Patent Publication Number: US-2023147555-A1

Title: Secure assistance for asynchronous task completion by unavailable endpoint device upon restored availability in a secure peer-to-peer data network

Description:
STATEMENT REGARDING PRIOR DISCLOSURES BY THE INVENTOR OR A JOINT INVENTOR 
     The following U.S. Patent Publications do not qualify as prior art under 35 USC 102(b)(1)(A) because their Jan. 28, 2021 publications are (1) one year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, and (2) by the inventor or a joint inventor: U.S. Pub. 2021/0026535; U.S. Pub. 2021/0026976; U.S. Pub. 2021/0028940; U.S. Pub. 2021/0028943; U.S. Pub. 2021/0029092; U.S. Pub. 2021/0029125; and U.S Pub. 2021/0029126, the disclosures all of which are incorporated herein by reference to the extent not inconsistent with this application. 
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     The present disclosure generally relates to a secure assistance for asynchronous task completion by an unavailable endpoint device upon restored availability in a secure peer-to-peer data network. 
     BACKGROUND 
     This section describes approaches that could be employed, but are not necessarily approaches that have been previously conceived or employed. Hence, unless explicitly specified otherwise, any approaches described in this section are not prior art to the claims in this application, and any approaches described in this section are not admitted to be prior art by inclusion in this section. 
     The Internet Protocol (IP) has enabled the Internet to evolve from a set of connected research institutions and universities to a world wide web of connected IP devices that enables worldwide communications between user-controlled devices (“user devices”), Internet of Things (IoT) devices (devices that do not require user control), and server devices providing ever-increasing cloud-based based services such as social networking services, business transaction services, media distribution services, data storage services, etc. The enormous success of the Internet is based on the deployment of IP routing protocols that enable a “source” device (having a corresponding “source IP address”) that is connected to the Internet to reach a “destination” device (having a corresponding “destination IP address”) that also is connected to the Internet. 
     This universal reachability also has introduced severe security threats to each and every IP device that is connected to the Internet, because any “threat device” originating at a “source” IP address (e.g., a malfunctioning network device infected by malware or a network device operated by a malicious user) can threaten any “target device” at a “destination” IP address in an attempt to steal private data, disrupt the target device, etc. Hence, this universal reachability has resulted in losses on the order of billions (or even trillions) of dollars in losses due to attacks on targeted devices, including attacks on personal devices, as well as attacks on large-scale corporate, government, and/or military networks. Individuals and institutions collectively have expended billions of dollars in network security in an attempt to thwart or mitigate against online attacks, yet malicious users still have been able to overcome network security attempts. 
     Security threats also can arise from a reliance on an intermediate network device to store a data object (e.g., email message, text message, etc.) that is originated by a user of a source network device and destined for a destination network device for completion of source-destination transactions: reliance on an intermediate network device to execute a “store-and-forward” operation can expose user-generated data objects to security threats based on a successful cyber-attack on the intermediate network device. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Reference is made to the attached drawings, wherein elements having the same reference numeral designations represent like elements throughout and wherein: 
         FIG.  1    illustrates a secure peer-to-peer data network comprising an apparatus causing autonomic execution for completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device, based on an indication requested from an assisting device that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  2    illustrates example data structures generated and/or stored by an endpoint device associated with a federation identifier owned by a requesting user, for establishment and maintenance of two-way trusted relationships in the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  3    illustrates an example implementation in an apparatus of executable code configured for providing operations for deployment of the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  4    illustrates an example implementation of any of the network devices described with reference to any of the Figures, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  5    illustrates in further detail interactions between user-controlled network devices, server network devices in an external data network, and one or more server network devices in the secure peer-to-peer data network, in establishing a two-way trusted relationship for creation of a federation identifier in the secure peer-to-peer data network for the requesting user and an endpoint identifier associated with the federation identifier for each endpoint device of the requesting user, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  6    illustrates secure communications between two-way trusted network devices in a secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIG.  7    illustrates in further detail a first endpoint device causing autonomic execution for completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device, based on an indication requested from an assisting device that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
         FIGS.  8 A- 8 D  illustrate a method of causing autonomic execution for completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device, based on an indication requested from an assisting device that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
     
    
    
     DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS 
     OVERVIEW 
     In one embodiment, a method comprises: detecting, by a secure executable container executed by a first endpoint device in a secure peer-to-peer data network, that a second endpoint device is unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device; generating and sending, by the secure executable container, a secure request destined for an assisting device, the assisting device being one of the second endpoint device or a third network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network, the secure request requesting an indication once the second endpoint device is available for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device, wherein the secure request does not contain any user-generated data; receiving, by the secure executable container, the indication generated by the assisting device that the second endpoint device is available for the execution of the secure asynchronous transaction; and causing, by the secure executable container based on the indication, autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the second endpoint device. 
     In another embodiment, one or more non-transitory tangible media are encoded with logic for execution by a machine and when executed by the machine operable for: detecting, by a secure executable container executed by the machine implemented as a first endpoint device in a secure peer-to-peer data network, that a second endpoint device is unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device; generating and sending, by the secure executable container, a secure request destined for an assisting device, the assisting device being one of the second endpoint device or a third network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network, the secure request requesting an indication once the second endpoint device is available for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device, wherein the secure request does not contain any user-generated data; receiving, by the secure executable container, the indication generated by the assisting device that the second endpoint device is available for the execution of the secure asynchronous transaction; and causing, by the secure executable container based on the indication, autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the second endpoint device. 
     In another embodiment, an apparatus is implemented as a physical machine, and comprises: non-transitory machine readable media configured for storing executable machine readable code; a device interface circuit; and a processor circuit. The processor circuit is configured for executing the machine readable code as a secure executable container, and when executing the machine readable code operable for: detecting, by the secure executable container executed by the processor circuit as a first endpoint device in a secure peer-to-peer data network, that a second endpoint device is unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device; generating and sending, by the secure executable container, a secure request destined for an assisting device, the assisting device being one of the second endpoint device or a third network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network, the secure request requesting an indication once the second endpoint device is available for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction with the first endpoint device, wherein the secure request does not contain any user-generated data; receiving, by the secure executable container, the indication generated by the assisting device that the second endpoint device is available for the execution of the secure asynchronous transaction; and causing, by the secure executable container based on the indication, autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the second endpoint device. 
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Particular embodiments enable network devices in a secure peer-to-peer data network to provide an autonomic execution of secure asynchronous transactions, even though a target endpoint device may encounter disconnected or “offline” states in the secure peer-to-peer data network, based on a requesting endpoint device generating and securely sending a secure “assist request” to an assisting device that can indicate once the target endpoint device is available for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction with the requesting endpoint device. Hence, the requesting endpoint device, having generated the secure assist request, can cause the autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the target endpoint device based on the indication initiated by the assisting network device that the target endpoint device is available. 
     Hence, the example embodiments enable secure and autonomic completion of secure asynchronous transactions between endpoint devices in the secure peer-to-peer data network, even if one or more of the endpoint devices encounter intervals of unavailability, for example in the case of 5G-enabled mobile devices that can be disconnected from a 5G data network, powered off by a user, undergoing software upgrades, etc. 
     Moreover, the example embodiments ensure that each secure assist request does not contain any user-generated data (e.g., user-generated images, video files, text messages, etc.), guaranteeing that no user-generated data can be compromised. In particular, prior store-and-forward systems assumed transfer of user-generated data to an intermediate storage device (e.g., an email server, messaging server, etc.); in contrast, the example embodiments ensure that no assisting device receives any user-generated data as part of the secure assist request, ensuring that no sensitive data generated by a user can be acquired in the case of a cyber-attack on the assisting device. 
     Hence, the example embodiments enable an assisting device to indicate to a requesting endpoint device once a target endpoint device is available, enabling the requesting endpoint device to cause autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the second endpoint device: the requesting endpoint device can submit the secure assist request without the need for specifying any user-generated data, or identifying the nature of the secure asynchronous transaction to be completed; the secure assist request can merely identify a first instructions identifying a notification event (e.g., identifying when a target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network), and a routing instruction identifying a destination for the notification (e.g., the requesting endpoint device and/or the target network device). 
     Consequently, the example embodiments enable establishment of a secure hybrid peer-to-peer data network where endpoint devices can provide to users an appearance of an “always-connected” or “always-available” service, even in cases where the endpoint devices cannot maintain a persistent network connection. 
     A description will first be provided of a network operating system providing secure encryption and secure communications, the secure peer-to-peer data network, and a secure identity management system used to establish the two-way trusted relationships, followed by a description of an endpoint device executing an autonomic execution of completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device, based on an indication requested from an assisting device that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network. 
     Network Operating System 
     Any and all access to any data structures to or from an external network device, or any network-based services, is exclusively via a network operating system ( 56  of  FIG.  3   ) in a secure peer-to-peer data network ( 5  of  FIG.  1   ), and is based on the strict security enforcement by the network operating system  56  executed by any network device within the secure peer-to-peer data network, for example an endpoint device  12  controlled by a network entity (e.g., a user entity, an IoT-based entity, etc.), a replicator device  16  having a two-way trusted relationship with the endpoint device, and/or a core network device (e.g.,  14 ) having a two-way trusted relationship with the replicator device. The network operating system  56 , implemented within every network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , provides exclusive access to the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 ; in other words, the network operating system (also referred to herein as a “secure executable container”) prevents any executable resource in the corresponding network device from accessing any unencrypted form of any “at-rest” or “in-flight” secure data structures, or accessing the secure peer-to-peer data network, without authorized access via a prescribed Application Programming Interface (API) ( 80  of  FIG.  3   ) required by the network operating system. 
     A fundamental problem with existing Internet technology is that the Internet was architected at the network layer (layer 3) with an Internet Protocol (IP) that merely routed data packets between a source device and a destination device, with no regard for anti-fraud protection, protecting user identities, etc. The worldwide deployment of the Internet using Internet Protocol at the network layer thus exposed network devices connected to the Internet to malicious attacks, unauthorized monitoring of user communications, and exploitation of user identities by service providers that have executed machine learning of user behaviors in order to identify targeted advertising to Internet users, including targeting addictive content. 
     Moreover, the use of Internet Protocol at the network layer, without any regard for anti-fraud protection or user identity protection at the network layer, resulted in implementing security-based network services (e.g., protecting owned content, building directories, building ontologies, providing security, etc.) “above” the layer 3 (network) layer, typically at the application layer; unfortunately, implementing security-based network services at the application layer cannot prevent a malicious user from reaching a target via the layer 3 Internet, especially since a malicious user often can bypass the OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) protocol stack using unencrypted “raw” data packets that can bypass a TCP/IP stack. 
     In contrast, the network operating system  56  according to example embodiments maintains exclusive control over all access to the secure peer-to-peer data network  5  and access to any data structure associated with the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , including any and all user metadata for any user accessing the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . Further, the network operating system  56  establishes an identity management system that requires a user to verify their identity upon initial registration in the secure peer-to-peer data network, and requires the user to establish a two-way trusted relationship with their endpoint device and any other network entity in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     Consequently, the network operating system  56  can provide secure communications between two-way trusted network devices in a secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , where the secure peer-to-peer data network is established based on an aggregation of two-way trusted relationships. 
     Moreover, each network device can uniquely and securely identify itself based on its network operating system  56  cryptographically generating a secure private key and a corresponding secure public key. Hence, data storage in each and every network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , as well as all network communications between each and every network device, can be secured based on sharing secure public keys between endpoint devices having established a two-way trusted relationship based on a secure verification of membership within the same “federation” according to a prescribed secure salutation protocol. 
     The secure storage and transmission of data structures can be extended between different “federations” of endpoint devices (established by different users having established respective two-way trusted relationships with the secure peer-to-peer data network), based on the different users establishing their own two-way trusted relationship according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol. 
     Secure Private Core Network Overview 
       FIG.  1    illustrates a secure peer-to-peer data network  5  comprising an example secure private core network  10 , according to an example embodiment. The secure private core network  10  is: a (1) cloudless (2) hybrid peer-to-peer overlay network that (3) can utilize artificial intelligence (AI) to extend security features and operations beyond end-to-end encryption between two endpoint devices  12 , for example wireless smartphone devices, wireless smart tablet devices, wireless Internet of Things (IoT) devices, etc. The secure private core network  10  comprises a master control program (MCP) device  14 , and one or more replicator devices (e.g., “R 1 ”)  16 . Each replicator device  16  can be connected to every other replicator device  16 , forming a pairwise topology (e.g., a “mesh”)  98  of interconnected replicator devices  16 ; each replicator device  16  also is connected to the MCP device  14 ; hence, each replicator device  16  provides a connection to zero or more endpoint devices  12  for reaching the MCP device  14  and/or another endpoint device  12 , described in further detail below. The devices  12  also can have peer to peer connections to one another allowing direct communications without the aid of the core network  10  (hence the name hybrid peer to peer network). Devices  12  can simultaneously communicate either exclusively with each other, peer to peer, with some devices peer to peer and other devices via the core network  10  or with all other devices  12  via the core network  10 . 
     The peer-to-peer network in the secure private core network  10  is based on a trusted aggregation of strict two-way trusted relationships (“cohorts”) between two entities: an “entity” can be based on a physical device (e.g., an endpoint device  12  or a physical network device in the secure private core network  10  such as the MCP device  14 ) having a verified secure relationship with at least an individual person utilizing the physical device; the verified secure relationship also can be with an identified organization associated with the physical device (e.g., a prescribed manufacturer of an endpoint device  12  such as an IoT device, a service provider offering services based on purchase or rental of an endpoint device  12 , etc.); the verified secure relationship also can be with another physical device attempting a communication with the physical device (e.g., a physical device executing the MCP device  14  and/or the replicator device  16 , another endpoint device  12 , etc.). Hence, the secure private core network  10  requires establishment of a strict two-way trusted relationship between two physical devices (also referred to as a “cohort”), where each physical device either is operated by a user, or is a physical device associated with an identified organization (including a corresponding physical device executing the MCP device  14 ). 
     Since an individual person (or identified organization) may utilize one or more endpoint devices  12  for network communications, the secure private core network  10  can identify an individual person (or identified organization) based on the allocation of a “federation” identifier (illustrated as “F 1 ”)  18  that has a verified secure relationship with one or more physical network devices (e.g., “A”  12 , “A 1 ”  12 , etc.) that are utilized by the individual person (or identified organization) for communications within the secure data network  5 ; hence, the secure data network  5  also is referred to herein as a “secure peer-to-peer data network” based on the trusted aggregation of two-way trusted relationships. As described below, the federation ID  18  is generated by an endpoint device  12  during initial registration of a user (e.g., individual person or identified organization) using a secure random number generator that results in a universally unique identifier (UUID) of at least one-hundred twenty eight (128) bits: an example 128-bit UUID can be implemented as proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (see RFC 4122). 
       FIG.  2    illustrates example data structures that can identify secure relationships between different entities, for example different endpoint devices  12 , different individual persons or organizations, etc. The secure private core network  10  causes each endpoint device  12  during registration with the secure private core network  10  to securely and randomly generate its own self-assigned 128-bit UUID as a unique endpoint identifier  20 : the endpoint ID  20  is stored in a data structure referred to as an endpoint object  22  that stores all attributes associated with the corresponding endpoint device  12  in the secure data network  5 . As illustrated in  FIG.  2    and as described in further detail below, the secure private core network  10  can cause the endpoint device “A”  12  to generate its own endpoint identifier “E 1 ”  20 ; the secure private core network  10  also can cause the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  to generate its own endpoint identifier “E 2 ”  20 . The endpoint ID  20  provides a permanent (i.e., unchangeable) cryptographically-unique identity for the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     Each physical device, including each endpoint device  12 , is uniquely identified in the secure private core network  10  based on its corresponding endpoint object  22 . The endpoint object  22  for each physical device can specify its corresponding endpoint ID  20 , the federation ID  18  of the federation  34  to which the physical device belongs, a corresponding lifecycle policy “L”  24 , and a corresponding distribution policy “D”  26 , described below. The endpoint object  22  for each physical device also can identify a corresponding device type, for example a “human interface” (user interface device), a “thing” (e.g., IoT device, mass storage device, processor device), or a core network component (e.g., an MCP device  14 , a replicator device  16 , a directory server  28 , a community server  30 , etc.); hence, a particular device type as specified in the endpoint object  22  can cause the corresponding physical device (e.g., an endpoint device  12 ), to be allocated or granted selected attributes within the secure private core network  10 . Each endpoint object  22  is securely stored in its corresponding physical device in which it represents, and also can be securely stored in other physical devices upon establishment of a two-way trusted relationship, described below. 
