Patent Publication Number: US-2020285740-A1

Title: Deception-Based Responses to Security Attacks

Description:
RELATED APPLICATION 
     This application is a continuation of, and claims priority to, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/784,720, filed on Mar. 4, 2013, entitled “Deception-Based Responses to Security Attacks”, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND 
     With Internet use forming an ever greater part of day to day life, security exploits that steal or destroy system resources, data, and private information are an increasing problem. Governments and businesses devote significant resources to preventing intrusions and thefts related to these security exploits. Security threats come in many forms, such as computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, keystroke loggers, adware, and rootkits. These threats typically employ security exploits, which are the weaponization of an attack against a specific vulnerability in software. These threats are delivered in or through a number of mechanisms, such as spearfish emails, clickable links, documents, executables, or archives. Some of the threats posed by security exploits are of such significance that they are described as cyber terrorism or industrial espionage. 
     To meet the threat posed by these security exploits, many security solutions, such as antivirus software, have been developed. Typically, these solutions scan a computing device, determine if the device is affected by a security threat, and block or remove the security threat. While blocking and removing counter the immediate threat, they are easy for an adversary purveying the security vulnerability to overcome. The affected user is then left always one step behind, always reacting to actions taken by an adversary rather than taking steps to prevent future intrusions and thefts by the adversary. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       The detailed description is set forth with reference to the accompanying figures. In the figures, the left-most digit(s) of a reference number identifies the figure in which the reference number first appears. The use of the same reference numbers in different figures indicates similar or identical items or features. 
         FIG. 1  illustrates an example network connecting a security service to client devices, the security service providing deception-based techniques for responding to attacks affecting the client devices. 
         FIG. 2  illustrates an example process for transitioning an attack to device monitored device posing as the computing device impacted by the attack and enabling the attack to obtain deceptive information from the monitored device. 
         FIG. 3  illustrates an example process for configuring a document to report identifying information of an entity opening the document to enable determination of whether an unauthorized entity is in possession of the document. 
         FIG. 4  illustrates an example process for determining that a domain specified in a domain name request is associated with malicious activity and responding to the request with a network address of an monitored device to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored device in place of an adversary server. 
         FIG. 5  illustrates an example process for monitoring dormant domains names associated with malicious activity and, in response to a change, responding with an alert or a configuration update. 
         FIG. 6  illustrates a component level view of a computing device capable of acting as a security service device, a client device, or a monitored device. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Overview 
     This disclosure describes, in part, deception-based techniques for responding to attacks. The techniques include transitioning an attack to a monitored computing process or device (referred to herein as a “monitored device”) that is posing as the computing device impacted by the attack and enabling the adversary associated with the attack to obtain deceptive information from the monitored device. The techniques also include identifying the adversary associated with the attack by configuring a document to report identifying information when an unauthorized entity opens the document. Further, the techniques include determining that a domain specified in a domain name request is associated with malicious activity and responding to the request with a network address of a monitored computing process or device (referred to herein as a “monitored server” or a “monitored device”) to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored server in place of an adversary server. Additionally, the techniques include monitoring dormant domains names associated with malicious activity and, in response to a change in name resolution or registration, responding with an alert or a configuration update. 
     In various embodiments, a security service may implement or enable any one or more of the deception-based techniques. In a first set of techniques, the security service may utilize monitored devices to run and monitor attacks and to use those attacks to provide deceptive information to an adversary. The adversary may then spend time and effort working on the deceptive information without realizing that the attack has been blocked. Future attacks are thus inhibited as the attacked gains the advantage over the attacker. 
     When first detecting an attack, a security agent or the security service may block processing of the attack by the impacted device. The security service then transitions the attack to the monitored device and processes the attack on that monitored device. The monitored device poses as the impacted computing device and is configured with a virtual image of the impacted computing device to enable a convincing pose. The security service then monitors activities and communications of the attack and uses information gained from the monitoring to improve deception capabilities and security agent configurations. The security service also enables an entity associated with the impacted computing device to provide deceptive information to be included on the monitored device. For example, if the adversary is a negotiation partner for a business deal attempting to illicitly acquire an entity&#39;s negotiating strategy, the entity could provide a false strategy for inclusion on the monitored device. 
