Patent Publication Number: US-2011055906-A1

Title: Method for authentication and verifying individuals and units

Description:
The present invention relates to a method for authentication and authentification of persons and/or devices. Both terms, “authentication” and “authentification”, provide information about the trustworthiness of the sender and the recipient. The term “authentication” herein is to refer to a verification of authenticity of the sender by the sender himself, and of the recipient by the recipient himself. The term “authentification” herein is to refer to a verification of authenticity of the sender by the recipient, and of the recipient by the sender. 
     Technical solutions for authentication are known that use biometrical characteristics. For example, biometrical characteristics such as fingerprints, iris data, and the like can be used. By checking inputted biometrical characteristics against stored biometrical characteristics, a party is authenticated. Additionally, passwords can be used for authentication. 
     Authentification is based on knowledge and on possession. Digital signatures, key dependent hash functions can be used for authentification. When using key dependent hash functions, each protocol message has to include a key dependent hash value. A disadvantage of this solution is in the exchange of keys. 
     EP 1 845 655 A1 discloses a signature method that ensures the identity of the data signing person by any signature. According to legislation regarding signature, there is a variety of signature terms. The term D(m)=sig is referred to as an electronic (or digital) signature (sig). D indicates a private key, and m indicates a signed message. In conjunction with a signature scheme, a public key E can be used to verify, if a message m is in conformance with the signature (sig). Advanced electronic signature refers to digital signature. Qualified signature is based on qualified certificates. Signature key certificates, e.g. according to X.509, comprise the name or pseudonym of the key proprietor, the public signature key assigned to the signature key proprietor, the sequential number of the certificate, start and end time of validity of the certificate, and the name of the certifying authority. The signing person enters a personal authentification token, generates a hash value from the data to be signed using a signature unit, and determines the signature for the data to be signed from the hash value and from authentification information which unambiguously identify the identity of the signing person. 
     DE 60 2005 000 121 T2 describes a method and an apparatus for reducing spam e-mail as well as the distribution of viruses by authenticating the origin of e-mail messages. The e-mail standard RFC 2821 allows verification of the sender of an e-mail. In this verification, only the existence of the sender&#39;s address in the domain is verified. It is not checked, whether the e-mail has really been sent from this address. Features of the method comprise receiving a request at an origin server of the e-mail message, checking data logged at the origin server, and responding to the request by the origin server. The request includes the question whether the user indicated in the e-mail message really is the sender of the e-mail. Logging serves to determine the origin of the transmission. The response to a request serves for authentification of the origin of the e-mail. 
     An object of the invention is to provide a method in which the identities of the sender and of the recipient of a message cannot be altered by the sender and/or the recipient and/or a third party, even with knowledge of the identities and all of the method steps. 
    
    
     
       According to the invention, this object is achieved by the teachings set forth in the claims. The invention will now be described in detail with reference to exemplary embodiments that are illustrated in  FIGS. 1 ,  2 ,  3 , and  4 . 
       In the drawings: 
         FIG. 2  shows authentification using an SID card; 
         FIG. 3  authentification via SID card authorized PSES; 
         FIG. 4  authentification via SID card authorized PSES. 
     
    
    