     A federation object  32  is a data structure that has its own unique federation ID  18  and comprises one or more endpoint objects  22 : the federation object  32  is established upon secure registration of the first endpoint device  12  and establishment of its corresponding endpoint object  22 . As described previously, an individual person (or identified organization) may utilize one or more endpoint devices  12  for network communications; hence, each endpoint object  22  is added to the federation object  32  in response to determining that the corresponding endpoint device (e.g., “A 1 ”)  12  has a two-way trusted relationship with a user (or organization) that has previously executed a secure registration with another endpoint device (e.g., “A”)  12  in the same federation  32 , described below. Hence, the secure private core network  10  can identify an individual person (or identified organization) based on a corresponding federation ID  18  that identifies a collection (i.e., “federation”)  34  of one or more endpoint devices  12  having been verified by the secure private core network  10  as each having a secure relationship with the identified person or user. 
     Hence, a “federation entity” (or simply “federation”)  34  as described herein is a logical entity in the secure data network  5 , expressed in the secure private core network  10  by its corresponding federation object  32 , that uniquely identifies the federation of secured endpoint devices  12  (identified by respective endpoint objects  22 ) that have a two-way trusted relationship with an individual user or organization. The secure private core network  10  establishes a trusted aggregation of strict two-way trusted relationships between two entities, where each endpoint device  12  of each federation  34  has its own permanent (i.e., unchangeable) and cryptographically-unique endpoint ID  20 . 
     An endpoint device  12  in a federation  34  can generate content as a message object  36  that can be securely stored in one or more endpoint devices  12  in the federation  34 . A message object can have different types including messages created within the secure private core network  10  (e.g., a notification object generated by an endpoint device  12  in the secure private core network  10 ), user created content from a user device  12  (e.g., a text message, an image, a media file, a media stream, etc.), or machine-created content from an IoT device (e.g., a sensor-based data record or media stream, an actuator message, etc.). A message object  36  is identified by a corresponding 256-bit unique message identifier  38  (illustrated in  FIG.  2    as “M 1 ” and “M 2 ”): the message ID  38  comprises the federation ID  18  of the federation  34  in which the content was generated, and a corresponding 128-bit message UUID (e.g., “UID 1 ”)  40  that is generated by the endpoint device  12  in the federation  34  that generated the content. As described in further detail below, the generation of a message ID  38  that comprises the federation ID  18  provides an ownership reference  84  that establishes an absolute and exclusive ownership right in the content created by the federation  34 , such that the content owner of the content in the message object  36  can be identified based on the federation ID  18  in the message ID  38 . The message object  36  also can include a corresponding lifecycle policy “L”  24  (identifying for example an expiration date and time that identifies an instance that the associated content is to be automatically deleted from any physical storage device in the secure data network  5 ), and a corresponding distribution policy “D”  26  (identifying for example a distribution scope such as can only be shared by two users in succession, a distribution start or stop time for granting free access to media content for only one week before or after a concert performance date that is independent of replication of the media content throughout the secure data network  5 , etc.). An endpoint device  12  in the federation  34  can distribute content that is stored in a message object  36  based on the endpoint device  12  generating a conversation object  42  comprising a conversation identifier (illustrated as “C 1 ”, “C 2 ”)  44  that comprises the federation ID  18  and a corresponding 128-bit conversation UUID (e.g., “UID 2 ”)  46  that is generated by the endpoint device  12  initiating the distribution of the content (i.e., initiating the “conversation”). The conversation object  42  can be of different types, for example a “post”, a “community”, a “vault” file system (for secure storage of selected messages at one or more locations). Each conversation object  42  can reference zero or more message objects  36 , and therefore can optionally include a message reference (or message “list”)  48  of one or more message objects (e.g., “M 1 ”, “M 2 ”); each conversation object  42  also can include a subscriber list  50  specifying at least the federation ID  18  of the federation  34  that created the conversation object  42  (e.g., that created the content in the referenced messages “M 1 ” and “M 2 ” from the message reference  48 ). A given message (e.g., “M 2 ”) can be referenced in more than one conversation object (e.g., “C 2 ”), enabling the message (e.g., “M 2 ”) to be replicated to different subscribers (e.g., federation “F 2 ”  34  and federation “F 3 ”  34 ) specified in the subscriber list  50  according to different policies specified by the corresponding lifecycle policy “L”  24  and the corresponding distribution policy “D”  26  in the conversation object “C 2 ”; hence, the same message object  36  need not be duplicated as separate instances. Hence, a message ID  38  can be distributed according to different policies based on utilizing different conversation objects  42 . Additional details regarding managing lifecycles for digital conversations can be found, for example, in U.S. Patent Publication No. 2021/0028940. 
     The federation object  32  can be implemented as a collection of the endpoint objects  22 , message objects  36 , and conversation objects that specify the same federation ID  18  as owner of the objects. In other words, the ownership within the same federation  34  is established based on storage of the same federation ID  18 : within each endpoint object  22 ; within the message identifier  38  of each message object  36 ; and/or within the conversation identifier  44  of each conversation object  42 . Hence, the federation object  32  can be implemented based on the federation ID  18  providing a reference to the owned endpoint objects  22 , message objects  36 , and conversation objects that can be stored at different locations within the memory circuit ( 94  of  FIG.  4   ) of a physical network device; as a result, the federation object  32  need not be implemented as a discrete data structure that includes the owned objects  22 ,  36 , and  38  stored therein. 
     Hence, each federation  34  in the secure data network  5  is a collection of one or more secured endpoint devices  12  (identified in the secure private core network  10  by its corresponding endpoint object  22 ) each of which have a two-way trusted relationship with an individual user or organization: each federation  34  is allocated a corresponding federation object  32  having a corresponding unique federation ID  18  that uniquely identifies the federation  34  in the secure data network  5 . The federation object  32  can be stored in a memory circuit ( 94  of  FIG.  4   ) of any one or more of the endpoint devices (e.g., “A”)  12  of the federation “F 1 ”  34 . 
     An endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can initiate a prescribed secure salutation protocol with another endpoint device “A”  12  in order to establish a two-way trusted relationship between the two endpoint devices “A” and “A 1 ”  12  in the federation “F 1 ”  34 , resulting in exchange of public encryption keys for pairwise sharing of encrypted content that cannot be decrypted by any intermediate device (e.g., a replicator device  16  in between two devices  12 ); hence, the addition of a new endpoint device (e.g., a new smartphone, a new smart tablet or laptop computer, etc. “A 1 ”)  12  by a user into the federation “F 1 ”  34  enables the new endpoint device “A 1 ” to execute a prescribed secure salutation protocol with at least one other endpoint device (e.g., endpoint device “A”  12 ), enabling the newly added endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  in the federation “F 1 ”  34  to establish a two-way trusted relationship with the other endpoint device (e.g., endpoint device “A”  12 ”). An example salutation protocol is illustrated in U.S. Patent Publication No. 2021/0029126. 
     The establishment of a two-way trusted relationship between the two endpoint devices  12  within the federation “F 1 ”  34  enable the two endpoint devices  12  to execute autonomic synchronization of any portion of the data structures  22 ,  36 , and  42  between any other endpoint device (e.g., “A 1 ”)  12  within the federation “F 1 ”  34 . 
     In particular, each physical network device (including each endpoint device  12 ) includes an autonomic synchronizer ( 52  of  FIG.  1   ) that is configured for autonomically (i.e. automatically by a machine) synchronizing data structures between physical network devices that are trusted peer devices, for example between endpoint devices  12  that are identified as subscribers of the same conversation identifier  44  (based on the subscriber list  50 ): the autonomic synchronizer  52  can autonomically synchronize data structures between any pair of physical network devices having a two-way trusted relationship based on determining any differential hypercontent state (e.g., stored changes) between the stored data objects  22  identified in the message reference  48 : the autonomic synchronizer  52  can reconcile any differential hypercontent state between any data objects  22  stored in different endpoint devices  12 , resulting in updating the data objects  22  to a most recent version instantaneously in each endpoint device  12  connected to the secure data network  5 ; any disconnected endpoint device  12  can execute autonomic synchronization upon reconnection to the secure private core network  10 , and/or in response to a P2P (peer to peer) connection with a trusted peer endpoint device  12  (e.g., within its own federation  34  or another federation  34 , as appropriate). Endpoint devices  12  within the same federation  34  also can execute autonomic synchronization of all data structures in the federation object  32  (including the federation object  32  itself), according to the policies set in the respective endpoint object  22 . Hence, any endpoint device  12  (e.g., endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 ) that is offline for some time interval can execute autonomic synchronization for updating of its stored content with the other endpoint devices  12  in its federation  34 . 
     The autonomic synchronizer  52  is configured for executing pairwise synchronization between trusted peer devices  12  in response to each update to a data object. In particular, each and every data object that is created and stored in the secure data network  5  comprises a creation timestamp indicating a time that the data object was created, and a “last change” timestamp (i.e., update timestamp) indicating the last time the data object was updated. Hence, the autonomic synchronizer  52  can execute, in cooperation with a corresponding autonomic synchronizer  52  in a trusted peer device, a pairwise update of an older copy of each data object to the most recently available update based on comparing the relative update timestamps. 
     The autonomic synchronizer  52  of an endpoint device (e.g., “A”)  12  utilizes a “database version number” for each other trusted physical network device (e.g., “A 1 ”, “R 1 ”, “B”, “C”, “MCP”) in which the endpoint device “A”  12  has established a trusted relationship, resulting in a corresponding pairwise relationship in the database version number between trusted peer devices  12 . In response to the trusted peer devices  12  connecting to each other (e.g., either directly via a local P2P data link, a logical P2P data connection via an external data network ( 96  of  FIG.  5  or  6   , or via the secure private core network  10 ), the autonomic synchronizers  52  in the trusted peer devices  12  can track their respective database version numbers and in response can update their database versions along with the associated database changes. 
     Since different endpoint devices can be “online” or “offline” at different instances, a “disconnected” endpoint device (e.g., “A 1 ”) can develop changes or “versions” that “drift apart” from the synchronized versions among the trusted peer devices that are connected to the secure private core network  10 , for example where a federation owner is updating a message object (e.g., a note or memorandum)  36  using the “disconnected” endpoint device (e.g., “A 1 ”). Hence, the autonomic synchronizer  52  of an endpoint device (e.g., “B”)  12  can respond to reconnection with the secure private core network  10  (or a trusted peer device  12  via a P2P data connection) by comparing its “database version number” (e.g., the database version number associated with its peer “A”) and determine if synchronization is needed. 
     The autonomic synchronizer  52  also can track changes of all locally-stored data objects based on creating a hash of a database state: the database state represents all locally-stored data objects as tuples of a data object identifier and the “last change” timestamp. Example locally-stored data objects that can be generated by a federation owner on an endpoint device  12 , and replicated and synchronized with other endpoint devices  12 , can include: endpoint objects  22 : conversation objects  42 ; message objects  36 ; outcasted endpoints, conversations and messages that are removed from a federation  34 ; membership of federations in conversations (e.g., subscriber lists  50 ); cohorts within a federation; voting state for conversations and messages; a vault file system within a federation; password recovery information for participants in password recovery; “shared” configuration between devices within a federation; etc. 
     Hence, any one or more of the endpoint devices  12  of a first federation (e.g., “F 1 ”)  34  can cause the secure private core network  10  to execute autonomic synchronization of any portion of the data structures  22 ,  36 , and  42  in any other federation (e.g., “F 2 ” or “F 3 ”)  34  in which the first federation has established a two-way trusted relationship, based on the subscriber list  50  in a given conversation object  42 : the autonomic synchronization is executed in a secure manner that ensures that all data structures always stored securely in a non-transitory machine readable medium, and that all data structures are always transmitted securely, for example via a wireless (or wired) transmission medium. 
     For example, any data object (e.g.,  22 ,  36 , and/or  42 ) that is generated and stored within an endpoint device  12  (e.g., “A”) can be encrypted using its public key (e.g., “KeyP 1 _A”); any data object that is sent from an originating endpoint device  12  (e.g., “A”) to a cohort (e.g., “B”) (either within its federation “F 1 ”  34  or in another federation “F 2 ”  34 ) for secure storage can be encrypted using the originator private key (e.g., “prvKeyP 1 _A”) and the cohort public key (e.g., “Key_B”), and further encrypted using a temporal key prior to transmission to the cohort. The cohort can decrypt the transmitted data object based on the temporal key (described below) and store the object that was encrypted using the originator private key (e.g., “prvKeyP 1 _A”) and the cohort public key (e.g., “Key_B”). 
     As described below, the verified secure relationship is established via a “two-way trusted relationship” that is verified by the MCP device  14  via the first party (e.g., an individual person, organization, or another physical device) and via the second party (e.g., via the physical network device); in other words, no third-party authentication (e.g., by a certifying authority outside the authority of the secure private core network  10 ) is permitted in the secure private core network  10 , nor is any one-way verification permitted in the secure private core network  10 ; hence, the trusted aggregation of multiple two-way trusted relationships establishes the hybrid peer-to-peer overlay network in the secure private core network  10 . 
       FIG.  3    illustrates an example implementation  54  in a physical network device (e.g., an endpoint device  12 ) for deployment of the secure data network  5  in a physical data network, according to an example embodiment. The example implementation  54  includes execution of secure private core network operations  56 , and execution of selected application layer resources  58  for formation of the secure data network  5 . For example, the application layer resources  58  can include executable application code that causes a physical network device to selectively execute element-specific operations within the secure private core network  10 , for example an MCP device  14 , a replicator device  16 , a community server  30 ; as shown in  FIG.  1   , additional application layer resources  58  that can be deployed in the secure private core network  10  by a physical network device (e.g., an endpoint device  12 ) can include a directory server  28  (hosted in the same network executing the MCP device  14 ), a community server  30  (hosted in the same physical network device executing the MCP device  14 ), and a load balancer  62  for allocating each endpoint device  12  to a replicator device  16 . The application layer resources  58  also can include a messenger application  72  that enables a user of an endpoint device  12  (e.g., a 5G smart phone) to send and receive content using conversation objects  42 , for example in the form of instant messages, public/private forum posts, etc. An example of the messenger application  72  that utilizes the “signet” as described herein is the commercially available application “Society” from WhiteStar Communications, Inc., Durham, N.C., at the website address “https://societyapp.io/”. 
     The secure private core network operations  56  can be executed by each of the physical network devices in the secure data network  5  (including each of the endpoint devices  12 ) executing machine-executable code that can be implemented in each physical network device in the form of a self-contained “network operating system” (NOS)  56 . The “network operating system”  56  can be implemented for deployment on various network device platforms, for example as a native operating system (e.g., for an IoT device or a physical network device dedicated for use in the secure data network  5 ), or as an executable “app” that can be installed and executed on a device utilizing an operating system such as Android, iOS, Microsoft Windows 10, or any other Unix-based operating system. 
     The network operating system  56  can include machine-executable code for executing numerous security-based operations in the secure data network  5 , including establishment of a secure peer-to-peer (P2P) network transport  74  based on a dynamic generation of a unique encrypted temporal key for each and every data packet that traverses the secure data network  5 , providing secure network services  76 , providing security policy enforcement  78 , and providing application programming interfaces (APIs)  80 . 
     Example secure network services  76 , illustrated for example in  FIGS.  1  and  3   , can include machine-executable code for executing an Artificial Intelligence (AI) based security service  64  that comprises a guardian service  66 , a sentinel service  68 , and a navigator service  70 . Additional example secure network services  76  can include machine-executable code for executing a prescribed secure salutation protocol with another physical network device (e.g., another endpoint device  12 ) for establishment of a secure two-way trusted relationship, executing management of messages or conversations (e.g., according to a lifecycle policy “L”  24  and/or a distribution policy “D”  26 ), executing management of secure and permanent deletion of data objects or an endpoint device  12  from the secure data network  5  (“zeroization”), account management, etc. Another example secure network service  76 , illustrated in  FIG.  1   , includes machine-executable code for executing a distributed search (DS) agent  82 : the distributed search (DS) agent  82  can execute AI analytics and generate metadata for AI operations; the distributed search (DS) agent  82  is configured for generation and selected synchronization of “projections” with other distributed search (DS) agents  82  that enable real-time searches to be executed by any endpoint device  12 , an MCP device  14 , any replicator device  16 , a directory server  28  or community server  30 , and/or any of the components or executable agents of the AI-based security service  64 . 
