Patent Publication Number: US-9838380-B2

Title: Visualization of trust in an address bar

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a continuation of and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. §120 to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/965,822, filed Aug. 13, 2013, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/776,260, filed May 7, 2010, now U.S. Pat. No. 8,843,749, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/089,544, filed Mar. 23, 2005, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,743,254, the disclosures of which are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND 
     The Internet has achieved widespread acceptance with the consuming public. Today people routinely conduct business or other personal transactions using the Internet. For instance, many people to use the Internet to conduct online banking or to manage their credit card accounts. The acceptance of the Internet has led to certain malicious individuals seeking to exploit some people&#39;s lack of understanding of Internet software. For example, one scheme, known as “phishing”, is used by malicious individuals to trick unwary Internet users into believing they are at a trusted site when in fact they are at the malicious individuals&#39; site. The malicious individuals then capitalize on this misunderstanding by prompting the users for certain personal information, such as bank account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, user login I.D.&#39;s, passwords, and the like. These phishing schemes seem to be more effective than one may think. 
     One technique, termed Secure Sockets Layer or “SSL”, is used to make a consumer&#39;s browsing experience more safe. In short, SSL is a technique for establishing trust between a remote computing system, such as an e-commerce server, and a local computing system, such as the consumer&#39;s computer. The entity that controls the remote computing system obtains an “SSL certificate” from a Certificating or Certifying Authority (“CA”). The CA is a highly trusted organization that assumes the responsibility of verifying the identify of entities or individuals that request a certificate, and then issuing the certificates to them. The SSL certificate is essentially an electronic document, digitally signed by the CA, that is un-modifiable and affirmatively associates a particular domain with a particular entity. 
     When the local computing system initiates a session with the remote computing system (which is inside the certified domain), the remote computing system returns the SSL certificate to the local computing system. The local computing system determines from the SSL certificate the identity of the CA that signed it. The local computing system then uses a locally-stored version of the CA&#39;s root certificate to verify the integrity of the remote computer&#39;s SSL certificate. If the remote computer&#39;s SSL certificate is valid and in-date, the local computer negotiates an encrypted session with the now-validated remote computing system. This encrypted session may be used to safely conduct sensitive transactions, such as online banking or e-commerce. 
     It should be apparent that the authenticity, validity, and even existence of the particular SSL certificate is of paramount importance to the value of the SSL protocol. However, most users are completely unaware that such a certificate even exists during an SSL session. Some browsing software may present a small icon or the like to indicate little more than the fact that a secure SSL session has been started. But importantly, few users know how to evaluate the information contained in the certificate because conventional technologies hide the certificate in the background and only use it to set up the secure session. 
     An adequate mechanism for conveying to a user the legitimacy of a session with a Web site has eluded those skilled in the art, until now. 
     SUMMARY 
     The present disclosure is directed at techniques and mechanisms that implement a system for presenting security information about a current site or communications session. Briefly stated, a browsing software is configured to receive a certificate during a negotiation of a secure session between a local device and a remote device. The certificate includes security information about a site maintained at the remote device. The security information is displayed to a user of the browsing software in a meaningful fashion to allow the user to make a trust determination about the site. Displaying the security information may include presenting a certificate summary that includes the most relevant information about the certificate, such as the name of the owner of the site and the name of the certificating authority of the certificate. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Non-limiting and non-exhaustive embodiments are described with reference to the following figures, wherein like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout the various views unless otherwise specified. 
         FIG. 1  is a functional block diagram generally illustrating a system for retrieving content from a remote location to browsing software, in accordance with one or more embodiments. 
         FIG. 2  is a functional block diagram illustrating components of browsing software that implement one or more embodiments. 
         FIGS. 3 through 6  are general representations of an address bar displayed by browsing software that includes security information about a current session. 
         FIG. 7  is an operational flow diagram generally illustrating a process for presenting security-related information in a browser display. 
         FIG. 8  is a functional block diagram illustrating a sample computing device that may be used in various implementations of the described techniques. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     The following description is directed at a system and method for a meaningful presentation of security-related information about a current browsing session. Generally stated, a graphical interface in browsing software is configured to display an address of a current site or page with the domain of the address highlighted. Specific implementations of this general concept will now be described. 