     In a second set of techniques, the security service uses beaconing to identify the adversary, thus enabling better targeting of deceptive information. The security service embeds executable instructions in a document that causes the document to report identifying information to the security service when opened. The security service may also or instead embed a link in the document that causes a request to a monitored network address (e.g., when the document is opened and the link is clicked). The security service is then able to receive the report or request to the monitored network address, determine from it whether the opener is an unauthorized adversary, and determine characteristics of the adversary, such as geographic location. These characteristics can be used to craft better deceptive information or more convincing monitored devices or monitored servers. The security service may also alert a user or security agent program of the unauthorized possession or update a security agent program configuration. 
     In a third set of techniques, the security service detects the presence of a attack through the attack&#39;s specification of a suspicious domain name in a domain name resolution request. In response, the security service deceives the adversary associated with the attack by responding to the request with a network address of an monitored server, the monitored server posing as an adversary server. The monitored server then gathers information from the attack that may be utilized to enhance the effectiveness of other deception techniques, such as improving the deceptive information made available through a monitored device. Also, the security service may alert at least one of a security agent or users of an entity impacted by the attack. In some embodiments, the security service may then transition the attack to a monitored device and perform the above described first set of deception techniques. 
     In a fourth set of techniques, the security service monitors dormant domain names that have previously been used in connection with malicious activity. By monitoring the domain names for changes in name resolution or registration, the security service may be prepared, having monitored devices or monitored servers ready to use when a attack utilizes one of these monitored domain names. With such techniques, the security service may also perform additional actions, such as detecting other dormant domains and monitoring them, or responding to the change in name resolution or registration by providing an alert or a configuration update. 
     Example Network 
       FIG. 1  illustrates an example network connecting a security service to client devices, the security service providing deception-based techniques for responding to attacks impacting the client devices. As illustrated in  FIG. 1 , a network  102  connects client devices  104  of a client network  106  to a security service  108  of a security service network  110 . The security service  108  may configure the client devices  104  with security agents  112 , the security agents  112  being capable of detecting attacks  114  of an adversary  116  that are directed at one or more of the client devices  104 . In response, the security service  108  may transition the attack to a monitored device  118  included in the client network  106  or an monitored device  120  included in the security service network  110 . The monitored device  118 / 120  may pose as the client device  104  that the attack is directed at and may be configured with a virtual image of that client device  104 . The monitored device  118 / 120  may also include deceptive information  122  for the attack  114  to obtain and provide to the adversary  116 . The attack  114  may provide the deceptive information  122  to one or both of a command-and-control (C2) server  124  of the adversary  116  or an exfiltration server  126  of the adversary  116 . In some embodiments, the security service  108  may also receive a redirection domain name resolution request made by the attack  114  and may respond to the request by identifying an monitored server  128  included in the client network  106  or an monitored server  130  included in the security service network  110 , the monitored server  128 / 130  posing as the C2 server  124  or exfiltration server  126  to the attack  114 . 
     In various embodiments, devices of the security service  108  may include modules and data  132 - 146  that enable the security service  108  to perform the operations described herein. These modules and data  132 - 146  include a monitoring module  132 , a deception module  134 , a beaconing module  136 , a domain name service (DNS) redirection module  138 , an dormant domain repository  140 , a response module  142 , an analysis module  144 , and a configuration module  146 . 
     In some embodiments, the network  102 , client network  106 , and security service network  110  may each include any one or more networks, such as wired networks, wireless networks, and combinations of wired and wireless networks. Further, the network  102 , client network  106 , and security service network  110  may include any one or combination of multiple different types of public or private networks (e.g., cable networks, the Internet, wireless networks, etc.). For example, the network  102  may be a public network and the client network  106  and security service network  110  may each be a private network. In some instances, computing devices communicate over the network  102 , client network  106 , and security service network  110  using a secure protocol (e.g., https) and/or any other protocol or set of protocols, such as the transmission control protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP). Further, each of the client network  106  and security service network  110  may be assigned a block of network addresses, such as IP addresses. 
     In various embodiments, the client devices  104 , the computing devices of the security service  108 , the monitored device  118 / 120 , and the monitored server  128 / 130  may each be or include a server or server farm, multiple, distributed server farms, a mainframe, a work station, a personal computer (PC), a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a cellular phone, a media center, an embedded system, or any other sort of device or devices. In one implementation, the computing devices of the security service  108  represent a plurality of computing devices working in communication, such as a cloud computing network of nodes. When implemented on multiple computing devices, the security service  108  may distribute the modules and data  132 - 146  of the security service  108  among the multiple computing devices. In some implementations, one or more of the client devices  104 , the computing devices of the security service  108 , the monitored device  118 / 120 , and the monitored server  128 / 130  represent one or more virtual machines implemented on one or more computing devices. An example computing device capable of serving as a client device  104 , a computing device of the security service  108 , the monitored device  118 / 120 , or the monitored server  128 / 130  is illustrated in  FIG. 6  and described below with reference to that figure. 
