwise, the answer to the test at decision block  475  is YES, and the method  400  proceeds to another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 3 ”). 
   From Terminal E 3  ( FIG. 4O ), the method  400  proceeds to block  473  where the method extracts a list of excluded computing machine classes from the profile. The method then causes the computing machine to review CPU information (e.g., vendor identity, type, family, model number, brand identity, and feature set). See block  471 . Next, at decision block  469 , a test is performed to determine whether the vendor identity is on the excluded list. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  469 , the method  400  continues to Terminal F. Otherwise, the answer to the test is YES, and the method continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 4 ”). 
   From Terminal E 4  ( FIG. 4P ), the method  400  continues to decision block  467  where a test is performed to determine whether the type, family, and model number are on the excluded list. If the answer is YES to the test at decision block  467 , the method  400  continues at another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 7 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  467  is NO, the method  400  continues to another decision block  465  where a test is performed to determine whether the brand identity and the feature set are on the excluded list. If the answer is YES to the test at decision block  465 , the method  400  continues to Terminal E 7 . Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  465  is NO, the method  400  continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 5 ”). 
   From Terminal E 5  ( FIG. 4Q ), the method  400  continues to decision block  463  where a test is performed to determine whether extended instructions to determine the CPU or the central processing unit of the computing machine identity exists. If the answer to the test at decision block  463  is NO, the method continues to Terminal F. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  463  is YES, the method invokes the extended instructions to obtain the name of the CPU or the central processing unit of the computing machine. See block  461 . Next, at block  459 , the method invokes the extended instructions to obtain the cache size of the central processing unit. The method  400  continues at another continuation terminal (“Terminal E 6 ”). 
   From Terminal E 6  ( FIG. 4R ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  457  where a test is performed to determine whether the name of the center processing unit is on the excluded list. If the answer to the test at decision block  457  is YES, the method continues to Terminal E 7 . If the answer to the test at decision block  457  is NO, another test is performed to determine whether the cache size of the CPU is on the excluded list. See decision block  455 . If the answer is YES to the test at decision block  455 , the method  400  continues to Terminal E 7 . Otherwise, if the answer is NO, the method  400  continues to Terminal F. 
   From Terminal E 7  ( FIG. 4S ), the method issues error messages that no protection is available on the computer machine and initiates system shutdown. See block  455 . The method  400  then continues to Terminal L and terminates execution. 
   From Terminal F ( FIG. 4B ), the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  408  defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal G”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal H”). The set of method steps  408  verifies whether the install files have been tampered with. 
   From Terminal G ( FIG. 4S ), the log-on module communicates with a protection dynamic-link library to access an encrypted protection profile relating to critical files on the computing machine. See block  453 . The steps  495 - 475  (in the illustrated sequence) of  FIGS. 4L-4N  are executed in the context of finding an encrypted protection profile relating to critical files on the computing machine. See block  451 . Next, at block  449 , the method extracts a list of critical files from the profile. A test is performed to determine whether the critical files on the computing machine have been changed. See decision block  447 . If the answer to the test at decision block  447  is YES, the method  400  continues to Terminal L and terminates execution. Otherwise, the answer to the test at decision block  400  is NO, the method continues to Terminal H. Please note that processing steps between Terminal G and Terminal H can be concurrently executed so as to continuously check whether critical files on a computing machine have been changed or tampered with. 
   From Terminal H ( FIG. 4B ), the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  410  defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal I”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal J”). The set of method steps  410  determines whether the registry has been tampered with. 
   From Terminal I ( FIG. 4T ), upon start-up, the log-on module invokes a protection function of the protection dynamic-link library to protect the keys and values of the registry of the system context. See block  445 . The protection dynamic-link library creates a thread to protect various keys and values of the registry of the system context. See block  443 . Next, at block  441 , the protection dynamic-link library returns a handle to the just created thread to the log-on module. The method  400  proceeds to block  439  where the method creates a timer to check the continuance of the thread protecting the keys and values of the registry at the system context. Next, the method  400  proceeds to three independent paths of execution, which are represented by a continuation terminal (“Terminal I 2 ”), decision block  437 , and another continuation terminal (“Terminal I 4 ”). These independent paths of execution indicate concurrency. A test is performed at decision block  437  to determine whether a pre-configured time period has expired. If the answer is NO to the test at decision block  437 , the method  400  proceeds to another continuation terminal (“Terminal I 3 ”) and loops back to decision block  437  where the above-described processing step is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  437  is YES, the method  400  continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal I 1 ”). 