     The APIs provide prescribed commands that are available to the application layer resources  58  for execution of the secure private core network operations  56 ; moreover, the APIs  58  separate application logic from the need for any domain knowledge of the underlying data network that is implementing the secure data network  5 . Hence, the example implementation  54  enables application developers to create the application layer resources  58  without any need of domain knowledge, and without any need to learn any security-based protocols, since the secure private core network operations  56  can ensure that the secure data network  5  provides a secure network that can prevent network intrusion. 
     A problem in prior deployments of cyber security is that no known security system for a user network device maintained cryptographic security of a data packet having an encrypted payload that is received via a data network. To the contrary, at most a resource in a user network device would decrypt the encrypted payload to recover a decrypted payload, and store the decrypted payload as a local data structure in a memory circuit of the user network device. Hence, the storage of the decrypted payload “at rest” within a memory circuit of the user network device exposed the decrypted payload to a potential cyber-attack. 
     Although existing encryption applications enabled a user to execute encryption of locally-stored data structures on his or her user network device, such encryption applications are executed at the “application layer”, resulting in the exposure of the decrypted data packet at the operating system level until a user executes the encryption application in the user network device for encryption of the locally-stored data structures. 
     Access to the secure private core network  10  by any physical network device  88  requires installation and instantiation of the network operating system  56 . Further, the network operating system  56  operates as a secure executable container that only allows access to an internal executable code, access to an “at-rest” or “in-flight” stored data structure, or access to the secure data network  5  only via one or more of the prescribed APIs  80 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  prevents any executable resource in a physical network device  88  (or a user of the physical network device  88 ) from accessing any unencrypted form of any “at-rest” first secure data structures encrypted and stored by the network operation system  56  in the physical network device  88 , without authorized access via a prescribed API  80 . The network operating system  56  also prevents any executable resource in the physical network device  88  (or a user of the physical network device  88 ) from accessing any unencrypted form of any “in-flight” second secure data structures encrypted and stored by the network operation system  56 , without authorized access via a prescribed API  80 . The network operating system  56  also prevents any executable resource in the physical network device  88  (or a user of the physical network device  88 ) from accessing the secure peer-to-peer data network, without authorized access via a prescribed API  80  required by the network operating system  56 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  establishes a “closed” access system that requires authorized access via one or more of the APIs  80 . 
     As illustrated in  FIG.  3   , the example implementation  54  also can optionally include a multi-hop transport layer  60  that enables the secure data network  5  to be deployed overlying an existing network infrastructure, for example the Internet or another multi-hop data network ( 96  of  FIG.  5   ), for example a private network provided by a wireless 5G service provider (e.g., Verizon, AT&amp;T, etc.), or a private network constructed according to an alternative multi-hop protocol such as the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) according to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 6550. Hence, the secure data network  5  can be deployed as a private network (e.g., by a 5G service provider or a RPL-based network) for use by private subscribers, without any data traffic exposed to the Internet. The secure data network  5  also can be deployed, however, from the “ground up” based on an aggregation of multiple trusted P2P connections using the secure P2P network transport  74  across multiple physical network devices establishing a mesh of peer to peer connections (e.g., via the pairwise topology  98  of replicator devices  16 ), resulting in the potential deployment of a worldwide deployment of a secure data network  5 , without the Internet. 
     The security policy enforcement  78  provides an enforcement of application-level and user level “manners and semantics” that ensures compliance with digital rights and user relationship rights in the secure private core network  10 . In one example, if an errant application (or user) attempted to modify content it did not have rights to (e.g., a user in the federation “F 2 ”  34  attempted to modify content in a message ID  38  generated by the user of the federation “F 1 ”  34  as identified by the federation ID “F 1 ”  18  in the message ID  38 ), the security policy enforcement  78  can block the attempt to modify the content. As apparent from this example, the security policy enforcement  78  can prevent unauthorized manipulation of media content that has resulted in a proliferation of “deep fake” videos. 
     The security policy enforcement  78  also provides an enforcement of user digital rights, where at any time a user in the federation “F 1 ”  34  can amend or delete instantaneously any one content item owned by the user (i.e., that includes the corresponding federation ID “F 1 ” as part of its message ID  38 ): the security policy enforcement  78  can cause all autonomic synchronizers  52  that have a cohort relationship with the federation “F 1 ” to instantly amend or delete the content item identified by its message ID  38 . 
     The security policy enforcement  78  also can enforce various trust levels between an identified cohort, for example a progression from a transient trust (based on location proximity or common interests) to a permanent trust relationship; the security policy enforcement  78  also can enforce a revoked trust (“outcasting”), where the security policy enforcement  78  can respond to a user of the federation “F 1 ”  34  wishing to revoke a relationship with the user of the federation “F 2 ”  34 ; in this case, the security policy enforcement  78  can provide various warnings regarding revoking a relationship (“outcasting”), including loss of shared data, loss of shared contacts, etc.; as such, the security policy enforcement  78  can encourage dispute resolution between two parties to encourage that societal contracts are fulfilled. 
     The security policy enforcement  78  also can enforce proper semantic behaviors in the secure private core network  10 , including ensuring API calls (by the APIs  80 ) are presented in the appropriate sequence (i.e., not out-of-order), and that a user of a federation  34  performs social-based operations in the secure private core network  10  in the appropriate order, e.g., a user cannot “join” a conversation without having been invited to join the conversation, and a user cannot “leave” a conversation without first being joined as a member, etc. 
     Hence, the example implementation  54  can ensure reliable establishment of cohorts, and can enforce security policies that ensure preservation of media rights and maintaining mutual trust between users via their federations  34 . 
     A fundamental problem in the Internet is that prior to deployment of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), IP addresses at first were allocated (in prescribed address ranges or “blocks”) to organizations, and specific IP addresses could be fixed to a specific location (e.g., an office); hence, an Internet Protocol (IP) address had been used to identify a business, a business location (e.g., office location), a person (e.g., an individual utilizing an office having a network connection), and/or a physical network device (e.g., a personal computer operated by the person within the office and utilizing the network connection). However, the use of DHCP, NAT/PAT, wireless access on a guest network, etc., demonstrates than an IP address does not, in fact, accurately represent any one of a business, a location, a person, or a physical network device. 
     Another fundamental problem in the Internet is that it is built from its Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) core outward to BGP peers that operate as respective Autonomous Systems (ASs), to establish a BGP mesh network, each AS subdividing out from there toward a network edge; hence, a network is not considered “converged” until any one IP address (source address) can route a data packet to any other destination IP address. In addition to causing scaling problems as more networks and more devices are added to the Internet, this universal reachability from any source IP address to any destination IP address also introduces severe security threats since any “threat device” originating at a “source” IP address can threaten any “target device” at a “destination” IP address. In other words, anyone can obtain unrestricted access to the Internet via a threat device using a “source” IP address, and target devices at destination IP addresses need to expend significant resources to prevent intrusion by the threat device. 
     These security threats are magnified by orders of magnitude by cloud computing services using data centers worldwide for replication of data for cloud-based services: a successful attack on any one of the millions of IP addresses in use by a cloud computing service has the potential to disrupt the entire worldwide cloud computing service for millions of customers of the cloud computing service. Attempts to implement a “zero trust network” (e.g., at a utility company, a gas pipeline company, etc.) in order to avoid a cyber-attack are ultimately ineffective because a “threat device” still has Internet-based access to numerous entry points within the “zero trust network”, which can be in the range of millions of IP addresses that the zero trust network relies on for cloud-based services: in other words, a zero trust network utilizing cloud-based services can have an attack surface area of over one million IP address. 
     The secure private core network  10  is implemented with the following security features and operations: the secure private core network  10  can provide full privacy for each endpoint device  12 ; the secure private core network  10  can ensure free association of users or their associated endpoint devices  12  (i.e., no third party can force a disassociation or disconnection between two associated users that have formed an association between each other); the secure private core network  10  can enable the protection of ownership of all content by users (i.e., user content cannot be “stolen” by another user); and the secure private core network  10  can eliminate the necessity for centralized services, controls, costs, such as found in a cloud-based computing system. The secure private core network  10  also can prevent unauthorized monetization of users&#39; data, and also can facilitate integrated money exchange. 
     The secure private core network  10  is implemented as a hybrid peer-to-peer overlay network that does not contain any centralized controls as found in a cloud-based computing system; to the contrary, the secure private core network  10  can be composed based on aggregating a large number of small, decentralized, networks that are built by endpoint devices  12  at the “edge” of the network. Moreover, the secure private core network  10  can inherently implement security as a core policy (i.e., a “base tenant” of the secure private core network  10 ), where each decentralized network has a limited number of network nodes, and every user must “opt-in” before communicating with another network node. 
     Hence, the secure private core network  10  can initiate a two-device secure data network  5  between two endpoint devices  12  (e.g., between two individuals sharing data between two smart phones via a local P2P link and/or via a P2P connection established via the external data network  96 ), and can aggregate additional devices  12  for eventual formation of a worldwide secure data network. 
     The secure private core network  10  comprises a single MCP device  14  that is implemented by a physical network device (e.g., an endpoint device  12 ) such as a user device, or a high-end computing device (e.g., a server device owned by a private network provider such as a 5G service provider, etc.) executing the executable application resource “MCP”  58  illustrated in  FIG.  3   ; in other words, the MCP device  14  can be deployed as an executable application layer resource  58  that can be executed on any physical network device. In one example, a user device (e.g., a 5G smart phone) can initiate execution of the application resource “MCP”  58  (overlying the 5G smart phone execution of the secure private core network operations  56  as a “network operating system” app) for establishment of the secure data network  5  as a private peer-to-peer data network in an isolated region that has a limited number of users (e.g., around twenty users in an isolated region that has no connection to a 5G service provider network or wide area network). 
     The MCP device  14  operates as a prescribed management agent in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . Hence, only one MCP device  14  is executed in the secure data network  5  at a given time, even though an isolated secure data network  5  can have its own MCP device  14 : hence, a physical network device must halt execution of its MCP device  14  prior to joining another secure data network  5  (e.g., executing a merge operation with a larger, pre-existing secure private core network  10  hosted by a 5G service provider). The MCP device  14  can manage subscriptions and registrations by individuals or businesses to the secure data network  5 , accounting, load balancing (executed by the load balancer  62 ), endpoint-replicator assignment (including tracking endpoint-replicator connections for replicator queries), and software update compatibility enforcement. The MCP device  14  also can coordinate with AI-based assist operations provided for example by the AI-based security service  64  (e.g., connection assist using the navigator service  70 , salutation assist, conversation assist using the community server  30 , revocation assist, zeroization assist, etc.). 
     The MCP device  14  is connected to each and every replicator device  16 , and can maintain a mapping of every endpoint device  12  to a state (either offline or connected to an identified replicator device  16 ). 
     The replicator device  16  can be deployed as an executable application layer resource  58  that can be executed on any physical network device. Each replicator device  16  can establish a secure two-way trusted relationship with the MCP device  14  using a prescribed secure salutation protocol that includes negotiation of a public key pair; each replicator device  16  also can establish a secure two-way trusted relationship with all other available replicator devices  16  (using a prescribed secure salutation protocol that includes negotiation of a public key pair) to form a pairwise topology  98  (i.e., one logical hop between each replicator); each replicator device  16  can provide connections between endpoint devices  12  using various secure network transport operations, including crypto tunnelling described below. Hence, each endpoint device  12  can be connected to another endpoint device by zero logical hops (pure peer-to-peer (P2P) connection “A-A 1 ” in  FIG.  1    or “A-D” in  FIG.  6   ), one logical hybrid P2P hop (e.g., “B-R 100 -C”), or two-logical hybrid P2P hops (e.g., “A-R 1 -R 100 -B”). Each logical connection is based on a first party trusted relationship established by a replicator (e.g., replicator device “R 1 ”  16 ) and its peer replicator (e.g., replicator device “R 100 ”  16 ). Replicator devices  16  each include a flow table (forwarding information base) for forwarding received packets after packet authentication. In particular, each replicator device  16  can include a flow table entry  154  that maintains a flow state for reaching a destination endpoint device via an identified trusted peer replicator device  16 ; each replicator device  16  also can establish a forwarding information base (FIB) entry  156  that enables the replicator device  16  to reach each trusted peer replicator device  16  and each connected endpoint device  12 . 
     The directory server  28  can be executed by MCP device  14 . The directory server  28  is configured for managing ontologies of data structures (e.g., caching intermediate results), storing tags, federation IDs etc. (for projections, e.g., parallel searches by the distributed search (DS) agent  82  of one or more physical network devices such as endpoint devices  12 ). 
     The community server  30  can be executed by the MCP device  14  and/or any endpoint device  12 ; the community server  30  is configured for hosting posts within a public and/or private community in the secure private core network  10 . 
     The guardian service  66  can be executed as part of the secure network services  76  and can manage protection of data during transmission or reception (“in-flight”) and while stored on a machine-readable non-transitory storage medium (“at rest”), including maintaining persistence of endpoint objects  22 , conversation objects  42 , and message objects  36  according to the associated lifecycle policy “L”  24  and distribution policy “D”  26 . 
     The navigator service  70  can be executed as part of the secure network services  76  and can manage connectivity graphs for how to connect cohorts; the navigator service  70  also can warn the sentinel service  68  of detected threats, and the navigator service  70  can respond to threats detected by the sentinel service  68 . 
     The sentinel service  68  can be executed as part of the secure network services  76  and can detect threats in real time, mitigate against detected threats (e.g., warning user, automatic mitigation operations, etc., notifying the navigator service  70 ), etc. 
     The guardian service (i.e., guardian security agent)  66 , sentinel service (i.e., sentinel security agent)  68 , and navigator service (i.e., navigator security agent)  70  executed as part of the AI-based security service  64  in the secure network services  76  are scalable in that every physical network device can execute the various services  66 ,  68 , and  70  at a scale corresponding to the associated application operations  58  of the physical device executing the associated application layer resources  58 ; hence, executable agents  66 ,  68 , and  70  operating in one endpoint device (e.g., “A”  12 ) can securely communicate and share metadata (e.g., feature data such as cyber-attack feature data, wireless network feature data, etc.) with agents operating in other physical network devices (e.g., “R 1 ”, “R 100 ”, the MCP device  14 , endpoint device “B”  12 ) to localize and identify potential threats and prevent any attacks within the secure private core network  10 . Hence, the AI-based security service  64  can manage user metadata in order to enhance user security, as opposed to monitoring user metadata for monetizing. 
     The distributed search (DS) agent  82  can execute projections: in relational algebra a projection refers to a subset of columns of information; hence, a distributed search (DS) agent  82  can apply a subset of information from a data structure (e.g., a federation ID  18 , endpoint ID  20 , message ID  38 , conversation identifier  44 , endpoint object  22 , message object  36 , conversation object  42  or a hypercontent component thereof), to decompose a mapping of a database lookup into a set of queries and subqueries; the generation of a projection enables execution of parallel distributed searches. A projection can be created by a distributed search (DS) agent  82  executed by any physical network device within the secure data network  5 . A projection generated by a distributed search (DS) agent  82  can have a defined scope (or “extent”), for example, local, within a federation  34 , within a conversation, global, etc.; a projection also can have different types (e.g., one-time, until a deadline, etc.), and can be named with arbitrary names (e.g., contact lookup, signet scan, etc.). Each projection defines an arbitrary number of “projection entries” that are used to match fields using various search techniques, and to select which fields associated with the matches should be returned; the fields can be arbitrary types of information in the secure data network  5  (e.g., signet, endpoint ID  20 , email address, tag, message ID  38 , conversation identifier  44 , titles, names, hypercontent, URLs, etc.), and the values for matches can be exact matches or regular expressions (“regex”) comprising a sequence of characters that have a matching pattern. Each projection entry can select a number of fields that should be returned when matches select information: if no matches are found for a projection entry then no record is returned; for matches, values for the fields selected are returned along with the associated projection entry tag. 
     Hence, a distributed search (DS) agent  82  can execute a projection that has a scope that limits the extent of a search: the scope can be limited at different locations: for example a scope can limit a search by an endpoint device  12  to a common word usage, old passwords, etc.; a scope can limit a search by a replicator device  16  to GIF image searches, for example; a scope can limit a search by the MCP device  14  to limited fields to preserve privacy of users of the endpoint devices  12 , for example limiting searches to a hash of a user email (and not the actual email which is not made available to the MCP device  14 ), federation ID  18 , endpoint ID  20 ; a scope also can limit a search by the directory server  28  and/or the community server  30 . Projections can be executed once, continuously, periodically, until a prescribed “event” deadline (e.g., time expiration, project deadline reached, etc.). 