       FIG. 1  shows, on the side of the sender, a unit  1 . 1 , an SID card device  1 . 2 , a home PC  1 . 3 , and on the side of the recipient, a unit  2 . 1 , an SID card device  2 . 2 , and a home PC  2 . 3 . Sender side unit  1 . 1  is connected to the recipient side unit  2 . 1  via a communication network  3 , e.g. the internet. Units  1 . 1  and  2 . 1  are the communication and/or authentification performing units. Units  1 . 1  and  2 . 1  each comprise at least one touchscreen,  1 . 11  and  2 . 11  respectively, associated with the unit. Unit  1 . 1  is connected to the internet  3  through an interface  1 . 12 , to SID card device  1 . 2  through an interface  1 . 14 , and to the home PC through an interface  1 . 13 . Unit  2 . 1  is connected to the internet  3  through an interface  2 . 12 , to SID card device  2 . 2  through an interface  2 . 14 , and to the home PC through an interface  2 . 13 . Each person possesses a unit assigned to the person, not illustrated in  FIG. 1 , which shall also be referred to as a ‘personal unit’ below. The personal unit is a secure identification card (SID card). Any exposure of a person in the cyberspace and any action performed in the cyberspace is only possible in conjunction with the personal unit. It carries at least data identifying the person and assigned to the person associated with the card, data identifying the personal unit, and random reference data. The random reference data are valid for randomly predefined times. The identifying data used for authentication of a person are biometrical data. Preferably, fingerprint data are used. The identifying data used for authentification of a person are data identifying the personal unit (SID card) and/or address data of the person. The address data comprise an address data element and an identity data element of the person. The data identifying the person furthermore comprise at least one signature data element identifying the signature of the person. The data assigned to a person comprise e.g. social insurance number, tax number, account numbers, cards number, commercial register number, association register number, cooperation register number. They also comprise a card validity data element and a data element identifying the certifying authority. The card validity data element comprises the date of certification of the data identifying the person, and a signature data element of the certifying person. Each unit performing authentification and/or communication, and each personal unit includes at least one random reference data element for randomly predefined time intervals, and at least one data element identifying the unit. The data element identifying the unit is inseparably and unalterably combined with the unit, and preferably is a worldwide unique device or card number. 
     In an instruction process, the card validity data element, the data element identifying the certifying authority, the address data, the signature data element or the signature data, and the biometrical data of the respective person are imported into an SID card and unalterably stored in the SID card. After at least a second pass of importation of all signature data and biometrical data of the same person and comparison of the imported data with the data stored, the personal SID card is enabled. With this activation all data imported during the instruction process are authorized. In another instruction process, the person, after successful authentication of the card possessor by the personal unit, can import the data assigned to himself or herself into his or her SID card, and can store it within his or her SID card in a manner unalterable for a third party. Also, after successful authentication of the card possessor by the personal unit, the person can alter his or her personal data. 
     The authentication of a card possessor is performed by the personal unit on the basis of biometrical characteristics of the card possessor. In a first embodiment of the SID card, the biometrical characteristics can only be imported indirectly via biometrical sensors, not illustrated, of units  1 . 1  and  2 . 1 . In a second embodiment of the SID card, the importation process is performed directly on the SID card, via biometrical sensors. 
       FIG. 2  shows an exemplary embodiment of the first part of the method according to the invention in which authentication and authentification processes are performed using personal SID cards. In this case, the SID cards not only carry the identifying and/or personal data but also function as a device for checking these data. 
     The figure illustrates communication performing unit  1 . 1 , SID card device  1 . 2 , home PC  1 . 3 , and SID card  1 . 4  of the sender, and communication performing unit  2 . 1 , SID card device  2 . 2 , and SID card  2 . 4  of the recipient. The method steps of authentification at the sender&#39;s and the recipient&#39;s side are briefly described as follows: 
     Sender-Side Authentification Steps 
     Step # 1 b: Selecting the address of the recipient from address register via PSES touchscreen; 
     Step # 2 : Acknowledging the public address via touch button; 
     Step # 3 : Communication PSES 1 →SID card of the sender 
     Request to provide the sender&#39;s address (authorized address and identity); 
     Step # 4 : Generating secret address data of the sender with a length of 96 bits from the two address data of the sender having a length of 80 bits each, and at least one 16 bit random data element in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki→interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the 16 bit random feature into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the sender; 
     Step # 5 : 
     Preparation of communication:
 
determining relative data of the sender&#39;s address with a length of 128 bits, and the SID control information (including SODki) with reference to card random reference data→generating relative data with a length of 1024 bits→interlacing permutation of the relative data
 
Communication SID card→PSES 1 
 
De-interlacing permutation
 
→determining the 1024 bits of data from the relative data thereof→therefrom the relative address data with a length of 128 bits→therefrom the address data of the sender with a length of 96 bits;
 
     Step # 6 : Generating the secret address data of the recipient with a length of 96 bits from the two address data of the recipient having a length of 80 bits each, and at least one 16 bit random data element in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki→interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the 16 bit random feature into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the recipient; 
     Step # 7 : Determining the relative address data with a length of 128 bits for: 
     secret sender address gABAki with reference to the random reference data element PZki
 
secret recipient address gADAki with indirect reference to gABAki
 
secret sender identity gABIki with indirect reference to gADAki
 
secret recipient identity gADIki with indirect reference to gABIki;
 
