Patent Publication Number: US-9405562-B2

Title: Set top box application in a concurrent dual environment

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENTS/PATENT APPLICATIONS 
     Provisional Priority Claims 
     The present U.S. Utility Patent Application claims priority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §119(e) to 
     1. U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/715,785, entitled “INTEGRATION OF UNTRUSTED FRAMEWORK COMPONENTS WITH A SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT” filed Oct. 18, 2012; 
     U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/725,964, entitled “INTEGRATION OF UNTRUSTED APPLICATIONS AND FRAMEWORKS WITH A SECURE OPERATING SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT” filed Nov. 13, 2012; and 
     U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/725,790, entitled “SET TOP BOX APPLICATION IN A CONCURRENT DUAL ENVIRONMENT” filed Nov. 13, 2012, all of which are hereby incorporated herein by reference in their entirety and made part of the present U.S. Utility Patent Application for all purposes. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     1. Technical Field of the Invention 
     The present invention relates generally to processing systems and, more particularly, to the use of virtualization techniques when incorporating untrusted elements in a trusted or secure operating system environment such as a set top box. 
     2. Description of Related Art 
     Attempts to accommodate relatively untrusted software applications or frameworks in certain types of devices may complicate applicable certification processes that are performed in accordance with one or more industry defined certification standards or testing procedures. For example, vendor certification of many set top boxes used by cable operators is conducted via rigid certification processes that test interoperability and security compliance for devices that implement specifications such as DOCSIS®, PacketCable™, CableHome™, and OpenCable™. Successful certification of such devices typically requires full end-to-end security. Likewise, digital rights management (DRM) and other technologies implemented in a particular device or component (such as a system-on-a-chip) may require distinct certification processes which do not allow certain interactions with an unsecured operating system (OS) environment or software framework. 
     In general, any unsecured portions of a media pathway in a set top box or like device, if not isolated, will cause the certification of such pathway to fail. Most conventional set top boxes are designed to provide a single secure and certified pathway through the various elements of the device. In some recent multi-processor set top boxes, a conventional certified pathway is separated from untrusted components by creating a hardware boundary between the two. In particular, a first processing module is utilized to provide secure functionality (e.g., decoding operations), while a separate processing module with a lower security level is used to support an untrusted framework. 
     As is known, a software framework may provide application programming interface functionality and services that are not offered by an underlying operating system, and may thereby offer a level of platform independence in certain implementations. Frameworks are often designed to be a reusable and adaptable software system or subsystem. For example, ANDROID™ (“Android”) has become one of the fastest-growing operating systems/frameworks for mobile devices. Android, which builds on contributions from the open-source Linux community, provides development tools and reusable components for building applications that can be deployed across many different types of devices, such as a smartphone or tablet device. 
     A typical Android framework is a “multi-user” Linux-based system in which each Android application is a different “user” having code that runs in general isolation from other applications. Such process isolation (or application “sandbox”) provides a certain level of security. However, various components, processes, threads, etc. used by an application may not entail sufficient protection when integrated in a set top box-type device, resulting in Android being considered an “untrusted” framework when used in such devices. For example, an application that visits an arbitrary web page or receives code from an unverified third party may result in untrusted JavaScript code being executed on a set top box, possibly with elevated privileges. Such code might exploit weakness in other code (e.g., browser code) and receive unauthorized access to file systems, etc., thereby compromising the security of a device, exposing protected data or introducing system instability. 
     As indicated above, the processing unit of some devices may have multiple processors or processing cores in order to provide higher performance and/or multi-tasking capabilities. In some of these multi-processor systems, when multiple applications or programs are running, access control is typically needed to separate the functionality of the applications running on multiple processors. Separation or segregation of different applications and/or tasks running on different processors helps to ensure that one application does not interfere with the execution of another. Likewise data assigned to one processor should not be accessed by another processor, unless that data is shared between the two processors. Such separation is typically handled through use of virtual memory, with each process having a unique view of memory that is not accessible from outside processes. Hardware access can be handled through a kernel or device driver interface, which provides some level of security. Even in a multi-processor system in which one processor environment provides trusted or secure operations while another operates in an unsecure or restricted environment, however, there can be a substantial possibility of an incursion from the unsecure zone into the secure zone when the operating system is managing the separation. 