     In various embodiments, the client devices  104  and client network  106  may be associated with an entity, such as a business, government, or other organization, or may be associated with a single user or groups of users. That entity or those user(s) may subscribe for security services with the security service  108 , which may monitor activities on client devices  104  of the entity/user(s). In some embodiments, that monitoring may involve installing security agents  112  on the client devices  104  to monitor execution activities of the client devices  104  and to report on those activities to the security service  108 . In other embodiments, the security service  108  may instead rely on scanning the client devices  104  from a security service scanner or rely on a third party security product or service to detect attacks and communicate them to the security service  108 . 
     Each client device  104  may be any sort of computing device, as described above. Each client device  104  may be configured with an operating system, applications, folders, files, and desktop screens. Further, each client device  104  may be associated with a user name of a user of that client device  104 , a machine name of the client device  104 , an operating system version, desktop screens, folder names, preloaded files, and computer firmware versions. 
     In some embodiments, the security agent  112  may be a kernel-level security agent that observes and acts upon execution activities of its corresponding client device  104 . The security agent  112  may be configurable by the security service  108 , receiving, and applying while live, reconfigurations of filters, components, models, etc. of the security agent  112 . Based on the observed execution activities, the security agents  112  may generate security information which the security agent  112  may act upon and/or provide to the security service  108 . An example security agent  112  is described in greater detail in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/492,672, entitled “Kernel-Level Security Agent” and filed on Jun. 8, 2012. 
     As mentioned, attacks  114  may be directed at client devices  104 . Such attacks  114  comes in many forms, such as computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, keystroke loggers, adware, and rootkits. These attacks  114  are delivered in or through a number of mechanisms, such as spearfish emails, clickable links, websites, drive by exploits, QR codes, Near Field Communications (NFC) triggered links, documents, executables, removable drives, or archives. The attacks  114  may be detected by the security agents  112  or other security mechanism and may be blocked or stopped from further processing. As mentioned further herein, the attacks  114  may then be transitioned to a monitored device  118 / 120  by the security service  108 . 
     In various embodiments, the security service  108  may be a provider of information security services to client entities, such as maintenance and configuration of the kernel-level security agents  112 , threat modeling, and/or remediation. In some embodiments, the security service  108  may also provide social aspects to the security services, forming groups of those client entities and automatically sharing security information among the client entities  104  constituting a group. 
     In addition, as described above in some detail, the security service  108  implements any of a number of deception techniques to respond to attacks  114 . The modules and data  132 - 146 , monitored devices  118 / 120 , and monitored servers  128 / 130  may be operated and used by the security service  108  to carry out these techniques. 
     In various embodiments, the monitoring module  132  may be configured to perform monitoring operations associated with a number of the techniques. For example, in associated with the first set of deception techniques described above, the monitoring module  132  may be configured to detect the presence or operation of attacks  114  on client devices  104  or to receive automated or manual notifications from security agents  112  of the presence or operation of attacks  114 . In one embodiment, receiving the automated or manual notification may include retrieving the attack from an information sharing system or portal to which the attack has been submitted. The information sharing system or portal may have received the attack from another entity that is different from the entity associated with client devices  104 . In some embodiments, the attack  114  may be included in an email (e.g., as a link or attachment), and a user of the client device  104  may forward the email to the security service  108 . In response to detection or received notice, the monitoring module  132  may invoke the deception module  134 . 
     The deception module  134  may take a number of actions to counter the attack  114 . First, the deception module  134  may block processing (or halt further processing) of the attack  114  by the affected client device  104 . In some embodiments, however, such blocking or halting may be accomplished by the security agent  112  and need not involve the deception module  134 . 