     Step # 8 : Preparation of communication: 
     Determining P2P control information (including SODki) with reference to P2P random reference data→arranging all of the 128 bits of relative data in a sequence→generating 1024 bits of relative data with reference to P2P random reference data→interlacing permutation→transmission in a header having a length of N×1024 bits→ 
     P2P communication (PSES 1 →PSES 2 )—at the sender&#39;s side 
     Recipient-Side Authentification Steps 
     P2P communication (PSES 1 →PSES 2 )—at the recipient&#39;s side 
     De-interlacing permutation→determining the 1024 bits of data from the relative data thereof with reference to P2P random reference data→therefrom the relative address data with a length of 128 bits with reference to P2P random reference data→determining the secret address data gABAki, gADAki, gABIki, and gADIki→determining secret address data of the sender and of the recipient with a length of 96 bits; 
     Step # 9 : 
     Preparation of communication:
 
Determining relative address data with a length of 128 bits, and SID control information (including SODki) with reference to card random reference data→generating 1024 bits of relative data→interlacing permutation→
 
Communication PSES 2 →SID card of the recipient
 
De-interlacing permutation→determining the 1024 bits of data from the relative data thereof with reference to the card random reference data→therefrom the SID control information (including SODki) and the relative address data with a length of 128 bits→therefrom the address data of the recipient and of the sender with a length of 96 bits;
 
     Step # 10 : 
     De-interlacing the secret 96 bits of address data of the recipient and the sender from the 16 bits of random features in conjunction with SODki; 
     Step # 11 : Comparing the received and the authorized, stored recipient&#39;s address data 
     →no data match→error! 
     →data match→continue! 
     Step # 12 : 
     Comparing the address random characteristics,
 
Comparing the identity random characteristics;
 