     For example, in a set top box that allows a user to receive television signals and also allows the user to access the Internet, the secure environment may run applications (including a secure set top box application) pertaining to the reception, decryption and display of certain channels or content provided by a cable or satellite provider or other service operator. The unsecure environment in the set top box may execute applications, such as Android-based applications, that allow a user to access the Internet for web browsing, gaming, etc. In this example, the content provider would generally not want the user or anyone else to access the applications pertaining to broadcast or premium channels. However, if there is commonality in software that controls the accesses to both environments, such as running the same operating system to manage accesses in both environments, then there may be a heightened risk of access violations. Such violations, whether intentional or non-intentional, could result in an unsecure breach into the secure applications of the set top box, such as a web-originated intrusion into protected television channels. 
     Accordingly, there is a need to obtain an efficient way to integrate untrusted frameworks, framework components and applications with a secure set top box application. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  illustrates integration of an untrusted framework and secure operating system kernel in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 2  illustrates integration of an untrusted framework as a client of a set top box application in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 3  illustrates concurrent operation of set top box application and an untrusted framework utilizing virtual containers in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 4  illustrates partitioning of a framework into trusted and untrusted portions in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 5  illustrates a set top box architecture utilizing certified applications in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 6  illustrates integration of trusted and untrusted software in a single processor environment in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 7  illustrates integration of trusted and untrusted software in a multi-processor environment in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 8  is a block diagram of a multi-processor system supporting hardware segregation of operating system environments in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 9  is a schematic block diagram of a set top box (STB)/gateway (GW) in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
         FIG. 10  is a logic diagram of a method for supporting interaction between a privileged operating system environment and an untrusted software framework in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     While certain embodiments are described in conjunction with an Android framework and/or Linux operating system, other embodiments of the present invention may be practiced with a variety of current or future operating systems/kernels and frameworks, and employ a variety of computing circuits, devices, servers and/or systems that might utilize multiple processors, processing cores and/or processing circuits. Further, certain of the illustrations herein describe a processing module, a processor or a CPU (e.g. CPU1, CPU2) for a device that provides a processing function in the described embodiments. However, it is appreciated that a variety of other devices and/or nomenclature may be used in other embodiments to provide for the processing function in practicing the invention. The invention may be readily adapted to other usages where multiple processing environments (zones, domains, etc.) exist, in which separation and/or segregation between two or more zones is desired. Likewise, while certain embodiments are described as implemented by a set top box (STB) or like media processing device performing trusted media processing operations, the novel architectures and methodologies are applicable in whole or in part to other devices, including media consumption devices such as PVR&#39;s, DVD players, access points, televisions, computing devices, smartphones, etc. 
       FIG. 1  illustrates integration of an untrusted framework  100  (such as an Android framework) and secure operating system (OS) kernel  102  within a secure device (such as a certified set top box device)  104  in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. In general, the OS kernel  102  may be viewed as the heart (or ring 0) of the operating system, providing an interface between system hardware and the rest of the operating system and installed applications. 
     As described more fully below, a secure software abstraction layer  110  is provided to isolate access to underlying software, hardware and secure components of the device. Communications and data exchanges between the untrusted framework  100  and secure OS kernel  102  may occur via a secure access layer or interface comprised of a secure access client  106  and a secure access server  108  that support an application programming interface (API) and secure inter-process communication (IPC) calls or kernel drivers. In certain embodiments, the secure access client  106  may be part of or accessible by the framework  100 , while the secure access server  108  is incorporated in a secure operating system environment or executed as a secure kernel module. In one embodiment, the secure access interface may help prevent system breaches or destabilization resulting from bad data or parameters by performing, without limitation, parameter validation/checking and peripheral range checking through hardware (when applicable), handle and pointer validation, heap isolation, and release of hardware resources following termination of a restricted process. 
       FIG. 2  illustrates integration of an untrusted framework  202  as a client of a set top box application (“STB application”)  204  in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown, a STB application  204  is provided to perform basic operations of a set top box  200 , and interfaces with an untrusted “client” framework such as an Android framework  202 . In this embodiment, the STB application  204  is executed in a secure or privileged Linux kernel environment, such as a Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP) Linux kernel environment  206 , that includes a secure access kernel driver  208  and an access server  216  that includes a full access interface  210  for use by the STB application  204 , and a more limited guest access interface  212  for use by the Android framework  202  via an access client  218 . The STB application  204  includes access client  214  functionality that supports communications with the full access interface  210  and enables the Android framework  202  to run as an untrusted client of the secure Linux kernel environment  206  using, for example, container-based virtualization. As may be appreciated, the client/server architecture allows untrusted processes to crash or terminate without compromising underlying hardware and causing system instability. 