     The deception module  134  may then configure a device on the client network  106  as a monitored device  118  or a device on the security service network  110  as a monitored device  120 . To configure the device, the security service  108  may capture and apply a virtual image of the client device  104 . In some embodiments, the monitored device  118  may be implemented in a virtual machine or partition of the client device  104  (e.g., as an isolated sandbox). Such a virtual image may include a number of attributes of the client device  104 , such as its user name, machine name, operating system version, desktop screens, folder names, preloaded files or computer firmware versions. In other embodiments, the security service  108  may receive this information from a user of the client device  104  rather than capturing the virtual image. If configuring a device on the security service network  110 , the deception module may utilize the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to have an IP address associated with the client network  106  assigned to the monitored device  120 , thereby enabling the monitored device  120  to convincingly pose as a device of the client network  106 . After configuring the device to create a monitored device  118 / 120 , the deception module  134  may transition the attack  114  from the client device  104  to the monitored device  118 / 120  and may process the attack  114  on the monitored device  118 / 120 . 
     By processing the attack  114  on the monitored device  118 / 120 , the deception module  134  enables monitoring of attack activities and deception of the adversary  116 . In some embodiments, the monitoring module  132  may monitor the activities of the attack  114  as it executes. For example, the monitoring module  132  may monitor commands and events issued by the adversary or monitor network activity, file activity, process activity, execution activity, registry activity, operating system activity, firmware updates, kernel extensions, or loaded drivers of the monitored device  118 / 120 . The commands and events issued may include keystrokes, mouse activity, or command line interface activity. Further, the monitoring module  132  may intercept and decode communications from the attack  114  to the adversary  116 . The monitoring module  132  may decode the communications by determining the protocol that the communications are using. If the protocol is not familiar, the monitoring module  132  may invoke the analysis module  144  to process the intercepted communications and determine the protocol used. 
     In some embodiment, the monitoring module  132  may further invoke the response module  142  to provide an alert to the security agents  112  or provide human-consumable intelligence to the client entity/user(s). Alternatively or additionally, the monitoring module  132  or response module  142  may invoke the configuration module  146  to reconfigure the security agents  112  to address the attack  114 . The reconfiguration may be based on the activity of the attack  114  captured by the monitoring module  132 . In some embodiments, the configuration module  146  may correlate attack activity information received from a number of monitored devices  118 / 120  and use these correlations in reconfiguring the security agents  112 . In some embodiments, the different monitored devices may be associated with different entities. 
     While the monitoring module  132  monitors activities of the attack  114 , the deception module  134  may take actions to deceive the adversary  116 . First, the deception module  134  may configure the monitored device  118 / 120  to mimic user activity by for example, opening a browser window, generating keystrokes, etc. By mimicking user activity, the monitored device  118 / 120  ensures that its pose will be convincing to an adversary  116 . 
     In addition to configuring the client device  104  to mimic user activity, the deception module  134  enables the client entity/user(s) to load deceptive information  122  onto the monitored device  118 / 120 . As mentioned above, the adversary  116  could be a competitor or enemy engaged in espionage, and the deceptive information  122  could pose as real information, causing the adversary  116  to waste time and effort analyzing the deceptive information  122 . The deception module  134  also enables the attack  114  to obtain the deceptive information  122  and to provide the deceptive information  122  to the adversary  116 . 
     In some embodiments, the deception module  134  may maintain the monitored device  118 / 120  and associated deception over an extended period of time (e.g., weeks, months, or years), feeding new deceptive information to the adversary  116  through its attack  114  throughout the extended period. 
     In various embodiments, the beaconing module  136  may operate independently of the monitoring module  132  and deception module  134 . When a document is created on a client device  104 , the beaconing module  136  may configure the document to report identifying information of the device opening the document. Such identifying information may include at least one of a network address, a geographic location, a universally unique identifier (UUID), domain information, or derived/upstream network data. Derived/upstream network data may include upstream router network addresses, network address translation (NAT) data, etc. The beaconing module  136  may achieve this configuration by embedding executable instructions in the document that open a connection to the security service  108  when the document is opened. Alternatively, the beaconing module  136  may achieve this configuration by embedding a link in the document that causes a request to be submitted to a monitored network address. In some embodiments, the executable instructions may specify expected identifying information, such as an expected network address or range or network addresses, and an expected geographic location or range of geographic locations. In such embodiments, the document may only establish a connection to the security service  108  or cause a request to be submitted to the monitored network address when the determined network address or geographic location of the document opener differs from the expected address/location. In other embodiments, rather than the beaconing module  136  configuring the documents of the client device  104 , the security agents  112  may perform the configuring. 