     Step # 13 : Match in all comparisons→recipient and sender authenticated! 
     Step # 14 : Communication SID card→PSES 2   
     Information about authenticity of the recipient and the sender; 
     Step # 15 : Permitting further data reception. 
     The authentification of a counterpart always starts at the counterpart and with the counterpart. Before transmitting a message, the sender enters the public address data of the recipient at the home PC  1 . 3 , which data are transmitted from home PC  1 . 3  to unit  1 . 1  where they are visualized on the touchscreen. Alternatively, the recipient&#39;s address data can be inputted directly through the touchscreen of unit  1 . 1 , and/or can be chosen from an address register. The sender of a message checks the recipient&#39;s data visualized on the touchscreen, and confirms the correctness of his input and selection, respectively, via a touch button. Following confirmation, unit  1 . 1  requests the SID card  1 . 4  of the sender to provide the sender&#39;s address (authorized address and identity). The communication between unit  1 . 1  and SID card  1 . 4  occurs in form of relative data. SID card  1 . 4  generates a position data element SODki using its random generator. In conjunction with the position data element SODki, unit  1 . 4  generates the secret  96  bits of address data from the two address data having a length of 80 bits (authorized sender data element, authorized identity data element) and at least one random data element having a length of 16 bits. The second position data element (SODki) includes two bytes. The first byte indicates the byte position in the valid random reference data element, and the second byte indicates the bit position in the selected byte of the separate random reference data element, from where on the 16 bits of the random data element or the 16 bits of random data and the interlace control information are read from the valid random reference data element. Each random data element with a length of 16 bits is interlaced into the address data element or address data associated therewith, wherein one bit of the secret 16 bits of the random data element to be interlaced is inserted into the bit data stream of the respective data element of the address data. Interlacing exactly occurs when the bit of the associated interlace control data element is ‘one’ or ‘zero’. Bit interlacing exactly terminates when all of the bits of the 16 bits of the random data element have been interlaced into the bit data stream of the respective data element of the address data, or when, at the end of the bit data stream, all bits of the secret 16 bits of the random data element that had not yet been interlaced, have been attached to the end of the bit data stream. SID card  1 . 4  determines, from the secret address data having a length of 96 bits, 128 bits of relative data with reference to card reference data. Furthermore, control data such as the position data element are adopted in the control information, from which, also, a relative data element with a length of at least 128 bits is determined. All of the relative data are arranged in a sequence, at least one hash value is generated therefrom, and this hash value is attached to the relative data. The data stream so formed is divided into partial data with a length of 1024 bits. From the partial data, relative data thereof, with a length of 1024 bits, are calculated with reference to associated card reference data. The relative data are subjected to another interlacing permutation and transmitted to unit  1 . 1 . There, de-interlacing permutation is performed, and the 1024 bits of data are determined from the relative data thereof Unit  1 . 1  calculates all of the hash values and compares them with the hash values generated by the SID card. If they are identical, unit  1 . 1  determines the 96 bits of address data of the sender and at least the second position data element from the 128 bits of relative address data. 
     Unit  1 . 1  determines, using the position data, the separate random reference data element and the random data element with a length of 16 bits, or the random data with a length of 16 bits, and the interlace control data associated therewith. With these data, unit  1 . 1  generates the secret address data of the recipient with a length of 96 bits from the two address data (address data element, identity data element) of the recipient having a length of 80 bits each, and the respective random data element associated therewith. Unit  1 . 1  then determines the relative address data with a length of 128 bits. According to the invention, the relative address data with a length of 128 bits are calculated from the 128 bits of secret sender address gABAki with reference to a random reference data element PZki, from the 128 bits of secret recipient address gADAki with indirect reference to gABAki, from the 128 bits of secret sender identity gABIki with indirect reference to gADAki, and from the 128 bits of secret recipient identity gABIki with indirect reference to gADIki. The letter ‘k’ indicates the communication dependency, and the letter ‘i’ indicates the dependency from the i-th random reference data element valid in the current time interval. Random reference data element PZki is a random number generated in unit  1 . 1 . The indirect reference is obtained by exclusive OR combining the respective data element with another random data element (which is also determined in unit  1 . 1 ). Unit  1 . 1  determines a first position data element. The position data element, like the second position data element, comprises two bytes. Both of the bytes have the same significance as with the byte position and bit position in the random reference data element mentioned above. The first position data element defines the bit position in the global random reference data element from where on a separate random reference data element is read. From the separate random data element, all of the separate random reference data necessary for P2P communication are extracted. Unit  1 . 1  determines P2P control information (including the first and second position data element), and calculates its relative data associated therewith with reference to P2P random reference data. Unit  1 . 1  arranges all of the relative data in a predefined sequence, calculates at least one hash value therefrom, adds it to the sequence of relative data, decomposes this data stream into 1024 bits of data each, calculates the 1024 bits of relative data therefrom, performs interlacing permutation, and transmits these data as a header in conjunction with other data to unit  2 . 1 . The header and the other data generally are data according to any standard communication protocol. 