     In addition to an access client  218 , the Android framework  202  of the illustrated embodiment may include applications and application support  220 , JavaScript interpretation, browser functions  222 , plug-ins (e.g., an Adobe Flash plug-in), and a Dalvik virtual machine. The Android framework  202  further includes platform or operating system access functionality  224  that enables limited access to necessary components of the secure Linux kernel environment  206  through a minimal guest Linux services access interface  226 . 
     As noted, Android provides a component-based framework for developing mobile applications. Each application may be comprised of differing numbers and types of components. By way of example, such components can include “Activity” components that form the basis of a user interface, where each screen presented to the user is a different Activity. Background processing is performed by “Service” components, which also define arbitrary interfaces for communicating with other applications. “Content Provider” components function to share information in a relational database form, while “Broadcast Receiver” components operate as an asynchronous mailbox for messages from the system and/or other components. The Android framework  202  of the disclosed embodiment supports varying degrees of collaboration and dependencies between applications. 
     However, the interfaces used by applications to provide services and communicate with other applications or an underlying operating system must be secured to defend against breaches and general malfeasance. By default, applications in a typical Android framework, do not have permission to perform operations that might negatively impact other system components (such as reading or writing private data or another application&#39;s files, performing network access, etc.). Because Android essentially “sandboxes” applications from each other, applications must explicitly share resources and data by declaring permissions needed for additional capabilities that are outside of the basic sandbox. For example, an application may statically declare the permissions it requires, and at the time of installation the Android framework may prompt a user for appropriate consents. As noted above in the Description of the Related Art, and without rigid hardware isolation and separate execution environments, the potential for execution of unauthorized code from an untrusted framework may compromise overall system security and negatively impact certification procedures for certain devices absent methodologies and architectures (e.g., a secure access server) such as those described herein. 
     In the illustrated embodiment, the untrusted Android framework  202  is executed in a first virtual machine (VM) guest Linux container(s)  230  (such as an “LXC” or Linux resource container) to provide further isolation from secure processes and resources. In this embodiment, the STB application may similarly operate in a second VM host Linux container  232  having full host Linux services access  228 . Briefly, and in general, container-based virtualization (or operating system-level virtualization) allows a kernel to run with a plurality of isolated virtual machines or virtual environments installed on top of it. Each virtual environment may be dedicated to run a particular application, and is typically not a complete operating system instance, but rather a partial instance of the operating system that works with a virtualization layer (or hardware resource abstraction layer) in the host operating system kernel. 
     Although virtualization may mitigate the need for hardware separation of untrusted components, in certain embodiments multiple processors having different levels of security may benefit from virtual container constructs which operate wholly via one of such processors, while other containers may span multiple processors (see, for example, the embodiment illustrated in  FIG. 7 ). In one such embodiment, a first processor(s) may be dedicated to execution of non-secure functionality, while a second, secure processor(s) may be dedicated to conventional STB functionality. In various alternate embodiments, an untrusted framework may be hardware sandboxed via, for example, non-processor hardware/peripherals, memory isolation from processors and/or peripherals, etc. Various other divisions between secure and untrusted software and hardware are contemplated (e.g., dividing an untrusted framework or applications themselves into a “trusted” portion and an “untrusted” portion), examples of which are described below. Further, by utilizing hardware and operating system virtualization features, multiple operating systems may run simultaneously on the same hardware. 
       FIG. 3  illustrates concurrent operation of set top box application  302  and untrusted client applications/frameworks  304  utilizing virtual containers  306  and  308 , respectively, in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. In the illustrated embodiment, untrusted client applications and frameworks interact with secure portions of an underlying set top box platform, including the set top box application  302  and secure Linux kernel environment  310 , through application IPC calls and an access minimal client  312  that accesses minimal “guest” Linux services access  316 . Likewise, applications in a trusted user mode (or “privileged”) operating system environment receive full access to “host” Linux services access  318  via an access client  314 . The trusted user mode environment can be supported by a full host root filesystem  320 , while a minimal guest root filesystem  322  on a separate partition or disk can support the untrusted user mode (or “restricted”) operating system environment. 