     In further embodiments, the beaconing module  136  may receive the reports or requests sent to the monitored network address from the documents and, in response, determine whether the adversary  116  or some other unauthorized entity/user is in possession of the documents. The beaconing module  136  may perform this determination based on expected identifying information such as an expected network address or expected range of network addresses, or based on expected geographic location(s). Such expected information may be received from the client entity/user(s) at the time of registration with the security service  108  or may be received from the security agents  112 . 
     In some embodiments, when the document is determined to be possessed by the adversary  116  or another unauthorized entity, the beaconing module  136  may invoke the response module  142  to provide an alert to the security agents  112  or provide human-consumable intelligence to the client entity/user(s). Alternatively or additionally, the beaconing module  136  or response module  142  may invoke the configuration module  146  to reconfigure the security agents  112  to address the exfiltration of the document. 
     In various embodiments, the DNS redirect module  138  may operate independently of the beaconing module  136 . The DNS redirect module  138  may configure a DNS server of the client network  106  to treat the DNS redirect module  138  as a higher-level DNS and to redirect domain name resolution requests to the DNS redirect module  138 . The DNS redirect module  138  may then receive domain name resolution requests and invoke the analysis module  144  to determine whether the domain names included in the domain name resolution requests are associated with malicious activity. In some embodiments, the analysis module  144  makes the determination by determining whether a domain name is included in a list of known malicious or suspicious domains. The analysis module  144  may also or instead determine that the domain name is unfamiliar or is associated with a specific geographic location (e.g., a known geographic location of a known adversary  116  or class or group of adversaries  116 ). 
     In some embodiments, when the analysis module  114  informs the DNS redirect module  138  that a domain name is associated with malicious activity, the DNS redirect module  138  invokes the deception module  134  to configure a device in the client network  106  as an monitored server  128  or a device in the security service network  110  as an monitored server  130 . The monitored server  128 / 130  may pose as a C2 server  124  or an exfiltration server  126  of an adversary  116 . To make the pose convincing, the deception module  134  may configure the monitored server  128 / 130  with a plurality of adversary protocols that may be used in decoding communications from a attack  114  that made the domain name resolution request. The DNS redirect module  138  may then respond to the domain name resolution request with a network address of the monitored server  128 / 130  to cause the attack  114  that made the domain name resolution request to communicate with the monitored server  128 / 130 . 
     In further embodiments, the DNS redirect module  138  may invoke the response module  142  to provide an alert to the security agents  112  or provide human-consumable intelligence to the client entity/user(s). Alternatively or additionally, the DNS redirect module  138  or response module  142  may invoke the configuration module  146  to reconfigure the security agents  112  to address the exfiltration of the document. 
     Additionally, in some embodiments, the DNS redirect module  138  may invoke the deception module to configure a monitored device  118 / 120  and to transition the attack  114  to the monitored device  118 / 120 . Such transitioning may take place after the attack  114  has communicated with the monitored server  128 / 130  for some time period. 
     In various embodiments, the dormant domain name repository  140  may be a repository of dormant domain names that were previously associated with malicious activity. The security service  108  may create the dormant domain name repository  140  from other available repositories of dormant domain names previously associated with malicious activity, by constructing the dormant domain name repository  140  as suspicious dormant domain names are detected, or some combination of both. The security agents  112  may be configured to identify as a suspicious, dormant domain name any locally-resolving domain name (e.g., resolves to network address 127.0.0.1) or any irresolvable domain name. The security agents  112  may inform the security service  108  of these, and the security service  108  may add them to the dormant domain name repository  140 . 
     In some embodiments, the monitoring module  132  may monitor for changes to name resolutions or registrations of the domain names included in the dormant domain name repository  140 . The monitoring module  132  may perform this monitoring for changes periodically or continuously. In response to detecting a change, the monitoring module  132  may further invoke the response module  142  to provide an alert to the security agents  112  or provide human-consumable intelligence to the client entity/user(s). Alternatively or additionally, the monitoring module  132  or response module  142  may invoke the configuration module  146  to reconfigure the security agents  112  to appropriately handle the now-active domain names. 
     In some embodiments, the deception module  134  may also prepare monitored devices  118 / 120  or monitored servers  128 / 130  for each dormant domain name in the dormant domain names repository  140 , in the manner described above. 