     Upon arrival at unit  2 . 1 , the unit performs de-interlacing permutation, calculates the 1024 bits of data from the 1024 bits of relative data, determines all of the hash values, and compares the hash values calculated with the hash values received. In case a match occurs in all comparisons, unit  2 . 1  determines the 128 bits of address data gABAki, gADAki, gABIki, and gADIki from the 128 bits of relative data. Furthermore, it determines the position data. From the 128 bits of address data, the 96 bits of address data are determined, which then are retransformed into address data with a length of 128 bits with reference to card reference data. From the address data with a length of 128 bits referenced to the card reference data, the relative data thereof are determined with a length of 128 bits. The position data element SODki (SID position data element) is incorporated into a card control data element which is also transformed into relative card control information of a length of 128 bits. All of the relative data having a length of 128 bits are arranged in a predefined sequence. From this sequence, unit  2 . 1  calculates at least one hash value and attaches it to the data sequence. Unit  2 . 1  decomposes the data sequence into 1024 bits of data each, calculates the 1024 bits of relative data thereof with reference to the card reference data associated therewith, performs at least one interlacing permutation on the data, and transmits these data to SID card device  2 . 2 . SID card device  2 . 2  transmits these data to the SID card  2 . 4  of the recipient. SID card  2 . 4  performs de-interlacing permutation, determines the 1024 bits of data from the 1024 bits of relative data, determines all of the hash values, and compares the determined hash values with the hash values received. In case a match occurs in all comparisons, SID card  2 . 4  determines, from the relative address data with a length of 128 bits, the address data with a length of 128 bits, from which it then determines the secret address data with a length of 96 bits. From the card control information, SID card  2 . 4  determines the position data element SODki. Using the position data element (second position data element), the card reads, from the random reference data element associated therewith, the random data element with a length of 16 bits, or the random reference data with a length of 16 bits, and the interlace control data associated therewith. Using the interlace control data, the address data having a length of 96 bits are decomposed into the address data with a length of 80 bits and the random data with a length of 16 bits. The de-interlaced address data element of the recipient is compared with the address data element which is authorized and unalterably stored in the SID card. The de-interlaced identity data element of the recipient is compared with the identity data element authorized and unalterably stored in the SID card. Also, all of the de-interlaced random data with a length of 16 bits are compared with the random data read from the random reference data element and having a length of 16 bits. In case of a match in all of the predefined comparisons, the recipient and the sender are authenticated. SID card  2 . 4  informs the unit  2 . 1  about the validity of the address data and the authenticity of the recipient and the sender. Then, reception continues. 
       FIGS. 3 and 4  illustrate an exemplary embodiment of the second part of the method according to the invention in which the authentication processes are performed using personal SID cards, and the authentification processes are performed using units authorized by SID cards.  FIG. 3  illustrates the authentification process at the sender&#39;s side, and  FIG. 4  illustrates the authentication process at the recipient&#39;s side. The second part of the authentification according to the invention by a unit authorized by an SID card is, in its substantial parts, identical to the authentification of the first part of the method according to the invention. Therefore, only the parts of authorization and the authorized method steps are described in detail. 
     The method steps shown in  FIG. 3  can be described as follows: 
     Step # 1 b: Selecting the addresses from address register via PSES touchscreen; 
     Step # 2 : Acknowledging the public addresses via touch button; 
     Step # 2 B: Entry in data exchange table with reference to the data to be exchanged and/or time; 
     Step # 3 : Communication PSES 1 →SID card 
     Request to provide the sender&#39;s address (authorized address and identity); 
     Step # 4 : Generating the secret address data of the sender with a length of 96 bits from the two address data of the sender with a length of 80 bits and at least one random data element having a length of 16 bits in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki →interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the random feature of 16 bits into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the sender; 
     Step # 5 : 
     Preparation of communication: 
     determining the relative data of the sender&#39;s address with a length of 128 bits and the SID control information (including SODki) with reference to the card random reference data →generating relative data with a length of 1024 bits→interlacing permutation of the relative data 
     Communication SID card→PSES 1   
     De-interlacing permutation→determining the data with a length of 1024 bits from the relative data thereof→therefrom the relative address data having a length of 128 bits→therefrom the address data of the sender having a length of 96 bits→de-interlacing the 96 bits of address data; 
     Step # 5 . 1 B: Entry of the 2×80 bits of sender address data and SODki into authorization table (transfer of authorization to the PSES); 
     Step # 5 . 2 B: Data exchange according to data exchange table; 
     Step # 5 . 3 B: Generating the secret address of the sender with a length of 96 bits from the two 80 bits of address data of the sender and the at least one 16 bit random data element in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki→interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the 16 bit random feature into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the sender; 
     Step # 6 : Generating the secret 96 bits of address data of the recipient from the two 80 bits of address data of the recipient and the at least one 16 bit random data element in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki→Interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the 16 bit random feature into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the recipient; 
     Step # 7 : Determining the 128 bits of relative address data for 
     secret sender address gABAki with reference to das random reference data element PZki
 