     In some embodiments, certain resources of a set top box platform, such as media processing and hardware acceleration resources (for audio/video encoding and decoding, rendering of 2D and 3D graphics using a standardized API (such as Open Graphics Library or “OpenGL”), DRM, encryption/decryption, etc.) and networking interfaces, may be accessed by untrusted client applications/frameworks  304  through IPC calls communicated through network sockets. Likewise, events such as IR control signals may be communicated from a set top box platform to untrusted client applications/frameworks  304  through IPC calls (such as a call into an Android API or button). 
     In the illustrated embodiment, a framework “aggregator”  324  may be employed to embrace and extend operation with a wide variety of frameworks. In this manner, for example, a service provider can provide secure access to system resources to third party frameworks and other “middleware” offerings. Such offerings may include, by way of example and without limitation, A DOBE  A IR ®, A DOBE  F LASH ®, Apple iOS®, Microsoft S ILVERLIGHT ®, J AVA ™ applets, and like side-by-side technologies. The framework aggregator  324  may include a set of tailored operating system libraries and HTML capabilities to support such technologies, as well as user interface web engine access, etc. 
     In certain embodiments, user interfaces supported by the framework aggregator  324  may enable a user to launch applications supported by an Android framework. For example, the framework aggregator  324  may offer a series of “buttons”, including an Android button that provides a visual display of available Android applications. Further, the Android framework and framework aggregator  324  may share a graphics screen. In this manner, it may not be necessary to port functionality into the Android framework that might otherwise be necessary. It is noted that in a given device, an Android framework may be built using a different tool chain than that utilized by other frameworks supported by the framework aggregator  324 . 
       FIG. 4  illustrates partitioning of a framework into trusted and untrusted portions  400  and  402  in accordance with an alternate embodiment of the present disclosure. In this embodiment, a trusted portion(s)  400  of a (Android) framework  400 , web browser, etc., and a corresponding untrusted portion(s)  402  are executed in one or more separate virtual machine containers  404  and  408 , respectively. The trusted portion  400  may include a secure platform and operating system access interface  410 . In addition to the trusted portion  400 , a set top box application  406  may operate in the virtual machine container  404 , or in a separate and secure virtual machine container(s). 
     Using an example involving a web browser, the portion of the browser that executes potentially unsafe Flash or JavaScript code (such as a rendering engine) can be executed in the “untrusted” virtual machine container  408  with limited file system and peripheral access, while the portion of the browser that has access to underlying platform hardware and sensitive operating system resources can be executed in one or more “trusted” virtual machine containers  404 . In further embodiments, the trusted portion  400  may comprise a secure clone of a framework, or modified version of a framework that supports secure applications and/or secure portions of applications. In such embodiments, unsecure applications or portions thereof may be executed by portions of a framework residing in an untrusted or restricted user domain or container. As discussed above, various approaches to hardware sandboxing may be employed to further isolate untrusted portions of a framework and to support restricted operating system domains or environments. 
     The secure Linux kernel environment  412  of this embodiment includes a secure access kernel driver  414  and an access server  420  that provides a full access interface  416  to support trusted user mode functionality and a guest access interface  418  to support untrusted user mode functionality. Full host Linux services access  422  and minimal guest Linux services access  424  are provided to the trusted and untrusted user mode environments, respectively. As above, the trusted user mode environment can be supported by a full host root filesystem  426 , while a minimal guest root filesystem  428  on a separate partition or disk supports the untrusted user mode environment. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates a set top box or other secure architecture  500  utilizing certified applications  502  in accordance with the present disclosure. In the illustrated embodiments, the certified applications  502  may be preinstalled or downloaded, for example, from a catalog of certified applications provided by a service operator or cloud-based source. Such applications might include, by way of example, media streaming applications (e.g., N ETFLIX ®), gaming applications, web browsing applications, iOS-based applications, Android applications, etc. In some embodiments, it may be necessary to incorporate or download additional operating systems to support corresponding classes of certified applications. Alternatively, different certified versions of a given application may be made available to support a variety of installed operating systems and/or frameworks  510 . Certified applications  502  may be executed in one or more virtual machine containers  508 . Other illustrated elements of  FIG. 5  function as described above. 
     In one exemplary embodiment, the primary set top box application  504  is constructed as an Android application executed in a virtual machine container(s)  506 . Depending on the capabilities of the relevant Android framework, non-standard API&#39;s or libraries may be required to support certain set top box functionality, such as PVR, picture-in-picture, transcoding, and channel tuning operations. Further, this approach may require special interfacing (e.g., passing a string to an interface to create an encode path as part of a hardware call) or provision of non-standard functions (or even applications) to address services and functions that may be lacking in a relevant framework or required for certification. For example, an Android framework might be extended to include non-standard functionality—without negatively impacting compatibility—by providing services that are “hidden” under the Android porting layers and receive and interpret uniform resource identifiers (“URIs”) passed through such layers. 