     In some instances, any or all of the client devices  104 , the security service  108 , the monitored device  118 / 120 , or the monitored server  128 / 130  may have features or functionality in addition to those that  FIG. 1  illustrates. For example, some or all of the functionality described as residing within any or all of the client devices  104 , the security service  108 , the monitored device  118 / 120 , or the monitored server  128 / 130  may reside remotely from that/those device(s). 
     Example Processes 
       FIGS. 2-5  illustrate example processes  200 ,  300 ,  400 , and  500 . These processes are illustrated as logical flow graphs, each operation of which represents a sequence of operations that can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination thereof. In the context of software, the operations represent computer-executable instructions stored on one or more computer-readable storage media that, when executed by one or more processors, perform the recited operations. Generally, computer-executable instructions include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, and the like that perform particular functions or implement particular abstract data types. The order in which the operations are described is not intended to be construed as a limitation, and any number of the described operations can be combined in any order and/or in parallel to implement the processes. 
       FIG. 2  illustrates an example process for transitioning an attack to an monitored device posing as the computing device impacted by the attack and enabling the adversary associated with the attack to obtain deceptive information from the monitored device. The process  200  includes, at  202 , receiving, by a security service, automated or manual notification of an attack directed at a computing device. In some embodiments, receiving the automated or manual notification may comprise retrieving the attack from an information sharing system or portal to which the attack has been submitted. The attack may be one of a spearfish email, a clickable link, a website, a drive by exploit, a QR code, a Near Field Communications (NFC) triggered link, a document, an executable, a removable drive, or an archive. Further, the notification may be received from a user forwarding the attack or from a security agent monitoring the computing device. 
     At  204 , the security service blocks processing of the attack by the computing device that the attack is targeted at. 
     At  206 , the security service transitions the attack to a monitored device, the monitored device configured to pose as the affected computing device to an adversary associated with the attack. The monitored device may be a physical machine or virtual machine configured with a virtual image of the computing device. The virtual image may include at least one or more of a user name, a machine name, an operating system version, desktop screens, folder names, preloaded files or computer firmware versions associated with the affected computing device. Also, monitored device may be located on a network of an entity associated with the impacted computing device or implemented remotely by the security service. If implemented remotely, the monitored device may be assigned a network address associated with the entity. Further, the monitored device may mimic user activity. 
     At  208 , the security service processes the attack on the monitored device. While processing the attack, the security service may, at  210 , monitor commands and events issued by the adversary or monitor network activity, file activity, process activity, execution activity, registry activity, operating system activity, firmware updates, kernel extensions, or loaded drivers of the monitored device. The commands and events issued may include keystrokes, mouse activity, or command line interface activity. At  212 , the security service correlates information obtained from monitoring attacks on multiple monitored devices. At  214 , while monitoring, the security service intercepts and decodes communications from the attack to the adversary system. At  216 , the security service updates configuration of security agent implemented on the affected device based at least in part on the monitoring or provides human-consumable intelligence. 
     At  218 , the security service enables an entity associated with the affected computing device to load deceptive information onto the monitored device posing as that impacted device. At  220 , the security service may then enable the adversary associated with the attack to obtain the deceptive information. In some embodiments, the monitoring of the attack and the enabling of it to provide deceptive information may occur over an extended period of time (e.g., weeks, months, or years). While performing the enabling at  220 , the security service may receive intelligence from the adversary about at least one of the adversary&#39;s tools, tactics, techniques, or procedures. 
       FIG. 3  illustrates an example process for configuring a document to report identifying information of an entity opening the document to enable determination of whether an unauthorized entity is in possession of the document. The process  300  includes, at  302 , configuring a document to report identifying information of a device opening the document to the security service. Such identifying information may include at least one of a network address, a geographic location, a universally unique identifier (UUID), domain information, or derived/upstream network data. In some embodiments, the configuring includes embedding executable instructions in the document. The executable instructions embedded in the document may be configured to open a connection to the security service and to perform the reporting based at least in part on whether the identifying information differs from identifying information embedded in the document. Alternatively, the configuring may include embedding a link in the document that causes a request to be submitted to a monitored network address. 
     At  304 , the security service may receive a report associated with the document, the report including the identifying information. 
     At  306 , the security service may determine, based on the at least one of the identifying information, that unauthorized entity is in possession of the document. 
     At  308 , the security service may alert an entity associated with the document of the possession by the unauthorized entity. 