     A distributed search (DS) agent  82  also can obtain metadata from other agents executed in the secure private core network  10  to extract feature graphs for assistance in AI-based decisions such as recommendations whether to accept connection requests or conversation requests, keyboard word suggestions, etc. 
     Hence, the implementation of the secure private core network  10  as a cloudless hybrid peer-to-peer overlay network enables every person and every device to be securely connected, and as such is a realization of “Metcalf&#39;s Law” that the value of a telecommunications network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system. The implementation of the secure private core network  10  as a cloudless hybrid peer-to-peer overlay network can extend security features and security operations that mimic social networks without technical constraints, and the use of AI enables the secure private core network  10  to fit policy and interaction requirements of individual users (i.e., people), as opposed to requiring people to adapt to technical constraints. 
     Hence, the aggregation of two-way trusted relationships in the secure private core network  10  ensures that any attack surface area within the secure data network  5  is limited to two devices at any time, requiring any “threat device” to successfully hack the secure keys of the two peer devices before being able to compromise only the pairwise-encrypted content shared only between the two peer devices; hence, any further attack would require the threat device to successfully hack a next pair of secure keys, etc. 
     The secure private core network  10  also can include a sensor network comprising one or more sensor devices (e.g., Internet of Things-based sensor devices): each sensor device has a trusted relationship with at least another sensor device, or a trusted relationship with another entity that enables the sensor device to associate with a single individual, a PAN, a room area network, etc. 
     Depending on implementation, the secure data network  5  can be established as an aggregation of decentralized secure networks. Each decentralized network can be connected to another decentralized network by one or more private dedicated optical fiber connections (“dark fiber pairs”) that are part of a private backbone network: the private backbone network can utilize one or more optical network carriers on diverse fiber paths in order to provide a regionally redundant connectivity over large geographic areas (e.g., providing connectivity between eastern United States, southwest United States, Midwest United States, etc.). Sub-oceanic fiber paths and/or satellite communications also can be used to extend the private backbone network in one geographic region to a worldwide private backbone network. The private backbone network also can be managed by a “bare metal infrastructure” where any server devices executing any network-based operations are single-tenant server devices, i.e., the server devices are reserved for the exclusive use of the private backbone network only, with no use by a third-party tenant permitted (as opposed to existing cloud computing systems that can “share tenants” on a single network device). Further, all data in the private backbone network is always encrypted by default, regardless of whether the data is stored on a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium (i.e., “at rest”), or whether the data is undergoing wired or wireless transmission (i.e., “in transit”). 
     Hardware Device Overview 
       FIG.  4    illustrates an example implementation of any one of the physical network devices shown in any of the other Figures (e.g.,  12 ,  14 ,  16 ,  28 ,  30 , and or  88  of  FIGS.  1 ,  2   , and/or  6 ), according to an example embodiment. 
     Each apparatus (e.g.,  12 ,  14 ,  16 ,  28 ,  30 , and or  88  of  FIGS.  1 ,  2 ,  5  and/or  6   ) can include a device interface circuit  90 , a processor circuit  92 , and a memory circuit  94 . The device interface circuit  90  can include one or more distinct physical layer transceivers for communication with any one of the other devices (e.g.,  12 ,  14 ,  16 ,  28 ,  30 , and or  88 ); the device interface circuit  90  also can include an IEEE based Ethernet transceiver for communications with the devices of  FIG.  1    via any type of data link (e.g., a wired or wireless link, an optical link, etc.). The device interface circuit  90  also can include a sensor circuit  102  (comprising, for example a touchscreen sensor, a microphone, one or more cameras, and/or an accelerometer, etc.). The processor circuit  92  can be configured for executing any of the operations described herein, and the memory circuit  94  can be configured for storing any data or data packets as described herein. 
     Any of the disclosed circuits of the devices (e.g.,  12 ,  14 ,  16 ,  28 ,  30 , and or  88 ) (including the device interface circuit  90 , the processor circuit  92 , the memory circuit  94 , and their associated components) can be implemented in multiple forms. Example implementations of the disclosed circuits include hardware logic that is implemented in a logic array such as a programmable logic array (PLA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or by mask programming of integrated circuits such as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Any of these circuits also can be implemented using a software-based executable resource that is executed by a corresponding internal processor circuit such as a microprocessor circuit (not shown) and implemented using one or more integrated circuits, where execution of executable code stored in an internal memory circuit (e.g., within the memory circuit  94 ) causes the integrated circuit(s) implementing the processor circuit to store application state variables in processor memory, creating an executable application resource (e.g., an application instance) that performs the operations of the circuit as described herein. Hence, use of the term “circuit” in this specification refers to both a hardware-based circuit implemented using one or more integrated circuits and that includes logic for performing the described operations, or a software-based circuit that includes a processor circuit (implemented using one or more integrated circuits), the processor circuit including a reserved portion of processor memory for storage of application state data and application variables that are modified by execution of the executable code by a processor circuit. The memory circuit  94  can be implemented, for example, using a non-volatile memory such as a programmable read only memory (PROM) or an EPROM, and/or a volatile memory such as a DRAM, etc. . . . 
     Further, any reference to “outputting a message” or “outputting a packet” (or the like) can be implemented based on creating the message/packet in the form of a data structure and storing that data structure in a non-transitory tangible memory medium in the disclosed apparatus (e.g., in a transmit buffer). Any reference to “outputting a message” or “outputting a packet” (or the like) also can include electrically transmitting (e.g., via wired electric current or wireless electric field, as appropriate) the message/packet stored in the non-transitory tangible memory medium to another network node via a communications medium (e.g., a wired or wireless link, as appropriate) (optical transmission also can be used, as appropriate). Similarly, any reference to “receiving a message” or “receiving a packet” (or the like) can be implemented based on the disclosed apparatus detecting the electrical (or optical) transmission of the message/packet on the communications medium, and storing the detected transmission as a data structure in a non-transitory tangible memory medium in the disclosed apparatus (e.g., in a receive buffer). Also note that the memory circuit  94  can be implemented dynamically by the processor circuit  92 , for example based on memory address assignment and partitioning executed by the processor circuit  92 . 
     The operations described with respect to any of the Figures can be implemented as executable code stored on a computer or machine readable non-transitory tangible storage medium (i.e., one or more physical storage media such as a floppy disk, hard disk, ROM, EEPROM, nonvolatile RAM, CD-ROM, etc.) that are completed based on execution of the code by a processor circuit implemented using one or more integrated circuits; the operations described herein also can be implemented as executable logic that is encoded in one or more non-transitory tangible media for execution (e.g., programmable logic arrays or devices, field programmable gate arrays, programmable array logic, application specific integrated circuits, etc.). Hence, one or more non-transitory tangible media can be encoded with logic for execution by a machine, and when executed by the machine operable for the operations described herein. 
     In addition, the operations described with respect to any of the Figures can be performed in any suitable order, or at least some of the operations in parallel. Execution of the operations as described herein is by way of illustration only; as such, the operations do not necessarily need to be executed by the machine-based hardware components as described herein; to the contrary, other machine-based hardware components can be used to execute the disclosed operations in any appropriate order, or at least some of the operations in parallel. 
     Identity Management System Forming Two-Way Trusted Relationships Based on Device Identity Container 
     The example embodiments enable the secure establishment of universally-unique identities in a secure peer-to-peer data network  5  that is established based on an aggregation of two-way trusted relationships, all under the control of the AI based security suite  64 . The secure establishment of universally-unique identities is based on establishing a unique federation identifier for a “requesting party” (e.g., user, business entity, etc.) once a two-way trusted relationship has been established between the requesting party and the secure peer-to-peer data network, and establishing a permanent and unique endpoint identifier for a network device used by the requesting party for joining the secure peer-to-peer data network. The endpoint identifier is associated with the federation identifier to establish that the requesting party has ownership of the corresponding network device, where the “ownership” establishes a two-way trusted relationship between the requesting party and the corresponding network device based on the requesting party retaining possession and control of the network device; hence, the endpoint identifier (associated with the federation identifier) can uniquely identify the network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network as an “endpoint device” that is associated with the requesting party based on a two-way trusted relationship between the requesting party and the endpoint device. 
     The requesting party can add additional network devices as distinct endpoint devices that are associated with the federation identifier based on a corresponding two-way trusted relationship between the requesting party and the corresponding network device, under the control of the AI based security suite. Hence, a requesting user can aggregate a “federation” of trusted endpoint devices for use within the secure peer-to-peer data network. 
     Moreover, each endpoint device can uniquely and securely identify itself based on the AI based security suite cryptographically generating a secure private key and a corresponding secure public key associated with the requesting party utilizing the endpoint device. Hence, data storage in each and every network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network, as well as all network communications between each and every network device, can be secured by the guardian security agent based on sharing secure public keys between endpoint devices having established a two-way trusted relationship based on a secure verification of membership within the same “federation” according to a prescribed secure salutation protocol under the control of the AI based security suite. 
     The following description summarizes the establishment of the secure peer-to-peer data network  5  as a trusted aggregation of two-way first-party trusted relationships, also referred to as “cohorts”. Each two-way first-party trusted relationship requires a requesting party “X” to send a relationship request directly to a recipient party “Y” (the first “way” of the two-way first-party trusted relationship), i.e., no “requesting agent” can act on behalf of the requesting party “X” without explicit authorization from the requesting party “X” to send the request; similarly, no “receiving agent” can act on behalf of a recipient party “Y” without explicit authorization from the recipient party “Y”. The relationship request can include a secure public key “Key_X” associated with the requesting party “X” (i.e., the requesting party “X” owns a private key “prvKey_X” corresponding to the secure public key “Key_X”), as opposed to relying on any trust in a secure certificate issued by a third party certifying authority. The recipient party “Y” can decide to accept the request or deny the request; if the recipient party “Y” decides to accept the relationship request, the recipient party “Y” can store the secure public key “Key_X” and send to the requesting party “X” an acknowledgment that contains the secure public key “Key_Y” of the recipient party “Y” (i.e., the recipient party “Y” owns a private key “prvKey_Y” corresponding to the secure public key “Key_Y”). The acknowledgment can be encrypted using a temporal key generated by the recipient party “Y”: the recipient party can encrypt the temporal key using the secure public key “Key_X”, and add to the encrypted acknowledgment (containing the secure public key “Key_Y”) the encrypted temporal key. Encryption can be executed, for example, using data encryption standard (DES), TripleDES, RSA, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), ECIES, etc. 
     Hence, the requesting party “X”, in response to receiving the encrypted acknowledgment containing the encrypted temporal key, can recover the temporal key based on decryption using the corresponding private key “prvKey_X”, and decrypt the encrypted acknowledgment using the recovered temporal key to obtain the secure public key “Key_Y”. Hence, the two-way first-party trusted relationship between the parties “X” and “Y”, or “cohort” between “X” and “Y”, can be securely maintained based on the secure storage of data (“at rest”) using the key pairs “Key_X” and “Key_Y”; secure communications between the endpoint devices  12  associated with the cohort “X” and “Y” also can be secured based on encrypting each data packet prior to transmission using a temporal key, where the temporal key also is encrypted (using the key of the destination device) to form an encrypted temporal key that is supplied with the encrypted data packet for decryption at the destination. 
     The aggregation of cohorts between two endpoint devices  12  (pairs of pairs of pairs) ensures that the attack surface area in the secure data network  5  is no more than two (“2”) devices, regardless of the size of the secure data network  5 . Use of encrypted temporal keys ensures that every transmitted data packet has a different key needed for decryption following transmission. Every data structure stored in the secure data network  5  has a different encryption with a different key, such that the “prize” for hacking a stored data file is only the one hacked data file. 
       FIG.  5    illustrates an example identity management system  86  that can be implemented in the secure private core network  10  for secure establishment of trusted relationships in the secure data network  5 , according to an example embodiment. A new subscriber “P 1 ” can operate his or her physical network device ( 88   a  of  FIG.  5   ) to cause the processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   a  to download and install, for example via an external data network  96  distinct from the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , an executable application (e.g., an “app”) that includes a desired application (e.g., a messenger application  72  of  FIG.  3   ) and the network operating system (NOS)  56 . 
     A new subscriber “P 1 ” as a “requesting party” can enter via the device interface circuit  90  of the physical network device  88   a  a command that causes the processor circuit  92  to start (“instantiate”) the executable application executing the secure private core network operations  56  on the physical network device  88   a  as an endpoint device “A”  12 , causing an account management service executed in the secure network services  76  to prompt the new subscriber “P 1 ” to register by entering an external network address such as a valid email address of the new subscriber “P 1 ” (e.g., “P 1 @AA.com”), a mobile number used to receive text-based or image-based messages, etc., where the external network address is used by the requesting party “P 1 ” for reachability via an external data network  96  distinct from the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     In response to the secure network services  76  (executed by the processor circuit  92  in the physical network device  88   a ) receiving in the request by the user “P 1 ” to register the physical network device  88   a  as an endpoint device “A”  12 , including the external network address (e.g., “P 1 @AA.com”) of the user “P 1 ”, the processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   a  executing the account management service in the secure network services  76  on the endpoint device “A”  12  can respond to the external network address entry (e.g., email address) by causing the secure network services  76  to generate a unique private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” and a corresponding secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” for the requesting party “P 1 ” on the new endpoint device “A”  12 . The account management service executed in the secure network services  76  by the processor circuit  92  on the endpoint device “A”  12  can generate and send a registration request (containing the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” and the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”))  106   a  to a prescribed destination  108  associated with the secure private core network  10  (e.g., a destination email address “registerme@whitestar.io” owned by the secure private core network  10 ) that is reachable outside the secure private core network  10  via the external data network  96  (e.g., the Internet, a 5G carrier, etc.). Hence, the device interface circuit  90  of the physical network device  88   a  can output, via the external data network  96 , the registration request  106   a  received from the processor circuit  92  executing the NOS  56  for transmission, via the external data network  96 , to a physical network device  88   b  hosting a messaging service (e.g., email server “@AA.com”) for the subscriber “P 1 ”; the messaging server  88   b  can forward the message  106   a,  via the external data network  96 , to a physical network device  88   c  hosting a messaging service (e.g., email server “@whitestar.io”) associated with the secure private core network  10  of the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     The prescribed destination  108  of the registration request  106   a  can be hosted by the same physical network device  88   c  receiving the registration request  106   a  from the transmitting messaging server  88   b  or a different physical network device (e.g.,  88   d ) in the secure private core network  10  (e.g., within a replicator device  16 ). The physical network device (e.g.,  88   c  or  88   d ) hosting the prescribed destination  108  can cause its processor circuit  92  to execute a distributed search (DS) agent  82  in order to execute fraud control using the AI-based security service  64 , including determining whether the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) specified in the registration request  106   a  has been previously been used for any registration in the secure private core network  10 , whether the external network address has been previously outcasted or “banned” by another subscriber or any AI-based security service  64  as owned by an untrusted party, etc.; the distributed search (DS) agent  82  (executed in the physical network device  88   c  or  88   d ) having received the registration request  106   a  can limit the scope in the availability of the external network address to prevent the MCP device  14  from obtaining any external network address (e.g., email address) “in the clear”, for example based on limiting any validation of email addresses to only hashes of email addresses, described below. 
     In response to detecting that the external network address (e.g., email address) in the registration request is a new external network address and does not appear to be fraudulent, the distributed search (DS) agent  82  (executed in the physical network device  88   c  or  88   d ) that executed the fraud control can validate that the external network address can be trusted: in response, the distributed search (DS) agent  82  can cause the secure private core network  10  to generate and send a validation response (e.g., email message, text message, etc.)  114   a  to the external network address of the new subscriber “P 1 ” (e.g., email “P 1 @AA.com” hosted by the physical network device  88   b ) via the external data network  96 , where the validation message  114   a  can include the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” generated by the secure network services  76  on the new device “A”  12 : the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” supplied in the registration request can be expressed in the validation message  114   a  in different forms, for example a QR code, a URL, or a text string. 
     Hence, the new subscriber “P 1 ” can utilize the physical network device  88   a  (or another physical network device  88 , as appropriate) to retrieve the validation response from the messaging server  88   b  “out of band” (i.e., outside the secure private core network  10 ): the validation response  114   a  specifies instructions enabling the new subscriber “P 1 ” to submit the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” for validation by the secure network services  76  executed on the new device “A”  12 , for example in the form of a machine readable QR code, a URL link, or a machine-readable text string. 