     In other embodiments, instead of an end-to-end security definition being managed by the source or being defined by the content itself (or associated metadata), each application that is downloaded (or preinstalled) includes a full security definition. For example, each application may have its own downloadable conditional access security (dCAS) or downloadable DRM element/definition. A corresponding certification process might entail, for example, certifying a part of an overall secure pathway, with one or more applications providing the final portion of the certification. Alternatively, a predefined plurality of conditional access mechanisms may be provided, with a (downloaded) application defining which mechanism is to be used. It may then be possible to certify a secure “boundary” without regard to the conditional access requirements of a particular company or media. 
     In various embodiments, a set top box or like device may exchange capabilities with other devices in a media consumption network (e.g., PVR&#39;s, DVD players, access points, televisions, computing devices, smartphones, etc.) to compare against the requirements of an application. Once this is done, the application may select which one or more modes of operation, if any, that it will permit. If the set top box cannot support such modes (due to resource competition or otherwise), such modes become unavailable. If available a set of modes of operation can be selected and dynamically switched to other of such modes on the fly during a media stream delivery, which may require coordination with the application or the source to support the transition (possibly requiring quality changes in the media stream). 
       FIG. 6  illustrates integration of trusted and untrusted software in a single processor (CPU1) environment in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. In this embodiment, an SMP Linux kernel  600  functions to control hardware and lock guest virtual machines  602  (supporting a “guest” instance of Linux and running untrusted applications) and host virtual machines  604  (running trusted application core services) to one or more separate CPU threads based on performance and/or security isolation requirements. 
     For example, the SMP Linux kernel  600  can perform load balancing for processes in both virtual machines across multiple CPU threads or cores when maximum performance is desired. Further, a host virtual machine  604  with control of a guest virtual machine  602  can terminate and restart a process in the guest virtual machine  602  (or the entire container) if it misbehaves or is compromised. Hard limits can be placed on CPU utilization by a guest virtual machine in order to prevent disruption of core underlying device functionality and to facilitate termination of runaway processes. In operation, separate threads may have segregated and/or restricted access to an I/D cache  606  and L2 cache  608 . 
       FIG. 7  illustrates integration of trusted and untrusted software in a multi-processor system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The illustrated system may be implemented in a device, module, board, etc. One or more components of the system may also be implemented on an integrated circuit chip or on multiple integrated circuit chips. The particular embodiment of  FIG. 7  shows two processing modules identified as CPU1 and CPU2, respectively. Although two processing modules are shown, other embodiments may have more than two processing modules or processors, and it is noted that CPU1 and CPU2 may be comprised of various processing devices, circuitry, etc. In one embodiment, CPU1 and CPU2 may be comprised of different processing cores of a single CPU, or some other processing circuitry. 
     Referring more particularly to the figure, the SMP Linux kernel  700  functions to control hardware and lock a guest virtual machine(s)  702  instance of Linux (running untrusted applications) and a host virtual machine(s)  704  (running trusted application core services) to one or more separate threads 1-4 based on performance and/or security isolation requirements. For example, an untrusted application might be executed in a virtual machine container that spans both CPU1 and CPU2. As described more fully below, various portions of I/D caches  706  and  708  and L2 cache  710  may be restricted to a particular thread or CPU, or shared with appropriate safeguards. 
       FIG. 8  is a block diagram of another multi-processor system supporting hardware segregation of operating system environments in accordance with various embodiments of the present disclosure. For example, a first processor(s) CPU1 may be dedicated to conventional STB functionality and support a secure access server  800 , while a second processor(s) (web) CPU2 may be dedicated to execution of non-secure functionality and untrusted applications (e.g., an Android framework client  802  or web browser). A trusted execution environment supported by CPU1 can limit access to certain core STB functionality, including hardware acceleration blocks  804 , DRM capabilities  806 , and the like. 