       FIG. 1  is a functional block diagram generally illustrating a system  100  for performing transactions or otherwise retrieving information over the Internet  112 . Included in the system  100  are a graphical display produced by browsing software  130  executing on a client computing system (not shown), a “legitimate” server  110 , and an “illegitimate” server  114 . Each of these elements is connected over a wide area network, such as the Internet  112 . 
     The legitimate site  110  is a computing system associated with a legitimate entity or business, such as a bank&#39;s online access, an electronic retailer, or the like. In this example, the legitimate entity is located at the domain “yourbank.com”. The legitimate site  110  supports SSL connections (e.g., the “https” protocol), so the entity that maintains the legitimate site  110  has obtained an SSL certificate  111  from a Certificating Authority (“CA”) (not shown) confirming that the domain “yourbank.com” is under the control of the entity. As is known in the art, the certificate  111  is an electronic document, digitally signed by the CA, that includes the entity&#39;s public key and information that confirms the identity of the entity and the association of the entity with that particular domain. 
     The illegitimate site  114  is a computing device under control of some malicious or untoward entity controlled by individuals that intend to deceive people into believing that the illegitimate site  114  is in fact the legitimate site  110 . In this example, the illegitimate site  114  resides at the domain “hackers.com”. In this example, the illegitimate site  114  is not confirmed by an SSL certificate, although it could be. 
     It should be noted that the domains “yourbank.com” and “hackers.com” are used here as examples only and are intended to represent the general concepts of a legitimate site and an illegitimate site for simplicity of discussion only. Neither the inventors nor the assignee of this patent document intend any importance to those particular domains or their respective owners, should there actually be any. 
     A user uses the browsing software  130  to visit (or “surf”) various locations on the Internet  112 , such as the legitimate site  110 . In one example, the legitimate location  110  may be the online access for the user&#39;s bank. When the browsing software  130  initiates the session with the legitimate site  110 , the two computing devices negotiate an SSL connection and the legitimate site  110  transmits the certificate  111  to the browsing software  130 . Once the browsing software  130  validates the certificate  111 , a secure (e.g., encrypted) session is established. 
     The resulting web page  137  (retrieved from the legitimate site  110 ) displays various elements used to conduct an electronic commercial transaction. For example, the web page  137  may include information that purports to identify the entity that is conducting business using the legitimate site  110 , “YourBANK” in this example. A frame  140  on the web page  137  includes fields that prompt the user to enter personal identifying information, such as a username and password, credit card number and expiration, bank account number, PIN number, social security number, or the like. A submit button  145  serves to post the form data from the fields back to the site hosting the web page  137  (the legitimate site  110  in this example). Using conventional technology, any one or more of those elements (e.g., the web page  137 , the frame  140 , or the form button  145 ) could negotiate an SSL session (or “sub-session”) to retrieve or post certain content over a secure link. However, conventional technologies do not communicate such SSL sub-sessions to the user in any fashion. 
     A common feature of browsing software generally is the ability to view, in the address bar  135 , a URL or Universal Resource Identifier (URI) that identifies the particular location of the content currently being rendered by the browsing software  130 . However, with conventional technologies, the URL may be obscured with too many various elements, such a protocol identifier, a domain name (including three or more levels of domain), any script names, parameters that are being passed to those scripts, and the like. Thus, the user may not easily be able to determine that the site currently being viewed is not actually within the expected domain for the web page  137 . For example, the user may have clicked a link in an e-mail message believing it would lead to a site maintained by the legitimate site  110  (e.g., within the domain “yourbank.com”). However, the link may have actually led to a site maintained at the illegitimate site  114  that was created to look similar to the legitimate site  110 , a technique called “spoofing” the site. In this way, the user can be fooled into providing the personal information  140  to the illegitimate site  114 . 