   From Terminal I 1  ( FIG. 4U ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  435  where a test is performed to determine whether the thread has terminated. If the answer to the test at decision block  435  is NO, the method continues to another decision block  433  where another test is performed to determine whether the thread has been suspended. If the answer to the test at decision block  433  is NO, the method  400  continues to Terminal I 3  and loops back to decision block  437  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. If the answers to the tests at decision blocks  435 ,  433 , are YES, the method  400  proceeds to block  431  where the system is believed to have been tampered with and the method initiates system shutdown. The method  400  then continues to Terminal L and terminates execution. 
   From Terminal I 2  ( FIG. 4V ) the method  400  proceeds to block  429  where the thread communicates with a protection dynamic-link library to access a list of system registry keys and values to be protected. The steps  495 - 475  (in the illustrated sequence) of  FIGS. 4L-4N  are executed. See block  427 . Next, at block  425 , the thread subscribes for notification of any changes to protect registry keys. A test is performed at decision block  423  to determine whether there is a notification of a change. If the answer to the test at decision block  423  is NO, the method loops back to decision block  423  where the above-described processing step is repeated. Otherwise, the answer to the test at decision block  423  is YES, and the method fixes the tampered key and its value. See block  421 . The method  400  then loops back to decision block  423  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. 
   From Terminal I 4  ( FIG. 4W ), the method  400  proceeds to block  419  where upon log-on by a user, the log-on module invokes a protection function of the protection dynamic-link library to protect the keys and values of the registry of the user context. The protection dynamic-link library creates a thread to protect various keys and values of the registry at the user context. See block  417 . Next, at block  415 , the protection dynamic-link library returns a handle to the just created thread to the log-on module. The method  400  proceeds to block  413  where the method creates a timer to check the continuance of the thread protecting the keys and values of the registry of the user context. The steps  437 - 421  of  FIGS. 4T-4U  (in the illustrated sequence) are executed for the user context. The method  400  then continues to Terminal J. 
   From Terminal J ( FIG. 4B ), the method  400  proceeds to a set of method steps  412  defined between a continuation terminal (“Terminal K”) and an exit terminal (“Terminal L”). The set of methods  412  determines whether services have been tampered with or whether unauthorized services are executing. From Terminal K ( FIG. 4X ), upon start-up, the log-on module invokes a protection function of the protection dynamic-link library to inhibit the execution of unauthorized services. The protection dynamic-link library creates a thread to inhibit the execution of unauthorized services. See block  407 . Next, at block  405 , the protection dynamic-link library returns a handle to the just created thread to the log-on module. The method  400  then continues to block  403  where the method creates a timer to check the continuance of the thread inhibiting the execution of unauthorized services. The steps  437 - 431  of  FIGS. 4T-4U  are executed. See block  401 . Next, at block  401 A, the thread communicates with the protection dynamic-link library to access an encrypted protection profile relating to a list of unauthorized services. The method  400  then continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal K 1 ”). 
   From Terminal K 1  ( FIG. 4Y ), the steps  495 - 475  of  FIGS. 4L-4N  are executed. A test is performed at decision block  401 C to determine whether an unauthorized service is running. If the answer to the test at decision block  401 C is NO, the method  400  continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal K 2 ”). Otherwise, if the answer is YES to the test at decision block  401 C, the method  400  proceeds to block  401 D where the method stops all services that are dependent on the unauthorized service. The unauthorized service is then deleted from the execution. See block  401 E. 
   From Terminal K 2  ( FIG. 4J ), the method  400  proceeds to decision block  401 F where a test is performed to determine whether there are more unauthorized services. If the answer to the test at decision block  401 F is YES, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“Terminal K 3 ”). From Terminal K 3  ( FIG. 4Y ), the method  400  loops back to decision block  401 C where the above-described processing steps are repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block  401 F is NO, the method  400  proceeds to block  401 G where the thread sleeps for a pre-configured period of time. The method  400  then loops back to decision block  401 C via Terminal K 3  where the above-described processing steps are repeated. The steps described in connection with the set of method steps  412  defined between the Terminals K and L are preferably concurrently executed to other sets of method steps. 
   While the preferred embodiment of the invention has been illustrated and described, it will be appreciated that various changes can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.