     In one embodiment, CPU1 and CPU2 are both segregated into separate and distinct zones when in a “sandboxing” mode. In another embodiment, the trusted CPU1 is set up having its own segregated regions of memory and also given access rights over some or all address ranges of memory mapped portions of CPU2. Generally, when operating in separate or segregated zones, environments or domains, the two CPUs operate on different applications, so that CPU1 executes one set of instructions, while CPU2 executes a different set of instructions. Segregation or separation of this nature is typically referred to as sandboxing or sandbox mode. The purpose of most sandboxing is to prevent one zone from accessing functionality in the other zone or to have controlled access of one zone into another. In some instances, both zones may be limited from having access to the other zone or only have controlled access between zones. In some applications, one zone may be regarded as a secure, privileged or trusted zone and the other as a restricted, non-secure or non-trusted zone, in which access by the applications operating on the non-secure zone are prevented or controlled from accessing certain applications running in the secure zone. 
     As noted above, a number of devices utilize multiple processors or processing cores to run separate programs, applications, etc. In a situation where one zone is not to have access to a second zone, one way to ensure this separation is by checking the accesses to the system memory. That is, by ensuring accesses that are allocated to CPU1 are not accessed by CPU2, unless the location of the access is a shared location, applications running on CPU2 may be prevented from breaching the functional separation. One way to achieve this protection is to provide an access check and access control to ensure that the correct processing module is accessing a permitted location for that processing module. In the illustrated embodiment, CPU1 and CPU2 may communicate directly through a network socket, IPC calls, etc. 
       FIG. 9  is a schematic block diagram of a set top box (STB)/gateway (GW)  901  in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The STB/gateway  901  provides a number of functions, including conversion of signals from external sources into content that can be consumed by network devices. The STB/gateway  901  may further operate as a gateway that supports unidirectional or bidirectional communications and bridging between network devices. 
     The STB/gateway  901  of the illustrated embodiment interacts with a residential network infrastructure  905  and external media systems  907  via one or more wired and wireless networks/links. The wired and wireless networks/links may utilize one or more of various transmission media—such as coaxial cable, shielded twisted pair cable, fiber-optic cable, power line wires, and wireless media (radio frequencies, microwave, satellite, infrared, etc.)—and operate in accordance with a variety of communication and networking protocols (TCP/IP, UPnP, IPv6, etc.). In addition, the wired and wireless networks/links may comprise a multi-hop network utilizing a spanning tree protocol, direct wireless connections, peer-to-peer links, etc. 
     The external media systems  907  may comprise, for example, one or more of cable, satellite and/or terrestrial televisions systems. Various headend equipment and services can be utilized by these systems, such as a cable headend that receives television signals for further processing and distribution, and may offer various other services such as internet connectivity and VoIP services. 
     The STB/gateway  901  of the illustrated embodiment includes a broadcast/unicast/multicast front end  913  that operates to receive uncompressed or compressed digital video, digital audio and other data signals, from either the external media systems  907  or residential network infrastructure  905 , for further processing and distribution. The front end  913  comprises tuner circuitry  919   a  operable to isolate particular channels. Signals from the tuner circuitry  919   a  are then provided to analog-to-digital (ADC) circuitry  920   a  and demodulation circuitry  921   a  for conversion into binary format/stream. Once in binary format, forward error correction (FEC) circuitry  922   a  checks the integrity of the received binary stream. Audio, video, and data extracted from the binary stream may then be decoded (e.g., by decoding  925 ) into formats suitable for consumption by downstream devices. It is noted that demodulation circuitry  921   a  may support one or more modulation techniques, such as Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK), Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM), Coded Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (COFDM), etc. 
     The front end  913  may be integrated into one or more semiconductor devices that may further support, for example, interactive digital television, networked DVR functionality, IP video over DOCSIS applications, and 3D graphics support. In addition, multiple tuner circuitry  919   a  (including in-band and out of band tuners), ADC circuitry  920   a  and demodulation circuitry  921   a  may be provided for different modulation schemes and television standards (such as PAL, NTSC, ATSC, SECAM, DVB-C, DVB-T(2), DVB-H, ISDB, T-DMB, Open Cable). 
     In one alternative embodiment of the disclosure, functionality of the STB/gateway  901  is performed by a smartphone or mobile computing device. In this embodiment, the “front end”  913  comprises one or more wireless interfaces (including PHY and baseband functions), such as a cellular (3G, 4G, IMT-Advanced, etc.) or wide area network (HetNet, Wi-Fi, WiMax, etc.) interface. The interface may support one or more modulation and multiplexing techniques, such as OFDM, OFDMA, SC-FDMA, QPSK, QAM, 64QAM, CSMA, MIMO, etc. In the illustrated embodiment, the wireless interface comprises a transceiver  919   b , analog-to digital (ADC) and digital-to-analog (DAC) circuitry  920   b , demodulation and modulation circuitry  921   b  and FEC (such as turbo codes or LDPC codes) circuitry  922   b . Encoding, decoding and transcoding  925  functions may be provided by processing circuitry and storage  911 . 