       FIG. 4  illustrates an example process for determining that a domain specified in a domain name request is associated with malicious activity and responding to the request with a network address of an monitored server to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored server in place of an adversary server. The process  400  includes, at  402 , redirecting a domain name resolution request from a domain name server associated with a device or entity implementing a process that submitted the domain name resolution request. 
     At  404 , a security service receives the redirected domain name resolution request. 
     At  406 , the security service determines that a domain name included in the domain name resolution request is indicative of malicious activity. In some embodiments, the determining comprises determining whether the domain name is included in a list of known malicious or suspicious domains. The determining may also or instead comprise determining that the domain name is unfamiliar, is associated with a specific geographic location, or is associated with a specific entity. 
     At  408 , the security service responds to the domain name resolution request with a network address of a monitored server to cause the requesting process to communicate with the monitored server in place of an adversary server. In some embodiments, the monitored server poses as an adversary command-and-control system or an adversary exfiltration system to the requesting process, the requesting process being a attack. Also, the monitored server may decode the communications from the requesting process. Further, the monitored server may determine that the requesting process is utilizing a new protocol to encode the communications and analyze the communications to learn the new protocol. 
     At  410 , the security service alerts at least one of a security agent or users of an entity affected by an attack associated with the requesting process. 
     At  412 , the security service transitions an attack associated with the requesting process to an monitored device, the monitored device posing as the computing device impacted by the attack. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates an example process for monitoring dormant domains names associated with malicious activity and, in response to a change, responding with an alert or a configuration update. The process  500  includes, at  502 , detecting suspicious domain names to add to a repository of dormant domain names by identifying whether the domain name resolves to local network address, whether the domain name resolves to non-routable network address, or whether the domain name fails to resolve and then ascertaining whether the domain name is associated with malicious activity. Dormant domain names associated with malicious activity are then added to the repository. 
     At  504 , a security service associated with the repository monitors for changes to name resolutions or registrations of domain names included in the repository. The monitoring may include continuously or periodically resolving the dormant domain names to determine if their name resolutions have changed. 
     At  506 , the security service associates a monitored server with one of the dormant domain names and, in response to the dormant domain name becoming active, responds to domain name resolution requests specifying the now-active domain name with a network address of the monitored server. 
     At  508 , the security service may perform at least one of updating a security agent configuration or alerting a security service user based on the detected changes. 
     Example System 
       FIG. 6  illustrates a component level view of a computing device capable of acting as a security service device, a client device, an monitored device, or an monitored server. As illustrated, computing device  600  comprises a system memory  602  storing modules and data  604 . Also, computing device  600  includes processor(s)  606 , a removable storage  608  and non-removable storage  610 , input device(s)  612 , output device(s)  614  and communication connections  616  for communicating with other computing devices  618 . 
     In various embodiments, system memory  602  is volatile (such as RAM), non-volatile (such as ROM, flash memory, etc.) or some combination of the two. The modules or data  604  stored in the system memory  602  may comprise methods, threads, processes, applications or any other sort of executable instructions, such as the instructions utilized to perform the operations of the client devices  104 , security service  108 , monitored devices  118 / 120 , or monitored servers  128 / 130 . The modules and data  604  may also include files and databases. 
     In some embodiments, the processor(s)  606  is a central processing unit (CPU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), or both CPU and GPU, or other processing unit or component known in the art. 
     Computing device  600  also includes additional data storage devices (removable and/or non-removable) such as, for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or tape. Such additional storage is illustrated in  FIG. 6  by removable storage  608  and non-removable storage  610 . Tangible computer-readable media may include volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. System memory  602 , removable storage  608  and non-removable storage  610  are all examples of computer-readable storage media. Computer-readable storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can be accessed by the computing device  600 . Any such tangible computer-readable media may be part of the computing device  600 . 
     Computing device  600  also has input device(s)  612 , such as a keyboard, a mouse, a touch-sensitive display, voice input device, etc., and output device(s)  614  such as a display, speakers, a printer, etc. These devices are well known in the art and need not be discussed at length here. 
     Computing device  600  also contains communication connections  616  that allow the computing device  600  to communicate with other computing devices  618 , such as others of the security service devices, the client devices, monitored devices, monitored servers, or adversary systems. 
     CONCLUSION 
     Although the subject matter has been described in language specific to structural features and/or methodological acts, it is to be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or acts described. Rather, the specific features and acts are disclosed as exemplary forms of implementing the claims.