     In response to the secure network services  76  executed on the new device “A”  12  (by the processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   a ) verifying the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” in the validation response  114   a  sent to the to the external network address of the new subscriber “P 1 ” (e.g., “P 1 @AA.com”), the secure network services  76  can verify the identity of the new subscriber “P 1 ” using the new device “A”  12  as a legitimate owner of the external network address (e.g., “P 1 @AA.com”) that has been determined as trusted through the above-described fraud control testing. The secure network services  76  executed on the new device “A”  12  also can respond to verifying the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” by registering the physical network device  88   a  as the endpoint device “A”  12  based on auto-generating (crypto-generating) a verified identity in the form of a federation ID “F 1 ”  18  that is allocated to the email address “P 1 @AA.com” used by the subscriber “P 1 ”, thereby establishing a trusted relationship between the trusted email address “P 1 @AA.com” and the endpoint device “A”  12 . The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  (within the physical network device  88   a ) executes registration also based on prompting the new subscriber “P 1 ” to create a new password for entry into the secure data network  5 , and by auto-generating (crypto-generating) an endpoint ID  20  for the endpoint device “A”  12  that is a 128 bit UUID (e.g., “EID_A”; “E 1 ” in  FIG.  2   ). The creation of a new password by the network operating system  56  ensures that the requesting party “P 1 ” retains exclusive “ownership” (i.e., possession and control) of the endpoint device “A”  12 , and thus establishes a two-way trusted relationship between the requesting party “P 1 ” and the corresponding network device “A” based on the requesting party retaining possession and control of the network device. 
     If the physical network device  88   a  is to be shared with a second user (e.g., “P 3 ”), then the network operating system  56  can establish a second “profile” for the second user “P 3 ”, enabling the second user “P 3 ” to register via the identity management system as described herein for creation of a different federation ID (e.g., “F 6 ”)  18  and a different endpoint ID (e.g., “E 6 ”)  20  for the same physical network device; in this case, the endpoint object  22  specifying the endpoint ID (e.g., “E 6 ”)  20  for the physical device used by the second user “P 3 ” can include a reference indicating the physical network device is shared separately by two federations (e.g., “F 1 ” and “F 6 ”); as apparent from the foregoing, there is no sharing between the two federations sharing the same physical network device unless a two-way trusted relationship is established between the two federations (e.g., “F 1 ” and “F 6 ”) according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol. 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  (by the processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   a ) can store in the memory circuit  94  of the endpoint device “A”  12  a federation object  32  that comprises the federation ID  18  and the endpoint object  22  having an endpoint ID “E 1 ”  20  that uniquely identifies the endpoint device “A”  12  in the secure private core network  10 . The federation object  32  stored in the endpoint device “A”  12  identifies the federation “F 1 ”  34  within the secure private core network  10 . 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  also can generate a cryptographic nonreversible hash of the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”), for example “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, that is considered in the secure private core network  10  an acceptable identifier for the federation  34  that is also identified by the federation ID “F 1 ”. The nonreversible hash of the external network address guarantees anonymity of the user “P 1 ” while maintaining absolute identity control; hence, an email address of an existing federation  34  can be protected against subsequent registration requests based on utilizing the nonreversible hash of the email address. 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can identify the MCP device  14  as a prescribed management agent in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , establish a connection with the MCP device  14  (e.g., via an IPv4 and/or IPv6 address that is created and/or obtained by the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12 ), and generate and supply in operation  124  a registration message  126   a  comprising its cryptographic nonreversible hash (e.g., its hashed email address “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”), its federation ID “F 1 ”  18 , and its endpoint ID “EID_A” that is owned by the federation ID “F 1 ” (e.g., “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]→F 1 ” and “F 1 →[‘EID_A’]”) (the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  also can include its public key “KeyP 1 _A”). The registration message  126   a  also can include one or more network addresses (e.g., IPv4/IPv6 addresses) obtained and used by the endpoint device “A”  12  for communications via a data network  96  as a multi-hop transport layer ( 60  of  FIG.  3   ) underlying the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . The registration message also can specify an “alias” used by the endpoint device “A”  12  as a reference for identifying a keypair (e.g., “KeypairP 1 _A”), where the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can generate multiple private/public key pairs having respective aliases, for example different cohorts, different data flows, etc. 
     The processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   e  executing the MCP device  14  can respond to receiving the registration message  126   a  by causing its distributed search (DS) agent ( 82  of  FIG.  1   ) to execute in operation  130  a projection search on the supplied identifiers “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, “F 1 ”  18  and/or “EID_A”  20  to determine if there are any matches. For example, the distributed search (DS) agent  82  can execute a projected search of the cryptographic nonreversible hash “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]” to determine if there is a match indicating the cryptographic nonreversible hash (generated using the same external network address) has already been used for an existing federation identifier  18  that is already registered in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     In response to the distributed search (DS) agent  82  finding no other matches, the MCP device  14  in operation  132  can register the new federation  34 . Hence, the registration message  126   a  enables the MCP device  14 , as the prescribed management agent for the secure data network  5 , to associate the federation ID “F 1 ”  18  as owning the cryptographic hash “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]” and the endpoint identifier “EID_A”  20 ; the registration message  126   a  further enables the MCP device  14  to associate the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” with the endpoint identifier “EID_A”  20  owned by the federation ID “F 1 ”  18 . As described below, the registration message enables the MCP device  14  to generate and store in operation  132  a data structure, referred to as a device identity container or “signet”, that comprises the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” of the endpoint device “A”  12 , the “alias” used by the endpoint device “A”  12 , a list of one or more network addresses (e.g., IPv4/IPv6 addresses) usable by the endpoint device “A”  12  for communications via an underlying data network  96  used as a multi-hop transport layer  60 , and the endpoint ID “EID_A”  20  of the endpoint device “A”  12 . Hence, the “signet” for the endpoint device “A” can provide a secure identification of the endpoint device “A”  12  that belongs to the federation “F 1 ”  34  in the secure data network  5 . If desired, the “signet” for the endpoint device “A”  12  also can include the federation ID “F 1 ”  18 . 
     In an alternate embodiment, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can generate the “signet” (containing the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A”, the alias associated with the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A”, the endpoint ID “EID_A”, and any IPv4/IPv6 addresses in use by the endpoint device “A”, and optionally the Federation ID “F 1 ”  18 ), and include the “signet” in the secure registration request  126  sent to the MCP device  14  in operation  124 . The MCP device can cause the projection search as described previously to verify the federation ID “F 1 ”  18  is not already registered. 
     The MCP device  14 , in response to determining there are no matches on the supplied identifiers “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, “F 1 ”  18  and/or “EID_A”  20  (indicating an absence of any previous use of the cryptographic nonreversible hash), can acknowledge the registration message based on generating and sending to the endpoint device “A”  12  a secure registration acknowledgment  136  indicating that there are no other endpoints, and can include an “MCP signet” (containing at least the public key “Key_MCP” and corresponding alias of the MCP device  14 , and optionally the endpoint ID and IPv4/IPv6 addresses) and the “A” signet of the endpoint device “A” for distribution to other network devices, described below; the MCP device  14  can encrypt at least the public key “Key_MCP” (and optionally the “MCP” signet and the “A” signet) with a temporal key (resulting in the encrypted data structure “ENC(Key_MCP)”), encrypt the temporal key with the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” of the endpoint device “A”  12 , and supply the encrypted temporal key “ENC(TK)” in the secure registration acknowledgment  136  with the encrypted data structure “ENC(Key_MCP)” to the endpoint device “A”  12 . The supplied identifiers “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, “F 1 ” and “EID_A” also can be supplied by the MCP device  14  to the directory server  28  for subsequent projection searches in the secure private core network  10 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  can receive the secure registration acknowledgment  136  containing a first encrypted portion (“ENC(TK)”) and a second encrypted portion “ENC(Key_MCP)”. The supply of the encrypted temporal key “ENC(TK)” with the encrypted acknowledgment “ENC(Key_MCP)” in the secure registration acknowledgment  136  enables the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  to decrypt the temporal key “TK” using its private key “prvKeyP 1 _A”, decrypt the acknowledgment using the decrypted temporal key “TK”, and obtain the secure public key “Key_MCP” of the MCP device  14 . Hence, the sharing of secure public keys between the endpoint device “A”  12  and the MCP device  14  establishes a two-way trusted relationship between the endpoint device “A”  12  and the MCP device  14  in the secure private core network. If received from the MCP device  14 , the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  can store the “MCP” signet for subsequent communications with the MCP device  14 , and can further store the “A” signet for distribution to other devices for initiating the secure salutation protocol, described below. 
     Hence, at this stage the federation object  32  contains only the endpoint object  22  having an endpoint ID “E 1 ”  20  that uniquely identifies the endpoint device “A”  12  used for initial registration with the secure private core network  10 . 
     The same user “P 1 ” can register a physical network device  88   f  as a new device “A 1 ”  12  based on installing and instantiating the network operating system  56  on the physical network device  88   f,  and entering the same external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) of the subscriber “P 1 ” in response to a prompt by the account management service executed in the secure network services  76  of the network operating system  56 ; the account management service executed in the secure network services  76  on the physical network device  88   f  can respond to reception of the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) by causing the secure network services  76  to generate a unique private key “prvKeyP 1 _A 1 ” and a public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” for the user “P 1 ” on the new device “A 1 ”  12 , and generate and send the registration request (containing the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”)  106   b  to the prescribed destination (e.g., “registerme@whitestar.io”)  108  associated with the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     As described previously, receipt of the registration request  106   b  causes a physical network device (e.g.,  88   c  or  88   d ) executing the distributed search (DS) agent  82  in the secure per-to-peer data network  5  to execute fraud control, for example based on determining an inordinate number of registration requests  106 . The distributed search (DS) agent  82 , having received the registration request, can limit the scope of searching the external network address (e.g., the email address) to prevent the MCP device  14  from obtaining the external network address “in the clear”, and can generate and send a validation response  114   b  to the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) of the subscriber “P 1 ”, where the validation response can include the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” generated by the secure network services  76  on the new device “A 1 ”  12 . 
     The subscriber “P 1 ” can receive the validation response  114   b  that specifies instructions (e.g., QR code, URL, text string, etc.) for submitting the included secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” for validation. In response to the secure network services  76  executed on the new device “A 1 ”  12  verifying the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” in the validation response  114   b,  the secure network services  76  executed on the new device “A 1 ”  12  can (temporarily) auto-generate a federation ID “FA 1 ”  18  that is allocated to the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) used by the subscriber “P 1 ”, establishing a secure relationship between the external network address (e.g., email address “P 1 @AA.com”) and the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 . The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  also can respond to verifying the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” in the validation response  114   b  by prompting the subscriber “P 1 ” to create a new password for entry into the secure data network  5  via the new device “A 1 ”  12 , and by auto-generating (crypto-generating) an endpoint ID  20  for the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  that is a 128 bit UUID (e.g., “E 2 ” in  FIG.  2   ). 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can store in the memory circuit  94  of the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  the federation object  32  that comprises the endpoint object  22  specifying the federation ID “FA 1 ”  18  and having an endpoint ID (e.g., “EID_A 1 ”)  20  that uniquely identifies the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  in the secure private core network  10 . The federation object  32  stored in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  identifies the federation ID “FA 1 ”  18  within the secure private core network  10 . 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  also can generate a cryptographic nonreversible hash of the external network address (e.g., the email address “P 1 @AA.com”), e.g., “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, connect to the MCP device  14  (e.g., via an IP address that is made available to the network operating system executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 ), and supply a registration message  126   b  (operation  124  of  FIG.  5   ). 
     The registration message  126   b  generated by the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can specify the cryptographic nonreversible hash “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, its federation ID “FA 1 ”  18 , and its endpoint ID “EID_A 1 ” that is owned by the federation ID “FA 1 ” (e.g., “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]→FA 1 ” and “FA 1 →[‘EID_A 1 ’]”) (the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  also can include its public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”). The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  also can add to the registration message  126   b  one or more network addresses used for communications via an underlying data network  96  used as a multi-hop transport layer ( 60  of  FIG.  3   ). 
     The MCP device  14  can respond to reception of the registration message from the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  by causing its distributed search (DS) agent  82  to execute in operation  130  of  FIG.  5    a projection search on the supplied identifiers “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, “FA 1 ” and/or “EID_A 1 ”. 
     In response to determining a match on the cryptographic nonreversible hash “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, the distributed search (DS) agent  82  can cause the MCP device  14  to generate an “A 1 ” signet containing the public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”, the corresponding alias for the public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”, the endpoint ID “EID_A 1 ”, and the list of zero or more IPv4/IPv6 addresses for reaching the endpoint device “A 1 ”. The MCP device  14  can generate and output to the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  in operation  142  a secure endpoint acknowledgment  144  indicating another endpoint device “A”  12  exists in its federation  34 ; the acknowledgment can include the “A” signet of the endpoint device “A”  12  that is already a member of the same federation  34 , the “A 1 ” signet for use by the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  for sharing with other network devices, and the “MCP” signet of the MCP device  14 . As described previously, the “A” signet of the endpoint device “A”  12  can include: the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” of the endpoint device “A”  12 , an “alias” used by the endpoint device “A”  12 , reachability information such as a list of one or more IPv4/IPv6 addresses usable by the endpoint device “A”  12 , and the endpoint ID  20  of the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     As described previously, the MCP device  14  can encrypt the endpoint acknowledgment (containing the “A” signet of the endpoint device “A”  12 , the “A 1 ” signet of the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 , and at least the secure public key “Key_MCP” or the “MCP signet) with a temporal key, encrypt the temporal key with the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” of the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 , and supply the encrypted temporal key in the secure endpoint acknowledgment  144  to the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 . The supplied identifiers “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”, “F 1 ” and “EID_A 1 ” also can be supplied to the directory server  28  for subsequent projection searches in the secure private core network  10 . 
     The encrypted temporal key in the secure endpoint acknowledgment  144  received by the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  enables the guardian security agent  66  in the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  to decrypt the temporal key, decrypt the acknowledgment, and obtain at least the secure public key “Key_MCP” of the MCP device  14  (and optionally the “MCP” signet). 
     The guardian security agent  66  in the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can respond to the decrypted acknowledgment (specifying another endpoint is a member of the same federation  34 , and that contains the “A” signet for the endpoint device “A”  12  and the “A 1 ” signet) by initiating a prescribed secure salutation protocol with the endpoint device “A”  12 . In particular, the secure network service  76  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can generate and send, based on the received “A” signet and “A 1 ” signet, a secure salutation request  148  that contains the “A 1 ” signet identifying its endpoint ID “EID_A 1 ”  20  and requesting a relationship with the endpoint device “A”  12 ; the salutation request can be encrypted using the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A” of the endpoint device “A”  12 ; as described previously, the “A 1 ” alias included with the salutation request can include the alias (associated with the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A”), and also can include the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ” of the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 , and optionally the IPv4/IPv6 addresses for reaching the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 . 
     The endpoint device “A”  12  can “automatically” respond back with the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 , for example the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can infer that the endpoint device “A”  12  and the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  are in the same federation based on a determined match of the hashed external network addresses (e.g., email addresses: for example, a search by a distributed search (DS) agent  82  on a hash of the email address can return the endpoint IDs for both the endpoint device “A”  12  and the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can respond to the salutation request by sending a secure salutation reply (e.g., a salutation acceptance)  150  that includes the endpoint object  22  of the endpoint device “A”  12 : the salutation reply  150  can be encrypted as described above using a temporal key that is further encrypted using the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”, for formation of a secure salutation reply (e.g., secure salutation acceptance). The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  also can store the “A 1 ” signet. 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can determine from the endpoint object  22  of the endpoint device “A”  12  specified in the secure salutation reply  150  received that the endpoint object  22  specifies a federation ID “F 1 ”  18 : the federation ID “F 1 ”  18  in the endpoint object  22  in the salutation acceptance  150  causes the network operating system  56  in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  to determine that the endpoint device “A”  12  pre-existed in the secure private core network  10 ; hence, the network operating system  56  in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  can establish a two-way trusted relationship with the endpoint device “A”  12  based on exchange of the public keys “KeyP 1 _A” and “KeyP 1 _A 1 ”, and in response re-associate its federation ID from “FA 1 ” to “F 1 ” in its endpoint object  20 , and discard the initial federation ID “FA 1 ”. Consequently, the network operating system  56  in the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  adopts the federation ID “F 1 ”  18 , thus establishing the identity of the owner of the devices “A” and “A 1 ” as federation“F 1 ”  34 . Hence, the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  in its corresponding endpoint object  22  adopts the identity, user name, user image, etc. of the same user as in the endpoint device “A”  12  (as identified by its corresponding endpoint ID  20 ). 