     In one or more embodiments, a portion of the graphical display of the browsing software  130  is used to convey security information to help the user determine what level of trust to attach to the currently-displayed web page  137 . More specifically, an “SSL bar”  139  is displayed next to an address bar  135  that visually portrays security information about the security level and details of the current session (e.g., the web page  137  at the URL in the address bar  135 ). There are many possible ways to emphasize security with the SSL bar  139 , in particular regarding the display of certificate information. Some options are discussed below in conjunction with  FIG. 3 . Briefly stated, the SSL bar  139  is used to display important security information about the current session or about the current web page  137 . For instance, if the user of the browsing software  130  had inadvertently been directed to the illegitimate site  114 , which was spoofing the legitimate site  110 , the SSL bar  139  would visually convey information about the current session that would hopefully allow the user to determine that the web page  137  was not actually from the legitimate site  110 . 
       FIG. 2  is a functional block diagram illustrating software components of browsing software  210  that are configured in accordance with one or more embodiments. The browsing software  210  may be any software components or modules that support the retrieval and viewing of content from a wide area network, such as the Internet, using the TCP/IP protocol. The browsing software  210  may be implemented as functionality or modules of code in an operating system, or it may be implemented as a standalone application, or some combination of the two. 
     In this implementation, the browsing software  210  includes a rendering engine  253  that is configured to render content commonly used by Internet programmers. For instance, the rendering engine  253  may be configured to interpret HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and eXtensible HTML (XHTML) and render Web pages created in those, and many other, markup languages and retrieved over the Internet  112 . Rendering content from Internet sites is well known in the art. 
     The browsing software  210  may also either include or interact with communications module  212 , which is responsible for establishing a communications link with other devices over the Internet  112 . As part of establishing that link, an SSL certificate  211  may be delivered to the browsing software  210  from a remote device within some domain. As mentioned above, the SSL certificate  211  definitively identifies the entity that owns or at least controls the domain. Other functionality of the communications module  212  may include negotiating an SSL session between the browsing software  210  and the remote device, and encrypting/decrypting content transmitted over that secure link. 
     A certificate manager  214  may receive and verify certificates received by the communications module  212 , such as certificate  211 . A certificate store  213  may contain root certificates for particular trusted Certificating Authorities (CAs) that are used to verify inbound SSL certificates, such as certificate  211 . It will be appreciated that the certificate store  213  may be pre-populated with root certificates for highly trusted CAs by the creator of the browsing software  210 . Additional root certificates may also be added to the certificate store  213  over time. The certificate manager  214  may be configured to examine the SSL certificate  211  to determine the particular CA that signed the certificate, and to search the certificate store  213  for a root certificate from that CA. The certificate manager  214  may examine an entire chain of certificates until determining the appropriate root certificate for the CA, as is known in the art. 
     The certificate manager  214  is also configured to make information about the certificate  211  available to other components of the browsing software  210 , such as the graphical interface  215 . That information may include anything discovered by the certificate manager  214  during the examination or verification of the certificate  211 . 
     The graphical interface  215  is configured to create a visual display of the content currently being rendered by the rendering engine  253 . In addition, the graphical interface  215  is configured to display certain information about the content, such as an SSL bar  214  that displays security-related information about the content. In this particular implementation, the SSL bar  214  is configured to render a visual element in the browser display that summarizes or conveys, in a simple and usable fashion, the information made available by the certificate manager  214 . As is described in greater detail below, the SSL bar  214  may present a visual representation of the degree of trust associated with the current content. For instance, the SSL bar  214  may present a visual element indicating that a secure SSL connection has been established, that a valid and current certificate has been presented, and identifying information found in that certificate. Likewise, the SSL bar  214  may present a visual element indicating that the certificate  211  is invalid or has expired, or is otherwise faulty. 
       FIGS. 3 through 6  are general representations of an address bar displayed by browsing software that includes security information about a current session. Beginning with  FIG. 3 , an address bar  310  is shown that may be presented by browsing software while a user is browsing sites on the Internet, or any other wide or local area network. In this example, the browsing software is currently displaying resources associated with a location that is not using security measures. This is suggested because the protocol portion  312  indicates that the “HTTP” protocol rather than the “HTTPS” protocol is being used to communicate with the remote location. Thus, in this example, the SSL bar  318  does not present any information to indicate that a heightened security session is in place. In other words, during a session in which there is no expectation of security, the SSL bar  318  is presented as a neutral indicator (perhaps no color or neutral color), if shown at all. The neutral indicator may also be displayed in the mixed content condition (e.g., a frame on the page is using SSL but the page itself is not, or vice versa). 