secret recipient address gADAki with indirect reference to gABAki
 
secret sender identity gABIki with indirect reference to gADAki
 
secret recipient identity gADIki with indirect reference to gABIki;
 
     Step # 8 : Preparation of communication: 
     determining the P2P control information (including SODki) with reference to P2P random reference data→generating the 1024 bits of relative data with reference to P2P random reference data→interlacing permutation→transmission in the header having a length of N×1024 bits→
 
P2P communication (PSES 1 →PSES 2 )—at the sender side
 
The method steps shown in  FIG. 4  can be described as follows:
 
     Step # 1 : Requesting transfer of reception authorization via touch button; 
     Step # 2 : Acknowledgment via touch button; 
     Step # 3 : Communication PSES 2 →SID card 
     (request to transfer reception authorization); 
     Step # 4 : Generating the secret 96 bits of address data of the sender from the two address data of the sender having a length of 80 bits each, and the at least one 16 bit random data element in conjunction with the bit position data element SODki→Interlacing the address data of 2×80 bits with the 16 bit random feature into 2×96 bits of secret address data of the sender; 
     Step # 5 : 
     Preparation of communication: 
     determining the 128 bits of relative data of the sender address and SID control information (including SODki) with reference to card random reference data→generating 1024 bits of relative data→interlacing permutation of the relative data; 
     Communication SID card→PSES 1   
     De-interlacing permutation→determining the 1024 bits of data from the relative data thereof→therefrom the 128 bits of relative address data→therefrom the 96 bits of address data of the sender→De-interlacing the 96 bits of address data; 
     Steps # 6 &amp; 7 : Entry of the 2×80 bits of recipient address data into authorization table; 
     Step # 8 : P2P communication (PSES 1 →PSES 2 )—at the recipient side De-interlacing permutation→determining the 1024 bits of data from the relative data thereof with reference to P2P random reference data→therefrom the 128 bits of relative address data with reference to P2P random reference data→determining the secret address data gABAki, gADAki, gABIki, and gADIki→determining the 96 bits of secret address data of the sender and of the recipient; 
     Step # 9 : empty; 
     Step # 10 : 
     De-interlacing the secret 96 bits of address data of the recipient and sender from the 16 bits of random features in conjunction with SODki; 
     Step # 11 : Comparison of the received and the authorized and stored recipient address 
     data→no data match→error! 
     →data match→continue! 
     Step # 12 : 
     Comparison of the address random characteristics, comparison of the identity random characteristics; 
     Step # 13 : match in all comparisons→recipient and sender authenticated! 
     Step # 14 : empty; 
     Step # 15 : Permission for further data reception. 
     The sender selects the addresses of recipients, for example from an address register. This can be done at home PC  1 . 3  or via touchscreen  1 . 11  of unit  1 . 1 . The selected recipient address data are accommodated in a data exchange table. The data to be sent are associated with the respective recipient address. Further, the calendar date and/or the time of transmission are defined by the sender. The sender has to acknowledge all of the data of the data exchange table by actuating a touch button (aware declaration of intention). The unit requests from SID card  1 . 4  to provide the sender&#39;s addresses. SID card  1 . 4  supplies the 96 bits of address data of the sender and the position data element SODki, according to the description of the method steps  3 - 5  of  FIG. 2 . From the 96 bits of address data, the authorized address data element with a length of 80 bits and the authorized identity data element of the SID card  1 . 4  with a length of 80 bits are determined by de-interlacing. Both sender address data with a length of 80 bits each, and the second position data element are added to an authorization table of unit  1 . 1 , which authorization table has a relationship to the data exchange table. By actuating an authorization transfer button (aware declaration of intention) on touchscreen  1 . 11 , a copy of the authorization for performing authentification is transmitted from SID card  1 . 4  to unit  1 . 1 . At the recipient&#39;s side, the recipient requests transfer of a copy of the reception authorization from SID card  2 . 4  via a touch button of touchscreen  2 . 11  of unit  2 . 1 . Acknowledgment of the request by the recipient via touch button is an aware declaration of intention of the recipient. SID card  2 . 4  transfers the 96 bits of address data and the position data element SODki, according to the method steps  3 - 5  of  FIG. 2 . Unit  2 . 1  determines, from the 96 bits of address data, the authorized address data element having a length of 80 bits and the authorized identity data element of SID card  2 . 4  having a length of 80 bits, and transfers the data into the authorization table of unit  2 . 1 . Furthermore, the person transferring the authorization defines the data for automatic termination of the authentification authorization which are also stored in the authorization table of unit  2 . 1 . By actuating the authorization transfer button, the copy of the authentification authorization of unit  2 . 1  is enabled. In this method part according to the invention the authorized unit performs steps  9  through  14 . The unit may, at any time, be deprived from the authentification authorization by the person having passed the authorization. In order that the authorization passing person does not loose overview, each transfer of an authentification authorization is logged in the SID card of the person passing the authorization. This is carried out by storing at least the calendar date and/or time of transfer, and/or the identifying data element of the authorized unit, and/or the calendar date and/or time of deprivation of the authorization and/or automatic deletion of authorization.