     Hence, the secure private core network  10  can establish that the federation “F 1 ”  34  owns the endpoint devices “A” and “A 1 ”  12 ; moreover, a cohort is established between the endpoint devices “A” and “A 1 ”  12  based on sharing cryptographic keys, such that any content created on one endpoint (e.g., endpoint device “A”  12 ) can be autonomically and securely replicated to the other endpoint (e.g., endpoint device “A 1 ”  12 ) by the autonomic synchronizer  52 . Since the synchronization process in the secure private core network  10  is aware of all the federations  34 , any connection by an existing endpoint device  12  in a federation  34  to a new endpoint device  12  or a new federation  34  can cause autonomic replication of the connection to the other devices in the existing federation  34  or the new federation  34  by the associated autonomic synchronizer  52 . 
     According to example embodiments, an identity management system can utilize signets for establishment of two-way trusted relationships in a secure peer-to-peer data network based on ensuring each identity is verifiable and secure, including each federation identity that creates a verified association with an identified external network address used by a requesting party, and each endpoint identifier that is cryptographically generated and associated with a federation identity, enabling a federation identity to own numerous endpoint identifiers for aggregation of two-way trusted relationships in the secure peer-to-peer data network. Additional details regarding the identity management system are disclosed in commonly-assigned, copending application Ser. No. 17/343,268, filed Jun. 9, 2021, entitled “IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ESTABLISHING TWO-WAY TRUSTED RELATIONSHIPS IN A SECURE PEER-TO-PEER DATA NETWORK”, the disclosure of which is incorporated in its entirety herein by reference. 
     Distributed Crypto-Signed Switching in a Secure Peer-to-Peer Network Based on Device Identity Containers 
     Device identity containers (“signets”) also can be used for establishing the secure storage and transmission of data structures across different “federations” of network devices, including endpoint devices (established by different users having established respective two-way trusted relationships with the secure peer-to-peer data network), and replicator devices, according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol under the control of the AI based security suite  64 . Hence, crypto-signed switching can be enabled between two-way trusted network devices in a secure peer-to-peer data network, according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol under the control of the AI based security suite. Additional security-based operations can be deployed in a scalable manner in the secure peer-to-peer data network, based on the distributed execution of the AI-based security suite  64 . 
     The guardian security agent  66  can secure (i.e., encrypt) all “at-rest” data structures as first secure data structures for secure storage in the network device, for example based on encrypting each “at-rest” data structure with a corresponding private key: for example, the guardian security agent  66  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can secure the “at-rest” data structures using the private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” that can be dynamically generated by the guardian security agent  66  during initialization of the network operating system  56 . The guardian security agent  66  (executed, for example, by the endpoint device “A”  12 ) also can secure “in-flight” data structures as second secure data structures based on dynamically generating a temporal key “TK”, and encrypting the temporal key  68  with a public key (e.g., “Key_B”) of a destination device (e.g., the endpoint (device “B”  12 , ensuring secure communications in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . Additional details regarding encrypting “at rest” data structures and “in-flight” data structures are described below, and are also disclosed in the above-incorporated U.S. Publication No. 2021/0028940. 
     In particular, the guardian security agent  66  of a source network device (e.g., an endpoint device “A”  12 ) can encrypt an “in-flight” data packet into a secure data packet based on dynamically generating a unique temporal key (e.g., “TK”) used for encrypting a data packet payload into an encrypted payload, and encrypting the unique temporal key into an encrypted temporal key (e.g., “ENC(Key_B)[TK]”) using a secure public key (e.g., “Key_B”) of a destination device (e.g., endpoint device “B”  12 ) identified within a destination address field (e.g., “DEST=B”). In other words, the guardian security agent  66  of the source endpoint device dynamically generates a new temporal (e.g., time-based) key “TK” for each secure data packet to be transmitted, ensuring no temporal key is ever reused; moreover, the encrypted temporal key ensures that only the destination device can decrypt the encrypted temporal key to recover the temporal key used to encrypt the payload. 
     The guardian security agent  66  of a source network device (e.g., an endpoint device “A”  12 ) also can digitally sign the packet (containing the encrypted payload and encrypted temporal key) using the endpoint device A&#39;s private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” to generate a source endpoint signature. Hence, the guardian security agent  66  can generate the secure data packet for secure “in-flight” communications in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     The source endpoint signature generated by the guardian security agent  66  in the source network device (e.g., the endpoint device “A”  12 ) enables the guardian security agent  66  of a receiving network device (e.g., the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , and/or the endpoint device “B”  12  of  FIG.  6   ) in possession of the public key “KeyP 1 _A” to validate that the secure data packet is from the endpoint device “A”  12 . The guardian security agent  66  of the receiving network device also can validate an incoming secure data packet based on determining that the receiving network device (e.g., the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , and/or the endpoint device “B”  12  of  FIG.  6   ) has a two-way trusted relationship with the source network device as described above, where the source network device can be identified by the source address field “SRC=A”. 
     Hence, the guardian security agent  66  of a receiving network device (e.g., the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  or the endpoint device “B”  12  in  FIG.  6   ) can validate an identity for a received secure data packet  158 , based on validating a source endpoint signature using the corresponding public key (e.g., “KeyP 1 _A”) of the source network device (e.g., the endpoint device “A”  12 ), and based on the guardian security agent  66  of the receiving network device determining that it has a two-way trusted relationship with the source network device identified in the source address field. 
     The guardian security agent  66  of each of the replicator devices “R 1 ” and “R 100 ”  16  also can enforce crypto-signed switching based on validation of a replicator signature. In particular, following validation of the secure data packet  158 , the guardian security agent  66  of the replicator device (e.g., “R 1 ”)  16  can cryptographically sign the secure data packet, using its private key “prvKey_R 1 ” to generate a replicator signature for secure transmission to its trusted peer replicator device “R 100 ”  16  as a secure forwarded packet (e.g.,  164   a ) containing the secure data packet (e.g.,  158   a ) and the replicator signature, ensuring no unauthorized network node  162  in the underlying external data network  96  can decrypt the secure data packet (e.g.,  158   a ) contained in the secure forwarded packet (e.g.,  164   a ). 
     Similarly, the guardian security agent  66  of a replicator device (e.g., “R 100 ”)  16  can determine that the cryptographically-signed secure forwarded packet (e.g.,  164   a  of  FIG.  6   ) is received from a trusted peer replicator device (e.g., “R 1 ”)  16 , and can execute validation of the secure forwarded packet (e.g.,  164   a ) based on verifying the replicator signature in the secure forwarded packet using the public key “Key__R 1 ” of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . As described below, the guardian security agent  66  and/or the sentinel security agent  68  of the replicator device (e.g., “R 100 ”) can verify the secure forwarded packet is not a replay attack. The replicator device (e.g., “R 100 ”) can respond to successful validation of the secure forwarded packet (containing the secure data packet  158   a ) by forwarding the secure data packet (e.g.,  158   a ) to its attached destination endpoint device (e.g., “B”)  12 , maintaining the cryptographic security of the secure data packet (e.g.,  158   a ) for decryption by the attached destination endpoint device “B”  12  following validation of the secure data packet (e.g.,  158   a ) by the guardian security agent  66  in the destination endpoint device “B”  12 . 
     Hence, the guardian security agent  66  can validate identities for establishment and enforcement of all two-way trusted relationships, including during execution of the prescribed secure salutation protocol as described previously. 
     The secure network services  76  executed in each physical network device  88  also includes a sentinel service  68 . The sentinel service  68  is implemented in each physical network device  88  as executable code (e.g., an executable “agent”) within the secure network services  76 ; hence, the sentinel service  68  also can be referred to herein as a sentinel agent  68 . 
     The navigator security agent  70  of an endpoint device (e.g., the endpoint device “A”  12 ) can enable secure communications to be established through a firewall (e.g., “FW 1 ”  152  of  FIG.  6   ) of a locally-utilized wireless data network, based on establishing a two-way trusted relationship with a replicator device (e.g., “R 1 ”  16 ) in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , for example according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol. As illustrated in  FIG.  6   , the “mesh”  98  of interconnected replicator devices  16  enables the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  to provide reachability to the destination network device “B” via a second replicator device “R 100 ”  16 . 
     In particular, the crypto-signed switching described herein is based on the MCP device  14 , as the prescribed management agent in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , tracking a connection status  160  of every network device in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , including each endpoint device  12  and each replicator device  16 . The MCP device  14  establishes a pairwise topology (e.g., a mesh)  98  of two-way trusted replicator devices  16  based on causing the guardian security agent  66  of each replicator device  16 , during registration with the MCP device  16 , to execute a prescribed secure salutation protocol with each and every other replicator device  16  in the secure private core network  10 . 
     The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  upon joining the secure private core network  10  can generate for itself a secure private key “prvKey_R 1 ” and a corresponding public key “Key_R 1 ”. The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can securely register with the MCP device  14  as described previously. 
     The processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88   e  executing the MCP device  14  can update a table of connection status entries  160  of all endpoint devices  12  registered with the secure private core network  10 ; the table also can store connection status entries  160  for registered replicator devices  16 . Each connection status entry  160  for an endpoint device  12  can specify a corresponding next-hop replicator identifier (if available) for each corresponding endpoint device  12 , or an “offline” state indicating the endpoint device  12  is not reachable in the secure data network  5 . The connection status entry  160  enables the MCP device  14  to identify a replicator device  16  that an endpoint device  12  should connect to (e.g., based on load balancing, locality, etc.). As described below, the connection status entries  160  enables the MCP device  14  to identify a “next hop” replicator device for reaching a destination endpoint device  12 . Since the MCP device  14  is attached to every replicator device  16 , each replicator device  16  has a corresponding connection status entry  160 . 
     Hence, the MCP device  14  can respond to the secure registration of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  by sending a secure acknowledgment: the secure acknowledgment can contain one or more signets (e.g., the “R 100 ” signet and the “R 1 ” signet) containing secure public keys of existing replicator devices (e.g., “R 100 ”). 
     In response to receiving the secure acknowledgement containing the “R 100 ” signet, the network operating system  56  executed in the replicator device “R 1 ” can establish a two-way trusted relationship with at least the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  using its corresponding “R 100 ” signet containing its corresponding public key “Key_R 100 ”, enabling formation of the pairwise topology  98  of two-way trusted replicator devices  16 . 
     In particular, the processor circuit  92  of the physical network device  88  executing the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can validate the secure acknowledgment as described herein, and establish a two-way trusted relationship with the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol by sending a secure salutation request using the public key “Key_R 100 ”; the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  also can include in the secure salutation request its “R 1 ” signet containing its public key “Key_R 1 ”. The replicator device “R 100 ”  16  in response can either automatically accept the secure salutation request (based on decrypting using its private key “prvKey_R 100 ”, and based on and the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  receiving the “R 1 ” signet from the MCP device  14 ), alternately the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can verify with the MCP device  14  that the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  is a trusted replicator device, and in response generate and send to the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  a secure salutation reply for establishment of the two-way trusted relationship between the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  and the replicator device “R 100 ”  16 . 
     The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can repeat the establishing of a two-way trusted relationship with each and every available replicator device  16 , based on a corresponding signet received from the MCP device  14 . 
     Hence, according to example embodiments the device identity containers (“signets”) provide a secure identification of replicator devices “R 1 ” to “R 100 ”  16 , for establishment of two-way trusted relationships between the replicator devices  16  and formation of the pairwise topology  98 . The establishment of a secure path based on an aggregation of trusted peer connections enable the establishment of secure network communications in the secure data network  5  via the pairwise topology  98 , without any need for any additional security considerations at the application layer ( 58  of  FIG.  3   ). 
     The device identity containers (“signets”) also can be used to establish two-way trusted relationship between an endpoint device  12  and a replicator device  16 , enabling formation of the secure data network  5  based on the aggregation of secure, two-way trusted relationships along each logical hop of the secure data network  5 . 
     The endpoint device “A”  12  can connect to the secure private core network  10  based on generating and sending a secure replicator attachment request to the MCP device  14  via a prescribed IP address utilized for reaching the MCP device  14  via the external data network  96  ( 60  in  FIG.  3   ), and/or using the “MCP” signet. The secure replicator attachment request “RQ_A” can be encrypted as described previously, and digitally signed by the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     The MCP device  14  can digitally verify the signature of the secure replicator attachment request “RQ_A” (using its stored copy of endpoint device A&#39;s public key “KeyP 1 _A”), and decrypt the replicator attachment request using the MCP private key (and the decrypted temporal key). The load balancer ( 62  of  FIG.  1   ) executed in the MCP device  14  can execute a discovery process that assigns each endpoint device  12  an attachment to a replicator device  16  in the secure private core network  10 . 
     In response to the load balancer  62  identifying the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  for allocation to the endpoint device “A”, the MCP device  14  can generate a secure replicator attachment response based on generating a replicator attachment response that includes the “R 1 ” signet of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 : as described previously, the “R 1 ”signet of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can include the secure public key “Key__R 1 ” of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , a corresponding alias to be used by the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  to identify the public key “Key_R 1 ” that is in use, reachability information such as a list of one or more IP addresses usable by the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , and a replicator ID  20  of the endpoint device replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . 
     The replicator attachment response (including the “R 1 ” signet of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 ) can be secured based on the MCP device  14  generating a new temporal key used for encrypting the replicator attachment response, encrypting the temporal key using the endpoint device A&#39;s public key “KeyP 1 _A”, attaching the encrypted temporal key to the encrypted replicator attachment response, and digitally signing the packet (containing the encrypted replicator attachment response and encrypted temporal public key) using the MCP private key “prvKey_MCP”. 
     The endpoint device “A”  12  can respond to reception of the secure replicator attachment response by digitally verifying the signature of the secure replicator attachment response (using its stored copy of the MCP device public key “Key_MCP”), decrypting the secure replicator attachment response using its private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” to decrypt the temporal key, and the decrypted temporal key, to recover the “R 1 ” signet for the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . As indicated previously, the “R 1 ” signet of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can include: the secure public key “Key_R 1 ” of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , an “alias” used by the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , reachability information such as a list of one or more IP addresses usable by the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , and the endpoint ID  20  of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . 
     The endpoint device “A”  12  can respond to reception of the “R 1 ” signet for the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  by generating and sending a secure attachment request to the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol (secured as described above including an encrypted temporal key and signing of the salutation request by the private key “prvKeyP 1 _A”). The secure attachment request can be encrypted using the secure public key “Key__R 1 ” of the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , and can include the alias (associated with the secure public key “Key_R 1 ”), and also can include the “A” signet (containing the secure public key “KeyP 1 _A”) of the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the physical network device  88  executing the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can respond by validating the secure attachment request according to the prescribed secure salutation protocol, enabling the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  to form a first party trust relationship with the endpoint device “A” based on sending a secure attachment acceptance that can include a corresponding endpoint object  22  that identifies the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can send a secure notification to the MCP device  14  indicating that the endpoint device “A”  12  has attached to the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , causing the MCP device  14  to update the corresponding connection status entry  160  of the endpoint device “A”  12  as attached to a next-hop replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . Also note that the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can obtain the “A” signet from the MCP device  14  in response to identifying the endpoint device “A”  12 , enabling further validation of the endpoint device “A”  12  prior to attachment. 
     Hence the endpoint device “A”  12  can establish a first-party trust relationship with the next-hop replicator device “R 1 ”  16  based on creating (as a local data structure) a key pair association of its private key and the peer public key{“prvKeyP 1 _A”, “Key_R 1 ”} for securely sending data packets destined for the next-hop replicator device “R 1 ”  16  and securely receiving data packets originated by the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . Similarly, the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can establish the first-party trust relationship with the attached endpoint device “A”  12  based on creating (as a local data structure) a key pair association of {“prvKey_R 1 ”, “KeyP 1 _A”} for securely sending data packets destined for the attached endpoint device “A”  12  and securely receiving data packets originated by the attached endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     The endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) also create a corresponding set of private/public keys, and securely register with the MCP device  14 , causing the MCP device  14  to send a secure acknowledgment containing the “B” signet (generated, for example, by the MCP device  14 ). 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “B” can generate and send to the MCP device  14  a secure replicator attachment request that causes the MCP device  14  to allocate the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  for attachment by the endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) by generating and sending back to the endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) a secure replicator attachment reply that includes the “R 100 ” signet. The endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) can decrypt and recover the “R 100 ” signet for the replicator device “R 100 ”  16 , and send to the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  a secure attachment request for establishment of a first-party two-way trusted relationship with the replicator device “R 100 ”  16 . The replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can respond to the secure attachment request from the endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) by generating and sending to the MCP device  14  a secure notification that the endpoint device “B”  12  (and/or “C”  12 ) has attached to the replicator device “R 100 ”  16 . 