     The STB/gateway  901  also includes (wide area network) interface circuitry  915  for communicating with residential network infrastructure  905  and/or external media system  907 . Through the communication interface circuitry  915 , the STB/gateway  901  may communicate directly with upstream resources, or offer (bidirectional) bridged communications between such resources and devices (e.g., devices  941 - 949 ) coupled to the STB/gateway  901 . 
     In the embodiment of  FIG. 9 , STB/gateway  901  interacts with a variety of devices  941 - 949  via communication interface circuitry  917 . For example, a television or display interface module  931  communicates with a (digital) television  941  or other media display device to relay television programming and enable available interactive media services. In certain embodiments, the television or display interface module  931  might include a remote user interface (RUI) server. Similarly, an audio interface  933  provides audio programming or audio library access to an audio system  943 . 
     The communication interface circuitry  917  further comprises a remote control interface  935  for receiving control signals from a remote control  945 . In addition to traditional remote control operations, the remote control  945  may further offer voice and/or gesture control signals that are relayed or mapped to relevant consumer devices. User interfaces  937  are also provided for communications with one or more user interface devices  947 . Gaming interfaces  939  function to provide interactive communications with a gaming system  949 . Such communications may involve, for example, online, multiplayer gaming between members of a social network and/or external players in a gaming platform. Power management interface  940  functionality is provided to enable power saving operations between devices  941 - 949 . 
     The STB/gateway  901  of the illustrated embodiment includes processing circuitry, operating system(s) and storage  911  (components of which may be comprised of hardware, software, or combinations thereof), services support  923 , and decoding/encoding/transcoding functionality  925  to support network interactions such as those described above. Services support  923  in this embodiment includes various functions such as power management  927 , bridging  928 , and media server-receiver services  929 . Other traditional features of a STB/gateway may also be included. For example, the processing circuitry  911  may include a system-on-a-chip or like device(s) that provide a core processor, audio/video decoder, media processor/DSP, graphics core, encryption/decryption core, adaptive transcoding, etc. 
       FIG. 10  is a logic diagram of a method  1000  for supporting interaction between a privileged operating system environment and an untrusted software framework of a media delivery device in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. In step  1002  of the illustrated embodiment, a privileged operating system environment is established to perform secure media processing operations and related functions, such as those performed by a hosted certified set top box application. Next, in step  1004 , a restricted operating system environment is established to host and support an untrusted software framework, such as an Android framework. In one embodiment, both the privileged and restricted operating system environments are constructed using virtual machine containers. In step  1006 , a secure access interface or layer (such as described above) is provide to support and regulate interactions between components of the privileged operating system environment and components of the restricted operating system environment. The secure access interface may function, for example, to limit access to underlying device resources controlled by a set top box application or other trusted software. 
     As may be used herein, the terms “substantially” and “approximately” provides an industry-accepted tolerance for its corresponding term and/or relativity between items. Such an industry-accepted tolerance ranges from less than one percent to fifty percent and corresponds to, but is not limited to, component values, integrated circuit process variations, temperature variations, rise and fall times, and/or thermal noise. Such relativity between items ranges from a difference of a few percent to magnitude differences. As may also be used herein, the term(s) “operably coupled to”, “coupled to”, and/or “coupling” includes direct coupling between items and/or indirect coupling between items via an intervening item (e.g., an item includes, but is not limited to, a component, an element, a circuit, and/or a module) where, for indirect coupling, the intervening item does not modify the information of a signal but may adjust its current level, voltage level, and/or power level. As may further be used herein, inferred coupling (i.e., where one element is coupled to another element by inference) includes direct and indirect coupling between two items in the same manner as “coupled to”. As may even further be used herein, the term “operable to” or “operably coupled to” indicates that an item includes one or more of power connections, input(s), output(s), etc., to perform, when activated, one or more its corresponding functions and may further include inferred coupling to one or more other items. As may still further be used herein, the term “associated with”, includes direct and/or indirect coupling of separate items and/or one item being embedded within another item. As may be used herein, the term “compares favorably”, indicates that a comparison between two or more items, signals, etc., provides a desired relationship. For example, when the desired relationship is that signal  1  has a greater magnitude than signal  2 , a favorable comparison may be achieved when the magnitude of signal  1  is greater than that of signal  2  or when the magnitude of signal  2  is less than that of signal  1 . 