     Turning now to  FIG. 4 , the user has navigated or otherwise arrived at a secure location, suggested by the protocol portion  412  of the URL indicating that the “HTTPS” protocol is in use (i.e., an SSL secure link). Because SSL is being used, the browsing software has been presented with an SSL certificate by the remote device (i.e., the device at the URL domain  414 ). Accordingly, the SSL bar  418  is this example may be displayed in a certain color to draw the attention of the user to the current level of trust. In this example, the SSL certificate was validated and a secure session established. Thus, the SSL bar  418  may be shown in “green” or some other color to indicate that the current session is secure. 
     In addition, the SSL bar  418  may display other information from the SSL certificate to help the user evaluate how trustworthy the current site is. For example, the SSL bar  418  may display the name of the company that has been verified (from the certificate) to control the site. Other information from the certificate could be displayed, but typically the certified owner or controller of the site is the most relevant information. In a further enhancement, the SSL bar  418  may be configured to respond to user actions, such as hovering over or clicking the SSL bar  418 . Such actions may result in the user being presented with an expanded summary of the active certificate, or perhaps may result in the user being prompted to click the SSL bar  418  to see the certificate (in the case of a hover). 
     Turning now to  FIG. 5 , if the user clicks the SSL bar  518 , a certificate summary  520  is dropped down from the SSL bar  518  to present the user with the most security-relevant information about the current site. This information is derived from the SSL certificate associated with the current site. The certificate summary  520  may be displayed in an area very near the address bar to help prevent spoofing by some elements of the web page being displayed, such as a “Flash pop-up” or the like. 
     The information displayed on the certificate summary  520  may include any security-related information, but in this implementation the display is limited to only the most important information. For instance, the existence of the certificate summary  520 , most importantly, indicates to the user that the certificate is valid. In addition, identifying information about the owner  522  of the certificate is shown, such as the owner&#39;s company name or individual name (if appropriate), the owner&#39;s address and country of origin, may also display a company logo. The certificate summary  520  may also show the name and location of the CA that signed the certificate, and may additionally display the CA&#39;s logo if applicable. In one enhancement, hyperlinks could be included from the owner&#39;s information  522  to the owner&#39;s home page and/or from the CA&#39;s information  524  to the CA&#39;s home page. A “more” button  526  may result in displaying a dialog that presents the complete information from the current SSL certificate, and a “close” button  528  closes the certificate summary  520 . 
     Turning now to  FIG. 6 , in some cases, the current session may be an SSL session, but there may be some infirmity in the certificate. Browsing software may not be able to validate an SSL certificate for many reasons, for example the certificate may have expired, the CA of the certificate may not be trusted by the browsing software (e.g., there is not a locally-stored root certificate for that particular CA), the name on the certificate does not match the name of the site, or the certificate may have been revoked. In these or any other circumstances where a certificate fails validation, the SSL bar  618  may be displayed in a color different from the safe color, such as yellow or perhaps red. In addition, the SSL bar  618  may textually indicate that the certificate is invalid and with a warning icon. 
     If the certificate is deemed faulty, an invalid certificate summary  620  may be automatically displayed to the user. The invalid certificate summary  620  is similar to the valid certificate summary  520  described above, except that the reason for the failure to validate the certificate is displayed, such as because the certificate has expired, is not from a trusted certifying authority, or the site name in the certificate does not match the Web page name. A warning (not shown) could also be displayed, such as: “Warning: Do not enter information into this Web page unless you trust it and the company securing it.” As with the valid certificate summary  520  described above, the invalid certificate summary  620  may include a “more” button  626  to display a dialog that presents the complete information from the current SSL certificate, and a “close” button  628  to close the invalid certificate summary  620 . 