     The endpoint device “B”  12  (of the federation “F 2 ”  34 ) can respond to attaching to the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  by sending to the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  a secure query for reaching the owner of the federation “F 1 ”  34 , using for example an identifier received by the endpoint device “B”  12 , for example based on email transmission of the endpoint identifier (implemented for example as a text string, URL string, and/or a QR code, etc.), machine scan of a QR code (generated by the endpoint device “A”) detected by a camera of the endpoint device “B”, etc.: the identifier can be any one of a hash of an email address used by the owner of the federation “F 1 ”  34  as described above, the federation ID “F 1 ”  18 , and/or an endpoint ID (e.g., “EID_A”)  20 . If needed, the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can execute a crypto-switching (described below) and forward a secure forwarded request to the MCP device  14 . 
     The MCP device  14  can respond to validation of the secure forwarded request (described previously) by executing a projection search on the identifier (e.g., “F 1 ”, “EID_A”, and/or “HASH[P 1 @AA.com]”), and sending a secure response that contains the “A” signet and the “A 1 ” signet of the respective endpoint devices “A” and “A 1 ” belonging to the federation “F 1 ”  34 . Alternately, the replicator device “R 100 ” can respond to the secure query from the endpoint device “B”  12  based on local availability of the “A” signet and the “A 1 ” signet for the federation “F 1 ”  34 . The MCP device  14  and/or the replicator device “R 100 ” also can specify in the secure response an online availability based on the connection status  160 , indicating for example “A online” and “A 1  offline”. 
     Hence, the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can forward the secure response to the endpoint device “B”  12 , enabling the endpoint device “B” to execute the prescribed secure salutation protocol with the endpoint device “A” in response to receiving the corresponding “A” signet of endpoint device “A”  12  and the indicator “A online” indicating the endpoint device “A”  12  is reachable via the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . As described previously, the endpoint device “B”  12  can generate a secure salutation request ( 158   b  of  FIG.  6   ) that includes the “B” signet, and forward the secure salutation request  158   b  via its replicator device “R 100 ”. 
     As described previously, the secure salutation request  158   b  can specify an alias (“ALIAS_A”)  174  for the endpoint device “A”  12  (identified from A&#39;s signet obtained by the endpoint device “B”  12 ): the endpoint device “B”  12  can encrypt the payload salutation request using a dynamically-generated temporal key (TK), encrypt the temporal key (TK) using A&#39;s public key “KeyP 1 _A” and add the encrypted temporal key “ENC(KeyP 1 _A)[TK]” to the data packet that also contains the encrypted payload “ENC(TK)[PAYLOAD]”; the endpoint device “B”  12  also can digitally sign the data packet using its private key “prvKey_B” to generate a source endpoint signature, enabling other network devices in possession of the public key “Key_B” to verify the secure data packet is from the endpoint device “B”  12 . Hence, the secure salutation request  158   b  cannot be decrypted by any device except the destination endpoint device “A”  12 ; consequently, the secure data packet  158   b  can secure the logical one-hop connection  216  between the endpoint device “B”  12  and the replicator device “R 100 ”  16 . 
     The replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can validate the secure salutation request  158   b,  and in response determine that the destination endpoint device “A”  12  is reachable via the next-hop replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , causing the replicator device “R 100 ” to generate and send a secure forwarded packet  164   b,  comprising the secure salutation request  158   b,  for secure transmission and delivery to its trusted peer replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can respond to receiving the secure forwarded packet  164   b  by validating the secure forwarded packet  164   b,  and forwarding the secure data packet  158   b  to the destination endpoint device “A”  12  via the network socket connection “Socket_A” that provides the logical one-hop connection between the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  and the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A” can accept the secure salutation request  158   b  by storing the enclosed “B” signet, and generating and outputting to the endpoint device “B”  12  (via the replicator devices “R 1 ” and “R 100 ”  16 ) a secure salutation reply  158   a.    
     The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “B” also can send an online notification request for the endpoint device “A 1 ” to its replicator device “R 100 ”. Depending on implementation, the replicator device “R 100 ” (if executing distributed processing on behalf of the MCP device  14 ) and/or the MCP device  14  can record the online notification request, and generate and send to the endpoint device “B”  12  an updated online indicator in response to the endpoint device “A 1 ”  12  connecting to a replicator device  16 . 
     The updated online indicator indicating the status “A 1  online” from the replicator device “R 100 ”  16  can cause the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “B”  16  to initiate and send to the endpoint device “A 1 ” a secure salutation request (as described in detail previously) that contains the “B” signet. The secure salutation request can cause the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A 1 ” to accept the salutation request, securely store the “B” signet, and send a salutation reply to the endpoint device “B” (via the replicator devices “R 1 ” and “R 100 ”  16 ). 
     Hence, the endpoint device “B” can establish a two-way trusted relationship with each of the endpoint devices “A” and “A 1 ”  12  belonging to the federation “F 1 ”  34 , based on receiving the respective “A” signet and “A 1 ” signet, merely based on identification of the federation “F 1 ”  34  established for the user “P 1 ”. Similarly, the endpoint device “C” can initiate establishment of a two-way trusted relationship with the endpoint device “A” based on sending a secure salutation request within a secure data packet  158   c  to the endpoint device “A” via the replicator devices “R 100 ” and “R 1 ” (as a secure forwarded packet  164   c ) as described above. 
     The example embodiments also enable dynamic updates of each signet stored in the secure data network  5 , for example if an endpoint device changes its public key (“rekeying”) and associated alias, and/or changes its IPv4/IPv6 address reachability. As described previously, a change in a data structure (including a signet) can cause an instant update among two-way trusted network devices. Hence, the endpoint device “A” can cause an instant update of its “A” signet to the replicator device “R 1 ” and/or its peer endpoint device “A 1 ” within the same federation  34 . The updated “A” signet can be forwarded by the endpoint device “A” to the endpoint device “B” (similarly, the replicator device “R 1 ” can forward the updated “A” signet to the MCP device  14 ). 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “B”  12  also can establish a first-party two-way trusted relationship with the endpoint device “C”  12 , for example based on executing the prescribed secure salutation protocol via a peer-to-peer connection that can be established while the endpoint devices “B” and “C”  12  are in local proximity to each other (e.g., within the same wireless local area network). For example, the endpoint device “C” can dynamically generate a visually-displayable or machine-readable identifier for retrieval of the “C” signet by a camera of the endpoint device “B”. In one example, the visually-displayable identifier can be sent as a text string within an email sent to the endpoint device “B”, enabling either manual user input of the text string into the endpoint device “B”, or detection of the text string in the email by the endpoint device “B”. 
     In another example, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “B” can obtain the “C” signet of the endpoint device “C”  12 , based on the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “C”  12  dynamically generating the visually-displayable or machine-readable identifier as one or more of a text string, a bar code, and/or a QR code. In one example the visually-displayable identifier generated by the endpoint device “C”  12  can specify the federation ID “F 3 ”  18  of the associated federation “F 3 ”  34  to which the endpoint device “C”  12  belongs, the endpoint ID of the endpoint device “C”, and/or a hash of the email used during registration of the endpoint device “C”  12 ; hence, the visually-displayable or machine-readable identifier enables the endpoint device “B” to send a projection search to the MCP, enabling the MCP device to return to the endpoint device “B” the “C” signet based on the identifier specified in the visually-displayable or machine-readable identifier. The visually-displayable or machine-readable identifier also can specify the “C” signet, enabling endpoint device “B” to initiate the salutation protocol, via a local peer-to-peer connection, in response to reception of the “C” signet. 
     Hence, the reception of a signet enables establishment of a two-way trusted relationship with a second network device based on executing the prescribed secure salutation protocol with the second network device (“target network device”) based on the public key specified in the signet. The device identifier specified in the signet enables reachability to the second network device (“target network device”). In one example, the device identifier can be an endpoint ID, where reachability to the endpoint ID can be resolved by a replicator device  16 ; in another example, the device identifier can be a local and/or global IPv4/IPv6 address, for example for reachability via a local peer-to-peer data link, a local private WiFi data network distinct from the private core network  10 , etc. 
     A received signet can be stored and arranged for display (e.g., as a QR code) on a “contact page” for a given federation entity  34 , where the “contact” page can include user name, email address used for registration, phone number, etc. Hence, the signet can be displayed on the contact page for a given federation entity  34  within a contact list, enabling a user to display the signet for another user that wishes to initiate a salutation request with the federation entity  34  identified on the “contact” page. 
     Additional details regarding the secure communications in the secure data network  5  are described in commonly-assigned, copending application Ser. No. 17/345,057, filed Jun. 11, 2021, entitled “CRYPTO-SIGNED SWITCHING BETWEEN TWO-WAY TRUSTED NETWORK DEVICES IN A SECURE PEER-TO-PEER DATA NETWORK”, the disclosure of which is incorporated in its entirety herein by reference. 
     The example embodiments also enable establishment of two-way trusted relationships by an endpoint device (e.g., “A”)  12  with one or more Internet of Things (IoT) devices, for example a wireless keyboard device. The endpoint device “A”  12  can establish a two-way trusted relationship with an IoT-based keyboard, within the secure data network  5 , based on the endpoint device “A”  12  receiving a corresponding device identity container specifying a secure public key and a device identifier for the second network device (e.g., the IoT-based keyboard). 
     Additional details regarding use of signets to establish two-way trusted relationships between network devices is described in commonly-assigned, copending application Ser. No. 17/477,208, filed Sep. 16, 2021, entitled “ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING TRUSTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURE NETWORK DEVICES IN SECURE PEER-TO-PEER DATA NETWORK BASED ON OBTAINING SECURE DEVICE IDENTITY CONTAINERS”, the disclosure of which is incorporated in its entirety herein by reference. 
     Secure Assistance for Asynchronous Task Completion by Unavailable Endpoint Device 
       FIG.  7    illustrates in further detail a first endpoint device (e.g., the endpoint device “A”  12 ) causing autonomic execution for completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device (e.g., the endpoint device “D”  12  of  FIG.  6   ), based on an indication requested from an assisting device (e.g., the MCP device  14 ) that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , according to an example embodiment. 
     Prior attempts to mitigate against unavailability of target network device (for example, as typically encountered in low power and lossy network (LLN) devices as described in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 6550) are inadequate because they typically rely on a store-and-forward operation, and/or a timeout operation if a target network device cannot respond to a request within a prescribed time interval: as described previously, store-and-forward operations are susceptible to security risks (e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks) if an intermediate network device is configured for storing sensitive user data destined for the target network device; use of a timeout operation also can cause unnecessary processing burdens on a requesting network device that needs to repeat generation of service requests, particularly if the requesting network device becomes unavailable at the same time that the target network device becomes available. 
     As described previously, the network operating system  56  executed in an endpoint device  12  can implement all executable services associated with security in the secure data network  5 , including encryption of in-flight and at-rest data structures, identity protection, enforcing privatization of user metadata, secure outcasting of bad actors, intrusion prevention, etc. The network operating system  56  retains exclusive control to any access of the secure data network  5 , or to any access of any in-flight and at-rest data structures associated with a user interacting with the secure data network  5 . Hence, all applications and all users can interact in the secure data network  5  with trust and knowledge that all network-based services, user identities, user data, user metadata, etc., are secured in the secure data network  5 . 
     Moreover, the network operating system  56  (e.g., in the endpoint device “A”  12 ) can execute executable services in the secure data network  5  autonomically (i.e., without user monitoring or interaction), including autonomically completing secure asynchronous transactions with another network device (e.g., the endpoint device “D”  12 ) in the secure data network  5 , based on a requesting network device “A”  12  generating and sending a secure assist request  104  to an assisting device (e.g., the MCP device  14 ) in the event that a target network device (e.g., the endpoint device “D”  12 ) is unavailable for execution for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction. 
     The example embodiments enable autonomic completion of secure asynchronous transactions despite non-persistent connections in a wireless data network. As described with respect to  FIGS.  8 A through  8 C , the endpoint device “D”  12  can be connected to the secure peer-to-peer data network  5  via a wireless 5G communications link in the external data network  96 : as described previously, instances can arise where the endpoint device “D”  12  cannot maintain a persistent connection with the secure peer-to-peer data network  5  via a communications link in the external data network  96 , for example due to a temporary loss of a wireless 5G communications link, a powered-down state initiated by the user of the endpoint device “D”  12 , or an operating system software update executed by the physical network device  88  executing the endpoint device “D”  12 , such that the endpoint device “D”  12  becomes temporarily unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the endpoint device “A”  12 . In this example, the example embodiments enable the requesting network device (e.g., the endpoint device “A”  12 ) to send the secure assist request  104   a  to the MCP device  14 , enabling the MCP device  14  to notify the requesting network device “A”  12  (and/or the target network device “D”  12 ) once the target network device “D”  12  is available for execution of the secure asynchronous transaction via the secure private core network  10  (e.g., via a replicator device  16 ), and/or via a secure P2P connection  110  initiated by the requesting network device “A”  12 . 
     As described in further detail below with respect to  FIG.  8 D , the example embodiments enable autonomic completion of secure asynchronous transactions despite disruptions in a secure P2P connection  110 . For example, the endpoint device “A”  12  can initiate a peer-to-peer (P2P) connection  110  with the endpoint device “D”  12  via the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  and the external data network  96  (e.g., in a “client-server” session where the client “A” initiates a connection to the server “D”). However, if the endpoint device “D”  12  determines that the endpoint device “A”  12  is no longer available via the secure P2P connection  110  (e.g., due to unreliable data link along the path of the secure P2P connection  110 ), the endpoint device “D”  12  is unable to initiate a new secure P2P connection  110  with the endpoint device “A”  12  through the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152 ; hence, the example embodiments enable the endpoint device “D”  12  (as a requesting network device) to generate and send a secure assist request  104   b  to the “assisting device” network device “A”  12  via a hybrid P2P connection  112   a  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . Since the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  already has an existing connection with the endpoint device “A”  12  via the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  (e.g., based on the endpoint device “A”  12  having sent a prior secure data packet along the secure hybrid P2P connection  112   b  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 ), the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  can pass the secure assist request  104   b  to the endpoint device “A”  12 , causing the endpoint device “A”  12  (as assisting device) to autonomically initiate (as the target device specified in the secure assist request  104   b ) the recovery of the secure P2P connection  110  that bypasses the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . 
     Hence, the example embodiments enable autonomic recovery of a secure P2P connection  110 , enabling the endpoint device “D”  12  to prevent any “client-server” session to potentially “freeze” due to a lost secure P2P connection  110 , which previously required a manual restart by the user of the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     Hence, the example embodiments provide an autonomic execution for completing an asynchronous transaction, without user involvement and without exposure of any user data, based on the requesting (“first”) endpoint device  12  generating and transmitting a secure assist request  104  that requests that an assisting device causes the requesting endpoint device  12  to receive an indication once a target (“second”) endpoint device is available for execution of the asynchronous transaction. 
       FIGS.  8 A- 8 D  illustrate a method of causing autonomic execution for completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device, based on an indication requested from an assisting device that the target endpoint device is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network, according to an example embodiment. 
     Referring to  FIG.  8 A , a user can install the network operating system  56  and optionally a security-enabled consumer application (e.g., the messenger app “Society”  72 ) in the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  120 , enabling the user “P 1 ” to register in operation  120  the user device as an endpoint device “A”  12  as described previously with respect to  FIGS.  1 - 6   . As described previously, the guardian security agent  66  (illustrated in  FIG.  1    as within the AI-based security suite  64  of  FIG.  7   ) executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can generate in operation  120  its own private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” and a corresponding public key “KeyP 1 _A”. As described previously with respect to  FIG.  5   , the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  120  can generate its own federation ID “F 1 ”  18 , and its own endpoint ID (e.g., “EID_A”)  20 , and generate and supply to the MCP device  14  a registration message ( 126   a  of  FIG.  5   ). As described previously, the MCP device  14  in operation can complete the registration of the endpoint device “A”  12  based on generating and sending a secure registration acknowledgment  136  that contains the MCP signet and the “A” signet. 