     As may also be used herein, the terms “processing module”, “module”, “processing circuit”, and/or “processing unit” may be a single processing device or a plurality of processing devices. Such a processing device may be a microprocessor, micro-controller, digital signal processor, microcomputer, central processing unit, field programmable gate array, programmable logic device, state machine, logic circuitry, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or any device that manipulates signals (analog and/or digital) based on hard coding of the circuitry and/or operational instructions. The processing module, module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit may have an associated memory and/or an integrated memory element, which may be a single memory device, a plurality of memory devices, and/or embedded circuitry of the processing module, module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit. Such a memory device may be a read-only memory, random access memory, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, static memory, dynamic memory, flash memory, cache memory, and/or any device that stores digital information. Note that if the processing module, module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit includes more than one processing device, the processing devices may be centrally located (e.g., directly coupled together via a wired and/or wireless bus structure) or may be distributedly located (e.g., cloud computing via indirect coupling via a local area network and/or a wide area network). Further note that if the processing module, module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit implements one or more of its functions via a state machine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logic circuitry, the memory and/or memory element storing the corresponding operational instructions may be embedded within, or external to, the circuitry comprising the state machine, analog circuitry, digital circuitry, and/or logic circuitry. Still further note that, the memory element may store, and the processing module, module, processing circuit, and/or processing unit executes, hard coded and/or operational instructions corresponding to at least some of the steps and/or functions illustrated in one or more of the Figures. Such a memory device or memory element can be included in an article of manufacture. 
     The present invention has been described above with the aid of method steps illustrating the performance of specified functions and relationships thereof. The boundaries and sequence of these functional building blocks and method steps have been arbitrarily defined herein for convenience of description. Alternate boundaries and sequences can be defined so long as the specified functions and relationships are appropriately performed. Any such alternate boundaries or sequences are thus within the scope and spirit of the claimed invention. Further, the boundaries of these functional building blocks have been arbitrarily defined for convenience of description. Alternate boundaries could be defined as long as the certain significant functions are appropriately performed. Similarly, flow diagram blocks may also have been arbitrarily defined herein to illustrate certain significant functionality. To the extent used, the flow diagram block boundaries and sequence could have been defined otherwise and still perform the certain significant functionality. Such alternate definitions of both functional building blocks and flow diagram blocks and sequences are thus within the scope and spirit of the claimed invention. One of average skill in the art will also recognize that the functional building blocks, and other illustrative blocks, modules and components herein, can be implemented as illustrated or by discrete components, application specific integrated circuits, processors executing appropriate software and the like or any combination thereof. 
     The present invention may have also been described, at least in part, in terms of one or more embodiments. An embodiment of the present invention is used herein to illustrate the present invention, an aspect thereof, a feature thereof, a concept thereof, and/or an example thereof. A physical embodiment of an apparatus, an article of manufacture, a machine, and/or of a process that embodies the present invention may include one or more of the aspects, features, concepts, examples, etc. described with reference to one or more of the embodiments discussed herein. Further, from figure to figure, the embodiments may incorporate the same or similarly named functions, steps, modules, etc. that may use the same or different reference numbers and, as such, the functions, steps, modules, etc. may be the same or similar functions, steps, modules, etc. or different ones. 
     Unless specifically stated to the contra, signals to, from, and/or between elements in a figure of any of the figures presented herein may be analog or digital, continuous time or discrete time, and single-ended or differential. For instance, if a signal path is shown as a single-ended path, it also represents a differential signal path. Similarly, if a signal path is shown as a differential path, it also represents a single-ended signal path. While one or more particular architectures are described herein, other architectures can likewise be implemented that use one or more data buses not expressly shown, direct connectivity between elements, and/or indirect coupling between other elements as recognized by one of average skill in the art. 
     The term “module” is used in the description of the various embodiments of the present invention. A module includes a functional block that is implemented via hardware to perform one or module functions such as the processing of one or more input signals to produce one or more output signals. The hardware that implements the module may itself operate in conjunction software, and/or firmware. As used herein, a module may contain one or more sub-modules that themselves are modules. 
     While particular combinations of various functions and features of the present invention have been expressly described herein, other combinations of these features and functions are likewise possible. The present invention is not limited by the particular examples disclosed herein and expressly incorporates these other combinations.