     Note that in the examples shown in  FIGS. 3 through 6 , the SSL bar is located immediately next to the URL of the currently-displayed site. This location improves the likelihood that it will be seen by the user. 
       FIG. 7  is an operational flow diagram generally illustrating a process  700  for presenting security-related information in a browser display. The process  700  may be implemented on a computing device on which resides and executes browsing software for accessing locations on a wide area network, such as the Internet. The process  700  begins at step  710  where browsing software negotiates a secure communications session with a remote device, and receives a certificate that attests to the validity of the remote device. 
     At step  720 , the certificate received at step  710  is evaluated to determine its validity. The certificate may be evaluated in one or more of very many different ways. For example, the signing of the certificate may be confirmed with a local root certificate for the certifying authority, evaluating the expiration date of the certificate, comparing site information in the certificate to the current session, determining whether the certificate has been revoked, and the like. Evaluating the certificate includes retrieving descriptive information from the certificate. 
     At step  730 , certain relevant information about the certificate is displayed to enable a user to make a trust decision concerning the current session. More specifically, an SSL bar may be presented in the browser display to indicate a security level associated with the certificate. Displaying the SSL bar may include presenting information in the SSL bar to convey the current level of security, such as the identity of the owner of the certificate and whether the certificate is valid. In addition, displaying the SSL bar may include presenting a certificate summary that includes highly relevant security information from the certificate, such as the owner of the current site and the certificating authority. In addition, the certificate summary may indicate that the certificate is invalid for some reason or that the certificating authority is not trusted on the local device. The certificate summary also includes a link or other mechanism that allows the user to retrieve additional or complete information about the certificate. In this way, the user can visually and easily make a determination about whether to trust the current site. 
     Although the above process is illustrated and described sequentially, in other embodiments, the operations described in the steps may be performed in different orders, multiple times, and/or in parallel. 
     Illustrative Operating Environment 
     The various embodiments described above may be implemented in general computing systems adapted as either servers or clients. An example computer environment suitable for use in one or more embodiments is described below in conjunction with  FIG. 8 . 
     Illustrative Computing Environment 
       FIG. 8  illustrates a sample computing device that may be used to implement the techniques described herein. With reference to  FIG. 8 , an example system includes a computing device, such as computing device  800 . In a very basic configuration, computing device  800  typically includes at least one processing unit  802  and system memory  804 . Depending on the exact configuration and type of computing device, system memory  804  may be volatile (such as RAM), non-volatile (such as ROM, flash memory, etc.) or some combination of the two. System memory  804  typically includes an operating system  805 , one or more program modules  806 , and may include program data  807 . This basic configuration of computing device  800  is illustrated in  FIG. 8  by those components within dashed line  808 . 
     Computing device  800  may have additional features or functionality. For example, computing device  800  may also include additional data storage devices (removable and/or non-removable) such as, for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or tape. Such additional storage is illustrated in  FIG. 8  by removable storage  809  and non-removable storage  810 . Computer storage media may include volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. System memory  804 , removable storage  809  and non-removable storage  810  are all examples of computer storage media. Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (“DVD”) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can be accessed by computing device  800 . Any such computer storage media may be part of device  800 . Computing device  800  may also have input device(s)  812  such as keyboard  822 , mouse  823 , pen, voice input device, touch input device, scanner, etc. Output device(s)  814  such as a display, speakers, printer, etc. may also be included. These devices are well known in the art and need not be discussed at length here. 
     Computing device  800  may also contain communication connections  816  that allow the device to communicate with other computing devices  818 , such as over a network. Communication connections  816  is one example of communication media. Communication media may typically be embodied by computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal, such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and includes any information delivery media. The term “modulated data signal” means a signal that has one or more of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media includes wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless media. The term computer readable media as used herein includes both storage media and communication media. 
     While example embodiments and applications have been illustrated and described, it is to be understood that the describe techniques are not limited to the precise configuration and resources described above. Various modifications, changes, and variations apparent to those skilled in the art may be made in the arrangement, operation, and details of the methods and systems disclosed herein without departing from the scope of the claimed subject matter.