     As described previously, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  in operation  122  also can execute registration with the MCP device  14 , including the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  generating its own private key “prvKey_D” and a corresponding public key “Key_D”. 
     As described previously, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  124  can obtain in operation  124  the “D” signet of the endpoint device “D”  12  (e.g., via an available QR code, text string received by the endpoint device “A”  12 , etc.), that can cause the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  (as a “requesting” endpoint device) to initiate a secure asynchronous transaction with the “target” endpoint device “D”  12 , for example initiate the prescribed secure salutation protocol. 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  134  can determine that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the endpoint device “A”  12  via the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . In one example, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  134  can determine the target endpoint device “D”  12  is unavailable based on a determined absence of any salutation response within a prescribed time interval after the endpoint device “A”  12  has sent to the target endpoint device “D”  12 , via the secure P2P connection  110  and/or via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 , a secure salutation request that contains the “A” signet. The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  134  also can detect that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is unavailable based on executing a projection search that causes the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  (and/or the MCP device  14  having access to its connection status entries  160  of  FIG.  6   ) to indicate to the endpoint device “A”  12  that the endpoint device “D”  12  is “offline”. 
     In response to determining the target endpoint device “D”  12  is unavailable, the network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138  can generate and send a secure assist request  104   a  that is destined for an assisting device, for example the MCP device  14  (or the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  if executing distributed operations on behalf of the MCP  14  device). 
     As described below, the secure assist request  104   a  requests that the assisting device causes the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  to receive an indication once the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 , for example based on the assisting MCP device  14  sending a notification to the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  and/or to the target endpoint device “D”  12  once available in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138   a  can generate secure assist requests  104  for various types of secure asynchronous transactions in order to receive a notification once the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available, including: a connection transaction (for establishing a secure P2P connection  110 ); a salutation transaction (according to the prescribed salutation protocol); a duplicate endpoint detection/resolution transaction (initiating a fraud/error resolution in response to detecting the endpoint identifier claimed by the target endpoint device “D”  12  is already in user); a join forum transaction (the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  is attempting to join a user forum hosed by the endpoint device “D”  12 ). As described below with respect to  FIG.  8 C , secure assist requests can be generated for other types of secure asynchronous transactions where the notification can be sent to the target endpoint device “D”  12 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138   b  can generate an assist request for the assisting MCP device  14  based on inserting, into the assist request, a first “trigger” instruction for identifying a notification event, namely that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is “available” via the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . The network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138   b  also can insert into the assist request a second “routing” instruction that identifies the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  and/or the target endpoint device “D”  12  as an identified destination for a notification message to be generated and transmitted by the assisting MCP device  14  in response to identifying the notification event. As described previously, no user-generated data is included in the assist request; hence, the assist request can be limited to identifying the requesting network device generating the assist request, the first “trigger” instruction identifying the target endpoint device, and the routing instruction identifying the destination for the notification message (e.g. “‘ID’ online” if the notification is destined for the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 ; or “‘A’ requests a transaction” if the notification is destined for the target endpoint device “D”  12 ). 
     As described previously, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138   c  can encrypt the assist request generated in operation  138   b,  using the public key “Key_MCP”, based on encrypting the assist request with a temporal key “TK 1 ”, encrypting the temporal key “TK 1 ” with the public key “Key_MCP” of the assisting MCP device  14 , and digitally signing the secure request with a digital signature using the secure private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” that was generated in operation  120 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  138   d  can send the digitally-signed secure assist request  104   a  to the assisting MCP device  14  via the replicator device  16 . The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  can validate the digital signature in the received secure assist request  104   a  as described previously, verify the secure assist request  104   a  is not a replay attack (as described in the above-incorporated application Ser. No. 17/345,057), and forward the secure assist request  104   a  to the assisting MCP device  14 . 
     Referring to  FIG.  8 B , the network operating system  56  executed by the assisting MCP device  14  in operation  140  can validate the digital signature in the secure assist request  104   a  using the public key “KeyP 1 _A”, decrypt the payload containing the assist request based on decrypting the temporal key “TK 1 ” using the private key “prvKey_MCP”, and decrypting the encrypted payload using the decrypted temporal key “TK 1 ”. The network operating system  56  executed by the assisting MCP device  14  can parse the assist request containing the trigger instruction identifying the target endpoint device “D”  12 , and the routing instruction identifying the destination for the notification message to be transmitted upon detection of the notification event. The network operating system  56  executed in the assisting MCP device  14  can store the pending assist request for the target endpoint device “D”  12 , for example based on storing the pending assist request in a hash for pending operations for the target endpoint device “D”  12 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the MCP device  14  in operation  146  can detect that the endpoint device “D”  12  is available in the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 , for example in response to receiving a secure notification indicating that the endpoint device “D”  12  has attached to a replicator device (e.g., “R 1 ”  16 ). The network operating system  56  of the MCP device  14  in operation  146  can update the corresponding connection status entry  160  indicating that the endpoint device “D”  12  is reachable via the replicator device “R 1 ” (or any other replicator device, as appropriate). The network operating system  56  of the MCP device  14  in operation  146  also can detect the notification event for the secure assist request  104   a  from the requesting device “A”  12  based on matching the availability of the target endpoint device “D”  12  to the pending notification instructions (e.g., based on the above-described hash for pending instructions for the target endpoint device “D”  12 ). Hence, the first instruction specified in the secure assist request  104   a  causes the assisting MCP device  14  to generate a notification in response to detecting the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available via the secure peer-to-peer data network  5 . 
     In response to detecting the notification event for the target endpoint device “D”  12  as requested by the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in the secure assist request  104   a,  the network operating system  56  of the MCP device  14  can generate and transmit a secure notification  168  that causes the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  to receive an indication that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction with the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 , for example based on generating in operation  166  the notification destined for the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 , or generating the notification destined for the target endpoint device “D”  12  that causes the target endpoint device “D”  12  to indicate its availability to the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 , described in  FIG.  8 C . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  of the assisting MCP device  14  in operation  166  can determine from the routing instructions that the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  is the intended destination for the notification. As described previously, a routing instruction can identify the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  as the intended destination for any of the following secure asynchronous transactions: connection, salutation, duplicate endpoint detection, and/or join forum. The network operating system  56  of the MCP device  14  in operation  166  can generate a secure notification  168  based on encrypting the notification for the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  (specifying the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available) using a temporal key “TK 2 ”, adding the encrypted temporal key (based on encrypting the temporal key “TK 2 ” using the public key “KeyP 1 _A”) to the encrypted notification, and digitally signing the secure notification  168  using the MCP private key “prvKey_MCP”. The network operating system  56  of the assisting MCP device  14  in operation  166  can securely send the secure notification  168  to the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  170  can respond to the received endpoint device “A”  12  by validating the digital signature using the MCP public key “Key_MCP”, decrypting the payload based on using the private key “prvKeyP 1 _A” to decrypt the temporal key “TK 2 ”, and using the decrypted temporal key “TK 2 ” to decrypt the notification specifying the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available. 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  can determine in operation  170  from the decrypted notification that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available for the execution of the secure asynchronous transaction that was specified in the previously-transmitted secure assist request  104   a.  As apparent from the foregoing, the network operating system  56  executed in the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  can maintain a list of pending transactions for different endpoint devices  12  in the secure data network. 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  of the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  172  can cause autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the target endpoint device “D”  12 , in response to receiving the decrypted notification from the assisting MCP device  14  that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available. Hence, the endpoint devices “A” and “D”  12  in operation  174  can autonomically complete the secure asynchronous transaction (e.g., connection, salutation, duplicate endpoint detection/resolution, and/or join forum), based on the secure notification  168  sent to the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 . 
       FIG.  8 C  illustrates a variation of  FIGS.  8 A and  8 B , where the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  176  determines that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is unavailable for execution of a secure asynchronous transaction via the secure peer-to-peer data network, where the routing instructions generated and sent by the endpoint device “A”  12  in the secure assist request  104   a  cause the assisting MCP device to send the secure notification  168  to the target endpoint device “D”  12 . 
     Example secure asynchronous transactions where the secure notification  168  is sent to the target endpoint device “D”  12  can include: a delete endpoint transaction (where the endpoint object  22  for the target endpoint device “D”  12  is deleted by the endpoint device “A”  12  and thus the target endpoint device “D”  12  needs to delete the corresponding endpoint object  22  for the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 ), and a zeroization transaction (described in further detail in commonly-assigned, copending application Ser. No. 17/409,067, filed Aug. 23, 2021, entitled “PASSWORD CONCATENATION FOR SECURE COMMAND EXECUTION IN A SECURE NETWORK DEVICE”, the disclosure of which is incorporated in its entirety herein by reference). Additional secure asynchronous transactions where the secure notification  168  is sent to the target endpoint device “D”  12  can include a subscription transaction (e.g., subscribing to a conversation identifiable by a conversation object  42  of  FIG.  2   ), a delete federation transaction, a revoke federation transaction (e.g., the federation “F 1 ” can execute “outcasting” of a federation owning the target endpoint device “D”  12 ), or fraud detection (causing the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  to execute security protocols in response to detected fraudulent use by the user of the target endpoint device “D”  12 ). 
     Hence, similar to operation  138  of  FIG.  8 A , the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  can generate and send in operation  138 ′ a secure request  104   a  destined for the assisting MCP device  14 , including adding to the assist request the same “trigger” instruction for identifying the notification event that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is “available”, however in this the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  adds a routing instruction for sending the secure notification  168  to the target endpoint device “D”  12  (in contrast to the routing instruction for sending the secure notification  168  to the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  as in operation  138 ). The network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “A”  12  encrypts the assist request and digitally signs the secure assist request  104   a  as described above with respect to operation  138 , and securely sends the secure assist request  104   a  to the assisting MCP device  14  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . 
     The network operating system  56  executed in the assisting MCP device  14  in operation  178  recovers and stores the assist request (specifying the routing instructions to send the notification to the target endpoint device “D”  12 ) as described previously with respect to operation  140 , detects the target endpoint device “D”  12  as described previously with respect to operation  146 , and in response generates a secure notification  168  destined for the target endpoint device “D”  12  and specifying that the endpoint device “A”  12  has requested to execute a secure asynchronous transaction with the target endpoint device “D”  12 . If desired, the secure notification  168  can include an identification of the type of secure asynchronous transaction to be executed with the requesting endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  in operation  180  can validate and decrypt the notification from the secure notification  168  as described above (including using its private key “prvKey_D”). The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  in operation  180  can respond to the notification indicating that the endpoint device “A”  12  has requested to execute a secure asynchronous transaction, by either initiating execution of the secure asynchronous transaction (if specified in the notification), or sending an indication (within a secure data packet) to the endpoint device “A”  12  (e.g., via the secure hybrid P2P connection  112   a ) that the endpoint device “D”  12  is available for the execution of the secure asynchronous transaction. 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  182  can respond to reception of the secure data packet from the endpoint device “D”  12  by validating and decrypting the indication as described above, detecting that the target endpoint device “D”  12  is available, and in response causing autonomic execution for completing the secure asynchronous transaction with the target endpoint device “D”  12 . If the target endpoint device “D”  12  has already initiated execution (based on the secure notification  168  identifying the type of secure asynchronous transaction), the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  can autonomically complete the secure asynchronous transaction, including for example completing any updates by the autonomic synchronizer  52 , clearing pending transactions, etc. Hence, the example embodiments enable the target endpoint device “D”  12  to be notified for autonomically completing execution of secure asynchronous transactions such as delete endpoint, zeroization, subscription, delete federation, revoke federation, and/or fraud detection. 
     Hence, the example embodiments enable the requesting endpoint device “A”  12  to send a secure assist request  104  to the assisting MCP device  14  for secure asynchronous task completion if the target endpoint device “D”  12  is offline. As described previously, the example embodiments also can enable a requesting device to send a secure assist request to the target network device, as the assisting network device, via an alternative P2P connection, for example to enable autonomic completion of secure asynchronous transactions despite disruptions in a secure P2P connection  110 . 
     Referring to  FIG.  8 D , the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  184  can initiate a secure peer-to-peer (P2P) connection  110  with the endpoint device “D”  12  via the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  and the external data network  96  (e.g., in a “client-server” session where the client “A” initiates a connection to the server “D”), based on sending a secure connection request to the endpoint device “D”  12  using a destination IP address of the endpoint device “D”  12 . The secure appliance “FW 1 ”  152  can store an internal “5-tuple” (comprising, for example a source IP address of the endpoint device “A”  12 , a destination IP address of the endpoint device “D”  12 , a TCP/UDP protocol type, a TCP/UDP source port of the endpoint device “A”  12 , and a TCP/UDP destination port of the endpoint device “D”  12 ), enabling the secure appliance “FW 1 ”  152  to allow a reply packet from the endpoint device “D”  12  to the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  in operation  186  can receive a secure P2P connection request from the endpoint device “A”  12 , and respond with a secure connection acknowledgment via the return path of the secure P2P connection  110 , where the secure appliance “FW 1 ”  152  can pass the secure connection acknowledgment based on the stored 5-tuple. Hence, the endpoint device “A”  12  and the endpoint device “D”  12  can execute a secure “client-server” session via the secure P2P connection  110  established by the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     Assume that a transient change or failure (e.g., port reset, link flapping, etc.) along the secure P2P connection  110  between the endpoint device “A”  12  and the endpoint device “D”  12  causes the failure in the secure P2P connection  110 . Hence, the network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  can determine in operation  188  that the endpoint device “A”  12  is no longer available via the secure P2P connection  110  (e.g., due to unreliable data link along the path of the secure P2P connection  110 ), for a secure asynchronous transaction; further, the endpoint device “D”  12  is unable to initiate a new secure P2P connection  110  with the endpoint device “A”  12  through the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152 . 
     Hence, the network operating system  56  executed in the endpoint device “D”  12  (as a requesting network device) in operation  190  can generate and send a secure assist request  104   b  (for a pre-emptive connection assist command to restore the lost secure P2P connection  110 ) destined for the “assisting device” endpoint device “A”  12  via a secure hybrid P2P connection  112   a  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 . The secure assist request  104   b  can include a first instruction for identifying the “assisting” endpoint device “A”  12  of the target endpoint device “A”  12  as the notification event, and a routing instruction identifying the target endpoint device “A”  12  as the destination of the notification for the pre-emptive assist command. The secure assist request  104   b  can be encrypted and digitally signed as described above, for secure transmission via the secure hybrid P2P connection  112   a.    
     The replicator device “R 1 ”  16  in operation  192  can verify the secure assist request  104   b  as described above, and forward the secure assist request  104   b  to the endpoint device “A”  12 . Since the replicator device “R 1 ”  16  already has an existing connection with the endpoint device “A”  12  via the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  (e.g., based on the endpoint device “A”  12  having sent a prior secure data packet along the secure hybrid P2P connection  112   b  via the replicator device “R 1 ”  16 ), the security appliance “FW 1 ”  152  can pass the secure assist request  104   b  to the endpoint device “A”  12 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “A”  12  in operation  194  can validate the secure assist request  104   b,  detect the first instruction identifying the target endpoint device “A”  12  as the notification event, and in response (as assisting device) cause the autonomic initiation (as the target device specified in the secure assist request  104   b ) of the pre-emptive connection assist for the autonomic recovery of the secure P2P connection  110  without any user action, based on generating and sending a secure data packet to the endpoint device “D”  12  via the security appliance “FW 1 ” and the external data network  96 . 
     The network operating system  56  of the endpoint device “D”  12  in operation  196  can validate the secure data packet received from the endpoint device “A”  12  via the secure P2P connection  110 , and resume communications with the endpoint device “A”  12  via the secure P2P connection  110 . 
     According to example embodiments, a requesting network device can send a secure assist request to an assisting network device for assistance in autonomic execution in completing a secure asynchronous transaction with a target endpoint device. The example embodiments can ensure that no sensitive information is provided to the assisting network device, and that no user involvement is needed. The example embodiments also enable a target endpoint device to act as the assisting network device, for example based on receiving the secure assist request from a secure P2P path that is distinct from a prior secure P2P path used by the requesting network device and the target network device. Hence, the example embodiments can provide to users the appearance of persistent and continuous network services despite the lack of persistent network connections, with no security risks encountered by any intermediate devices. 
     While the example embodiments in the present disclosure have been described in connection with what is presently considered to be the best mode for carrying out the subject matter specified in the appended claims, it is to be understood that the example embodiments are only illustrative, and are not to restrict the subject matter specified in the appended claims.